



ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
STUDIES CENTRE FOR FEDERAL STUDIES

PRACTICE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTHERN NATIONS
NATIONALITIES AND PEOPLES' REGIONAL STATE: THE CASE OF
SEGEN AREA PEOPLES' ZONE

BY
MISGANAW ADDIS MOGES

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and all the sources of material used for the thesis have been dully acknowledged.

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June 2014

This thesis was submitted for examination with my approval as advisor of the candidate

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Approval

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Acronyms

ANDM	Amhara National Democratic Movement
CoR	Council of Representatives
BoFED	Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
EPLF	Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
HoF	House of Federation
HoPR	House of Peoples' Representatives
ICCPR	International Conventions on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Conventions on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
NNPs	Nations, Nationalities and Peoples
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPDO	Oromo People's Democratic Organization
SNNPRS	South Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State
SEPDF	South Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Front
SEPDM	South Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Movement
SLM	Sidama Liberation Movement
SPDC	South Peoples' Democratic Congress
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

Glossary

Derg---A Provisional Military Administrative Council, which seized power following social revolution against the reactionary imperial monarchy (1974-1991).

Kebele---The lowest administrative unit in Ethiopian local government structure since 1974

Segen---a river name that intersects the territories of the concomitants of the *Segen Zone*

Special Woreda---Equivalent to Zonal administration in status in Ethiopian local government structure but territorially smaller in size as compared to Zonal Administration, and constitutes a sizable number of *Kebeles*.

Wogagoda ---failed integration project in the hitherto *Semen Omo Zone*, which was intended to put together and name the *Wolayita, Gamo, Goffa, Dawro* in one ethno-linguistic identity.

Woreda---Equivalent to district level of Government in the context of Ethiopian Local Government Structure, which constitutes a number of *Kebeles* within it.

Zone---The highest level of local government in the context of the Ethiopian local government structure, and which has basically two features. In some states such as the SNNPRS, Gambela, and Benshangul-Gumuz it is autonomous local self-ruling entity devised for distinct ethnic group's (NNPs) self-rule. Whereas, in relatively homogeneous states such as Oromia, Somali, and Tigray, Zonal Administration remains a *delegated organ* of the respective States, and has no constitutional autonomy.

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NB: The author is exclusively responsible for all faults that reader may find out in this piece of work.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this piece of work is examining practice of self-government in the SNNPRS with particular reference to the Segen Area peoples' Zone. Given that the federal project in Ethiopia is a new model (synthesis) that has replaced the failed 'nation-state' building project since 1991, self-government to the NNPs has become the ideological core of the incumbent party and pillar of the constitution. As per the gist of the FDRE Constitution, the NNPs are the actual constituent units and composers of the federation, and hence they are entitled to unconditional self-determination right (Art 39 (1)). The SNNPRS, which is one of the 9 sub-national units of the FDRE, is known for extraordinary diversity constituting some 75% of the total NNPs of the federation. The NNPs of this Regional State practice self-rule at the local level with territorial autonomy. The Regional State Constitution permits the indigenous NNPs of the Region to establish local self-government by adopting Zone/Special Woredas (Art 45(2)). The previously self-governing NNPs in the region namely: Konso, Dirashe, Burji and Amaro, had been exercising such right for not less than fifteen years. However, currently they have been merged and established shared Zonal Administration known as Segen Area Peoples' Zone incorporating newly emerged Woreda called Alle. The merger has changed the Special Woredas to Ordinary Woredas, at the same time shifted the nationality self-rule to multi-ethnic self-rule, which is a paradigm shift from favorable to unfavorable scenario in view of practice for self-rule. For examination of this study the method and procedure employed was qualitative in design with multiple data collection tools namely: document analysis, field observation, FGD, and interview. Triangulation and ethical consideration was made to come up with reliable and valid findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The sample technique utilized was purposive sampling- a non-probabilistic method. To this effect, convenience and judgmental sampling was administered. The data gathered with this method was systematically organized followed by analysis and interpretation. As per the findings, the merger has caused negative outcome on the practice of self-rule to the NNPs. The conclusion drawn is that the merger has negated the constitutional promise and ideological commitment of the ruling party besides the pragmatic negative outcome. Finally, the study suggested possible mechanisms to address the challenges of self-rule practice followed by the merger.

Key terms: federalism, self-determination, self-government, ethnicity, and local government

CHAPTER ONE

1. Introduction

1.1. General Background

Ethiopia, one of the polities located in the horn of Africa, mainly houses agrarian society with remarkable ethnic, linguistic, religious, and ecological diversity. Italian Anthropologist, Conti Rossini, expressed as ‘a museum of peoples’ in his description to the mosaic nature of the polity.¹ There are more than 80 ethnic groups with distinct languages and more than two fold dialects.²

In terms of ethnic composition, the country remains a land of ethnic minorities in that none of the ethnic groups happen to be majority at national level. Nonetheless, two ethnic groups: the Oromo and the Amhara take considerable numeric share 34.4% (25.4 million) and 27% (19.9 million) respectively. Other ethnic groups with relative share: Somali 6.22% (4.59 million), Tigrayan 6.08% (4.49 million), Sidama 4% (2.95 million), Wolayta 2.52% (1.86 million), and Gurage 2.27% (1.68 million).³ Diversity in terms of religion is evident, too. Christianity, Islam, Judaism along with traditional belief has been practiced.⁴ Christianity and Islam in particular, have had the role of social cohesion by cross-cutting the boundary of the ethnic groups.⁵

Although Ethiopia is believed to be historic, its territorial boundary was not constant throughout its history. Swelling and shrinking based on the relative power of the successive Kings was the inherent feature of the polity. It was in the turn of 20th century that the

¹ Donald Levine (1974) *Greater Ethiopia: the Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, p. 19-20

² Ayele Sime (2013) *party structure and ethnic self-determination right in Ethiopia: a study in southern regional state*, LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, deutschland/Germany, p.1

³ Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing census results, issued by the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) (accessed on 25 December, 2013)

⁴ Central Statistical Agency, *supra note 5*

⁵ Hashim Tewfik. (2010). *Transition to Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience*: Forum of Federations ISSN: 1922-558X (online ISSN 1922-5598)

present political map of Ethiopia has been demarcated by the conquest and expansion of the *Shewan* King Menelik.⁶

The pre-1889 Ethiopia was chiefly characterized by *de facto* ‘federalism’ because the provincial lords could practice actual jurisdictional power notwithstanding the will of the centre, and the polity had remained ostensibly unitary (Clapham 2013:16). On the other hand, the post-1889 political order of Ethiopia has witnessed two unparallel political cycles.

From 1889-1991, with the consolidation of imperial power, the political paradigm shifted from *de facto* decentralization to *de jure* centralization and assimilation undermining and concealing the existing diversity for realization of ‘nation-state’ building with a slogan of ‘one nation, one language, one religion.’ Eventually, however, this project notwithstanding the huge investment made by the successive imperial regimes mercilessly failed. And in the post-1991, the model of ‘nation-building’ project has been replaced by the ‘multi-nation’ building project (multinational federal political project) federalizing the unitary political order with a radical shift in ideological commitment and institutional and constitutional models as a reversal of the state policy from centralization and assimilation towards power devolution and accommodation of diversity for multinational state making.⁷

The transition from one political *status quo* to the other was substantively dialectical in its character with a manifestation of thesis-antithesis-contradiction and eventual synthesis.⁸ The

⁶The historic Ethiopia as per the centrist writers such as Fattovich, 2000; Bahru, 1991; Tewelde, 1990, dates back to the Axumite civilization which emerged around one millennium BC at the present State of Tigray. Since then, various dynasties most notably the *Axumite*, the *Zagwe*, and the *Solomonid* dynasties ruled and expanded the Empire southward. As the Empire expanded, more and more diverse ethnic groups have been incorporated into it.

⁷Article 39 (1) of the FDRE Constitution, Proc. No.1/1995

⁸ Building a ‘nation-state’ project (**thesis**) was pursued by the successive imperial regimes, including the military dictatorship (the *Dergue* regime). This project is about mainstreaming or building ‘nation-state’, which is centrist thesis. ‘Nation-building’ thesis is centrist thesis in its mindset because it advances mono-cultural, linguistic, religious values to become standard nation-wide concealing the actual ethno-linguistic and religious diversity that inherently characterizes the polity. It promotes *Amharanization* as ideal/ mainstream/core culture of pan-Ethiopia, and which aimed to integrate others into this domain. The negation of this thesis has produced **antithesis** with a secessionist drive which is the left extreme thesis-colonial thesis. The antithesis/ the colonial thesis/ argues that the historic Ethiopia was nothing more than the Abyssinian warlords’ empire built through the conquest of the varied ethno-national kingdoms and principalities. The colonial thesis proponents interpret Menelik’s military campaign as a project of ‘colonial aggression’ which is tantamount to ‘internal

nature of the contradiction was not unidirectional that limited to a particular concern as well. Although concern for the ethno-national emancipation from national oppression was at the top of priorities, *inter alia*, class struggle and religious struggle were also extended concerns. Since the inception of the modern state of Ethiopia at the dawn of 20th century, the ruling class, which was partly characterized by feudal-theocracy, and later on, military dictatorship with garrison socialism, advanced centralization and assimilation state policies and strategies invariably (1889-1991).

Discontented with such ethno-national oppressive regimes, in the mid of the 1970s, the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and other ethno-national liberation insurgencies such as the Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF) waged guerrilla warfare against the regime in power. Quest for actualizing autonomy for the ethno-nationals' self-determination, or otherwise, secession were the agenda entertained and pursued by insurgencies for the liberation of the ethno-nationals from the oppressive regime. Particularly, the ethno-nationalist insurgencies such as the Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) have been pursuing secession/independence.⁹ After the doom of the military dictatorship by the allied forces of the TPLF and the EPLF in 1991, the TPLF the later on EPRDF has assumed

colonialism' against the autonomous kingdoms of ethnic groups in pursuit of their resource (Getahun, 1974; Guluma, 2002:51; Asafa, 1993:52-53; Asafa, 2010; Mohammod, 1996). 'Decolonization' of the 'conquered' ethno-nationals by the 'Abyssinian warlords' is the only way out accordingly. Notably, the OLF and the ONLF subscribe to this thesis.

The federal political project, as **synthesis is a 'multi-national state' building project**, which has developed out of thesis (**nation-building**) and **antithesis (secession drive) contradiction**. The national oppression discourse is the heart of the synthesis advocated; *inter alia*, by the TPLF/EPRDF. According to the national oppression discourse, Ethiopia despite its long and independent history had remained '**a prison-house of nationalities**' for years because of national oppression by the successive authoritarian regimes. Ultimately, national oppression has caused 'nationality **question**' with a subsequent armed struggle/guerrilla fighting/ against the regime. The national oppression thesis has ultimately brought a synthesis political order, which is the federal political project that substituted the failed nation-building project reconciling with the antithesis project (secession quest).

⁹"Tigray more than any other regions of [Ethiopia], embodied very strong sense of regional identity and at the same time co-existed with equally strong commitment [determination] to the Ethiopian statehood (italics mine)." (Christopher Clapham, (2013:28), supra note 8. From this remark it can be apparently deduced that the TPLF had **priority** for securing regional autonomy, and not secession and/or hegemony. See also Aaron Tesfaye, 'The Genesis of Ethiopian Federalism', *EJFS, Centre for Federal Studies, Addis Ababa University*, Vol. 1(1), 2013, p. 34-45.

power. As an alternative to the failed ‘nation-state’ building project, the EPRDF has adopted the multiethnic federal project, and ventured peculiar (revolutionary) democratic model, which negotiates between group and individual rights, and again, between free market (liberal) and developmental state economic model.¹⁰

On the other hand, the EPLF has achieved its dream of (*de jure*) independence in 1993. In summary, the competing ethno-national liberation force has triggered the multi-ethnic¹¹ federal project as an alternative to substitute the failed ‘nation-building’ project. So it is evident that the contradictory forces of ‘nation-building’ thesis and the ethno-nationals secessionist drive, anti-thesis, have necessitated the synthesis of a legitimate and inclusive polity that accommodates diversity and in the meantime upholds unity.

Out of 9 Constituent Units of the federation, the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (hereinafter the SNNPRS) is one, and which is a ‘federation’ within federation. It constitutes more than 56 ethnic groups. In analogous to Ethiopian federation, the SNNPRS is devoid of a *staasvolk* (*a majority with demo constraint role*). At the local level, however, it is possible to obtain minority of minorities. Obviously, the Ethiopian federation has created two types of minorities: territorial and non-territorial minorities, of

¹⁰The hegemonic/dominant/vanguard/ political party, the EPRDF, is a coalition of four regionally (if not completely ethnic based because in effect, non-Tigrayan can join the TPLF or Non-Amhara to the ANDM) based political parties making a front since 1989 with a Marxist-Leninist discipline of “democratic-centralism” in passing decisions. These member parties include: the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in Tigray, the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) in Oromia, the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) in Amhara, and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SPDM) in the SNNPRS. In the remaining five regional states the EPRDF affiliating political parties (but non-members to the front) represent to their respective regional states. (Assefa Fiseha, 2013: 120-121 & 137-144).

¹¹Although gravities of provincialism was higher than ethnic forces in the past, and yet ethnicity was not absent. The ‘Solomonid’ dynasty led by Yikono Amlak claimed power from the *Zagwean* dynasty in the late 13th (1270) century. The ‘argument’ was that Zagwean were illegitimate power holder, and the ‘rationale’ was ethnic/linguistic factor--Cushitic (*Zagwean*) vs. Semitic (*Amhara*)—groups for the myth that Semites are descendent of the Tribe of Judah that ordained to rule with divine legitimacy. Interestingly, power was shifted from *Lasta* to *Tegulet* (*Shewa*) in 1270 which is a period regarded as the *restoration* of ‘Solomonid’ dynasty. (See *Kibre Negest*, [Glory of Kings] (2000) translated by Miguel F. Brooks, the Red Sea Press, INC. Asmara, Eritrea, p. 23-33). The Era of Prince [*Zemene-Mesafint*] was characterized by not only *provincialism* but also ethnic identity. *Semitic groups* (*Tigrayean and Amhara*) vs. *Cushitic* group, *Yeju* dynasty (the Oromo ethnic group descendent).

which the second type is totally alienated and disenfranchised by the orchestration of such an ethno-territorial federal project.

In the SNNPRS, so far, 55 ethnic groups have seats in the Council of Nationality (CoN) at State level, and in the upper chamber (House of Federation (HoF)) in the Federal Parliament. Diversity is extraordinary in this constituent unit as opposed to its counterparts as it constitutes some 75% of the total ethnic groups of the federation of Ethiopia. The SNNPRS takes the lead by housing some about 75% (55 out of 75 currently nationwide recognized) of the total ethnic groups in the country. As a result, some 45.5% of the HoF seat (61 out of 134) is occupied by the SNNPRS.¹²

The SNNPRS has established three hierarchical tiers of local governments within the State: *Zonal/Special Woreda*, *Woreda*, and *Kebele* level Administrations.¹³ Zones and Special *Woredas* possess similar position/status with slight difference. While Zonal Administration constitutes a *Woredas*, *Special Woreda* constitutes *Kebeles*. Currently, altogether there are 14 Zones and 4 special *Woredas* which constitute the SNNPRS since 2011.¹⁴

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Segen Area Peoples' Zone (hereafter, *Segen Zone*) has been established in 2011 by blending four Special *Woredas* (Konso, Dirashe Burji, and Amaro). The merger relegates the Special *Woredas* to Ordinary *Woredas*, which is a shift from favorable scenario to unfavorable administrative order in light of practice for self-government because there is cardinal difference between Special *Woreda* and Ordinary *Woreda* according to the SNNPRS constitution. For instance, as per the regional state constitution of Art 81 (3), Special *Woredas* are local self-administrative entities with self-rule autonomy. However, Ordinary *Woredas* are subordinate units to Zonal Administration, and have no autonomy for self-rule.

¹² HoF documents, 2010, Shares of the House manually computed.

¹³ Article 45 (1) of the Revised Constitution of the SNNPRS (2001)

¹⁴ Out of 18 local self-rule divisions (14 Zones and 4 Special *Woredas*), Sidama, Shaka, Wolayta, Hadiya, Gedeo, Silte, Dawro, Basketo, Halaba, Yem, Konta constitute Nationality self-rule/administration, whereas, Gurage, Kembata-Tembaro, *Debub* Omo, Keffa, Bench Majji, Gamo-Gofa, and recently Segen Area Peoples Zone, constitute composite multiethnic local self-rule/administration.

Those ethnic groups, which previously secured separate self-rule at the highest local unit level (special *Woreda* level), thus have recently experienced downgrading because of the merger act. The fused ethnic groups can no longer become autonomous as previous were, and experience the same degree of self-rule. In short, *Zones/Special Woredas* are the minimum self-administrative local arrangements according to the SNNPRS Constitution (Art 45 (2)). Again the merger shifted the mono-ethnic (nationality) local self-rule towards multi-ethnic local self-rule. Obviously, nationality self-rule is much more advantageous than multinational (composite) self-rule because there is no favorable room (mechanism) for accommodation at this level because local self-rule is meant for entitlement of each NNP and the regional constitution doesn't devise accommodative tools.

The SNNPRS constitution says nothing for the local administration below *Zone/Special Woreda* instead it asserts that *Woredas* and *Kebeles* are subordinate units. This means that ethnic groups, which lost their own special *Woreda* administration, are bound to be repressed to freely practice self-rule right as they are reduced to Ordinary *Woreda* status and subsequently they form multiethnic *Zone*. Local governments at the Ordinary *Woreda* level cannot exercise self-rule because they are subordinate, and not enjoy self-rule autonomy.

1.3. Objective of the Study

1.3.1. Main Objective

The main purpose of the thesis is to explore the process and outcome of the merger. It is the belief of the author that the administrative merger has to be judged in its process (whether it was the consent of the NNPs concerned) and in its outcome (effects of the merger).

1.3.2. Specific Objective

- ❖ Explored the pros and cons of the SNNPRS setup as Constituent unit for self-rule.
- ❖ Evaluated parallel between the promise-practice of the FDRE Constitution in connection to the NNPs right to self-determination in general.
- ❖ Examined challenges of the Segen Zone NNPs in practicing self-government.

1.4. Research Questions

- ❖ What triggered for the merger and how consulted was the act?
- ❖ What institutional and normative implication does the new zone bring on self-rule?
- ❖ What are the pros and cons of the merger?
- ❖ How capacitated is the newly set Zone to shoulder the political dynamics taking place?

1.5. Significance of the Study

The research findings would make useful contribution in the following respect:

- It produces knowledge and offers useful information for the Government and other stake holders engaged in protection and enforcement of the NNPs right to self-determination.
- It offers insight for the revisit and fixation of the practice of self-determination rights in line with the rhetoric affirmed under the FDRE and the Regional State Constitutions.
- It benefits both Federal and State Governments to realize and ensure sustainable peace and development via optimal policy recommendation in areas of self-determination right.
- Last but not least it alleviates gaps of literature sources seen in the study area, besides it motivates individuals for conducting further studies in the related topics.

1.6. Delimitation/Scope of the Study

Engagement in this study explored the practice of self-government in the SNNPRS with more emphasis to the Segen Zone. Exploring the promise and practice of self-rule particularly for ethnic groups inhabited in the SNNPRS is the scope of the study.

1.7. Limitation/Challenges of the Study

It was not easy for the author to obtain accurate data from participants. The accuracy of the data rendered was challenged by the anticipated fear and suspicion of the dealing on the ground. Affiliation and opposition to the ruling party had also its own impact in generating some sort of bias. In order to maintain the balance, filtering the data was compulsory step, and some amount of data collected by interview was discarded.

1.8. Research Methods and Procedures

1.8.1. Research Design

Qualitative research method was employed for this particular study, which is not because of arbitrary choice against quantitative method, but because of its inherent suitability. Since the study attempts to analyze and interpret than explain the perspectives of participants being as insider, it becomes hardly appropriate method to pursue quantitative design that quantifies and explains the data obtained based up on the data collected. Quantitative design is based on the positivist conception of reality as objective, direct, simple and fixed, which doesn't, however, help to interpret the informants' perspective in holistic manner. Social world cannot be explained in the same light to the natural world because of marked variable gap in between. Qualitative design offers the researcher to differentiate appearance from reality employing common sense.¹⁵

1.8.2. Instruments of Data Collection

In order to maintain validity and reliability, multiple instruments of data collection were utilized. The method used for the empirical data and information collection in connection to the actual operation of self-government in the study area falls into three categories:

A. Document analysis: various categories of documents were explored, which include: Federal and Regional State Constitutions, policy documents, legislations, minutes, party programs, and other various sources of governmental statistics, figures and maps.

¹⁵ Holliday, A. (2002:37) Doing and Writing Qualitative Research, London: SAGE Publisher Ltd.

B. Interview: A total of 26 interviewees were personally conducted. Out of which, 10 interviewees were recruited from among government officials at the local (Zonal and *Woreda*), state, and federal levels. On the other hand, 11 interviewees were selected from civil servants who are closer to the views of the ordinary people with better information. And 5 interviews made with opposition party.

C. Participant Focus Group Discussions (FGD): a total of 12 participants purposely selected in consideration of their willingness, ethnic background, education level, and political affiliation, and which was administered in *Segen*, the administrative city of *Segen* Zone, 22-25 February 2014. The discussion was arranged in two sessions based on the participants' convenience. Each session involved 6 different participants. Utilization of the FGD has quite benefited the researcher to witness divergent views and in the meantime capture condensed and sizable amount of data. The whole primary data was personally collected by the researcher aided by (to some extent) field assistant with a very well preparation of checklist guidelines and field note.

D. Field Observation: in the course of data gathering the researcher has personally explored the location of newly established Zonal Centre in relation to infrastructural, institutional, and topographic setup. As a result, the author has much benefited in objectively assessing the data and value judgment.

This research has also much benefited from secondary sources. In pursuit of entertaining the various conceptual and theoretical variables, which are essential for the study, explorations of various academic literatures were compulsory. The author attempted to elucidate key concepts and theories such as federalism, self-determination, ethnicity, local government, and so on, has reviewed several literature sources. Moreover, similar sources were maintained in the endeavor to explore the past experiences and the present turmoil in relation to demand for self-rule autonomy and self-determination right at large, in a condensed approach. Secondary sources benefited from reviewing books, journal articles, Dissertations, MA theses, and internet websites.

1.8.3. Sampling Technique and Sample Size

The selection of key informants was based on purposive sampling, a non-probabilistic method. To qualify the purpose for this study, purposive sampling became optimal to the researcher, and hence, convenience and judgmental sampling was administered. Whilst convenience sampling uses instant and accessible participants, the judgmental sampling helps recruit participants on the basis of their competence to offer as much required data and information as possible.¹⁶ As far as sample size is concerned, as discussed above, a total of 38 individuals were participant. For the sake of triangulation and compensation for the limit of the sizable amount of data, the researcher employed two sessions of FGD which involved 6 different participants in each session.

1.8.4. Method of Data Analysis

So as to attain the set of research objectives and answers to the research questions, the gathered data was systematically analyzed and interpreted by following the necessary steps of data screening and organization in argumentative, descriptive, and inferential fashion. The conceptual and theoretical foundations discussed in the consecutive chapters had critical role to play in the course of data analysis, conclusion and recommendation. The linkage across the subsequent chapters necessitated going back and fro across chapters in dealing with the subject under study.

1.8.5. Reliability and Validity

To maintain the reliability and validity of this research triangulation on the collected data was administered as promised earlier -the researcher has cross-checked all the data accessed via one tool against other tools using multiple sources of data collection. All things remaining constant if this study is re-tested, the same result will be obtained. Submission of the draft of the interpreted data for *peer review* is another scheme maintained by the researcher to this end.

¹⁶ Cohen, et al, (2000) *Research Method in Education*: London Routledge Falmer. Dartmouth.

1.8.7. Ethical Consideration

As far as ethics in the course of data collection goes, the researcher had to insist on persuading the informants in the endeavor to convince and win their confidence. The researcher promised that the dealing had no any negative consequence on their life by telling that all their data and information remains confidential besides informing the sole objective of the data required and its concern, and pledged not to disclose their identity by listing out their name in the course of reference citation. The researcher duly considered and respected the privacy of participants. The researcher never involved participants without winning their prior consent. The researcher made aware of the participants about the prime concern of the study.

As informants were pledged to keep their privacy, several officials and members of the ruling party held contrary views to the position of their party and state policies in several issues on the course of the dealing. As the researcher pledged to keep their privacy and security, the names of the interviewees are not revealed in this thesis as they are. And yet, to satisfy the requirement of citation and documentation of the research source, the researcher devised alternative mechanism of citation and documentation. The interviewees and informants are identified by their roles and status in a way that better keep their safety, and common names and numbers are maintained. For instance, the citation sample as it appears in the text citation: *[A member of Woreda Administrative Council, Karat, Interviewee 5, 24 March 2014]* in the method of this citation it refers to the role/status of the interviewee, where he/she is, the interviewee number coded by the researcher, the date, the month, and the year of the interview conducted.

