



**Addis Ababa University
School of Graduate Studies**

**The United States and the Arab-Israeli
Peace Process with a Special Reference to
the Roadmap Peace Plan**

**By
Abebe Getachew**



**March, 2007
Addis Ababa**



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By
Abebe Getachew

Advisor
Professor K. Mathews

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University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Master's
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ABEBE GETACHEW

APPROVED BY BOARD OF EXAMINERS

K. Mathews (prof.)

for Prof. Tafese Acha

ADVISOR

Hussein Ahmed

HZ

EXAMINER

Kassahun Berhanu (ph. D)

[Signature]

EXAMINER



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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1. Historical Background

The involvement and the role of the United States in the Middle East peace process (with particular focus on the Roadmap Peace Plan) is the central theme of this study. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been corroding the peace and stability of the Middle East region and has far reaching implications for world peace and international relations. This is mainly due to the fact that the region is of great economic importance to the whole world.

From the outset, let me make clear that the Arab-Israeli conflict has two levels: the interstate conflict between Israel and the Arab states and the inter-communal conflict, i.e., the conflict between the two peoples-Israelis and Palestinians. The latter level is what this research is heavily concerned about. And, the Israeli - Palestinian conflict is a protracted conflict. Smith Charles (1988:1) argues that the history of this conflict dates back to ancient times, when the *Torah* (the Jewish religious book) says the Jews inhabited the land of *Eretz* Israel. Other scholars like Jiryis (1976), Saunders (1992) and Rothman (1992) believe the conflict truly begins in the late 19th century with the beginning of the Zionist movement which started in 1897.

Hence, looking at the history of ancient Palestine briefly may help us understand the facts on the ground. Accordingly, Archeological data and the Torah indicate the presence of a Kingdom of Israel in Canaan (ancient Palestine) dating from about 1020 BC. This Kingdom became divided among several Jewish tribes and was eventually conquered by the Assyrians in 721 BC. The Temple, Judaism's holiest shrine, was destroyed, and the Jews were expelled to the Kingdom of Judah in the Negev desert. Centuries later, however, the Jews retook Jerusalem and Israel under the leadership of Cyrus the Great, and they rebuilt the Temple in 516 BC. But, again, in 168 BC, King Antiochus IV and the Syrians took Jerusalem, destroyed the temple and declared Judaism illegal. Two attempts by the Jews to retake the land in 66 AD and 132 AD proved unsuccessful, and the land of Israel was renamed Syria Palaestina. According to Smith (1988:2),

The area called Palestine by biblical scholars more or less coincides with the territory controlled by the Jewish kingdom of Israel and Judah around 860 B.C. Its boundaries extended from the base of the Golan Heights of present-day Syria westward to the Mediterranean Sea, then southward to Gaza where the coast bends west to border the Sinai Peninsula, directly south again to the harbor at the northern tip of the Gulf of Aqaba, north to beyond the eastern edge of the Dead Sea, and finally northwest to touch Lake Tiberias at the foot of the Golan.

He further argues that this area was not always the same for the Jews who often ruled over areas east of the Jordan River. Again there were times when the Jewish rule was only in southern Palestine only. The land was then ruled from Rome for about five centuries. In 638 AD, the Arab Caliphate over the land then called Filastin began. For the next millennium, Filastin saw relative peace where slowly most of the inhabitants converted to Islam, but self-reliant communities of Christians and Jews remained. Several minor shifts of power took place over these thousand years, but overall the area became predominantly Muslim. The Ottomans then conquered the rulers of Palestine (the Mamelukes) in 1517. The Ottomans controlled Palestine from the 16th through the 20th century. Jews lived in Palestine peacefully and it wasn't until the rise of Zionism¹ in the late 1800's that Jews asserted a historic right to Palestine.

And, citing history and the Old Testament, the Israelis claim that they returned to their original and "Promised Land" where they were expelled immediately after the dismantling of the Second Temple of King Solomon and lived in the Diaspora for 2000 years. The Palestinians, on the other hand, say that they are original inheritors of the land and ostracize the Israelis by labeling them as outlandish to the Holy Land. The deep suspicion between the Israelis and Palestinians emanate mostly from the mutual denial of the historical and religious evidences that both sides present with regard to their ownership of the Holy Land (Smith Charles, 1988:1)



Hence, the conflict has been very complex and intractable not only because it has lasted for over half a century but also because it is a conflict which has involved the entire Middle East and the Islamic world. This conflict has also brought in the involvement of the two super- powers, the United States and the former Soviet Union, during the cold war to the extent of even provoking a possible nuclear confrontation.

