

**Federalism and Inter-Clan Relations along the Regional Borders of
Oromia and Somali: A Case Study of Liban and Filtu *Woredas***

*A Dissertation Submitted to the Center for Federal Studies of the College of Law and
Governance Studies of Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Federalism and Governance Studies*

By

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**Addis Ababa University
College of Law and Governance Studies
Center for Federal Studies**

**June 2018,
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia**

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this PhD dissertation entitled Federalism and Inter-Clan Relations along the Regional Borders of Oromia and Somali: A Case Study of Liban and Filtu *Woredas* is my own original work, and has not been presented for a degree in any other university or academic institution, and that all source of materials used in the dissertation are fully acknowledged and properly referenced.

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ACRONYMY

AAPO	All Amhara People's Organization
BoFED	Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
CSA	Central Statistics Agency
CUD	Coalition for Unity and Democracy
DLDP	District Level Decentralization Program
DPPB	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau
DF	Development Fund
EDAG	Ethiopian Democratic Action Group
EDP	Ethiopian Democratic Party
EPRDF	Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESDP	Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FWAB	Filtu <i>Woreda</i> Agricultural Bureau
FWFEB	Filtu <i>Woreda</i> Finance and Economic Development
IIRR	International Institute of Rural Reconstruction
HRW	Human Rights Watch
LWAB	Liban <i>Woreda</i> Agricultural Bureau
LWFED	Liban <i>Woreda</i> Finance and Economic Development
LWCTB	Liban <i>Woreda</i> Culture and Tourism Bureau
LZAB	Liban Zone Agricultural Bureau
NEBE	National Electoral Board of Ethiopia
NNPs	Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples
OFC	Oromo Federalist Congress
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
OPDO	Oromo People's Democratic Organization
PCDP	Pastoral Community Development Project
PFE	Pastoralist Froum Ethiopia
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF	Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
UEDF	United Ethiopian Democratic Forces
UNDP	United Nation Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front

Glossary of Local Terms

<i>Abba Geda</i>	current <i>geda</i> leader (<i>Geda</i> is - Oromo governance system)
<i>Abbaa Maddaa</i>	afaan Oromo phrase for a man who controls the water-wells
<i>Awuraja</i>	a term equivalent to sub-province in previous regimes of Ethiopia
<i>Balabat</i>	a local intermediary ruler during the feudal government of Ethiopia
<i>BuusGonofaa</i>	an Afaan Oromo phrase used for traditional institution which organizes the community for social self-help
<i>Dabaree</i>	an Afaan Oromo term for heifer tradition used to help women economic support
<i>Degmo</i>	an Af-Somali word for smallest unit of settlement
<i>Dergue</i>	an Amharic term for committee which ruled Ethiopia from 1974-1991
<i>Deyr</i>	an Af-Somali term for spring season
<i>Dilal</i>	an Af-Somali word to broker
<i>Finna</i>	an Afaan Oromo term used for children
<i>Gosa</i>	an Afaan Oromo term used for below ethnic or Clan
<i>Gooli</i>	an Af-Somali words used for below ethnic or Clan
<i>Guurti</i>	an Af-Somali term to council of clan elders
<i>Gu</i>	an Ad-Somali term for Autumn season
<i>Hagaa</i>	an Af-Somali word to season from July-September
<i>Jaarsa</i>	an Afaan Oromo word to elder
<i>Jilaal</i>	an Af-Somali term for season from January - March
<i>Kaloo</i>	an Afaan Oromo term for fenced grazing land
<i>Kebele</i>	an Amharic word for smallest unit of the government in Ethiopia
<i>Killehager</i>	an Amharic term to sub-province in the previous regime in Ethiopia
<i>Kora eelaa</i>	an Afaan Oromo word to elder council of the water-wells
<i>Olla</i>	an Afaan Oromo term for smallest unit of settlement
<i>Seer Marraafi bisanii</i>	an Afaan Oromo phrase to customary law for water and pasture
<i>Wakil</i>	an Af-Somali word to agent
<i>Woreda</i>	an Amharic word equivalent to district local government in Ethiopia
<i>Xeer</i>	an Af-Somali term to customary law
<i>Yarsin</i>	an Af-Somali word used for local technician who controls the water
<i>Zelan</i>	an Amharic word for derogatory word used for herder

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Abstract

This dissertation is an examination of inter-clan relations along regional borderlands within the federal political system of Ethiopia in the last two decades. It examines explicitly whether the legally decentralized political, administrative and fiscal power have been implemented at the local level, i.e. in pastoral and agro-pastoral communities. Emphasis was given to institutions, political representations, administrative functions, fiscal transfers, implementation of the decentralized authority and resources, in the light of perception and participation of stakeholders; and whether or not this devolution of power has promoted cooperation among various clans thereby brought sustainable peace and development. Thus, a phenomenology, embedded case study which was primarily qualitative, was conducted on two case study *woredas*—Liban *woreda* of Oromia state and Filtu *woreda* of the Somali state. Data were collected through document analysis, focus group discussions, interviews and observation. In order to explain these data, a combination of conceptual and analytical frameworks was constructed and organized on the basis of theories of federalism, decentralization, ethnic relations, and conflicts.

The findings indicate that in both *woredas*, federalism and its local government institutions—and public policies from above—have marginalized traditional institutions, the customary law of the communities, which used to help clans cooperation on resources use, allocation and management. As a result, owing to delayed actions to respond to grievances of communities-like boundary demarcation, resource sharing, representation of pastoral community at regional parliament and minority access to administrative power and unequal service delivery by local governments along Somali-Oromia regional border, inter-clan relations have deteriorated. Furthermore, inter-clan relations in these border areas have been influenced by the absence of inter-governmental relations at *woreda* level, lack of accountability and transparency, the politicization of clan identity by officials, and lack of emphasis on social service provision which could serve as a means for promoting clan cooperation. Overall, the study revealed that constitutionally decentralized political power, administrative functions and fiscal issues of Ethiopia have not yet been fully implemented at the *woreda* level as planned.

The findings of the study also disclosed that full implementation of local level decentralization of authority in the case study areas was inadequate. This suggests that the traditional leadership structure and customary law be restored to enhance peaceful coexistence and cooperation among the clans. In addition, the local communities complain about issues related to boundary issues, minority representations, demand local accountability, and lack of basic infrastructures that tie clans together in the areas need to be given immediate responses. From the study, a well established and closely supported intergovernmental relation is implied, and hence much attention needs to be given to the *woreda* level inter-governmental relation by Somali-Oromia regional states.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

In Ethiopia, the question of providing political and legal recognition to the nations, nationalities, and peoples of the country despite its inherent multicultural and multilingual realities, stayed unresolved for more than a century (Donald, 2000). This question, which is widely known as the "nationalities question," was not addressed by the imperial regime; at the early formation of the present Ethiopia; hence it became one of the impetuses that cover the way for the eruption of the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution which resulted in the demise of Haile Selassie's regime. The impractical sense of homogenization in the form of "Ethiopianization" policy with the myth of one nation-state, one language, and one religion features was intended to eliminate the multi-ethnic reality of Ethiopia (*Ibid.*) Thus, diverse communities who were known by their "peculiar" respective languages, cultures, and history was the Oromo, Somali, Tigre, Gurage, Sidama, Hadiya, Afar, extra. These were forced to view themselves as "one Ethiopian national identity" or at least it required "possessing abiding connections with all other citizens in society in that you were "Ethiopian first" (Keller, 1998:110).

The Imperial government had used homogenization strategy through assimilation of selected (non- Amhara) ethnic groups into the ruling class, which was obviously identified as an Amhara group. People who had their ethnic origins, cultures, historical traditions, languages, religions, and administrations were suppressed officially by the 1955 constitution (Andreas, 2003). The constitution dictated that the regime sustainably worked towards avoiding diversities by destroying the languages, cultures, and religions of the non-Amhara ethnic groups; specifically those groups, which are found in the south, west, and east of the territory suffered a lot when compared with other areas of the country. These areas were included into the Empire only in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (*Ibid.*).

Like that of the Haile Selassie regime, its successor, "Derg" (committee in Amharic) failed to address the question of ethnic identity and suppressed the "national question," which was mainly raised by the Ethiopian students' movement in the 1960s and early 1970s. Instead, the *Derg*

preferred to introduce a new social ideology adopted by the Soviet Union based on the principles of 'scientific socialism,' which holds that ethnicity is not a justifiable organizing outlook. As a result, people were grouped into a mass organization. And then the military government's initial program was *Ityopia Tikdem*, and at the end, it "came up with conception of national unity eventually degenerated into an obsessive dogma which brooked no cultural or ethnic diversity among the peoples of Ethiopia" (Alemayehu, 2009: 29).

After more than a century of the centralized rule of monarchies and military junta under a unitary empire state, Ethiopia adopted ethnolinguistic based federal governance in 1991; and it is more than two decade since Ethiopia has started practicing federal system of governance at least at two tiers of government (federal and regional levels). The members of the regional states are equal (symmetry), and no one level of government is subordinate to the other (FDRE, 1995, Article 47(9(h))). Thus, nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia became the bases of the federal system in the exercise of self-rule and shared-rule. Indeed, for the last two decades, Ethiopia has been attempting to establish a harmonious inter-ethnic or inter-clan relations and peaceful co-existence.

The present federal arrangement in Ethiopia is widely known as 'ethnic federalism' in which power has meant to be decentralized from the center to the ethnic-based regional states. This arrangement was believed to affirm the long-denied right of nations, nationalities, and peoples to enjoy and practice 'self-rule' in the distinctly defined territory (ethnic autonomy) and 'shared rule' with the central or federal government level. Both levels of government are expected to 'act within the law' (Stepan, 2003). To administer Ethiopia the country of more than 80 million inhabitants, and with more than eighty linguistic and cultural groups (of course one of the most diverse society in Africa), the EPRDF government introduced 'ethnic federalism' which was enshrined in the *Constitution*. The Constitution that came into effect in 1995 established a federation made up of nine ethnolinguistically divided regional states and one chartered federal city-Addis-Ababa. The nine regional states are Afar, Amhara, Beni Shangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Harari, Oromia, Somali, Tigray and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region (FDRE 1995, Article 47).

The federal *Constitution* had explicitly given all ethnolinguistic communities the right to protect and promote their own culture, language, and historical heritage through self-government. It assumes that every community has its own territory and confers upon it the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in State and Federal governments (*Ibid.* Article 39). This constitutional provision was also mentioned in the transitional charter of 1991.

Therefore, the Oromia and Somali National Regional States, selected as sites for the present study, were established in July 1992 pertinent to the 7/1992 proclamation of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) which was reiterated in the 1995 Constitution.

The Oromo and Somali peoples are classified under the Cushitic language family. The Oromo occupy the central highlands, east, southeast and south semi-highland part and the lowland and semi-arid part of Ethiopia whereas, the Somalis live in east, southeast and south part of Ethiopia in the lowland and semi-arid part of the country. Thus, the study sites were selected from southeast and south part of Ethiopia in the lowland and semi-arid part of the two regional states. The Oromo are pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. Similarly, the neighboring Somali groups are transhumant nomadic pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. Although they have some linguistic and cultural affinities and similar livelihood, the Oromos are mostly characterized by cattle pastoralism, while the Somalis are known by camel pastoralism. Another dimension of cultural differentiation was differential levels or degrees of joining into the Islamic faith. The Somali adopted Islam earlier than the south eastern Oromo communities. In fact, some Oromo groups, such as the Guji and the Borana maintain their traditional religion (Asnake, 2009; Fekadu, 2011).

Historically, the Oromo and the Somali relations are characterized by peaceful coexistence with minor disputes over access to resources such as grazing lands and water resources (Deguo, 2002; Markakis, 1998). For instance, relations between the Borana Oromo and the Digodia, Garri, and Gabra Somali clans have been characterized mainly by longstanding resource based competitions, conflicts and peaceful interactions (Getachew, 2003). This was observed in the past when they were living in one administrative *zone* known as ‘Sidamo’ *kiflehager* and Borana *Awuraja* during the Derg regime.

However, after governance system change in Ethiopia in 1991, the Oromo and Somali groups in the study sites were separated and reframed in the Oromia and Somali regional states and the relations between the two adjacent groups started to change within the new political and administrative context. These had enormous contributions in reshaping the already existing competition for resources, and came up with new competition in the form of inter-regional administration. As a result of the new administration and the demarcation of an administrative border, the two clans who are living in the interface since time immemorial in the two areas (Liban and Filtu *woredas*) were forced to choose to be delineated in either of the two regional states, i.e., the Oromia and Somali regions. This led the people to accept the separation in the sense of the subjective aspect of a group ñwe feelò and a sense of commonality or oneness, or a distinction between an ñin-groupò versus an ñout-group.ò

Therefore, this study attempts to investigate the relation between Liban and Filtu *woredas* clans of Oromia and Somali regional states in post-1991 Ethiopia. Specifically, the study investigates the role and contribution of federalism in promoting peace and development in the selected local study areas. Besides this, the study examines the extent to which the new administrative system has contributed to the minimizations of competitions for resources between the Oromo and Somali groups who share common territorial administrative borders in the selected study *woredas*. To this end, the study focuses on clans in the interface of the Liban and Filtu *woredas* of Oromia and Somali states respectively in the southern part of Ethiopia.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

One of the broad aims of Ethiopia's federal arrangement, as enshrined in the 1995 constitution, is to rectify the past historical injustices related to differences such as social, economic and political spheres to bring equality, the rule of law, sustainable peace and development among Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia. The constitution also promises to decentralize power and to resolve the nationalities question by accommodating the various ethnolinguistic groups.

However, the Ethiopian federal system has been dubious since its inception and continued to be controversial after it has been experimented for more than two decades. In this regard, there are two opposing arguments, among elites, scholars, researchers and political activists.

The first group includes the proponents of the federal system. They have been arguing that federalism brings sustainable peace and development for the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples, by correcting the historical injustice of previous regimes of Ethiopia. The proponents of this argument try to justify their position, theoretically by attributing the way the Transitional Charter and the 1995 Constitutions were adopted. This was accepted by ethnolinguistic groups and their consent would be taken into consideration and also the approach that different institutions were utilized to accommodate the diversity to bring peace and development at local, regional and national levels (Alemseged, 2004; Assefa, 2007; Hashim, 2010; Horguelin, 1999; Smith, 2008).

The second group includes the opponents of ethnic federalism who base their opposition on the experience of failed former communist federations, such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. These categories reflect their concern by arguing that ethnic federalism is a curse which leads the country to disintegration rather than conveys sustainable peace and development. They contend that although the government claims that the country is a federal state but the system is not decentralized as it is written in the Constitution. Therefore, they consider the state as failed, weak, and dark and less developed (Alemante, 2003; Asafa, 1998; Mushe, 2014; Solomon, 1993; Young, 1996).

On the other hand, a number of recent studies on inter-ethnic conflicts in southeastern part particularly around Moyale have shown that the adoption of the federal political system exacerbated competitions and disputes over public and natural resources. This makes worse the conflict between different clans of Oromo and Somali in eastern and southeastern Ethiopia (Getachew 2003; Ali Gedi 2005; Asnake 2009, 2010; Fekadu 2011). Nevertheless, their findings do not seem to verify whether ethnic-based federalism itself and the decentralization that accompanied it or the lack thereof has been exacerbating the conflicts. This dissertation aims to fill this research gap.

However, there are mixed Somali-Oromo communities who had lived together along and within the borderline lands for centuries in one administrative zone. Therefore, these groups had been integrated before the new ethnolinguistic based administrative territorial boundary was made. Studies which have been conducted on “inter-ethnic conflicts” in the border areas of adjacent regions of Ethiopia in general and in the study site, in particular, have not shown the status of the inter-ethnic relations (cooperation/interactions) since the implementation of restructuring of the boundary on ethnolinguistic basis.

Both views of those groups of researchers on inter-ethnic conflicts seem to be very general and lack vast empirical data and factual evidence but, as well as, local perspective to justify the implementation of the system practically. Thus, local level practical research perspective is viable to examine the system to understand its theory and practice. This study aims at portraying how the Ethiopia’s federal system of governance is working in the study areas from local perspectives.

Thus, this study takes the two adjoining *woredas* (Liban and Filtu) as a study site to generate and provide empirically based knowledge on the ongoing dynamics of conflict and cooperation between Somali and Oromo clans. This research work can identify and verify lines for state interventions to support sustainable peace and development along the border areas. Hence, this research investigates context specific impacts of ethnolinguistic federal state model and its effects on building sustainable peace in the state in general from a local perspective. So the questions guiding this research are stated in the following section.

1.3 Basic Research Questions

- o How does the current framework of ethnic based federal system in Ethiopia promotes (or inhibits) inter-clan cooperation, peaceful coexistence among the Somali-Oromo clans in Liban and Filtu *woredas*?
- o What are the primary causes of the conflicts between the clans along the Liban and Filtu *woredas*?

- o How far does Ethiopian federalism provide for the opportunities of decentralization and local developments as means of cooperation among local communities at the lower levels of government?
- o How are the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists' clans of the Liban and Filtu *woredas* being represented in *woreda* councils and regional parliaments?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The study attempts to assess the implementation of Ethiopian federal governance system from a local perspective regarding inter-clan relations by using the Oromia and Somali regional states administrative border as a study site, in the light of local development and pastoral representation since the introduction of a federal system of governance in Ethiopia. By focusing on the adjacent *woredas* of Liban and Filtu, the study intends to attain the following specific objectives.

- o To explore the effect of the current ethnic federalism in Ethiopia on interethnic-clan relations along the Somali-Oromia regional border *woredas* of Liban and Filtu.
- o To identify the major causes of the conflicts between the clans along the Liban and Filtu *woredas*.
- o To investigate whether the new framework of ethnic federal state structure of governance promotes local development and cooperation among the clans along the Liban and Filtu *woredas* borderland.
- o To look into the representation of the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists' clans of the Liban and Filtu *woredas* at *woreda* council and regional parliament levels.

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study has an academic as well as policy relevance. Since it attempts to employ empirical evidence from the selected study areas, it likely contributes to the body of knowledge on ethnic interface conflict management. It also has implications for policy improvement as it showed opportunities that have not had yet been exploited in the area. Therefore, this research is useful in the following essential points.

- o It provides insights to policymakers about the existing situation of inter-clan relations.
- o Regional, Zonal and *woreda* development offices, which are in charge to expand development at rural areas will also benefited.
- o It initiates policymakers to consider the substantial effect of inter-clan relations on peace and development.
- o It creates awareness among Federal, Regional, Zonal and *woreda* officials about the implementation of federalization and decentralization at local levels.
- o Regional, Zonal and *woreda* officials consider the representation of pastoral and agro-pastoral peoples in different institutions.

1.6 Scope of the Study

This research is limited to analyzing the impact of ethnic-based federal governance system from local perspectives. Thus, geographically, it is bounded in the southeast and south part of Ethiopia, particularly to the adjacent *woredas* of Liban and Filtu in Oromia and Somali regional states where the pastoralists and agro-pastoralist communities live. These communities sharing a common border are chosen as a study setting. One zone and one *woreda* were selected from each region; i.e., Liban *woreda* from Guji zone of Oromia region and Filtu *woreda* from Liban zone of Somali regional state.

These study areas were chosen to investigate inter-clan relations of pastoralist communities along Oromia and Somali regional states administrative border. The study focus on, the inter-clan ties between Liban and Filtu *woredas* of Oromia and Somali regions respectively, since the adoption of a federal system of governance in Ethiopia in 1991.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

There are various factors that hold back a research process; of these, during my data collection periods, it was challenging to get sufficient secondary data from local sources. These are because of inadequate data management systems at *woreda* level in almost all sectors. Most informants are also very skeptical when they provide information, and they lack the willingness to give first-hand information. In addition, when I approached them they want to understand my political

position and affiliation to provide me with what I would like to hear and not what actually in their mind. And also, officials were absent from office during data collection. Since they are tied in meeting in the *woreda* and they also called by regional officials for meeting and they stay their two weeks and above.

The research focuses on four main categories; institutions, inter-clan relation, conflict, and decentralization and authority performance and their actual practice at local level. Each of them is a broad subject worthy of independent study. Therefore, the broadness of the topic was a limiting factor. However, the utmost effort was made to minimize the negative impact of such constraints on the results of the study.

1.8 Central Arguments of the Thesis

The Imperial and Military governments of Ethiopia failed to decentralize at all. Thus, their systems were unable to accommodate ethnic groups by allowing self-determination or self-rule or local autonomy and cultural rights of different nations by devolving political power, culture, education, land and natural resources. On the contrary, they did their best to create and maintain a unified (centralized nation-state) political system. However, the current federalism is trying to entertain unity by considering diversity as the asset of the state.

Hence, this study attempts to explain the challenges of post-1991 decentralization of governance from the perspective of the local communities with particular emphasis given to inter-clan conflicts and cooperation. The assumption is that respect for nations, nationalities and peoples' distinctive social, cultural and religious identities and thereby granting local autonomy (self-administration) for local development would help them to cooperate in reducing intra-and inter-ethnic or-clan conflicts. Therefore, in this study, it is assumed that decentralization increase local development and cooperation/peaceful coexistence among interfacing ethnic groups.

1.9 Theoretical and Analytical Frameworks

This section presents the theoretical and analytical frameworks. The theoretical framework covers issues related to federalism, decentralization, inter-ethnic relations, whereas the analytical

framework deals with concepts such as institutional path dependency¹ and man-environment system scheme model.

1.9.1 Theoretical Framework

1.9.1.1 Theory of Federalism

The term ‘federal’ is originated from the Latin word *Foedus* which means covenant. This embodies ideas of promise, commitment, and undertaking so that the federal idea involves cooperation, reciprocity, and mutuality (Cohen, 1999). In its actual meaning, a federal arrangement is one of partnership, established and regulated by agreement; whose inside relationship replicate the particular kind of sharing among partners, namely one that both recognizes the truthfulness of each collaborator and seeks to promote a unique kind of unity among them (Elazar, 2000).

Accordingly, Elazar argues that the ‘Federal Idea’ is concerned with the combination of self-rule and shared rule. The defining feature of a federation is that in it neither the federal nor another levels of government (regional, district and *kebeles* or subnational governments) are constitutionally subordinate to the other to form genuine federal structure. Therefore, each tier of government has sovereign powers defined by the constitution rather than by another level of government. So, each level of government is empowered to deal directly with its citizens in the exercise of its legislative, executive and taxing powers, and each member is directly elected by and responsible to citizens (Elazar, 1987)

Similarly, Watts (1998) puts general structural features of the federal system into at least two orders of government. The first one is a written constitution that formally allocates legislative, including fiscal powers to the two order of government, to ensure some genuine autonomy for each other. The second one is some political arrangement notably in upper house and a procedure usually involving courts, but sometimes referendums or an upper house and process and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental relations for those areas where governmental

¹ Path dependence is often used in a variety of ways to mean a variety of things: in this study “it refers to a notion that history matters or that the past influence the present as well as the future, and also, it refers to path dependence is compatible with a number of mechanisms for path change “(Boas, 2007:35).

responsibilities are shared. In countries where cultural cleavages such as language or ethnic or religion are important in social ties, federalism offers a broad arena of potentials for peaceful coexistence (*Ibid.*). Federalism is expected to accommodate such diverse cultural identities by giving them the autonomy to work towards development.

According to Smith different factors determine the success or failure of a federation. A successful federalism is usually considered as the most appropriate for political association. It offers a balance between unity and diversity for common purposes and self-rule for ethnic or other local reasons by giving autonomy or decentralization of power. However, ñexperience has shown that a federation imposed from above and in the absence of popular (participation) and approval is likely to experience difficulties and may well lead to disintegrationö (Smith, 1995: 262).

In contrast to those who agree with the notion of federalism as constitutional objects, Riker (1975) argues that federalism is not a single constitutional thing preferably it is a choice of phenomena. He explains the federal arrangement does not always mean that the power is fixed at a certain point on a permanent basis, but it needs a continuous political process. Riker recognizes federalism as a continuous process concerning centralization and decentralization. In addition, he understands that ñfederalism is a political organization in which the activities of the government are divided between regional governments and a central government in different ways that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisionö (*ibid.*:101). Riker emphasized that based on different contexts the central government may intervene in the sphere of actions allowed for regions, without totally influencing their autonomy. Wheare (1946; 1980) [cited in Isawa (2002)] argue that true federalism has clear demarcation of powers and functions among the levels of government. In order to exercise those powers and functions assigned by the constitution, each level of government should be autonomous. In general, for the management of inter-ethnic or inter-clan relations of a given area, federalism remains very important.

1.9.1.2 Theory of Decentralization

Decentralization is a form of governance and a development policy, which is distinguished by participation and empowerment. From the 1950s onwards, the concept of decentralization has been used as a means of reaching populations scattered in rural areas by instituting center-periphery connections. Since the 1960s, the notion has been more focused on making possible the participation of people at grassroots level in development. Decentralization aims to attain one of the fundamental objectives of political governance or the desire that people should have a say in their own affairs (Agrawal and Ribot 2000, cited in Mahat 2007:25).

Moreover, democratic devolution is the development of mutual relationships between central and local governments and between local governments and citizens. It addresses the authority to develop and implement policy, the extension of “democratic” processes to lower levels of government, and the measures to ensure that “democracy is sustainable.” Democratic decentralization incorporates both decentralization and democratic local governance concepts and processes (USAID, 2009).

The decentralization program in Ethiopia, theoretically, seems to have been drawn from this conception. Usually, the explanation of democratic decentralization embraces different interlinked dimensions in various literature. For example, Saunders (2008) asserts that there is an infinite variety of decentralized arrangements. The terms used to describe them are not always used consistently in different states as well as in the literature. However, Saunders identified three principal types of decentralized arrangements.

One of the decentralized arrangements is referred to as delegation. Delegation relates to the allocation of power by the center to other levels of government in what remains a unitary state essentially. In this arrangement, the center retains authority to withhold or withdraw the delegated power to direct involvement of the sub-regional states. The power that could be delegated may be an executive or an administrative power, or it may be a minor law-making power.

The second type of decentralization is known as devolution. This deals with the delivery of legislative, executive and sometimes judicial power on local tiers of administration or government in a way that gives them substantial autonomy, without the total give up on the formal control by the center.

The third one is regional autonomy, which refers to delivery on one or more regions of a superior degree of autonomous power than is awarded in other parts of the state. This one is related to non-centralization in a federation.

On the other hand, Work (2002) additionally explains decentralization in terms of political, administrative and fiscal perspectives. Political decentralization refers typically to situations where political power and authority has been transferred to sub-national levels of government. Political decentralization requires a constitutional, legal and regulatory framework to ensure accountability and transparency. Administrative decentralization aims at transferring decision-making authority, capacity, resources, and responsibilities for the delivery of a selected number of public services from the central government to other levels of government. Fiscal decentralization is the most critical and possibly traceable degree of devolution since it is directly linked to budgetary practices.

Furthermore, in decentralization, accountability denotes the dual responsibility of elected officials to their constituencies and the higher body of government. The hired employees always have accountability to the body of government that appointed them and to the laws. However, in practice in developing countries a decentralized local government, merit-based employment and that of employees holding key positions depending on loyalty, patronage and clientele criteria should be distinguished (USAID, 2009).

Sample of the performance indicators of political decentralization used and identified by *Research Triangle Institute* include the following: passage of constitutional and legal reforms to devolve power (local governments have protected legal status and specific powers and responsibilities); number or percentage of local government decisions overturned by central government; level of authority to accept, modify central government plans for urban infrastructure constructed by central agencies; competitive election of local officials; level of consultation with associations of local officials on national policy issue; percentage of citizens

registered to vote; elections scheduled and held as planned; percentage of executives, administrators, candidates, and elected officials who are women; convey lawmaking power to local councils to collect local taxes and fees, percentage of local staff completing relevant skills training, and confirmation of use of that training, proportion of local government staff hired by local government, percentage of local revenue generated by sub-national government, percentage of local government in service costs covered by local revenue, percentage of cost of urban services covered by fees; ratio of local government executive posts for which recruitment is based on clear job descriptions and merit, and public perceptions of bribery in the provision of administrative services, as reported in view polls (Research Triangle Institute, 1997). These are clear measurements of political decentralization and are helpful to analyze the situations in the two adjacent *woreda* local administrations of Somali and Oromia.

1.9.1.3 Theory of Inter-Ethnic Relations

Anthropologists describe a “plural society” as one in which different groups are internally distinguished from each other by institutional and cultural differences. In some plural societies, ethnic groups are not only divided culturally and structurally but also organized in highly unequal political relationships (Kuper and Smith, 1969).

Another form of relations is referred to as egalitarian relations. The proponents of this view explain that this type of connection is based on the more egalitarian relationships among ethnic groups (Scupin and DeCorse, 2004). They perceive, in this type of relations, that the government safeguards the structural and cultural variations among the different ethnic groups. The ethnic groups are formally organized by the state and its administrative institutions to allocate political rights, and economic opportunities to all citizens and each ethnic group has a relatively great deal of local political, administrative autonomy, and in theory, there is no politically dominant ethnic group (*Ibid*).

In egalitarian kind of relations, Kuper and Smith (1969) state that ethnic groups have the lawful and political right to preserve their own languages, educational systems, and cultures and that sense of balance of authority is often attained among the diverse ethnic groups.

The other segment of theory on ethnic relations in a multiethnic nation, which is described by Weber, is the political dimensions of ethnic groups' relations. Weber defines ethnicity in terms of dynamic political activity; hence, even though ethnicity is dependent on a belief in common descent, that belief can only be created and sustained through joint political action. While political leaders regularly claim primordial loyalty of 'their' ethnic group, involving the sentiment and beliefs of common descent, these ideas become meaningful and popular only when the group undergoes the process of politically enthused social action (Weber, 1997).

Reciprocity is another aspect of intra and inter-ethnic relations which are rooted in an instrumental logic of trade and exchange (Malesivic, 2004). People cooperate in order to benefit mutually. Reciprocity becomes increasingly crucial as societies evolve and grow more complex. However, even in a very complex and highly modernized society, reciprocity remains a much weaker force than primordial relations do. Furthermore, reciprocity refers to the nature and quality of the social interaction among members of a political community and its significant indicator in the public realm is the degree to which individuals are free to form associations to defend and protect their interests (Hyden, 1992). Thus, relations between groups could either cooperative or conflictual. Normatively, federalism and decentralization in a multiethnic society tend to promote local inter-ethnic or inter-clan cooperative ties and developments; and centralized administrations tend to breed hostility among local communities and thereby to discourage local developments.




Fig. 1: Federalism, decentralization & inter-clan relations

(Source: My own Diagram)

As the above diagram shows federal political system allows decentralization of political, administrative and fiscal autonomy for sub-national government. The decentralized elements of decentralization help for inter-ethnic/clan cooperation and local development.

1.9.2 Analytical Framework

This study uses an analytical framework based on institutional path dependency theory and scheme system model of Batson (cited in Javakhishvili, N. *et al.*, 2007). The rationale for the selection of this approach and model and their strength in the analysis is addressed as follows.

1.9.2.1 Institutional Path Dependency

Historical institutionalism delineates institutions that are guided by existing and past arrangements. This may mean that policy choice made in the past influence choices made in the present. This approach to institutions put forward the assessment of the path dependency of the traditions of the past, present and future choices (Peters, 2011).

The idea of path dependency is a central principle for historical institutionalism. It is a significant concept through time approaches to understanding social and political processes. Besides, it is an ongoing activity that limits a future choice set ñat every step along the wayò. There are political and economic choices those provide real alternatives. Path dependency is a way to narrow conceptual choice set and link decision making through time; it does not guarantee a strong inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the futureò (North, 1990:98-99). Furthermore, Levi (1997:28) argues that ñpath dependency has to mean if itô to signify something that previously a country or state has begun down a path, the costs of reversal are extremely high. There will be other alternative points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangement obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choiceò. Similarly, Sewell (1996:262-63) conceptualizes path dependence as, ñwhat happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time.ò

In this study, institutional path dependency theory is used because, its objective is to explore change and continuity in the inter-clan relations along the Liban *woreda* of Guji zone, Oromia region and Filtu *woreda* of Liban *zone*, Somali region.

1.9.2.2 Bateson System Scheme Model

According to Bateson (cited in Javakhishvillin *et al.*, 2007:19), an individual and group have their physical, social and geopolitical environment that can be regarded as a single system with different and logically interconnected levels. In this study context, this system can be described by the following scheme: It is possible to include other variables in this scheme.

Therefore, Bateson's scheme is not a rigid; instead its strength lies in its flexibility.




Fig. 2: Bateson System Scheme Model

(Source: A Model, adapted from Bateson's, G. (2000) cited in Javakhishvill, N., *et al.* (2007:19) "man – environment" System Scheme).

In this study, Bateson model is used to break down the data collected to interconnect for interpretation logically. Thus, as the model shows there are four units of government which show tiers of government in Ethiopia like -federal, regional, *woreda* and *kebele* levels of government. Among these governments, there is a power which is constitutionally enshrined political, administrative and fiscal decentralization. Within this, there are actors like family, clan, communities, societies, ámodernô institutions, átraditionalô institutions, NGOs. Among these groups, there are claims and counterclaims of power, autonomy, identity, resources, values, knowledge and skills with in-group and out-group clans. Even then, with all these complaints these groups would live together. Thus, human relation approach is essential in these study areas. Therefore, for human relations: understanding the self and others, communicating effectively, developing cooperation are the pillars of multiethnic and multilingual communities. These activities are supported by building teams, participatory decision-making and managing conflicts. These are the major activities that I used to analyze the collected data by substantiating it with theories of federalism/ decentralization.

1.10 Research Design and Methodology

This study employed qualitative research method to collect data from the members of the selected study areas. The study of this kind requires indepth data anlaysis from the lived experience of the community. Hence, it is argued that qualitative research methods is more appropariate as it enables the researcher to get into the community and get quality data (Trochim, 2005).

Qualitative methods are instrumental to collect data pertaining to feelings, understanding and perception of respondents, which are difficult to measure quantitatively. Among the five approaches² to qualitative research, phenomenological case study design was used. A

² There are actually many varieties of qualitative methods. Similar to the way you can group usability testing methods, there are also a number of ways to segment qualitative methods. A popular and helpful categorization separate qualitative methods into five groups: phenomenological, Ethnography, Narrative Grounded Theory and Case Study (Creswell, 2007 and Sauro, 2015).

phenomenological study describes the meaning for several individuals of their lived experiences of a concept or a phenomenon. Phenomenology approach focuses on describing common experience study-participants have with regard to a phenomenon. The inquirer then collects data from persons who have lived experience and develops a composite description of the essence of the experience of all the individuals (Moustakas cited in Creswell, 2007).

Qualitative methodology is employed in this research for several reasons. First, in qualitative approach, the possible efficient sampling is purposive. Since respondents are chosen based on their role in specific activities in their communities and also their knowledge about the local communities and associated developments. Secondly, the researcher is a crucial factor to manage their views without any bias in this case. He should reflect their role in the research process and make this clear in the analysis. For these reasons, it is claimed that qualitative is best to carry out this study.

This research was a case study design based on open-ended questions which need a qualitative analysis that employs various methods of collecting information, mainly semi-structured in-depth interviews, observation, document review and focus group discussions which were conducted from June 2015 to September 2016. To realize this study, cases were selected from both regions. Thus, this design was selected in order to collect in-depth data for a detailed understanding of the problem.

1.11 Source of Data

Source of data for this research were collected from primary and secondary sources. The primary data sources were obtained from local elders, elders council, women, youths, *woreda* officials, *kebele* leaders, religious leaders, and communities at large and also, the FDRE Constitution, the State Constitution-both the Oromia and Somali regional states constitutions were used. Secondary data were obtained from document reviews such as national and regional census data and findings from other academic works that could provide further substantiation and *woreda* level offices documents which are appropriate to the problem under study were consulted. Yin

(1994) states that the use of multiple sources or triangulation could strengthen the validity of a study process during data collections.

1.12 Sampling Procedures

The researcher has employed purposive sampling technique to select the research participants. Thus, this study was carried out on two purposefully selected *woredas*, namely, Filtu *and* Liban from the two regional states. Filtu *woreda* was selected from the three *woredas* in Liban zone of Somali region while Liban was selected from the six *woredas* in Guji zone of Oromia region. The rationale for the selection of these two *woredas* was that they were adjacent *woredas* of the two zones, in which the intensity of clan conflict has persisted, and the study focuses on inter-clan relations along the borderlands of Filtu and Liban *woredas*.

The participants of the research were also selected purposefully from the identified two *woredas* of both Oromia and Somali regions, based on their knowledge of the subject under study. From both regions, the members of the *woreda* councils, the ruling parties, and opposition parties supporters at *woreda* and zone levels, local elders, local leaders *woreda* and zone officials at different levels, rural development agents, youth, and women were included. The main reason for purposeful sampling method is that this research needs lived experience of individuals and leaders who served many years in different levels of government. Hence, total of one hundred twelve research participants were selected from both *Woredas* for interview.

1.13 Instruments of Data Collection

1.13.1 Interviews

For this study, structured oral interviews were conducted in which the researcher tries to provide consistent information to ask a pre-determined set of question, using the same wording and order of items as specified in the interview plan.

Accordingly, face-to-face interviews were conducted with sixty-two individuals from Liban *woreda* and fifty individuals were selected from Filtu *woreda*. The participants were selected from traditional and modern administrative institutions. From customary administration, informants include clan authorities, clan heads, clan councils (elders), while from modern

administration offices like *woreda* administrator, *woreda* council *kebele* administration, *Woreda* Office of Economy and Finance, *woreda* Office of Justices. Besides informants from religious institutions, civil servants, traders were an interview to triangulate the information. During interview, digital audio recorder (mobile, voice recorder), paper, and pencil were used to record ideas and explanations of the respondents. The medium of communication was local languages (both Afan Oromo and Af-Somali³) to create a comfortable situation for the discussion.

1.13.2 Focus Group Discussions

For this study, the researcher employed sixteen Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) in Liban *woreda* and nine (FGDs) in Filtu *woreda* from rural and urban areas with elders, women, men, and youths. All groups consist of 7-10 members, and each discussion took an hour. The researcher and a research assistant facilitated discussions. FGD helps to triangulate the interview and observation to substantiate the issues and also is important to get different viewpoints since there were differences in age, gender, education, access to resources, access to information, experiences, worldviews and other factors.

1.13.3 Observation

During the observation, the researcher remained a non-participant observer. He did not participate in all activities of the study participants. But he is merely gathering information about the contemporary situations of the community including, how clans react in different cultural, social and economic relations and how they cooperate and also what the communities have benefited from a federal system of governance, in the area of peace and development such as education, health, infrastructures, and others.

1.14 Methods of Data Analysis and Interpretation

Data is basic information and is not knowledge by itself. Transforming data into knowledge requires specific research method(s). Obviously, the nature and goals of the research determine

³ Afan Oromo and Af-Somali are languages that I used for interview. I use Afan Oromo by my own for both Oromo and Somali individuals those whom speak Afan Oromo. And my research assistant (Mukter Usman) use Af-Somali for those who speak only Af-Somali during interview and FGD sessions.

the method of data analysis. Thus cognizant of the quality of the subject of study the researcher employed the qualitative thematic discourse of data analysis and interpretation. According to Myers (1997:44), "this method is developed in the social sciences to enable researchers to study social, economic, political and cultural experience".

Accordingly, the data analysis method for this study was an interpretational description, which is written in a narrative form to provide a holistic picture of the objectives of this study. Hence, the researcher tried to construct meanings out of participants' responses and reviews of documents.

1.15 Ethical Considerations

Ethical consideration was taken into account while gathering the information from the respondents; a formal letter was submitted to all the concerned bodies to obtain their cooperation, the interviewees, who were educated, got informed written consent from the study subjects before the data collection process. Moreover, all the study participants were told orally about the purpose of the study and that their information is to be kept confidential indefinitely. They were also informed that they could withdraw from participation in the study at any stage of the data collection whenever they felt dissatisfied with the data collection process.

Furthermore, in the study pseudonyms were used to assure anonymity of the participants. They were also informed that their information would be used only for the academic research purpose. Moreover, an audio recording device was used with their due consent and knowledge.

1.16 Organization of the Study

This study is organized into nine chapters. The first chapter is the introduction which deals with the background to the study, statement of the problem, research questions, objectives, theoretical and analytical framework, and research methodology. The second chapter presents the setting of the study area. The third chapter explores literature on the subject matter; and focuses mainly on overview of conceptual and theoretical issues on federalism, decentralization and inter-ethnic relations. The fourth chapter discussed literature related to Ethiopian context on federalism, decentralization and Somali-Oromo relations. Chapter five up to Chapter Eight deal with

empirical data analysis in the form of data presentation, analysis, and interpretations. In chapter five, traditional means of resource use and management in relation to government policy and strategies are discussed. In chapter six, social, political and economic relations among the clans in the study *woredas*-in Liban and Filtu with in-group and out-group are sketched. In chapter seven, the primary causes of the inter-clan conflicts in Liban and Filtu *woredas* are identified and the conflict resolution mechanisms employed are outlined. Chapter eight emphasizes on whether decentralization and local development was used as means for the cooperation among local communities in the study area-Liban and Filtu *woredas*. The last chapter is the conclusion based on the summary of the major findings and recommendations.

Chapter Two

Setting of the Study Areas

2.1 Introduction

This part of the dissertation is a description of the study areas. As already mentioned in chapter one, two adjacent *woredas* (districts) of two regional states of Ethiopia are selected to examine the impact of Ethiopian federalism and *woreda*-level decentralization on inter-clan relations. Somali and Oromia regional states are chosen purposively. Since, in the boundary of these two regions there have been continued conflicts along the clans in adjacent areas. Furthermore, Liban *woreda* of Gujii Zone in Oromia and Filtu *woreda* of Liban Zone in Somali Region were chosen as the cases of local administrative units. Therefore, in the following part of this chapter, five issues related to the description of the study areas are outlined. The first part deals with an overview of pastoralists and agro-pastoral communities in Ethiopia. The second part is a general statement about the Oromia National Regional State in relation to the issue under discussion. The third part presents about the demography and geography of Liban *woreda* of Oromia. In the fourth section, the Somali National Regional State is briefly discussed. The final section of this chapter deals with the demography and geography of Filtu *woreda* of Somali Region.

2.2 Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral Communities in Ethiopia: An overview

In Ethiopia, pastoralists cover an area of about not less than two-thirds of the land mass of the country. Pastoral communities are approximately about 10-12 million people of the country's population, and they have a large number of cattle, cows, oxen, goat, sheep, camel (livestock) population. They are living in dry and hot areas of the lowlands located in the arid and semi-arid regions in the East, Northeast, West, and South of the country (Solomon, 2006:12).

Since the pastoral land converges is vast; it represents many Ethiopian ethnic groups. The most dominant ethnic groups in terms of a number of people, livestock, and size of the area occupied are the Somali in the east and southeast, Afar in the northeast, the Oromo in the southeast and south. In addition, there are smaller groups such as the Hamar and Gelebe, Arbore and

Dassenetch, who live in the extreme southwest of the country (Ibid). Besides these, pastoralists are also found in other parts of the country like Tigray, Benishangul Gumuz, and Gambella. Based on the areas they inhabited those people are quantified as follows: the Somali constitute 53% of the pastoralists, the Afar 29% and the Oromo 10%. The remaining 8% of the Ethiopian pastoralists are found in the lowland of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples region, Gambella, Tigray and Benishangul Gumuz regional states (Coppock, 1994; cited in Solomon, 2006).

The study areas for this research are the pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities in Oromia and Somali regional states. From Oromia Region, Liban *Woreda* of Guji Zone, and from Somali Region, Filtu *Wareda* of Liban Zone are selected. The settings are presented as follows.

2.3 The Oromia National Regional State

The Oromia National Regional State was established in July 1992 following the 1992 proclamation of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). Geographically Oromia is located in a central area and borders all of the regional states except Tigray region. This region has a population of more than 33 million and is one of the nine regional states in Ethiopia (CSA, 2012).

Administratively, by 2012, the Region was divided into 18 administrative zones, 304 *woredas* (out of which 39 are urban *woredas* and 265 rural *woredas*), having more than 6,342 peasants and 482 urban dwellers *kebeles*. Agriculture is the basis of livelihood for the majority of the population in the region and accounts for about two-thirds of the GDP, whereas industrial activities contribute less than 10 % (BoFED, 2012:11).

At present 33 pastoral and agro-pastoral *woredas* are found in Oromia National Regional State, which is located in six zones (namely, Borana, Bale, Guji, East Hararghe, East Shoa and West Hararghe). The pastoral and agro-pastoral areas of the state cover about 152,170km², accounting for about 37% of the total area of the Oromia region. Its total human population size is estimated to be nearly four million; while about 30% of the livestock population of the Oromia region is found in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas (Ahmed *et al.*, 2011).

The pastoral and agro-pastoral areas commonly receive bimodal, variable, erratically distributed and an insufficient amount of annual rainfall. The main rainy season occurs between March to late May and the short rainy season is between October and November. The average temperature ranges from 25-35o/c, whereas annual rainfall average is 400-700mm. The major means of livelihood basis of the pastoralists of the region is livestock production integrated with crop farming (*Ibid*).

Guji Zone is one, among the eighteen zones of Oromia National State. Guji is bordered on the south by Borana zone, on the west by the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region, on the north by the Bale zone and the east by Somali Region. In Guji Zone, there are three major Oromo clans: the Guji, Borana and Arsi; and also there are non-Oromo minority clans, like Burji, Gedeo, Marehan, Garri, Karanle and Gurra pastoralists (BoFED, 2012). According to CSA of Ethiopia (2007), the total population of Guji zone is above five million. They are partly pastoralist and agro-pastoralist and partially agrarian and urban societies. From pastoral and agro-pastoral *woredas* of Oromia, Guji Zone, Liban *woreda* is selected as research setting for this study. This *woreda* shares a common border with Filtu *woredas* which are found in the Liban Zone of Somali Region.

2.4 Liban Woreda: Demography and Geography

Liban *Woreda* is located very near to Nagele town which is the capital city of the Guji Zone, situated at a distance of 595km from Addis Ababa. Liban *woreda* has an area of about 8950km² or 8.95ha. It is an area where pastoralist, transhumant and agro-pastoralist activities take place, which are the major means of livelihood of the local people (WoFED: 2012). The expansion of social services, secondary economic activities and modern means of transportation and communication are in their early stage of development. There are seventeen (17) rural *kebeles* in Liban *Woreda*.

Location and Area: Guji zone shares common boundaries or has direct physical contact with Borana zone to the south and southwest, Somali National Regional State to the east, Bale zone to the north and Nations, Nationalities and People's Regional State of Southern Ethiopia to the northwest direction. Astronomically, Liban *woreda* is located between 4°30'58ò - 5°42.'8ò

Northing latitudes and 41°34'57"- 39°9'34" easting longitudes, Liban *woreda* is bordered by Somalia National Regional State to east, Bale zone to the north, Oddo Shakiso *woreda* to the south-west and Goro-Dola to the west direction. According to the Geographical Information System (GIS) output of the rural Statistics Department of the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (BoFED), the total area of the district is 8950 Km² (*Ibid*).

Climate: Liban *woreda* is characterized by two type of rainy season, namely spring season, which starts in early February to April, and autumn, which lasts from late September to the beginning of November. The annual rainfall depth varies in the range from 592mm to 1200mm with the mean depth value of 896mm. The annual temperature of the district ranges from 26c⁰ and 32c⁰ (WAO, 2012).

Population: According to the population projection made based on the 2012 Population and Housing Census results, the total population of Liban *woreda* is 138,813. Of the total population of the *woreda*, male population accounted for 70,130 while the remaining 68,683 were females. Rural population was 137,428 (69,477 males and 67,951 females), while urban population was 1,385 (653 males and 732 females) (CSA, 2012). The population of the *woreda* is composed of mainly three clans of Oromo: Borana the majority clan in the *woreda*, Guji and Arsi clans. Moreover, Somali clans (Gurra, Karanle, Ajuran, Marehan clans) and others are also living in Liban *woreda*.

Livestock Population: Livestock plays a significant role in the economy of the *woreda* as well as the *kebeles* in general and the farmers and households in particular, with variations in significance from pastoralist lowlander society to farming highlanders. In general, they deliver food (milk, meat, egg, hides, and skins, etc.), and serve as a means of saving or hoarding. They are also kept for prestige as a symbol of social status and wealth in the society. Despite the role they play in the life of the people, their products (milk, meat, butter, egg, etc.) have remained low. Poor nutrition, the prevalence of diseases and insufficient veterinary services, traditional animal husbandry practices and poor genetic potential of the local breeds are some of the detrimental factors that affect the productivity of the livestock sub-sector in the *woreda* (LWAO, 2012).

The livestock population (cattle, sheep, goats, horse, donkey, mules, camels and poultry) of private peasant holdings of rural *woreda* was estimated between 823127 to 829959 heads, livestock population. According to the *woreda* Finance and Economic Development office cattle, sheep and goats respectively accounted for about 27.95, 30.45 and 13.29 percent respectively out of the total livestock population of the *woreda*. The proportion of mules, donkeys, and camels of the *woreda* accounted for 0.35, 2.5 and 25.46 percent respectively. Moreover, 72,166 of the *woreda* total poultry are found in liban *woreda* (*Ibid*).

Agriculture: In Liban *woreda*, almost in all *kebeles*, the size of cultivated land and production obtained vary from season to season as well as year to year. Cereals followed by pulses and oilseeds cover the primary crop production of the cultivated land and crops production of the *woreda*. In the *woreda* wheat, barley, teff, maize, sorghum, oats field peas, haricot bean, and chickpeas are the most widely cultivated crops among others. Agro-pastoralists cultivate this production.

All the agricultural activities are done by small-scale agro-pastoral communities since there is no private and government or NGOs based agriculture in the *woreda*. Currently, a few private investors are trying to invest in the *woreda*. Traditional methods characterize agricultural systems. The uses of modern farm inputs are very low. The size of land which has been used for farming purpose varies from *kebele* to *kebele*; since they are pastoralist *kebeles* which use livestock production only.

Mining and Industry: There are plenty of mine resources in Liban *woreda*. However, very few of them are only under extraction and exploration by different departments or groups. As the *woreda* has plenty and extra minerals such as gold, traditional extraction of mineral activity has been common in the *woreda*. Only a few minerals such as Sookoo is officially extracted and explored within the *woreda kebeles* such as in Algee, Malka Guba, Miêsa and Kooba Adi and Tuliti-Booba. Nowadays, some private and group licensed explorers and extractors are seen in the area of different mines under Guji Zone investment office.

Tourism: In Liban *woreda* of Guji zone, there are some cultural and historical tourist sites or centers; however they are not efficiently used for tourist attractions. Moreover, the area is not well developed for tourist attraction. In the *woreda*, there are unique areas and animals, which are not yet known to tourists. But would be attractive if once the tourists knew them. Such tourist attractions include hot springs, historical sites, and also, animals like birds (endemic to the *woreda* only) called Liban Lark), natural standing stone called Daka Kuntullo, Melka Guba, Urji Gobicha, Goda walaji, Kalitti mountain and Akomenoye sites which are local tourist attraction centres.

Social Institutions: the Gadaa system of Oromo in general and that of Liban *woreda*, in particular, is still functional as a social institution. It is also used for the administrative purpose, and generations succeed each other every eight years in political, judicial, military, legislative and ritual functions at least ceremonially. The Gadaa system directs the customary practices of Guji, Borana and Arsi clans who live in Liban *woreda*. They used to divide the seasons; since it has rules and regulations which the member of the clan and the outsiders need to fulfill, during mobility in dry and wet seasons like pre-informing the neighboring clans to get permission to move to their areas; the time they stay should be limited (LWCTO, 2010).

Using the pastoral pasture land and water sources for an extended period, the Borana clan divided their animals into two main groups. The Warra-Fooraa classifications of animals are based on the capacity of animals to travel far away from home, which is mainly based on the season. For example, when the season is wet, animals like sheep, goats, calves and calving cow are left with children, women and elderly person at home; this is the *Warra's* system. When the season is severe, and there is drought they use the *Fooraa* system, which they left the environment totally with their livestock such as camel, bull, cow and with some families. At the same time, this is the way they use rangelands and water wells, which are more of cyclical. This helps to managing the pasturelands, ecology, vegetations, and water-wells by minimizing overgrazing and reduction of water. These processes and functions are governed by the Gadaa system (*Ibid*). Gadaa is not much used as a tourist attraction, and now it should be studied in the Oromo-nation in general and in the Liban *woreda* in particular.

2.5 The Somali National Regional State

The Ethiopian Somali Region is the most abundant Ethiopian pastoral region. It borders Djibouti to the north, Somalia to the east and northeast, Kenya to the south, Oromia Region to the west, and Afar Region to the north-west (Solomon, 2006). It has a population of about five (5) million people (CSA, 2012). Most of the people are pastoralists, though there are some agro-pastoralists and pure farmers. There are nine administrative zones (Jijiga, Shinile, Liban, Afder, Godey, Korahay, Warder, Dagahbrur and Fik). However, Abdifatah *et al* (2005) and the Somali Region Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau (DPPB) divided the region into 17 food economy zones. Of these, eight are categorized as 'pastoralist' six are 'agro-pastoralists,' and three are agricultural food economy zones (DPPB, 2004; Abdifatah *et al*, 2005).

Therefore, there are four broad types of the economy found in the region; consisting of transhumant pastoralist, agro-pastoralist, farming and urban dwellers. Pastoralism is the most abundant economic activity, comprising about 60% of the region's rural population. Agro-pastoralism accounts for about 25% of the total population and is a mixture of wide livestock nurturing and rain-fed crop production; some may be better portrayed as pastoralist with opportunistic farming activities as in Fik and a number of areas of Liban Zone. The remaining 15% of the countryside population includes sedentary (Jijiga zone) farmers. Both farming and agro-pastoralist groups keep some livestock, but farmers' herds do not migrate and are occasionally hand-fed, only migrating with other groups if there is a severe drought (*Ibid*).

The region's altitude, ranges from 200m in the southern/central parts, to 1,800 in Jijiga Zone; medium altitudes consisting of hilly topography and highland which are found in some parts of Liban, Degahbur, Fik and Shinile zones. The climatic condition of the region is typically dry and semi-arid in lowland areas and wetter in the higher areas, yearly rainfall ranges from 150-1,000mm per year. Temperature range from 19⁰c (Jijiga zone) to 40⁰c (the southern zones, particularly the Shebelle, Dawa and Ganale river basins); northern Shinile zone becomes very hot between May and August (*Ibid*).

As shown above, Liban zone is one of the nine administrative zones of Somali National Regional State. The zone is found in the southwestern corner of the Region and has borders with Kenya in

the south, Afdher zone in the east and Oromia Region in the north and west. The zone has three *woredas*, Filtu, Dolo Ado and Moyale. Filtu is the capital town of the zone (LZAB: 2010). Abdifatah,*et al.*, (2002:6) classify the economy of the people into five revenue-generating zones, such as, ñMoyale-Wayamo pastoral, which makes up 25-30% of the Zone's population; Filtu-Dolo pastoral (15-25%); Dawa-Ganale riverine (15-25%); Liban Agro-pastoral (15-25%); and urban groups (which mainly consist of urban poor) make 10-20%.

Moreover, in Liban zone agro pastoral income is found mostly in Filtu *woreda*, since there are Dawa and Ganale Rivers which the agro-pastoralist used to produce crops. The majority of the communities are pastoral. The Liban zone is close to the international boundaries with Somalia and Kenya as a result of which its communities also benefit from cross-border markets for both livestock and other commodities (*Ibid*).

2.6 Filtu Woreda: Demography and Geography

Filtu borders with Oromia Region, Afdher zone, and Dollo Ado *woreda* of Somali region. Filtu *woreda* is one of the three *woredas* of Liban zone, situated in the southern part of Somali National Regional State. The *woreda* is located in the northern part of the zone and is the capital seat of the zonal administration. It borders with Dolo *woreda* in the south and southeast, Afdher zone in the east and northeast, Oromia Region in the north and west and Moyale *woreda* in the southwest. The *woreda* is located between the two rivers, Genale and Dawa, and the distance between the two rivers varies between 140 and 200kms. These two rivers, which make the southern and northern boundaries of the *woreda*, are relatively close to each other in the western part and further apart in the central and eastern areas. Administratively, the *woreda* is divided into 27 rural *kebeles* (FFEB, 2009).

A massive area of grazing lands in Filtu *woreda* is appropriate for livestock production particularly camel and cattle. In addition to livestock production, pastoralists in this *woreda* mainly practice rain-fed farming. There are few manually made water wells; there are no permanent water points, which can be used for both human, and livestock populations. The water wells were excavated by donors and are now used as permanent sources of water, but those water wells are often broken down and take very long time to repair. Thus, the wells that are temporary

water points dry up during the dry seasons and force local residents to look for other options. There are few ponds, and shallow wells, mostly constructed by non-governmental organizations. These contain water during rainy seasons. Due to recurrent droughts and concentration of human and livestock population around these water points, either they will not obtain enough water or they dry up early in the dry season. Currently, the town of Filtu has started to get water from Ganale River in the form of tap water.