1.9. Organization of the Thesis

This particular study consists of five chapters. Chapter one deals with the introductory part of the study. It provides brief information about the general blue prints of this particular research and the structural organization of the whole content. Accordingly, it includes general introduction, which lays foundation for the study, statement of the problem, research inquires, objectives, significance, and method and procedure of study.

The second chapter covers conceptual and theoretical approaches on federalism, self-determination, and ethnicity. It offers insight whether Ethiopian multi-ethnic federative trajectory, which has assumed the venue of the failed 'nation-building' project as viable option, satisfies ethno-nationals demands and in the meantime maintains the state integrity. Conceptual, theoretical, legal, and empirical experiences on the topics at global and local contexts were explored to this end.

The third chapter assesses the status of local government in federations at large and in Ethiopia in particular, and its role to the efficacy of self-determination with a particular reference to the SNNPRS.

The fourth chapter constitutes the locus of the study. This chapter covers the details with the basic research inquiries posed by the author. In the effort to address the research inquiries, the unit maintains the ethnic groups under study including their shared values, language, settlement pattern, economic engagement, demography, and societal interaction. Looking much deeper into the administrative merger of the hitherto autonomous local units along with its pros and cons, the data obtained was interpreted and analyzed accordingly.

Finally, chapter five concluded the main themes of the thesis development suggesting optimal policy interventions based on the theoretical exploration and empirical research findings.

Chapter Two

2. Related Literature Review

2.1. Introduction

This unit is meant for the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study. It discusses key ingredients for this thematic study namely: federalism and federation, self-determination, and ethnicity. A thorough elaboration of these variables helps understand the Ethiopian federal political order and practice of self-government which is the focus of this thesis.

2.2. Conceptualizing Federalism and Federation

Federalism is a normative political philosophy, which is best distinguished by attainment of more than one legitimate source of authority. Elazar (1987) defines federalism as a political order, which constitutes self-rule and shared rule. In federal political order, sovereignty is constitutionally divided at least between two sets of political units so that the units can have final authority to decide in matters of their own jurisdiction (Fasil 1997). King (1982) defines federalism as a political principle that combines self-government and joint action. In a nutshell, the definition of federalism by all scholars attests the demand of autonomy and union at a time. Basically, the essence of federalism is to attain and perpetuate autonomy and union at a time. While autonomy is for self-rule, accommodation, preservation, and promotion of distinct identities within the larger political union, the latter (union) is for shared interest (Assefa 2006b; Elazar 1987). Federalism is a dynamic working balance that perpetuates autonomy and union in a proper order through a political bargain among the federative political entities. Preserving autonomy for self-rule and union on the ground of shared-rule is the major tenet of federalism. Ronald Watts notes that federalism is negotiated, pragmatic, prudent, and dynamic political technique.¹⁷

Federations are reflections of the normative concepts of federalism, and which represent polities constituting the normative federal political philosophy. Federations markedly vary nonetheless, because problems which instigate federal political order as a way out vary

¹⁷ Ronald L. Watts, (2013), "The Contemporary Relevance of Federalism", *EJFS*, *Centre for Federal Studies*, *Addis Ababa University*, Vol.1(1), p. 2.

across polities.¹⁸ For federations are the products of their own peculiar challenges, it is tedious task to attempt the theory of federalism to fit with the practice. The federative model of a given polity is mainly depends on factors which induce it. Consequently, it is unattainable to keep the parallel between federal theory and the practice. Daniel Elazar reinforces the case at point as follows:

The great strength of federalism lies in its elasticity [effort to be all-catching], but that very strength makes federalism quite difficult to discuss adequately on a theoretical level (...). Flexibility [irregularity in its principles] causes ambiguity though it has great operational [a federal system tailored to specific needs and preferences] advantage.¹⁹

2.2.1. Federalism on the Rise

Federalism is gaining impetus across polities of the world for its merit to ensure autonomy for groups of people who want to assert their distinct identity and at the same time forge integrity. Yash Ghai, eminent Kenyan Constitutional Lawyer, made the following remark:

Post-modernist thinking challenged the liberal state, glorifying difference and particularistic identity, fragmenting the political community into self-sufficient groups. The struggle [is] no longer over new territory, but over the internal division of state territory, and with it the diffusion and fudging of sovereignty. The principle of self-determination was turned from secession to autonomy. Hence, Constitutional innovations of our times derive from the imperative to accommodate diversities and plurality of identities, captured in the cliché of 'unity in diversity.'²⁰

Firstly, as the remark above reveals quest for autonomy is on the rise. The liberal nation-states, which are centrist notwithstanding diversity within, are in contrary to the need of contemporary era, which in practice, is characterized by *glocalization* and *globalization*.²¹ Those states, which were ardently unitary, are on the move to negotiate with the federal-like

¹⁸ Michael Burgess (2006:2) *Comparative Federalism Theory and Practice*: Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN, Routledge.

¹⁹ Daniel J. Elazar (1979:16) "The Role of Federalism in Political Integration," in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., *Federalism and Political Integration* (Ramat Gan: Turtledove Publishing).

²⁰ Yash, Ghai, (2002), *A Journey around Constitutions Reflecting on Contemporary Constitutions*, Article written based on Beinart Lecture at the University of Cape Town. p.3

²¹ Regionalism and/or post-modernism antithesis of modernism/*Westernism*/globalism is on the blow.

rule.²² The demand for autonomy to maintain diversity offers a special appeal for the federal political order than its counterpart.²³ Secondly, globalization *per se* makes federalism to gain momentum, in the sense that globalization urges states to become so invincible powers so as to maintain the global power balance, and thereby to counterbalance the impact of globalization.²⁴ Attainment of a giant and a super power is possible through federal scheme. For instance, continental scale unification as in the case of the European Union (EU) is becoming true with a federal institutional mechanism, which desires to become a single political unit- the United States of Europe. The African Union (AU) has also devised federal-like apparatus to realize the dream of the United States of Africa. Thirdly, federalism has the merit for local experimentation, efficiency, co-ordination, residential self-selection, and so on. Fourthly, federalism has the merit of shielding abusive government. Just as competitive market protects consumers against monopolistic exploitation, and again just as competitions among political parties protects voters from the oppressive one-party regimes so does competition among the federal and the States protect citizens against government tyranny (Andreas 2013: 92 cited in Amar 1987).

2.2.2. Debate over Holding vs. Coming Together Federal Genesis of Ethiopia

Ronald Watts (2013:6) classifies federations by their genesis as ‘holding together’ and ‘coming together’. The ‘holding together’ federal genesis is by devolution (disaggregation) of previously unitary states, and the ‘coming together’ federations are by aggregation of the hitherto separate states with the purpose of building strong political economy. As to which category Ethiopia falls in its federal genesis is a contested one, nevertheless. In this regard the author has conveniently put three perspectives.

The authentic birth date of Ethiopia varies depending on whom to be asked. For instance, to the centrist, Ethiopia dates back to over two millennia, and its modern state has begun with the advent of the Emperor Tewodros II (1855-1868). For the ‘national oppression’ discourse

²² Malcolm, Waters, (2001), *Globalization: 2nd Edition Routledge*, Taylor & Francis Group, p. 123-170.

²³ Dual polity in federal political order accommodates the competing demands of autonomy/*glocalization* from diverse groups, and the need to maintain shared interest to compete in globalization.

²⁴ Ronald L. Watts, (2013), “The Contemporary Relevance of Federalism”, *EJFS*, *Centre for Federal Studies*, *Addis Ababa University*, Vol.1(1), p. 2.

advocates, Ethiopia was created as a modern polity in the turn of 20th Century with the advent of King Menelik of *Shewa* (1889-1913). The Ethno-nationals were under '*prison house*' because of national oppression for years since the formation of the empire-state, and have emancipated quite recently since 1991. Accordingly, the new modern, inclusive and legitimate state started in 1991. For the 'extreme ethno-nationalist' or for the 'colonial' thesis proponents, interestingly, Ethiopia as has been *Abyssinian warlords creation*, and the political power is still disproportionately gripped by them [Amhara and/or Tigryian], so it doesn't yet stand as a legitimate, modern and inclusive state.²⁵

Putting aside the divergent views reflected by the varied interest groups about the birth date of the polity, let's look into the three perspectives for the federal genesis of Ethiopia.

Perspective one: Looking into the institutional constituent units of Ethiopian federation, there are so far nine regional states carved and devolved from the hitherto historic polity. The nine states obviously had no independent existence and cannot qualify the definition for 'coming together' just because none of them had independent existence prior to the formation of the federation. Rather these states have been devolved as a means to ensure autonomy for self-rule to the ethnic groups-the actual constituent units of the federation. Apparently, it becomes, therefore, 'holding together' type viewed through this lens.

Perspective two: closely looking into preamble of the FDRE Constitution, it is quite discernible that the Ethiopian federation bears a 'coming together' genesis. The free will and full consent of each ethnic group (NNP) has made the multiethnic federal project possible replacing the 'nation-building' project. The federal system of Ethiopia is essentially 'coming together' in that the transition from unitary to federal political system is a shift from nation-building project to multi-nation building project, and which is not a mere shift as in the case of other federations such as Belgium. The turn from the historic unitary political order to the federal political order is tantamount to 'decolonization' of NNPs from oppressive regimes. However, taking Ethiopia is a 'holding together' federation as classified by Ronald Watts (2013:6) would mean that Ethiopia was a unitary state at some time in the past and gradually transformed into a federation by constitutional devolution. This is not so true, however. By

²⁵ See the *infra note* discussions in chapter one, introduction part. pp. 2-3.

the time when the military regime was crushed by the collaborated forces of the TPLF and the EPLF,²⁶ there was neither institutional means nor constitutional device which could retain the polity in order. The competing ethno-nationals were in a position to opt for either secession or a new form of democratic association. Some opted for secession and did it. The EPLF is a classic example for secession as it felt under the colony of Ethiopia. The TPLF could have pursued the same way for its own. And again, TPLF had neither will nor any better capacity to hold back the EPLF from secession. EPRDF, the front of four regional political parties, opted for democratic association. So the federal political project in Ethiopia is a synthesis that could reconcile the interest of the thesis group and the antithesis group.

Unambiguously, the introduction of the federal project in Ethiopia opened a new chapter for the non-dominant ethnic groups, which were reduced to subjects, forgotten of their culture, ignored of their language and history, ashamed of their identity with psychological disorientation, and dissociated from the state apparatus. The federal political order has theoretically and practically has shifted this scenario.²⁷

Perspective three: looking into institutional and constitutional setup, dual character of ‘coming’ and ‘holding’ together is evident in Ethiopian federal political order, and hence some federalist scholars such as Assefa Fiseha (2013:95) preferably observes and argues taking both lines as most favorable alternative to reach sound conclusion. As per this perspective, therefore, the genesis of Ethiopian federalism falls somewhere in between, and it is difficult to stick to any of the above perspective.

2.2.3. Domains of Federalism

Generally, the contemporary federations can be put in two main federal domains: national federation and multinational federation. National federation include: the USA, Australia, Austria, Germany, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela. National federations differ

²⁶ Indeed, the *Derg* regime was overthrown by a ‘second round social revolution’ as the first round revolution (1974) had remained unsuccessful, which was meant to bring about social justice, however, the revolution was snatched by the military junta-the *Derg regime*. The *Derg* regime had interest to respond for the ethnic groups demand despite some gesture and constitutional provisions as it was rather filtering with the ideology of ‘socialism’ with ‘Ethiopia first’ motto [*Ethiopia Tikdem-in Amharic*].

²⁷ Article 8, 39, 62 are exact reflections for the ‘coming together’ federal genesis besides the preamble.

from multinational federations not only in form but also in content. National federations are arranged in a way that it enables them to diffuse the possible concentration of ethnic groups in a particular territorial constituency, and power is drawn along such sketched territorial line than ethnic/linguistic line.

In doing so, national federations invent civic territorial constituencies and institute *de-ethnicized* federal political order notwithstanding diversities in the federation. In other words, national federations consume federal political order for the objective of nation-building and not for the purpose of accommodation. National federations utilize federalism just with the need for power diffusion into multiple poles, and in the meantime to subtly pour diversity to mainstream domain. National federations formulate state/civic culture dissolving the multiethnic cultures as argued by Kymlicka (1995:20).

For instance, the USA, which is typical example of national federation, all the constituencies are arranged in a way that the White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs) dominate.²⁸ The USA claims to be a nation (while it is evidently nation of nations) just because it produces ‘civic culture’ by dissolving multiethnic culture of the minorities such as African American, Red Indian American, etc. Speaking of this in plain terms, the USA claims to be a nation-state adopting English, professing shared religion-*Protestantism*, and sharing liberal democratic ideals.²⁹ Consequently, what they name it ‘melting pot’ nation-state has developed. Basically, national federations in effect, have resemblance with the Jacobinist Unitary nation-states of the French Model. The difference is that the latter pursues assimilation *explicitly* inducing state policies and strategies as it was the case in the pre-federal regimes of the historic Ethiopia.³⁰

2.2.4. Debate on Compatibility of Multiethnic Federalism to Ethiopia

The intensity of need for federalism may vary from one polity to another. While federalism may be just a way of organizing a state for administrative convenience, it may have much

²⁸ McGarry, J. and O’leary, B. (2003:20-23), *Federation, Conflict-Regulation and National and Ethnic Power Sharing: A paper prepared for Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.*

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Merera Gudina. (2003: 63-64), *Ethiopia: Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the Quest for Democracy, 1960-2000.* Maastricht: Shaker Publishing.

more sensible meaning for others. While it may only be difficult to govern large and homogeneous states in centralized way, it becomes altogether impossible to rule large and heterogeneous polities in centralized scheme. The implication is that federalism remains a matter of choice for some states while it becomes a desperate necessity for others. Prior to implantation of federal institutions, some polities constitute ‘federal societies’ (Livingston 1968: 22), which is to mean that non institutionalized federations exist due to diversity therein. And the prevalence of federal societies inevitably necessitates installing federal political order (ibid).

On conceptual and theoretical ground, proponents and opponents invariably agree that federal political order suits for Ethiopia. About the compatibility of multiethnic federal political order, however, there is divergence between the proponents and opponents. The opponents argue that ethnic politics (identity politics) is undesirable for Ethiopia at any rate as it inherently nurtures ethno-centrism, provokes interethnic conflicts, uproots national sentiment, and heightens ethno-nationalism offering excessive attention, which eventually bears fatal consequences, including the possibility of state disintegration.³¹ As a result, the opponents urge for the reconstitution of national federation abandoning the multiethnic one, which is currently in operation.³²

Conversely, the proponents argue on the contrary. *The national oppression thesis* is a corner stone in their argument and answer to the critics. And they argue that the factor behind the inception of multiethnic federal project in Ethiopia has to do with the historic injustice committed by the imperial regimes of the historic Ethiopia against the non-dominant nationals. The historic Ethiopian identity was depicted as the mirror image of a particular group’s cultural and ethnic trait which failed to reflect the genuine Pan-Ethiopian identity. Rather the national identity was imagined as the mirror-image of the *Shewan* ruling elite’s ethnic and cultural manifestations such as Amharic language and Orthodox Christianity with a self-proclaimed moral superiority and military triumph over others (Merera 2003; Teshale 1995). As a result, territorial based ethnicity has become the marker of political power

³¹See also the brief discussion made in chapter one, introduction part, about the discourse/thesis on the modern state formation of Ethiopia. *Foot notes*, on page 2.

³² Ibid.

dispensation in organizing the federal political order in the country. Hence, after the demise of the military dictatorship, the ethno-national forces opted for such a federal project by framing constitutional and institutional devices to reconcile the ethnic groups' interest. However, it remains to be tested if it takes state into a workable ethnic federal model (Assefa 2013; Andreas 2013; Clapham 2013).³³

Kymlicka (1995:59) suggests that multi-ethnic federal arrangement can be preferably used in the prevalence of territorial concentration of ethnic groups. Ethiopia, which largely constitutes ethnic groups with a distinct geographic concentration, thus, has induced the multiethnic federal system, primarily with the intent to regulate inter-ethnic conflict and in the meantime maintain integrity (Vaughan 2003:36). Admitting the historic injustice done to the non-dominant ethno-nationals through the state policies of assimilation and exclusion, the newly devised federal project has put the marginalized ethnic groups in a position to regain their lost social dignity (Assefa 2013: 116).

2.2.5. Theoretical Debate on Ethnic Federalism as a Whole

In connection to viability of ethnic federalism as a way out, for the maintenance of unity in diversity, there is no unanimity among federalist scholars. It has remained a bone of contention, indeed. Some argue that it definitely manages diversity and upholds unity without suppressing the interest of the ethnic groups as it avoids the possible exclusion, alienation, assimilation, and disenfranchisement of particular ethnic groups by its institutional devices. But others question if it really does so make and maintain unity at a time. Among the proponents of the multi-national federalism, Kymlicka (2005:269) argues that multi-national federalism offers appropriate venue for accommodation of ethnic diversity. Elazar (1987) shares the same view point in saying that federalism, which aims to achieve self-rule and shared rule at a time, manages unity in diversity.

Conversely, some federalists hold the contrary view that multi-national federalism rather induces secession, heightens ethno-national competition, and instigates ethnic conflicts. For instance, though a proponent, and yet Kymlicka (2005:263) acknowledges that regional

³³ Ibid

autonomy in the multiethnic federations augments the desire for much more autonomy, and this precipitates proliferation of ethno-nationalism incapacitating the national cohesion, and which ultimately might lead to disintegration. In the same fashion, Donald Horowitz (1985), and Basta & Fleiner (2000) contend that multiethnic federalism escalates ethnic tension instead of rendering lasting medication. Similarly, scholars like Lipset (1983) and Ake (1996) argue that multiethnic federalism institutionalizes discrimination, impedes individual rights, induces secessionist mindset, introduces zero-sum competition, generates hazardous reactions like ethnic cleansing, expulsion and disintegration, etc.

For Horowitz (2002), non-ethnic federal arrangement can better forge shared interest, and recommends for multinational states to adopt any sort of federalism as long as ‘ethnically blind’ political order that undermines ethnic divide. In addition, he advises for the multinational federations to maintain truly democratic and integrative political dynamics, which encourages heterogeneous ethnic groups or political units to work for common goals on the ideals of ‘shared-rule’ that can provide incentives for inter-ethnic co-operation.

Horowitz (1985) besides, advises for multi-national federations to maintain relatively strong centre in order for the federation kept in order by counterbalancing the centrifugal and centripetal force. This remark reflects the instance of Belgium at the moment. For the sake of glance, had it not been for Brussels Capital Region, which is the sole holding factor of Belgium united added its democratic feature, of course, which is inhabited by both the Flemish and the Walloons, and which belongs to none of them separately, as it is a region by its own right, and again which serves as the EU laboratory site for federal experiment, the Flanders and Wallonia could have said ‘bye-bye Belgium’ declaring their own independence. High centrifugal force accumulated as a result of the ever more demand for regional autonomy, which has ultimately incapacitated the centre (Liesbet Hooghe 1991). The deep linguistic divide and strong regionalist political parties have played critical role in this respect. For Ethiopia such party structure is not recommendable therefore. Such loose party structure is as dangerous as centralized party structure for federations.

The main lesson which can be drawn here is that, the prime purpose and aspiration of a multi-national federation has to be to generate and maintain both diversity and unity at a

time. To this effect, recognition of diversity must be anchored in the national ideals that transcend any unduly concentrated order of power at constituency level into the nation-wide. A multi-national federative model, which guarantees group autonomy with high incentives for integration and inter-ethnic co-operation, is an optimal and foresight approach. However, national unity must not be unduly pursued for the sake of ‘unity’ by compromising the self-rule ideals through coercion or any other similar means. If this so, it makes the very objective of having federalism null and void. National unity has to be maintained through consistent bargain between the two orders of rules on the ideals of self-rule and shared-rule. Moderation is actually the heart of federalism.

Switzerland, Canada, India, Belgium, Nigeria, and Ethiopia fall in the domain of multiethnic federation, which as opposed to national federations are contended among federalist scholars as they would be more secession inducing as discussed above, and such federations are strongly recommended to practice: *consociational democracy*³⁴ at all levels of government, to build economic and social interdependence among constituencies, to build trust and consensus, to exercise authentic democracy, power sharing, equitable power representation at the centre, etc. Assefa (2013:91-94), Horowitz (1985), and Lijphart, (1979) argue that executing ingredients advised above would serve them to keep united acting as glue and holding them together.³⁵

2.3. Conceptualizing Self-Determination

Self-determination basically embodies a group right concept, and denotes that any group of people³⁶ has natural right to freely determine their destiny. For the elucidation of the term more plainly, it refers to the group right to decide on their political, economic, and cultural destiny. Conception of self-determination as group right on international legal

³⁴Lijphart (1979:78) enumerates four institutional arrangements in practicing consociational democracy: “power sharing government (grand coalition), mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy.”

³⁵ Will Kymlicka, (2005), *Federalism, nationalism and multiculturalism*. In D. Karmis and W. Norman (ed.), *the theories of federalism: A Reader*. USA: Palgrave Macmillan; McGarry, J. and O’leary, B, (2003:21-22)

³⁶ For elucidation of the term ‘People’ given by Justice Kirby in the UNESCO international meeting of experts, reads as follows: “[a] group of individual human beings who enjoy some or all of the following common features. These features are: a. common historical tradition, b. racial or ethnic identity, c. cultural homogeneity, d. linguistic unity, e. religious or ideological attitude, f. territorial connection, g. common economic life.” The elements are markedly similar to the criteria stated for the NNPs in the FDRE Constitution of Art.39 (5).

instruments went back to the works of Woodrow Wilson who made the following remark. “National aspiration must be respected; people must not be dominated by others, and be governed only by their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere phrase; it is an imperative principle of action” (11Feb. 1918). The concept of self-determination in 1960-1980’s was a tool for anti-colonialism and again for independence. Of course, by then self-determination didn’t mean a group right in a free state. However, with a different context, in the post-colonial independence, as well, it has resumed serving as group right concept in a free state, and hence the right to self-determination is still at work in the international legal instruments excluding the right to secession. Secession nowadays is neither allowed nor banned in international legal instruments; rather it depends upon the geo-politics and the stance of the ‘mother’ state therein.

Self-determination is still fundamental group right concept that virtually all international legal instruments incorporate it. It takes central place on the charter of the United Nations (1945), in the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action (1993), in the twin International covenants namely: ICCPR and ICESCR, (1966), and in the African charter of human and people rights (1981). For instance, the Charter of United Nations, in Article.2 reads as “all people have the right to self-determination to freely determine their political status, (...), and cultural development.” The African charter of human and people rights, in article 19(2) states: “nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another.” And further goes to accentuate it in Article. 20 “[a]ll peoples shall have the right to existence: they shall have unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination; [t]hey shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policies they have freely chosen.”

International covenant on civil and political right (ICCPR), and on economic, social and cultural right (ICESCR) as well, have incorporated self-determination right on their respective charters in Article.1, which reads “[a]ll [groups] of people have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they can freely determine their political status, and pursue their own economic, social, political and cultural development.”

The whole discussion about the concept of self-determination reveals that, it is internationally acknowledged group right. International legal instruments almost in every inter-state institutions have well acknowledged and incorporated in their governing legal entities. The signatory states are bound to respect and incorporate self-determination right into constitutions (Vilij, 2004).

Article 39 (1) of the FDRE Constitution states that “[e]very Nation, Nationality and People has unconditional right to self-determination, including and up to the right to secession.” This article is manifestation for the entitlement of full self-determination right for groups of people in compliance to international legal requirements. Only nations not nationalities or peoples have the right to determine their destiny in the 1913 Stalinist description of *Nation, Nationality*. The FDRE constitution has not made such differentiation in status, however. I.e. it is generic term in reference to the varied ethnic groups. Who is nation and who is not, or who is entitled to such right, and who is not as per the gist and explicit expression of the FDRE constitution is attuned for all. However, empirically tested, it varies. And distinction is made by variation in autonomy. According to Stalinist conception of nation, nationality, *Harari* becomes a nation while *Sidama* or *Wolayta* remain nationalities, which is obviously ridiculous and misleading. Basically, the Marxist-Leninist conception of nation, nationality cannot be interpreted in the same way with the FDRE constitutional usage of the same terminology. The similarity is however, that in both cases it refers to ethnic groups be it at any level in status. Plus, the concept of self-determination up to exit right makes alike.

2.4. Dimension of Self-Determination

Self-determination, which is a group right concept, when put into practice has internal and external aspects. This classification is, however, made for maintenance of the concept in plain manner. Internal self-determination includes everything of self-determination right, but secession. Internal aspects of self-determination is not only about the peoples’ right to administer own affairs within defined territorial limit but also extends to fair and proper representation for active involvement in the apparatus of the centre (Daniel, 2013: 19).

