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ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

Department of Political science and international relation

Dynamics of Border Dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan over Al-Fashaga (Yewuhabist) Since 2018.

By

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Addis Ababa

March 2024

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Yewuhabist (Al-Fashaga) Since 2018.**

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The thesis entitled “ Dynamics of Border Dispute Between Ethiopia and Sudan Over Yewuhabist (Al-Fashaga) Since 2018 is conducted by Andualem Menan and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in international relation and diplomacy complies with the regulations of the University.

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis entitled the Dynamics of Border Dispute Between Ethiopia and Sudan Over Yewuhabist (Al-Fashaga) Since 2018 is my own work and I have duly acknowledged the sources of materials that I have used.

Name: Andualem Menan

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Abstract

This study delves into the long-lasting conflict dynamics of the Ethiopia and Sudan border dispute, particularly after the 2018 regime change in both countries. The study uses qualitative research methods and purposive sampling to explore the root causes of the conflict and patterns of the dispute. The focus of the research is on the border land of Alfashaga, which has significant geostrategic and geoeconomic importance and is a potential source of economic development. The study uncovers why the resources and potential of the area have not been properly utilized and how the dispute has been provoked by different visible and non-visible external actors. The state behaviors of the countries, internal conflicts, military discipline, and self-interest of war commanders have contributed to the dispute dynamics. The study also highlights the impact of improper border management of Ethiopia as another provoking factor.

The research provides solid evidence of the current territorial occupation of Sudan and the problems faced in the area. The study emphasizes the impact of colonial legacies on African border-related crises and recommends bilateral talks and negotiations with counter diplomacy and para diplomacy as a possible solution. The study suggests that a joint soft solution could be found to curve the border dispute from being a bone of contention to a bridge of cooperation, rather than relying on the UN border dispute mechanism.

The findings of the research contribute to the understanding of the conflict dynamics of the Ethiopia and Sudan border dispute and provide insights into the root causes and patterns of the dispute. The research also highlights the importance of proper border management and bilateral negotiations in resolving border disputes. The study underscores the need for African countries to find joint soft solutions to border disputes, rather than relying on external mechanisms.

Acronyms UN:

united nation AU:

African Union

AUBP: African Union Border program

PSD: Peace and security department of African union

AUC: African union commission

ICG: International Crisis Group

OAU: Organization of African Union

ENDF: Ethiopian national defense force

IGAD: Intergovernmental authority of development

USA: United States of America

UAE: United Arab Emirates

Note; the researcher used Alfashaga and Yewuhabist interchangeably as Arabic and Amharic word.

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Chapter one

1. Introduction

1.1. Background of the study

Ethiopia and Sudan share a long stretch of border and have a deep historical connection of African states and strategic partners in the Horn of Africa. The boundary issue between the two countries has a century-long history, serving as both a source of cooperation and conflict. Ethiopia and the Sudan have a rich and significant history that, until now, has received limited attention from scholars. (Pankhurst, 1975)

In mediaeval age of Ethiopian history the first Ethiopian and Sudan relation had mentioned by Alvares. Alvares was the first to mention the Suakin trade route, indicating that merchants covering "a little over three leagues in a day's march" took around fifteen days to travel from Dabarwa to Suakin. The return journey also required a similar duration. Trade caravans between Ethiopia and the Sudan were utilizing both the Suakin route and the supposedly more perilous western route. . (Pankhurst, 1975) Commerce between Ethiopia and the Sudan in the early nineteenth century was, for all these reasons, much diminished but was still by no means insignificant. This is evident from the fact that Shendy and several other Sudanese regions continued to be in commercial contact with Gondar, and to a lesser extent, areas of western Ethiopia. (Yagya, 1990)

The two nation shared 2000 km non-demarcated boundary and Sudan's role as a gateway to external interventions, potentially detrimental to Ethiopia's national interests, have necessitated closer attention. Despite the challenges in both states and their visible spillover effect, efforts have been made to address the constant tension. Moreover, mutual perceptions, both imagined and concrete, that each harbors destabilizing elements intent on overthrowing the ruling party/regime of the other, further exacerbate the situation. (Taha, 1978)

Since African nations gained independence, border demarcation has been a persistent cause of disputes and conflicts. According to the African Union, approximately two-thirds of African state boundaries have been delineated without frontal conflict, (Institute peace and security

.2016) with only a limited number being defined by natural features such as rivers, mountains, and gorges. The lack of visible border lines has been a source of conflict and warfare among African states, including Sudan and Ethiopia. This issue introduces complexities in the geopolitical, geo-economic, and socio-economic interactions of African nations. The legacy of colonial boundary lines continues to be a source of crisis for African nations following their attainment of independence, (African Union Commission, 2014). Reckless border delineation of Ethiopia and Sudan has source of conflict in century rather to Fostering closer collaboration of state. While external interventions remain a concern, the collaborative approach reflects a positive effort to navigate challenges and improve relations between the two nations. (Yihun, 2016)

The research intended to state of relations been Sudan-Ethiopia has harshly affected by political transitions of Ethiopia in 2018 and Sudan in 2019. The local power shift of the both country have also direct impact for the border dispute, in Ethiopia prime minister Abiy Ahmed have been came power, in case of Sudan the sovereign transitional council of has been come to power over through of the former president Omar Hassan AL Bashir. The researcher clarified the change.

The ongoing border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan over the Yewuhabist area, also known as Al-Fashaga, has been further complicated by recent instability in the region, particularly the conflict in Tigray. According to a report by Getahun (2021), the border dispute has not only been frontal but also ideological or based on differing naming conventions. Narratives from Sudanese scholars and Ethiopian literature differ in their descriptions of the border dispute (Alemayehu, 2018). The perspectives of the two states have led to different understandings of the conflict. While Sudanese scholars refer to the disputed area as the Al-Fashaga triangle, Ethiopian calls the conflict area as Al-Fashaga. The physical frontier dispute spans hundreds of kilometers, extending from Setit to Nefs Gebeya, with the Quara border line serving as a shared boundary. This fertile land is suitable for agricultural activities. The researcher assessed these recent developments in the border conflict underscore the complexity and volatility of the situation.

1.2. Statement of the problem

The Ethiopia-Sudan border dispute has persisted for over a century, oscillating between violent conflicts and minor disputes. This protracted conflict has strained bilateral relations, disrupted interactions among local communities, and hindered cultural exchanges. The Al-Fashaga (Yewuhabist) corridor, which is economically and geostrategically significant, remains a focal point of contention. Recent global phenomena have increasingly challenged the security frameworks of interstate relations (Sprize and Nahmis, 2001). The Ethiopia-Sudan border conflict has compromised state security, resulting in socio-economic, geopolitical, and geo-economic crises. Divergent narratives from Sudanese and Ethiopian scholars further complicate the situation, reflecting differing ideological perspectives on the dispute (Alemayehu, 2018).

The root of the conflict can be traced back to the colonial-era demarcation by Colonel Charles Gwyn in 1907. Ethiopian scholars argue that Gwyn's unilateral border delineation ignored Ethiopian inputs and violated treaties with Emperor Menelik, while Sudanese scholars highlight the logistical challenges of the delimitation process (Wondwosen T, 2009). These colonial legacies continue to influence local communities and state securities, fueling ongoing disputes.

The conflict has been marked by incidents of violence and clashes between armed forces and local communities, exacerbating security concerns and further straining Ethiopia-Sudan relations. Economic interests, such as access to fertile agricultural land, trade routes, and natural resources, have heightened the conflict. This has attracted third-party interventions from international organizations, regional bodies, and countries with vested interests (Jonas and Ahmed, 2023).

This study investigates the implications of the border dispute on regional stability, security, and development. It examines the role of international actors in either exacerbating or mitigating the conflict and explores the perceptions and interests of local communities and stakeholders. The research aims to identify potential avenues for conflict resolution and sustainable peacebuilding efforts.

Political transitions since 2018 in both Ethiopia and Sudan have further complicated the border dispute. The rise to power of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Ethiopia and the establishment of the Sovereign Transitional Council in Sudan following President Omar Hassan al-Bashir's

ousting have significantly impacted bilateral relations. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for addressing the border dispute comprehensively, considering historical, political, economic, and social factors.

The research aims to provide an in-depth analysis of how regime changes have influenced the evolving nature of the dispute, the underlying factors contributing to its escalation, and the impact on regional stability. It emphasizes the importance of historical context, political transitions, economic competition, and international interventions in shaping the conflict dynamics. The study underscores the need for a multifaceted approach to conflict resolution, focusing on sustainable peace building and cooperative border management strategies.

1.3. The central argument

The Al-Fashaga region, also known as Yewuhabist, possesses significant economic value due to its fertile agricultural resources and abundant water supply, making it a critical asset for both Ethiopia and Sudan. However, this valuable "bread basket" has become a major source of contention, escalating into an intense border conflict. The recent aggravation of this conflict, exacerbated by the Tigray war in Ethiopia, has transformed Al-Fashaga into a focal point of regional, ethnic, and international instability.

This study argues that the Al-Fashaga border dispute is not merely a bilateral issue but a significant source of regional instability, with the potential to attract international intervention due to its geostrategic importance. The conflict's persistence and escalation highlight the failure to address deeply rooted historical grievances and contemporary geopolitical interests. The study will explore the causes and contributors of the dispute, critically analyzing its impact on regional growth and development, and examining potential future scenarios for Yewuhabist.

Furthermore, this research contends that the dynamics of the Al-Fashaga conflict present opportunities for major powers to intervene, further complicating the already intricate local, interstate, and international dimensions of the dispute. By providing a comprehensive analysis, this paper aims to shed light on the multifaceted nature of the border conflict, arguing that a nuanced understanding of these dynamics is essential for developing effective conflict resolution strategies. It asserts that addressing the historical, political, and economic dimensions of the conflict is crucial for achieving sustainable peace and stability in the region.

1.4. Objectives of the study

The Al-Fashaga region, also known as Yewuhabist, has long been a contentious area between Ethiopia and Sudan due to its significant economic value, rich agricultural resources, and ample water supply for irrigation. This region, often referred to as the "bread basket," has become a focal point of intensified border conflicts, particularly exacerbated by the Tigray war in Ethiopia. The recent escalation has not only threatened local stability but also introduced ethnic and international dimensions to the conflict. Understanding the complexities of this dispute is crucial for devising effective resolution strategies that can foster regional stability and development.

1.4.1. General Objectives of the study

The overall objective of this thesis is exploring the dynamics of the border dispute of Al-fashaga recent turmoil of the conflict since 2018.

1.4.2. Specific objectives of the study

The specific objectives of this research are to:

- Explore the root causes and recent developments of the Yewuhabist conflict.
- Investigate the triggering factors that exacerbate the dispute.
- Identify the participants involved in the Yewuhabist dispute.
- Determine the interests at stake in the Yewuhabist region.

This study aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Al-Fashaga conflict by delving into its historical context, current dynamics, and the various stakeholders' roles and interests. By achieving these objectives, the research seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of the conflict and propose informed strategies for sustainable peace and cooperation in the region.

1.5. Research questions

The Al-Fashaga region, colloquially known as Yewuhabist, stands as a critical nexus of economic and geopolitical significance, boasting abundant agricultural resources and vital water reservoirs. However, its strategic value has been overshadowed by persistent tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan, leading to protracted border disputes. Recent escalations, notably

exacerbated by the Tigray conflict in Ethiopia, have underscored the volatile nature of this region, prompting a need for deeper examination. In light of these complexities, this study seeks to unravel the underlying causes and dynamics of the Yewuhabist conflict, probing into its historical roots, contemporary triggers, involved stakeholders, and vested interests.

1.5.1. Over all question of the research

What are the root causes and recent developments of the Yewuhabist conflict, and what triggering factors exacerbate the dispute?

1.5.2. Specific question of this research

The specific questions of this research is

1. What historical factors have contributed to the emergence and persistence of the Yewuhabist conflict?
2. How have recent developments, including the Tigray conflict in Ethiopia, impacted the dynamics of the Yewuhabist dispute?
3. Who are the primary stakeholders involved in the Yewuhabist conflict, and what are their respective roles and interests?
4. What are the key triggering factors that exacerbate tensions and escalate the conflict in the Yewuhabist region?

By addressing these sub-questions, the study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the Yewuhabist conflict, paving the way for informed interventions and sustainable peace building efforts in the region.

1.6. Methodology and techniques of the study

According to Paulo Ugwnowo (2016), methodology is the systematic techniques used to produce research articles by compiling theoretical investigation of the research principles. Research methodology is an orderly system that serves to establish procedures for selecting and examining data related to the study. It is helpful in providing guidance and illustrations on how to study and explain the method of analysis (Goundar, 2016).

Research methods are strategic procedures and techniques used for collecting data or evidence, aimed at uncovering new insights and information (Prize, 2001). Methodology, on the other hand, is the intricate formulation of theories crucial for hypothesizing and elucidating the complexities of researched issues. It plays a pivotal role in elaborating and developing theories and scientific understanding (Samra, 2021).

Scholars often emphasize the distinction between research methodology and methods, asserting that methodology focus on theoretical frameworks, while methods concentrate on the collection of data (University of Newcastle, 2023). Various types of research methods exist, including qualitative, quantitative, and mixed research methods. In this particular study, the researcher employed a qualitative research method due to its capacity to offer robust and explorative insights into the experiences of individuals, drawing on a broad range of textual information and conceptual evidence (FHI, 2005).

Qualitative research method has coached by different type of insight. Such as phenomenological,(in-depth interview).focused group discussion, ethnographic, content analysis, case study, historical study and action research. The researcher developed this paper by using in-depth interview and content analysis methods.

Qualitative data proves beneficial for capturing the lifelong experiences, feelings, and behaviors of individuals relevant to the research issues. It facilitates the collection of culturally rich and contextually meaningful evidence, supporting the development of comprehensive solutions (Mack and Miliy, 2005). In the context of the Ethiopia-Sudan border dispute, qualitative methods bring forth explorative evidence to shed light on the intricacies of the conflict.

1.6.1 Research Design

The researcher employed Constructivist Design and Content Analysis Design of qualitative method. Content Analysis Design entails the systematic analysis of textual, visual, or audio data to identify themes, patterns, and meanings within the data. Constructivist Design involves exploring how individuals or groups construct reality and knowledge through their interactions and interpretations of the world around them. Depending on the research goals and objectives, aims those design have been important to understand complex social phenomena and explore subjective experiences through in-depth exploration. It relies on non-numerical data, such as interviews, observations, and textual analysis. Qualitative research employs various techniques such as structured and non-structured interviews, Qualitative research employs various techniques such as structured and non-structured interviews, focused group observation, document analysis, and oral history (University of Newcastle, 2023). For this specific study, the researcher utilized interview techniques and document analysis together to explore the evidence. Given the complexities of the Yewuhabist border dispute, purposive sampling was employed to select individuals with in-depth knowledge. Key informant interviews, conducted both face-to-face and via telephone, were instrumental in obtaining nuanced perspectives from individuals well-versed in the border treaties and recent developments in the area.

1.6.2. Targeted population and source of data

The researcher made diligent efforts to gather sufficient information to comprehensively address the specific objectives. The interviewees were purposefully selected from the relevant areas. Such as: researchers, diplomats, local communities of the border former local administrator' s academicians and politicians of both countries. The key informant interviews selected based on their approach of the issues and knowledge to the study topic. Therefore, a minimum of twelve 12 key informants have been encompassed. Such as diplomat' s researcher, politician' s journalists and local community members from various backgrounds were interviewed to gather comprehensive insights. These interviewees included representatives from the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, scholars from institute of Peace and Security at Addis Ababa

University, border researchers from foreign affair institute, advisors from political parties, historical researcher from wollo university, members of the Sudanese community in Ethiopia, Sudanic citizen journalist based in Addis Ababa and diplomats of Sudan embassy of Addis Ababa.. In addition, experts specializing in the study of Ethiopia-Sudan border dispute were also interviewed.

To supplement the primary data gathered through interviews, a diverse array of secondary sources was utilized. These sources include books, magazines, news outlets, newspapers, broadcast media, journals, and articles, all contributing to the wealth of information available to the researcher.

1.6.3. Data Collection

The Researcher employed primary and secondary data collection in interview and document analyzing. In this paper to seek of clarified information the researcher used In-depth interviews for allow researchers to gather detailed data directly from interview. According to complexity of the dispute it needs depth information. it conduct structured or semi-structured and unstructured interviews, exploring participants' perspectives, experiences, and beliefs. The researcher also used phone call interviews to get local communities view.

1.6.4. Data Analysis and Interpretation

The paper used Qualitative analysis methods to derive meaningful insights and exploring the dispute In interviews conducted with border communities, researchers politicians academicians and diplomacy professionals put there clarification with the understanding of responding the research question and problem of statement

The qualitative data analysis of this paper reveals several key insights related to the impact of resource competition on the Ethiopia and Sudan border dispute, the competition beyond local communities. Both Ethiopia and Sudan seeking to secure their economic interests with ensure access to valuable resources. The analysis vividly explored how the recent dispute has intensified as the interviewer responds. The data analysis also used mixing the document with key informant views for gaining detail and depth exploration.

1.7. The scope and delimitation of the study

The scope of the research paper focuses on the dispute of Alfashaga (Yewuhabist) between Ethiopia and Sudan since 2018, Ethiopia and Sudan have neighborhood of 753 kilometer long border search and claim areas. But The paper specifically examines the dynamics of border issues in a 264 km² area, and explores the broader relationship and negotiating between the two countries. The paper analyzes the new dynamics of the Yewuhabist dispute that emerged after the regime change had been happened both Ethiopia and Sudan since 2018. The researcher targeted to the potential short-term and long-term implications of this tension on both countries and attempts to address why the border conflict remains unresolved and ongoing. This study is not cover all border Area of the two countries it covered only Alfashaga triangle. There have different Cause of raising this dynamical border conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan but the researcher intended only regime change external interference resource computation colonial border legacies.

1.8. Significance of the study

The research holds significant policy implications not only for the governments of Ethiopia and Sudan but also for regional and international stakeholders invested in the stability and prosperity of the Horn of Africa. By undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the conflict dynamics surrounding the Ethiopia and Sudan border dispute, policymakers are presented with a nuanced understanding of the root causes, triggers, and potential avenues for resolution. This understanding is indispensable for the development and implementation of effective policy interventions aimed at promoting sustainable peace, stability, and cooperation in the region.

Specifically, the research offers policymakers the opportunity to delve deep into the historical, socio-economic, and geopolitical factors that have contributed to the border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan. By uncovering these underlying drivers, policymakers can address not only the immediate manifestations of the conflict but also its structural and systemic roots. This holistic approach is essential for formulating policies that address the conflict's multifaceted nature and promote lasting peace and reconciliation.

Furthermore, the research provides policymakers with insights into the perspectives and interests of the parties involved in the dispute, including local communities, ethnic groups, and external

actors. By understanding the diverse range of stakeholders and their motivations, policymakers can develop inclusive and contextually relevant strategies for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Additionally, the research sheds light on the potential role of regional and international actors in either exacerbating or mitigating the conflict, offering policymakers valuable insights into opportunities for collaboration and diplomacy.

Overall, the research serves as a valuable resource for policymakers seeking to navigate the complexities of the Ethiopia and Sudan border dispute and to contribute to the promotion of peace, stability, and cooperation in the Horn of Africa region. Through evidence-based analysis and informed policymaking, stakeholders can work towards addressing the root causes of the conflict and fostering a more peaceful and prosperous future for the people of Ethiopia, Sudan, and the wider region.

1.9. Limitation of the study

While this research provides valuable insights into the dynamics of the Ethiopia and Sudan border dispute, several limitations warrant consideration. Firstly, the small sample size utilized in this study may constrain the generalizability of the findings. With only three Sudanese citizens interviewed, there is a risk that the perspectives shared may not fully represent the diversity of opinions and experiences pertaining to the disputed location of Budget. The limited number of participants may also restrict the breadth of insights gleaned from the interviews, potentially overlooking important nuances and perspectives.

Moreover, the absence of physical visits to the contested site represents a notable limitation. On-the-ground investigation could have provided firsthand insights and contextual understanding that may have enriched the data collected through interviews. By immersing oneself in the local environment, researchers could have observed firsthand the socio-economic, cultural, and geographical dynamics shaping the border dispute. The lack of such field visits may have implications for the accuracy and depth of the data collected, potentially leading to gaps in understanding and interpretation.

To mitigate these limitations, future research endeavors could adopt several approaches. Firstly, researchers could consider expanding the sample size to include a more diverse range of

participants, encompassing individuals from different demographic backgrounds, professional roles, and geographical locations. This would facilitate a more comprehensive exploration of the various perspectives and experiences related to the border dispute. Additionally, incorporating field visits to the disputed location would offer researchers the opportunity to engage directly with the local context, gaining firsthand insights and enriching the data collection process. By adopting these strategies, future research could enhance the robustness and validity of findings,

1.10. Organization of the study

The researcher organized this paper by five chapters. Chapter one have introduction of the study, statement of the problem, central argument, objective of the study, research questions, research methodology ethical consideration of the paper, Scope contributing to a deeper understanding of the Ethiopia and Sudan border disputes Of the study and organization. Chapter Two had been exploring the theoretical understanding of international relations and this research paper. Chapter three contributes literature reviews of the study. Chapter four had dealing the dynamics of border dispute on Yewuhabist area using on primary source and document analysis of secondary source to sufficiently reflect the development, change, and prospects of the dispute and analyzing the issues. The last unites of chapter five had including conclusion and recommendation. Well discussed briefly.

