

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES (IPSS)

**THE CHALLENGES OF POST-CONFLICT  
PEACE BUILDING IN AFRICA**

(WITH FOCUS ON RWANDA)

BY

DECHASA GURMU AYANU

June 2009, Addis Ababa.

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A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of  
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## **Acronyms**

AU ---African Union

DDR ---Demobilization, Disarmament, & Reintegration

DRC ---Democratic Republic of Congo

EU ---European Union

FAO ---Food & Agricultural Organization

FNLA ---National Front for the Liberation of Angola

FRELIMO---Front for the Liberation of Mozambique

GDP ---Gross Domestic Product

GNP ----Gross National Product

ICT ---Information, Communication, Technology

ICTR ---International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

IDP ---Internally Displaced People

IMF ---International Monetary Fund

MDG ---Millennium Development Goals

MPLA ---Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

MSCBP –Multi-Sector Capacity Building Program

NEPAD---New Economic Partnership for African Development

NGO ---Non-Governmental Organization

NURC ----National Unity and Reconciliation Commission

OAU ---Organization of African Unity

RENAMO---National Resistance of Mozambique

RPA ---Rwandan Patriotic Army

RPF ---Rwandan Patriotic Front

SAP ----Structural Adjustment Program

UN ---United Nations

UNAMSIL ---United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone

UNDP ----- United Nations Development Program

UNHCR ---United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF ---United Nations Children's Fund

UNITA ---National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

USAID ----United States Aid for International Development

USSR ----Union of Soviets Socialist Republic

WHO ---- World Health Organization

## **Abstract**

In 1992, the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, introduced the concept of Post-conflict Peace Building in his document known as 'An Agenda for Peace'. The new concept of post-conflict peace building which encompasses multi-faceted programs that are geared towards sustainable peace and development is a result of this document. Africa has been the victim of conflicts first due to the colonial wars and later on due to civil wars between rival political parties and ethnic groups. On top of this, the peace agreements that are made are often violated and conflict relapse takes place. This problem is the focus of this research. The research explores why post-conflict African states often fail to achieve sustainable peace. It follows that exploring the challenges to post-conflict peace building becomes the objective of the research. It is mainly a qualitative research of secondary data in which African conflicts and their impacts as well as the post-conflict peace building challenges were reviewed. Reference was made to books, journals, papers and websites that focus on these issues. The research is focused mainly on the conflict in Rwanda that includes the horrific events of the genocide and its aftermath of post-conflict peace building efforts. Alongside the investigation of the conflict and post-conflict peace building activities in Rwanda, a brief overview of the conflicts and post-conflict situations of Mozambique and Angola were taken for the sake of comparing the progress of conflicts and peace building opportunities and constraints in different socio-economic, cultural, political, and country specific situations. Moreover, key-informant data from a few Rwandese and a Burundian residents in Addis were collected and used for the purpose of complementing and enriching the secondary data. The informants possess a rich knowledge of the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region in general and that of Rwanda in particular. This primary data though limited to Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region, has also served as a counter-checking mechanism for the various secondary data sources. The study indicates that the major challenges to post-conflict peace building are: security, functional law and order, socio-economic reconstruction, governance and participation, and the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), in that order of priority. Finally, it has been found that the success of a sustainable post-conflict peace building depends on a coordinated, coherent, holistic, and country-specific approach that focuses on local ownership and participation.

## Chapter 1

### **Introduction to the Concept of Post-Conflict Peace Building**

Post-conflict Peace building is a term that has come into widespread use after the famous Agenda for Peace was announced by the former U.N. secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, in 1992. Today, one of the most important agendas of the UN is the post conflict peace building program of war-torn countries. According to Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, post-conflict peace building is meant to prevent the recurrence of a crisis, unlike preventive diplomacy which seeks to avoid the crisis. In *An Agenda for Peace*, a report pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January, 1992, Mr. Ghali came up with a new approach to the concept of peace building. In his report to the summit meeting, he stated that, for peace-making and peace-keeping operations to be truly successful, comprehensive efforts of consolidating peace and confidence building among the people should be included. Moreover, the former Secretary-General emphasized that disarming ex-combatants and destruction of the arms, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support of security personnel, monitoring elections, protecting human rights, strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation, must also be undertaken. In his document, Mr. Ghali further describes that, in surveying the range of efforts for peace, the concept of peace building in the construction of a new environment be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy which seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions (Ghali, 1992). Knowing that peace and development are inseparable and inter-dependent, the secretary-general also produced *An Agenda for Development* as a supplement for *An Agenda for Peace*.

The proposal of *An Agenda for Peace* consists of four major activities: Preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace building. A variety of sequential response mechanisms and functions to conflicts at different contexts and different times are needed to resolve conflicts, according to the document. For the UN, this important document has become the cornerstone for its activities of post-conflict peace building. Many social scientists and researchers share this opinion by qualifying the concept as an inherent component in the UN's efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts and to preserve peace (Schnabel and Erhart, 2005). On the other hand, though the document has been appreciated by many politicians, some social scientists have reservations on some of the

proposed actions in the document. In his book entitled: *Building Peace—Sustainable Reconciliation in divided Societies*, John Paul Lederach expresses this opinion as follows:

However, the most important departure I will make in this book is in the use of the term “peace building”. The secretary-general qualifies the use of the term by connecting it exclusively to the post-conflict support of peace accords and the building of war-torn societies. I agree fully that this is an increasingly critical phase to which much attention has to be paid. I suggest that “peace building” is more than post accord reconstruction. (Lederach, 2000, p. 20)

According to Lederach, the term “*peace building*” is a comprehensive array of processes, approaches, and stages to transform conflict into sustainable, peaceful relationships, thus involving a wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Lederach further clarifies this concept as follows:

Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct. Such a conceptualization requires a process of building, involving investment and materials, architectural design and coordination of labor, laying of a foundation and detailed finish work, as well as continuing maintenance.

On the other hand, in the executive summary of her document entitled *Post-Conflict Building Revisited: Achievements, Limitations*, Necla Tschirgi<sup>1</sup> described the trends in the development of international post-conflict peace building as follows:

In the 1990s the concept became more expansive, combining conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction. Today, peace building is no longer an exact term; it often needs the qualifier “post-conflict” peace building to refer primarily to the non-military or civilian dimensions of international efforts to support countries emerging from conflict

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<sup>1</sup> Dr. Necla Tschirgi is Vice president of IPA and Director of the Security Development Program. Previously she was the Team Leader of the Peace building and Reconstruction Initiative at the International Development Research Center (IDRC) of Canada, where she was actively involved in the design and management of research projects on peace building in the Middle East, Central America and Southern Africa. The paper is prepared for the WSP/International/IPA Peace building Forum Conference, October, 2004, New York.

even though it might accompany or succeed military operations (Tschirgi, 2004, p. i).

Thus, despite the similarities or differences of opinions of these writers on the components and the timing in the process, they all agree that the concepts of *post-conflict peace building* entrench far more elements of peace than reducing hostility and avoiding crisis. In addition, contrary to the ease and little time it takes to start a conflict, there is a consensus that post conflict peace building and *reconstruction* are complex issues that need a long-term agenda and considerable resources.

The post-cold war era is a time when the UN is met with global problems of different categories. Various multilateral conferences were held to search for the right approaches to address these problems. The *Millennium Declaration* was a result of these conferences in which the international community realized the importance of a multilateral approach to the problems. Similarly, the role of the UN in monitoring and addressing the global problems was also expanded. The UN Security Council realized that the new developments in human rights abuses, the protection of civilians in war, the proliferation of small arms, and the role of natural resources in armed conflict, are threats to international peace and security (Tschirgi, 2004, p.). These issues are no longer left to the discretion of individual states where they take place. As the problems are of an international nature affecting other states and people outside the boundary, the UN and the international community have assumed an obligation of intervening in such cases. Africa took the lion's share of the attention in line with this new policy. Since then, the U.N. has been focusing on structural transformation and institutional reforms (Peace makers.ca, 1994). These include long-term development, capacity building of governmental and non-governmental institutions for peace making and peace building as well as improving governance and human rights structures.

The human rights and human security issues and appeals prompted the international community including the UN, to interfere in localized conflicts. In the past, these issues used to be considered as interference in the sovereign rights of the state in-conflict. Much as the international community wanted to solve these internal problems of the conflict-ridden countries, they failed to understand the socio-cultural assets and values of the people. Necla Tschirgi confirms this and believes that the problems in achieving more

effective peace building by post-conflict states are usually manifested due to the chronic inability of the international community to understand and adapt their assistance to the political dynamics of the war-torn societies they seek to support (Tschirgi, 2004, p. i). This is true since conflicts sometimes display shifting variables due to their dynamic nature and the prevailing situations. What has originally started as a conflict for the emancipation of ethnic subjugation or restoring democracy can turn into a lust for an appeasement of hidden power-greed, or the plunder of natural resources, by the leaders of the conflicts. The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone are good examples where power and wealth-greedy leaders devastated the social capital and economic infrastructures of their countries.

UNDP's post-conflict peace building policy of durable peace and sustainable development currently focuses on economic recovery, the removal of small arms from the community, the rebuilding of governance institutions, the launching of reconciliation processes, the releasing of land for agricultural purposes, and the rebuilding of social capital (UNDP, 2001). It is therefore important to note that peace building requires an understanding of the numerous local situations and realities by the international community and donor organizations, in order to undertake a common and holistic approach to peace, development, and democratic governance. Picking out a single variable as the most important element and ignoring the rest will not bring about the desired sustainability of peace.

Post-conflict situations provide opportunities for change in the social, political and economic spheres of a country. Inequalities could be eliminated and a culture of inclusion instituted in the society, as a result of the change of the government. A new democratic order of popular participation and political franchise by the state can be encouraged and implemented by taking the opportunity. State policy frameworks and institutional capacity building are important tasks to be undertaken in order to achieve these changes. Moreover, developing a new economic plan along coherent and nationally owned policies that meet the desires of the people for an inclusive and equitable growth can also be taken as an opportunity to be undertaken. However, all these opportunities emanate only from a conducive and plausible characteristic of a post-conflict situation.

On the other hand, many politicians agree that as a result of the episode of 9/11 on the twin towers of the World Trade centre in New York, peace building has taken a new

discourse due to the political pressure exerted on the international community by the western powers. A lack of consensus has been created recently between the developing countries and some powerful western governments, regarding the priorities in peace building strategies. *An Agenda for Peace*, *An Agenda for development* and the Millennium Development Goals (*MDG*), that had become the UN's new strategies for peace and development, are no more appealing to these western powers. A new approach of "*Nation-building*", "*Regime change*", "*Stabilization and Reconstruction*" has come forward (Tschirgi, 2004, p.ii). According to the proponents of this approach, the new trend is meant to stabilize the weak and failing states and prevent their vulnerability from negative external influences of insecurity. We have seen this being tested on Afghanistan and Iraq by the U.S. and its allies. However, despite the various innovative approaches to the contemporary peace building initiatives, I agree with Tschirgi's belief that the UN's peace building strategies in *An Agenda for Peace* and *An Agenda for Development*, as well as the *MDG*, still remain to be the important toolkits for the world body.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Exploring African Conflicts and the Challenges to Post-Conflict Peace building.**

It will not be so easy to explore the challenges to post-conflict peace building with out first understanding the origin and the dynamics of the conflicts. Many social scientists and authors have done a great deal of research and have written various documents on this issue. The works of (John Paul Lederach, 1997, Necla Tschirgi, 2004, Wendy Lambourne, 2004, Renata Dwan and Sharon Wiharta, 2004, Roland Paris, 2004, and John Paul Dunne, 2006), are just a few that are cited for this thesis. They have different as well as congruent concepts about the type and priorities of the challenges and the strategies of overcoming them in order to achieve a sustainable peace at the end. They all agree that some of the challenges are structural problems that need long-term processes of intervention while other problems can be overcome within a relatively short period of time. Another universal

fact on which they agree is that conflict characteristics differ from country to country, and countries emerging from conflict heavily depend on external aid to come to a stable situation where they can run state affairs by themselves, in a fairly adequate manner. On the other hand, some of these writers do not have the same perspective on the priorities and modalities of post-conflict peace building.

Experiences have shown that no genuine and durable solution to conflicts can be found without a full understanding of the causes. The knowledge and understanding of the conflict characteristics is vital before embarking on the peace building engagement at the end of the conflict.

Knowing what the challenges are and setting the strategies to overcome them is as good as reaching half-way towards resolving the conflict. It is therefore mandatory to explore the nature of the conflicts, the impacts they have caused and the manner in which they have ended. Thus, the first task in the long way towards sustainable peace building is to find out the obstacles that have been created by the conflicts. The path will indicate the various challenges to be encountered during the peace building endeavor. I have tried to briefly review the general characteristics of three African conflicts. This has enabled me to find out the major challenges that threaten post-conflict countries to relapse back into conflict. Two of the conflicts were chosen for the purpose of comparative analysis of their similarities and differences as well as the challenges at post-conflict, while the third one was chosen for its magnitude of the conflict (genocide) and the extreme difficulty of rebuilding peace.

### ***2.1 Statement of the problem***

Conflicts can arise at any time in any part of the world. In Africa, it looks like it is always at the door of each country waiting to break in. Just like the differing socio-cultural and economic characteristics of the countries, the conflicts were also diverse in their nature. The devastating effects of these conflicts usually leave the countries in a helpless situation, making them unable to recover from the catastrophic human and material losses. It is clear that human-beings are the main actors in the process of conflict dynamics. The continuous social interactions of people change the trends of conflicts which in turn change the social environment and life of the people. The role of state-leaders and the socio-economic and cultural factors of the country are major contributors to conflict dynamics.

Africa has suffered for centuries under colonialism, and later it had experienced inter-state conflict among its own people. Out of 60 major conflicts that have taken place between 1980 and 2000 in the world, 40 were in Africa (Mehari, 2008). The impacts of conflicts usually leave the countries in a helpless situation, causing challenges to the efforts to recover from the catastrophic human and material losses. In a paper he presented to a conference at the African Union Commission, Dr. Naison Ngoma stated that implementing post-conflict activities would be expected to be a nightmare in a vast continent such as Africa, with a multiplicity of societies and complex socio-economic and political landscape (Ngoma, 2008). Moreover, many of the African conflicts had relapsed after peace agreements, continuing with more damage to its people and property.

Civil wars have a tendency to relapse after peace has been maintained in one way or another, unless proper care of handling the post-conflict issues is undertaken. According to a report presented to an ad hoc expert group meeting on the economies of civil conflicts in Africa (Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis, 2000), 31% of conflicts resumed within the first ten years of peace settlements. In the case of Africa, half of them last for less than a decade. The authors state, "The high rate of peace collapse in Africa is not inevitable. To date, policies on the part of both the international community and the post-conflict governments have been highly inefficient. With better policies, the risk of peace collapse can be radically reduced"<sup>2</sup>. This signifies that strategies that can assist in reducing the collapse of peace depend on policy choices of the post-conflict governments as well as the international community that has stakes in the peace building tasks. Moreover, apart from the immediate need to diffuse the violent internal and external military threats at post conflict, making the government more inclusive and giving attention to local cultural values of peace building, will help in sustaining the otherwise shaky peace situation. In Africa, the roles of the UN peace-keeping missions that were deployed at the end of conflicts were limited to observer status until recent times. However, it had become apparent that, for an eventual attainment of a sustainable peace building program, the mandates of these missions have to be broadened. In addition to the peace-keeping tasks, the inclusion of military operation mandates and

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<sup>2</sup> Quoted in "*Policies of Building Post-conflict Peace*"—paper presented to the ad-hoc expert group on the economies of Civil conflicts in Africa, April 17, 2000, AA, UNECA

engaging in development activities in the short-term peace-keeping mission, have now become quite essential.

It is therefore important to investigate why these countries relapse into conflict after peace agreements have been made between the warring parties. Accordingly, the research question is:

**Why do post-conflict African states often fail to achieve sustainable peace?**

The answers to the research question will indicate the challenges that hinder peace building and create a relapse into conflict. The main objective of the research is therefore:

**To identify the major contributing factors that pose as challenges to the post-conflict peace building programs.**

The knowledge of these challenges will help in designing the appropriate intervention mechanisms for sustainable peace. In order to explore the answers as to why most of the African conflicts relapse, it is vital to look into the origin, the progress, and general characteristics of the conflicts as well as the impacts they make on the countries and the people. I decided to base my study on the Rwandan conflict case which culminated in the genocide of 1994. This choice is made from among the many African conflicts, because of its unprecedented conflict level which in turn reflected the level of difficulties of post-conflict peace building. On the other hand, conflict characteristics and peace building experiences of Mozambique and Angola were also briefly reviewed for comparing them with those of Rwanda.