Altitude and Climate: Filtu *woreda* is very remote and has the harsh climatic conditions. The *woreda* climate is semi-arid and arid, with temperatures varying between 27-42°C at noon. The rainfall is erratic and changes from season to season. The mean annual rainfall for Filtu is 600mm (SCF/UK, 2002). Rainfall is higher alongside the river where there are small mountain ranges. Altitude in Liban zone ranges from 300-1500m. There are two major seasons in this *woreda*-the wet and the dry seasons. Rainfall is bi-modal rains following the typical autumn (*Gu*) & spring (*Deyr*) pattern: autumn covers, mainly April, May and June, and is the long rain season and spring, mostly October, November, and December, it is the short rain season. Like the wet season, the dry season is also explained by Jilaal (January - March) and Hagaa (July-September). During the wet season, the movement is towards rangelands outside the riverbanks whereas during the dry season towards the permanent water points, especially along the riverbanks, wells, and boreholes. It is thought that there have been more irregularities in rainfall levels in the *woreda*, with less annual rains falling in aggregate. The altitude in the area is related hot climate, grouped under ñKollaò climatic Zone (FWAO, 2011).

Population: The Filtu *woreda* has a total population of 130,993 (74,537 male and 56,456 female) out of which; the total urban population is 4,972(2,733 male and 2739 female), and the total number of the rural population is 126,021(71,804 male and 54,217 female) (CSA, 2012). The population of the *woreda* is composed of two major Somali sub-clans and other minorities. The Digodia clan, make up the majority of the *woreda*'s population, and the Marehan clans and other minority clans like Gurra, Karanle, Ajuran, are living in the *woreda*. Filtu town is located at about 1,300km to the southwest of Jijiga and 730km to the south of Addis Ababa (WoFED, 2011).

Livelihood: Filtu *woreda* is divided into three livelihood zones as follows: 65-75% agro-pastoralists (50-60% rain fed and 10-20% river line along Ganale River), 25-35% pastoralists and 5% urban dwellers (including those in towns that are engaged in crop and livestock production) (*Ibid*). In Filtu *woreda*, a lot of people who became pastoral drop out had also settled and became agro-pastoralist. These agro-pastoralists have settled on the area that is located on banks of Ganale River. Most of the communities in this river areas use very few small-scale irrigation pumps to irrigate their farms; they also use river floods during rainy seasons. In this river-line-based economic zone livestock plays a vital role in sustaining livelihoods of the pastoral communities. But, the agro-pastoral groups use the rain to cultivate maize, wheat, sorghum, and beans.

Most of the farms are used to grow hay and pasture for livestock. Due to lack of rain, the farmers are unable to produce crops and hay all over the year. When Ganale River dries up the farmers dig shallow wells in the riverbed to irrigate their farm's lands. Rain fed agriculture practiced in some of the areas such as Haya-Dimtu, Masaajid, Ahad, Arasamo, Borey, Usubey, Bifato, Kulun, Hugul, Lantuwer, Gunwayn, and Garabgel villages. In these villages people were cultivating beans, maize, sorghum, and wheat in good black clay soil areas by diverting water from the valley to the farm.

Trade: The main livestock markets are Nagelle in Oromia's Liban *woreda*, Haya-Suftu, Filtu and Ayinle in Filtu *woreda*, Dolo & Raamo in Dolo *woreda*, Chirati in Afdher zone, and Mandhera in Kenya and Bay-dhaba market in Somalia. Mandhera and Dolo are markets for livestock bound for Somalia and Kenya while Nagelle and Chirati markets are main routes for the supply of livestock for Adama town and Babile and export to Djibouti. Kenya is the most important international market for livestock where cattle and goats are sold locally to people of the border areas. Camels are also sold to Kenya and Somalia. Bay-dhaba located in southwestern Somalia is the center for donkey and sheep trade. Furthermore, in Filtu *woreda* the main crops are local maize, sorghum & commercial wheat. Nagelle is also a key transit point for goods and cereals (like wheat flour, kerosene, soap, and candles) coming from other parts of Ethiopia (SCF-UK; DPPB, 2002).

Access to Water: Lack of permanent water sources is a significant problem in dry periods, especially in central, populated areas. Groundwater is very deep; most water (poor quality) is obtained from communal rain-fed ponds and *birkas* (mostly hand-excavated). Kulun, Masaji, Harabali, Bifato, Usubey, Filtu, Ab-amin, Arasamo, Malka labi, Kuley, Ayinle, Sayidmahamed, Wa-laman, and Ahad are ponds found in settlement areas which are suitable for livestock watering during in normal dry seasons. Wa-laman is a wide pond that retains water for a long time used for both human and livestock consumption. As the case on border areas sometimes conflict may arise from competition over this stream.

The only permanent water sources are a borehole at Sero and two boreholes in the Kura-*bul* area in Filtu district. The other source of drinking water supply is government owned Filtu and surrounding village's water supply which intended for cattle and public taps provided at each place of the identified rural areas to be used for their domestic and livestock watering. Most of the wells are salty and mainly used by animals only; some of them are permanent like Boqolmayo spring. Boreholes are government-owned, and their use for livestock is preferred due to saltiness and the fuel consumption and technical problems always it faces. Therefore, the pastoralist livestock in the area migrates to the two river sites to get water as the rain-fed ponds dry. These two rivers side-watering points are Dawa and Genale that are used to sustain animals (PCDP, 2005).

Areas for Accessing Water for Households: Scarcity of permanent water sources is the major problem in dry periods, especially in central, populated areas. Most water (poor quality) is obtained from communal rain-fed ponds. Though it is not fit for human consumption and all rain-fed ponds (Kulun hand excavated well, Masaajid hand excavate well, Ayinle *birkas*, Laan-Tuweer *birkas* in Filtu) are used by humans including the inhabitants of Filtu town.

Like other pastoral areas in Ethiopia, Filtu and Liban *woredas* which were previously in Borana *Awuraja* (province) have been highly marginalized by the previous regimes; and the interactions of these areas with the central parts of the country remain very minimal. Pastoral areas were underestimated as if it did not have any influence and advantage for the state economy. Therefore, there was no concern for pastoral communities. Thus, there are no well-developed infrastructures like roads, health, education, banking, telephone and postal services. Both health

and education coverage is in these areas, for instance, are by far below the national coverage. Most of the health center and education facilities are either not operational or underutilized due to lack of manpower, equipment and other infrastructures related problems. The quality of services in these facilities is also deficient.

Due to recurrent droughts, environmental degradation, and weak socio-economic services, the herd size per household is declining from time to time. Livestock productivity is also declining, and this, in turn, increases the number of food insecure households. Therefore, past injustice has its own influence on the current government struggle to promote the life of pastoral and agro-pastoral communities.⁴




Fig. 3: Study *Woredas*

⁴ FGD: Filtu worda Elders, 22 June 2016, Filtu town.

2.7 Summary

This chapter has tried to present a description of the study areas. Two adjacent *woredas* (districts) of two regional states of Ethiopia are chosen to investigate the local level impact of Ethiopian federalism and district-level decentralization on inter-clan relations. Somali and Oromia regional states are purposely chosen as a case studies. These are Liban *woreda* of Gujii Zone in Oromia and Filtu *woreda* of Liban Zone in Somali Region. First, it has been shown that pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in Ethiopia occupy larger territories though they are few in terms of demography. Both Liban *woreda* of Gujii Zone of Oromia and Filtu *woreda* of Liban Zone of Somali region practice similar livelihood that is pastoralism and agro-pastoralism. The two major Somali clans in Filtu *woreda* are Digodia and Marehan; whereas, in Liban *woreda*, three major Oromo clans include the Borana, Gujii, and Arsi. Both demographically and geographically explanations of the two *woredas* have been offered in the chapter. The next chapter is about the theoretical underpinnings of the study.

Chapter Three

Ethnicity, Conflict, Federalism and Decentralization: Concepts & Theories

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has provided a brief description of the study areas. In this chapter, eight major points of discussions with their respective sub-sections are presented: ethnicity, ethnic group, identity and boundary, inter-ethnic harmonization, conflict, federalism, decentralization and good governance. To this end, in the first section, theoretical perspectives on ethnicity, ethnic group and identity, ethnic group and boundary and ethnic group harmonization and dichotomization and conflict theories are presented. Then, theories of federalism in general which have been argued by different scholars and political activists would be discussed. In the last parts, concepts of decentralization, rationale for decentralization and concepts of good governance and its elements would be outlined. In the study areas, when it comes to inter-clan issues, it often takes ethnic dimension either in the line of Oromo or Somali. That is why the discussion on ethnicity is relevant. If the point is an intra-ethnic matter, ethnicity might not be necessarily important.

3.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Ethnicity

Scholars in the area of studying ethnicity, ethnic relation, ethnic group, and ethnic conflicts are mainly from anthropology, sociology and political science (Cohen, 1978). They argued that because of the wideness of the area in social science thought the concept of ethnicity lead to misunderstanding and abuse of political and legitimate use (Durkheim, 1996).

The widths of the premise of ethnicity come from different perspectives on the terms ethnicity, ethnic identity, and ethnic relations; because the terms are related to many complex ideas within it. Since, ethnicity, ethnic identity and ethnic relations have a lot of perspectives like historical, political, economic and social issues, which have a fussed and complicated thing to human life (Cohen, 1974). Similarly, Eller (1989) argues that the term ethnicity is mostly confusing and vague because it is related to the experience of societies which lived together for centuries; and it

has an ongoing process even for the future. As a consequence of the nature of the term ethnicity, scholars defining the term in different ways based on their areas of study, research interest and the subject area they studied, the various definitions by different scholars from different perspectives are described below.

According to Eriksen (2002), ethnicity deals with groups' identity, which is mostly related to 'mutual contact rather than isolation.' Similarly, Dwyer (1996:4) argues, 'ethnicity is a product of contact, not of isolation.' As stated by Eriksen and Dwyer ethnicity is relational than isolation which requires a relationship between societies. This leads the term to become complex and changing over time. Since their beliefs and viewpoints go with relations and difference of their cultural diversity; therefore, ethnicity matters with a minimum of contact with each other or relationship, not in isolation.

From the above scholars' definitions, one can deduce that ethnicity deals with similarity and difference of a given group of society from social, economic and political perspectives of that society. Within these aspects, this, in turn, implies that there are cooperation, coordination and challenges between different groups and communities. Of course, there are diversity issues within a given parents, families, communities, societies and nation at large.

As Horowitz (1985) pointed out, ethnicity deals with the social unit, which has a common ancestry throughout their life and developing an identity because of their shared values, customs, and cultures. Similarly, Scupin and DeCorse (2004) explain ethnicity as a social entity based on alleged differences in hereditary descent and common historical and cultural inheritance. Likewise, Horowitz (1985) and Scupin and DeCorse (2004) argument goes together in line with 'Kinship' issues since ethnicity brings people and makes them think differently from each other because of their similarity and difference.

Furthermore, Vaughan (2003) stated the concept of ethnicity from two perspectives citing different scholars mentioning it. Accordingly, some define it as primordial cause of action, and some as instrumental strategy quest of 'objective' material interest that is considered as a causal factor or itself a result of ethnicity. Of different scholars in the area, Smith (1986) defined ethnicity in relation to the instrumental strategies. According to him, ethnicity goes with visible

cultural and shared symbols of a particular group. This includes language, religion, food habits, history, culture, hairstyle, dressing style and predominant means of livelihood, which had been maintained by society for a long time.

Scholars identified ethnicity as a subjective feature which related to the interest of a given group which goes either with "we-feeling" that in turn leads to communal feeling and it is "in-group" sense or "you-feeling" which is "out-group" sense. Thus, ethnicity holds the internal beliefs of the people concerning their shared ancestor and the external manifestation which is seen by the naked eye. This implies that the ethnic group has a shared origin and common social views, which lead them to communal integration and differentiation.

There are three schools of thought whereby different scholars in the area of ethnic studies explain ethnicity; "the primordial," "instrumental" and "constructivist" views are discussed as follows.

3.2.1 Primordialist

According to the primordialist viewpoint ethnicity is considered as an unchangeable characteristic that clearly distinguishes one group from another; since these features are static, persistent, and constant (Geertz, 1967). Clifford Geertz added that primordial theory's advocates view human society as a buildup of different social groups, which have their own particular individual identity at birth to become a member of particular group. Therefore, ethnic identification is based on deep, primordial attachments to a given group, which is established by kinship and descent. As a result, ethnicity is a fixed and an unchangeable part of one's identity (*Ibid*).

Additionally, primordialism includes the concept that ethnicity had been existing throughout all human history. Therefore, the current ethnic groups have historical continuity and relations with their predecessors. For primordial proponents, the idea of ethnicity is directly connected to primordially existing groups fixed by kinship and biological inheritance. In addition, the concept of ethnicity, as being universal, omnipotent and prehistoric, power is based on primordial characters such as shared history, shared myths of origin, common name, language and rituals

that differentiate groups of people and individual from each other (Poluha, 1998; Thomposon, 1984).

Similarly, Cohen (1974) argued primordialists identify the notion of ethnicity as something that naturally gained its inherent quality in one's formulation of identity. This concept does not consider the how and why nations, nationalities, and peoples emerge, disappear and time and again re-emerge through history. However, there are many factor factors that have been influencing the appearance and disappearance of nations and ethnic groups, such as: inter-marriage, trade, migration, and colonization of the current multi-ethnic nations of the world.

3.2.2 Instrumentalist

According to the supporters of the instrumentalist theory ethnicity is something that can be misused or maneuvered to gain specific political and economic benefits. Instrumentalists also associated their views to elite theory, which argues that the leaders of modern nations use and manipulate the perception or attitude of ethnic groups or ethnic identity for their own interest to stay in power for a long period of time (Cohen, 1981; Ted Gurr, 1993). From this, one can infer that the elite creates ethnicity for their position and power by systematically manipulating the attitudes and sentiments of the society. Thus, ethnicity is a political myth created by the elite and used mainly for political and economic gains.

Furthermore, the instrumentalist argument is strictly contrary to primorialist perspectives, since, they view ethnicity as a belief that is changed, manipulated, unstable, subjective and elite dependant and situational to fulfill political, economic and social objectives of the authorities(elites). Thus, it is mainly dependent on the elite interest to advance their wish, and an individual or a group can change their ethnic attribution depending on their political, economic and social advantages (Brass,1985). Similarly, Scupin and DeCorse (2004) argued people use their ethnic affiliations for a political and economic benefits based on different condition and time as the basis of collective political mobilization or to enhance their economic interests as individuals or groups.

According to instrumentalist view, ethnicity is not prearranged incident. Instead, it is shaped in action and dependent on a variety of factors such as social interest, individual self-interest, political situations, individuals and groups' ideas and perceptions that are the major factors, which influence to change the ethnicity of an individual or a group. Moreover, Barth's (1969) arguments on ethnicity have further elaborated the concept. For Barth strong ethnic attachments are not the result of the social and territorial isolation of groups, rather, their interaction with other groups matter to their contacts. Consequently, Barth's approach shows the dynamic quality of ethnicity in real life of societies.

To sum up, the instrumentalist view holds that the concept of ethnicity is a tool used by political groups or authorities to control resources such as wealth, power, territory or status in their particular groups' interests (Noel, 1968).

3.2.3 Constructivist

The other theoretical point of view of ethnicity is constructivism. The proponents of constructivism consider both primordial and instrumental perspectives as defective and refuse the idea of ethnicity as a fundamental human condition, and holds that ethnic groups are maintained only in so far as they are preserved as valid social constructs in societies (Bobo *et al.*, 1996). Rather the constructivists associate the manifestation of ethnicity with the movement towards nation states beginning in the early modern period of human history. The advocates of this theory such as Hobsbawm (1992) argues that ethnicity and notions of ethnic pride such as nationalism are just modern creations, which has come to reveal itself only in the contemporary era of the world history for political, economic and social purposes.

For a long time, most anthropologists have tried to establish a synthesis between both the primordial and instrumental models of ethnicity. For them the primordial view has been extremely useful in authenticating determination of ethnicity, whereas the instrumentalist model has to assist in how ethnic identity can be distorted and constructed in various social, economic and political situations (Malesevic, 2004).

Furthermore, many scholars in the area of ethnicity, in general, and DeCorse (2004), in particular, argues that today, many current anthropologists occupy a middle ground between primordialist and instrumentalist point of views; by advocating comprehensive approach in which ethnicity may consist of both primordial and instrumental aspects.

To sum up, perspectives about ethnicity based on the above viewpoints of different scholars vary. On the one hand, the primordialist theory conceptualizes ethnicity as fixed at birth and is mainly related to blood and inheritance. According to the proponents of this theory, ethnic identification is based on deep, primordial attachments to a group. On the other hand, the instrumentalist view advocates explain ethnicity, based on individuals or groups historical and symbolic memory, and is something created and used and exploited by leaders or elites. This is based on a realistic quest of their own interests. To advocates constructivist theory, ethnic identity is not something people ñownò rather it is something they ñconstructò indefinite social and historical context to enhance their own interests. Therefore, the concept of ethnicity is fluid and subjective.

3.3 Ethnic Group, Identity, and Boundary

According to the primordialist outlook, a frequently used characterization of an ethnic group is a collectivity of people who share the same primordial distinctiveness such as common language, culture, and lineage. In addition, scholars from socio-biology share the view that ethnic groups are primordial entities dating back to and even before the origins of Homo Sapien in the universal hereditary descent of the human characters (Poluha, 1998).

Additionally, Scupin and DeCorse (2004) demonstrated ethnic groups as a collectivity of people, who consider themselves as sharing a common history, myths of common origin, culture and lineage. Therefore, ethnic groups may be distinguish themselves by language, common historical past, culture, and sometimes, by their religion. In contrary to this, for constructivistsô ethnic groups, stay alive only in the plural, that is, in the relationship between ñweò and ñthem.ò Similar, to this argument, David Turton argues, áan ethnic group is not a group because of ethnicity but because of its members engage in common action and share common interestsô (Turton 1994: 17).

Researchers or academician in the area of ethnicity suggest some criteria for the identification of an ethnic group in different areas. Among these, Brown (1997) identifies about six criteria whereby an ethnic group should:

1. *a group has a name for itself;*
2. *groups should share similar myths, legends, history and they have to transfer this from generation to generation, and they should refer that to claim and reclaim their identities;*
3. *groups should have a common culture, religion, customs, music, artifacts, dressing style, food habits, customary laws;*
4. *four, groups should believe in a common lineage;*
5. *five, groups have to think they are one group who share the issues mentioned above; and*
6. *six, groups should think they share common territory currently or in the past which lead them to a common understanding about their identities, and they have to be conscious about what they share in past and present.*

However, Fuku and Markakis (1994:6-7) challenge the effort to define ethnic identities based on the ancestral and cultural criteria which are mainly complex to identify the similarity and difference among groups in a real sense. They argued that ethnic characters are to be realized as political, social and economic domains based on group interest and on the situation that is available for the groups. Likewise, Brass (1991: 19) argues that ethnicity is a sense of ethnic identity that can be used 'to create internal unity and differentiate themselves from other groups.' He put forward that ethnic identity is related to subjective self-consciousness, which an individual or groups position himself or themselves in a superior or inferior or equal to another group, to claim his/their political, social and economic interest.

Eriksen (2002:59) argues 'ethnic identity and ideology deal with, the understanding of how individuals perceive and classify their social surroundings and also how the past is used to make sense of the present.' He added that the idea of common origin is usually central to ethnic identity, and understanding of history is, therefore, significant to ideologies looking for validation, make stronger and preserve particular ethnic identities. Furthermore, in anthropological discourse, 'identity means being the same as oneself as well as being different; the study of identity must oscillate between the peoples of disconnected singularity and globalizing unity' (Benoist, 1977:15 cited in Eriksen, 2002:60).

According to Berman, (1982) cited in Eriksen (2002:68) when boundaries are under pressure between two ethnic groups, it needs visible forms of the boundary. Since, ethnic identity represents and distinguishes- its continuity from the past, it helps to reassure the psychological way of accepting and respecting others and selves, because of the bond between the past and the present.

These all means that, whether the state is well developed and robust or relatively weak, an entire host of everyday business and communication will fall below or outside its domain and thus open to problems of opportunism. That is to say, the incomplete reach of the state release up space for more local and decentralized mechanisms for resolving the problem between ethnic groups.

However, Eriksen (2002) argument on the making of clear boundary among the conflicting groups does not work in pastoralist areas. Since pastoralists are mobile; and therefore difficult to have clear boundary among the units.

Moreover, he suggests about three social characteristics of identity which shows global truth on identity politics:

First, there is competition over scarce resources. As Horowitz (1985) and many others writing about group conflict in contemporary societies have shown, such conflicts invariably involve perceptions of scarcity and struggle to retain hegemony or equality. Successful mobilization on the basis of collective identities presupposes a widespread belief that resources are unequally distributed along group lines. Resources should be interpreted in the widest sense possible, and could in principle be taken to mean economic wealth or political power, recognition. Second, modernization actualizes differences and triggers conflict. With the integration of formerly discrete groups into shared economic and political systems, inequalities are made visible, a comparison between the groups becomes possible. Third, the groups are largely self-recruiting. Kinship has an important social dimension. Since, without kinship,

symbolic boundaries are never effective unless underpinned by the social organization (Eriksen, 2002:158-59).

Furthermore, Eriksen added five cognitive features to identity politics: one is ideology, which reflects that beliefs of cultural oneness overrule social equality. Two representations of experience and inequality appeal to the present. Three, political symbolism and rhetoric evokes personal experience, which goes with using myths, cultural symbols, and understanding of terminology in addressing personal experience and group history to promote identity politics. Four, first 'comers are contrasted with invaders.' This may not be universal identity politics; instead, it tends to happen whenever things are possible; since historical facts are often extended. Five, social complexity in society is reduced to a set of simple contrast. Since crosscutting ties decrease the probability of violent conflict; group identity must be based on moderately unambiguous principles such as location, religion, mother-tongue (language), and relationship (*Ibid*, 2002: 159-60).

Ethnic Boundary-the ethnic boundary is the main focal point with, which some scholars defines the group by excluding the cultural issues that it includes. The definition of Barth (1969) points to the attention of different researchers in the area is a social boundary, even if it has territorial counterparts. While a group preserves its identity, when a group or members of a group cooperate with others, this shows a group to be inclusive or exclusive from membership. Ethnic groups are not only based on living in exclusive territories; and the different ways in which they are preserved, not only by pure evaluation but also by assessing continuous evaluation and legalization which needs a critical examination of a group.

Barth states that the issue of the ethnic boundary is a complex issue to identify easily when it is mainly related to social relations and behavior of groups or members of a group. To identify an individual's membership to a group does not need too much critical evaluation to reach an agreement. Membership is not only bonded by territory, which makes things a bit complex, and there are factors which are related to social and cultural issues which easily cross-border and difficult to represent because of the duration of the period. However, there is a categorization of groups into 'we' and 'them' based on similarity and difference. Moreover, considering some as

outsiders and some as belonging to the groups is based on common interest and common understanding of their values (*Ibid.*)

According to Barth, to make boundary maintenance promising, we need to understand cultural units and social contact. Safeguarding ethnic boundary requires social contact between different individuals and groups having different cultural affairs. Ethnic groups may continue to think about their difference in culture and behavior. However, when there is contact between various ethnic groups, they considered reducing the gap and tried to form similarity between them and believe that they create common characters (*Ibid.*)

Therefore, the determination of ethnic groups in contact shows a means to differentiate a group and it is arranging contacts that permit the determination of cultural differences among the groups. The characteristics of an ethnic group which Barth argues that inter-ethnic relations are a systematic way of governing social relationships across groups, by having rules and regulations. Thus, in all planned social life, everything, which is essential for social interactions, is put down in regulations that help for better social contact (Goffman, 1959 cited in Barth, 1969).

Furthermore, Barth argues that inter-ethnic relations characteristics are expressed by many scholars differently and lack attention to be related to boundary maintenance. Particularly, anthropologists have come with the ambiguous concept of the model that they use to explain an inter-ethnic situation. Most of them consider inter-ethnic relations regarding sharing common histories and cultures to accommodate each other. In the direction of ethnic diversities existence, Barth forwarded that scholars and researchers ask themselves what a particular group is different from the other, is it organizational or specific criteria we need to implement to differentiate from one another, which required as a principle or standard to apply to different categories (Barth, 1969).

According to Horowitz, ethnicity becomes less confusing, if one can conceptualize it based on ethnic affiliation as being located along a large of ways in which people organize and categorize themselves. Therefore, ñat one end, there is voluntary membership; at the other end, membership gave at birthò (Horowitz 1985: 55-56). He added that scholars would ñthink of birth and choice

as mutually exclusive principles of membership, but all institutions are infused with components of both (Ibid.).

Furthermore, ethnic identity is relatively difficult for an individual to change, but change sometimes occurs. Group's origins are also important, for the corporate aspect means that the group is intergenerational, ongoing and independent of its present members (Horowitz: 53). However, for the political purpose of getting access to power, resources and social affairs, the group or an individual establish a forceful organization who claim political and economic goals. Therefore, according to Horowitz ethnic group can be located at different positions along the birth-choice continuum; but not contradictory things. Moreover, most people are born into the ethnic group in which they will die, and an ethnic group holds those born into it. In the concept of ethnic groups, there is a birth-choice whereby individuals change their ethnic identity and a group can do the same (Ibid: 56-64).

3.4 Inter-Ethnic Dichotomization, Harmonization, Socialization and Cultural

Relationships

The intergroup contact has encompassed ethnicity, which may ground on the diversity of issues, such as population expansion, communication, trade/ exchange, including new groups to the system, migration, new political system which include or exclude groups (Blom, 1969).

For interethnic contact to take place at all, there should be common understanding or respect is natural in the process of communication among different individuals or groups. If not, among the group, one is ignored, and the communication situation can be changed and neglected in between groups. Thus, if there are mutual recognition and respect for each other among the group, complementation is acknowledged. Whereas dichotomization essentially expresses 'we-them' kind of relationships among groups. When an individual or group goes into an interethnic tie, it can be said that complementarities would be formed. This needs a shared language within which interaction can take place (Ibid).

Moreover, according to Eriksen (2002: 28-29), 'interethnic relations are not necessarily conflictual.' It can be based on cooperation and mutual acknowledgment. If there is very few complementation in interethnic relations, there will be an inclination towards identity shift or

assimilation among members of the group. In ethnic relations, there is an establishment of "we-them" difference among groups, but they have shared space for interaction which is mainly related to group life.

Verkuyten and Zaremba (2005:375) argue that ethnic relations can be studied most importantly across time, in relation to political situations, from different viewpoints such as majority and minority within the groups and in relation to different ethnic groups across the territories. They added that intergroup relations are pressurized or manipulated by social and political developments. Many studies on in-group and out-group assessment show that there is in-group preference than out-group studies. This does not always mean true in different cases.

However, out-group studies evaluation show that there are many negative stereotypes and the degree to which the ethnic out-group has become accustomed to society, as well as the degree to which out-groups are distinguished as threatening to the in-group's position and attention towards each other (*Ibid*).

There are theories that hub on how state authority put off curved antagonism allow believable commitments to interethnic political bargains and may overpredict violence. In many parts of the world in general and in post-Soviet Republic in particular, in the space where state authorities are absent or weak inter-ethnic relations frequently remained cooperative than the other place where strong authorities were present. On this point, Laitin and Fearon advance a theory that can account for ethnic violence without over-predicting its occurrence. They argue that "decentralized, nonstate institutional mechanisms may often arise to mitigate problems of opportunism in the interaction between individuals from different ethnic groups" (Laitin and Fearon, 1996:715).

Furthermore, the same authors confirm how different decentralized methods help to safeguard interethnic peace and most of the time it may have a dissimilar result for ethnic violence in the event of stopping working together with the neighborhoods. Consequently, without interest to cancel either of the arguments, discussed above Laitin and Fearon follow a new strategy. They promote a different significance for "groupness" and show the difficulty of continuity in interethnic peace at the stage of individual contact engage the probability of chance to get self-

interest behavior that has socially destructive effects; such as, robbing, cheating, avoidance, deception, abuse, rape and extra. Again, in interethnic situations, the internal distinctions are under-communicated in the act of describing boundaries by dominating others (*Ibid*). This system is familiar with a wide range of interethnic situations, from social classification.⁵

Socialization and Cultural Relationships-There are criteria for people to qualify to form an ethnic group and the social relations; among this, they should have to believe in common lineage, collective past(myths), shared beliefs and culture, which include language, customs, customary institutions, dress, music and artifacts, and the group should also have attachments to specific territory (Malesevics, 2004).

In multiethnic societies, ethnic identification can have a diverse measurement of concentration, which sometimes leads to poor relations among members of the groups. Therefore, to have good relationships among the members of the group and groups in societal, political and economic affairs, they have to have interregional cooperation from the grassroots level, to living together in mutual respect (Michael *et al.*, 2004). Similarly, Bennet *et. al.* (2003:426) argue, ñinteraction must involve strong feelings of loyalty and respect in order to create different aspects of relationships between ethnic groups within the membership of the group and out-group members.ò

Sociological moves towards culture give more emphasis to cultural diversity while they are dealing with the concept of ethnicity. In this case, institutions are free from discriminations of culture of others. Since, members of a group are indoctrinated in accommodation of diversities in different perspectives, for this group living and modifying their behavior is easy than the monoculture members of a given group (Friedkin, 2004; Parekh, 2006).

Multicultural socialization has rarely become ethnocentric viewpoints and can form ethnic-relative world (Bennet *et. al.*, 2003). Further Malcevics (2004) argues that the more ethnic relative world individual or groups formed, the more societies are living interdependently together with their families, communities and neighborhood communities at large.

⁵ See, Epstein, (1992), the Zambian Mining towns; Eidheim, (1971), the Norwegian-Sami Relations in Sub-Arctic Scandinavia; Kapfever, (1988), the Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict and Handler, (1988) Quebecois Nationalism.

Thus, social institutions which represent many cultural and diversified ethnic and clan identity have different perspectives on their and others' identity to form societal cooperation. And it has so many advantages for the participation of social, political and economic affairs of their localities to promote unity in diversity to preserve the pluralistic nature of the communities.

Cultural identification process during socialization, serves as the group inclusion function and exclusion function, by forming in-group and out-group belongingness. In-group refers to group members who identify themselves with each other; and the out-groups are those who have emotional and psychological distance from other groups (Fong, 2004a). Such consciousness of out-groups often leads to stereotyping, and prejudice. These may lead to barriers to effective intercultural communication among the groups or group members. That is why the process of cultural identification begins with drawing boundaries between an in-group and an out-group. Those are perceived to exist among different groups of people.

Therefore, cultural identity can be examined as all members of the group have similar symbolic and conceptual meaning of given cultural artifacts, which represent them. Usually, cultural identities vary in various ways based on its scope, meaning beyond the symbol, greater or strengthen of its views by the owners (Collier and Thomas, 1998). In addition, Fong, (2004a) states that cultural identities are not bounded like national and regional borders tangibly. Instead, it is shared by beliefs and values based on intangible boundaries, which may connect the groups consciously and sometimes unconsciously, by crossing borders among the group members or groups.

Moreover, Dyke and Dyke (2002), state that group identity is formed by the social construction of boundaries, which create a demarcation between the in-group and out-group or stranger and well-known members in a group. Each cultural identity locally and globally is a self-reflective image, which expresses 'us' as unique from 'others,' and it reflects the interaction of being cultural communities. In the case of cultural identities, there is imaginary boundary, which shows others, others, and without others, there is no self. These imply that intra-cultural, inter-cultural and cross-cultural communications are essential to understanding others and to be understood by others too.

3.5 Concepts of Conflict

Conflict is a broad term, and that is broadly in use in the scientific literature to point out a state of difference or disagreement (Kriesberg, 1996). Similarly, it is largely established that the history of conflict is as old as human history. Assefa (2001) and Pruitt (2001) have stated that it is from the dawn of human history that communities have been competing for control of natural and human-made resources and dominance of political, economic and social affairs. These competitions unavoidably led individuals as well as social, political, economic and religious groups of certain societies to conflicts. It is true that conflict could have destructive consequences and it is unwelcome. However, conflict is inevitable, and it has a nature of determination in one way or the other. Likewise, it is also true that conflict is not only inevitable but functionally required and helpful (Deng et al., 1991). Bohannon (1967) soundly highlighted that conflict calculates as fundamental as culture is in a certain society.

The types of disagreement resolution are also as diverse as those forms of social conflicts. Schellenberg (1996) has accepted a set of approaches that are functional to the resolution of conflicts. These are coercion, negotiation or bargaining, adjudication, meditations, and arbitration. This author further categorizes conflict resolution mechanisms into two: the violent and the peaceful. The violent included war, self-help and duel, whereas the peaceful incorporated avoidance, burying the dispute in the symbolic process, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication.

Usually, people have valid customs to handle conflicts in their societies. Gluckman (1965) asserts that tradition emerges to aggravate or restrain conflicts from destroying the structure of social arrangement. In societies where there are no offices with established authorities to control quarrels and to put into effect formal laws, there are well-established and recognized codes or laws of principles and rituals. Reasonably speaking, there are various indigenous traditional conflict resolution mechanisms universal. Particularly, Africa which consisted multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-linguistic societies possessed various traditional mechanisms of managing conflicts. On the basis of a given belief in a given society the conflicting parties are abided to be governed by their traditional codes. Ignoring these traditions would invite risks of exclusion from that society. Elders play a central role in these mechanisms, reconciling the conflicting groups according to the norms and forms prevalent in their respective areas (Tsega, 2006). Similarly, Ethiopia is a land of varied nationalities, clans, tribes,

communities and possessed complex cultural make-ups in which each deserves its own peculiar cultural, socio-political, and course of historical development (Tedechea, 1988).

Moreover, social process theories perceive conflict as a process of social interaction between individuals or groups and look for to make generalizations about the nature of this process. This theory does not try to reduce conflict to some quality residing in the individual, nor does it see it as primarily given by the structure of society. Rather it considers conflict in a process terms. The works of Adam Smith became the basis for the emergence of this theory. Smith's work on moral philosophy helps to see how out of the fabric of social relationships, may emerge the principle of conflict resolution (Schellenberg, 1996).

Other recent theories of conflicts have, however, paid attention to cultural perspectives. Levinson (1996) and Murithi (2006), have, for instance, argued that culture shapes conflict behavior. To these theorists, humans are not inevitably innately violent. Instead, human nature is flexible regarding how physical aggression is expressed. The flexible nature of human being is embedded in the culture of ongoing social life. Murithi (2006:15) on the other hand, asserted that cultural attitudes and values provide the foundation for the social norms by which people live.

Similarly, Jacuqin (1998:160) has stressed that culture is usefully thought of as a worldview which explains about when, why, where, and how people in one's culture and those in other cultures are likely to act in a particular way. In support of this view, Gulliver (1979:74) likewise, argued that in ongoing social life, relationships and interactions between individuals and groups are oriented and guided by customary standards currently held by the society. And that relationship is governed by more or less such accepted rules or norms, by those members of the social group. Levinson (1996) on the other hand has stressed that through socialization within their culture; individuals acquire views as to what the world and human nature are like, acquire particular sets of values, and gain an understanding of the cultural meaning of events and actions.

3.5.1 Conflict and the Question of Attitude

The study of conflict has a long practice going back to the most primitive historical traces (Kriesberg, 1996). Though, Schellenberg (1996) has stated that it is only in the twentieth century that organized study of conflict has become a disciplinary field in its own right. Through its

courses of improvement researchers in the field have viewed the conflict from different approaches. For instance, Levinson and Ember (1996) defined conflict as perceived different interests between two or more social gathering. Pruitt (2001) has classified the word conflict to overt conflict, which refers to clashing actions by two or more parties and subjective conflict, which refers to supposed to the deviation of interest or annoyance attributed to another party.

On the other hand, Goldman (2003) has examined conflict from narrower and broader sense. In its narrowest sense, a human conflict exists when parties oppose each other because one or both perceive that the others in preventing achievements of a particular desired goal. In a broader sense conflict arises when parties perceive that they have divergent interests. Along with this view, Jacquin- Berdal (2002) and Levinson (1996) argued that conflict occurs when parties find themselves divided by perceived incompatible interests or goals or in competition for control of scarce resources.

From viewpoints of the extent of the field, Schellenberg (1996) argued that the field of conflict studies does not focus on conflict within individual minds or purely individual reactions to conflict. Rather it focuses on the social conflict that is a conflict between or among individuals or between or among groups. This author further stressed that social conflicts do not necessarily limit to violent or confrontational forms of opposition. It includes not only cases of high emotional involvement but also impersonal and unconscious forms of opposition.

Schellenberg also noted that such conflict might take place between individuals, between collectivities, or between individuals and collectivities. Scholars have also been divided on the question of attitudes related to the concepts of conflict. Some scholars have considered conflict as undesirable and that it is bad. The main concern of these scholars is then to banish or stop conflicts. On the other hand, some modern conflict theorists have considered conflict as integrated parts of society; it cannot be excluded from social life or be eliminated. For them, conflict stimulates new thoughts, promotes social change, defines our group relationships and helps us from our own senses of personal perceptions (Schellenberg, 1996; and Swedberg, 2005).

In relation to this view, Deng, and Zartman (1991) also argued that though protracted conflict is dysfunctional, some conflicts might not be necessary but also functionally useful. However, we need to note that not all forms of conflicts are useful. Conflicts may hinder social and economic

development, particularly, if it escalated to the violent stage. Therefore, conflicts should be controlled. Along with this view, Swedberg, (2005:17) stated that "society is impossible without conflict. But society is worse than impossible without control of conflict". This might invite us to not only embrace the concepts of conflict, but also conflict resolutions. Conflict resolution is a broad term that refers to the reversal of the conflict process.

Schellenberg (1996) viewed conflict resolution either, broadly as any marked reduction in social conflict through self-conscious efforts or specifically as a process of conscious settlement of the issues between parties. The author further associated the term "conflict management" and "conflict regulation" with the broader views and "conflict resolution" or "dispute resolution" with the specific perspectives. Similarly, Deng and Zartman (1991) argued that conflict can be prevented on some occasions and managed on others but resolved only if the term is taken to mean the satisfaction of apparent demands rather than the total eradication of underlying "sentiments", "memories" and "interests".

In summary, it is important to note that, as not all forms of conflicts are bad and unnecessary and likewise, all forms of conflict resolutions are not good and satisfactory. Taking this theory into account, we may consider what Schellenberg (1996) stated that not all attempts to resolve conflict lead to justice or mutual satisfaction; they can sometimes lead to undesirable consequences.

3.5.2 Causes of ethnic/clan conflicts

Conflicts have multiples of reasons. Campbell (2006) has identified some sources of conflicts like different values, religious beliefs, economic priorities, political ideology, and principles of conduct. The conflict might evolve from limited or scarce resources, such as land, minerals, money, property, time and water, etc. Gluckman (1965) has mentioned that human beings may quarrel over many things such as over cattle, land, prestige, and indeed by accidents. Similarly, another source of conflict may be motivated by the denial of human rights and basic needs like participation, freedom, health, education, and security. Besides, human beings could have differences of opinion on the rights and wrongs of conduct. Gluckman further argued that often difficulties in disputes arise not only over what is the appropriate, legal or moral rule, but also over how the law applies in particular circumstances. In connection with this issue, it is worth

what Pruitt (2001) noted that, role differentiation that produces disparate values; any condition that causes aspirations to rise rapidly or to become inconsistent with those of another party; and any source of distrust, because distrust tends to block cooperation and produce defensive behavior, which often annoys or frightens the other party. All these are additional causes of conflict.

3.6 Understanding Federalism

Scholars in the area of federalism define the concept of federalism in various ways. The arguments of some of them are as follows. Ronald Watts (2000a: 14-15) define federalism as a broad term which includes both normative and descriptive connotations that, unless clarified well may lead to misunderstanding. To avoid confusion, he comes up with three terms to differentiate their concepts: 'federalism,' 'federal political systems,' and 'federation.' According to Watts, 'federalism' is understood as a normative concept, which is defined mainly as an idea, principle, and phenomenon that is conveyed in the implementation and the variety of existing federations. 'Federal political system' is presented as the basic descriptive term for the whole group including the broad variety of political system combining 'self-rule' and 'shared rule;' and he evaluates 'federation' as one type of federal political system.

In addition, Watts (1998:7) puts general structural features for federal system. These are at least two orders of government, a written constitution that formally allocate legislative, including fiscal powers to the two order of government, for ensuring some genuine autonomy for each other, some political arrangement notably in upper house and a procedure usually involving courts, but sometimes referendums or an upper house and process and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental relations for those areas where governmental responsibilities are shared.

Similar to Watts, Perston King made a difference between 'federalism' and 'federation.' According to this author, on the one hand, federalism is a normative term is an ideological and philosophical position. Whereas, the federation is a descriptive term defined as an institutional arrangement, taking the form of an independent state and differentiated from other countries exclusively by the reality that its federal government incorporates regional units in its decision method on some constitutionally firmly held basis (King, 1982). From this concept, one can infer

that there may be federalism without federation, but there cannot be federation without federalism.

Furthermore, Burgess differentiates 'federalism' from 'federation.' For Burgess, 'federation' is the institutionalization of those relationships in a state that have political relevance (Burgess, 2000). He added 'federation' is a distinctive organizational form that encompasses institutions, structures, and techniques. It is a tangible institutional reality. Here the underlined point in a federation is a form of the democratic and constitutional rule rather than merely a division of power between central and local governments. Constitutional protection is, thus the key for federation with regard to economic, political, and cultural self-protection. Furthermore, these agreements help the continuity of federation within an entire nation (*Ibid*).

Similar to Watts and Burgess, Elazar, one of the experts in the field of federalism, defined the concept of federalism; as it has to do with the interest of the groups and political entity to come together for common reasons, but remain divided to preserve their reliability. Therefore it is concerned concurrently with the dispersal of political power in the name of independence and its awareness on behalf of agreement (Elazar, 1987). According to Elazar, the federal basic characteristics are concerned with the combination of 'self-rule' and 'shared-rule.' Therefore, federalism is measured as a comprehensive system of political association which give due attention to the combination of self-rule and shared rule within an arrangement of constitutionally distributed powers.

However, in contrast to scholars who perceived federalism as a constitutional object, Riker explains that federalism is not a single constitutional thing instead it is a choice of phenomena. According to him, the federal arrangement does not always mean that the power is fixed at a certain point on permanent bases, but it needs a continuous political process. Riker places federalism as a continuous process concerning centralization and decentralization (Riker, 1975). In addition, Riker rightly argued that federalism is a political institution in which the power and function of the government are divided between central government and regional governments in dissimilar way that all regions of administration have some actions on which they make last judgment, which is mainly focused on the interest of the societies that they administrate (*Ibid*).

Riker argues that, based on different contexts, the central government may interfere in the sphere of actions allowed for regions, without totally influencing their autonomy.

From the above arguments, one can realize that federal arrangement is taken into account with some constitutionally based division of powers and functions of a central government and regional governments within one country. This appears to be the central objectives of a federal arrangement which promotes unity and diversity at the same time. Having this brief conceptual note, in the fourth coming chapter (chapter 4), the contending views on Ethiopia's federalism has briefly discussed.

3.7 Concepts of Decentralization

Different scholars have defined decentralization in different ways. Thus, for political scientists, decentralization mainly focuses on policy issues and emphasizes who has authority and responsibility. For economists, decentralization means fiscal decentralization. For a sociologist, decentralization means public participation that mainly focuses on the informal indigenous institutions (Camille *et al.*, 1997). Therefore, the concept of decentralization contains complicated definitions because of the interdisciplinary nature of the idea.

Moreover, decentralization is the transfer of legal and political authority from national government to sub-national governments to give them decision making power (Kasahun and Tegegne, 2004). Turner and Hulme (1997) added that decentralization could be seen as service delivery to the public by transferring authority to local governments since the local actors are closer to the public to be served. In its broad definition, decentralization is the transfer of public power, resources, and personnel from the center to local governments (Crook and Manor, 1998; UNDP, 1999; World Bank, 2001).

As a result, decentralization improves successful performance and understanding of local preferences. In this regard (Kumera, 2006) argue that a preparation to the problems linked in a centralized system is decentralization. This is because decentralization is distinguished by nearness, significance, independence, participation, accountability and democratic system. So, decentralization places power and accountability for decision making outside the political and

administrative center and generally promote resource mobilization and transparency, accountability, participation, efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness in service delivery.

The debate of decentralization between levels of governments and local communities at large is for the division of power, autonomy to decide on their fate. Therefore, the main objective of decentralization is to promote the effectiveness of government apparatus through the exchange of ideas as well as spatial fairness in the sharing of political, administrative and fiscal powers for development decision making to reduce poverty from the sub-national level or grassroots communities. Thus, one can understand from the above discussions that decentralization is the system of government which down the structures for political, functional and administrative authority to be transferred institutions representing identified socio-cultural, any political as well as territorial interests (*Ibid*).

There are key features for successful decentralization-decentralization needs some promise and also the continuation of well organized institutional arrangements to promote the growth attempt of all levels of governments at federal, regional and local levels (Fritzen and Lim 2006; Robinson, 2003). These scholars point out the following tips that are required situations for successful devolution. These are:

Political promise: Political commitments are of inherent significance to decentralized service delivery for various causes. It is broadly established that political promise on the side of central or regional governments is a sign of efficient self-governing decentralization, and particular forms of decentralization that are explicitly geared to the well-being of the mass poor especially in developing country. Successful in favor of poor decentralization is linked with administering parties that are politically committed to the democratic empowerment of local governments.

Therefore, devolution cannot happen until it is supported by the highest political power. Decentralization in at all case shaped by political means and also it takes places at political program, i.e., it is practiced inside and under the control of political command and the regime should be appropriately committed for the accomplishment of political goals. The extent to

which nationwide political leaders consideration the political chain of command are committed to distributing planning purposes decides the effectiveness of decentralization policies.

Efficient inter-organizational relations: In respect of the hidden power of prearranged public complaints, local administrators in different states have tested with institutional planning and designed to make easy public appointment, criticism, and mistake. Decentralization needs some extraordinary implementing apparatus including an organization particularly accountable for organizing and put into practice an action plan and a public relations implement to guarantee sympathetic of and sustaining for the restructuring.

Accessibility and right to use resources: The accessibility of resources is a serious cause of the fairness, value, and effectiveness of community services and the insufficiency of fiscal resources frequently make clear poor service results. Lack of resources means incapability of any organization. Most developing countries are typically forced by lack of funding to realize decentralization policies.

The capacity of realizing institutions: legitimate decentralization has to be institutionalized and incorporate their own institutions policies into practice. The nature and capacity of that organization establish the result of decentralization strategy.

Ecological convenience: The distances of the regions enclosed by numerous local government authorities are attended by associated complexities in infrastructures and another service delivery. These features, related to the limitations of civil society organizations at the local level, which makes local participation and local responsibility even more complicated to attain what is already planned as policy (Mmari, 2005). Living in distant settlements will have incredibly different levels of experience, compassion, and adaptive ability. The majority susceptible are those paining from numerous basis of drawback are low education levels, poor health and low incomes provider (Morrison, 2009).

The Rationales for Decentralization-related to the importance of decentralization in the federal, nonfederal and unitary system of governance to decentralize the economic, political and decision making power to sub-national governments is: this helps the center to reduce the burden and to

share the authority and decision-making power with the local level. In this case, local governments have to be responsible for different service delivery and regulation such as education, health, agriculture, and infrastructures. Indeed local governments are nearer to the people to solve the problems of the community according to priorities based on, and they have the better local knowledge to overcome a problem of the communities. In a sense, in decentralized units of government, the local officials are accountable to the societies who elected them and responsible for resource allocation decision across the communities. Also, decentralizing resources, power, and autonomy to sub-national units helps to improve quality of service delivery and regulation; since, immediate feedback can be obtained from the local communities (Robinson, 2003).

Moreover, Yonatan and Kirkby (2008) argue that development, political, financial and administrative autonomy are the most visible aspects why states give decentralizing power to sub-national governments. The reason is that the sub-national governments have a better grasp of local needs and priorities than the central government does. Furthermore, decentralization is a means to practice the check and balance across levels of governments, which helps to promote government actors or non-government actors accountability towards the communities, they serve and to upgrade the opportunities for local communities to enhance their economic, political and social aspects (Tegegne and Kassahun, 2004).

Similarly, the World Bank states that decentralization as a system forces the central government to decentralize power, resources, and politics to local government when it is legalized more. These bring sustainable peace and development by ensuring political stability through empowering local representatives who are closer to the society. Therefore, the local authorities become more autonomous to decide on social, political and economic affairs of society by negotiating with the communities. Generally, in continents like Africa, the multiparty political system is creating demand for a more local voice in decision making, because, there are incredibly diversified societies (World Bank, 2000). Thus, the concept of decentralization, and its rationale mentioned show its importance of in a country like Ethiopia in its quest to form-a symmetrical federation.

3.8 Concepts of Good Governance

Good Governance is one aspect of governance where public needs to be managed effectively and efficiently based on the resources and problems they might have and should be responsive to societies interest. Meanwhile successful democratic forms of governance need an accountable leader, public participation, and transparency among the leaders and the communities at large(UNDP, 2005). Researchers in the area of good governance describes that the term good governance was introduced by the World Bank in 1998 to differentiate the crisis in the world in general and the Sub Saharan Africa in particular. This period was the time when the donors were increasingly popular and preferred and also considered as vital for promoting social, political and economic growth and improving poverty in the developing countries were without considering elements of good governance. It was understood that the reform should not take into consideration the poor and the funds were not reached to the beneficiary efficiently in those periods (Azmat and Coghill, 2006).

Good governance is also conceptualized from the public sector point of view that government would be influenced and managed to determine and to achieve the goal of the public regarding the economy, politics, and social affairs. These have a different phase which needs various features like clear policy formation referring to professional ethos, openly and reasonably working for public interests by strictly following the rule of law and to enrich citizens's participation in public interactions. Good governance requires committed leaders who actively interested and involved in management and public issues and know the rights of the people and the right and obligation of his own (Kargbo, 2009).

Mostly the concept of good governance come into view is because of the practice of bad governance that the leaders experienced such as corruption, inefficiency, unaccountability, lack of transparency, disrespect of human rights, lack of implementing the rule of law, lack of public participation are the major once. Good governance should replace these problems by intervening in the political, social and economic affairs of the societies since this hinders the development and peaceful coexistence of the society especially in developing countries. Therefore, good governance is all about effectively managing the social affairs by following the core elements of good governance like Participation-this is important in society would be taken into consideration

in decision making. And it needs to be informed and organized. Transparency-people have a say in decisions that affect their lives. Accountability-an organization or institution is accountable to those who will be affected by its decision or actions, and people can hold decision-makers accountable. But accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law. The rule of law requires a fair legal framework that is enforced impartially. This means an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible policy power. Effective and efficient human right and fundamental freedoms are respected, allowing them to live with dignity and people are free from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, gender or any other attribute (UNDP, 1997).

Elements of Good Governance-good governance are crucial means to adhere the rule of law; and therefore, responsive government is seriously linked with success in economics, development, and security (*Ibid.*). Good governance has many elements among this the following five elements are used for this study.

Participation-Participation is an essential building block for an occupied civil society. The public sector can endorse contribution of the community by endorsing legislation that reinforces the autonomy and diverse nature of media which help the nationality equally without any biases or without hiding the truth from people. And also, political participation is mainly seen by the election of the citizens; therefore, free and independent electoral management is very important for the success of election activity. Besides, people from the grassroots level should participate in decision-making activities such as planning and budgeting from the initial point up to its implementation, because participation promotes people awareness towards their rights and obligation, which promote the development of the community in particular and the country in general. Participation mainly requires skilled man powers which belief in society's public development and public institution that have sustainable policies and support from the government (ADB, 2005).

According to Creighton (2005), public participation is an ongoing process which takes into consideration about public anxiety, interests, and wisdom are included in government and private institutions decision making. To decide on different public affairs the communication should be

bi-dimensional among the government, private institutions and the public to make better decisions that supported by both groups.

Moreover, good governance needs giving access to participating in civil society in political, social and economic affairs. It needs an engaging society in the design and implementation of programs and projects, even when a certain project is implemented better if the society's view should be considered, it helps for project sustainability. These features of governance are a necessary element in securing promise and hold up for projects and enhancing the worth of their realization (IFAD, 2013). Such broad activities of participation built on freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of electing and to be elected, as well as capacities to contribute usefully. Using broad involvement in different activities is crucial, but representative democracy does not mean that community's problem should be solved since they are represented in various levels of government (UNEACAP, 2008: UNDP, 1997).

Transparency-refers to access to information by different means that the government publicizes to the society; this should be addressed without any biases to the communities by following the rules and regulations of the legal law and decision should be holistic as much as possible. The decision should enforce rules and regulations. This helps to reduce uncertainty and can help inhibit corruption among public official. For those who worry and interpret the rules and regulations into different directions, the policy has to be clear, straightforward and easy to understand and to apply (ADB, 2005).

United Nations (2007) document also describes transparency is all about the accessibility and clarity of information provided to the general public about the government activity. Furthermore, the government should also not only access to information but also ensuring this information for public participation is a crucial issue that the government takes into consideration. Lack of transparency led the officials to corruption, nepotism and it affects public sectors efficiency.

Accountability-this is a key element of good governance, since government, private institutions and stockholders should be accountable to the public in political, social and cultural affairs. Politically the officials must be accountable down to their electorate, and socially, culturally and economically they have to give the opportunity to the public, and they have to be responsible for anything wrong on public affairs. As a result, accountability is mainly concerned with those

governmental institutions to have to be responsible to the people who are influenced by their decision and activity. Furthermore, to check and balance the point of accountability for officials there must be criteria to measure the performance of public officials. Lack of accountability led the country to conflict, corruption, imbalance of the rule of law and this led the public lack trust from the government. Therefore, government and their employee should be responsible for their action. Accountability also, related to the fiscal choices that must be transparent for the public at large. These are in terms of efficient, transparent public accountability system for expenditure control and management system (Scott &Wilde, 2006).

Effectiveness and Efficiency-is mainly focus on the capacity of the officials in both government and public institutions and also how they use and implement resources in best way like fiscal issues, employment process and the sustainability of the product, besides prioritizing government services to correspond with citizen needs (UNDP, 1997).

Rule of Law-good governance needs reasonable legal frameworks that are implemented impartially. It also needs the protection of a human right, particularly for minority groups in a certain society. To implement these, it requires independent judiciary and principled constitution and police forces (*Ibid*).

Johnston (2003) describe that rule of law is a written document which has standard and included the human right, political right, a social and economic power which is accepted by the public at large. The public should respect and accept without any fear in its usefulness. Almost in any country laws should be enacted. To this end, corrupt and oppressive governments can legislate in accordance with the rule of law of the state. Therefore, according to Johnston authentic rule of law needs the cooperation of state and society, since it is complicated and deep-rooted social processes. Besides, for wrongdoers, not only legal penalties but also societal sanction on them is very important by using different media outlet to correct them. Thus, the legitimate ways of punishment should integrate with society's value to get strong attention from the public at large.

3.9 Summary

This chapter reviewed theories of ethnicity, federalism, and decentralization. In the first section of the chapter, ethnic theories are explained which helps to understand clan relations and the formation of identity and ethnic boundary and relations-within the group or outside the group or in-group and out-group ethnic harmonization and dichotomization. As Barth argues, ethnic identity is beyond boundary formation based on ethnic identity. Further, conflict theories were presented, which help conceptualize conflicts in the study area after 1991.

In the third section, the concepts of federalism are broadly discussed. Burgess (2000) definition about federation is holistic and useful to see the practicability of federalism as a means of a political system for multi-nation societies. For him, federalism encompasses institutions, structures, and techniques. It is a tangible institutional reality. According to him, the underlined point in a federation is that it a form of the democratic and constitutional rule rather than a mere division of power between central and local governments. Constitutional protection is, thus the key for federation about economic, political, and cultural self-protection. In the last sections, the concept of decentralization, its rationale, and the concept of good governance and its elements were generally examined.

Chapter Four

Review of Related Literature

4.1 Introduction

Chapter Three described the overall concepts of ethnicity, conflict, federalism and decentralization and good governance. In this chapter, I shall review and critically discuss major topics in the literature related to the Ethiopian context. These are 1) Historical over-view of Oromo-Somali relation. 2) Contending view on Ethiopia's federalism, argued by different scholars and political activists. 3) Historical and post-1991, decentralization efforts in Ethiopia. 4) Local inter-ethnic conflict after 1991 and its causes.

4.2 Oromo-Somali Relations: Historical Overview

According to Lewis "the homeland of the Eastern-Cushitic-speaking peoples must have been in southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya" (Murdock, 1959; Lewis, 1962; Greenberg, 1963; Fleming 1964; cited in Lewis, 1966:38). Thus, "the Oromo and the Somali ethnic groups were originated in southern Ethiopia; the original homeland of the Oromo may be placed in or around north-western Borana; that of the Somali in the south-eastern highlands of Ethiopia" (*Ibid*: 42).

Furthermore, "the Somali expanded to the east and north much prior than the Oromo, and that the Oromo lived only in southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya until their expansions started about 1530" (Lewis, 1966:27). Lewis added that in the 1500's and 1600's for the Oromo were times when they were expanding towards north, north-east, east, and south-east parts of the empire. It was unquestionably at this period that contact between the eastern majority of the Oromo and the western majority of the Somali began in different affairs. Accordingly, these contacts were sustained over the centuries across several directions. The most important of these contacts are with Ifat and Adal in the north; with Ogaden, in the center; with, Shebeli and Juba Valleys in the south. Thus, Oromo and Somali started to make contact and continued for the last 400 years with alternating periods of conflict and peace over grazing grounds and agricultural lands (*Ibid*).