CHAPTER TWO

2. Review of related literature

2.1. Introduction

This chapter has explained the theoretical and conceptual frame works of the thesis. The theory helps opened the view of the eye as concrete knowledge of the issues and help build base line of the issues. The theoretical framing have helps the researcher related issues of the main ideas to frame the scientific researcher. This chapter has manly based background and baseline knowledge of the main issues as discussed the following.

2.2. Establishing the theory

International relations theories encompass conceptual frameworks and ideas that delve into the exploration of ideologies. According to Burchile and Andrew (2005), these theories constitute a set of principles and existing concepts. The focal point of these theoretical frameworks often revolves around the concept of national interest, which is primarily centered on attaining economic growth, safeguarding sovereignty, building hegemonic power, and ensuring security.

Theories of international relations serve as a lens through which the global system is comprehended, offering diverse perspectives that illuminate complex realities. As Stephen and Rose aptly describe, "theories are like maps," providing condensed points of reference for understanding international relations knowledge. Each theory functions like a map, crafted with specific aims to guide users in their interpretation, helping to dispel misunderstandings and clarify ways of thinking (Walter, Gold and McGlinchey, 2013).

International Relations (IR) theory encompasses diverse perspectives that offer insights into the complexities of global interactions. Feminist International Relations Theory scrutinizes gender dynamics, highlighting the role of women and power relations. Constructivism delves into the influence of ideas, norms, and identities on international relations, emphasizing the non-material aspects of state behavior. Liberalism prioritizes cooperation, international institutions, and the advancement of democratic values for fostering global stability. Realism adopts a pessimistic view, focusing on state power and national interest as driving forces, while Marxism interprets international relations through economic structures and class struggle. Classical Realism

underscores human nature and power politics, while Neorealism concentrates on the structural aspects of the international system. Capitalist Peace posits that economic interdependence between states reduces conflict, and the English School examines shared norms and institutions within an international society. Collectively, these theories contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the intricate dynamics shaping the global landscape. (Schienflug and Walter, 2005).

This research paper, we have selected the theoretical frameworks of Realism, Liberal Institutionalism, Dependency Theory and post colonialism theory. Realism is utilized to analyze the conflict experience in the Ethiopia-Sudan border dispute. In the conclusion chapter of the discussion, Liberal Institutionalism is applied to explore cause-and-effect relationships within the institutional framework. Dependency Theory is employed to assess how external powers have exploited African resources and contributed to the exacerbation of the conflict.

Additionally, Post-colonial theory is employed in this paper. It attempts to illustrate how European powers have imposed their culture and ideology on Africa, becoming a source of conflict even after the attainment of state freedom.

2.3. Realism

The basics of international relation theory realism is rivalry and conflict parts of IR school of the thought thinks that still the realist theory of implementation had not happened to till. But back in 431 BC, Thucydides history of the peloponestation war had a best example of theory. But theory pattern of the occurrence have continuing on much way.

As the scholars of realist state are the main actor and the centers of philosophy in realism. So it leads to nation interest are the most untouchable aim of the state during war. The decider of the state is logical thinker of the state lastly state or nation survives anarchy contextual war. (McGlichey,walter.). The security institution of the state is instrument such as military. Police, and court are non-expected or anarchy instrument of the nation. Human nature is :||naturally egoistic || fo0r aspire of seeking power the selfish behavior of personality raised from nature of human

One of the liberal thinker Nicholas Machiavelli study that how individual egoism affected that state security. in this study the leaders are made that directly affected the state stability and

political system of the basement, the main leader thinker over the vulnerable duties of leader are accompanied state security , the task measures ordering of power security to attained national interest.

The governor thinks over moral ethics of personalities confining the decision of leader rather than religious morality. After WWII another liberal thinker Hans Morgenthau states that the political governed of ruler had makes human nature rose from individual ethics, But administrated by rule of law. He developed IR compressive theories of Ir managed and controlled by real politics. He state out the morality and interest affected international realism theory and practice of global relation. Every political decision power development implementation and administration of control had Idealism inability manifesting of this, if he policy maker based on their ideal morality it is weakens of makers.

Another scholars of realist Keneth Waltz 1979 developing IR theories that; puts hypothesis of human nature and power using. Realism theory modernization state out structural realism are another calling neo realism, he state out structural realism another calling neorealism he state out every national decision and power implementation had directives with human nature. The state or global anarchy has measured on physical power enabling as the theoretical of the political power and state behavior is reflection of political power practitioner of ruler in case of the realism. Theory is more near to real power use of reality world and may be more understanding and best them other theory, but the theory are used that realism Unable to predict explaining major current transforming political development after the end of cold war in the 1991 the global political dynamics has vastly changed new era of political significance has occurred. But they blamed that realism only focused of solid implementation of power and state. this solid element of world system (McGlinchey,Walter schinpflug.2017).

The core conclusion of neo realism thinker has seeking anarchy of state. the power of great influencer has treat other non-government of less power always hampered over. The balance scholars think developing political party is better for minimizing risk of anarchy party. (Burchile, Link-laterDonney,Peterson,reouse-smith and true,2005).

The fundamental tenets of international relations theory emphasize that realism centers around rivalry and conflict. Some within the realm of IR thought argue that the practical implementation of realist theory has yet to fully materialize. However, dating back to 431 BC, Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War serves as a compelling early example of realist theory in action, and its patterns persist in various ways.

In the realist perspective, the state is identified as the primary actor and the focal point of philosophical consideration. This outlook asserts that national interest stands as the paramount objective of the state, especially during times of war. Decision-makers within the state are viewed as logical thinkers, ultimately steering the nation through the context of an anarchic war (McGlichey, Walter, Schenpfulg, 2017). The security apparatus of the state, including military, police, and the judiciary, is seen as indispensable tools in the face of potential anarchy. Realists characterize human nature as inherently egoistic, driven by a natural inclination to seek power.

Nicholas Machiavelli delve into how individual egoism can impact state security. Leaders play a direct role in influencing state stability and the political system. Leaders, as per this study, bear the responsibility for safeguarding state security and must employ measures that align with national interest. This theoretical foundation offers insight into how the president of the Sudan Sovereign Council may have intensified the dispute between the two countries, impacting the national interests of both Sudan and Ethiopia.

Hans Morgenthau, another realist thinker post-WWII, contends that political governance should be guided by individual ethics but administered through the rule of law. He developed comprehensive IR theories centered on real politics, arguing that morality and interest influence international realism theory and the practice of global relations. Morgenthau posits that idealistic moral policies weaken decision-makers, a perspective with relevance to the Sudan-Ethiopia border conflict, particularly during the Tigray war.

Kenneth Waltz, in 1979, further contributed to IR theories by proposing hypotheses regarding human nature and the use of power. His theory, often referred to as structural realism or neorealism, contends that every national decision and power implementation is influenced by human nature. While realism is considered to be more attuned to real-world power dynamics,

critics argue that it falls short in predicting and explaining major political developments, especially after the end of the Cold War in 1991.

Neo-realists, at their core, seek to understand the anarchic nature of states. Influential powers tend to treat less powerful, non-governmental entities with a sense of dominance. Some balance scholars argue that developing political parties is a preferable strategy for minimizing the risks associated with anarchic tendencies (Burchile, Link-later Donney, Peterson, Reouse-Smith, and True, 2005). This perspective holds significant importance in the evolving landscape of global political dynamics.

2.4. Institutional liberalism theory

Liberal institutionalism, also known as institutional liberalism, is a theory that took root in the late 19th century within the realm of international relations. This theory posits that international cooperation between states and governments is not only necessary but also sustainable. Edward Koldozej, through his work on security and international relations, and Robert Keohan, in the book "Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism," has significantly contributed to the development of this theory. Liberal institutionalism advocates for cooperation among diverse actors on both economic and political fronts. The underlying principle is that power must be harnessed to secure social interests and facilitate cooperation based on shared interests.

Some scholars interpret this sophisticated form of liberalism as institutional liberalism, asserting that cooperation is a source of economic prosperity and a means of minimizing conflicts in the realm of international security. Institutions, such as multinational organizations like the United Nations, the African Union, UNICEF, and the International Monetary Fund, legally intensify cooperation and serve as sources of peace.

In addressing the security dilemma and armed struggles between states, this theory advocates for dialogue, discussion, and friendly talks through bilateral diplomacy. Scholars emphasize the importance of bilateral diplomacy as a needed solution to the Ethiopia-Sudan border conflict. The theory is particularly pertinent in the conclusion section of the paper, as it calls for an institutional approach to escape conflicts.

Edward defines institutional liberalism as the institution itself, emphasizing its importance in understanding and defining actors involved in conflicts. He argues that it vividly reflects the real

actors of disputes involving state and non-state entities, offering a perspective distinct from realist theory. In the current political landscape, states are interdependent, with both state and non-state actors establishing their own roles, goals, and power dynamics to achieve their aims.

Like realism theory, liberal institutionalism attempts to integrate anarchy and egoism within the framework of interdependent states. While state actors are crucial, the theory acknowledges that problems involving interdependent actors cannot be solved sequentially. Instead, it seeks solutions as occurrences escalate. In situations of serious danger, instability, or war, the responsibility falls on state actors to make decisive decisions in the domain of policy issues.

When it comes to the relationship between two states, decisions for secure and perpetual peace are serious and highly recommended. This emanates from state behavior, and institutionalism asserts that decisions on high and low politics are guided by the conception of state interest. State behavior involves interactions with both non-governmental and governmental organizations.

Institutionalism suggests that coercive and military institutional power is less important than cooperation. Collective action becomes a valuable source of solutions, as it enables the community to restrain state power and avoid the use of military force. The theory finds substantial application in the descriptive chapter (Chapter Five) of the paper.

2.5. Dependency theory

Dependency theory, a diverse school of thought ranging from right to far-left political perspectives, shares the common assumption that underdevelopment is caused by external factors. Despite the unwillingness of dependency theorists to be associated with a unified school of thought The concept that underdevelopment is connected to the disadvantage of "peripheral" nations in the global market is most fully articulated in Emmanuel's (1972) theory of unequal exchange, which superficially critiques the Ricardian doctrine of comparative advantage. The primary implication is that the terms of trade and wages must be reexamined to ensure that labor (and capital) in the periphery receive compensation in proportion to the value they produce. (Kaufman, Chernotsky, & Geller, 1975)

Dependency theory challenges the bourgeois social science notion that the primary hindrance to development lies in the inherent sociocultural traits of the "traditional" sectors in underdeveloped countries. According to this perspective, these sectors are deemed lacking in the characteristics

of the "modern" Western capitalist economies. Dependency theory rejects the idea that social history follows a linear transition from one ideal type (traditional underdeveloped society) to another (modern developed society). This critical stance is considered the most progressive aspect of dependency theory, as it highlights the role of imperialism in national oppression and underdevelopment. (Cueva, Villamil, & Fortin, 1976)

According to this definition, one can easily argue that Latin American nations were essentially "born" dependent and have, to a significant degree, continued in that state ever since. Spanish and Portuguese mercantilist interests played a decisive role in shaping the economic organization of the Iberian colonies. The New World engine and mines were primarily intended to supply Europe with foodstuffs and minerals, either directly or indirectly. (Angotti, 1981).

Another key concept is the idea that the world is categorized into "core" and "periphery," representing a widely accepted division. Although the specific terms may vary, the fundamental approach is consistent: the core consists of prosperous advanced countries, while the periphery comprises underdeveloped and impoverished nations. This distinction is also applied to describe the internal structure of individual nations, leading to the concept of the "internal colony."

Dependency theory faces a paradox as it critiques bourgeois thinking from a perspective close to Marxism while simultaneously criticizing Marxism-Leninism, using concepts from bourgeois social sciences and "desarrollista" approaches. An example of this ambiguity is seen in the discussion on feudalism and capitalism in Latin America. To align with Andre Gunder Frank's thesis that Latin America has been capitalist since the Spanish-Portuguese conquest, one needs to depart from Marx's concept of capitalism and equate it merely with a money economy. Essentially, dependency theory has attempted to transform into a type of "neo-Marxism" that deviates from Marx's original principles. (Cueva, Villamil, & Fortin, 1976)

The first influential perspective within dependency theory proposes an independent route to capitalist development or a gradual transition to socialism, aiming to overcome the historical underdevelopment legacy by gaining independence from foreign domination. However, this approach is deemed reformist, potentially perpetuating poverty and exploitation. Advocates, such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1972) and Samir Amin (1976), are seen as sophisticated proponents of this line. (Kaufman, Chernotsky, & Geller, 1975)

2.6. Post-colonial theory

This theory implies that framework and critical approach focused on literature originating from nations that were formerly, or presently are, colonies of other states. It extends its purview to literature composed by individuals from colonizing nations, which explores colonies or their inhabitants as its central theme. Central to this theory are the fundamental concepts of otherness and resistance. This critical perspective gained prominence in the 1970s and owes much of its foundation to Edward Said's influential work, "Orientalism." Said's book is often regarded as the seminal work that laid the groundwork for the incorporation of postcolonial theory into the critical discourse, becoming an integral part of the analytical studies. (John. 1998,1997)

This theory develops otherness feeling of colonized country. It delves into the intricate dynamics of colonizing culture distorts the lived experiences and realities of the colonized people. This falsehood is evident in how notions of inferiority are embedded in the literature created by colonized peoples. Despite these challenges, the literature from the colonized strives to articulate their identity and reclaim their historical narrative, navigating the complexities of an inherent otherness in their past. This body of thought goes beyond a singular focus, addressing a spectrum of dimensions including the political, aesthetic, economic, historical, and social aspects influenced by colonialism. (Cueva, Villamil, & Fortin, 1976)

In exploring the political facet, postcolonial theory scrutinizes the power dynamics established during colonial rule, the imposition of governance structures, and the subsequent struggles for independence. Aesthetic considerations involve examining how colonialism shaped artistic expression and cultural representations.

Economically, postcolonial theory analyzes the exploitation of resources, economic systems instituted during colonial periods, and the lasting impact on the economic structures of formerly colonized nations. The historical dimension delves into the narratives and histories constructed during colonial times, often reflecting a Eurocentric perspective. .(John. 1998,1997)

Furthermore, postcolonial theory addresses the social consequences, such as the shaping of identities, societal hierarchies, and the enduring legacy of colonial ideologies. By encompassing these diverse dimensions, postcolonial theory provides a nuanced understanding of the profound and lasting effects of European colonialism on a global scale.

Colonized nations actively work towards articulating and even celebrating their cultural identities, aiming to reclaim them from the grasp of colonizers. This involves a thorough examination of how literature from colonial powers is employed to justify colonialism by perpetuating images that portray the colonized as inferior. Despite these efforts, the pursuit of a singular definition for postcolonial theory has sparked controversy. Some writers strongly critique the entire concept, contributing to ongoing debates and discussions about its application and validity in scholarly and literary spheres. (Elam .2019)

The proactive nature of envisioning a post-colonial world aligns with the transformative goals of postcolonial theory, which seeks not only to critique the past but also to contribute to the construction of a more just and equitable future. In doing so, it becomes an integral part of a broader intellectual movement that challenges established narratives and strives for a more inclusive and egalitarian understanding of human experiences.

2.7. What is border

As Merriam-Webster dictionary border defines the boundary of a surface. A boundary serves as a demarcation between entities, often exemplified by national borders delineating countries. Occasionally, neighboring nations engage in border disputes arising from perceived unfair line drawings or strained relations. Borders, however, extend beyond geopolitical contexts. For instance, you may choose to establish a border of cabbages along your front walk or embellish the edge of your collar with a sequin border. It's crucial to exercise moderation with sequins, as an excess could verge on the bright.

Borders, which are a fundamental security concern for nations, define the geographical area that falls under a State's exclusive jurisdiction. Poorly managed border areas and unclear territorial control can lead to serious conflicts, especially in regions rich in natural resources with competing claims.(Merriam-Webster,2023)

A border is a delineating line that distinguishes between different regions, whether they are actual or human-created. These divisions serve to separate countries, states, provinces, counties, cities, and towns. The establishment of a border is indicative of the extent of control exerted by a government over a particular area. Laws and regulations are formulated and enforced exclusively within the confines of a government's jurisdiction. (Staff. 2019).

The dynamic nature of borders is evident in their susceptibility to change. Instances of one region assuming control over another may occur, while peaceful land exchanges or sales are alternative means of border adjustments. Additionally, post-war scenarios often witness the reconfiguration of land divisions among governments. (National Geographic Society. 2019).

On occasion, borders align with natural features such as rivers or mountain ranges. An illustration of this is the boundary between France and Spain, which traces the crest of the Pyrenees Mountains. Similarly, a section of the border separating the United States and Mexico is defined by the course of the Rio Grande River. Borders, particularly those between nations, exert a significant influence on travel. They play a crucial role in shaping the experiences of individuals moving from one country to another.

Countries sharing comparable economic prosperity and governance structures often exhibit a more accommodating stance toward each other. Such nations frequently maintain open borders, devoid of military presence, fostering a sense of mutual welcome and cooperation. (Carl, 1989)

2.8. Patterns and thinking of African Border dispute

Africa is a continent that has been divided in various ways, leading to debates on its geographical, sociological, and political implications. Borders play a significant role in shaping identities, fostering conflicts, and defining state sovereignty. The arbitrary division of Africa by European powers during the 1885 Berlin Conference disregarded the interests and histories of African communities, leading to the establishment of colonial borders that became international boundaries upon independence. Despite decades passing since independence, border issues continue to impact African states, influencing territorial disputes, armed conflicts, national security, refugee concerns, regional integration, sovereignty, smuggling, and trade disputes. (Peace and Security Department. 2016).

African nations have been hesitant to address border modifications, fearing potential fragmentation and instability. The sensitivity surrounding border issues is heightened during periods of anti-government rebel activities or smuggling. The reluctance to alter borders stems from the fear of opening a Pandora's Box that could lead to further division.

The demand for Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia in the 1960s highlighted divisions among African countries, with some advocating for respecting inherited colonial borders to maintain stability. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) urged African nations to uphold these borders, emphasizing the complexities and risks associated with border modifications. (Peace and security Department .2019).

In pre-colonial times, African states had sovereign borders that were shaped by the establishment and dissolution of kingdoms and chieftaincies. However, these borders were not always defined by hard geographical lines as seen in European colonial borders. This ambiguity in border demarcation led to uncertain governance in peripheral regions within traditional African states. Throughout African history, large populations or ethnic groups often migrated, leading to repeated shifts in territorial boundaries. (Neguendi. 2012)

In border issues, international relation scholars discussions two opposing views - the revisionists and the anti-revisionists. The revisionists advocate for a reconfiguration of Africa's borders and state system to address issues of sociological disparity, enhance economic viability, and tackle crises related to legitimacy, identity, development, and integration. They argue that the current post-colonial state structure in Africa is incompatible with the societies and communities on the continent, and will always struggle to align with the traditional Westphalia state system.

The anti-revisionists believe that maintaining the current borders in Africa is important because borders worldwide are artificial and there is no strong case for African exceptionalism they argue that while African borders may be arbitrary, they have not had as many negative effects as suggested by revisionists and have actually provided opportunities for African people and aided in state consolidation. They also argue that attempting to change these borders would be too costly and the potential benefits are only hypothetical.

During the period when countries were gaining independence, the idea of maintaining existing borders in Africa, known as the "anti-revisionist" stance, was favored by both departing colonial powers and emerging African leaders. This perspective was evident in the inclusion of the principle of respecting national boundaries in the 1963 OAU Charter, which emphasized sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the independent existence of each member state. Despite

this commitment to existing borders, African leaders acknowledged that these boundaries could lead to conflicts and thus established guidelines for peacefully resolving disputes. This was exemplified by the adoption of resolution AHG/Res.16 (1) during the First Ordinary Session of Heads of State and Government in Cairo in July 1964. (African Union Border Programme .2019)

The Horn of Africa has undergone a distinct form of state formation, deviating from the typical state-building processes observed across the continent. Unlike in other regions where European imperialism largely determined states and boundaries, Ethiopia has played a significant role in shaping state borders in the Horn. Consequently, it has been viewed by some neighbors as a colonial and expansionist state. This historical context has had profound implications on inter-state relations, particularly regarding border issues. The Horn of Africa is home to diverse states with varying forms of statehood, yet a common theme is the neglect of peripheral regions by central authorities.

For numerous decades, the Horn of Africa has been a hotspot for both intra-state and inter-state conflicts, giving rise to some of Africa's most intricate crises. Despite the internal origins of most conflicts in the region, their impact has been intensified by a recurring pattern of neighboring states intervening and interfering in each other's domestic affairs. Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, and Eritrea have all grappled with significant legitimacy crises, creating a tangled network of domestic political tensions that easily spill across fluid inter-state borders. . (Neguendi. 2012)

In addressing their internal political and security challenges, the states in the region have often sought support from insurgents and dissatisfied groups in neighboring countries. This dynamic reflects a strategy employed by these states to navigate their own internal issues by enlisting assistance from external sources, further complicating the already intricate web of regional relationships.

In 1948, Ethiopia gained control of the predominantly Somali-inhabited Haud and Ogaden regions. Additionally, Eritrea became a federated territory of Ethiopia in 1952 following Ethiopia's diplomatic maneuvers. However, a decade later, Ethiopia unilaterally transformed Eritrea from a federated territory to one of its provinces with limited autonomy, violating the terms of the federal arrangement. This action triggered a 32-year war of independence,

concluding in 1993 with a referendum resulting in Eritrea's independence. The perception of Ethiopia as a 'black imperial state' has left a lasting legacy of complex border relations in the region, challenging the continent's norm of maintaining a territorial status quo. (Peace and security Department.2019).

