



Center for African and Oriental Studies
Addis Ababa University

The Role of Internal and External Actors in Reshaping the African Nation States: the Case of Somalia

A MA dissertation submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of the Addis Ababa University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master's Degree in African Studies

Submitted to:

Mohammed Hassen (Dr)

By:

Nasir M. Ali
GSR/505/06

Addis Ababa
June, 2015

Addis Ababa University
School of Graduate Studies

By:
Nasir M. Ali

Approved by Board of Examiners:

Signature

Dr. Mohammed Hassen

Advisor

Dr. Abdiwasa Abdilahi

External Examiner

Dr. Getachew Kassa

Internal Examiner

Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	III
------------------------------	------------

ACRONYMS.....	IV
----------------------	-----------

ABSTRACT.....	V
----------------------	----------

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction.....	1
--------------------------	----------

1.1 Background of the Study.....	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....	3
1.3 Purpose of the Study.....	7
1.4 Research Questions.....	7
1.5 Research Design.....	8
1.6 Limitations and Delimitations.....	10
1.7 Significance of the Study.....	11
1.8 Structure of the Study.....	12

CHAPTER TWO

The State in the African Context.....	13
--	-----------

2.1 The Nature of State in Africa.....	13
2.2 The Modern State and the Somalis.....	16
2.3 The Internal and External Drivers for African States Fragility.....	18
2.3.1 The Cold War.....	18
2.3.2 The ' <i>War on Terror</i> '.....	20

2.3.3	Effects of Foreign Aid on the African State.....	22
2.3.4	Ethnic Conflict and Rivalry as Source of Fragility.....	24
2.3.5	Leadership Style and Authoritarianism Regimes.....	25

CHAPTER THREE

The Somalia Conflict.....28

3.1	The Somalia Political History.....	28
3.2	The Genesis of the Conflict.....	32
3.3	The Peace Attempts and Outcomes.....	34
3.4	Success and Failure Stories and Manifestations.....	35

CHAPTER FOUR

The Internal and External Actors in Post-State Collapse Era.....38

4.1	The Internal Actors: Effects and Impact.....	39
4.1.1	The Business Lords.....	39
4.1.2	The Leadership Factor.....	41
4.1.3	The Media.....	44
4.1.4	The ' <i>Islamist Factor</i> '.....	46
4.2	Reshaping the Somalia State Post-1991: the Role of External Actors.....	49
4.2.1	The Regional Actors.....	49
4.2.2	The Distant State Actors.....	55
4.2.3	The Role of Non-State Actors.....	58
4.3	Political and Socio-Economic Impact of the Actors.....	61

CHAPTER FIVE

Responding to the Challenges And the Way Forward.....64

5.1 Reconstituting the State: Will External Actors Give the Chance to the Somalis?..64

5.2 Grassroots Engagement as a Vehicle for Sustainable Peace.....66

5.3 Prospects for the Somalia State.....69

CONCLUSION.....73

REFERENCES.....77

ANNEXES.....90

Annex 1: List of Informants.....90

Annex 2: List of Major Questions.....91

Annex 3: Map of Somalia.....92

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take the opportunity to thank a number of people for their personal and intellectual support from the tentative conception of the study to its completion. Without their different contributions, my work would not have been possible. I am immensely grateful and extend my deep gratitude to Dr. Mohammed Hassen, my advisor and also a professor at the Center for African and Oriental Studies (CAfOS) in Addis Ababa University. Without his sincere encouragement and guidance it would not have been possible to manage and conduct this study.

A word of thanks also goes to the many people who helped me in the production of this study. Special thanks go to Col. Gebre Egziabher Alemseged, a Peace and Security Advisor to the Office of the Facilitator for Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation at Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Berouk Mesfin, a Senior Researcher in Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), who generously helped me and gave an opportunity to interview with them in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Moreover, Professor K. Mathews of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Addis Ababa University and Dr. Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan, a founding director of the Frantz Fanon University in Hargeisa, Somaliland.

I would also like to thank, Abdirashid Sheikh Said, Deputy Head of the Mission of the Federal Republic of Somalia to Ethiopia and the African Union, Abdirahman Diria, commentator on the Somalia political, economic and social affairs, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and other intellectuals who spoke to the researcher a condition of anonymity.

Similar thanks to Ms. Katharina Newbery, at the University of Saint Andrews in the United Kingdom. Similarly, I gratefully acknowledge the support of Helen Tesfaye, Tigist Hailu, Amin Abdilahi Hashi and Aidarus Mohamed Abib in Addis Ababa and Hargeisa respectively, each of whom helped me during the data collection in various ways. I thank many others whom I have not named here, but their assistance was crucial to the research.

I wish to express my deepest appreciation and heartfelt gratitude to my family and parents for their love and expression through the sacrifices they made which enabled me to complete this study. And, lastly but certainly not least, I deeply indebted to my classmates and many other colleagues in the university whom we shared experience and knowledge throughout the study period.

Nasir M. Ali
June, 2015

ACRONYMS

AD	Anno Domini
AKP	Justice and Development Party (Turkish Political Party)
AMISOM	African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia
APRCT	Alliance for Peace Restoration and Counter-Terrorism
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Cooperation
BC	Before Christ
CAfOS	Center for African and Oriental Studies
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
EDF	Ethiopian Defense Forces
EPLF	Eritrean Popular Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
ICG	International Crisis Group
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGOs	International Non-governmental Organizations
IRI	International Republican Institute
ISIS/L	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/Levant
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
LNGOs	Local Non-governmental Organizations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFD	Northern Frontier District
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front

ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
PRC	People's Republic of China
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
SNM	Somali National Movement
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Movement
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UIC	Union of the Islamic Courts
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
US	United States
USC	United Somali Congress
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front

ABSTRACT

Africa has been in a state of crises since independence, primarily linked to external influences which have social, cultural, economic, and political dimensions. The African states, not all, suffered the extreme consequences from unviable forms of political rule which criminalized both the state and the economy and produced ethnic contention and deeply divided society. The external actors are not the only chief architects of the Africa's lingering conflicts and state failures, but also their local actors in the post-colonial age are partially responsible for the political and economic troubles, and the frequent state collapse. Somalia, for example, became a victim of internal and external actors; while the post-state collapse actors are the tragic, violent outcome of gradually deteriorating political dynamics since 1991. From the rubble and ruins of the state, self-appointed warlords who struggled to rule the country from the barrels of guns, business groups and, later, Islamists aspire to power with the influence of external actors, both from the region and beyond exacerbated the political instability and economic shortcomings which impacted both on the state and the lives of the ordinary Somali citizens.

In fact, numerous peacebuilding efforts and attempts at building a centralized Somali national government have failed due to extensive involvement of diverse external actors. Without exception, Somalia neighbors, Arab and Western states have been involved in Somalia's conflict for political and economic reasons. This study, therefore, dismisses that the external actors, both from the region and beyond will bring peace and stability to Somalia. Therefore, the issue should be considered as a Somali issue that has an economic, social, and political impact on the Somalis at large, and according to this suggestion, any resolution to the Somalia conflict needs indigenous efforts since it affects the internal peace and security of the Somali citizens as well as their destiny. Without a unified grassroots involvement, it is difficult to foresee a sustainable peace and stability in Somalia.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1. Background of the Study

Since the establishment of modern states in Africa following their independence from the colonial powers in the 1950s and the 60s, the institutions that it was hoped would grow into and form the core of a future African state have instantaneously faded, while the euphoria of the citizens at large have quickly dissipated and changed into disenchantment, thus, produced discontent and unviable state–society relationships which shaped the future of the state in Africa. This early derailment appears to be one of the most distressing results of the Africa's independence, which fabricated the unexpected future political conflicts. As a result of many interwoven factors emerged at the dawn of independence, twelve of the forty-seven new African states in the 1950s and the 1960s, including the Congo, the Sudan and among others, have been crippled by political instability and civil wars (Thomas, 1991: 680; Richard, 1999: 1; Jeffrey, 2000: 258; Lawrence, 2007: 197; Paul, 2008: 21).

The root causes of the troubled post-independence African states appear not only to be the emergence of the modern African states as a colonial product followed by strong colonial influence, unequal terms between the African independent states on one hand, and the colonial powers on the other, its subsequent evolution, which deepened the asymmetrical relations between the two that forged dependence relations for the decades to come and made the outcome uncertain. But, the African leaders at independence should be blamed also partially for being responsible the political instability, chronic economic troubles, environmental risks and shocks, and the frequent state collapse that has been the character of the continent (Nasir, 2014a: 417; Wangari, 2009: 25; Antony, 2008: 4).

The leaders of Africa at independence though succeeded politically to liberate the African states from the traps of colonialism, on the other hand failed to meet the needs and expectations of their citizens. Most of these leaders if not all, betrayed the euphoria and the exhilaration of their

fellow citizens and finally dissipated as many citizens felt that their independence doesn't bring any substantial change and difference from the colonial powers (Nasir, 2014a: 422; Wangari, 2009: 25). Most of the Africa's political, social, and economic instability has internal root causes and plays a significant role in undermining the institutions that are expected to nurture peace, progress and in return lead to societal development and prosperity in the African continent. While some regard lack of democracy, rule of law, presence of weak leadership style and governance institutions, others regard one-party rule and tendency towards the authoritarian type of government as one of the most heartbreaking sources of political, social and economic crisis in Africa since independence. However, the African continent is not entirely in a state of crisis and economic shortcomings, but there are other succeeded states like South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Ghana, and others.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the last decade of the twentieth century went down in a history of turmoil as many have quite simply ceased to exist as politically organized entities like Somalia. It will probably be remembered for the political, institutional and economic disruptions that have altered the face of the continent immeasurably since the dawn of independence. On the other hand, it has witnessed the end of colonialism, with the abolition of apartheid and the eclipses of the single-party system and of overtly authoritarian and brutal regimes (Paul, 2008: 64; William, 2002: 8, Dambisa, 2009: 6; Nasir, 2014a: 422). Similarly, it will be remembered for the armed conflicts, massacres, migrations, epidemics and uprisings whose repercussions still continue to into the twenty-first century (Tie'bile', 2008: 201).

One of the most heartbreaking examples of state crisis in the sub-Saharan Africa is Somalia; Somalia has experienced violent conflict, political, economic, and social instability since the collapse of the central authority in 1991. Non-state reckless actors in the form of '*Warlordism*', '*Jihadism*', and other vicious forms have gained shelter and safe-haven and become increasingly prevalent as the country plunged into civil war, followed by famine and droughts (Roland, 2007: 13; Dirk, 2008: 25; Jody, 2014: 1; Ken, 2008: 41; Bulhan, 2013a: 267). The present Somalia after many years of conflicts and crisis experiences intense competing external interests that engage in reshaping the Somalia's state structure. This fierce competition, both from the region and beyond has geopolitical and geostrategic dimensions. As a result of the prolonged conflict

and state collapse, external actors, most notably Somalia's regional neighbors: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and most recently, Uganda, have engaged in the conflict going after their own national interests. In addition, a number of other regional and distant actors such as the AU, the Arab League, the EU, the UN, Egypt, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, UK, Turkey, and the U.S. has decided to intervene in Somalia's peace and state building processes pursuing their national interests (Peter, 2008: 48; Dirk, 2008: 22; Ken, 2008: 42; Bjørn, 2009: 19; Mikael, 2013: 4).

This study produces empirically grounded research that adds a political dimension to the previous studies of political, social, and economic dynamics in Somalia. The study critically examines two separate, but interwoven key factors that influence the Somalia state politics. These are: a) internal factors which prevail in Somalia and influence politics, social, and economic, and, b) the external factors which have links to colonial legacy and produced waves of conflicts, confrontations, and mistrust between Somalia and its regional neighbors. The major objective of the study is to analyze and examine the internal and external actors that engaged in the Somalia's agony and tragedy since the state collapse in 1991 with ambition to reshape its future. The study suggests strategies that could serve as a milestone in preserving the Somalia state. This kind of policies will prevent further penetration of external actors not only in the Somalia's state internal dynamics, but also to the entire African nations.

2. Statement of the Problem

The African states since independence in the mid-1950s have been trapped into vicious cycles of intra- or/and interstate conflicts which made the viability of the African states remain in limbo. The African states showed poor economic performance, which led them to be among the least developed and the least industrialized countries in the recorded history (Blaine, 1991: 15). The genesis of these underdevelopment and conflicts not only have colonial roots, but also have vicious internal actors, though Ali A. Mazrui (2008: 36) argues that the deadliest wars in Africa post-independence period have colonial roots. Indeed, over fifty years after independence, Africa has not yet shown any imperative progress to tackle the multi-faceted challenges inherited from

the colonial powers, while the African leaders failed to also break the cycles of insecurities and social crises in their respective states (Errol, 2008: 52).

In an apparent form of analysis, much of the Africa's political instability has an internal root cause, however, the interpenetration of internal and external factors, especially geopolitical and economic interests of the outside world play a significant role in undermining the efforts for making the states in Africa succeeded. In combination of such factors as unequal development, pervasive poverty, endemic diseases, violence and the manipulative tendencies of the local elite, political and economic instability in Africa pose potential threats to the survival of the African states (Antony, 2008: 2; Jephais, 2008: 16). Furthering this point of argument, most sub-Saharan states had suffered the extreme consequences from unviable forms of political rule which criminalized both the state and the economy, lack of rational leaders, but the citizens enjoyed the mercy of dictators on power, fraud and fake elections, multiple foreign interventions, pervasive corruption, lack of politics of inclusion, weak governance institutions, economic dependence on the West, lack of accountability, transparency, independent judiciary, application of law as well as tribal politics, unjust actions against minorities and zero-sum game among others, are the major factors that crippled the African states and shaped their future (M. Mbaku, 2008: 31; Nasir, 2014a: 420).

Being similar in many ways, the Somalia state is one of the ill-fated states in Africa, which suffered multiple external interventions which complicated the internal dynamics of the Somalia state since independence (Dirk, 2008: 17). This has led the complex state institutions that are responsible for providing social services such as the health and education to the public plus security to collapse and cease to function as a state and made it to be characterized as an orphan of a foreign intervention. It seems obvious that the present situation in Somalia is not simply the continuation of conflict and prolonged failure of state institutions; but it is a product of a foreign intervention against state institutions existed for 30 years and fell apart when the Somali citizens revolted against it who had held it together and fell at the same time in the hands of clan-based oppositions and Islamists which were growing with a foreign influence (Scott, 2000: 13; Ken, 2008: 31; Jody, 2014: 1). In the last decades, Somalia remained without central effective authority, albeit several weak internationally-backed governments relied on the protection of

foreign troops; this made Somalia to experience many years of political tension, and prolonged absence of legitimate state institutions representing the will of the Somali public at large.

Indeed, there is no single factor that can be regarded as the central problem of the Somalia's protracted state collapse and conflict, but there are a number of issues that contributed their part in keeping the state institutions absent. Unfortunately, many non-Somali scholars in the field of social sciences label '*clan*' as the sole and the major source of the Somalia's agony and tragedy. Pragmatically speaking, the clan factor or clan identity is the major bond and a bridge that serves as a source of interdependence and co-existence among the Somali society in general. This doesn't mean that the researcher is denying the negative role of the clan and its domino effect on the Somali politics; without doubt, it has, and much of that should be blamed to the Somali politicians who manipulated it as a means to climb on or retain power (Dirk, 2008: 26; Peter, 2008: 34; Bulhan, 2013: 247). Scott Peterson, a journalist who reported from the battlefields of Africa, in his book: *Me Against My Brother* (2000: 8) argues that clan has always been the last refuge, the last security during the crisis, the only proven guarantor of safety when the world falls apart. Therefore, Somalis for centuries had developed peacemaking as an art form almost on par with war making. According to his argument, these traditional restrictions could be considered a Somali version of the Geneva Conventions.

Most importantly, resource allocation is one other important facet; this remains the source of the Somalia's lingering conflicts with the engagement of external actors which made the Somali state to move beyond tribal and clan politics (Ken, 2008: 36). This should be regarded as the evil if not the source of the evil which ruthlessly engaged in the internal affairs of Somalia in the hope to exploit the Somalia's natural endowments. For instance, the piracy, though, is an illegal act that was recognized as a violation of the rules at sea, according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea adopted in 1982 (United Nations, 2009: 54); Somalia's pirates those hijacking the vessels from the high seas had controversies in their nature and causes. One argument was linking it to the illegal foreign off-fishing in the Somalia waters that started to exploit that undefended waters and resources long before the emergence of piracy. In addition, the European giant companies under the auspices and coordination of the mafia and the world criminal networks has used as a dumping site for the disposal of radioactive, toxic, hazardous

and waste materials to the Somalia coast off and hinterland (Bulhan, 2013a: 254). Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the emergence of piracy is a response against not only those who are exploiting the Somalia's national resources, but also those dumping hazardous waste materials to the Somalia coast off over decades. This kind of practice is against article (195) of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, which clearly attests the "*Duty Not to Transfer Damage or Hazards or Transform One Type of Pollution into Another*" (Ibid: 117). Nonetheless, as it has been noted, these trends are indicative how the external actors conspired against the Somalia's state while there are continuing interventions which have made the southern part ungovernable and changed the state capital Mogadishu into rubble.

Not only in the resource allocation, but also Balkanization of the Somalia state into quasi-states by competing interests both from the region and beyond are undeniable facts. Doubly important, there are growing numbers of autonomous regions which claim independent administrations from the center, Mogadishu, with the support of the regional governments. There were Puntland, Galmudug, Himin & Heeb, Jubbaland, and the most recent, the Southwest Somalia administration in Baidoa and the Central regions' administration which is under discussion and should be established soon. All these administrations claim greater autonomy within the Somalia state territories in contrast to Somaliland. Somaliland, a former British Protectorate in the Horn of Africa before it merged with the Italian Somalia in the 1960, unilaterally declared its separation from the rest of Somalia, claiming the boundaries it inherited from the British Government on 26 June, 1960. These multiple administrations in the name of federalism have not only contributed its part in endangering the Somalia's state existence, but also derail to establish long-lasting peace and state institutions in the future.¹

This study, therefore, attempts to understand the actors, both internal and external those reshape the Somalia state. It illustrates the gaps that existed between the Somali citizens and the state institutions which contributed their part the inability of the Somalia state since independence. This study also wants to start a fresh dialogue and discussion on this element that could be a flashpoint for the future debates that may take place between the academicians and those who

¹ The involvement of foreign actors in Somalia's agony have never helped the Somali people but detailed the momentum of peace and reconciliation

run the state and lack the charisma to overcome the actors that reshape the Somalia political institutions emanating both from within and outside. The study seeks ways forward strategies that aimed to prevent further penetration into the Somalia internal affairs from the outside world which feed grievances and existed in the country since the dawn of independence in the 1960.

3. Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to analyze the nature, the role, and the impact of the internal and external actors in the African states post-independence period.

The specific objectives of the study are:

1. To identify the major internal and external actors that engage in reshaping Somalia state, including their goals, dynamics and characteristics,
2. To scrutinize the wider economic and political context which determines the emergence of those actors being internal and external;
3. To examine the nature of the Somalia state structure from the dawn of independence to present times; and,
4. To provide valuable suggestions that could serve as a leeway and an avenue for preventing the Somalia state from extinction and resolving conflicts before it escalate and limit the actors that engage or involve in the internal dynamics of the Somalia.

4. Research Questions

As a result of state crisis with the engagement of multiple actors in Somalia since 1991, this study intends to raise questions that could seem as critical. The *central research question* is: what are the internal and external actors that influence or shape the Somalia governance institutions in both post-independence and state collapse periods? In line with the research objectives, the overall research question is sub-divided into different sets of questions:

1. Which are the actors (internal and external) those engage in Somalia conflict?

2. What is the ultimate goal of those actors?
3. What is the role of internal actors to end this political, economic, and social dilemma?
4. What is the role of the external actors to end this political conflict?
5. What is the way out of this mess: from internally-engineered strategies or externally-imposed initiatives?

5. Research Design

5.1 Qualitative Research Design

The qualitative research is used to describe a set of non-statistical inquiry techniques and processes used to gather data about social phenomena. Qualitative data refer to some collection of words, symbols, pictures, or other non-numerical records, materials, or artifacts that are collected by researchers and is data that has relevance to the social group under study (David, 2004: 341; Paul & William, 2006: 313). The uses for these data go beyond simple description of events and phenomena; rather, they are used for creating understanding, for subjective interpretation, and for critical analysis as well.

This study essentially relied largely on qualitative methodology of data collection. Thus, qualitative data emerged from semi-structured interviews by asking a number of open-ended questions that allow for variations plus observations. The research questions were answered using established qualitative procedures to understand the role of internal and external actors in reshaping the Somalia state politically, economically and socially post-independence period, with particular emphasis on post-state collapse period.

5.2 Data Collection

The data collected, analyzed the most critical challenges that face the Somalia state which lead them to collapse or take another shape and the efforts necessary to build a viable state with the engagement of citizens to make the state work. Both primary and secondary data were collected from various sources.

In the primary data, the major methods used to collect data in qualitative research were employed include: a) personal and/or elite-group interviewing, and, b) observation (David, 2004: 107). This activity primarily has taken place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Hargeisa, Somaliland. On the other hand, it approached to the intergovernmental organizations based in Ethiopia such as the ISS and the IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) plus academic community in the region which remained one of the crucial targets of the study. In the secondary sources, the study relied on an extensive review of the literature relevant to the subject matter from books, journals, and policy documents, among others.