There is a long distance territory between the Oromo and Somali, upon which they have competed with each other over a long border from Dire-Dawa in the north to the lower Juba in the south, for a long time. During that time, there were many territorial claims and counter-claims among the Oromo and Somali clans sharing the same border. An Oromo group found within Somali territory, ñno longer in continuous distribution with other Oromo, may be considered a remnant group relative to the most recent Somali movements, but was undoubtedly once in the vanguard of Oromo movement into Somali territory. In their nomadic rounds, which may cover hundreds of miles in a single year, pastoral Somali and Oromo groups must have penetrated each other's territories many times since 1500ò (Lewis, 1961: 105).

Thus, there are Oromo and Somali clans, which have contacts in the interface areas of south and southeast of Oromia. Among these groups, the Borana, Guji, Arsi, Hawiya, Garri, Gabra, Gurre, Garri Maro are the few clans who have long years of contacts between them. According to Oba (1996), the oral customs or beliefs of Borana show that their ancestors were inhabitants of Dirre and Liban before the arrival of full Boranaôs (Borana Guutu) ⁶ in 16th c. The proper Borana identity as known today emerged after the Borana Gutu has incorporated the clans of Hero Abba Biyya. This group was a small but politically and ritually more powerful than other groups. The incorporation process did not change the rights to key resources of the inhabitant groups. Because those who have wells joined new clans with their resources and only the wells owned by the departed *woreda* were divided among the Borana clans by the Abba Gada, Goba Alla (1698-1705) (Oba, 1996).

However, Turton (1975) and Schlee (1984) argued that the Borana, Arsi and Guji clans existed in the regions of Dire and Liban land today; which the Borana clan lives mainly and continuing into Northern Kenya currently. This area was inhabited by pre-Hawiya Somali cultural groups composed of people who practiced Camel pastoralism. Schlee (1989) argues that, it was *ward* who drove the first lodge and disrupted the continuous settlements of Proto-Rendile-Somali; it was the Borana using their warrior grade, which terminated the domination of the Proto-Rendile-Somali culture in a southern part of Ethiopia.

⁶ Borana *guutu*-are those Borana's who did not assimilate or change his/her religion and culture or Borana identity and live with culture of Borana (*aada seera* Borana).

Similarly, Turton (1975:531) has argued that the southward expansion of the Borana met with strong resistance, not from Oromo who had preceded them but from the Garri. Pease (1928) records the Garri tradition that earlier in the twentieth century they had lived in Serar in eastern Arsi zone and that they moved southward to Filtu, where they came into contact with well established Borana. The evidence available demonstrates that the conflict with Somalis did not begin until the early eighteenth century.

Schlee (1984, 1989:37) interprets the effects of the Oromo expansion as one in which the Borana's role was hegemonic in nature and which dispossessed the inhabitants and imposed its rules on the population of the Somaloid cultural groups. He concludes that the relationship between Borana and Somaloid groups was characterized by mutual advantages and the period was remembered as a period of relative peace (Schlee 1994a:990).

Even if there are oral and literary evidence suggesting that Borana were victims of Somali aggression. There was, however, no doubt that the merger of Borana Gutu with Hero Abba Biyya created a dominant cultural and political group. The Borana remember that they were neighbors of Somali clans in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries on their eastern border at Dhadacha Waar Abi. Contact with Garri-Liban and Somali clans probably increased as trade between the interior and the coast grew.

The group of Somali clans with whom Borana had the longest, lasting relationships was the Ajuran. According to Cassanelli (1982), the Ajuran Sultanate probably emerged between 1500-1600 A.D. At the time, Oromo occupied a vast arc of territory bordering the western margins of the Ajuran Sultanate at Kelofo. Cassanelli believes that their presence may have discouraged Oromo expansion into the present day southern Somali before 1500. The decline of Ajuran power in the middle of Shebelle in between 1590-1625 following the in-migration of the Hawiya brought changes. The coalition was overwhelming and spread by the cooperative forces of the Giledi, Jido and Bimaal Somali clans and some of the survivors went to upper Shebelle while other Ajuran crossed the Juba (Cassanelli 1982:94). Some driven to present-day northeastern Kenya and formed *gosa/gooli* alliances with Borana (Dalleo, 1975). They famous by the name Jiltu clan of the Gona Moiety (Jille gamoji) and, to differentiate them from the previous, they

were known as Jille Qulullu that is to say without *guutu*. They were integrated into the customary law of the Borana (*aadaa seera* Borana) but continued as Moslems.

During the mid-seventeenth century the Garri Marro, so called to distinguished them from the Garri Liban with whom the Borana had earlier contacts, moved down to the Juba river and came in contact with Borana in Liban-(Dalleo 1975:30-31). They occupied the land to the west of Galaana Dawa in the country called Hoggobi Marro, which bordered Dhadacha Waar Abi, and since then contacts increased as trade flourished. The interior towns such as Lugh and Bardera served as staging points for the camel caravans traveling between Borana and the coast. To reach Borana caravans from Lugh moved along the Daua before arriving at Dirre and Liban (Dalleo 1975:45-46).

Garri and Juran traders brought cloth and household items in exchange for ivory, rhino horns, coffee and salt (Donaldson Smith, 1897). The traders were called *saffaar goolo*, after the hide bags in which they carried their cloth. Each trader established client ship with an influential Borana family and hence came to be identified as *saffaarticha*, the Somali of family X or family Y supporters were responsible for negotiating prices for the trade goods after they had received their own share. Borana became active in the coastal trade and demanded and obtained permission to send caravans to Lugh in exchange for permission for Somali caravans to trade in their country. Borana was the language of trade (Abir, 1970:130).

Through trade and inter-marriage, the Garri gradually got a position in Borana land and established small settlements. To gain access to crucial resources they influenced Borana leaders with gifts, *finna* (children). Some attached themselves to particular clans. Such clan attachments were mostly ceremonial, and incomers retained their political and religious independence. Among the notable Garri families that settled in Borana, one was the family of Uruble, who were adopted by the Nonitu clan. He took over the supply of the ceremonial flags; white flags (*qoolo faaji*), and red flags (*qoolo baqaal*) used during the Gada handing over ceremonies after the Heji (Ogaden) had clashed with Borana. Peaceful trade association with Borana families and precious gifts to important elders gained Garri access to the Tula and other wells in eastern Dirre.

After the African countries got their independence from the colonial rule in 1960, Somalia, hoped to reunite all Somalis across the horn of Africa into one nation-state. When gained awareness this idea and encouraged armed rebellion along the border of Ethiopia and Kenya at the begging of 1960th. Therefore, an ardent rise of Somali nationalism emerged and motivated by the dream of building ñgreater Somaliò by reuniting Somalis of French Somaliland (Djibouti), British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, Ethiopia and British East Africa (Kenya). These in turn triggered inter-ethnic conflicts across the border regions of Bale, Guji and Borana area between the pastoralists and agro-pastoralist groups. Thus, the Ethiopian government (then the imperial regime) became more doubtful of Somali pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, and it began supporting and arming the Guji, and Borana pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in their conflicts with the Somali (Markakis, 1987).

The interference of the Imperial regime further intensified the antagonism between the pastoralist groups in the areas. The local administration support to Bale, Guji, and Borana pastoralists and the Somali landlord (*balabats*) exclusion from the administration system in 1960s has led the Somali pastoralists to join the group arising arms against the Imperial regime in the area (Abdulahi, 2005). As a result, the government took action very harshly on Somali clans all the way through by killings of herds, control of movement and burden of levying heavy charges. These oppressions forced the Somali pastoralists to look for support from the new state of Somali, which was motivated to build a greater Somalia (*Ibid.*). The logistics later reciprocated by providing arms, munitions, to the Somali clans of Ethiopia and even to the members of the Bale peasants uprising against the Imperial regime in 1970.

After the downfall of the Emperor's regime in 1974, again the contradiction in this interface area continued during the Derg period. Then the local conflict between pastoralists intensified and the designation changed into the Ethio-Somalian war in 1977-78.

At the end of the 1970s, the irredentist idea created after the Somalia got independence to build greater Somalia had negatively affected the goal of maintaining peace in the horn of Africa. There was Ogaden war, between Ethiopia and Somalia, in late 1977; the Somalis captured most of the Ogaden areas. In addition, this war brought vast outflows of Ethiopian Somalis into Somalia. However, the Derg got military support from USSR and Cuba to regain control over the

region in early 1978. The Somalis faced serious military challenge and forced to lose strategic areas and eventually total defeat (Henze, 2000). This war forced thousands of the Ethiopian Somali to enter Somalia refugee camps, where they lived for about 11 years (Hagmann, 2006). Throughout the 1980s Somalia did not continue as the stable regime in the horn of Africa. In this period, the Ethiopian Somali who wanted to unite with Somalia continued to challenge the Derg regime. However, the OAU effort, in the form of organized peace negotiations at both Mogadishu and Khartoum, to reconcile the two sides by the end of 1981 was not successful (*Ibid.*).

Both Ethiopia and Somali used to support rebel groups against each other. Ethiopia supported a rebel group named Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia and Somalia on her part supported a secessionist group of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which fought against the Ethiopian army in Ogaden. By the end of-1980s and the beginning 1990s, the Ziyad Barre regime collapsed, and there was famine and civil war in Somalia. In addition, this led the Somali society to reverse refugee path of Somalis to Ethiopia. Some of the Somali immigrants joined refugee camps and others crossed the border (with or without their cattle and camels) to live in new areas. This process brought a new wave of Somali people to Ethiopia and pushed the existing further west into Guji and Borana territory from southeast to south parts of Ethiopia (Helland, 1998). Many of these immigrants were heavily armed pastoralists (Watson, 2001:10).

When a land policy was observed, on the Oromo-Somali relations during Dergue and Imperial regimes, the Imperial regime stated that the state and pastoralists owned all land that is deemed not permanently cultivated were officially evicted from their lands. According to Yacob (2000), the 1955 revised constitution of the Imperial regime clearly stated that pastoral territory, referred to as *zelan* land, was state property. In the early 1960s, consecutive support was made for livestock expansion programmes, which mainly focuses on market facilitation, rangeland services, water-well and veterinary services are those who get special attention from the government side, even if it did not get continuity to support pastoralists (Mesfin, 2000).

The major aim of this programme was to enhance or increase the number of water wells by excavating different boreholes and ponds for animals to be used in different season. In the 1970s this program has weakened the traditional ways of water wells and rangeland management and

led to exacerbating rangeland and water wells degradation in today's Oromia and Somali regional states border, since the program did not give attention to customary institutions (Helland, 2000; Walker, 1998 cited in Hagmann and Alemaya, 2008).

The 1975 land nationalization by the Derg regime brought the question of pastoralists under peasant associations; they were not seen as an exclusive category, and considered as a peasants, who use the land for the individual purpose, while for the pastoralists land is communal; because of their lifestyle. Nevertheless, the policy promised to increase water wells and range-land management and to increase service delivery. Of course, pastoralists have enjoyed recognition by the state (Getachew, 2000).

Moreover, the 1975 land reform policy of the Derg played a great role for the regime to get acceptance and recognition from the society and at the same time to mobilize people under its program and mainly to control state machinery. According to PFE, IIRR, and DF (2010) documents, the land proclamation gave the pastoralists communal right over their lands; they can use resource management based on their customary law on rangeland and water wells management and also to use this land for the farming purposes. Moreover, they were ordered to pay all the taxes to the government not to traditional chiefs in their areas, like what they used to do during the Imperial regime. In addition, the policy urged the pastoralists to create an association to enhance their service delivery in water wells and to increase rangeland management and settlement.

The newly established association helped the pastoralist to enhance, what they already have since pastoralists have cooperation on rangeland management and water wells, based on their customary laws. The policy did not force them to distribute and redistribute their lands (*Ibid*).

Similarly, Getachew argues, the directive did not erode the communal right to land in pastoral communities; instead, it gave respect to and recognized the customary laws of the society that support resource management and role of elders in a community. In the newly formed association elders were assigned to play great role by facilitating different activities for the society such as resource management, rangeland and water wells usage and they promoted the

migration of pastoralist from one area to the other during dry and wet seasons. They also assisted while crossing local and international boundaries (Getachew, 2002).

However, according to Helland (1998), the Derg land policy and pastoralist association unexpectedly underestimated the customary institutions of the societies, because the association experienced tight state control. Thus, there are times when the pastoralist elders of Borana officially asked to overview the association, to reduce the undermining of the customary institutions.

In 1987, the Derg came up with new administrative reform. In this reform Borana was given a separate administrative status, and Borana clan dominated the administrative positions in Borana *awuraja* (Helland, 1998). Hence, according to Abdulahi (2005), the Somali pastoralists felt that the Derg government was unfair towards them. In response, the Derg government managed the Somali grievance by putting huge military presence to reduce the inter-clan violence rather than trying to bring a lasting solution to the problems. Therefore, during the Derg regime, the inter-clan conflict between the Borana, Guji, Arsi Oromo and the Somali clans such as Digodia, Ajuran, Garri, and Gabra remained unresolved since they shared border

Hagman (2005:4) argued, "historically, relations between the Ethiopian highland and its Somali periphery has been characterized by successive phases of Somali resistance to their Christian highland rulers." To a certain degree, this resistance reflected itself in the "proto-national" Dervish uprising of Abdulla Hassan, and later on grew to a large-scale conflict in the 1977-78 Ogaden war, which led the Somalis and the Highlanders' local and central administrators to become suspicious of each other. Nevertheless, from that time onwards the Somali, the highlanders, and the administrators' relationships were not friendly and smooth. Consequently, the Somali have not fully integrated themselves into the Ethiopian state and that was not clearly visible (Barnes 2000; Gebru Tareke 2000; Lewis 1989, 2002; cited in Hagman, 2005).

The incomplete integration of the Ethiopian Somali Region was a continuation of the Emperors' regime, during which the central government lacked genuine political commitment to accommodate the Somalis to the center; rather it chose using forceful and violent action to

annex them to the center. This action led the relationship between, on the one hand, Somali clans, and on the other hand, the Highlanders and local and central level administrators, to remain highly antagonistic. Thus, the Somalis feel, they were discriminated against and marginalized by Highlanders' administration; since, the Imperial regime, the Somali issues were treated by military action rather than by civil handling. As a result, the Somalis had indifferent or elusive attitudes towards state institutions in Ethiopia. The conflict between the Somali clans and highlanders administrators is not only territorial issues, but also economic issues were there in place. This relates to huge import of 'contraband' goods from Somaliland and Somalia, which the Ethiopian Somalis trade for their survival (*Ibid*).

4.3 Ethiopia's Ethnic Federalism: contending views

There are two competing views on whether Ethiopian ethnic federalism is relevant to the management of inter-ethnic relations (inter-clan relations in my case). Some groups advocate of the system saying 'ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is desirable,' and there are opponents who argue against the system saying 'ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is undesirable.' The issue of desirability and undesirability of Ethiopia's federalism can be seen from many angles. This thesis evaluates the desirability and undesirability of ethnic federalism in light of sustainable peace and development (social, political and economic) from local perspective pertinent to the selected study areas. Both views have been debated by media argued in journal articles, books, and magazines for the last two decades by different scholars, elites, and political activists. Some of their views are reviewed below.

4.3.1 Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia is Desirable

Since 1991, Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) started to establish a federal form of governance in Ethiopia. Some scholars argued that the federal government system has answered the basic questions of nations, nationalities and peoples' of Ethiopia. Among the scholars, Hashim (2010), for instance, refers the Transitional Government Charter or interim constitution (1991-94) and the 1995 constitution of the FDRE as new legal frameworks in Africa to accommodate the existing diversity, which emphasizes the equality of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia. The Constitution created an ethnically based federal

republic that has at least two levels of government, which is a break from prior Imperial and military regimes that were dictatorial and centralized unitary rule. Similarly, Tronvoll (2000:20) has argued that "the Ethiopian constitution may seemingly be characterized as one of the most minority-friendly constitutions in Africa, or even globally."

Therefore, the constitution creates a parliamentary system of government (FDRE, 1995, Article [45]) with power distributed between a federal government and a number of states (*Ibid.* Article [1]). The Federal Government is responsible for the general national policy and strategy concerning economic, and social development matters. Further, the Federal Government controls national standards and policies related to public health and education, by enacting laws related to land and natural resources. And also, administers the armed forces, oversees the National Bank and regulates currency, handles foreign policy matters, and is responsible for other matters traditionally reserved to federal governments operating within a federalist system (*Ibid.* Article, [51-2-7]).

In addition, the constitution recognized and granted rights to Ethiopia's ethnic groups. Further, the constitution sets forth the shared powers and responsibilities of the federal and state governments with regard to Ethiopia's ethnic groups. The Constitution creates nine states based on settlement patterns, language, identity, and the consent of the people living within them. Furthermore, each of Ethiopia's "Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples" has an unconditional right to self-determination including the right to secession (*Ibid.* Article 39).

Moreover, from the point of view of the proponents of ethnic regionalization, approval of the recognition of group rights, seeing creation of ethnic-based administrative entities as the only meaningful approach to resolving ethnic dissatisfactions and therefore, ethnic federalism is the right way of governance to correct the past injustice among the groups in Ethiopia (Alemseged, 2004). Sara Vaughan associated Alemseged view with the day-to-day widely promulgated view of the ruling government. Thus, the EPRDF government argues that Ethiopia's nations, nationalities, and peoples have experienced centuries of domination by a central government that forced the use Amharic language and culture upon them. Granting "nationalities" their cultural, ethnic, and political aspirations is necessary to rectify historical discriminations of the country. Therefore, equality among nations, nationalities, and peoples cannot be achieved by imposing an

influential pre-defined national identity upon them instead by accepting the existing diversity and allowing the expression of their interests at the central level (Vaughan, 2003).

Consequently, the federal system of governance brought significant recognition to culture and language of many marginalized groups. Such rights were also crucial for pastoralists, agro-pastoralist, and minorities who are far from the center and were hardly seen as equal citizens during the regimes of monarchy and military junta. These groups were excluded from education, health services, infrastructures and major business opportunities. It is argued that their empowerment should be credited to the EPRDF (EPRDF, 2000). For example, regarding education, every ethnic group now has the right of instruction in its language. The Ethiopian Constitution declares the equal status of all of the country's languages (FDRE 1995 Constitution, Article 5[1]). Given this provision, Smith argues that "two or three languages are taught in the schools; primary school students learn their mother tongue; secondary and higher education institutions teach in English. This has required major investment in education, notably in SNNPR, where more than 23 large groups speak their own tongues" (Smith, 2008:23).

Similarly, Kymlicka (1995) argued that language exemplify the difficulty of inequality that a country encounter complexity, especially if it does not recognize a particular language. One of the measurements of the continued existence of an ethnic group relies on the status of its culture and language, whether or not its language is the language of administration and education. "Giving formal recognition to a language safeguards that it is passed on to future generations along with the culture with which it is inseparably linked" (*Ibid*: 96).

On the contrary, if a language lacks official recognition, the culture it represents risks marginalization or even extinction. This fear increases ethnic distrust and doubt and mobilizes ethnic communities to engage in political action to protect their group interests. For example, the civil war in Sudan since 1956 can be, at least in part, an example of language and cultural warfare. Similarly, the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) complaints in opposition to the Ethiopian monarchy and military junta were related, in various evaluations, to the lack of official recognition for their respective languages (Alemante, 2003). Thus, it can be convincingly argued that giving recognition, acceptance, and autonomy for the

ethnolinguistic groups's culture and languages is a means to bring about sustainable peace and development mainly in multiethnic contexts like Ethiopia.

The proponents of the desirability of ethnic federalism further substantiate the arrangement with the fact that it warrants all citizens's treatments with genuine equality. Therefore, the constitution tends to recognize and give more attention to determination, which is largely accepted by different groups. This plan helps decentralize power and function for regions and local councils; within this, there is the response for 'nationalities question' by accommodating the diversities of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of the country. This is arguably seen as the means to bring nationwide peace, stability, and development (Assefa, 2007).

Likewise, Horguelin (1999) has argued that the essence of federalism is an attempt to solve ethnic claims at the local level though, but it is also supposed to keep the country united as a whole. As we can see from the FDRE constitution, Ethiopian federation is made of free and sovereign states and the central government. Thus, constitutionally, nations, nationalities, and peoples are allowed to exercise their traditional rights at the local level and, at the same time, keep the unity of Ethiopia. The new system of government (ethnic federalism) allows people to be participating with and recognize levels of government, together with appointments of representatives of all ethnic groups at local, regional and national level (FDRE 1995, Article [54] & [61]).

The proponents of Ethiopia's ethnic federal system of governance provide several additional long-term benefits for the state. Ethnic federal system of governance promotes the central government's recognition of the importance of group and individual ethnic rights. Further, ethnic federal system of governance helps in the avoidance of ethnic disintegration and brutal civil war through nurturing ethnic and regional autonomy while maintaining Ethiopia as a formal political union. In addition, the creation of a legal, political space for ethnic identities and social ties allows the state to tie together the available political strength as an integrated polity. Along with these long-term benefits, ethnic federal system of governance contributes to the overall state unity. Therefore, ethnic federal system of governance is a clear break from the past regimes that had ruled Ethiopian citizens for centuries.

4.3.2 Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia is Undesirable

Ethiopia's federal system of governance has been implemented for more than two decades; however, it is still resisted by different scholars and political activists. The opponent groups argue that this system is the most controversial EPRDF policy. Even some of them consider it as a dangerous concept that will eventually dismember the country like the previous the communist federations of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Alemante, 2003; Solomon, 1993). There are extremist opponents of ethnic federalism who believe that Ethiopia appears to be a new colonial empire in the pre-1991 era and also consider the new government in Ethiopia as yet another colonial deception, and as a result advocate "decolonization" (Asafa, 1998).

Alemante (2003) elaborates the degree of difficulty in accommodating the demands and claims by ethnic groups. According to this author, these claims are classified into three broad categories: First: "ethnic groups may demand to share political power and to be represented in the various institutions of the state. Second, they may seek rights that affirm and preserve their particular identities, cultures, and languages. Finally, some ethnic groups may seek to establish their own independent nation-states" (Alemante, 2003:53). Indeed, Alemante argues as "Ethiopia's practice shows, when the country intentionally uses ethnicity as a means of political uniqueness, ethnic groups who might not have been aware of their ethnicity regroup themselves and claimed their uniqueness" (*Ibid*: 79). This formal division of ethnic groups in a country may be an advantage for the member of a particular ethnic group to live in their own sub-state.

Opponents say that ethnic-based system of governance does not support leaders from different ethnic groups to work together for national integration. Instead, ethnic federal system of governance encourages polarization of the division among ethnic groups based on their identities and interests. As a result, different neighbouring ethnic groups may not cooperate for the national unity (*Ibid*.)

Alemante (2003:86) further argues "Ethiopia's marriage of federalism with ethnicity appeal to too many difficulties to be practical or feasible. By its very nature, such a "system relies on dividing citizens along ethnic lines and institutionalizes their division." He further argues that once ethnic federalism concept is understood by the people like he mentioned above, it does a

modest possibility to avoid this understand from Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples within a short period. Therefore, according to Alemante ethnic-based federal system of governance is a poor constitutional approach because of the above-mentioned weaknesses. In addition, he added ethnic federalism had increased differences and conflicts among ethnolinguistic groups since 1991. Elazar (1987) argues that federalism in general by its nature has no secured stable means of governance, let alone when it is coupled with ethnicity. Generally, federalism has no distinguished record as a stable form of government.

The other criticism of Ethiopia's ethnic federalism is based on the view that it hinders economic development. The opponents say ethnic federalism can limit the mobility of workers, goods, and resources across subnational jurisdiction, and thereby weakening the idea of a common market. Thus, uneven contact leads the groups in to negative attitude and intolerance and excluding others members from their groups. This leads the ethnolinguistic groups to competition rather than cooperation. They say that because of leaders in ethnic, regional government considers themselves as agents of their ethnic groups, they have fewer responsibilities to share their resources with other ethnic groups (Daniel, 2003). Thus, as was the case in the Soviet Union, the opponents especially Alemante (2003), argued that "Ethiopia's federal government shares little of its political or economic power with the sub-national governments." And also see Abbink, *supra* note.⁷

The Ethiopian constitution appears to support the ethnic subunits' power to formulate and implement their economic development plan and strategies. When it is examined, however, the constitution shows evidently the central government has controlling power and responsibility to manage the national economy.⁸ Therefore, the regional governments have few resources, which are free from the control of the central government. This implies that the desire to decentralize financial resources is weak. Thus, regions encounter difficulty in exercising their autonomy on

⁷ See Abbink, *supra* note 9, at 167 (stating that "[t]he actual division of federal powers between member states and federal government (as defined in the constitution) is 'not federal enough'").

⁸ See FDRE Constitution, art. LII, § 2, cl. c-e (granting the states the power to "formulate and execute economic, social and development policies, strategies and plans," to levy and collect taxes, and to administer land and other resources).

the issues of economic development at local levels (Alemnate, 2003: 80). Therefore, the opponents equate the case with what Nwabueze (1984) expresses in the case in Nigeria and Congo on resources sharing that led to the demands for the political division as the central government tries to reallocate resources among the subunits more fairly. The pro-independence tendencies of Katanga in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Biafra in Nigeria were irritated, in no small part, by the desire to have utmost self-government and control over their resource. However, there was no such massive dispute between the federal government and the member states in Ethiopia.

Young has also argued, in spite of formal policy and rhetoric, Ethiopia has only nominally devolved decision-making power to local levels. All important political decisions must be taken at the center or be in line with central policies (Young, 1996:59). The federal government employs different methods to control or maneuver policy in the regional states and policymaking come down from the EPRDF executive committees via the EPRDF's allied parties in local government. Executives and members of the regional councils are often found waiting to implement decisions taken at the federal level (*Ibid*).

Ethiopia's federal system of government further criticized in its operation at grass root local levels. Ketijel (2009) has argued that *kebele* administrators are assisted by model farmers known as *ñcadres* that are ruling party members. Their duties are mobilizing the farmers for a government program to bring development in the rural areas. This follows the top-down order in which federal, regional and district offices describe policy involvement and share that *kebele* staff then forces upon farmers. In the name of nationwide development, the EPRDF need farmers to contribute their money *ñvoluntarily*, time and effort for construction, conservation and too many various public works. Moreover, during elections, the *kebele* officials are the backbone of EPRDF to stay in power (Ketijel, 2009).

The number and shape of districts and *kebeles* have continuously evolved since 1991, as groups were awarded the good side of self-administration to have their own subunit to get access to resources and autonomy as district, special district or special zones. While the federal architecture is dynamic, its strategies and principles are not changed. Ethnic federalism presumes that nations, nationalities, and peoples are homogeneous and occupy clearly bordered territories.

However, ethnic groups relate to distinct locations, their settlement patterns are often complex, because they are seldom homogeneous. In addition, pastoralists have different relations to territory in the semi-arid lowlands than farmers (Schlee and Shongolo, 1995).

Moreover, the opponents of ethnic federalism are criticizing the system on the basis of economic distribution, peace, and social relation. Opposition party president of Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP) Mushe Semu says Ethiopia's federal system lacks the basic standards. It is largely based on language and cultural borders by ignoring economic boundaries and equities. As far as federalism is concerned, he says, there must be equitable economic distribution and conducive environment for appropriate governance system. For him, the EPRDF focused on language groups and psychology of identity simply ignoring other decisive elements of federalism. "The existing ethnic federalism in Ethiopia can answer only nations and nationalities's rights to learn and work with their language. But it fails to deal with social and economic issues, justice and related matters," he said.⁹

Opposition parties such as the former (Medrek) accept ethnic-based federalism in principle, but they argue that the EPRDF is using federalism as an instrument of hegemonic control. The opposition parties believe that the EPRDF failed to materialize what it promised in 1991 such as on: breaking the vicious cycle of hunger and poverty, democratization and the rule of law, solving environmental crisis, and arriving at a viable national economic development.

Many opposition parties describe ethnic federalism as a hateful TPLF strategy to fix divisions among ethnic groups to facilitate its divide and rule goal. Most opposition supporters make the contention that the TPLF manipulates ethnic identities and conflicts to stay in power (Makau, 1993).

Both groups's critiques of the federal system of governance have their good reasons mainly based on theories, principles and legal documents provisions. Supporters grasp that the federal system

⁹Mushe Semu, President of Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), "Ethiopia's federalism lacks fundamentals" The Ethiopian Herald, 20 December 2014.

of governance could decrease groups' difference, encourage accommodation of diversity and self-rule, support ethnic agreement through peaceful co-existence and by so doing it reduces secession tendencies. In contrast, opponents argue that ethnic federalism could establish ethnic prejudice, block individual citizens' rights, reinforce centrifugal forces, generate pointless ethnic rivalry and produce unsafe reactions like ethnic cleansing, exclusion, and disintegration of the nation. However, I argued that both views need largely empirical investigation from a local perspective to judge the workability and unworkability of the federal system of governance in Ethiopia.

Moreover, there are arguments by some scholars that federalism equates by itself with democratization. Certainly, the concept of federalism mainly goes with more decentralization of decision making power and autonomy to local governments. As many scholars argued, decentralized decision-making power and autonomy to the local government does not essentially exist only in the nation that follows a federal system of governance. This is because decentralization of decision-making can also take place in unitary states (USAID, 2009). The political system of a given country matters.

A lot of evidence shows that there are unitary states that have a good practice of their democratic implementation with the best practice of decentralization program, which improves the lives of their societies. Therefore, the issue is that "the fundamental nature of the state is not the structure of the state"; when the system is under single-party control, the traditional way of governance and federal system of governance indicate the name of states not the essence of the states (*Ibid.*). In the case of Ethiopia, for the fact that the country has been under a single party control in the last two decades, the implementation of federalism and decentralization at the local community level could be questioned.

4.4 Decentralization in Ethiopia: pre and post-1991

Decentralization is not a new experience in Ethiopian history and has been exercised in different periods in unique ways in the modern era of the country. Thus, Ethiopia has experienced three forms of decentralization in three regimes. The first decentralization was designed by Emperor Haileselassie I (1930-1974). The second decentralization was by the Derg regime from (1974-

91), and the third decentralization is by EPRDF from 1991 to present (Negalegn, 2010). Each regimes ways of conducting decentralization are presented below.

4.4.1 The Imperial Regime

The imperial regime attempted decentralization was not based on ethnic realities of the empire. This is to say decentralization was implemented in the way it helped the emperor to monopolize power or to grant absolute power to him. Cultural and structural inequalities typified the imperial rule, with ethnic and regional dissatisfaction rising until the revolution of 1974 overthrew the emperor regime (Mulalem, 2009). The first attempt to exercise decentralization has been made by Emperor Haileselassie I in 1966. One of the first such efforts was in the form of local self-administration at *awraja* or sub-province level by Order No. 43 of 1966 (Paul and Clapham 1967). The order established a system of elected *awraja* councils to exercise jurisdiction over local affairs such as building economic and social infrastructure. It was a policy draft submitted to the then parliament for approval. The imperial government proposed the 1966 Awraja self-administration proclamation as a direct project to make 50 Awraja self-administering units with substantial autonomy; the Haileselassie government first attempt to decentralize local and regional government in Ethiopia was made in 1966(Meheret, 1998).

However, Mulugeta argues that,

...the plan was not to create these autonomous sub-provinces, but the selection was made with focus only on macro political stability. While on the one hand, the purpose was to deconcentrate the powers of the nobility around the king and create broad-based support from the local people, but on the other hand it was a response to pressure for a self-rule that gradually grew within different nations and regions. This was a time when the old system was pregnant with the new. However, it was not successful because the parliament voted against it (which led to the total collapse), with the feeling that it would create a loophole for fragmentation and secession (Mulugeta (2012:57).

4.4.2 The Derg (Military) Regime

The second decentralization attempt was exercised by Derg, which offered administrative ‘autonomy’ for five regions-Assab, Eritrea, Tigray, Dire Dawa and Ogaden. The military government attempted to retain a unitary state and address the national question within a framework of Marxism Leninism (Mulualem 2009:8).

The establishment of autonomous administrative regions was made effective by Proclamation No. 14 of 1987 (PDRE, 1987A). Twenty-five administrative regions (including Addis Ababa) and five so-called autonomous regions were asymmetrically and selectively created in 1987, based on a proposal submitted by the Institute of Nations and Nationalities which was organized by the Workers Party of Ethiopia. The autonomous regions consisted of Eritrea, Aseb, Tigray, Dire Dawa and Ogaden. This structural reform in the country was a new initiative, but there were many complaints about it (Mulugeta, 2012).

The autonomous and administrative regions were further divided into *awrajas* thus founding a three level of division center, region, and *awraja*. The committee set up to classify regions used a lot of criteria such as nationality, economic and geographical variables, administrative efficiency, border areas and their political state of affairs (Mulatu, 1990 cited in Tegenge, 1998). The application of the criteria, however, was subjective and there was no clear basis for quantifying and weighing them (Tegenge, 1998). This was somehow able to break the traditional pattern of structure but created a lot of gaps and grievances again. The Derg’s plan to decentralize the Ethiopian state was an answer to political force planned to give some autonomy to groups fiercely opposed to central rule (Mulugeta, 2012).

Tegenge, (1998) noted that the Dergue decentralization in Ethiopia lasted for four years from 1987 to 1991, and give emphasis to the significance of nationalities and raised the awareness of minority nationalities. The decentralization, however, was not able to address important features such as fiscal decentralization and as a result was not able to give the people the authority to determine their own social and economic affairs. Similarly, by eliminating the lowest administrative unit, the *woreda*, the decentralization removed governance from the local people

(*Ibid*). In the last decade of its rule, ethnic-based liberation fronts had strengthened their attack on the military government leading to the regime's end in 1991.

4.4.3 The EPRDF Rule

The third decentralization is implemented by the efforts exerted by the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to preserve the Ethiopian state on the basis of ethnic federalism largely as well as cultural, language and political autonomy at regional and sub-national levels (Mulalem, 2009 cited in Negalegn, 2010). The Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, Proclamation Number 1/1991 and the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1995) were landmark achievements with regard to placing the foundation for federalism by introducing decentralized government systems (*Ibid*).

The Transitional Government of Ethiopia, which succeeded the Derg after seventeen years of struggle in 1991, adopted a federal form of state in 1992. The Ethiopian federal system assumed its current shape and form in 1995 following the approval of the national constitution. The 1995 EPRDF constitution recognized nine Regional States and one city administration of Addis Ababa. In addition, the state's Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somalia, Benshangul/Gumuz, Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples, Gambela and the Harari People (FDRE, 1995(Article, 47)).

According to the Federal Constitution, each of the nine regional states has their own constitution, flag, legislature, executives, judiciary, and police. It was granted power to choose its working language. The constitution allows further decentralization from regional state to sub-regional units for establishing regional administration on the basis of self-determination and a democratic system. Regional states were grand powers for formulating and executing economic and social development policies and strategies; administering land and natural resources on the basis of the federal law. And also, determining taxes and collecting revenue from regional sources; formulating and executing statutes concerning civil servants administration and work conditions in the region; and maintaining peace and order in the region and establishing regional police forces(FDRE, 1995).

Moreover, in the constitution, zones are mentioned explicitly as a structure to be used for administrative convenience. According to (UN-HABITAT 2002), cited in Negalegn, 2010:51),

in all regions, zonal administrators have been installed which are mostly appointed, except in the most diverse region its name is quite revealing, i.e., Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples, (SNNP) where they are elected. The status of zonal administrations is not defined in the evolving federal structure in Ethiopia. There is no mention of Zonal Administrations as the recognized level of local government in most regional constitutions. A zonal function remains one of supervising the work of woreda and kebele administrations. These are an exception to the SNNPRs where zones have been designated as separate tiers of administration and government with elected councils, and administrative structures.

Moreover, Ethiopia's federal structure involves the *woreda* as the third administrative unit, the region as the second unit and the federal as the highest unit. The three levels of governments have their own three main functional support of government:

...the legislative, the executive and the judicial, to be performed by government organs established at central, regional and local levels. The Woreda Executive Committee prepares social services and economic development plans, programs and budgets. It submits development plans, programs and budgets to the Woreda Council and implements them upon approval. The Woreda Administration is given similar authority and functions with Woreda Council and the Woreda Executive Committee (Tegenge, 1998:8).

Moreover, Tegenge argues that the current decentralization in Ethiopia has some association with the past decentralization in terms of emphasizing nationalities and using some previous administrative regions as current zones. However, the current devolution is far better than the previous one, because it brings governance closer to people and provides them with the power to decide on their own political, social and economic issues. Besides, the federal constitution allows the regional governments to create their own local governments. Based on this direction the

regional governments establish zonal and *woreda* administration units. The zonal administration used for *woreda* supervision in most regions; which help the regional government to coordinate *woredas*. Yet, the decentralization program in these two phases (the first step was federal to regional and the second phase was at *woreda* level) does not create any requirements for inter-regional and/or *woreda* collaboration and the federal government does not take the directive in creating such cooperation between the three levels of governments (*Ibid.*).

4.5 Post 1991 Local Inter-Ethnic/clans Conflict in Ethiopia: An Overview

Some researchers have been done in Ethiopia during the post-1991 era on conflicts in general and among pastoralists of the lowlands in particular. However, review of the available literature on conflicts among pastoralists of southeastern and southern Ethiopia shows that some research gaps are evident. Most of the studies only emphasize a general tendency of conflict in the region as a whole with little or no reference to the specific case of the southeast and south part of Ethiopia. In addition, a little was said about the issue from a historical perspective.

The main post-1991 inter-ethnic conflicts observed in Ethiopia were: the Oromo-Somali conflict, Arsi-Oromo and Halaba conflict, the Gedeo-Guji conflict, the Borana-Garri conflict, Karayu Oromo and the neighboring Amhara conflict, Gumuz-Oromo conflict, the Silte-Gurage conflict, the Anuak-Nuer conflict, the Berta-Gumuz conflict, and, the Afar-Issa conflict. The major root causes of these conflicts were explored by different researchers as highlighted as follows:

There are few attempts in the last few years, for instance by Tsegaye Ababa (2009) who worked on inter-ethnic conflicts between Arsi-Oromo and Halaba ethnic group in Oromia and SNNPRS. He mainly emphasized the root causes, aggravating factors and mechanisms of conflict management in the study area. Girum Kinfemichael (2011) worked on federalism and ethnic conflict management in Ethiopia taking the case of Guji-Gedeo conflict. The focus of this study was to explore the causes and ways of managing the recent conflicts. Bethlehem Baysasaw (2010) also worked on the inter-ethnic conflict in Ethiopia taking, the case of Karayu Oromo and the neighboring Amhara. The main objective of her thesis was to point out the root and aggravating causes of conflicts as well as its dynamics. Similarly, Gemede Fekadu (2010) who worked on conflict management under the Ethiopian federal system with emphasis on the case of

Gumuz-Oromo conflict in western Ethiopia has mainly investigated the root causes and conflict management system.

In general, all these researchers's theses has pointed out that federal system of governance; ethnic division and border disputes are causes of conflict in the border of Oromia and other neighboring regions. There are also conflicts between the indigenous and settlers, such as the Oromo-Amhara conflict of Eastern Wollega, as Assefa (1995) states, it was a violent inter-ethnic conflict and suppressed by force when it opposed forced evacuation by the Oromo against the settler Amhara in Horo, Addis Alem, KIRAMU, and Northeastern Wollega. This conflict is related to the social, economic and political imbalance of the two groups's interest in the past and in the present time.

Moreover, some scholars have also worked on pastoralist conflicts. For example, Muhammad (2005) conducting research on the shifting nature of pastoral conflicts in the southeastern part of Ethiopia focusing on the case of the Boran and Digodi clan which their livelihood is pastoralists. This author would argue that the conflict between Borena and Digodi could not be reduced to an ethnic division. Instead, it is competition over resources. Muhammad's, argument lacks the specificity of the conflict, and he generalized the issues.

The competition over the territory of Oromo-Somali conflict has its long-term roots, but the post-1991 political, administrative arrangement in Ethiopia has given a new and greater impetus to territorial claim and counterclaims (Asnake, 2009, Fekadu, 2011). These new claims are based on border and identity to benefit from self-determination option recognized by the provision of the 1995 FDRE constitution.

However, when one looks at the nature of life in this border area since they are pastoralists, it is difficult to judge based on border and identity as inherent causes. Because it is difficult to identify their identities and even border since both groups are mutually dependent on one another particularly socially and economically. The 2004 referendum conducted by the House of Federation was a good evidence since it failed to satisfy the two conflicting groups (Liban *woreda* of Guji zone (Oromia region) and Filtu *woreda* of Liban zone (Somali region). And also, other adjacent *woredas/kebeles* of both regions, because of the double identity of the people along the border. Moreover, there are ethnic entrepreneurs among the local officials, which

created difficulties for the House to resolve the ethnic lines between the regions; and to determine the border that would satisfy all groups. Moreover, the House of Federation did not understand the reality on the ground, and local officials misinformed them.

The Borana-Gerri conflict, ñwas a violent inter-ethnic conflict which manifested itself as a result of the Borana ethnic groupôs dissatisfaction; with the Gerriôs actions to get grazing lands and water resources that allegedly belonged to the Borana in the Oromia Regional Stateò (Befikadu, 1999:24; cited in Lubo, 2012: 67). However, Asnake (2002: 19; cited in Lubo, 2012: 67), explains different causes of the Borana-Garri conflict and he attributed these conflictual problems to the new developments of Gerriôs demand for ethnic self-assertion and related difficulties of ethnic boundary delimitationsò. Asnake too added that:

...this conflictual problem, like that of the Siltie-Gurage, was expressed as ethnic self-assertion of the Gerri who began identifying themselves with the Somali, yet ascribed to a number of interrelated factors that includes traditional cattle raiding and competition over pasturelands as well as water resources which manifested itself as conflict over frontiers between Oromia and Somali regional states (Asnake, 2002: 14; cited in Lubo, 2012:67-68).

Similarly, the main cause of conflicts among the Borana, Gabbra and Garri clans ãn the past was competition over access to land resources such as water and pasture (Bassi 1997: 271, cited in Asnake 2009: 184). Likewise, Mark (2002) argues that the Oromo-Somali conflict which manifested violently and finally handled by House of Federation by conducting a referendum in the entire border of Oromia and Somali regions was competition on natural resourcesò (Mark, 2002:1).

Therefore, most of the research done in-post-1991 era on ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia consisted of multifaceted variables; but it is simply considered as a mere inter-ethnic differences. Hizkias (2001) argues that many researchers are in position to label the inter-ethnic and intra-clan conflicts in Ethiopia as conflicts between different ethnic groups like those mentioned above. Intra clan conflicts between Somali clans such as Marehan, Digodia, Issa, Garri, Gabra and that of Oromos like Guji and Borana clans has been considering as if it emanates from ethnic

differences. Asnake, (2002:16-19) too identified the post-1991 conflicts among the Ethiopian ethnic groups as inter-ethnic problems rooted in an ethnic-based federal system of governance since 1991.

However, the real causes of the conflicts in Ethiopia were inequitable distributions of economic and political power or the demand for access to political and economic benefits. In addition, almost all of the major conflicts in post-1991 period were not based on ethnic antagonisms. Until now, many used to label them as 'inter-ethnic conflicts' because the name stands for the participants of a conflict in a general term as an ethnic group. However, the conflict has been the result of the past injustice, which did not equally share economic and political space, and this brought inter-ethnic clan distance among many clans in the country at large. Since, there were prejudice, stereotypes and ethnocentrism ideas among the groups; the problem remained unabated until the present.

Similarly, Lubo (2012) state that some scholars simply generalize that conflicts are inter-ethnic, but, others strongly argue that inter-ethnic conflicts in the Horn of Africa in general and in Ethiopia in particular considered as driven by multifarious complex and interrelated variables rather than pure ethnic hatred and antagonism. More to the point, I argue that case-specific based type of research study are important to understanding the causes of the conflict from grass root level as to what really causes the so-called 'inter-ethnic conflicts' as the only way to decide as to whether or not the particular conflict is inter-ethnic.

Different scholars identified that conflicts have numerous causes. For instance, Pruitt (2001) has identified various sources of conflicts like 'different values, religious beliefs, economic priorities, political ideology, and principles of conduct.' Conflict may also grow from scarce resources, such as land, minerals, property, and water, etc. Gluckman (1965) has stated that humans may disagree over many things such as robbing cattle, land usage, status, and in fact by different mistakes from any of a group.

In the same way, the source of conflict may be provoked by the rejection of fundamental desires of a human being like participation, freedom to elect and to be elected, health, education, security and human rights. Besides, peoples would have a different attitude and know-how on

different issues. Thus, what matters is not the legality and the moral rule of law. Instead, how the rule applies in particular circumstance on an individual or group (*Ibid.*). Similarly, Pruitt (2001) argues that function discrimination that generates different values and forms that basis ambition to increase quickly or to become incoherent with those of a different party; and any cause of mistrust, because mistrust is liable to block cooperation and create distrustful behavior, which often worries the other groups or individuals.

4.6 Summary

This chapter reviewed historical relation among Oromo and Somali, which helps to understand their relations at present. In addition, the inter-clan conflict in post-1991 Ethiopia, in general, is overviewed to examine the current conflict in the study area and its dynamics.

Furthermore, two schools of thought of Ethiopia's ethnic federalism are explained. One of the contending views said Ethiopia's ethnic-based federal political system is undesirable for multi-ethnic societies. The proponent of this view argues that an ethnolinguistic based demarcation of regions mainly focuses on ethnic division than unity. Their major argument mostly emphasized theoretical perspectives and other countries' experience based on constitutional design. On the other hand, those who argue Ethiopia's ethnic federalism is desirable for the Ethiopia's Nations, Nationalities and Peoples to correct the past injustice on ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic diversity and by giving self-determination up to succession by the rule of law. This section helps to see the scholars focus on theoretical generalization on both schools of thought to substantiate whether the Ethiopia's federal political system has a conceptual problem or related to the lack of its implementation from the grassroots perspectives.

In the fourth section, a decentralization attempt in Ethiopia from Imperial regime up to EPRDF rule is described. In both the Imperial regime and Derg regime, the attempt to implement decentralization policy was made on the eve of their collapse, and in both cases the effort was nominal. The EPRDF rule marked political achievements about laying the foundation for autonomy and introducing decentralized government systems. The Ethiopian federal structure involves the *woreda* as the third administrative unit, the region as the second unit and the state as

the highest unit. Currently, the government is trying to implement what was constitutionally promised, with all its limitations.

Chapter Five

The Role of Indigenous Institutions in Inter-clan Relations and Resource Management: Liban and Filtu Woredas

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the role of indigenous institutions in the inter-clan relations and resource management among the pastoral communities of Liban *woreda*, Guji zone (Oromia region) and Filtu *woreda*, Liban zone (Somali region) are examined. To this end, the chapter is organized into four interrelated points of discussions. First, it presents how both study areas' clans have been practicing and using their indigenous knowledge to manage and use their communal resources and how this knowledge strengthens the inter-clan relations. Within this, the customary law to manage water-wells and grazing land of the clans are discussed. The second part conveys state policy which has impacts on the practice of customary laws of the local communities and on their inter-clan relations, such as settlement policy, an official ban on bush burning practice and sub-*kebele* level government structures to control pastoral communities are presented. The third section discusses traditional versus government/modern institutions concerned with grazing- land and water-wells use and management systems and inter-clan relations. The final section deals with the status of traditional institutions of both study *woredas*, which are highlighted in relation to their importance for inter-clan relations and the attitude of local officials towards these institutions.

5.2 Customary Law to Manage Water-Wells and Grazing-Lands

Pastoralists have been using different strategies and systems to manage their communal resources like water wells and grazing lands for a long period. The term 'customary law' as it applies to Africa in general and Ethiopia, in particular, refers to the body of traditions, mores, social conventions, and rules that through long usage and widespread acceptance direct and govern traditional society (Mohammed, 2014). Customary law therefore is as much social convention as it is legal protocol.

It is broadly accepted that 'customary laws' include customary worldviews, principles or values, rules and codes of conduct, and established practices. They are enforced by community institutions and can have sanctions attached. They are derived from natural resource use some practices and beliefs acquire the force of law (Swiderska, 2005, cited in Mohamed: 2014: 15).

In the pastoral and agro-pastoral context, the right to access water and land tenure are closely connected to water and grazing management cannot be isolated from the context of the pastoral economy and the ways in which pastoralists adapt to environmental imbalances (Thebaud *et al.*, 1995 cited in Hoffmann, 2004: 81). However, the current access to resources in Liban and Filtu *woredas* reflects not only different user requirements but also power relations as a result of the political situation. Particularly, in the post-1991 federal system in Ethiopia during which the state policy has not considered the culture of the local communities to manage their resources in the study areas.

Moreover, the federal constitution confirmed that 'Ethiopian pastoralists have the right to use the free land for grazing and cultivation as well as the right not to be displaced from their own lands' (FDRE1995, Art. 40(5)). However, both the federal and regional laws have not yet publicized far enough to implement this constitutional principle effectively. These are because administrators at all local level of government put aside the rule of law and emphasized the implementation of national and regional directives from above, i.e. top-down rather than bottom-up.

As described by elders from both study *woredas* relatively most of the ponds and grazing lands are found in Liban *woreda* than Filtu *woreda*. Because during the previous regime these two *woredas* are under one *Awuraja* (Borana *Awuraja*) and then the current Liban *woreda* has got more water wells than Filtu *woreda*, because of geographical setting of the land and ideal border that they have in common. However, for centuries all clans used to share these resources on an equal basis according to their own customary law not only for human but also for domestic and wild animals. While they use these resources, they accept and respect their customary laws¹⁰.

¹⁰ Focus Group Discussion: Borana, Arsi, Digodia and Marrihan Elders, 04 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

According to the Liban and Filtu *woredas* Culture and Tourism *Bureau* documents and informants, the following are the rule of customary laws that both *woredas* communities accept and respect for centuries to manage and to get access to pasture and water resources. This law was locally recognized, orally held, adaptable and enacted by elders (LWCTB, 1998 and FWCTB, 2001).

5.2.1 Customary Law on Ponds/Water Wells

The primary asset for pastoralists is their livestock such as camels, cattle, sheep, goats, horses, mules, etc. In addition, the pastoralists have no option during the dry season rather than moving to get water and pasture. Therefore, the pastoralists have centuries-old customary law that fairly regulated the communal and systematic use of natural resources based on the culturally determined administrative structure (LWCTB, 1998).

Therefore, Borana, Arsi, Digodia, Garri, and Marehan have their customary law for water wells. Water wells have clan, sub-clan and individual ownership *Abbaa Maddaa* (Literally the father of the water source) in Borana, Arsi and Guji clans, while in Degodia and Marehan clans *Yarsin* (Literally, the local technician who control the water). Nevertheless, they obtain the ownership position because they are the first to excavate the water wells and then elders give them ownership recognition. After giving recognition and some award for the group or an individual who excavate the pond first, the pond is transferred to become public resource based on the traditional laws. Then elders and communities elect an individual who is committed to societal issues and equally treat all the communities and the neighboring clans. This process takes place at a meeting of the clan group council called *kora eelaa*.¹¹

The Borana call this person *Abba Herreega* (Literally, a formally responsible person for the day-to-day supervision of watering procedures including the maintenance and cleaning of ponds. However, Digodia calls it *Yarsin* (meaning, the local technician who protect the water). The role of this person is to make instructions to the communities to use pond based on scheduled date and time, and the person takes orders from elders when something changed to avoid biases. For

¹¹ Personal Interview: Borana Elder, 11 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

example, when women whom lost her husband on war/conflict among other clans came to get service he get order from elders and give her special service. If the person is not in a position to give fair service to the communities, he is penalized by fining him two heads of cattle or one camel, and the elders meet together and elect another person.¹²

The Borana, Digodia and other clans from the *olla* (smallest unit of settlement) use the pond and water well by respecting the rules and regulations of the communities. The law that all clans and individuals need to respects is the following:

*No one can use the pond without the permission of the elders; when individuals or groups come as a guest to this place, they should first consult the elders and then it is allowed for them to use. And Abbaa Herrega or Yarsin should be informed by elders. People who take their animals for watering need to keep their dung outside the fence of the water wells. And also if they come last after the animals watered they expected to fill Gabate(wood material used to contain water for animals) because this helps to protect wild animals not to enter into water wells. Persons who use the pond should repair a fence when Abba Herrega or Yarsin order them to do so.*¹³

Therefore, elders accordingly punish those who do not respect and accept this customary law. The punishment is, if an individual breaks the law for the first time, the elders call and advise him. For the second time they punish him by a fine of one head cattle or a camel; and, for the third time they call his clan and inform what he did and the step that they use to teach him and then together with his clan they make the decision that he should not use the water-wells forever.¹⁴ Similarly, as the North Sudan Kordofan district experience shows ñone of the most important features of the customary land tenure system is the right exercised by the native traditional leadership in the allotment of land and the settlement of disputes over land.

¹² Personal Interview: Borana Elder, 02 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana and Digodia Elder, 21 July 2015, Filtu.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Accordingly, an outsider has no right to settle in a land area even if it is unoccupied, unless he is permitted to do so by the local authorities (Mustafa (2008:5)).

However, informants state that post-1991 Ethiopia, no matter how the traditional leaders and elders have passed sanction over a deviant person, it has little impact on him. This mainly because those herd owners banned from using water wells can use the government and NGOs excavated ones; because there are no strict rules and regulations to manage access rights of an individual's herds to these resources. Therefore, these resources have been serving the communities as options for a short period. When the herd owners are not satisfied with the decision of traditional elders and leaders, they use this government and NGO excavated resources. Since, anyone does not control these resources. These resulted in the weakening and collapse of the customary law of the communities and led to the failure of the traditional institution's control on water wells and land use rights and management in Liban and Filtu *woredas*.¹⁵

Moreover, one of the key informants adds another reason for the weakening of customary institutions: "when we meet at water wells areas we insult each other. Thus, when Abba *Herrega or Yarsin* asks an individual whether he/she has a permit from elders to use the water wells, the latter is being found saying water is natural and God's property, but you consider it as if it is your urine." This and other offensive terms trigger personal conflicts and in some cases turned to inter-clan conflicts. These conflicts between clans lead to weakening the inter-clan relations.¹⁶ These imply that local government official and domestic NGO workers poor understanding of the constitution meant capitalizing on what is traditionally already in place in the communities.

In addition, the government and NGOs activities lack community participation, and also they do not try to inter-relate their activities with the socio-cultural and economic practice of the local communities; they mainly give emphases on the accessibility of the resources for the communities in different areas in the *woreda*.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Personal Interview: Resident of Qoraatti *Kebele*, 08 July 2015, Qoraatti.

Regarding natural resources such as rainwater, floods, which appear during the rainy season and river water such as Gannale, and Dawa rivers are God gift (*Kenna Waaqaa*) no one has exclusive rights to it. Since, no Borana, Digodia and Marehan clan no effort or the economy was invested in to obtain it (Helland, 1997: 66-67).

5.2.2 Customary Law on Grazing Land/Pasture

Like that of water wells and ponds excavated by individual, tribe or clan; the Borana, Digodia, Arsi, Gerri, and Marehan clans have a customary law for grazing lands/ pasture (*dheedaa*). Accordingly, no clan can claim exclusive right to any land in any part of the study areas like rainwater, floods, and river water. The Pastoralist knows the season when some areas are vacant, and some are not vacant for grazing. They inhabit in one place in one season and some other place in another season (LWCTB, 1998 and FWCTB, 2001). This means there are seasonal movements. Scholars who studied the area rightly argued that the importance of seasonal movements for pastoralist with a regular seasonal variation of pastures (wet and dry grazing areas) is important to allow vegetation and underground water recovery (Shazali, 1999).

In addition, pastoralists are free from the pressure on vegetation around permanent water points by widely dispersing in different areas during the rainy seasons to use both surface water and pasture, which are resulting from the rains and the subsequent green pastures (*Ibid.*). Moreover, the shift from permanent grazing, in the wet grazing areas where the new water wells were drilled, reduced the availability of the greenest recurrent grass and browsed species consumed by the herds (Oxfam, 2002:27).

During seasonal movements, the Digodia, and Marehan clans consult with the neighboring Borana and Arsi clan elders to allow them to move to water and pasture places and vice versa. Then elders allow them according to their customary law; this law forces guests back to their home after the season is out and those guest clans act accordingly. This particular administrative unit managed by a council of elders (*jaarsa dheedaa*) or by an individual called *abbaa dheedaa* (LWCTB, 1998 and FWCTB, 2001). Different researchers argued that customary resource allocation and management methods in pastoralist communities have proven efficient and effective (Helland, 1980 and Baxter, 1991).

5.3 Policy Impact on Customary Law and Clan Relations

The 1995 FDRE constitution is the supreme law of the land that determines and governs the overall behavior of nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia. It also has provisions about customary laws under different articles. For example, in Article 34(4) and (5) “Ethiopia recognizes customary marriages and allows the customary law to be applied in the adjudication of disputes relating to personal and family law.” From this article, one can easily understand that customary law plays a vital role in governing disputes that are relating to personal and family law for its long-lasting effect. This, in turn, implies that customary law has strong binding force in this area than statute law.

In addition to the above articles, FDRE Constitution’s Article 9 (1) states that “Any laws, rules, regulations and customary practices that are inconsistent with this Constitution shall be invalid.” The binary opposite of this article fully works for customary laws in Ethiopia. That is to say, any customary laws that are in line with the provisions of the constitution are legally recognized and protected by law. If customary laws contradict the constitution, it is illegal to put them in force. These means the constitution enforce equality, growth and the enrichment of cultures and traditions that are compatible with fundamental human right and dignity, democratic norms and ideals, and other related provisions of the constitution.