## ***2.2 Methodology of the Research***

The methodology I used for this thesis is mainly qualitative research based on secondary data with a mix of limited primary data. In order to explore the challenges to post-conflict peace building in Africa, I have focused on the secondary data from the conflict and peace building challenges of Africa in general, and that of Rwanda in particular. Accordingly, my sources of data were books, journals, published papers with relevant topics related to this thesis, as well as the internet. The libraries of the Economic Commission for Africa (E.C.A), the African Union (AU), the Ethiopian International Institute for Development (EIIPD), were my major sites of the research in addition to the Libraries of Addis Ababa University. I have

also used some books that were made available by the office of the University of Peace (UPEACE) in Addis Ababa. The reading list included resources on African conflict, peace building and related topics. Thus, a literature review of the concepts of post-conflict peace building and its challenges, as well as overviews of the conflicts in Mozambique, Angola and particularly Rwanda were made before going to the writing of the thesis.

The violent conflict in Rwanda and the challenges it faced at the end of the conflict are the main focus of this research, while the conflicts in Mozambique and Angola are taken for the purpose of a comparative analysis among states that possess both similar and different historical legacies as well as elements of conflict initiation and peace building scenarios. The comparisons between the experiences of Mozambique and Angola are meant to show the similarities as well as the diversities of conflicts, and the post-conflict peace building strategies in relation to country specific issues. These strategies depend mainly on the manner the conflicts were started, progressed, and ended. The Rwandan experience which has a completely different background and context is taken separately in order to show the extreme case of violent conflicts, and the level of challenges that post-conflict peace building can reach in such situations.

In addition to the secondary data, I have also gathered a modest primary data through key-informant interviews, from some prominent Rwandan citizens and a Burundian living in Addis Ababa. They represented different personalities from different organizations (The African Union, the Rwandan Embassy, and the UN University of Peace) and the refugee community of Rwanda and Burundi. They were all rich with information on the background of the regional conflict, the ethnic relationships among the regional states, the process through which the conflict has passed (including the genocide), and the nature of the peace building strategy after the genocide. These valuable primary data although limited to the conflicts and peace building issues of the Great Lakes Region and Rwanda, were used to compare, evaluate and verify the various secondary data that I have gathered from books, journals, papers on conference proceedings, and the internet. Thus, the final writing of this thesis is the result of a combination of all these data sources.

## ***2.3 Significance of the study***

Building peace at the end of any conflict is a task that all conflict countries are obliged to undertake. However, just like the differing political, socio-cultural and economic characteristics of the countries, the post-conflict peace building strategies are also diverse in their nature. Thus, the significance of this research is to contribute its share to the task of post-conflict peace building, by identifying the challenges. Once the major challenges are known the conflict countries and the international community can easily develop appropriate strategies for their eventual interventions. Moreover, future researchers can use it as a source of data for exploring more knowledge in the ever progressive world of new conflict dynamics and peace building strategies.

## **Chapter 3**


### ***Literature Review***

#### ***3.1 Conflicts as the starting points of Post-conflict Peace Building***

There would be no post-conflict peace building if there were no conflicts. The characteristics and the trends of a conflict indicate the components and modalities of peace building that has to be undertaken at the end of the conflict. We can therefore argue that the conception of post-conflict peace building actually starts during the conflict period. Bujra and Solomon state that “Conflicts are so complex, so dynamic and so multi-layered. Some can be contained within national boundaries; others may generate spillover effects that may cause yet another war in a neighboring state” (Bujra and Solomon, 2004, p. 165). According to Bujra and Solomon, most of the challenges of African conflicts have their origins in the issues of justice in the running of state affairs. The lack of will and capacity to develop and maintain a democratic state, in which the civil society plays the pivotal role of ensuring justice and the rule of law in the interest of all citizens, the lack of access to political power and economic resources by all, and the lack of equitable treatment in all public matters, are some of the fundamental causes that lead to conflict. Almost all of these realities can be attributed to the conflicts that have taken place in different African countries.

In his book, *Building Peace*, John Paul Lederach has elaborated Adam Curle's matrix on *The Progression of Conflict* (see fig. 1 & 2), which is based on the latter's experience of working in Africa and Asia, as a mediator. According to Curle's matrix, conflict moves as a continuum from the un-peaceful to peaceful relationships. The matrix compares the level of power and awareness of conflicting interests and needs between the two parties in conflict (fig.1). It helps to locate conflict along the progression, at any moment. The location of conflict in the progression will help to choose the appropriate peace building strategy. The four major stages of conflict are represented by the four quadrants. Quadrant 1 represents the latent (hidden) stage where people are unaware of the imbalance of power and the injustices inflicted on them. This is the stage where *education to raise awareness* of the injustices and the balance of power is required. The erasing of ignorance about the inequality coupled with advocacy by concerned stakeholders triggers the demand for change by those experiencing injustices and inequalities. In Quadrant 2, confrontation begins as the demand for justice and equality increases by the affected people. Here, the conflict is more overt than at any other stage. The conflict can be expressed in violence or non-violence, or a combination of the two. The confrontation ultimately moves towards negotiation as indicated in quadrant 3, where the conflicting parties recognize each other after rebalancing their power strength and relationships. The negotiations will foster mutual understanding and power balancing. Finally, in Quadrant 4, the successful negotiation and mediation end in the restructuring of the power relationships as a result of which a *sustainable peace* is developed. Lederach reaffirms that the matrix is a useful visualization of the movement and change of conflict over time. (Lederach, 2000, p. 65).

**Figure 1.** The Progression of Conflict.




Source: Adam Curle, *Making Peace* (London; Tavistock Press, 1971). Adapted from *Building Peace*, (Lederach, 2000, p.70).

The Curle matrix is therefore taken as a relationship indicator of conflict progression and peace building, locating the entry points of different peace building activities. As an example, the author illustrates that at the *Education* and *Confrontation* stages of conflict progression, the works of preventive diplomacy will be conducted in conjunction with education, research and advocacy. During the confrontation period, the conciliators, convertors, and decouplers come into picture in order to disengage the confrontation between the conflicting parties. This is where the conflict is transformed from violent to non-violent. The *Negotiations* stage involves the mediators, facilitators, guarantors, and moderators who play the role of bringing the parties to a negotiating table. Finally, it is the turn of the peace-keepers, observers, mentors, enforcers, reconcilers, enhancers and rehabilitators, who make sure that the negotiated peace is made sustainable.

The peace building process of multiple roles and activities corresponds with the view of conflict progression indicated below (fig.2.). Thus, the transformation of conflict into sustainable peace is achieved by the application of the various roles and functions of peace building at the different stages of conflict (refer to fig.2 below).

**Figure 2.** The Progression of Conflict: Peacekeeping Roles and Functions



Source: Adam Curle, *Making Peace* (London : Tavistock Press, 1971) adapted from Building Peace, J.P. Lederach, 2000, p. 70.

The graphic representation of conflict progression in the Curle matrix is a good example for African conflict dynamics. The awareness about conflict and its dynamics is low in many of the African communities. People live with hidden grievances not knowing how to overcome them. However, once these grievances come to the open by way of education and enlightenment, open confrontations are manifested creating unstable relations. This situation can often lead to violent conflicts. The problem is usually mitigated by the intervention of third parties. Accordingly, negotiation between the conflicting parties starts resulting in the adjustment of their power balance in which the initial grievances are eliminated. At this stage the degree of awareness is so high that both conflicting parties realize their new positions in the power balance. Finally, mutual understanding prevails and a sustainable peace is

established. Therefore, Lederach's theory verifies that the peace building activity actually starts during the education and confrontation stages of conflict progression.

### **3.2 Brief Over-view of Some African Conflicts and their Characteristics.**

Africa is a continent that has experienced conflicts for a long period of time. Almost all of the countries in the continent have faced conflicts at one time or another. During the colonial period, the European powers were forced to search for raw materials needed by the flourishing industrial revolution that was sweeping all over Europe. With its untouched natural resources and cheap labor, Africa became an easy target for plundering. Ali A. Mazrui dichotomizes African conflicts into blacks clashing with whites over resources and blacks clashing with blacks over identities. Thus, the conflicts during the colonial wars of blacks against whites were resource based, while most of the African internal civil wars were identity based (Ali A. Mazrui, 2008, p.38). The socio-political and psychological damages that the European colonialists inflicted on the people of Africa weigh much more than the wealth they plundered. The seed of divide and rule policy by which they turned one tribe against the other, remains one of the major conflict starters that is still sparking violence in many African countries. Thus, the legacies inherited from the colonial period coupled with the influences of the cold war era are considered to be the major drivers for the conflicts in most African countries today.

It is no wonder that Africa is persistently dependent on external assistance not only for the alleviation of its poverty, backwardness, and for the recovery from colonial liberation wars; but also for the remedies of the destruction it is causing on itself by waging unnecessary conflicts with neighboring states as well as among its own citizens. After the catastrophic destruction of infrastructures and countless human lives at the end of the conflicts, the countries often find themselves in hopeless situations where the conditions are no better than during the conflict years. Cooper (as cited in J.P. Dunne, 2006), believes that "post-conflict peace is often no peace at all"<sup>3</sup>. The reason why post-conflict states are unable to achieve sustainable peace is many-fold. The shattered economy, the large number of refugees and displaced people that have to be resettled and assisted until they become self-

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<sup>3</sup> J. Paul Dunne, After the Slaughter: Reconstructing Mozambique and Rwanda, *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal*, Vol. 1. No. 2 (2006:39). Quoted from Neil Cooper's "Peaceful Warriors and Warring Peacemakers", published in *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal*, Vol. 1. No. 1(2006) [www.epsjournal.org.uk]

supporting, the internal security threats posed by ex-combatants that are demobilized, and the possible external threats from neighboring countries that have been implicated by the conflict, are some of the reasons why post-conflict peace building is a difficult and nerve breaking task for the new governments. That is why seeking international assistance becomes obligatory. But the question is, “does international assistance alone solve the problems”? In the opening to the executive summary of her paper prepared for a peace building forum, Necla Tschirgi has stated, ...“while there is no doubt that peace building will continue to require international attention, the lessons of the last ten years do not add up to a successful record” (Tschirgi, 2004, p. i).

Given the various conflicts that have taken place in different countries of Africa during the last few decades, *post-conflict peace building* has become a major task for these African countries and the international community. The conflicts in these countries have their own different causes (covert or overt). The strategies for their respective peace building programs differ, based on their respective root causes and the political, socio-cultural, economic, and security characteristics. For many of the poor countries in Africa, which are often conflict prone, the costs of recovery from the damages are usually enormous. The pain and misery that are felt by the victims at the end of the conflicts are also loaded with complex issues that need immediate as well as long-term treatments.

### ***3 .2.1 Overview of the Conflicts in Mozambique and Angola.***

Mozambique and Angola were two of the most prominent Portuguese colonies, situated in the east and west of the southern part of Africa, respectively. The Portuguese ruled the two colonies with stubborn determination for several decades until the early seventies, when the wave of political changes at home brought about the end of the dictatorship of the Portuguese elites, paving the way for political independence of its colonies in Africa and elsewhere.

The two ex-colonies of Portugal have economic potentials as diverse as their geographical locations. The possession of diamond and oil by Angola puts it at a better economic potential than Mozambique which lacks any globally marketable natural resource. Paradoxically, the same natural resources that were owned by the warring Angolan combatants (oil by MPLA and diamonds by UNITA) contributed to the relapse of the conflict

after a peace agreement was brokered by the international community in 1992. On the other hand, Mozambique's rival parties quickly put aside their differences and accepted the peace accord, knowing that continuing with the conflict will further devastate the country.

In Mozambique, it was the Marxist-oriented FRELIMO led by Samora Machel, one of the most charismatic African guerilla fighters, which brought the country to independence in 1975. After independence, FRELIMO's political rival, RENAMO, supported by the then Rhodesia and South Africa, carried out a prolonged civil war against its opponent. It was an ideology based civil war with FRELIMO getting military aid from the soviet block. It was also a competition for legitimacy between the two political rivals. The civil war devastated the poor country and left hundreds of thousands killed and millions displaced (Zartman, 1989).

At the end of the civil war, the country found itself totally bankrupt without any remedies except dependence on external aid. The ex-combatants, who had no alternative skills for livelihood except fighting and robbery, posed a great human security issue. Moreover, about 6 million (more than one-third of the total population) were displaced due to the civil war.

Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programs of ex-combatants are primary tasks for any country that has come out of conflict. The root-causes of the conflict and the manner in which the conflict has ended usually determine the modalities of the demobilization and reintegration programs. Wilkinson (1998) has written that in Mozambique, 1.7 million people were reported to have returned home within 30 months after the peace agreement, using all sorts of transport, and walking on foot as well. Actually, 75% of the displaced returned home on their own before an organized repatriation was started. The repatriation was considered as one of the most highly successful returns since World War II. In the case of Mozambique, families had stayed together for the most part during the conflict and those that were separated were united quickly. There were few orphaned children. The reintegration program was swift and smooth costing little as compared to the number of the displaced (US 100 million for 1500 projects). The success of the program is credited to the Mozambicans themselves (Wilkinson, 1998). Another interesting factor about the success of the Mozambican DDR was that, the local supporters of both warring parties buried their

differences virtually overnight and reconciled without any military recrimination or need for criminal tribunals. A local official was quoted as saying: "We were interested in planting seeds and not starting war tribunals to punish the guilty" (Wilkinson, 1998). However, the demobilization and reintegration programs of skills training focused mainly on male ex-combatants due to security and political concerns. No specific considerations were given to the needs of female ex-combatants or were gender issues incorporated in the programs (Baden, 1997).

According to the peace agreement, FRELIMO and RENAMO reduced and integrated their forces. The program of reintegrating the demobilized soldiers was conducted in cooperation with the international community and local authorities. The reintegration became sustainable and acceptable to all thanks to the application of traditional social values by the local population at community level. To everyone's surprise, the government abandoned the hard-line communist ideology and liberalized its institutions. Mozambique's experience is taken as a good example for a successful post-conflict reintegration program in Africa. The participation of local elders in the post-conflict DDR process and the maintenance of social capital were major contributing factors, to the smooth and peaceful reintegration of the demobilized combatants and their families. In general the success in Mozambique is a shining example among the many failures in post-conflict reconciliation, reintegration and peace building programs in Africa.

International donors played a critical role in reconciling the two parties. They created a fund for RENAMO opposition party so that it can transform itself from an armed movement into a political party (Katarobo, 2003). The 1990 constitution abolished the Marxist one-party and established a multiparty system with a widened recognition of citizen's rights and independence of the courts from the executive and party control (International Bar association, Mozambique: Justice and the Rule of law, 2006, p. 3-4). Mozambique conducted its first democratic elections in 1994 and since then, thanks to the international community that poured in aid, it had been rated as one of the fastest growing economies in the world. However, despite the high economic growth, the per capita GDP remained far below the average for low-income countries of the world, indicating poverty and inequality among the people. Moreover, the conditions of the *Structural Adjustment Program* of the World Bank

and IMF created problems of unemployment, inflation, devaluation of the currency, elimination of price control, subsidies and privatization of state properties (Dunne, 2006).

Like Mozambique, Angola got its independence after thirteen years of guerrilla war with Portugal. After the 1974 military revolution in Portugal resulted in a will for granting independence to its colonies, the three liberation movements, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), signed an accord for the modalities of independence with the colonial government. The formal date of independence was set for November 11, 1976. However, by March-April 1975, the Alvor accord had collapsed and civil war broke out among the movements as each wanted to get hold of Luanda, the capital, before the date of independence. The external forces behind the warring parties had considerable contribution to the escalation and prolonging of the Angolan civil war (Zartman, 1989).

The Marxist MPLA was supported by the former Soviet Union, ever since its establishment. On the other hand, UNITA used to be assisted by the western countries, and by Apartheid South Africa which intervened with its troops. The FNLA and its leader Holden Roberto, a close friend of Mobutu, were assisted by Zaire, where its military base was located. The three rival movements fought for legitimacy and eventual seizure of power in the country. There was a time when the OAU recognized FNLA as the legitimate national liberation movement of Angola. The U.S provided military equipment to both UNITA and FNLA, which were committed to oust the Marxist MPLA. On the other hand, Russia and Cuba poured in military equipment and troops respectively, for MPLA. The assistance provided by the latter enabled MPLA to score victory over its opponents by capturing Luanda and declaring independence (Zartman, 1989, p.141). However, it was not controlling all the territories in the country at the time.

The three movements are regional organizations in their formation. MPLA is a Mubundu party from north-central and eastern Angola. FNLA is a Bacongo party from northern Angola while UNITA is an Ovimbundu party from southern and eastern Angola. They were also ideological parties attached to their foreign supporters. MPLA was a Marxist organization supported and sculptured along Soviet and Cuban lines while UNITA exhibited

changing images based on its foreign supporters--U.S, France, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and even China. FNLA was supported by Zaire, the U.S. and China (Zartman, 1989, p. 142). With all these external involvements there could be no doubt that the brutal civil war between MPLA and the two other parties incurred more harm to the Angolan people than the independence war against Portugal.