5.3 Data Analysis

In the last two decades, the Somali state has been a laboratory of external initiatives and multiple interventions that complicated the situation and reshaped the Somalia state. This research produced empirically grounded research on the nexus between internal and external actors that played an important role in reshaping the Somalia state in post-state collapse period.

Data collection concentrated on the analysis of agents of regulation; practical norms and political and economic factors manifest and have a domino effect on the state. The research informs the institutions, politics and economy, both in Somalia and beyond. The data were collected through elite-interviewing and observation, and were analyzed, interpreted in qualitative approach which was aimed to understand the meaningful and symbolic content of the qualitative data.

5.4 Ethical Consideration

In order to assure the safety and dignity of the interviewees and the integrity of the research as well. The researcher adopted an ethical consideration approach to avoid risks and build trust between the researcher and the participants. In addition, the researcher has realized the responsibility to maintain that trust, just as participants expect, maintain and analyze the data they provide, and not unveil their names, if requested so. Not only their names, but also preserve and respect the integrity of the information provided and analyze it as their own point of

argument. On the other hand, the all sources of material used for the dissertation were duly acknowledged and the intellectual property rights were also respected.

6. Limitations and Delimitations

6.1 Limitations

Although there is much remains to be done, the work generated important findings in the field of study such as actors that have an influence on Somalia state. In other words, having acknowledged the limitations of the data processing and gathering, the researcher can nevertheless confirm that there were some limitations of this study.

The main limitations concerned the actors that reshape the Somalia state being internal and external. To put it in another way, there were some relevant factors, which have significant influence on the Somalia state and its domestic policies. However, the discussion of other relevant actors was not beyond the scope of this study, it was within the scope of this study to provide an extended discussion of the ongoing debates on how the Somalia state can survive. The factors that challenge African states are still tentative, subject to through further investigation and examination.

The study was limited to Somalia state and the actors that involve in its socio-politico-economic dynamics. Consideration of internal and external actors may reveal interesting findings. The creation of the Somalia state and its orientation were measured through an in-depth interview and extensive review of literatures by the researcher to show research reliability and validity.

6.2 Delimitations

The conduct of analysis was limited to the availability and consistent data on the Somalia state since the 1960s to present times, a period spanning 55 years. Much of the data contained in this study were generated from secondary sources related to the topic of study and the actors that involve in the Somalia state politics. These data were duly incorporated in the research to support

the primary data and were analyzed in a qualitative research approach. While the primary data were collected from different sources, including intergovernmental organizations such as IGAD–CEWARN, diplomatic missions, academic and research institutions as well as individuals as key informants.

The focal point of this study explained on the role of internal and external actors in reshaping the Somalia state and its quest for a long-term viable statehood with particular emphasis on the period from the state collapse. The analysis was aimed at gaining a better understanding of the issue, explains the fundamental concepts, and develops the approaches which the Somalia state may utilize in the future to put cornerstone for functioning state institutions to overcome those actors.

On the other hand, due to the difficulty to obtain official documents from the government offices in Somalia due to the civil war which remained the most critical challenge that faced the study. The study was not avoided or abandoned to approach Somali and non-Somali scholars in the field; it approached and conducted an in-depth interview. On the other hand, it contacted the academic communities, research and intergovernmental organizations that engaged in the Somalia politics.

7. Significance of the Study

The findings of the study are hoped to be useful in many ways. The study will assist in the assessment of strategies for addressing political and economic turmoil in similarly distressed regions in the future, which are striving to get peace and stability and long-term state survival like Somalia. The study tirelessly attempts to fill the gap if any, that emerged from the absence of similar studies written by Somali and non-Somali scholars in the field to point out the role of internal and external actors and their impact on the Somalia state and citizens. Further, and finally the study will offer additional information that could be used by researchers, academic communities, Somalia government, international/local non-governmental organizations (INGOs/LNGOs), multilateral bodies in their role to understand the role of internal and external actors in reshaping the Somalia state which remained in a political and economic limbos since

their independence, while others fall apart by experiencing unrest in the form of political disorder, civil wars, conflicts and strife which made the outcome uncertain.

8. Structure of the Study

This study is structured into five chapters. The first chapter discusses the methodological aspect of the study. The second chapter covers the conceptual framework of the study, and discusses the state formation in Africa, its nature, the internal and external drivers for African states fragility, and the perception of the Somalis on the modern statehood. The third chapter discusses the political history of Somalia, the genesis of the conflict, peace attempts and its outcome which survives today and has had an impact on the Somali politics and reshaped its state structure. The fourth chapter is the nucleus of the study and it analyzes the actors that engage in the Somalia statebuilding and restoration processes which have both internal and external dimensions. Similarly, it attempts to understand the nature of these actors, their goals being economic or political as well as their impact on the state and the society. The fifth chapter discusses the way forward and what is expected from the external actors to do. In addition, it tries to foresee the future prospects of the Somalia state and its quest for sustainable peace and stability. Therefore, it suggests the need for re-visiting the state restoration efforts to overcome the very weaknesses of its building blocks and processes, thus, adopt integrated and collective approaches, include: ownership of the statebuilding processes and inclusive peace and reconciliation to sustain the Somalia's state in the long-term. The study has conclusion, references and annexes as usual.

CHAPTER TWO

The State in the African Context

2.1 The Nature of State in Africa

The concept of the state has been one of the major preoccupations of political philosophers in the Western world from ancient to the modern period. Both secular and cleric philosophers from Socrates to Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas to Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, to modern writers like J.S. Mill, Tocqueville and Karl Marx have wrestled with the subject. These discussions spanned the period from the sixth century (B.C) to the twentieth century (A.D). While the modern political theory preceded modern political practice, and has generally accompanied and pointed out the way for change, political science has had a very important share in altering the actual character of the state and the ideal of what it should be (Johan, 2000: 63). Therefore, to examine a nature of the state demands a particular way of analysis to come up with valuable insights for dealing with politics and public affairs in any state in the world we are living today.

The concept of state is crucial to our understanding in the dawn of the twenty-first century. This leads us to raise two critical and interrelated questions that disclose: by what exactly do we mean the term state and why do we need to have a state? The term state is a concept that encompasses authoritative and coercive apparatus enabled it to lead complex institutions that may have national and international dimensions. This makes it to be conceived as the logical foundation for all decisions about how the various apparatuses of government can and should be utilized in order to achieve social and political goals both at national and international levels. Thus, state formation is not only about the creation of an efficient and effective public sector, but it goes beyond that including national and international interactions (Nasir, 2014c: 157). It is also about society being comprised of the state, and the state, penetrating and structuring social relations.

The logic and the aim behind state formation are to serve as a shield to protect citizens from internal and external dangers and extend any social services to the public at large. This protection

on the other hand means the preservation of the internal and external sovereignty of the state. While the provision of security and social services to the public by the state in return endorses the citizens' trust the state institutions, thus ensure legitimacy (Johari, 2006: 58). To carry out these tasks, the state should have a capacity, legitimacy and authority to implement its policies, strategies and programs (Archie, 2000: 51). On the other hand, citizens come to take the presence of the state and its rules for granted, while they may reject or endorse a given policy or government, they do not question the state's position as the highest political authority (Steinberger 2004: 35). Therefore, the state needs to be both closely linked to and embedded in society, while at the same time maintaining sufficient autonomy to allow it to operate as the overarching authority responsible for making decisions that are binding on society as a whole.

In Africa, the concept of state is not new, and its practice is as old as the continent has existed. But, the state as it is today goes back to the arrival of the imperial powers in the late of the nineteenth century and the earliest of the twentieth. The concept of modern statehood with territorial definition, demarcation, among other attributes which belongs to the state that we have today descends from arbitrary colonial administrative units designed as instruments of domination, oppression and exploitation. No doubt after some [60] years of independence their origin remains entirely European set up against African indigenous institutions and societies existed prior to the arrival of the colonial powers (Pierre, 1997: 767). In observing the numerous instances of state failure in Africa and the massive evidence of societal exit, it should be apparent that these pathologies derive from the very exogeneity of the state, its lack of embeddedness, its divorce from underlying norms and networks of social organization. Patterns of neo-patrimonialism², rent seeking, and administrative decay can be thought of as deriving from the legitimacy deficit of the African state (Michael & Nicolas, 1994: 458; Thandika, 2001: 299; Rod, 2004: 167). One of the prominent African intellectuals Chinua Achebe in one of his writings discussed the problems of the African development and linked to the fact that in the affairs of the African nations there were no owner; and the laws of the state became powerless' (Pierre, 1997: 768).

² Is a system of social hierarchy where patrons use state resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population. It is an informal patron-client relationship that can reach from very high up in state structures down to individuals

One may summarize the major problems that the African state faces as two interrelated factors: a) disconnection from the past history of the African societies, and, b) disconnection of the state from the mass of the people. First and foremost, the state does not respond to the wishes of the people and the leaders stay in power without the peoples' consent. For this reason, governments operate without caring for the impact of their policies on the public, while it relies solely on force to get the citizen to comply with the government's directives. As a result, the loyalty of the people to the state is weak. One area where this is readily visible is the consistent decline in the services which African governments deliver to their people (Rod, 2004: 169). Undoubtedly, the major problems faced the post-colonial African states was and still remains the absence of strategies aimed at improving the performance of the basic government institutions and functions due to the fragility of the states in terms of policies, governance and security (Callaghy, 2008: 44). Thus, the establishment of viable governance institutions with committed leaders remains the most fundamental approach that can overcome the most critical challenges that face the African states.

Therefore, the post-colonial governance institutions are widely believed to be a colonial product and the continuation of imperial imposed administrative structures with an authoritarian form of state apparatuses which impacted on the post-colonial state. Indeed, the colonial rule was an alien system of rule, superimposed from outside and established in the midst of functioning cultures and indigenous institutions serving in the interests of their communities (Ruth, 1999: 552; Julian, 2002: 562; William, 2002: 137; Crawford, 2008: 19; Bulhan, 2013: 251). The colonial powers' destruction to the old methods of conflict resolution and traditional African political institutions, and their failure to create effective substitute ones in their place going hand in hand with the indigenous African institutions had an adversary impact on post-colonial state institutions and the society at large (William, 2002: 28; Ali, 2008: 37; Daniel & Patrick, 2013: 302).

In this regard, the weak governance institutions inherited from the colonial powers with fragmented society at the grassroots due to penetration of colonialism in return faded the relationship between the state and its citizens and later served as a precursor of foreign penetration and intervention thus undermined the sovereignty of the African state. Indeed,

sovereignty is an important component of the state attributes which has two distinct dimensions: internal and external (Gabriella, 2000: 40). The internal, states have their own political institutions which are responsible for governing the state, making laws, providing public goods and ensuring the security of the citizens (Maurice & Ugumanin, 2014: 529). While the external has two crucial dimensions: formally recognizing each other through diplomatic means and legal equality among the world nations under international law (Archie, 2000: 51; John, 2003: 782).

On the African continent, the sovereignty of the most African states if not all is under threat posed by multifaceted external actors with the help of local actors. There is no doubt that the foreign aid, western form of democracy imposition, regime change, ‘*war on terror*’, and others are elements of neo-colonialism prevalent in contemporary Africa. This argument is valid when we see what has happened in Africa recently. A few western powers led the United States launched harsher military campaign against Libya without securing the consent of the African Union – an umbrella of the sovereign African nations. Admittedly, these bombing measures were part of omnipotence strategy aimed to dominate the strategic gates of the African continent which severely suffered since the Cold War (Asongazoh, 2010: 69; Nasir, 2014a: 421). Sadly, in ruthless air strikes spearheaded by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the economic infrastructures of the state were targeted and destroyed; thousands were killed and injured, while innocent Libyans were displaced. Therefore, given such a reality, one may question if the so-called political independence or sovereignty of the African nations is real or genuine in nature and clearly underlines how the external actors penetrating deep into African nation-states and reshaping one after another.

2.2 The Modern State and the Somalis

For centuries nomadic pastoralism provided a livelihood to the Somali people in the Horn of Africa, before the colonial partition of the Somali ‘territories’ in the middle of the nineteenth century (Judith & Judy 2004: 3). While traditional institutions known as ‘clan councils’ have been into effect using Customary Laws known as (*Xeer*)³, there were traditional values, norms or culture, institutions and religious faith which mainly encourage helping the needy people, and

³A Somali word meaning the ‘Rules and Regulations’

supporting each other. The clan structure through which the Somali society operates could be traced back to the origin of the Somali society that have been using it as a means of political actor and other social issues that relate to their way of life (Ahmed & Lewis 1993: 12; Ruth, 1999: 559; Joakim, 2006: 19; Bulhan, 2013: 83). Indeed, the clan factor or clan identity was and still remains the major bond and a bridge that serves as a source of interdependence and co-existence among the Somali society in general. But, its negative impact on the working of the state could be blamed on the Somali politicians who manipulated it as a means to climb on or retain power.

Therefore, there is a marriage of inconvenience between the Somali society who is traditionally pastoralist accustomed to move from one place to another in search of pasture and water and the modern state structures brought by the colonialism which impacted the way of life of the pastoralist society. The modern state brought the attributes of the statehood including the territory with defined the boundaries. This challenged many ethnic groupings not only in Africa, but also many parts in the Third World countries. For instance, Somalis who are pastoralists and used to move from one place to another in the Horn of Africa without restrictions were divided into five regions falling in the boundaries carved by the colonial powers. Ali Mazrui (2008: 37) described Somalia as a nation trying to become an all-inclusive state and accommodate the Somalis who scattered in four different countries, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. Thus, their desire for reunification has resulted in deadly conflict. Not different from the argument of Mazrui, Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan (2013: 247) argues that the Somali experience with colonial rule illustrates the arbitrary way in which the Europeans powers partitioned the land and consequently tearing society leaving behind a legacy of political conflict, cultural confusion, and psychological malaise that to this day reverberate with no effective resolution in sight. Not only did the partition of the land bring about the partition of families and psyches; it also sets Somalis in political and territorial conflict with their neighbors, making a succession of wars, waste of sorely needed resources on arms, and perpetuating mass trauma a tragic legacy of the region.

Therefore, the demise of Somalia may have begun with the colonization of Somalia in the 1880s, and the penultimate chapter in its collapse may have begun with attempts to make Somali political culture fit into the Western image of modern government. This effort was typical of

colonial and postcolonial rule in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, indigenous cultures and institutions were largely ignored as parliamentary-style democracy was thrust upon newly emerging nations. Moreover, the underlying legacy of colonial institutions and mechanisms, which would ultimately undermine nationalist efforts, remained. Thus, perhaps it is here that the international community should begin to understand the problem and propose solutions, not only in the case of Somalia, but also the post-colonial states in Africa (Ruth, 1999: 535). Therefore, one may regard the genesis of Somalia's state collapse and disintegration as the breakdown of traditional institutions and the role both internal and external actors had played since the creation of the Somalia state in the 1960 which undermined both internal and external sovereignty of the Somalia state. Indeed, the sovereignty of the Somalia state with its internal and external dimensions were threatened by multiple interventions both from within the region and beyond pursuing their own interests.

2.3 The Internal and External Drivers for African States Fragility

2.3.1 The Cold War

The end of the Second World War led to the world to move from conflicts and confrontations to what one may describe it 'cold war'. Consequently, the friendly relations among the allied forces during the War, particularly the British, and the Americans on the one hand; and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on the other had inclined to fade mainly due to ideological differences. This decline led those powers to mutual fear and suspicion, and what was universally known as the "*Cold War*" had come into being following the emergence of the U.S. and the Soviet Union as the major powers on the international scene (Macfarlane, 2003: 16; Ned & Richard, 2004: 7). Furthermore, the establishment of the allied blocs such as the NATO in 1949 by the West, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, also known as the 'Warsaw Pact' by the East in 1955 as a collective defense against NATO was another milestone for escalating the ideological differences between the West and the East post-Second World War era (Roger, 2006: 333). Although no direct confrontations have taken place between the two opposing camps, the regions far beyond the borders of both the U.S. and the USSR has witnessed and engaged in

what one may describe it as the “*Hot War*”, as many developing and underdeveloped countries has fallen under the influence of the two and served as the proxy agents of the Superpowers.

The geopolitical interests and the geostrategic location of the sub-Saharan Africa should be considered as one of the leading factors that made countries in the region to become the playground of the Superpowers and serve as Cold War proxies which devastated the environment and led its citizens to remain in destitute and abject living conditions. Therefore, as a consequence of the massive maneuvers and the huge military equipment and installations supplied to the arc-foe regimes of Africa from the Superpowers of the day had escalated the situation and made many states in the region on the verge to collapse, and many others fall apart (Bereket, 1980: 137; Roger, 2006: 338; Wangari, 2009: 109). Though the East–West ‘*War of Ideas*’ made the African states to serve as proxies, the Cold War has never been a ‘*Cold*’ for the Africans, but it was ‘*blazing*’, ‘*painful*’ and ‘*bloody*’, and positioned the African continent economically, socially and politically on the grave (Amare, 1996: 502; Macfarlane, 2003: 19; Nasir, 2014a: 419). In this respect, one may characterize this period as the major setback of the Africa’s peace, development and prosperity and the source of its future fragility, while it has caused the assassination or deposing of many African leaders and intellectuals who opposed the interests of the Superpowers of the day. For instance, being situated in one of the most crucial and strategic regions in a globalizing world, Somalia became a victim and an orphan of that War and submerged into a state of war, while its state institutions ceased to function as a state (Aisha, 2012: 319).

Despite this high degree of intervention and exploitation, the demise of the Soviet Union and the end up of the Cold War in the early 1990s has neither ended the international security dilemmas nor regional conflicts (A. Zack & Giles, 1995: 481; Nasir, 2014: 99). Although the superpowers withdrew from much of the Third World in which they had for more than three decades engaged in a relentless struggle for influence, the legacies of that competition remained (Alamin, 2004: 13; Roger, 2006: 343). In connection with these securities and political dilemmas emerged post-Cold War period, many African states shifted their foreign policies and strategies to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and opened their domestic markets to Chinese products. This kind of move made the ruling classes in the U.S. and the Western Europe feel insecure. In the

contemporary world politics, China is considered as the major challenge against the interests of the West in many parts of the world, while China has managed to control various geopolitical and geostrategic regions of the world, including the African continent through soft power mechanisms in the form of unconditional investments and trade (Wangari, 2009: 108). Without doubt, China is the largest trading partner with the African continent (Dorothy & Firoze, 2008: 2; Dot, 2008: 78) as many Chinese companies injecting huge investments are present and engaged in the African continent.

2.3.2 The '*War on Terror*'

Although African responses toward U.S. policies in the '*war on terrorism*' including the U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq have been mixed and African and Western leaders maintain disparate priorities when it comes to combating terrorism. The overwhelming question regarding the '*war on terror*' is the extent to which the United States has been successful (John, 2007: 163). However, there is an equally important, and for some, a far greater series of questions to consider: What is Africa's role in the '*war on terror*' and what are the benefits and dilemmas associated with participating countries? Answering these questions requires an in-depth research and analysis, not just of the America's policies, but also of the role played by individual states in Africa.

In a glimpse of Africa's role in the '*war on terror*', there are a number of variables that need to be examined, including: the role of states in the continent, and the impact of their actions in the region. Some African countries hosted the campaign against '*terrorism*' such as Djibouti which hosts not only the America's Task Forces fighting the radical groups, but also serving as a military base of different European powers with the same mission and mandate to the Americans. Djibouti looks on the '*war on terrorism*' as a blessing because it has gained the attention of the United States, and indeed, secured financial assistance with greater skills and resources (Lange, 2004: 8). Therefore, Djibouti now acts as the principal logistical hub for U.S. and allied operations in East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula (Styan, 2013: 4). Similarly, Ethiopia is a reliable partner for combating '*terrorism*' and one with which it cooperates on security matters. This includes the sharing of intelligence, training of Ethiopian security

personnel, and cooperation in counter-terrorism programs across the region (Shinn, 2004: 6). However, the United States engage only in activities that clearly meet its national goals and objectives whether it have negative consequences for the region and the citizens, or not.

Whatever the impact, negative or positive, Africa finds itself trapped in another international conflict, like the Cold War. The '*war on terror*' is another calamity that faced the African continent in the dawn of the twenty-first century. Indeed, the campaign against '*terrorism*' has had political, social, as well as economic, repercussions on the African states as well as individuals. For instance, the emergence of waves of radical groups across the sub-Saharan Africa, such as the *Al-Shabab* in East Africa, *Boko Haram* and *Taureg* fighters in Nigeria and Mali respectively in the West African region, and the *Al-Qaeda* operatives in North Africa known as *Al-Qaeda* in the Islamic Maghreb (Greg, 2007: 18; Judy, 2007: 64; Nasir, 2014a: 420). These groups are believed to be the outcome of the African states' involvement of a war in which one may characterize it as a war aimed by some West to secure and dominate the strategic gates not only the African continent, but also other parts of the world as well.