When conflicts in the central regions drive border disputes, the border itself becomes a focal point for national security concerns. This frequently leads to armed conflicts and violent border disputes that fail to benefit or address the needs of border communities. In contrast, when states maintain ambiguity towards border issues, it is less likely for conflicts to escalate into violence. In such cases, the lack of clear state intervention can prevent violent outcomes and promote stability in border regions. Many boundary disputes stem from inaccurate delimitation of boundaries by former colonial powers. After decolonization, these unclear colonial boundaries became the international borders between independent states, leading to uncertainty and disputes over sovereign control. (Besley And Querol.2014)

Boundary disputes between states can also arise when there are conflicting descriptions or depictions of boundary alignments, and the relevant states disagree on which boundary should be recognized. This type of dispute typically originates from situations where two colonial powers both claimed or administered the same piece of remote or inhospitable territory. Examples of such disputes include the conflict between Chad and Libya over the Aouzou Strip and the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula. (Kornprobst.2020)

Even when states agree on a specific boundary, disputes can still occur over how that boundary is physically marked on the ground. This issue is common in Africa, especially between states that were previously under the same colonial administration. Colonial powers often defined boundaries between their territories imprecisely, leading to discrepancies in maps and legal documents. An example of this is the boundary dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali after gaining independence from France.

Disputes can arise when two states have never agreed on a boundary between their territories and both claim ownership of a specific area. This was more common in the past when centralized state control was not established in certain regions land boundary disputes have become common in recent years in Africa. (Hugues.2018)

2.9. Colonial legacies and colonial impacts of African border dispute

The Scramble for Africa launched with the Berlin Conference (1884- 85) and concluded in the

early twentieth century. Throughout this period, European colonizers divided Africa into spheres of influence, colonies, and distinct segments. The partitioning process was carried out from European capitals, often with limited understanding of Africa's geography, history, and ethnic composition. As a consequence of these colonial partitions, numerous African countries have populations that are significantly divided among various ethnic groups.

Between 1900 and 1930, European powers conducted cartographic surveys through boundary commissions, solidifying their control over colonies. However, these surveys primarily focused on land control, neglecting the repercussions of partitioning on ethnic groups. The establishment of artificial borders resulted in the separation of closely related ethnic groups across different colonial regions. In the Horn of Africa, for instance, the Somalis were divided among French Somaliland, British Somalia, Italian Somalia, Ethiopian Somalia, and the Somali region of northern Kenya. This division had profound effects on the Somali people, who share common culture, a similar way of life, and the same religion but live as separate citizens of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. Similarly, the Afar people of Ethiopia were divided among Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, while the Anyuaa and Nuer were split between Ethiopia and South Sudan. (Aluede.2017).

The imposition of artificial borders constrained the movement of African communities in their daily activities and nomadic practices, resulting in economic hardship and social inconvenience. The alteration of lifestyle and structural systems negatively impacted traditional life, administrative structures, and economic well-being. This restriction deprived African borderland communities of economic opportunities by hindering their movements and forcing them to adopt a lifestyle different from their traditional one. For instance, many Africans are pastoralist and nomadic, requiring vast land for grazing and water. However, artificial borders confined borderland people to herding on limited land, leading to resource competition and confrontation due to restricted mobility with other borderland peoples.

In Africa, colonial powers merged or assimilated various independent ethnic nations across the continent, primarily driven by their political and economic interests. These actions were undertaken without considering the potential consequences on post-independence Africa. For

instance, in British and French colonial territories across West Africa, diverse ethnic nationalities some ethnic groups with no shared history were forcibly merged. (Besley And Querol.2014)

Post-independence African leaders have contributed to hindering the nation-building process by fueling ethnic rivalries within their states. Moreover, many of them exhibit a disregard for the rule of law, democratic processes, and are involved in corrupt practices. The combined impact of the colonial legacy and the actions of post-colonial African leaders has led to political instability in several African states. This instability is manifested through coup d'états, intra- and inter-state conflicts, as well as ethnic, religious, and communal tensions in countries like Nigeria, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The political instability has impeded efforts towards infrastructural and economic development, critical for the continent's progress. These challenges persistently hinder the promote on of nation-building by African leaders. The ongoing issues rooted in colonialism and the failure of continental leaders to address them continues to obstruct domestic nation-building efforts in post-independence Africa.(Tasew.2017)

Post-independence Africa has faced obstacles due to the arbitrary boundaries left on the continent by its colonial rulers. While these colonial boundaries lacked logical cohesion, they gained significance following the end of colonialism. Each territorial unit became the focal point of its own national loyalty (Emerson, 1961), fostering rivalry among newly independent African states. This rivalry has, in turn, hindered efforts aimed at fostering genuine cooperation and, by extension, nation-building. Additionally, the colonial boundaries have forged connections among ethnic groups with a shared history but separated by these imposed borders. The partitioning of the African continent not only introduced the state system but also altered the pre-existing boundary arrangements. The arbitrary demarcation of Africa in the nineteenth century, without the consent of its peoples, led to the separation of relatives, ethnic and linguistic groups, establishing the concept of international boundaries that was foreign to Africans prior to the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.(yoon.2014)

African nations gained independence with artificially drawn and poorly defined borders, often regarded as a significant source of conflict and political instability. This situation has sparked debates on whether to alter or maintain these colonial-era borders. Border-related conflicts

persist as a considerable challenge for the continent, impeding the realization of Africa's aspirations for economic, social, and political well-being. (Peace and security Department.2019).

The presence of porous borders and contested boundaries has led to an increase in criminal activities across Africa. The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons, frequently used in resolving border-related disputes, has escalated into internal conflicts in various African states. Instances of banditry and insurgency in countries like Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and the Central African Republic are partly linked to ongoing border conflicts.

The borders in Africa have generally remained unchanged since the conclusion of the colonial era, with South Sudan serving as a notable exception. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) played a vital role in fostering stability across the continent during the decolonization period in the early 1960s, effectively curbing widespread secessionist movements. However, despite this stability, disputes over borders have become a common feature in African politics. (Aluede.2017).

In Africa, there is a widespread consensus that emphasizes decolonization as a crucial norm, stemming from centuries of oppression by foreign powers. This shared understanding predates the independence of African states and was officially expressed in the 1945 Manchester Congress Declaration of the Colonial Peoples of the World. The primary goal of this declaration was to grant all colonial peoples the right to control their own destiny, even allowing the use of force as a last resort to secure independence. For example, the declaration explicitly stated that if colonial powers showed no willingness to recognize the right to self-determination, the committee would utilize all available means to assist oppressed people in achieving swift and effective independence.(Mohammed and Baba.2020)

The declaration, along with other United Nations treaties, has established a solid foundation for understanding struggles for secession, particularly in Africa. In the aftermath of World War II, various countries under colonial rule developed strategies to liberate themselves from foreign imperialist control. Independence movements worldwide have employed a range of techniques, from non-violent approaches to violent struggles. While some third-world nations achieved independence relatively peacefully, others, such as Sudan, Eritrea, and the Democratic Republic

of Congo, underwent violent struggles, including civil wars, to attain self-dependence. (Yoon.2002).

2.10. Nature and dynamics of African conflict with shaping instrument

2.10.1. Dynamics of the conflict

After the end of colonialism in Africa, the expected peace dividend was shattered as conflicts erupted in nearly all of Africa's sub regions Central Africa and the Great Lakes region grappled with conflicts in Chad, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic

of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Burundi. West Africa experienced conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. The Horn of Africa saw turmoil in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia. Southern Africa faced unrest in Lesotho, Angola, and Zimbabwe.

Despite Africa's democratization struggles in the early 1990s, which aimed to restore democratic values and human rights, some countries such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Benin, Niger and Congo-Brazzaville faced resistance to the democratization process from ruling political and military elites. This resistance resulted in "communal" violence in countries like Togo and Kenya. Political exclusion, inequalities in access to economic and social opportunities, along with issues of identity and citizenship, mass murder in Burundi, contributed to genocide in Rwanda, and civil wars in Liberia, the Central African Republic and Somalia. (International Peace Institute.2002).

The crises and conflicts in Africa are worsened by different issues like land access and resource competition. Unemployed youth in rural areas are recruited into rebel groups, leading to lawlessness and the rise of private armies and militias, as seen in countries like Uganda, Somalia. Sierra Leone, Sudan and Liberia, Interstate conflicts, differently Eritrea and Ethiopia inters the war from 1998 to 2000 its exceptional case for the above reason, and contribute to the instability. While some African states have tried to mediate conflicts, challenges remain due to the complexity of the issues, limited resources, and weak regional conflict management mechanisms. Each sub region has its own unique conflict trends that must be understood to develop effective intervention strategies. (Juma & Mengistu, 2002).

2.10.2 Conflict shaping instrument and nature of the conflict

2.10.2.1 Exploitation of natural resource by external powers

In Africa resource exploitations activities were disrupted, highlighting the role of international interventions in curbing conflict fueled by control over mineral resources. The exploitation of natural resources by these groups not only continued violence but also undermined peace processes and state-building efforts of Africa. Sierra Leone and Liberia both had been good example.

The historical grievances related to diamond mining in Sierra Leone and the control of natural resources in Liberia illustrate how economic interests intertwined with political power can fuel conflicts and hinder peace building efforts. Addressing the root causes of resource-based conflicts requires not only domestic reforms to improve transparency, governance, and accountability but also international cooperation to prevent the illicit exploitation of resources that fund violence and instability. (Yoon. 2014)

Efforts to promote sustainable development, strengthen institutions, and ensure equitable distribution of natural resource wealth are essential for addressing the underlying drivers of conflict in resource-rich African countries. By promoting responsible resource management and inclusive economic development, it is possible to mitigate the risks associated with the exploitation of minerals and prevent them from being used as tools of war and instability.

Likewise, the conflict in Liberia appeared to favor a select group of warlords leading factions such as the NPFL, the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO). These factions held sway over extensive territories abundant in natural resources. Exploiting ethnicity and military strength, these groups established dominance in a profitable export trade involving gold, iron ore, diamonds, and timber, often collaborating with commercial firms from the Europe US, and Asia. (Juma & Mengistu, 2002).

Natural resources play a crucial role in the war economy of Central Africa. This dynamic has persisted since the colonial era, with both state and private entities vying for access to the mineral wealth of the Congo. Internally, both the government, non-governmental and rebel movements generate revenue through the sale of gold, diamonds, timber, and coffee to attain

weapons, recruit troops, secure military support, and finance their war efforts. European Regional states and USA engaged in the Congo war extract resources from areas under their control. (Aluede.2017).

The issue of access and exploitation of mineral resources is fundamental and addressed perpetuate conflicts. The issue of resource access and exploitation of natural resource has to be a sustainable source of conflicts and promoting war and instability in the region and continent. And source of Prolong conflicts in Africa. Any genuine pursuit of peace must understand the direct connections between resources and war.

2.10.2.2. Accessibility's of Small Arms and Light Weapons

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Africa has had devastating consequences, leading to increased violence, conflicts, and casualties. These weapons are easily accessible, fueling conflicts and exacerbating the humanitarian impact, particularly on vulnerable populations. This arm proliferation has also enhanced border security. In addition to obtaining weaponry, young individuals in Africa have been recruited into fighting units. Governments and rebel movements have bolstered their military resources, hired armed force or employed "private security companies," and established militias to confront rivals, seize state power, and control and exploit natural resources and participating border dispute. it comment in west Africa and central Africa republic (Norbeck.1963).

In horn Africa The escalation of armed conflicts such as Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia was a notable consequence of the end of the Cold War. This transition had significant security implications for the Horn of Africa. Sub regional leaders, including Somalia's Siad Barre and Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam, who had relied on superpower support to maintain their regimes, encouraging armament of civilians for reacting internal challenges and regional issues. (Yoon. 2014)

in horn Africa militarization of populations, had bring state collapse and the withdrawal of superpowers by accompanied of widespread availability of small arms and light weapons. From Southern Sudan to Northern Uganda and Ethiopia, militias and rebel movements engaged in fights with central administrations often possess artillery comparable to that of the government. States of the Horn have been increasing their armaments, ostensibly to address security threats.

Instead of enhancing security and fostering peace, this arms buildup has accelerated the proliferation of weapons, heightened tensions, and escalated conflicts. The capacity of states to control or hold militias accountable for the proliferation of arms has significantly diminished. The continuous flow of arms and the proliferation of militias carry significant impact for interstate relations in the Horn of Africa. (Juma & Mengistu, 2002).

2.10.2.3. Ethnicity and political grievance

In Africa, there is a significant focus on ethnicity as the primary division leading to opposition and conflict. However, the practical results are somewhat inconclusive. Evidence shows that ethnic polarization is understandable rather than fractionalization. In Africa ethnicity is positively correlated with conflict. Ethnic boundaries in Africa often do not align with state boundaries, primarily due to the arbitrary borders imposed by colonial powers. These borders divided the same ethnic group into two or more countries. The border Communities overflow overpass boundaries by encompassing corresponding members in neighboring countries. (Yoon.2005).

The potential interventions cross-border ethnic Empathy as an opportunity for military intervention, of on state to others the connection between ethnic linkage and intervention was apparent in Africa have experienced different state. This intervention has systematic and uncontrolled for other state this bring political grievance over another.

Internal conflicts frequently spill across borders into neighboring countries, when rebels establish havens for there and initiate attacks on their home nation. The backing rebels receive in the host country is perceived as a security threat by the home country, leading to heightened tension and bid political grievances. Subsequently, internal contention occurs in the host country, the home nation often lends support to rebels in the host country, aiming either to deter or match the intervention. This reciprocal involvement fosters interconnectedness among internal conflicts in Africa and ethnic connectivity. Might to be State intervene if they face attacks from rebels originating in other nations. (Juma & Mengistu, 2002).

CHAPTER THREE

3.0. literature review of Ethiopia and Sudan border dispute

3.1 Introduction.

This chapter exploring the historical views of the conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan border claim. This border dispute had been started before one century ago as physical and ideal dispute. This chapter help to understand how to going more than 100 years border conflict as main Cause and triggering factor. This chapter sufficiently explores how other researchers have been written and insight the Ethiopia and Sudan border dispute. The border disputes have different dynamics of conflict horizon as internal, local side of issues and international and interstate nature of conflict have viewed by different researcher as follow.

3.2. Background of Ethio-Sudan border dispute

The delineation of the Ethiopian and Sudanese border has a history spanning over a century, marked by debates and disputes that have yet to find a conclusive resolution (Wubneh, 2019). The roots of this dispute lie in the negation and delamination process initiated by colonial powers, rather than the direct actions of Ethiopia and Sudan. The Yewuhabist border dispute gained momentum after Sudan gained independence in 1956, leading to numerous negotiations and discussions between the two nations. However, political and social complexities have hindered the attainment of a conclusive resolution (Wubneh, 2019).

The border between Ethiopia and Sudan extends for 1600 kilometers, ranging from Setit River to Metema (264 km²), referred to by different names locally, such as Alfashaga in Arabic, Alfashaga in Sudan, Mazaga in Eritrea, and Yewuhabist in Ethiopia. This triangular region has become a source of conflict between the two nations and poses a security threat to the Horn of Africa. Despite economic and social ties between Ethiopia and Sudan, border-related issues have resulted in disputes over land use and demarcation, intensifying after Sudan's declaration of freedom in the 1950s (wubneh, 2011).

The prolonged non-resolution of this dispute can be attributed to two main factors. Firstly, Sudan has supported Ethiopian separatist political groups, including Shabiya and other armed factions. Secondly, Ethiopia, on its part, has aided the Anyanya movement, a South Sudanese liberation armed group (Mulatu, 2011).

Over the past 70 years, diplomatic meetings, political allegations, and the establishment of border commissions have been attempted for dispute settlement. Despite these efforts, Sudan has maintained its position based on the 1903 Gwyn demarcation, following the Anglo-Egyptian and Ethiopian treaties of 1902, while Ethiopia contends that this demarcation is void as it was conducted without Ethiopian participation (Alemayehu, 2018).

Diplomatic settlements between Ethiopia and Sudan have failed to establish a clear position and pattern, often resorting to the "status quo" established in the 1972 note exchange (Exchange of note, 1972). Even after secret treaties signed by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and President Omar Hassan AL Bashir in the 2000s, offering Yewuhabist to Sudan, and subsequent agreements in 2015 by Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, the dispute has not seen a lasting resolution (Sudan Tribune, 2007; Sudan Tribune, 2015; Wubneh, 2011).

The recent actions in 2020, where Sudan's military seized disputed border land, reflect the lack of success in diplomatic and institutional negotiations spanning over a century. Ensuring security in the Horn of Africa is crucial, given the potential for instability to spread across the region (Fenatahun, 2018). Despite attempts at border demarcation in the 2000s and 2007, involving agreements on crop cultivation, pastoralists, and trade exchanges, citizens from both countries have continued to move into Al-Fashaga (Yewuhabist), creating uncertainties in the border dispute (International Crisis Group, 2021).

3.3. Border dispute pattern between Ethiopia and Sudan

Since African nations gained independence, border demarcation has been a persistent cause of disputes and conflicts. According to the African Union, approximately two-thirds of African state boundaries have been delineated without physical markers, with only a limited number being defined by natural features such as rivers, mountains, and gorges. The lack of visible border lines has been a source of conflict and warfare among African states, including Sudan and

Ethiopia. This issue introduces complexities in the geopolitical, geo-economic, and socio-economic interactions of African nations. The legacy of colonial boundary lines continues to be a source of crisis for African nations following their attainment of independence, as discussed during the 1964 ordinary session of the OAU. Recognizing the need to address these challenges, the African Union implemented the Africa Border Program to resolve stretched borders between African states. The borders of African states are a result of the 1885 Berlin Conference, which divided Africa among European imperialists and shaped the current map of African states, diverging from ancient and natural Africa. These demarcations have been at the root of political and geo-economic problems for African nations (African Union Commission, 2014).

Ethiopia and Sudan share a long stretch of border and have a deep historical connection as ancient African states and strategic partners in the Horn of Africa. The boundary issue between the two countries has a century-long history, serving as both a source of cooperation and conflict. The border dispute has not only been physical but also ideological or based on differing naming conventions. Narratives from Sudanese scholars and Ethiopian literature differ in their descriptions of the border dispute (Alemayehu, 2018). The perspectives of the two states have led to different understandings of the conflict. While Sudanese scholars refer to the disputed area as the Al-Fashaga triangle, Ethiopian accounts identify the conflict area as Mazega. The physical frontier dispute spans hundreds of kilometers, extending from Setit to Nefs Gebeya, with the Quara border line serving as a shared boundary. This fertile land is suitable for agricultural activities such as cotton, sesame, spice, and oilseed cultivation, making it a crucial economic resource for both countries. The area is geographically significant, featuring various rivers and plains conducive to mass crop production and animal husbandry. Sudanese accounts describe this area as connecting the eastern frontier of Sudan's breadbasket Gedarif State with western Ethiopia's Amhara region (John, 2020)..

The border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan over a 260 km² area known as Setit to Nefis Gebeya and Quara (Alfashiga) has been ongoing for over a century. Despite numerous attempts at reaching a settlement, the issue remains unresolved. Various treaties and agreements have been made in an effort to address the dispute, including the 1902 treaty between Menelik II of Ethiopia and Anglo-Sudan, secret treaties between Italy, England, and France in 1907, the 1974 exchange of note book, and a treaty in 2007 between Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia

and President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan. However, none of these agreements have provided a lasting solution to the border problem.

An important historical event in the dispute occurred on April 22, 1898, when Harington, an envoy of England, and Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia held a significant conciliation meeting in Addis Ababa. The envoy attempted to persuade the emperor to accept border delineation from Todluc to Melile based on topographical limits and tribal borders. This plan proposed that Ethiopia cede territories such as Hamran, Kedaw, Gellabat, Dabana, Dar Sumati, Dar Guba, Dar Gumz, and Bela Shangul to Anglo-Sudan. However, Emperor Menelik insisted that these territories were part of Ethiopia and refused to compromise on their ownership. He emphasized the historical and strategic importance of Bella Shangul and Metema, stating that they were historically Ethiopian territories and non-negotiable. Despite reaching an agreement to stop aggression and cooperate on border delimitation, subsequent field surveys were conducted without Menelik's recognition and knowledge, leading to ongoing conflict.

The dispute continued following the 1902 convention demarcation. This was driven by the political and economic interests of both Ethiopia and Sudan in controlling the local area and managing its economic potential. In 1972, Emperor Haileseilase of Ethiopia visited Sudan, leading to discussions and the signing of an agreement called the exchange of notes, which aimed to respect the status quo between the two nations.

The dispute persisted for 33 years until 2005 when Ethiopia and Sudan agreed to cooperate in resolving the conflict over the Yewuhabist area (Alfashiga). In 2007, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir established a team to pursue a solution. The team reached a cooperation agreement in Yewuhabist, allowing citizens of both countries to engage in farming, trade, and free movement of pastoralists in the conflict area, ultimately providing stability for local citizens.

In summary, the border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan over the Setit to Nefis Gebya and Quara (Alfashiga) area has been marked by a long history of treaties, agreements, and ongoing conflict. Despite various attempts at resolution over the years, the issue remains unresolved.