At the end of the cold war and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the parties were pushed by the international community to come to a negotiating table where a peace accord was signed. The changing world political order due to the east-west detente had a negative impact on the continuity of the civil war for both sides. The ideological proxy war was no more appealing to some of the external supporters. Meanwhile FNLA fell out of the picture of rivalry and lost support from Zaire after Mobutu and Agostinho Neto of MPLA eased their hostilities. The civil war was then left to the two bitter enemies—MPLA and UNITA. In 1994, the international community brokered a peace accord between the two parties, in Lusaka. The agreement to merge their forces and share power in a government of national unity was rejected by UNITA after Dos Santos narrowly beat Savimbi in a national election. Thus, UNITA's refusal to accept the results of the elections in which MPLA got the upper hand, led to another round of conflict. Despite the pressure from the international community to accept the results of the elections, UNITA relied on the strength it derived from the diamond wealth it was controlling in the area it occupied. With this wealth, it was able to once again continue waging war until its leader, Jonas Savimbi, was killed in 2002 and his followers returned to the negotiation table. Similarly, MPLA was also using the revenue from the sales of oil, to purchase heavy military equipment from the former USSR. Thus, the natural resources of the country were used by both parties in fighting each other and destroying the infrastructure as well as the lives of innocent citizens. For UNITA and Savimbi, peace seemed to deliver fewer benefits than the revenue it drew from the illicit trade of diamonds (Neil Cooper, 2006). If it were not for the revenues of oil and diamond sales, the fate of the civil war in Angola could have not been different from that of Mozambique.

After the death of Savimbi which ended the conflict, UNITA transformed itself into a parliamentary opposition party. Over 100, 000 ex-combatants were demobilized by the end of 2002. The war which had lasted over 40 years induced urbanization of Angola. Landmines and destroyed infrastructures were major obstacles that prevented the return of

displaced people to their place of origin and prolonged the start of reintegration by two years. Angola is one of the most severely landmine affected countries in the worlds. “An estimated 90,000 Angolans are said to have been killed or maimed by landmines, a figure which has had a negative impact on almost every aspect of society” (International Bar association, Promoting Justice in Post-Conflict Angola, 2003, p. 11). Two-thirds of the population was living below poverty line at the end of the conflict. Women’s role in society changed during the conflict making them shoulder a major burden in reconstruction and active participants in civil society mechanisms (Cain, 2005).

Some of the conflicts in other parts of Africa also share similar challenges to peace making. The West African countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone had experienced conflicts that have depended on the wealth from the illicit trades of diamond, and timber. The rebels that first took up arms in defiance of the corrupt leadership of their respective countries, were found inflicting unprecedented atrocities of killings at random and other human rights violations, against the innocent civilians whom they said they were going to liberate. The enormous number of refugees and internally displaced people due to the conflicts were case loads that the UN and other international organizations had to take care of. All of these calamities took place with the aid of the revenues from the illegal trade of plundered natural resources.

### ***3.3 Impacts of the Conflicts in Africa***

#### ***3.3.1 Impacts of the Conflicts on State Security***

Conflicts weaken state security institutions and eventually lead to state failure and collapse. As the military and police become in-effective due to the war, human security of the citizens is endangered. Robbery, killing and looting become the order of the day, like it has happened in Somalia for more than a decade. In countries where the DDR programs were not carried out quickly, strictly, and efficiently, the ex-combatants returned to violence immediately. A good example is Sierra Leone where the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) did not properly conduct the DDR program in 1997 (UNDP, 2007). The amnesty that was provided to all combatants and the opportunity to join the national army irrespective of their records of crime retarded the pace of the DDR and reignited the conflict in which a military coup took place.

To sum up, conflicts destroy the infrastructures of the state including the basic services such as, health, education, transport, electricity, and water supply. The negative impacts of these non-functioning services culminate in a weak government with weak public institutions, low capacity in skills, high illiteracy, and weak investment opportunities.

### ***3.3.2 Socio-Economic Impacts***

In the context of Africa and most developing countries, massive decline in agricultural production and GDP are observed during war time, as men are engaged in military combat activities. Moreover, the chaotic situation of civil wars is not favorable for agricultural activities. In some cases, crops are burned down by conflicting parties in order to starve their opponents. This situation will further aggravate the conflict. Infrastructures suffer the most severe damages during civil wars. Roads, rails and bridges, schools hospitals and other government institutions are destroyed in order to deny access to the opposition or weaken the state's governing capacity.

The plunder of exportable natural resources is a primary target of rebels in Africa, where these cash commodities are available. The money obtained from the illicit trade of these commodities is used to finance and sustain the conflicts that killed people in good numbers every day. It was paradoxical to see the unfortunate Angolan citizens suffering from poverty, in a country which is rich in diamonds and oil wealth. The civil war waged by power and wealth greedy leaders denied the Angolan people the right to benefit from their natural resources.

The second round of intervention in the DRC by Uganda and Rwanda, and their subsequent plunder of the natural resources in the east of the country, was the most disgraceful episode. The forces of the two allies (Uganda and Rwanda) fought each other allegedly over the wealth in a foreign soil. This is a stark evidence of the degree of greed for precious natural resources that are plundered from a neighboring state or from one's own country. On the other hand, citizens of these states suffer from hunger and disease as the countries in conflict used what ever fund was available, for the war. As a result, hunger and disease prevail, when they can be prevented easily.

Educated people and professionals flee their countries due to the unfavorable situation created by the conflicts. Africa has lost a good majority of its intellectuals to western

countries. The large exodus of refugees from conflict countries sharply reduces the labor force in the country. These are the citizens who could have contributed to the national economic development programs of their respective countries.

Conflicts prevent young people from attending schools. The governments which are engaged in civil-war lack funds for the schools or the schools are closed for security reasons during the active conflict periods. The youth are either conscripted into the combat forces or remain idle increasing the number of the unemployed, and pose threat to national security.

All in all, the set-back due to the impacts of conflict on the socio-economic development of the countries in Africa results in poverty and desperation.

### ***3.3.3 Trauma and Loss of Social Capital caused by Conflicts***

The main actors of conflicts are human-beings, so are the primary casualties. The loss of civilian life is the most harmful and yet an unavoidable consequence of any violent conflict. Moreover, the situation becomes even worse when civilians are targeted and the killings are undertaken in the most brutal and inhuman manners. This brutality has even gone a step further where the killings were targeted against a certain ethnic group of the country, with systematic planning and execution by government authorities. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda is a good example of an unprecedented cruelty. It is enough to add up the number of people killed in African conflicts of the last two decades alone, in order to understand the magnitude of the impact on humanity. Apart from the loss of lives, millions were internally displaced or fled the country as refugees, with continuous dependency on the international community.

The level of cruelty exhibited in most African conflicts is not limited to the brutal killings alone. The maiming of limbs during the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone added another unique phenomenon. The victims were innocent men, women, children and the elderly who are ordinary poor citizens, having nothing to do with the conflict. The trauma that these innocent victims live with for the rest of their lives will remind the people of Liberia and Sierra Leone about the legacy of the brutal conflict in their country.

The torture and damage to the mind is more serious than physical harm. Children that have survived the conflicts in African countries including the Rwandan genocide are the most traumatized. Many have lost their fathers and mothers when they were infants and will remain without knowing the love of parents. Survivors that have been forced to witness the killing of their beloved ones (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda) cannot forget the tragedy for the rest of their lives. The trauma becomes so severe in the case of children, with possibilities of complete change of behavior during latter years. Many ex-combatants also live with the trauma of the war after demobilization. In extreme cases, they become insane and roam the streets thinking that the war is still going on. Many child soldiers become drug addicts for the rest of their lives, having been exposed to the drug during the combat years. This is true for the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

One of the many non-physical impacts left behind by internal ethnic conflicts is the loss of social capital. The report by the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda (*The Preventable Genocide*, 2000) describes that the relationships and social values that people build over ethnic lines during many years of social interaction and living together are usually shattered over-night, when suddenly conflict erupts between them. People lose trust and stop purposeful communication among them, or limit their relationships with those they trust only. Friendships could break replacing suspicion and animosity. Neighbors can stop talking to each other. In extreme cases like the Rwandan genocide, the conflict can turn into a nightmare, where husbands kill their wives, or mothers kill their children (Anne Kubai, 2005). The hatred and animosity which are developed due to the brazen propaganda of ethnic cleansing widen the gap. Thus, a valuable social asset is lost, often not to return again.

### ***3.3.4 Human Rights Violations***

In Africa, frequent violations of human rights take place during times of war. The civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and in all the Great Lakes countries testify this. When states lose their power and authority to govern, individuals take the rules into their hands and go on a killing spree as they like. The combatants in most of the African conflicts have used the cruelest types of body inflicts on innocent civilians. In many cases, the rule of law and retributive justice were evaded. The experiences of Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Rwandan genocide are vivid testimonies.

Another legacy of the impacts of African conflicts is the use of rape as a tool for genocide. This was particularly experienced during the genocide in Rwanda as well as the conflicts in Darfur (Sudan), and West African countries. The fate of these women and the children born from these evil deeds is obvious.

Moreover, forced conscription of child-soldiers has become quite common in most of the African conflicts. Young boys and girls were taught to kill people, sometimes their own relatives. They were drugged in order to make them withstand the fear of killing people. At the end of the conflicts, these children found themselves isolated from the community, suffering from a variety of psychological disorders.

## Chapter 4

### Rwanda—Experiences in Post-Conflict Peace Building

#### *4.1 Background of the Conflict*


In order to fully understand the origin and trends of the conflict in Rwanda, it is necessary to look back at its historical emergence as a country and the events that took place thereafter. Located in the heart of Africa, Rwanda is one of the smallest but densely populated countries in the continent. Geographically, it is sandwiched between Uganda to the north, Burundi to the south, the DRC to the west, and Tanzania to the east. The country is a landlocked highland plateau with mountain ranges, adequate rainfall, fertile soil and hospitable climate. The indigenous inhabitants of Rwanda and Burundi are believed to be the Twa, who lived in the forest for thousands of years, as hunters and gatherers. Today, they are a minority community with an insignificant role in the socio-economic dynamics and the outrageous ethnic conflict. Moreover, they are not aligned to any of the two rival ethnic groups (Rugumamu & Gbla, 2003, p. 31).

The first settlers of Bantu clans came to Rwanda between the fourth and seventh centuries A.D. and cultivated the land by clearing the forest. They exercised trade by bartering cattle skins and meat with salt and iron goods (Rugumamu & Gbla, 2003, p.31). Later on, this group became the *Hutu* and the *Tutsi*. The group that became *Hutu* developed the culture of

farming while the *Tutsi* were predominantly cattle herders. Both groups speak the same language and share the same religious beliefs. They have been intermarrying and possess mixed grand parents.

Eventually, the group that was categorized as Tutsi enjoyed an upper-class social status dominating the majority Hutu. Even then the two ethnic groups lived together for at least over a century without confrontation and violence until the arrival of the colonialists towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Thus both the Hutu version of categorizing Tutsis as foreigners and the Tutsi version that no ethnic dichotomy existed before the colonialists came, are contradictory (The Preventable Genocide, 2000, p.12 ).

Figure 3. Map of the Great Lakes Region



Adapted from the International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwandan Experience, in *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda*, by John Eriksson et.al. (p. 7).

According to the 1991 census, Rwanda's population was estimated at 8 million inhabitants. Out of this, the majority *Hutu* comprised over 90% while the *Tutsi* accounted for 8%. Less than 1% was contributed by the *Twa* (Rugumamu and Gbla, 2003, p. 31). Rwanda is one of the poorest countries in the world with the majority of its population depending on subsistence agriculture. It ranked 161<sup>st</sup> out of 179 countries (UNDP's 2008 *Human Development Index Report*).

The Germans first colonized Rwanda in 1899 and ruled it until 1916, after which it became a "trust territory" under Belgium. In 1961, a referendum was conducted resulting in the abolishment of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic. After a parliamentary election, the country proclaimed independence in 1962.

There is no other country in Africa where a colonial policy of *ethnogenesis*<sup>4</sup> was highly dramatized as in Rwanda. Said and Bangura have quoted John Stack's view on the concept of ethnicity by stating that "ethnicity is 'a group identity' that is essentially fluid, depending upon how the boundaries of an ethnic group are drawn in a specific context, and hence, the precise context of ethnic identity is defined in relation to distinct external stimuli"<sup>5</sup> (Said and Bangura, 1994 p. 99). The scholars have clearly shown that the external influence has a determinant role in defining ethnicity. Ethnicity is also believed to be a major driver of conflict, and challenge to peace.

Different historians and conflict analysts have different approaches to the origins of the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy of ethnicity in Rwanda. The post-genocide Rwandan government strongly believes in the version that asserts the cleavage between Hutu and Tutsi as a social construct fabricated by the colonialists who divided the population based on their physical appearance and occupation. Thus, the current government of Rwanda puts the official history of its people as having the same origin, living together in harmony for many years. However, this version is refuted by the Hutu *genocidaires*<sup>6</sup> who have their own belief

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<sup>4</sup> A politically motivated creation of ethnic identities based on socially constituted categories from the pre-colonial past.

<sup>5</sup> Quoted by Abdul Aziz Said & Abdul Karim Bangura, in their article--"Ethnicity's Threat to Peace", in the book *Rethinking Peace*, p.99, edited by Robert Elias & Jennifer Turpin, (1994), Lynne Publishers, Colorado, USA.

<sup>6</sup> The terminology used for those who participated in the genocide.

that the Tutsi originated from the Horn of Africa, and are therefore considered as alien to Rwanda. The current government blames the white colonial masters for the ethnic divisions. It is believed that the Hamitic ideology version of Tutsi origin is actually an invention by the white colonialists and the Catholic Church. Consequently, Eugenia Zorbas states that “*genocidal massacres can only occur in a context where the very legitimacy of presence is questioned*” (Zorbas, 2004, p. 42). On the other hand, Ian Wallace writes that the Rwandan conflict is not simply an ethnic conflict as many people think. He defends his point with the fact that the two principal ethnic groups (Hutu and Tutsi) share language, culture, history and had intermarried. Rather, he believes that the roots of the complex conflict run deep in Rwanda’s history and involve colonial mismanagement, power struggles, shallow doctrine in the church, unresolved justice and false beliefs about racial differences (Wallace, 2005.)

Looking back at the history of the Great Lakes region in general and that of Rwanda in particular, it is quite evident that the events of violence and massacres have kept a regular recurrence ever since the ethnic cleavage started way back during the German colonization period. The roots of class distinction between the favored Tutsi over the Hutu, for being taller, is attributed to the German colonization. The Belgians, who came to Rwanda after the Germans left, favored the majority Hutu. According to Johan Galtung, it was time for favoring numbers over centimeters. Sarcastically, he describes this change as the setting in of democracy (Galtung and Jacobsen, 2002, p.275).

The Belgians and the Catholic Church are together held guilty of what has happened in Rwanda during the latter years. The report by the *International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events* puts the realities of the complicity between the Belgian colonialists and the Catholic Church as follows:

It is not possible to write about Rwanda without writing about the role of the Catholic Church, which since the arrival of the Belgians has functioned virtually as the country’s state church. That role as evident during the genocide as it was in the colonial period, is one about which it would be hard to feel proud at any time. (The Preventable Genocide, AU, 2000, p. 14)

The universal fact of dealing with the root causes of any conflict in order to solve the problem once and for all holds true for the recurring problems in the Great Lakes region also. The expression, “When Rwanda sneezes, Burundi and Congo catch cold” (Prendergast and Smock, 1999), is a good description of the inter-related conflict characteristics in the region. There is no point in solving the animosity between the Hutu and the Tutsi in Rwanda alone, while neighboring Burundi is boiling with a similar conflict, and the DRC is combating ethnic threats of secession. As the region is so much ethnically and culturally intertwined, a holistic solution involving all the Great Lakes countries is mandatory. But how to deal with the problem simultaneously in all the concerned countries, with a single mitigation process, remains to be the future agenda for the therapy of the chronic conflict in the region. In a lecture he delivered at Delphi University in New York, Ambassador Crispin Grey Johnson of Gambia summarized that the root or structural factors of conflict are issues of governance and the functioning of the state, with regard to its relations with the citizens, its legitimacy, its ability to provide basic services and its mode of governance (Johnson, 2005). These are some of the factors that the pre-genocide governments of Rwanda lacked.

#### ***4.2 Impacts of the Conflict in Rwanda***

The indiscriminate killings of men, women, children and the elderly left tens of thousands of children without parents, women without husbands and men without wives during the 1994 genocide. The killings took place in front of the loved ones. As Anne N. Kubai put it, it was not just the Hutu killing the Tutsi, but husbands killing their wives, uncles killing their nephews, and mothers killing their children. Neighbors killed their neighbors and teachers killed their students while colleagues killed their colleagues at places of work, including hospitals and church premises (Kubai,<sup>7</sup> 2005.). The magnitude of the horror and the trauma it left behind in the minds of the survivors is impossible to measure. Those that were lucky fled the country, some never to return back as they have lost all that they had---family, home and hope.