In a post-9/11, any government labels its oppositions as well as rebel groups as '*terrorists*'. Indeed, once a group is labeled '*terrorist*' its grievances, legitimate or not, is usually viewed as invalid, reducing international pressure on governments to work towards a negotiated settlement. However, this has helped many countries obtain funding from the U.S. as part of the '*war on terror*'. In Somalia, for example, a link has been made between *Al-Qaeda* and the Union of the Islamic Courts in 2006 to justify a war against them. Without hesitation, the U.S. is heavily involved in the battle with Union of the Islamic Courts (UIC) in Somalia by giving both material and moral support to Ethiopia which invaded many parts of Somalia including the capital, Mogadishu, as part of its strategy to implement the U.S. policies against '*terrorism*' for one hand, and its long-term ambition to weak the Somalia state (Aisha, 2012: 329). This move made Ethiopia one of the several African countries involving in the America's large counter-terrorism programs and in return getting financial and political support. Therefore, the U.S.-led campaign to combat international '*terrorism*' has negative implications on the African continent. However, close attention must be paid to the broader impacts of the '*war on terror*' on the continent, and to understand the implications in many aspects of the social life of the African citizens is crucial.

2.3.3 Effects of Foreign Aid on the African State

Since the late nineteenth century, Africa's economy has left in a marginalized state of affairs and highly dependent on outside actors and forces and experienced difficult times and challenges posed by those external actors which have increased over time (Callaghy, 2008: 39). Fundamental changes have not taken place within the African state economic system which is still, in essence, the one created by the colonial powers and inherited at independence by the governments of modern Africa. Indeed, the pre-independence African economies were incorporated into the global capitalist economy dominated by the developed northern states which established a dependent relationship that continued after independence (Thandika, 2001: 297; Nasir, 2014: 418).

Though the sub-Saharan Africa was endowed with abundant natural resources, its development has lagged behind that of other regions in the world since the end of the colonial period. In this respect, one may regard Africa's resource, in this case as a curse, not a blessing, not only for the uneven political calculations of the African leaders, but also the western companies involved for decades in the extraction and exploitation of the African resources exacerbated the situation (Antony, 2008: 5; M. Mbaku, 2008: 30; Daniel & Patrick, 2013: 300). For instance, Congo has experienced continuous conflicts, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, and most recently the South Sudan due to the resource allocation engaged by foreign actors with the help of indigenous agents.

Not only on resources allocation from outside beneficiaries, but also foreign-driven policies which have different goals and dimensions were imposed on the Africans which served as a future challenge on the African economies and its development thesis⁴. The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) deserves mention. The economic policies in the form of SAPs from the international financial institutions put the burden on the Africa's economies. These adjustments imposed on the African governments to implement it has various forms, include: reduction of government ownership and management of productive resources through the sale to

⁴Interview with Prof. K. Mathews – Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations of the Addis Ababa University – Addis Ababa, on 03 February, 2015

the private sector of several state-owned enterprises; abolish government-imposed price ceilings on agricultural products in order to improve incentives in the farm sector and increase the production of foodstuffs; devaluation of the domestic currency to make the country's exports more competitive in the global markets; reduction of government subsidization of domestic consumption; reduction government regulation of private exchange and rely more on markets for the allocation of resources; implementation of policies that attract and retain foreign investment; and encouragement of free trade by eliminating protectionist laws and statutes (Stefano, 1994: 547; Thandika, 2001: 292; Antony, 2008: 6; M. Mbaku, 2008: 34; Asongazoh, 2010: 72). Nevertheless, the SAPs and the aid furthered the economic crisis and aggravated the poverty and the abject situation that has been the defining factor of Africa since the known history⁵. The consequences of these economic conditions in Africa have obviously had serious ramifications for essential services such as health, education and infrastructure.

In the 1980s, Africa became more tightly linked to the world economy in two major ways which had their own effects: a) an extreme dependence on external public actors, particularly the IMF and the World Bank, in the determination of African economic policy, and, b) the liberal or neoclassical thrust of this economic policy conditionality, which tried to push the continent toward more integration with the world economy. Both of these aspects were linked directly to Africa's debt crisis. Indeed, much of Africa's debt was owed to international financial institutions (IFIs), especially the IMF and the World, and resulted largely from the borrowing associated with externally sponsored economic reform programs, usually referred to as structural adjustment (Stefano, 1994: 543; Callaghy, 2008: 42; M. Mbaku, 2008: 31). Until 1996, this debt could not be formally rescheduled or diminished, and significant arrears accumulated, with the result that some countries were cut off from IMF and the World Bank assistance.

Without exaggeration, one may ask why Africa, which has enormous endowments of both human and natural resources, failed to develop? Why are there so much poverty and diseases in the continent? Indeed, underdevelopment in Africa has been examined in the lens of many African and non-African scholars and identified a number of factors as important obstacles to poverty alleviation, disease control and sustainable development in the continent. Therefore,

⁵Ibid., 4.

John Mukum Mbaku (2008: 31) and Professor K. Mathews raised different but interrelated factors that hamper Africa's development include: a) bureaucratic and political corruption; b) political violence and destructive ethnic conflict; c) unmanageable external debts; d) pervasive military intervention in national politics and governance; f) foreign aid, and, g) a chronic shortage of both human and physical capital, among others. The argument advanced here is that the African states are not within same basket, but there are others who succeeded to some extent, for instance, South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, and Namibia succeeded to some extent.

2.3.4 Ethnic Conflict and Rivalry as Source of Fragility

Despite the fact that Africa has had elements of intra-ethnic conflicts before the arrival of the colonial powers, without doubt, it has been exacerbated and affected by the colonial-imposed administrative machineries in their respective colonies. Indeed, the problems at present in the contemporary African societies have taken different dimensions which vary from those of the pre-colonial period (Bereket, 1980: 3; Asongzoh, 2010: 66). The conflicts that we have today have both colonial as well as indigenous African roots which are the major, if not the sole source of the crises and confrontations happening in many parts of Africa. For instance, the political boundaries created by colonial powers in Africa enclosed groups with no traditions of shared authority or shared systems of settling disputes. These groups did not necessarily have the time to learn to become congenial (Ali, 2008: 37). However, the carved boundaries were ill-conceived and parceled out homogenous groups into different states while re-grouping different, often mutually hostile, entities within the same territorial boundaries. Nigeria, for example, accommodates as many as 250 ethno-linguistic groups, though there are three major identities: the Hausa, the Ibo, and the Yoruba. This artificial mixture is the root cause of the Nigerian state fragility and the 1967–1970 civil war regarded by many Africa's great human tragedies (William, 2002: 25, Martin, 2006: 22; Ali, 2008: 37).

Not only Nigeria, but also the Congo, the Sudan, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, is among the best examples that demonstrate how the ethnic conflict made the African states in a fragile state of affairs. In this respect, though African states have much in common, not only their origins as colonial territories, the multi-ethnic groups and the lack of committed leaders

who can accommodate positively that diversity define the difficulties that Africa has been facing for decades. To be honest to the point, the imperial powers are not only to be blamed, but those ruled post-independence African states have played their role in generating ethno-phobia, mistrust and suspicion among the African citizens which later criminalized both the state and the economy (Ruth, 1999: 547; Stefan, 2006: 27; Bulhan, 2013: 247). The post-colonial African nation-states have undergone or are undergoing serious ethnic conflicts including: Northern Nigeria, Eastern Congo, the Sudan, South Sudan, and the African Central Republic, to mention a few.

African solutions for African problems is important, therefore, the future of peace and stable sub-Saharan African nations remain only in the hands of the sub-Saharan African people and its elites who failed to draw strategies to serve their nations impartially⁶. The grievances and exclusions from opportunities expressed by some ethnic groups in the sub-Saharan Africa against other ethnics could lead to further future conflicts and confrontations in the region. This can be prevented only if the sub-Saharan African leaders take the lead in finding appropriate solutions to ensure that social justice prevails in the sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Nevertheless, if the sub-Saharan African states' leaders fail to de-escalate and degenerate the conflict and reconcile those fighting in their respective states, more social and political instability will follow and certainly will have an adverse effect on the wider African continent and beyond.

2.3.5 Leadership Style and Authoritarianism Regimes

The African continent has a history of authoritarian rules since most African countries gained their hard won independence from the imperial powers in particular the British, the French, the Italians, the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Belgians, among others in the early 1950s, sweeping through 1960s till 1970s. The African political instability and other related problems are basically associated with its leadership. The post-colonial leaders sought national unity through the centralization of political and economic power, employing remaining colonial laws and institutions to suffocate and destroy the politics of pluralism (William, 2002: 72; Bulhan, 2013: 247). Indeed, African leaders are mainly responsible for what went wrong after independence

⁶Ibid., 4.

and failed to break the cycles of insecurities in their respective states, though its genesis according to Ali A. Mazrui (2008: 36) has colonial roots and lie in the white legacy.

As far as the issue of the African leaders is concerned, the idea that African leaders had in common was to build their state power which could be linked to the realist state-centric approach. But, building the state in terms of military capability was not aimed only to defend their respective states from any foreign aggression, but emphasized on the capacity of the state's coercive apparatus to be used to suppress dissent and discontent among the socially and economically insecure citizens (Wangari, 2009: 75; Nasir, 2014: 100). Indeed, the most African leaders from the late 1960s until the early 1990s have had one-party systems and at least four-fifths of the continent were ruled by authoritarian regimes, either in the form of one-party system, military regime, military socialist regime or civil dictatorship (Michael & Nicolas, 1994: 65; Matthijs, 2004: 193; Axel & Jan, 2006: 6; Giovanni, 2007: 1; Mohamed & Per, 2007: 42). For instance, Guinea is one of the African states that faced serious problems from its leaders. The leader of Guinea, Ahmed Sékou Touré was not different from those leaders across the continent. Touré made Guinea a one-party dictatorship, maintained a stranglehold on all aspects of political and economic life, and used state-sponsored terror ruthlessly to suppress all real, potential and perceived political opponents (ICG, 2010: 4; Human Rights Watch, 2011: 10). According to Charles Scribner (1972: 208), in 1968, the number of Guineans who fled from Touré's harsh rule due to their opposition ideology was estimated about 250,000, mostly penetrated to Ivory Coast or Senegal. This kind of practice has shaped the Guinea's future state system of rule and generated the long lasting mistrust between the state and the Guinean citizens at large.

Therefore, the post-independence African leaders have many contradicting characters; some may describe them as puppets and servants of external forces and powers, while others label them as corrupted who installed their families, extended families, and friends into the state system to exploit the state resources and opportunities which quadrupled the phobia and suspicion among the state citizens, thus, delegitimized the state institutions. In fact, African state leaders are, by and large, produced the fragility of the states politically and economically and can be regarded the tools of the neocolonial ambitions which contributed its part the demise of the some African states. This kind of practice from the African leaders often crippled Africa's development and

progress and made the governance institutions in a fragile state of affairs. Nevertheless, the responsibility of the Africa's protracted conflicts and crises rests on the shoulders of its leaders. To retain or climb to power, these leaders fragmented their citizens either in ethnic, clan or sub-clan lines or religious and beliefs wisely. This kind of policies never helped Africans, but led many to collapse or on the verge to collapse, the Central African Republic, the South Sudan, among others, is the best examples that explain the negative role of the African leaders in running their respective states.

It seems obvious that Africa has had a history of authoritarian regimes since gaining its independence from the colonial powers in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. Though its first leaders were regarded as ardent revolutionaries who were the vanguard of Africa's independence, on the other hand, surprisingly, there are catalogue of grievances accumulated during their rules and visible on their political legacies. Despite their role to lead to free the African nations from the cage of the imperial to independence and their role in promoting Pan-Africanism ideology based on independent and liberated African countries from the imperial powers. Their political abuse, economic mismanagement, and deconstructing the trust between the state and the society at large with decades of authoritarian rules could be regarded as the center stage and the most negative implications of the post-colonial African leaders' which made the outcome uncertain.

CHAPTER THREE

The Somalia Conflict

3.1 The Somalia Political History

The Horn African region bridges the three ancient civilizations: Africa, Arabia and India. In fact, the association between Asians in particular the Arabs and the Horn African region has been one of long standing. According to both Somali and non-Somali scholars and anthropologists', the origin of present-day Somali people is rooted in the early history of mankind and civilization who had settled in the Somalia coastal areas, establishing strong trading links with Arab peninsula, in particular Yemen and Oman, even before the birth of Christ (Bereket, 1980: 98; Bulhan, 2013: 99). There is another argument contrary to that, according to Hussein Ali Dualeh (2002: 09), the real origin of the Somali people is wrapped in mystery. It is widely believed that their founding fathers had crossed from the Arab peninsula, and intermarried with the indigenous tribes, many of whose descendants do still exist, though they have for centuries intermingled with the Somalis. Therefore, while some argue that Somalis have lived in this present-day Somalia since their known history, there are others who attach the Somali origin with the arrival of Arab Sheikhs in the region and later intermarried and intermingled with the indigenous people those lived the area (Woodward, 2006: 23; Mark, 2008: 10).

Nevertheless, following the rise of Islam, the region's integration with the Middle Eastern region has intensified and accelerated. Since then, the successive Muslim Empires extended their sphere of influence and control not only to the Somali coast, but also beyond, for instance, since 1546 to 1874; the Othoman Empire which is the largest Muslim Empire in history ruled the Somali coastal areas such as Berbera, Zeila, among other coastal towns facing both the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean while its legacy is present in many parts of the Somalia coastal areas including buildings and mosques as well as watering system which survive today (Lewis, 2002:21; Bulhan, 2008: 21), such as the piped water system for Berbera from the springs of Dubaar.

Being similar with any African, Asian, and Latin American country, the political history of Somalia goes back when the European powers scrambled the African continent in 1884–1885 in the Berlin Conference. Indeed, three states colonized Somalia, and divided the land into five territories; namely, the British, the French and the Italians (Bereket, 1980: 2; Mary, 2012: 48). Without going into detail, the British occupied the northern part of Somalia (the current Somaliland), the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya, and the Eastern part of Ethiopia known then, the Haud and Reserve Area. Less influence in the East African region than the British, the French occupied the coastal area facing the Gulf of Aden (the current Djibouti), while the Italians also occupied the northeastern, and the south–central Somalia (Ruth, 1999: 560; Judith & Judy, 2004: 2; Bulhan, 2013: 294; Haldén, 2008: 21). Nevertheless, those regions remained under the colonial rule until the breeze of independence reached the shores of Africa in the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century. It is important to note that the NFD in Kenya has remained under the British rule until Kenya got its independence in 1963 and became part of Kenya, while the Somali region in Ethiopia – the current Somali National Regional State of Ethiopia – were relinquished to Ethiopia in 1954 (Bereket, 1980: 103). The rest, the British Somaliland Protectorate and the Italian Somalia, gained their independence on 26 June, 1960 and the 1 July, 1960 respectively, and united to form the first Somali Republic in history (Matt, 2004: 170; Martin, 2006: 465).

Similar to many parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America those who had an experience of colonial rules, colonialism was in place in Somalia since the end of the nineteenth century. With this in mind, while the struggle for freedom is a never-ending process, the Somali elite to revive the quest for freedom and Pan-Somali-Unity have gone through the whole cycle of struggle (Bulhan, 2008: 46). In this regard, Somalis fought against the colonial rule, for independence, and against the oppression of the ruling elite on whom they entrusted power. More specifically, Somalis in the 1940s and 1950s did not fight for independence in violent ways that the Somali Dervishes did (Bereket, 1980: 99; Woodward, 2006: 23; Haldén, 2008: 21). Nevertheless, their armed struggle against colonialism reached its peak under the leadership of Mohamed Abdulle Hassan and his dervish movement in the late and the early of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries respectively (Lewis, 2002: 80; Mark, 2008: 24; Mary, 2012: 48; Bulhan, 2013a: 274).

The independence granted in 1960 to the former Italian colony of Somalia and the former British Protectorate of Somaliland brought jubilation and high expectation to Somalis in these territories. It also raised the hopes of other Somalis in the Northern Frontier District in Kenya, and the Somali Region in Ethiopia, and the former French colony, today the Republic of Djibouti. Somalis in all five territories took for granted that independence of Somalia and Somaliland would usher a new era of freedom and unity for all Somalis under one state, one flag (Bereket, 1980: 97; Matt, 2004: 171; Bulhan, 2008: 77; Haldén, 2008: 22). According to Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan (2008: 77), after independence, however, these dreams of freedom and unity dissipated and turned into bitter disillusionment and despair. Independence did not bring freedom, but derailed and distorted it. The aspiration of Pan-Somali-Unity also diminished and later died.

According to many Somali and non-Somali scholars, the disillusionment and disenchantment from the Somalis lies primarily in the direction to which the civilian ruling elite took the newly independence and united territories of Somalia and Somaliland in the first nine years, from 1960–1969. In this regard, one may regard it as the source of the Somalia's agony and its bad governance and corruption practices led the army to depose them (Ruth, 1999: 573; Bulhan, 2008: 77). Nevertheless, the civilian governments lasted until 1969 when the army took the power on 21 October 1969 (Lewis, 2002: 207; Woodward, 2006: 24). The new military junta instituted a Marxist regime by introducing '*Scientific Socialism*', and became a close ally of the Soviet Union (Ruth, 1999: 574). However, the military government has not only deposed the civil administration, but also introduced the centralization strategy aimed to control the state authority under the leadership of the Army Chiefs. In many regards, one may argue that Somalia's unending tragedy, agony and state collapse are the product of a long-term abuse of power and state institutions perpetrated by both the army and the civilian rules.

In 1977, the uneasy relations between Ethiopia and Somalia which basically emanate from claiming people and land in the adjacent area (irredentism) led the Somali military government to go to war against Ethiopia. This war is considered as one of the bloodiest wars ever-witnessed in the Horn of Africa in the Cold War era. Nonetheless, Somalia's ambitions ended with its catastrophic defeat by Ethiopia and its allies in the 1977–1978 Ogaden War (Bereket, 1980: 117; Judith & Judy, 2004: 3; Woodward, 2006: 25; Haldén, 2008: 24; Mark, 2008: 39; Louise, 2013:

69). This military fiasco challenged Somalia's both internal and external policies and served as a future source of conflict and disintegration with the engagement of regional as well as distant actors. In the late of 1970s and the early 1980s waves of oppositions were organized inside the country and the first of the two movements against the regime were created (Martin, 2006: 467; Ken, 2008: 31). The Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) based in the northern and the northeastern parts of Somalia respectively were the two first armed movements. Following the eruption of the war in the northern regions in 1988, other two movements were established in the south-central and the remote south of the country, namely, the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) respectively (Woodward, 1996: 71; Judith & Judy, 2004: 4; Matt, 2004: 171; Bulhan, 2008: 342; Haldén, 2008: 25; Mark, 2008: 46). Those four armed movements are regarded the major source of the Somalia's state collapse and disintegration, while those running the state during the war are held accountable and responsible in what went wrong.

After the fall down of the Somalia's central authority and the breakdown of the all civil and political institutions in 1991, Somaliland (North Somalia) declared its separate existence from the rest of Somalia within the borders it inherited from the British Government on 26 June 1960 as a State of Somaliland. It managed to restore peace and order through traditional and religious leaders who filled the power vacuum that was created due to the absence of central authority (Joakim, 2006: 27). Unlike the northern part of Somalia, the southern regions have been encircled by anarchy and witnessed one of the most serious and barefaced violence and unending conflict in the Somali history with the involvement of multiple actors and interventions both from the region and beyond (Haldén, 2008: 28; Ken, 2008: 34). These conflicts led thousands to perish; others have been displaced internally or fled to the neighboring states and countries far beyond the borders of Somalia, while other thousands died or still dying in the oceans seeking better living conditions. Peter Woodward (1996: 74) described the situation in Somalia not just one of collapse, but a new destructive dynamic, whose political, social and economic focal point rested on the gun and the armed trucks known locally as '*technicals*'.

4.2 The Genesis of the Conflict

More generally, when the root causes of the Somalia's conflict and state collapse are analyzed, there are multifaceted factors which lack any single explanation and logical point of view. While some see the causes of the Somalia's agony as a clan caused conflict and linked to Somalia social structure, political and governance-related factors, others could relate it external-driven by which many regard it as a colonial legacy inherited from the imperial powers (Bulhan, 2008: 341). Though the conflict in Somalia may have one, two or all of these factors, the role of the external actors engaging in the post-state collapse conflict or even prior to that are not a deniable fact.

Without doubt, the root cause of the Somalia's conflict is debatable; one may argue that the origins of the Somalia's state disintegration lie in the role that Somalia had played as a Cold War proxy of both the U.S. and the former Soviet Union in the battle to control the strategic Horn of Africa (Bulhan, 2008: 359). While on the other hand, the causes of this havoc have political and economic dimensions, it exacerbated by the colonial legacy and the ruling elites of the Somalia's governments from 1960 to 1991 (Woodward, 1996: 67; Hussein, 2002: 49).

The European's scramble and division in Africa was the seed of future conflicts, chaos and enmity in Africa. Not only conflicts and chaos, but also created distrust among the coherent and co-existing societies prior to their arrival (Mark, 2008: 28). In the 1960s, the ugly face and the social crisis, which was a colonial export, have emerged in the Somali society. This has served as a future political, economic and social agony that contributed its part the total demise of the Somali state institutions after thirty-one years (Hussein, 2002: 48; Mark, 2008: 34). In line with this point of argument, one of the Somali best-known intellectual, nationalist and poet, Ahmed Ismail Diria known as '*Qasim*', has argued that the neo-colonial elements are present in the Somali society in post-independence period. In 1964, less than four years of the so-called political independence, the first Somali Government has failed to meet the basic needs and expectations of its citizens (Nasir, 2014a: 422). This Somali prominent poet has questioned the sovereignty of the Somali post-colonial leaders and accused the colonial powers as the mentors of the Somali leaders.