5.3.1 Settlement Policy

According to local officials, there are two major reasons for the policy of pastoralists’ settlement; one is to involve them into farming, and the other is to live near to town to get access to infrastructures. However, Schlee argues, in the process, the pastoralists are losing land and livestock; since, they may be attracted by new opportunities like market and labor in the town. In some situations, settlement is not voluntary, as it occurs because of famine and civil war (Schlee, 1995).

Likewise, in both (Liban and Filtu *woredas*) the settlement policy of pastoral communities has been implemented to encourage the pastoral communities to settle and involve in farming activities. According to this policy, the *woreda*, and zone officials allotted land for individuals

who are interested in farming and livestock fattening activities.¹⁷ In the contrary, the Borana elders argue this policy has been implemented at the cost of the customary practice of the pastoral and agro-pastoral communities. Centuries old communal land resources rights and management practices were excluding in official policies. Moreover, local resource use and management institutions and traditional administrative structures of the pastoral communities were neglected. Besides, these measures affect the wet season grazing lands, because of very much reduced pastoral mobility it also allotted the use of ritual places for farming and forming *kebele* in Liban *woreda*.¹⁸

The above practices of government officials have eroded the clan relations in the study areas, since communities have overlooked the rules and regulations of their customary practices. Similarly, Juul (1993) argues about the perception of development planners and government officials towards pastoral communities are uncomfortable with traditional forms of collective land management. They also criticize customary resource management for not being specific on how and when to use grazing land and water wells. Likewise, Getachew (2002) argues that pastoral livelihood requires extensive use of land and freedom of movement, since, for pastoral communities mobility is a necessary response to climate and vegetation variations. The need for free movement is the best way for economic use of grazing lands and water wells because of the shortage of rainfall, and seasonal mobility guarantee a regular support of water wells and pasture.

Therefore, practically after decentralization/regionalization of the state, customary law has been undermined, broken and changed. This is due to the state policy direction on pastoral communities. This the policy encourages pastoral settlement, by restricting mobility and expanding farming of crops the study areas. Thus, local government officials implementation of the policy, ethnolinguistic based regionalization and lack of local level inter-governmental relations are the significant factors, which hinder the implementation of the customary law.

The pastoralists become confused because the local government officials are saying the land belongs to those who are permanently settled on it. Thus, pastoralists had to settle in one place

¹⁷ Personal Interview: Liban Woreda official, 05 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁸ Personal Interview: Borana Elder, 08 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

for a long time in order to get ownership right. However, the policy is a severe challenge to pastoralists, since pastoralism without movement is meaningless. Thus, they are in a dilemma, since nature forces them to move, whereas local government officials restrict their mobility. While they request the neighboring clans to move they worry to allow them according to their customary law because the directive of the government on access to land in pastoral areas is based on the stable settlement.¹⁹ Therefore, there is land ownership by permanent settlement and this leads different clans to claim and counterclaim natural resources and state resources in between the clans. One of the key informants said, 'the conflict between Borana, Digodia, Arsi, and Marehan has been not to win but to survive, since, conflict to live weaken their in-group and out-group inter-clan relation.'²⁰

Another key informant from government official argued, 'the government officials use the current settlement as a means to settle the pastoralist in one area, to change their life from pastoral to farming crops, to fulfill the directive that came from regional government to settle pastoral societies.'²¹ For example, the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi noted in his speech on 13th Ethiopian Pastoralist Day, there would be fears that climate change will make future rainfall even highly dependable, and additionally discourage the flexibility of pastoral livelihoods and bring an inevitable escalation in conflict over natural resources. The solution proposed by Meles was 'to urge pastoralists to settle and start farming crops.'²²

Therefore, government officials have failed to allow pastoralist to continue pastoral mode of existence, to a certain extent because of their biases against pastoral livelihoods. Such views are referred to by Monod as 'the sedentary nature of the official mentality.'²³ He adds that people in power and pastoralists often belong to a different clan or ethnic groups and those in government office are 'dominated by the cultural values of the settled population and sometimes have contempt for the pastoralists' (Monod, 1975:176).

¹⁹ Focus Group Discussion: Borana, Arsi, Digodi, Marehan, and Garri Elders, 05 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

²⁰ Personal Interview: Resident of Waleenso *Kebele*, 07 July 2015, Waleenso.

²¹ Personal Interview: High Filtu Woreda Official, 24 July 2015, Filtu.

²² See, Speech by Meles Zenawi during the 13th Annual Pastoralists' Day celebrations, Jinka, South Omo, 25/1/2011

Furthermore, researchers in the area of pastoralism argued that mobility is not the problem rather it is the solution, and that conflict, land degradation, and food insecurity are mainly the results of policies designed to restrict mobility in pastoral areas (Scoones and Graham, 1994; Hatfield and Davies, 2006). Similarly, ecologists argue that pastoral systems can respond to changeable and irregular resources with cultural behaviors that include flexibility, mobility, and diversity of species (Ellis and Swift, 1988; Homewood and Rodgers, 1991).

Because of policy directive, in the study areas, after regionalization all clans disrespected the customary laws and all groups gave more attention to ownership of the water wells and grazing land by settling in one area. Nature forces them to move from place to place looking for water and grazing lands. Thus, their customary laws are broken, and almost no clans can trust each other. Therefore, today in Liban and Filtu *woredas* water wells are uncontrolled, misused, and the grazing areas are overused. There is an implication of underestimating customary law and promoting permanent sedentarization of pastoralist households in one specific area with common water well and grazing area by restricting mobility.

According to the informants in Liban and Filtu *woredas*, the permanent settlement of pastoralists led to over usage of the resources, individualization of common resources, and collapse of traditional resource controlling institutions, and weakened clan relations.²³ Moreover, the implementation of settlement plan, the introduction of settlement policy as an institution to allocate resources, and the expansion of agriculture in Liban and Filtu *woredas*, come up with the scarcity of water wells, grazing lands and have generated conflict on resources, which reduce their inter-clan relations.²⁴

Many anthropologists forwarded their arguments, particularly; Paul Baxter (1994) argues that most of the times there have been attempts to improve traditional ways of life, and use of resources and management in pastoralists development. They all failed and the pastoralists are growing poorer. From his argument, one can infer that development interventions by

²³ Focus Group Discussion: Borana and Arsi Elders, 5 July 2015, Nagelle Borana; and Digodia and Marehan Elders, 25 July 2015, Filtu.

²⁴ Ibid.

sedentarizing pastoralists are triggering conflict, which finally led to eroding the harmonious inter-clan relations.

In case of study areas, there are two government institutions one works on agriculture (Agricultural Office) and the other on pastoral development (Pastoral Development Office). According to informants, both offices create awareness in different issues, ñé the agricultural office teach the importance of settlement and having large farmland for crop production and the pastoral development office workers teach how to fatten livestock and how to get access to grazing land and water in dry and wet season.²⁵ Therefore, the pastoralists are confused to prefer the one that gives them more advantage and practice it properly. From this argument, one can conclude that the government officials are not working collaboratively by focusing on the context of the area. I argue that integrated policy is needed to promote both crop farming and livestock production in pastoralist and agro-pastoralist areas.

However, the local government officials in both *woredas* argue that settlement is more critical for pastoral communities to provide basic economic, social and other services, such as schools, health posts, roads, clean water, electricity and market to the communities. Moreover, they added settlement helps to facilitate the participation of the pastoral communities in the political and economic processes of their *woredas* in particular and the country in general. And therefore, according to local officials, in particular sites of Liban *woreda*, many Borana and a few Guji, Arsi and Gurra clans were settled in Did Liban, Bitata town, Gobicha, Legagula, Wachile, Waleenso, and Melka- Guba. Likewise, in Filtu *woreda*, many Digodia and Marehan clans were settled in Filtu, Haya-Suftu, Bur-Amino, Sadde and Haya Dimtu. There are essential development strategies based on this settlement plan of action by the government; for example, agriculture is rapidly expanded in Liban and Filtu *woredas* in the new settlement areas. And in this settlement sites, the community's political participation is better than those of mobile pastoralists.²⁶

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Personal interview: Liban *woreda* Official, 7 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana; and Filtu *woreda* Official, 23 July 2015, Filtu.

Regarding development by settling the pastoral communities, Ellis and Swift (1988) criticize such efforts that consider rangeland in stable balance unless disrupted by overstocking and overgrazing domesticated animals. They argued that rangelands are inherently unstable because of large climatic factors and that development should enhance traditional pastoral practices because they are more appropriate for arid ecosystems than those based on ranch management paradigms are. Moreover, Meir (1988) argues that the insider ideology of pastoralists seeking autonomy, power, and mobility is different from the outsider ideology of the sedentary state that endeavor domination and encapsulation to rule pastoral communities.

However, focus group discussants argue that agricultural expansions, which begin with river valleys, is encroaching into wet season grazing lands. Therefore, the expansion is being made at the cost of pastoral production and by restricting the mobility of pastoral communities. Moreover, they argued agricultural based development is creating a scarcity of grazing lands, which reduce livestock production and exacerbate intensity of resource competition and conflict over resources rights. These, in turn, threaten intra and inter-clan relations.²⁷ To this end, the pastoralist communities came up with the idea of fencing grazing lands (*Kaloo*) to tackle the expansion of land grabbing for agriculture and settlement of the community. These large areas, which are enclosed by the community, are exclusively limited to the group who enclosed it, and there is formal regulation to share the resources according to the traditional way of resource use and management of the Borana tradition.²⁸

Furthermore, elders complain that if they bring cases on resource use and management rights of pastoral communities to court, there is no provision that deals with pastoral rights on resource usage. Instead one can find many provisions that describe land use and management rights for agriculturalists or farmers. Accordingly, this indicates that the government has no attention to pastoral communities.

As discussed above, there are two opposing views regarding pastoral ways of life. The government policy and the government officials argue for pastoral settlement to access different

²⁷ Focus Group Discussion: Borana, Arsi, Digodia, Garri and Marehan Elders, 5 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

²⁸ Ibid.

services and infrastructure. This has the support of some scholars. For example, Steen (1994) recommended putting pastorals all together and encouraging former herder to crop farming and feeding livestock in sedentary setting and to integrate them into the modern industry and modern market-based economy.

However, opposing views are found in Baxter (1993) and Horowitz (1986) which mainly goes with local communities' view. The two authors recommend protecting the pastoralists' traditional way of life through recognition to their knowledge about water wells and grazing lands management system, giving legal protection to their rights for mobility during migration periods including unlimited rights to cross-regional and state boundaries stopping sedentarization propaganda to modernize the pastoral communities, and giving them rights to manage their own local affairs by their own knowledge is the best strategies to overcome the problem in pastoral communities. The two scholars' argument appears to help the pastoral communities to promote their inter-clan relations if the policies consider bottom-up initiative and local officials have awareness about the traditional ways of managing and allocation of resources.

5.3.2 Official Ban on Bush Burning Practice

Another policy intervention of the government was the official ban on bush burning practice by pastoralists. The Borana elders argue traditionally the pastoral communities practice bush burning to improve the quality of grazing lands and to protect its livestock from harmful wild creatures/living things. According to them, they put fire over old grass to improve the status of the grass and while they fire old grass, grass, they protect their livestock from ticks, snakes and other reptiles that endanger their life.²⁹

Bhasin (1991) cited in Joyce (1997) support elders' idea by suggesting, people's role must be of paramount importance in the planning, designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluation of local programs as well as in the management of resources. These necessarily imply mainstreaming of resource use and management within the local context. Only when the same

²⁹ Personal Interview: Borana Elders, Waleenso *Kebele*, 9 July 2015, waleenso.

community is given responsibility for management of its resources will the conservation of those resources be possible.

According to informants from agricultural office and *woreda* court office, after the government's directive on bush burning, any person who sets fire for old grass and bush burning in both study *woredas* are penalized by the *woreda* court. This is implemented when the *garee*(a group which contains 20-30 households) leader report to the court and confirmed by the *kebele* council.³⁰

According to the Borana informants, the government intervention on the traditional practice of the pastoralist communities on bush burning resulted in the reproduction of dangerous pests. These harmful pests attack the livestock and harmful bush has been overtaking large areas of grassland and reduce the quality and quantity of the grass. Besides, it is creating the scarcity of the grazing land and reproduction of dangerous pests, which seriously attack the livestock. The scarcity of the grazing lands, in turn, led the community to resource competition and conflict within the *woreda* and across the *woreda* clans, and this is threatening inter-clan relations.³¹ Indeed, conflicts are becoming frequent in Liban and Filtu *woredas*.

Furthermore, the undermining of customary law led to a weakening of inter-clan relations, livestock theft, rape, and murder by group members or by neighboring clans. The neighboring clan/s forcefully expands their territory without the hosting clan's knowledge with the shadow of looking for grazing land and water wells. This attempt had broken the temporary resource use and management rights of the hosting clan, territorial resource usage rules and regulations and powers of the local elders.

5.3.3 Sub-Kebele Government Structures in Control of Pastoral Communities

The intended plan of the government is to address the official policy. Therefore, the Oromia and Somali Regional states governments have created a new set of quasi-government structures below the *kebele* through the Oromia in 2001/2 and Somali Regional states in around 2004/5. In

³⁰ Personal Interview: Liban Woreda Agriculture and Court officials, 07 July 2015, Nagelle and Filtu Woreda Official 23 July 2015, Filtu.

³¹ Personal Interview: Borana Elder, 8 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

both study *woredas*, every *kebele* was divided into “*gooxi*,” “*garee*,” (literary, group of households) and one-to-five *ñtokko-shaneeò* in case of Liban *woredas*. Similarly, in Filtu *woreda reer*, *qabiil* (literary, group of households) and one-to-five (*hafatu-shan*) are the mechanisms to control pastoral movement.

In Liban *woreda*, the *ñgooxiò* encompasses 40-60 households, and the *ñgareeò* encompasses 20-30 households, the number varies from *kebele to kebele*. The *gooxi* leaders supervise the activity of *garee* leaders, and the *garee* leaders monitor the activities of the one-to-five leaders. Then the *gooxi* leaders report the activities of each group to *kebele* authorities. The one-to-five is more active than *garee* and *gooxi*; since they have a day-to-day contact with households.

The *woreda* officials state, the *gooxi*, *garee* and one-to-five have been introduced for over 12 years. Since then the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists benefit a lot from this system, such as digging water wells, road repairing, supporting each other socially and the like. According to them, the *gooxi*, *garee* and one-to-five are nothing more than a voluntary association of pastoralists (the herders) and agro-pastoralist who are interested in promoting development in their communities.³²

Moreover, focus group discussants of the Liban *woreda* Culture, Sport and Social Affair Bureau added that no herder and agro-pastoralist community is participating non-voluntarily in these government activities. They added that herder who does not want to get organized into *gooxi*, *garee* and one-to-five is not forced to join the group.³³ The officials stressed that the *gooxi*, *garee* and one-to-five have no other purpose than facilitating and organizing the communities for local development activities such as road repairing, terracing, and digging wells, which were selected by communities themselves. Hence, they added promote, inter-clan relations within the *woreda*.³⁴

³² Personal Interview: Borana and Digodia Elders, 08 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

³³ Personal Interview: Liban *woreda*, Culture, Sport and Social Affairs Officials, 10 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

³⁴ Ibid.

However, the *garee* leaders from Bulbul and Gobicha *kebeles* argue that every household would expect to join the *garee* in their *Kebele's*. Since *woreda* authorities introduce the system the *kebele* leaders and council should implement it according to the order from the *woreda* official. They added that the members of the *garee* are required to contribute voluntary labor service in the development activities which is chosen and ordered by *woreda* officials. These are terracing of land which, have nothing to do with our environment; the *kebele* chairman order the *gooxi* and *garee* leaders and the members of the *garee* implement it; the one-to-five is used to exchange information even more than development activities.³⁵

Despite this, in both study areas (Liban and Filtu) *woredas*, the herders argue that *woreda* officials have been introduced these sub-kebele structures *gooxi*, *garee* and one-to-five and it does not help us at least for three major reasons. First, it restricts mobility and elders role in leadership; second, it erodes the indigenous social capital; and third, it restricts freedom of speech in meeting places.

5.3.3.1 Restricting Mobility and Elders Role in Leadership

The informants argue that the life of the herders is mainly related to mobility from place to place in search of grazing and water for their livestock. However, the *gooxi*, *garee* and one-to-five needs frequent meeting at least for two days in a week. *Kebele* leaders said the system is imposed by *woreda* officials for development purposes and that they were not consulted. According to them the participation of these structure has not been voluntary. However, we are forced to join one of the *garee* and one to five in our *kebele* after that the *garee* leader propose meeting days in a week if we want to move from that area on that day we have to ask permission by bringing accepted evidence. If we are absent for three times from the meeting, we used to be punished 10-15 birr or detained for three days.³⁶

Moreover, during the focus group, discussion herders said that they do not want to attend any meeting with *gooxi*, *garee*, and one-to-five structure; they attended because of the punishments

³⁵ Personal Interview: *Garee* leaders of Bulbul and Gobicha Kebeles, 10 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

³⁶ Personal Interview: Liban and Filtu Residents, 14 July 2015, Nagalle Market Place, Nagelle-Borana.

for failure to attend the meeting. The activities that have been performed by these structures do not go with the lifestyle of the pastoral communities; it may help the agro-pastoralists and sedentarized farmers. In case of pastoralists, the *garee* and one-to-five system are implemented simply to restrict mobility and encourage settlement and to control the political activities of the pastoralists. Furthermore, in *gooxi*, *garee* and one-to-five system elders are not encouraged to become leaders or member of the committees, since, elders are genuine and often challenge the system.³⁷

However, the *kebele* leaders said the young and adult men understand the perspective of these systems better than elders do and they have the ability to mobilize communities for development. Besides these, they cannot resist it, as it is the order of the *woreda* officials. The *kebele* leaders did not deny the herders are in need of elders' leadership in societal affairs than young and adult men; and that elders have more experience in different aspects of the society. However, these unwanted inclusion and exclusion practices by local officials have brought mistrust among the community, which leads them to conflict and erodes their relationships.

5.3.3.2 Restricting Freedom of Speech in Public Meeting

The second impact of the *gooxi*, *garee* and one-to-five system under the *kebele* is restricting freedom of speech in meetings. The one-to-five and the *garee* are nearer to every household to understand. Since within the *garee* structure, there is a one-to-five structure, which encompasses 4-6 households. One of the *garee* leaders argues in principle the purpose of *gooxi*, *garee* and one-to-five systems are for development when they make us aware about these systems. Nevertheless, in practice when leaders from different *garee* groups and the *kebele* leaders have meeting, the latter expect a detailed report on what individuals and the *garee* members said than on development and security issues.³⁸

³⁷ Focus Group Discussion: Liban and Filtu Residents, 14 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

³⁸ Personal Interview: Resident of Gobicha Kebele, 09 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana.

One of the elder herders said that

In garee meeting held in 2009, I raised many questions regarding the irrelevance of the structure and purpose of gooxi, garee, one-to-five (tokko-shanee) for pastoral communities in particular since we have our own system to excavate water wells. However, the kebele leader tells us we come together to repair road; and for terracing the land. In our context, there is no road to repair and terracing is not important, since, we safer with the scarcity of rain for what purpose we terrace the environment. The garee leader labeled me as an OLF and reported my case to kebele authorities. The kebele leaders called me and warned me not to speak at public meeting; since, the idea that you raised in garee meeting is not your idea it is OLF idea, these institutions tell you what you speak, what to do and they are behind you.³⁹

Furthermore, he added that elders and leaders of the communities are often offended for commenting against the *kebele* and the *woreda* officials's efforts in doing any, which is not accepted by the communities. Indeed officials simply label such elders as anti-development agents standing against the agenda of the ruling government, rather than listening and responding to the grievances of the communities.⁴⁰

Tyler (1999) argues state policy enacted with little consideration of the existing traditional and local practices are found out to have aggravated the existing local conflicts and to erode inter-ethnic relations. This argument shows how useful are traditional practices in building peace and stability from below.

³⁹ Personal Interview: Resident of Qoratti kebele, 08 July 2015, Qoratti Kebele.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

5.3.3.3 Eroding the indigenous socio-cultural and economic self-help system of the communities

The third point regarding the impact of sub-kebele (*gooxi*, *garee* and one-to-five) structures is the fact that they are marginalizing the indigenous socio-cultural and economic self-help of the communities in Liban woreda. The Borana clan has their own traditional wealth distribution mechanisms such as *Buusa Gonofa*,⁴¹ and *Dabaree* heifer traditions. These traditions are a social security system whereby people of same clan members contribute in various ways to those highly affected and vulnerable to disaster like drought, conflict and disease. Coppock (1994:3) argue *the Borana traditional self-help mechanisms allow them to support members who do not have livestock assets and lost their assets*. Key informants confirmed that to overcome these problem clan council and elders appoint certain groups who are looking for the have not economy in their communities; and also those who lose their assets by theft and natural disaster appeal the case to clan council and elders to get help; and then the elders and clan council redistribute the wealth such as cattle, sheep, goat, etc., at annual clan meeting.⁴¹

Regarding their contribution, particularly *Buusa Gonofa* contribution type and rates, are determined by clan leaders or elders of the clan council. If an individual resists elders' decision, he will be punished and a strong social sanction will be imposed on him. Furthermore, *Dabaree* heifer tradition also used to help women economically in which the *dhaves* give one heifer or more to the *dhave not* to keep with them and use its milk and milk products. After some years the owner goes to the *dhave not* to take back his/her cow. This time the owner does not take all, he/she leaves one heifer to the poor. This strengthens the relations between the families and clan at large (*Ibid*).

Moreover, *Hirphaa* (obligatory restocking of improvised members) is also another social asset of the Borana clan. *Hirphaa* is the most known means of live stock redistribution by the Borana clan. According to informants, this support is held when a household loses its livestock due to epidemic, drought, and raids. Informants said that all the clan members are involved in restocking the members, who are victims of these natural, human-made and environmental

41 Personal Interview: Borana Elders, 05 July 2015, Nagelle Borana.

disasters. Notably, from the lineage members, a lot of contribution is expected that other within the clan.⁴²

However, the Borana elders argue that “when we meet for the social purpose the leaders of *gooxi*, *garee* and the coordinators of 1-5 oppose the acts of the members of the traditional institutions; since without their knowledge, it is impossible to have meeting in communities”.⁴³ One of the *garee* leaders confirms that “the woreda officials told us that communities could help each other in this system (*garee* and 1-5) and also without our knowledge it is not allowed to carry out meeting in society”.⁴⁴

Therefore, according to elders this newly introduced sub-*kebele* system of structures by the government has authority’s eroded communities’ indigenous self-help cultures, which were transmitted from generation to generation and threaten the intra-ethnic relations of the local communities.

5.4 Traditional Versus Government Institutions on Grazing Land and Water Wells

In the study areas, there are binary opposing forms of grazing land and water use system, allocation and management. One is the traditional institutions and the second one is government institutions. According to elders, traditional land and water wells use, allocation and management have been communal; there is no private land and water wells ownership. Therefore, the majority pastoralists and few agro-pastoralists are a beneficiary of this institution. However, the government institutions land use, allocation, and management system benefit a few individual by settling few communities to farm crops and to make them residents of the towns. This system of usage and management benefit the minority section of the pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities and the town based agriculturalists. Furthermore, they added the government institutions system is not uniform and viable to vary from place to place or from *kebele* to *kebele*. Therefore, the government institution is marginalizing the majority communities of pastoralists. This marginalization has led to weakening self-development and

⁴² Personal Interview: Borana Elders, 08 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Personal Interview: Resident of Qoratti kebele, 08 July 2015, Qoratti Kebele.

exacerbates conflict on land and water resources which mainly dangerous for harmonious inter-clan relations.⁴⁵

According to scholars in the area traditionally in Borana society, the lowest units of social organization structure is the family (*warra*) units. These units are the smallest social as well as territorial units in Liban *woreda* Borana communities. These families form small interrelated and closely cooperated herd management units. A group of these herd management live in a mixed settlement. The smallest unit of the group (*olla*) may consist of 15 to 30 households (*warra*). These share natural resources and herd management activities with strong inter-clan relations (Getachew, 1998:28).

Furthermore, the *ñolla* has their own leader and elder father of the village (*abba olla*). This person is responsible for calling a meeting (*gaadisa-jaarsaa*) and he chairs discussion to make decisions about resources (grazing land and water) use, management and control. He also supervises and guides settler members in their herd management, grazing resources, and water use practices. Also, his major social duty is to settle petty conflicts between members of the settlement. Besides, together with other elders, he organizes resources sharing arrangement within and with guests who come from other places, in the *woreda* or across the *woreda*. Some *ñolla* come together and form temporary resident and resource sharing group. The latter shares grazing lands and water wells by permission of *Olla* as to how and when they have to use the resources (water wells and pastureland) (*Ibid.*).

Thus, the tradition of the social and political organization of the Borana clan show us the accountability, efficiency, and participation of the different clans in equal use, allocation, and management of communal natural resources within the Borana sub-clans and with another neighbor of different clans, which help them to maintain centuries-old peaceful inter-clan relations.

Similarly, among the Digodia and Marehan clans in Filtu *woreda*, there are traditional administrative structures such as clan elders and council of clan elders (*shiir*), which bond their

⁴⁵ Personal Interview: Borana and Arsi Elders, 12 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana, and Digodia and Marehan Elders, 26 July 2015, Filtu.

internal (within) and external (outside) relations; and also resource related institutions such as the *ñdegmo/olla* and “*beel/deeda*.” They provide and ensure fundamental rights of access and use of the land and grazing resources of the clan. The Digodia elders argue that according to their traditional institution's exclusive control right over the land and water wells and natural resources are not allowed. Since, all the natural and tribe based excavated, water wells are the communal properties of the clans in Filtu *woreda*. Furthermore, the elders state that non-excavated water wells, ponds/rainwater/, river water, and grazing lands are considered as a gift of *Allah* (God) to the clans in general. Any tribe or clans do not claim these resources.⁴⁶

However, during the dry season in grazing areas households and livestock unities are often organized for settlement within and outside the *woreda* clans for survival. Indeed, there is clan a claims ownership of that settlement area and considers others as guests. Thus, there is support in intra-ethnic relations among (the Digodia and Marehan, Digodia and Gurra, Borana and Arsi, Borana and Guji, Arsi and Guji) and inter-clan arrangements have been common in between ((Digodia and Borana, Digodia and Arsi-Gurra (Somali), and Borana and Marehan)). According to elders, these inter-clan relations are declining from time to time due to territorial expansion, disrespect of customary law, and intergroup conflicts between these groups.⁴⁷ They added tribes and clans are the primary structural unit of political participation and resource use, and resource management and allocation related matter. These local institutions have been caring for the pastoral population in Filtu *woreda*.⁴⁸

Like that of the Borana clan traditional institutions, the Digodia and Marehan clans traditional institutions also have elements which make them more effective in the administration of resource use, allocation, and management of the pastoral groups. When, it is compared with the introduced state institutions, these focus on a settlement to use the resource, to allocate and to manage it in pastoral communities; which does not go with the way of life of the pastoralists communities and lacks concern for the traditional practice of the communities at large.

⁴⁶ Personal Interview: Digodia Elders, 26 July 2015, Filtu.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

5.5 The Status of Traditional Institutions

Pastoral and agro-pastoral communities have their own local institutions, which help them to lead and manage their lives and to plan their day-to-day activities. For the Oromo Nation in general and the pastoral and agro-pastoral communities, in particular, the Gadaa system is a pan-Oromo institution that has been in operation for at least the last 600 years (Tache and Irwin, 2003). These authors argue that long historical and political processes in Ethiopia have weakened Gadaa system in the central parts of Oromia. However, in spite of all these challenges, the Borana Gadaa remains one of the most intact traditional institutions in Ethiopia today (*Ibid*). Similarly, Helland argues Gadaa plays a great role since it has important ñritual, political and judicial aspects attached to itò (Helland, 1998:52). Besides, he states that;

Gadaa consists of a series of individual celebrations as well as a cycle of large-scale public rites, both of which require considerable economic resources for their proper performance. Succeeding set of men is selected to represent their respective generations and carry public responsibilities over an 8-year period for the adequate unfolding and celebration of the Gada. These Gada councils, headed by the Abba Gada, do not have direct political responsibilities, but participation in a Gadaa council is an essential platform for those who later build individual political careers and assume positions of leadership in Borana. The Borana have throughout been able to provide the resources needed to maintain the Gadaa, and there is no doubt that the Gadaa has continued to be relevant to the Borana at both an individual and a societal level (Ibid.).

This day, because of modern development issues, the survival of the *Gadaa* as a ritual and ideological system may be perceived as being less essential to the survival of some other Borana institutions with a far more practical outlook. On Oromo myths of origin:

The Borana are accorded a particularly senior position,⁴⁹ is kown as the ‘angafa’ or first-born of the Oromo nation. Well-known indicators of this

⁴⁹Ranking by (ritual) seniority is an important organising principle in Oromo societies.

particular status were the Oromo pilgrimages to Borana. Until quite recent times, Oromo pilgrims from all over Ethiopia would travel to Borana to attend the ‘muda’ ceremony, at which the senior Borana ‘Kallu’⁵⁰ receives gifts of cattle from the participants, in exchange for blessings (Ibid: 51).

As one of the key informants further argued that ñas Borana is áangafaô or firstborn of Oromo nation; Liban is áangafaô among Oromo lands. As the Borana saying goes ñBariif Boruun, lafaaf Liban angafaò (literary Boruu is first when the sun rises, and Liban is the first land that Borana lived in). Therefore, most of the Borana ritual places are found in Liban *woreda* (currently under Guji zone) than Dirre (the current Borana zone)⁵¹.

Boranaôs are known for their Gadaa system; while this system is practiced, there are different rituals that are performed in different places in Liban *woreda*. For example, the change ceremony by which one age set to pass from the *dabballe* (stage of childhood) into *gamme* grade (intensification to 2nd stage) and they shave the *dabballes* hair. They also give names to their son(s), and this is performed at the shrine of Nura, near the town of Nagelle-Borana. The Gadaa assembly goes to Liiban for the Oda (Gumi Gayyo) ceremony in the fourth year that it is a ceremony that concerns all Borana. In the fifth year of the Gadaa period, the class goes once again to the eastern part of Liban *woreda* to perform the *muda* ceremony. In addition, the circumcision and ear piercing is performed in the shrine of Ejersa Gurura. The Gadaa system is required to complete four major celebrations in the fourth and fifth years of the period, and these ceremonies are named Ginda, Gumi Gayyo, Oda and Muda and all are carried out in Liban *woreda* (LWCTB, 1998).

However, according to key informants, these days,

Ritual places are given to investors for agriculture, religious institutions, and to kebele to settle the pastoralists. For example, Ardaa Nuraa, Dooyyoo, Hariiroo, Ofii, Dhaalan and Ejersa Gururaa all these ritual

⁵⁰ Often translated ‘high priest’, - the *Kallu*’s are the ritual custodians of the two moieties, named Sabbo and Gona, into which the Borana are organized.

⁵¹ Personal Interview: Borana Elder, 13 July 2015, Nagelle.

*places were given to investors for agriculture, Ardaa Hardooti and Deebanoo ritual places were given to religious institutions for protestant church and Muslim mosque respectively, and Bitaatata was given to kebele to settle pastoralists.*⁵²

Consequently, these traditional authorities were compelled to bring their case up to regional states to protect their ritual places intact, but they did not get a response from the states. For example, in 2015 the Assembly of Raba Guyyo Gubba did not get ritual places to perform what is expected. Finally, the assembly of Gumi Gayoo decided to stay for 25 days in an individual farmland in Ardaa Nuuraa, which has crop on it, and this action triggered conflict and intimidated the clan relations.

The government authority argues that; ñthey can change places to perform the rituals because currently focus is changed more to modern agricultural based development affairs for the community. As a result, crop farming is becoming preferable than having ritual places. What local community wanted is to get back ritual places owned by religious institutions that were marginalized in the previous regime and the current move to evacuate the ritual places.⁵³

The official argument and the action taken by authorities on ritual places are going against the provision of Article 27(1) of 1995 FDRE constitution that reads,

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall include the freedom to hold or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and the freedom, either individually or in community with others, and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching” and Article 39(2) “Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to speak, to write and to develop its own language; to express, to develop and to promote its culture; and to preserve its history.

⁵² Personal Interview: Borana and Arsi Elders, 12 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

⁵³ Personal Interview: Liban Woreda Official, 16 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

Especially that official argument goes contrary to Article 41(9), which reads, “The state has the responsibility to protect and preserve historical and cultural legacies and to contribute to the promotion of the arts and sports.”

Despite the above provisions, the *Woreda* Culture and Tourism Bureau official maintained that “the *woreda* political authorities have no ear for what we recommend especially on the importance of traditional institutions for the communities in a different aspect. These are to resolve conflict to promote clan relations and resource management in pastoral areas and also to transfer indigenous knowledge from generation to generation.”⁵⁴ Therefore, in Liban *woreda* ritual places and the traditional institutions are eroded and are found in a severe problem that need local and regional government’s attention to solve.

In Filtu *woreda* the Digodia and Marehan Somali pastoralists have the traditional local institution of administration having a leader called *waber* (King of all clans). According to informants “*waber* is the head of all clans which has the highest power to preside on every decision, and his decision should be accepted and respected automatically by all clans.”⁵⁵ He has frequent contacts with clan leaders. In Filtu *woreda* *Waber* has fifteen (15) members. He has a meeting with clan leaders and discusses peace and security issues of their communities. The communities get information from their clan leader about what is discussed and what is decided. This traditional institution arranges a meeting when problems arise within and outside their communities. Outside their communities, for example, the *waber* meets with local elders of Borana and Arsi under Gadaa council to negotiate access to local natural resources in the border areas. However, Digodia elders state that,

The government officials interfere in their affairs like canceling their decision and also without their knowledge they used to decide societal issues which need elder’s discussion to convince the communities. Therefore, the government authorities have to stop phase challenging what elders have decided. Elders participation is better on societal

⁵⁴ Personal Interview: *Woreda* Culture and Tourism Bureau official, 16 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

⁵⁵ Personal Interview: Resident of Filtu, 27 July 2015, Filtu.

issues in our communities because things may lead the communities' to conflict".⁵⁶

Regarding this Braden and Marjorie (1999) argue against the local officials, intervention by saying local cultures do matter on development, peace, and cooperation which comes to an area in which the peoples have shed a great many of their old habits. Traditional society's approach to resource use and management has been useful. However, it should reiterate that its emphasis on the transformative power of modern structures has tended to dismiss the usefulness and vitality of the old cultures. Such an approach, gave no serious attention to the study of traditional cultures values and their relationship to the resource use and management process at grassroots levels.

As it is discussed above, the pastoralists, have a customary institution for managing primary and secondary rights of access with different rules and regulations for negotiation between different clan groups to adjust the sharing of ponds, water wells, and grazing lands. The indigenous (Gadaa council of Borana and council of elders (*guurti*)) of Digodia and Marehan) institutions help to govern natural resources and mobility of pastoralists and their livestock which maintains and restores cooperation and collaboration among clans groups. They have also reliable know how to manage conflicts. Borana, Arsi, Digodia, Marehan and other clans' pastoralists in the previous Borana *Awuraja* and the current Liban and Filtu *woredas* have long relied on the management of natural resources to maximize land use and maintain livestock productivity. Clans know how they manage herd movements which help them to manage natural resources based on the season, by making some areas vacant to use during the wet season and some for the dry season. The natural resources as a whole constitute communally owned economic resources that must be shared among the different clans living in the areas.

In both study areas-Liban and Filtu *woredas*, government officials have been discriminating, overlooking and marginalizing the knowledge of the local communities. Since, modern or government institutions are imposed on the peoples in these localities by officials from above; their practice is not contextualizing the objective realities of the people and their environment. It

⁵⁶ Personal Interview: Digodia Elder, 27 July 2015, Filtu.

appears that they do not consider the legality of the FDRE constitution on customary laws and the implementation of the rule of law for Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia.

Researchers in the area of indigenous knowledge like Antweiller (2004) also argue, indigenous knowledge is partly experience, partly custom, religion, community laws, and the attitude of the societies that concern their lives and the lives of other living things. It is, therefore, a grave mistake to think of indigenous knowledge as 'old-fashioned, backward, static or unchanged.' This author further adds the fundamental difference between indigenous and modern or scientific knowledge, among other, is that the scientific one focuses on information having universal significances without considering the context of a given environment. Whereas the indigenous one is the result of social circumstances closely associated with cultural and environmental context specific to a given locality (*Ibid.*).

Emery, (1996) identifies the advantages of using indigenous knowledge for sustainable peace and development, by integrating it with the modern or scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, there is the absence of policies that encourage the integration of traditional and contemporary knowledge at regional and local levels, which help to use and manage their environment, resources, security, and clan relations. This implies lack of capacity to enhance national, regional and local indigenous knowledge networks. Which limited knowledge to local exchange and adaptation of indigenous knowledge to the local context; the inability of identifying different mechanisms to protect indigenous knowledge in a way that foster the promotion and validation of the resource use and management of the local peoples hinder the inter-clan and intra-clan relations of the communities.

On the other hand, acquiring the indigenous knowledge of the local communities on the basis of trust, respect, equity, and empowerment, in general identifying the types, levels and the characteristics of indigenous knowledge which found in the rural areas and working for its implementations in clan-relations, resources use and management efforts will enable to bring sustainable peace and cooperation among the clans in the study areas.

Flaveir, (1995) argues that indigenous knowledge represents successful ways in which people have dealt with their environment and can provide valuable input about the local situation and

how to effectively manage its natural resources. Such practices as environmental sustainability, soil, water and grazing land conservation are important aspects to consider through giving emphasis on the role of local knowledge and land management and giving attention to stakeholders participation in conservation activities. Therefore, policy formulation and action towards inter-clan relations, conflict resolutions, resource use and management should base itself on local peoples' knowledge and practices.

Shide (2003) adds the question of recognizing traditional approaches to use of resources and conflict management, is an increment to reflect the importance of accepting and respecting local culture to understand the reality on the ground. This is because, far before any state formation, the traditional local pastoral and agro-pastoral groups used to settle their differences on resource use and solve the emerging local conflicts using indigenous knowledge and ritual practices. However, the above evidence shows how specific centralized government policies are undermining the indigenous knowledge and ritual practices of the local communities and how far they have triggered local resource conflicts and threatened the harmonious inter-clan relations in the study *woredas*.

5.6 Summary

This chapter has examined the role of indigenous institutions in the inter-clan relations and resource management in pastoral communities in Liban and Filtu *woredas*. To this end, the chapter has four interrelated points of discussion. The first part discussed customary laws to manage resources such as water wells and grazing land. It examined how, when and why pastoralists have been using customary laws in their localities. In the second point of discussion, it showed how customary law and clan relations have been influenced by state policy and local officials' interventions. Since natural resource use and management system in the study areas (Liban and Filtu *woredas*) have been weakened and overlooked because of state policy that focuses on sedentarization of pastoralists communities. This in turn resulted in border clashes and erosion of pastoral institutional arrangements and thereby left negative impacts on inter-clan relations. In many cases, as key informants complain government in general and local government officials, in particular, have failed to recognize the already existing customary laws and its institutional arrangements. However, the current resource use and management system

and institutional arrangements are illegal forms without the knowledge of the local communities; this is performed by the goodwill of the local government officials without understanding policy and constitution of the state and both regions constitution. These have been triggering grave conflicts, mistrust and worries which undermined the hitherto existing inter-clan cooperation and mutual trust; since traditional institutions and its rules, regulations, and practices of resources use and management have been eroded and weakened.

For pastoral communities to continue to live herding their livestock, development policy of the state and regional states should be changed in favor of pastoral communities. Mainly, pastoralists should have rights to grazing land and water wells rights that includes communal clan-based resources use and management guaranteed by law. Besides, legal recognition of customary land and water use and management is important for the continuations of pastoralism and to bring sustainable peace and mutual integrations in the case study woredas of Liban and Filtu.

Furthermore, the statuses of traditional institutions in the case study woredas are marginalized eroded and discriminated against by government officials. This is because local people are losing their ritual places for investors, for settlement of pastoralists, to establish *kebele* and town and for modern religious institutions. As Antweiller, (2004) argues it is usually a mistake to think of indigenous knowledge as 'old-fashioned, backward, static or unchanged.' In Oromia and Somali regional states in general, and the case study *woredas* (Liban and Filtu) in particular, there is the absence of policies which encourage the integration of traditional and modern knowledge at regional and local levels which help to use and manage their environment, resources, and security.

This implies lack of capacity to enhance national, regional and local indigenous knowledge networks. Limited knowledge of local exchange and adaptation of indigenous knowledge to the local context; the inability of identifying different mechanisms to protect indigenous knowledge in a way that foster the promotion and validation of the resource use and management of the local peoples which hinder the inter-clan and intra-ethnic relations of the communities.

Chapter Six

Federalism and Inter-Clan Relations: Identity, Socio-Economic Affairs and their Dynamics

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined the role of indigenous institutions in inter-clan relations and resource management among the pastoral communities of Liban and Filtu *woredas*. The task of this chapter is to examine the federal political system and inter-clan relations- with respect to identity, socio-economic issues between the clans and their dynamics in the two study *woredas*. The chapter is organized into eight sections with interrelated points of discussion. The first section examines inter-clan relations across the study *woredas* in between the majority clan Borana in Liban versus the Digodia the majority clan in Filtu; and minority clans such as Marehan, Gurra, Karanle, and Ajuran in Filtu versus Arsi, Guji, Gurra, and Karanle minority in Liban. Besides, there is also a minority within minority such as Marehan, Gurra, Karanle and Arsi clan and even majority within minority. The third and fourth sections deal with inter-clan relations within Filtu *woreda* such as Digodia, Marehan, Garri-Marro, Gurra, Karanle and Garri and those in Liban *woreda*'s like Borana, Arsi and Guji clans, respectively. The fifth part treats the relations between pastorals and agro-pastorals on natural resources within the study *woredas*, and the sixth section examines minority clans' challenge in both *woredas* about their right to social, economic and political powers. The seventh section examines the trade relations of the clans within and across the *woreda* clans, and the last section points out the clan relations and its dynamics after the decentralization of the two regional states in general and the study areas- Liban and Filtu *woredas* in particular.

6.2 Inter-Clan Relations across the Woreda

Following the post-1991 federal system of Ethiopia which is based on the ethnolinguistic administrative system, the previous Sidamo *Kiflehager* (province) and the then Borana *Awuraja* (county) has been restructured mainly under different Afaan Oromo and Af-Somali speaking clans. The Societies around border areas of the regions in southern Ethiopia are categorized in

Ethnic, clan, sub-clan, religion, language and political allegiance. With all these features, they cross-regional and international border (Markakis, 1996a).

There are several different clans, sub-clans, and lineage of Oromo (Borana, Arsi, Guji, Gurra and Karanle) living in Liban *woreda*, Guji zone of Oromia. Somali clans (Digodia, Marehan, Gurra, Garrimaro, Karanle) residing in Filtu *woreda*, Liban zone of Somali region or the former Borana county or Sidamo province. Therefore, their relations are complex and ever changing. The details of their relationships are discussed in the following sections.

6.2.1 The Relations of Borana and Arsi with Digodia and Marehan

The Borana and Arsi clans are living in Liban *woreda*, and the Digodia and Marehan clans are living in Filtu *woreda*. All clans are Cushitic speaking in pastoral and agro-pastoral communities engaged in different herding livestock but have a different clan and ethnic identity and overlapping religion, since most Arsi and few Borana Oromo are followers of Islam religion like Somali clans. But, they mainly emphasize their sources of livelihood than the complex identity that they have in the border areas of the two study *woredas*.

The Borana and Arsi are mainly known by cattle pastoralism whereas the Digodia and Marehan are known by camel pastoralism. However, in Liban *woreda*, the Arsi and Borana who are living on the shore of Dawa and Genelle River also cultivate some crops, since they are mainly agro-pastoralists.

During 1991 regionalization of the state the Liban and Filtu *woredas* are located at a frontier line between the territories of the Oromia and Somali regional states occupying the southeastern part of Ethiopia. Accordingly, local groups of the Oromo clans (Borana and Arsi) are claiming Filtu *woreda* should be part of Guji zone administrative unit since it was under Borana *awuraja* in the previous regimes and they have many ritual places in this areas.⁵⁷ On the contrary, the Somali clan (Digodia) has a vested interest in the control of the relatively rich pastoral resources in the Liban *woreda* of Guji zone and therefore advances opposing claims.⁵⁸ Focus group discussants

⁵⁷ Personal Interview: Borana and Arsi Elders, 6 June 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

⁵⁸ Personal Interview: Digodia Elders, 22 June 2015, Filtu.

attribute the conflicting claims to uncertainties occurring from its location at an ill-defined border area between the opponent and largely nomadic groups of different ethnic origin.⁵⁹

In the previous regimes, the Somali clans such as Digodia, Ajuran and Marehan were allies of Borana against other Somali clans because of the fact that they had access to water and rangelands freely by respecting the local Oromo customary law (Bassi, 1997:27-30). Even though, there were irregular clashes between individuals on the water wells and pasture areas, the history of Digodia and Borana was mostly characterized by mutual tolerance (*Ibid*). Moreover, informant mentioned that, Borana and Marehan had no history of conflict. Since, Marehan, the minority clan of Somali, did not have defined territories of their own; they were living with Borana and Digodia clans in Borana Awuraja (county) and the current Liban and Filtu *woredas*. However, in 2014 the Somali region's Filtu *woreda* officials gave them, a disputed area in between Filtu and Liban specific land (Aysuftu) adjacent to *woreda* of Liban. Since then Marehan has been in conflict with Borana clan.⁶⁰

According to focus group discussants, the conflict between Digodia and Borana for two decades became serious after decentralization system of governance in Ethiopia and also, with Marehan from 2012. Since, the conflict is transformed from individual to clan conflict, which hitherto did not occur in these areas between Borana and Digodia clans. They add that clan relations between the Borana, Arsi and the Digodia, and Marehan became reduced and there is distrust and intolerance increased.⁶¹

According to informants' argument in the previous regimes, all clans move from place to place by having consent from elders based on their customary rule and regulation that they have been practicing.⁶² However, after regionalization, things have changed because land is given to those clan that are settled in particular place. Therefore, elders from both study *woredas* (Liban and

⁵⁹ Focus Group Discussion: Borana, Guji, Arsi, Digodia and Marihan Elders, 5 June 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

⁶⁰ Focus Group Discussion: Borana and Marehan Clans, 8 June 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

⁶¹ Focus Group Discussion: Borana, Arsi, Elders, 11 June 2015, Nagelle_Borana and Digodia and Marehan Elders, 22 June 2015 Filtu.

⁶² *Ibid*.

Filtu) said that ñwe lack trust to allow neighboring clans to get access to grazing land and water wells. The directive from government officials stated that land belongs to the group or clans who settled over it; this directive is undermining customary law with which we have lived together for long years.⁶³ In the previous regimes Elders of different clans have strong relationships on different societal affairs, but now such relationships are broken, and their authority reduced from time to time. Despite this, nature forces them to move, and even if elders lacks trust, because of state policy of settlement, they have to tolerate each other. This is possible by the relentless effort of elders from both *woredas*, to negotiate on resources usage based on the seasons. The agreement is that after the dry season is the guest clan had to leave the hosting clan and return to their place. In rare cases, some clans refuse to leave the place, and this leads to conflict between the clans in the frontier of the study *woredas* (Liban and Filtu).

6.2.2 The Relation of Arsi Oromo Clans (Gurra, Karanle, and Ajuran) with Somali Clans (Gurra, Karanle, and Ajuran)

As their name indicates, there is identity overlap by name between Arsi and some Somali clans in the study areas. Since, the Somali Gurra, Karanle and Ajuran clans called themselves previously as Arsi Oromo clan and post 1991 they call themselves as Somali clan.

In the post federalization of Ethiopia's governance system, clans have been looking for identity recognition as it is legitimated in the constitution. Informants argue that, previously Arsi Oromo sub-clans were withdrawing from Oromo and claiming Somali clan identity by considering the real objective identities like religion, culture, and language. These groups are some of the Gurra, Karanle, and Ajuran previously taken as Arsi sub-clans but now they claim Somali clans identity since-1991.⁶⁴ Regarding this Bobo *et al.*, (1996), advocates of constructivist theory argue that ethnic identity is not something people ñownò rather it is something they ñconstructò in a specific social and historical circumstance to enhance their concern.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Personal Interview: Arsi Elders, 11 June 2015, Bitatta.

Similarly, the key informants argue the life of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists are similar in their economy. They are multicultural and multilingual societies in cases of culture, language, and religion and have been living together for centuries as diverse clans. There was intermarriage between them, especially, the Arsi Oromo (Gurra, Karanle, and Ajuran) clans; with Somali (Gurra, Karanle, and Ajuran). Their names indicate that how much their identities are overlapping in different aspects culture such as, religion, and language.

Therefore, the relations between these clans are in some respect harmonious; but it is not devoid of conflict because they are pastoralists and they move from place to place based on seasons. Moreover, there had been a claim and counterclaims over land and natural resources. During focus group discussion, informants argue that after the 2004 referendum made by House of Federation (HoF), the Gurra and Karanle Somali clans conflicted with Arsi. In 2005 at Goyele local elders resolved the dispute, after an immense loss in human life and material wealth damage. However, elders added that Gurra and Karanle were allies of Arsi, when there is a conflict between Digodia and Marehan, because of the marriage contract and blood relation that they have in common. Almost all clans are looking for water and grazing lands depending on season. Though they may clash, and at the same time they may help each other or cooperate, because of the relations that they have for centuries and their mobile lifestyle.⁶⁵

Regarding this relation Scheel (1989) argues that ethnicity is not something clear, but the meaning and status attached to it matter to redefine your identity and to find your ally in your environments, which is sometimes situationally based on the economy and changing political contexts. He adds the post-1991 Ethiopia governance system, which is mainly based on ethnic and linguistic identity, forced the Somali clans who lived long together with Borana and Arsi to choose their region, *woreda* and *kebele* to form ethnic regions of Ethiopia.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

6.2.3 The Relation of Borana Oromo with Garri Somali

The relation of Borana with Garri is ñgeographical and historical; this is characterized by conflict, peace and cooperation (Getachew, 1983:22). Historically the Garri clan argues that the Borana came from Liban and invaded of their residence; which was inhabited by many Somali clans including Garri. However, the Borana clans also claim that Garri were guests for them and that they had a promise to live together as vassals of Borana clan, by paying tribute to Borana Sabo sub-clan. Before the conquest of emperor Minilik II, the tributes were collected every week, and failure to pay often led to a punishment that in turn cause clash between them (*Ibid*).

The Borana and Garri have close social and trade relations, and according to informants, they have shared water wells, grazing lands, and marketplaces. The marketplace links their economy together because they exchange different items. Moreover, they argue that they have common language and also the similar culture of marriage, but Garri Somali and Borana have rarely been inter-married. This is because of religion, since Borana are *Waaqeffata* while Garri are Moslems. However, Garri Oromo and Garri Somali intermarried, though it is reduced currently, due to the regionalization of the governance system that has brought competition over resources among the different clans in the border areas of the study *woredas*.⁶⁶

Furthermore, informants argue that the Borana and Garri elders have shared many common issues, especially to protect their enemies from their territories. Thus, they support each other, for example, when Garri conflicted with Gabra or Digodia, the Borana is the ally of the Garri. Similarly, when Borana conflicts with Guji, the Garri was supporting the Borana.⁶⁷ This is because of the socio-economic relations that they have, and previously the Garri considered themselves a sub-clan of Borana.

⁶⁶ Personal Interview: Borana and Garri Elders, 14 June 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*.

6.2.4 The Relations between Majority and Minority Clans

In both study *woredas*, the minority clans were living under one *Awuraja* (province) with the majority clans as dependents of the latter during pre-1991 regimes. Hence, they had similar identities, like religion, language, traditional beliefs, common name for places and some cultural objects. After the regionalized governance system of Ethiopia, some of the minority Oromo clans changed some aspects of their old identity such as language, and religion in favor of Somali clan and while minority Somali clans changed their identity to Borana and Arsi. For example, some Garri identifies themselves as Borana-Oromo and some as Garri-Somali. Similarly, some Gurra, Karanle, and Ajuran identify themselves as Arsi-Oromo and other Gurra, Karanle and Ajuran-Somali clan. Previously Garri clan used to identify themselves as Borana clan, while all Gurra, Karanle and Ajuran clans used to identify themselves as Arsi clan when they were living under Borana *Awuraja* in previous regimes.

This identity shifts go with Weber's argument about ethnicity regarding dynamic political activity, hence, even though ethnicity is dependent on a belief in common descent, that knowledge can only be constructed and sustained through joint political action. While political leaders and intellectuals regularly claim 'their' ethnic group is primordial, involving the sentiment and beliefs of common descent, these beliefs become meaningful and accessible only when the group (as a group) undergoes the process of politically enthused social action (Weber,1968).

According to minorities' clan elders,

Previously we did not have our own defined land, and we were living with majority clans in this area by then known as Borana Awuraja and the current (Liban and Filtu woredas). Now the Gurra, Karanle, and Ajuran are Somali clans and claim kebeles or identified area of their own in the border of the two woredas, but they are mixed with the Arsi clan it is challenging to get specific kebeles or woredas. Similarly, Garri and Marehan claim woredas after regionalization/decentralization system of governance in Ethiopia. This is to get access to learn in our language and to protect and promote our culture;

*even if there are people who argued against our claim. Some said 'to get advantage from Somali.' This argument is wrong. Because for us, it is a right time to claim our identity. In fact, we get this right from FDRE 1995 constitution, not from Somali clans. For example, after 2004 referendum our kebeles belong to Filtu woreda, but our clan is rarely represented in woreda council and woreda administration because the dominant clan of Digodia dominates the political and economic power of the Filtu woreda. We have to get advantage from the constitution to educate our children in our language and to promote our culture.*⁶⁸

This feeling corroborates with the argument of Kuper & Smith (1969) who made it clear that the ethnic groups have the legal and political right to maintain their own language, educational systems, and culture and a balance of power are often reached among the different ethnic groups. Besides, Weber argued ethnicity regarding dynamic political activity, so that, political leaders and intellectuals regularly claim primordial loyalty of átheirô ethnic group to maintain their political and economic power, these ideas become significant and known when the group accepts, follow and take action socially and politically (Weber,1968).

Accordingly, the 1995 FDRE constitution states in Article 39(2) ñEvery Nation, Nationality, and People in Ethiopia has the right to speak, to write and to develop its language; to express, to develop and to promote its culture; and to preserve its history.ò Elders argue that ñthis is what they want to achieve based on this provision. These come to reality when we have our own *woreda's* or *kebele's*, to educate our children in our mother tongue, promote our culture and to preserve our historyò.⁶⁹

The focus group discussants from Somali clan rightly argued that,

In the previous regime we (the Garri clan) call ourselves as Borana clan but we are Muslim, and we are camel herder, and Borana's have their own religion

⁶⁸ Personal Interview: Gurra, Karanle, Ajuran and Garri, Elders, 19 June 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

*different from us Waaqeffanna, and they are cattle herders. We are Somali before and our neighbor Borana also knows who we are. In the previous regimes, we are a minority; we do not have the power to speak about our identity. Even, the majority clans Arsi or Borana or Digodia have no power to speak confidently about their culture and language. Thus, we all minority clans called ourselves by the name of the majority clans. Since power is in the hand of the majority in the previous regimes in this area, and the state favors the Borana or Arsi than minority Somali clans.*⁷⁰

They add that; we are mixed since we lived together for centuries. Thus, our religion and some of our cultures are similar, and also we married with each other. We have common market; we speak both Afaan Oromo and Af-Somali languages. And some of us have similar religion of Islam. Mainly the Garri clan has many cultural links to the Borana, and many of them are bilingual since they are speakers of both Af-Somali and Afaan Oromo (Schlee, 1989; Bassi, 1997; Getachew, 1996). However, because of the absence of border and undermining of customary law and elders, since 1991, we have conflicted and at the same time in peace.⁷¹

As it is described above, the Somali-Oromo inter-clan relationships in the border areas of Liban *woreda* of Oromia region and Filtu *woreda* of Somali region are not clear, and it is extremely complicated. As it is examined above, the case of Gurra, Karanle, Ajuran and Garri clans are the best example for the complication of their relations, because there are no clear means to identify this clan's identity simply. Some Oromo speakers claim Somali genealogies, and there is also ritual cooperation like the case of Garri, Gurra and Karanle clans, and there is also social interdependence. The inter-clan relations between clans in the border areas of both study *woredas* are not easy as the local officials tried to simplify it.

⁷⁰ Focus Group Discussion: Gurra, Karanle, Ajuran and Garri Elders, 20 June 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

⁷¹ Ibid.

6.3 Inter-Clan Relations within the Filtu Woreda

Filtu *woreda*, Liban zone of Somali regional state is the home area of diverse Somali clans. The southern part of this socially mixed *woreda* is adjacent to Dollo *woreda* which is dominated by Garri-Maró. The eastern part is an extension of Digodia territory, while the northern part starting from Aysufto village and its surroundings are inhabited by Marehan, Gurra, Ajuran, and Karanle.