The problem started, mainly, when Great Britain supported for the first time the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine when that region was under its mandate rule. The support by Great Britain was done in the form of a declaration famously known as the Balfour Declaration. Arthur James Lord Balfour in his declaration issued in November 3, 1917 expressed the official British Government's support towards the establishment in Palestine of a national homeland for the Jewish people and also expressed its commitment for the realization of this self-declared objective without prejudice to non-Arab people. This brought anger among the Arab world then.

The killing of around 6 million Jews (the Holocaust) by Hitler and his entourage during the Second World War intensified the Jewish move and yearning to establish their own state through the propagation of the idea of Zionism.

In the aftermath of the Second World War the United Nations, after a very arduous negotiation, in its resolution number 181 of 1947 passed by 33 votes in favor, 13 against and 10 abstentions called for the partition of the British-ruled Palestine Mandate into a Jewish State and Palestine (See Appendix 1). And, the United States had played a significant role and exerted diplomatic influence in the United Nations² for the adoption of that Resolution. In fact, the resolution was accepted by the Jews in Palestine but rejected by the Arabs (www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/peace process.) The state of Israel was formed on 14 May 1948. And, the next day on 15 May 1948 the U.S. gave recognition for the state of Israel. That time was the period of euphoria and exuberance for the Jews while it was the most indignant time for the Palestinians and the Arabs. The Palestinians call this time "nakb" (catastrophe) (International Crisis Group, 2004:3).

However, less than twenty-four hours after Israel was declared a state, Egypt, Iraq, Syria,



as per the agreement, Israel pulled back its forces across the Canal into Sinai and came to ceasefire terms with Syria. This war also caused a near- nuclear confrontational situation between the US and USSR (Kissinger, 1982:507).

After being fatigued of war and driven by the quest for peace and to regain the whole of Egypt's territories conquered by Israel, Egypt's president Anwar Sadat made a historic and daring visit to Israel, which later cost his life as part of the mutual attempt for the pacific resolution of the conflict (Ibid). Consequently, a peace Treaty was signed between Israel and Egypt at Camp David (USA) in 1979. In a bid to implement the Treaty, Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and, in return, Egypt recognized Israel's right to exist.

However, the Palestinian forces were attacking Israel from neighboring Lebanon as Lebanon supported the cause of Palestinians. Hence, Israel as part of the conflict invaded Lebanon in 1982 with a view to chase Palestinians. Israel, however, stayed in Southern Lebanon until 1999.

Meanwhile, the first Intifada (a spontaneous explosion of popular resistance) of Palestinians against Israel broke in 1987 and lasted until 1993 ([www. Jerusalemite.org/intifada / first. htm](http://www.Jerusalemite.org/intifada/first.htm)).

However, all the afore- mentioned wars which were in one way or the other initiated by the Arabs failed to achieve the intended purpose of defeating Israel. Many of the efforts made to resolve the dispute prior to 1990 by and large were futile and of no avail. It was after 1990 that light began to emerge at the end of the tunnel with respect to resolving the conflict through peaceful means. This was partly because of the changed situation of the political landscape of the entire Middle East as well as globally after the end of the Cold War and, partly because of the understanding in the Arab world and by the Palestinians that the conflict between the Arabs and Israel could not be solved without adopting peaceful means (Ahrari, 1996:28-29). Israel also chose to use the window of opportunity of American superpower (which meant the hegemony of its ally and friend) and Arab weakness resulting from the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the Victory of the

proposal to resolve the dispute between the Arabs and Israel; and the 'Road map to peace.' The Road map was hailed as a document which would serve as a vehicle to help Israel, the Palestinians and the Arabs to reach into a peace agreement. It particularly stressed on the need to end violence, to cease settlement activities and to end occupations and conflict on and accelerated pace through realistic negotiation which aims at establishing a viable Palestinian state living side by side with a secure Israel. Moreover, it was seen as a gesture where by the international involvement rather than US alone, would bring peace in the region as it is promulgated and followed up under the aegis of the Quartet. However, the peace plan like its predecessor has been through various bottlenecks in its implementation process. It has not been implemented even partially since its unveiling in 2003.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a major conflict which could trigger worldwide conflicts and wars that lead to an all out frenzied instability in the Middle East region as well as the world. The conflict sustained for more than half a century with heavy casualties in human lives as well as properties. (Rothman, 1992:4; Drysdale and Gerald, 1985:269). This conflict is the most explosive one. It has implication for regional and International peace, security and stability. As per emotional and religious attachment to the "Holy Land", the crises draw the attentions of millions of people around the globe.

So, peaceful settlement of the conflict in the region is crucial for international peace, security and stability. In the contention between the two sides, the settlement issue, the extent of the territories to be evacuated by Israel, the status of Palestine Authority, water issues, the refugee problem, and the issue of Jerusalem are crucial ones. Jerusalem is a holy place for both Israelis and the Arabs and it is religiously very important. Be that as it may, a number of attempts were made by different international actors to resolve the conflict. However, despite some major achievements in the peace process, the conflict is still continuing.