Nevertheless, the major curse of the Somalia state is not only the European powers who planted the seeds of the future social crisis and conflicts in Somalia, but partially it is from the Somalia's *leaders* who are responsible the agony and tragedy happening across the Somali state (Woodward, 1996: 67; Hussein, 2002: 49). It seems obvious that the Somali leaders from the dawn of independence till present are the servants of external actors and can never oppose the demands and interests of those actors who hijacked the political, social, and economic resources of the Somali state⁷. Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan (2013a: 267) argues that independence from colonial rule failed to deliver the freedom and prosperity the elite promised during anti-colonial struggles. Instead, according to him; the elite deepened misery and conflict through corruption, nepotism, and plundering the treasury until the state collapsed out of its internal rot in January 1991.

The most important point to note is that the ruling elite in Somalia as many parts of Africa was a product of colonial and neocolonial rule, knew no better than duplicate the exploitation and divide-and-rule of their colonial mentors, adding to these their use of the clan cult and delusion of clan superiority to attain and retain power (Bulhan, 2013: 247). Contrary to the argument of Hussein Bulhan, some non-Somali scholars argue that the clan structure is one of the most serious factors which was and still remains a factor of Somalia's conflict and not its solution. Indeed, the Somalia's quarter century agony and tragedy is not an outcome of the clan structure which served as a means of political and social actor and cohesion prior to the arrival of the European powers, and still serves as a major bond, interdependence and co-existence among the Somali society and the only proven guarantor of safety when things fall apart. But, there are other internal and external factors that used the clan as a means to pursue their goals and ultimate purposes. Since the state collapse in Somalia, the most significant actors that involved in the Somalia's conflict are the regional governments, the European Union, the U.S. and some dominant Arab governments pursuing their own agendas and interests (Ken, 2008: 42). Hence, due to the numerous differences among the Somali politicians who represent different external actors, these foreign powers has managed intervening Somalia's internal affairs for their own end results that was sustained over decades and complicated the already deteriorating situation.

⁷Ibid., 4.

3.3 The Peace Attempts and Outcomes

The conflict in Somalia, which started post-state collapse in 1991 was a crucial security challenge faced by the Horn African region (Aisa et al. 2008: 151). The costs one of the longest civil war in the Horn of Africa amounts thousands of innocent people, who lost their precious lives, displaced millions (internally and externally) and devastated unimaginable amount of properties. Since the eruption of the Civil War, several governments brokered numerous peace deals, pressured or persuaded the warring parties to end the conflict (Mark, 2008: 49). Those attempts were from various fronts, such as the U.S., and most notably, from African and Arab Governments including the Somalia neighbors (Woodward, 1996: 74). These attempts have never produced peace and stability in the long term. One of the most distressful thing that come out the decades long debates has been the unwillingness of the parties for ending the civil war. Eventually, the 2004 conference concluded in Kenya paved the way the emergence of the Somalia's current federal government (Haldén, 2008: 39).The agreement though was not a home-grown initiative which has its own challenge since it born in foreign land; actually it represented a '*paradigm shift*' in the administration, politics and economy of Somalia comparable to many peace and reconciliation conferences (Aisa et al. 2008: 134; Kidist, 2009: 28). This is true when we see the outcome of that conference which is the federal form of government; though its viability to the Somalia context is questionable, it survives today.

There is an important point that deserves to be noted which many scholars and researchers both Somali and non-Somali have failed to raise it. Indeed, any foreign brokered peace cannot bring peace and stability in the long-term. Therefore, one may ask why over fifteen peace attempts have failed. Since 1991, there were a number of transitional governments which have not been legitimate and genuine authorities working on the will and the interest of their fellow citizens, but were foreign imposed governments which contradict with their claims as a legitimate authority over the Somalia state territory. Therefore, the basic question confronting outside actors which the study attempts to tackle is whether to engage in a top-down or bottom-up policy that relate to establish or strengthen institutions and leaders, or foster a functioning indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in the hope that this will cultivate enlightened institutions and committed leadership in the long term. Indeed, the answer is very precise and important to

consider it. Somaliland and Puntland are the best examples that highlight how a bottom-up approach has produced a sustainable peace and stability without an international engagement (Ahmed & Lewis 1993: 11; Joakim, 2006: 8), while the top-down imported leaders and institutions are relying on the protection of foreign troops.

In this regard, the absence of a homegrown peace and reconciliation in Somalia has invited non-state beneficial actors, both from within and outside Somalia, such as the '*global jihadists*' who get a safe-haven and shelter from the chaotic environment (ICG, 2014: 1). With this in mind, there is a need a true and real reconciliation among the Somali conflicting politicians, and the state institutions should be reconstituted as a genuine, inclusive government of national unity, while giving the intellectuals including the elders their deserved role in the society. However, the signs of their willingness to accept the role of the elders as the Somaliland and Puntland politicians has done are discouraging. Therefore, sustained local pressure is needed on Somalia's politicians, and the international community needs to encourage the society at the grassroots' to use their indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms to address Somalia's endless conflict and chronic state failure, and allow them to put aside the outside architected state leaders and institutions (Jody, 2014: 3). Therefore, the sobering assessments that have emerged from this study are that statebuilding works best when people at the grassroots rally behind enlightened and committed leaders like the Somaliland and Puntland State of Somalia people has done. But very little at all will work if they rally behind one who is not, as the current situation in the Federal Government of Somalia attests.

3.4 Success and Failure Stories and Manifestations

After 30 years of its independence, Somalia had ceased to function as a single state. In May 1991, the northwest regions seceded from the rest of Somalia to form the independent Republic of Somaliland claiming the colonial boundaries; it inherited from the British Government on 26 June, 1960. Since its inception, it has managed to restore peace and order through indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms, while it governs security and stands out as a relatively stable region in a volatile region without international engagement (Ahmed & Lewis 1993: 11; Ruth, 1999: 582). It is worth mentioning that the most important thing that is hard to ignore is that

Somaliland has denied accepting any external actor that interested to involve in its momentums of peace and statebuilding to architect and design their destiny. Hence, this intellectual decision has served as a milestone for Somaliland's long-term security and stability moving it forward to adopt multi-party democracy (IRI, 2005: 7), which made this tiny unrecognized region in the Horn of Africa to hold a series of contested elections. Therefore, although there are both local and regional factors those effects and challenges Somaliland's security and stability. The influence of these positive developments and others has enabled Somaliland to maintain its security and the regional stability simultaneously.

Indeed, there is a quite different region from the south-central Somalia, which managed to architect home-engineered state institutions like Somaliland has done. The Puntland State of Somalia is a self-governing region in north-eastern part of Somalia and regarded itself as an important component of the federal arrangements of Somalia in contrast to Somaliland who distant its state structures from the Somalia's federal institutions (Judith & Judy, 2004: 5; Haldén, 2008: 37). Since its inception in 1998, it has enjoyed a relative peace and stability, albeit years of conflict among the Puntland politicians which escalated into open conflict in 2003. Except these shortcomings, Puntland developed its own institutions, while four leaders succeeded the power since its establishment in 1998.

Despite Somaliland and Puntland success stories, after the removal of the military government from the power in 1991 (Aisha, 2012: 328); south-central Somalia has plunged into conflict and civil strife and experienced a worst political and security conditions over the last twenty years coupled with the '*war on terrorism*' which is yet another calamity that aggravated the existing situation in that war ravaged nation in the Horn of Africa which made the most of the south and center of the country remains ungoverned (Woodward, 2006: 136). This '*war on terror*' came to Somalia after 9/11, and the subsequent emergence of the Islamist elements in the Somalia state showing sympathy those in Afghanistan and the Middle Eastern region (Tom, 2014: 4). Though the emergence of the Somali Islamists has been seen as a sign of hope in its early inception such as the UIC, the situation has changed when the current *Al-Shabab* radical group those operate in the southern and central parts of the country has emerged (Haldén, 2008: 42; Ken, 2008: 41; Kidist, 2009: 13; Jody, 2014: 2). In this regard, multiple interventions both from the region and

the world have worsened the already deteriorating situation of Somalia. Henceforth, the external involvement has made the conflict in the Somalia much more complicated than expected. Thus, it is hard to ignore that external parties involved in Somalia's politics have derailed the momentums of peace and reconciliation over the past twenty years. In this case, one may argue that the peace initiatives brokered by foreign or state institutions under foreign architect produce neither sustainable peace nor robust and resilient institutions.

In this regard, the solution of the Somalia's lingering conflict should be internal-initiative and will require a number of sacrifices from the indigenous parties involved. To do so, firstly, endogenous methods and traditional knowledge of facilitation and conflict resolution should be applied in order to reconcile those fighting over the past two decades. Secondly, the society at the grassroots' should be taught about non-violent transformation of conflicts and reconciliation approaches and gave them as a lesson to those adopted by Somaliland and Puntland to resolve and settle their differences. Thirdly, although the root causes of the Somalia's crisis have various dimensions, the Somalization of the conflict is the most significant factor that needs to be taken into account. But, international backing should be necessary to help local processes, provide resources and create a favorable space for local actors to start dialogue and define their fate to generate locally-designed durable institutions, but, neither dictates nor imposes them foreign-designed state bodies. Fourthly, all parties involved the enmity and hostility should be obliged to renounce their claims over: power, territory or properties belonged to the Somali public.

Therefore, translating these initiatives into action will serve as a bridge that would avoid the people from the tragic vision of politics, such as "*nihilism*", "*warlordism*" and "*Jihadism*" in the country. Nevertheless, these points will at least ease inter-politicians tensions and the impasse in the area who shelter their respective clans and perhaps allow all the clans and sub-clans to trust each other and to concentrate on general development instead of spending their meager or scarce resources on armaments either to launch attacks on the other clans or defend their traditionally belonged territories which they reclaimed after the Somalia's state collapse twenty three years back.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Internal and External Actors in Post-State Collapse Era

In 1991, the Somalia central authority for all intents and purposes came to an end and its institutions collapsed and ceased to function as a state (ICG, 2006: 6). Within the ashes and ruins of the state collapse, self-appointed warlords greedy for power, business lords seeking for wealth as well as Islamists using Islam as a motto benefited the vacuum. External actors, both as state and non-state were not absent, but engaged in and fueled the conflict in Somalia. Without exception, the neighboring countries, Arab and Western states have been drawn into Somalia's conflict, both for political and economic interests (Bjørn, 2009: 19; Bulhan, 2013a: 268). For instance, the U.S., Italy, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Uganda, UK, Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the UAE, and later Turkey have played a decisive role. All these actors, both internal and external lack coordination, but except the internal, the others have one factor in common, '*national interest*'.

Because of these multiple interventions from the transnational actors and their local clients. This chapter examines the reason and the interest behind, and questions why both internal and external actors engage in the lingering violent conflicts in Somalia which led the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent Somalis to perish since the state collapse in 1991 and kept the state institutions absent. And asks who the major actors' are, being states from the region and beyond. It identifies the engagement of strong, reckless actors that challenge the state restoration efforts for their own purposes. Thus, all those actors undermined both the internal and the external sovereignty of the state and have had ambition for decades to re-shape Somalia's state and its governance institutions simultaneously.

4.1 The Internal Actors: Effects and Impact

4.1.1 The Business Lords

Since the breakdown of all civil and political institutions in Somalia, the state has become a victim of multiple interventions from different fronts. Its total collapse and disintegration paved the way for the emergence of strong and influential actors which occupied the central role of the state and dominated the whole sectors of the state being economic and political. The chaos gave a window of opportunity to new business people who dominated the failed state economy, looted and smuggled the state resources. Because of this, post-state collapse business community has become a political force in its own right; with significant ties not only the powerful and the greedy warlords, both in Mogadishu and its outside, but also with the self-governing administrations and the successive transitional governments (Sabrina, 2004: 8; Aisha, 2012:319). According to Aisha Ahmad (2012: 322; 323) in Mogadishu, for instance, the aggressive and illicit nature of these new business entrepreneurs required to establish relationships with local warlords not only to shield them from economic and political rivals but also pushed out the longstanding members of the Mogadishu and the nearby business communities.

Indeed, the engine of the market economy is the pursuit of profit; this system will persist only if it produces profits for the participating bodies. In Somalia, a war economy, which differs from a civilian economy has emerged following the state collapse and was a precursor of strong and greedy criminal networks (Sabrina, 2004: 4). These are the business lords who benefited the state collapse and had collaborations with the warlords (Kidist, 2009: 37; Aisha, 2012: 319) in the case of the south-central Somalia or maintained close relations with the self-governing administrations like Somaliland and Puntland. In Somalia, telecom and money transfer companies, for instance, though demonstrated remarkable success stories of the failed state, and are the largest privately-owned business establishments that generate millions of dollars per annum for their own end benefits without paying a single penny of tax, also offer and create employment opportunities for the Somali youth (Mary, 2012: 119). On the other hand, the telecom and money remittance companies are characterized as the major challenge against the state restoration attempts and initiatives not only in the south-central Somalia, but also engage

tirelessly in undermining the capacity of the existing institutions in the other parts of the Somali state.

For instance, in Somaliland, there are at least two influential companies which play a great role in the decision-making processes of Somaliland; namely, the Dahabshiil⁸ and the Telesom⁹ Companies. These two companies are the largest employers in Somaliland before the Government, unfortunately, exacerbate the situation by using the unemployment paranoia, which is at a high rate as a weapon to harass and abuse the rights of the already employed people which worsen the underemployment rate in Somaliland and exacerbated the relations among the societies¹⁰. Not only in the economic sector, but also these companies undermine the security as well, for instance, Telecom companies subscribe services to Somalis regardless of ideology and the group affiliated with without prior screening the customer which jeopardizes both the state security and citizens' safety in one way or another (Ken, 2004: 9). Therefore, due to the absolute freedom of these companies, it provides services even the criminal networks operating across the region, include: *'terror groups'*, pirates, drug dealers, those engaging in human trafficking, and others.

Telecom and money transfer companies are not the only companies that engage the business transactions throughout the state pursuing their own benefits, but there are self-organized organizations in the form of *'civil society'* those secure funds from various sources, for instance, from the EU, the UN, among other donors. These organizations as a form of business portfolios emerged from the ashes of the civil war and used it as a vehicle for revenue-generating benefiting the absence of the state regulating agencies. These organizations are fake in nature, for example, since the 1990s; there was a fake NGO industry or a suitcase NGO business model aimed to generate revenues from the aid delivery contracts which created a marriage of convenience between warlords and the new business elite. The fake NGO industry provided a highly lucrative cash-grab opportunity for both businessmen and warlords, which further

⁸ a Somali and privately-owned money transfer company operating across the world continents with 220 offices worldwide

⁹ the largest telecommunication company in Somaliland and the sister company of the Gollis and Hormud Telecoms in Puntland and South-Central Somalia respectively

¹⁰Discussions with a senior officer at Telesom in Somaliland on April 14, 2015, Hargeisa, Somaliland

solidified their elite-level partnership. The international intervention directly created the conditions in this industry to develop and flourish (Aisha, 2012: 326).

Therefore, one may argue that the '*civil society*' in the form of NGO and business actors who have had a link with the Somalia's successive transitional governments, the self-governing regions, the Islamist elements, and the warlords as well, aggravate the situation than expected. In this respect, one can never exclude those actors for being part and parcel of the Somalia's chronic problem over decades and an obstacle to its state restoration efforts¹¹. In this regard, Somalia has become a failed state governed by powerful business elites, profit-seeking civil society organizations and local warlords succeeded by Islamists who aspired to rule the country on sword points. All of these actors without exception have a material interest in maintaining international aid dependence and perpetuating state failure indefinitely (Ibid: 327).

Against the above argument, there are other strong arguments which clearly underline the crucial role of the civil society and the business communities and appreciate their efforts in improving the livelihoods of the Somali people at large. Not only their livelihoods, but also contributed a lot positively to the income of many which the absence of the state institutions impacted on their living conditions. Without doubt, the civil society and business communities have both negative and positive impact on the state and citizens livelihoods. But, their positive role in contributing both to the individual and collective incomes should be appreciated.

4.1.2 The Leadership Factor

The imposition of Western institutions and values upon the colonies disrupted the social structures and cultural life of the subject peoples (William, 2002: 42). According to Ali A. Mazrui (2008: 37), in Africa, for instance, the colonial powers destroyed old methods of conflict resolution and traditional African political institutions, and failed to create effective substitute ones in their place. Despite the erosion of the indigenous institutions, the colonizers intentionally denied to offer the Africans training opportunities to cope up with the imposed European

¹¹ Interview with Berouk Mesfin – Senior Researcher in Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis at the Institute for Security Studies – Addis Ababa, on 26 January, 2015

institutions. Therefore, the leaders of Africa at independence had mostly not been adequately trained by the colonial governments and had limited experience of operating a governmental system on a national scale. The absence of skill and knowledge on administrative issues in the post-colonial period never helped African state institutions, but derailed the euphoria of the African peoples, and later declined (William, 2002: 76). With the presence of these gaps and challenges in the newly established African states, African leaders on the other hand failed to meet the needs and expectations of their citizens and to bring any substantial change and difference from the colonial powers.

Being similar with many other developing and underdeveloped countries, Somalia has fallen under the influence of its colonial masters which shaped its economic, social and political structures and later criminalized the state institutions. However, the major source of the Somalia's conflict and crisis is not only the involvement of external actors in its internal dynamics who planted the seeds of future conflicts in the Somali society in particular and the developing world including the African continent in general. But the undeniable fact is that the Somalia's leaders are partially responsible for the agony and tragedy happening across the Somali state (Nasir, 2014a: 423). It seems obvious that the Somali leaders from the dawn of independence till recently are the servants of external actors plus their inward looking policies with the practices of nepotism, favoritism and dishonesty to their fellow citizens.

Since the independence in the 1960, Somalia has experienced three generations of leadership which passed and inherited both weird and negative attributes from one to another which later destroyed the state. These are: a) the civil leadership from the 1960–1969, b) the military junta from 1969–1991, and, c) the post-state collapse leaders from 1991–present. The tragedy and agony of Somalia are the outcome of the first generation who seeded the Somalia's future crises because of their odd policies and practices. Thus, are regarded the midwives of the military government, while the latter gave birth the greedy warlords who emerged from the ashes and ruins of the state collapse and scrambled its resources. As a result of this, the politicians throughout the Somalia modern history without reservation mobilized the people using the clan

cult, while on the other hand, every clan reclaimed their traditional independence and territories following the state collapse¹².

Despite the critical stance of the Somali leaders at independence against the imperial powers, which deserve appreciation, on the other hand, there is a crude critique against the leadership style of the first generation of the independent Somali state as well as those succeeded. The most distressing political calculations adopted by those leaders, could be summarized in three main crucial points thus have had an adversary impact on the socioeconomic and political aspects of the Somali citizens at large, these are: a) injustice practices in the state politics at national, regional and local levels, b) unequal distribution of wealth and state resources among the citizens. In Somalia, the practices of nepotism, favoritism, and dishonest are overt, most of the Somali successive leaders if not all, introduced versions of policies by installing their clan group members or clan affiliates, close and extended families, and friends within the state system and empowered them to manipulate the state power and exploit the state resources, and, c) cracking down both the ordinary and political figures which existed and widely practiced without exception in the Somalia state politics since the independence in the 1960¹³.

In essence, the rule-mongering traits and the tragic visions of the Somali politicians since the 1960s should be described as the epicenter of the country's chronic problems and can be recorded as an important cause. While the suspicion and mistrust that existed for decades among the major external actors involving in the Somalia's internal dynamics, in particular post-state collapse period is another viable cause, for instance, Egypt and Ethiopia are deeply divided over the Somalia's question and never accepted each other's initiative to restore peace and order¹⁴. Due to this disagreement among the external actors and the internal division and fragmentation within Somalia's politicians, many believe that the absence of effective state institutions in Somalia will be a long-time not a short-time as many may think. In either view, the Somali public at large is prepared to accept any leadership elected by the people at the grassroots then will determine their fates and destiny, besides establishing locally-owned effective and

¹²Interview with Dr. Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan – a leading figure in academia, former tenure professor at Boston University and Chancellor of the University of Hargeisa, UNAMID Chief of Staff, and the founding director of the Frantz Fanon University in Hargeisa – Hargeisa, Somaliland, on 4 April, 2015

¹³Ibid., 12.

¹⁴Ibid., 11.

responsible state institutions. This will enhance its security power to preserve its internal security and stability and start enforcing its laws properly without fear and reluctance.

Beyond these quite distressing relations among the major external actors in Somalia, a more convincing argument is that Somalia's crisis is an outcome of both weak leadership and governance institutions aggravated by suspicion and mistrust among the Somali politicians which lasted for decades in particular post-state collapse period¹⁵. To realize this; grassroots engagement is necessary and crucial for restoring peace and order, in particular the major stakeholders, including the women, the youth, the media, the business people, and the elders. For instance, while any problem that happens in any region, mostly has an effect on women, the role this category of the population play as credible agents of peace should be highlighted and deserve encouragement to promote peacebuilding, preventing or ending possible violence within the community.