The internal aspect of self-determination is particularly meant acquisition of a full measure of self-rule right within the larger polity. The internal aspect of self-determination can be expressed by the prevalence of adequate political, fiscal, and administrative autonomy for

experimentation of territorial self-government. Acquisition of self-rule autonomy for any people within the bound of the larger polity offers dual benefits at a time which include defense, foreign relation, and economic prosperity on the one hand, and opportunity for the maintenance and promotion of own language, culture, and history on the other hand (ibid).

External aspect of self-determination on the other hand, refers to the right of a particular group of people to go for secession, to become outside of the 'mother' state for establishment of a full-fledged sovereign polity. External aspect of self-determination emanates from the notion that all groups of people have the right to freely determine their own political status, and situate their place in the international scene based upon the principle of equal rights for all groups of peoples. The entire concept of self-determination however cannot be amounted to acquisition of total independence. It is erroneous to assume so. Secession is an extreme degree of self-determination assertion, and regarded as the external dimension of self-determination. In summary, the concept of self-determination has got international legal foundation throughout. The FDRE constitution, which incorporates the right to self-determination, is basically in observance to international legal instruments.

2.5. Concepts and Theories of Ethnicity

The term 'ethnicity' was developed from the Greek word 'ethnos' meaning a unit of human beings embedded with common socio-cultural expressions. Nonetheless, it is difficult like the word 'federalism' to provide a straightforward definition for what really 'ethnicity' signifies due to its objective and subjective elements. However, ethnic groups are defined by a common inheritance of culture, racial similarity, common religion, belief in common history and ancestry, and psychological feeling to belong to the group (Ayele 2013:15)

Smith defines an ethnic group as "a group of people who share ancestry myth, history, culture having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity."³⁷ Unlike tribe and clan that may involve blood tie, ethnicity is based on common values such as language, culture, history, inhabiting common territory and belief in common descent. The notion of ethnicity as stated here has to do with the definition of the NNPs in article 39 (5)

³⁷ Alder Smith, (1991), *National identity*, New York: Penguin, p. 21

of the FDRE Constitution. Theoretically, there are three schools of thought dealing with the characteristics of ethnicity:

2.5.1. Primordialism

This school of thought argues that, ethnicity is something objectively given. It explains ethnicity based on the primordial elements such as kinship, sharing common psychological makeup, custom, language, culture, tradition, history, religion, and territoriality that keep members together as a separate entity and distinct group with unique characteristics. These primordial elements virtually are genetic traits, which are biologically determined. These elements are also used as an identity marker for understanding ethnic groups with ascription by others. The primordialist understanding of ethnicity is as coherent, easily identifiable, innate, and permanent over time.³⁸

Primordialism has been criticized for presenting a static and naturalistic view of ethnicity that mystifies emotion and reduces cultural and social behavior to biological drives. The primordial assumption ignores change and dissolution of ethnic groups and does not speak of the modern processes of fusion and fission of ethnic groups (Berhanu, 2007: 36-39).

2.5.2. Instrumentalism

For this school of thought, ethnicity is perceived something dynamic, flexible, negotiable, and that can be maneuvered by elites for political consumption.³⁹ Although ethnicity embodies common traits of culture, language, history, custom, nonetheless, as per this school, can be easily dissolved or again synthesized. Instrumentalists argue that ethnic entrepreneurs, with the objective of advancing their political and economic interest in particular, and for the group members in general, can select, distort, and even fabricate the necessary materials from the culture of the groups they wish to represent.⁴⁰ Instrumentalists underline that ethnicity is strategically used, and is open for manipulation of several ends. David Turton (1994:17) for instance, asserts that “*an ethnic group is not a group because of*

³⁸ Phandis, U. & Ganquly, R. (2001), *Ethnicity and nation building in South East Asia*, New Delhi: Sage, p. 23

³⁹ Merara Gudina, (2003), *Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the Quest for Democracy*, p. 83-86

⁴⁰ Phandis and Ganquly, *supra note* p. 24-26. See also Barth, F. (1969), *Groups and Boundaries: the social organization of culture difference*. USA: Universitetsforlaget.

ethnicity but because of its members engages in common action for acquisition of shared interests (italics mine).”

2.5.3. Constructivism

For this school of thought ethnicity is socially constructed phenomenon. Constructivists, in contrast to the instrumentalists' understanding of ethnic identity, incorporate analysis of how ethnic relations are maintained, defined, and perceived by the group itself. Constructivism focuses on cultural and historical ground for the development of ethnic consciousness instead of taking for granted that ethnic groups are created by elite maneuvering for strategic political and economic consumption.⁴¹ Unlike instrumentalists, constructivists denounce the assumption that ethnicity is strategic material based invention by elites, and it can easily dissolve. And they maintain that affection on the basis of selective interpretation of the real cultural experience of history and shared culture constructs ethnicity.⁴²

Constructivists blame for instrumentalists as they have ignored the role of societal affection for ethnic mobilization through the vehicle of communal identities assuming ethnicity as only artificial synthesis by elites' maneuvering (Yeros, 1999:12). Constructivists also criticize for primordialist for undue glorification of communal affection/sentiment. Constructivists maintain the two extreme thought in balance. Accordingly, Ethnic groups' behavior can be influenced by the elites' level of maneuvering and the individuals' perception of identity.

The empirical and theoretical discussion on ethnicity so far reveals, ethnicity is quite vague and fluid phenomenon both at empirical and theoretical level. The premordialists' emphasis on innateness of ethnic identity as well as the instrumentalists' assumption of ethnic identity as such fluid is overstated. Empirically, however, ethnic identity consciousness and ethnic solidarity depends on circumstances. Ethnic solidarity may diminish if that group members secure another solidarity alternatives such as professionalism, class relation, and political affiliation (Berhanu 2007).

⁴¹Horowitz, Donald L. (1985), *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press. P. 55

⁴²Ibid. p. 56-58

Conversely, ethnic identity heightens when ethnicity is politicized and identity politics is glorified, and when such an arrangement offers special benefit to a particular group, or otherwise, when such groups are marginalized, subjugated in one way or another. These factors will become basis for ethnic consciousness by keenly instituting the ‘us-them’ divide. In such circumstances, as it requires the group to assert its perpetual survival, maintaining cohesion and solidarity of the ethnic members will become the only way out.

To substantiate my argument with instance, Zionism of the Jewish nation (ethnic group) could be the best illustration. The Jews nation which was dispersed across the world due to their expulsion by the Roman Empire from their homeland left them to remain stateless nation until 1948. The impetus which instigated for the movement of Zionism in pursuit maintaining own nation-state was the anti-Semitism (marginalization, including the dehumanized holocaust by the Nazi during WWII). Had it not been for the suffering and marginalization they encountered in many cases, it could have been too difficult for Jews to mobilize the scattered nation across the board, and reinstate their own nation-state.⁴³

Basically, ethnic identity consciousness and solidarity elevates if either of the earlier discussed factors surface out. It is, however, erroneous to assume that ethnic solidarity *per se* is destructive and obsolete as such it has obvious benevolence that can be attained though the development of ethnic solidarity, and again it would be to evade the nature that ethnic affection is inconsistent to the modern society. After all, ethnic affection is universal. There is a saying, which supports the fact- ‘birds of the same feather flock together’.

2.6. Debate on Maintenance of Ethnicity in Ethiopia

There are mainly two major intellectual perspectives in Ethiopia in connection to ethnicity.⁴⁴ The first perspective believes that the Ethiopian society has reached a stage of common identity by nurturing a common Ethiopian citizenship, obliterating primordial attachments and loyalties to the kinship. Ethiopic culture and mindset has blown and civic mentality has

⁴³ Israel. (2012). Encyclopædia Britannica. *Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite*. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica.

⁴⁴ Ethnicity basically refers to the concept of nation, nationality, and/or people. There is hardly any differentiation between ethnic group, nation, nationality or people at least for the conception of this thesis.

long become the cult than ethnic affinity; merit has long been instituted than ascription; maintaining ethnicity is therefore degeneration rather than regeneration (Levine, 1974).

The second perspective, on the other hand, argues that Ethiopia is a home for various distinct ethnic groups with their own geographic concentration, and that need to get some form of political representation and self-government to maintain their particular need and preference, and in the same time to maintain their color. The second line of perspective holds the view that, it is favorable and desirable for people who share common symbol, history, destiny, and future aspirations to have their own self-rule autonomy without having to snub their ethno-cultural identity, and get subsumed by some dominant groups which supposed to be the mainstream culture or '*Pan-Ethiopian*' culture (Hameso 1997; Fasil 1997; Merera 2003; Assefa 2013:116).

Ethnic identity claims in Ethiopia are triggered more of due to instrumental factors as demand for social status, political power and economic benefits rather than primordial factors like the need to maintain and nurture the primordial bondage and to transcend from generation to the other. However, primordial attachments have decisively become instrumental to advance these social, political, and economic objectives (Berhanu 2007). Encouraging ethnic entitlement simply for primordial attachments could open venue to institutionalize ethnic hostilities and ethnic competition that could be hazardous for public cohesion in multiethnic societies (ibid). Multinational federal political order is a continuous negotiation between the conflicting parties. Multinational federal political order as it resolves the 'old' conflicts; it also induces 'new' conflicts inevitably (Tsegaye, 2010). Multinational federalism is not a panacea for conflict, nor, however, is the next step to conflict. It is at once a problem and a solution. Whether it is one or the other depends a great deal on other factor (Assefa 2013: 104).

2.7. Conclusion

The discussion has shown that federative models vary both in principle and in practice owing to variation in problems that set federalism in place. Besides, federations vary not only in form but also in substance. While national federations are meant for nation-building,

ethno-territorial federations to maintain unity in diversity. All federations despite marked discrepancies amongst, generally they share commonalities such as the political philosophy of self-rule and shared-rule and constitutional power devolution.

With regard to multiethnic federation scholars hold divergent views. Some argue that such federative arrangement offers opportunity for equality of ethnic groups to exercise their own self-rule and promote their culture, language in the meantime upholding state integrity and shared benefit from the larger unity in economic, political, security terms. On the other hand, some other scholars argue that ethnic federalism is not viable political option as it may be divisive in its ethnic line power distribution and identity politics promotion. However, it is noticeable that for diversity accommodation purpose multinational federal order is highly commendable. Multinational federal political order is a device for multination state making.

Finally, right to self-determination and the concept of ethnicity, which are the twin cores in the Ethiopian federative project, have been explored in conceptual and theoretical sense. In connection to self-determination, from conceptual stance, it refers to a group right to decide on its political, economic and cultural destinies. Self-determination as a concept of group right offers for a group to practice self-rule, promote cultural and linguistic values, and preserve historical antiquities, and it may involve to the extreme case practice of secession. Self-determination is internationally acknowledged right. Virtually all international legal instruments incorporate the right to self-determination (though not include secession clause). Secession is however neither allowed nor banned in international legal instruments; rather it largely depends on the geopolitics and the mother state stance of the scenario.

Chapter Three

3. Self-Government in the SNNPRS: Institutional Exploration

3.1. Introduction

This unit analyses the SNNPRS institutional arrangement and socio-political dynamics pertaining to self-determination. The unit discusses the practical and potential challenges of the constituency taking several empirical evidences. The connection between local government and self-government is also explored looking into the constitutional and institutional aspects. As the main theme of the research is exploring the practice of self-government at local level, exploring the constitutional and institutional settings of local governments becomes vital. The unit elucidates the essence of local government in the context of federations with emphasis to Ethiopia. It looks into the fiscal and administrative status of local governments with particular emphasis to the SNNPRS. In doing so, this chapter contributes to some objectives of the study.

3.2. Overview of Basic Facts about the SNNPRS

The SNNPRS is located in Southwest part of Ethiopia. Internally, it is virtually surrounded by Oromia and to some extent bordered with Gambela to the northwest. Internationally, it shares borders with Kenya and South Sudan to the South and West respectively. It covers 10% of the total national area, standing fourth largest constituency next to Oromia, Somali and Amhara respectively. It is the third largest constituency in terms of demographic share, which represents about 20% of the country's population. Diversity is extraordinary in terms of ethnic background, language⁴⁵, religion, etc. As per the 2007 Census, Ethnic groups like Sidama (19.4 %), Wolayta (10.6%), Gurage (8%), Hadiya (7.6%), Gamo (7%), Kafficho (5.5%) and Silte (5.4%) which together constitute more than 50% of the total population

⁴⁵ **Omotic** include: Ari, Basketo, Bench, Benna, Chara, Dawro, Dimie, Dizi, Gamo, Gofa, Hamer, Kafficho, Konta, Kore, Male, Na'o, Oyda, Shakicho, Shecko, Tsemay, Wolaita, Yem and Zeysse
Cushitic include: Alaba, Arbore, Burji, Dasench, Derashe, Dobasse, Donga, Gedeo, Gidicho, Hadiya, Kebena, Kembata, Konso, Kusme, Mashole, Mossiye, Sidama, and Tembaro,
Semitic include: Gurage and Silte
Nilotic include: Bodi, Gnagatom, Me'init, Mezenger Mursi, and Surma,

share in the region. In terms of religion Protestant (55%), Orthodox (20%), Islam (14%), and the remaining share goes to other beliefs.

3.2.1. The Genesis of the SNNPRS as Sub-National Unit

The internal territorial delimitation of constituencies of the Ethiopian federation was drawn during the Transitional Period (1991-1994), and endorsed in the 1995 Constitution. Originally, the Transitional Government under Proclamation No.7/1992 carved 14 Regional Self-Governments.⁴⁶ However, soon after a year in 1993, the regional states were reduced to 9 states blending (putting together) the five regional states (7-11) of the Southern Ethiopia under one state- the SNNPRS. Region7: North Part of the SNNPRS (Gurage, Hadiya, Kembata, Alaba, Tembaro, Yem). Region8: East Part (Sidama, Gedio, Burji, Amaro (Kore), etc). Region 9: Central Part (Wolayta, Gamo, Goffa, Dawro, Konta, Dirashe, Konso, etc). Region10: South Part (Basketo, Murssi, Ari, Hamer, Dassenech, Gngangatom, Tsemai, etc), and Region11: West Part (Kefficho, Nao, Shekacho, Bench, Surma, Sheko, etc).

The configuration of the SNNPRS has remained a subject of dispute between opponents and proponents. Opponent elites in the regional opposition parties such as the SPDC and the SLM strongly criticize the merging act of the five states as it patently contradicts with the core principles of the Constitution that promises the right to self government.

There was no clear explanation how the merger was initiated, consulted and agreed, however. The merger decision was made through closed door agreement among the self-appointed ethnic organizations in the name of the people (Interview made with Professor Beyene Petros, Chairperson of Ethiopian Social Democratic Party, Member of the Central Committee of Medrek quoted in Ayele, 2013). Even if the 7/92 proclamation allowed for merger, it had made a specific precondition in a manner that the merging should not hinder the NNP's right to preserve its own local self-government capacity against its will.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Art. 3(1) of Proclamation No. 7/1992, A Proclamation to provide for the establishment of National/Regional Self-Governments, *Negarit Gazeta* 51st Year No. 2

⁴⁷ Article 3(2b) of Proclamation No. 7/1992

The SEPDM/EPRDF, which is the proponent of the installation of the SNNPRS, on the other hand, argues on economic perspective. Since the NNPs, which were incorporated into the SNNPRS, are small in terms of demographic and geographic share, maintaining such small states in isolation is not economically viable. The merger offers economies of scale for public services delivery. The proponents further argue that the merger of the states was concluded as a result of the regional parties' interest and desire to utilize a common natural resource and human resource in the respective administrations. The proponents of the merger on the other hand congratulate the blending of the five minor states into one giant constituent unit as the SNNPRS.⁴⁸

However, prominent individuals in the SNNPRS such as Professor Beyene Petros held contrary view that the decision was imposed up on them by the EPRDF from above in contrary to the agreed covenant-the Transitional Charter. The five constituent units which were separate during the transitional period officially endorsed as one constituency (sub-national unit) by the 1995 constitution as the SNNPRS on illegal means (Berhanu 2007).⁴⁹

Some scholarly arguments are also entertained as to why the party opted to merge the five constituent units into one administration. The argument flows like this:

Because the south region is composed of small and fragile ethnic groups which cannot counterbalance the dominant surrounding constituent unit-the Oromia- and the OLF has special interest to annex these delicate constituent units sooner or later; the best option is, therefore, to forge them and create strong counterbalance that can resist such probable risks and influences.⁵⁰

Otherwise, the proponents' argument, which is solely economic narration, doesn't sound right. Even the economic narration can be interrogated for the States like Gambela, Benshangul-Gumuz and Harari, which enjoy regional statehood, are hardly economically viable and any better, and one could make a case for merging them with the neighboring states. At least,

⁴⁸ Interview made with then Regional Executive and founding member of the SNNPRS quoted in Ayele, 2013

⁴⁹ Notwithstanding the justification for the act of merger by the ruling party, the blending of the five regional states without any public negotiation and/or referendum is antithetical to democratic measure. Those five states were basically created through pertinent negotiation by Council of Representatives [CoR] during the Transitional Period.

⁵⁰ Informal discussion made on the same issue by the author with a lecturer at Addis Ababa University.

they are not in a better economic condition than the merged five constituencies. Basically, the ideological commitment of the ruling party-the EPRDF- and the constitutional promise left aside in this argument, which is inconsistent and unconvincing discourse. To attest this for instance, one of the expertise on the course of Transitional Period, Fasil Nahum (1997:52), stated that during the Transitional Period ethno-linguistic classification approach was basically the favored approach for granting self-governing institution, however, given the presence of about sixty-five officially identified ethno-linguistic groupings in the country at that point of time (during the transitional period), it became a difficult task to grant each and every ethnic grouping its own self-governing structure/state. Consequently, many ethnic groupings have joined larger ethnic groups to form a state/self-governing structure.

3.2.2. The Genesis of the Ruling Party in the SNNPRS

Basically, the merger of the five constituencies on account of economic efficiency was preceded by the nonstop blending of the myriads of political parties in the region.⁵¹ When the ruling party's integrationist rhetoric turned to concrete measures in 1992, there remained 20 EPRDF affiliated political parties in the region named as the SEPDF (Ayele, 2013: 84 cited in Young 1998a). And again the SEPDF, the ruling party in the SNNPRS, has been transformed into single party by dissolving the 20 ethnic-based political organizations and merging them into one single regional party-the SEPDM in 2003.

The former ethnic-based parties have become branches of the new one by losing their previous status. The blending of SEPDF into a single party structure with the name of SEPDM, though the ruling party claims that the merger was a demonstration of 'the strong commitment for the Southern peoples unity and integration', critics disclaim and argue that, it was rather a scheme to suppress the increasing quest for autonomy and separate regional state administration (ibid).

The establishment of the South Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Front (SEPDF) in 1992 was orchestrated by the EPRDF for the aim of extending its authority in the southern

⁵¹Prior to the conclusion of the merger, several EPRDF affiliated parties in the region formed a front cross-cutting the constituencies. And these political parties were merged once and again until unified political party has evolved.

Ethiopia in incorporating the diverse ethno-linguistic groupings under a single political command and structure. The SEPDF was a coalition of 20 ethnic based political organizations which most of them were established by EPRDF as PDOs (Peoples' Democratic Organizations) by specially trained EPRDF's cadres from the various areas of the south who were 'pre-positioned' to move in their home areas in order to mobilize the people to facilitate the EPRDF's rule. In September 2003, the SEPDF was reorganized by dissolving its 20 constituting ethnic organizations and merging their members into a single organization called the SEPDM (South Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movement) (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 116).

3.2.3. The Role of the Incumbent Party in Self-Rule

For practical case examination out of several other trends, the *Wogagoda* project is selected for this thesis. This project essentially attempted to merge the closely related *Omotic* ethnic groups. In this process, political unification of the ethnic parties preceded administrative unification of the ethnic groups, and then linguistic unification was attempted so as to realize administrative and linguistic integration of the four ethnic groups (Wolayta, Gamo, Goffa, and Dawro) this project however ultimately failed notwithstanding similar Omotic language, culture that they have accumulated for years. The failure of the project has brought loss of several human life and text books, which cost several million birr in 2000 (Tsegaye 2013).

Semen [North] Omo Zone used to constitute mainly *Omotic* ethnic groups such as Wolayta, Gamo, Goffa, Dawro, Konta, and Basketo. The *Wogagoda* project basically aimed at unification of the people of the Omotic group under one common (re-engineered) language-*wogagoda*- by picking the first two letters in the four main Omotic ethnic groups, namely: wolayta, Gamo, Goffa and Dawro. The objective was consolidation of ethnic groups with negligible difference in between reconstructing shared language extracted in the four dialects. The newly synthesized language was meant, therefore, to be used as instrument of instructional media at school and to use as the working language of the *Semen* Omo Zone. Nevertheless, the scheme didn't work out. Rather, it brought about the disintegration of the *Semen* Omo Zone itself with bitter inter-ethnic conflict between the Wolayta and Gamo ethnic groups, and at the end of the day 3 Zones and 2 special *Woredas* came into being. These are Wolayta, Gamo-Goffa, Dawro, Basketo and Konta.

3.2.4. Conflict Inducing Factors in Relation to Self-Rule

Ambiguity in the FDRE Constitution happens to be conflict inducing factor because on the one hand, it declares the right to self-government for every ethnic group, on the other hand, there are only nine self-government constituent units established without uniform criteria. The FDRE Constitution with its promise-practice gap instigates ethnic groups to claim for the attainment of autonomy for self-rule but with little hope for its actualization and even with a feeling of relative deprivation.

3.2.5. Nationality Self-Rule vs. Composite Nationalities Self-Rule

Table-1.1 Zones/Special *Woredas* along with indigenous inhabitants in each local self-rule unit

Zone/S. Wo.	'Indigenous' Ethnic Composition of each Zone/Special Woreda
Gurage	Gurage , Mareqo , Kebena
Segen	Konso, Kore, Burji, Alle, Dirashe, Mussiye, Mashole, Kusume
Sidama	Sidama
Wolayta	Wolayta
Kaffa	Kafficho , Na' o , Chara
Shaka	Shakacho
BenchMaji	Bench, Surma, Dizi, Zelmam, Miniyit, Sheko.
Silte	Silte
Dawro	Dawro
Kembata Tembaro	Tembaro , Donga, Kembata
Hadiya	Hadiya
Debub Omo	Ari, Male, Benna, Tsemay, Biraili , Hamar, Arbore , Karo, Dassenech , Gngangatom , Murille , Muguji , Dimie, Bodi , Mursi,
Gamo-Goffa	Gamo, Goffa, Zayes, Gedicho Oyda,
Gedeo	Gedeo
4 Special Woredas	Each Special Woreda constitutes single ethnic group: Halaba, Yem, Konta, and Basketo named after the ethnic groups themselves

Source: *Author's synthesis based on official document prepared by CoN, Hawassa, 2013.*

At the table above shows the current administrative structure of the SNNPRS along with ethnic composition is depicted. It is evident from the table that only 11 ethnic groups constitute nationality self-government. The objective of this section is to objectively evaluate the nationality self-administration against the composite nationalities self-administration pragmatically.

The SNNPRS is a mirror reflection of the larger federation as Beken (2007: 135) has asserted. This is because in both cases there are two types of self-rules: “(---) large and territorially relatively concentrated ethnic groups have their "own" administrative entities while the remaining groups are (---) brought together into multi-ethnic self-administrative entities” (ibid). Therefore, the SNNPRS is required to be more democratic to take into account ethnic self-rule claims unlike its counterparts, which are relatively homogeneous.

The constitution of the SNNPRS doesn't list all ethnic groups as opposed to its counterparts. But it acknowledges ethnic groups on *de facto* basis. In this case, the SNNPRS constitution is open ended constitution, and may be taken as merit or demerit. The merit is that it doesn't arrest ethnic groups by listing down in the constitution nor does it arrest ethnic groups from formulating any level of administration hierarchy. In fact, the constitution seems to take into account the fact that the Ethiopian federation is after all the federation of NNPs, and the NNPs are free from any constriction. They can form any level of government by the entitlement of self-determination which includes up to secession from the union as opposed to the argument by Tsgaye (2013: 39) who seems to omit this point and criticizes the limitation of the south constitution comparing with its counterparts such as Gambela and Benshangul-Gumuz, in which the latter list down all the 'indigenous' ethnic groups inhabiting the regional states.

In fact, the SNNPRS is even more extraordinary in diversity and should not be compared with any of the multiethnic constituencies, which constitute not more than five indigenous ethnic groups. Basically, ethnic groups in the south are not exhaustively identified due to huge share of similarities one to the other, and listing ethnic groups will preclude any new identity group to claim the right of self-determination on the account of predetermination without careful study of the whole varieties of ethnic groups in the SNNPRS. Moreover, the regional constitution can have no right to delimit the ultimate administration hierarchy of an ethnic group whatever it is. If the regional constitution is in a position to limit the administration level of any NNP, it directly contradicts with the law of the land which doesn't limit the ultimate level of administration hierarchy for NNPs.

Coming back to the comparative evaluation of territorial autonomous Zones/Special *Woredas* on the basis of ethnic composition, it is important to examine in a comparative way to reach sound conclusion. Thus, the cross-examination focuses on which one of them have opportunity and favorable condition to practice self-rule? Which one of them maintains better peace, order, and stability, and prosperity? And what are the factors behind?