The deep ethnic hatred that was cultivated among the population of Rwanda by the leaders of the first and second republics is a major social evil that was planted in the minds of the people. The periodic conflicts in the past which often led to massacres of the

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<sup>7</sup> Anne Kubai is the research director for Life and Peace Institute (an International Ecumenical Centre for Peace Research and Action) in Uppsala, Sweden.

Tutsis, finally reached its apex culminating in the 1994 genocide. The 1994 genocide directly affected more than half of Rwanda's population, either as victims or perpetrators. Death, rape, physical injury and displacement were the order of the day during the three-month period of genocide. At the end of the genocide, the gender ratio of the population was dramatically in favor of women. This was reflected by women heads of household that comprised 34% of the total population, the 250, 000 women and girls that were victims of rape and sexual violence, 66% of whom tested HIV/AIDS positive (The Preventable Genocide, 2000, p.161, Izabiliza, 2003, p. 2).

Most of the physical infrastructures including schools, health facilities, transport and other community centers were destroyed. At the end of the genocide, government capacity had diminished in all economic and social sectors. Skilled professionals and entrepreneurs had either been killed or fled the country. The hundreds of thousands of vulnerable groups that were created due to the genocide, such as the unemployed, ex-combatants, widowed women, orphaned children and the physically and mentally disabled, were caseloads of the new government.

### ***4.3 Post-Genocide Peace Building***

Unlike other conflicts in Africa, the Rwandan genocide was not a spontaneous violence that erupted out of perceived grievances. It was rather a systematically planned and efficiently executed mass killing by extremist elements in the ruling hierarchy of the government. This makes it a unique event in the socio-cultural life and co-existence of humanity in modern times. However, it should also be remembered that there were underlying factors that led to this situation. Paul Dunne describes these factors as a combination of structural inequality, colonial legacy, economic and agricultural decline, deep-rooted animosity, and the international lack of vision (Dunne, 2006, p.41). These were the agenda to be undertaken by the new government of National Unity that was formed after the forces of Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) victoriously entered Kigali in July 1994. Hence, post-genocide peace building in Rwanda faced such multi-faceted and complex issues, besides the security threats from the exiled ex-military and militia (*interahamwe*) genocide perpetrators.

A score of challenges popped up one after the other in post-genocide Rwanda where poverty reigned throughout the country. Social and physical insecurity prevailed

among the people after the most dramatic, and unbelievable event of genocide. The first task of the victorious RPF was to round up the suspects of the genocide and bring them to justice. Accordingly, more than 100,000 suspected *genocidaires* were jailed. In addition, the country had to get out of the melodrama of the genocide by transforming the minds of the people, in order to eliminate hatred, and bring them back to social coherence, for building a peaceful democratic society. As Rwanda is a small country, there is an acute shortage of land for all. A fair and equitable land reform was needed so that people get occupied with agricultural activity, thus easing the national security threat, while contributing to domestic food production. On top of that, the acute challenge in capacity building needed a long-term program; so did the restoration of human capital and democratic governance.

#### **4.3.1 Combating Security Threats.**

The security issue in post-genocide Rwanda was a serious one given the fact that most of the population was involved either as perpetrators or supporters of the genocide on one hand and as victims on the other hand. Thus, the primary task of the victors (RPF army) was to ensure human security and eventually restore peace and justice. During the genocide, all Hutus were given instructions through continuous mass media propaganda to kill the Tutsis, while all Tutsis were subject to extermination. Social-mistrust and suspicions for revenge among the citizens escalated at the end of the genocide. Besides the physical security threats, the new government of post-genocide Rwanda faced political, social and economic threats. It is believed that post-conflict situations provide opportunities for promoting changes while the structures of a new state are being formulated. Despite criticisms on some of its actions, the new government of RPF had no option but to take drastic measures that would ensure a reliable and secure social and political atmosphere.

The biggest security threat was the ex-Rwandan army and militia that fled to Eastern Zaire from where they were launching cross-border attacks on the civilian population, while getting organized for an eventual attack on the new Rwandan government. The sporadic raids across the border by ex-militia and soldiers of the ex-Rwandan army forced the new government of Rwanda to intervene in Zaire. "Following the incapacity of the international community to separate the genocide leaders from refugees, the Rwandan army intervened militarily in October 1996 in order to bring to an end to that threat and to enable refugees to come back home" (Gassana et al, 1999). Rwanda's intervention in the conflict in

Zaire (later renamed DRC) was aimed at eliminating this group that posed a constant threat to its peace.

The attempt to restore security in Rwanda was not an easy task. In a state where most of the citizens were involved in genocide, disarmament alone is not a solution. Reforming the security sector was a complex challenge, given the events that have taken place and the background and composition of the new government. On top of that the mistrust of the government was inflated by the economic stagnation, wide-spread poverty and border conflicts. Moreover, demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating ex-combatants into the society needed a lot of fund and technical expertise which the country could not afford. Dealing with ex-combatants who were involved in human rights abuses and bringing them to justice in line with building a democratic institution, posed extra challenge to the new government, in addition to combating security threats.

#### ***4.3.2 Human Rights Issues and the Restoration of Justice***

Apart from the well planned and intimidated mass killings that have taken place during the genocide in Rwanda, the explicit violations of human rights take the biggest share and worst picture of crime during the episode. These violations are more magnified when they are committed by the state apparatus. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, the organizers and the perpetrators of the genocide included top Hutu leaders in the state security institutions such as the army, police and the militia---the very people who were supposed to protect the wellbeing of the people and the state.

The brutal and unprecedented manners in which hundreds of thousands of Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed demonstrated the extent of the cruelty and inhuman nature of the genocide. Many were killed by blunt metal weapons such as machetes, knives, axes and clubs studded with nails. Beating to death, amputating limbs, drowning, and burying alive were some of the means used for killing<sup>8</sup>. Dead bodies were strewn all around the country (The Preventable Genocide, 2000, p. 122).

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<sup>8</sup> These means of killing were identified by physicians for Human Rights, as reported in "*The Report of the International panel of eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events*" in (The Preventable Genocide, 2000 : 122), OAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The genocide perpetrators used *rape* as a weapon as well. Many of the women that were raped had additional burden of giving birth to children that they did not want to raise. Several of these women were found infected with HIV/AIDS, loosing the least bit of hope for life, after the genocide was over. Women heads of family (widows from the genocide and wives of detainees) were estimated at nearly 34 % of the total households in the country, at the end of the genocide (Kelly and Fitzduff, 2002, p.34). The loss and detention of manpower contributes to a serious set back in the country's socio-economic development.

The international community including the UN closed its eyes and ears to the dangerous events that were leading to the genocide in Rwanda. The question here is why didn't the UN or other individual countries intervene to prevent the catastrophe? In his paper entitled "*Intervention is Prevention*", Anthony Morin, quotes Michael Walzer, the leading war theorist, as follows:

The general problem is that intervention, even when it is justified, even when it is necessary to prevent terrible crimes—even when it poses no threat to regional or global stability, is an imperfect duty—a duty that doesn't belong to any particular agent. Somebody ought to intervene, but no specific state or society is morally bound to do so. And in many cases, no one does. People are indeed capable of watching and listening and do nothing. The massacres go on, and every country that is able to stop them decides that it has more urgent tasks and conflicting priorities; the likely costs of intervention are too high. (Walzer quoted by Morin, 2005, p. 7)

The abuse of human rights in the Rwandan case is not confined to the *genocidaires* alone. The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) is also implicated in human rights violations during its insurgency and at the time it entered Kigali. However, these crimes committed by the RPA before and during the genocide and the killings of thousands of Hutus in Rwanda and the DRC are eclipsed by the genocide (Zorbas, 2004).

With its meager resources and determination of setting an example by doing away with impunity, the government of Rwanda embarked on the task of categorizing the jailed prisoners according to the level of crimes they committed. Accordingly:

- a. Category one included the planners, organizers, leaders, supervisors, and instigators of the genocide including acts of sexual torture. These include persons in high government authority and political party, from the national to the communal level.
- b. Category two is those persons with criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation as perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices of intentional homicide or serious assault causing death.
- c. Category three includes persons whose criminal acts and participation make them guilty of other serious assaults against the person.
- d. Category four is persons who committed offenses against property.

The categorization was later on reduced to three levels only.

#### **4.3.3 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)**

Following the Rwandan genocide, the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, has set up a war crimes tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, in November 1994. The tribunal is known as the *International Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda* (ICTR). Despite protests from Rwanda, the UN decided to establish the court in Arusha for the sake of safety of the witnesses and lack of adequate premises in Kigali that has suffered devastation due to the war.

The tribunal was mandated to prosecute the perpetrators of the genocide and persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighboring states, between 1 January and December 31, 1994<sup>9</sup>. Article II of the statute of the tribunal defines *genocide* as the conspiracy to commit it, direct public incitement towards it the attempts to commit it, or complicity with it as acts punishable under international law. The tribunal was also believed to contribute to the national reconciliation in Rwanda and the general maintenance of peace in the region. The UN Security Council recruited capable judges from member states and presented them to the general Assembly which made the final selection from among the

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<sup>9</sup> Prelude to the statute of the ICTR adopted by the Security Council Resolution 955(1994), amended by Security Council Resolutions 1165(1998), 1329(2000), 1411 (2002), 1431(2002),

nominees. The statute and set-up of the court was similar to that of Nuremburg which tried the criminals of World War II. The judges were elected for a four-year term. In addition the UN judges for an appeal court established in The Hague. A budget of USD 79,753,900 and 810 posts were allocated for the year 2000 alone (Kelly & Fitzduff, 2002, p.35).

Some of the senior government officials and military officers of the interim government during the genocide have been arrested and tried. Arrest warrants for those who fled the country, were sent all over the world. Former senior Rwandan government officials have been arrested abroad and sent to the tribunal. As an international court, the ICTR is the first to convict individuals on genocide charges and rule that the crime of rape is an act of genocide. It is believed that the number of criminals arrested and tried is quite few as compared to the volume of atrocities committed during the genocide.

The Tribunal has been criticized frequently for moving slowly and taking more time and budget than first allocated by the UN. After nearly 15 years since its establishment, it was able to arrest and try only a handful of *genocidaires*<sup>10</sup>. By March 2009, the ICTR had managed to arrest 79 suspects only and gave final jurisdiction to 41 top genocide planners and executioners. Life imprisonment is the maximum sentence that the tribunal can pass according to its mandates. Those sentenced were sent to prisons in countries that have volunteered to host them for the enforcement of the sentences, based on agreements made between the tribunal and the countries.

The tribunal took quite considerable time to organize itself and start the job. Moreover complaints of incompetence and corruption became frequent grievances against the tribunal as a result of which a number of the judges had resigned. This problem has been solved by the UN which reviewed the tribunal's procedures and recruited additional new staff. According to a recent report by the ICTR on the status of detainees, only 79 top political leaders that have planned and participated in the execution of the genocide have been arrested

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<sup>10</sup> On December 17, 2008, Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, a top military official and one of the top genocide planners and architects, was given life imprisonment for his crimes in the genocide. He was arrested in Cameroon in 1996. (Reported by the [bbc.co.uk](http://bbc.co.uk), December 17, 2008).

and put to trial (Status of ICTR, March 16, 2009). The activities of the court which were scheduled to end in 2008 have been extended due to unfinished legal proceedings.<sup>11</sup>

How much impact the ICTR has had on the Rwandan citizens and the reconciliation efforts is doubtful, as the common people in Rwanda have very little knowledge of what is taking place at the ICTR in Arusha. In Rwanda, lack of media coverage about the activities of the tribunal made the people feel that the tribunal is not theirs. The ICTR became a “legal” yet controversial institution due to its inefficiency, corruption and incompetence. Emily Harpester quoted the Rwandan public opinion as follows: “The ICTR does not belong to us, Rwandese say, and it does not affect us” (Harpester, 2008).

The ICTR was mandated to try the top leaders and planners of the genocide (category one) while the lower level perpetrators of the genocide were left to the jurisdiction of the local Rwandan legal system. The ICTR does not pass death sentences while the Rwandan domestic courts did to lower-level criminals of the genocide until recent times. The death penalty has been abolished by the government nowadays. The top officials in the new Rwandan government (including the then vice-president Kagame) had insisted that the tribunal should be authorized to impose death penalty. This issue was the major departure point for the Rwandan government to vote against the November 8 Security Council Resolution No. 955 that established the tribunal which they consistently demanded in the beginning. Moreover, the decent facilities that the top level prisoners in Arusha and elsewhere in third countries enjoyed looked like heaven when compared to the over-crowded and filthy prison cells in Rwanda. The irony of this incompatibility of justice standards was escalated when some of the top genocide planners and executioners were released because of technicalities<sup>12</sup>. The Rwandan government and the public were so furious that cooperation with the ICTR was suspended.

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<sup>11</sup> Brief discussion with Mr. Charles C. Jalloh, ICTR associate legal officer, who was attending a conference in Addis Ababa, on March 17, 2009.

<sup>12</sup> Emily Harpester, *Creating a Court*, in *The International Criminal Court for Rwanda*—cites this case---Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, who had controlled hate radio during the genocide, was released fortunately temporarily, by an appeals court in November 1999, because he had spent 18 days in jail with out charge.

#### 4.3.4 The *Gacaca*<sup>13</sup> Court

The huge number of genocide suspects encamped in several prison halls through out the country posed an enormous justice problem at the end of the genocide. It was virtually impossible to try the over one hundred thousand crime suspects by the formal judicial system. The formal judicial system in Rwanda would require more than a century to judge all those in custody (Zorbas, 2004). The best alternative found was to revive the pre-colonial *gacaca* system. Thus, the *gacaca* law was passed in January 2001. The *gacaca* is a local conflict resolution process in which the perpetrator and victim go before a group of elders. There, an acknowledgement of the harm done, a determination on the punishment of the perpetrator and compensation for the victim is decided. Community service verdicts are also given for convicts who cannot pay for properties they destroyed (Kelly & Fitzduff, 2002, p.37). Those who confess before being denounced will benefit from a reduced sentence. On the other hand, confessions, though considered as the best source of “truth”, created an unanticipated outcome of revenge from the victims, while witnesses also faced vengeance and intimidation from the perpetrators. As the activities of the *gacaca* progressed through out the country, the feeling of insecurity by witnesses and survivors as well as the perpetrators increased. In one case it is reported that about 1000 released prisoners voluntarily returned to the prisons after they were set free, for fear of vengeance by survivors. These were some of the serious shortcomings that the *gacaca* faced in its legal process (Kubai, 2005).

*Gacaca* courts were authorized to try suspects categorized under class two, three and four<sup>14</sup>. Besides giving verdicts, the ultimate goal of the *gacaca* courts, is described as, “to promote reconciliation and healing by providing a platform for victims to express themselves, encouraging acknowledgements and apologies from the perpetrators, and facilitating the coming together of both victims and perpetrators every week on the grass” (Zorbas, 2004, p. 36).

Despite criticisms from the western world regarding the lack of due process of law in the *gacaca* system of justice, there was no known alternative that could be undertaken for the quick trial of the large number of detained suspects of genocide. The other option

<sup>13</sup> Literally meaning ‘*justice on the grass*’, the *Gacaca* Court is a traditional participatory form of justice used in Rwanda during and before the colonial times, in which the whole community is involved and the judges come from the local population.

<sup>14</sup> Later on the categories have been reduced to three only.

would be to let go the perpetrators with out justice; which would be promoting the culture of impunity, which undermines the very principles of “*no reconciliation before justice*”, which the new government strongly advocates. As a matter of fact, the government has done what it could in its capacity, in order to reform and reshape the archaic *gacaca* system, by institutionalizing it and training the judges. Many countries and aid organizations have since then realized the situation on the ground and provided considerable assistance. Eugenia Zorbas expressing her opinion on the choice of *gacaca* as an alternative tool of the justice system for trying the numerous genocide activists has state: “*gacaca* presently represents the most suitable and only workable solution for bringing those responsible for atrocities to trial promptly and ending the legacy of impunity” (Zorbas, 2004, p. 37).

Different conflict analysts have different opinions about the *gacaca* justice system. Some call it “victor’s justice” while others consider it as not serving the purpose of reconciliation. Those who are worried about the validity of the *gacaca* justice system believe that while restorative justice is helpful, retributive justice could be counterproductive. This group includes the “*IBUKA*”<sup>15</sup> (genocide survivors). They strongly advocate for reparations and addressing the root cause of the conflict. Some victims also feel that the gravity of the genocide cannot be compensated by forgiveness and restorative justice alone (Kubai, 2005). Thus, the system is inextricably caught between the competing realities of justice and reconciliation, with a challenge of entertaining both elements at the same time.