4.1.3 The Media

Mired by anarchy and chaos since 1991; Somalia has had an independent media, and for the most part took its role in escalating or de-escalating the conflicts among the Somalia contending parties and later affected the ordinary people. In the post-state collapse, Somalia media faced challenges emanating from two compatible fronts: the increased domestic news outlets to meet pressing issues with a little knowledge to the media ethics, rights and responsibilities for the one hand, and the lawless public who had no tolerance at all to the media and respond it in an aggressive way to the other (BBC, 2011: 5; David, et al. 2012: 1). According to the Reporters Without Borders (2013: 6) 18 journalists were killed, caught up in bomb attacks or the direct targets of murder, making 2012 the deadliest in history of the country's media. With this in mind, the Horn African state was the second most dangerous country in the world for those working in news and information, behind Syria.

Indeed, what is happening in Somalia is an important factor that needs to be analyzed and discussed, because it needs to raise the question of whether the freedom of speech and expression

¹⁵Ibid., 4.

is helping the peace and the state restoration efforts or jeopardizing. The experience and practice of the Somalia media over the past two decades seems to have both negative and positive elements which are observable from their practices and its impact on the society¹⁶. In the post-state collapse years, there were and still are growing criticisms of the conduct of the media in Somalia. Among those who criticize the media are local community members, the political elites, and academicians. At least there is one typical critique raised against the media. First and for most, the media are not an objective, but a politically biased actor. This criticism is common among all Somalia media, and especially this is common during the conflict and political tensions.

The center stage of the neutrality is the objecting reporting, which is a crucial element in the media and adds a weight. The objective reporting is a necessary component of media ethics to narrate an unbiased reporting and cover a given story in a fair and accurate manner (Raphael, 2001: 78; 2008: 6). Indeed, the idea of objectivity should be rejected in the cases presenting ideas sharply opposed to peace and stability, which encourages various forms of violence against others, including hate, subjugation and intimidation (Ibid, 2008: 18). In the liberal world, freedom of speech is a guiding principle, and one of the foundations of the liberal democracy, but at the same time, freedom does not imply anarchy (Ibid, 2001: 88), and the right to exercise free expression does not include the right to do unjustified harm to others including social and political institutions.

Though the media in Somalia have shown a quantitative rapid increase (BBC, 2011: 4), on the other hand, it has its own challenges and gaps that existed since the state collapse. This could be linked to the argument that the press in Somalia has been established with working on unfriendly environment¹⁷. At this time, the media have enjoyed absolute editorial independence and self-censoring since the state collapse in 1991, but failed to avoid public and private disappointments. While on the other hand, the major frictions between the lawless public and the media linked to news items which are in one way or another annoying the lawless public. This could be attributed to the fact that the absence of objective reporting is regarded as the most challenging

¹⁶Observed from Somalia media regardless of region and type of the media

¹⁷The media in Somalia releases any news item they interested without calculating the impact on the citizens life and the state security and its restoration efforts. Thus faces the consequences of their actions later

factors on the Somalia freedom of speech and expression plus absence of law enforcement machineries at national and local levels (BBC, 2011: 10). Due to this fact on the ground, the proliferation and pluralism of the press in clan bases under the coordination and financing of the Somalia's Diasporas are believed to be the source of tension that fuels the Somalia's endless conflicts (David, et al. 2012: 2).

Against all these odds, though Somalia has had a vibrant industry of private radio and television stations that usually find themselves operating in circumstances of varying degrees of repressive environment, political turmoil and other challenges related to their profession, knowledge gap and experience in their field. On the other hand, one may regard it as a major precursor for promoting social cohesion, disseminating and transmitting the voice of the voiceless in the public faces in a sense of helping the needy people. This means that the media has an active and affirmative impact on the overall community development and peacebuilding processes of the state¹⁸. But, this doesn't mean that it is without challenges, indeed, it has challenges that need to be addressed through capacity building programs to promote its effectiveness that could balance the interests of the citizens and the public simultaneously.

4.1.4 The '*Islamist Factor*'

Despite the fact that the growth and the expansion of the Islamists in Somalia have increased in the post-state collapse period, on the other hand, the Islamists and their hard interpretation of Islam is not a new phenomenon in the Somalia politics. It seems obvious that the history of the Somalia Islamists goes back in the 1960s, following the independence, when the Somali youth went to the Middle Eastern countries for study and employment opportunities. Upon their return from the abroad in the 1970s, many of these individuals formed parallel Somali movements to Islamist elements in many parts of the Middle Eastern region, seeking peaceful transformation of the Somalia state to Islamic Republic (Markus, 2009: 3). This Islamist trend was not without challenges. In too many parts of the Somalia state, Islamists faced harassment, detention, prison, and violent reaction from the Somalia government following their resistance against the Barre's plans for '*Scientific Socialism*' and his amendments to the Family Law in 1974. This ultimately

¹⁸ Discussions with a Somali intellectual who lives in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 5 June, 2015

led the government execute thirteen religious clerics (Medhane, 2002: 18; Mark, 2008: 37; Napoleon, 2010: 58). This move by the Somalia's military government shaped the future image of the Somalia Islamists and served as their point of departure to capture the state power in the future.

As a result of the Somalia's state collapse in the 1991, a new dawn of the Somalia Islamists has risen as the state collapse at least gave a room and a safe-haven to the Islamists within the ashes and ruins of the state. The Islamists started to arrange themselves into two separate but too closely interrelated organized groups: as an armed group and as a form of social organization that engage in the areas of charity, for instance, *Al-Ittihad* and *Al-Islah* respectively (Mary, 2012: 77). For one reason or another, those groups are committed to occupy the vacuum in an attempt to secure a leadership position both in the economy and state politics, and therefore, transform the state (Ken, 2004: 9; 2005: 26; Markus, 2009: 6; Lauren, 2010: 5). Indeed, considerable progress and expansion has been achieved by the Islamists within that period, while their revival and its subsequent penetration deep into the state has both negative and positive contribution to the Somalia citizens who suffered severe civil wars for decades and lived in abject and destitute situations.

Though the Islamists were present in the Somalia territory long before the state collapse, the 9/11 have changed the Somalia Islamists context as the '*War on Terror*' has emerged and many elements associated with *Al-Qaeda* came into being at a global level¹⁹. Indeed, there are various types of Somalia Islamists who operate both as radical and moderate elements; however, *Al-Shabab*, which is characterized as the *Al-Qaeda*'s version in the Horn African region, a fanatic and a radical wing of those Somali Islamist elements has controversies (ICG, 2005: 6; Bjørn, 2009: 13; Lauren, 2010: 6; Mary, 2012: 96; ICG, 2014: 4). While both Somali and non-Somali scholars argue that the *Al-Shabab* neither has a political objective²⁰ nor agenda that could help the Somali state, and according to them, should be regarded as a vanguard for a foreign agenda

¹⁹Ibid., 11.

²⁰Ibid., 11.

representing external actors²¹ that benefiting the lawless Somalia state since the 1991. Others regard it as a vehicle for social and state salvation emerged from the ruins and rubble of the state to save the Somalia citizens from the vicious actors that engulfed the state since 1991. The fact, however, remains that the revival of the idea of Islamism emerged from the ashes of the Somalia severe civil wars as the many Somali public realized that the Islam is the only solution that can solve their differences with the influence and support of the Gulf States²², thus citizens had shown sympathy to the Islamists due to their desperate situation about the self-appointed warlords who scrambled the state and its resources among themselves.

Therefore, the manipulation of power and corruption in the economic, social, and political processes lies at the heart of the Somalia's political maneuvers which made the state restoration efforts in danger or uncertain. On the other hand, Somalia, politics has tended to be contentious along politicized clan factor and radicalized faith²³, with the contentiousness sometimes stimulated and exploited for political and faith-related reasons²⁴. For this reason and for many others, it is not a thing of surprise to state that the other Islamist elements that are present in Somalia though are moderate in practice, on the other hand has close link with *Al-Shabab*, empowering this radical group by giving support and assistance both moral and material, these elements includes: *Al-Islah* and *Al-Ittihad* in contrast to *Ahlu-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah*, which play a crucial role in supporting the government and its efforts to stabilize the country. Nevertheless, *Al-Shabab* who maintained close relations with *Al-Qaeda*, its ultimate goal is to topple the Federal Government of Somalia, while the Federal Government militia and the African Union peacekeeping forces are fighting against the *Al-Shabab* insurgents. However, it is too early to declare the end of Somalia's conflict where *Al-Shabab* elements are largely active and threaten guerrilla warfare in the south-central Somalia regions and poses security threats even the regions beyond the borders of Somalia (ICG, 2007: 1). With this in mind, the jihadi surge in Somalia,

²¹ Interview with Gebre Egziabher Alemseged (Colonel) – Peace and Security Advisor to Intergovernmental Authority on Development in particular Office of the Facilitator for Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation – on 16 January, 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

²² *Ibid.*, 11.

²³ Discussions with Abdirahman Diria, commentator on the Somalia political, economic and social affairs, on 11 June, 2015; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

²⁴ In a focus group discussions attended by the researcher in Dollo Addo, a Woreda in the Somali Region in Ethiopia on 26 February, 2015; the participants clearly stating how the differences in religious sects and ideologies are growing within the Somalis as well as the clan factor. The two factors were politicized or aggravated by the Somali elite with the involvement of both regional and distant actors

which is the tragic, violent outcome of steadily deteriorating internal political dynamics and measureless outside interventions since the state collapse in 1991 and conquered many parts of the south–central Somalia reveal the fragility of the Horn African region in general and Somalia in particular (Nasir, 2014: 98).

With all these pro and cons, there are contending ideas and arguments on *Al-Shabab*'s role for re-stabilizing the Somali state. Some argue that *Al-Shabab*'s vision for Somalia runs counter to long-running international efforts to create a stable, inclusive Somali government. Indeed, Somali successive authorities unable to secure the Somalia on their own and relied on forces from the IGAD Member states, Burundi and Sierra Leone to help the government to retake and secure the state²⁵. The weakness of the Somalia state capacity is evident, but this brings up the question of the level of effectiveness of government in Somalia. Are there state institutions in Somalia providing the necessities that *Al-Shabab* provided and the government failed to provide? The answer is yes but only in the areas which fall under the control and auspices of *Al-Shabab*. Though those elements stick on radical ideologies and advocates hard interpretation of Islam, on the other hand, they provide necessary services to people living in their strongholds such as security, food and other elements important for the survival of the citizens²⁶. Surprisingly, the areas controlled by *Al-Shabab* are more peaceful than other areas that fall under the control of the Federal Government and the self-governing administrations. Not only in terms of peace and security, but also food security and its sufficiency are prevalent in those areas.

4.2 Reshaping the Somalia State Post-1991: the Role of External Actors

4.2.1 The Regional Actors

Of course, the decades-long Somalia conflict has produced a number of actors opposing each other and involve in the internal politics of Somalia. Since the state collapse in the 1991, the Somalia state fell under the influence of opposing domestic, regional and international actors

²⁵ In February, 2014, around 4 major attacks were carried out by this group targeting various government places including the presidency, the airport and the national security service headquarters which are tightly secured by the African troops

²⁶ The regions that fall under the control of this group there is no major security threats from the local people except the harsh rule and hard interpretation of the group the Islamic religion

(Lunn, 2008: 29; Kidist, 2009: 38). In fact, the neighboring countries of Somalia have been criticized for supporting the Somalia self-appointed warlords, those scrambled the state before the Islamist forces drove out their strongholds in the south–central Somalia in 2006 (Abbink, 2003: 413). For instance, IGAD members who are the Somalia’s neighbors exported their political differences to Somalia, which complicated the situation than expected. According to Kidist Mulugeta (2009: 50) the rivalry and conflict between Member States extended in Somalia and aggravated the situation as Member States’ propose contradicting initiatives to deal with the Somalia issue, thus, hampered IGAD from taking a common position. In this regard, IGAD is a reflection of its Member States, which are engulfed in inter- and intrastate conflicts and have had a history of intervening in the internal affairs of one another, supporting rebel groups, and spoiling their relations (Abbink, 2003: 414). These conflicts have simply paralyzed IGAD from playing a meaningful role in Somalia (Kidist, 2009: 43).

Fundamentally, the Horn of Africa is one of the most strategic and geopolitical region for one hand, and the most vulnerable and fragile for the other. This fragility and vulnerability are attributed to its diversity in terms of ethnicity, religion and other elements plus the presence of enormous natural resources (Nasir, 2014: 100). For these attributes, the wars and the fear of wars has been the defining character of the regional states which shaped their state structures and their mutual relations. Since the known history, Somalia and Ethiopia have had uneasy relations full of mistrust and political hostility which basically emanates from claiming people and the land which Somalia has claimed the Somali-inhabited parties not only in Ethiopia, but also in Kenya and repeatedly characterized it as “*Lost Territories*” (Amare, 1989: 482; Napoleon, 2010: 56). This has led Ethiopia and Somalia fight over territory in 1964, and the deadliest in 1977–78²⁷.

In the olden days, the Derg regime of Ethiopia extended military assistance to the Somalia rebel groups, the SSDF, the SNM and later the USC and the SPM. The Ethiopian government at that time, mostly engaged by harboring, training, arming and allowing access to Media for propaganda purpose that aimed to weaken or topple the regime in Mogadishu as it was common and as part of the African states’ tit-for-tat foreign policy orientations (Nasir, 2011: 8). The Somalia state retaliated by giving support to the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), the

²⁷Ibid., 11.

Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF) to overthrow the Derg regime (Abbink, 2003: 410). As part of the Somalia's support and assistance, a number of the Ethiopian dissident leaders at that time reportedly carried Somali-issued passports (Ted, 2009: 18). Not only the EPLF and TPLF, but the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), also received assistance from Somalia. The major concerns of these two regimes were to weaken and ultimately destroy each other's government.

Due to this mistrustful relation between the two sides, Ethiopia has had security legitimacy and its relation with Somalia is militarized and securitized. With the existence of this, the current ruling party of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) pursuing its national interest and strategy has established relations with post-state collapse entities and warlords in Somalia, while on the other hand it hosted several Somali peace processes from Addis Ababa to Sodere (David, 2004: 5; Kidist, 2009: 26). Though Ethiopia was intervening the Somalia internal dynamics long before the state collapse and after, following Ethio-Eritrean war; Ethiopia deeply engaged into Somalia internal affairs and reframed its relations with Somalia into a security legitimacy interest as Eritrea appeared as arch-rival of Ethiopia using Somalia's self-appointed warlords and later the Islamists as proxy agents to destabilize Ethiopia²⁸. Since then, Ethiopia publically declared its military intervention into Somalia and the most important point to note is that the Ethiopian Defense Forces (EDF) paraded the Somalia's capital, Mogadishu late 2006, for the first time in history and even moved beyond it by reaching the coastal city of Kismayo on the Indian Ocean hunting elements of the Somalia's Islamists those fled to that part of the country.

Therefore, Ethiopia engaged in this war for at least two reasons: a) as a part of its national security strategy to counter its enemies that sheltered in the Somalia's lawless state according to its point of argument, and, b) support the Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which Ethiopia was its midwife and chief architect (Ken, 2005: 30). In the region we are living today, it would be fair to conclude that Ethiopia is involved in the Somalia affairs for political and security reasons and publicly expressed its support for the Somalia Federal Government

²⁸Ibid., 11.

institutions flourish. For the time being, Ethiopian troops are in Somalia as part of the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) fighting the Islamist insurgents and helping the Federal Government. Nevertheless, while many regard Ethiopia as the “*traditional enemy*” of Somalia, Ethiopia neither wants united and strong state in Somalia nor stable self-governing administrations²⁹. But, keeping the state in a state of economic, political and social dilemmas by supporting the internal political actors remains one of its top agendas and priorities towards Somalia. Therefore, its intervention in 2006 one may categorize it as a state destroying.

In addition, Uganda is an active actor in the Somalia political dynamics, Uganda though it is a new actor in regards to the involvement of the Somalia affairs; it has maintained regular contact and support with the Somalia’s Federal Government. In the most recent conflict, Ugandan troops are physically in Somalia fighting the *Al-Shabab* elements and support the government in order to restore peace and order. In this context, Kampala has expressed concerns that the *Al-Shabab*, which carried out suicide attacks in Kampala in 2010, could extend its operations in Uganda territory and beyond (Mary, 2012: 66; Matt, 2014: 8). This attack against Uganda was retaliation against the Uganda’s army presence in Somalia under the coordination of the AU and their fierce fighting against *Al-Shabab* insurgents in Somalia. However, though some may consider the support of Uganda as a friendly, Uganda on the other hand has its own strategy and desire to protect its political and economic interests not only in the region, but also compete with the other actors benefiting the Somalia state fragility.

Despite the joint coercive measures against the Islamists coupled with political and economic interests of the actors that involve in the Somalia politics. Kenya shares with the other actors in the region the same concerns, thus has a fear that renewed instability in Somalia will send back waves of refugees to its borders which could have an adversary impact on its state security, while some may argue that Kenya has long been the victim of the Somalia insecurity (Gilbert, 2004: 3; Mary, 2012: 189). Therefore, the Kenyan Government sent thousands of its ground troops to Somalia fighting the Islamists. Since October, 2011, the Kenyan military has been present in the remote southern part of Somalia using that part as a buffer zone to prevent the penetration of the Islamists into the Kenyan territory. Nevertheless, though the Kenyan troops are in the Somalia

²⁹ Discussions with journalist, who spoke the researcher in a condition of anonymity

territory, on the other hand, elements of the Islamists are infiltrating deep into the Kenyan territory targeting the economic infrastructures in particular the tourism sector which is one of the Kenya's sources of revenues. Due to this, the Islamists carried out a number of operations in the Lamu tourist resort and killed over hundreds of Kenyan citizens in different places in separate attacks, including the most recent attack that the Islamists targeted the Garissa University College, which claimed the lives of 148 students (Matt, 2014: 1; Nasir, 2014: 103). However, it would be no exaggeration to say that the manner and the tone of the Kenyan Government in regards to its intervention in Somalia was without a doubt in breach of the Somalia territory and sovereignty, without hesitation, the Kenyans has shown an interest to extend its territorial sea and jurisdiction to the Somalia waters which raised many questions and concerns among the Somalia citizens at large³⁰.

The decades-long standoff among the Somalis has shaped the Somalia's politics as the state remained in a state of dilemma and a victim of multiple interventions. Egypt is one of the regional actors that engaged in the Somalia politics since the known history. Since the state collapse, Egypt tried to persuade the Somalia's warring parties to resolve all their differences and problems, but the Somalia's warlords and politicians have never shown sympathy to the Egyptian proposals and any other initiatives. Likewise, Egypt made all its efforts to make the unity of Somalia an obligation not an option to contain and thereby weaken Ethiopia. Therefore, Egypt, thus sought to sponsor its own peace process in Somalia (Woodward, 2006: 139). However, this peace plan of Egypt was no more successful than Ethiopia had been. Interestingly, both countries, Ethiopia and Egypt, had used their best efforts to frustrate the work of the other and challenge each other's initiatives³¹. In the current situation, Egypt has a close observation on what is going on in Somalia. In December, 2014, in a state visit, the Somali president met with his Egyptian counterpart, after the meeting, Egypt confirmed its support to the Somalia state in order to help the country, not to slip into further chaos that resulted from the collapse of the Somalia state institutions in 1991.

³⁰There are public crying among the Somali citizens due to the Kenya's ambition to expand its territorial sea to the Somalia ungoverned waters

³¹Ibid., 11.

The political vacuum in Somalia gave a room and opportunity for multidimensional actors involved in the situation which bothered and deeply discouraged the people of Somalia and broke their hope. Ethio–Eritrean clash over the border in a war characterized as one of the bloodiest wars between the Horn states in the post-Cold War era (Abbink, 2003: 407; I. Rotberg, 2005: 3; Lunn, 2008: 52; Nasir, 2014: 101), and the ‘*War on Terror*’ have never helped the Somalia’s state restoration efforts. These new developments both in the region and beyond invited new actors that involved in the Somalia internal dynamics which made it to be a battleground of the regional actors for one hand, and the “*global jihadists*” and the Americans on the other which complicated the situation than expected (Lauren, 2010: 3; Mary, 2012: 186). Therefore, Eritrea, have been accused of being maneuvered the crises in Somalia by harboring, training and giving access to propaganda both the Somalia warlords and the Islamists (Abbink, 2003: 414; Ken, 2008: 44; Alexander, 2010: 19). Nevertheless, Eritrea’s government repeatedly denies all these allegations and regards as “*false*” fabricated by foreign powers and enemies of Eritrea.

Of all of these theses, when the state collapsed in the 1991, the neighboring countries tried to re-establish the state institutions under the auspices of IGAD which Somalia is a founding member. Most importantly, the aim behind the establishment of IGAD was and still remains to solve and prevent the problems, being inter- and intrastate that has been the character of the region since independence of the African states. To restore peace and order, IGAD Member States delegated Djibouti mediate and reconcile the Somalia confronting sides, but were not successful in resolving the problems (Woodward, 1996: 74; Kiefe, 2002: 65; Kidist, 2009: 26). The peace initiatives and reconciliation, not seemed a true and a paradigm shift to the peace as the problems and mistrust persisted among the warlords which contributed to the continuation of the conflict. Since then, the role of Djibouti was not absent as it pursues its own national interests. Similar to the other states in the region, it hosted several peace conferences such as the Arta Conference, which produced another dysfunctional Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2000 (Ken, 2005: 29; Lunn, 2008: 15). In most recent days, the Djiboutian ground troops are present in the Somalia’s southern regions as part of the AMISOM Mission and fighting against the radical insurgents not only to help the Somalia’s Federal Government, but take its share the funds allocated to the restoration of peace and security in Somalia.