Putting aside the judgment that the FDRE constitution doesn't realize its rhetoric⁵² and there is inconsistency between the practice and the promise, and so on, in comparison, those nationality self-administration local units are in a better position to enjoy peace and stability in the sense that there is little politically induced conflict. Nationality self-administration is better in terms of the opportunity to practice self-rule because they do not face structural constriction unlike the composite Zones, the latter, however, will be potentially constrained by interest gap among the ethnic groups which arises because of diversity of interest.

For instance, let's look at the workability of language policy to determine as 'mother tongue' for Zonal working language in homogenous and heterogeneous Zones. For multiethnic Zones it becomes even more complicated notwithstanding the constitutional provision. The same is true to adopt particular mother tongue as instrument of instruction for school. As a result, in most cases multiethnic Zones prefer to adopt *lingua franca*.⁵³ However, policy of utilizing 'mother tongue' at least for instructional media (if not as the official language) at lower grades for the ethnic groups to the *Woreda* level may work out and yet, not easier in effect. *Woredas* are constitutionally meant to play functionary role in providing public service and infrastructures, etc, and they are not constitutionally entitled to determine their language for office or instructional media purpose which is the sole authority of the Zone/Special *Woreda* administration. Secondly, if an ethnic group demands to adopt own language for instructional media, in the geographic and administrative area where it is

⁵²The SNNPRS Constitution stipulates NNPs to establish territorial autonomy Zonal/Special *Woredas*. Article 45(2), Article 81(3a-b), Article 5(3) talk about the power of nationality administration-Zone/Special *Woreda*

⁵³ For examples Wolayta, Gedeo, Hadiya, sidama which are homogeneous Zones have adopted mother tongue as zonal working language. In addition to instructional use for schools even to the level of award of BA Degree in higher institution. Sidama is a classic example. On the other hand, multiethnic Zones almost none of them have implemented a Zonal Working language but Kambata which is also highly constricted because of the factors pointed out earlier. Meaning territorial minorities (Tembaro and Donga) feel alienated and dominated at Zonal level, and are claiming autonomy for a separate self-administration.

(be it *Woreda* or *Kebele* level) what it requires is to win majority vote at Zonal Council. The Zonal council is likely to favor to adopt a *lingua franca* for it can better serve shared interest and minimize cost. If veto was allowed for the representatives of the NNPs at Zonal Council (unfortunately the Council is not minority sensitive), or the ordinary *Woredas* were entrusted to such nationality self-rule rights, it could furnish conducive venue for the practice of self-rule to each ethnic groups notwithstanding the administration hierarchy it constitutes.

3.2.6. Challenges of Practicing Language Right in the SNNPRS

Language is known to be identity marker in a diverse society, which plays significant role in multinational federations such as Belgium, India, Canada, Ethiopia, and so on. In Ethiopia for instance, it has significant role to play accompanied by ethnicity for political power allotment. Linguistic right cannot be seen in isolation from self-determination right. Insofar as the language policy of Ethiopia goes, all languages have equal state recognition notwithstanding their development level (Art 5(1)) of the FDRE constitution. And again, the same constitution provides power for the member states of the federation to adopt their respective working languages. As opposed to the pre-federal Ethiopia's language policy where Amharic remained the sole and privileged national language, its status has now shrunk to the federal working language alone.

The SNNPRS constitution in Art 5(1) acknowledges equal state recognition of all languages in the region notwithstanding their development stage. Of course, the SNNPRS has adopted a *lingua franca*- Amharic as the state's working language. Prudent choice it is, indeed. In the state where extraordinary diversity and languages prevails, what best option can be there other than maintaining *lingua franca*? However, the constitution doesn't compel its units (Zones/Special *Woredas*) to replicate the same *lingua franca*, Amharic rather in Art. 5(3) it permits Zones/Special *Woredas* to determine their working languages through their Council. Hence, it is evident that language prerogative prevails at the local level, too. This is basically the outcome of the fact that the Ethiopian federation is not of the mere nine states but of the NNPs. The logic is that the NNPs have the right to self-determination and including secession. As per Art 39 (2) of the FDRE Constitution and Art 39 (1) of the SNNPRS Constitution every NNP has the right to speak, to write and to develop its own language.

Adopting *lingua franca* (Amharic) as the sole working language of the state will constrain the sub-units to effectively utilize their own working language. Hierarchical relations among the government structure entail immense communication among the levels of government on day to day official matters through different media. Legislations, policies, official reports, directives, court judgments, working manuals, etc, are some of the chains through which vertical communication frequently take place. Such vast and inevitable communication could not be accomplished easily between the entities using different official languages. Both sides are bound to shoulder additional burden of translating every communication into the language of the concerned recipient. This requires extra resources for supplying adequate stationeries, experts in different languages, offices and office equipments, and so forth. This becomes unaffordable for poor economies like the SNNPRS. Not only incurs extravagancy in economic terms but also administratively it becomes inconvenient both at the regional and the sub-regional levels of government. The fate of the NNPs is to utilize Amharic favorably.

For instance, it has become difficult for some Zones which have launched their own local language as the working language of the respective Zones/Special *Woreda*, and they are constricted to implement it effectively. With reference to constriction of language policy in the SNNPRS Tsgaye (2013:58) has noted that Amharic has continued to serve as the working language in Wolayta Zone in all government offices despite the fact that the local language has been introduced as the Zonal working language. “Official *Wolaytigna* discourse is limited to periodic reports on government performance submitted to the Zonal council and media of discussion of the regular meetings of the Zonal Council (ibid: 58). This problem exists not only in vertical communication (State-Zonal relationship) but also in horizontal communication among the adjacent Zones/special *Weredas* as they could also introduce their own working languages. Because of structural constriction thus virtually all Zones/Special *Woredas* replicate the *lingua franca*-Amharic. Despite the practical challenge some Zones have attempted to use local language for office since 2003 namely: *Sidama, Wolayta, Hadya, Kambata-Tambaro, and Gedeo* (Beken 2007: 143).

Language policy as instructional media at schools varies from the order of ministry of education to education bureaus of the respective states. The ministry of education has made dispensation as to the right to experiment language for instructional media at schools to the

respective bureaus. While the maximum limit that local languages can serve as instructional media set by the ministry is to the level of Grade 8, the SNNPRS has not effectively utilized this Prerogative. Instead the maximum limit of local language use as instructional media shrank to Grade 4. Starting from Grade 5 English has been serving as instructional media of schooling all over the region. The reason why the regional bureau has reduced the prerogative of language use has to do with economic factor as well as lack of trained manpower in the area and low level of development in the languages themselves. Many of the languages don't have script let alone to carry enough vocabulary to serve as instructional media for schools above first cycle primary school (above Grade 4). On account of this fact the local language service for instructional media has been confined to Grade 4. Even within this bound only some 10 NNPs have effectively used. Some other 10 NNPs have implemented only from Grade 1-2 and Amharic serves as interim instructional media up to Grade 4. And yet, the remaining NNPs have not made use of this right.

Table-1.2. List of Local Languages Used as Instructional Media for Primary Schools

No.	Languages applied in Grades 1-4	Year of launch	Languages applied in Grades 1-2	Year of launch
1	Sidama	1992	Kebena	1997
2	Wolayta	1992	Kore	1999
3	Gamo	1992	Konta	2001
4	Goffa	1992	Shaka	2007
5	Dawro	1993	Basketo	2009
6	Hadiya	1993	Yem	2010
7	Kembata	1993	Me'init	2010
8	Gedeo	1994	Sheko	2011
9	Kefa	1997	Bench	2011
10	Silte	2005	Dizi	2011

Source: *The SNNPRS Education Bureau, Hawassa, 25April, 2013.*

3.3. The Role of Governmental Institutions for the Practice of Self-Rule

3.3.1. The State Council

The 2001 Revised Constitution of the SNNPRS has adopted bicameral legislature analogous to the Federal Parliament (Art.48)). The lower chamber, which is the State Council, is the highest legislative authority of the State (Art. 46 (1)). The State Council is vested with the highest regional political power (Art.51 (2)). The key powers and functions of the State Council, *inter alia*, includes issuing laws and approving social and economic programs; establishing additional administrative hierarchies that *best advances self-government* (italics mine), electing the regional president and approve the appointment of the members of the regional executive council (Art 51 (3)). The State council is composed of representatives elected by the plurality electoral system through direct election for a term of 5 years, and rhetorically represents the peoples of the State as a whole (Art.50 (3)).⁵⁴ Besides, the State Council has special reserve seats arranged for minority groups analogous to the lower chamber of the Parliament (Art. 50 (2)).

3.3.2. The Council of Nationalities [CoN] Comparative Observation

The upper chamber (Council of Nationalities) evolved as a house of the NNPs of the Constituent unit (Art.58). The CoN is the house of the indigenous ethnic groups of the SNNPRS. The reflection is that the sovereignty of the SNNPRS resides in the indigenous ethnic communities of the SNNPRS as they would become authors of the constitution and constituent units (Art. 8, 59). No other inhabitants (settlers) of the region are represented in this institution irrespective of their population share. Exogenous inhabitants are non-territorial minorities, and hence they have no representation in this institution, which is basically meant to accommodate indigenous groups. Non-territorial minority exclusion is not distinctive to the SNNPRS, however (Beken, 2006).

⁵⁴ The notion is that the State council is accountable to the people [electorate] whom it represents irrespective of ethnic origin of its electorate in that constituency. However, dubious it is to argue that there is authentic representation of the non-territorial groups in the lower chamber (State Council) the same could have been replicated in the **upper house**, where verification of the ownership and sovereignty of the state is asserted.

The institution of the CoN is a replica from the Federal institution of the HoF in its power and function, and procedure of representation.⁵⁵ However, dissimilarity is also visible in the two parallel institutions. It is evident that majorities will have chance to dominate in the lower chamber by the virtue of the fact that they constitute vast population size in the constituency. Cognizant of this fact, federations design a mechanism to counterbalance in the upper chamber by proposing equal representation to each constituent unit and/or ethnic group, which constitutes the federation irrespective of demographic share.

For instance, Nigeria and USA adopts two senators in each constituent unit even with the power to influence in law making. However, the HoF can neither offset the domination of majority ethnic groups nor *influence* in law making process because of the proportionate representation maintained and alienation from law making (Art. 61 (2), 62, 55 (1)). Alienation of the HoF federation from meaningful law making and policy design indicates exclusion of the constituent units from involvement of the legislative activities at the federal level (Tsgaye 2013:29). The hegemonic power of law enactment role is left to the HoPR, the federal legislation may not reflect the interest of all the states equally for the reason that the HoPR is dominated by majority ethnic groups/constituent units/ as pointed *infra*, and which may not tend to reflect the interest of minorities/smaller constituent units with majority rule.

Members of the HoF are in practice selected from among the State Councils of the respective States, and hence they supposedly represent the interest of the State where they come from as well as the particular interest of the ethnic group they belong to. However, dual function is not discernible for ‘nation-states’ such as Oromia and Somali since they are single ethnic-states. For instance, a representative of an Oromo ethnic group in the HoF by default represents the State of Oromia alone. A representative of Wolayta ethnic group on the other hand, will have dual representation. On the one hand she/he represents the interest of her/his nationality; on the other hand, advances the interest of “own” state, the SNNPRS.

In the HoF few dominate both as an ethnic group and as Regional State. As an ethnic group the Oromo followed by the Amhara dominates. However as a State the SNNPRS takes the lead followed by Oromia and Amhara States respectively. In practice, members of the HoF

⁵⁵ Compare Art. 61, 62 of the FDRE Constitution (1995) and Art.58, 59 of the SNNPRS (2001) respectively

are entirely members of the ruling party due to the fact that they are selected from among the respective State Councils. Thus, the HoF is highly affected by its method of selection. It lacks genuine independence since it can have no courage to resist the stringent party ethics of the EPRDF, to which it belongs and independently operate its assigned business. No member is allowed to interrogate the law drafted and adopted under the auspice of the incumbent political party- the EPRDF (Tsgaye 2013:32 cited in Abbink 1998)

The CoN as compared to HoF, however, can effectively counterbalance the domination of majorities in the State Council by the virtue that no ethnic group exceeds three million in the SNNPRS. For example, only Sidama has (3) representatives, followed by ethnic groups such as Gurage (2), Wolayita (2), Hadiya (2) and Gamo (2), and the rest are represented by one.⁵⁶ Members of the CoN are also practically selected from among the Zonal/Special Woreda Councils. In case of an ethnic group fails to have representation in *Zonal/Special Woreda*, the constitution demands representatives to be selected from among *Woreda* Council (Art.58 (3)). The implication is clear that an ethnic group will be represented at *Woreda* Council at least and of course at the state Council, too, by the virtue of reserve seats (Art.50 (2)). The other side of implication is that an ethnic group might not be necessarily represented at the *Zonal/Special Woreda* Council for there is no reserve for ethnic accommodation at local self-rule units that constitutionally arranged unlike state and federal Councils.

The core point here is that by the virtue of the respective articles cited above, each ethnic group in the SNNPRS has been ensured participation at the State Parliament in both chambers as well as in the Federal Parliament in both Houses notwithstanding the gaps discussed. Tsgaye (2013:28) argued that “the NNPs in the South Region lack authentic representation in the HoF” on account of the selection process and responsibility for. But this doesn’t seem sound argument because despite the fact that the members are practically selected in the State Council, it is made based on ethnic equity. As pointed out above every ethnic group is ensured representation in the State Council with a special reserve seats in a similar vein to the HoPR (Art. 54(3)). And hence, there is no one ethnic group skipped from representation in the HoF. Secondly, as explored there is dual representation inevitably

⁵⁶ Article 58 (1&3) of the SNNPRS constitution (2001)

happens to the multi-national states, which doesn't, however, mean that ethnic groups in the multinational states are devoid of true representation simply because they do play dual role as contended by Tsgaye (2013).

In addition to ethnic group representation and state constitutional interpretation, Art. 59 of the SNNPRS Constitution (2001) stipulate other functions. It is, for instance, entrusted to decide on issues related to Nations, Nationalities, or Peoples' right to constitute own local administration such as *Zonal/Special Woreda Administrations* (Art.59 (2)). In addition, it is bestowed with the power for promotion and consolidation of unity and equality of the peoples of the region based on their mutual consent (Art.59 (3)). The CoN is entrusted to amicably solve disputes that may arise between administrative hierarchies (Art. 59 (5)). The CoN is also entrusted to decide up on budget allocation and submit it to the State Council for approval (Art. 61).

The mission (of the Council of Nationalities) is not only to resolve conflicts once they happen but also to advocate unity, advocating unity and peaceful coexistence. The peaceful coexistence of the Southern peoples is important. When you become unified, you become strong. It is up to this institution to advocate unity and create awareness about the need to strengthen the unity of the southern peoples (Interview conducted by Walta Information Center with the president of the Southern Region, Hailemariam Desalegn, Walta, 20 April 2002, quoted in Beken, 2007:141).

3.4. General Overview of Local Government in Federations

Local government constitutes public administration at grassroots level. In every federation local government constitutes lowest tier of administration. Local government basically acts within the bound of the power limit delegated by legislation, or otherwise by higher level authority. In federations local governments generally constitute vertically the third tier of government below the constituent unit. The drive to institute local government lies in its benefit of maintaining the government agents closer to the grass roots population (Daniel 2013). Local government is meant for ensuring public involvement in the political process. As political entity, local governments govern own jurisdictions such as cities, towns, districts, municipalities, and villages (Teune, 1995). Federal and constituent

unit governments bear responsibilities of governing national or regional affairs while local governments have their own list of responsibilities that can impact on the daily life of the local community.⁵⁷

Three-levels of governments namely- federal, state and local units-are common to all federal systems. However, the place and role of local governments vary from one federation to another. In some (younger) federations, the local governments' power and competence is constitutionally recognized and hence, their jurisdictional powers and competences are spelt in the federal constitution. In relatively younger federations such as Brazil, Germany, India, Nigeria, South Africa, local governments have got constitutional recognition, and their mandate is enumerated in the federal constitution.⁵⁸ However, local governments have no constitutional recognition in some (older) federations like the UAS (1787), Switzerland (1848), Canada (1867) and Australia (1901) (De Visser, 2005). Local governments in these federations are left to the Regional States' power and competence.⁵⁹

3.5. Overview of Ethiopian Local Government Structure

The FDRE Constitution like older federations remains silent about the local governments' power and function. Local governments in the case of Ethiopian are totally put at the mercy of the respective states. Local governments are drawn by the respective states not by the federal government. Unlike the older federations, however, the federal Constitution of Ethiopia puts legal duty on the states to devolve adequate power to the lowest local units.⁶⁰

This is because the FDRE constitution promises every ethnic group to practice self-rule, and hence although local matters are regulated in the constituent states' constitutions, the constituent states are obliged by the FDRE Constitution to transfer adequate powers to the local units in the meantime. The FDRE Constitution, in addition stipulates that “[e]very

⁵⁷Responsibilities of local governments Dennis Hartman, http://www.ehow.com/list_6068028_responsibilities-local-government.html last accessed on 26/01/2014.

⁵⁸ Teune H. (1995), “Local government and democratic political development” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

⁵⁹Anwar Shah & Sana Shah, (2006), “*The New Vision Of Local Governance and Evolving Roles of Local Government*” Anwar Shah (ed.) Local Governance in Developing Countries, Washington DC: The W. Bank.

⁶⁰ Article 52 (2a), of the FDRE Constitution

Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has right to a full measure of self-government, which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and equitable representation in State and Federal governments.”⁶¹

The arrangement of local governments varies across the constituent units of the federation as it differs based on the conditions of the constituent units. For instance, local governments in the SNNPRS, Gambela, and Benshangul-Gumuz, are structured into three levels on constitutional ground. Interestingly, the Harari state constitutes one level local government (*Kebeles* alone under one Hundi *Woreda* and the City of Harar). The Harari People’s State exceptionally constitutes one level local government due to its small territorial size. What is unique to the Harari state from others is that, although it assumes to be a regional nation-state in terms of territorial ownership of Harar, it involves the Oromo ethnic group in its domestic political affairs, *inter alia*, it has adopted Oromiffa as official language besides Harari language. This might be seen as non-territorial autonomy devised by the Harari State for accommodation of ***non-territorial majority***, which are alienated because of territoriality principle. In fact, there are also other such ethnic groups like Amhara, Gurage, etc, but they are not treated in the same way.

The nature of local government structure and opportunity for practice of self-government has direct correlation. In this case the nature of local government structure of the SNNPRS and Amhara national regional state, which have resemblance at some point and difference as well, deems necessary to comparatively observe with the intent for better comprehension. The SNNPRS constitutes 14 Zones, 4 special *Woreda*, 131 ordinary *Woreda*,⁶² and several Urban *Kebeles*, Rural *Kebeles*, and 22 Town Administrations. Zones/special *Woredas* are autonomous nationality self-administrations drawn approximately on linguistic and territorial contiguity, on ethno-cultural affinity, settlement pattern, language, and consent of

⁶¹Art 39 (3) of the FDRE Constitution (1995)

⁶²*Ordinary Woredas* are subordinate to Zone/Special *Woreda* in their effort to make any decision in their own internal affairs. *Woreda* and *Kebele* administration hierarchies are *subordinate* entities irrespective of the administrative/functionary competence allotted. Their role is *functionary* to provide public service under the auspice of the Zone/Special *Woreda*. *Woredas* are meant for good governance, administrative efficiency for the public residents at the *Woreda*. *Woredas* are not constitutionally autonomy for self-rule, and they are devoid of basic powers like the power to adopt own language, exercise territorial autonomy as opposed to Zones/Special *Woredas*.

the people with the intent to guarantee the ethnic groups' right to self-government.⁶³ All levels of local administration hierarchies constitute elected Councils⁶⁴, Executive⁶⁵ and Judiciary.⁶⁶ Similarly, nationality administration zones in the Amhara regional state are drawn with the same intent to protect the right to self-rule for the ethno-territorial minorities in the state (Assefa 2006a). In the Amhara regional state minority NNPs own nationality administration.⁶⁷

However, unlike the SNNPRS, in Amhara regional state, there is what is called, Functional Zone. Unlike nationality administration zone, the Functional Zones are simply delegated State organs, and they have neither elected Zonal Council nor Judiciary. In Functional Zones, the State appoints the Executive body, and hence, it remains responsible to the State Council. This is so because functional zones are primarily meant to facilitate State-*Woredas* connection only, and it is the state and the *Woredas* which have more power and influence in local matters. Functional Zones are established with the intent to create administrative link between the State and the *Woredas*, they are not entitled to formulate their own policies and strategies as in the case of nationality administration council which are elective and have constitutional entitlement to formulate Zonal policies and strategies. Unlike the *Woredas* of the nationality administration, the state can easily penetrate and intervene in matters of the *Woredas* of the functional zones.⁶⁸

⁶³ Art 45 (2) of the SNNPRS Constitution (2001)

⁶⁴ Zonal/Special *Woreda* Council is composed of members elected for State Council and those elected for Zonal/Special *Woreda* Council. Such institutional arrangement eases 'unity in diversity' as the zonal councilors are not in isolation and distant from information above because the members of state council who directly become members to the respective zonal council become mentor to those zonal councilors who are directly elected to zonal council and would easily coup up with the new environment. A member of state council may assume triple position at a time. She/he is a member of **legislative body at zonal and state councils besides** may be selected for the **HoF**.

⁶⁵ *Parliamentarian system* characterizes the SNNPRS, which is thus a direct reflection of the Federal Government from top to bottom. This is because at every level of local government, it is the Council which establishes the government by electing the head of the government (executive head) which assumes decisive role in government matters. Executive *intergovernmental relation* with upward accountability is evident.

⁶⁶ Look at article 80 (2); article 90; article 103 (2) of the SNNPR Constitution (2001)

⁶⁷ Article 45(2), of The Revised Constitution of the Amhara Regional State, Proclamation No. 59/2001.

⁶⁸ This is so because functional zones have no constitutional basis as opposed to nationality zones. The state is the sole authoritative body and operates in a manner of unitary state in functional zones in that the state devolves power and competence to the functional zones by its desecration and not based on constitution. The

Zones/Special *Woredas* in the SNNPRS and nationality administration Zones in Amhara have, therefore, similarity as they are established with autonomy for self-rule.⁶⁹ Majorities of the NNPs in the SNNPRS however don't own exclusive self-administration. Rather many of them are confined under one zonal administration as multi-nationalities self-rule. *Debub* [South] Omo Zone takes the lead by housing not less than 16 NNPs.⁷⁰ Out of more than 56 ethnic varieties only eleven NNPs have secured exclusive Nationality Administrations.⁷¹

3.6. The Need for Empowerment of Local Government

Adequately empowered local government furnishes institutional mechanism for democratic rule by enhancing public participation and experimentation, and subsequently brings about economic progress (Assefa 2006a). Decentralization (though remains a subject of dispute in literature) may be favorable for development and accommodation of diverse interest.⁷² Local government which aspires to achieve the aforementioned objectives needs to be sufficiently empowered. Empowerment of local government is manifested by the constitution of free, fair, and periodic election. In terms of administration, it constitutes distinct and exclusive functional competences in certain areas of governance which are clearly defined by federal or regional constitution or other similar legislations. It embodies decision making power on matters of its jurisdiction. It enables locally concentrated ethnic group administer themselves (Assefa 2006a). Finally, it owns reasonable size of financial source to run its mandates.⁷³

state can take away the power and competence from functional zones any time it deems necessary as opposed to the nationality zones.

⁶⁹ 45 (2) of the Amhara Regional State Constitution (2001); Art 45 (2) of the SNNPR Constitution (2001)

⁷⁰ The seven largest ethnic groups reported in South Omo Zone are the Aari (44.59%), the Male (13.63%), the Daasanach (8.17%), the Hamer (8.01%), the Banna (4.42%), the Tsamai (3.39%), and the Nyangatom (2.95%).
Source: The 2007, the national Census Statistical Agency.

⁷¹ While Sidama, Welayta, Hadya, Gedeo, Silte, shaka, Dawro, have secured zonal administrations, Basketo, Halaba, Yem, and Konta, have achieved special *Woreda* administration. These listed NNPs form local majority in the respective territorial local units. The rest NNPs are 'lumped together' in the remaining zones with the formation of either dominated or with no local majority in the respective territorial local unit.

⁷² Assefa F. (2006). *Federalism and the accommodation of diversity in Ethiopia: a comparative Study*. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers.

⁷³ Stoker, G. (1996). 'Introduction: Normative theories of local government and democracy', in King D & Stoker G (eds) *Rethinking Local Democracy* Basingstoke: MACMILLAN; Assefa. 2006. *Federalism and the accommodation of diversity in Ethiopia: a comparative Study*. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers; N. (2006). *Fiscal federalism in the Ethiopian ethnic based federal system* Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publisher.