The ongoing border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan over the Yewuhabist area, also known as Al-Fashaga, has been further complicated by recent instability in the region, particularly the

conflict in Tigray. According to a report by Getahun (2021), the Sudanese military took control of Yewuhabist during the local instability in Ethiopia, with General Alburhan, the leader of Sudan's ruling council, reportedly dispatching over 6,000 soldiers to the Ethiopian border. This has escalated the long-standing tensions between the two countries and has drawn attention to the conflict in the Horn of Africa.

A recent article from Reuters (February 21, 2021) highlighted the border clash between Sudan and Ethiopia over Al-Fashaga, an area of fertile land settled by Ethiopian farmers. Sudan claims that this area lies on its side of the border, demarcated in the early 20th century, while Ethiopia rejects this claim. The Ethiopian foreign minister expressed concerns that the conflict is being amplified by the Sudanese government for ulterior motives, potentially at the expense of the Sudanese people.

Dr. Fredrico, in an article discussing the Al-Fashaga dispute, described it as a "powder keg in the heart of the Horn of Africa." He noted that as Ethiopia descended into internal conflict in 2020, Sudan swiftly took control of the disputed Al-Fashaga border region by deploying troops (Fredrico, year). This recent escalation has further exacerbated the tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan over the Yewuhabist area. These recent developments in the border conflict underscore the complexity and volatility of the situation, with potential implications for regional stability in the Horn of Africa

3.4. Detail historical progression of border treaty and border demarcation

The history of the Yewuhabist border control and dispute can be traced back to 1882 when Egypt gained full control of Sudan. This acquisition aimed to secure the headwaters of the Nile River, driven by Egypt's national interest in the Nile and competition with European powers for control of the upper stream of the river. An additional intention was to dam the upper Nile River to safeguard Egypt against potential destruction without the Nile River (Langer, 1950).

In 1898, following England's full occupation of Sudan, the Anglo-Egyptian colony was established. The primary objectives of this colony were to counter and control European superpowers seeking dominance in Africa. The second goal of the Nile Egyptian colony was to support Egypt's policy regarding Nile ownership and the occupation of the upper stream area

(Langer, 1950). This era of African colonization witnessed the partitioning of East African countries by England and Italy, with Italy annexing more Ethiopian land.

Emperor Menelik made a commitment to respect his territory and informed European powers about accepting Ethiopia's national borders, emphasizing his dedication to defending Ethiopian territory at any cost. Italian writers Andrezi Bartinniski and Yoana Mantel Niyechico, in their book on Ethiopian history, highlighted Menelik's understanding of the geopolitical dynamics and European interests in sizing up the East African region. During this period, Menelik received British missionary Reiner Rode and his team, with the missionary having two aims. The first was to normalize the Ethiopian-Sudanese border dispute, which had started around that time, and the second was to strain the strong relations between France and Emperor Menelik. However, Menelik welcomed the British missionary and expressed his understanding of European colonialist motivations and his stance on the border adjustment with Sudan. But king Menelik understand the envoy mission give Warm welcoming. ^{i.1}Menelik ye europeanun be ethiopia yalachewun yepoletica gib be agbabu teredttotal. Menelik understand how the European political affiliation needs to make. When the welcoming ceremony of Britain Missionary he expressed his affiliation about European colonialist and his border adjust with Sudan. His expression directly put as follow.

²Andand hizbochi enen endehitsan lji adrigew yayugnal laynea maraki yehonu bilchilchi negerochin ena lyu lyu tenkesaqash mechawecha sitota blew yisetugnal.

I am amused of Some European people' s thinks as am chilled. Those gifted me toys and rubbish

luggage need of reward from my sovereignty.

So the missionary failed there aim of achieving two missions. And he expressed for missionary Rode.

³Yethiopia wosen besemian behuletegnaw ena bearategnaw digre sifat mekakil yiewedkal bemisrak eske wuqiyanosu yizelqal. bemierab eskeabay yekegni tefases dires yiwerdal sil Menelik lerod yigelstal.)

¹ ማኒኢክ የአውሮፓውያኑን በኢትዮጵያ ያላቸውን የፖለቲካ ግብ በአግባቡ ተረድቶታል

² የኢትዮጵያ ወሰን በሰሜን በ2ኛው እና በአራተኛው ዲግሪ ስፋት መካከል ይወድቃል በምስራቅ አስከ ውቂያኖሱ ይዘልቃል። በምእራብ አስከአባይ የቀኝ ተፋሰስ ድረስ ይወርዳል ሲል ማኒኢክ ለሮድ ይገልጻል።(

Emperor announced that the missionary of Britain. Ethiopian border in the northern part lies in 4⁰ and 2⁰ longitudes, in the eastern part the adjacent has the ocean and In the western that adjoining the right side of the white Nile river territory of the land.

Ras tesmam besena wer 1898 nechi abay bederese giza kabay wenz bestekegni yalew yeethiopia meriat new sil Ethiopia benechi abay qebela lay ewunetegna tikim endalat maregagecha settewal.)⁴

Ras Tesema is one of Menelik officials who administered western part of sovereign Ethiopian. When he arrived at White Nile district in 1898, he announce that the Ethiopia territory include the right side of White Nile district. This announcement confirms that Ethiopian national interest has including The White Nile area of the territory.

Emperor Menelik announces that his territory had bordering of Sudan and stretched from Tomat in the north to Gedarif and in the west the junction place of White Nile and Sobat to Lake Turkana (Paulo' s 2010). Anglo Egyptian colony had established while After Britain full control

of Sudan and Egypt. The Britain interest hadn' t intended in those country territory also extending

to interests of line making between Ethiopia and Sudan, Sudan and Egypt. They didn' t to accept

Menelik claimed. There are many treaties had established on the base of Britain interest. Thos are 1900, 1901, 1902, and 1907 (Wubneh 2011)

3.4.1. The 1900 treaty

The delineation convention of 1900 marked an agreement between Ethiopia and Italy, aiming to establish the borders between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The specified border line, known as Tomat-Todluc-Mareb Muna, deviates from a straight line between Tomat and Todluc. To this day, this delineation continues to serve as the boundary line between Eritrea and Ethiopia, as outlined in the 1900 declaration.. (1900 copy of declaration)

³ የኢትዮጵያ ወሰን በሰሜን በ2ኛው እና በአራተኛው ዲግሪ ስፋት መካከል ይወድቃል በምስራቅ አስከ ውቂያኖስ ይዘልቃል። በምእራብ አስከአባይ የቀኝ ተፋሰስ ድረስ

ይወርዳል ሲል ማኒሊክ ሰርድ ይገልጻል።

⁴ራስ ተሰማም በሰኔ ወር 1898 ነጭ አባይ በቶረስ ጊዜ ከአባይ ወንዝ በስተቀኝ ያለው የኢትዮጵያ መሬት ነው ሲል ኢትዮጵያ በነጭ አባይ ቀበሌ ላይ እውነተኛ ጥቅም አንዳላት ማረጋገጫ ሰጥተዋል።

3.4.2. 1901 Declaration

The aforementioned declaration, signed in November 1901, was treated as confidential and conducted between Britain and Italy. It focused on the delineation of the border between Eritrea and Sudan. According to the declaration, the boundary was specified to extend from Abu Gamal to the junction of Umha Jira with the Setit River. The western part of this delineation was designated as Sudanese territory, while the eastern part pertained to Eritrea. Notably, this delineation line deviated from the 1900 treaties of Menelik, particularly the Tomat to Umha Jira section. This discrepancy has led to confusion between Ethiopia and Sudan. Ethiopia perceives this line as merely an imaginary direction, whereas Sudan maintains that the delineation follows a direct line connecting to the Setit River (Mulatu, 2011). The ongoing border dispute over Alfashaga or Yewuhabist can be traced back to these differences in interpretation.

3.4.3. The 1902 Treaty

The treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia, and also between Great Britain, Italy, and Ethiopia, resulted from negotiations between Menelik and British representative Colonial Harington on May 15, 1902, in Addis Ababa. This treaty holds significant importance as one of the major agreements between Ethiopia and Sudan, with each negotiator pursuing distinct objectives. On the Italian side, Signor Chicodla aimed to strengthen diplomatic relations with Menelik and cover and defend Italy from potential claims related to the Sudan and Ethiopia border treaty. On the British side, Colonial Harington had the mission of implementing British ideology, advising his country to embrace Sudan as part of the Anglo-Egyptian colony, and studying the place for practical delineation of the Ethiopia and Sudan border.

Article II of the 1902 treaty is crucial, defining the boundaries of Ethiopia and Sudan and establishing a joint boundary alienation commission. The British government assigned two teams and team leaders for border alienation. Major Gwyn surveyed the border from Sobat River to Nile River, and the second team, led by Major Austin, surveyed the south half from Rosieres on the Nile up to Lake Rudolf. Major Gwyn compiled his report in May 1900, and Major Austin concluded his report in July 1900 for Colonial Harington. Another article in Article I had a definitive part outlining general terms and the path of the boundary line (Copy of 1902 treaty).

This article served as the source of the confluence dispute idea. Article I identified major points where the border line passes through, extending from Khor Um Hajer to Galabat, the Blue Nile, Baro, Pibro, and Akobo River to Melile. However, it did not express the boundary line from Tomat to the confluence of Um Hajer and Setit River, an omission that Ethiopia does not accept.

The second point of this treaty addresses the Demarcation River, covering 16,002 kilometers and accepting Major Gwyn's report. There is a difference between the treaty text map and the actual land demarcation of the boundary, violating the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947. This article needs to be readjusted for mutual understanding and agreement.

Article II focuses on key concerns about the boundary demarcation commission representative. Ethiopia and Sudan's demarcation line was drawn by Gwyn, but it was not accepted on the Ethiopian side because Major Gwyn's border alienation was done without Ethiopian representation. Although Britain and Sudan scholars claimed inclusivity, evidence shows the exclusion of Ethiopians (Alemayehu 2015).

The second distress of this article claims that Gwyn's line deflected into Ethiopian territory, tilting down the western side of the Tekeze River, shifting the western line from demarcation from Gallabat to Um Hajer, and making changes in the central and southern parts of the boundary (Mulatu 2011).

The third concern, a source of dispute, is that Major Gwyn made the demarcation on an arc of alienation that slid three kilometers from the mountain and river line in two Ethiopian regions. The points of the mountain tilted towards the Ethiopian side, named Jebeles Jarok, Jebel Halawi, and Jebel Montana. These three main issues have been a source of ongoing conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan and are now referred to as the triangle dispute; known locally by different names involving Ethiopia, Sudan, and Eritrea.

3.4.4. Background and Formation of the 1907 Treaty

The border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan finds its origins in the 1907 treaty brokered between Britain and Ethiopia. This treaty marked a significant development, resulting in the demarcation of borders not only between Ethiopia and Sudan but also between Ethiopia and Kenya. The delineation of the Ethiopia-Sudan border spanned from the 60th parallel north to a longitude of 35° east, extending up to Lake Turkana. Major Austin, as part of Britain's 1900

mission, played a crucial role in defining this boundary. Notably, his report on border alienation was completed nearly seven years prior to the formalization of the 1907 treaty.

The signing of the treaty was notably delayed, and this delay can be attributed to significant changes occurring in both Sudan and Ethiopia during that period. The altered dynamics between the two nations necessitated careful consideration before reaching a formal agreement. The treaty was eventually signed to address the shifting circumstances and solidify the diplomatic relations between the involved parties.

Subsequent to the signing of the 1907 treaty, Major Gwyn was appointed to oversee the Commission of Border Alienation in 1908. His responsibility included the completion of the border alienation process, a task that was successfully accomplished by 1909. This commission played a crucial role in implementing the agreed-upon borders and ensuring their adherence.

3.4.5. 1972 treaty and after 1972

Over different periods, diplomatic settlements between Ethiopia and Sudan lacked a consistent pattern, notably marked by a reliance on the "status quo" established through the 1972 note exchange. In that year, Emperor Hailesilase sought to establish a secure and normalized position through the exchange of notes. However, despite this effort, a conclusive and enduring solution remained elusive.

The persistent challenge endured for three decades until Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Sudanese President Omar Hassan AL Bashir entered into confidential treaties in 2007. This had been confidential secret agreements, while seemingly favorable for Sudan, triggered claims from Ethiopian farmers who reported displacement from their farmlands. Unfortunately, these treaties failed to deliver a final resolution (Sudan Tribune, 2007; Wubneh, 2011).

In 2015, Hailemariam Desalegn, the former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, took a step towards resolution by signing an agreement addressing the border dispute (Sudan Tribune, 2015). However, even this attempt did not offer a conclusive solution to the persistent Yewuhabist border dispute.

The events of 2020 witnessed the Sudanese military seizing new the disputed area and extra land occupation, reflecting the ongoing struggle to achieve a successful resolution in the century-long diplomatic and institutional negotiations. The non-mirrored action in 2020 underscores the challenges in reaching a successful dispute settlement. The imperative focus on ensuring security in the Horn of Africa is crucial, given the potential for instability to spread across the region. The prolonged dispute discussions between the two largest countries in East Africa highlight the interconnected nature of national problems, emphasizing the need for comprehensive and enduring solutions (Fenatahun, 2018).

3.5. How Gwyn line is Unconventional.

The delineation of the Ethiopian and Sudanese border by Colonel Charles Gwyn in 1907 has emerged as a pivotal source of conflict between the two nations. Ethiopian scholars assert that Gwyn's main challenge lay in delimiting the border without Ethiopian knowledge and disregarding the binding treaty with Emperor Menelik. On the Sudanese side, scholars argue that border delimitation faced different obstacles, with Colonel Gwyn compromising to address various issues and considering the technological limitations of the time in the nation-bordering process.

Gwyn's border delineation lacked proper surveying and the presence of Ethiopian representatives, leading to an arbitrary alienation of the Ethiopia-Sudan border. The sole criterion employed by Gwyn was the occurrence of tribal conflicts in the area. This unilateral decision-making process sowed the seeds of the border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan, exacerbated by the British's fear of potential military retaliation from Emperor Menelik. Gwyn's recklessness in single-handedly delineating the border further fueled tensions (Wondwosen T, 2009).

There is no evidence that Emperor Menelik accepted Gwyn's delineation. Menelik's notes reflect his lack of full authority in delineating the border, emphasizing the absence of Ethiopian representatives during the process. In 1950, an Ethiopian border studies delegation highlighted several mistakes in Gwyn's line. First, Gwyn's delineation point started from Rewuyan Setit's River, deviating from the 1902 treaty's specified measuring point at Cor AmhaJer and the confluence of Setit (Tekeze) River. Second, the treaty dictated the border alignment from Cor Amhajer and Setit River to Gelabat, but Gwyn's line followed a different path, stretching from Kerawuyan to Setit confluence to Gelae Zeraf foothill and entering Ethiopian territory to

Corsaraf Hamad hills. This resulted in a fragile delineation extending to Galabat, neglecting the specifics of the 1902 Treaty.

A significant difference arises in the territory area of the Setit district (woreda) agreed upon in the treaty and Gwyn's delineation. Gwyn's line reportedly ceded 13,430 hectares of land to Sudan. Moreover, the Ethiopian-Sudan border became internationally recognized based on Gwyn's line rather than the original agreement. Ethiopia, lacking technical map knowledge at the time, continued to use maps based on Gwyn's line. These discrepancies and shortcomings in the delineation process have been extensively documented in reports on the Setit to Galabat line (Belete, 2014).

3.6. Political dynamics and state of relations of the nation.

Since 2018, the Horn of Africa has witnessed a series of conflicts intensifying in various regions of Ethiopia, significantly impacting the state of relations in the region. The escalating conflict in the Horn of Africa has proliferated in recent years, characterized by military interventions and insurgencies among neighboring nations. Vigorous local and regional wars have unfolded in the last two decades, reflecting the intricate dynamics of state relations (Lowing, 2021).

The current state of Sudan-Ethiopia relations has been harshly affected by various issues that unfolded after 2018 and continued into 2019. During this time, different stakeholders and international organizations expressed optimism and goodwill towards positive changes and stability in both countries. Various actors demonstrated interest in supporting political transitions and addressing border issues, with the hope that the changes in the governments of Ethiopia and Sudan would contribute to regional stability in the Horn of Africa.

Before 2018, the relations between Ethiopia and Sudan had been friendly for the past decade. However, following the unstable regime changes in both countries after 2018, the dynamics of the relationship underwent significant shifts. The transition period introduced challenges due to a lack of effective communication, resulting in heightened tensions and hostilities along the border. This strained communication was reflective of high-level governmental patterns, leading to hostile cross-border issues (Chatham House, 2023).

Initially, after the first political change in both nations, the leadership relations were positive and marked by flourishing cordial ties. In 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declared the weakening

of the core federal power controlled by the TPLF, while Sudan Prime Minister Abdelah Hamdok took leadership in April 2019 after the overthrow of Omar Hassan Al Bashir. The relations between Ethiopia and Sudan initially flourished, with Hamdok giving credit to Abiy Ahmed for his role in diffusing tensions in Sudan during a critical period of military and civil power rivalries. However, this positive dynamic began to face challenges due to deficient communication.

The strained communication became apparent when Sudanese officials perceived that Abiy Ahmed overlooked the role of IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) in resolving the Ethiopian TPLF conflict, where Sudan holds the chairmanship. This perception led to a loss of credit for Sudan. The complicated relation further involved Eritrean President Isayas Afworki, who, while initially maintaining a friendly relationship with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, created complications due to Eritrean forces supporting the Ethiopian military in the TPLF conflict. (Chatham House, 2023).

Throughout 2020, tensions escalated in the Al-Fashaga area, with Sudanese military warriors supporting the Tigriyan forces in the Yewuhabist dispute. Sudan's occupation of Yewuhabist received considerable support from the TPLF, creating a volatile situation. During this time, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appealed to Egypt and Sudan for support. The disrupted relations also involved Sudanese forces allegedly supporting Ethiopian armed anti-government Gumuz militant fighters, as accused by the Ethiopian government, further complicating the geopolitical landscape.

On December 2, 2020, Sudanese forces swiftly captured the disputed area of Al-Fashaga (Sudan's term) or Yewuhabist (Ethiopian's term), an area controlled by Ethiopia for over 26 years. Sudan claimed that the capture respected agreements made during the administrations of Albsshair and Meles Zenawi. Tensions expanded to the Abu Tyour area in mid-December, leading to clashes between Sudanese and Ethiopian forces. The area, situated between the Atbara and Angereb rivers, including the Yewuhabist triangle, saw casualties on both sides. Sudanese forces claimed that farmers sought protection from government forces. By December 20, Sudanese military leader Abdul Fatah Al Burhan announced that Sudan had gained full control over most of the Al-Fashaga area (Sudan Tribune, 2020). The escalating tensions and military clashes signify a complex and evolving chapter in the Sudan-Ethiopia relationship.

3.7. Triggering factors of Yewuhabist (Alfashaga) border conflict

The enduring relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan has been significantly influenced by various factors, encompassing both domestic and international dimensions, with the recent political transitions in both nations having a notable negative impact. The political transformations, occurring in 2018 in Ethiopia and 2019 in Sudan, have cast a shadow over the bilateral ties, affecting diverse interests and creating a complex interplay of local and regional dynamics.

The critical catalyst for the escalation of the Yewuhabist dispute can be traced back to Ethiopia's local political issues and the subsequent political transition. The ascent of Abiy Ahmed to power in 2018 marked a shift in the political landscape, altering the balance of power and dismantling the long-standing dominance of Tigray in the Federal government. This change triggered a sense of ethnic favoritism, particularly among the Tigray community, with the older guard of the TPLF exacerbating these sentiments, ultimately leading to the crisis in Tigray (Fedrico Donelli, 2023).

Since 2018, the once amicable relations between Ethiopia and Sudan have undergone a transformation into a more negative trajectory. This shift has been propelled by various influencing factors, including longstanding territorial disputes over Yewuhabist (Al-Fashaga), Eritrean interests in the region, Amhara territorial claims, the construction of the Ethiopian Great Renaissance Dam, and the volatile Tigray war. These multifaceted issues have contributed to the fragmentation of the relationship, creating a complex web of challenges that require careful navigation and diplomatic solutions.

3.7.1. The GERD

Ethiopian great renaissance dam have been greatest hydroelectric power dam in Africa. Built on Nile River which is water shared between two countries. This dam management and process of operation over the dam have been source of conflict between Ethiopia Sudan Egypt. As Ethiopian government reports of 2023 the extent of dam building around 90 percent finalized.

⁵Yehidasea gidib ginbata 90 bemeto tetenakual yetalaku yeethiopia hidassie gidib gimkata project mastebaberiya project tsihifet bet.) AMECO wrote that Great Ethiopian renaissance dam has been completed 90 % of the construction finished. Sudan and Egypt thinks over decisions of Ethiopia

⁵ የሕዳሴ ግድብ ግንባታ 90 በመቶ ተጠናቋል የታላቁ የኢትዮጵያ ህዳሴ ግድብ ግምባታ ፕሮጀክት ማስተባበሪያ ፕሮጀክት ጽህፈት ቤት።

decide on the GERD has been directly affected by the flow of Nile river. But Ethiopia responds the normal flow of the Nile River and extent of water had not affected by the dam. Only Declarations of principle (DOP) 2015 long time Intermittent talk have successful agreement over the operation and management over the GERD. Sudanese consider the GERD filling and constriction process has processed on favor way. In 2020 without notice of water discharge from great Ethiopian renaissance dam the rosaries dam face problem of pumping. In 2022 the downstream countries and Ethiopia had been agreed sharing of information and data of GERD filling and constriction process.