4.2.2 The Distant State Actors

The United States' foreign policy making towards the Horn of Africa combines a number of elements. The Horn itself has been a source of concern for decades and developed its specialists with their own expertise and experience (Woodward, 2006: 1). Early interest of the U.S. to the region goes back in the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century following the America's emergence as a Superpower and its interest to dominate the strategic gates of the world. In this regard, the America's involvement in the Somalia internal affairs intensified when the military government offered a military base at Berbera following withdrawal of the Soviets (Louise, 2013: 75). As a result of the Soviet demise, the directions of the U.S. foreign policy were far from clear and in the subsequent years there was an expression of reviews of possible directions that it could and should take. There was also much reflection on the U.S. role historically and the approaches of the past with possible relevance for the future (Woodward, 2006: 153).

In the early 1990s, following the state collapse, Somalia was in the throes of what is known in the jargon of humanitarian work difficult to work (Burnett, 2005: 2). Thus, the U.S. decided to send peacekeeping forces to protect the humanitarian workers and the aid conveys. This mission later turned into conflict and confrontation. In an operation involved by more than 25,000 American troops (Mary, 2012: 60) plus the UN peacekeeping members finally collapsed following the America's and the UN joint failed attempt to disarm the self-appointed warlords in 1993 which culminated the lives of 18 American Rangers, UN peacekeeping members and led thousands of Somali citizens to death in one of the largest battles ever involved by UN-led peacekeeping force (Kinfе, 2002: 91; Lunn, 2008: 15; Aisha, 2012: 322). In post-intervention period, the United States government has pursued a policy informed principally by counter-terrorism concerns that led the U.S. support an alliance of militia leaders in Mogadishu who were eventually defeated by the UIC in 2006 (Abbink, 2003: 414; Woodward, 2006: 69). Since 2006, the U.S. has backed the TFG and Ethiopia in their joint efforts to defeat the insurgency in Mogadishu and beyond (Napoleon, 2010: 62). The U.S. has pressed hard for an African Union peacekeeping force to replace the Ethiopians, on ground evidences based on that the continued

presence of the Ethiopians in Somalia will quadruple the insurgency and anti-Ethiopian sentiments in the Somalis (Ken, 2008:45).

In the present situation, the Americans are critical about the Somalia situation for strategic and security reasons. America's *'War on Terror'* determines its engagement to the Somalia affairs as it targets the terrorist groups, launch drone attacks against those elements aimed to dismantle the leaders of the terrorists and weak the insurgency to make the AU forces run over the militants without resistance. In this respect, one may regard the Americans as the backbone of the all activities taking place in Somalia under the auspices and coordination of AMISOM. Targeting not only the radical elements operating in that part of the country, but also coordinates with the help of the AU and IGAD to all political and security sectors of Somalia with the assistance of the British Government as well, to support the security forces of Somalia in a financially wise, and extent capacity building programs to strengthen the army and security sectors³².

As a Muslim and as a member of both the Arab League and the OIC, the Saudi involvement in Somali politics has been deep (Medhane, 2002: 171). Not only the Saudis, but also Kuwait, Yemen, the UAE, and the most recently Qatar; play a significant role in Somalia. In many instances, those states serve as good offices with the opposition, and have at times allowed the opposition – both Islamist and non-Islamist – to operate freely in their countries for residency and fund-raising (Ibid, 2005: 23). As stated above, all play a critical role in Somalia's economy, with the UAE serving as the main commercial and financial hub for Somalia, Saudi Arabia as the main foreign market, and Yemen as the main source of small arms and a primary transit stop for Somali migrants seeking employment opportunities in the Gulf region (Ken, 2008: 45; Alexander, 2010: 18). It seems obvious that the Islamists and even the Federal Government have a close relation to the Arab States and Turkey as well. In this respect, one can never downplays that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and any other external actor are exploiting the internal factors and dynamics in Somalia pursuing their own interests³³.

³²Ibid., 21.

³³Ibid., 4.

On the other parts of the Middle Eastern region, the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 as a political force has turned Turkish foreign policy on its head, articulating a vision for improving relations with the Middle East countries and beyond. As a result, the Turkish republic, which is the successor state of the Ottoman Empire – the largest Muslim Empire in history – opted to rekindle its historical roots and the legacy it left in the other parts of the world (Haoues, 2011: 4; Sinan, 2011: 28). Therefore, the Turkish involvement in the Somalia affairs has been already popular since the time of the famine that hit the southern part of Somalia in 2011 which led the current President of Turkey who was a Prime Minister at that time visit Mogadishu (ICG, 2012: 3; Mehmet, 2014: 21). This move attracted the eyes of the international community and led many other European and non-European high ranking officials visit Mogadishu after. Since then, the role of Turkey has remained visible as Turkey injected millions of dollars to Somalia through both Turkish charity organizations and state-owned enterprises. Moreover, Turkey is the chief mediator of the ongoing Somalia–Somaliland negotiations to settle their political differences.

In addition, the European countries and the EU play an important role both as sources of foreign aid and in diplomacy in Somalia. The EU has for years been the largest donor in Somalia and even before the state collapse. Among the European countries, Italy has played a leading role in Somalia (Kinfu, 2002: 243) in which regarded by many as the mastermind of the Somalia's endless agony, while the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian states also more engaged than others in Somalia (Woodward, 2006: 139; Ken, 2008: 46). Without doubt and as mentioned earlier, the Somalia–EU relations go back for decades; thus, the current role of the European Union has both political and humanitarian dimensions. The European Union gives political support for the Federal Government with the coordination of IGAD and the AU, and is the major financier of the AMISOM operations the entire Somalia, while it works with IGAD and the AU to establish the national security forces³⁴. Apart from that assistance, the western countries have their own concerns, thus their approach to Somalia were militarized and securitized by sending drones to Somalia to strike the Islamists and also combat the piracy on the Somalia coast off³⁵. Not only to eradicate the piracy and terrorist networks, but also have the fear and the concerns

³⁴Ibid., 21.

³⁵Ibid., 11.

over the Somali citizens, since large contingents of Somalis are living in the western world, thus, acquired American or European nationalities and without hesitation opted to join the Islamist insurgents³⁶ across the Horn and the Middle East regions, such as *Al-Shabab* in Somalia and the most recently emerged, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/Levant (ISIS/L).

4.2.3 The Role of Non-State Actors

In fact, the Cold War made many developing and underdeveloped nations battlegrounds of the Superpowers, while many collapsed following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War. Due to the fact that Somalia was a victim of the Cold War and ceased to function as a state, many regarded it as the only failed state in the world in the post-Cold War period (Kidist, 2009: 37). Since the state collapse in 1991, the IGAD members organized at least fifteen peace conferences starting from the beginning of 1991 until 2004. These efforts eventually ended with no actual concrete results as the armed faction leaders failed to reach common understanding. These meetings ended while the problems are not treated, as they should have been; while some factions refused to take part in the conference with the support and influence of an external actor. These conferences were held in different places, like Sodere and Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, Eldoret and Mbagathi in Kenya, Arta in Djibouti, among other places in the region.

Being similar with many other actors engaged in Somalia's peace and state restoration attempts, IGAD has been engaged in with the Somalia problem since the 1990s. Throughout the 1990s, it mandated its Member States, especially Ethiopia and Djibouti deal with the issue, but failed to manage the differences among the Somalia warring parties (Kidist, 2009: 50). Since all the members reflect different interests and hence support different groups within Somalia, it has seriously compromised the neutrality of IGAD. Members of IGAD, for example, were informally screened the participants who would take part in the Somali peace processes to make sure that their interests were represented (Kidist, 2009: 43). Thus, the results of the Somali peace processes are often viewed as the outcomes of the front-line states, not IGAD.

³⁶Ibid., 11.

The argument advanced here is that IGAD as an organization in which Somalia is a founding member of it, played a golden role in the reconciliation of Somalia by bringing the Somalis together, to prepare a constitution, and establish a Government in their own in 2002–2004 Somalia peace conference in Kenya. The researcher does not wish to enter into a debate about whether the IGAD role in the Somalia affairs is positive or negative. For practical matters, IGAD is the one who brought the mission to Somalia and deployed troops as a *'peacekeeping mission'* called AMISOM. These troops are from the front-line states, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, plus Uganda, Burundi, and Sierra Leone (Markus, 2009: 21; Mary, 2012: 184). Therefore, one may argue that this kind of engagement shows how IGAD is helping Somalia; at around 95 percent of the troops in Somalia are from IGAD Member States and fall under its auspices and supervision³⁷. Nevertheless, one may reveal the real intention of the mission; indeed, the front-line states of IGAD have security concerns and have ground troops in Somalia in the framework of AMISOM to preserve their national interests and protect their state securities not only for the interest of Somalia, but for their own political and economic calculations³⁸.

Undoubtedly, the AU as well as its predecessor the OAU hardly played a significant role in addressing the state collapse in Somalia. There have been fifteen peace initiatives with the view of forming a functioning central government. None of them, however, was sponsored by the OAU/AU. This appears to be that the OAU/AU was not a leading actor in Somalia affairs until recently. In other words, it is pertinent to say that it has been limited in endorsing the decisions of the regional organization, IGAD, other initiatives taken by the UN and Member States. As IGAD is taken as one of the five building blocks of the AU, it could be argued that the AU endorses the decisions of IGAD that promote the policy coordination and harmonization, while all the decisions for re-establishing Somalia comes from IGAD (Kidist, 2009: 46). One of the most fascinating points to note is that as a continental organization, the role of the African Union (AU) in Somalia has been marginal. But, in most recent times, the AU has deployed peacekeeping troops under the auspices of IGAD, its presence in Somalia, however, has effectively ensured the continuity of the weak Federal Government. In general, regional and

³⁷Ibid., 21.

³⁸Ibid., 11.

international organizations have provided a vital forum for various actors to address the conflict in Somalia. It has to be noted that IGAD in particular has made a significant contribution in terms of trying to resolve the Somalia conflict. Nevertheless, the AU mission is to stabilize Somalia, help the Federal Government to eradicate the radical groups³⁹. Apart from that, the AU, the IGAD, the EU and the UN are umbrellas of countries, thus reflect the policies and interests of their respective countries⁴⁰.

As a global organization, the history of the UN's involvement in Somalia is extremely complex and has left a legacy of mistrust between the Somalis and the international partners. The overall perception of the UN in Somalia is entirely negative. Soon after the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the UN with the help of U.S. sent large peacekeeping forces named United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to Somalia. After eighteen U.S. marines and thousands of Somalis were killed followed by the well-known event, '*the Black Hawk Down*', which precipitated the America's withdrawal from Somalia, the UN peacekeepers also left Somalia without restoring peace and stability (Woodward, 2006: 67). This failure has had a huge impact on the role of the UN in Somalia (Ken, 2008: 46; Kidist, 2009: 47).

Indeed, though the joint UN-U.S. operation has had some initial success in ensuring aid conveys reached their destinations without being attacked and pillaged by clan militias. On the other hand, both the UN and the U.S. failed to understand the complexity of the situation on the ground, and things soon started to go badly wrong. By now, the mission had become the largest UN operation in the world; known as UNOSOM II, it had some 30,000 personnel, and cost approximately US \$ 1.5 billion a year (Mary, 2012: 60). Nevertheless, the UN tried to sponsor a peace conference in the early 1990s, which failed without any tangible result. After this, the UN remained more or less passive in Somali affairs except in engaging in humanitarian activities. With the existence of this, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was established on April 15, 1995 to promote the cause of peace and reconciliation through contacts in Somalia, supported and overseen by the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA) (Kinfе, 2002: 117). Moreover, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

³⁹Ibid., 21.

⁴⁰Ibid., 11.

(SRSRG) for Somalia also closely monitors the situation and provides periodic briefings and written reports to the Security Council.

Of course, the regional and global organizations are not the only non-state actors that engage in the Somalia's internal dynamics, but there are many other strong elements that spoil the situation. A variety of foreign Islamist elements, mainly based out of the Gulf States, play an important role in Somalia, primarily as sources of funding (Woodward, 2006: 60). There are more progressive Islamic groups providing funding for Somali movements like *Al-Islah*, which has helped establish schools and hospitals the entire Somalia state (Ken, 2005: 33; Ken, 2008: 46; Bjørn, 2009: 27). In addition, there are small but dangerous foreign Islamist actors in Somalia consisting of *Al-Qaeda* and other radical groups and individuals believed to provide funds and trainings to the *Al-Shabab* militia which one may regard it as an obstacle to the Somalia's state restoration efforts.

4.3 Political, Socio-Economic, and Security Impact of the Actors on the Somalis

The conflict in Somalia that started long before the total collapse of the Somali state in 1991 was basically characterized as a conflict that can be expressed in two major dichotomies: conflict between Somalia's internal actors with different forms and characters⁴¹, and Somalia's neighboring states which have their long term interest in reshaping Somalia's structure and politics. Though there may be elements of each of these dichotomies in the situation, none of them offer a thorough explanation of sustaining the situation. Dr. Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan (2013: 247) in one of his publications discusses the rise of the modern Somali state and the root cause of its total collapse after thirty-one years, followed by greedy warlords who struggled to rule the country from the barrels of guns.

One of the most heartbreaking actors that are regarded as a source of political, social and economic crisis in Somalia is the Somali political elites who exploited the state resources and abused the power and seeded the future conflict. This followed by figures who emerged from the

⁴¹ Discussions with the Deputy Head of the Mission of the Federal Republic of Somalia to Ethiopia and the African Union

ashes and ruins of the state collapse, thus destroyed the governance institutions and resisted any effort to re-establish it⁴². On the other hand, non-state beneficiaries in the form of business lords and religious clerics engulfed in the state agencies also followed. The present Somalia experiences intense competing internal interests that engage in reshaping the Somalia state structure. This fierce competition, both from within the federal government, the self-governing regions and its outside has individual and collective dimensions. Indeed, this has had a severe toll on the environment of Somalia; concerns include the widespread falling of trees for charcoal to export, which makes as a non-livestock income generating activity, over-hunting of wildlife and over-fishing of Somalia's waters. Therefore, the chain effect of these internal and external factors has also contributed its part to maintain Somalia's prolonged state collapse.

As a result of that multiple interventions both from the region and beyond which exploited the internal dynamics of Somalia state. On the other hand, the emergence of piracy in the Somalia coast off should be regarded as an outcome of the Somalia's state collapse exacerbated by endless external interventions impacted on the state and its citizens. Of course, piracy is a crime and an illegal act that was recognized as a violation of the rules at sea (United Nations, 2009: 54). But, Somalia's pirates those hijacking the vessels from the high seas have controversies in their nature and its immediate causes. Therefore, one may connect the emergence of piracy with the breakup of the Somali Navy due to the civil war (Alexander, 2010: 21), while others link this trend with the illegal foreign off-fishing in the Somalia waters that started to exploit that undefended waters and resources long before the emergence of piracy (Mary, 2012: 149). In addition, the European giant companies under the auspices and coordination of the Italian mafia has used as a dumping site for the disposal of radioactive, toxic, hazardous and waste materials to the Somalia coast off (Bulhan, 2013a: 254).

Not only the piracy, but pragmatically speaking, the America's unbalanced foreign strategy for Somalia radicalized the local people and forced many moderate Somali youth join the extremist and the radical groups. For instance, Somalia suffered a severe civil war under the coordination of the Somalia's ruthless warlords who scrambled the Somalia state into quasi-states which culminated the lives of thousands of Somalis, over hundreds of thousands forced to flee from

⁴²Ibid., 12.

their homes, and others wounded. With this reality on the ground, the threat posed by the global 'war on terrorism' post-9/11 has had an adversary impact on the Somalia state and even derailed the citizens hope to see functioning Somalia state. In fact, one may argue that the Americans are behind the radicalization of the Somalia ordinary people as they shown support for the self-appointed warlords those destroyed the Somali state.

Without hindrance, the international community, in particular the U.S.A actively and illegally channeling arms, guns, and military supplies to their political favorites in a civil war competition (Aisha, 2012: 329). In 2006, with the support of the U.S. the warlords who were in Mogadishu established the Alliance for Peace Restoration and Counter-Terrorism (APRCT). This alliance received financial and other material assistance from the American government as the newly created alliance launched a military offensive against the Islamists, including the UIC (Lunn, 2008: 16; Markus, 2009: 9; Mary, 2012: 80). This led the society in Mogadishu side with the Courts and thus overthrew the warlords, while the citizens at large believed that the alliance are exploiting the people and the state, and thus the Somali public disagreed on the role of U.S. in Somalia affairs.

Indeed, the Courts, which were multi-clan and broadly popular successfully reconstructed the state for the first time since the collapse. But, the Courts finally collapsed and overthrew by Ethiopia with the support of the United States of America. The Americans as usual unanimously oust any government or system that it does not like. However, the allied forces imposed on the Somalis a warlord-dominated 'TFG' creating a new wave of violent extremism that continues to this day. This intervention was categorically state-destroying (Aisha, 2012: 329). Therefore, the Somalia state without reservation is a victim of reckless internal actors those manipulated the state power and institutions and impedes to flourish, and at the same time exploited the national resources as well for their own gains. In addition, the external actors, both from the region and beyond in the form of state and non-state actors also messed the already worsening situation in Somalia and used it as a shield to protect their own national interests. Therefore, the relations between the transnational patrons and their local clients in Somalia impacted the nature of the Somalia state-society relations. This convergence of interest of the states in the region and their global patrons meant divergence from the Somalia societal interests and aspirations.

CHAPTER SIX

Responding to the Challenges and the Way Forward

5.1 Reconstituting the State: Will External Actors Give the Chance to the Somalis?

Since the state collapse of Somalia in 1991, the most significant actors that involved in the Somalia's conflict are the regional governments, the European Union, the U.S. and the Middle Eastern countries pursuing their own agendas and interests as well as transnational '*terror groups*'. Hence, due to numerous differences among the Somali internal political actors, those foreign powers have managed intervening Somalia's internal affairs for their own interests which continued for decades in particular post-state collapse in 1991. Thus, the opportunistic interference escalated the deteriorating condition of the Somali people. For instance, Ethiopia with the public support of the Americans has involved in the Somalia domestic affairs in post-9/11 aimed to fight the Islamist elements in Somalia, which resulted many death casualties among the Somali unarmed citizens and destroyed unimaginable properties. This intervention had no contribution for the ordinary Somalis, for whom life is not getting any easier, but categorically was state destroying.

Without doubt, Somalia will likely confront a number of cross-regional challenges which equally affect the peace and stability of the Somali state. This challenge starts from the regional to distant actors which practically involved in the Somalia's tragedy and agony. Indeed, front-line states adopted different and opposing approaches in resolving the Somalia internal political conflict and its prolonged state collapse. According to Kidist Mulugeta (2009: 40) there was a fundamental difference, particularly with the adoption of either federal or a unitary form of government. For instance, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Kenya were in a position to promote a unitary structure in an attempt to maintain the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia and have seen federalism as a gateway of the Somalia's state Balkanization. While Ethiopia and its allies within Somalia warlords and factions saw the federal system as an agent of political settlement and reconciliation within Somalis referring the successful examples of Puntland and Somaliland, two regional entities which managed to solve their internal conflicts and developed their local

institutions which survive today. But, both Somaliland and Puntland developed its institutions without external penetration and intervention.

There is no doubt that the peace, security and stability in Somalia are necessary to the region in general and the neighboring states in particular. Conflicts and insecurity in one country spread and affect other countries in one way or another. However, the fact that Somalia's conflict is complex and involved by multiple actors is evident; without doubt, this conflict hosts different external actors, such as transnational radical elements, regional and other distant state benefactors⁴³. Therefore, the issue should be considered as a Somali issue that has an internal impact on the Somalis at large. According to this suggestion, any resolution to the Somalia conflict needs indigenous efforts since it affects the internal peace and security of the Somali citizens as well as their destiny. Without a unified grassroots involvement, it is difficult to foresee a sustainable peace and stability in Somalia.

While the external actors have different and diverse interests in regards to Somalia, one may question to the extent that external actors engaging in building peace in the country can bring sustainable peace and stability? And how do their actions help the prospects for a more durable Somali political settlement? Indeed, many external actors mainly from the Somalia's regional neighbors are working at the sub-national level toward a variety of objectives which is not favorable to the interest of the Somalia state in general. This study, therefore, dismisses that the external actors, both from the region and beyond will bring peace and stability to Somalia. While on the other hand, it underlines that an accumulated international and regional effort do not likely produce sustainable peace and cannot bring together with the internal actors into one place with a unified objective. With the fact that the conflict in Somalia has international implications in peace and security, international community action is suitable for providing facilities and other logistical elements. In doing so, the international community can support the Somalia state institutions and peace building efforts, and encourage the local peoples' engagement and willingness for peace and stability.