3.6.1. Fiscal Empowerment of Local Government in the SNNPRS

Decentralization of powers and competence to the local government has to be accompanied by fiscal power devolution in a form of devolved taxing (revenue generating) and spending powers (De Visser 2005:41). Local governments should be given certain taxing powers which will enable them to collect as much revenue as required to discharge their function. The requirement for financial dispensation of local government is to help discharge its functions and maintain the autonomy of the local government active being accountable to the local people. Unless the local government is fiscally autonomous enough, it becomes easily subject to influence by the upper authorities, and hardly remains answerable to the grass roots population. The logic is administrative and political devolution *per se* cannot meet the objective unless accompanied by effective fiscal power devolution.

In Ethiopia the federal government has a scheme of intergovernmental revenue transfer which is known as ***block grants*** (Solomon 2006:148). Through this scheme the federal government transfers a considerable amount of money to the regional states. The grant is transferred according to a pre-arranged formula, and has no minimum conditions attached to it (ibid: 148). However, *Woredas*, town municipalities and Zones do not receive intergovernmental grants directly from the federal government. Instead, revenues are transferred to them by the respective states. The intergovernmental grant that the *Woredas* and Zones obtain from the regional governments also takes the same formulae (ibid: 238).

The States adapted the Federal subsidy formula for computing the distribution of *Woreda* block grant amongst the local governments. The variables which are used to determine the grant are: population size (55%), level of poverty (10%), expenditure needs (20%), revenue raising capacity and execution efficiency (15%) (ibid: 238). Local governments have full liberty as to how to spend the revenue of block grants transferred to them by the State as opposed to specific purpose (conditional grants) on which case the grant has to be spent on specified areas alone. The *Woreda* block grants, which represent the lion share of the local governments' revenue, is a non-conditional grant transfer from the States to respective local governments. It was introduced as part of the *Woreda* level decentralization in 2002. *Woreda* block grant targets on recurrent expenditure, and doesn't include the capital budget.

The objective of the *Woreda* block grant is to finance the local governments' administrative and functional expenses. *Woreda* block grant is distributed among the local governments taking into account their expenditure needs and status whether they are rural *Woredas* or town municipalities.⁷⁴

The *Woreda* capital budget transfers are made on *ad-hoc* basis, on the other hand. They are conditional transfers, and not part of block grants. The pool size of capital transfer to local government is a function of anticipated Federal transfers to the States plus the States' revenue mobilization forecast plus States' socio-economic development plan. Capital transfers among local governments by the respective states takes into account the comparable access to public services among local governments but the room is free for negotiation and lobbying (ibid).

To look at the financial autonomy of local administrations in the SNNPRS, *Woredas* collect some constitutionally specified tax mandates on State delegation basis. They collect certain taxes such as rural land use fees and agricultural income taxes, but also can impose and collect service charges. Revenue raising power and function is not given for Zone/Special *Woredas*. Zone/Special *Woreda* Administrative Council draws its budget, approves and then it is sends to the State government for the grant receipt.⁷⁵

Gebrehiwot asserts that with regard to local government tax autonomy in Ethiopia in general, the story is a miserable. Although local governments are major providers of the local public goods and services, States have not yet devolved tax powers to the respective local governments (in this regard the Tigray State case is exception, at least on paper). The whole discussion so far shows that local governments are heavily dependent on the state transfers and external agents for their revenue source. The very basic point is zones/special *Woredas*, or *Woredas* have no any difference with reference to *tax autonomy*. They are invariably utterly dependent on the state transfers and external sources for their execution of assignments in relation to self-rule.

⁷⁴ Interview conducted with Gebrehiwot Tesfai, a senior researcher on practice of fiscal federalism in Ethiopia, and a lecturer of fiscal federalism at Addis Ababa University, 15 February 2014.

⁷⁵ Article 81(3d) and 85 (3) of the SNNPRS Constitution (2001)

3.6.2. Administrative Empowerment of Local Government in the SNNPRS

As treated above local governments are authorized to run their assignment in the absence of any meaningful tax power. Administratively also how empowered are they? Obviously, provisions are there both in the federal and the state constitutions indicating the general regulatory roles of the federal and the state governments in local affairs. For instance, the FDRE Constitution provides that the federal government has the power and mandate to establish and implement national standards and basic policy criteria in certain areas.⁷⁶ The federal government sets standards in the area of public health, education, science and technology as well as for the protection and preservation of cultural and historical legacies.⁷⁷ The same Constitution provides that states shall issue laws regarding state civil servants and their working conditions which are approximate to national standards.⁷⁸ The State Constitution similarly provides the Zones/Special *Woreda* Council and *Woreda* Council should exercise their legislative power in line with federal and state laws.⁷⁹

The Federal Constitution has divided powers and functions between the Federal and the State Governments alone.⁸⁰ The State is the sole sovereign entity in the State matters, therefore. The State Constitution affords Zone/Special *Woreda* Council and *Woreda* Council legislative powers which are to be exercised in line with State and Federal laws. On this account, supposedly, the legislative power of the State on Zones/Special *Woredas* and *Woredas* should have certain limits. However, practically, there is no clear distinction between the State and Local Government matters. Meaning, whatever competences local governments may have, they lack exclusivity. The extent to which the State can exercise legislative powers on Local Government matters (if there is any such matter) is not patent. What is so unambiguous is that the local government cannot enact law contrary to the proclamations enacted by the State and the Federal Parliament. In contrast, the FDRE Constitutions do not preclude the states from legislating on local matters.

⁷⁶ Art 51(3) of the FDRE Constitution (1995)

⁷⁷ Art 51(5) of the FDRE Constitution (1995)

⁷⁸ Art 52(2(f)) of the FDRE Constitution (1995)

⁷⁹ Art 81(3(c)) SNNPRS Constitution (2001)

⁸⁰ Art 51 & 52 of the FDRE Constitution (1995)

Given the limitless legislative power of the state on the state matters as a whole, the laws enacted by the *Zone/Special Woreda Council* and *Woreda Council* will stay in force only temporarily. Provided that the State Government issues proclamations that contradict with the legislation of the *Zone/Special Woreda Council* and the *Woreda Council*, the latter prevails and former automatically lose effect. Under the State constitution there is neither explicit procedure as to how the state government can assess local governments nor clear procedure of intervention as to how to intervene by the State when a Local Administration fails to discharge its responsibilities.

The same mirror reflection prevails in Federal-State relationship. Since policies and strategies are drawn top-down, policy diversification and experimentation, which are part of the merits of federal political order, again lose effect. For instance five year development plan is drawn centrally by the party then goes down as it is without any modification for its effect without any adjustment let alone to be tailored to the specific local conditions. Assefa (2006b) remarks that in principle, the Ethiopian federal political system appears among the most devolved federations in light of federal constitutional provisions provided to the states. The powers of the states include all powers and functions listed in (Art. 52(2)) and residual powers (Art. 52 (1)).

Ostensibly, strong states and weak centre prevail. In practice, however, the federation of Ethiopia is characterized by voluntary surrender and upward power delegation of the constituent units, meager fiscal autonomy, downward intergovernmental relation, asymmetry between the centre and ‘emerging states’ on account of capacity building, which is a sort of ‘tutored federalism’ to borrow the phrase from Assefa (2013), and party centralism characterizes the federation. Assefa (2006b) concludes in practice, however, strong centre and weak states prevail. Clapham (2013) wonder that the Ethiopian federal political order is yet to be tested if it could operate after EPRDF left power in his assertion of the party centralization. Obviously, it is the Federal Government, which makes all the national policies and central decisions under the direct control of the ruling political party, and its enforcement is easily achieved via the centrist party channel.

3.7. Conclusion

The discussion in this unit has attested that there are several factors restraining the NNPs right to self-government. As the genesis of the region was precipitated by the continuous merger of myriads of ethnic political parties in the region, the same trend is manifested after unification of the (7-11 regions) five regions into one-the SNNPRS. One of the witnesses could be the failed *Wogagoda* project.

In connection to maintenance of peace and order in the region several challenges were witnessed. Institutionally, since the region *per se* remains a tacitly formed one without appropriate public discourse and/or referendum its legitimacy as sub-national unit remains contentious. Another equally important conflict stimulating factor comes out of the gist of the federal constitution. The federal constitution which promises the same right for NNPs to self-determination, in effect it fails to keep its pledge. Consequently, those NNPs which are deprived of their entitlement are dismayed with the mere rhetoric of the constitution, and pursue for alternatives either peacefully or otherwise.

Within the region there are two forms of NNPs: those which own nationality Zones/Special *Woredas* and those which constitute multinational Zones/Special *Woredas*. Attempt was made to compare the two forms of NNPs. As the comparison has proven the former category has been in a privileged position in terms self-government execution, including language use. In terms of the pace of urban infrastructural development the former have happened to be in a better and promising situation. This has to do with among others, maintenance of peace, order and stability, and good governance and leadership. Besides, better sense of solidarity and oneness, which easily mobilizes the locality for development, healthy competition with other counterparts, little/no segmental interest, which diverts attention and concentration outward significantly contributes. The latter category is restrained by all these factors pointed out one way or another as discussed in the text.

The role of the parliament in preservation of the NNPs self-rule is immense. In this region the parliament is bicameral imitating from the federal parliament. Particularly, the CoN play marvelous role for representation of the NNPs in the State Government. This body is entitled

to interpret the state constitution, which is a manifestation of sovereignty of the NNPs of the region. They are represented proportion. The discussion has shown its outstanding qualities against the HoF federation, where majority still dominates. The CoN is a represented institution to resolve conflicts which may arise in relation to self-determination. Besides, it works for solidarity and amicable function of the State. However, this institution is not without limit. Since it is practically drawn from among Zonal/Special *Woreda* Councils in the current trend, the house remains a collection of legislative body again. This means all the members are part and parcel of the same majority seat ruling party. Exclusivity in passing decisions and counterbalancing the lower chamber for any legislation becomes futile as a result because they cannot work out against their own party.

The correlation between self-government and local government has been assessed. In some federations local government has constitutional recognition and its power and functions are enumerated. However, in federations such as Ethiopia local government has no direct constitutional recognition. The power and function of local government formulation is left to the respective states. The prime reason for the federal constitution why it fails to recognize local units is for the fact that local governments constitute different NNPs. Therefore the Federal constitution tacitly leaves them without restriction. Instead, intelligently informs to the states to devolve as much adequate power to the lower units of administrations. In a comparative approach this unit has assessed the status of local governments in Amhara and the SNNPRS, and witnessed similarity in between in the maintenance of self-rule.

Finally, fiscal and administrative empowerment of local government was evaluated. As the discussion has attested, local governments in Ethiopia in general are utterly dependent on the subsidy and transfer of the respective states. Both the *Woredas* and Zones/Special *Woredas* are dependent on the state which negatively contributes for execution of self-rule at local level. In terms of administration also the floor is not free for independent execution, experimentation, etc. Fiscal and administrative centralization has become the feature of the federation throughout.

Chapter Four

4. The Study Area: *Segen* Area Peoples' Zone

4.1. Introduction

This unit constitutes the ultimate destination of the research journey. The unit constitutes two sections: while the first section provides a short account of the ethnic groups found in the study area, the latter section directly ventures to investigate the earlier proposed research questions.

4.2. Geographic Location of the Study Area



Map1.1. the Map of the FDRE and the SNNPRS

Study Area/*Segen* Zone



Map1.2. the Map of the SNNPRS and the Newly Organized *Segen* Zone

Source: Frew Tesfaye (2012:10)

4.3. Demographic Characteristics and Economic Activities

The aforementioned Special *Woredas* namely: Amaro, Burji, Dirashe, Konso, and a newly emerged Alle *Woreda* have together constituted a composite *Zone-Segen Area Peoples' Zone*- in March 2011. The *Segen Zone* shares large part of its boundary with Oromia Regional State in the East and South direction, besides with Gamo-Goffa Zone in the North, and with *Dehub Omo Zone* in the West. The *Zone's* total population is estimated nearly **630,000**. It constitutes eight ethnic groups, which are officially recognized with seats in the HoF and in the CoN. These ethnic groups are: *Alle, Kore, Burji, Dirashe, Konso, Kusme, Mashole and Mossiye*.

Before merger was concluded, these ethnic groups were in four special *Woredas* in different composition. The Dirashe, *Dobasse*, Mossiye, Mashole and Kusume were incorporated in the Dirashe special *Woreda*. Konso had a special *Woreda* composed of the majority Konso and the minority Gewada. Amaro and Burji had their own nationality special *Woreda* administration. The present 'Alle' ethnic group was identified as *Dobasse* and *Gewada* until 2010. The two sub-groups united together seceding from *Dirashe* and *Konso* respectively and collectively named as *Alle*. Recently, *Alle* has its own *Woreda* since 2010, a year before *Segen* was established.⁸¹

4.3.1. Kore Ethnic Group

Kore constitutes its own *Woreda* known as Amaro *Woreda*. The administrative center of the Amaro *Woreda* is **Kele**. The *Woreda* is found 206 km away from the centre of the region (Hawassa).⁸² The Amaro *Woreda* named for the *Kore* ethnic group, their language is **Korete**, which falls under the *Omoti*c language family. Largest ethnic group in Amaro *Woreda* is the *Kore* (93.11%), and all others together makeup 7.5% of the population. About 51.6% of the populations are Protestants, 35.5% practices traditional beliefs, and 10.38% practices Orthodox Christianity. The *Woreda* has a total population of **149,384**.⁸³

⁸¹ Interview made with Ato Yared Baneto, Expert in the CoN, Hawassa, and 17 March 2014

⁸² CoN department of language, history and culture (2001) the southern nations, nationalities and peoples profile. Fireselam Printing, Hawassa. P.97-100

⁸³ Based on the 2007 Census conducted by the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA)

The *Kore* ethnic group practices sedentary agriculture. Mixed farming is widely practiced. Agriculture is the mainstay of economy for this people. Agriculture is a source of employment and subsistence for about 97% of the *Woreda*. Maize, *Enset*, Wheat, Barley, *Teff* and Beans are the main food crops grown, and *Coffee* is the main cash crop of the *Woreda*.⁸⁴

4.3.2. Burji Ethnic Group

Burji constitutes its own *Woreda* called Burji *Woreda*. The administrative center of Burji is said to be *Soyama*, which is found 268 km to the south from the centre of the region (Hawassa). The Burji speaks a Cushitic language family called “*Dashatee/Burjigna*.” The Burji people are largely dispersed outside of the special *Woreda*. They reside in Oromia region, in Gideo Zone, in Konso special *Woreda* and widely exist in Kenya even with representation in the Parliament. According to the 2007 census result the total population of the Burji people is **71,871**. Largest ethnic groups living in the Burji *Woreda* are the Burji (84.54%) and the *Kore* (11.75%). Some 42.71% of the population profess the Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity, 24.05% practice Protestantism, 18.05% practices traditional beliefs, and the remaining 14.29% are Muslims.⁸⁵

Agriculture is the base of economy for this *Woreda*. It serves as a source of employment and subsistence for 86% of the population. *Teff*, maize, wheat, barley beans and *Enset* are the main food crops grown in this *Woreda*. *Teff* is the main crop grown at large, and serves as cash crop in which the *Woreda* is well known. Animal husbandry is also widely practiced.⁸⁶

4.3.3. Konso Ethnic Group

Konso constitutes its own *Woreda* called Konso *Woreda*. The administrative centre is called **Karat**, which is found 361 km south of the capital of the regional government, Hawassa. Based on finance and economic development bureau (BoFED) annual statistical abstract report, Konso *Woreda* constitutes a total population of **270,988**. Konso (87.01%), Gawada (9.2%), and all other groups together makeup 3.79% of the population of *Woreda*.

⁸⁴ Invest in our special woredas, Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Regional State Investment Expansion main Process <http://www.southinvest.gov.et/potentialSpecialWeredas.htm> last visited on 16 January 2014

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

Some 66% of the population practices the traditional belief, and while some 24% are Protestants, the remaining 6% professes Orthodox Christianity. Agriculture is the major source of income and livelihood for this community. Konso as well as Gewada speaks Cushitic language family. Konso is known for maintenance of soil conservation with stone terraces, and the main crop production of the *Woreda* includes: Sorghum, root crops, and cotton.

4.3.4. Dirashe Ethnic Group

Dirashe constitutes its own Dirashe *Woreda* with three ethnic groups. The administrative center of Dirashe *Woreda* is called **Gidole**, which is 350km far from the regional capital, Hawassa. Dirashe is multiethnic *Woreda*. Linguistically, *Dirashtati* shares 55.08%, *Dobassate* 19.6% *Bussigna/Mossiye* 7.26%, and the remaining 18.64% speaks other languages most importantly Oromiffa and Amharic. 51.63% of the population practices traditional beliefs, 35.46% professes Protestant Christianity, and the remaining 10.38% practices Orthodox Christianity. Dirashe *Woreda* incorporates four indigenous ethnic groups (namely, Dirashe, Mossye, Kusume and Mashole), and the reason why the *Woreda* named after the Dirashe is that Dirashe is the majority. All indigenous ethnic groups in this *Woreda* speak Cushitic language family. According to the 2007 census report the Dirashe ethnic group size is **30,031**.⁸⁷ Agriculture is the major source of income and livelihood of the Dirashe people. Sorghum, Onion, *Teff*, Coffee, and *Chat* are main crops produced.

4.3.5. Mossiye Ethnic Group

Mossye is one of the four ethnic groups co-existing in this *Woreda*. The Mossiye resides in the western part of the *Woreda* with a population size of **19,698**. The language family of Mossiye is Cushitic, which is called *Mossitati*, and agriculture is a major income source.

4.3.6. Mashole Ethnic Group

Mashole is one of the four indigenous ethnic groups in the Dirashe *Woreda*. The Mashole ethnic group lives in the place called “*Kolla Mashele*” 26 km south of the administrative

⁸⁷ SNNPR, Nationality Council 2001, the Southern Nation, Nationality and People profile, Department of culture, language, history and heritage studies. *Fikreselam Printing Press*, Addis Ababa.

center (*Gidole*). According to the 2007 census report the population size of the Mashole ethnic group is **10,458**. Their language is called “*Masholigna*” and categorized under the Cushitic language family.⁸⁸ Agriculture is the major source of income and livelihood of the Mashole, and cattle herding is additional source of income that they are engaged in. The main crops of the Mashole are coffee, corn, sorghum and *Teff*.⁸⁹

4.3.7. Kusume Ethnic Group

The Kusume ethnic group is one of the four indigenous groups in the Dirashe *Woreda*. This ethnic group is mainly located in the “*Gattoo*” *Kebele*; the Dirashe and the Konso people also live together in this *Kebele*. Based on the data obtained from the 2007 census report the total population of the people is **7,740**. *Kusumigna* is the language of the group; however, they are multilingual, so they can speak *Derashigna*, *Konsigna*, and *Oromiffa*. *Mixed farming is their economic activity*; corn and sorghum are the main crops.⁹⁰

4.3.8. Alle Ethnic Group

Alle ethnic group has recently formed its own *Woreda*, but earlier it was one of the five ethnic groups in the Dirashe *Woreda* with the name Dobasse and also was in Konso with the name Gawada. The population share of Alle is **68,600**. *Dobassigna* is its language, which falls under Cushitic language family. The *Alle* is agro-pastoralist. *Teff*, Barley, Corn, Wheat, Coffee, and Chat are the main crops grown. Alle has obtained its own *Woreda*, *Alle Woreda*, taking 10 *Kebeles* from the Dirashe *Woreda* and 7 *Kebeles* from the Konso, and their centre is *Gawada*.⁹¹

4.3.9. The NNPs Common Denominator

Irrespective of the diversity and variation explained about these entities, there are shared elements among the ethnic groups under consideration, too. In these ethnic groups there has been continuous interaction, sharing contiguous boundary, culture, intermarriage, etc.

⁸⁸ SNNPR, Nationality Council 2001, the Southern Nation, Nationality and People profile, Department of culture, language, history and heritage studies. *Fikreselam printing press*, Addis Ababa.

⁸⁹ Ibid :186

⁹⁰ Ibid: 197

⁹¹ Ibid: 209

Table.1.3. Summary of the Ethnic Groups' Composition which Constitutes *Segen Zone*

No.	Ethnic group	Population size	Language family	Percentage
1	Alle	68,600	Cushitic	12%
2	Kore	149,384	Omotic	25.2%
3	Burji	71,871	Cushitic	12.5%
4	Dirashe	30,031	Cushitic	5.8%
5	Konso	270,988	Cushitic	41.4%
6	Kusume	7,740	Cushitic	1.3%
7	Mashole	10,458	Cushitic	1.7%
8	Mossiye	19,698	Cushitic	4.16%
	Total	628770		100%

Source: re-arranged and computed based on the description made on the subject above.

4.4. Data Presentation and Analysis

In the preceding section the author heightened and acquainted reader with the ethnic groups that established the Segen Zone. In the preceding sub-section the author strives to react on the research questions with a method of data presentation followed by analysis and discussion. The pointes investigated in this section include: *in the course of the merger key role player(s), and whether it was negotiated with the NNPs concerned or not; the merger whether affected the NNPs autonomy for self-rule or not; the merger whether constitutional act or not; the merger whether it was necessary or not; the merger whether it is a direct continuation from the incumbent party's legacy of imposed unity or a new venture; finally, whether the newly established Zone is capacitated to shoulder newly developing political dynamics or not. This chapter winds up the long journey of the thesis providing suggestions concerning the*

4.4.1. Route of the Merger

According to the data obtained employing multiple tools, the course of the merger was originally initiated by the regional government. From the FGD as well as the interview conducted the author learnt that it was the regional government which played key role for initiation as well as conclusion of integration. According to the informants prior to the act of blending the regional government had made negotiation with the respective special *Woreda* councils and officials about the imperative of integration, and also had consulted communities at various levels.⁹²

According to the data obtained prior to the merger was effected, study had been conducted by the SEPDM/EPRDF Central Committee. And the intention for establishing a new Zone was to resolve the frequently occurring conflicts in the area. Besides, the project had extra objectives like the need for overcoming maladministration, inefficiency, unemployment, and related socio-economic problems of that area in general. The historical and cultural interface of the people in the area was taken as an opportunity for merger in order to enhance peace, stability, good governance, productivity for mutual benefit of all parties by bringing them into one roof-within one administrative structure.⁹³

The author's data and information from the SEPDM/EPRDF officials at various level asserted that the act of merger was not done coercively, but rather in consultation with the peoples and the *Woredas'* officials. Although it was initially proposed by the regional government, it was not effected in isolation, rather it was done in a democratic manner with due consultation with the people concerned about its advantage based on study findings.⁹⁴

Informants have asserted that these special *Woredas were* in a perpetual state of conflict for years. And now quest for peace and development is an urgent and burning issue than anything else. The informants asserted that the recent political profession of unity and integration in the area will bring harmony, peace and stability, and finally, development and societal solidarity. And, it is this demand for peace, stability, and development, that the

⁹² Ex-chief executive of the SNNPRS, Addis Ababa, 10 March 2014

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Chief of Dirashe *Woreda* SEPDM sub- branch office, Gidole, 28 March 2014

merger was executed. The fragile and tiny self-administrative entities in the name of self-rule, which were yet frequently in state of conflict one another, are required to reinstate in one bigger administration with hope to establish peace, stability and prosperity by making them competent and co-operative entities.⁹⁵

The regional government conducted studies and submitted the proposal to the State council, finally the merger was officially declared. From this phenomenon, it is possible to infer that key role player was the regional government, and the State Council with its constitutionally entrusted power to establish additional administrative hierarchies has approved the proposal presented by the regional government. One may question that how possible for the NNP to voluntarily renounce its right and autonomy? The regional government claimed that these NNPs were convinced. If the NNPs are voluntary to relinquish their autonomy in pursuit of shared interest, may be, the merger could be justified.

However, there were informants who contended that there was no any public consultation. They pointed out that, the SEPDM might have consulted its own *Cadres*, otherwise. “For all I know, there was no grassroots consultation; at least there could have been referendum for such a big deal (issue of self-rule) to democratically decide up on.”⁹⁶

From the author’s data of interview, an anonymous *Woreda* official also reflected similar view in saying that, “at the start there was off the record and top secret meeting of the *Woreda* chief administrators and Cabinets (executive officials) that personally chaired by the Chief Executive. And the meeting secession was concluded with stringent order to accept the establishment of the *Zone* and convince the people by hook or by crook that eventually the guts of the resistant *Woreda* (Konso) officials melted down.”⁹⁷

In view of the latter set of informants, it might be possible to conclude that the blending was the utmost interest of the regional government and the incumbent party. Those section of people (members of the incumbent party) involuntarily complied with the party’s mission and vision of integration. And, however, this account has become a ‘hard swallow’

⁹⁵ Head of Burji *Woreda* agric. & rural development office, *Segen*, 27March 2014

⁹⁶ Interviewee3, a member of opposition party (*Medrek*), Hawassa, 18 March 2014

⁹⁷ Interviewee7, a member of *Woreda* Council, Karat, 24March2014

for the author due to factor of *reliability*. It has become dubious for the author to reach in such conclusion with such scanty source of data and information as multiple data sources obtained have failed to reflect and substantiate the same. The naked fact that the author arrived at is that there was no referendum conducted other than undertaking study and consultation made between the regional government and the ethnic group elites/officials.