#### **4.3.5 National Unity and Reconciliation Commission**

Reconciliation is a process in which the feelings of hatred and conflict are transformed socially into peace and mutual understanding for a better co-existence in the future. It is the best mechanism for avoiding the recurrence of conflict in post-conflict societies, and for restoring a sustainable peace. It is also a process in which truth, justice, and forgiveness are mingled to serve the purpose of bringing together societies that have been broken apart by conflict. The pains of the victims may not be healed, nor does love necessarily replace hate overnight. However, the future is important and the relapse of conflict should not be given a chance. The words of former UN Secretary General Kofi

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<sup>15</sup> “Ibuka” means “remember”, .in Kenyarwanda. It is an organization of Genocide Survivors.

Annan are good testimony for these assumptions. ... "*You and only you can show the world that there is life even after genocide, love after hate and humanity even after evil*"<sup>16</sup>.

In a post-conflict situation like that of Rwanda where the entire population has been affected by genocide, the task of reconciling communities that have drifted apart due to ethnic dichotomy is a difficult but unavoidable challenge. The new Rwandan government established the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), in 1999. The commission was given a broad mandate of working from the grass-roots up to the national level by organizing workshops, seminars and national summits on the theme of reconciliation. Solidarity groups of demobilized soldiers and released prisoners known as *ingando*, were also the participants in the community events such as discussions and civil education for reconciliation (Kubai, 2005).

However, critics consider the commission as a government instrument with vertical approach and little impact at the grassroots level. With its scarce resources, it is a burden on the government to handle the over 100,000 prisoners. Moreover, it would be a paradox to think about reconciliation when a huge number of prisoners are languishing in jails through out the country, while their families are stigmatized and traumatized (Kubai, 2005).

#### ***4.3.6 Reconstruction and Reviving of the Economy***

In Rwanda, agriculture provides employment for 90% of the population although it contributes only 45% of the gross national product (GDP). Both the private and public sectors of the economy were at their infant stage before the genocide. The development of Rwanda's weak economic structures was a key challenge.

The series of reforms that were taken by the post-genocide government in the service delivery sectors were meant to address the root causes of the conflict, and to establish decentralized institutions that are transparent, efficient, equitable and accountable. The development initiatives focused on transport, energy, housing, ICT and meteorology (Rwanda Country Report, August 2007, p.24). The private sector of the economy was highly promoted and encouraged to participate in these sectors. Road networks and airports were rehabilitated. Alternative transport methods like railways and water transport were planned. An ambitious

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<sup>16</sup> Quoted from a speech by Kofi Anan, former UN Secretary General, on a visit to Rwanda in May 1998

plan of equitable energy distribution through biogas development and increase in hydro-power production was introduced. The post-genocide Rwanda has planned to manage 70% of its population in rural settlements (*imidugudu*) and 30 % as urban dwellers. The development of ICT through out the country is expected to promote education and capacity building programs in addition to attracting the private sector.

Prior to the eruption of the genocide the World Bank and IMF had introduced a structural adjustment program in 1991, which was interrupted by the civil war. At the end of the war the macro economic and institutional infrastructures were destroyed. In July 1994, the fleeing government took 24 billion Rwandan francs and allegedly a substantial amount of hard currency that was in the coffers of the Central Bank (Rugumamu and Gbla, 2003, p. 53). In short, the economy has totally collapsed together with all the institutions of local and central government. The desire to have a sustainable peace after the genocide needed a substantial progress towards equitable economic development. Rwanda's Vision 2020 is focused on the poor, aimed at eradicating extreme poverty by 2020. The program is designed to alleviate the living standard of the extremely poor in a cost-effective and sustainable way with local participation (Rwanda Country report, August 2007). It is to be remembered that the inherent poverty of the country was one of the contributing factors to the conflict in Rwanda.

The international community had responded to the reconstruction of the country and revival of its economy. UNDP, World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conducted a series of studies for priorities in the reconstruction program. The RPF-led government also came up with its policy guidelines of the new economic structure. It focused on reinstating the principles of macro economy such as: market liberalization, state exemption from productive and commercial activities, reduced public expenditure and promotion of regional trade. Monetary and financial liberalization regulations, including the legal framework for privatization were reformed. Based on the UN's appeal for emergency assistance, about 100 NGOs and scores of UN organs participated in the emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.

The post-genocide economic recovery became rapid while its real GDP was below the 1990 level, for the first few years after the genocide. This was because the

government was not able to build enough capacity to collect revenues, nor did it allocate adequate resource to the public sector. Besides, the huge military expenditure as a result of security threats, and the intervention in Zaire, together with the debt burden, accounted for the budget deficit. Despite its endemic poverty and the high external debt history, Rwanda has managed to build one of the fastest growing economies in Africa nowadays.

#### ***4.3.7 The Role of Women and Children in Rwanda's Post-conflict***

##### ***Peace Building***

It is men who make war. Women and children are usually the victims of the war started by men. In the Rwandan genocide, women and children were the hardest hit segment of the society. Right from the outset of the genocide, Tutsi women were specifically targeted as part of the carefully organized program. The Hutus committed all sorts of crimes (rape, torture, mutilation, murder) on Tutsi women. That the mistakes made by their predecessors in allowing women and children to survive during the massacres of 1959 and 1963 should not be repeated, was taken as an item of faith (The Preventable Genocide, 2000, p. 159). The *genocidaires* believed that eliminating the women was the best way to eliminate the future Tutsi. An enormous propaganda campaign was carried out in order to degrade and dehumanize Tutsi women. If at all the level of human degradation and cruelty during the acts of the genocide is to be measured, then, there would be no parallel to the acts of Hutu women who killed (rather were forced to kill) their own children born from Tutsi fathers, in order to express their loyalty to "Hutu Power" (The Preventable Genocide, 2000, p.161).

Taking into account the large number of men who were killed or fled the country, and the number of detainees for crimes of genocide, and those who are serving in the army, it is quite evident that women in post-genocide Rwanda are shouldering a disproportionate burden in the country's reconstruction and peace building activities. The fact that Rwanda is by far a rural and agricultural country magnifies the level of the role that post-genocide women play in the largest economic sector of the country. It was estimated that they contributed 70% of the agricultural production. It is no wonder that the subsequent policies of the new government and international aid organizations took this reality into account during the reconstruction of the country. The neglected gender inequality during the past regimes, but

highly reflected by the results of the genocide, forced the new government to take prompt actions.

The Government of National Unity focused on a policy reform of empowering women in the political, social and economic sectors of the state. Since then the important roles of Rwandan women in decision-making and peace building activities were increased. The ex-law of inheritance that exempted women and girls from inheriting property was also reformed, putting the rights of women's property ownership on equal level with their men counter parts.

In an official opening of gender-training workshop for parliamentarians, President Paul Kagame stated:

It is imperative to our law makers, policy makers and implementers to have an objective and correct analysis of the gender question in order to design appropriate corrective policies and programs. The question of gender equality in our society needs a clear and critical evaluation in order to come up with concrete strategies to map the future development in which men and women are true partners and beneficiaries. My understanding of gender is that it is an issue of good governance, good economic management and respect of human rights. (Quoted in '*The Role of Women in Reconstruction: Experience of Rwanda*', by Jeanne Izabiliza, 2005).

Accordingly, a Ministry of Family and Women's Affairs was established. Women's committees organized at the national to the local grassroots level play important roles in reconciliation, poverty reduction and peace building. With the outcomes from the determination and good-will towards the new policy, Rwandan women occupy and play important roles within the state machinery. The commitment to women's empowerment was highly reflected in the post-genocide national parliament where 30% of the members were women. Currently, this number has reached 56%.

On the other hand, half of all the remaining households after the genocide were headed by women or female minors. In 1999, the number decreased to 34%, which is an increase by 50 percent over the pre-genocide years (The Preventable Genocide, 2000, p.161). This reality of a large number female-headed population is of great concern for the country's economic development. In the third world in general and the African context in particular,

men are the bread-earners for their family. It is therefore possible to understand the extent to which poverty prevailed in the country in general.

The traditional practices of inequalities and the customary laws that women were subjected to in pre-genocide Rwanda affected the economic base of the large number of widowed women at the end of the genocide. Women were not eligible to inherit properties unless specifically designated as a beneficiary. As a result, most widowed women could not inherit properties of their husbands, their fathers, nor that of any of their male relatives that have died during the genocide. The government realized the problem and made amendments to the law allowing women the right to inherit and own property.

Given the fact that post-genocide women form the majority of the working population in Rwanda, there is no doubt that they are in the fore-front of the successful economic development growth of their country. As there would be no sustainable peace without a substantial development progress, the role of Rwandese women in their country's peace building is therefore quite evident. Women have been organizing themselves into various self-help and development associations, which are appreciated and supported by international donors. With the government's policy of non-ethnic identification in its social services, the new trend has promoted social cohesion among the Tutsi and the Hutu. Moreover, women's associations established at the national level have taken up issues of: needs of women survivors, returnees, empowering of women politically and economically and participation in the reconciliation and reconstruction of the Rwandan society. The *Pro-femmes Twese Hamwe* (Pro-women All Together) is a collection of 35 organizations working on women's rights, development and peace. They are important in ensuring women's empowerment besides facilitating the integration of returnees by directly intervening in the reinstallation projects. A number of *dialogue clubs* have been formed in the women's committees at the grassroots level. The discussions are primarily focused on the causes of the genocide. Prominent Rwandan activists like Rose Rwabuhibi and Suzanne Ruboneka became distinguished advocates of the common problems that women share in the realms of health, nutrition, water and caring for children. Their conviction was that since post-genocide Rwandan women have these common problems, they can bring peace together (The Preventable Genocide, 2000, p. 169). Women also participate in all government institutions including the *Gacaca* courts, as well as other forums from the national to the grassroots level. Moreover, women officials were chosen to serve as the president of the Supreme Court of Rwanda, the Minister of Justice

and the Executive Secretary of the *Gacaca* courts (Izabiliza, 2005, p. 4). Since women were primary witnesses of the genocide, they were considered to be the best choices for dealing with reconciliation (Mzvondiwa, 2007). This is a major cultural breakthrough in a society where women used to refrain from appearing at public forums.

The atrocities that children were subjected to during the genocide are no less dramatic than those to which women were subjected. Apart from the thousands that were killed an additional 100,000 were separated from their parents. These included Hutu children that were abandoned during the flight to eastern Zaire and Tanzania. Only a few of these were reunited with their parents later on. Hundreds of thousands were taken in by families. The government was forced to establish several temporary orphanages for the remaining children. It is to be remembered that several children had directly participated in the genocide, either forced to kill or conscripted as child soldiers. This group had to be separately imprisoned and given the necessary rehabilitation services. All of these cases exerted considerable social and economic burden on the government.

However, the most serious impact of the genocide on children was the trauma that was left behind. Many of them live with the nightmare of the killings of their parents and relatives apart from the loneliness after they lost their family. At the end of the genocide, some 300,000 children were forced to live in child-headed families, 90% of whom were headed by girls who had no regular income (The preventable Genocide, 2000, p. 171).

#### ***4.3.8 The Role of the International Community and Civil Society***

The international community silently and indifferently watched the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu, when it could have intervened and saved them. Post-conflict peace building endeavors require external assistance for their economic recovery as well as maintenance of peace and security. Since the state which has just come out of conflict lacks the capacity to carry out these tasks, it is often the international community that comes to its rescue. Donor countries and aid organizations provide funds to normalize the failed economic situations while the deployment of peacekeeping forces prevents the recurrence of violent conflict. In addition, the activities of DDR, rebuilding of institutions, and reviving the economy require considerable amount of

fund which the post-conflict country cannot afford, making external assistance mandatory. These multi-faceted tasks are often contracted by a number of NGOs that form the civil society group. However, this intervention by the international community and the civil society is controversial sometimes. The most important considerations in this respect are the political, economic and national security interests of powerful states. Some donor countries come with their own policies of assistance delivery without taking into consideration local capacity and ownership of the aid projects. Others lack to identify emergency assistance from long-term development programs, thereby lacking overall sustainability. Moreover, financial requirements by different post-conflict countries differ based on the country's resource situation, stage of development, as well as the nature and extent of the social and economic damage caused by the violent conflicts (Brown, Langer, and Stewart, 2008).

The international donors have realized that a different approach is required nowadays for the weak and fragile states. Development programs are now focused on very basic and nation-building tasks (Lund, 2006). Accordingly a multi-sectoral, holistic and comprehensive strategy is required. Inter agency coordination of the different sectoral institutions needs to develop coherent approaches to foster cooperation.

The demand by the international community for democratization of the state during the first two years of post-conflict reconstruction has become customary. However, it has been criticized that it is quite difficult to carry out such a difficult task with too little input and within too little time. According to Peter Uvin, it is important to promote democratic structures in post-conflict environments since it is the lack of such structures in most cases that led to the eruption of conflict in the first place (Uvin, 2008).

Civil society is considered as one of the pillars of a democratic system. It is also a vanguard to the civil rights issue and an efficient implementer of development projects. Thus, the active participation of the civil society in post-conflict peace building and reconstruction is an indication for the promotion of democracy. The emergency phase is mostly mitigated by external NGOs as they are the ones that have the money and the know-how. With the maturity of post-conflict environment, the importance of NGOs diminishes due to the phasing out of the emergency intervention and the take over by the post-conflict government that has built capacity. The case of Rwanda where the government drastically reduced the NGOs followed this trend.

Massive relief support was provided to refugee camps of Goma in eastern Zaire, by the international community at the end of the genocide. The paradox of this assistance was that the camps were virtually controlled by the armed *interahamwe* who were the very culprits who not only committed the genocide, but were also making incursions into Rwanda to destabilize the post-genocide government. The international community focused on saving the lives of people by providing food, shelter and medicine to refugees in eastern Zaire and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Inside Rwanda, the emergency relief assistance shifted to rehabilitation and reconstruction within Rwanda only after August 1994. It was then that the international community began to realize the severity of human and institutional devastation brought about by the civil war and genocide. With a comprehensive program for rehabilitation, and reconstruction launched by UNDP in collaboration with the government, other actors like the World Bank, FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF, and WHO followed suit either as funders or implementers (Kumar & Tardif, 1996). By 1996, the over 100 NGOs also moved from emergency to the rehabilitation phase.

The government and the survivors of the genocide in Rwanda believed that the international community was more concerned about the refugees than the survivors, given the fact that the vast majority of the billions of fund went to the refugees in the asylum countries. Despite the doubts and misunderstandings of the objectives of the new government, the delays in the disbursement of funds and occasional deadlocks between the government and the donors, the international community managed to provide considerable resources for the mitigation of the crisis.

#### **4.3.9 Policy and Institutional Reforms**

The post-genocide government of Rwanda has made a number of policy and institutional reforms in order to respond to the structural causes of the conflict during the past governments. It introduced the community driven reconstruction known as *Ubudehe*, which is a system of decentralization that advocates for block grants at the lower level of development schemes. This policy of starting development at local level and expanding it to nation-wide level was supported by the major donors. In such a way, the project will be accountable to local communities that will eventually exercise ownership, and become responsible for the continuation, efficient implementation, and sustainability. Moreover, donors provide their

grants through government channels where the funds would be accounted and audited based on the government laws.

Of all policy reforms to which the new Rwandan government is strictly committed is its stance on justice and ethnicity. The commitment to '*Never Again*' by the RPF-led government emphasized that never again will the acts of genocide repeated on Rwandan soil; and there will be no amnesty without justice for the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide. This firm policy was strictly adhered to during the deliberations with the international community on the establishment and procedural arrangements for dealing with the tens of thousands of genocide suspects. All of the Rwandan citizens that I have interviewed here in Addis Ababa share this conviction and believe that the people and the government of the new Rwanda will never allow another round of genocide. Accordingly, the old rhetoric about the genesis of the Tutsi and the Hutu is no more valid, since it was the main cause for the origin of ethnic dichotomy and hatred that led to the genocide. Thus, the current policy on ethnicity of the Rwandan government is that all the people of Rwanda are one people---the *Banyarwanda*.

## **Chapter 5**

### **The Challenges to post-conflict peace building in Africa**

#### **Why do African conflicts relapse after peace agreements have been reached?**

Having examined some of the characteristics and impacts of the conflicts in Africa, it is now quite possible to list and prioritize the major challenges that face African states during their post-conflict peace building endeavors. The reason why conflict characteristics are vital in prioritizing and outlining the peace building strategies is because many of the elements of peace building have their origins rooted in the progression of the conflict itself, as indicated by Adam Curle's theory (Refer to figs. 1 & 2 on page 12 & 13 respectively). Therefore, tracking the progression of the conflict will help to identify and streamline the appropriate peace building strategy.