⁴³ Retrieved from a Video in a public lecture addressed by Dr. Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan on October 27, 2014 at School of African and Oriental Studies in the University of London, London, UK

Indeed, ending the involvement of external actors into Somalia's internal politics and dynamics will open a window of opportunity to building peace and the state as well. In fact, numerous prior peacebuilding efforts and attempts at building a centralized Somali national government have failed due to extensive involvement of diverse external actors. The conditions and risks that have sustained the conflict for decades continue to exist: the presence of strong influence of external actors on their local clients, fragility of the state in terms of governance and security and mainly relying on foreign forces, presence of a society driven by clan politics; environmental devastation and youth unemployment; a booming war economy that benefits a powerful elite; the emergence of a radical interpretation of Islam, such as the *Al-Shabab* insurgency; and a fragmented international community which has pursued competing objectives. Therefore, there is a need to re-constitute the state's public and political institutions to seem as a genuine inclusive national governance system to restore the trust and the long-awaiting expectation of the citizens. This initiative to generate new vibrant state–society relations that will help the state in overcoming the very weaknesses of its sovereignty and institutions should come from within not from outside to sustain the Somalia's state governance system thus strengthen state sovereignty in the long-term.

5.2 Grassroots Engagement as a Vehicle for Sustainable Peace

To ensure a sustainable peace, the empowerment of local actors as the primary architects, owners and the long-term stakeholders in the peace processes is necessary. From the perspectives of Somaliland and Puntland, local actors played a major role in the peace processes. Indeed, the traditional elders and the women have played crucial roles in the peace and institutions building processes at the level of putting pressure on the politicians to agree a sustainable peace deal aimed at bringing a lasting peace for the peoples of Somaliland and Puntland (Aisha, 2012: 328). The peace processes were, indeed, truly owned by all parties, more especially by the peoples of Somaliland and Puntland and so they had an interest in maintaining its results.

In the south–central Somalia, the traditional elders and the women actors were kept out of the peace processes. Since the state collapse in January, 1991; peace initiatives were being coordinated or brokered by the regional governments, IGAD, the Arab League, and some Arab

states like Egypt, Libya, Yemen and others who were and still are after their own national interests. However, as time went on, the traditional elders and the women in south-central Somalia was gradually marginalized and sandwiched between the conflicting and contending parties denying their deserved role to serve as an indigenous peace facilitating actors and accommodates the demands of the confronting parties and seek a lasting solution. What is significant here is that, south-central Somalia political actors themselves never enjoyed political independence and owned the negotiation processes and so did not feel obliged to adhere to its terms. Thus, unlike Somaliland and Puntland situations where the local non-political actors and the conflicting parties were given ample opportunity to participate in the peace talks thus owned the process, it was a different outlook in the south-central Somalia situation⁴⁴. Indeed, the local peace advocates were not offered the opportunity to contribute their part in seeking peace in the south-central Somalia. However, their absence from the scene derailed the prospects for peace to happen in south-central Somalia state.

What we need to note is that, the responsibility for preventing, managing and transforming intrastate conflict lies on the shoulders of the local people of the regions in conflict and crisis through negotiation and dialogue to further understand each other (Galtung & Charles, 2007:40). Therefore, as the practice has shown, the external involvement is neither proficient to reconcile Somalis nor establish institutions that are legitimate and sustainable. But, this kind of involvement has not only contributed its part in breaking Somalia's hope, but also betrayed to establish long-lasting peace and state institutions in the future and the role of the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms of the Somali society was also undermined. Nevertheless, state institutions under foreign architect neither produce sustainable peace nor robust and durable institutions.

To find a lasting solution, it is important to identify all the actors associated with the conflict so as to reach a peaceful settlement and political stability (Charles & Elizabeth, 2008: 14). For example, while the women are the primary victims of any conflict, the role women play as credible agents of peace would be highlighted and stressed as they serve as both observers and mediators in a perspective that can help find a lasting solution to the conflict. Indeed, women can

⁴⁴Ibid., 43.

involve in promoting peacebuilding, preventing or ending possible violence within the community⁴⁵. Therefore, their involvement in the peace negotiations is crucial to find a lasting solution to the problems and generate sustainable peace and stability. In the case of Somaliland and Puntland peace and institutions building efforts, which sought to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, the emphasis was on all-inclusive processes that involved in or accommodated both the warring parties and non-political actors. From the beginning of the peace talks, a conducive environment for peace were created, the peace facilitating figures saw the need to bring together the important actors and extended request to participate the negotiation, from the politicians and non-political actors to the negotiating table, thus to make the negotiations more credible amongst the peoples of Somaliland and Puntland (Ahmed & Lewis 1993: 11; Joakim, 2006: 8). In short, all the actors that mattered were duly identified and included in the negotiation. These efforts produced governance institutions with the capacity to provide security and social services to the public at large and in return endorsed the citizens' trust the state institutions, thus ensured their legitimacy.

In the case of south–central Somalia, little effort was actually made to include all the stakeholders in the peace processes. The process was included only the armed groups with the coordination of external actors which are after their own national interests (Woodward, 1996: 74; Haldén, 2008: 10; Mark, 2008: 49). These actors marginalized the role of the non-political actors. In the successive peace efforts, representatives from the contending parties such as the warlords and the other political figures were included, while non-political actors who are believed to be the genuine representatives of the people at the grassroots were not offered the opportunity to contribute towards the peace settlement, thus, made the outcome uncertain. Dr. Hawa Abdi Diblaawe is a physician and internationally renowned humanitarian, nominated for the Nobel peace prize for her unparalleled success in humanitarian and peacebuilding work in Somalia. Dr. Hawa attended the Somalia London Conference in 2012 attended by delegates from over 55 countries plus representatives from all Somalia political parties including the self-governing regions and administrations. Dr. Hawa has had little expectation about the meeting in London and argued that the British people destroyed the Somali society centuries back.

⁴⁵Discussions with focus group participants in Dollo Ado Woreda, in Liban Zone, the Somali National Regional State of Ethiopia, February 25, 2015

According to Dr. Hawa the Somali peace is not in London, instead, the British has caused so much pain to the Somalis (Aisha, 2012: 330)

Continuing her point of argument, the international community should stop making forced government that the external actors making for the Somalis. Instead, and according to her, Somalis they can solve their own problems sitting under their own trees, thus can make their own peace. Interestingly, Dr. Hawa highlighted that the Somalis are not in need the relief aid and the advice from the west plus their political help. In a short form of the statement, she described as the following: “the international community – let them leave us. If they leave us, within two years I am sure that we will have our peace among Somali people. We will put our effort among our people. We will sit and discuss. Everyone can understand each other. We have intermarried. We are friends. We are one nation. Leave us alone. Somali peace is underneath our own trees” (Ibid: 331).

5.3 Prospects for the Somalia State

State collapse, civil war and warlords rivalry manifested proxy wars in Somalia profoundly affected the life of population in Somalia. Somalia is today a nation broken by internal conflict, albeit the presence of an internationally-backed federal government standing on the feet of foreign troops. The problem has both political and economic dimensions exacerbated by the competing interests from the reckless local actors with the presence and influence of multiple external interventions both from the region and beyond, intensified after the state collapse in 1991 (Mary, 2012: 71). Those actors are there not to help Somalia but above all pursuing their own national interests.

The Somalia state can work properly when people at the grassroots decides their own destiny through their own traditional mechanisms which are still in practice, but undermined by foreign actors that engaged in the Somalia internal affairs with the help of local clients. This kind of practice will never produce enlightened and committed leaders like those in Somaliland and Puntland whom the peoples of those two regions decided (Aisha, 2012: 328). But very little at all will work if their leader were decided by external actors as the current situation in south–central

Somalia attests. Therefore, the dilemma in the Somalia affairs needs committed leaders that can put an end to the conflict that has destructed the Somali state politically, economically, and socially for the last 24 years. Hence, restoring rule and order in Somalia needs experienced, wise leaders and intellectuals who can play a constructive role in organizing and reconciling the three separate but interrelated factors that contributed to the Somaliland and Puntland peace and statebuilding processes: the political elites, the elders and the women (ICG, 2002: 1). In this regard, these approaches adopted by Somaliland and Puntland indigenous actors should be used to assist and contribute its part in the assessment of strategies for addressing political and economic turmoil that hit not only in the south-central Somalia but also other similar regions striving to get peace and stability both in developing and underdeveloped world.

In Somalia, there is an urgent need for establishing an indigenous independent committee that is similar to the “*Truth and Reconciliation Commission*” that the South Africa’s late president Nelson Mandela adopted as a tool of reconciliation and amnesty at national level which remains one of the most crucial achievements recorded by the contemporary South African history (Kristin, 2002: 22). Therefore, any attempt to restore peace and order will be dysfunctional unless otherwise the trust among the Somali citizens were restored and the sores and rifts resulted from the political conflict were dressed probably, compensated the damaged, destroyed and plundered properties. This will serve as a precursor for inclusive peace and reconciliation from the grassroots, thus could contribute to the peaceful coexistence of the people who lived on Somalia side by side for centuries. Without doubt, peace initiatives through top-bottom approach cannot produce positive results, but bottom-up mechanism is necessary to employ which mainly focuses on the societies at the grassroots level and reaching out the victims and those suffered from the atrocities committed by the warring parties since the 1991.

In the light of the peace attempts and its counter-productive in the south-central Somalia, new approaches and solutions are required. Although the African peacekeeping forces in Somalia have advanced and occupied the strongholds of the militant group in the south-central Somalia regions including the capital, Mogadishu. It is too early to declare that Somalia’s crisis seem to an end, because elements of the *Al-Shabab* militants are largely active and threaten guerrilla warfare (ICG, 2007: 1). Hence, peace requires that the Federal Government to be reconstituted as

a genuine, inclusive government of national unity, while giving the intellectuals, including the elders and the women their deserved role in the society. But the signs of its willingness are discouraging. Therefore, sustained international pressure is needed on Somalia's Federal Government, and the international community needs to encourage the society at the grassroots use their indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms to address Somalia's endless conflict and chronic state failure, and allow them to put aside the outside designed state leaders and institutions that neither produce accountable leaders nor robust state institutions.

From a practical point of view, one cannot expect the international community resolve Somalia's chronic problems, but state building and reconciliation should be started at the bottom to generate locally-owned viable institutions⁴⁶. Indeed, if the internal situation of Somalia was fixed by the Somalis, these external factors will not have an access to penetrate deep into the Somalia internal dynamics⁴⁷. However, internal actors are responsible what's has gone wrong and currently happening, and should address for their own efforts. Therefore, it is not fair to frequently blame and criticize the external actors, while the Somali elite are partially responsible what happened and still happening. With this in mind, the elite are those who created the gaps and loopholes that existed in the Somalia state since independence which the external actors have benefited and still benefiting⁴⁸.

Coming to the final analysis, it is essential to adopt appropriate measures, strategies and mechanisms to address the challenges of building after the conflict that could threaten the stability and any peace agreement and reconciliation among the Somalia opposing parties. Though reportedly there was a division among and between IGAD Member States in regards how to solve the problems in Somalia since the state collapse in 1991 (Kidist, 2009: 50), on the other hand, efforts to address the conflict in Somalia occupied the attention of the IGAD Member States in particular post-2004 when the Somalia warlords adopted '*Federalism*' as a form of governance. However, though IGAD proposed several initiatives to restore peace and order in Somalia, on the other hand, it has failed to find a comprehensive and balanced approach to end the conflict, taking into account the links between the political reconciliation and sustainable

⁴⁶Ibid., 11.

⁴⁷Ibid., 4.

⁴⁸Ibid., 11.

peace. For peace to happen and last; IGAD should bring mechanisms to build the Somalia's state institutions from the bottom as the Somaliland and Puntland did without the engagement of the international community. Therefore, ensuring progress in peace and state building in Somalia requires the establishment of clear targets and strategies aimed to reach the people at the grassroots coupled with a performance monitoring framework from the local stakeholders with the help of the international community.

CONCLUSION

In post-colonial period, African states except few has experienced waves of political disorder, disintegration, ethnic conflicts and strife, civil wars which has been the defining character of the African continent for decades. The root and the immediate causes of those problems were linked to a number of factors which has both internal and external dimensions. While some see the major source of the Africa's problems as a weak governance institutions and leadership style which generated political, economic, social as well as environmental troubles. Others enlist as an externally-driven disaster which endangered the political independence of the African state in general and led the African continent to be described as the most vulnerable and conflict-belt continent on the earth. The study has questioned the political independence of the African states and labeled it as *'illusion sovereignty'*. It critically discussed the internal and external drivers that produced the fragility of the continent with different and diverse forms, include: the cold war and its legacy, the current *'War on Terror'*, the foreign aid and its effect in the African political economy, hate and phobia among the African ethnics which produced deeply divided societies, and the presence of authoritarian regimes with poor and weak leadership style. Therefore, the combination of those two actors, the internal and external, are responsible for the political instability, chronic economic troubles, environmental risks and shocks, and the frequent state collapse in the African continent.

With the breakdown of all civil and political authorities, the absence of peace and stability became overt in Somalia primarily in the south-central regions which remained in chaos and anarchic situation following the fall down of the state institutions in the 1991. The result was the eruption of civil clashes within self-appointed warlords who sheltered their respective clans and used the clan cult as a tool to mobilize both human and financial resources. In addition, a proliferation of *warlordism* and profit-oriented, non-state reckless actors in the form of businessmen and NGOs were established which also maintained close relations with the warlords' and became the defining character of the country. Similarly, the country's northern region, which before the 1960 union was under the British rule declared unilaterally their separation from the rest of the country on May 18, 1991 soon after the collapse of the military government claiming the boundaries it inherited from the British Government on June 26, 1960;

and distanced its peace and stability from the Somalia's conflagration. Moreover, Puntland State of Somalia also enjoyed a relative peace and stability in comparison to its neighbouring south-central regions.

Against all these overlapping issues, the role of external actors in escalating or de-escalating the Somalia's problems was not absent. The international community in a multilateral intervention spearheaded by the U.S. Government and the UN grounded in Somalia in 1992 as a lifesaving mission aimed to help and assist the Somalis suffering from the mass hunger, but the peace initiatives and attempts fuelled the conflict. This could be attributed to the international community's defiance to accept the reality on the ground and halt favouring one side of the conflicting parties of the Somalis. This was the immediate cause of the U.S. and the UN confrontation with General Aided who clearly expressed concerns over the practices of the mission in regards how to settle the Somalia problems. The faults committed by the international community derailed Somalia's hope to get peace and stability and later culminated the lives of the American Rangers dragged by anger Somalis in the streets of the Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, and over dozens of other UN peacekeeping members mainly from Pakistan and Malaysia were also killed by the Somalis warring factions while other thousands of Somali citizens also lost their lives. This well-known event precipitated the America's withdrawal from Somalia followed by the UN as well.

Indeed, the Somalia problem is multidimensional; there are both internal and external factors that have their own interests with political and economic dimensions and eager to reshape the Somali state. The local actors are mainly there to benefit the absence of the state institutions and have the fear to see centralized and strong institutions that could challenge their freedom, for instance, the business people were engaged in business throughout the state collapse period and never paid the applicable tariffs and tax. Thus have a fear to see the state institutions coming back and regulating the market and the state economy. In addition, the media enjoyed absolute freedom as those engage in the media sectors have never experienced censorship and restrictions from any national institutional framework that can check their practices in the framework of media rule and regulations. Not only the business people and the media, but also there are other actors that do whatever their desires are, these are the local non-governmental organizations who are mainly

believed to be the agents of those who finance them. Therefore, the proliferation of the local non-governmental organizations within a volatile environment like Somalia is another threat that serving against the interest of the state restoration efforts.

On the other hand, the Somalia state became a victim of multiple external interventions both from the region and beyond. Indeed, the Somalia state became a battleground of the Americans who are fighting 'terrorists' against both Somali and non-Somali radical groups affiliated with *Al-Qaeda* and operating in many parts of Somalia. This move never helped the ordinary Somalis, but had and still has an adversary impact on their livelihoods, for instance, the Americans targets the Somalia's money transfer companies those channel small amount of money to the ordinary Somalis to cover and tackle their worsening living conditions. Targets not only the money transfer companies, but also launching drone attacks against suspects linked to the terror networks as the Americans claim, but indiscriminately kill innocent civilians the entire south Somalia regions.

In the regional context, the neighboring states consistently engaged in the Somalia's conflict since the state collapse in the 1991. This engagement evolved both from one form and objective to another throughout the state institutions absence period. Without doubt, Somalia's neighbors without reservation are pursuing their own national interests and their ground troops are in Somalia for one reason or another engage in the Somalia conflict, mainly to protect their national security and prevent the penetration of the radical groups into their territories. However, the conflicting interests of the IGAD Member States since its establishment in 1986, as well as the internal division of the Somalia's politicians plus the disintegration of the country into self-governing administrations made the Somalia's hope to restore peace and order uncertain. But, the regional states are preserving their national strategies as mentioned earlier and one can never expect to solve the Somalia's problems as it is, but indeed, offer a general anesthesia to the Somalis, thus framing state institutions that neither applicable to the Somalia context nor convince the Somali citizens at large. These externally-imposed institutions and leaders will never serve the interest of the Somalis rather representing the will and interest of foreign actors. The best example is the adoption of the federal system as a governance and state structure which

cannot integrate the Somalis into one polity, but even disintegrates the existing unity and coexistence among the citizens.

Without blaming the regional and distant actors who are after their own national interests, the Somalia solution remains in the hands of the Somalis through traditional knowledge and conflict resolution mechanisms belonged to the Somalis, which, for instance, adopted by Somaliland and Puntland, thus resolved and settled their differences without the help of the international community. For peace and stability to happen, Somalization of the conflict is necessary and remains the most significant factor that needs to be taken into account which will define their fate and generate locally-designed durable institutions. Indeed, peacemaking and state restoration must involve the efforts of all sectors of the society to address the underlying causes of violence and create the space and the environment in which the local people interact with and further understand each other. It is grassroots engagement that can produce sustainable and long lasting stability. Thus, empowering, allowing and facilitating local peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms are necessary. But, the support of the international community in addressing those underlying factors is also crucial.

REFERENCES

- Abbink, Jon (2003). Ethiopia–Eritrea: Proxy Wars and Prospects of Peace in the Horn of Africa, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, No. 21, pp. 407–425.
- Ahmed, Aisha, Rutto, Edwin & Sabala, Kizito (2008). “*The Somali Peace Process from Arta to Eldoret to Mbagathi: Opportunities and Challenges.*”. In *The Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. Oxford: James Currey Ltd.
- Ahmed, Ismail & Green, Reginald (1999). The heritage of war and state collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: local-level effects, external interventions and reconstruction, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 113–127.
- Ainley, Kirsten & Brown, Chris (2005). *Understanding International Relations*, 3rd edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Alemazung, Asongazoh (2010). Post-Colonial Colonialism: An Analysis of International Factors and Actors Marring African Socio-Economic and Political Development, *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, Vol. 3, No.10, (September 2010), pp. 62–84.
- Ali Dualeh, Hussein (2002). *Search for a New Somali Identity*. Printed in the Republic of Kenya.
- Alence, Rod (2004). Political institutions and developmental governance in sub-Saharan Africa, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42, 2 (2004), pp. 163–187.
- Allard, Kenneth (1995). *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. USA: National Defense University.
- Amare Tekle (1996). International Relations in the Horn of Africa (1991–96), *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 70, pp.499–509.
- _____ (1989). The Determinants of the Foreign Policy of Revolutionary Ethiopia, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 27, Issue 3 (September 1989), pp. 479-502.
- Asfaw Teferra (2008). *Africa: Past, Present and Future Development*. Addis Ababa: Chamber Printing House.
- Atarodi, Alexander (2010). *Yemen in Crisis: Consequences for the Horn of Africa*. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency.
- A. Bamfo, Napoleon (2010). Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 2006: Motives and lessons learned, *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, Vol. 4 (2), pp. 55 –65.

A. Bulhan, Hussein (2013). *In-between Three Civilizations: Archaeology of Forgotten Experience and the Triple Heritage of Somalis*. Bethesda, Maryland: Tayosan International Publishing.

_____ (2013a). *Losing the Art of Survival and Dignity: From Self-reliance and Self-esteem to Dependence and Dhame*. Bethesda, Maryland: Tayosan International Publishing.

_____ (2008). *Politics of Cain: One Hundred Years of Crises in Somali Politics and Society*, 1st edn. Bethesda, Maryland: Tayosan International Publishing.

A. Coker, Maurice & B. Obo, Ugumanin (2014). The Marxist Theory of the State: An Introductory Guide, *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 5 No. 4, pp. 527–533.

A. Henderson, Errol (2008). “When States Implode: Africa’s Civil Wars 1950–92”. The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs (eds). Addis Ababa: Published in association with OSSREA.

A. Lake, David, Ikenberry, G. John & Mastanduno, Michael (1989). Towards a Realist Theory of State Action, *International Studies Quarterly*, 33, pp. 457–474.

A. Mazrui, Ali (2008). “Conflict in Africa: An Overview”. The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs (eds). Addis Ababa: Published in association with OSSREA.

_____ (2008a). “Africa and Other Civilization: Conquest and Counter-Conquest”. *Africa in World Politics: Reforming Political Order* (eds). Singapore: Westview Press.

BBC (2011). *The media of Somalia: A force for moderation?*, BBC World Service Trust Policy Briefing # 4 (November, 2011).

Baylis, John (1997). *The Globalization of World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations* (eds). New York: Oxford University Press.