4.4.2. Pressing Factors for the Merger

According to the data obtained from multiple sources, there were frequent intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts in the area. For instance, the Dirashe *Woreda* was in state of frequent intra-ethnic (inter-kebeles) conflicts, most importantly in Onotta, Kiyamma, Shelele, Walesa, Ateya, Hiyebena, and *Holite Kebeles*. The sources of conflicts are primarily of resource related, including the claim for utilization of farm land.⁹⁸

Similarly, there were frequent Konso-Dirashe inter-ethnic inter-*Woreda* conflicts. The victims of the Dirashe *Woreda* inter-Kebele fighting often flocked to the neighboring Konso Kebele in search of refuge, and which instigated conflict with Melagadukaya, Kirecho, and Segen-Genet Kebeles of Konso. Sources of the conflict are derived from the support of the Konso *kebeles* to the escaping peoples of the *Kiyamma Kebele of the Dirashe*.⁹⁹

The other source of conflict between the Konso-Dirashe *Woredas* was the claim for *Abullo-Alifacho* arable land that frequently caused conflict.¹⁰⁰ Besides, Konso-Alle inter-ethnic or inter-*Woreda* conflict on the claim for utilization of the *Kukuba-Sala* farm land and grazing land is another conflict that frequently occurs in this area.¹⁰¹ From the data obtained through FGD, the author learnt that the area was characterized by frequent conflicts for so long. The main sources of conflicts were claim for arable land, grazing lands, and other resource based factors than purely ethnic nature. The other feature of conflict in the area was prevalence of bordering inter-ethnic conflict. The Burji and the Kore groups were frequently attacked by the numerically dominant neighboring- the Gugji. Like *Burji* and *Kore* that of the *Konso* were in conflict with the neighboring *Borena* Oromo on claim of the fertile *Segen* Area

⁹⁸ Interview conducted with a member of *Woreda* Administrative Council, Gidole, council 28 March 2014

⁹⁹ Interview made with Marintu Geletu, rural development expert, Karat, 23 March 2014

¹⁰⁰ Interview conducted by the author with Tamiru Getalo, Head of Development Association, 28 March 2014

¹⁰¹ Ibid

coming from *Borena Zone* in a place called *Teltele*, and their claim has not yet ceased.¹⁰² The regional government as well as the Burji and Amaro officials has been convinced that if they were organized with the other three *Woredas*, they would smoothly manage the bordering conflict in co-ordination.¹⁰³

To be sure, once again, the author has become adequately aware with multiple data sources that the area had been in a state of ‘*all against all*’ in and out like conflict between Konso and Derashe, between Burji and Guji, between Alle and Dirashe, between Konso and Alle, between Konso and Borena, between Kore and Burji, etc, mainly in pursuit of accession to arable land, grazing land, boundary, veneration, and other resource related factors.

Some informants accounted that, in order to solve conflicts locally rather than waiting for regional government it was a better option to have unity. Whenever conflict erupted in these areas, the *Woredas* frequently appeal to the State. It was this root factor that instigated for the regional government to devise a mechanism to circumvent these problems in order. In short, the need for conflict management was at the heart of the proposal and culmination of the administrative merger with additional objective to bring about other opportunities such good governance, job opportunity, development, solidarity given that they share a lot in common. During the FGD the author was able to realize that, at the utmost demand of the natives is how to secure stability, development, and get rid of poverty. The informants collectively asserted that their pressing problem is development, conflict management, bringing about infrastructures, roads, schools, etc. The recurrent conflict amongst ethnic groups in the area had negative role for development and maintenance of peace and order.

4.4.3. Dispute over Placement of the Centre

In the course of merger as per the author’s data and information, the issue of locating the centre was tedious. “But, our problem is in relation to the center placement. The center is placed in the area where there is no commercial activity, road facility, and transportation facility.”¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Interviewee 9, Chief of Segen *Zone*, Segen, 24 March 2014

¹⁰³ Interview with Ato Abdulkadir, public prosecutor in the SNNPRS justice bureau, Hawassa, 17 March, 2014

¹⁰⁴ Interview made with Civil servant, Karat, 23 March 2014

This was the message from several informants in Konso and Dirashe Woredas. Of course, resentment in placement of the centre is invariably rampant across the *Woredas* mainly on account of insufficient infrastructural facilities. As to the position of the centre there was resistance from the beginning. Konso has claimed its capital, Karat, to host the centre taking advantage of its better infrastructural facilities vis-à-vis the newly located centre (Segen) that previously known as *Gumayde*.

Several informants have uniformly asserted that none of the concomitants are contented with the centre. Some informant from Karat argued that *Karat* could have better served their interest. As a matter of fact, as the author has also observed the newly established Zonal centre, and it is located in mountainous and pocket area, where road and transportation facilities are devoid of. In this regard the author has faced terrible challenge during the field work for data collection by lacking transportation facility, besides there is no basic service such as pension and hotel. It is rather a village under construction in terms of facilities. There are no facilities like road, transportation, commercial transaction that can connect the concomitants.

In relation to infrastructural factors such as road and transportation facilities, the problem is even more serious for relatively distant concomitants particularly of Amaro *Woreda*. Alle complains for the same problem of distance and poor transportation facilities. In general, they all are complaining for the government to have made their problem even more difficult in this respect. Access to road and adequate transportation is their burning issue currently facing. In this respect, *Karat* does have definitely better infrastructure as the author was physically present and observed the area in comparison. Karat is tourist site and favorable in its access to road and transportation, and it is even a better site of commercial activities.

The author contacted with some informants as to why *Segen* was selected notwithstanding its infrastructural limitation, and why not *Karat*. The obtained data uniformly asserted that it was because *Karat* was not acceptable by some groups. It didn't satisfy all concomitants. The two neighboring foes and friends at a time (jealousy) namely: the Konso and Dirashe elites couldn't agree up on it. They competed to host the centre in their respective capital (Karat and Gidole), and it became difficult to reach consensus. The *Dirashe* elites didn't

welcome the suggestion, and it was to satisfy the whole groups that *Segen* has been selected. *Segen* is as such bordering site for all concomitants and neutral from any ethnic group claim though Konso has special interest.¹⁰⁵

Opting for Karat was anticipated that eventually it may induce conflict between the two competing parties, and thus irrespective of infrastructural facilities *Segen* has got upper hand by the virtue of bordering feature to the concomitants.¹⁰⁶ From this the author has inferred that there is no as such internal unity and consensus among the parties united. Strong feeling of unity and oneness is yet not built, otherwise. If the merger is for shared interest, yet if they remain divided, the author is pessimistic for the sustenance of the *Zone per se*. The merger was concluded to address the ‘*all against all*’ feature of the area and if still unity is pseudo, it may not sustain that long. It is a pre-requisite to maintain shared interest to ensure continuity.

4.4.4. Dispute over Nomenclature

From the data and information obtained, including the official document, another challenging issue in culminating the administrative merger was the issue of titling the *Zone*. From the interview made, the author learnt that meetings were hosted by regional government in towns of *Hawassa, Arba-Minch and Karat* for discussion on nomenclature. While the regional government has come up with the title ‘*Eastern Omo Zone*’, yet it was resisted and finally rejected by the concomitants on two main accounts. First, for the fact that they are not the only Eastern *Omoti* peoples for it could include others: *Gedeo and Sidama*. Second, the term *per se* was connoted with the failed ‘*North Omo Zone*’.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Interviewee 4, civil servant, Hawassa, 18 March 2014

¹⁰⁶ The present ‘*Segen*’ in its historic account was under Gamo-Goffa *Kiflehager*. It was known as *Geradula Awraja with its own centre ‘Gumayde’* by constituting surrounding *Kebeles* of the four special *Woredas*. These *Kebeles* are divided to the current four special *Woredas* in 1996 based on the identity claim of the *Kebeles*. And hence, *Melega-Dugaya, Segen-Genet, Becho and Kirecho* went to Konso *Woreda*. *Berriqi, Beneya, Gobezze and Tineshewa Qeyatte* included to Burji *Woreda*. *Hiyebena and Hebele* incorporated to Dirashe, and finally *Buniti, Abullo and Alliffacho* apportioned to Amaro (interview9, Chief of *Segen Zone*, 25 March 2014:2). NB. Konso has special interest because *Segen-Genet*, the centre of the *Segen Zone*, is the *Kebele* which is apportioned to Konso.

¹⁰⁷ Interview made with a member of *Woreda* executive Council, Karat, 23 March 2014

The *Woredas* also came up with different titles with their preferences but at the end of the day consensus was reached. The title ‘*Segen*’ has become best fitting title due to the fact that, ‘*Segen*’ is a name of a river that intersects these concomitants, and hence, it serves as a symbol of unity for the concomitants as they all share tributaries for the same river.

4.4.5. Upshot of the Merger

Now, it is time to investigate the state of affairs following transformation in administrative paradigm in the study area. It is common sense to anticipate a merger in administration in any case empirically produces not only opportunities but also challenges. The issue would be then measuring the comparative advantage, otherwise. Seen in this lens, it is possible to compare its positive side vis-à-vis its negative effect so far. On this account, with empirical data accession, the author has investigated various pros and cons in the post-merger.

4.4.5.1. Positive Outcome of the Merger

All data sources invariably asserted that the merger has made difference in maintenance of peace and order. “Those *Woredas* which were frequently in conflict one another have recently radically improved. Those *Woredas* which were notoriously known for repelling one another and with little culture of co-operation have become co-operative and compassionate.”¹⁰⁸

Another informant marked that since the establishment of the Zone, the Guji has ceased attacking against Burji and Amaro that frequently used to happen, which is exactly attributable to the administrative merger. The possible reason for the Guji is perhaps, it might felt that the *joint force* would combat and may even retaliate against it. This informant added that Burji and Amaro were fed up with the frequent violence of Guji, and the fight claimed several lives.¹⁰⁹

Plenty of data and information obtained employing multiple instruments have asserted that the merger has made difference in peace making. In the course of the FGD also the same assertion was witnessed. Based on these findings with triangulation of multiple data sources, the author confidently proves that the merger has brought relative peace, order and stability.

¹⁰⁸ Interview a member of *Zonal Council*, Segen, 26March 2014

¹⁰⁹ Interview13, Ex-Burji Special *Woreda Council* member, Segen, 25March 2014

Some informants argued that the merger has positively contributed for societal cooperation. The merger has shown a positive signal in societal relation. *Zonal* institutions are not only creating job opportunity but also even more accelerating the social interaction by building socio-cultural intimacy and closeness that eventually establishes a community with common psychological makeup.¹¹⁰ However, the author has faced contradictory views in this respect. Some informants reflected as follows:

There is division at the élites' level, and they are manipulating masses to discolor unity. The potential for unity is challenged by defects of accommodation. There is no mechanism that ensures seats for minorities in *Zonal* institutions both at the council and executive arm. Demographic size of the respective *Woredas* is the sole criterion taken into account in power allotment.¹¹¹

This remark inspired the author to assess the power sharing mechanism that whether there is such imperfection and defect in practice with accession of empirical data sources. According to the data obtained from zonal officials about power sharing scheme, there are mechanisms, but it is as the author had already been informed. It is computed based on demographic size of the respective *Woredas* and not based on ethnic composition in strict sense of term. For instance, the *Zonal* council has a sum of 50 seats and each *Woreda* (there are 5 *Woredas*) assumes 10 seats notwithstanding ethnic composition. And hence, *Dirashe*, a multinational *Woreda*, has four ethnic groups within; however, it receives 10 seats as any of the uni-national *Woredas*. The informant added that, “the concern here is population amount of the *Woredas*, not the ethnic composition of the *Woredas* as such. The *Zonal* council behaves in this way.”¹¹² The mandate of *Zonal* council include: power of supervision and control over the ordinary *Woredas*, making direct contact to the state in its intergovernmental relation on behalf of the ordinary *Woredas*. It determines working language and cultural right matters of the NNPs within the *Zone*. It approves its own budget based on the budget allocated to it by state council. It appoints presidents and vice presidents of *Zonal* High Court and *Woreda* First Instant Courts (Art 81(3) of the SNNPRS constitution 2001).

¹¹⁰ Interview11, a school principal, Segen, 25March 2014

¹¹¹ Interviewee1, a member of executive state council, Hawassa, 17March 2014

¹¹² Interviewee10, member of *Zonal* council, Segen, 25March 2014

The issue of ethnic accommodation by granting quota seats is left to the concerned *Woreda(s)* to vigorously implement it. Therefore, each *Woreda* within given quota seats may reconsider the issue of accommodation. For instance, *Dirashe* has been allotted 10 seats and hence, it is up to *Dirashe Woreda* to make sure that all ethnic groups within are represented in *Zonal* council.¹¹³

The author was informed that, currently all ethnic members have got seats in *Zonal* council. However, it is not that accommodative because unfair share apportioned to *Dirashe Woreda* because minorities are not duly taken into account. For instance, both at State Council and HoPR minorities have reserve seats, in a similar vein there could have been reserve seat. In this respect, the proportion of the *Dirashe Woreda* seat has to be revisited with extra reserve.

The problem is that the State Constitution presupposes each NNP would constitute own *Zone/special Woreda*. The State constitution has failed to predict probability of composite multinational Zones/Special *Woredas* so that it has fallen short of accommodation at local level. The state constitution didn't grant ethnic minorities to have reserve seats at local council because *Zone/Special Woreda* is not availed for accommodation but for self-rule as a singular unit. In the ex-special *Woredas*, the Special *Woredas* were represented by each ethnic group with equivalent power to the present *Segen Zone* constitutionally speaking.

As it was dealt with in chapter three, *Zonal* council is *assemblage* of those who got elected from the respective Zones for State Council and those elected for *Zonal* council. Its merit was discussed in chapter three, to mention say, it establishes vertical legislative relationship; it reduces awareness gaps the respective *Zonal* Councils, etc. In the case of *Segen Zone*, the *Zonal* Council is a joint of the 50 seats of the *Zonal* council elected for this end and those members of the state council elected from the *Segen Zone*. Accordingly, there are a total of 68 members for *Segen Zonal* Council. Out of which 18 are members of the State Council elected from the special *Woredas* a year before the establishment of the *Segen Zone*.¹¹⁴

On the other hand, power sharing in the executive arm is even more important concern to look into. As to how power is shared in this institution, the author explored the scheme.

¹¹³ Chief of *Dirashe Woreda* SEPDM head, *Gidole*, 28 March 2014

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*

Regarding executive council, the author has been informed that there is power sharing in the sense of demographic size again, not in ethnic sense, and out of 12 cabinet seats, Konso and Amaro takes 3 each, and Alle, and Burji, Dirashe each 2.¹¹⁵

From the figure above it is possible to infer that Konso and Kore with relative significant demographic share have more opportunity than minorities which are likely to be forsaken. From this figure itself it is possible to detect two minorities which are left without any sort of accommodation because the share of the *Dirashe* is under its ethnic composition. While it has four indigenous ethnic groups, the *Dirashes'* share is limited to two for it was computed on account of demographic size. And yet, as per power sharing scheme, this format can be justified in that *significant groups* (Konso and Kore) have shared power in a way that it can ensure stability.

Finally, power sharing in the context of Judiciary has been explored. Despite the fact that Court is independent and merit based institution in the course of appointment, there is usually tacit rule and formulae in the multinational federations. In the case of Segen Zonal High Court, it is established with constituting judges from all the previous special Woreda High Courts.¹¹⁶

The effect of the merger with respect to efficiency and job opportunity was empirically evaluated with data accession employing interview and participant FGD. In both cases the author has found out contradictory views. The positive response includes that the newly established Zone overcame duplication of governmental activities, minimized expenditure, time, and resource wastage.¹¹⁷

However, contrary views were also held regarding efficiency that the ex-Special *Woredas* were even better than the newly established Zonal center. Effective service delivery has been bottlenecked by insufficient infrastructural facilities. For instance, an accused person whose case is referred to the High Court has to visit *Segen Zone* from any of the *Woredas*.

¹¹⁵ Interviewee 9, Administrative Chief, Segen, 25 March 2014

¹¹⁶ Kara M. Segen Zone SEPDM owner of urban politics organizing department, 26 March 2014

¹¹⁷ Interviewee 16, Department Head, *Segen*, 26 March 2014

There is no road and transportation facility, however. But the same court was in service in the nearby *Woreda* that recently have been demoted to *Woreda* First Instance Court.¹¹⁸

In view of the employment opportunity also there is contradiction. Some informants asserted that the newly established Zonal institutions have become source of employment. On the contrary, others argued that ‘brain drain’ of the educated and skilled personnel from the *Woreda* to Zonal Centre is negatively affecting the potential growth and development of the *Woredas*. Following the merger, well educated, experienced, and skilled personnel are wiped out from the respective *Woredas*. Depopulation of skilled human resource (social capital) that taken away recruiting and assigning to the newly established centre from the respective *Woredas* has caused poor leadership at the *Woredas* because of little experienced leadership. The Special *Woredas* which had Zonal status and quailed staff recently relinquished to ordinary *Woreda* status with less qualified staff.¹¹⁹

To be sure, the establishment of the Zone is at the cost of the *Woredas*’ opportunity for growth and development. The merger act has brought reduction of governmental institutions (offices) in the *Woredas*, including the High Court for these institutions have to be relocated somewhere in pocket area so that those destitute people would incur more cost in search of the remote even without adequate road and transportation facilities.¹²⁰ The same informant further added that insufficient road and transportation are severely affecting commercial activities in the whole spheres. To conclude, the positive outcome obtained as a result of the merger include: job opportunity though with adverse effect, peace and stability, social solidarity and cooperation, and socio-cultural intimacy. From the findings the core positive effect is that it has brought stability to the community as compared to its past scenario.

4.4.5.2. Negative Outcome of the Merger

First, the author explored the minute of the SEPDM decision No. 11/2011. As per the minute, the merger had some six intended targets. The minute stated that the structure and status of special *Woreda* is constitutional right of the Ethnic groups and thus their councils’

¹¹⁸ Interviewee 15, *Segen*, 26March 2014

¹¹⁹ *ibid*

¹²⁰ Interviewee12, Zonal youth and sport officer, *Segen*, 25March 2014

power remains unaffected. The special *Woredas* will have joint administrative centre, which improves the benefit of the ethnic groups in the area creating favorable landscape.¹²¹

For achievement of policies and strategies, and for enhancement of products and production, peace and order is required in advance. And thus, the reconfiguration of the Special *Woredas* under one self-governing entity entails this basic assumption. The fragile and tiny self-governing entities manufacture bigger self-administration with administrative merger. In doing so, capacity enhances through co-operative integration of one another, and which again reduces time, finance, and resources of the regional government in the effort to resolve the frequently occurring conflicts. The merger is thus a way out.¹²²

However, from the minute it is evident that there are ambiguous points reflected which needs to be reconsidered. The establishment of the new *Zone* according to the party's minute becomes *strange* because it argues that the newly established *Zone*, which is self-governing entity, leaves the ex-special *Woredas'* autonomy unaffected but it is extra constitutional.

According to the SNNPRS Constitution which is anomalous because a *Zone/Special Woreda* is autonomous unit whereas Ordinary *Woredas* are subordinate units to the respective *Zones* as it has been discussed in the preceding unit. The role of the ordinary *Woredas* is restricted to functionary role and/or public service provision. The *Woredas* are not endowed with key identity related self-government autonomy like the power to determine on the working language. For instance, it is power of *Zonal council* to determine on the working language of the *Zone*. In general, it is *Zonal council* that constitutionally entrusted to decide on all identity related matters. It is *Zone* which is untimely entrusted to fire and hire the *Woreda* officials if deems necessary. It is *Zone* that plays the role of supervision. Accountability of the *Woreda* executive council is to *Zonal Council* in vertical intergovernmental relation. The chief of the *Woreda* is accountable to *Zonal Chief* and not to the chief executive of the State as discussed in chapter three. Therefore, the party's minute is fallacious in this respect.

¹²¹ Minute, the establishment of the four special *Woreda* in to one zone, SEPDM, 2011, Hawassa P.2-3

¹²² Ibid :5

According to the data obtained through interview with regard to the impact of the merger on the respective *Woredas*, reduction of *capital budget*, frequent transfer of skilled man power, decline in the pace of development program, particularly infrastructure of urban development program has been critical issue.¹²³ All these four special *Woredas* were on equal footing in autonomy with Zonal administration prior to the merger. They had financial and administrative competence and liberty. They were conveniently situated to the people for service accession. They had their Council, Executive, Judiciary equivalent to Zonal jurisdiction. The High Court was reduced to *Woreda* First Instant Court following the merger. The executive power has become under direct control and supervision of *Zonal* government with vertical accountability. Neither the *Woreda* council nor the *Woreda* executive arm possesses direct contact to the regional government anymore. The ordinary *Woreda* council is not in a position to determine its own official language as opposed to its previous position. Thus, the merged units are destined to resume with *lingua franca*-Amharic. The newly formed Zonal Council works together, decides together. There is no independent political decision making. Everything is in common. It is tedious as to which language the new *Zone* would adopt as a working language. The practice of self-rule has drastically fallen following the merger that relinquished the status of the special *Woredas* to ordinary *Woreda*, which the latter has meager constitutional right to practice self-rule. Admittedly, it was about shrinking the power and competence of the hitherto Special *Woredas* that what was achieved with this administrative merger.¹²⁴

4.4.6. Conclusion

In this particular unit, the research questions were administered employing multiple data generating instruments. Most importantly, it has shown the general figure of the study area. Findings of the study includes that the pressing factors behind the administrative merger was the need for combating frequently happening conflict within. As it was explored, the area was characterized by vast array of instability and disorder caused mainly by resource based clash. The emergence of another new *Woreda* (Alle) in the area also could have the possibility of Special *Woreda* if the merger was not committed. Obviously, this phenomenon

¹²³ Interviewee 14 a member of *Woreda* Council, Segen, 26 March 2014

¹²⁴ Interviewee 10, Zonal Council, Segen, 25 March 2014

creates burden on the regional government. The cunning approach is therefore to merge them and ease its load.

The study proved that the key role player of the merger was the regional government. It was the regional government which conducted study about the viability of the administrative merger and facilitated the concomitants to have got merged. According to the finding there was consultation at various levels concerning the benefit of the merger. In this respect, there is trajectory shift in the legacy of the incumbent party in that in its previous legacy which was known for imposed unification like in the case of the *Wogagoda*, or even in the creation of the SNNPRS itself. This is indeed a leap in the incumbent party's legacy of centralization-a shift from forced centralization to appeased centralization. Admittedly, the merger has made changes in relation to peace making. The relegation of the NNPs constitutional right to self-government could be justified on account of the restoration of peace, order and stability that the people in the area were longing for. And again, on account of the fact that the administrative merger was not unashamedly imposed top-down, may be subtle, otherwise, because referendum is the sole litmus test to prove that it was the consent of the people boldly.

Because of the merger, concomitants have surrendered their autonomy to the newly installed administrative entity. Because of this merger, they have instantly degenerated from nationality to multinational administration after a long period (some 15 years) of experience. In doing so, they have abandoned their exclusive autonomy for self-rule. They have complicated their constitutionally guaranteed right to self-determination. But looking at the whole scenario it seems that the concomitants are loser than winner. It would have been better for them to find other alternatives to solve the problem within. The regional government which argues to have made studies before the initiative, what kind of study was it? In fact, up on this merger the regional government seems to have benefited in cost minimization. It must be this one which was paid more attention with the alleged study. Otherwise, it would have been better to find out other alternatives in the endeavor to bring down the recurrently occurring conflicts.

Chapter Five

5. Conclusion and Recommendation

5.1. Conclusion

As it was uncovered in the theoretical and empirical sessions of this thesis development with reference to self-government, the incumbent party, EPRDF/SEPDM, has not been abided by its original ideological pledge nor respected the very frame of reference- that of the constitution. Those ethnic groups which were constitutionally promised for genuine self-administration since the inception of the federal project, their satisfaction have just remained in its ideological commitment than the practice. In actual implementation, however, it (the political practice) has deprived their genuine self-administration entitlement. Theoretical framework in the binder and practice on the ground has remained irreconcilable subject in the federal political order of Ethiopia since its evolution.

Writing of this MA thesis has not only been an academic mission for the author but also has been a dutiful expedition to show gaps in the federal political order of the country and point out the possible medications for the healthy operation of the federal project to the future. It is with this spirit that the author offers the following remarks summarizing the whole results and/or findings.

Of course, the various theoretical discourses explored in the preceding units have attested the possibility of unity in diversity with the adoption of multinational federal project. Under this section various discourse were entertained about the viability of multinational federal political order. In the context of Ethiopia, this project was induced due to the pressing factors from below in dialectics. As various literatures testified for polities like Ethiopia, which is characterized by diversity and vast geographic size, federal political order is the only viable suit.