After time Sudan become optimist about GERD. Al-basher leadership considered the dam offer positive impact for Sudan. Even GERD controlling sudden flooding of Nile River, the dam offering sufficient electric power and stable irrigation work for Sudanese farmer. But the former president AL Bashir over throw from power the Sudan positive thinking about dam changed to negative impact. The transitional government of civil administration sought another position from Ethiopia. The stance of Sudan and Egypt tying together in the interest of downstream water use over Nile, The legal and technical issues of the GERD reconciliation of tripartite talk have interrupting because of Sudan stance converted. As associated press report of 21 of May 2021egypt and Sudan started joint military drilled over Nile river disputes of Ethiopia.

Egypt military force Arrived Sudanese capital Khartoum ahead of joint drill amid mounting tension with Ethiopia over a decade – long Nile water dispute; Sudanese state run news agency reported Friday. The dispute focuses over the controversial dam that

Ethiopia is building on the Blue Nile. Water governing agreement over the dam, water share of Nile and drought time water release has been focused point of the dispute.

Reconciliation with Ethiopia had braced before a month of this joint military training. Different stakeholder' s international and regional organizations have attempting to continue this settlement but none of them could achieve come up talk on the table. As an expert reflect and changes about

dynamics of the two country local case had escalating by another country support for interest, cordial relation of Sudan and Ethiopia has instable by the case of Alfashaga, GERD has an burning issues of the border dispute of two nations. (ISS 2021)

3.7.2. Interruption of Eritrean over the border dispute.

The Ethiopian Tigray war has led to the formation of distinct combatant forces aligning with various participants in the conflict. Eritrea firmly supports the Ethiopian federal force, while Sudan backs the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). However, tensions have arisen between TPLF and Eritrea, fostering a sense of enmity. Recent developments indicate Eritrea's growing impact on the eastern Sudan region, with a continued Eritrean presence in the border area.

The Beni Amir ethnic group, with ancestral ties to Eritrea, has been encouraged by the Eritrean government to settle in the border area. According to Chatham House, President Isayas Afeworki's influence extends beyond Eritrea, actively participating in Ethiopian politics and mediating between combatants in Sudan. Eritrean officials have also expressed interest in reconciling the Yewuhabist (Alfashaga) dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia (Chatham House, 2023).

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed acknowledges that Ethiopia has resolved its local issues independently, emphasizing the need for the exit of external forces. However, Eritrea continues to maintain a long-term antagonistic stance towards the TPLF. President Afeworki's influence persists within Ethiopian territory as of 2023. Eritrea perceives the TPLF as a source of destabilization in the Horn of Africa, and this stance remains unchanged. In March 2021, Bloomberg reported that Eritrean troops were deployed to the disputed areas of Alfashaga, straddling the border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan. The United Nations confirmed the credibility of this deployment information (Bloomberg, 2021).

3.7.3. Amhara interest

The Yewuhabist dispute has prominently highlighted the heightened interests of the Amhara region. As Sudan asserted control over the contested area, Amhara's interests became a focal point, leading to clashes with Sudanese forces. The Amhara forces' focus aligned with their territorial claims, turning the region into a hotbed of identity politics. This interest also extended into business considerations related to the area. Notably, this Amhara interest became entwined with both the federal government of Ethiopia and the Eritrean government. Abiy Ahmed, aiming

for a common cause, encouraged Amhara forces to defend the Sudanese frontier against both Sudanese and TPLF troops (Chatham House, 2023).

However, despite the initial alignment, differences emerged between the interests of the Amhara forces and the federal government after the signing of the Pretoria treaties between the TPLF and the FDRE government. These treaties significantly impacted the political dynamics of the Yewuhabist area and local territorial disputes in Ethiopia. The Pretoria treaties led to a divergence in the stances of Amhara nationalist group Fano and the Amhara regional government led by the Prosperity Party. In response, the federal government took stringent actions, including the arrest of thousands of Fano members in 2022 and the subsequent dismantling of the Amhara special force in April 2023. The federal government's actions received support from the Amhara regional government, triggering tension and protests across Amhara areas. This federal government stance was interpreted as an effort to curb the Amhara forces' ability to fight for control over Yewuhabist (Alfashaga) and the Wolkaet area around the Setit River (Reuters, 2022).

According to reports from Al Jazeera in May 2023, the federal government strategically deployed Amhara forces in the border dispute with Sudanese troops in Alfashaga. The situation in Alfashaga was seen as potentially influencing Abiy Ahmed's decisions regarding the integration of Amhara forces. Analysts and researchers in the Horn of Africa expressed varying opinions on the role of Amhara forces in the region, with some suggesting a limited role while others deemed the possibility of Amhara forces engaging in the region (Al Jazeera, May 2023). Amhara nationalists maintained a firm stance, considering Sudan's control over Alfashaga as a threat to Ethiopia and an unacceptable situation for the Amhara region. They asserted that Yewuhabist was part of the western Amhara territory, emphasizing their commitment to restoring the area at any cost, either through federal or regional actions.

3.8. Involvement of External force

In the ongoing dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan, the primary source of fragility revolves around the perpetual dispute over farmland. The current state of interactions between the two countries is at a low tide. Recent political transitions play a crucial role in diminishing the relations between Ethiopia and Sudan, creating a dynamic shift in support and opposition for both new and old leadership factions. This antagonistic division has drawn the attention of

central political figures, engaging authorities and expanding beyond local conflicts to encompass neighboring issues. Such issues have attracted the involvement of third parties in the quest to find a solution to the dispute. These third-party stakeholders include international organizations, regional bodies, and various countries with vested geopolitical interests in the region (Jonas H and Ahmed S. 2023).

Behind the scenes, these stakeholders are implementing policies aimed at resolving the triggering factors of the Ethiopian and Sudanese conflict. The collective effort seeks diverse solutions for the two disputing nations. Special envoys have been appointed by countries such as the UN, EU, US, China, France, and the UK. In addition, the USA, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the UK hold special interests and stances over the region. These envoys are tasked with crafting regional and continental diplomatic solutions to address the problem. International support and cooperative methods serve as instruments for advancing the interests of these countries in the region. The envoys play a crucial role in stabilizing regional conflicts and bridging the gaps between Ethiopia and Sudan.

The USA's special envoys for the Horn of Africa have a mission to mend the gaps between the embassies of Khartoum and Addis Ababa. They are also working towards establishing new cooperative relationships between Washington, Addis Ababa, and Khartoum. Collaboration between the UAE and the UK in the Horn of Africa is another area of focus. The USA empowers Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to reinvent and develop economic and cultural influence in the region. These countries are utilized to stabilize the boiling border conflict between Ethiopia and Khartoum. Jeffrey Feltman, the special envoy for the Horn of Africa and former State Department staff member, along with Molly Phee, the current US ambassador to Khartoum and former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, have navigated the complexities of resolving the dishonesty and antagonism between Ethiopia and Sudan. After gaining a nuanced understanding of the issues at hand, they are working to link the concerns of the two countries and strategize actions for plural implementation. This approach aims to support Ethiopia's rehabilitation efforts after the war and contribute to the restoration of Sudan's civil and military political transition. The envoys are also attempting to restart trade programs and development aid between the two nations.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have articulated their commitment to financing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and supporting agricultural initiatives in the Yewuhabist (Alfashaga) area. Their interest extends to investing in agriculture to address food security issues in both Arab countries and the Horn of Africa. The Yewuhabist region, characterized by untapped natural resources and abundant agricultural potential, serves as a crucial settlement area utilizing Nile water.

Recognizing the benefits of investing in the Yewuhabist region, the Gulf states have channeled their interest through the AU Gulf Cooperation and Red Sea Security Cooperation initiatives. These investments primarily target the agricultural production in the Nile water region. During the 2021 Abu Dhabi meeting, the UAE emphasized the importance of resolving the disputes related to Alfashaga.

Additionally, the UAE has other strategic interests, including the control of gold exports from Sudan to the Emirates and Dubai. There is also a need for access to the Red Sea, specifically through Port Sudan. According to a report from Sudan Tribune in April 2021, the Gulf countries have a direct and vested interest in participating in the development of the Alfashaga land.

-According to several Sudanese officials, The UAE proposed to withdraw the Sudanese troops from the Sudanese troop from the border areas that it has controlled since November 2022, divided the income of UAE investment project in Alfashaga by 40% for Sudan 40% for the emirates and 20 % for Ethiopian farmer. ||

Before Hassan AL Bashir's political transition, Gulf countries supported the Sudanese government through direct currency subsidies and loans. This support continued even after the regime change in 2018-19, with the Arab states maintaining their assistance to Sudan. Hamadan Degalo (Hamditi), the leader of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF), strengthened trade ties with Dubai, particularly in the export of gold, which contributed to Sudan's economic support. Sudan received a direct aid package of \$3 billion from the UAE and Saudi Arabia, intended to assist the new Sudanese authorities. This financial aid aimed to bolster Sudan during the transition period. (Jean G, 2021).

Chapter four

4. Situating Alfashaga on the current dynamics since 2018

4.1. Introduction.

This chapter is the analytical and main part of the thesis. That explains how Ethiopia Sudan border dispute has become current inflammation of east African are and sorcerer of unsettlement for Ethiopia and Sudan. This chapter has vividly reflected that the main cause of the border dispute and triggering factors of the dispute. The chapter also implied implicative solution of the dispute.

4.2. Patterns of the dispute

Ethiopia and Sudan have been disputed over one and quarter century in Alfashaga area. The main difference of the Ethiopian and Sudan had been on the root of Gwyn line demarcation. As of his explanation Ethiopia accepted the Gwyn line demarcation on the treaty of note exchange on 1972. The root cause of chronological land mark of the conflict have been started the treaty of 1902. After This Treaty great Britain brings General Gwyn to Ethiopia for land demarcation. He started His work with unilaterally as part of Anglo Egyptian (Sudan) part without Ethiopian representative. He concludes his work within 6 month of a year after treaty. This had been the long and main root cause of the Ethio-Sudan (Alfashaga) border dispute. His demarcation tilting For the benefit of colonizer Britain the demarcation had not inclusive. Ethiopia had been claim more than 70 years. but on the time of 1972 Ethiopia and Sudan Agreed exchange of note. Ethiopia and Sudan have been established joint boundary Commission after the Sudan freedom. This Commission had been discussed many years. In 1972 the joint border Commission has agreed after strong debate in Addis Ababa. Then the Two countries signed the exchange of note. This treaty reflects that Ethiopia accepted line of Gwyn as basic level of considering 1902 treat.

The 20 and 21st century Alfashaga area have not long time stable. It has non structure line and not formed treaty. This has point of root cause which is Colonial demarcation and ignoring of African society cultural solidity of the demarcation. More of it economically natural rich area has more basic and root cause of Alfashaga. In Ethiopia and Sudan there have long line dispute from Kenya to Eritrea but the Sudan more claimed north of Benishangul demarcation line. Because it natural rich area which have all season flow river, Suitable farm land and other natural resources.

Other causes have risen in this area but this have more balance by natural endowed potential area. The policy Makers and the earth reality have bite different thinking of them. The area has more diversified in both side. In Ethiopian side their have different Ethics Diversity of Population Have living Sudanese side. Both countries of the population have joint market place and towns, this shows that the area have not only dispute area also way of cooperation and diversification. Sudan official and political elites have calming Ethiopia take Sudan land. This issue have more raised When internal uprising of Sudan have intensifies. But in Ethiopia the populations have claimed more than the political elite and officials. in history of Ethiopia the great land area have including Sudan. Ethiopia is not starting from Moyle. The lands have been stretched to Nubian. So Ethiopia have more solid negotiations evidence than Sudan.

Other insight of the root cause of the Ethiopian and Sudan conflict have not clear demarcation of demarcation the two states. Colonized Ethiopia and colonized Sudan have not participated in colonial delineated. But Sudan considered this delineation have the own area and acceptable . But it's not considerable in Ethiopia part. In hailesilase regime the border moves to seeking the solution. But not solve lastly. In Derg ruling time the two country border in metema side had been guwang river (Atbara). After derg regime the Sudanese had moved to crossing Guwang River and occupied the delello area. The local community states that the EPRDF government has given our land for Sudan. And ask how to. In acquire of this issue. The have had applied this claimed For regional and federal government. But none of them respond the local government and the community. In 1985 the Sudan makes farming occupied area. Then the local district administrator visited this occupied area but they prisoned official including him. Even we had free own contact not government interruption. After their 6 military members of Ethiopian defense forces shouted by Sudan force. This had marking point of dispute. The Ethiopian government react this action by highly mobilized the defense force. This dispute brings two sides for negotiations. The sizing area of Sudan has accepted delello is Ethiopian. After collecting the crops in delello, they have returned this product 30 % of production for Amhara region in 2004. In this discussion the discussants ask well known border status qou. We had gave sufficient evidence for them. Then delello give for Ethiopia. Sudan accepts this area is Ethiopian and not used yet. This action continues 2005. But after there the EPRDf (TPLF) representative Abay tsehay gave delello for Sudan during that time Mulualem G/medihn was district administrator. He perpetuates and prisoned by FDRE government. I case of he refused to give delello for

Sudan. Still this area has farmed and occupied by Sudan. EPRDF and Sudan government talk back on the Sudan support of TPLF rebellion before 1991. Delello gave for compensation of this action. He mentions that the local community didn't understanding the Gwyn line. they know Ethiopian border line is GUWANG River. The local community and administrators Thinks that Gwyn line is Imaginative line. And local community and administrators think that, he didn't not demarcate honestly. So the Gwyn line is unacceptable. After emperor hailesilase time Ethiopian investors have lets down their land, by the socialism policy of Derg. This unfarmed situation gives opportunity for Sudan occupation. The local community still claimed the Government has given Ethiopian land for Sudan.

The researcher interviewee place of Metama, before 2002 local farmers has been living at Delello number one and number two. Local inhabitant claimed that Sudan have conquered Ethiopian land since 2013. He have farm landing at delello area. They occupied lominat and forgrat. The border demarcation of Ethiopia is Guwang River from Hailesilase. basonda was town of Ethiopia and Sudan now it a history. When they occupied the land every farmer and equipped man have put concrete cement memory and new docketing fetter sign of memory. Building infrastructure in the history this time was highly conquered by Sudan. He states that the conquered are from Guwang to Metema have estimated 80 kilometers. Sudan entered Ethiopia 80 kilometers. This is very negligible issues by FDRE government. The local dwellers point out that negotiations and discussion may bring solution for border dispute.

There was an agreement between Menelik and Al-Sadiq. The Sudanese citizen understanding is different from Ethiopia and not understands 1902 treaty. The think that when The British had colonized Sudan. It was in an agreement between Menelik and the English government at the time they give the Alfashaga region to the Sudanese in exchange for giving the Benishangul region to the Ethiopians. The matter went well, but then they did not acknowledge this agreement. And from here began the problem of Alfashaga, that in the Amhara regions in particular, the agreement was not real. Then came the period of Omar Bashir, and in fact the Ethiopians began farming for 25 years in agreement with the Ethiopian government.(Sudanese thinking of Alfashaga) Then came the revolution, and according to the first old agreement, it was proven that the land belonged to the Sudanese and not to the Ethiopians. It was a grant to improve agriculture and lands. It is said that Omar Bashir gave them fertile land in exchange for

Ethiopia expelling all those who opposed Bashir. It took 25 years until the government came.(Sudanese believe this).

4.3. How border community understand the frontier.

The border community shared between Sudan and Ethiopia has a rich history and spans a vast frontier. Local residents in the border areas have developed a profound understanding of the geographical extent of their shared border. This understanding is grounded in various activities such as trade, cattle farming, and interactions with natural features like mountain chains and rivers.

On the Ethiopian side, the community of Metema-Humera plays a significant role in defining the border. The Gwang River (Atbara) serves as a defining line, as perceived by the local residents. The stretch of territory from Humera to Metema holds historical significance, particularly for its large-scale farmland, known to have been established during the reign of Emperor Hailesilase (Mulatu W. 2010).

In 1950, the Ethiopian border delegation highlighted a notable concern. The place names in the border region were identified using Arabic nomenclature, leading to debates and discussions between Ethiopia and Sudan. The Arabic names became central to debates surrounding ownership, particularly from the Sudanese perspective. This historical context adds depth to the understanding of the complexities surrounding the Sudan-Ethiopia border. Some areas have both Amharic and Arabic name.

Ethiopian calling

Arabic calling and Amharic meaning

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. Tekeze | setit |
| 2. Guange | Atbara |
| 3. Angreb | bahire selam (Yeselam wonz) |
| 4. Rewuyan | rewuyan (wuha yetegebe) |
| 5. Kormur | hormur (yemeda fyel meshet) |
| 6. Gelae zraf | gelae Zeraf(yeqech metaya tera) |
| 7. Alkadra (bebeni Amir kuankua) | tewulil (behumeran kuawnkua) |

The Ethiopian border delegation group has presented a comprehensive report indicating that the disputed area primarily serves as a cattle-growing region rather than a cultivated farming area. The conflict emerged when Ethiopian farmers initiated agricultural activities in the region. Local Ethiopian dealers and farmers assert that the Ethiopian border extends from the Tekeze (Setit) River to the confluence of the Guwang (Atbara) River in Tomat. According to the delegation, the recognized owner of the area is a resident of Qabtya Begemidr (Belete B, 2020).

The territorial claims made by Ethiopian farmers are deeply rooted in historical backgrounds and have practical grounding. Key areas contested by Ethiopian farmers include Setit Humera, Delelo Shimela Gara, Taya Fazerah, Nefs Gebeya, Kurmuk, and Melile (Mulatu W, 2015).

Contrarily, Sudanese writer Nur Taha Hassan argues that the eastern Sudan border extends along the Atbara River. The considerations of Sudanese perspectives are influenced by the historical colonial demarcations in the region.

From Sabdarat to south the primary line allocate the Anglo Italian sphere of influence defining the 1891 was still valid when this section was delimited. The Anglo Italian sphere of influence followed from Sabdarat to river Gash, when it' s touched the Gash little touches Kassala and then reached river Atbara. It touches the confluence of

Ethiopia's approach to border delineation distinguishes itself from other African countries due to its successful resistance against European colonial forces. Unlike many African nations, which were shaped by colonial interventions, Ethiopia engaged in a successful struggle and independently established its boundaries by negotiating with European colonialists. Notably, countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan owe their territorial outlines to the pens of colonialists who drew expansive boundaries during the colonial era (John Y, 2002).

4.4. of Colonialism Role for the border dispute

The contemporary map of Africa is a product of the Berlin Imperialism Conference of 1885, where European colonizers delineated boundaries that shaped the African landscape. Among the legacies of colonialism is the disputed Gwyn line, which separates colonized Sudan and colonized Ethiopia. Major Gwyn, a British map missionary, played a pivotal role in this demarcation in 1903 over a span of six months. Notably, Gwyn's approach to the Ethiopia-Sudan border demarcation is marked by certain colonial legacies.

Firstly, Gwyn conducted the land demarcation without the involvement of Ethiopian government representatives. This unilateral decision-making process reflected the colonial disregard for the sovereignty of the colonized nations.

Secondly, Gwyn's demarcation followed a direct line without considering natural features like mountains and rivers, a departure from Ethiopia's traditional demarcation practices. The imposition of straight-line boundaries ignored the region's geographical and ecological nuances.

Thirdly, the timing of the demarcation in October posed challenges due to harsh natural conditions. The complex terrain, including dense forests and extensive grasslands, made it difficult for human traversal. Local communities raised concerns that Gwyn may not have physically walked the demarcation line, adding to the contention surrounding the colonial legacy of the Gwyn line.

The 1902 treaty represents a pivotal factor in the ongoing border dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia, serving as the second root cause. This treaty, delineated from the joint point of Umhajir to Lake Turkana, outlined that land demarcation would be conducted jointly by representatives of both nations. However, this agreement was not implemented as outlined, with Great Britain unilaterally appointing Representative Gwyn to carry out the demarcation one year later. Gwyn delineated Mirab Armachiho, Humera, Metema, and Quara without Ethiopian government representation, deviating by 30 to 40 kilometers inclined towards Ethiopia. Notably, strategic considerations led to the demarcation of Sikuar Terara, named in Amharic, for Sudan.

Gwyn's delineation resulted in a significant inconsistency in the territory of the Setit district (woreda) as defined in the treaty. Gwyn's line reportedly conceded 13,430 hectares of land to Sudan, impacting the internationally recognized Ethiopian-Sudan border. Ethiopia, lacking technical map knowledge at the time, continued to utilize maps based on Gwyn's line. These discrepancies and shortcomings in the delineation process have been extensively documented in reports on the Setit to Galabad line (Belete, 2014).

In the border areas of the Ethiopian periphery, there remains a lack of proper settlement among the population. This region is also characterized by the widespread prevalence of tropical diseases. A third contributing factor to the ongoing conflict is that during the demarcation process, there was no representation from the Ethiopian elite. Three reasons underlie the concern

that Gwyn delineated the border without raising questions: firstly, the absence of elite Ethiopian representation; secondly, the method of demarcation using stone markers as explained by Gwyn; and thirdly, the swift completion of the demarcation from Setite to Milile within only six months. Notably, non-Ethiopian government representatives participated in this demarcation, with Gwyn bringing Ethiopian students from Sunday school for translation purposes. Questions arose regarding who represented the Ethiopian government during this process.