It has been said time and again that post-conflict peace building is a complex and time taking issue with multi-faceted functions and several actors working together for a common goal. The different tasks of peace building require prioritization. Experiences gained from peace building activities during the last two decades, have helped in setting the sequence of prioritization. Accordingly, *Security* has been designated as the first and foremost function of the state. If the state cannot re-establish and provide *security* to its people and its government, it cannot embark on post-conflict peace building. The prevention of violence, maintenance of ceasefire between the warring factions, disarmament of the combatants, the set up and control of the nation's new army and securing the national borders of the country are all security tasks that the state must be able to enforce. In short, the very existence of the state is demonstrated by its ability to maintain its own security and that of its people.

The next in-line of the priority is the establishment of a *Functioning Law and Order* within the society. Without the establishment of a functioning law and order, both social rehabilitation and economic reconstruction cannot be undertaken. Thus, putting legal and administrative structures in place is mandatory. Social rehabilitation and confidence building can only be undertaken by restorative and retributive justice, which are components of law and order (Dwan and Wiharta, 2004). The third and fourth priorities are Social and Economic Reconstruction and Governance and Participation, respectively. According to Dwan and Wiharta, there is little consensus on this level of priority, as some social scientists believe that some degree of economic reconstruction is a pre-requisite for building confidence among post-conflict societies before divisive political processes are undertaken. Still others believe that the establishment of a legitimate and effective government is a necessity for the attainment of a sustainable economic reconstruction which is a lengthy and painful task. As peace building has no single formula, I believe that it is the prevailing situation that dictates which task should precede the other.

### ***5.1 Post-Conflict Security Challenges***

The primary issue that comes on top of all other concerns at the end of a conflict in a war-torn country is that of security. A quick security sector review followed by a *Security Sector Reform* can guarantee a sustainable peace building process. Security threats are usually created from both internal and external situations. The internal security threat is

manifested by the institutional gaps created due to the destruction caused by the conflict. Demobilized ex-combatants and the unemployed youth, are the main threats to vandalism, robbery and violence. This problem can be solved by the quick response to DDR and creation of productive employment opportunities. The external security threat usually comes from unfavorable conditions prevailing in the neighboring countries that have a stake in the conflict in one way or another.

### ***5.1.1 Internal Security Threats***

The major internal security threats are the demobilized combatants that have nowhere to go after a long period of engagement in the military. They are armed and can take an organized military action against the state or the citizens. In the African context, the ex-combatants usually come from the illiterate segment of the population, having no skills for employment. The only option they have on hand is the use of their guns, for getting whatever they need for survival. Many turn into bandits and become dangerous hooligans, killing and robbing at will. Others sell their weapons in order to get money for their subsistence until they get assistance. Small arms trade flourishes inviting more chaos as the weapons get into the hands of civilians, thus escalating the already precarious security of the citizens. The proliferation of the small arms can even cross borders creating security threats in neighboring countries. Hence, a swift and effective DDR is essential immediately after a peace accord, before the ex-combatants get out of hand. The Mozambique experience of quick demobilization and reintegration of the combatants saved the country from further chaos and violence. Following the DDR, a security sector reform program is vital for the development of a reliable and credible internal security services. Once, the demobilized soldiers are disarmed and encamped they can be fed temporarily and provided with skill training that would enable them to get employed.

### ***5.1.2 External Security Threats***

External threats exist usually when the conflict in a country has a regional character. The conflicts in West Africa and the Great Lakes Region are good examples. It was Charles Taylor of Liberia who played the major role in exporting the conflict to Sierra Leone. Similarly, due to lack of conflict management practices in Zaire after Laurent Kabila ousted Joseph Mobutu, the country was invaded by Ugandan and Rwandan forces---the very forces

that helped Kabila to seize power. The pretext for the invasion was Kabila's non-compliance with Rwanda's demand for tracking down and eliminating the 1994 genocide perpetrators who were hosted in eastern Zaire. They were constantly launching attacks on Rwandan citizens living around the border. It is to be noted that the first intervention in Zaire by Rwanda on the side of Kabila was primarily to track down the *interhamwe*<sup>17</sup> and ex-Rwandan army that were active in eastern Zaire. On the contrary, Kabila wanted the forces of both Rwanda and Uganda out of the Zaire immediately after he entered Kinshasa. It was a strange decision given the sacrifices that the two countries paid to bring him to power. But above all, he should have considered the regional security situation and the military balance of his neighbors. Some people believe that Kabila wanted to be independent of the protection of foreign powers, in order to gain acceptance by his own Congolese people. No matter what his motives were, he could have weighed the pros and cons of his decision.

## ***5.2 Functional Law and Order***

Due to the loose security situation at the end of a conflict, the need for functional law and order is one of the priority issues at post-conflict peace building. Once the conflict has been put to an end, it is mandatory to immediately introduce the rule of law by strengthening the public security institutions. Otherwise, conflict will relapse with even more vigor as there would be groups that may not be happy with the cease-fire, wanting to settle scores before the opportunity is lost. Once again, the case of Sierra Leone where the peace accord was violated by staging a coup, and the refusal by Charles Taylor to abide by the cease-fire in Liberia's first peace agreement, testify the consequences for lack of an immediate DDR and restoration of justice and the rule of law.

### ***5.2.1 Justice System Reform and the "Rule of Law"***

African conflicts are characterized by the violations of human rights and the culture of impunity. Restoring the justice system and ensuring accountability and the rule of law by both the ruling authorities as well as the people were found to be difficult challenges. Africa has a rich heritage of traditional justice mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution. The mechanisms accommodate both retributive and restorative justice elements. But there are challenges from the international community with regards to

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<sup>17</sup> *Interahamwe* ---means "Those who attack together"

the application of these traditional mechanisms. One such example is the Rwandan *gacaca* court that was utilized for the trials of genocide perpetrators. Though the government had no other alternative<sup>18</sup>, some quarters within the international community were quick to blame it for by-passing the rule of law in introducing a traditional system of justice, for sensitive issues like the genocide.

In post-conflict peace building, bringing the justice system back on track is vital for the success of all subsequent activities of socio-economic reconstruction. It is a challenge that has to pass through various corrupt and spoiled institutional cultures and habits. The conflict years have developed the culture of impunity in the minds of the combatants. The legacy of the civil wars and the fact that they possess arms has made them believe that they can kill anybody at will. Thus the restoration of an effective justice system and the rule of law face challenges that would take some time, to eradicate.

### **5.2.2 Human Rights, Justice and Reconciliation**

In the African conflict context, the violations of human rights are more severe, due to the low-level socio-cultural norms and lack of democratic governance. Quite often, the violations have their structural foundations in the ruling hierarchy and state machinery. The situation that ensues after the eruption of conflict is even worse. In West Africa and Rwanda, the actors of the conflict deliberately violated human rights by utilizing the most extreme means of cruelty so as to weaken their opponents physically and psychologically. The prevalence of the culture of impunity at the end of conflicts was one of the recurring African post-conflict problems that needed to be done away with. These imperfect stances of evasion of the rule of law were taken usually during peace negotiations in order to compromise for cease-fire agreements and the restoration of negative peace. The impunities that were allowed at the expense of human rights violations, proved to have encouraged the perpetrators for further crimes. The case of Sierra Leone is an example where human rights violation crimes were compromised for peace settlement. The immediate relapse into conflict by staging a coup, demonstrated the reward for impunity.

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<sup>18</sup> At the end of the genocide, most of the judges have either been killed or have fled the country. Only 40 jurists remained out of 800 judges and prosecutors in the entire country. The RPF-led government has a strong defense against the criticisms of using the *gacaca* courts. The more than 100,000 jailed suspects of genocide needed a mechanism that can speed-up the process of trial. Besides, the participation and witness by the victims, in the various local *gacaca* courts, have strong reconciliation factors, according to the government policies.

Justice and reconciliation were used as competing objectives in the process of making and building peace (Wendy Lamborne, 2004, p. 5). This practice was exercised in Africa in the interests of reaching a settlement during peace negotiations. In some cases, alleged perpetrators of human rights abuses have been included in the new governments after peace agreements. However, this practice does not prevent future conflicts; neither does it bring lasting peace. Reconciliation should not be compromised by impunity. Most contemporary conflict analysts also agree that the issues of justice and accountability for war crimes and gross human rights violations should not be painted with passivity during peace settlements. The international community emphasizes the need for justice and reconciliation without properly analyzing how they could be achieved in different conflict and cultural environments. It is universally agreed that justice and reconciliation are fundamental to post-conflict peace building. However, the relationship between the two and what they mean in the context of post-conflict peace building, are not well theorized, according to Wendy Lamborne (2004, p.7). The argument is that although justice is a necessary component of reconciliation, the two are seen as mutually incompatible in practice. The victims need vengeance by justice while the perpetrators want amnesty through reconciliation. In post-conflict peace building, the best strategies to follow would be establishing the truth about what has happened, upholding justice for the victims and punishing the perpetrators. The second type of strategy focuses on establishing the rule of law, developing a human rights regime and strengthening the judicial systems. In most cases a combination of both is applied.

Moreover, Lamborne quotes Lederach for the identification of what he calls the “*justice gap*” in peace building, where he states that the peace building framework that reduces direct violence, and produces social and economic justice has not been built. After all, economic imbalances within a society are contributing factors to the eruption of conflict. Thus, for a peace building endeavor after conflict, legal justice is not the only type of justice that should prevail. Economic justice and social justice are also as much important as legal justice for the sustainability of reconciliation and peace building.

### ***5.3 Socio-Economic Reconstruction***

No effective post-conflict peace building is achievable without a sound economic reconstruction program. In fact, some post-conflict peace building analysts argue that economic recovery is the priority issue before tackling any other challenge at post-conflict (Dwan and Wiharta, 2004). The writers claim that the state cannot function without restoring its economic capacity. The challenges in the socio-economic development sector include the rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic social and economic infrastructures that the war has destroyed. Refugees and displaced people have to be resettled and rehabilitated. This operation requires huge amount of fund which the failed state cannot afford. The international community is usually involved in the project. Damaged physical infrastructures like health facilities, schools, roads and bridges have to be rebuilt. Legal institutions have to be made operational.

Conflicts destroy human, social and economic capital. Development is impaired and poverty reigns due to the conflicts that eat up the scarce resources of the country. The link between conflict and poverty has become more evident especially after the end of the cold war, when most of the poor countries experienced conflict. It is believed that conflicts are the drivers of political, social and economic changes, which are the results of the new system that is created at the end of the conflict. Post-conflict reconstruction of war-torn countries has become the obligation of the international community because of its complex and wider issues of socio-economic and political implications. The ex-president of the World Bank, Mr. James D. Wolfensohn had once stated as follows: "The sustainable reconstruction of countries emerging from long periods of conflict is a challenge we ignore at our peril. This is not an issue we can relegate to the sidelines of development." (World Bank, Post-conflict Reconstruction, 2005).

Economic reconstruction forms the basis for peace building in the short term as it brings together the former conflicting parties to a common state building strategy. It is vital that economic inequity which is often the root cause for conflict is addressed by appropriate intervention mechanisms. This will develop confidence in the process of building the culture of peace. The Rwandan conflict and the subsequent genocide devastated both human life and the economic structures of the country. In addition to the enormous task of putting things in

order by prioritizing security issues and the rule of law, the new leadership in collaboration with the international community dealt quickly with the economic issues so that basic services could be delivered to the people. Emphasis was given to capacity development as a major prerequisite for the post-conflict reconstruction activities. Thus, a multi-sector capacity building program (MSCBP) that deals with five capacity building problem areas was set up in 2001. These are: a) Policy and program formulation, implementation and monitoring; b) Human resource development; c) Institutional capacity building development; d) Information generation, sharing and dissemination; e) Promotion of private public partnership (Rwanda Country Report, August 2007).

Apart from the challenge posed due to financial constraints, the development and execution of strategies in reconstruction and rehabilitation of the state's functional mechanisms have become key issues for countries that have come out of conflict. These countries depend on external assistance for the fund and expertise in developing their strategies. The role of the international community in post-conflict peace building is a fundamental issue that has to be assessed thoroughly. The policies and strategies employed by external actors and the effective implementation of these policies have to be scrutinized for being appropriate to the local challenges in the country. This will help to know whether the right thing is being done in the right way.

External donors usually come with their own strategies based on their assistance principles and modalities which are often incompatible with the local needs of the country. Another major challenge in the post-conflict reconstruction is the delay in the release of funds by external donors. This has been a chronic problem for many African post-conflict states, causing them to pay high prices, as the demobilized combatants returned to even more violent acts of vandalism, once they realized that there is no one to care for them. Besides, the international humanitarian assistance is usually a short-term focused emergency relief intervention, while post-conflict countries aim at a linkage between the short-term emergency and a long-term sustainable economic recovery program that aims at poverty reduction. Thus, the challenge to distinguish between the two strategies while keeping their linkage, and giving due respect to the donors in spite of their displeasure, is often tough and painful. Many of the post-conflict countries in Africa had to pass through this confrontation.

## ***5.4 Governance and Participation***

The political transition, governance and participation dimension of the African Post-conflict Reconstruction Framework involves the development of legitimate and effective political and administrative institutions, ensuring participatory processes and supporting political transition. These include: facilitating elections, strengthening public sector management and administration, establishing a representative constituting process and local governance, strengthening the legislature, broadening the participation, capacity building and decision making of civil society and political parties, and generally ascertaining the development of the rule of law (NEPAD, 2005, p.11).

The chronic challenge that has become characteristic of most African election histories is unfortunately contrary to the policy framework stated above. Despite the efforts being made by regional and international actors (AU/NEPAD, EU, UN), most African leaders are willing to install the structures for democratic participation and election procedures. However, when it comes to genuine application of the systems, the results do not go beyond lip-service.

Conducting democratic elections and refusing to accept the results of the votes has become a common habit for many African leaders. The recent conflicts in Kenya and Zimbabwe are living examples, where leaders became adamant and refused to concede defeat at the end of the elections. In such situations, it is always the poor citizens that become victims of the violence that follows the disagreements. The power greedy leaders (like Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe), do not bother for the loss of lives and the devastation of the country, as a result of the violence following the dead-lock in the political dialogues.

### ***5.4.1 Institutional Challenges***

Civil wars destroy institutions that have been operating during peace times. In some cases, new institutions have to be built in order to respond to the new political order that the country is trying to put in place. Based on the peace agreements and the needs of the society, economic, socio-cultural, justice and security institutions have to be organized. The task is not so easy especially for African countries that are fresh out of conflict. In Africa, expertise and resources are major challenges to cope up with, as the countries depend mostly on external assistance during post-conflict. The dual challenge in this regard is the lack of coherence between the government policies and those of the external actors who provide the

assistance. The UN with its various organs and pioneering roles in peace building did not have an effective mechanism that could coordinate its scattered efforts in the field (Tschirgi, 2004, p.13). It is therefore, obligatory to enter into dialogue and negotiate with all stakeholders and come to a common strategy and coherence of the different activities.

On the other hand, experiences in post-conflict peace operations have shown that putting in place institutional mechanisms alone cannot be solutions for the development of an effectively functioning state. The most important task is making those institutions operate by involving people in the process and make sure that they understand the values of the institutions and use them. The mechanisms should be made to establish relations among the people and between people and state.

#### ***5.4.1.1 challenges at strategic policy level.***

African countries undertaking post-conflict peace building lack the capacity for institutionalizing and implementing concrete programs. The fundamental cornerstones for the development of a democratic society include: the promotion of the civil society, multi-party elections, constitutionalism, the rule of law, the respect for human and minority rights, gender equality, good governance, transparency and accountability, economic liberalization and security sector reform. These are coherent and mutually reinforcing overall package of post-conflict peace building (Tschirgi, 2004).

Radical critics of the liberal peace building consider civil wars as natural outcomes of the aggressive globalization, which simultaneously creates wealth for some and instability and violence for others in an inter connected global world (Tschirgi, 2004, p. 14). Thus, they assume that liberalizing the economy during post conflict can induce the relapse of the conflict. However, Paul Collier and colleagues argue that well-chosen policies can reduce the global incidence of civil war, provided that they are appropriate at different conflict contexts and take country-specific characteristics into account<sup>19</sup> (Collier and colleagues, quoted by Necla Tschirgi, 2004, p.14). Accordingly, they propose different economic strategies for different types of conflicts. On the other hand, the opponents of Collier and

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<sup>19</sup> *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civi War and Development Policy* –a book by Paul Collier and colleagues.

colleagues strongly criticize that this new research reduces civil wars to economic elements which are easy to fix by international donors.

Based on the arguments and counter arguments of the social scientists, regarding economic policy developments during post-conflict peace building, new studies are being undertaken to search for alternative economic and social policies that focus on employment, livelihoods, and social policies for returnees, refugees, the demobilized, the displaced and economic spoilers. But until then, liberalization of the economy remains the paradigm for international peace building assistance (Tschirgi, 2004, p. 15).