6.3.1 Digodia-Garri Relations

According to the informant, the Digodia and Garri Somalis have a common language, religion, and culture. They also have similar interest to dominate large areas of the region. Thus, they support each other in different conflicts.⁷² However, in the previous regimes, the Digodia paid tributes to Garri, when the Digodia refuse not to pay the tribute, they came to a clash.

Moreover, they argue that both clans have a common culture, like hairstyle, wearing stale, and also they have common objective materials like house style; they are followers of Islam religion, they have a similar marriage ceremony. Both clans are mainly camel and goat pastoralists.⁷³

Furthermore, after decentralization, majority clans in Liban zone of Somali region disagree on their choice of an administrative headquarters the Liban zone. The Garri elders recommend Moyale town to be the administrative headquarters of Liban zone by justifying that the town is rich when we compare with Filtu and Dolo towns. Thus, they prefer Moyale town for Liban zone headquarters.⁷⁴ On the contrary, elders from the majority Digodia clan in Liban zone of Somali region argued that,

Filtu town is a potential administrative headquarters for Liban zone since it is relatively located at the center of the Liban zone, unlike Moyale that is located at the tip of the western part of the zone and it is not stable area, due to a competition between Garri and Borana clans over Moyale town.

⁷² Personal Interview: Digodia and Garri informants, 9 June 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Personal Interview: Garri Elder, 23 June 2015, Filtu.

*Dollo town is also not centrally located and hence not suitable to become the administrative headquarters of the zone. Thus, we prefer Filtu as headquarter than Moyale and Dolo Ado towns.*⁷⁵

The claim and counterclaim of zonal administrative headquarters between the two clans are not yet answered from the regional government side; the majority clans in the zone are still debating to have the nearest town for their socio-economic and political advantage. The Digodia elders argued that ñour clan can upgrade the status of Filtu town which other clans forwarded as a deficit for the town; in short period of time; especially, we lack road which attracts the socio-economic and market of people from in and out.⁷⁶

Moreover, the other minority clans, like Gurra, Karanle, Ajuran, and Marehan are the ally of Digodia in proposing Filtu town for a capital city of Liban zone of Somali region. They said, ñFiltu *woreda* is a home for many majorities, and minority clans and also Filtu is relatively a center for Liban zone.⁷⁷

The Digodia and Garri are the majority clans who have an oath of alliance and economic cooperation with the Borana, among the Somali clans in Liban zone, the main rival of other Somali clans in the zone. Currently, because of the disagreement between different clans in the zone the regional government did not suggest a stable administrative headquarters town for Liban zone. Despite prevalent disagreement between clans for the time being, currently, Filtu is made a administrative headquarters town for Liban zone administration.

6.3.2 Digodia-Garri-Maró Relations

The Digodia is the largest clan in Filtu *woreda*. They are mainly pastoral. They also have minority group living with them in Filtu *woreda* which is the sedentary Garri-Maró found along the lower courses of the Ganale River. Now Digodia clan from the river vally displaces them and they shift to Udate *woreda* in the side of the Moyale and Dolo-Ado area. Garr-Maró also

⁷⁵ Personal Interview: Digodia Elder, 23 June 2015, Haydimtu *Kebele*.

⁷⁶ Personal interview: Digodia Elder, 17 June 2015, Haydimitu *Kebele*.

⁷⁷ Personal Interview: Marihan, Gurra, and Ajuran Elders, 19 June 2015, Filtu.

displaced by Marehan clan who currently settled in between Liban *woreda* of Guji zone and Filtu *woreda* of Liban zone. The Garri-Maró, Marehan, and others in Filtu *woreda*, the Somali (Gurra, Karanle, and Ajuran) all act as independent groups who are collectively responsible for administering themselves at the *kebele* level.

Therefore, the clan is linked to a particular territory, which may or may not match with the frontier of the *woreda* administrative entity. Currently, in Filtu *woredas*, the Digodia clan is mainly dominating. Since, territory of the land-holding clan tends to occupy is based on the *woreda*, they live. Regarding this Garri-Maró elders argue land based on clan settlement for pastoralist communities are not inclusive based on the real settlement of the pastoral communities. According to them ñboundary making within the regional state like zones, *woredas*, and *kebeles* in the pastoralist communities in practice have created conflict within the clan and outside the clan like with the neighboring Oromo clans such as Boran, Arsi, and Guji.ð⁷⁸

According to elders, ñthere is struggling for access to mainly agricultural land in between majority clan of Digodia and minority clan of Garri-Maró under the current regime since the majorities are dominating and grabbing the minority's property. In the previous regime, it seems balanced when we compare with the current oneð.⁷⁹ Informants add that even ñthe minority Garri-Maró was considered as a deducted unit and was given main concern in the distribution of government development resources for fear of being indirectly controlled by Digodia clan whose loyalty to regional government is not trusted and insecure.ð⁸⁰

As discussed above relations between the Digodia and the Garri-Maró are tense largely because of competition over access to major agricultural land. Similarly, around Ganale River, there is a struggle with Gurra, Karanle and Ajuran clans. Overall relations between the Digodia clan and other minority groups in the Filtu *woreda* are harmonious.

⁷⁸ Personal Interview: Marehan Elder, 25 June 2015, Dheeka *Kebele*.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

6.3.3 The Relations between Majority Digodia Somali clan with Minority Somali clans

According to informants, the Gurra, Karanle, and Ajuran clans were vassals of Arsi Oromo in the previous regimes of Ethiopia. However, after federalization/decentralization of Ethiopia governance system, they claimed Somali identity through the descent line, and history based on their oral tradition.⁸¹ To this end, they argue that their claim of Somali affiliation did not get acceptance from the Digodia and the minority Marehan clans side, since, they claim the land that these minority clans (such as Gurra, Karanle, and Ajuran) are currently living in. Therefore, they conflict with Digodia and Marehan, in Filtu *woreda*, after the referendum made by the HoF in 2004. Since then, they have been marginalized from economy and politics in the *woreda*.⁸²

According, to Gurra, and Karanle minority clans, they have similar, religion (Islam), language and culture with Digodia and Marehan, but they rarely intermarried, because in the previous regimes these minorities considered themselves as Arsi-Oromo. At the time of conflict, between Gurra, Karanle and Ajuran Somali clans with Marehan Somali clan, the Digodia allies with the Marehan to attack those who previously claim Arsi Oromo identity. Therefore, the past and present identity claims between them hinder their marriage and their relationships⁸³

The intra-clans relation in Filtu *woreda* shows that, after decentralization of the Ethiopian governance system, within the *woreda* clans there have been cooperation and distrust. They cooperate in their social and cultural aspects; and based on their interest they are ally of one another during the conflict with external enemies. The causes for distrust between the different neighboring clans in the study area is that, each clan is becoming opportunistic in the use the governmental policy on pasture, agricultural land, settlement and water wells. Thus, clans who live in relatively resourceful areas distrust, clans who came from neighboring areas; and they defend their pasture and water wells, especially at drought time when the resources become

⁸¹ Personal Interview: Gurra and Karanle and Ajuran Elders, 11 June 2015, Bitatta Town.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

scarce. And, they feel disappointment on access to the economy and political representation between the majority and minority clans in the *woreda* council.

However, elders tried to give necessary resolution by sharing resources between herders from different clans for the sake of the entire pastoralist communities and to keep the security of the nomadic societies in the Filtu *woreda*. Still, government official structure, and policy are not implemented according to the way it was proposed and promised. Throughout policy implementation, officials failed to accommodate indigenous knowledge of the local communities into government policy with the view to bringing about sustainable peace and development.

6.4 Inter-Clan Relations within the Liban Woreda

6.4.1 Borana, Arsi and Guji Relations

There are three major pastoral and agro-pastoral Oromo groups living in Liban *woreda* of Guji zone (Borana, Guji, and Arsi). The Guji and Arsi clans occupy areas that are located more in the highland areas of the zone and the Borana's clan is living in the low land area of the Guji zone. The Gadaa system is a very inclusive institution of the Oromo Nation. To understand the Oromo culture and history, understanding Gadaa system is very crucial. Since the Gadaa system includes all Oromo lives. The Gadaa system forms many inessential elements of Arsi, Borana and Guji social being. According to Taddesse (1988), the Gadaa system mainly reflects the concept of fertility, status, place, and sense of identity and religious values. Besides, the Gadaa is a social and political institution. It is a system of administration or leadership that succeeds in each every eight years to take for granted political, military, judicial, legislative and ritual responsibilities for the Oromo nation.

In their oral history, they prove that three of them had common administration under common Abba Gadaa until the 1594-1602 Gadaa that was known by the Gadaa of Doyo Boro. After this Gadaa period, they were separated. After this, they consider themselves as the enemy (Nyaapha) of each other. Since then the relations of the Guji, Arsi, and Borana were mainly known as *ñsidii sadiin*, which means the three enemies to each other (*Ibid*). In Liban *woreda*, these three Oromo

clans have been living for a century together without major conflicts. The conflict provoked when there is a scarcity of resources in the region.

The Borana, Guji and Arsi Oromo groups have common Gadaa system for political and social stratification and collective identity (being an Oromo) which they share with other Oromo clans. As Asmarom (1973) and Hinnant (1977) argue, the Borana and Guji Afaan Oromoo speaking clans have common Gadaa organization and Qalu institution with a minor difference in its structure and performance to identify the way they perform during ritual and while they are doing activities. They use Qalu institution to lead their indigenous religion (*Waaqeffanna*). The Qalu has the power to make legal the Gadaa leaders. That is why the Gadaa leaders visit the Qalu with a gift to get oral blessings.

Informants argue that they have a common customary law to share common resources with pastoral Borana and agro-pastoral Guji. And also, they have common language and religion (they share with most of the Guji clan), and there is also intermarriage between them.⁸⁴ This means there are cultural ties between these clans in Liban woreda. These ties strengthen intercommunity activities such as weddings, funerals and joint community's cultural celebrations within in-group communities. These ties are very important during in-group or out-group wars. This may erode fear between the clans. They add that there had been deep-rooted economic and trade relations between them. Their potential economic and trade relations in Liban *woreda* is Nagelle-Borana marketplace.⁸⁵ The agricultural Guji provides cereal crops, fruits, and vegetables to the cattle pastoral Borana clan and the Borana clan is the provider of livestock to agro-pastoral Guji, and also they provide deepwater wells during drought season.

However, after the regionalization of the governance system in Ethiopia, new conflict triggering issues has been emerged in between Borana and Guji clans who have closest Oromo communities, well known to share many similarities. Nevertheless, there were competitions between Guji and Borana clans regarding the choice of which town to house the administrative headquarters of the zone; like that of Digodia and Garri clans's competition to make Filtu or

⁸⁴ Personal Interview: Boran Elder, 09 June 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Moyale administrative headquarters for Liban zone of Somali region. According to elders from Borana and Guji clans within clans there have been two different cases about Liban *woreda* and the *woreda* town. One is the Borana clan's are not happy with the allocation of Liban *woreda* under Guji zone. Second, the Guji clan's are not happy with the administrative headquarters of the Guji zone in Liban *woreda*, Nagelle-Borana town.⁸⁶ Therefore, the allocation of Liban *woreda* under Guji zone and the administrative headquarters of the zone town has become a catalyst for the discontent in Liban *woreda*.

Informants complain, ñé there are two groups of government officials emerged to take over the above-mentioned discontents. One group was interested in moving the capital seat of Guji zone from Nagelle-Borana to Adola town. The second group interest was by changing the name of Nagelle-Borana; by removing the name 'Borana' and to use as administrative headquarters of Guji zone.⁸⁷ (See, chapter 7). These conflicts were behind waging a full-scale war in between Borana and Guji in May 2014. Moreover, many lives lost and many properties were damaged. Officials or elites organized this activity, as the instrumentalist theorists argue that the elites manipulate group differences (Hamesso, 2001). Similarly, Cohen, (1981) and Ted Gurr (1993) say that the leaders in a modern nation use and manipulate the perception or attitude of the ethnic groups or ethnic identity for their own interest to stay in power for a long period. In general relations between the three major Oromo clans and other minority groups in the Liban, *woreda* are pleasantly sounding.

In general regarding clan relations along Liban and Filtu *woredas* as different scholars in the area of ethnicity and ethnic group argue, Aalen (2008) states ethnicity is socially constructed, flexible and fluid and susceptible to change over time. The Gurra and Garri case mentioned above is a good example. Moreover, intermarriage among Arsi Oromo and Gurra Somali, Garri Oromo and Garri Somali, Digodia and Marehan, Borana and Guji could be a good example here. Besides, as Schlee and Shongolo (1995:8) argue even individuals or groups are coming as strangers and be affiliated to a particular group, ñguests became broths, first metaphorically and then in a more and more binding sense.ò Myth and history are used to help to legitimize such construction. An

⁸⁶ Personal Interview: Borana and Guji Elders, 09 June 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

instrumentalist consider ethnic identity as flexible and malleable argue that individuals or groups may use ethnicity to achieve political, economic and social goals (Brass, 1991). Furthermore, state involvement in initiating competitions between groups for political benefits (Udogu, 2001).

6.5 Pastoral and Agro pastoral Relations on Natural Resources

In Liban *woreda* of Guji zone of Oromia and Filtu *woreda* Liban zone of Somali region, there are lands which are suitable for farming and to herd livestock. Because of long-term environmental change, political and societal development in this situation also changed. According to informants in Liban *woreda*, the Did-Liban areas are suitable for farming and to herd livestock. And in Filtu *woreda* around Ganale River in Gurra, Karanle and Ajuran minority's clans' *kebeles* are proper to herd livestock and farm different agricultural products.⁸⁸ In addition, they argue that pastoral and agro-pastoral communities meet at semiarid areas of Did-Liban plane areas of Liban *woreda* and in the sub-humid area of Ganale River in both Liban and Filtu *woredas*. According to informants, these areas perceived by agro-pastoralist that because it has sufficient rain it is available for crop cultivation. Similarly, the pastoralists consider that there is no livestock attacking pests or sticks in these areas and these areas are important points for seasonal mobility for pastoralists' communities.⁸⁹

Furthermore, the agricultural Arsi clan in Liban *woreda* and the pastoral Borana clan are exchanging their products in marketplaces. Similarly, in Filtu *woreda* the Gurra, Karanle, and Ajuran clans are agro-pastoralists who have a good relation in exchanging of their products at the small market in their *woredas*. Besides, all the agro-pastoral and pastoral communities have to meet and exchange their products at the most prominent marketplace in Nagelle-Borana and Ganale, and therefore, they have good relations with each other.

In addition, the pastoral and agro-pastoral clans of both study *woredas* also linked by the complementary use of the environment. During the dry season, the land that is not suitable for crop production is used as dry season grazing areas for livestock. During the rainy season,

⁸⁸ Personal Interview: Resident of Nagalle, 03 November 2015; and Resident of Filtu, 21 November 2015, Filtu

⁸⁹ Ibid.

livestock is grazed in the area for farmland by keeping the cattle away from the crop are and when the crop is harvested the livestock use crop residues as fodder. In this way, both groups gaining mutual benefit and their interaction make it possible and sustainable.

According to informants because of this peaceful contact between agro-pastoralist and pastoralists, there is an attraction of one another based on the benefit that they got from their products. Thus, there are individuals from Borana and Digodia clans who motivated to join crop production and animal fattening, especially when the drought is extremely critical in Liban and Filtu *woredas*.⁹⁰

However, there are threats to the peaceful relations between pastoral and agro-pastoral groups. Since, they are livings in adjacent areas particularly, when crop and livestock are nearby on the same land. In this regard, Hussein (1998:23) argues, "conflict of interest is omnipresent in cases where different stakeholders use resources." This would be serious when the drought affects the pastorals and agro-pastoral communities and drought period is prolonged. According to elders in the study areas, the growing demand for farming land has led to decreasing tracts of grazing land and this minimizes the agro-pastoral and pastoral clans' relations in Liban and Filtu *woredas*.⁹¹

According to informants, post-federal Ethiopia, government officials biased to words agricultural sector than pastoralist they promote access to crop production and settlement. This one-sided promotion of the officials had its own influence on the pastoral mode of existence; since it restricts the mobility of livestock and access to grazing land. Thus, these biases by government officials weakened the relationship between the pastoral and agro-pastoral communities, which ranged from simple exchange relation up to interactive services.⁹² The relationship between agro-pastoralist and pastoralist in the Liban *woreda* of Oromia and Filtu *woreda* of Somali are multi-dimensional, and like most social relationships it involves both cooperation and conflict.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

In the previous regimes as it is discussed in Chapter Five on resource use and management in pastoral areas in both study *woredas* were under one province. Thus, water wells are unevenly distributed in the previous Borana *Awuraja* (county). Moreover, grazing lands in this area were seasonally based. All the pastoral clans communally used the natural resources in the previous regimes, based on their customary law. Therefore, all clans in the study areas cooperate and integrate to use these natural resources. However, the current political decentralization, which mainly focuses on ethnolinguistic basis, shifted the cooperation on natural resources into claims and counter claims over the resources in the study areas. As elders of both *woredas* argue in the past the Borana and Digodia developed flexible inter-clan relations; currently, it seems rigid kind of relations, which mainly focus on excluding the out-group than the in-group from the resources that they use together.

Post-1990, the Borana, Arsi, and Guji Oromo clans with Digodia, Marehan, Gurra and Karanle and Ajuran Somali clans, inter-clan relations are influenced by town based intellectual and local officials. They are using the regionalization of the state as means to manipulate the relationship of these clans, mainly by triggering conflict between the clans. Since they use conflict as a means to generate economy or to get access funds from federal and regional governments and also, from international and local NGOs.

After decentralization, the expansion of farmland to wet season grazing areas of the pastoral communities, posed threat to the relationships between different clan groups within the *woreda* residents. For example, the Arsi agro-pastoralists in Liban *woreda*, Did-liban kebele is the best example that the Borana pastoral clan suspect this crop production oriented Arsi clan may displace them totally from their ancestral land. Therefore, these activities create fear among the clans in the Liban *woreda*. Besides, in Liban *woreda*, the Borana clan is not only threatened by other clans in the *woreda* but also the Borana clan those who live in town or near to the town participate in farming the grazing land.

Similarly, in Filtu *woreda*, the Digodia clan suspects the Gurra and Garr-marro clans, because both clans are agro-pastoralists and they mainly expand the farming land into the grazing areas of the pastoral Digodia clan territory. In both study *woredas*, the pastoralists are suspicious about their future grazing land which use is mainly season-based on the survival of pastoral livestock.

Moreover, as scholars in the area of resources argue, in the Horn of Africa rapid population growth, recurrent drought, endemic poverty, and harsh climatic conditions are the contributing factors over the local conflict and local community's relationships, since they intensify the competitions between pastoralists and agro-pastoralists (Suleiman, 1999).

6.6 Challenges of Minority Clans

In the study areas, there are minority clans within majority clans. Thus, the minority groups in Filtu *woreda* lose their ancestral lands by majority clan in the *woreda*. According to the informants, the Garri-Maró minority clan in Filtu *woreda* loses their lands by majority Digodia clan, after the federalization/decentralization of Ethiopia. The majority Digodia clan returned from Somalia. Moreover, they evacuated the agro-pastoral Garri-Maró and took over their lands. The Garri-Maró elders state that they legally appeal to regional government, but they did not get any response from the regional government. Finally, they decided to wage war to raise the gun to defend their economic rights. Nevertheless, they did not become succeed; since the majority Digodia clan is dominating the political and militia forces at the *woreda* level, they crushed their quest for economic rights violently by the *woreda* security forces.⁹³ Thus, most of the Garri-Maró clan dispersed in a different part of the Liban *woreda* of Guji zone Oromia regional state and Liban zone of Somali regional state.

Moreover, there are other minority groups in Filtu *woreda* such as Gurra, Karanle, Warra-duube, Ajuran, and Marehan who, because of their demography, they do not access economic and political rights at the local level. Similarly, there are minorities in Liban *woreda* of Guji zones such as Waataa, Reerbarre, Garri-Maró, and Marehan minorities are living mainly around Diid-Liban areas with similar status with minorities in Filtu *woreda*. According to informants, from both *woredas*, these minority groups are the most discriminated, marginalized and disadvantaged clans in Filtu and Liban *woredas*.⁹⁴ They add that the local government/or *woreda* officials have not addressed their problems. Thus, they lack primary education, health services, and transportation, communication, road, etc., when compared with the neighboring *kabeles*, in

⁹³ Personal Interview: Garri-Maró Elders, 03 November 2015, Nagelle-Borna.

⁹⁴ Personal Interview: Gurra, Karanle, Waataa, Reerbare, Garri-Maró Elders, 05 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

which the majority clans live. These basic services are unequally distributed within the *woreda kebeles*.

The decentralization process has not practically addressed minority's problems. Federalism by its principle is inclusive and stands for minorities. However, it is not inclusive of pastoralist communities in the study area. Since decentralization has not essentially accommodated minority within majority and minority within minority. Moreover, there is lack of political and economic autonomy, political representation and participation in the newly established decentralized local government structure in *kebeles* and *woreda* levels of the pastoralist communities.

According to minority clans' informants in the study areas, they faced multiple discrimination and marginalization. They lack rights of self-rule, right to land, and right to resources in the new local government formation in general and in the study areas in particular. Since the system support, a new form of bias and supporter clients sought networks in government decision-making officials and those who enforce law and resource allocation structures in government institutions are not fairly distributed between *kebeles* within the *woreda*. Therefore, they argue that their human security is endangered after federalization of governance system in Ethiopia than the previous regimes.⁹⁵ Federalism in Ethiopia promised to grant the right of self-determination to minorities and all ethnic groups. However, it has not been successful to implement its theory in practice regarding minorities in pastoral areas.

To implement and change the stated situation of minority clans as much as possible it needs promoting and building democratic, decentralized accountable governance, which is accountable, transparent for the citizens at large without any bias.

6.7 Market and Trade Relations

Pastoralists are a mixture of independent and dependent life, since they are antagonistic and often friendly related clans. In this kind of association, there is cooperation for common interest across the regions, *woredas* and *kebeles*. Marketplaces and trade are the one that built relationships across the Liban and Filtu *woredas*. According to informants, "trade network

⁹⁵ Personal Interview: Resident Filtu *woreda*, 21 November 2015, Filtu

allows the pastoralists free movement of people and also effectively transfers of goods.⁹⁶ This guides them to social and economic interaction across the study *woredas* namely Liban and Filtu.

In Liban *woreda*, Nagelle-Borana town is a center for pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in the area and thereby facilitated important socio-economic relations via trade and marketplace. The Camel herders Digodia and the cattle herders Borana pastoralists and other minorities in the study areas meet at Nagelle-Borana and Ganale marketplaces to exchange their animals and also to purchase manufacturing goods and food commodities from the Highlanders⁹⁶ and from their neighbors. Nagelle-Borana and Ganale marketplaces are a center for pastoralist communities in Liban and Filtu *woredas*. Predominantly from Nagelle-Borana livestock market, stocks such as camels, cattle, sheep and goats are taken to Adama and Moyale and then to national and international markets.

Liban *woreda*, Nagelle-Borana town is integrated to the high-land *woredas* of Guji zone. The rainy season road between Nagelle-Borana town and Adama /Addis Ababa/ provides an opportunity for the physical link with the highland areas. Similarly, Filtu town is also linked to highland areas via Nagelle-Borana town. These links with the highland areas are very important as a means to ensure food security. When there is a shortage of food deficit affecting a large portion of the pastoralists in both study *woredas* namely Liban and Filtu; they get wheat and maize from highland areas. Thus, Nagelle-Borana and Ganale marketplaces assist the Filtu pastoralist mostly than Dollo town and other places of the region.

However, in the study areas, when there is inter-clan conflict among the Oromo clans of Arsi and Borana with Digodia and Merehan Somali clans, traveling to the marketplace is not allowed. Since they pass through clans⁹⁶ land to reach the marketplace. Though, through the elders, *xeer*/elders council/ agreement should be enforced and ensured compensation payments. In pastoralist areas, almost all property is owned by clans and respected, recognized and guaranteed by customary law. Property like livestock, water wells, and rangelands are not registered with any authority; community sanctioned structures own it (see, chapter 5).

⁹⁶ Personal Interview: Residents of Liban and Filtu *woredas*, 02 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana and 23 November, 2015 Filtu Respectively.

Therefore, in pastoralist areas in general and the study areas in particular, trade networks are based on clan linkages and unity. In each route of trade, there should be clan related ties. Informants from Filtu *woreda* argue that,

When there is clan conflict, it is a high level of risk to carry out business and trade with neighboring clans. There are many challenges we face, because of the conflict in 2006 between Digodia and Borana, and between Arsi and Digodia and Marehan and Borana, during this time, we stopped to travel to Nagelle-Borana marketplace, which is nearer to us. This time we (the Somali clans) (Digodia, Marehan, Hawiye and other minority clans) were forced to travel a long distance from Filtu to Moyale, Gode, Gura Baqsa, northern Kenya and southern Somalia.⁹⁷

However, when conflicts are resolved via elders's negotiations, the clans started to use Nagalle-Borana marketplace for their trade and business, since in Liban and Filtu *woredas*, local travelers from one home to the marketplace with their property needs clan-based security arrangements. Because clan-based arrangements are the mere security available for traders in pastoral areas. According to informants, clan-based arrangements are not only needed for security purpose but also help local traders to get access to pasture and water wells, while they travel. In addition, they deal with their clans when there is animal theft and search together with their clan members.⁹⁸

Moreover, the relations between traders, clans and customers and trade within the clan and outside the clan are governed by trust, since they trust their elders and customary institutions. However, informants argue, their trust is eroded from time to time, since some people sought government court, while they trust them and give them their properties (camel, sheep, goat, etc.). Then the court asks them the agreement that they made with the person including the witness signature. Nevertheless, in pastoralists culture, there is no written agreement between

⁹⁷ Personal Interview: Digodia and Marehan Elders, 23 April 2016, Filtu, resident of Burweyn *kebele*.

⁹⁸ Personal Interview: Digodia, Merehan, Elders, 23 April 2016, Filtu; and Borana and Arsi, Elders, 16 April 2016, Nagelle-Borana.

customers and traders and also, between traders and clans. Rather, they have an oral agreement, which all groups trust and respect.⁹⁹

Above all, there are large distance travelers by their foot who bring livestock to marketplaces. This group made agreement oral with the owner, and finally, they collect their balances after they arrived at marketplaces. Travelers should have good relationships with different clan elders, who support them in case they face problems during travel to market places. Additionally, they are responsible for animal safety and security.¹⁰⁰

According to elders in Liban and Filtu *woredas*, each clan has its own brokers (*Dilal*) in marketplaces. The role of the broker is negotiating, the rural communities and traders. Informants argue that brokers (*Dilal*) are very important, since they trust them, while they negotiate with the trader to sell their properties; they consider them as 'diplomats'.¹⁰¹ Similarly, the traders also trust the brokers, since they know the qualities of livestock and current market values of the stock.¹⁰²

One broker from Arsi clan told me that, 'most of them, speak at least three languages; for example, he can speak Afaan Oromo, Af-Somali, and Swihili (a Bantu language). Thus, they do not have any communication problems with customers and they serve all clans equally, without any biases'.¹⁰³ He adds, they have many codes to communicate by using facial expression, finger and by shaking hands, extra. Further, informants argue, 'traders are the backbone for pastoral communities, since they help their communities during dry seasons, by purchasing food items from highlanders and help their pastoral communities. Thus, we have great respect for traders'.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Personal Interview: Digodia and Merehan, Elders, 23 April 2016, Filtu.

¹⁰¹ Personal Interview: Digodia, Merehan, and Garri-Maró Elders, 23 April 2016, Filtu; and Borana, Guji and Arsi, Elders, 16 April 2016, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁰² Personal Interview: Digodia, Merehan, Borana, Guji and Arsi Traders, 21 April 2016, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁰³ Personal Interview: Arsi Clan Broker, 21 April 2016, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁰⁴ Personal Interview: Digodia, Merhen, Borana, Arsi, Elders, 21 April 2016, Nagelle-Borana.

6.8 Dynamics of Clan Relations: Filtu and Liban *woredas*

In Ethiopia, the post-1991 period is marked by dramatic political changes involving the rise of claims and counter claims of new rights. As it is indicated in the above case studies, these political changes lead the pastoralists in the border area of the two regions shows higher intra-ethnic relations and lower inter-clan/ethnic relations across the *woreda*. Besides, decentralization in Ethiopia has not been accommodating as it is promised in legal constitution for minority groups in this localities.

The above-mentioned case studies on inter-clan relations evaluation show that favoritism is relatively an in-group than an out-group phenomenon. According to informants the in-group relations shows positive aspect than the out-group. However, this does not mean all the out-groups are evaluated similarly. As it is discussed above, for example, the Gurra, Karanle and Ajuran Somali, who are out-group of the Arsi clan, should not be evaluated equally with Digodia and Marehan Somali. Because, the historical relations that Gurra, Karanle and Ajuran Arsi Oromo clan and the Somali Gurra, Karanle and Ajuran have over lambing. Thus, currently, when the Digodia and Marehan are in conflict with Arsi Oromo the Gurra, Karanle and Ajuran Somali clans are the allies of Arsi clan. This is to keep their social and economic advantages. From this, one can infer that inter-group and intra-group relations are not static; rather they are dynamic based on social, political and economic advantages of the given groups.

The above-discussed cases explain that social structure and political conditions influence clans' attitude towards inter-clan and intra-ethnic relations in Liban and Filtu *woredas*. These positions seems to reflect the realities in the ground in the study areas about clan inter-clan and intra-ethnic relations in combination with clans struggle for access to resources typical and signifying identities.

Moreover, the expansion of the farmland by the Arsi Oromo in Liban *woreda* threatening peaceful relationships between the Borana and Arsi clan, and the agropastoralist Gurra, Karanle and Ajuran Somali clans in Filtu *woreda* are threatening the Digodia and Marehan clans' relationships. Therefore, the Borana, Marehan and Digodia clans' herders today feel threatened by the encroachment of their neighbor agropastoralists' clans and town farmers. This imposition

may in the finally results in the takeover of their lands. The situations have created a sense of fear and distrust about their neighbor agropastoral clans and local government officials. In addition, this may lead them to conflict and violence against the government and against the encroachers.

As it is discussed above the previously Borana clan, currently Garri-Somali and the previously Arsi Oromo (Gurra, Karanle and Ajuran) clan and now Gurra, Karanle and Ajuran Somali clans are reconstructing their clan and ethnic identities. As Schle (1989) argues human being, have multiple identities. At any time, people use their identities by selection based on environment, politics and economies. According to him, different identities become relevant for different situations. People use some of their identities to form alliance and some to make difference. Therefore, Garri, Gurra, Karanle and Ajuran clans cases show these clans use their identities to form similarities and differences, some on historical evidence, some on the current political situation and some on economic benefit. Thus, there is past and present situation on the issues of clan relationships; which needs sociological and historical inquiries to understand clan relations in the study area of Liban and Filtu *woredas*.

To sum up, in both study *woredas*, clans identity and their way of life and production have been subject to continuous change due to various factors such as continuous inter-clan conflict between Oromo of (Borana, Arsi, Guji) and Somali of (Digodia, Marehan, Garri-marro and Gurra) clans, permanent settlement in seasonal grazing lands, development intervention by government, new settlement programs which allow access to use natural resources for common purpose, natural phenomena such as climate change, environmental degradations, and drought, and linguistic based territorial demarcation of the regions are the most challenge which bring dynamic change in the life of the pastoral communities in the study areas. However, the Afaan Oromo speaking clans of Liban *woreda* of Oromia region and the Af-Somali speaking clans of Filtu *woreda* of Somali region have different ethnic background, believers of different faiths-the Oromo are Waaqeffata and the Somali are Muslims, they speak different east Cushitic languages, until now they have intermarried, trade bonds, they are friendship and alliances and they also live together and intermingle by settlements and live side by side in different territories. Even if there is mistrust between them and it has increased from time to time; they shared some

resources especially during dangerous periods like serious drought, since they have culture of tolerance that they developed for centuries and negotiate to live together mutually by accommodating the culture, resource and different interests of various clans in Liban and Filtu *woreda*.

6.9 Summary

This chapter examined federalism and inter-clan relations: identity, socio-economic issues and its dynamics across and within the study *woredas*-Liban and Filtu. The Somali and Oromo clans in general and the study areas clans in particular have overlapping social, economic, political and religious background. The majority Oromos are *Waaqeffataa* (believe in God) and the Somalis are Muslims. In addition, they speak different language of the east Cushitic family. However, some of them are intermarried, they have customary laws, trade bonds, friendships and alliances during conflicts and they are living in adjacent *woredas/ kebeles* and mixed together in settlement and shared resources for a long period of time by developing pillars of diversity management such as tolerance, respect, recognition and acceptance through their customary law, which mainly led them to have multiple identities. However, the federal political system has not been implemented as it was promised on constitutional provisions on the issues of minority self-rule, protecting the identity of the clans and on the pillars of diversity management. It has been hijacked by officials.

In Liban and Filtu *woredas*, the trade route and clan based system helps the pastoral communities to cooperate and negotiate with each other in their day today life. However, they dare from lack of road and access to nearby market to sell and buy their livestock and goods, since some *kebeles* in the *woreda* travel long distance, more than 140km, to get access to market place. When there is inter-clan conflict, they may travel more than this distance to reach market places.

Long-time contact between the Somali camel herding clans (Digodia, Marehan and Garri) in the Filtu *woreda* and the neighboring cattle rearing Borana, Guji and Arsi Oromo groups in Liban *woreda* resulted in the failure to create harmonious cultural, economic and political exchanges between them, because of elite manipulation of clan identity as a means to access to power. Further, the post-1992 state restructuring the governance system from unitary to federal along

ethnic lines introduced by the transitional government further aggravated the dynamics of traditional hostility between extremely mixed Somali and Oromo clans of the pastoral communities in the study *woredas*-Liban and Filtu. Since then, officials in general and local officials in particular misuse the implementation of decentralization in sub-local governments.

Chapter Seven

Post-1991 Inter-Clan Conflicts in Liban and Filtu *Woredas*

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter the post 1991 inter-clan conflicts between the clans along the Liban woreda of Guji zone, Oromia region and Filtu woreda, Liban zone of Somali region are examined. To this end in this chapter, the main factors of inter-clan conflict are described. Firstly, border conflict is discussed with case studies (Borana versus Digodia, Marehan versus Borana, and Arsi versus Gurra Somali) conflicts. Secondly, natural and government resources conflict is examined. Thirdly, the status of good governance and its implementations is discussed. In this part of the discussion only five principles of good governance are taken into consideration to examine capabilities and constraints of good governance practices in this locality. These principles are accountability, participation, equity and inclusiveness, transparency, and rule of law. In the fourth and fifth parts of the discussion actors of conflict resolutions such as local elders, local leaders, government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with their roles in the study area are examined. This helps to suggest the importance of traditional institutions, local elders, local leaders, government institutions and NGOs to resolve conflicts among the clans.

7.2 Border Conflict

Since 1991, there was an introduction of new system of governance based on ethnic federalism. Thus, based on the proclamation No. 7/1992 of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) fourteen (14) regional states were created. However, when the FDRE constitution ratified in 1995 nine regions were established¹⁰⁵ and one city administration (Addis Ababa) was established in Ethiopia.

¹⁰⁵ The nine regions are Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, South Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, Somali, Afar, Harari, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz regions.

According to the 1995 FDRE constitution article 48(1 & 2) "all State border disputes shall be settled by agreement of the concerned States. Where the concerned states fail to reach agreement, the House of Federation (HoF) shall decide such disputes based on settlement patterns and the wishes of the peoples concerned. And then the House of Federation shall, within a period of two years, render a final decision on a dispute submitted to it pursuant to sub-Article 1 of this Article".

Oromia and Somali National Regional states are among the states that share common border. However, both states failed to settle their border by agreement as it is outlined in the constitution. Thus, the House of Federation interfered to manage the disputes in 2004 and it made referendum on the membership of people to either one of the two regions. The House of Federation (HoF) identified *kebeles* to decide their position based on the will of the societies and settlement pattern. Some *kebeles* obtain recognition to join Oromia and other to join Somali region. However, the House of Federation did not clearly demarcate the common border in most parts of Oromia and Somali regions *woredas* and/or *kebeles* in general and in Liban-Filtu *woredas* in particular. Despite this demarcation of territorial borders between Somali and Oromia regions in general and the Afaan Oromoo speaking and Af-Somali speaking clans pastoral communities in Liban and Filtu *woredas* has changed the traditional settlement pattern, mobility and grazing pattern of the pastoral Oromo clans of Borana, Arsi, Guji and Somali clans of Digodia, Marehan and Gurra.

As a result of this new state structure, every pastoral community had been politicized based on their ethnic and/or clan identities to the grass-root level of local government unit known as *kebele* to get political autonomy, leadership, self-rule and power. According to informants, this new development has led to frequent and intense conflict over use and management of resources, i.e territory, grazing land and water-wells. Both *woredas* residents briefly argue prevalence of claims and counter claims of rights on those resources.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, the Borana elders argue that after regionalization, the Digodia clan occupied traditional Borana grazing lands and water-wells in 1993, 1995, 2003, 2004, 2005, and in 2007. Likewise in 2012 the Marehan clan

¹⁰⁶ Personal Interview: Resident of Liban *woreda*, 04 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana; and Resident of Filtu *woreda*, 24 July 2015, Filtu.

occupied the Borana grazing land with the support of Filtu officials. In all these conflictual years all the clans in the study area tried to organize themselves, based on their clan identity, a fact had intensively aggravated the conflicts.

Currently the traditional dimensions of inter-clan cooperation to common use of grazing lands, water-wells that are shared, scarce resources and the free mobility experience of the pastoral communities in Liban and Filtu *woredas* have changed into new dimensions and principles of claiming resources and territory for permanent usage by excluding the neighboring clans. This is because of the strong tendency that clan identity gets more emphasis on territorial border demarcation between the groups. Therefore, the undermining of the traditional institutions (see, Chapter 5) and the decline of the local security into unstable one has its own negative long-term effect for sustainable local peace and development. Elders argue that on the issue of border the *woreda* authorities have not been in a position to respect local institutions ways of managing pastoral mobility and resources usage. On the other hand, the officials have not seriously managed different crimes with legal frameworks. The crimes include illegal movement, illegal settlement, rape and theft among those groups who are in need of forceful territorial expansions, for controlling grazing land and water-wells.¹⁰⁷

The entire problem between Borana, Arsi, Digodia, Garri, Gurra and Marehan clans is the result of absence of clearly demarcated border between Liban and Filtu *woreda*, and undermining/violation of customary law. Indeed the disregard for customary law that they have used together for centuries and giving cold look to border demarcation and delay to take action by local and federal governments officials is worsening the border conflict.

Because of this, in both study *woredas* there is in-group and out-group conflicts. The in-group conflicts refer to those between different clans within Liban *woreda* of Guji zone is like that of Borana, Guji and Arsi for whom conflict has mainly emanated from dissatisfaction on access to economy and political representation. According to informants, the serious problem in Liban *woreda* is access to scarce resources, since there is competition over land for farming and grazing. The scarcity of dry-season grazing land led to frequent inter-clan conflict between the

¹⁰⁷ Personal Interview: Borana Elders, 08 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in Liban *woreda*. In this *woreda* the Borana clan has been against the expansion of farmland into their grazing land and ritual places. In the year 2001, the Borana elders have brought their petition to zonal and regional authorities. This was because *woreda* officials used to give farmlands to town dwellers of Borana, Arsi and Guji. However, elders' grievances did not get response from concerned body. Instead, the *woreda* authorities continued giving grazing land to town based investors and agropastoralists.¹⁰⁸ Regarding this idea, two researchers noted that the *woreda*, zone authorities sided with the town based residents who were investing on farming (Helland, 1999; Getachew, 1998).

According to Borana elders, the *woreda* authorities are eager to take legal action when the pastoralists prevent town-based investors and farmers from appropriating their grazing lands. However, they do not have ear for pastoralists' complaints. Due to this problem, the pastoralists fenced communal grazing land, which they overused and even misused.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, these communities' grievances need immediate response, if not it trigger conflict in between the residents in Liban *woreda*. Similarly, the in-group conflict in between Digodia, Marehan, Gurra and Garri-marro in Filtu *woreda* of Liban zone has been caused by grievances related to access to economic resources and political representation.

The out-group conflict refers to conflict between the clans in Liban *woreda* of Oromia and Filtu *woreda* of Somali, which have been mainly caused by territorial expansion to form *kebele*; than on access political and economic power-such as administrative, natural resources, state resources and NGO resources. The expansions were made by use of force totally ignoring the customary law that they hitherto used to share scarce resources. The following cases are examples of out-group conflicts in Liban and Filtu *woredas*.

7.2.1 Borana-Digodia Clan Conflict

The conflict between Borana and Digodia was not registered or formally known by the local people before the Ethiopia federal governance system. It was after regionalization of 1992 that

¹⁰⁸ Personal Interview: Resident of Liban *woreda*, 04 July 2015, Did-Liban, *Kebele*.

¹⁰⁹ Personal Interview: Borana Elders, 05 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana.

the Borana and Digodia clans had begun open inter-clan conflicts. Until regionalization of the country Filtu *woreda* was under Liban *woreda* (Fekadu, 2004). According to informants after 1992, claiming and counter claiming of border and resources between Borana and Digodia became intensified. The territorial arrangements and administrative restructuring led both clans from competing over natural resource to the expansion of Filtu *woreda*. Hence, the Degodia clan began illegal movement and settlement in Liban *woreda* without the consent of the neighboring Borana and Arsi clans. Such a movement during former times used to take place on the Borana clan elders's knowledge and mainly practiced based on the rule and regulations of their customary law. Rather the competitions between the two clans had its manifestation on territorial claims and counter claims. Therefore, the tension has continued to this time, since, there is no political solution the problem of conflicting territorial claims of the communities by all tiers of governments. Even the 2004 referendum was not able to bring any lasting solution in between the clans in Liban and Filtu *woredas*.¹¹⁰

Moreover, elders from both *woredas* argue that border issues between them have been politicized by government officials, herders and elders. For example, after a travel of seventeen kilometers from Nagelle-Borana to Filtu, one finds welcome pole notice, this is written in Af-somali an act that is offensive to Borana, which seriously provoked the conflict of 2010 between Borana and Digodia. The Liban *woreda* officials argue that the action was deliberately done by Filtu officials at night. The officials said even though they reported to zonal and regional officials of Oromia to solve the problem, there is no response by the officials until 2015.¹¹¹ On the contrary, the Filtu officials and residents said, "our territory is up to Awash River. We claim additional territory of the *woreda*."¹¹² These indicate that there is politicization of the border issues and economic interest of both the officials and residents of the *woreda*. Regarding this Gultung (1996) and Finlev (2012) state that when there are manifestation of incompatible goals like one group's goal is blocked by the other group's goal, contradictory attitudes, and violent behaviors concurrently, exist and often cause intergroup conflicts. The more basic the blocked goals are such as access to grazing and water wells, the more likely the conflict will turn violent.

¹¹⁰ Personal Interview: Elders of Borana, Arsi, Digodia and Marehan, 11 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana.

¹¹¹ Personal Interview: Liban *woreda* Official, 07 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana

¹¹² Personal Interview: Filtu *woreda* official and Resident, 26 July 2015, Filtu.

According to Borana elders after the coming of the new regime in Ethiopia in 1991 the Digodia and Marehan clans did their best to take additional grazing lands, water-wells and also they tried to gain recognition of the central government for political and administrative influence in the areas under study.¹¹³ The informants argue that the main problem for the conflict between Borana and Digodia have been over rights to territory. The informants's argument shows some historical grievance; according to Mayer (2000), the history of the people who participate in a conflict, the system in which the conflict is occurring and of the issues themselves has a powerful influence on the course of the conflict. Therefore, that it is vital to address the roots of conflicts in times of conflict resolutions.

7.2.2 Borana-Marehan clan Conflict

The Borana and Marehan conflict after the new state restructuring of Ethiopia was mainly based on land claiming for permanent settlement. Since, the Barre regime the Marehan left their land and went to Mokadisho. After the collapse of Barre regime in 1991, however, they returned to the previous Borana province (*Awuraja*), where they could not find their former territory since it was occupied by other clans. When they arrived at Borana province, they settled in a land located at a distance of 10km from Nagelle-Borana and they called it Haro Marehan camp. Then the Marehan clan together with joined by other Somali clan expanded this camp to *kebele* level in short time. According to informants, during the 2004 referendum they wanted to join Somali region. However, they were not successful, because the geographical location of the *kebele* they formed is a pocket place in Liban *woreda* and nearer to its administrative headquarters.¹¹⁴

According to Liban *woreda* officials during the 2007 population censuses the Merhan were registered in Somali region. Accordingly, there were a debate between the two *woreda* officials about the fate of Haro Marehan *kebele*, and management of infrastructure. The Filtu *woreda* officials argue that they have assigned teachers and collect taxes; but they are not in a position to facilitate infrastructure for the *kebele*, because of the location and illegality of employing and

¹¹³ Personal Interview: Borana Elders, 09 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana.

¹¹⁴ Personal Interview: Liban *woreda* resident, 08 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana.

collecting taxes from the government employees. The Liban *woreda* officials argue that we have to collect taxes, employ teachers and to guarantee their access to infrastructures.¹¹⁵

Constitutionally speaking the Liban *woreda* officials' argument holds legitimate ground than the Filtu officials' argument. Since, the constitution stated that pocket areas in a given region should be governed by the region where that *kebele/s* is located. Therefore, the Haro Marehan *kebele's* economic and political affairs remained unsolved by the local officials from the 2004 referendum up to 2016. The conflict resulted in loss of life and many properties were damaged and burned. While the Marehan clan want to expand their *kebele's* but the surrounding Arsi and Borana clan conflicting on resource use and management with Marehan clan.

In 2012, the Filtu *woreda* officials settled the Marehan clan in between Liban and Filtu *woreda*. According to Marehan elders, 'we were happy when the officials gave us a permanent land, which belong to our clan. However, after we settle in between Borana and Digodia, we understood that this activity was deliberately done by Digodia officials. As a result of this we had restarted violent conflict with Borana clan and the conflict has been continuous and intense'.¹¹⁶ This shows how the *woreda* officials desire to expand the territory of the *woreda* and create conflict between the clans. The Liban *woreda* officials did not take significant action, but the local communities seriously defended their territory blocked Merhan's access to grazing resources, water wells and ritual places.

7.2.3 Arsi and Gurra (Somali) conflict

Ethnic regionalization required people with fluid identities. In this case as Asnake (2010) argues, the process of inter-regional boundary making was linked with identity shift of the clan. A good example is the case of Garri in south eastern part of the Borana zone. Similarly, the Gurra clan case is also a good example since during the previous regime the Gurra clan consider themselves as Arsi-Oromo clan. According to informants this clan shares both Oromo and Somali clan identities. During the ethno-linguistic based regionalization of the state some of the Gurra clan

¹¹⁵ Personal Interview: Liban *woreda* Officials, 07 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana and Filtu *woreda* Officials, 26 July 2015, Filtu.

¹¹⁶ Personal Interview: Elders of Marehan, 21 July 2015, Haysuftu *Kebele*.

identified themselves as Arsi-Oromo and others identified themselves as Somali. However, identity shift of some of the Gurra clan to Somali resulted in the reduction of Arsi Oromo territory around Ganale River. The Arsi and Rayitu clan elders argue that the choice of the Gurra clan of Somali identity in 1992 was aimed to get better access to resources and power of their own at the local level.¹¹⁷ Of course, as stated by Scupin and DeCorse (2004) people use their ethnic affiliations for political and economic benefit based on different condition and time as the basis of collective political mobilization or to enhance their economic interests as an individual or a group.

Before regionalization, the Gurra clan identified themselves as Arsi Oromo clan. Regarding this, the state constitution allows for Nations, Nationalities and Peoples to have equal opportunities to exercise social, economic, political and cultural rights (FDRE, 1995). However, the implementation of this rule of law at the local level has its own limitations. While, the local officials manipulate the constitutional rights of the communities for their own purpose, especially they politicized the clan identity to mobilize along their ethnic/clan identities.

According to the informants, since the beginning of the ethno-linguistic based border demarcation in the country, the border between the Arsi and Gurra clans remained unclear and even the 2004 referendum did not come up with clear border demarcation.¹¹⁸ Therefore, the conflicts between Arsi and Gurra Somali have continued; unabated because there is resource claim and counter claim between these clans. Moreover, the Arsi and Rayitu clans argue that the Gurra Somali desired to expand their territory and to occupy their resources permanently. The Arsi and Rayitu clans have been defending their territory and resources.¹¹⁹

The local officials argue that the absence of clear border between these clans have been a big problem even on administrative grounds. The claim and counter claim of both groups have created either gain and/or loss of territory, which is mainly related to resources.¹²⁰ Residents of

¹¹⁷ Personal Interview: Arsi and Rayitu elders, 03 July 2015, Ganale Town.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Personal Interview: Filtu woreda Officials, 24 July 2015, Filtu.

Liban *woreda* argue that the referendum was rejected by the Borana and Arsi clans. They add that the idea of referendum was not taking into consideration the socio-economic situation of the communities, since the lives of pastoralists are dependent on seasonal mobility and they use the territory beyond administrative territory. The referendum tried to create solid boundary between the pastoralists' *woreda/kebele*. Both Arsi and Gurra Somali were not happy with the results of the referendum, while most of the Arsi clan *kebeles* around Ganale River completely reject the principle itself and the Gurra Somali clan was also disappointed with their loss of some *kebeles*.¹²¹

Moreover, Arsi clan elders reflect the deep discontents of their land taken by Gurra Somali clan, who they welcome as a guest, after the collapse of Barre regime. They add that the Gurra Somali clan took their ancestral land-which they used for grazing. Therefore, they are unhappy about the calculation that the Gurra Somali were doing to access the resources and power. They have been fighting for this land and they will fight for the future.¹²²

On the other hand, the Gurra Somali elders also reject the Arsi clan claim; they argue, 'we are claiming our own historical land that we lost during the Ethio-Somalia war'. They add during that time the Derg regime supported the Arsi and the Arsi expanded their territory towards Gurra land and as a result some of them left the area and went to Somalia during that time. Thus, this is how the Arsi dominate Gurra land.¹²³

According to the *woreda* officials, the referendum intensified the conflict between the border *kebeles* than resolving the conflicts. They add that after referendum the conflict have continued in the border *kebeles*.¹²⁴

However, the residents of both *woredas* attribute the continuity of the conflict to the intervention of local officials in favor of their own clan. Similarly, Getachew (2006) and Ali, (2005) argue

¹²¹ Personal Interview: Residents of Ganale, 03 July 2015, Ganale.

¹²² Personal Interview: Arsi Elders, 04 July 2015, Ganale.

¹²³ Personal Interview: Gurra Elders, 03 July 2015, Ganale.

¹²⁴ Personal Interview: Liban *woreda* officials, 07 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana and Filtu *woreda* Officials, 24 July 2015, Filtu.

that the extensive use of local militia and local officials indirect involvement to support their clan was hated by residents in between Oromia and Somali regional states in eastern and south-east part of the country. This involvement of the officials increased the reappearance of the conflicts and dynamics of cause and effects of conflicts.

It can be argued that the Arsi, Borana Oromo clans and the Gurra, Digodia and Marehan Somali clans claim and counter claim have been the issue of border, territorial expansion and self-administration at local level to get access to power, politics and economy.

Moreover, the theory of ethnic boundaries by Barth (1969) gave an end to the already dominant view that community lived in isolation, more or less as a homogenous functional unit with rigid boundary. This view which criticized by Barth does not work especially in pastoral communities. Other scholars argue that ethnic/clan groups can be objectively defined and easily traced, since little emphasis was given to sub-group (minorities) in society, which are often identified as ethnic groups. Rather Barth argues ethnic/clan groups can never live in isolation and individuals or groups of peoples can pass across the border even if they maintained some prejudice, stereotypes to keep their identity and to exclude outsiders.

7.3 Resource Conflict

Some local and international researchers argued that the post-1991 conflicts between the Oromo and Somali have been ethnic conflict, related with resource conflict and ethno-linguistic system of governance. For example, Hizkias (2001) argued that the conflictual problems in the Horn of Africa and mainly in Ethiopia originate from ethnic dissimilarity. Similarly, Asnake (2002) has differentiated, ñalmost all of the conflictual problems of the post 1991 as inter-ethnic problems caused by the ethnicized state administrative structures adopted since 1991ò(Cited in Lubo, 2012: 63).

In addition, Befikadu (1999: 24) argued, ñthe Borana-Gerri conflict was a violent inter-ethnic conflict which manifested itself as a result of the Borana ethnic groupòs dissatisfaction with the Gerriòs actions to get grazing lands and water resources that allegedly belonged to the Borana in the Oromia Regional Stateò. Asnake (2002: 19) too attributed these conflictual problems to ñthe

new developments of the Gerriôs demand for ethnic self-assertion and related difficulties of ethnic boundary delimitationsò (*Ibid*: 67). Asnake added, ñé inter-regional boundaries that divide the Somali region from its neighbors (Oromia and Afar) are ill defined and there are violent conflicts along these borders. In some cases, resource conflicts involving Somali, Afar and Oromo clans transformed into more protracted boundary and territorial conflictsò(Asnake, 2009: 180). Therefore he argued ñEthiopian ethnic federalism has created a fertile ground where territorial/resource conflicts between neighboring communities turn into inter-ethnic and inter-regional conflicts (*Ibid*: 207).

Moreover, the conflict between the Borana and Digodia pastoralists could be attributed to an ethnic division and competition over resources (Mohammud, 2005). Similarly, ñthe main cause of conflicts among the Borana, Gabbra and Garri clans ãn the past was competition over access to land resources such as water and pastureò (Bassi, 1997: 271, cited in Asnake, 2009: 184). Mark also argued that the Oromo-Somali conflict which manifested itself violently and finally handled by the House of Federation by conducting referendum in the border of Oromia and Somali regions was a result of competition over natural resourcesô (Mark, 2002:1). In similar way Suleiman, (1999) argues that in the Horn, one can observe that whenever local conflicts are emanating from competition for land and water brake out they lead to a situation where ethnic and cultural divisions. And it gets firm and thus comes into play in the local conflicts between local pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in the Horn.

From the above discussion, one can infer that the fundamental causes of inter-clan conflict in different adjacent areas of the regional states have two general reasons that is ethnic based federalization and resource conflicts. However, this argument was too much generalized to capture the main reasons that trigger conflicts in different local *woredas*.

Specifically in the study areas in Liban and Filtu *woredas* key informants from Borana and Digodia clans argued that,

There were natural resource conflicts between individuals and the mandated person to manage the resources; because of illegal usage of ponds, water wells and grazing lands, but not between clans in the

previous regimes”.¹²⁵ According to them since the regionalization of the state, there have been continuous conflicts between Borana and Digodia, Borana and Marehan, Arsi and Marehan, Arsi and Digodia, Borana and Garri clans for the last two decades. All these conflicts are not because of ethno-linguistic based border demarcation and the natural resource that they used for centuries together.¹²⁶

Likewise, focus group discussant from mixed clans emphasized that

We do not have any problem regarding ethnic and/or clan identity since we lived together for centuries and we know each other. Rather the major causes of the conflicts are absences of border, undermining of customary law, which leads the communities to illegal usage of water wells and pasture, illegal settlements, illegal movements.¹²⁷

According to Schlee and Shongolo (1995) ethnic conflicts are ones in which the warring parties are defined by a combination of historical, linguistic and cultural features. Therefore, based on this definition and informants' explanation, one could argue that in the study areas-Liban and Filtu *woredas* there is no ethnic/clan conflicts founded on history, language and culture.

Key informant from both *woreda* Peace and Security Office shared the idea that the main cause of conflict relates to the absence of clearly defined border between the two *woredas* and illegal settlement and movement of the communities. In addition, they added state and NGO resources are causing inter-clan conflict. For example, when the government and /or NGOs from Somali region built different services such as school, health center (for both human and animals) in

¹²⁵ Focus Group Discussion: Borana and Digodi Elders, 02 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

¹²⁶ Personal Interviewee: Borana and Arsi Elders, 01 July 2015, Nagelle and Digodia and Marrihan Elders, 22 July 2015, Filtu.

¹²⁷ Focus Group Discussion: Borana, Arsi, Marrihan, Garri, Hawiye and Digodia Elders, 04 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

border *kebeles*, the Borana and Arsi used to destroy it. Likewise, when NGO from the Oromia region build such services the Digodia and Marehan take counter action.¹²⁸

Key informants elaborated the case by taking the following specific examples from both *woredas*; ñin 2006 one school was built in Walenso *kebele* by Filtu *woreda* officials that were destroyed by Borana clan after many deaths and a lot of properties were damaged. Similarly, in 2014 school was built by Liban *woreda* in Qaxxee-Waare *kebele* that was destroyed by Digodia and Marehan clans¹²⁹. This is highly related the absence of border demarcation between Liban and Filtu *woredas* and also absence of peaceful local inter-governmental relations. Moreover, everyone of the clan is making claims for the ownership of the land; and for government and NGO resources around border areas.