Concerns regarding Gwyn's demarcation prompted Sudan to establish a committee to ascertain whether Emperor Menelik had provided permission for the demarcation without Ethiopian representation. The Sudanese committee confirmed that Emperor Menelik had not granted such permission. It was emphasized that Menelik was well aware of European needs and potential fraud in Africa, indicating his conscious decision. Another issue stemming from Gwyn's demarcation is the use of movable border markers. Gwyn employed stone heaps as markers, making the demarcation highly movable and non-permanent, deviating from Ethiopia's demarcation culture that traditionally involves mountains, rivers, and gorges as fixed markers. The conflict over Alfashaga (Yewuhabist) is further exacerbated by the broader colonial legacy issues. Colonial demarcation and delimitation have instigated crises across Africa, affecting not only Ethiopia and Sudan but also numerous other African nations, with Alfashaga being a manifestation of this colonial legacy.

Another fundamental factor contributing to the border issue stems from Sudan's state behavior. Whenever Ethiopia experiences internal conflicts, Sudan tends to seize the disputed area. This region has dual aspects: one characterized by trade and cooperation, and the other by arms trafficking and contraband. The formation of African states has been marked by contests and a lack of understanding regarding colonial border delineations, with Alfashaga serving as an example. The delineation problem has severed cultural ties within societies, as colonial demarcation failed to grasp the actual territorial reality. The demarcation line, arbitrarily imposed without consideration for state knowledge, became an alien concept. The Anglo-Egyptian demarcation, carried out without the involvement of Sudan and Ethiopia, laid the groundwork for a ticking time bomb between the two states. Gwyn's demarcation further complicated matters, deviating from the intentions outlined in the 1902 treaty.

4.5. Roles of Treaties and negotiation to the current dispute

The 1972 exchange of notes, following the 1902 high-level treaty between Ethiopia and Sudan, is a pivotal event in the ongoing border dispute. Despite the 1972 exchange of not explicitly agreeing on a new joint land demarcation, it emphasizes the importance of respecting the status quo. However, the actual land demarcation was not implemented due to changes in government. The 1972 exchange of notes binds Ethiopia to the Gwyn demarcation as a fundamental reference, essentially accepting it as a cornerstone. Understanding the significance of this exchange of notes is crucial for the Ethiopian government in seeking a resolution to the border dispute.

The negotiations in 1972 embodied in the exchange of notes, present a potential win-win situation for both sovereign states. Signed by Dr. Minase Haile of the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mansour Khalid of the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this exchange of notes stands as a landmark treaty. In future attempts to resolve the border dispute, this treaty could play a key role in addressing certain aspects of the issue.

Article two of the 1972 note exchange explicitly states the "basic acceptance of Major Gwyn demarcation on the basis of the 1902 and 1907 treaties' boundary line between Ethiopia and Sudan." Ethiopia's acceptance of the Gwyn demarcation is conceptual rather than a commitment to actual land demarcation. The treaty also recognizes the need to respect the status quo, as outlined in Article 3, until a final agreement is reached between the two governments.

The 2005 memorandum of understanding between the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and Sudan, as well as the 2015 political economy cooperation signed by Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, further demonstrate the intention of both countries to find solutions to the ongoing border problems. These agreements contribute to the broader context of negotiations and treaties aimed at strengthening bilateral economic ties between Ethiopia and Sudan.

4.6. Contribution of recent political transition (regime change) for border conflict.

Ethiopia and Sudan, both undergoing political transitions in 2018 and 2019 respectively after decades of long-term governance, have not remained neutral towards each other's domestic disputes. This complex situation has unfolded over the past half-century, with the recent political changes bringing new dynamics to their relationship.

The military leadership, particularly General AL Burhan and General Hamden Dogalo, has systematically supported longstanding strategic relations with the former Sudanese president. This support has been evident through the occupation of Alfashaga and facilitating an international gateway for the TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front). The recent developments in the relationship between AL Burhan, Hamadan Degalo, and Abiy Ahmed regarding the Yewuhabist border dispute (AL-Fashaga) have stabilized the previously hostile situation.

The conclusion of the TPLF war with a ceasefire and the Pretoria treaty involving Ethiopian forces have contributed to the establishment of a stable situation in the region (Chatham House, 2023). The recent political transitions and diplomatic developments have played a crucial role in shaping the current state of affairs between Ethiopia and Sudan.

4.6.1. Ethiopian position

The recent stable relationship between Addis Ababa and Khartoum was initially built on the solid foundations laid by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and President Omar Hassan Al Bashir. However, following Meles Zenawi's death in 2012, challenges arose, leading to a careful and strained friendly relationship. Haile Mariam Desalegn, Meles's successor as the Ethiopian leader, took on the responsibility of continuing Meles's legacy, emphasizing the need to strengthen relations with neighboring countries.

Despite the Meles Zenawi-led TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) maintaining influence in formal leadership and military commands, a crisis emerged in 2014 within the EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) leadership, impacting the entire country. In 2016, Haile Mariam's leadership declared a state of emergency, resulting in economic challenges and a significant increase in internally displaced people by 2018. The Oromo and Amhara youth

populations continued to voice opposition against the TPLF administration (International Crisis Group).

Prime Minister Haile Mariam also encountered a border dispute with Sudan, marked by Sudan claiming 420,000 hectares of territory farmed by Ethiopians during that period. The instability and disputes over the Yewuhabist area persisted into 2018, with Ethiopian farmers crossing and cultivating beyond the demarcated line facing fatal consequences. This marked the symbolic starting point of a high-dispute area. Efforts to resolve the dispute over the Alfashaga or Yewuhabist region have been ongoing for many years through joint border committee meetings (John, 2020).

In response to the uncontrolled Ethiopian popular uprising, Hailemariam Desalegn resigned from power. A lieutenant colonel and security service officer assumed control on April 2, 2018, marking the conclusion of three decades of power dominance by the influential TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) and EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front). Abiy Ahmed, who swiftly addressed ethnic clashes and regional instability in Ethiopia, signaled a significant shift from a northern-driven to a southern-driven power dynamic.

Upon assuming power, Abiy Ahmed implemented reforms, including the release of political prisoners, liberalizing policies, and promoting press freedom. Within 90 days, he resolved the longstanding conflict with Eritrea, fostering reconciliation in the region. These peace-building efforts garnered widespread support and trust for Abiy Ahmed and enabled him to address ethnic tensions within the country. However, his ambition to create a new party called Prosperity and detach it from the regional party coalition of the ruling party EPRDF faced substantial challenges from ethnocentric politicians and societal factions.

A second major challenge emerged from the old guard of EPRDF senior politicians and federalist thinkers associated with the TPLF, who viewed Abiy Ahmed's leadership with suspicion. Anti-Abiy protests further heightened tensions, particularly with the TPLF as a group and individual power seekers. The situation escalated in 2020 with the outbreak of war and serious conflict in the northern part of the country, known as Tigray. The leadership of the federal government and the TPLF engaged in a fierce rivalry, exacerbated by ethnic-based attacks.

This conflict delineated two opposing groups: federal government supporters, including the Amhara ethnic warrior group Fano, Afar regional state police, and other regional forces, and TPLF supporters, comprising the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), Gumuz militants in Benishangul-Gumuz and Oromia regions, as well as minorities of Agew and Qimant in the Amhara region. Eritrean forces entered the war in support of the federal government. This protracted conflict has endured for two years, resulting in significant bloodshed (International Crisis Group, 2023).

This bloodshed war has resulted in a significant loss of life across the country. According to the Oslo Peace Research Institute's report on June 7, 2023, the Ethiopian war, in terms of war-related casualties, has exceeded even the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Financial Times reported on January 14, 2023, stating, "The war in Ethiopia resulted in more battle-related deaths in 2022 than the wars in Ukraine, Yemen, Myanmar, Nigeria, Somalia, Mali, and Burkina Faso combined." The Financial Times interviewed African Union peace mediator, Alusegun Obasanjo, the former Nigerian president, who stated, "The number of people killed was about 600,000, we have stopped 1000 deaths every day."

This bloodshed came to an end with the Pretoria Agreement brokered by the African Union between the federal government and the TPLF. This marks a crucial point in concluding a two-year conflict characterized by high human casualties.

in 2020, during the onset of the TPLF war, the region of Alf-Fashaga (also known as Yewuhabist) witnessed an occupation by Sudanese military forces, marking a reflective point in the broader Ethiopian local conflict. The Sudanese forces took a firm stand in supporting Tigrinyan forces, with substantial assistance from the TPLF, involving military base provision, territorial supplies, and a gateway through Al Fashaga in eastern Sudan. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed sought support from Egypt and Sudan during this time (International Crisis Group, 2021).

A March 2021 report from African News asserted that Sudanese forces had control over the area, referred to as Alfashaga. However, Addis Ababa countered this claim, stating that Sudan had unlawfully seized land in December 2020, contending that it was part of Ethiopian territory, not Sudanese land. On May 22, Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs

Demeke Mekonnen addressed the FDRE Parliament, accusing Sudan of unlawfully capturing Ethiopian territory in Alfashaga. In his parliamentary speech, Mekonnen highlighted that this occupation served another purpose—providing a gateway for the TPLF and supporting their fighters. Sudan released the border and ceded territories to facilitate the TPLF's restoration and launching an attack on Ethiopia, prompting concerns of impending conflict. Mekonnen warned Khartoum that such actions could strain relations between the two countries.

In the context of the Ethiopian Tigray war, Sudan did not maintain a firm and neutral stance. Initially, Sudan accused the federal government of supporting Amhara fighters in occupying the disputed area. The Amhara force asserted that this region belonged to their territory and not Sudanese land. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed employed a strategy of utilizing Amhara fighters to impede the TPLF's movements, restricting border movement and escape routes. Approximately 60,000 Tigrinya fighters and civilians were evacuated through this border. Sudan's military claimed that Abiy Ahmed denied Sudan its territories, as stipulated in the agreement signed by Meles Zenawi and Omar Hassan AL Bashir. This situation paints a picture of the conflict in the Horn of Africa, indicating that it extends beyond a local dispute. The Ethiopian-Somalia-Eritrea conflicts involve multiple participants, and the Tigray war is interconnected with broader conflicts in the Horn.

4.6.2. Sudan case

On April 12, 2019, Sky News reported the Sudanese Defiance Forces successfully ousted President Omar Hassan AL Bashir, capturing him with the assistance of the army. This event unfolded as antigovernment protesters expressed their frustration, citing 30 years of rule without addressing basic societal needs. BBC News described AL Bashir's tenure as defined by war, noting that when he assumed power, the country was in the midst of a 21-year conflict. The BBC report emphasized AL Bashir's authoritarian rule over the past three decades.

Sudan's political transition remained unstable, witnessing another coup in 2021, where civilian and military powers exchanged roles. However, the military force seized control once again, overthrowing Prime Minister Abdela Hamdok. Widespread protests erupted in Khartoum, demanding civilian administration, but the military responded by dispatching the demonstration and engaging in conflicts with protesters, resulting in the shooting of 120 people. Negligence

towards protests extended to the peripheries of Sudan, particularly in Darfur, southeast, and east Sudan.

The fragile situation in Sudan was exacerbated by the division of military power, with competing leaders vying for supremacy. General Abdul Fatah Al Burhan, the head of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the chair of the ruling military group or sovereign council, and General Mohammed Hamadan Dogalo (Hemdeti), who also chaired the paramilitary Rapid Support Force (RSF), emerged as powerful figures. Their rivalry escalated, fueled by national and international support, as they sought dominance in local power structures (BBC, 2022).

Hamdeti strengthened his military group RSF by seizing crucial economic organizations and gaining acceptance through guarding peripheral regions of Sudan, posing a significant challenge to SAF. This power struggle resulted in a firm conflict between the two factions, negatively impacting the country's public services and macroeconomy. In an attempt to de-escalate the conflict, the two powers reached a political framework agreement in December 2022 (Reuters, 2022).

Both military leader of Sudan have engaged the neighboring country Ethiopia conflict. As Chatham house military source implies that Sudan has source supply and materials for Tigryan forces and Benishangul Gumuz rebel on local conflict of Ethiopia. But the Sudan ruler denied giving training or material supplies for TPLF. Some source shows that refugee camps in personals of Sudan have been take military training in eastern Sudan. BBC Amharic wrote sourcing from UN confirms that the refugee camp is source of military training in eastern Sudan. UN confirming who had been evidence had been of takes place military training in Sudan refuge camps.

⁶Yetebaberut mengistat dirjit keftegna sidetegnochi commission ethiopiawuyan tefenaqayochi beneberubachew yesudan yesdetegnochi meteleya tabiya wust yegidaji yewutdirna milmela yikahad endeneber mereja neberegni ale.becampochu gidaji wetaderawi milmela chimir yideregu endeneber teamani reportochi dersewubet endeneber le bbc geltual.

⁶ የተባበሩት መንግስታት ድርጅት ከፍተኛ ስድስት ስድስት ኮሚሽን ኢትዮጵያውያን ተፈናቃዮ በነበሩባቸው የሱዳን የስድስት ስድስት መጠለያ ጣቢያ ውስጥ የግዳጅ የውትድርና ምልመላ ይካሄድ እንደሚችል መረጃ ነበረኝ አለ። በካምፖቹ ግዳጅ ወታደራዊ ምልመላ ጭምር ይቆረጡ እንደሚችሉ ተአማኒ ሪፖርቶች ቀርሰውት እንደሚችሉ ለቢ.ቢ.ሲ. ገልጧል።

UNHCR confirms that they have concrete evidences of military training takes place Sudan refugee camps. Who are comes from Ethiopia and some training had been takes forcefully. UNHCR tolled for BBC This evidence had been received trust full source.

Disjointedly, Also Sudan offer shelter and materials Gumuz insurgent during the TPLF war. The aim of this supporting is majorly impediment transport of GERD construction. The Gumuz rebel reports that the base of their training and support is from Sudan Blue Nile region which is the bordering Benishangul Gumuz region of Ethiopia. (Chatham house 2023).

4.7. Immediate and Promoting factors of the dispute

The current border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan is rooted in various triggering factors that have contributed to the ongoing tensions. One significant factor is the historical legacy of colonial-era demarcation GERD, external participates and TPLF war and others. Since 2010, the central focus of Ethiopia has been the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a monumental economic and political initiative with regional implications for the Horn and Northeast Africa. This project has not only raised concerns within Sudan but has also triggered reactions from Egypt and other Arab states. Egypt, in particular, has been opposed to the construction of the dam and, in an attempt to thwart the project, has influenced Sudan to engage in territorial conflicts. The Arab League and other Arab states have sided with Sudan, expressing solidarity against the GERD.

Adding complexity to the situation, internal divisions within the Ethiopian ruling party, particularly between the dominant factions of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) in the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), have played a significant role. The Amhara parties within ANDM have contended that, following the 2005 EPRDF and Sudan treaty, extensive farmland was ceded to Sudan, becoming a primary catalyst for internal crises in Ethiopia. This internal discord has spilled over into debates and discussions surrounding the GERD, shaping the federal government's stance on the project over recent years.

Moreover, the Alfashaga dispute is further fueled by the evolving perception within Sudan, where intellectuals and the general population now recognize the GERD's importance. They

acknowledge its potential to provide a consistent water flow, affordable electric power, and essential irrigation services, reshaping the narrative surrounding the dam within Sudan.

Conflict has become a recurring annual event, marked by Sudanese armed individuals crossing the border to seize farm products and loot agricultural materials. Typically occurring in March and April, this incursion by Sudanese military personnel has become a regular feature, although it has not escalated into a highly conflictual situation, resembling more of a localized community issue.

A significant contributing factor to the dispute lies in the behavior of the Sudanese government. Since gaining independence, Sudan has struggled to establish a stable civil government, creating a fragile governance structure that acts as a trigger for disputes. These contested areas are also endowed with abundant natural resources and serve as important trade routes. Sudan tends to capitalize on Ethiopia's internal issues, consistently occupying disputed areas. Compounding this, the Sudanese military's conduct is often unpredictable, driven by individual interests. Businessmen reportedly engage in financial arrangements with Sudanese military members and commanders, motivating them to pursue personal gains. Additionally, retired Sudanese military chiefs have invested in agriculture within the disputed Alfashaga (Yewuhabist) area, leading to a cycle where occupation and provocation of military members become recurrent strategies.

On the Ethiopian side, the government's inadequate attention to the Yewuhabist region is another contributing factor. The government has pursued a deficient peripheral management approach, lacking a centralized strategy for border management. The absence of a cohesive approach is evident in the disparate actions of various ministries and agencies, including the Ministry of Defense, intelligence services, federal police, map agencies, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The lack of coordination among these entities exacerbates the intensity of the dispute. Furthermore, Ethiopia's constitution fails to provide a clear demarcation of its borders, and the country has not established dedicated border management institutions or agencies. The current Ethiopia Map Agency, cited in bibliographic sources, does not include the disputed Alfashaga area, demonstrating a lack of understanding of the geographical reality and excluding it from official maps.

4.7.1. Tigray war as triggering and immediate Cause of the dispute

over the past three decades, the agreement between Ethiopia and Sudan regarding the status quo has contributed to the relative stability of the border region in Yewuhabist (Alfashaga). These areas have been economically productive, cultivating crops such as sesame, cotton, sunflower, and sorghum. However, the incidental war sparked by the Ethiopian Tigray conflict has disrupted this stability, leading to regional fragmentation in the Horn of Africa. The border between Ethiopia and Sudan, once fragile, has evolved into a firm stand border dispute (Washington Post, 2021).

The Tigray war has aggravated the situation, with Sudan supporting anti-Ethiopian armed rebellions, while Ethiopia has shown disregard for Sudan's responses during the conflict. Since the beginning of the Tigray war in 2020, the Sudanese military has occupied Alf-Fashaga (Yewuhabist), reflecting a local conflict within Ethiopia. Sudan has firmly supported Tigrinya forces during this occupation, providing substantial backing to the TPLF in the form of military bases, territorial supplies, and gate access through Al Fashaga in eastern Sudan. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed sought support from Egypt and Sudan during this tumultuous time (International Crisis Group, 2021).

A March 2021 report from African news sources indicated that Sudanese forces were in control of the area, referred to as Alfashaga. However, Addis Ababa claimed that Sudan, in December 2020, had seized land that was part of Ethiopian territory, not Sudanese land. On May 22, Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Demeke Mekonnen addressed the FDRE parliament, accusing Sudan of unlawfully capturing the Ethiopian territory of Yewuhabist. He argued that Sudan's occupation not only aimed at land conquest but also sought to provide a pathway for the TPLF and support its fighters. Sudan offered its border for the TPLF to restore and launch attacks on Ethiopia, a move that Ethiopia viewed as a declaration of war. This situation reflects how the TPLF war has intensified the Alfashaga dispute (John Young, 2020).

Sudan has pursued an alternative strategy to capture Yewuhabist, calculating its impact on Addis Ababa and aiming to negotiate the supremacy of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). In 2020, during Ethiopia's subsequent filling of the dam, Khartoum deployed numerous troops to the disputed area, escalating the conflict significantly. Sudanese authorities have

expressed their willingness to explore various solutions, emphasizing that total control of Alfashaga remains in their hands. Officials highlighted the complexity of internal conflicts, indicating a commitment to address these issues independently. However, when it comes to Alfashaga, they assert readiness to use power for resolution (Washington Post, 2021).

Efforts to minimize aggression have involved international actors attempting to reduce military financing while allocating more resources to civil administration. Despite these attempts, Sudan has not de-escalated its occupation of the area. External persuasion to reconsider the conquest has not yielded a solution. Sudan continues to develop civil and military infrastructures in the region (International Crisis Group, 2021).

Following the Pretoria Treaty and Ethiopian forces resolving the local conflict in November 2022, Sudan's stance shifted positively towards dispute and diplomatic resolution. Sudan claimed that the occupation of Alfashaga (Yewuhabist) is legally justified, citing knowledge of Ethiopia's historical background. Khartoum expressed the condition that displaced Ethiopian farmers could return when Ethiopia acknowledges the area's sovereignty as part of Sudan (Chatham House, 2023).

4.8. Recent development and Sudan occupation

In December 2020, the Sudanese troops entered Alfashaga, occupying the disputed area, looting agricultural materials, and displacing Ethiopian farmers. Subsequently, they erected fortifications in Alfashaga. This period coincided with the commencement of internal conflict between the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF in November 2020. The withdrawal of Ethiopian defense forces from the contested region was a consequence of the Ethiopian government's engagement in the Tigray war, serving as the immediate catalyst for the Alfashaga dispute. General Abdul Fatah Albertan declared the land of Alfashaga to be under Sudanese ownership, while the Ethiopian government insisted on maintaining the status quo. The power shift in favor of Sudan did not offer a satisfactory resolution, and Ethiopia, too, employed a similar approach without achieving a resolution.

Despite this, some interviewees suggested that the Ethiopian government might be negotiating with Sudan to occupy Alfashaga with the aim of sealing the border and countering TPLF's foreign allegations, potentially seizing arms imports.

The actions of Sudan have raised questions regarding the implementation of state behavior. General Albertan, with economic interests in Alfashaga, owns substantial agricultural areas in the region. Additionally, Abdul Fatah Al-burhan supports the Qimant militant group in the Amhara region of Ethiopia, receiving backing from Sudanese forces in terms of infantry training and armament support. In Sudan's case, the military's actions were not solely instigated by Chief Al-burhan; rather, various businessmen, investors, and contrabandists were capable of mobilizing military forces for infantry support.