Many argue that in Ethiopia ‘ethnic’ federalism has become a bottleneck for effective unity, and hence they attempt to recommend national federalism. However, national federalism has been proven to become the inverted form of the Jacobinist nation-state, which cannot

tolerate and accommodate diversity and provide room for self-government. Under this subsection the author raised the case of USA which is a classic example and elucidated the practical defects.

The idea of self-determination was elaborated in the same chapter with the objective to justify the practice of Ethiopian federal political order. As the discussion has shown self-determination is global concern and not restricted to the federal constitution of Ethiopia. It is the utmost requirement in virtually all international legal documents. It has evidently shown that among others it has been incorporated in the UN charter. The notion is that any group must not be oppressed by other agent(s). Accordingly, 'group' is defined in a way the NNPs are defined.

Ethnicity was another key issue in this thesis write-up. As the federal political order of Ethiopia was largely based on ethnic/linguistic territorialization and power delineation, many criticized on its stance. To be sure, the constitution defines the nations, nationalities, and peoples based on ethnicity. Otherwise, the term NNP directly address to ethnic groups with connotation of various position, and with unique characteristics. The intertwined concept of self-rule with the former entity is a big deal in the Ethiopian federal political context, particularly in the SNNPRS. This is mainly because there is big variance.

As the exploration of the genesis of the SNNPRS has shown, it was the outcome of a tacit unilateral culmination of the incumbent party notwithstanding the hitherto arrangement (region7-11) with a due negotiation of the Interim Council of Representative. The re-engineering of the SNNPRS from its transitional period skeleton was precipitated by unification of the incumbent party. Closely looking into the gradual political development in the SNNPRS and the practice of self-rule in the meantime, there proves to be a non-stop centralization tendency within the incumbent party with the resultant defect on practice of self-rule at any rate. In the author's attempt to explore institutional setups, including the genetic makeup of the region and the incumbent party, various sources asserted that both entities are walking along the track of centralization and uniformity than promoting diversity to maintain unity. The incumbent party's centralization has ever been intensifying, and

which has resulted in amalgamation of the various ethnic groups in one roof. Those five states (region7-11) tacitly put together as a result.

This is however antithetical to the gist of any multinational federal political order in general and to the Federal constitution of Ethiopia in particular. Practically, the incumbent party pursues the old trend. It is just the old wine in a new sack. The incumbent party is doing in the way it was done but failed. The country tried it, tested it for years, what ‘nation-building’ was meant, the need for repeating the old political cult produces degeneration eventually. The recently developed but the failed project could be a testimony here. Externally imposed homogenization project of the *Wogagoda* could be a nice lesson for the incumbent party. Unfortunately, the ruling party failed to draw lessons from that particular instant, and repeated (by hook or by crook) merging the ethnic groups which were in a position to better exercise their self-rule right on account of administrative efficiency, conflict management, economic solidarity, and so on.

5.2. Recommendation

- ❖ Following the merger stagnation of capital budget to the ordinary *Woredas* has become evident as it has been diverted to the newly established Zonal centre, which eventually might cause resentment over the creation of the new Zone with a resultant threat for sustainability of the Zone itself. Thus, the regional government has to add capital budget the ex-special *Woredas*.
- ❖ Besides, since it is a new Zone, it has no facilities to shoulder the newly developing political dynamics. There are no infrastructures such as road which connects the *Woredas* with the newly established Zone, public health centre, hospital, and so many other infrastructures. The regional government has to provide adequate budget to the newly established Zone under consideration of ethnic composition and minority prevalence.
- ❖ The Zonal government has to devise mechanism for accommodation of minorities with equitable representation in Zonal institutions irrespective of constitutional limitation.
- ❖ Delimitation of self-administrative local units should be stable enough. If redrawing of the existing boundary deems necessary, it should be based on thorough evaluation in terms of its long term political implications, economic and administration feasibilities.

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Appendix-I

1. Checklist of the qualitative interview and list of interviewees or informants

The questions below were formulated and used as a checklist for interview. However, the interview process didn't necessarily and stringently follow the sequence for the interview process had to be smooth instead of 'hard talk', and again not limited to these questions.

A. Checklists used for focus group Discussion

1. Who was key role player for the initiation of the merger?
2. How was the community or the public participated for the establishment of the Zone?
3. What advantages has the merger offered to the NNPs and to the peoples as the whole?
Like in terms of social, economic, and political development

3. How do you get the newly developed administration of *Segen* zone, vis-à-vis social consolidation and integration, economic transaction, maintenance of peace, order and stability, job opportunity, and so on?

B. Interview questions directed to the *Woreda* level government official informants

1. Who took the initiative for the establishment of the *Segen* Zone?
2. What advantage does the establishment offer to the NNPs concerned?
3. How participatory was the merger act? And what looks like the reaction?
4. How reacted the previously special *Woreda* councils to the newly arrangement?
3. What role played by regional government to the merger of the special *Woredas*?
4. How do you see the previous status of special *Woreda*'s powers and functions against the current ordinary *Woreda* status?
6. What implication of the merger on the status of the NNPs right to self rule?

C. Interview questions directed to Zonal Council members and officials worked/ing there

1. Could you explain the main objective and purpose of the zone vis-à-vis the previous specials *Woredas* concern?
2. What advantages could have the merger to the NNPs of the previously special *Woredas*?
3. What does the nomenclature of the Zone refer to, and how you selected the center?
3. How able is the newly established zone to shoulder the new political development?

4. What are the challenges facing the newly established zone in general?
5. How does the Zonal Council currently operate? Like, how many seats the council embodies and how representative is it?
6. How many cabinet/seats do the zone administrative council have, how the *Woreda* or ethnic groups are guaranteed, and how and on what criteria they are represented?
7. Who allocates the Zone and the *Woreda* budget, and what are the variables taken into consideration in budget allocation?

D. Interview questions directed to State Council members and officials

1. What is the justification for the merger and reconstitution of *Segen* Zone?
2. Where did the initiative come from the need to reconstitute the hitherto special *woredas*?
3. Does it not the merger act contradict with the constitutional provision of the NNPs to self-rule? Like does it not the merger act impend the NNPs concerned for practice of self-rule?
4. How the house/council approved the establishment of the zone, what are the proceedings of the house?

E. Interview questions directed the civil servants at Zonal and the *Woredas* level

1. How was key role player for the initiation and mplementation of establishment of the new Zone?
2. How was the community or the public participated for the establishment of the Zone?
3. What kind of advantages offered the establishment of the new Zone to the NNPs, and to the people as the whole? Like, in terms of social, economic, and political development.
4. How do you get the newly developed administration of the *Segen* Zone in terms of economic transaction, peace, order and stability, job opportunity, and so on?

F. Interview Questions Directed to Council of Nationalities (CoN)

1. How is your institution effective protection of the NNPs right to self-rule which is unconditional right provided in the covenant-the FDRE Constitution?
2. It is said to be that your institution is ineffective to address the claims of the various NNPs to self rule mainly because of stringent legislation and your affiliation to the party, how do you see that?

3. Needless to mention that the SNNPRS is diverse in its composition how are you accommodating this diversity and maintaining unity amidst?
4. Often the incumbent party is blamed of exercising against the gist of the Constitution for tending to unity than promoting diversity how do you see that?
5. How do you look at the merger of the previously special *Woredas* of the current Segen Zone? Like, what effects could it have on the concomitant parties/NNPs vis-à-vis self-rule?
6. Was the idea deliberated by your institution? Like, what scheme pursued in the course of concluding the merger, was there consultative sessions in your institution? Which party brought the idea before the table? How welcoming was your institution to this proposal?
7. As your institution is the guardian of the constitution and the NNPs of the region what schemes were devised in case the NNPs get affected by the merger act?
8. Which institution of the government was responsible to pass final decision for the establishment of new composite self-administration? And finally, what benefits could you notice in the post of the merger vis-à-vis peace and stability as well as any other factors?

G. Interview questions directed to opposition parties

1. How do you see the new political development?
2. Whose initiation do you think was it? What for?
3. Do you think that the merger affects the self-ruling entities (NNPs) at the local level?
4. Do you think that the merger contradicts with the constitutional right of the NNPs?
5. How do you feel about the political development in the SNNPRS? Like do you think that the incumbent party is respecting the promise of the covenant or working against it?

Appendix-II

A. List of those informants who preferred to remain anonymous with their code number.

No.	Code of No.	Position	Place of Interview	Date of Interview
1	Interviewee 1	A member of Executive council	Hawassa	17 March 2014
2	Interviewee 2	A member of state council	Hawassa	17 March 2014
3	Interviewee 3	A member of opposition party (<i>Medrek</i>)	Hawassa	18 March 2014
4	Interviewee 4	Civil servant	Hawassa	18 March 2014
5	Interviewee 5	A member of opposition party (SLF)	Hawassa	18 March 2014
6	Interviewee 6	Ex-Chief Executive of the SNNPRS	Addis Ababa	10 March 2014
7	Interviewee 7	A member of <i>Woreda</i> Council	Karat	24March2014
8	Interviewee 8	Chief Administrator of Konso Woreda	Karat	24 March 2014
9	Interviewee 9	Chief administrator of Segen Zone	Segen	25 March 2014
10	Interviewee 10	A member of Zonal Council	Segen	25 March 2014
11	Interviewee 11	A school principal	Segen	25 March 2014
12	Interviewee 12	Zonal youth and sport officer	Segen	25 March 2014
13	Interviewee 13	Ex-Burji Special Woreda council member	Segen	25 March 2014
14	Interviewee 14	The representative of Amaro woreda council	Segen	26 March 2014
15	Interviewee 15	Health officer	Segen	26 March 2014
16	Interviewee 16	Education department head	Segen	26 March 2014
17	Interviewee 17	Civil Servant	Segen	27 March 2014

B. List of key informants who were voluntary to disclose their identity in time of request

1. Ato Temesgen Tilahun, Head Office of Affiliated Parties and Organization Department, a member of SEPDM Central Committee, and member of EPRDF General Assembly, Addis Ababa, 12 March, 2014
2. Ato Tesfaye Benjige, a member of SEPDM Central Committee and Vice-Chairperson of the Party Hawassa 18 March 2014
3. Ato Daniel Demissie, Secretary of Constitutional and Regional Affairs Standing Committee in HoF, Member of the SNNPRS State Council, Addis Ababa, 16 March 2014.
4. Ato Adane Gebeyehu, Head of Office of Good Governance and Administrative Affairs in SNNPR, President Office, Hawassa, 16 March, 2014
5. Ato Abdulkadir, ex-head of Justice Office in Burji Special *Woreda*, now public prosecutor in SNNPR Justice Bureau, Hawassa, 17 March, 2014
6. Ato. Darsema Ansa, an Expert of Nationalities Right in CoN, Hawassa, 17 March 2014
7. Ato Chuna Buya head of Burji *woreda* agriculture & rural dev't office, Segen 27 March 2014
8. Ato Katale Gelebo coordinator of the Konso *woreda* community policing, karat 23 March 2014
9. Ato Ditaye Shorrebite the speaker of the Dirashe *woreda* council. Gidole 28 March 2013
10. Yelima Ketema the Chief of Dirashe *Woreda* SEPDM sub- branch office, Gidole, 28 March 2014
11. Kara Mamo Segen Zone SEPDM owner of urban politics organizing department, 26 March 2014
12. Ato Kedir Daro Civil Servant, 21 March 2004
13. Ato Tadewos Lemma Member of *woreda* council, Gidole, 28 March 2014
14. Tamiru Getalo, Head of Dev. Asso. Gidole, 28 March 2014
15. Mamo Gedebo, Member of state Council, Addis Ababa, 10 March 2014
16. Pawlos Atiso, a member of Executive Council, Karat, 23 March 2014
17. Biru Simalo, Civil Servant, Karat, 23 March 2014
18. Maritu Geletu, Rural development expert, Karat, 23 March 2014
19. Pawolos Kanchre, Legal expert, Karat, 24 March 2014
20. Ayele Koricho, a member of administrative council, Segen, 26 March 2014
21. Yared Baneto, Expert in Council of Nationalities, Hawassa, 17 March 2014

Appendix III

አራት ልዩ ወረዳዎችና አንድ ወረዳ

በዞን

ለማደራጀት የቀረበ

የመወያያ መነሻ ጽሁፍ

የደ.አ.ሀ.ዴ.ን ማ/ኮ/ጽ/ቤት

ታህሳስ 2003 ዓም

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አራት ልዩ ወረዳዎችና አንድ ወረዳ በዞን ለማደራጀት የቀረበ የመወያያ መነሻ ጽሁፍ

መግቢያ

አሁን ያለንበት ዘመን የዓለም ህዝቦች ከመራራቅ ይልቅ መቀራረብን ብቻ ከመሆን ይልቅ በጋራ መሆንን መተሳሰርን፣ የጋራ ጥቅሞችን በጋራ የማሳደግን፣ የጋራ ኢኮኖሚያዊና ፖለቲካዊ ማህበረሰብ የመፍጠርን አስተሳሰብ እያዳበሩ የመጡበት ጊዜ ነው። ይህንኑ የዓለም ሁኔታን ከግምት ውስጥ በማስገባትና የአገራችንን ተጨባጭ ሀቅ መሠረት በማድረግ የተቀረፀው ህገ መንግስታችን በህዝቦች መፈቃቀድ ላይ የተመሰረተ አንድነትን የሚያጠናክር፣ ልዩነትንና ብዙሀነትን የሚቀበል ፌዴራላዊ የመንግስት አወቃቀርን የተላበሰ እንዲሆን ተደርጓል። የክልላችን ህገ-መንግስትም ይህንኑ መሰረታዊ እውነታ ያገናዘበ ነው። የክልላችን አደረጃጀት ብሔሮች፣ ብሔረሰቦችና ህዝቦች መገኛና መኖሪያ ብቻ ሳይሆን የበርካታ ባህሎች፣ ቋንቋዎችና ሃይማኖቶች መኖሪያ እርስበርሳቸው የሚከበሩበትና የሚቻቻሉበት መልካም እሴት ያለውና ህገ መንግስታዊ ዋስትና ያለው ኢኮኖሚያዊና ፖለቲካዊ ማህበረሰብ ለመመስረት ሰፊ መሰረት የተጣለበት ነው። በዚህ ረገድ በአገራችን እየተገነባ ያለው ዲሞክራሲያዊ ፌዴራሊዝም ለክልላችን ከፍተኛ አስተዋጽኦ እያበረከተ የሚገኝ ሲሆን ክልላችንም ለዚሁ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ፌዴራሊዝም የበኩሉን ጉልህ ድርሻ እያበረከተ ይገኛል።

ክልላችን ከፍ ሲል እንደተገለፀው የበርካታ ብሔሮች ብሔረሰቦችና ህዝቦች መገኛና መኖሪያ ከመሆኑ አንጻር ምንም አይነት እንቅፋትና የተለየ ችግር ሳይገጥመን በየአካባቢያቸው የብሔር ብሔረሰብ መብቶቻቸውና ባህላቸው ቋንቋቸው ተከብሮ ባህላቸውን እያሳደጉ አካባቢያቸውን ራሳቸው እንዲያስተዳድሩና እንዲወስኑ የተደረገበት የፖለቲካ አስተሳሰብ እየተፈጠረ የሚገኝ ስሆን በአገራችን ይህ የመጀመሪያ እንደመሆኑ መጠን ለእኛ ጭቁን ህዝቦች ያለውና የሚኖረው ዘርፈ ብዙ ፋይዳ በቀላሉ የሚገመት አይሆንም። በዚህም በርካታ የፖለቲካና የኢኮኖሚ ለውጥ መጥቷል። ባለፉት ዓመታትም በዚህ ረገድ ባለ ሁለት ዲጅት ዕድገት በክልላችን በመመዘገቡ ህዝቦችን ይኸው ፌዴራላዊ አደረጃጀትና ልማታዊ አቅጣጫ ያመጣው ውጤት ለመሆኑ ጥርጥር አይኖርም። በዚህም የቡርጂ፣ የአማር፣ የኮንሶና የደራሼ ልዩ ወረዳና የአሌ ወረዳ ብሔረሰቦች ተጠቃሚነታቸውን በማያጠራጥር መልኩ ሲያረጋግጡ ቆይተዋል። ሆኖም ከዚህ በላይ የተጠቀሰውን

ተጠቃሚነት ይበልጥ ሊመዘገብ የሚችሉባቸውን አደረጃጀቶችን መፈተሽ ጠቃሚና ገንቢ ጎኖችን ወደፊት ሊያስገኝ ከሚችልባቸው ፋይዳዎች አንፃር ማየቱ ሊተኮር የሚገባ ጉዳይ መሆኑን ማንሳት ያስፈልጋል። ምክንያቱም እነዚህ ልዩ ወረዳዎች ህገ መንግስቱ ያገናፀፋቸው መብቶችና ጥቅሞች የተጠበቁና ማንም ገደብ የሚጥልባቸው አይሆንም። ከዚህ ጎን ለጎንና ይህንኑ የበለጠ ተጠቃሚነትን ለማረጋገጥ ከልማትና ሌሎችም ተጓዳኝ ጉዳዮች ተጠቃሚ ሊያደርግ የሚችል አደረጃጀቶችን በጋራና በተቀናጀ መንገድ እንዲመሩ ማድረግ ወቅቱ የሚፈልገው ጉዳይ ከመሆኑም በላይ የልዩ ወረዳዎቹ ብሔረሰቦች ከዚህ በፊት በተደረጉ ውይይቶች በአስተያየታቸው ይሁንታን ሲቸሩ የቆዩበት ጉዳይ ነበር።በዚህ ረገድ የተወሰኑ ነጥቦችን አንስተን ማየት ይቻላል።

2. የልዩ ወረዳዎቹና የወረዳው መገሻ ሁኔታና የአደረጃጀት ፋይዳው፡-

2.1. ፖለቲካዊ መገሻና ፋይዳዎች

ባለፉት ሥርዓቶች በአምስቱም ወረዳዎች የሚኖሩ ህዝቦች እንደሌሎቹ የሀገራችን ህዝቦች ሁሉ ተመሳሳይ የጭቆና ብትር ያረፈባቸው በመሆኑ ስለማንነታቸው (ባህል፣ ቋንቋ፣ ሀይማኖት፣ ራስን በራስ የማስተዳደር ...) ጥያቄ የማንሳትና የመጠየቅ መብት እንደነውር የሚወስድበት የሰብአዊና የዲሞክራሲያዊ መብቶች የታፈነበት ዘመናት መሆናቸው የቅርብ ጊዜ ትዝታ ነው። ይህ አስከፊና ጨቋኝ ሥርዓት በኢትዮጵያ ውድ ልጆች ከተገረሰ በኋላ ህገ መንግስታዊና ዲሞክራሲያዊ ፌዴራል ሥርዓት በሀገራችን እውን ሊሆን ችሏል። የዚህ ሥርዓት ውጤቶችን በብዙ መልኩ መግለጽና መተንተን የሚቻልና የሚገባ መሆኑ እንደተጠበቀ ሆኖ የተለየና ልዩ የሚያደርገው የብሔር፣ ብሔረሰቦች መብት (ዲሞክራሲያዊና ሰብአዊ መብቶች) በፖለቲካዊ መንገድ መፈታታቸውና መከበራቸው ሲሆን እነዚህ ሁሉ ህገ መንግስታዊ ዋስትና ያገኙበትና የተረጋገጠበት መሆኑ ለሀገራችንም ሆነ ለክልላችን የተለየ ድል አድርገን መውሰድ የሚገባን ነው።

ስለሆነም የአራቱም ልዩ ወረዳዎችና የአሌ ወረዳ የወረዳው ብሔረሰቦችና ህዝቦች ከዚህ ድል ተቋቋሽ በመሆን ባለፉት ሁለት አሥርተ ዓመታት የበርካታ የፖለቲካና የኢኮኖሚያዊ ድሎች ባለቤቶች ሆነዋል። ይህ ፖለቲካዊና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ድሎች በመተባበርና በመተሳሰብ በጋራና በተጣመረ መንገድ የምንቀጥልበትን ሁኔታ ማየትና መቃኘት የተገኙትን የፖለቲካና የኢኮኖሚ ድሎችን የበለጠ እንድናስፋና ህብረተሰባችንን የበለጠ እንዲጠቅም

ያደርጋል። በአሁኑ ሰዓት በየልዩ ወረዳዎቹ ተከፋፍሎ ያለው አደረጃጀት የብሔረሰቦቹ ህገ መንግስታዊ መብታቸው በመሆኑ እንዳሉ የሚቀጥሉና ም/ቤቶቻቸውም የሚቀጥል ሆኖ ልዩ ወረዳዎችንና ወረዳውን አማክሎ ፖለቲካዊ አመራር የሚሰጥ አደረጃጀትን መመስረት ግን እነዚህን ድሎች የበለጠ የሚያጠናክር ከመሆኑም በላይ ዝርዝር ሥራዎችን እንድናውቅና ዕድገቱንም እንድናፋጥነው፣ አቅማቸውንም እንድናሳድግ የሚያደርግ የተሻለ መንገድ ይሆናል።

2.2. ኢኮኖሚያዊና ማህበራዊ ገፅታና ፋይዳው

በአራቱ ልዩ ወረዳዎችና በአንድ ወረዳ የሚኖረው ብሔረሰቦችና ህዝቦች ኢኮኖሚያዊ መሠረታቸው እንደሌሎቹ የክልላችን ብሔር ብሔረሰቦች ሁሉ የግብርና ክፍለ ኢኮኖሚ ነው። ከግብርና አንጻር የተለያዩ የእርሻ ውጤቶች ለአብነት የሰብል እህሎች በቆሎ፣ ስንዴ፣ ገብስና፣ ጤፍ ዋና ዋናዎቹ ሲሆን ለገበያ የሚውል ሌሎች የእርሻ ውጤቶች (cash crops) ቡናና ጫትም ተጠቃሾች ናቸው። የእንሰትና የዓሣ ምርቶችም በአንዳንዶቹ አካባቢዎች የሚገኙ ሲሆን የተለያዩ የቀንደ ከብትም የሚገኝበት ነው። እነዚህ የግብርና ውጤቶች በሁሉም ወረዳዎች በእኩል መልክ ይመረታል ወይም ይገኛል ማለት ግን አይደለም። በአንዱ ዘንድ የሌለውና የሚያንሰው በሌለው አካባቢ በብዛትና በበቂ መጠን የሚገኝበት ሁኔታ ይስተዋላል። ለምሳሌ ጤፍ በቡርጂ በብዛት እንደሚመረት ሲታወቅ በቆሎ ደግሞ ደራሽ በብዛት ይመረታል። ቡናና የእንሰት ውጤቶች በአማሮ በብዛት ይገኛል። የተትረፈረፈ ጉለበትና የተሻለ የሥራ ልምድ ደግሞ በኮንሶ ይገኛል። እነዚህ መሰረታዊ የአካባቢዎቹ ባህርያት ከወቅቱና ከህዝባችን ፍላጎት አንጻር በገበያ እንዲተሳሰሩ ማድረግ ተገቢና ወሳኝ ነገር ይሆናል፣ ተጠቃሚነቱንም እያጎላና እያሻሻለ ይመጣል። እነዚህን የንግድና የገበያ ትስስርን በመፍጠር አንዱ ክልላው ጋር የሚተሳሰርበት የሚመጋገብበትን ሁኔታ በመፍጠር አደረጃጀታቸውን በማስተካከልና በማቀናጀት የበለጠ ሊዳብር ይችላል።

ከማህበራዊ ገፅታ አንጻርም እነዚህ ብሔረሰቦች በአንድም ሆነ በሌላ የየራሳቸው ወግና ባህል፣ ቋንቋ፣ የአኗኗር ዘይቤ ያላቸው መሆኑ እንደተጠበቀ ሆኖ የጋራና የሚወራረስ የጋብቻና የሃይማኖት ትስስሮችም አላቸው። እነዚህ መሠረታዊ ሀቆች በህገ-መንግስታችን የተመለሱና በቂ ዋስትና ያገኙ ጉዳዮች ስለሆኑ እነዚህን ማስቀጠልና ማሳደግ የሚያስፈልግ

ሆኖ በተቀናጀ ፖለቲካዊ አደረጃጀት ቢመራና ድጋፍ ቢሰጥ የተሻለ ተሞክሮና ተደራሽነትን የሚያመጣና የአንዱን ጉድለት አንደኛው አካባቢ የመሙላት ዕድልን የሚያገናኝበት በመሆኑ የአንዱን ጉድለት አንደኛው አካባቢ የመሙላት ዕድልን የሚያገናኝበት በመሆኑ ትኩረት ተሰጥቶት መታየት አለበት። ይህ ጉዳይ በተለይም በትምህርት በጤናና በሌሎች የማህበራዊ ዘርፎች የሚኖራቸውን አፈፃፀሞች ከክልሉ አጠቃላይ ግብ ከአምስት ዓመቱ የዕድገትና የትራንስፎርሜሽን ዕቅድ ጋር በማጣጣም ለመምራትና ለመደገፍ ወሳኝ አቅም የሚፈጥር ይሆናል።