Furthermore, key informants from Waleenso and Qaxxee-Waare *kebeles* confirmed the destruction of the humanitarian properties which was built by government and NGOs. Accordingly, they expressed their worries about the future: ñthis is a time when they are benefited from decentralization system of government, since, they are living in the border of the two *woredas* and absence of border in between them, and they did not benefited from the system”.¹³⁰

Key informant from Liban *woreda* pastoralist office employees rightly argued, ñé their conflict is not clan identity conflict. Rather, the conflict is to expand their *woreda* to dominate natural resources by illegal movement and settlement. These comes because of disrespecting customary law that they experienced for centuries, which did not allow illegal movement and settlement without the knowledge of traditional authorities or elders.¹³¹

¹²⁸ Personal Interview: Liban *Woreda* cabinet, 08 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana; and Filtu *Woreda* cabinet, 21 July 2015, Filtu.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Personal Interview: Resident of Waleenso *Kebele*, 07 July 2015, Waleenso and Resident of Qaxxee-Waare *Kebele*, 11 July 2015, Qaxxee-Waare.

¹³¹ Personal Interview: Liban *Woreda* Pastoralist Development Officer, 08 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

Fukui and Markakis, (1996) argue that resource conflicts are associated with competition for natural resources through expanding territory and to get political autonomy from the government. Indeed, according to both *woredas* elders three to four decades back when the demographic size was small, when there were no regional based border between clans, there were no problem to share resources; even if resource areas were identified based on clans they were shared equally based on the customary law. For example, the Somali clans Digodia and Marehan used to stay inside the Borana Oromo clan territory and the Borana clan did the same to use resources by entering into the Degodia clan territory. Clan elders arranged resource sharing based on their customary law, founded on the principles of reciprocity and inter-clan cooperation.

However, post 1991 the state redrawing of the boundary of the new administrative regions which mainly focus on ethno-linguistic demarcation and the rapid growth of population and livestock in the pastoral areas transformed mutual cooperation between the communities, since they claim and counter claim available resources, based on the ill-defined territory in between the study *woredas*. According to informants demarcation between adjacent *woredas* of the Somali and Oromia regions in general and the Liban and Filtu *woredas* in particular was handled with less public or community participations and consent; this was a major reason why it was not successfully demarcated between both study *woredas*.¹³² They add, the conflict in the recent years have been when a group expanded its territory by using violent force upon territorial resources-such as grazing lands and water wells without any recourse to customary law principles prior to arrange with the host clan and clan leaders and elders knowledge to access and use resources based on the season. These activities led the hosting clan elders to deny the rights of the guests to access the resources according to their traditional rules and regulation. Therefore, the guests may expose to livestock theft, rape, and homicide cases, since the hosting elders are not comfortable with the guest clan's settlement or there is lack of negotiation based on the previously known traditional law. When these crimes occur, it is difficult for hosting elders to handle the problems, since, for example, in Borana and Digodia tradition there were compensations when different crimes occurred in their environment. Such compensations are in

¹³² Personal Interview: Resident of Liban woreda, 09 July 2015, Waleenso Kebele; and Resident of Haysuftu Kebele, 23 July 2015, Haysuftu Kebele.

the form camels and cattle. The Degodia pay few camels for compensation and the Borana pay more cattle when it compared with the number of the camel for compensation. When the settlement is without the knowledge of the hosting group/clan their agreement is already failed; as a result, it would be difficult to negotiate when a crime occurred; and therefore, this is also factors behind some of the inter-clan conflicts between Borana, Arsi, Guji, Digodia, Marehan and Gurra clans in the study areas.

Moreover, these days clan difference and religious differences do not have an important contribution to the conflicts between the neighboring clans-Borana, Arsi, Guji, Digodia, Marehan, Garri-marô and Gurra in Liban and Filtu *woredas*. This difference is not a triggering factor within the in-group and out-group conflicts of the clan in both *woredas*. In both *woredas*, all clans accept and respect their cultural and religious variations and give due values and beliefs to these dimensions of identities. However, in Liban *woreda* of Oromia elders argue that there are ritual places that were given for agricultural purpose and for town settlement, which is mainly driven by government authorities to implement settlement, based development policy.¹³³

There is also no specific national policy for water development in pastoral areas. This has allowed unplanned interventions, especially from the humanitarian organizations (UNICEF, UNHCR), which operate in emergency situations with a public health rationale (Oxfam, 2002). On the other hand, the experiences of state land and water management in riverside lands did not prove efficient. This policy has been associated with alienation of indigenous agricultural land for inefficient cash crop production schemes or resettlement schemes for poor pastoralists which did not achieve their goals (Prior, 1994).

Gurra Arsi, Gurra Somali, Kerele Arsi and Kerele Somali and Digodia clans, has practiced this on Dawa River, as the government officials from both *woreda* argued, ñé the government transferred pastoralists from mobile animal husbandry to sedentary cash crop producing communities.¹³⁴ However, the focus group discussion participants position is that ñthe transfers

¹³³ Personal Interview: Borana and Arsi Elders, July 10 2015, Did-Liban kebele.

¹³⁴ Personal Interview: Liban Woreda Agricultural officer, 11 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana and Filtu Woreda Agricultural officer, 19 July 2015, Filtu.

of irrigation canals maintain duties to administrative services disrupted the customary water management institutions that we have, and promoted few wealthier pastoralists who have the capacity to buy irrigation supporting material to use irrigation continuously.¹³⁵

Pastoralist systems mainly focused on indigenous and traditional ways of natural resources management and practices. However, the central decision makers are not in a position to accommodate or unaware of the experiences of pastoral communities on resources management. Even then, the local elders did not get opportunity to transfer their knowledge to outsiders ways to manage their environment, since policy makers and local implementers underestimate them and their indigenous knowledge was not acknowledged. This influences the resource management, economic and social sustainability of the pastoral communities and led them for inter clan conflicts.

Furthermore, according to elders in both study *woredas* the major conflict triggering factors have been unequal access to basic natural resources, administrative, political and development driven policies which are imposed from above on the local communities have been the major triggering factors which exacerbate the conflict in the study areas.¹³⁶ They add that conflict begins when an individual or minority groups or elite feeling exclusion; and they turn to attach to ethnic/clan identity. Thus conflicts were seen by external observers as if they were ethnic identity conflicts. However, the conflicts begin with unnegotiated resource sharing-such as grazing land, pasture and water wells and market places, illegal settlement, and illegal movement of certain groups/clans without the knowledge of the hosting groups/clan and also individual theft and murder. These issues attached to ethnic/clan line led to war between the clans in the study areas. The major factors triggering conflict are not the scarcity of the resources, but it is sharing principles/regulations, which violated the customary law of the communities.¹³⁷

Furthermore, risk increase based on the season, since pastoral life is mainly season based and mobile to get access to natural resources. Particularly, during the dry season conflict is highly

¹³⁵ Focus Group Discussion: Gurra, Karele, Dogodia clans, 29 July 2015, Ganale.

¹³⁶ Personal Interview: Elders of Borana, Guji, Digodia and Marehan clans, 9 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana

¹³⁷ Ibid.

tempered than other seasons. According to elders of both *woredas*, during the 2006 drought season in the area there were serious conflict between Borana and Digodia. The conflict resulted in the death of about 300 people and immense loss of materials wealth in Walenso *kebele* and its surrounding areas.

Suleiman (1999: 206) argued, in addition to conflicts based on competition for land and access to water sources, insecurity and livestock raiding for economic and culturally related matters also play a tremendous role in violent conflicts between the neighboring local pastoralists' communities in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, Suleiman suggests in order to managing some of the natural resources problem in the Horn of Africa, there is a need to tackle the specific causes of conflict over natural resources such as land use, human and animal population growth and climatic variations. He adds that state and identity politics are equally important to take into account the crucial issues of contemporary local conflicts between various ethnic communities in the Horn of Africa.

7.4 Bad Governance and Inter Clan Conflict

In Ethiopia, regional states constitution in general and Oromia and Somali regions states in particular have provisions on accountability, transparency, participation, effectiveness and equity and rule of law of good governance. For example, article 78(2) of the Oromia region's 2002 revised constitution and article 76(2) of the Somali 2002 revised constitution clearly states that *woreda* officials are accountable to *woreda* councils which are in turn accountable to people that elect them.

Furthermore, Oromia regional state's constitution describes the *woreda* council is responsible to encourage the communities to participate on different societal needed development and security issues (Article 79(2c)); besides they control the effectiveness and efficiency of the performed activities in the *woreda* (Article 79(2g)). The *woreda* administrative council has collective responsibility for what they are doing because of the power that they have (Article 85(2)). This shows due respect for rule of law is clearly stated in this provision.

Similarly, the 2002 Somali regional state constitution describes the *woreda* council is responsible to motivate the communities to participate them in development issues like excavating water wells for pastoralists in nearest area (Article 77(c)). The *woreda* council should understand that political power belongs to the societies and then they have to be transparent for their societies and the societies have to participate directly or indirectly in policy planning and implementation (Article 77(d)) and the *woreda* administrative council is responsible to encourage the communities of the *woredas* to participate in development activities (Article 83(f)). This helps in identifying what has been done effectively and efficiently in the *woreda* and it provides an opportunity for check and balance in between the officials and societies. The *woreda* administrative council has collective responsibility for what they are doing and deciding because of the government power that they have (Article 83(3)). This shows rule of law is clearly stated in the provision of the regional constitution.

Indeed, DeWit (2000) argues, local government serve as a key agency in the wellbeing of the population of developing African countries, since, local authorities serve as a link between communities and officials of central and regional governments. Likewise, Merera states that one of the major motives behind the implementation of decentralization programs such as *woreda* level decentralization is to promote good governance, through inspiring accountability, transparency, rule of law and grassroots participation at *woreda* and *kebele* levels to promote the efficient and equitable implementation of the democratic governance and local self rule (Merera, 2007).

However, according to informants, the practice in Liban and Filtu *woredas* is different from the principles of good governance and different from both regions constitutional provisions and contrary to scholar's argument. According to them, ñé the last eighteen years inter clan conflict between Borana, Digodia, Arsi, and Marehan and the intra ethnic conflict between Borana and Guji, Marehan and Digodai was because of lack of good governance among local government officials¹³⁸.

¹³⁸ Focus Group Discussion: Borana, Arsi, Marrihan, Garri, Hawiye and Digodia Elders, 04 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

Key informant substantiates the reality by taking specific example of the intra clan conflict between Borana and Guji in 2012, which they said, was fueled by the then zone administrator. In addition, this conflict goes to innocent people at the locality¹³⁹. Informant narrates the case as follows:

The then zone administrator of Guji convinced individuals from his Guji clan to change the name of the Nagalle Borana town Municipality and Hospital. The previous name of municipality and hospital was Nagelle Borana Municipality and Nagelle Borana Hospital. According to different informants the leader was interested to change the name into Nagelle Guji municipality and Guji hospital. However, even if those who were ordered to do, did it over night, but individuals from Borana clan who saw them while they were trying to rub the board when they went to bus station and challenged them. There were conflicts and word exchanges. Meanwhile the neighboring people heard and went out to see what was going on. However, they supported the Borana clans and things changed to serious conflict. Early in the morning, famous Borana elders from the communities went to zone administrative office and woreda to report the case. Around 9-10 am, the surrounding kebeles heard the case and came to Nagelle Borana town. Then inter clan violent conflict between Guji and Borana started in Nagelle town and the fighting resulted in the death of 120 people and damage of huge property. Finally, Federal Police intervened to stop the fighting.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ Personal Interview: Borana elder, 14 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.



Fig. 4: the previous Nagelle Borana Hospital

(Source: Picture taken by the author)

The Liban *woreda* informants complain that the leaders in Guji zone have no ear to hear the problem of Liban *woreda* because of two reasons: first, the communities do not elect them; the regional government appoints them; second, they are thinking in line of their clan (Guji). This is why they are in position to marginalize, discriminate, and disrespect Borana identity (like name, ritual places), which originated in current Guji zone. Moreover, they are not willing to respond to questions raised by Liban *woreda* communities. Instead, they often focus on splitting the *woreda* into two, for administrative purpose. In this *woreda* there are 17 *kebeles*, among this 11 *kebeles* are inhabited by Borana clan and the rest 6 *kebeles* are inhabited by Arsi and Guji clans. Therefore, some of the Guji zone administrators are not in a position to help Liban *woreda* communities, since Borana clan mainly inhabits the *woreda*'s community. Rather they are triggering conflict between Borana clan and other neighboring clans to get fund from government and NGOs.¹⁴¹

As a result, the action of zone authorities went against good governance as one critically observes it. This corroborates with Abdellatif (2003:26) who argued democratic governance from human development perspectives needs to acknowledge that ñpeople are free from

¹⁴¹ Personal Interview: Civil servants and Residents, 18 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, gender and any other attribute and economic and social policies are responsive to people's needs and aspirations.

However, the Guji zone and Liban *woreda* officials agreed with the complaint of the local communities who maintain that few individuals who were then zone officials triggered conflicts, but they disagree on the opinion that those officials trigger the conflict to support Guji clan, even if those individuals are from Guji clan. The major reason for those groups interested to trigger conflicts was criticized and disqualified by Borana officials at the quarterly and annual evaluation (*qoranno* in afaan Oromo) of government officials. After the evaluation, the Guji officials were given very low grade and warning. Thus, they plan to cover their inefficiency and to divert the attention by triggering conflict between Borana and Guji clans, since they get less grade and warning because they stand beside their clan (Guji) in all activities socially, economically and politically.¹⁴²

Moreover, the local elders argued that they bring the case to regional government. Moreover, the regional government assigned committees to resolve the case. They stayed for six months, but they did not bring any solution. Finally, they went back, but they promised to put back the previous name. About two years passed, and until now, they did nothing. The Borana proverb goes *Dhugaa muruu dhabaaf murtii lafarra butuun dhugaa haaluufi* (Literary mean, Justice delayed is Justice denied). Elders state that similar to that of border issues this case was delayed without any decision made to resolve the problem.¹⁴³

The Liban *woreda* communities and elders claimed that those officials were responsible for the death of 120 peoples and damage of property. However, things went against their claim. To make matters even worse the accused officials were seen in television while they are making interview as officials promoted to the office of regional government.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Personal Interview: Guji Zone and Liban *Woreda* Officials, 13 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁴³ Personal Interview: Borana Elders, 9 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁴⁴ Personal Interview: Resident of Nagelle-Borana, Borana, Guji and Arsi elders, Civil servant, 15 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

Likewise, in Filtu, there is Marehan clan who had no land; because during the Siyad Bareê regime this clan went to Mokdesho and stayed there up to the Bareê regime collapse. Different clans already occupied their land when they came to their previous areas. Then they started to live dispersed in different zones, *woredas* such as in Liban zone of Somali region and Guji zone of Oromia region.¹⁴⁵

The Digodia elders argued that in 2012 the Filtu *woreda* administrators call up the Marehan clan to give them land and to have *woreda* of their own without the Digodia, Gurra, Karenle clans and elders knowledge. Then Marehan from Guji and Borana zone of Oromia region and Dolo Ado and Udat *woredas* of Liban zone of Somali region went to Filtu *woreda* to receive land offered by officials and to have their own *woreda*. Then the *woreda* officials gave them Dhekka-Suftu *woreda* in between Liban and Filtu *woredas*.

Then Marehan clashed with Digodia, Gurra and Karenle clans mainly with Digodia because of the land grabbed by Marehan. Because of this conflict, there were about 80 death and many properties were damaged in year 2012. Then elders brought the case to the region but the regional government promoted those officials who cause the conflict and responsible for all the death of human and damaged properties to higher regional offices, without giving solution to the problem occurred in these areas. Rather, zone officials together with regional officials, assigned other clans (Ogaden) to Filtu *woreda* as a solution to the problem.¹⁴⁶

This case brought not only intra ethnic conflict but also, inter-clan conflict between Arsi and Marehan, Borana and Marehan, since Marehan settled in between Liban and Filtu *woredas*. Thus, Marehanê has been in intra and inter clan conflicts since, November 2012.

One of the key informants from Filtu argued that:

The then woreda administrators deliberately did this action and a few government appointed elders because Borana and Digodia clans agreed not to fight on border and land grabbing (illegal settlement and movement) issues via

¹⁴⁵ Personal Interview: Marehan Elder, 23 July 2015, Filtu.

¹⁴⁶ Focus Group Discussion: Digodia, Gurra and Karele clan elders: 27 July 2015, Filtu.

*their respected clan elders. Moreover, they agreed to promote and to respect their previous ways of resource sharing and management, because they understood the benefit of the last 18 years of conflicts in between them.*¹⁴⁷

From the above elders argument one can infer that the *woreda* officials propose clan conflict. Therefore, the societies conclude, ñé the government officials are not happy when conflict is stopped around the border, because for them it is a means to promote and access funds from federal and regional governmentsò.¹⁴⁸

Largely, participants in eldersò focus group discussion from both *woredas* argued that:

*Absence of border is lack of good governance; we are in continuous conflict for the last eighteen years. If the woreda officials are accountable for the communities who elect them and they are efficient and effective in their duties, and if there is check and balance between woreda, zone, region and at large federal government officials, how the federal and regional government did not give any solution to this problem. They came after conflict is irrupted many and many deaths registered, and many properties damaged to support those who are seriously attacked by the conflict together with NGOs.*¹⁴⁹

The other point that the Filtu *woreda* informants argued that the *woreda* administrators encouraged the calans to undertake illegal movement and settlement and also forced them to disregard the customary law that they were experienced with their neighboring clans for centuries. They said to expand the *woreda* for the benefit of the communities, but indirectly they promote themselves while he/she is doing such jobs. Nevertheless, the issue triggers continuous inter clan conflict in Liban and Filtu *woredas*.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Personal Interview: Digodia Elder, 26 July 2015, Filtu.

¹⁴⁸ Personal Interview: Resident and Civil servant, 25 July 2015, Filtu.

¹⁴⁹ Focus Group Discussion: Elders, July 04, 05 and 10 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana and 27 and 29 July 2015, Filtu

¹⁵⁰ Personal Interview: Civil servant in Filtu, July 24 2015, Filtu.

In both *woredas*, there is corruption and nepotism in the recruitment of individuals for different sectors.¹⁵¹ In Filtu *woreda*, the dominant clan (Digodia) has also dominated leadership positions, and it was after 2011/12 that the Ogaden clan possessed key positions in the *woreda*.¹⁵² In Liban *woreda*, the minority Guji and Arsi dominated leadership positions. Of the seventeen *kebeles* of Liban *woreda*, eleven *kebeles* are inhabited by Borana clan, three *kebeles* by Guji clan and the rest three *kebeles* by Arsi clan. Thus, the majority Borana clan occupied few leadership positions in Liban *woreda*, since the zone officials are dominated by Guji clan. Moreover, *zone officials indirectly appoint woreda* officials and, therefore, the Guji clan dominated the executive positions in Liban *woreda*.¹⁵³

In Liban *woreda* there are investors who are not registered legally at *woreda* Investment Bureau, some of which are residents of the *woreda* while others are from outside. The investors were given many hectares of land for agriculture. For example, Walensu Ranch (25, 000 hectares), Dida Liban Ranch (4000 hectares), Dida Tuyura Ranch (above 4000 hectares) in Simito *kebele* in the area of Did-Liban and Walensu *Kebele* are the good example.¹⁵⁴

My informants who were representatives of two investors told me “they are legal investors recognized by the zone and region”.¹⁵⁵ However, zones have no mandate to permit investors to invest. Rather this is a mandate of regional government. Even then, these investments cannot benefit the communities, since they are investing on agriculture while the communities are pastoralist and they are in need of animal related investment to get experience. Thus, investment in this *woreda* seems individual benefit focused rather than collective. This implies that the pastoralist groups in Liban *woreda*’s are marginalized economically.

¹⁵¹ Personal Interview: Resident of Nagelle, 08 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana and Resident of Filtu, 25 July 2015 Filtu.

¹⁵² Personal Interview: High Official of Filtu *woreda*, July 28, Filtu.

¹⁵³ Personal Interview: High Official of Liban *woreda*, 10 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁵⁴ Personal Interview: High Official of Liban *woreda*, 12 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁵⁵ Personal Interview: Resident of Nagelle, 9 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

From the above discussion, one can infer that in practice, there is lack of accountability of the *woreda* and zone administrators to the public, but rather there is an upward accountability of the *woreda* administrators to zone administrators and zone administrators to regional governments.

The absence of accountability of *woreda* administrators to the local people mainly due to the way the zone and *woreda* administrators are assigned, because they are simply appointed by the regional president with the approval of regional parliament and *zone administrators indirectly appoint woreda* administrators with recruitment based on membership and loyalty to the ruling party. Therefore, there is strong influence and interference from zone and regional administrators to the extent of removing the *woreda* administrators from their office, when the latter are found to resist commands of the zone and regional officials. This goes against the 2002 revised Oromia region constitution (Article 85 and 87) and the 2002 revised constitution of Somali region (Article 85 and 83). Obviously, the practice is harming the political, administrative and fiscal autonomy of the local governments to exercise their function according to legal documents of the regional states. Key informants expressed ñthe current trend in local government political structure has become individualized rather than institutionalized which promotes upward accountability than downward (to public) accountability.¹⁵⁶

In both *woredas*, the societies are not satisfied with accountability, transparency and participation, which indicate the poor implementation of principles of good governance. Informants explain experience that they had on the issues of good governance such as upward accountability, lack of transparency and public participation in their local administrations. For example, they mention the illegal settlement of Marehan in Filtu; log the support of *woreda* administrators without consulting peoples of the Digodia and other minority clans (Gurra, Karenle and Ajuran). Similarly, in Liban *woreda* when the zone administrators want to change the name of institutions, they did not discuss with societies. This meant that practically there was no accountability, i.e. decision makers are not responsible for their action and there is no check and balance in place, and they are deficient in clarity and openness for decision-making that hardly invite public participation and inclusiveness.

¹⁵⁶ Personal Interview: Resident of Nagelle Borana and Filtu, July 14 and 27 2015, in Liban and Filtu *woreda* respectively.

On the contrary, in both *woredas*, when local communities bring different cases showing maladministration of *woreda* officials to the regional and zone administrators, the latter promote accused local officials to zonal or regional offices, since they are accountable and transparent to each other than to the people whom they are serving. This shows lack of check and balance, absence of private media (both electronic and print) and absence of opposition parties, particularly in Somali regional state.

7.5 Role of Elders in Conflict Resolution

Pastoralists have age-old complex institutional arrangements to manage their land and conflict among the group and individuals. At the local levels, it is important to know the extent to which traditional institutions address local problems. It is also an issue of paramount importance that at both national and local levels legal provisions exist for the involvement of traditional authorities elected by communities to participate in decision-making processes from initial inception up to the final ones. This helps to recognize the autonomy of customary institution in pastoral societies in order to bring sustainable peace and development from grassroot level.

Key informants among community elders argued that:

*How the federal government from all this distance gives solution to local problems, like resource use and management? Even the local government and ‘government elders’ are not in position to solve local problem. Instead, they prefer triggering conflict to get a project of peace making. For them conflict itself is a resource. Of course, they did to get money from NGOs and fund from federal government to resolving conflict in the name of making sustainable peace. This is the crucial problem and that is why solutions are not yet practically implemented in these localities for the last two decades.*¹⁵⁷

Similarly, during FGDs with informants from mixed clans, they boldly argued, “border demarcation is easy for federal government. However, local government officials and

¹⁵⁷ Personal Interview: Borana Elder, 9 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

“government elders” have problem to give genuine information that can help decision of federal government by discussing with the societies”.¹⁵⁸

For example, during the 2004 referendum the communities’ elders asked delegates from the HoF to see the history and map of the previous regimes. However, the latter were not willing to see the historical issues that the elders asked, because they were wrongly pre-informed by local officials and government elders. The HoF delegates prefer to give land to the currently settled clans. This argument goes with the local officials’ argument about ownership of land. Then in both regions of Oromia and Somali local communities refused to accept the delegates’ decision and conflict have continued until today.¹⁵⁹

Informants from Liban and Filtu *woreda* argued that now days, the government structure interfere into local elders’ duty and responsibility and confuse the societies. In different societal issues like, conflict resolution among youths, parents, different personal cases that used to be resolved by elders previously¹⁶⁰, at present government officials are interfering and bringing cases to the court. In most community issues, elders’ participation is not allowed, because the *woreda* officials label them as “anti-development” “narrow minded” and they are considered as they have negative attitude towards the government structure.¹⁶¹ Similar to the *woreda* officials, the *kebele* administrative councils goes against the advice of the elders, who are clan representative and responsible for a more flexible natural resource management. This in turn causes disagreements within and among different clans.¹⁶²

While ignoring elders represented by the society nicknamed “government elders” the government officials appoint handpicked elders from the societies to discuss different issues

¹⁵⁸ Focus Group Discussion: Borana, Arsi, Marrihan and Digodia Elders, 05 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ FDRE 1995 constitution, Article 34 (5) this Constitution shall not preclude the adjudication of disputes relating to personal and family laws in accordance with religious or customary laws, with the consent of the parties to the dispute.

¹⁶¹ Personal Interview: Borana, Garri and Arsi Elders, 01 July 2015, Nagelle and Digodia, Marrihan and Garri Elders, 23 July 2015, Filtu.

¹⁶² Personal Interview: Resident of Did-Liban *Kebele*, 15 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

within and outside the societies based on their customary law. Then the societies categorize elders into two groups. They called those elders selected and appointed by *woreda* and zonal officials are ‘government elders’ and those whom the government officials ignored referred to as ‘community elders’. These different elders view societal problems from different perspectives. Government elders are elders who are selected by the government officials to treat different issues and disputes of the community parallel to modern government structure. Community elders on the contrary are those elders who get recognition by the communities and have great role to treat different internal and external issues of the communities from local perspective based on the customary law of the communities.¹⁶³ That is why community elders are more knowledgeable and effective in resolving local conflicts. Yet government officials at all levels marginalized them.

Societies do not have full trust in ‘government elders’; they complain that ‘government elders’ are working for their perdiems; than working for solving society’s problem and opportunities. They stressed that those elders who have recognition of the government prefer continuity of the conflict; because they benefit from clan conflicts with rewarding perdiems during training by government and NGOs and at the time of assignment to resolve the conflict and they are considered as trader.¹⁶⁴ Thus, the political economy of conflicts suggests that ‘government elders’ are found to hide the truth to resolve the conflict. It is often said that rather than solving the problem genuinely, they are often engaged in provoking conflict.¹⁶⁵

One of the key informants raised a serious question during FGDs about government elders he said, ‘Our elders in pastoralist areas have lifetime experience on the issues of how conflict is resolved among clans and individuals and sometimes on environment. Thus, why training is needed? What to train? Who train them? He tried to forecast from his experience that those ‘government elders’ are trained on why, how, and when to lie to their societies’.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ Personal Interview: Resident of Nagelle, 09 July 2015, Nagelle and Resident of Filtu, 26 July 2015, Filtu.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Focus Group Discussion: Resident of Nagelle, 10 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

It followed that even though government officials train “government elders” at zonal and *woreda* levels; those elders did not get recognition and respect from their society. Therefore, they cannot solve societal problems without the acceptance and trust of the communities, since societies have their own elders to resolve problems. However, community’s elders have no say on inter and intra clan conflict to resolve publically, because the government warns them not to interfere in societies issues. The communities have these disagreements with government officials in Liban and Filtu *woreda*.¹⁶⁷

Another discussant from the group said that after 2011/12 inter-clan conflict has decreased in Liban and Filtu *woredas*. The reason is that the federal government has ordered the NGOs, especially international NGOs not to work on conflict and human right affairs. Following that there was no conference, workshop, training on conflict resolution for “government elders” and local government officials, and then provoked conflict has stopped nearly for two years.¹⁶⁸

One of the key informants from the international NGOs-Mercy Corps confirmed that, his office have been working a lot on pre and post conflict resolution and human right issues in the pastoralist areas. Pre-conflict NGOs gave workshops, conferences and training and post conflict NGOs support those who are severe victims of the conflicts. This great role was carried out with elders, communities, government structure to resolve conflict. However, the federal government came up with the Charities and Societies Proclamation No.621/2009 with which the international NGOs were informed to stop to work on conflict and human right issues, in 2011/12 international NGOs totally stopped to work on conflict related issues.¹⁶⁹ The reduction of local conflicts might be related to the introduction of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No.621/2009 by the federal government, which stopped especially the international NGOs not to work on conflict and human right.

¹⁶⁷ Personal Interview: Resident of Nagelle-Borana, 9 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana and Resident of Filtu, 27 July 2015, Filtu.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Personal Interview: Expert in MERCY CORPS, Filtu *woreda* Ethiopia, 25 July 2015, Filtu.

Moreover, key informants from government official appreciate the action of federal government on NGOs. Because, from time to time elders did not welcome government officials call to resolve conflict and other societal problems as soon as possible. However, when NGOs send them letters they appear immediately and fulfill their duties accordingly. This is probably due to per diem and other facilities difference during training and implementation.¹⁷⁰ Similarly, officials at Liban *woreda* also put their reservation on the way some elected elders were acting based on the profit that they get and they literary asked, is the letter is from GO or NGO? Moreover, their responses were based on their interest, and he said, ñé for us the federal government action on NGOs was a reliefò.¹⁷¹

Moreover, the Borana and Digodia elders have traditional way of joint inter-clan conflict management, prevention and resolution mechanisms. These are the Borana council of elders (*Jaarsummaa Nagayaa*) and the Digodia council of elder (*guurti*) are the main institutions to resolve conflict. The majority of the communities in two study *woredas* has accepted the decision of this joint committee of the eldersô council. Therefore, the local leaders and leadersô councils have stronger power to enforce decision without local government officialsô interventions.

According to informants in the previous regimes the local leaders and councils of elders have stronger power to decide and to punish criminals without any external interferences. Members of all the groups in Liban and Filtu *woredas* accept and respect this institutionôs decision without any hesitation, when all clans in the study areas were living in one province (Borana *Awuraja*).¹⁷² Besides, they add these local institutions started to weaken from time to time since 1991 because, of the imposition of state administrative structure and legal frameworks. These externally imposed legal structures lack official recognitions to traditional institutions such as traditional eldersô councils, traditional leadership and authority.¹⁷³ Thus, the traditional conflict resolution mechanism and the ñmodernò government structure, rules and regulations are not

¹⁷⁰ Personal Interview: Cabinet in Filtu *Woreda*, 25 July 2015, Filtu.

¹⁷¹ Personal Interview: Liban *Woreda* Official, 13 July, Nagalle-Borana

¹⁷² Personal Interview: Borana, Arsi, Digodia and Marehan Elders, 10 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

mutually exclusive and they compete with each other in their practices. These opposing ideas of both institutions encourage individuals and groups to provoke criminal activities and inter-clan conflict than discouraging inter-clan conflict in between Borana, Arsi, Digodia and Marehan clans.

According to informants from both *woredas*, criminals begin their appeal to traditional institution and at mean time; they stopped and bring their case to government court. Then the government court interferes and decide based on the legal structure. This is the worst thing that both institutions encounter to practice according to their rule and regulations. Since there is no check and balance in between the two institutions, things led an individuals or groups in to conflict.¹⁷⁴ This indicates that government institutions based on the legal law of the state have resolved almost all the societal affairs, in general, and conflict aspects, in particular.

This means that in the study areas there are dual leadership and laws vary in conflict with each other to bring sustainable peace. However, because of their differences in rules and regulations and its practices, there is a competition between them, which open up the gap for criminals and promote crime for criminals to hide themselves, when they are defeated by one of the laws. This practices trigger conflict within and/or outside the groups in the study *woredas*-Liban and Filtu.

Moreover, it is remarkable that the local conflicting groups hold integral traditional conflict managing and resolution institutions. But this long time experienced indigenous knowledge of the communities have been undermined by the ñmodernò newly structured forms of the government legitimate organ. However, the elders in the study area argue that they are working to re-empower their traditional institutions to resolve conflicts in their localities,¹⁷⁵ since these traditional institutions play great roles for the preventions of possible outbreaks of conflicts. To this end, the Gadaa leader (Abba Gadaa) of Borana and king of Digodia (*woberki*) should get due recognition and acceptance from local authorities to play the expected role to resolve the conflicts in between the clans in the study *woredas*-Liban and Filtu.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

As the effort of the local authorities and government ñselectedò elders in the study areas are contradictory, some of the disputes were not successfully resolved, since those government-selected elders have not been accepted by the majority of the communities. However, among the conflicts happened in the study area, community elders mediated some of them. As the key informants argue during focus group discussion, eldersò mediation was so effective and smooth for the last long peaceful integrations of the communities in the border *kebeles*. They add that government authorityòs interventions in different conflict resolution made the implementation complicated and created tensions among the disputant groups, since both *woredas* local authorities have not been genuinely trying to build peace among the communities. Some informants argue that they support indirectly their own clans, rather than thinking of mutual ways whereby neighboring clans live together.¹⁷⁶

Moreover, to resolve the problem of the territory (border) and other resources related problems community leaders participation should be helpful to bring sustainable peace among the groups in the study *woredas*-Liban and Filtu. This is because local leaders know the causes of the conflicts from its grassroot up to its escalation. Thus, local leaders who are accepted, respected by community at large should participate as the major actors of conflict resolution mechanisms, which is organized by government, NGOs or donors.

7.6 Roles of Government and NGOs in Conflict Resolution

Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) played many roles in pastoral communities in general and in Liban and Filtu *woredas* in particular. They improve pastoralist living standard by many ways such as food security, environment conservation, natural resources protections, health, education, veterinary services, infrastructures, encouraging crop production by settlement. According to informants, many of the development projects, which are existed in both study *woredas*, are mainly the tribute of donors and NGOs dependent.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁶ Focus Group discussion: Resident of Liban *woreda*, 03 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana; and Resident of Filtu *woreda*, 22 July 2015, Filtu.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

Moreover, informants of both study *woredas* argue that even though the NGOs are better in public participation when compared with government institutions, but NGOs also lack public participations of the communities during planning times. This is why most of the projects used to come with NGOs and goes with them without sustainable continuity. Moreover, they lack integrations of the indigenous knowledge of the communities while they plan to implement.¹⁷⁸

Indeed, during focus group discussion, elders confirmed that the major shortcomings of government institutions and NGOs have been underestimating traditional institutions, traditional leadership structure and indigenous knowledge of the communities. They blame both institutions for having introduced new institutions, knowledge and structure of leadership which do not goes with local culture or are not contextualized to the local affairs of the community.¹⁷⁹

Besides, in the government institutions and NGOs there is no check and balance of the program, which were implemented in both study *woredas*. This led to corruption, nepotism, disrespect for rule of law; and this activity discourage communities, and bring lack of trust and absence of ownership feeling for local development projects on: health centers, schools, infrastructure, and water wells. In addition, there are no formal working relations between local government institutions and the NGOs; while they are working on similar projects like education, health, and agriculture. These led government institutions, NGOs and donors unsuccessful implementation of their programs. Since, they lack integration and cooperation to implement their objectives to grassroots level communities; therefore, the projects are often unsuccessful¹⁸⁰

The federal government has made interventions to stop the inter-clan conflicts by, sending the government security force to stop the conflict. Focus group discussant from both *woredas* maintain that after the conflict is stopped the federal, regional, zonal and *woreda* government authorities from both regions called the conflicting clans via their elected officials and government elders came together to organize peace and development conference. The aim of the conference was to resolve the conflict, to build inter-clan peace and security, and to return looted

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Personal Interview: Borana, Digodia, Marehan, Guji and Arsi Elders, 08 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

property. Its final goal was to bring sustainable peace between the conflicting groups and to normalize relationships between clans. When insecurity issues improved because of deployed security forces from federal government, the government officials in each level, representative elders of the community encourage the disputed clans to return to their home; and then those who were victims of the conflict were often helped by government and NGOs.

However, the interventions of the federal government by sending defense force and regional government intervention by administrative authorities does not have sustainable peace in between Borana and Digodia clan for the last two decades. This is because their presence in the area was after many lives lost and many properties damaged. This intervention may help groups seriously affected by the conflict. According to informants in both study *woredas* the local officials, security personals are reluctant to resolve the conflicts between Borana, Digodia and Marehan clans by peaceful means of negotiations and arbitrations. Rather they are provoker by siding towards their clan affiliation indirectly by violating the rule of law.¹⁸¹

Different researcher in the area of good governance argued that bad governance meant barriers to accountability, participation, transparency, efficiency, equity and rule of law. Moreover, it results in huge loss in economic growth, improper use of human resources, decreases creativity and increases insecurity. All these result in hampering economic, social and political development of the citizens and finally lead to the collapse of nation states (Stell, 2008; Imran and Shah Nawaz, 2009; Amoko, 2003).

7.7 Summary

This chapter has examined root causes of conflict in Liban *woreda* of Oromia and in Filtu *woreda* of Somali. The chapter outlined about five interconnected contents. In the first section, the regionalization of state post 1992 and the constitutional promise on territorial demarcation of regional state and its political realization in between Oromia and Somali regional states. In addition, the interference of HoF in 2004 to make referendum in between Oromia and Somali regional states border in general and in Liban *woreda* of Oromia and Filtu *woreda* of Somali

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

region states in particular. After referendum, some *kebeles* of the Liban *woreda* and ritual places were included under the current Filtu *woreda* of Somali region; before referendum Filtu was a *kebele* under Liban *woreda* and the ritual place in Filtu *kebele*, which was used to celebrate Gumy-Gaayoo ceremony, was under Liban *woreda*. Therefore, the referendum made mistrust among the clans in the study area and finalized without border demarcation in between Guji zone of Oromia and Liban zone of Somali regions in general and within the adjacent *kebeles* of Filtu and Liban *woredas* in particular.

In the second part of the discussion, resources are examined as the major cause of conflict. Since, there is claim and counter claim of territory to access resources in between the clans in the border and the referendum developed mistrust among the clans; because, before referendum all clans use natural resources based on their customary law that they practiced for centuries. On the eve of referendum and post referendum illegal settlement, illegal movement have increased without the knowledge of the hosting group/clan-these activities broken the customary law of the pastoral communities and this led to livestock theft, rape, murder; no one is responsible for this crime and these activities led them to serious conflict. Furthermore, after referendum not only the natural resources but also state resources and NGOs resources are the major problem in the adjacent *kebeles* of the *woredas*, since the border demarcation between Liban *woreda* and Filtu *woreda* was inadequate.

Moreover, lacks of good governance by local authorities are examined as serious problems, which trigger inter-clan conflict within the *woreda* clans and across the *woreda* clans. The Guji-Borana conflict in Liban *woreda* and the Digodia-Marehan conflict in Filtu *woreda* were evidence. According to the informants these conflicts were deliberately organized by local officials those who were removed from the office by *gimgema* (evaluation). Since they were interested to hide their capacities, they propagate their clan, and the reason for the removal from the office was, due to their loyalty to their clan. As the case example shows in the discussion those officials broken the rule of law. Besides, their accountability and transparency were upward than downward to their electorate. This shows that there is inadequate vertical and horizontal check and balance among government structures. In the fourth and fifth part of the discussion the roles of local institutions-such as local leaders, local elders council (*guurti* of

Digodia) and head of Gadaa assembly (*Abba* Gadaa of Borana), and government institutions and Non Government Organizations are the main institutions to resolve conflict in the study area are included. The local institutions played significant role to resolve the conflicts, since they are familiar with the root causes of the conflicts and the factors that trigger them. Therefore, it is easy for them to decide based on facts, the truth and the resolution is long lasting; but the government and NGOs are external institutions that tried to resolve conflict by collecting evidence from a second party. Thus, they are not successful in resolving conflicts, but they manage temporarily.

However, there are inadequate coordination and cooperation between these two structures of the institutions in the study area-Liban and Filtu *woredas*, since the government and NGOs underestimate and even interfere in the activities of local institutions. These activities have been its own contribution for the continuity of the conflict and for its lasting solutions.

Chapter Eight

Decentralization and Local Development as a Means for Promoting Clan Cooperation

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the status of decentralization and efforts of local developments as a means of cooperation in Liban (Oromia) and Filtu (Somali) *woredas* are examined. To this end, the chapter is organized into four interrelated points of discussions. First, it presents an account of decentralization in Oromia and Somali regions in general and Liban and Filtu *woredas* in particular. The discussion here focuses on political decentralization in relations to local elections, public participations, and administrative decentralization policies particularly after-2002 in Oromia and Somali regional states. The so-called *woreda*-level decentralization efforts in both case studies are highlighted. The District Level Decentralization Program (DLDP) was introduced mainly to enhance the transfer of political, administrative, fiscal powers to local governments to bring about local economic and service developments (MoCB, 2004).

Second, fiscal decentralization is treated separately due to its potential significance for local development, which is often recommended in the resource scarcity related group conflicts. The revenue generating capacities and expenditure responsibilities of Liban and Filtu *woredas* are explored; and the imbalances between them (revenue and expenditure) in both *woredas* have influenced the level of local social services and economic development. Third, it identifies the basic social service developments in both case studies and suggests the importance of focusing on expanding capital budgets in the future to develop the remote and border *kebeles* of the two *woredas* as means of both intra-*woreda* and inter-*woreda* clan cooperation. Finally, the chapter examines wheather the local government use social service delivery as a means to promote clan cooperation among the *woredas* practically.

8.2 Decentralization in Oromia and Somali Regions: Liban & Filtu Woredas

The structures and institutions of the regional states of Ethiopia were created by the 1995 FDRE constitution. This legal framework provided for the establishment of federal state structure with

nine Member States of the Federation (FDRE, 1995; Article 50(1)). Regions were granted various powers and responsibilities. Moreover, regional power is reinforced by a constitutional provision Article 52(1) "all powers not given expressly to the Federal Government alone, or concurrently to the Federal Government and the States are reserved to the States".

Furthermore, the constitution allowed the regional government to establish other administrative levels: "state government shall be established at State and other administrative levels that they find necessary. Adequate power shall be granted to the lowest units of government to enable the people to participate directly in the administration of such units" (*Ibid*, Article 50(4)). Therefore, the basic reason for local government formation is to enhance popular participation in government and development activities.

Following the 2001 poverty reduction and development policy of the federal government, all regional states revised their constitutions in 2002 to establish three further tiers of government to implement the District Level Decentralization Program (DLDP) at local levels (Zemelak, 2011). As a result, zones, *woredas* and *kebeles* were re-established to expand mainly the power of the *woredas*. In fact, the administrative structure of the new arrangement involved the *woreda* as the lowest unit with some decentralized powers. The program made the *kebeles* the nearest administrative organ to the people with authority to govern, and the zonal local governments as intermediary unit and the state as the highest unit. Tegenge (1998: 8) argues that the three-tiered structure has three main functional branches of government: the legislative, the executive and the judiciary, to be performed by government organs established at central, regional and local levels.

8.2.1 Political Decentralization

Political decentralization is the transfer of political authority and autonomy to local governments where elected and empowered local government part survives (USAID, 2009:10). Moreover, Dickovick and Riedl (2010:20) argues, "sub-national elections are a first principle in making political accountability downward to the citizen as well as upward to national actors".

As a result, there have been local elections in Ethiopia. Local election is widely believed to be a central element of local democratic governance and development. To this end, the Constitution

of Ethiopia states, "The sovereignty [of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia] shall be expressed through their representatives elected in accordance with this Constitution and through their direct, democratic participation" (FDRE, 1995: Article 8/3). Moreover, in Article 38 (1), it emphasizes that: "Every Ethiopian national [has the right] to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly and through freely chosen representatives". Similarly, in the 2002 revised Oromia and Somali regional states constitution, Article 38(1) states that "every resident of the region without any discrimination based on their nationality, race, color, sex, language, religion, political and other opinion has the right and the opportunity to elect and to be elected".

In the post-1991, regional election was held in June 1992 to establish the transitional regional self-governing entities and other local units. There was also a national election in 1994 to elect members of the Constituent Assembly that approved the current constitution. Since then, five general elections (federal and regional levels) have been held in 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015. In all elections, the ruling party of Ethiopia, the EPRDF and its affiliates emerged victorious at all levels of government. By the two most recent elections which were held in 2010 and 2015, the ruling EPRDF party and its allies together won 99.6% and 100% of federal parliamentary seats, respectively (NEBE, 2010).

Similarly, in the last two regional elections, the EPRDF and its affiliates won 100% of the seats in the regional councils. The following table shows the results of regional elections in Ethiopia.

Table 1: Final results of the 2010 and 2015 general election: The Regional State Councils

No	Regional State	No. seats	Winner Party	Results Obtained	
				2010	2015
1	Tigray	152	Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF/EPRDF)	152	152
2	Afar	96	The Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP)	93	93
			The Argoba People’s Democratic Organization (APDO)	3	3
3	Amhara	294	Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM/EPRDF)	294	294
4	Oromia	537	Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO/EPRDF)	537	537
5	Somali	186	Ethiopian Somali People’s Democratic Party (ESPDP)	186	273 ¹⁸²
6	Benishangul Gumuz	99	Benishangul Gumuz Peoples Democratic Party (BGPDP)	98	99
			All Ethiopian Unity Organization (AEUO)	1	-
7	SNNP	348	Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement (SEPDM/EPRDF)	348	345
8	Gambella	156	Gambela People’s Unity Democratic Movement (GPUDM)	156	155
9	Hareri	36	Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO/EPRDF)	18	36
			Harari National League (HNL)	18	
Total number of seats in the 9 Regional States				1,904	1989

Source: National Electoral Board of Ethiopia June 21, 2010 and June, 2015

As it can be observed from Table (1) above, in Oromia and Somali regional states, the OPDO/EPRDF and the ESPDP (ally of EPRDF) have ensured the total control of regional councils during the last two consecutive elections. However, in both study *woredas*, informants complain that the representatives from *woredas* to the regional parliaments were not representing the

¹⁸² During the 2015 election in Ethiopia, in Somali region 16 *woredas* and 4 towns administrative entity was added. Therefore, the number of the representative in regional parliament was increased from 186 in 2010 to 273 in 2015.

pastoralist and agro-pastoralist electorates because they were selected from *woreda* towns candidates for election and mostly they were not elected by local peoples rather they were 'selected' or 'assigned' through the party channel to "represent" the pastoralists.¹⁸³ The other point that the informants criticized during focus group discussions about their representatives, at regional parliament is that:

*They introduce themselves during election campaign, and post their election symbols, after they get chance to join regional parliament, the local communities do not see them up to the next election period...How can we say that we have representatives in the regional parliament? Sometimes they may come back when there is conflict between the neighboring woreda clans or clan conflict with local officials just to report the case, not to find solutions.*¹⁸⁴

Elected representatives in Oromia and Somali regional states parliament, who were elected in 2010 from Liban and Filtu *woredas*, tended to admit that they have received reports about the people whom they represented from the *woreda* council, *woreda* authorities and zone officials.¹⁸⁵ They confirmed that they almost did not have direct contact with the peoples, whom they represented. They rarely contact the people in the *woreda* in special cases when there is something like inter/intra clan conflict. In relation to this fact, Aalen (2000:12) argues:

The centralized party structure of the EPRDF is clearly contradictory to the provisions of the federal and regional constitutions...It promotes upward accountability to the party organs above rather than downward accountability to the people of the region, woreda [districts] and kebele [grassroots administrations]. The constitutional rights for the regions to formulate and implement plans and policies are severely diminished by the fact that regional governments, which are under EPRDF's hegemony, follow the centrally designed policies and five-year plans. ... In the

¹⁸³ Personal Interviewee: Borana and Arsi Elders, 4 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana. And Digodia and Marrihan Elders, 22 November 2015, Filtu.

¹⁸⁴ Focus Group Discussion: Borana, Arsi, Marrihan, Garri, Hawiye and Digodia Elders, 06 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁸⁵ Personal Interviewee: Caffee member of Oromia region, 08 December 2015, Adama and Somali region parliament member, 12 December 2015, Addis Ababa.

Ethiopian case, the party structures are centralized, and when the party and the state are the same, this leads inevitably to a centralized division of state power.

According to Lovise Aalen (2000), Ethiopia exercised local electoral democracy by determining the composition of local governments through the ballot box for the first time ever in June 1992 during the transition period. At that time, the major political parties like Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), All Amhara People's Organization (AAPO), and Ethiopian Democratic Action Group (EDAG) and others have withdrawn from the election.¹⁸⁶ I emphasize on the two recent local elections of the 2008 and 2013, which are the third and fourth round of local elections respectively after the 1995 constitution came to effect. As discussed above, the Constitution of Ethiopia underlines that direct participation of the people is the manifestation of their sovereignty.

In the April 2008 local election, authorities of the *kebele* and *woreda* councils were elected by acclamation, i.e. without competition between opposition and ruling parties; because opposition parties were either not registered or withdrew or boycotted elections. The opposition parties' leaders complained that they "were forced to boycott because of the ruling party's security pressure on their candidates". However, the ruling party officials blame the opposition's parties for the problem systematically hiding their weakness and defeat.¹⁸⁷

Similar to the 2008 election, the 2013 local election was boycotted by opposition parties who complained that the government was committing political violence against their members, supporters, and candidates. This is confirmed by Human Rights Watch (HRW), "as the election was approaching, many key members and candidates of opposition political parties were detained while thousands of supporters were intimidated and harassed".¹⁸⁸ The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), however as usual announced right after all elections that the elections were conducted in a peaceful manner meeting all international standards (ibid.).

¹⁸⁶ See Aalen Lovise, *Ethnic federalism in a dominant party state: the Ethiopian Experience 1991-200*.

¹⁸⁷ Ethiopians vote in polls, ruling party seen as winning, Reuters, 20 April 2008, and see Aalen and Tronvoll 2008.

¹⁸⁸ <http://ecadforum.com/>, 5 may 2013

Regarding the *woreda* level elections in Oromia and Somali regional states in particular, the two case study *woredas* are presented as follows:

Table 2: Final Results of the Liban and Filtu *Woredas* Local Election: 2008 and 2013

No	Regional State	Zone	<i>Woreda</i>	No <i>Kebeles</i>	No Seat	Winner Party	Sex	
							M	F
1	Oromia	Guji	Liban	17	51	Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO/EPRDF)	30	21
2	Somali	Liban	Filtu	27	81	Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party (ESDP)	54	27

Source: Liban and Filtu *Woreda*, *Woreda Administration Election Board*, 2008, 2013

The results of the two consecutive elections were the same. As described on the table above, the Liban *woreda* council consists of 51 members (21 females and 30 males). These members were elected from the 17 *kebeles* of the *woreda*. From each *kebeles* three persons were elected to join the *woreda* council. These three candidates in each *kebeles* were selected and proposed from the members of the OPDO with full membership. Most of the members of the council are traders, agropastoralists, teachers and agricultural workers who mostly live in town (Liban *Woreda* Electoral office, 2008 & 2013).

As discussed above, both local elections were held without competition from opposition parties. In Liban *woreda*, 100% of seats in the *woreda* council were filled by the OPDO. However, during focus group discussion with residents three competing views were observed about members of *woreda* councils. Some of the discussants held that "the *woreda* councils are the officials that we elect and they represent us in different societal levels, since they have power to address communities' problem".¹⁸⁹ On the other hand, some of the discussants said, "we suspect whether these councils have knowledge about their duties and responsibilities" (*ibid.*). The extreme ones said, "é members of the *woreda* councils were not élected' by the public instead they were élected' by their party to serve the interests of their party and *woreda* officials, not the people".

¹⁸⁹ Focus Group Discussion: Resident of Nagelle, 02 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

Regarding this dilemma, the regional constitution clearly states under Article 78(1 & 2) that ñ(1) member of the district council shall be elected directly by the people from residents of each *Kebele* found in the district; and (2) accountability of the district council members shall be to their electorate. Contrary to this constitutional provision, some of the members of the *woreda* council said that ñwe represent our party, OPDO, which means, the public who elect them have been consciously relegated to secondary importance or forgotten at all. If so, therefore, as some informants viewed and some councilors confirmed members of the *woreda* council were ñselected by and represent their party, not ñelected by and represent the public.

The problem goes on and focus group discussant argued that:

When a resident of a given kebele complains about a kebele chairperson, woreda administrators do not accept and take corrective action. Rather they consult kebele chairperson and target the person who reports his case to the woreda officials. Since the kebele chairperson is appointed by the woreda administrator indirectly, the latter trusts the former than the one who reports the case. When a kebele chairperson challenges woreda officials without the consent of the kebele residents, woreda officials sack him and assign another person whom they trust.¹⁹¹

Thus, *woreda* administrators' real power over *kebele* and *kebele* affairs is clearly seen. Furthermore, the regional president appoints zone administrators and present to the regional parliament for approval, [Oromia constitution 2002, Article 57(e)]. However, zonal administrators appoint *woreda* administrators indirectly and then the *woreda* administrators appoint *kebele* chairperson indirectly via party channel. That is how party channel affected the formal structures of political decentralization or political autonomy arrangements in Oromia Region from local *kebeles* to regional level. Thus, the likelihood of the federal government's influence over regional matters via party channel is extremely high as many agree (Assefa, 2007). Therefore, the *woreda* authorities do not exercise political powers as they tend to report to

¹⁹⁰ Personal Interview: Member of *Woreda* Council, 03 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁹¹ Focus Group Discussion: Residents of Liban *woreda*, 11 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

the higher authorities and wait for decisions from above (region or zone) upward accountability.

Likewise, key informants from members of the *woreda* council said: "We were elected to join *woreda* council. However, the role we played is insignificant; we have a meeting once a year to approve *woreda* budget, and sometimes the *woreda* administrators may call a meeting when they desire to appoint individuals to, and fire them from, local political positions".¹⁹² This shows the critical political roles played by district governors.

However, the 2002 revised constitution of Oromia regional state has granted *woreda* councils wider powers and functions. These powers were however not functional practically. Even the *woreda* administrators wait from above plans and decisions by ignoring the power and function of *woreda* councils which was stated under article 79(2(a)): "Deliberate upon and approve plans and programs with regard to economic development, social services and public administration of the district". For example, focus group discussants complained that once the federal government introduced agricultural-led development policy, and its implementation rushes were similar everywhere, the *woreda* administrators and the *kebele* chairperson wasted the time without contextualizing the policy to the environment. Regarding the policy from above (region or federal), *woreda* and *kebele* administrators always say, "We should implement it; because we will be evaluated". In the case of pastoralist *kebeles*, informants stated, it was impossible to implement agriculture-led development policies due to various natural reasons, like environment, climate, soil and topography of the land. However, the local government authorities try to implement it, though not successful. Policy implementations were not contextualized, and local officials did it simply to satisfy authorities from above.¹⁹³

One of the *woreda* authorities said, "the zone officials interfere in the *woreda* affairs since they are agents of regional authorities to report and control the *woreda* activities. However, they abuse sometimes, by rejecting *woreda* reports saying '*kun gabaasaaf hingenye*' literary 'this is not enough report' and they force to change it by increasing the number, if they are not satisfied.

¹⁹² Personal Interview: High official in the Liban *woreda*, 16 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁹³ Focus Group Discussion: Agricultural Officials in Liban *woreda*, 03 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

This is simply to persuade the regional authorities by lyingò.¹⁹⁴ Discussants also complained that *ñworeda* officials are not responsive to society's problems since their accountability is upward than downward to the public who voted themò.¹⁹⁵

In the case of Somali regional state, the Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party (ESPDP) is a political party that officially claims to represent the Somali people. It is an allied party, not member party of the EPRDF. Similar to OPDO in Oromia regional state, the ESPDP is the single ruling party of Somali Regional State at regional parliament and *woreda* councils. As you can see from Table (1) above, the ESPDP won all seats in regional parliament in general elections held in 2010 and 2015. In the last two consecutive election periods, it won the elections with no competition from opposition parties.

An informant from Filtu *woreda* argues that individuals who join Somali regional parliament were not representing pastoralist as they were from *woreda* towns.¹⁹⁶ Similarly, other elders shared this idea and tried to suggest a way forward: "Better if elders are officially elected representing the pastoral societies at regional parliament, because they know the life of the pastoralists from their lived experience than these town based individuals."¹⁹⁷ They said, "é when we say elders, we mean elders électedô by the communities, not the ones who are éselectedô by government officials" (ibid.). At the regional level, there are government selected elders from few zones and few clans to work on the issue of pastoralist. Informants claimed that these handpicked elders did not represent the communities at large.

In Filtu *woreda*, like that of the Liban *woreda*, each *kebele* sent three persons to join the *woreda* council. As Filtu *woreda* has 27 *kebeles*, a total of 81 members of the ESPDP were elected to *woreda* council which consists of 18 females and 63 males.

When it comes to the legitimacy of *woreda* council, in Filtu too, a key informant argues, ñé most of the *woreda* communities do not trust the *woreda* council, because they are appointed by *woreda* officials not elected by community. The community trusts the *Ugaz* (elders) of its

¹⁹⁴ Personal interview: Liban Woreda official, 09 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁹⁵ Focus Group Discussion: Borana, Arsi and Guji Elders, 13 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

¹⁹⁶ Personal Interview: Resident of Filtu, 23 November 2015, Filtu.

¹⁹⁷ Personal Interview: Hawiye Elders, 26 November 2015, Filtu.

own. Yet there are government *guurti* (elders) who work hand in hand with government authorities who criticize the genuine community elders as those who are not accountable and responsible for their community.¹⁹⁸

A *woreda* official in Filtu admits that, "we press the *kebele* chairperson to appoint elders from individuals who believe in our politics and government system and who are willing to serve the government and their communities accordingly."¹⁹⁹ The *woreda* officially selected elders who participate in different societal issues like conflict resolution and other development related issues. There is a distinction between "government-elders" and "community-elders". The *woreda* officials did not recognize the community-elders, because the latter's focus is always with traditional way of managing things. Community-elders resist top-down impositions from the government. Thus, the *woreda* appoint elders who can participate in different affairs of the *woreda* and they are known as government-elders.²⁰⁰

Like that of Liban *woreda* informants, key informant from Filtu *woreda* council said, "the role of the council is mainly to approve budget once a year. Moreover, members of the council may be called when there are appointments and dismissals of individuals from offices, and they vote on that and approve what has already been approved by *woreda* administration authorities."²⁰¹

However, according to the 2002 revised constitution of the Somali regional state (Article 77), the *woreda* council has wider power and duties on different issues, but as member of the council argues, the council performed only two duties among the listed power and duties under Article 77(2)(e & h): "(e) approve the appointment of Deputy administrators and other officials upon recommendation by the administrator (h) utilize revenues other than those that fall within the domain of the Regional State; deliberate upon and approve its budget".