Mohammed Kasim, a farmer residing in the Metema district, was once the owner of 200 hectares of farmland in the disputed area known as Forgena, which is part of the Alfashaga (Yewuhabist) region. Unfortunately, this land has been taken over by Sudanese forces. Kasim recounts that around 50 investors from his kebele in Delello, Metema, have been displaced, and their lands are now occupied by Sudanese military and businessmen. Expressing regret, he questions why the Ethiopian government has not taken steps to reclaim their land.

Kasim was a member of the tentative border-lined committee in 2004 and 2006, which aimed to provide a preliminary solution to the border conflict. However, the outcomes led to further conflicts as more areas, including Tiha kebele, were reportedly given to Sudan. Despite this, the tentative delineation respected the status quo. Kasim, who has a history of farming dating back to the Derg regime, recalls that during that time, the EDU (Ethiopian Democratic Union) opposition party controlled the area and collected taxes from Sudanese crossing the Guwang River.

The Ethiopian border delineation during the Derg and Emperor Hailesilase periods was defined by the Guwang River. Another opposition party, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), owned and administered the Ethiopian side of the territory behind the Tiha River. However, the border disputes persist, with controversial delineation points causing ongoing conflicts. Many farmers have attempted to cultivate the land, facing sacrifices each year due to the contested border points.

Kasim expresses disappointment with the current Prosperity government, stating that it has shown less care than its predecessor, the EPRDF. He views the government's inaction on safeguarding Ethiopian sovereignty over disputed territories as a source of shame.

During the previous regime, local militants, Fano, investors, and farmers actively safeguarded the Alfashaga region. However, the current situation has changed, and engaging in a conflict with the Sudanese military leads to prosecution by the Ethiopian government against its own citizens. This action has raised concerns and criticisms directed at the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Government. Some believe that the government might have engaged in negotiations with Sudanese military groups, potentially leading to the seizure of Alfashaga for political gains in the context of the Northern Ethiopia war.

A knowledgeable source familiar with the dispute area highlighted key delineation points from Metema to Abderafi, including the Guwang River, Angereb, Lgudi, Humera, and the Tekeze River, marking the Sudan-Ethiopia border. The town of Berekete serves as another significant point, representing the joint line of Eritrea, Sudan, and Ethiopia, and it marks the last point of Sudanese territory. According to the source, the entire region has now been occupied by the government. The estimated occupation spans approximately 70 kilometers from north to south and 350 kilometers from west to east, making this area crucial for economic energy.

A Sudanese citizen, Khalid Ali, shared his perspective, considering the region a shared space for Sudanese-Ethiopian investment. He advocated for flexible laws allowing Ethiopians to cultivate the land, fostering mutual benefits between the two countries. Despite Ethiopia's challenges, including the conflict in Tigray, Sudan opened its land to assist Ethiopian brothers, particularly in the Gedaref region. Ali emphasized the brotherly relationship between Sudanese and Ethiopians, questioning why the two nations couldn't invest in each other's lands without unnecessary complications. He expressed disappointment that Sudan did not stand with Ethiopia during its conflict with the Tigray Liberation Front, asserting that it was not an opportune time for Ethiopia to engage in such conflicts, and Sudan should have offered support.

Ethiopian political elites allege that the Ethiopian government intentionally invited Sudan to seize Alfashaga, asserting that internal conflicts in Tigray might prompt Ethiopia to negotiate with Sudan for border closure. These claims are not mere rumors, as they argue that the Ethiopian defense force has yet to reclaim the occupied area. Despite the potential to expel Sudanese forces, no action has been taken, suggesting a possible negotiation between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Government and Sudan.

The ongoing political transitions in both Ethiopia and Sudan contribute to the current occupation of Alfashaga. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed engaged in negotiations with Sudan's civil administration and military chief, leading to an agreement that was publicly acknowledged. Abiy Ahmed himself participated in the events surrounding this agreement. Subsequently, Sudan's military presence in Alfashaga became apparent a few weeks later, indicating a complex and significant development.

4.9. Considering Global and regional Actors involvements of the dispute

The dispute over Alfashaga involves both state and non-state actors who are directly or indirectly participating for their individual purposes. Traditional and external actors are drawn to this region due to its geostrategic and geo-economics significance. The area is rich in natural resources, making it attractive for economic and political interests.

In terms of economic involvement, various Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have engaged in agricultural investments, cultivating extensive farmland. On the political front, Egypt has played a vital role in initiating the recent dispute in 2020, these phenomena had also historically involved in the Alfashaga (Yewuhabist) region, and it. Egypt's actions serve dual purposes - gaining negotiating leverage in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance

Dam (GERD) issue and securing economic advantages by utilizing Sudan's fertile territory for agriculture.

Other Arab nations, such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, have also invested significantly in agriculture in Sudan, capitalizing on the country's rich natural resources and vast farmland. European and Asian countries, such as Russia and China, have entered Sudan's economic and security arena. Russia attempted to seize Port Sudan for a military base until the 2019 coup, and China pursued oil-rich areas in 2018. European Union and the USA have also shown interest in Sudan's economic and political matters.

These external actors often interpret and participate in the conflict based on their biased interests in Sudan. Those benefiting from Sudan's territory tend to support Sudan's claims over Alfashaga (Yewuhabist), viewing it as Sudanese property. In times of conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan, these actors support Sudan and analyze the Alfashaga dispute through the lens of their specific interests. The USA, on the other hand, seeks a stable region and aims to balance the interests of

both Ethiopia and Sudan. However, their proposed solutions, such as the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC), may be perceived as arbitrary.

Various external actors have engaged in the Alfashaga region, each pursuing their specific interests. This area is notable for its fertile agricultural land, contraband trading, and illegal arms trade, making it a focal point for different Arab states seeking economic and political advantages. The dispute involves multiple participants, with their involvement driven by both economic and political considerations.

Traditionally, Egypt has been a key player in the dispute, exerting political pressure on Sudan and aligning its interests with the Sudanese military. However, this alignment may not necessarily be in Sudan's best interest, as Egypt prioritizes its own concerns.

While scholars argue that the direct military presence of external actors in the area is not visible, their influence is evident in diplomatic and media campaigns. Egypt, along with Arab states and European countries, has expressed support for Sudan in these arenas. Although the external actors may not have a clear military presence, their indirect participation contributes to the complexity of the dispute.

The external actors' involvement can be categorized into two main initiatives: economic and political. Egypt emerges as a prominent political actor, actively intervening in the Alfashaga dispute to address its strategic concerns in northern Sudan. General Abdul Fatah Al-burhan is viewed as an agent of Egypt, working towards resolving land disputes in the region.

Economic actors, represented by Arab states, are also significant players. European and American interests align with maintaining stability in the area. The research suggests that Al-burhan's personal interest in occupying Alfashaga stems from his background as a military member in eastern Sudan, where he experienced attacks from local militants and farmers. This personal connection drives his actions in the ongoing dispute, acting in what he perceives as retaliation against Ethiopian farmers.

4.10. Implication of regime change for the dispute

Ethiopia and Sudan underwent political transitions in consecutive years, 2018 and 2019, respectively, following the prolonged rule of their respective governments over the past three decades. This transition has unearthed historical domestic disputes, revealing a lack of neutrality between the two nations over the past fifty-plus years. The political changes in Ethiopia, marked by a regime shift, ushered in a period of peace and cooperation with Eritrea, significantly impacting Sudan. The geopolitical landscape underwent notable shifts, particularly as Sudan grappled with its border dispute with Egypt in the northern Alibe triangle.

General Alburhan strategically utilized the Alfashaga dispute as a means of internal political maneuvering, framing it as a restoration of Sudanese heroism. Both Sudan and Ethiopia have instrumentalized border issues for managing internal political affairs. The border disputes resurface during periods of internal instability, becoming a tool for political leverage. The governments of both nations seem more focused on using these border issues as a means of internal political posturing rather than seeking a long-lasting solution. Notably, discussions on this matter have been absent from the diplomatic table since 2005.

The political transitions in both Ethiopia and Sudan during 2018 and 2019 played a crucial role in the recent border dispute between the two countries. These political transitions acted as immediate causes and triggering factors of the dispute dynamics of the conflict. Ethiopia's history of political transitions and internal conflicts has consistently led neighboring countries to assert territorial claims, such as the 1976 Somalia invasion, Eritrea's invasion in 1994, and Sudan's occupation during every Ethiopian political transition, which has not been forgotten.

Sudan, in particular, has a long history of the conquest of Alfashaga. Following the overthrow of the Umar Hassan Al Bashir government, the military regime exhibited anti-Ethiopian sentiments. The military ruling group engaged in anti-Ethiopian conspiracies, aligned with Egypt, and opposed Ethiopia, illustrating how the political regime change triggered the border dispute.

General Alburhan, the military chief, owns extensive farmland in the Alfashaga area (Yewuhabist). During Ethiopia's internal conflict in Tigray, the military staff supported the TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front), and individuals involved in atrocities in Micadra found cover under the Alburhan government. The TPLF's war served as an immediate cause for the recent

border dispute, but when examining the regime change, it becomes clear that this event acted as a triggering factor rather than an immediate cause.

The political transitions of 2018 and 2019 in Ethiopia and Sudan have indeed played a significant role in the recent occupation in Sudan's disputed area. The crackdowns faced during these transitions led to changes in political friendships and relationships between the two countries. Each new government brings about enthusiasm and scrutiny, and in Sudan, there is a sentiment that Omar Al Bashir's permission for Ethiopians to farm in fertile and virgin lands did not benefit the Sudanese population. This has sparked complaints about why these lands were given to Ethiopians when Sudan could have reaped the economic benefits, amounting to 800 million Sudanic currency gains annually.

4.11. Encountering African union border program issue annexes with Bilateral talk

The Ethiopia and Sudan border dispute since 2018, within the framework of the African Union Border Program (AUBP), reflects a broader context of border issues across Africa. The continent ripples with 110 unresolved interstate border crises, impacting 65% of its borders. A mere 35% of these borders are free from conflict, underscoring the widespread nature of the problem, which carries global implications.

The African Union Border Program, initiated in 2007 and formally declared in 2016 (AUBP, 2012), seeks to transform borders into bridges rather than crisis points. Within this program, the Ethiopia and Sudan border stands out as one of the unresolved crises. Encouragingly, neighboring countries are urged to pursue solutions for their shared borders.

Bilateral solutions are highlighted as a commendable approach within the AUBP, presenting an effective means to resolve border disputes. Conversely, the text emphasizes that trilateral solutions are deemed inappropriate for Ethiopia, especially in the context of addressing the Alfashaga dispute. Researchers argue that a bilateral approach is a more effective direction, particularly in resolving the Alfashaga (Yewuhabist) conflict.

The historical backdrop reveals that since 1966, Ethiopia and Sudan established a joint border commission dedicated to resolving their dispute. The text advocates for the consolidation of this commission, asserting its importance in bringing about a solution. This method is considered more pivotal than any other United Nations approach in resolving conflicts.

Cooperation methods emerge as a critical aspect of resolving long-standing border disputes. This arrangement is particularly promoted and deemed significant for Ethiopia. Acknowledging the potential escalation of single conflicts in the Horn of Africa to regional proportions, the text underscores the importance of a cooperative method, emphasizing its relevance for both countries involved in the dispute.

The United Nations' approach to conflict management has proven ineffective in addressing the ongoing border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan. Instead, the African Union Border Program emerges as a more promising framework for resolution. This program envisions the transformation of shared borders into bridges that unite states, aiming to eliminate sources of division and conflict. The key to resolving this conflict lies in bilateral talks and discussions that align with Ethiopia's interests. Ethiopia and Sudan, sharing common customs and traditions, prioritize their unity over external interference, and emphasize the necessity of direct dialogue between the two countries at the table. This approach, fostering strong ties between sisterly nations, is deemed more fruitful than involving external parties. The importance of maturity is highlighted as a key factor in resolving issues through discussions, forming committees, and strengthening the joint border commission. The researcher advocates for negotiations and soft power, emphasizing those coercive measures are unlikely to bring a lasting solution. Additionally, there is a suggestion to establish an economic zone in the disputed area for the mutual benefit of both countries.

Chapter five

5. Conclusion

The central reasons behind the persistent border tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan can be traced back to colonial legacies and the inadequacies in demarcating the border. The historical Gwyn line, drawn without consideration for indigenous cultures and without the involvement of the local populations, stands as a glaring example of how colonial powers have left enduring scars on the African continent. This arbitrary demarcation has become a contentious point, setting the stage for ongoing disputes. The post-colonial theory explains that the colonizer feels otherness of colonizing country. This externalization have source of conflict in Ethiopia and Sudan, even the colonizer attempt to interrupt and managed the current government structure. The states could be understand and managed it. The colonizer had been forgotten and identities of the border community.

The Alfashaga region has become a focal point for external actors due to its geostrategic and geo-economics significance. Various Arab states, European countries, the USA, and China have participated in the region's economic and security landscape. Investments in agriculture and natural resource exploitation have created a complex web of interests, with each external actor interpreting the conflict in a way that aligns with their economic and political goals. The complexity of the border dispute is further compounded by the active involvement of regional and continental actors. These external players, both visible and hidden, pursue economic and geopolitical interests in the naturally endowed Alfashaga region. The result has been intensified military engagement and provocations, driven by economic interests, geopolitical considerations, and the recklessness of border administration by the involved governments. Postcolonial theory analyzes the exploitation of resources, economic systems instituted during colonial periods, and the lasting impact on the economic structures of current colonized nations. The historical dimension delves into the narratives and a history constructed during colonial times continues to present time. Ethiopia and Sudan could understand this interest.

The current African map, a product of the Berlin Imperialism Conference of 1885, reflects the colonizers' division of Africa along arbitrary lines, leading to enduring conflicts. The Gwyn line, dividing colonized Sudan and Ethiopia, is a manifestation of this colonial legacy. Rejecting this

historical division, both nations could benefit from the African Union Border Program, working together to transform the region from a bone of contention into a spot of cooperation.

Ethiopia, inadequate concentration on the Yewuhabist region and poor peripheral management has contributed to the intensification of the Alfashaga dispute. Fragmented border management, with separate approaches from various government ministries and agencies, exacerbates the situation. The absence of clearly defined border lines in the Ethiopian constitution and the oversight of disputed areas like Alfashaga underscore the deficiencies in border management.

Critical to the resolution of the border dispute is the establishment of a dedicated border management institution in Ethiopia. The current fragmented approach, with different government agencies working independently, has contributed to a fragile border management system. The new institution should centralize efforts, harmonize activities, and contribute to political stability, economic development, and the safeguarding of national sovereignty. Addressing the fragmented and fragile nature of border management is paramount. A robust border management institution should be established in Ethiopia to centralize efforts, harmonize activities, and contribute to political stability and economic development. This institution, equipped with the necessary authority, can effectively navigate and resolve disputes, ensuring a coherent approach to border-related matters. The formation of a robust border management institution emerges as a proactive and pivotal step in this transformative journey

Implementing agreement of exchange of note signed in 1972 offering the conflict to coalmines. The 1972 exchange of notes stands as a unique opportunity for Ethiopia and Sudan to find common ground. By accepting the Major Gwyn demarcation as a conceptual agreement, both nations acknowledged the need for a cooperative approach. The local residents' recognition of the status quo, as outlined in Article 3, provides a foundation for building trust and respect. The researcher suggests that implementing this treaty could pave the way for a win-win solution beneficial to both states.

So Alfashaga is the extended dispute over the Ethiopia-Sudan border in the Alfashaga region is rooted in colonial legacies, an undefined demarcation line, and the contentious seizure of natural resources. Regional and continental actors have significantly influenced the conflict, intensifying military engagements and economic interests. External involvement, both visible and unseen, has

further complicated the dynamics, with geostrategic and geo-economics considerations driving interventions.

Tactically understand and carefully manage colonial legacies of Berlin conference. The roots of the Ethiopia-Sudan border dispute can be traced back to the Berlin Imperialism Conference of 1885, where European powers divided Africa arbitrarily, laying the foundation for conflict. The Gwyn line, a product of this colonial legacy, symbolizes the need for a wake-up call. The imperialist imposition, devoid of indigenous cultural considerations, has perpetuated tension. Rejecting traditional power dynamics, Ethiopia and Sudan can opt for a diplomatic and cooperative solution, transitioning from a bone of contention to a spot of cooperation. Because the dependency theories suggest that the conflict and underdevelopment is caused by external factors in previous legacies.

Though, the area needs Transforming Colonial Legacies into Cooperation. To address the colonial legacies embedded in the Gwyn line, a transformative approach is essential. Rejecting methods of hard and soft power, a paradigm shift towards Para-diplomatic strategies is necessary. By leveraging the African Union Border Program, both nations can collaboratively redefine the disputed area. This calls for the establishment of a joint economic zone, fostering mutual benefits and transforming a historical source of conflict into a symbol of cooperation.

To manage participations Incitements of External powers of the dispute they could be move towards the resolution, it's crucial for both Ethiopia and Sudan to recognize and mitigate triggering factors. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and external provocations, particularly from Egypt, have added complexity to the border dispute. Sudan's benefits lie in cooperation with Ethiopia rather than succumbing to external pressures. Acknowledging that development projects are sources of economic growth and cooperation, both nations should focus on internal solutions rather than deflecting internal issues onto the Alfashaga dispute. Institutional liberalism argues that real actors of disputes involving state and non-state entities, the perspective of theory, in the current political landscape, states are interdependent, with both state and non-state actors establishing their own roles, goals, and power dynamics to achieve their aims. While state actors are crucial, the theory acknowledges that problems involving interdependent actors cannot be solved sequentially. Instead, it seeks solutions as occurrences escalate. In situations of serious danger, instability, or war, the responsibility falls on state actors

to make decisive decisions in the domain of policy issues. The nation could be recognizing this arena.

Ethiopia and Sudan underwent political transitions in consecutive years, 2018 and 2019, respectively; they govern over the past three decades. This transition has unearthed historical domestic disputes, revealing a lack of neutrality between the two nations over the past fifty-plus years. The political changes in Ethiopia, marked by a regime shift, ushered in a period of peace and cooperation with Eritrea, significantly impacting Sudan. The geopolitical landscape underwent notable shifts.

General Alburhan strategically utilized the Alfashaga dispute as a means of internal political maneuvering, framing it as a restoration of Sudanese heroism. Both Sudan and Ethiopia have instrumentalized border issues for managing internal political affairs. The border disputes resurface during periods of internal instability, becoming a tool for political leverage. Liberalism theory states that Nation interest is the most untouchable aim of the state during war. State or nation survives anarchy contextual war. The security institution of the nation such as military, Police, and court are anarchy instrument of the nation. Human nature is naturally egoistic for aspire of seeking power the selfish behavior of personality raised from nature of human. So the state used this instrument for aspiring of national interest to accompany of natural resource. The governments of both nations seem more focused on using these border issues as a means of internal political posturing rather than seeking a long-lasting solution. Notably, discussions on this matter have been absent from the diplomatic table since 2005. They could be restored this diplomatic discussion.

Following the overthrow of the Umar Hassan Al Bashir government, the military regime exhibited anti-Ethiopian sentiments. The military ruling group engaged in anti-Ethiopian conspiracies, aligned with Egypt, and opposed Ethiopia, illustrating how the political regime change triggered the border dispute. Ethiopian regime change brought Tigray war. The Tigray war has aggravated the situation, with Sudan supporting anti-Ethiopian armed rebellions, while Ethiopia has shown disregard for Sudan's responses during the conflict. Since the beginning of the Tigray war in 2020, the Sudanese military has occupied Alf-Fashaga (Yewuhabist), reflecting a local conflict within Ethiopia. Sudan has firmly supported Tigrinya forces occasionally. War provokes and calling the border dispute as force distribution and resettlement of ENDF.

The political transitions in both Ethiopia and Sudan during 2018 and 2019 played a crucial role in the recent border dispute between the two countries. These political transitions acted as immediate causes and triggering factors of the dispute dynamics of the conflict. Ethiopia's history of political transitions and internal conflicts has consistently led neighboring countries to assert territorial claims, such as the 1976 Somalia invasion, Eritrea's invasion in 1994, and Sudan's occupation during every Ethiopian political transition, which has not been forgotten. Sudan, in particular, has a long history of the conquest of Alfashaga.

They need for a Cooperative Approach and build Joint Economic Zone. To address the Alfashaga dispute effectively, Ethiopia and Sudan must shift away from divisive methods. Cooperative frameworks, guided by the African Union Border Program, can provide a path toward conflict resolution. Establishing a joint economic zone in the disputed area could serve as a symbol of cooperation, fostering mutual benefits and shared prosperity.

This approach is vital to reshaping the narrative of the Ethiopia-Sudan border dispute. Shifting from adversarial methods to cooperative frameworks is crucial. Underpinned by mutual benefits and shared prosperity, represents a tangible step towards turning this area from a source of contention into a symbol of collaboration. Rejecting colonial legacies, fostering regional cooperation, and establishing effective border management institutions are critical steps. The active involvement of the African Union, not as biased interpreters but as sole rolling facilitators of dialogue and understanding, can contribute significantly to achieving a lasting and equitable solution for both Ethiopia and Sudan. Liberal institutionalism theory posits that international cooperation between states and governments is not only necessary but also sustainable. The theory also advocates that, cooperation among diverse actors on both economic and political fronts. The underlying principle is that power must be harnessed to secure social interests and facilitate cooperation based on shared interests.