2.3. ልማታዊ ጉዞዎችንና ፋይዳው

የክልላችን መንግስት ከአገራችን መሠረታዊ የልማት አቅጣጫና ፖሊሲ ጋር በማስታረቅና መሠረት በማድረግ የህዝባችንን ድህነትና ድንቁርና ከመሰረቱ ሊንድ የሚችል ፖሊሲና ስትራቴጂ ነድፎ መንቀሳቀስ ከጀመረ ዓመታት አልፏል። ይህ ፖሊሲና ስትራቴጂ በዋናነት የአገራችንም ሆነ የክልላችን መነሻ የሆነውን ጉልበትን ተጠቅሞ ምርቱን በማሳደግ ለግብርና ምርትና ዕድገት አስተዋጽኦ ያደርጋል? እንዴትስ ይጠቀማል? ለሌሎች ልማታዊ ተቋማት እንዴት አስተዋጽኦ ያበረክታል? የዋጋ ግሽበትንና የውጭ ምንዛሬን ችግሮችን እንዴት ይፈታል? የሚሉትን መሠረታዊ ጉዳዮችን አንስቶ ነበር ልማታዊ ጉዞዎችን የቀጠል ነው እንዚህን አቅጣጫዎች ተከትለን የፈፀምናቸው ሥራዎች በልማቱ ዘርፍ ውጤት አምጥቷል። በተለይም ባለፉት ሰባትና ስምንት ዓመታት ተከታታይ ዕድገት በክልላችንም ሆነ በአገራችን የተመዘገበው ከዚህ የተነሳ ነው። በዚህ ረገድ ከሁለትና ሶስት ዓመታት የማስፋት ስትራቴጂ ተግባራዊ በማድረግ ቀላል ያልሆነ አርሶ አደሮች ከፍተኛ ምርት በማግኘት በአገር አቀፍ ደረጃም ሆነ በክልል ደረጃ ተሸላሚ ሆኗል። እነዚህ አርሶ አደሮች በቡርጂ በአማሮና በሌሎችም የሚገኙ ናቸው።ይህ ሥራ ግን ሁሉን በአንድ ጊዜ ሊያደርስ የሚችል መልኩ ሁሉም ተጠቃሚ የሚሆንበትን ሁኔታ ለማመቻቸት የክልላችን መንግስትና መሪ ድርጅቱ ደኢህዴን/ኢህአዴግ ሰፊ ርብርብ እያደረገ ይገኛል። ከግብርና በተጨማሪ በሌሎች ዘርፎችና ሴክተሮችም ተጨባጭና የሚታዩ የልማት ለውጦች ተመዝግቧል። በልዩ ወረዳዎቹ ባለፉት ሥርዓቶች ሙሉ በሙሉ ያልተሰሩና ያልተገነቡ ት/ቤቶች ቁጥር በዚህ ስርዓት ግን በሁሉም በሚባል ሁኔታ ተዳርሶ የብሔረሰቦቹ ልጆች መብታቸውን ተጠቅሞ የሚማሩበት ሁኔታ ተፈጥሯል፤ ይህ ለልማታችን የሚሰጠውን አስተዋፅኦ ከዚህ መረዳት ይቻላል። በጤናና በሌሎች ሴክተሮችም የመጡ ለውጦችን

ህዝባችን ራሱ የሚመሰክረው በመሆኑ የተለየ ገለፃ የሚያስፈልገው አይሆንም። ሆኖም በተለያዩ ምክንያቶች የሚፈጠሩና ልማቱን ወደፊት በፍጥነት ለማራመድ የሚያደናቅፉ ጉዳዮችን ከመመልከትና ከማስተካከል አኳያ በጋራ ተደራጅቶ በጋራ አመራር እንዲመራ ማድረግ የበለጠ የተሻለ ዕድል ይፈጥራል የሚል አስተያየት አለ።

2.4. ፀጥታና ሰላምን ከማስፈን አኳያ ያለው ፋይዳ

ሰላም የልማት መሠረት ነው። ሰላምና ፀጥታ ከሌለ መንግስታችን የተቀየሱት የልማትና የመልካም አስተዳደር ፖሊሲዎችና ስትራቴጂዎቻችን መተግበር አይቻልም። ፖሊሲዎችንና ስትራቴጂዎቻችንን መሠረት በማድረግ የአርሶ አደሩንና የአርብቶ አደሩን ምርትና ምርታማነትን ጨምረን ኑሮአቸውን ወደተሻለ ደረጃ ለማድረስ በየአካባቢው የተረጋጋ የፀጥታ ሁኔታ ሊኖር ይገባል። ይሁን እንጂ ካለፉት ቅርብ ዓመታት ወዲህ በልዩ ወረዳዎቹ የሚፈጠሩት የእርስ በርስና ከአጎራባች ወረዳዎችና ዞኖች ጋር የሚፈጠሩት ግጭቶች የልማትንና የመልካም አስተዳደር ችግሮችን ለመፍታት የሚደረገውን ጥረት ከማደናቀፉም በላይ ውድና መተኪያ የሌለውን የሰው ህይወት ቀጥፎአል፤ ንበረት እንዲወድም ምክንያት ሆኖአል፤ በህይወት የተረፈው ከቀየው አንዲፈናቀል ምክንያት ሆኖአል። ተፈናቃዩም ለተረጂነት ተጋልጦአል። ያላቸውን የእርሻና የሣር ግጦሽ መሬትን በዘመናዊ መንገድ ግብአትን ተጠቅሞ ምርታማነትን ጨምሮ ኑሮውን ከማሻሻል ይልቅ ለዚህ ፍለጋ እየሄደ ከአጎራባች ወረዳዎችና ዞኖችም መጋጨቱ እየተዘወተረ መጥቶአል። በመሆኑም ልዩ ወረዳዎቹና ወረዳው በዞን ደረጃ መደራጀት በየጊዜው እየተከሰተ ያለውን እርስ በርስ ግጭቶችንና ከአጎራባች ዞኖች ጋር የሚፈጠሩትን አለመግባባቶች በተደራጀ መልኩ ተንቀሳቅሶ ለመፍታት አቅም ይፈጥራል። በሚሠሩት የህዝብ ግንኙነት ሥራዎች ግጭቶችንና አለመግባባቶችን ለማስቀረት ይቻላል፤ ከኋላቀር አስተሳሰብና ጎጂ ለማዳደር አመለካከት የሚመነጨ ችግሮችን ደረጃ በደረጃ በመፍታት ግጭቶችን ለማብረድ የምናጠፋውን ጊዜ ፣ ጉልበትና ሀብት እንድንቆጥብ ያስችላል።

2.5. የመልካም አስተዳደር ችግሮችን ለመፍታት ያለው ፋይዳ

መንግስታችን የተለያዩ የመልካም አስተዳደር ችግሮችን ለመፍታት የሚያገለግሉ ፕሮግራሞችን ቀርጾ ሥራ ላይ ከዋለ አመታት ተቆጥረዋል። ይሁን እንጂ የአፈፃፀም ሁኔታው እንደየአቅማችንና እንደየአካባቢያችን ይለያያል። የአመራሩ የተሻለ ፖለቲካዊ ቁርጠኝነት (commitment) ባለበት አካባቢ በተሻለ ሁኔታ ተግባራዊ እየተደረገ ይገኛል። ይህ የአመራሩ ቁርጠኝነትና የአመለካከት ችግር ባለበት አካባቢ ደግሞ የዚያውኑ ያህል የአፈፃፀሙ ሁኔታ የተዳከመ ነው። ለዚህም ጥሩ ምሳሌ የሚሆነው በልዩ ወረዳዎቹ ያለው አንዳንድ አመራር በተለያዩ ጊዜያት በመንግስታችን ፖሊሲዎችና ስትራቴጂዎች ላይ ሥልጠና የወሰዱ ቢሆንም የህዝባችንን የልማትንና የመልካም አስተዳደር ችግሮችን ለመፍታት መልካም አዝማሚያ አይታይም። በሌላ በኩልም አመራሩ በተለያዩ ችግሮች ውስጥ ስለሚገባ የአመራር መለዋወጥ በስፋት የሚታይባቸው ናቸው። የችግሩ ምንጮችም የአመለካከት ጥራትና የብቃት ችግሮች ቁልፍ ሲሆኑ አንዳንዶቹ ደግሞ ከባህላዊና ጎሣዊ አደረጃጀትና ተዕዕኖ ያልተላቀቁ በመሆናቸው ችግሩን አስፍቶታል። ስለሆነም በዙን ደረጃ መደራጀት የህዝባችንን የመልካም አስተዳደር ችግሮች ለመፍታት የተሻለ አመለካከትና ብቃት ያለውን አመራር ከስብስቡ ለማግኘት ያስችለናል።

2.6. የሰለጠነ የሰው ኃይልን ለማሰባሰብ ያለው ፋይዳ

ኢህአዴግ ሀገሪቱን ከመቆጣጠሩ በፊት ቁጥሩ እጅግ የሚበዛው የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ የትምህርት ዕድል ተነፍጎትና ተረስቶ እንደቆየ ይታወቃል። መንግስታችን ይህንን ችግር ከመሰረቱ ለመፍታት የተጓዘው ርቀት እጅግ የሚያበረታታ ነው። ይኸውም የዜጎች የመማር መብት እንዲረጋገጥ ፖሊሲዎችና ስትራቴጂዎች ተቀርፀው ተግባራዊ ሆነዋል። በዚህም በየቀበሌው 1ኛ ደረጃ ት/ቤቶች ተሠርተዋል፣ በየወረዳው ማዕከላት 2ኛ ደረጃ ት/ቤቶች ተሠርተዋል፣ የቴክኒክና ሙያ ማሰልጠኛ ኮሌጆችና ዩኒቨርሲቲዎች እንዲስፋፋ ተደርገዋል። የመማርና የመሰልጠን ምቹ ሁኔታ ተፈጥሮአል። ለዚህም ጥሩ ምሳሌ ሊሆን የሚችለው ከ1983 ዓ.ም በፊት በጣት የሚቆጠሩ ከመምህራን ማሰልጠኛ ተቋማት ሰልጥነው የወጡ መምህራን ብቻ የነበሩት አካባቢዎች በአሁኑ ወቅት በርካታ የመጀመሪያና 2ኛ ድግሪ ያላቸው ምሁራንን ካፈራንበት ወቅት ላይ ደርሰናል። ይሁን እንጂ መንግስታችን ለሁሉም ዜጎች የፈጠረውን የመማርና የመሰልጠን ዕድል በአፈፃፀማችን ችግሮች የተነሣ

እኩል ተጠቅመናል ለማለት አይቻልም። በዚህም የተነሳ በልዩ ወረዳዎቹ የሰለጠነ የሰው ኃይል ክፍተት አሁንም ያለበት ሆኖ እናገኛለን። ያለውም ቢሆን የልዩ ወረዳዎቹ አደረጃጀት ትምህርታቸውን አሻሽለው የሚመጡትን የሚያስተናግድበት መዋቅር አነስተኛ በመሆኑ የተሸለ የኑሮ ሁኔታና ደመወዝ ፍለጋ የሚፈልገው የሰው ኃይል በርካታ ነው። ይህም በድህነት ላይ የከፈትነውን ዘመቻ እንዲራዘም እያደረገው ነው።

ስለሆነም ከሁሉም ወረዳዎች የሚገኙትን ምሁራንን በማሰባሰብ የዞን መዋቅርን በመፍጠር የፈለገውን ወይንም የሚፈልገውን የሰለጠነ የሰው ኃይል ለመግታት ይቻላል። እንዲሁም የልማትና የመልካም አስተዳደር ችግሮችን በዕውቀት ላይ ተመስርቶ ለመፍታት ይቻላል።

በመጨረሻም በልዩ ወረዳዎችና በወረዳው የሚኖሩ የተለያዩ የህብረተሰብ ክፍሎች በዚህ መነሻ መወያያ ጽሑፍ ላይ በመወያየትና ጽሑፉን በማዳበር የተጀመረው አደረጃጀት ልማታችንን ለማፋጠን፣ የመልካም አስተዳደር ችግሮቻችንን በአጭር ጊዜ ውስጥ ለመፍታት የምያስችለንና አንድነታችንን የሚያጠናክረን በመሆኑ ሁሉም ወገን ሚናውን እንዲወጣ ድርጅታችን አጥብቆ ያሳስባል።

አንድነታችንን በማጠናከር በልማቱ ላይ እንረባረብ!!!

Appendix IV

የደቡብ ብሔሮች፣ ብሔረሰቦችና ሕዝቦች ክልል ምክርቤት

4ኛ ዙር 1ኛ ዓመት የስራ ዘመን

2ኛ መደበኛ ጉባዔ

ቃለ-ጉባዔ

የካቲት 15-16/2003 ዓም

ሀዋሳ

አጀንዳ ሶስት

የሰገን አካባቢ ሕዝቦችን ዞን ምስረታ የውሳኔ ሃሳብ

የውሳኔ ሃሳቡን የክልሉ ርዕሰ መስተዳድር ክቡር አቶ ሸፈራው ሸጉጤ እንዲያቀርቡ ተጠይቀው ይህ የውሳኔ ሃሳብ የክልሉ ህገ መንግስት ምዕራፍ 4 አንቀጽ 45 የክልሉን የአስተዳደር እርከን በተመለከተ “የክልሉ መንግስት በዞኖች፣ በልዩ ወረዳዎች፣ በወረዳዎችና በቀበሌዎች የተዋቀረ ነው። ይሁን እንጂ የክልሉ ምክር ቤት አሰራሪ ሆኖ ሲያገኘው ሌሎች የአስተዳደር እርከኖችን ሊያዋቅር ይችላል” ስለሚልና በዋናነት የክልሉ መንግስት በዞኖች በልዩ ወረዳዎች የተዋቀረ በመሆኑ እነዚህንም አደረጃጀቶች በምክር ቤት ማስፈቀድ ስላለብን የቀረበ ነው። ከዚህ በፊት በአራቱ ልዩ ወረዳዎች ማለትም የቡርጂ ልዩ ወረዳ፣ የአማር ልዩ ወረዳ፣ የኮንሶ ልዩ ወረዳ እና የደራሽ ልዩ ወረዳ በወቅቱ በዚህ መንገድ እንዲደራጁ መደረጉ ትክክልና ተገቢ ነበር። አሁን ካለው አጠቃላይ የኢኮኖሚና የልማት እንቅስቃሴ እንዲሁም ከዴሞክራሲያዊ ሥርዓት ግንባታ አንጻር የተፈጠሩትን አቅሞች በጋራ በማስተባበር እና በማጠናከር አንድ የአስተዳደር ዞን ቢኖራቸው የበለጠ ውጤታማ መሆን እንደሚችሉ በመታወቁ በአካባቢው ያለው ሁኔታ በዝርዝር ከተጠና በኋላ ከህዝቡ ጋር ውይይት ተደርጓል። በየልዩ ወረዳዎች ካለው አመራር፣ ምሁራንና ተወላጆች ጋር በምን መንገድ ብናደርጅ የበለጠ ተጠቃሚ አንሆናለን የሚለው ነገር በዝርዝር ከታየ በኋላ በኮንሶ በኩል ገዋዳ፣ በደራሽ በኩል ዶባሴ የተባሉትን ህዝቦች በጋራ “አሌ” በሚል አንድ ወረዳ እንዲደራጁና የቀድሞዎቹ ልዩ ወረዳዎች ባሉበት ወረዳ ሆነው የጋራ ዞን እንዲመሰረት ወስነዋል።

በዚህ መሰረት የአያንዳንዱ ወረዳ ምክር ቤቶች እና እንደ አዲስ የተደራጀው የአሌ ወረዳ በጋራ ሲያሟው ሲቀር በሌሎች ጉዳዮች ከተስማሙ በኋላ ክልል አቀፍ የሁሉም ብሔር ብሔረሰቦችና ህዝቦች ተወካዮች የተገኙበት ኮንፍረንስ ተደርጎ የዞኖቸው ስያሜ “የሰገን አካባቢ ሕዝቦች ዞን” በሚል በጋራ ወስነዋል።

የክልል ምክር ቤት ይህንን የሰገን አካባቢ ህዝቦች ዞን ብሎ እንዲያደራጅና የቀድሞዎቹ አራት ልዩ ወረዳዎች ልዩ ወረዳ መሆናቸው ቀርቶ የኮንሶ ወረዳ፣ የደራሽ ወረዳ፣ የአማር ወረዳ የቡርጂ ወረዳ ከቀድሞዎቹ የደራሽና የኮንሶ ልዩ ወረዳዎች የተለየው አሌ ወረዳ ተብለው ዞኑ አምስት ወረዳዎች ያሉት ሆኖ እንዲደራጅ እንዲሁም ምርጫ ተደርጎ የዞን

ምክር ቤት እስኪደራጅ ድረስ የዙን አስተዳደር ምክር ቤት የመስተዳድር ምክር ቤቱ በጊዜያዊነት እንዲያደራጀው የተከበረው ምክር ቤት ተወያይቶ እንዲያጸድቅልኝ በታላቅ አክብሮት እጠይቃለሁ ሲሉ የውሳኔ ሃሳቡን አቅርበዋል።

አስተያየትና ጥያቄ

የተከበሩ አቶ አበራ ሙላት (ከሃድያ ዞን) ቀደም ሲል እኛ የምናውቃቸው የቡርጂ፣ የኮንሶ፣ የደራጅና የአማር ልዩ ወረዳዎች በእርግጥም ቀድሞ የነበራቸውን አንድነት፣ ኅብረትና መተሳሰር የበለጠ በማጎልበት ለልማትና መልካም አስተዳደር በሚመች መልኩ አደረጃጀት መፈጠሩ እጅግ ወሳኝና ጠቃሚ እንደሆነ ይታያል። እኛም በመስክ ክትትል ምናቸው አነሱም በዛ በአንዳንድ ሁኔታዎች ተፈጥረው የነበሩ ያለመግባባቶች እንዳሉ እናውቃለን። በቂ የሆነ የልማትና የመልካም አስተዳደር ድጋፍ በመስጠት በኩል ያሉብንን ችግሮች ለማስተካከል የሚረዳ አደረጃጀት ነው። በቀጣይ የምናካሂደውን የዕድገትና ትራንስፎርሜሽን ዕቅድ ስኬት የበለጠ ያጎለበታል የሚል እምነት አለኝ። ውስጡ ያሉ ሃሳቦችም የበለጠ ህጋዊ መሰረት ለማስያዝ የተቀመጡ ስለሆኑ ምንም ልዩነት የለኝም። ይህ መተሳሰር ወደፊት በሚደረጉ እንቅስቃሴዎች ለሌሎች አካባቢዎችም ጭምር እንደ አንድ ጥሩ አብነት የሚታይ ነው። በቀጣይ የምናካሂደውን የዕድገትና ትራንስፎርሜሽን ዕቅድ ስኬት የበለጠ ያጎለበታል የሚል እምነት አለኝ። ይህ አወቃቀር ወደፊት በሚደረጉ እንቅስቃሴዎች ለሌሎች አካባቢዎችም ጭምር እንደ አንድ ጥሩ አብነት የሚታይ ነው። ሌሎች ልዩ ወረዳዎች አካባቢም እንደዚሁ ጥናቶች ተደርገው የበለጠ ልማት የበለጠ ኅብረትና መልካም አስተዳደር እንዲጎለብት የሚያስችል አደረጃጀት ሊታይ የሚችልበት ህይወት ያለ ነው የሚመስለኝ። በሌሎች አካባቢዎችም ክልል ሁልጊዜ ተንጠራርቶ ወረዳ ላይ የሚደርስበት ሁኔታ አይኖርም። የዞን አደረጃጀት የክልል ደጋፊ አደረጃጀት ነው። ምናልባት ይህ ምክር ቤት በውሳኔ መልክ ነው ማጽደቅ ያለበት ወይስ በአዋጅ ነው ሚለው ላይ ተጨማሪ ማብራሪያ ቢሰጥ እንጂ “ኤሌ”ን ጨምሮ አምስቱን ወረዳዎች አንድ ዞን ካስተሳሰሩ ሌሎች አካባቢ ያሉ ሁኔታዎችንም በመቃኘት ልማትን ለማቀላጠፍ በሚያስችል መልኩ የማየት ስራ ለወደፊት የቤት ሥራ ሊሆን የሚል አስተያየት ጭምር ነው ለማቅረብ የፈለግሁት።

ማብራሪያ

የተከበሩ አቶ ሸፈራው ሸጉጤ (የክልሉ ርዕሰ መስተዳድር) እዚህ ላይ በጣም መሰመር ያለበት ጉዳይ በክልላችን ውስጥ መሰረታዊ ያስተሳሰብ ለውጥ እየመጣ መሆኑን ነው። ይህ ክልል በርካታ ብሔር ብሔረሰቦችና ሕዝቦች ለጋራ ጠቅምና አላማ፣ እድገትና ብልፅግና በጋራ የተደራጁበት አካባቢ ነው። ክልላችንን እስከተሃድሶ ድረስ የተለያዩ የአካባቢ አጀንዳዎች የመበጣጠስ ጥያቄዎች እየመጡ ሲፈታተኑን ነበር። ባሁኑ ጊዜ እነዚህ ችግሮች ብሙሉ እየተፈቱ ወደጋራ አንድነት እና ወህደት እየመጡ ያለበት ምዕራፍ ላይ ነው የምንገኘው። ይህ ባጠቃላይ በክልሉ የመጣ መሰረታዊ ለውጥ ነው ተብሎ ሊሰመር የሚገባው ጉዳይ ነው.....

ውሳኔ

ከምክርቤት አባላት ለቀረቡት ጥያቄዎች ክቡር ርዕሰ መስተዳድሩ በቂ ማብረሪያ ከሰጡ በኋላ የውሳኔ ሃሳቡ የሰገን አካባቢ ሕዝቦች ዞን ለማቋቋም የቀረበ ውሳኔ ቁጥር 11/2003 ዓ.ም ሆኖ በስራ ላይ እንዲውል በሙሉ ድመፅ ጸድቋል።

Appendix IV

Table 1: Lists of Woredas and their Respective Kebeles of Segen Zone

Woreda	Alle Woreda	Amaro Woreda	Burji Woreda	Dirashe Woreda	Konso Woreda
Names of	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Gewada 2. Gargama 3. Welango 4. Turruba 5. Gumma 6. Ayana 7. Karkarite 8. Dega-mashele 9. Gobezze 10. Dugullo 11. Gorrozze 12. Lallicho 13. Tsemmahie 14. Lokitee 15. Digentee 16. Bolle 17. Delibena-gamma 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Kobbo 2. Golebe 3. Kelle rural 4. Dammo-bulit'o 5. Korre-biko 6. Kerrema 7. Suluko 8. Shaffule 9. Gammule 10. Zokessa 11. Kerreda 12. Sharro 13. Jello 14. Dorribade 15. Gummuree 16. Darreba 17. Tiffatee 18. Yeroo 19. Segen 20. Ella 21. Dallea 22. Genna 23. Heyello 24. Ayessumme 25. Zaregetee 26. Madayenne 27. Ayekuree 28. Werekalee 29. Dyeketa 30. Bunitte 31. Abullo 32. Alliffacho 33. Marreta 34. Kelle 01 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Berreqi 2. Beneya 3. Tinishewa-keyate 4. Gobazze 5. Yabeno 6. Ladeshe 7. Halamma 8. Tondalle 9. Haralle 10. Walaya 11. Garra 12. Ralleya-bella 13. Ralleya-goche 14. Woredaya-godde 15. Woredaya-denbacho 16. Atomalle 17. Harronje 18. Murre 19. Tisho 20. Semmo 21. Seggo 22. Kellichio 23. Gammeyo 24. Dallio 25. Soyoma (Two urban kebeles, 01 & 02) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Layegnawu-ariguba 2. Walayetee 3. Walessa 4. Keyamma 5. Onotta 6. Shelele 7. Gatto 8. Kabburra 9. Holletee 10. Ateya 11. Ariguba-tinao 12. Busa-killla 13. Busa-basso 14. Nallo 15. Siletoya 16. Kolla-mashele 17. Hayebena 18. Gidole (Two urban kebeles, 01 & 02) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mellega-dugaya 2. Segengenet 3. Becho 4. Addis-geberre 5. Ayellota-dokatu 6. Birrbirsa 7. Lullitu 8. Garricho 9. Fuchucha 10. Biayedde 11. Tishemalle 12. Gellabo 13. Leahayetee 14. Areffayede 15. Massoya 16. Tibella-na-kuchalle 17. Geligello-na-kolemalle 18. Matarre-na-gezabba 19. Borkore 20. Gugnara 21. Kemelle 22. Fasha 23. Doha 24. Gesergiyo 25. Kashalle 26. Sawugamma 27. Mecheqi 28. Gahho 29. Debana 30. Gerra 31. Aba-roba 32. Mechello 33. Busso 34. Gammolee 35. Gocha 36. Serrobo 37. Dokattu 38. Naleya-segen 39. Darra 40. Jarriso 41. Durayetee 42. Segen 43. Karate (urban kebele)