On the other hand, they disregarded the major powers and duties which are stated under article 77 (2) a-c & j): (a) deliberate upon and approve plans and programs with regard to economic

¹⁹⁸ Personal Interview: Resident of Filtu, 23 November 2015, Filtu.

¹⁹⁹ Personal Interview: High Filtu *woreda* Official, 23 November 2015, Filtu.

²⁰⁰ Personal Interview: Cabinet of Filtu *woreda*, 27 November 2015, Filtu.

²⁰¹ Personal Interview: Executive committee of Filtu *woreda*, 27 November 2015, Filtu.

development, social services and public administration of the district; (b) oversee that activities of basic agricultural development is undertaken within the time set and natural resources development preservation and maintenance is accomplished by giving due attention to it in the district; (c) create conducive situations to mobilize and activate the populace for development activities; and (j) issues directive and implement the same to ensure the maintenance of peace and security.

During the focus group discussion, the discussants argued that,

*Most of the members of the woreda council do not know their duties and powers as a representative of the community due to many reasons: (1) most of them are not literate; (2) they do not have awareness about their responsibility and duties; (3) they are not committed to the interests of their society since they are 'selected' by woreda officials, not 'elected' by the community; (4) lack of training for the councilors, and training is given to the woreda governors who are not interested to train them, because if they are aware of their responsibilities, the woreda administrators might be challenged. Thus, they prefer not to alert them.*²⁰²

Even some of the members of the *woreda* council do not know whom they are representing. During interviews, some of them said that ñwe represent our party ESPDPò.²⁰³ This goes against the regional constitution Article 76(2) that says, ñé accountability of the district council members shall be to their electorateò.

Thus, there is awareness gap, the members of the *woreda* council need to get consciousness regarding who they represent, their autonomy, power, duties and responsibilities that they have, as a member of the *woreda* council which is already guaranted by regional constitution.

According to informants from Filtu *woreda*, as was the case in Oromia regional state, the Somali regional ruling party plays a great role to centralize the power and function of the local *woreda*.

²⁰² Personal Interview: Resident of Filtu, 21 November 2015, Filtu.

²⁰³ Personal Interview: Member of the *Woreda* Council, 23 November 2015, Filtu.

Therefore, the regional president appoints the zone administrators with the approval of the parliament based on Somali region's 2002 constitution, Article 61(e). Unconstitutionally or informally, the zone administrators appoint the *woreda* administrators and then the *woreda* administrators appoint the *kebele* chairperson. This shows a highly structured centralization of power by party channel in practices in Somali Region. Local governments appear to be regional government agents. Thus, the *woreda* authorities do not decide independently on different societal issues; they report to and wait decision from the authorities who appoint them (i.e., to the zone officials).

Far worse, the Filtu *woreda* administrator was appointed by regional and zonal authorities from other *woreda* of the region and even from outside the clan of the *woreda*. For instance, they appointed the one who was elected in Filtu *woreda* to some other *woreda*, where he was not elected. However, according to the 2002 revised constitution of the Somali region "the administrator of the district shall be appointed by district council upon recommendation by a political party or a coalition of political parties that constitutes a majority in the council" (Article 84(1)). Theoretically, *woreda* administrators are elected by *woreda* council; but in practice, the regional and zone administrators violate this law and assign officials based on their party's interest. One of the authorities from the *woreda* council argues that

*The woreda council has no say when the regional government assigns local authorities in places where they are not elected. It is decided at zone and/or regional level; our responsibility is approving together with woreda administrators. For example, the current Filtu woreda administrator came from Gode zone in 2013 and the one elected in Filtu woreda was assigned to somewhere around Jijiga.*²⁰⁴

Moreover, for Somali ethnic group a clan is a social institution and its social bondage is very strong and important. Therefore, the societies are interested to be represented in *woreda* council based on their clan to get political positions and economic advantage. However, informants from minority clans said, "in Filtu *woreda* the minority clans, like Karanle, Garri-Maró and Gurra are

²⁰⁴ Personal Interview: Filtu *woreda* Official, 19 November 2015, Filtu.

rarely assigned to different position at *woreda* levels. As a result, in their *kebeles* there is lack of access to infrastructure and service delivery despite, in post 1991 period, we get the constitutional advantage to educate only our children in our language and promote our culture.²⁰⁵ Despite language of education advantage, minority clans believe that “they did not have economic and political power in their localities”.²⁰⁶

Moreover, informants from the minority clans complain that,

*Some Arsi and Borana clans [Oromo] consider us as we changed our identity to get advantage from Somali region. This is totally wrong. We get advantage from the constitution, not from the Somali Region. For example, our kebeles are found in Filtu woreda, but our clan is rarely represented in woreda administration, because the dominant clan—the Digodia—dominates the political and economic power in our locality.*²⁰⁷

One of the *woreda* authorities confirm the above claim,

*Minority clans of Karanle and Gurra are rarely hired in different position, because in previous regime they consider themselves as Oromo/Arsi. After regionalization of the government, they claim their identity and call themselves as Somali clan. Therefore, during election in woreda council majority clan (Digodia) dominates them and also while the zones appoint woreda administrators they may give more emphasis to majority clans, similarly, during woreda election, they are dominated by majority clans.*²⁰⁸

Therefore, the claims of minority clans' under-representation seem convincing.

In a nutshell, both Liban and Filtu *woredas* are experiencing almost similar political centralization trends due to their respective single party rules or party channels, which negatively

²⁰⁵ Personal Interview: Resident of Filtu, 21 November 2015, Filtu.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Personal Interview: High Official of Filtu woreda, 22 November 2015, Filtu.

affected the constitutional *woreda*-level political and administrative decentralization and autonomy promises.

8.2.2 Public Participation

In a democratic system, citizens vote for political leaders and representatives of their choice. Yet, public participation in regional election for members to represent Liban *woreda* of Guji zone in Oromia Region does not seem promising. Focus group discussants argue,

In the 2005 regional election in their woreda, the number of registered participants was extremely high, and opposition and ruling parties seriously competed with each other but the ruling party won at the end of the day. In most communities, the election results turned the opposite of what was expected; and therefore, the opposition parties complained about the independence of electoral board and the harassment and arrest of their candidates by security. After five year, in the 2010 election, the number of people who registered to vote declined because the electorates did not get what they expected during the 2005 election. In addition, the opposition parties did not come to Liban to compete with the ruling party (OPDO) and the ruling party won from the woreda lonely. Similarly, in 2015 general election, public participation rose again in Liban woreda. There were good competitions between the OPDO and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), but the OPDO won and sent individuals from Liban woreda to regional parliament, even if there were complain by OFC as of the case in 2005.²⁰⁹

Most informants in Liban *woreda* argue that now election is held only for the formal requirements, it is not real election to hear the voice of the public; it is all not genuine (fake) as learned from 2005 and 2015 elections.²¹⁰ One of the members of OFC argues, ñé the 2015

²⁰⁹ Personal Interview: Resident of Liban *Woreda*, 11 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

regional election was meaningless, unfair, and unreliable; and I have observed our members' and supporters' frustration to further participate in election again as they lack trust in elections.²¹¹

However, one of Liban *woreda* authorities argue that

*We held democratic, fair, and reliable election for the last two decades, for example in 2010 regional election no opposition party came to compete in Guji zone, Liban woreda; but in 2015 regional election opposition parties came and they did not have policy to lead the country in general. This is the reason why the society did not vote them. Always they came up with complaints without having good policy for the people. Regarding participation, there is variation of number, which seems high in one period and low in the other time; no one force them to elect and to be elected since the constitution allow them to act the way they chose.*²¹²

According to local political activist's argument, "similar to the regional elections, local election participation in Liban *woreda* was simply organized to give legitimacy for the ruling party OPDO/EPRDF to stay on power. The reason for the low public participation has been a lack of public trust in the elections."²¹³ In Guji zone, Liban *woreda*, no opposition party member has ever won a single seat in the regional parliament and *woreda* council in the past five regional elections and four local elections. It was simply a single party-rule in practice.

In Liban zone, Filtu *woreda*, the participation of the people in regional parliament and *woreda* council seems constant. As informants argue, in the *woreda* there was no opposition to compete with the ruling party of the regional state and as a result, nothing motivated the people to the election pull.²¹⁴ Most of the informants said that local people might have been inspired, had there been competition. Hence, election seems to take place for formality.

One of the political activists strongly criticized,

²¹¹ Personal Interview: Resident of Nagelle, 13 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

²¹² Personal Interview: Liban *woreda* official, 10 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

²¹³ Personal Interview: Resident of Nagelle, 13 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

²¹⁴ Personal Interview: Resident of Filtu, 21 November 2015, Filtu.

*In our case better if we don't use the term election. Election to my understanding is choices from different items, there is no different items in Ethiopia which is available for us, what is available is only one item. Thus, we do not have alternative to elect, what we have is approving the one which is available. Therefore, in Liban zone, Filtu woreda, we always approve the ruling party's candidate, to give legitimacy and recognition for formality to both the regional parliament and woreda council.*²¹⁵

Consequently, one can safely conclude that decentralized public participation in local politics, as was envisaged in the constitution, was not being implemented in both *woredas*, as ample evidence indicated.

8.2.3 Administrative Decentralization in Post-2002

The establishment of sub-national administrative structures and the legal framework and institutional architecture that initiated decentralization had a significant importance to manage decentralized governance and local development (Ribot, 2002). The 2002 revised Oromia and Somali regional states constitutions established sub-national government structures with powers and functions at the zone, *woreda* and *kebele* levels. The *woreda*-level administrative decentralization was at the core of the reforms.

The 1995 federal government constitution (Article 52(2)) clearly states the powers and functions of regional states. However, it does not state the powers and functions of sub-regional local governments below the regions. The same constitution instead granted regional governments to establish sub-regional tiers of governments: "State government shall be established at State and other administrative levels that they find necessary. Adequate power shall be granted to the lowest units of government to enable the people to participate directly in the administration of such units (Article, 50(4))".

Especially, it was after the 2001 poverty reduction development policy of the country that the so-called *Woreda*-Level Decentralization Program was introduced. Accordingly, the constitutions of

²¹⁵ Personal Interview: Resident of Filtu, 22 November 2015, Filtu.

the Oromia and the Somali regional states were revised in 2002. Articles 46 of both regions constitutions state that there are three organs of regional governments these are legislative, executive and judicial. The legislative organ, which is the highest organ of the regional state, and is accountable to the electorate of the region: the executive organ is the next governing organ of the Administrative Council, which shall be accountable to the regional parliament, and the judicial organ is vested only in the courts of the region.

Based on the FDRE constitution (article 50(4)) and other policy directions, the revised Oromia and Somali regional states constitutions (article 45) established administrative structures consisting of the Regional Government, Zones, *Woredas* and *Kebeles*. The regional constitutions also stated that the regional parliament may establish other administrative structures if find necessary.

Therefore, the Oromia regional constitution establishes zonal administrative tier of local government, which has constitutional powers and functions, just below regional state comprising of certain districts, but it is not self-governing body. According to the Oromia regional state constitution Article 71(1& 2) ñthe zonal administration is an executive organ, which is established below the Regional Administrative Council and they are accountable to the president of the Region and the Administrative Council of the regionò. In addition, they have the power and duties to coordinate, support, follow up, the *woreda* administrations while they implement policies, proclamations, regulations, directives and decisions made by the *Caffee* (regional council) and the Regional Administrative Council. However, the Somali regional state constitution does not have provision which grants powers and duties to the zonal administrative organ, but the region by *de facto* exercise the power that tier of government. Both regional states assign zonal administrators from the members of regional state councils to coordinate and supervise the *woreda* administrations on behalf of the regional government. The zone administrations are intermediate local government proximate to the *woreda* government. In both regions, zonal administrations are deconcentrated administrative organs of the regional governments in practice.

Box 1: Power and Duties of the *Woreda* Administrative Council

Powers and Duties of District Administrative Council (Oromia Region, Article 85 and Somali Region, Article 83)

1) District Administrative Council shall have the powers and duties to:

- (a) Implement the polices, laws, directives, plans and programs of the state in the district;
- (b) Coordinate, supervise and lead activities of executive organs found in the district;
- (c) Prepare annual budget draft and submit it to the district council, implement same upon approval;
- (d) Maintain peace and security in the district and direct the district police and security force as well as coordinate their function,
- (e) Prepare plans for social services, economic development and administration and submit same to the District Council for approval;
- (f) Protect, preserve and develop the natural resource; mobilize the populace for development activities;
- (g) Oversee that cultural heritage have the necessary preservation and protection;
- (h) Discharge other functions assigned to it by the District Council and Regional Administrative Council

2) In the exercise of the state function, members of the District Administrative Council shall be collectively responsible for their decisions.

As is indicated in the above box, in both regional constitutions there is no provision which allow the *woreda* administrative government the mandate to employ civil servants. However, the regional government has a legal mandate to employ civil servants according to the national standard. Article 47(2(e)) of both regions constitutions reads that regional governments can enact and implement laws on matters pertaining to the administration and conditions of work of civil servants of the Region taking into account the Federal state standards on educational training and experience required for any public position. However, as focus group discussant

argued, in Liban *woreda* of Oromia Region and Filtu *woreda* of Somali Region, the *woreda* officials employ individuals to various jobs and positions without constitutional mandate granted to do so.²¹⁶ Though administrative decentralization in all cases must be encouraged, the above practice however implies that the constitution is neglected at sub-national government levels in practice.

Furthermore, the regional constitutions grant *woreda* administrations to plan and implement social services and economic development policies, but I did not find any *woreda* document which focuses on the preparation of the said policies in both study *woredas* of Liban and Filtu. Both regional government constitutions state that *woreda* governors “prepare plans for social services, economic development and administration and submit same to the District Council for approval” (article 85(1(e)) of Oromia and article 83(1(e)) of Somali regions). Mainly they performed the implementation of policies, laws, directives, plans and programs of the state in the district; coordinate, supervise and lead activities of executive organs found in the district; and they prepare draft of annual budget and submit it to the district council, and implement it based upon the approval of the council.

One of the *woreda* officials commented, “we do not have *woreda* specific plan and program for social and economic development, because these things come from the regional government to the *woreda*; what is expected from *woreda* officials is only focusing on its implementation.”²¹⁷ Moreover, *woreda* officials have the mandate to protect and manage cultural heritages found in the *woreda*. However, as discussed in chapter five, the communities have long complained on the neglect of their traditional institutions and ritual places, which are not well protected especially in Liban *woreda* of Oromia Region.

²¹⁶ Focus Group Discussion: Residents of Liban *woreda*, 11 November 2015, Nagelle and Residents of Filtu *woreda*, 23 November, 2015 Filtu.

²¹⁷ Personal Interview: Liban *Woreda* Officials, 14 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

Box 2: Power and Duties of the *Kebele* Administrative Council

Power and Duties of *Kebele* Administrative Council (Oromia Region (Article 96) and Somali Region (Article 94)

1) *Kebele* Administrative Council shall have the following powers and duties:

- (a) Prepare development plans and programmers, submit to the *Kebele* Council for approval and implement same;
- (b) Conduct activities for the protection, preservation and development of natural resources; coordinate and mobilize the populace for development activities;
- (c) Maintain peace and security in the *kebele*;
- (d) Preserve historical and cultural heritages in the locality and forward suggestions for their utilization to the higher concerned organ;
- (e) Submit periodic reports to the *Kebele* Council on its activities;
- (f) Carry out other functions assigned to it by the *Kebele* Council;

2) *Kebele* Administrative Councils shall formulate programmes and evaluate its implementation on periodic meetings.

As we can see from Box 2, the *kebele* has many duties and power to perform. However, during interviews with member of *kebele* administrative council, it was found that, *kebele* administrative council does not have any constitution in their hand to read and understand their duties, responsibilities and power.

We were informed during quarterly meeting, or if there is an urgent issue, we were called by letter and then the administrators inform us the policy, which the zonal and regional government ordered them. Then they tried to implement

*orders accordingly, largely on the issue of social and economic development of the communities at large.*²¹⁸

Imposed development policies, which need contextualization for implementation like excavating water well, irrigation and terracing of mountain slopes, may fall due to lack of Term of Reference (ToR). Indeed, once planned at national level, it is not contextualized based on the environment and interest of *kebele* communities. Plans are implemented all over the regions and *woredas* alike. Thus, local communities are not satisfied with the implemented development policies in both study areas, for example, as irrigation and terracing of mountain slopes are not important in Liban and Filtu, because of the lowland nature of the environment and pastoralist life of the communities. Therefore, the so-called *woreda* level administrative decentralization in both regions seems to have been challenged mainly due to the excessive ruling party's centralism and top-down imposed development policies. The system is structured well and promised to bring development, but its implementation is half hearted-not fully implemented.

8.3 Fiscal Decentralization and Local Development: Liban and Filtu *Woredas*

Fiscal decentralization indicates financial relations between units of governments in federal (or unitary) government systems. It deals with the division of governmental functions and financial relations among levels of government. In other words, it is the study of how competencies (expenditure side) and fiscal instruments (revenue side) are allocated across different (vertical) layers of the administration in order to facilitate development activities (Treisman, 2002; Oates, 1999). Accordingly, the restructuring of governmental functions and finances between the national and lower levels of government has entered into the core of development debate. This is so in part because ñ in most countries, national governments have failed to ensure regional equity, economic union, central bank independence, a stable macroeconomic environment and local autonomy (Shah, 2004:2).

²¹⁸ Personal Interview: Liban *woreda* officials, 10 November 2015, Nagalle and Filtu *woreda* Officials, 27 November 2015, Filtu.

Federal systems are seen to provide safeguards against the threat of centralized exploitation as well as decentralized opportunistic behavior while bringing decision makers closer to the people. Sharma (2005:44) states that “fiscal federalism constitutes a set of guiding principles, a guiding concept that helps in designing financial relations between the national and sub-national levels of the government, and therefore, fiscal decentralization on the other hand is a process of applying such principles”. This section mainly focuses on local revenue collection capacities, expenditure responsibilities and intergovernmental transfers of Liban *woreda* of Oromia regional state and Filtu *woreda* of Somali regional state.

8.3.1 Liban *Woreda*’s Annual Revenue Collection Capacity

Woreda gets most of their block grant from the regional government. Regional transfers to localities are mostly directed towards the payment of salaries. As you can see from Table (3) below, the recurrent expenditures by far exceed the capital expenditure indicating inadequate local developments.

Woreda Finance and Economic Development officials argue, “a majority of the budget sent for the *woreda* is of a conditional type”.²¹⁹ Therefore, the *woreda* administration has no power on the use of the budget as they like, it is mostly impossible, because, for example, budgets from NGOs are for a pre-specified area and cannot be used for anything else. Therefore, decentralization of expenditure responsibilities only may not guarantee the power of the *woreda* to act as a responsible authority. That is why *woredas* are encouraged to build their revenue capacities.

Table 3: Total Annual Revenue Collected by Liban *Woreda* in Eth.Birr (2012/13-2014/15)

Woreda	Budget years		
	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15
Liban	5,233,371	6,024,281.65	8,048,321

Source: *Woreda* Finance and Economic Development Office (WFEDO)

²¹⁹ Personal interview: Official of Liban *woreda*, 11 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

The above table shows the revenue capacity of the Liban *woreda* in Guji zone. The capacity of the Liban *woreda* revenue collection responsibilities increased from time to time for three consecutive years in an ascending order. However, according to informants from Finance and Economic Development Office of the *woreda*, they "might have collected more than what have been collected if the sector has its own system of technology-by registering the trader and other communities as the case for civil servant to control the people who pay or not".²²⁰ The weak performance of local revenue collection is linked to the failure of most of local officials to deliver public services to their constituencies (ibid.).

At the *woreda* level, the *woreda* budget is prepared by the *Woreda* Finance and Economic Development (WFED) based on the initially forwarded proposals of all sectors. Usually, the *Woreda* Council makes substantial changes to the draft budget, and finally approves it by issuing a proclamation and then implemented by responsible sectors in that local government. Public revenue, specifically tax revenue obtained from domestic source in *woredas* is part of region's financial resources raised for public use.

Thus, *woredas* do not have that much lucrative resource to cover their expenditures. One of the informants argues that "the main sources of revenue for *woreda* in Oromia region in general and Liban *woreda* in particular are from employees' tax of *woreda* government offices whose salary is paid from the budget of the *woreda*, business taxes from traders and agricultural income tax and market place taxations".²²¹

8.3.2 Expenditure Responsibilities of Liban *Woreda*

Expenditure assignment refers to the duties and expenditure responsibilities of each tiers of government whether at the federal or sub-national governments levels (McLure, 1999). Sub-national governments in Ethiopia have more expenditure responsibilities than their revenue capabilities in general. The reverse is true for the federal government. *Woredas* in the Oromia Regional State have expenditure responsibilities and functions including administrative and

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

general service, economic services and social services. The major functions of the *woreda* administrations are believed to be local development activities.

Table 4: Liban Woreda, Budget and Expenditure by Major Item, 2012/13 and 2014/15(ETB).

Types of expenditure	2012/13			2014/15		
	Recurrent Expenditure	Capital Expenditure	Total Expenditure	Recurrent Expenditure	Capital Expenditure	Total Expenditure
Administrative and general service	9,735,174	818,344	10,553,518	14,275,192.17	8,924,897.70	15,167,681.87
Economic Services	7,604,950	3,210,994	10,815,944	12,108,539.34	2,073,348.24	14,181,887.58
Social Services	12,707,527	1,221,220	13,928,747	16,624,402.23	1,143,677	17,768,079.23
Total	30,047,651	5,250,558	35,298,209	43,008,133.74	4,109,514.94	47,117,648.68

Source: *Woreda Finance and Economic Development Office (WFEDO)*

Table 4 above shows the amount of recurrent and capital budget expenditure of the Liban *woreda* for two consecutive years. The recurrent expenditure which included salary and petty cash, and mainly used for administrative and equipment expenditures was birr 30,047,651 and 43,008,133.74 for the year 2012/13 and 2014/15 respectively. On the other hand, capital expenditure which is used for social service development and economic development was birr 5,250,558 and 4,109,514.94 for the same years.

From this, one can deduce that, the largest chunk of the local government budget is taken by recurrent expenditures. Little capital expenditure implies little developments in terms of social services, infrastructures, and public-shared economic resources in Liban *woreda*. This has its own negative influences on local cooperation as clan groups may compete over scarce resources within the *woreda* or with Filtu *woreda*.

As it is done in other developing countries, in Ethiopia too, block grants are the principal means by which regional government transfer financial resources to *woreda* governments and it is the highest portion of *woreda* budgets. Yearly the regional government transfer budget in the form of recurrent budget and capital budget. *Woreda* Finance official stated that the largest per cent of *woreda* recurrent expenditure budget is the salary of teachers, health workers, and administrative staff of the *woreda*.

8.2.3 Filtu *Woreda* Annual Revenue Collection Capacity

As indicated earlier, *Woreda* gets most of their block grants from the regional government. Regions transfers to localities are mostly directed towards the payment of salaries. As we can see Tables (5 &6) below, similar to Liban *woreda*, the recurrent expenditure by far exceeds the capital expenditure of the Filtu *woreda*.

According to focus group discussion with *woreda* finance officials, the highest amount of the *woreda* budget is sent as conditional type.²²² Therefore, the *woreda* executive committee has no autonomy on the use of this conditional budget. As is the case in other *woredas*, most of Filtu *woreda* expenditure is assigned for salaries and wages. As shown in the following table, Filtu *woreda* has very little revenue generation powers. Therefore, decentralization of expenditure responsibilities without commensurate revenue capacity cannot guarantee *woreda* level fiscal decentralization.

Table 5: Total Revenue Collected by Filtu Woreda in Eth.Birr (2012/13-2014/15)

Wereda	Budget years		
	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15
Filtu	3,134,127	5,256,357	8,011,211

Source: *Woreda* Finance and Economic Development Office (WFEDO)

The above table shows the revenue capacity of the Filtu *woreda* in Liban zone of Somali Regional State. The capacity of Filtu *woreda* revenue collection function has been rising from

²²² Focus Group Discussion: Finance Officials of Filtu *woreda*, 25 November 2015, Filtu.

year to year for three consecutive years at moderate pace. However, according to focus group discussants from finance and economy of the *woreda*, they could have collected more than what is collected now if they had done enough awareness creation to their communities, on the importance of paying revenues for social services and its developments returns.²²³ The weak performance of local revenues collection is related to lack of awareness about the importance of revenue paying and its development returns for the societies.

Similar to the Liban *woreda* of Oromia state, the Filtu *woreda* budget is prepared by the *Woreda* Finance and Economic Development (WFED). The procedures for improving and approving the budgets up to the implementation are similar to that of Liban *woreda*. All local budgets from domestic taxpayers are collected on behalf of the region.

Therefore, *woredas* have no power to use what they collected; following its collection, since they had to first send it to region and then the region send back block grants based on population (65%), development level index (25%), revenue mobilization/ sectoral performance (10%) since 2006-7 (Tegegne, 2009). Similar to Liban *woreda*, focus group discussants argued that the major sources of revenue collected in Filtu *woreda* are mainly from employees' income taxes of *woreda* government offices, business taxes from traders and market place taxations.²²⁴ That is why very small amount of revenue is collected from this *woreda*.

8.3.4 Expenditure Responsibilities of Filtu Woreda

Likewise in any other *woreda*, Filtu *woreda* has expenditure responsibilities and functions including administrative and general service, economic services and social services.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.

Table 6: Filtu *Woreda*, Budget and Expenditure by Major Item in the Year 2012/13 and 2014/15(ETB).

Types of expenditure	2012/13			2014/15		
	Recurrent Expenditure	Capital Expenditure	Total Expenditure	Recurrent Expenditure	Capital Expenditure	Total Expenditure
Administrative and general service	8,824,246	812,503	9,636,749	10,176,756	834,439	11,011,195
Economic Services	4,502,028	2,000,445	6,502,473	8,834,494	2,563,796	11,398,290
Social Services	7,008,412	1,000,560	8,008,972	12,225,006	2,088,582	14,313,588
Total	20,334,686	4,313,008	24,647,694	31,236,256	5,486,817	36,723,073

Source: *Woreda* Finance and Economic Development Office (WFEDO).

The above table shows the amount of recurrent and capital budget expenditure of the Filtu *woreda* for two consecutive years. The recurrent expenditure, which included salary and petty cash, and mainly used for administrative expenditures was Birr 20,334,686 and 31,236,256 for the year 2012/13 and 2014/15 respectively. On the other hand, capital expenditure, which was used for social services development and economic development, was Birr 4,313,008 and 5,486,817 for the same year.

This indicates that the highest part of the local government budget is consumed by recurrent expenditures, and the capital expenditure gets the lowest share of the budget when compared with the recurrent budgets. This means, construction and other developments in Filtu *woreda* is very insignificant. This has its own influence on service delivery and economic development of the *woreda*.

The revenue and expenditure gap of the *woreda* is filled by block grants that is the principal means by which regional government transfer resources to *woreda* governments and it is the

highest portion of *woreda* budgets. Similar to Liban *woreda* officials, Filtu *woreda* officials indicated that the largest amount of *woreda* recurrent expenditure is salary of teachers, health workers, and administrative staff of the *woreda*.

As a final remark, the revenue powers and expenditure responsibilities of Liban and Filtu *woredas* are almost similar. The mismatches between local revenue generation capacities and expenditure responsibilities on the one hand, and the diminished size of local capital budgets as compared to the recurrent budgets of the *woredas* on the other, have hindered genuine fiscal decentralization and its local development effects which in turn continued to affect inter-clan relations over the scarce resources in the localities.

8.4 Social Service Developments

The key purpose of federalism and decentralization is to help people receive administrative and social services from a government near to the localities. Put differently, people should not travel distances wasting their time, energy and expense to get administrative and social services. Therefore, as a principle, it is understood that, local administrators know better about their society's preferences and can deliver better services to them; but also, local communities are more eager to pay taxes for services they get from nearby local administrators (Robinson, 2003).

In this final section, basic service sectors (education, health, water, rural road, etc) and their deliveries in Liban and Filtu *woredas* are presented. These sectors are the main indicators of local developments and associated social cooperation especially in inter-regional border areas such as in Liban and Filtu *woredas*.

Table 7: Social Service Delivery in the Study *Woredas* (2009/10-2014/15)

Service Delivery	Liban Woreda		Filtu Woreda	
	Up to 2009/10	2014/15	Up to 2009/10	2014/15
Health				
No. of Health Centers	4	5	2	3
No. of Health Posts	18	21	14	19
No. of Health Professionals	47	63	34	51
Health care Coverage (%)	32	65	31	60
Sources: Liban and Filtu Woredas Health offices				
Primary Education				
No. of Primary Schools	34	46	21	34
Informal Alternative Basic Education (ABE) Schools	6	11	28	52
KG			0	1
Numbers of qualified teachers paid by the <i>woreda</i> (TTI and diploma holders)	174	210	131	219
Pupil-Teacher Ratio(1-8)	1:60	1:52	1:109	1:85
Pupil-Textbook Ratio	1:2	1:1	1:3 or 4	1:1
Number of Pupils enrolled(1-8)	10401	10883	14,285	18,762
Sources: Liban and Filtu Woredas Education Bureau				
Rural Roads, Water, and Telecommunication				
Road connecting kebeles to <i>woreda</i>	4	12	1	7
No. of medium <i>Eelas</i> (Ponds) for people	31	44	41	62
No. of highly <i>Eelas</i> (ponds)for people	3	6	2	2

No. of motor pump wells for people	1	1	1	1
Access to safe water coverage	52%	61%	48.7%	54.3%
Telecommunication service	1	1	1	1
Access to mobile telephone network service	4	14	1	24
Sources: Liban and Filtu Woredas Rural Roads, Water, and Telecommunication Offices				
Agriculture and Rural Development				
No of Animal health assistant and Vets	31	39	9	17
No of farmers training centers	11	17	1	1
Animal health/post clinics constructed	13	19	10	15
Animal Eela (pond) constructed	pre 1991 510	pos 1991 318	-	118
Agriculture Coverage (%)	2.78	8.9	1	4%
Sources: Liban and Filtu Woredas Agriculture and Rural Development Offices				

The above table shows that there are a number of improvements in the basic social service sectors of both study *woredas*. As the table indicates, progress is observed in all sectors from the viewpoint of increasing in number, coverage and access to basic services in the nearby *kebeles*.

8.4.1 Discussion on Liban Woreda Basic Service Deliveries

Health Sector: As stated by World Health Organization report (2008), there is proven concern on the impact of health on development and poverty reduction. It means that healthy community develops or conversely, development policies should focus on the achievement of health goals.

In particular, government's local developments should support investments in health, and ensure that health is prioritized within overall economic and development plans of the country. In this context, development efforts have to support health policies that respond to the needs of the poorest classes. This requires decentralization of national developments to local levels.

In Liban *woreda*, as indicated in Table 7 above, health service has increased in quantity from year to year and health coverage has doubled from 32 to 60 in the last five years. However, there is poor health status in most of the rural *kebeles*. Key informants argue, ñé there are health centers or health-posts with insufficient man power and basic medical equipments in different *kebeles* of the *woreda*.²²⁵ Thus, the community may not receive health services in this *kebeles* and even in those *kebeles* with few professionals, there is clear lack of skills to work effectively.

Education Sector: Education is instrumental in increasing the progress of development. However, for education to enhance the development of any society, it should be relevant to the needs of the society or people. Educational system should be oriented towards resolving socio-economic constraints of the *woreda*. With this in mind, the widely available constraints of education, shortage of schools, teachers, educational materials including text-books, laboratory equipment, libraries, low administrative capacity of educational planning and implementation, to mention a few, have been substantively reduced nowadays and encouraging improvements have been recorded in Liban *woreda* so far. Accordingly, Liban *woreda* had 46 elementary schools, among these, 25, are 1st cycles and 21 are 2nd cycles in 2014/15. Similar to the health sector, as informants stated, education sector also lacks skilled work force, basic and modern equipments and durable buildings.²²⁶

Road Sector: Road network should be resourceful in order to capitalize on economic and social benefits of the local communities. It plays a significant role in achieving national development by contributing to the overall performance and social functioning of the community at local level. It is acknowledged that roads enhance mobility across the societies, and reduce poverty.

²²⁵ Personal Interview: Resident of Liban *Woreda*, 08 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

²²⁶ Ibid.

In Guji zone, Liban *woreda* has seventeen *kebeles*. Among these *kebeles*, almost 12 *kebeles* have access to dry road currently and the rest 5 *kebeles* have not yet got that opportunity. For example, Melka Guba, Walenso, Dawa are located at a distance of 135 kilometers or more from the *woreda* capital. Residents from these *kebeles* have long complained about the insufficiency of development infrastructures such as road, water, electric, school, and health center for both animal and human.²²⁷ A focus group discussion with different officials from different sectors has confirmed,

*Because of, shortage of access to road to the woreda capital, people of the woreda are losing many things. For instance, when the woreda assign teachers, health workers, animal science graduate, those kebeles that have no roads will attract no workers and equipment. Even some employees, after they arrived there, they come back to the town. Because of road problems, schools, health centers that were built by government and NGOs remain empty lack of work force. Pregnant women could not deliver in hospitals and health centers because of the distance.*²²⁸

Thus, road is the major problem that members of the communities and local officials put as their first priority to get.

Water Sector: Water is one of the most important substances on earth. All plants and animals must get water to survive. If there were no water, there would be no life on earth. Apart from drinking to survive, people use water for many other issues. In Liban *woreda* the water coverage has increased in quantity; number of medium and high deep-water wells for human use rose from 31 to 44 and 3 to 6 in 2009/10 and 2014/15 years respectively (see Table 7); its coverage increased from 52% to 61% in the same years. However, the remote *kebeles* have no opportunity to have access to clean water. Similar to access to water, in distant *kebeles* telecom network accessibility is lacking.

Agricultural Sector: As it is described in Table 7, in Liban *woreda* number of animal health assistant and veterinaries, farmers training centers, animal health post/ clinics constructed, and

²²⁷ Personal Interview: Resident of Meleka Guba, 09 November, 2015 Nagelle-Borana.

²²⁸ Focus Group Discussion: Liban *woreda* experts, 14 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

agriculture coverage is increasing in those five years. However, the number of animal water wells construction has decreased. Informant said that in the post 1991, the number of deep-water wells (*Eala*) has been decreasing, because of lack of ownership responsibility and degradation of customary laws (see chapter 5).²²⁹

As the data in Table 7 indicated above, there are about 17 rural *kebeles* that were covered by Farmers Training Center (FTC) in the mentioned years. Development Agents (DA) play great role in modernizing agricultural sector. DAs have various fields of specialization, which can help the expansion of modern agricultural inputs, seeds, livestock rearing, poultry production, beehives, vegetables, fruits, etc. Accordingly, they played valuable role in enhancing farmers's awareness regarding the uses and application of modern agricultural inputs and by transforming agricultural sector in the *woreda*. However, focus group discussants remarked, "the government gives more emphasis to crop production by irrigation than modern livestock rearing, poultry production. Animal rearing is better for Liban *woreda* pastoralist than teaching them things such as irrigation and crop production which are rarely available in their surrounding areas".²³⁰

8.4.2 Discussion on Filtu Woreda Basic Service Deliveries

Filtu *woreda* is the largest *woreda* from among the three *woredas* of Liban zone of Somali Regional State. Because of the long distances up to 125km between *kebeles* and *woredas* capital, there is lack of administrative and infrastructure services just similar to that of Liban *woreda* in Guji zone of Oromia. In Filtu *woreda*, there are *kebeles*, which are located up to 125 kilometers from the *woreda* capital. In Ayinle, Usubey, Bifato, Kulun, *kebeles* very distant from the *woreda* town, there are lacks of roads, electric, water, health center, schools and associated lacks of equipments and human-power.

Health Sector: Health care is one of the crucial components of basics social services that have direct linkage to the growth and development of the *woreda* society. There is a very high health

²²⁹ Personal Interview: Resident of Liban *Woreda*, 03 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

²³⁰ Focus Group Discussion: Residents of Liban *Woreda*, 10 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.

care need particularly in rural areas of the Filtu *woreda* that should be addressed through expansion of primary health institutions as soon as possible.

As the above table shows, there is increment in health posts from 16 to 22, health center from 2 to 3, health professional from 38 to 61 and health coverage from 31% to 60% in 2009/10 and 2014/15 consecutive years respectively. However, an informant from health office argues, ñthere is change in quantity, but there is lack of professional and medical equipments in these sectors.ò²³¹ However, another informant from health office of the *woreda* indicates the plan for the future:

*...the woreda government follows a health policy that emphasizes the achievement of access and basic package of quality primary health care services, which include preventive and basic health-giving services. There are great commitments to implement health extension program throughout rural kebeles. The program starts from training up to employment of more than two health extension worker in each rural kebele.*²³²

Education Sector: In Filtu *woreda*, the number of primary schools increased from 21 to 34 in the years of 2009/10 and 2014/15 respectively. In the same years, the number of Informal Alternative Basic Education (ABE) Schools increased from 28 to 52; one KG was built in *woreda* town (Filtu). The number of qualified teachers increased from 131 to 219 and teachers and student textbooks ration and students enrollment also changed from time to time.

However, as a *woreda* education bureau official confirms, ñeven if there is increment in quantity in education sector in different aspects, there is lack of professional teachers, and materials. Especially, most of the time the *woreda* administration uses unprofessional teachers to teach childrenò.²³³

²³¹ Personal Interview: Filtu Health Official, 20 November 2015, Filtu.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Personal Interview: Filtu *woreda* Officials, 19 November 2015, Filtu.

Road Sector: Regarding road in Filtu *woreda*, it is difficult to mention about road, which connects *woreda* town to *kebele* or *kebele* to *kebele*. According to informants:

*The main road from Nagelle-Borana of Oromia to Filtu woreda was built by Italy in (1935-41) and it was asphalt road and then Derg regime devastated it during the war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977/78. Now this road is changed into a dry season road and it needs repairing, but the woreda or the region has to take responsibility to repair this road. For example, from Nagelle to Filtu it is about 130 kilometers, but because of the nature of the road, it requires traveling for about five hours.*²³⁴

The elders said that they requested the *woreda* and regional authorities many times to get solution on the problem of road, but they did not get any response from concerned body of the government institutions.²³⁵ A *woreda* official replied that "responsibilities to build and repair main road is the responsibility of the federal and/or regional governments, it is not a *woreda* mandate to build and repair", and he adds "even in *woreda*, there is insignificant improvement in case of road construction because of lack of budget."²³⁶ As discussed above, the *woreda* capital expenditure was very low, and thus, rural road construction was not satisfactory. As the table indicates, among the 27 *kebeles* in the Filtu *woreda*, only 7 *kebeles* get access to road to connect with the *woreda* town (Filtu).

Water Sector: As indicated above, Filtu *Woreda* is less rich in water resources. However, as the data on the table indicate, the water coverage of the year 2009/10 and 2014/15 has increased from 48.7 to 54.3% respectively. In the same year, the medium water wells for peoples have increased and the deep-water wells and motor pump for human was constant. Overall development should be maintained and sustained by giving priority for quantity and quality of water. Thus, policy makers need to give emphasis in this area.

Agricultural Sector: As the above table shows, the number of animal health assistant and veterinary, animal health post, clinics, and agricultural coverage was increasing from time to

²³⁴ Personal Interview: Resident of Filtu *Woreda*, 23 November 2015, Filtu.

²³⁵ Personal Interview: Digodia Elders, 28 November 2015, Filtu.

²³⁶ Personal Interview: Filtu *Woreda* Officials, 21 November 2015, Filtu.

time. According to informant from agricultural office ñlike that of the human health and education sectors, agricultural sectors also lacked trained human-power and materials.²³⁷

In both study areas, there is similar complain within *woredas*. Focus group discussants state that: there are *kebeles* having access to different infrastructure and administrative services than those *kebeles* in remote areas. Those *kebeles* in remote areas may not even get services of the local governments and NGO resources mainly due to lacks of roads. Moreover, those *kebeles* in the remote areas have unsolved border problems with neighboring *kebeles* or clans of Filtu and Liban *woredas*. Moreover, communities on both sides of the *woredas* complain on the absence of administrative, economic and other developments on remote/border areas, which *kebeles* on both sides may share.²³⁸

In general, remote *kebeles* in both *woredas* of Liban and Filtu seem to have not benefited from the rare decentralization attempts and they are in fact marginalized in administrative and infrastructure services. In both *woredas*, authorities argued that, border *kebeles* are relatively the largest *kebeles*. Thus, schools, health centers and other services are built at the border of the *kebeles*. The communities are pastoralists. When the government and/or NGOs build institutions for local services in the border areas, either the Borana or Arsi clan of Oromo, or the Marehan or Digodi clan of Somali often advances claim and counter-claim(see Chapter 7). Because of this, *kebeles* in the border areas are forced to send their children to schools very far distant.²³⁹

Moreover, in both *woredas*, elders said that the people of both *woredas* had long been requesting their respective governments to divide each of the *woredas* and create new *woredas* for service delivery and development purposes.²⁴⁰ *Woreda* administrators responded that regional governments were not willing to split the *woredas*. The elders took the cases to the regional authorities and the regional authorities promised to do so by assigning committees. Nevertheless, there was no action taken so far.

²³⁷ Personal Interview: Official of Filtu *woreda*, 27 November 2015, Filtu.

²³⁸ Focus Group Discussion: Resident of Filtu and Liban *woredas*, 13 November 2015, Aysuflu.

²³⁹ Personal Interview: Liban *woreda* officials, 2 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana and Filtu *woreda* officials, 27 November, 2015, Filtu.

²⁴⁰ Personal Interviewee: Borana and Arsi Elders, 04 November 2015, Nagelle and Digodia and Marrihan Elders, 21 November 2015, Filtu.

In general, the basic service delivery sectors have fairly increased in quantity in both study *woredas*. In case of Filtu *woreda*, no little effort has been made by the Emerging Regions Development Program, which is supported by UNDP, World Bank and UNICEF mainly on the sectors of construction of schools, health posts, veterinary clinics, shallow wells and ABE schools; but the contribution of local administrations remain low. Likewise, in Liban *woreda*, the regional government together with other international NGOs has contributed mainly on the construction of vet clinics, primary schools, health posts, water wells and ABE schools. In both *woredas*, service sectors, which are constructed by communities' participation and *woreda* capital expenditure, are insignificant in number.

However, the major problem of all service sectors is lack of professional work force, materials/equipments, and qualified buildings. Professionals are unwilling to go to remote *kebeles* to serve the communities. This is because lack of road, and health posts which encourage the employees to work in the remote areas. The major problems of the pastoralists and agropastoralists are undeveloped socio-economic infrastructures, weak institutions, absence of skilled human-power and climate change. In both case studies, almost all inter-group cooperation and conflicts in those border areas are mainly linked to absence of adequate social services and local developments.

To overcome these problems, the regional government, who has constitutional mandate to employ qualified human-power, should think to motivate its employees by offering training or education opportunities and additional incentives other than their basic salaries. Above all, regional governments should focus on local developments by allocating sufficient capital budgets. Decentralization needs to be accompanied by resources. Moreover, weakness in local public and civil society's participation, the dominance of one party rule, upward accountability of local authorities who disempowered local electorates are particular shortcomings affecting local political and economic capacities of study *woredas*— Filtu and Liban.

8.5 Social Service Delivery for Clan cooperation

The advocates of decentralization and federalism argue that decentralization and federalism can be interpreted as instruments intended to forge better service delivery and transform or solve

internal conflicts and bring inter-ethnic/clan cooperation of the multi-ethnic state especially at the local levels (Lovies, 2000).

However, as the above data shows and different informants argued, basic social services have not been used as means of peaceful cooperation in and between the clans in Liban and Filtu *woredas*. In these *woredas* infrastructures is extremely inadequate. As the data shows a lot has been done at *woreda* administrative by government, NGOs and donors organizations and institutions. However, there is still lack of inter-*woreda* and intra-*kebele* relationships within the *woreda* which has been relaying on infrastructures which facilitate the cooperation of the clans in adjacent *kebeles* of both *woredas*.

In this regard, both *woredas* required special attention to increase the relationships between different Oromo, Somali and other clans or communities in the *woredas*. For example (as mentioned in Chapter Six, a case of Qaxxee Waree and Waleenso *kebeles* schools, which were built in the border of the two *woredas* were damaged by local communities). Had there been smooth inter-*woreda* relations, they could have build schools at secondary levels which accommodate both *woreda* pupils. Since in secondary schools in Ethiopia the medium of instruction is English and inclusive for both ethnic groups in the border. Furthermore, as the above data shows there is inadequate road facility within and across the *woredas*; but road that is very crucial to integrate clans along the *woredas*-to get access to market for exchange commodity to reach as soon as possible when there is conflict in and between the clans or groups. Therefore, as the informants argue the communities have been in need of dry and rainy season weather roads to connect the *woredas*.

Furthermore, as the data shows there are no health services, which both *woredas* use together in the border areas; which integrate an adjacent *kebeles* of both *woredas* for animals and peoples. In case of human power for clinics and schools as I observed the communities are mainly bilingual and they speak Afaan Oromo and Af-somali. Thus, they can serve the communities of both ethnic groups. Besides, both *woredas* authorities lack working on inter-governmental relations such as security, service delivery, and development related which cooperate both *woredas* clans. These activities should include community elders, traditional institutions, elder councils (*guurti* of Digodia), *abbaa Gadaa* of Borana, NGOs and donors allows to participate on infrastructures

building and constructions which cooperate the clans along Liban and Filtu *woreda*. Since, elders of both *woredas* argue that they have their own traditional means of cooperation on conflict resolutions, and resources sharing (see Chapter Four). However, in both *woredas* there is no written agreement, which encourage inter-governmental relations of both *woredas*, for social, economic and political purpose.

8.6 Summary

This chapter has examined the status of decentralization and attempts of local developments as means of cooperation in Liban and Filtu *woredas*. To this end, four inter-connected points of discussions are outlined. First, the chapter has presented about the constitutional promises and political practices of decentralization in Oromia and Somali regions in general and Liban and Filtu *woredas* in particular. In the second part of the discussion, three sub-points are included: political decentralization in relations to regional and local elections, public participations, and administrative decentralization policies particularly in the post-2002 in Oromia and Somali regional states. All these efforts have been hindered by the centralization practices of the single ruling party channels, weak public participations due to local authoritarianism, inefficient and absence of resource mobilization for local developments. Therefore, the so-called *woreda*-level decentralization efforts in terms of transfer of political and fiscal powers have largely remained in limbo. This has critically influenced the capabilities of local governments to bring about local economic and service developments.

Moreover, fiscal centralization problems and low level of local development have been one of the main factors of resource scarcity related inter-group conflicts. The case study *woredas*, in which various Somali and Oromo clans co-exist, are no exception. Scarce local resources have long affected inter-clan relations in the areas. The revenue generating capacities and expenditure responsibilities of Liban and Filtu *woredas* are imbalanced— little revenues with higher recurrent expenditures. Such imbalances in both case *woredas* have influenced the level of local social services and economic developments. As a result, the basic social service developments— education, health, roads, electricity, telecom, agriculture and agro-pastoral sectors— in the case studies are very low both in terms of quantity and quality. In addition they did not use social service delivery as a means to enhance clan cooperation among the *woredas*. This suggests the

immediate importance of focusing on expanding the existing own revenues and regional capital budgets in the future to develop the remote and border *kebeles* of the two *woredas* as means of both intra-*woreda* and inter-*woreda* clan cooperation.

Chapter Nine

Summary & Conclusions

In the previous chapters, I have presented federalism and inter-clan relations along the regional borders of Oromia and Somali by taking the case studies of liban and filtu *woredas*. Theoretical frameworks have been sketched against which empirical data were analyzed and interpreted. After setting of the study area in chapter two, theoretical reflections on ethnicity, conflict, federalism and decentralization were discussed in chapter three. Following a review of related literature in chapter four, the role of indigenous institutions in inter-clan relations and resource management in Liban (of Oromia) and Filtu (of Somali) *woredas* is identified in chapter five. More importantly, empirical data on inter-clan relations (chapter six), post-1991 inter-clan conflicts (chapter seven), and decentralization and local development (chapter eight) in both *woredas* have been widely assessed.

In this concluding chapter, I reiterate my major research questions, methods and corresponding key explanations made to them. The research questions include: how does the current framework of ethnic based federal system in Ethiopia promotes (or inhibits) inter-clan cooperation, peaceful coexistence among the Somali-Oromo clans in Liban and Filtu *woredas*? How does Ethiopian federalism provide for the opportunities of decentralization and local developments as a means of cooperation among local communities at the lower levels of government? How are the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists' clans of the Liban and Filtu *woredas* represented in *woreda* council and regional parliament? What are the primary causes of the conflicts in and between the clans along the Liban and Filtu *woredas*? In order to address these research questions, a qualitative method has been employed. Federalism, decentralization & inter-clan relations have been theorized to explain the efforts being made in Ethiopia. In order to examine inter-clan relations in the border areas of Somali and Oromia regions, institutional path dependency theory and scheme system model of Bateson are used. The selection of the two adjacent *woredas* of Oromia and Somali regions is based on purposive sampling. Though, the research is mainly dependent upon qualitative methods of data collection and analysis.

An appropriate methodology and design was prepared to address the research problem. To this end, the case study based design, which needs a qualitative research approach, is selected. I used different methods of data collection tools such as semi-structured individual in-depth interviews, observation, document review and focus group discussion conducted in the two *woredas* from June 2015 to August 2016. During these periods the researcher regularly discussed, on *woreda* level, the impact of decentralization program on local development in relation to service delivery, conflict, clan relations as well as with respect to social, political and economic affairs, state restructuring in relation to boundary demarcation and other related issues with various stakeholders. Oral information was gathered from various stakeholders, such as local political leaders, civil servants, clan elders, clan councils (leaders), Abba Gadaa of Borana, Wober of Digodia (king of Digodia), and religious leaders, local and international NGOs personnel and also, state constitution, both Oromia and Somali regional states constitutions. Secondary data was obtained from published and unpublished materials, from *woreda* and *kebele* level bureaus documents that are relevant to the study. Data obtained from these sources was exhaustively analyzed to triangulate and to confirm the validity of the process and to substantiate the primary data sources.

My initial hypothesis of this dissertation was that the introduction of federalism has resulted in local decentralization, peaceful co-existence, cooperation and development by reducing inter-clan conflicts. However, this central argument was challenged as one can find frequent local competitions and conflicts than cooperation. In the following part of this chapter, I present summary of the major findings, key conclusions and suggest way forwards.

9.1 Summary of the Major Findings

9.1 Ethiopian Federalism: Linking Theory and Local Communal Relation Practices

The study is committed to generate and provide empirical based knowledge on the practicability of Ethiopia federalism from a grassroots perspective by taking the case study of clans relations along the Liban *woreda* Guji zone of Oromia region and Filtu *woreda* Liban zone of Somali region. The key question, which is addressed by this study, was how the ethnic-based federalism promotes or inhibits inter-clan cooperation, peaceful coexistence among the Af-Somali and

Afaan Oromo speaking clans in the study *woredas*. The 1995 FDRE constitution allows self-rule and power sharing among tiers of governments and also each level of governments are autonomous in political, administrative and fiscal issues. At a time when the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia are constitutionally empowered, why the Borana, Arsi, Guji, Oromo clans and Digodia, Marehan, Gurra, Karanle and Ajuran Somali clans are in conflict, along the border of Liban and Filtu *woredas* is the question. This needs to be assessed in light of the implementation of the Ethiopia's federalism from local perspectives.

9.1.1 Oromo-Somali (Inter-clan) Relation: Historical Account and the Practice in the Study *woredas*

Historically, the Oromo and Somali clans along the borders have shared many things in common. And also they share very long border ranging from Mieso in the north to the lower Juba in the south. Hence, they have long years of contact sharing similar geographical areas which had implication for the present ethnic based territorial demarcation. Along this border, for four centuries, the Oromo and Somali have competed with each other over a long front (Lewis, 1961).

Moreover, in the 1950s, the central government of Ethiopia (imperial regime) adopted a policy, which is said to have given advantage for Borana clan to stop the advance of Somali. Which means the government supported the Borana by giving weapons and the advantage to govern the Sidamo province of southern Ethiopia with the assistances from the centre (Markakis, 1990). Similarly, the Derge regime is also said to have supported the Borana to stop the expansion policy of Somali clans in southern Ethiopia (Clapham, 1988). The policy initiates the southern Oromo clans such as, Borana, Guji and Arsi but frustrated the southern Somali clans such as, Digodia, Marehan, Garri and Gabra Miigo (*Ibid*).

However, the Somali clans joined together to revolt against the Ethiopian government. Finally, the revolt was stopped by government and Borana militia (Markakis, 1990). Similarly, the successor of imperial regime (Derg) also continued supporting Borana by appointing in administrative, military policy positions and continued the trust on Borana to stabilize the southern region of the country (*Ibid*). As a result, the southern part Ethiopia was seen dominated by Borana during the Imperials and Derg regimes. After the Somalia independent in 1960s Pan-

Somalism, the desire to unite all Somalis across the horn of Africa into one nation state, gain popularity and promoted armed insurgency along the border with Ethiopia and Kenya in 1963 and 64. Then the Ethiopia government became more suspicious of Somali pastoralists and it began arming and supporting the Borana and Guji pastoralists in their conflicts with Somali clans (*Ibid.*)

Therefore, the Oromo-Somali bordering area was typically characterized by systematic economic and political marginalization, conflict, and development policy which was not community centered (Getachew, 1996; Farah, 1996; Gedi, 2005).

However, post 1991 federalization of Ethiopia based on ethno-linguistic criteria has affected area. The previous Sidamo *Kiflehager* (province) and the then Borana *Awuraja* has been restructured mainly under different Afaan Oromo and Af-Somali speaking clans, and then the relations between the two adjacent groups started to change within the new political and administrative context. Contrary to the historical significance of the Borana, who suddenly allied with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in the transitional period, the new government started to use the Somali clans such as, Gabra, Garri and Digodia as neutralizing force for the operations of OLF insurgence (Getachew, 1996). This started cause new relations between clans along the border.

Regarding this, Verkuyten and Zaremba(2005:375) argue that ñit is important to study ethnic relations across time, in relation to political circumstances from the perspective of both majority and minority group members and in relation to different ethnic out-groups and in-groupsò. Furthermore, studying minorityôs attitude towards multiple groups in their environment helps to examine different groupsô relationships. Since minorities are important to attaining true inter-ethnic harmony in societies.

As it is discussed under chapter four, the clan along the current Liban and Filtu *woredas* were living together for centuries and they have long years of common history and relations which is mainly reflected both harmonious and hostile relation. Since, state restructuring in Ethiopia in 1991, mainly based on ethno-linguistic formula, to rectify the past injustice committed against the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia. These two *woredas* were annexed under two

different regional states. The relation between Borana, Arsi, and Guji Oromo clans and the Digodia, Marehan, Garri-Maró, Gurra, Ajuran and Karanle Somali clans have changed, since these communities are pastoral and agro-pastoral and their life is mostly dependent on mobility. As Chapter Five reveals, the traditional institution and the customary law assist cooperation of these clans relationships peacefully in the previous regime in Ethiopia. However, the post 1991 government interacting into local resources and customary laws had resulted in several disadvantages to the local people and often generated conflicts over resources. Regarding this, Verkuyten and Zaremba (2005) argue intergroup relations are pressurized or manipulated by social and political developments.

Watts (1998) argues in countries where cultural cleavages such as language or ethnic or religion are important in social ties, federalism offers a broad arena of potentials for peaceful coexistence; since federalism is expected to accommodate such diverse cultural identities by giving them the autonomy to work towards development. Similarly, Agrawal and Ribot 2000, cited in Mahat (2007) argue that decentralization aims to attain one of the fundamental objectives of political governance or the desire that people should have a say in their own affairs. However, as the empirical data shows in post-1991, Ethiopia's federalism lacks these features at *woreda* level. Since minority clans in both study *woredas* such as Gurra, Karanle, Ajuran, Garri-Maró, Marehan, have come under challenge because their claim is neglected in the lowest local government unit (*Kebele*), *woreda* and out-side the region including the claim-like culture and language and some lost their ancestral land, the Garri-Maró case in Filtu *woreda* are good examples. Moreover, (as Cohen, 1998; Ted Gurr, 1993), the advocates of the instrumentalist views, argue that leaders in a modern nation use and manipulate the perception or attitude of the ethnic groups for their own interest to stay in power for long period. This is clearly observed in the study site; since clan identities have been misused and abused by elite, *woreda* and *zone* officials. They use clan identity as a means to stay in power in order to reap economic benefits and political power.