In the African context of post-conflict peace building, externally driven policies have even more problems in the external support of political liberalization. The urge for immediate democratization by the donor countries can jeopardize the fragile peace process during post-conflict peace building. Issues like elections, human rights promotion and liberal media development do not necessarily fit into the prevailing local needs. It has been found obvious that the success of democratization depends more on local factors that constitute, historical, socio-economic, cultural, leadership and regional factors. The renowned social scientist, Roland Paris,<sup>20</sup> also advocates the development of institutions that can provide political stability and effective administration prior to initiating political and economic competition. He calls this strategy "*Institutionalization before Liberalization*" (cited by Eric Brahm in the book summary of "*At War's End*", by Roland Paris, 2004).

#### ***5.4.1.2 challenges at management and implementation level.***

After all is said and written down as a strategy for post-conflict peace building, the task of implementation poses the major challenge to cope up with. The effectiveness of peace building policies and strategies depends on the implementation capacities. Various international organizations and actors engaged in the peace building activities have been learning from their practices in the past few decades. The lessons include peace implementation, peace enforcement, truth and reconciliation, gender and peace building; inter agency collaboration, skills training, funding schemes, and intervention and exit strategies. The documentation of lessons will help them in delivering assistance in the future. However,

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<sup>20</sup> Roland Paris is the author of the book entitled, "*At Wars End*"; Building Peace After Civil Conflict, Cambridge, U.K; New York, USA.

these important knowledge components of post-conflict peace building are focused mainly on their own activities, with little concern for local capacities of domestic actors. I agree with Necla Tschirgi's belief that it is the ultimate transfer of power, resources and capacity to local actors that defines the effectiveness of peace building on the ground.

The strategy for peace building by international actors is usually designed in a manner that fits their own visions. For them, it is a short-term and time-bound undertaking while peace building is actually a long-term, multi-dimensional and local based process. The fact that the framework is based on local capacities makes it capable of withstanding any future violent conflicts. Finally, the overall success in the implementation of peace building depends on the mutual understanding of the roles of both local and international actors and the importance of ownership by local stakeholders, even in a situation of conflicting political environments. Local stakeholders should be encouraged and assisted in managing their conflicting interests if any, for the sake of the major agenda--- peace building.

#### ***5.4.1.3 Challenges of Resource Mobilization.***

A post-conflict country is usually dependent on external assistance for its reconstruction. As millions of people are affected, the financial requirements are enormous. The reconstruction is also difficult to plan and finance due to the complexity of the issues and the number of financiers. The different donors with multi-schemes of financing were found to be incompatible with the policy commitments of the post-conflict countries. Besides, the compatibility of policy options with the resources available, were found to create the major challenge to the reconstruction process. The NEPAD document lists three categories of options for the reconstruction programs. Developing a new transitional assistance that links the traditional emergency relief assistance and long-term development assistance is one option. The second one is expanding the relief assistance to a development stage. The third is to pool resources from a variety of sources for an expanded post-conflict agenda (NEPAD, 2005, p. 28). The choice of the options and the implementation strategy are the points of departure between the donors and the post-conflict country. Most important however, is the challenge to come to an agreement between the donors and the country, to make the program country-specific with local ownership status.

The need for resources is not limited to financial and material requirements only. Human resource, in the form of expertise was a serious challenge that was faced at post-conflict situations by African countries, especially where most of the local professionals have either been killed in the conflict, or had fled the country. External professional actors may fill the gap for a short time; but the best and sustainable option is to build the capacity of local actors who can understand local situations and ownership of the programs.

The World Bank and IMF are the major lending partners for countries that come out of conflict. However, their policies of granting loans are so strict that many post-conflict countries faced painful challenges to undertake the *Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP)* that the two financial institutions demanded before granting the loans for reconstruction. The *Structural Adjustment Programs* were so bitter and rigid that they affected the livelihood of several citizens, with possibilities of creating a threat to the national security of the countries. These policies were however, relaxed during their discourse with the Rwandan and Angolan governments (Dunne, 2008, p. 43).

### **5.5 The Refugee Situation---Repatriation and Resettling Refugees and IDPs.**

Out of the various challenges that are confronted in the post-conflict peace building process, the refugee issue is an important element that should be handled carefully. Refugees are protected by the International Human Rights and the International Humanitarian Law, and the UN Convention for Refugees. The return of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) is considered to be a positive indication of the restoration of peace. The UN and the host country are responsible for the repatriation of the refugees back to their country of origin. Post-conflict states have an obligation to resettle and rehabilitate the refugees. The refugees and displaced persons need quick reintegration and rehabilitation as soon as they return back to their original places. Otherwise, they can create security threats, especially in urban centers. Many will find their former belongings occupied by strangers, or by those who had stayed behind. This can easily lead to conflict. If left unattended, the feeling of neglect and despair can lead them to violence. In some cases where the refugees and displaced people are parties to the conflict, it is mandatory to include them in the peace-making process. All of these operations need quite a lot of money.

On the other hand, much as refugees and displaced people pose threats to post-conflict peace building, they can also create opportunities by filling the gaps of human capital in the reconstruction and peace building process. Their participation in political parties and their contribution to the recovery of local economy are promising trends towards the policy of inclusion and the development of a sustainable peace. In Africa, where there is an acute shortage of expertise, refugee professionals have played important roles in the post-conflict peace building, after they returned back to their countries.

The safe return of refugees to their place of origin is a very important task, though it has a lot of challenges. Landmines and unexploded ammunitions pose danger during the return to their homelands. Illegal armed groups are also active during such periods, creating insecurity along the route of return. Despite all the obstacles, UNHCR which is mandated to guarantee the safe return of refugees to their country of origin has the obligations of making sure that the refugees return back safely and in a dignified manner.

According to the UN Convention for Refugees, repatriation is a voluntary choice by the refugees and hence, in circumstances where the basic infrastructures have been destroyed and not yet reconstructed, refugees usually prefer to stay in the host country until conditions are improved. Moreover, limited access to employment, ethnic discrimination, unfavorable economic and market conditions are some of the factors that prevent refugees from returning back to their country. The challenges of addressing the security, socio-political and economic issues of the returned refugees and displaced people fall on the government and the international community.

Finally, it is a challenge by itself to list the many challenges of post-conflict peace building as the nature and context of the conflicts are the determining factors for the typology of the challenges which in turn determine the appropriate and achievable strategies and policies of intervention.

## Chapter 6

### Discussions & Summary

The concept and interpretations of post-conflict peace building in Boutros Ghali's '*An Agenda for Peace*' has been commented and criticized by some social scientists that have different opinions about the concept. Though they agree that post-conflict peace building evolved through time under different stages of peace building processes, the writers have varied opinions on the new theme. In comparison to the classical concept of peace building, Boutros Ghali's post-conflict peace building has gone a step further by formulating additional mechanisms that contribute to stopping the recurrence of conflict after peace has been attained in one way or another. The new additions are the security sector reform, socio-economic development, the democratic institutionalization of the government, and the holistic approach to the process of the peace building effort.

The distinguished social scientist and writer, J.P. Lederach presents his deviation from the Secretary-General's use of the term *peace building* exclusively for the support of peace accords after conflict. Lederach's view goes far beyond that. He does not limit peace to a stage in time or a condition. He sees peace as a dynamic social construct that has a wider perspective. The perspective involves a process starting from the initiation of peace, the design of the modalities of implementation, the mobilization and coordination of the actors and resources, the actual process of implementation and follow up and the continuous support to ensure its sustainability (Lederach, 1997, p. 20).

On the other hand, Necla Tshirgi complements the Secretary-General's concept of the new post-conflict peace building agenda indicating that after the 1990s the original peace building concept has expanded by combining conflict prevention, conflict management, and post-conflict reconstruction. According to her view, the new trend emphasizes the non-military or civilian dimensions of the interventions of the international community to support countries emerging from conflict, with or without military operations. Understanding the dynamics of conflict and its socio-economic, cultural and ethnic implications in different countries, at different times, she concludes that there is no commonly agreed post-conflict peace building policy or doctrine (Tschirgi, 2004, p. i).

On her part, Wendy Lambourne understands and defines post-conflict peace building as a strategy designed to promote a secure and stable lasting peace in which the basic human needs of the population are met and violent conflicts do not recur. She believes that it has a long-term focus and incorporates both negative and positive peace. Lambourne says that she based her stance on the comprehensive and normative definition of Rebecca Spence's study (Lambourne, 2004, p. 3), which defines peace building as activities and processes that focus on the root causes of the conflict, rather than just the effects. Her concept is based on supporting, rebuilding, and rehabilitating all the war-torn society and the efforts of reconciling the damaged relations between the societies by fostering interaction and starting the process of restoring dignity and trust. Incorporated in this process is the encouragement and support of participation of indigenous resources throughout the process of the peace building and the promotion of the sustainability of the program.

Quite often the root causes of conflicts are not mitigated or are deliberately overlooked for the sake of provisional peace making. And what are these root causes in the African context? An insight into the roots of most of the African conflicts reveals that poverty, scarce resources, poor governance, leadership greed, and weak or absence of state institutions are the major causes. There will be a likely-hood of conflict relapse no matter how peace has been achieved after the conflict, unless a strong, capable and participative strategy is set and implemented in order to neutralize these structural problems. Peace accords that were meant to stop violent conflicts have proved to last only temporarily since they did not take on board the process of mitigating the root causes of the conflicts. Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Rwanda, which failed to achieve sustainable peace after their first peace accords, are practical examples in this regard. With adequate resources, appropriate strategies and the determination and commitment of the leadership to tackle these structural problems, it has been proved that sustainable peace can be built over a period of time no matter how difficult and numerous the challenges are. The experience of Mozambique can be taken as an example of a successful reintegration and post-conflict peace building undertaking.

There is a sharp distinction between peace building in the aftermath of genocide (like in Rwanda), and peace building following other civil wars or ethnic conflicts. The conflict in Rwanda is taken as a unique experience which is unprecedented so far. The genocide was efficiently planned and executed by the elites in the top government hierarchy.

All institutions and human capacity were destroyed. The reconciliation efforts undertaken by the current government cannot be an easy task after all that had happened. The survivors may forgive but cannot forget the genocide. Besides, the fact that no reparations have been made for the genocide survivors, will keep on reminding them about the enemy. Most of the persons I interviewed were applauding the steps that the government has taken by allocating 5% of its budget towards this end. The Report by the International Imminent Personalities appointed by the OAU, for the investigation of the genocide, also recommends that reparations should be paid and the follow up should be the mandate of the UN Security Council. It is important to think about a swift reconciliation between the perpetrators and the survivors. An equally important challenge of clearing people's mind from the mistrust and trauma left behind by the genocide should also be given consideration.

Unlike many other African conflicts, the Rwandan conflict ended in a victory for the RPF which seized power after the Hutu-led *genocidaires* were defeated. The peace building process in the aftermath of the genocide faced greater challenges since the society was totally devastated physically, psychologically, structurally, politically, economically, socially and spiritually. It is no wonder that the current Rwandese government has developed little trust and stiff relations with some members of international community. The Rwandese were neglected by the world at a time when they needed help desperately to survive the genocide. The international community that kept silent during the genocide was left with the moral obligation of rebuilding the country. The principal challenge from the international community was the nature of the controversial transitional justice that the country constituted to try the genocide perpetrators.

### ***6.1 Lessons Learnt from the Post-Conflict Peace building in Rwanda.***

The universal fact of dealing with the root causes of any conflict in order to solve the problem once and for all holds true for the recurring problems in the Great Lakes region also. As the region is highly polarized with ethnic conflicts that have followed a historical trend, it needs a solution that is focused on all countries of the region. The presence of identical ethnic groups on each side of the borders these countries, has influenced the spill-over effect of conflict from one country to the neighboring country.

Johan Galtung has a unique suggestion to be considered. He puts one possibility in what he calls a “*bi-oceanic confederation*” stretching from the Indian to the Atlantic oceans that includes Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and the two Congos. According to Galtung’s idea, even more countries can join the confederation making it a wider semi-continental unity that provides wider socio-economic opportunities and cultural homogenization. Communication by roads and rail (which can be built by interested friendly countries like Japan) can increase the mobility of people and goods thereby widening and cementing the social and economic cohesion of the people of the confederated countries (Galtung and Jacobsen, 2002, p. 276). Thus, allowing people from an over-populated small country with scarce resources and volatile ethnic differences, to mix with people from diverse socio-cultural and ethnic background in a wider environment, will neutralize the otherwise explosive ethnic hatred that exists in the small countries like Rwanda and Burundi. It is no doubt that this trend is the road map that the African Union should draw for its eventual realization of a continental unity. After all, it is the trend of the unavoidable globalization.

However, the respondents to my key-informant interviews have skeptical opinions on this novel plan. They all indicated that much as they cherish the prevalence of peace and economic integration in the region, the current hostile political atmosphere between these states does not permit the formation of such a federation. They strongly believe that each country should first clean its houses by doing away with all ethnic biases and introduce democratic governance in which all citizens participate, irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds. Some of the respondents believe that there are countries that still discriminate Tutsis even after the latter has lived for more than half a century in that country.

The Rwandan genocide is entirely a different phenomenon where most of the population were involved in the carnage either as killers or as victims. As a result, the post-conflict peace building effort was also quite difficult. In line with these general facts a number of lessons learnt can be recorded.

1. The classical approaches to post-conflict peace building were limited in that they did not take on board cases where the conflict ended with a military victory. In Rwanda, the ownership and accountability of post-conflict peace building had to be left to the new government. This has significant implications on the provision of transitional justice.

2. At the end of the genocide, the complexity of peace building and reconstruction was beyond known expectations and therefore needed the firm determination and commitment of the new ruling elites.
3. The restoration of security and justice were priority tasks that were undertaken in order to restore the rule of law in a state where every body had taken the law into his own hands during the genocide.
4. The objectives of transitional justice were meant to heal the wounds of victims and survivors while restoring broken relationships between neighbors and communities.
5. In a situation where the entire justice system has collapsed including the death and disappearance of the jurists and prosecutors, and in a situation where tens of thousands of detainees had to be tried; the restoration and utilization of organic laws and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are mandatory. The Rwandan community is lucky to have the *gacaca* system on hand.
6. The *gacaca* though oriented towards retributive justice, has been confirmed as a transitional justice policy towards national unity by the Rwandan government that is committed to make it a realistic outcome.
7. Many believe that the coming together of the community where the victims and perpetrators openly confess the truth of what has happened counts a lot more than what happens at the *gacaca* forum.
8. The current Rwandan government hegemonic stance that ethnic groups do not exist cannot be a good strategy for the way out of the conflict, given the historic developments of ethnic dichotomy that prevailed for a number of decades.
9. In the eyes of the Rwandan victims of genocide, the ICTR did not serve the purpose of justice, not only because the survivors did not have access to the trials, but also because it indicted and tried only a handful of the top genocide architects.
10. Besides being ignored, the Rwandan experience indicated that the 1948 Geneva Convention on genocide lacked clarity on the definition of genocide, mechanisms to prevent genocide, and the legal obligation of states when genocide is declared.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> 1. It lacks the trigger mechanism with appropriate action to prevent such atrocities being repeated again.  
2. The present convention is geared towards reaction after genocide has happened.  
3. The convention states that states may call upon the UN to take an action "as they consider appropriate", indicating no clear obligation.  
4. The crime of rape was not included.