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
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III. Appendix

Current Ethiopian map used by Ethiopian map agency (demarcation used Gwyn line)



כבוד הנהלת בית הדין הרבני בארץ ישראל
הרשומות מס' 1000 תל אביב : : משרד המשפטים
תל אביב : : משרד המשפטים תל אביב : :
1983

אשר על פי החלטת בית הדין הרבני בארץ ישראל
מיום 14/10/1983 אשר לפיה הורה בית הדין
למשיבא להשיב למשיב על אתר המדובר

החלטת בית הדין הרבני בארץ ישראל
מיום 14/10/1983 אשר לפיה הורה בית הדין
למשיבא להשיב למשיב על אתר המדובר

14/10/1983 תל אביב : : משרד המשפטים


1000 תל אביב : : משרד המשפטים

2007, Ethiopia and Sudan treaty

Within the contest of bilateral meeting between the Federal Republic of Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, subsequent to the Honorable visit made by the Ethiopian Delegation headed by H E Foreign Minister of Ethiopia Mr Seyoum Mesfin as response to the previous visit of H E Minister of Defence of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan Lt General PSC Abdulrahim Mohammed Hussein.

Referring to the previous meetings of the two parties within the historical and strategic relationship between the two.

Seeking permanent solution for the best interest of both sides of the Borders in full transparency and within the spirit of brotherhood the following points were decided: 20/6/2007



The Joint Field Work Committee (JFWC) should meet within 5 days time to work out together a temporary solution regarding the following matters :

1. Shaded area .
2. Area left north of Abdelmajeed .
3. Access to the river through traditional roads .


it is agreed to work according to the following principles :


- 1- Shaded area to be divided between Sudanese and Ethiopian farmers on 50% basis . ✓
- 2- The area left north Abdelmajeed up to the junction of Basalam and Atbara rivers :
 - a) to follow the general rule that lands Cultivated before 1995 by Ethiopians should be left to them , using the data that already collated in the JSWG report 2004 . ✓
 - b) All the remaining lands west of the farms lands registered in 2004 should be allocated to the Sudanese farmers regardless whether the land is forest or grazing land .

3- Regarding Access to the river through traditional roads . It is agreed that the traditional roads should be reserved for the usage of both sides . ✓


4- As the above mentioned points conclude the last phase of the temporary solution of agricultural land on the borders of both countries , and pending redemarcation the two teams are requested to exert their at most effort to conclude this matter .

The Governor of Gadaref state and the Governor of Amhara / Tegray region are requested to sponsor the efforts of the joint team to finish this assignment as soon as possible .



H E Seyoum Mesfin
Minister of Foreign Affairs
For the Government of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia


H E Lt General ENG PSC
Abdulrahman Mohammed Hussein
Minister of Defence For the
Government of the Sudan

Treaty maps of Great Britain and Ethiopia 1907



1966 Border commission understanding demarcation point line of



፱ተኛ፡ ክፍል።

ጸገሆ። ዳግጣዊ፡ ምኒልክ፡ ገጉሠ፡ ነገሥት፡ ዘኢትዮጵያ፡
ለብሬታገዳና፡ ለሱዳን፡ ጠገሥት፡ ጠባር፡ ወገዝ፡ ላይ፡
ጠሊታገ፡ ኦጠገብ፡ በዓፄጣዕዛን፡ ፱፻፲፯፡ ጫኑር፡ የጫህገ፡
፮ ቦታ፡ የገገድ፡ ጠተጣ፡ አገገብሩ፡ ያውባሉ፡ በዛህ፡
ቦታ፡ የጫናሩ፡ ሰዎች፡ የአገገላዝ፡ ጠገሥት፡ ሱዳን፡
አስጠላቀ፡ ድረስ፡ በሱዳን፡ ገዛት፡ ሥረት፡ ተጻጥተው፡
ይኖራሉ። ይህ ነገዎ፡ የተዋሉትን፡ ቦታ፡ የጠርና፡ የሶሊ
ቲን፡ ነገር፡ አገገገገባባት፡ ሁለቱ፡ ጠገሥት፡ ውል፡
አድርገዋል።

፳ተኛ፡ ክፍል።

ዳግጣዊ፡ ምኒልክ፡ ገጉሠ፡ ነገሥት፡ ዘኢትዮጵያ፡ ለብሬታ
ገዳ፡ ገጉሥ፡ ጠገሥትና፡ ለሱዳን፡ ጠገሥት፡ የሱዳንና፡
የዑጋንዳገ፡ የዎድር፡ ባቡር፡ ለጣጋጠዎ፡ በኢትዮጵያ፡ ገዛ
ት፡ ላይ፡ የዎድር፡ ባቡር፡ ጠገድ፡ ለጠዘርጋት፡ ፈታድ፡
በጥተዋቸዋል። ነገር፡ ገገ፡ ባቡሩ፡ የጫዘረጋበትን፡ ጠረ
ት፡ ፱ቱ፡ ጠገሥት፡ ተሰጣጥተው፡ ይጠርባሉ።
የብሬታገዳ፡ ገጉሥ፡ ውሉገ፡ ወደደሀ፡ ይሸና፡ በለው፡ ለኢ
ትዮጵያ፡ ገጉሠ፡ ነገሥት፡ ያስታውቃሉ። ባስታወቁት፡
ቶገ፡ ዘዎር፡ ውሉ፡ ይረጋል።

ጠዘጠጥ፡ ክፍል ።

በኢርትራ፡ ገዛትና፡ በኢትዮጵያ፡ ገዛት፡ ጠባብ፡ በታላቅ፡
አሰብ፡ ተደራሽ፡ ድረስ፡ የነበረው፡ ወሰን፡ ተርቶ፡ ተጥሎ፡
የተጻፈው፡ ወሰን፡ ድምብር፡ ይሁን፡ በለው፡ በዚህ፡ ውል፡
የተሰማው፡ ሰሰቱ፡ ጠገሥቶች፡ ውል፡ አድርገዋል ። ይኸው
ም፡ አዲሱ፡ ወሰን፡ ከገር፡ አምሀገርና፡ በሰቲት፡ ወገን፡
ጠገኛ፡ አገሥቶ፡ የሰቲት፡ ወገን፡ ይዘ፡ የጣኢተገና፡
የሰቲት፡ ወገን፡ ጠገኛ፡ ድረስ፡ ነው። በዚህ፡ ጠገኛ፡
አገሥቶ፡ አላቶቡራገ፡ ወጪ፡ ኢርትራ፡ ገዛት፡ አድርጎ፡
ወሰኑ፡ ጠረብና፡ ጣይ፡ አገበባ፡ ጠገኛ፡ ድረስ፡ ይሄል ።
በጣኢተገና፡ በሰቲት፡ ጠገኛ፡ አሰብ፡ ጠረብና፡ ጣይ፡
አገበባ፡ ጠገኛ፡ ያለውን፡ ወሰን፡ የኢጣልያ፡ ጠገሥት
ና፡ የኢትዮጵያ፡ ጠገሥት፡ የጠረብቸው፡ ሸጣጥሎች፡ አይ
ተው፡ ተሰማሎተው፡ ይወሰኑታል ። ይህ ነገም፡ የጣወሰኑ፡
ሸጣጥሎች፡ የቡናጣገ፡ ጉሣ፡ ሸገጥሎች፡ ወጪ፡ ኢርትራ፡
ገዛት፡ እገዲህኑ፡ አድርገው፡ ይወሰናሉ ።


፪ተኛ፡ ክፍል ።

የኢጣሊያ፡ ጠገሥት፡ ጠልክተኛና፡ የአገገላዝ፡ ጠገሥት፡
ጠልክተኛ፡ የሱዳንና፡ የኢርትራ፡ ገዛት፡ ወሰን፡ ይሁን፡
በለው፡ በጣኢተገና፡ በ፲ ተገ፡ በ፲፯፻፲፫፡ ምሕረት፡
የጻፈት፡ ውል፡ ተርቶ፡ በኢርትራ፡ ገዛትና፡ በሱዳን፡ ጠባ
ብል፡ ያለው፡ ወሰን፡ በሰብድረት፡ አገሥቶ፡ አሰብ፡ አቡ
ገጠል ። በአቡገጠል፡ አሰብ፡ ገር፡ አምሀገርና፡ ሰቲት፡ ወገን፡ ጠገ
ኛ፡ ይሁን፡ በለው፡ ዛሬ፡ የተጥሎት፡ ፫ቱ፡ ጠገሥቶች፡ ውል፡
አድርገዋል ።

የአገላለጽ ገጥሞች፣ የኢጣሊያ ገጥሞች፣ ይህንን ውል፣
 ወደደገ፣ ይጽፍ፣ ብለው ለኢትዮጵያ ገጥሞች፣ ገጥሞች፣
 ያስታውቃሉ። ገጥሞች፣ ተገ፣ ዘጭር፣ ይህ ውል፣
 ይረጋል።
 ዳግግ፣ ይረጋል፣ የኢትዮጵያ ገጥሞች፣ ገጥሞች፣ ለረባቸው
 ውና፣ ለወረታቸው፣ ሆነው። በግደታ፣ ግደታ፣ ረደሪ
 ገ፣ ችግራት፣ የተኛው፣ ቢክቸር፣ አጣኝ፣ የኢጣሊ
 ያ፣ ገጥሞች፣ ባለጭሉ፣ ሥልጣን፣ መልክተኛ፣ በኢጣሊ
 ገጥሞች፣ ሰጭ፣ ለረባቸው፣ ለወረታቸው፣ ሆና። ደግሞ፣ ተ
 ኒገቲ፣ በሉኒል፣ ሐሪገቸ፣ የብሪታንያ፣ የኢርላንድ፣
 በባሕር፣ ወዲያ፣ ያለው፣ የአገላለጽ ገጥሞች፣ ገጥሞች፣
 ኢድወር፣ ፲ተኛ፣ የህገደ፣ ገጥሞች፣ ገጥሞች፣ ባለጭሉ፣
 ሥልጣን፣ መልክተኛ፣ በአገላለጽ ገጥሞች፣ ሰጭ፣ ለረባቸው
 ውና፣ ለወረታቸው፣ ሆና። ይህንን ውል፣ በአጣሪኛ፣
 በአገላለጽ፣ በኢጣሊያ፣ ታገታ፣ በሰሰት፣ ላይ፣ ትክክል፣
 ሆና፣ ተጽፎ፣ ወደነጻ፣ ብለው፣ በየጣጣቸው፣ አትጭ
 ል። ገጥሞች፣ ፲ ተገ። ፲፯፻፺፬ ዓ.ተ፣ ጭረት።
 አዲስ፣ አበባ፣ በተጣ፣ ተጽፎ።

ምንጭ፡ የፕሮፌሰር ኡሉንድርፍ ጥናት.
 Source: Ullendorff, Edward. 1967 "The Anglo Ethiopian Treaty of 1902"
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, No. 3, pp. 641-
 654.

Disputed areas of Ethiopia and Sudan



1972 exchange of note

6. Exchange of Notes of July 18, 1972

(xvi) The Exchange of Notes set forth below, dated July 18, 1972, is published in a work entitled *Sudan's Foreign Policy 1973: Report from the Minister for Foreign Affairs* (Sudan Ministry for Foreign Affairs), App. 5, p. 204/1. An Arabic translation of the Exchange of Notes, together with President Numriy's ratification, has appeared as a Legislative Supplement to the *Gazette of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan*, No. 1134, of August 30, 1972, p. 227. The text and the information concerning publication has been supplied by Dr. F. A. R. A. Taha of the University of Khartoum.

*Imperial Ethiopian Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

I have the honour to refer to the discussions held between Representatives of the Imperial Ethiopian Government and the Representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan concerning the question of the common boundary between the Sudan and Ethiopia.

In the course of these boundary discussions I had the honour to submit on behalf of the Government of Ethiopia the following proposals for Your Excellency's consideration:—

- I. Basic acceptance of Major Gwynn's demarcation on the basis of the 1902 and 1907 treaties as the boundary line between Ethiopia and Sudan, regardless of the issue concerning the validity of Gwynn's demarcations. As regards the boundary north of Setit River, acceptance of the Talbot/Martinelli demarcation of February 1903 (as intensified in February 1916) as the boundary line as far as Abu Gamul.

For purposes of the redemarcation, the boundary south of Setit River shall be divided into two parts, namely, the boundary south of Mount Dagleish and north of Mount Dagleish.

- II. Boundary south of Mount Dagleish.

A. *Minor rectifications*

There shall be a rectification of the boundary to the effect that the line of demarcation shall run across the crest points rather than the base of the hills of Halawa, Umdoga, El Mutan and Mount Jerok.

B. The Governments of the Sudan and Ethiopia shall, before deciding on the southern terminal point of their common boundary, invite the Government of Kenya for the purpose of determining the point of tri-junction of the frontiers of Ethiopia, the Sudan and Kenya.

- III. *The Boundary north of Mount Dagleish to Setit River*

A. *Identification line in Setit Humera*

In areas where either side has apprehension about fresh penetrations, the Government of Ethiopia is prepared to accept the Sudanese proposal that an identification line be drawn to fix the limit of territories of their *de facto* holdings, particularly in the section of the frontier north of Mount Dagleish to the Setit River.

The status quo shall be respected until final disposition of the case by agreement between the two Governments.

B. Re-demarcation between Setit River and Mount Dagleish

Prior to re-demarcation of the Gwynn line in this sector of the boundary, the Government of Ethiopia wishes to arrive at an understanding with the Government of the Sudan on the following:—

The two Governments shall agree that while re-demarcation proceeds from Mount Dagleish southwards, the Governments of the Sudan and Ethiopia shall study the problem resulting from settlement and cultivation by nationals of either nation in the territory of the other with a view to finding an amicable solution. The two Governments shall set up a special committee to deal with the problem in detail and submit a report to the Consultative Committee as soon as possible.

If the foregoing proposals are acceptable to Your Excellency, I propose that this Note and your note in reply expressing agreement thereof shall constitute an understanding between our two Governments regarding our respective positions on the subject matter.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Sigd.

Dr. Minasse Haile
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

H.E. Dr. Mansour Khalid,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

**EMBASSY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA.**

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of 18th July, 1972, concerning the boundary question, which reads as follows:—

I. Basic acceptance of Major Gwynn's demarcations on the basis of the 1902 and 1907 treaties as the boundary line between Ethiopia and the Sudan, regardless of the issue concerning the validity of Gwynn's demarcations.

As regards the boundary north of Setit River, acceptance of the Talbot/Martinelli demarcation of February 1903 (as intensified in February 1916) as the boundary line as far as Abu Gamul.

For purposes of redemarcation, the boundary south of Setit River shall be divided into two parts, namely, the boundary south of Mount Dagleish and north of Mount Dagleish.

II. Boundary south of Mount Dagleish.

A. Minor rectifications

There shall be a rectification of the boundary to the effect that the line of demarcation shall run across the crest points rather than the base of the hills of Halawa, Umdoga, El Mutan and Mount Jerok.

B. The Governments of the Sudan and Ethiopia shall, before deciding on the southern terminal point of their common boundary, invite the Government of Kenya for the purpose of determining the point of trijunction of the frontiers of Ethiopia, the Sudan and Kenya.

III. The boundary north of Mount Dagleish to Setit River.

A. Identification line in Setit Humera

In areas where either side has apprehension about fresh penetrations, the Government of Ethiopia is prepared to accept the Sudanese proposal that an identification line be drawn to fix the limit of territories of their *de facto* holdings.

particularly in the section of the frontier north of Mount Dagleish to Setit River. The status quo shall be respected until final disposition of the case by agreement between the two Governments.

B. *Re-demarcation between Setit River and Mount Dagleish*
Prior to re-demarcation of the Gwynn line in this sector of the boundary, the Government of Ethiopia wishes to arrive at an understanding with the Government of the Sudan on the following:

The two Governments shall agree that while re-demarcation proceeds from Mount Dagleish southwards the Governments of the Sudan and Ethiopia shall study the problem resulting from settlement and cultivation by nationals of either nation in the territory of the other with a view to finding an amicable solution. The two Governments shall set up a special committee to deal with this problem in detail and submit a report to the Consultative Committee as soon as possible.

In reply I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the foregoing proposals are acceptable to my Government and I agree that Your Excellency's Note together with this Note in reply shall constitute an understanding between our two Governments regarding our respective positions on the subject matter.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Sigd.

**Dr. Mansour Khalid,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.**

**H.E. Minasse Haile,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Government of Ethiopia,
Addis Ababa.**

1902 treaty (English version)

4. The May 15th, 1902 Treaty

Treaties between Great Britain and Ethiopia, and between Great Britain, Italy, and Ethiopia, relative to the Frontiers between the Soudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Signed at Adis Ababa, 15th May, 1902.

(Signed also in the Amharic text.)

HIS Majesty Edward VII by the Grace of God, King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty Menelek II, by the Grace of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia, being animated with the desire to confirm the friendly relations between the two Powers, and to settle the frontier between the Soudan and Ethiopia, and His Majesty King Edward, having appointed as his Plenipotentiary Lieutenant-Colonel John Lane Harrington, a Commander of the Royal Victorian Order, His Majesty's Agent at the Court of His Majesty Menelek II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, whose full powers have been found in due and proper form, and His Majesty the Emperor Menelek, negotiating in his own name as King of Kings of Ethiopia, they have

agreed upon and do conclude the following Articles, which shall be binding on themselves, their heirs, and successors:—

Art. I.—The frontier between the Soudan and Ethiopia agreed on between the two Governments shall be: the line which is marked in red on the map annexed to this Treaty in duplicate, and traced from Khor Um Hagar to Gallabat, to the Blue Nile, Baro, Pibor, and Akobo Rivers to Melile, thence to the intersection of the 6th degree of north latitude with the 35th degree longitude east of Greenwich.

Art. II.—The boundary, as defined in Art. I, shall be delimited and marked on the ground by a Joint Boundary Commission, which shall be nominated by the two High Contracting Parties, who shall notify the same to their subjects after delimitation.

Art. III.—His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct, or allow to be constructed, any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tsana, or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Soudan.

Art. IV.—His Majesty the Emperor Menelek, King of Kings of Ethiopia, engages himself to allow His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Soudan to select in the neighbourhood of Itang, on the Baro River, a block of territory having a river frontage of not more than 2,000 metres, in area not exceeding 40 hectares, which shall be leased to the Government of the Soudan, to be administered and occupied as a commercial station, so long as the Soudan is under the Anglo-Egyptian Government. It is agreed between the two High Contracting Parties that the territory so leased shall not be used for any political or military purpose.

Art. V.—His Majesty the Emperor Menelek, King of Kings of Ethiopia, grants His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Soudan the right to construct a railway through Abyssinian territory to connect the Soudan with Uganda.

A route for the railway will be settled by mutual agreement between the two High Contracting Parties.

The present Treaty shall come into force as soon as its ratification by His Britannic Majesty shall have been notified to the Emperor of Ethiopia.

In faith of which His Majesty Menelek II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, in his own name, and Lieutenant-Colonel John Lane Harrington, on behalf of His Majesty King Edward VII, King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Sea, Emperor of India, have signed the present Treaty, in duplicate, written in the English and Amharic languages, identically, both texts being official, and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Adis Ababa, the 15th day of May, 1902.

(L.S.) JOHN LANE HARRINGTON,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

(Seal of His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II.)

5. **Annex to the 1902 Treaty**

Annex to the Treaty of 10th July, 1900, regarding the frontier between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the Treaty of 15th May, 1902, regarding the frontier between the Soudan and Ethiopia.

His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia, Menelek II, Major Ciccodicola, Italian Minister in Ethiopia, and Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington, His Britannic Majesty's Agent in Ethiopia, have mutually agreed that:

I.—The frontier Treaty between Ethiopia and Eritrea, previously determined by the line Tomat-Todluc, is mutually modified in the following manner:—

Commencing from the junction of the Khor Um Hagar with the Setit, the new frontier follows this river to its junction with the Maïeteb, following the latter's course so as to leave Mount Ala Tacura to Eritrea, and joins the Mareb at its junction with the Mai Ambessa.

The line from the junction of the Setit and Maïeteb to the junction of the Mareb and Mai Ambessa shall be delimited by Italian and Ethiopian delegates, so that the Canama tribe belong to Eritrea.

II.—The frontier between the Soudan and Eritrea, instead of that delimited by the English and Italian delegates by the Convention of the 16th April, 1901, shall be the line which, from Sabderat, is traced via Abu Jamal to the junction of the Khor Um Hagar with the Setit.

The present Agreement shall come into force as soon as its ratification by the British and Italian Governments shall have been notified to the Emperor of Ethiopia.

In faith of which His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia, Menelek II, in his own name and that of his successors; Major Ciccodicola, in the name of His Majesty Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy, and his successors; and Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington, in the name of His Majesty Edward VII, King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and his successors, have signed the present Note in triplicate, written in the Italian, English, and Amharic languages identically, all texts being official, and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Adis Ababa, this 15th day of May, 1902.

(L.S.) JOHN LANE HARRINGTON,

Lieutenant-Colonel.

(L.S.) MAGGIORE FEDERICO CICCODICOLA.

(Seal of His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II.)

Appendix two Questions

The following Questions are raised for key informant interviewee.

- Which historical issues are rolling the current ethio-Sudan border dispute?
- What is the root cause of Alfashaga (Yewuhabist) dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan?
- What the triggering factors of border dispute?
- How to tie the regime change in Ethiopia 2018 and 2019 Sudan and the recent border dispute
- Who are external actors of the conflict on Alfashaga (Yewuhabist) dispute?
- Which issues are bring solutions for border dispute?.