The characteristics of an ethnic group which Barth argues that inter-ethnic relations are a systematic way of governing social relationships across groups, by having rules and regulations. Thus, in all planned social life, everything, which is essential for social interactions, is put down

in regulations that help for better social contact (Goffman, 1959 cited in Barth, 1969). However in the study area the old peaceful trade relations and inter-marriage have declined and replaced by livestock theft, rape, misuse of the excavated water-wells, and decline of trust in and between the clans are rapidly increased. Moreover, the expansion of the farmland to the areas of the grazing in both study *woredas* threatened mainly the Borana, Digodia and Marehan clans. Largely, the breakdown of customary law, the marginalization of the traditional institutions and the claim of identity by minority clans, claim and counter claim of land by different clans along the study areas had undermined both the in-group and out-group clan relations and cooperation. This lacks what Cohen (1999) argues about federal idea which involves cooperation, reciprocity, and mutuality of a certain societies.

9.1.2 Post-1991 Ethnicity and Inter-clan conflicts

Campbell (2006) has identified some sources of conflicts like different values, religious beliefs, economic priorities, political ideology, and principles of conduct. And also, the conflict might evolve from limited or scarce resources, such as land, minerals, property and water.

In the study area the root causes of the conflicts are mainly absence of defined boundary, conflict over resources, different values and bad governance or lack of rule of law. In the previous time natural-resource conflicts are common between individuals or certain group of communities. However, customary laws or traditional mechanisms of managing conflicts of the community easily solved these conflicts previously. Tsega (2006) argues on the basis of a given belief in a given society the conflicting parties are abided to be governed by their traditional codes. Ignoring these traditions would invite risks of exclusion from that society.

After regionalization of the state, however, clan conflicts have also been caused by claim and counter claim of the territory, natural resources, and resources given by the state/NGOs conflicts. Therefore, absence of border has been leading the clan to claim territorial expansion by illegal movements and illegal settlements. Conflicts on state and NGO resources, lack of implementing rule of law have been the new cause of conflicts after the regionalization of the state. As it is discussed (in chapter seven), the conflicts in Qaxxee-Waree and Waleensoo *kebeles* were the

claim and counter claim of the state and NGOs resources based on boundary claim and counter claim.

Regarding this, as Eriksen (2002) describes when boundaries are under pressure in between two ethnic groups, it needs clearly visible forms of boundary to reduce the tension between the groups. Again Barth (1969) argues in order to comprehend ethnic group and boundary the perspective of the processes of making and maintaining boundary, we need to understand the cultural units and social contact. However, as the study reveals in the study *woredas* there is no clear boundary among the *woredas*. Its implementation lacks popular participation of the communities and it should not be consulted the elders and elder councils in the *woreda* and also it doesn't consider the cultural and social contact of the communities. Rather, the government officials and the elite tried to implement the referendum to demarcate the boundary in 2004, but it was rejected by the community since its implementation was from above without considering the reality on the ground.

Cohen, 1998; Ted Gurr, 1993 argue that, ethnicity is political myth and created by elite and they misuse for their own political and economic advantage. The instrumentalists' argument on ethnicity is that it is shifting, manipulated, and unstable, subject to change and elite dependent. Alternatively, the advocates of constructionism theory also argue that ethnic identity is not something owned by people rather it is something they 'construct' in specific social and historic context to enhance their own interests. The study have also found out that there is lack of implementing rule of law by *zone* and *woreda* officials, since they misuse and abuse clan identities for political purpose to stay long in power and/or economic benefits. Similarly, as Weber (1997) describes ethnicity in terms of dynamic political activity; hence, ethnicity is dependent on a belief in common descent, that belief can only be created and sustained through joint political action; whereas, political leaders regularly claim primordial loyalty of 'their' ethnic group. The study reveals that, in the study *woredas* the government officials tried to consider their clan identity is primordial. However, the study shows clan identity in both *woredas* have been created mostly based on instrumentalist and constructivist views. Regarding this, Eriksen (2002) argues ethnic identity represents and distinguishes its continuity with the past which helps reassure the acceptance and respecting of other and selves of mainly relay on

the past and present. Similarly, Dwyer (1996:4) argues, "ethnicity is a product of contact, not of isolation."

Tyler (1999) argues state policy enacted with little consideration of the existing traditional and local practices are found out to have aggravated the existing local conflicts and to erode inter-ethnic relations. Similarly, Antweiller (2004) argues, the fundamental difference between indigenous and modern or scientific knowledge, among other, is that the scientific one focuses on information having universal significances without considering the context of a given environment. Whereas the indigenous one is the result of social circumstances closely associated with cultural and environmental context specific to a given locality. These argument shows how useful are traditional practices in building peace and stability from below.

Contrary to the above argument on indigenous knowledge of the community, the study identified that there are two groups of elders in the study areas. One is "government elders" and the other is "community elders". Their acceptance by community and recognitions for what they decide is different. Government elders are handpicked by government officials to resolve conflicts among the communities and other societal problems and they take training and workshops with government officials. However, the communities do not accept their decision and give them recognition. In support of this view, Gulliver (1979:74) argued in ongoing social life, relationships and interactions between individuals and groups are oriented and guided by customary standards currently held by the society. And that relationship is governed by more or less such accepted rules or norms, by those members of the social group.

As it is examined in both study *woreda's*, there have been conflicts between community and government elders, and also between community elders and government elders and between government officials and community elders. This is because the local officials manipulated by undermining the duty and responsibility of the community elders.

9.1.3 Inter-Clan Cooperation along Regional Border

The major resources of the pastoral communities in Ethiopia in general and in the study areas in particular had been grazing land and water-wells. As legal documents revealed that in Ethiopia in the past two regimes and the current government (EPRDF), land is state property (Yacob, 2000; FDRE1995, Art. 40(5)). However, among pastoral communities resources such as pastureland, water wells, and Rivers are scarce resources. As it is discussed (in chapter five) according to the clans of Liban and Filtu *woredas* culture and tradition, these resources are common properties of the pastoral communities and also protected mainly based on the customary law of the clans. This shows, policy choice made in the past influence choices made in the present. This approach to institutions put forward the assessment of the path dependency of the traditions of the past, present and future choices (Peters, 2011).

However, after the regionalization of the state, clans in the study areas ignored or overlooked the rule and regulations of the customary law that they experienced lifelong and began claiming and counter claiming of the previously common properties of the communities for individual and specific clan ownership of the pastureland, water wells and territory. Besides, as the study reveals in both study *woredas* the local officials were found undermining, marginalizing and understanding little about customary law of the communities in contrary to the provisions of FDRE Constitution's Article 9 (1) states that any laws, rules, regulations and customary practices that are consistent with this Constitution shall be valid. The study indicates that local government officials have no interest in understanding and integrating the constitutional provisions with rules and regulations of the customary law of the local communities. Breaking the customary law led the clans along the study area to illegal settlement and illegal movement without the knowledge of the hosting clans. Since, Antweiller (2004) argues, indigenous knowledge is partly experience, partly custom, religion, community laws, and the attitude of the societies that concern their lives and the lives of other living things. It is, therefore, a grave mistake to think of indigenous knowledge as 'old-fashioned, backward, static or unchanged.'

The 1975 land nationalization by the Derg regime has weakened the traditional ways of water wells and rangeland management and led to exacerbating rangeland and water wells degradation in today's Oromia and Somali regional states border, since the program did not give

attention to customary institutions (Helland, 2000; Walker, 1998). Similarly, the study shows that post-1991 the state policy has also impacts on customary laws, since state policies encourage pastoral settlements and officially ban on bush burning practices. This show as Peters, (2011) argues historical institutionalism delineates institutions that are guided by existing and past arrangements. This may mean that policy choice made in the past influence choices made in the present. However, the customary law allows when, why and how the communities burn the bush and mobility of the pastoral communities which is inevitable because of nature-such as drought, climate change and seasonality. Besides, customary law of the pastoral communities allow bush burning because of various reasons like-to improve the quality of the grazing lands and grass, and to protect their livestock from wildlife such as-ticks, snakes and reptiles which put in danger their livestock.

Hyden (1992) argues reciprocity refers to the nature and quality of the social interaction among members of a political community and its significant indicator in the public realm is the degree to which individuals are free to form associations to defend and protect their interests. Contrary to this argument the study reveals that government policies use different mechanisms to control the pastoral settlement and bush burning practices by organizing people into *goox*, *garee*(group of households) and one to five (*tokko-shane*) in Liban *woreda* and in Filtu *woreda reer*, *qabiil* (literary, group of households) and one-to-five (*hafatu-shan*). This structure at the lowest unit of the government restricted mobility and excluded elders from leadership position, eroded the indigenous social capital of the communities and also restricted freedom of speech publically in meeting places. These activities are contradictory with the state and regional governments' legal provisions.

The study also reveals that there are dual opposing forms of grazing land and water-wells use, allocation and management institutions. One is the traditional institution and the other is government institution. The traditional institutions consider all resources as communal for the whole communities and thus had to be protected by all the clans'inside and out-side the territory where the resources are found. However, government institutions allocate the resources to individuals or certain group of the communities and it may or may not be protected by the communities. Moreover, the study found out that in both study *woredas* 'traditional' institutions

were overlooked, since ‘modern’ institutions are simply imposed on the local communities by elite and government officials without contextualizing the reality on the ground, even if their actions contradicted with provision of the state and regional government constitutions about customary law and traditional institutions in practice. Overall, the erosion of customary law and the marginalization of the traditional institutions of the communities in Liban *woreda* and Filtu *woreda* have been the major issues at the center which trigger conflicts and weaken clan relations/cooperation in the study areas. Since, the local practice lack what Emery (1996) argues, the advantages of using indigenous knowledge for sustainable peace and development, by integrating it with the modern or scientific knowledge help to use and manage their environment, resources, security, and society relations.

The state constitution allows both Oromia and Somali regional states to have sub-regional governments and power sharing. Based on this provision both regions decentralized power and functions to *woreda* and *kebele* levels of governments (FDRE, 1995; Article 50(4)). Therefore, both regions constitutionally decentralized political, administrative and fiscal autonomy to *woreda* and *kebele* governments. However, the theoretically decentralized power, autonomy and functions given to sub-national government below the region (i.e *woreda* and *kebele*) was not implemented at in Liban and Filtu *woredas*. The study identified the following reasons: first, the local officials misuse what the constitutional provisions allowed for the communities. Second, the *woreda* and zone officials lack capacity to implement the theory into practice and also they lack accountability, transparency, efficiency, equity and practicing of rule of law-their accountability has been upward not downward to their electorate. Thirdly, there has been no public participation on development plan at initial period. Fourthly, development policies have been top-down not from bottom up-it was imposed from above without contextualizing the reality on the ground, no prompt response for communities grievances was evident. Fifthly, the centralized party structures of the ESDP and OPDO/EPRDF contradict both regions constitutional provisions; for example, in Filtu the *woreda* administrator is not elected by Filtu *woreda* communities; rather he was appointed by zonal officials.

Contrary to the above identified problems, Burgess (2000) argues a federation is a form of the democratic and constitutional rule rather than simply a division of power between central and

local governments. Constitutional protection is, thus the key for federation with regard to economic, political, and cultural self-protection. Furthermore, these agreements help the continuity of federation within an entire nation. Moreover, Ndegwa (2002:2) argues to measure the extent of decentralization we focused on the existence and overall operation of institutions and structures of governance, administration and fiscal control at the local level.

Moreover, the sub-national governments in both study *woredas* have limited revenue collection capacities; because they lack well-trained human power, and lack of communities understanding on the issues of taxpaying and absence of technology to control who pays and who does not pay his/her taxes. These limitations of revenue collection capacities of the *woredas* influence their expenditure responsibilities. This has its own impact on social service developments of the *woreda*. Since decentralizing resources, power, and autonomy to sub-national units helps to improve quality of service delivery and regulation, immediate feedback can be obtained from the local communities (Robinson, 2003).

Regarding social service development, a lot has been done mainly by federal and regional governments on education, health posts for human and livestock, road, excavating water-wells, telecom and different infrastructures in both study *woredas*. Moreover, the new system of government (ethnic federalism) allows people to be participating with and recognize levels of government, together with appointments of representatives of all ethnic groups at local, regional and national level (FDRE 1995, Article [54] & [61]). Opposite to these provisions, there is shortage of infrastructures in some *kebeles* where the minority clans are living, since minority clans have been rarely represented in *woreda* council. Therefore, the *woreda* officials deliberately ignore the issue of minority clans; this is highly serious in Filtu *woreda* of Somali region and also in Filtu the *woreda* administrator was not elected from Filtu *woreda*; rather he was appointed by the zone cabinet to administer the *woreda*, the communities and elders have not consulted. Similarly, in both *woreda* the pastoral communities have been rarely represented at regional parliament. Thus, pastoralists have rare representatives who speak on behave of them in regional parliaments. However, successful democratic forms of governance need an accountable leader, public participation, and transparency among the leaders and the communities at large (UNDP, 2005).

Moreover, the study identified that social service development and delivery has not been used for clan cooperation; for example, except the main road from Nagalle-Borana to Filtu, there is no road that integrate the local *kebeles* along the border of the two study *woredas*. Besides, there is no health post for both human and livestock, which the border *kebeles* can commonly use. On the contrary, when school, health posts were built around the border area, they damage them and claim the land; since there is territorial claim among each other. This implies social service developments are a conflict prone entity than using them for clan cooperation. Besides, there is no written document about local inter-governmental relation between Liban and Filtu *woredas* except the written negotiation between the security offices of both *woredas* to exchange information.

9.2 Conclusions

Ethiopia's federalism constitutionally promised to rectify the past injustices and to bring sustainable peace and development for Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of the state. This study within the framework of ethnic federalism examined the lived experiences of the pastoral and agro-pastoral communities from the local perspectives.

Pastoral communities are marginalized on the basis of geographical and geopolitical setting and the communities had low level of awareness about their rights in social, political and economic issues in the previous regimes of Ethiopia. However, since the 1991 decentralization in Ethiopia, legal provisions promised many things. Therefore, the Oromia and Somali regions and Liban and Filtu *woredas* emerged as a result of this decentralization. Moreover, the pastoral and agro-pastoral clans in Liban *woreda* of Oromia and Filtu *woreda* of Somali region are known for experiencing centuries of political, administrative and economic marginalization from the government side. Nevertheless, they have their own customary law and traditional institutions which service them to live together peacefully by managing social, political and economic affairs of the communities. Furthermore, they have long time inter-clan relations. Thus, most of their identities are overlapping, since they were living in one province in the previous regimes.

Their main sources of livelihood are camel and cattle. The Somali clans are mostly camel herder and the Oromo clans are cattle herders. They have common grazing land, water-wells and rivers. These livelihoods are not their commodities; it is their means to survive.

As the empirical chapters revealed, after 1991, the state was newly restructured based on ethno-linguistic federalism. The 1995 FDRE constitution granted the right of self-rule and shared rule (power sharing) for Nations, Nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. This new state structure came up with political, administrative and fiscal decentralization to sub-national governments. However, as this study has shown, government policies and legal provisions have been hijacked, misused, and abused by local government officials, and by political party channels.

The study has practical details and shows the pressure and threat of pastoral and agro-pastoral communities on their survival. The constitution has promised to assure self-determination of the people and to protect the culture, language, and religious identities of the people. The government also believes that federalism gives protection for Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, by correcting past injustices. The intervention of the government by having different policies in pastoral areas has been primarily to bring sustainable peace in the border of the country in general and within the regional states of the country in particular.

However, the practical implementation of the policy at local level in both study areas in the last two decade of decentralization goes against the promise of the constitution and of the government. As the study pinpointed, the constitutional provisions at sub-national governments-in zone and *woreda* levels in both study *woredas* have been misused and abused by local officials and government institutions.

Furthermore, in Liban and Filtu *woredas*, local officials neglected traditional institutions, customary law, and community elders. The official goes against the regional and state constitutional provisions. Besides the policies, which have been implemented in Liban and Filtu *woredas*, are policies from above such as-settlement policy, ban of bush burning and sub-*kebeles* structured policies. These policies have been threatening the indigenous knowledge of the community on resource use, allocation and management and it eroded the indigenous social capital of the communities. Additionally, the marginalization of traditional institutions and

customary law by government officials and government institutions and the lack of sufficient information about local reality among policy makers at federal and regional levels while they intervene with local development policy, leads the pastoral and agro-pastoral clans into in-group and out-group clan conflicts in Liban and Filtu *woredas*. This allows them to claim territory, resources-such as pasture, land, water wells and state and NGOs resources. The indigenous institutions, which the communities use them to resolve conflicts have been, neglected in the study areas. The officials and the government elders have not been in a position to respond on time for the grievances of the communities in Liban and Filtu *woreda*.

As it was discussed, the border issues, the split of the *woreda*, the transfer of ritual places into farmland, *kebeles*, and for small towns settlement, road building, economic marginalization of minority clans, have been the communities' questions so far and which need urgent response from the government.

Besides, the inter-clan conflict which is mainly because of the reluctance of the local officials, overlooking of the traditional institutions and customary law and lack of implementing the legal provisions by officials bring lack of mistrust among the clans and the breakdown of clan relations in the study areas. Thus, clan relations dimension is also changed overtime. Since, the elite and the local government officials shift clans complain towards identity conflicts. As the study shows, this has impacts on clans' socio-economic relation such as trade and market relation, inter-marriage, and hence on the exchange of livelihood in between the pastoral and agro-pastoral groups and in between the majority and minority clans relations. In both study *woredas*, practically minorities within majority and minority within minority clans have not been protected socially, politically and economically even if the FDRE Constitution is pro-minority.

Overall, this study argues that the political, administrative and fiscal decentralization issues introduced by the government of FDRE were expected to protect and empower traditional institutions, traditional leadership structures and customary law, to promote inter-clan relations and to reduce conflicts and finally to bring peaceful coexistence between the clans at sub-national government levels. However, the study revealed that constitutionally decentralized power, autonomy to the *woreda* level has been misused by zonal and *woreda* officials in the study areas. The political decentralization aspect, that is political representation of the pastoral

communities, has not genuinely been implemented in regional parliament and *woreda* council. The study shows that especially, the minority clans have largely been excluded from administrative positions in Filtu *woreda*. Moreover, there is lack of public trust to participate on elections and the development plan at local levels.

The administrative issues at *woreda* level have been abused by political party channels, as local officials are 'selected' by top officials prior to the election by the local communities. The study has also found that *woreda* officials accountability have been upward than downward to their electorates. Besides, the *woreda* and zone officials present false report about the *woreda* to convince the regional government officials. As the data shows both Oromia and Somali regional states constitutions have not been genuinely implemented.

Furthermore, regarding fiscal decentralization in both study *woredas*, the *woreda* officials lack capacity of collecting revenue from the communities. Thus, their expenditure is limited to invest on social service development. Moreover, on social service development, a lot has been done by federal, regional and NGOs, when we compare with what the *woreda* contribute for local development. As the study shows, the zone and *woreda* administrators have not yet planed for clan cooperation along the Filtu and Liban *woredas*; by using social service development as a means to collaborate the Borana, Arsi, Guji Oromo clans with Digodia, Marehan, Ajuran, Gurra, Karanle and Garri-Maró Somali clans in general and the border *kebeles* in particular.

As it is discussed, facilitating infrastructures within the *woredas* and with the neighboring *woreda* increase trade and market relations, access to information and exchange of commodities. Little have been done on that. All these would have smoothen clan relations and develop the capacity of working together for further development of these shared areas. In nutshell, the outcome of the post-1991 federalization policies, as far as the inter-communal relations in the study areas is concerned, is mixed with the tendencies of conflict and competition outweighing cooperation.

9.3 Way Forwards

In the following part of this concluding chapter, way forwards are suggested.

- o It is advisable if the government revises policies on the local leadership structure and integrates local institutions with customary laws. In this regard, the Regional State Constitutions should be revised and a provision which contains the customary law and indigenous knowledge of the pastoral and agro-pastoral communities need to be included.
- o The governments' institutions have to encourage shared participation from the planning up to its implementation especially on the cross border development projects.
- o Development planning should be a bottom up not a top-down; for example, in the study areas tracing, plant seedling, water conservation have been practiced, but they were not successfully implemented in the study *woredas*.
- o It is good, if the boundary between Liban *woreda*, Oromia and Filtu *woreda*, Somali regions could be demarcated; but it is not a lasting solution and its cross boundary issues must be left to clans' traditional institutions, elders' council and customary law for when and how the clans cross border.
- o The government needs to empower pastoral community's approaches to resource use, allocation and management based on their customary law and traditional institutions.
- o Local government officials are required to listen and give immediate response to clans' grievances which includes modernization and democratization of local governments.
- o It is advisable, if there would be inter-governmental relations at *woreda* level, which include government officials, local elders and elders' council.
- o Better if there could be an independent institution that makes check and balance in between tiers of governments.

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Appendixes

Appendix I: List of Informants

A. List of Interviewees Liban Woreda

No.	Name	Date of Interview and Place	Role	Remark
1	Anonymous	11 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Borana Elder	Interview
2	Anonymous	08 July 2015, Qoraatti	Resident of Qoraatti <i>Kebele</i>	Interview
3	Anonymous	05 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Liban <i>Woreda</i> official	Interview
4	Anonymous	07 July 2015, Waleenso	Resident of Waleenso <i>Kebele</i>	Interview
5	Anonymous	7 July 2015, Nagelle	Liban <i>woreda</i> Official	Interview
6	Anonymous	9 July 2015, waleenso	Borana Elders, Waleenso <i>Kebele</i>	Interview
7	Anonymous	07 July 2015, Nagelle	Liban Woreda Agriculture and Court officials	Interview
8	Anonymous	08 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Borana and Digodia Elders	Interview
9	Anonymous	10 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Liban <i>woreda</i> , Culture, Sport and Social Affairs Officials	Interview
10	Anonymous	10 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	<i>Garee</i> leaders of Bulbul and Gobicha Kebeles	Interview
11	Anonymous	14 July 2015, Nagalle Market Place, Nagelle-Borana	Liban and Filtu Residents	Interview
12	Anonymous	09 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana	Resident of Gobicha Kebele	Interview
13	Anonymous	08 July 2015, Qoratti Kebele	Resident of Qoratti <i>kebele</i>	Interview
14	Anonymous	June 2015, Bitatta	Arsi Elders ¹¹	Interview
15	Anonymous	14 June 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Borana and Garri Elders	Interview

16	Anonymous	19 June 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Gurra, Karanle, Ajuran and Garri, Elders	Interview
17	Anonymous	9 June 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Digodia and Garri informants	Interview
18	Anonymous	11 June 2015, Bitatta Town	Gurra and Karanle and Ajuran Elders	Interview
19	Anonymous	09 June 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Borana and Guji Elders	Interview
20	Anonymous	03 November 2015	Resident of Nagalle	Interview
21	Anonymous	03 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Garri-Maros Elders	Interview
22	Anonymous	05 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Gurra, Karanle, Waataa, Reerbare, Garri-Maros Elders	Interview
23	Anonymous	16 April 2016, Nagelle-Borana.	Borana and Arsi, Elders	Interview
24	Anonymous	16 April 2016, Nagelle-Borana	Borana, Guji and Arsi, Elders	Interview
25	Anonymous	21 April 2016, Nagelle-Borana	Digodia, Merehan, Borana, Guji and Arsi Traders	Interview
26	Anonymous	21 April 2016, Nagelle-Borana	Arsi Clan Broker	Interview
27	Anonymous	21 April 2016, Nagelle-Borana	Digodia, Merhen, Borana, Arsi, Elders	Interview
28	Anonymous	04 July 2015, Did-Liban, <i>Kebele</i>	Resident of Liban woreda	Interview
29	Anonymous	07 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana	Liban woreda Official	Interview
30	Anonymous	09 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana	Borana Elders	Interview
31	Anonymous	08 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana	Liban woreda resident	Interview
32	Anonymous	03 July 2015, Ganale Town	Arsi and Rayitu elders	Interview

33	Anonymous	03 July 2015, Ganale	Residents of Ganale	Interview
34	Anonymous	04 July 2015, Ganale	Arsi Elders	Interview
35	Anonymous	03 July 2015, Ganale	Gurra Elders	Interview
36	Anonymous	08 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Liban <i>Woreda</i> cabinet	Interview
37	Anonymous	07 July 2015, Waleenso	Resident of Waleenso <i>Kebele</i>	Interview
38	Anonymous	11 July 2015, Qaxxee-Waare	Resident of Qaxxee-Waare <i>Kebele</i>	Interview
39	Anonymous	08 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Liban <i>Woreda</i> Pastoralist Development Officer	Interview
40	Anonymous	July 10 2015, Did-Liban kebele.	Borana and Arsi Elders	Interview
41	Anonymous	11 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Liban Woreda Agricultural officer	Interview
42	Anonymous	9 July 2015, Nagalle-Borana	Elders of Borana, Guji, Digodia and Marehan clans	Interview
43	Anonymous	18 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Civil servants and Residents	Interview
44	Anonymous	13 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.	Guji Zone Officials	Interview
45	Anonymous	15 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.	Resident of Nagelle-Borana, Borana, Guji and Arsi elders, Civil servant	Interview
46	Anonymous	10 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	High Official of Liban <i>woreda</i>	Interview
47	Anonymous	15 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Resident of Did-Liban <i>Kebele</i>	Interview
48	Anonymous	13 July, Nagelle-Borana	Liban <i>Woreda</i> Official	Interview
49	Anonymous	4 November 2015	Borana and Arsi Elders	Interview

50	Anonymous	08 December 2015	<i>Caffee</i> member of Oromia region	Interview
51	Anonymous	03 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Member of <i>Woreda</i> Council	Interview
52	Anonymous	16 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	High official of Liban <i>woreda</i>	Interview
53	Anonymous	09 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Liban <i>Woreda</i> official	Interview
54	Anonymous	11 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Resident of Liban <i>Woreda</i>	Interview
55	Anonymous	10 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Liban <i>woreda</i> official	Interview
56	Anonymous	13 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Resident of Nagelle	Interview
57	Anonymous	14 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Liban <i>Woreda</i> Officials	Interview
58	Anonymous	11 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Official of Liban <i>woreda</i>	Interview
59	Anonymous	08 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Resident of Liban <i>Woreda</i>	Interview
60	Anonymous	09 November, 2015 Nagelle-Borana	Resident of Meleka Guba	Interview
61	Anonymous	03 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Resident of Liban <i>Woreda</i>	Interview
62	Anonymous	2 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Liban <i>woreda</i> officials	Interview

B. List of Interviewees Filtu *Woreda*

No.	Name	Date of Interview and Place	Role	Remark
1	Anonymous	21 July 2015, Filtu	Digodia Elders	Interview
2	Anonymous	24 July 2015, Filtu	High Official of Filtu <i>Woreda</i>	Interview
3	Anonymous	23 July 2015, Filtu.	Filtu <i>woreda</i> Official	Interview

4	Anonymous	26 July 2015, Filtu.	Digodia and Marehan Elders	Interview
5	Anonymous	23 June 2015, Filtu	Garri Elder	Interview
6	Anonymous	23 June 2015, Haydimtu <i>Kebele</i>	Digodia Elder	Interview
7	Anonymous	17 June 2015, Haydimitu <i>Kebele</i>	Digodia Elder	Interview
8	Anonymous	19 June 2015, Filtu	Marihan, Gurra, and Ajuran Elders	Interview
9	Anonymous	25 June 2015, Dheeka <i>Kebele</i>	Marehan Elder	Interview
10	Anonymous	21 November 2015, Filtu	Resident of Filtu	Interview
11	Anonymous	23 April 2016, Filtu, resident of Burweyn <i>kebele</i>	Digodia and Marehan Elders	Interview
12	Anonymous	23 April 2016, Filtu	Digodia, Merehan, and Garri- Maro Elders	Interview
13	Anonymous	26 July 2015, Filtu	Filtu woreda official and Resident	Interview
14	Anonymous	21 July 2015, Haysuftu <i>Kebele</i>	Elders of Marehan	Interview
15	Anonymous	24 July 2015, Filtu	Filtu woreda Officials	Interview
16	Anonymous	22 July 2015, Filtu.	Digodia and Marrihan Elders	Interview
17	Anonymous	21 July 2015, Filtu.	Filtu Woreda cabinet	Interview
18	Anonymous	23 July 2015, Haysuftu Kebele.	Resident of Haysuftu Kebele,	Interview
19	Anonymous	19 July 2015, Filtu	Filtu Woreda Agricultural officer	Interview
20	Anonymous	23 July 2015, Filtu	Marehan Elder	Interview

21	Anonymous	26 July 2015, Filtu	Digodia Elder	Interview
22	Anonymous	25 July 2015, Filtu	Resident and Civil servant	Interview
23	Anonymous	25 July 2015 Filtu	Resident of Filtu	Interview
24	Anonymous	July 28, Filtu	High Official of Filtu <i>woreda</i>	Interview
25	Anonymous	July 27 2015, in <i>Filtu woreda</i>	Resident of Filtu	Interview
26	Anonymous	25 July 2015, Filtu	High Filtu <i>Woreda</i> Official	Interview
27	Anonymous	23 July 2015, Filtu	Digodia, Marrihan and Garri Elders	Interview
28	Anonymous	26 July 2015, Filtu	Resident of Filtu	Interview
29	Anonymous	25 July 2015, Filtu	Expert in MERCY CORPS, Filtu <i>woreda</i> Ethiopia	Interview
30	Anonymous	24 July 2015, Filtu	Cabinet in Filtu <i>Woreda</i>	Interview
31	Anonymous	22 November 2015, Filtu	Digodia and Marrihan Elders	Interview
32	Anonymous	12 December 2015, Addis Ababa	Somali region parliament member	Interview
33	Anonymous	23 November 2015, Filtu	Resident of Filtu	Interview
34	Anonymous	26 November 2015, Filtu	Hawiye Elders	Interview
35	Anonymous	23 November 2015, Filtu	High Filtu <i>woreda</i> Official	Interview
36	Anonymous	27 November 2015, Filtu	Cabinet of Filtu <i>woreda</i>	Interview
37	Anonymous	27 November 2015, Filtu.	Executive committee of Filtu <i>woreda</i>	Interview
38	Anonymous	21 November 2015,	Resident of Filtu	Interview

39	Anonymous	23 November 2015, Filtu	Member of the <i>Woreda</i> Council	Interview
40	Anonymous	19 November 2015, Filtu	Filtu <i>woreda</i> Official	Interview
41	Anonymous	22 November 2015, Filtu	High Official of Filtu <i>woreda</i>	Interview
42	Anonymous	21 November 2015, Filtu	Resident of Filtu	Interview
43	Anonymous	22 November 2015, Filtu	Resident of Filtu	Interview
44	Anonymous	20 November 2015, Filtu	Filtu Health Official	Interview
45	Anonymous	23 November 2015, Filtu	Resident of Filtu <i>Woreda</i>	Interview
46	Anonymous	28 November 2015, Filtu	Digodia Elders	Interview
47	Anonymous	21 November 2015, Filtu	Filtu <i>Woreda</i> Officials	Interview
48	Anonymous	27 November 2015, Filtu	Official of Filtu <i>woreda</i>	Interview
49	Anonymous	13 November 2015, Aysuflu	Resident of Filtu <i>woreda</i>	Interview
50	Anonymous	21 November 2015, Filtu.	Digodia and Marrihan Elders	Interview

Appendix II: Focus Group Discussions

A. List of Focus Group discussants Liban Woreda

No.	Discussants Remark	Date of Interview and Place	Role
1	FGD (with Oromo-Somali Elders)	04 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Borana, Arsi, Digodia and Marrihan Elders
2	FGD (with Oromo-Somali Elders)	05 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana.	Borana, Arsi, Digodi, Marehan, and Garri Elders
3	FGD	5 July 2015, Nagelle Borana	Borana and Arsi Elders
4	FGD(Mixed group from both ethnic groups)	14 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Liban and Filtu Residents
5	FGD(with Oromo-Somali Elders)	5 June 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Borana, Guji, Arsi, Digodia and Marehan Elders
6	FGD(with Oromo-Somali Elders)	20 June 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Gurra, Karanle, Ajuran and Garri Elders
7	FGD	02 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Borana and Digodi Elders
8	FGD(with Oromo-Somali Elders)	04 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Borana, Arsi, Marrihan, Garri, Hawiye and Digodia Elders
9	FGD	July 04, 05 and 10 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Elders
10	FGD	10 July 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Resident of Nagelle
11	FGD(with Oromo-Somali Elders)	06 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana.	Borana, Arsi, Marrihan, Garri, Hawiye and Digodia Elders
12	FGD	11 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Residents of Liban woreda
13	FGD	03 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Agricultural Officials in Liban woreda
14	FGD	13 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Borana, Arsi and Guji Elders
15	FGD	11 November 2015, Nagelle	Residents of Liban woreda
16	FGD	14 November 2015, Nagelle-Borana	Liban Woreda experts

B. List of Focus Group discussants Filtu Woreda

No.	Discussants Remark	Date of Interview and Place	Role
1	FGD (with mixed clan Elders)	22 June 2016, Filtu town	Filtu woreda Elders
2	FGD (with mixed clan Elders)	25 July 2015, Filtu	Digodia and Marehan Elders
3	FGD (with mixed clan Elders)	22 June 2015 Filtu	Digodia and Marehan Elders
4	FGD (with mixed clan Elders)	29 July 2015, Ganale	Gurra, Karele, Dogodia clans
5	FGD (with mixed clan Elders)	27 July 2015, Filtu	Digodia, Gurra and Karnle clan elders
6	FGD (with mixed clan Elders)	27 and 29 July 2015, Filtu	Elders
7	FGD	22 July 2015, Filtu	Resident of Filtu <i>woreda</i>
8	FGD	23 November, 2015 Filtu	Residents of Filtu <i>woreda</i>
9	FGD	25 November 2015, Filtu	Finance Officials of Filtu <i>woreda</i>

Appendix III: Interview and Focus Group Discussion Guidelines

Addis Ababa University

College of Law and Governance Studies

Center for Federalism and Governance Studies

Interview and Focus Group Discussions Guiding Questions

Key informants Questions that are used as a checklist for the qualitative interview under different categories bellow are guiding question for interview and FGDs. The interview process did not necessarily follow the sequence and also not limited to these questions. These questions served as guide in directing the interview process.

Category I: For Clan Heads/Authorities/, Clan Council/Elders/, Local People, Religious Leaders and Civil Servants (traders, teachers, health workers).

1. Ethnic Relations and Identity Groups

- o How do you observe inter-clan relations in your *woreda* after and before the introduction of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia?
- o Is there a dominant clan in terms of role, economy and status in your *woreda* in different public affairs? If yes, Why?
- o Do you have a common market with neighboring region clans? Where? How does exchange takes place?
- o How do you share the resources which are found in the border of the neighboring region/*woreda*/ clans?
- o How do you see conflict in your *woreda* with the neighboring region /*woreda*/ after the introduction of federalism in Ethiopia? Is it exacerbate or abate? Why?
- o Do you think the border between the two regions have influence in your inter-clan relations? Why?

2. Political, Social, Economic and Cultural opportunities

- o Do you fairly exercise the cultural and language rights that you get from the federal and regional constitutions? How?
- o Is there some form of inequality among the clans in your *woreda*? Do you think these inequalities are historically embedded or emerged currently? How and why?
- o Do your *woreda* communities now get equally access to health services, job, political representation and education?

3. Legitimate, Democratic and Effective Governance and Public Participation

- o Does your indigenous local institution have a role in societal affairs? How?
- o Do you think the law in the regional constitution is implemented as enshrined in your *woreda*? How and Why?
- o Do you think election in your *woreda* or /and *kebele* are follow legal, fair and transparent procedures? If no explain what problems exist and who is accountable for it?
- o Do you think the *kebele* leaders and *woreda* leaders have popular support from the communities in your *woreda*? Why?
- o Which institutions (customary or modern) that the society prefer to bring their cases of litigations, criminal acts?
- o Do you think local leaders equally treat or manage their societies? How? Why?
- o How do you explain about the role of the *woreda* council played in representing the interests of their communities? How?
- o Do you think the communities' participation is conscious and voluntary and resources spent to engage the people meaningful?
- o Are they aware of what their voices do against/for them?
- o Do you think power sharing among the clans in your *woreda* is fair and legitimate?
- o Have you come across false report on your *woredas* cases from media?

4. Effective Dispute Resolution and Social healing Mechanism

- o How do you see the role of traditional and/or modern institutions for resolving the disputes within the *woreda* clans, inter- *woreda* clans and inter-region (*woreda*) clans?
- o In your *woreda* from modern or traditional institutions which one is perceived as neutral or effective in their conclusions on disputes and accepted by all conflict parties? Why?

5. Pluralism /Diversified debate/

- o Do you think *woreda* leaders equally accommodate diversity in your *woreda*? How?

6. External Engagement

- o Do your *woreda* clans have political, commercial trade and cultural relationships with the neighboring region/ *woreda*? Would you explain their contribution to peaceful life?

7. Active and organized civil society

- o How do you see the role of NGOs in civil and human rights, health, education and the environment in your *woreda*?

8. Political Group Rights

- o Do you think all clans in your *woreda* have civil and political liberties equally? How?

9. Economic Peace Interest

- o Is there strong trade and investment in your *woreda*, to meet with the neighboring region or *woreda*? How?

Category II: For *Woreda* and *Kebele* Administrators

1. *Woreda*/ *Kebele* leaders

- o Is there any document which guides decentralization program and knowledge of decentralization related policy, program, strategy, guideline, documents and other records which were prepared in your *woreda*?
- o Do you think all clan groups are fairly represented in *woreda* council? How?

- o How far do scarcity of resources and frequently migration led to violent conflicts among the groups in your *woreda* and its neighbors?

2. Economic Peace Interest

- o Is there strong trade and investment in your *woreda* which linked your *woreda* with the neighboring region or *woreda*? How?

Category III: for office of Justice

I. Criminality, social and political Issues

- o How do you scale (level) violence in your *woreda* from time to time? High or low? Why?
- o What are the causes of conflict in your *woreda*? Why?

Category IV: Questions for FGDs

- o How do you observe ethnic federalism affect or promote inter-ethnic clan relations? Why and How?
- o How do you see conflict in your *woreda* with the neighboring region *woreda* after the introduction of federalism in Ethiopia? Is it exacerbate or abate? Why?
- o How do you see the existing government structures in your *woreda*, based on: the structure, human power, adequacy of budget, political structure, justice systems, functional committees, system of check and balance and internal control system for transparency and accountability?
- o Are there development projects in your *woreda*? Who involved in the planning process? Where do the *woreda* get the budget? Do the *woreda* generate income? What do the *woreda* do with the income?
- o Is there any new institution which works on inter-clan relations in between the two regions/interface *woredas*? How and Why?
- o What are the current challenges in your inter-clan relations with neighboring *woreda/region*?
- o Is there a person who represents your *woreda* at regional or federal parliament? Why?
- o Do you think different clans participate in different social, political and development issues equally in your *woreda*? How and Why?

- o How do you see the role of traditional and/or modern institutions for resolving the disputes within the *woreda* clans and inter- *woreda* clans?

Category V: Lessons learnt and Possible Solutions

- o To have a better cooperation and peaceful coexistence with the neighboring region clans. What should be done by local peoples, government and NGOs?
- o From the existing government structures in your *woreda*: the structure, human power, adequacy of budget, political structure, justice systems, functional committees, system of check and balance and internal control system for transparency and accountability. Which one needs change? And which one has been done well practically? Why?
- o From the lesson learnt, how do you see the implementation of federal governance system at local level?
- o What are the challenges that affect the realization of development and democracy in general and the decentralization of political system of governance in particular in your local areas?

Appendix IV: Interview and Focus Group Discussion Questions Guidelines in Local languages (Afaan Oromo and Af-Somali)

A. Afaan Oromo Interview and FGDs Guiding Questions

Yunivarsitii Addis Ababaatti
Kolleejjii Seeraafi Bulchiinsaa
Damee Barnoota Feederalizimiifi Bulchiinsaa

I. Gaaffilee Af-gaaffifi Marii Gareef Qophe

Gaaffileen armaan gadiitti qophaayan kun kutaa adda addaa jalatti qoodamanii yemmuu ta’u, qoqqoodinsi isaanii nama gaafatuuf haala mijeessuufi gaaffilee yaadachisuuf malee tartiiba kanaan deemuufi miti.

Kutaa 1: Itti gaafatamtoota gosaaf, Jaaroliif, bakka bu’oota gosaaf, jiraattotaaf, abbooti amantaaf, hojjettota mootummaaf.

1. Akkaataa Walitti Dhufeenya Sabummaafi Eenyummaa

- o Akkataa walitti dhufeenya sabummaa aanaa kee keessatti, osoo sirni Feedaralizimi hojiirra hinooliniifi erga oolee akkamitti ilaalta?
- o Aanaa keessan keessatti gosti olaantummaa gama siyaasaa, dinagdeefi hawaasummaan qabu jiraa? Akkamitti?
- o Gosoota oollaa wajjin gabaa walitti qabduu? Eessatti? Haalli itti waan adda addaa waljijjirtan maal fakkaata?
- o Qabeenya naannoo dangaa Libaniifi Filtuu jiru haala kamiin fayyadamtu?
- o Erga Sirni Feedaralizimii Itoophiaa keessatti hojiirra oolee haali walitti bu’iinsa gosoota cimaa moo gadi bu’aa dhufe? Maaliif?
- o Dhimmi dangaa Libaniifi Filtuu jidduu jiru walitti dhufeenya gosoota aanaa kana lamaan jidduu jiranirratti dhibbaa qabaa?

2. Dhimma Siyaasa, Dinagdee, hawaasummafi aadaa

- o Dhimma Siyaasa, Dinagdee, hawaasummafi aadaa akkatuma heerri biyyattifi naannoo hayyamuun fayyadamtanii?
- o Aanaa kee keessa gosti hundi ija tokkoon ilaallamuu? Walqixa ilaallamuufi dhabuun kun waan durirra jalqabee jiru moo waan yeroo dhiyootti dhufeedha?
- o Hawaasni aanaa kana hundi dhimmoota akka banootaa, fayyaa, karaa, ifaafi buufata fayyaa looni argachuurratti walqixaa?

3. Seerummaa, Dimookiraasi, Bulchiinsa Gaariifi Hirmaannaa Ummataa

- o Beekumsiifi muuxannoon kee kan ati dur irraa qabdee beektu dhimma hawaasummaatif akka oolfattu haalli mijataadhaa? Akkamiitti?
- o Aanaa keetti, Seerri Feedaralaafi kan naannoo akkatuma waraqaarra taa'een hojiirra oolaa?
- o Filannoon aanaa, kan gandaafi kan naannoo haala ifa ta'ee fi hirmaannaa ummataa kan jiddu galeessa godhateedhaa? Seerummaan isaa hoo? Rakkoo uumamuuf eenyutu itti gaafatama?
- o Bulchitoota aanaafi gandaa ummanni nideeggaraa? Maaliif?
- o Ummanni ganda ykn aanaa keeti yeroo rakkoon wahi muudatu dhimma isaanii mana murtii moo jaarolii ykn bakka bu'oota gosaa bira kaayyatu?
- o Bulchitoonni gandaafi aanaa hawaasa isaanii hunda walqixa ilaaluu ykn tajajiluu? Maaliif? Akkamiitti?
- o Manni maree aanaa gosoota hundaan bakka bu'aa? Faayidaa gosa hundaa eegsisaa? Akkamiitti?
- o Hirmaannan ummata gama hundaanuu kan feedhii isaanirratti hundaayee?
- o Ummanni sagaleen isaanii murteessa akka ta'ee hubannoo qabuu?
- o Qoqqoodinsi angoo gosoota jidduu jiru akka aanaa keetti heerummaafi walqixxummaa qabaa?
- o Sabqunnamtii adda addaarra gabaasa sobaa waa'ee aanaa keeti dhageessee beektaa?

4. Dhimma Araaraafi Walitti Fidinsa Gosoota Yeroo waldhabbi

- o Gahee waajjiraalee hawaasummaa isaan aslii ta'aniifi kan ammayyaa, dhimma hawaasummaa gosoota aanaa kee keessa jiraniifi ollaaf qabu haala kamiin ilaalta?
- o Waajjiraalee Asliifi isaan ammayyaa keessa kan hawaasni jaalatu isa kami? Maaliif?

5. Dhimma Garaagarummaa

- o Bulchitoonni gandaafi aanaa hawaasa isaanii garaagarummaa isaan qabaniin osoo adda hinbaasin ilaalu? Akkamiitti?

6. Walitti Dhufeenya Ollaa Wajjin

- o Gosoonni aanaa kee keessa jiraatan gosoota olla wajjin maal fakkaata? Faayidaa walitti dhufeenyi gosoota lama jidduu jiruu akkamitti ilaalta?

7. Dhaabbilee Alaafi Hawaasummaa

- o Gahee dhaabbileen adda addaa gama walitti bu'insa tasgabbeessuu, barnootaafi fayyaarratti qaban akkamiitti ilaalta?

8. Dhimma Siyaassarratti Mirga Garee

- o Akka aanaa keetti gosoonni hunduu mirga siyaasa walqixa qabuu?

9. Dinagdee Horachuu

- o Gosoota aanaa keefi kan olla jidduu walitti dhufeenyi daldalaa cimaadhaa? Akkamiitti? Faayidaan isaa hoo?

Kutaa 2: Bulchitoota Gandaafi Aanaaf

1. Hoggansa Aanaafi Gandaa

- o Akka aanaa keessaniitti, sagantaan dhimma guddina aanaa keessaniifi ta'u kan aanaan qopheeffate jiraa? Gama aangoo, misooma, filannoo, hawaasummafi afaanii ilaalchisee wanti qopheessitan jiraa sadarkaa aanaatti? Maaliif?
- o Mana mare aanaa keessati gosti hundi walqixa carraa filamanii galuu qabuu? Maaliif?

- o Dhimmi qabeenya fayyadamu karaa nagaatin gosa ollaafi kan aanaa jidduu jiru hanga yoomitti itti fufa?

2. Fayyadamummaa Dinagdee

- o Gama dinagdeetin gosoonni ollaa keessan jiran akkamiin walqunnamu? Daldala moo investeemantiini?

Kutaa 3. Hojjetoota Mana Murtiif

1. Dhimma Nageenyaa, Hawaasummaafi Siyaassaa

- o Walitti bu’iinsi gosoota jidduutti adeemsifamu akka aanaa keetti dabala moo hir’achaa adeema? Maaliif?
- o Ka’umsii ykn sababbiin walitti bu’iinsaa maali? Yakka akkamiifaatu aanaa keetti baay’ata.

Kutaa 4: Gaaffilee Garee

- o Akka aanaa keetti Sirni Feedaralizimii walitti dhufeenya gosoota aanaa keetiifi ollaa aanaa keeti jiran nicimsee moo nidadhabsiise? Akkamitti? Maaliif?
- o Erga Sirno Feedaralizim hojiirra oolee walitti bu’insa gosa jidduu jiru nidabalee moo nihiir’ate?
- o Akka aanaa keetti caasaa mootummaa akkamitti ilaalta gama? Siyaasan, bajatan, humana namaatin, heerafi seera hojiirra oolchuun, itti gaafatamuummaan, iftooman, waltoo’achuudhaan?
- o Aanaa kee misoomni jiraa? Dhimma kanarratti eenyutu hirmaat? Eenyuutu karoorsa? Eessatti karoorfma? Qabatama naannoo wajjin walqabataa? Bajata misoomaa essaa fuudha? Eenyyurraa walitti qaba?
- o Dhaabbanni walitti dhufeenya gosoota naannoolee ykn aanaalee olla jidduu jirurratti hojjetu jiraa? Maaliif?
- o Wanti yeroo ammaa walitti dhufeenya gosoota ollaa jidduu jirurratti gufuu ta’an maal faadha?

- o Namni aanaa keessan bakka buêe mana mare biyyooleessa ykn kan naanoo keessa jiru jiraa? Maaliif?
- o Gosoonni garagaraa kan aanaa keessan jiru hundi walqixa dhimma Siyaasaa, Hawaasfi Dinagdeerratti hirmaatuu?
- o Dhaabbilee Aslii taêaniifi isaan ammayyaa kamtu irra walitti buînsa hawaasa hiikaa jira? Maaliif?

Kutaa 5: Barumsa Muuxannoorra Argameefi Furmaata Gara Fuulduraa

- o Gosoota olla wajjin nagaa itti fufiinsa qabu fiduuf mootummaarra, miti mootummaarra, bulchitootraafi ummatarraa maaltu eeggama.
- o Caasaa mootummaa amma jiru kun isa kamtu haala gaariin hojjechaa jira? Isa kamtu jijjiirraa barbaada?
- o Muuxannoo qabdurraa hojiirra oolmaa Sirna Feedaralizimi kana haala kamiin ilaalta?
- o Hojiirra oolmaa Sirna Feedaralizimi kanaaf wantoonni gufuu taân maali?

B. Af-Somali Interview and FGDs Guiding Questions

Suêalo loogutalagalay warays lalayelanayo bulshada qaybeheega kaladuwan ee kunool labada degaan ee Jaarka ah ee Oromoda iyo Soomaalida

QaybtaI: Maamulayaasha, Odayo Dhaqameedyada, Shacabka, Masha’ikhda, Ganacasatada, Macalimiinta iyo waliba shaqaalaha Caafimaadka.

1. xidhiidhka Qabiilada iyo jilibya kadhexeeya

- o Sided u aragtaa xidhiidhka kadhexeeya qabiilada kadib marikii iy itoobiya qaadatay nidaamka kusalaysan qoomiyadaha ee loyaqaano federalism?
- o Majiraan qabiilo ugu awood bada dhinacyada dhaqaalah, qadarinta iyo waliba hogaaminta shabcaka iyo dawlada? Haday jiraan maxaa sababay in qabiilada qarkood hogaanka hayaan?
- o Majiraan xidhiidh ganacsi oo idinka dhexeeya idinka iyo gobolada jaarka ah? Xagee? Ganacsi nuuceeya idinka xdhexeeya?

- o Sideed u qabsataan dhaqaalaha nii dhexeeya idinka iyo degmoyinka/ gobolada/ aad jaarka tihiin?
- o Sided u aragataa colaadaha idiin dhexeeya idinka iyo degmooyinka jaarka aad tihiin kadib arii la hirgaliyay nidaamka federalismka ah? Makasii dareen colaaduhu mise way roonadeen?
- o Makulataha in ay saamayn kugu yeelatay xidhiidhka udhexeeya labada Deegan ee jaarkaah?

2. Fursadaha siyaasadeed, bulsho, dhaqaale iyo dhaqan

- o Makulataha in aad si sinaani kudheehantahay uga faaiiday xuquuda ay dhigayaan dustuurka dalka iyo degaanka? Sidee?
- o Makulatahay in ay jirto cadaalad doro iyo sinaan la'aan degmandiina gudeheeda?cadaalad daradu mawax tariikhi ah baa miso waa wax hadda abuurmay? Balse maxaa sababay?
- o Degmadaatu may heshaa fursadaha kaladuwan ee ah caafimadka, waxbarashada, shaqo abuurka, kaqayb galka siyaasadeed? Kuwaayo kusalaysan sinaan iyo cadaalad?

3. Hogaamin kusalaaysan cadaalad, Dimoqradiyad, oqoonsiga Bulshada oo modho Dhalah.

- o Xubnaha hogaamin dhaqammedku door intee dhan ayay kaciyaaraaan hogaaminta bulsha?
- o Makultaahay in in Degmadaad ay kahirgaleen fulinta distuurka iyo sharciga? Sideey loo hirgaliyey?
- o Doorashooyika degmadaada/qabalahiina masicadaalada ,sharciga kusalaysan, cadcaddaan ayaa loqabtaa?
- o Hogaaminta Dagmadiina makulatahay in ay leeyihiin tageerada bulsha waynta? Sidee?
- o Bulshadu xubnaha cadaladda makuwa Casriga ah miso miso wkuwa dhaqammeed ah ayay tegaan?
- o Makulatahay hogaamiye dhaaqameedyadu in ay si sinaan leh ugu adeeegan bulshadooda? Sidee?

- o Sided u qeexi lahayd dorka ay kaciyaaraan gudiga konsilka degmada in ay wakil iil kayihiin?
- o Makulatahay in ay tahay bulshada kaqayb galkeedu in uu yahay ku kusalaysan ikhtiyaarkooda?
- o Bulshadu bahubtaa waxa uu codkoogu u qabtay amaba yeelay?
- o Makulatahay qabsashada xilka hogaaanminta Degmadiina in ay tahay cadaalad?
- o Wali malakulantay wali warbixin been ah oo laga sheegay degmadiinna?

4. Xalinta iskudhacyada bulshada

- o Maxaay kultahy doorka ay kaciyaari karaan laamaha cadaalda kuwa dhaqameedka/kuwa casriga xalinta isgudhacyada degmoyinka, qabiilida,iyo waliba gobolada jaarka ah?
- o Dagmadiina bulshadu mawaxa ay doorbidaa laamaha cadaaladda ee dhamaeedka ah miso kuwa casriga?

5. Kaladuwanashada iyo Dulqaadka

- o Makullatahay hugaamiyayaasha degmadaada in si cadaalad ah u fuliyaan kaladuwanaanta bulshada?
- o Maniga dhexeeya xidhiidh siyaasadeed, ganacsi, iyo waliba xidhiidh dhaqameed idinka iyo bulshada kunool Degmoyinka, gobolada iyo waliba Degaana jarka ah? Maxay kulatahay doorka ay kuyeelan karaan xaga nabad sugidda?

7. Hayadaha Dawliga ahayn

- o Sideed u araktaa doorka ay kaciyaaraan hayadaha aan dawliga ahayn xaga sugidda xuquuda aadamaha, wax barashada, iyo waliba caafimaadka?

8 Xuquuqda Guud ee Siyaasadeed

- o Makulatahay in uu qabiilkaagu leeyahay xuquuq siyaasadeed oo lasiman qabiilada kunool Degmadaada?

9. Dhaqaalaha iyo Nabad Galiyada

- o Majiraa ganacsi xoogan iyo waliba malgashi adag oo nii horseeda xidhiidh aad la yeelataan Degaanada Jaarka ah?

Qaybta II: Maamulka Degmooyinka iyo Qabalayaasha

1. Maamulka Degmada/ Qabalaha

- o Majiraa wax cadayn qoraal ah oo aad katix racdaan arimaha desentralasationka, oqoon desentralayseetionka, mashruuc yada, jadqalada, brograamyada aad bulshada kuhogaamisaan?
- o Makulatahay in dhaamaan qabiilda degmada sis sinaanleh ay uga qayb galaan maamulka Degmada?

Waxyeelo inteedhan ayay gadhsiiyeen amaba u horseedeen isudha,iyo dagaa, barakac ay sababatay dhalaaha dabiicaiga ah oo so koobnaaday

2. Danta Dhaqaalaha Nibadeedka

- o Majiraa ganacsi xoogan iyo waliba malgashi adag oo nii horseeda xidhiidh aad la yeelataan Degaanada Jaarka ah?

Qaybta III Xafiiska Cadaalada

I. Arimaha Dambiilanimaadda, siyaasadaa iyo bulshada

- o Seeded u qiyaasi lahayd iskudhayada degmadaa? Masiikordhayaa miso waa siinaaqusaya marba mark akadambaysa? Maxaase usababah?

Qaybta IV: Su'aalo kusaabsan wadatashiga Guud

- o Sided u aragataa nidaamka federalismka kusalaysan qabyaalada yio saamaynta uu kuleyaha xidhiidhka kadhaxeeya qabiilada kaladuwan? sedee iyo maxaa sabababay?
- o Sided u aragata iskudhac kadhaxeeya Degmooyinka iyo Gobolada jaarka ah iyo colaadaha kadib marki la hirgaliyay nimka aan kor kusosheegnay?
- o Makabixin kartaa sawir guud qaabdhismeedka degmadiina: xaga cadaaladda, siyaasada, dhaqaalah, sinaanta iyo waliba cadcaddaanta, iyo mas'ulida hogaanka suuban?

- o Wax mashruucyo ah makajiraan degmaniina?ayaa kasheqeeya mashariicdaas? Dhaqaalaha lagu hir galiyo xaguu kasoo gala degmada? Degmadu dakhli u gaar ah maleedahay xaguuse kasoo galaa? Maxayse kuqabtaan dakhligaa?
- o Majirta cid kashaqaysa xidhiidhka qabaañlada jarka ah ee labada Degaan? Maxaa sababay? Sidayse uga shaqeeyaan?
- o Majiraa qof wakil niga ah heer Degaan iyo heer federalba?
- o Makulatahay in ay qabiilada kaladuwani si cadaalada uga qayb galaan arimaha bulshada, siyaasadda, humarka, dhaqaalah yio hogaanka degmada?

Qaybat V: Khibradaha laga qaatay iyo xal guud

- o Siñaan dabad iyo wannag uguwada noolaanno muxuu yahay doorka ay kaciyaari karaan Hayñaduhu, dawladu iyo dadka degmada kunool?
- o Dhinaca qaabdhismeedka degmadiina: xaga cadaaladda, siyaasada, dhaqaalah, sinaanta iyo waliba cadcaddaanta, iyo masñulida hogaanka suuban? Qabtee ubaahan in wax lagabadalo? Waybtese waxqabad wanaagsa leh?maxaa u sabab ah?
- o Annagoo kaduulayna khibradehena maxay kulatahay hirgalinta nidaamka federalismka ee heer degmo?
- o Maxay yihiin caqabadaha udiid in sidiilogutalagalay uu usocon waayo nidamka dimoqraadiyaddaa ah, gaar ahaan maamulka suuban marka aan kahadlayno Degmadiina?