11. The Great Lakes Region was contaminated with the genocide ideology. The ethnic dichotomy propaganda that was promoted during Rwanda's first republic by Kayibanda's regime influenced the political forces in Burundi to follow the same line.
12. In a geo-political and ethnic related region like the Great lakes, conflicts quickly ramify from one state to the other. Defeated armed groups from one state tend to cross border and join their compatriots in the neighboring country, thereby off-setting the security and political power balance in the latter. The new politico-military dynamics often lead to the destabilization of regional peace and security.
13. The presence of a large number of ex-FAR soldiers and *interahamwe* militia in eastern DRC has proved to be a threat to the regional peace and security.
14. The inability of the international community to separate the *genocidaires* from the refugees in Eastern Zaire demonstrated that organized and well armed groups can contribute to insecurity of the host country and destabilize regional peace.
15. The assistance that is provided by the different donors for post-conflict peace building should be coordinated and implemented in a coherent manner. Moreover, it should be based on the specific needs of the country and with targeted out-comes.
16. The role of women in the post-conflict peace building program should be mainstreamed in order to achieve a sustainable peace and development. The Rwandan experience has proved the importance of taking them on-board on an equal basis

## **6.2 Comparative Analysis of the challenges at post-conflict**

### **(Mozambique, Angola and Rwanda)**

Mozambique and Angola were under the same colonial power. They got their independence in a similar manner thanks to the Portuguese domestic political dynamics that took place during the early seventies. After independence, they both experienced ideology-oriented civil wars between rival parties. The external interference by neighboring racist governments of Rhodesia and South Africa is a common characteristic of their conflict history. The huge number of displaced people due to the wars adds to the similarity of events in both countries. The departure however, is seen when Angola's first peace agreement failed while that of Mozambique succeeded. The major cause for the failure of the first peace agreement in Angola was the availability of globally marketable natural resources on which

Savimbi relied to continue with the conflict. These resources were used for further fueling the conflict. On the other hand, Mozambique is a very poor country with no significant marketable natural resources that could tempt the actors to sustain the conflict. For Angola, the ethnic based parties also gave the conflict another dimension. Moreover, unlike Mozambique, the continuing influence of Marxist ideology of MPLA widened the gap and problems even after the elections of 1992. Thus, the reintegration of the displaced people and ex-combatants in Angola took considerable time due to the unfavorable security and socio-economic problems that prevailed even after the conflict has subsided. Most of the displaced Angolans preferred to stay in urban areas for the sake of security and employment opportunities. The displacement from the rural areas resulted in the loss of assets on which to rebuild life at the end of the conflict. Moreover, the social stigma that prevailed among the society prevented a smooth reintegration of refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants. On the contrary, Mozambique was able to reintegrate its displaced people within a remarkably short period of time, thanks to the assistance by the international community and the positive and accommodative social values of the local community. At local community level, the traditional ritual practice of *gamba spirits*<sup>22</sup> were conducted for individuals that were considered to have committed grave crimes, before they were accepted into the society. The *gamba spirits* ritual is believed to cleanse the individual from the evils that he acquired during the war. This traditional practice has contributed to trust-building and the smooth reconciliation of ex-combatants

Similar to the experiences in Mozambique and Angola, the unique and extremely violent conflict situation in Rwanda had its roots in the colonial legacy as well. The ethnic dichotomy principle of divide and rule along which the conflict was driven, was highly mechanized for the purpose of colonial subjugation. Consequently, it resulted in the recurring massacres of Tutsis starting from independence, until finally the genocide of 1994 took place.

In Rwanda, the priority given to agriculture at post-conflict is a logical outcome of the small land holdings, the dense population, and the need for reintegration of the vastly displaced population and ex-FAR soldiers. With funds from the international community, the result was an impressive economic growth and food production. Most of the

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<sup>22</sup> A traditional ritual practice in which the person who is considered to have committed a crime is brought before a community gathering chaired by traditional elders, and is sprinkled with a certain liquid that is believed to cleanse the individual from the assumed sin.

conflicts in other African countries had also similar characteristics at post-conflict, where their devastated socio-economic structures as well as the justice and human rights situations required massive international assistance for recovery. However, the manners in which a conflict has ended, the level of damages caused by the conflict, the political out-look of the new government and the amount of resource mobilized by the international community, are usually the determining factors for a smooth and sustainable recovery for any country that comes out of conflict.

The three countries have experienced violent conflicts. The Mozambican conflict ended with a peace agreement while Angolan and Rwandan leaders came to power by defeating their opponents. Thus, security issues after the conflicts varied for each country, based on the mode in which their respective conflicts ended. Mozambique had a fairly positive and accommodative reintegration of ex-combatants while the other two countries faced difficulties of security threats from remnants of the opposition. Similarly the change of political ideology, the democratization of institutions, reforming the justice system, and the quick reintegration of the displaced people, has made things easy for Mozambique in order to register a fast economic growth despite the stiff SAP conditions imposed by the World Bank and IMF. Both Angola and Rwanda lacked these opportunities except the relaxed SAP conditions.

The reform of justice and reconciliation were also different for each country. Again the mode in which the civil wars ended was a determining factor. The peace agreement between FREIMO and RENAMO of Mozambique paved the way for a smooth reconciliation based on the terms of the peace agreement and the blessing of traditional customs at local community levels. On the other hand, since both MPLA and RPF came to power by military victories, their respective post-conflict governments decided the type of justice to be delivered.

The dynamics in the roles of women and international assistance in the post-conflict reconstruction programs were more or less similar for the three countries. Women played active roles in the post-conflict reconstructions in all three countries, although in the case of Mozambique, local chiefs did not approve the new trend. The assistance from the international community came generously for all, despite some constraints faced as a result of

government policies in the case of Angola. Finally, the huge number of refugees and IDPs was similar in all cases while their reintegration differed. Mozambique fared much better in reintegrating its displaced people within a short period of time, as compared to the problems faced by Angola and Rwanda.

The following table is drawn to show an over-view of the post-conflict situations and challenges of the three countries

**Table 1.** Comparative analysis of the post-conflict challenges and situations for Mozambique, Angola and Rwanda

Strategies	Mozambique	Angola	Rwanda
Mode of end of conflict	Peace Agreement	Death of Jonas Savimbi and victory for MPLA.	Victory for RPF and end of genocide.
Security			
1. Internal	1. Minimal internal threat as demobilization was conducted swiftly and successfully.	1. Internal threats of defeated UNITA soldiers that have not been reintegrated and the threat of secession in Cabinda.	1. Internal threats of revenge from RPF soldiers (Report by Amnesty International, Oct. 20, 1994).
2. External	2. External threats ceased as the country dropped its Marxist ideology.	2. External threats reduced as a result of the internationally brokered peace agreement.	2. Prolonged external threats from ex-FAR soldiers in eastern DRC.
Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration, resettlement and reconciliation.	DDR conducted smoothly and effectively. Quick and positive reintegration undertaken thanks to local values and traditions of acceptance into the society. However too many street children and girl prostitutes resulted from the excluded child-soldiers and the consequences of	Reintegration took more than two years to get underway. Social stigma prevailed as a barrier. Only 0.75 ha. of land available per returnee out of the required 2 ha. for subsistent farming. Rural institutions exclude women, youth, and outsiders.	To promote reconciliation, the gov't put aside 5% of the national budget and the cost from the community services imposed as partial sentence on the perpetrators, for assistance to survivors. National Unity and Reconciliation

	the war. The displaced successfully reintegrated and were able to grow enough food.	Weakened traditional leadership and loss of social capital due to the war.	Committee established for the integration of refugees and those released from prison.
Justice and the Rule of Law	Amnesty provided to all war-crimes by ex-combatants. The 1990 constitution provided protection for human rights and separation of the courts, the executive and the legislature. Mozambique has made remarkable progress in reforming the justice system from the one party rule to an independent judiciary. It has also signed most of the international laws on human rights. But there is a problem of accessibility to its courts by local people.	The war has devastated the civil society, democracy, government & infrastructures. Justice and rule of law were priorities in the reconstruction endeavor. Few courts were operational due to shortage of lawyers. Detention with out trial was common in several of the crowded and filthy prisons.	Organic law constituted. ICTR and <i>Gacaca</i> courts established to try genocide suspects. RPF's motto of "Justice before Reconciliation" through the <i>gacaca</i> system. Genocide perpetrators categorized into four levels.
Socio-Economic Reconstruction	Heavily damaged infrastructures needed external assistance for reconstruction. World bank and IMF provided loans with strict conditions. High rate of economic growth recorded but the country remains one of the poorest in the world.	Country is rich in oil and diamond resources but 2/3 of families lived below poverty line. Most of the displaced lost their assets. Lack of access to land, credit and basic services for the poor. Conditions of SAP were relaxed but corruption was rampant in the government. The livelihood of the people remained poor.	Very poor country depending on Agriculture. Equitable distribution of land to returnees. Good food production after the genocide years. Fast economic growth despite the poverty. Conditions of SAP were relaxed.
Governance	Marxist ideology dropped after the peace agreement. Local and traditional values given importance. First democratic elections held	MPLA won the internationally monitored first democratic elections in 1992. Corrupt and victor's democracy	RPF formed a National Government of Unity after taking power through military victory. First democratic elections

	in 1992.	exercised with strong Marxist leanings.	held in 2003, nine years after the end of the conflict.
Dynamics in the role of women at post-conflict	Although the government acknowledged the new roles of women at post-conflict, local chiefs did not recognize these roles and responsibilities.	Women's role in society changed. They shouldered the burden of reconstruction and increased participation in the civil societies.	The genocide resulted in high demographic change in the composition of women among the population. Women became active participants in the economy. New law was constituted to enable them to inherit property. The new government supported and empowered women in all sectors.
Refugees and IDPs	Estimated 6 million displaced (4.3 million refugees and 1.7 million IDPs).	4 million displaced people. Despite the government's good will for free movement, IDPs were reluctant to return. Induced urbanization and poverty in urban and rural areas due to the war.	More than 2.5 million refugees fled to neighboring countries. Hutu refugees reluctant to return home due to fear of reprisals at first. Mass return in 1996, when RPF invaded eastern Zaire.
International Assistance	The World Bank and the IMF provided loans with strict SAP conditions.	International assistance was not quite encouraging due to the Marxist policies of the government.	Considerable assistance provided by the international community.

## Chapter 7

### Conclusions

Conflicts in the countries of Africa are notably characterized by their massive violations of human rights and killings. Although no single policy of post-conflict peace building is suitable for all conflicts, it is important that coherent and multi-faceted policy interventions are introduced in order to stop the recurrence of the conflicts. The failures of post-conflict peace building programs can be attributed to many factors as observed from the experiences of many African countries. Among them, security threats, the culture of impunity, lack of adequate resources for DDR programs, access to globally marketable natural resources by rebel groups and, power greedy leaderships. Above all, getting a clear picture of the background of the conflict and its magnitude should be the primary task for designing a suitable intervention strategy, before indulging into peace building activities.

Conflicts inflict material and psychological damages to human beings while infrastructures of the state are destroyed. The damaged human values and properties as well as the destroyed infrastructure have to be rebuilt. But the task of rebuilding these elements is a hard job full of challenges that the state cannot undertake without the assistance of the international community. In a conflict situation, the violence and killings are usually carried out by the military or politically motivated radical elements within the society. The experiences of the conflicts in Mozambique, Angola and Rwanda are sufficient proofs for understanding how much damage conflicts can inflict on humanity both physically and psychologically. The hundreds of thousand of lives that were lost in each country, the surviving but physically and mentally affected citizens, and the enormous destruction of infrastructure contribute to the challenges of peace building and reconstruction.

The conflicts and post-conflict peace building experiences in Mozambique, Angola and Rwanda reflect their respective diversities in the different countries and under different socio-economic, cultural and political backgrounds. For Mozambique and Angola, the similarities in their colonial legacy and ideological out-look did not transcend into similar peace arrangements as well. Instead, the luring benefits derived from the illicit trades of Angola's diamond and oil contributed to prolonging the civil war, while a sustainable peace was achieved in Mozambique, which lacked such precious natural resources.

On the other hand, the challenges to peace building in Rwanda was a different scenario where a deep-rooted ethnic hatred culminated in the genocide of 1994, and a country that was totally devastated socially, economically and spiritually. The burden of rebuilding the state with all its institutions fell on the new government which came to power through military victory. The RPF government was caught in a dual task of fighting the ex-FAR insurgents on one hand while trying to reconstruct the devastated country on the other.

Post-Conflict Peace Building is a complex activity that aims at restoring what has been destroyed by the conflict. Its major goal is ensuring that conflict doesn't recur. The nature and magnitude of the conflict as well as the manner in which it ends determines the modalities of the post-conflict peace building process. Moreover, the post-conflict peace building tasks are multifaceted and need a well organized and coherent approach by all stakeholders. Past experiences have demonstrated that focusing on a single challenge cannot bring about the desired and sustainable peace. It is therefore recommended to take a coordinated and holistic approach. The major challenges of post-conflict peace building are security (both internal and external), the restoration of functional law and order, socio-economic reconstruction, governance and participation, and the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced people. The response to all of these challenges should be made in a coordinated, coherent and holistic package of strategies that are implemented by the stakeholders over a long-term intervention.

On the other hand, the different perspectives of social scientists regarding the concept of post-conflict peace building reveal that it has a dynamic character and is governed by the prevailing local and international situations. Boutros Ghali's initiative to produce *An Agenda for Peace* in order to face the new challenges, was a result of this dynamics in the origin and trends of conflicts that were taking place after the end of the cold war. The new strategy has updated the classical peace making, peace keeping, and preventive diplomacy theories which had served as tools for the UN's response to peace building until recent times. A decade later, due to the new discourse of international terrorism, the powerful western countries have come up with yet a new logic of *regime change* and *nation building*. They have already tested it in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is a vivid proof that the dynamics of conflicts will continue provoking the development of new dimensions in post-conflict peace building. There is ample opportunity to investigate and research the challenges of the new

initiative (*regime change, stabilization, and nation building*) of the US and its allies. It is also to be remembered that this new trend was not quite appreciated by the majority of the UN members. Can this lead to a fragmentation of the agenda for peace? Would the world body remain united in responding to global conflicts like international terrorism? All of these can be researched for the purpose of responding to future conflicts and for developing new strategies for post-conflict peace building.

### ***The Way Forward***

1. The international community should increase its assistance in building democracy and good governance in African countries, alongside the economic assistance. African countries that ignore democracy and elections should be denied economic assistance and diplomatic attention from the international community.
2. The key factors that initiate grievances and conflict in most African countries are lack of democratic governance, socio-economic inequality, poverty and ethnic sentiments. In today's global world of mutual concern, the developed countries should give more attention to the socio-economic and political development of Africa in order to eliminate these structural and proximate causes of conflict.
3. The international community should learn from the Rwandan genocide and take serious steps to eliminate the seeds of genocide from ever being sowed in future, in any ethno-conflict fragile country. A strong early warning and intervention mechanism should be in place. The compromise of human rights violations by the costs for intervention should never be repeated.
4. Though the Rwandese people were ignored, as the whole world closed its eyes and neglected them during the genocide, they should now work on a democratic policy that encompasses an inclusive and participatory democracy that is structured from the grassroots to the top level of society. The international community should assist in this endeavor and compensate for the grave mistakes it committed in not stopping the genocide.
5. Given its records of unending conflicts, the Great Lakes Region should embark on a regional economic integration program as a first step in a priority agenda of achieving a sustainable regional peace. Rwanda's initiative in joining the EAC (East African Economic Community) is a positive step towards this goal.

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## Appendix--1

### Interview Questions---Key Informant

1. Given the inter-relationships of conflicts in the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda, what do you think would be a common strategy (for all) to get out of this recurring human catastrophe in the region?
2. In your opinion, what should be the best mechanism for a sustainable reconciliation of the Hutu and the Tutsi in the Great Lakes Region?
3. The 1994 genocide has left an unforgettable scar on the minds of the survivors in Rwanda. Genocides have been taking place in the past also. Given the present socio-economic and political situation of the countries in the Great Lakes Region, and the dynamics in the roles of the international community, do you think another round of genocide can take place in future? Can you elaborate?
4. Would you comment on the priorities of post-conflict peace building strategies that are undertaken in Rwanda, both from the government and the donor agencies' point of view? What are the major agreements and disagreements in tackling the challenges?
5. Though the RPF led new government that took power in 1994, received a devastated country, it was true that a number of western governments and donor agencies had responded to the rescue of the shattered socio-economic reality of Rwanda. The restoration of justice and the rule of law have received attention through the establishment of the ICTR and the *gacaca courts*. However, some social scientists believe that there was one thing missing that is believed to be a key point to complete the reconciliation process. **No reparations** (in one form or another) were made for the victims of the genocide that have lost all that they had including their homes and dear ones. It is also believed that neither the international community nor the government has taken up this vital agenda seriously. Why do you think was this overlooked? Was it not possible to at least consider the special cases of extreme

- vulnerabilities, like rebuilding devastated homes and free schooling for orphaned children? Many are left with young siblings forced to head a family of under-aged children. Is there any undertaking of correcting such serious errors, at the moment or are there implications that the government does not want to go into?
6. Since the Hutu-Tutsi conflict is a recurrent issue that has to stop somewhere, what is being done at the moment among the new (post genocide) generation in order to eradicate this evil social construct that has been cultivated in the minds of the people of the Great Lakes Region? Do you think that the leaders of these countries are committed towards this end, or are they waiting for a showdown in another round?
  7. What would be the prospect and the out-come for establishing a confederation of the states in the Great Lakes Region (eventually including Uganda, Tanzania and the Republic of Congo), with regards to regional peace and development?

**Appendix—2 –List of Key-informants**


1. Mr. Jacques Mukwende -----Senior Policy Officer at the AU Commission.
2. Mr. Peter Matsiko -----1<sup>st</sup>. Secretary of the Rwandan embassy in Addis Ababa.
3. Dr. Jean Bosco Butera----- Director of UPEACE—Africa Program
4. Mr. Bill Muhoozi ----- A Rwandan Refugee in Addis Ababa.
5. Mr. Bigirimana Issa -----A Burundian Refugee in Addis Ababa.

### Declaration

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university, and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.


Dechasa Gurmu Ayanu

I.D. No. GSR / 2510/ 00

Signed:  \_\_\_\_\_

Date : 06/07/2009

Confirmed By: Dr. Marcel LeRoy  
(Advisor)

Signature :  \_\_\_\_\_  
Date : 6 July 2009