Bender, Barbara, Gledhill, John & T. Larsen, Mogens (1995). *State and Society: The emergence and development of social hierarchy and political centralization*. New York: Routledge.

Bereket Habte Selassie (1980). *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa*. United States of America: Monthly Review Press.

Berridge, G. R. & James, Alan (2001). *A Dictionary of Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave.

Berry, David, Husein, Mohamed & Jarle, Stig (2012). *Mapping the Somali Media: An Overview*. Norway: Norwegian University of Life Sciences.

Bogaards, Matthijs (2004). ‘Counting parties and identifying dominant party systems in Africa’. *European Journal of Political Research*, No. 43, pp. 173–197.

Bradbury, Mark (2008). *Becoming Somaliland*. London: James Curry Publishers.

Bratton, Michael & Van de Walle, Nicolas (1994). 'Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa', *World Politics*, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 453–489.

Brown, Stephen (2001). Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: how foreign donors help to keep Kenya's Daniel Arap Moi in power, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 5, pp. 725–739.

Bryden, Matt (2014). *The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab*. Washington, DC: the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

_____ (2004). "State-Within-a-Failed-State: Somaliland and the Challenge of International Recognition". States-Within-States Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era (eds). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cilliers, Jakkie & D. Sisk, Timothy (2013). *Assessing long-term state fragility in Africa: Prospects for 26 'more fragile' countries*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Clapham, Christopher (1996). "The international politics of economic failure". African International System: the Politics of Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cohen-Almagor, Raphael (2008). The Limits of Objective Reporting, *Journal of Language and Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2008), pp. 138–157.

_____ (2001). *Speech, Media and Ethics, the Limits of Free Expression: Critical Studies on Freedom of Expression, Freedom of the Press and the Public's Right to Know*. New York: Palgrave.

Collier, Paul (2008). *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Falling and What Can Be Done About It*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Collin, P.H (2004). *Dictionary of Politics and Government* (third edition). London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Crawford, James (2006). *The Creation of States in International Law*, 2nd edition. New York: Oxford University Press.

Creswell, John. W (2003). *Research Design: Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. California: Sage Publications.

C. Opello, Walter & J. Rosow, Stephen (2004). *The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics*, 2nd edition. Boulder, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

C. Pick, Anthony (2011). *The Nation State: An Essay*. Copyright © Anthony C. Pick.

Dagne, Ted (2009). *"Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace"*. Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress: Congressional Research Service.

Dannreuther, Roland (2003). *"The Political Dimension Authoritarianism and Democratization"*. In *The Third World beyond the Cold War: Continuity and Change* (Eds). New York: Oxford University Press Inc., New York.

Davis, John (2007). *Africa and the War on Terrorism*. London: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Deegan, Heather. 2009. *Africa Today: Culture, Economics, Religion, Security*. New York: Routledge Ltd.

Duncker, Judy (2007). *"Globalization and Its Impact on the War on Terror"*. In *Africa and the War on Terrorism* (Ed.) England: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Englebort, Pierre (1997). The contemporary African state: neither African nor state, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 18, No. 4, pp. 767–775, 1997

Eriksson, Mikael (2013). *External Intervention in Somalia's civil war: Security promotion and national interests?* (ed). Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency.

Eubank, Nicholas (2010). *"Peace-Building without External Assistance: Lessons from Somaliland"*. CGD Working Paper 198. Washington, D.C: Center for Global Development.

E. Kanet, Roger (2006). The Superpower Quest for Empire: The Cold War and Soviet Support for 'Wars of National Liberation', *RoutledgeTaylor & Francis*, Vol. 6, No. 3, (August 2006), pp. 331–352.

E. McNabb, David (2004). *Research Methods for Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative Methods*. New Delhi: Asoke K. Ghosh, Prentice-Hall.

Farah, Ahmed & I.M. Lewis (1993). *Somalia: The Roots of Reconciliation*. A piece of original research commissioned by Action Aid.

Franceschet, Antonio (2006). *'Global Legalism and Human Security'*. In *A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms* (eds). England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp. 31–38.

Fukuyama, Francis (2004). The Imperative of State-Building, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 2, (April 2004), pp. 17–31.

Galtung, Johan & Webel, Charles (2007). *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies* (eds). New York: Routledge Ltd.

Gandhi, Jennifer & Przeworski, Adam (2007). Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 11, pp. 1279–1301.

Gardner, Judith & El Bushra, Judy (2004). *Somalia: The Untold Story The War Through the Eyes of Somali Women*. London: Pluto Press.

Go, Julian (2002). Modeling the State: Postcolonial Constitutions in Asia and Africa, *Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (March, 2002), pp. 558–583.

Gordon, Ruth (1999). Growing Constitutions, *Journal of Constitutional Law*, No. 1. 3: pp. 528–582.

Gott, Richard (1999). *The African Dream: The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo*. New York: Grove Press.

Grosse-Kettler, Sabrina (2004). *External Actors in Stateless Somalia: A War Economy and its Promoters*. Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion.

Guerrero, Dorothy-Grace & Manji, Firoze (2008). *China's New Role in Africa and the South: A search for a new perspective*. Nairobi, Oxford and Bangkok: Fahamu and Focus on the Global South.

Gundel, Joakim (2006). *The role of traditional structures in security, rights, law and development in Somalia*. Nairobi: Danish Refugee Council & Novib/Oxfam.

G. Shivji, Issa (2008). *Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism?*. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers.

Hadenius, Axel & Teorell, Jan (2006). *Authoritarian Regimes: Stability, Change, and Pathways to Democracy, 1972–2003*. Kellogg: The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies.

Haldén, Peter (2008). *Somalia: Failed State or Nascent States-System?* Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency.

Hansen, Peter (2009). *Governing Khat: Drugs and Democracy in Somaliland*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Harden, Blaine (1991). *Africa: Dispatches from a Fragile Continent*. London: Harper Collins Publishers.

Harper, Mary (2012). *Getting Somalia Wrong?: Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State*. London: Zed Books.

Hay, Colin (1999). 'Marxism and the State'. In *Marxism and Social Science* (eds). Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Henderson, Jody (2014). Somalia: From clan wars to religious conflicts, *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, Vol. 26, No. 3, (May-June 2014), pp. 1–8.

Henrard, Kristin (2002). Post-Apartheid South Africa's Democratic Transformation Process: Redress of the Past, Reconciliation and 'Unity in Diversity', *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (March 2002), pp. 18–38.

Hoehne, Markus (2009). *Counter-terrorism in Somalia: How external interference helped to produce militant Islamism*. Germany: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology.

H. Jackson, John (2003). *Sovereignty – Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept*. USA: Georgetown University Law Center.

International Crisis Group (2014). *Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War*. Africa Briefing N°99. Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

_____ (2012). *Assessing Turkey's Role in Somalia*. Africa Briefing N°92. Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

_____ (2011). *Guinea: Putting the Transition Back on Track*. Africa Report N°178. Dakar/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

_____ (2010). *Guinea: Reforming the Army*. Africa Report N° 164. Dakar/Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

_____ (2007). *Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead*. Africa Briefing N°45. Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

_____ (2006). *Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership*. Africa Report N° 110. Addis Ababa/Brussels/Hargeisa: International Crisis Group.

_____ (2005). *Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?*. Africa Briefing N°95. Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

_____ (2002). *Salvaging Somalia's Chance for Peace*. Africa Briefing. Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

International Republican Institute (2005). *Somaliland: September 29, 2005 Parliamentary Election Assessment Report*. Washington, DC: International Republican Institute.

I.M. Lewis (2002). *A Modern History of the Somali, Revised, Updated and Expanded*, 4th edition. United Kingdom: Long House Publishing Services.

I. Rotberg, Robert (2005). "The Horn of Africa and Yemen: Diminishing the Threat of Terrorism". *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa* (eds). Virginia. R. R. Donnelley: Harrisonburg.

Johari, J C (2006). *Principles of Modern Political Science*. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers.

J. Gassama, Ibrahim (2008). Africa and the Politics of Destruction: A Critical Re-examination of Neocolonialism and Its Consequences, *Oregon Review of International Law*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 327–360.

J. Goode, William & K. Hatt, Paul (2006). *Methods in Social Research*. New Delhi: Surjeet Publications.

J. Quinn, John (2004). “Diffusion and Escalation in the Great Lakes Region: The Rwandan Genocide, the Rebellion in Zaire, and Mobutu’s Overthrow”. *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation* (eds). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Keet, Dot (2008). “The role and impact of Chinese economic operations in Africa”. In *China’s New Role in Africa and the South: A search for a new perspective* (Eds). Nairobi, Oxford and Bangkok: Fahamu and Focus on the Global South.

Khadiagala, Gilbert (2004). “Kenya: Haven or Helpless Victim of Terrorism”. In *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. Washington, DC: the United States Institute of Peace.

Kidist Mulugeta (2009). *The Role of Regional and International Organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD*. Addis Ababa: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung.

Kinfe Abraham (2006). *The Horn of Africa: Conflicts and Conflict Mediation in the Greater Horn of Africa*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

_____ (2002). *Somalia Calling: The Crisis of Statehood and Quest for Peace*. 1st ed. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Künzler, Daniel & Ziltener, Patrick (2013). Impacts of Colonialism: A Research Survey, *American Sociological Association*, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 290–311.

K. Bluntschli, Johan (2000). *The Theory of the State*. Canada: Batoche Books.

K. Herrmann, Richard & N. Lebow, Richard (2004). *Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations* (Eds). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Leeson, Peter (2007). *Better Off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government Collapse*. Department of Economics, West Virginia University.

Lunn, Jon (2008). *Interlocking Crisis in the Horn of Africa*. London: House of Commons Library.

Maathai, Wangari (2009). *The Challenge for Africa*. London: Arrow Books.

Macfarlane, S. Neil (2003). “Taking Stock: The Third World and the End of the Cold War”. In *The Third World beyond the Cold War: Continuity and Change* (Eds). New York: Oxford University Press Inc., New York.

Maliti, Tom (2014). IGAD and Somalia: Now and then, *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, Vol. 26, No. 3, (May-June 2014), pp. 1–8.

Malone, David (2007). *Retaining legitimacy in fragile states*. UK: Institute of Development Studies.

Marchal, Roland (2007). “*The Role of Religion in the Somali Conflict and External Ways to Deal with It*”. A Nation without a State (eds). Stockholm: The Nordic Africa Institute.

Matunho, Jephais (2008). Regional Economic Integration: The Key to Africa’s Development in the 21st Century, *OSSREA BULLETIN*, A Tri-annual Publication, Vol. V, N^o, 2. (June, 2008), pp. 10–22.

Mayer, Tom (1994). *Analytical Marxism: Contemporary Social Theory* (Volume 1). London: Sage Publications.

Medhane Tadesse (2002). *Al-Ittihad: Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia*. Addis Ababa: Mega Printing Enterprise.

Menkhaus, Ken (2008). “*Understanding State Failure in Somalia: Internal and External Dimensions*”. Somalia: Current Conflicts and New Chances for State Building. Berlin: Heinrich Böll Foundation.

_____ (2005). “*Somalia and Somaliland: Terrorism, Political Islam, and State Collapse*”. In *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa* (Ed). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

_____ (2004). “*Terrorism in Somalia: Threat Assessment and Policy Options*”. In *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. Washington, DC: the United States Institute of Peace.

Meredith, Martin (2006). *The State of Africa: A History of fifty years of independence*. London: Free Press.

Mills, Greg (2007). “*Africa’s New Strategic Significance*”. In *Africa and the War on Terrorism* (Ed). England: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Mkandawire, Thandika (2001). Thinking about developmental states in Africa, *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, No. 25: 3, pp. 289–313.

Mohan, Giles & Williams, A. Zack (1995). Imperialism in the Post-cold War Era, *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 66: pp. 481–484.

Moyo, Dambisa (2009). *Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How there is a Better Way for Africa*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Møller, Bjørn (2009). *The Somali Conflict: The Role of External Actors*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Mullerson, Rein (2004). *International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS*. United Kingdom: Lightning Source.

Mutua, Makau (1995). Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, *Michigan Journal of International Law*, Vol. 16, pp. 1113–1176.

M. Adam, Hussein (1994). Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea, *Review of African Political Economy*, ISSN 0305-6244; RIX#5903, pp. 21–38.

M. Ali, Nasir (2014). Somaliland Security at the Crossroads: Pitfalls and Potentials, *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*, Vol. 4, No. 7, (July, 2014), pp. 98–108.

_____ (2014a). Why the African States Fall Apart and Who is to be Blamed?, *Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Studies*, Vol. 2, Issue 03 (June, 2014), pp.417–427.

_____ (2014b). South Sudan: A Nation in Trouble, *Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Studies*, Vol. 2, Issue 02 (April, 2014), pp.305–314.

_____ (2014c). Building State Capacity in a Post-Conflict Situation: the Case of Somaliland, *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (January, 2014), pp. 157–170.

_____ (2011). Ethio-Somaliland Relations Post-1991: Challenges and Opportunities, *International Journal of Sustainable Development*, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp.1–10.

M. Callaghy, Thomas (2008). “Africa and the World Political Economy: Still Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place?”. *Africa in World Politics: Reforming Political Order* (eds). Singapore: Westview Press.

M. Carbone, Giovanni (2007). ‘Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa: Themes and Research Perspectives’. *World Political Science Review*, Vol.3, Iss. 3, pp. 1–31.

M. Cousens, Elizabeth & T. Call, Charles (2008). Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies, *International Studies Perspectives*, pp. 1–21.

M. Hobson, John (2000). *The State and International Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

M. Howe, Herbert & Urell, Aaryn (1998). African Security in the Post-Cold War Era: An Examination of Multinational vs. Private Security Forces, *African Association of Political Science*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 42–51.

- M. Mazrui, Alamin (2004). *English in Africa: After the Cold War*. Great Britain: Cromwell Press Ltd.
- M. Mbaku, John (2008). “*The African Debt Crisis and the New Globalization*”. In *Africa and the New Globalization* (Ed.). England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- N. Ndegwa, Stephen (2001). *A Decade of Democracy in Africa*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill.
- N. Shaw, Malcolm (2008). *International Law*, 6th edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- _____ (2004). *International Law*, 5th edition. New Delhi: Brijbasi Art Press.
- OECD (2010). *The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity*. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Olden, Anthony (1999). Somali Refugees in London: Oral Culture in a Western Information Environment, *Libri*, Vol. 49, pp. 212–224.
- Özkan, Mehmet (2014). *Turkey’s Involvement in Somalia: Assessment of a State-building in Progress*. Istanbul: SETA Publications.
- O. Okyere, Frank & Abdallah, Mustapha (2011). *The NATO Intervention in Libya: Implications for the Protection of Civilians and the AU’s Pan-Africanist Agenda*. Accra, Ghana: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.
- O. Ong’ayo, Antony (2008). *Political instability in Africa: Where the problem lies and alternative perspectives*. Amsterdam: The African Diaspora Policy Centre.
- Pakenham, Thomas (1991). *The Scramble for Africa*. London: Clays Ltd, St. Ives plc.
- Peterson, Scott (2000). *Me Against My Brother At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda: A Journalist Reports from the Battlefields of Africa*. New York: Routledge.
- Pierson, Christopher (1996). *The Modern State*. London and New York: Routledge Ltd.
- Ploch, Lauren (2010). *Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response*. Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress: Congressional Research Service.
- Ponte, Stefano (1994). The World Bank and ‘Adjustment in Africa’, *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 66: pp. 539–558.
- Reno, William (2004). ‘*The Collapse of Sierra Leone and the Emergence of Multiple States-Within-States*’. *States-Within-States Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era* (eds). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Reporters Without Borders (2013). *2013 Press Freedom Index*. Paris: Reporters Without Borders.

Rodden, Jonathan (2004). Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement, *Comparative Politics*, pp. 481–500.

R. Devlin, Lawrence (2007). *Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone*. New York: Public Affairs.

R.M.Maciver (2006). *The Modern State*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Sachs, Jeffrey (2005). *The End of Poverty: How we can Make it Happen in our Lifetime*. London: Penguin Books, Ltd.

Salih, Mohamed (2001). *African Democracies and African Politics*. London: Pluto Press.

Salih, Mohamed & Nordlund, Per (2007). 'Political Parties in Africa: Challenges for Sustained Multiparty Democracy'. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Schermerhorn, Lange (2004). "Djibouti: Fulcrum of the Horn". In *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace.

Schneider, Aaron (2003). Decentralization: Conceptualization and Measurement, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 32–56.

Schoiswohl, Michael (2004). *Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto Regimes in International Law: The Case of 'Somaliland'*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Scribner, Charles (1972). *Africa Independent: A Study of Political Developments*. New York: Keesing's Publications.

Shinn, David (2004). "Ethiopia and Combating Terrorism: An Important Ally with Its Own Priorities". In *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. Washington, DC: the United States Institute of Peace.

Simpson, Archie (2000). "Nations and States". *Issues in international relations*, 2nd (eds). New York: Routledge.

Slomp, Gabriella (2000). "On Sovereignty". *Issues in international relations*, 2nd (eds). New York: Routledge.

Spilker, Dirk (2008). "Somalia on the Horn of Africa: National and Regional Lines of Conflict in the Past and Present". *Somalia: Current Conflicts and New Chances for State Building*. Berlin: Heinrich Böll Foundation.

- Steinberger, Peter (2004). *The Idea of the State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Styan, David (2013). *Djibouti: Changing Influence in the Horn's Strategic Hub*. London: Chatham House.
- S. Aondohemba, Shaapera (2012). Theories of the State: Perspectives on the Nigerian Variant, *European Scientific Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 20 (September, 2012), pp. 11–27.
- Taguia, Haoues (2011). *Turkey: Stretching the bow towards the east so that the arrow can hit the West*. Qatar: Al Jazeera Centre for Studies
- Taylor, Jeffrey (2000). *Facing the Congo: A Modern-Day Journey into the Heart of Darkness*. New York: Three Rivers Press.
- Tierney, Stephen (2007). *Accommodating Cultural Diversity*. England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Tordoff, William (2002). *Government and Politics in Africa*, (fourth edition). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- T. Munro, Lauchlan (2004). 'Providing Humanitarian Assistance Behind Rebel Lines: UNICEF's Eastern Zaire Operation 1996–1998'. *States-Within-States Incipient Political Entities in the Post–Cold War Era* (eds). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ülgen, Sinan (2011). *From Inspiration to Aspiration: Turkey in the New Middle East*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- United Nations (2009). *United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea*. New York: Nova Science Publishers.
- UNECA (2013). *Elections & the Management of Diversity*, African Governance Report III. Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.
- V.I. Lenin (1976). *The State and Revolution: The Marxist Theory of the State & the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution*. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.
- Weber, Cynthia (1995). *Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State, and Symbolic Exchange*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Webersik, Christian (2004). Differences that Matter: The Struggle of the Marginalized in Somalia, *Africa* 74 (4), pp. 516–534.
- Williams, Christopher (2013). Explaining the Great War in Africa: How Conflict in the Congo Became a Continental Crisis, *the Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol.37:2 (summer 2013), pp.81–100.

Wolff, Stefan (2006). *Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Woodroffe, Louise (2013). *Buried in the Sands of the Ogaden: The United States, the Horn of Africa, and the Demise of Détente*. Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press.

Woodward, Peter (2006). *US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa*. England: Ashgate Publishing Company.

_____ (1996). *The Horn of Africa: State politics and International Relations*. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers.

W. Barrow, Clyde (1993). *Critical Theories of the State: Marxist, Neo-Marxist, Post-Marxist*. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.

W. Harbeson, John (2008). "Promising Democratization Trajectories in Africa's Weak States". *Africa in World Politics: Reforming Political Order* (eds). Singapore: Westview Press.

Young, Crawford (2008). "The Heritage of Colonialism". *Africa in World Politics: Reforming Political Order* (eds). Singapore: Westview Press.

Young, John (2004). 'Sudan's South Blue Nile Territory and the Struggle Against Marginalization'. *States-Within-States Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era* (eds). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

ANNEXES

Annex 1:

List of Informants

1. Berouk Mesfin – Senior Researcher in Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
2. Gebre Egziabher Alemseged (Colonel) – Peace and Security Advisor to the Office of the Facilitator for Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation at IGAD, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
3. Dr. Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan – a leading figure in academia, former tenure professor at Boston University and Chancellor of the University of Hargeisa, UNAMID Chief of Staff, and the founding director of the Frantz Fanon University in Hargeisa, Hargeisa, Somaliland.
4. Prof. K. Mathews – Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations of Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
5. Abdirashid Sheikh Said – Deputy Head of the Mission of the Federal Republic of Somalia to Ethiopia and the African Union.
6. Abdirahman Diria – commentator on the Somalia political, economic and social affairs, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
7. Journalist who spoke a condition of anonymity, Hargeisa, Somaliland.
8. A Somali intellectual living in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; who spoke a condition of anonymity.

Annex 2:

List of Major Questions

1. Which are the actors (internal and external) those engage in Somalia conflict?
2. What is the ultimate goal of those actors?
3. What is the role of internal actors to end this political, economic, and social dilemma?
4. What is the role of the external actors to end this political conflict?
5. What is the way out of this mess: from internally-engineered strategies or externally-imposed initiatives?

Annex 3:



Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a Degree (Master's Degree) in any other University and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Signature

Nasir Mohamed Ali
June 2015

This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the candidate.

Dr. Mohammed Hassen
June 2015