On the other hand, the United States as one of the crucially important actors and a peace broker in the process, changing its previous position of not supporting the establishment

peace in the Middle East

1.5.2.3 To identify and assess issues that have been challenges to the Middle East peace process specifically to the Roadmap peace plan.

1.6 Research Methodology and Method

For the purpose of this research political idealism and realism are used to guide the study. As a result, the involvement and role of third party has been assessed from the perspectives of these theories. In so doing the research will give an insight to factors that motivated America to involve in the Middle East peace process. Hence the research is more of qualitative in its data use and analysis as it does not rely on numerical data. The discussion encompasses socio-economic factors and political processes of the Peace process. This is to mean that the research has looked at the American involvement and role from socio-economic as well as the political dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

And, with regard to the method, the data relevant to this study have been collected from secondary sources such as books, journals, Articles, magazines, newspapers, and websites.

1.7 Scope and Significance of the Study

The scope of this research is limited to the survey and analysis of the issues raised under the research questions above. And, the study will provide modest contribution to the Ethiopian academia in their quest to better understand the U.S. foreign policy objectives & role as well as its efforts deployed in the Middle East peace process. It as well may assist individuals who are interested in making further study in the area. Moreover, it motivates the academicians, civil society's members and other peace loving groups or individuals to identify the challenges to the Middle East peace and contribute their part in the process of resolving an age old conflict and bringing about sustainable peace in the region as the instability of the region is highly intensified by the Arab-Israel and Palestine- Israel relations, which are directly interconnected. The settlement of the Israel-Palestine issue would benefit not only the economic growth and political stability of the region but also the peace and security of the whole world as it may rid the region off

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On the other hand, the United States as one of the crucially important actors and a peace broker in the process, changing its previous position of not supporting the establishment

of an independent Palestinian state came up with the recent Roadmap peace plan which envisions an independent state for Palestinians. However, the Roadmap plan having three phases which are sequential and inter-connected, Phase I (the cessation of violence) has not been implemented fully and timely let alone phase II and Phase III, which includes Agreement on permanent status issues which was slated to be accomplished by 2004-2005. Therefore, technically speaking, the Roadmap can be said to have faced the same challenges that faced its predecessors and the problem has not yet been solved. Hence, will the process particularly the two-state solution bear any peace in the near future?

1.3 Hypothesis

The United States' controversial role in the Middle East peace process can be considered as one of the major factors responsible for the failure of the different peace efforts between Israeli and Palestinians.

1.4 Research Questions

This research will try to answer the following interrelated questions:

1. What are America's foreign policy objectives and their impact in the Middle East peace?
2. What is the role of America in the Middle East peace process? And why?
3. How United States' controversial role negatively influenced the previous peace efforts?
4. What is the Road Map Peace Plan?
5. What are the challenges and prospect of the peace process?

This and other related questions will be examined in the research.

1.5 Objectives of the Research

1.5.1 *The general objective:* - is to examine the role of America in the dynamics and dilemmas of the Israeli-Palestine Peace process so as to provide some insights into what the future holds for the main conflicting parties, i.e. The Israelis and Palestinians.

1.5.2 *The specific objectives are:-*

1.5.2.1 To identify and explain American interests and foreign policy objectives in view of its role in the Middle East peace process.

1.5.2.2 To assess the implication of Israeli-Palestinian peace process on the prospect for

peace in the Middle East

1.5.2.3 To identify and assess issues that have been challenges to the Middle East peace process specifically to the Roadmap peace plan.

1.6 Research Methodology and Method

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fundamentalist and terror groups, which are known to bring havoc to defenseless innocent people as well.

1.8 Limitations of the Study

Absence of adequate and unbiased written materials on the area of the study, problem of getting resource persons for interview, problem of undertaking the study without field visit, time and page restrictions may be some of the limitations.

1.9 Organization of the Research

The research is organized into four chapters.

The first chapter offers an overview of the historical background to the Middle East conflict, the statement of the problem, hypothesis, research questions, objectives, significance, scope, limitations, method and methodology as well as organization of the study.

The second chapter will deal with the theoretical and conceptual framework of peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts. In this regard, the Idealist and Realist perspectives of peace, Peace process, the involvement and role of third party and the different methods and strategies of conflict resolution constitute a particular interesting subject for investigation.

The third chapter is devoted to the discussion of the foreign policy objectives of the United States, its role and impact in the Middle East peace process. It also deals with the different peace attempts made and the reason why they all failed

The fourth chapter, being the focus of this work, analyses the Roadmap peace plan in its totality, together with the challenges and prospect of the two-state solution after Hamas' electoral success in the Palestine Authority in January 25, 2006. Moreover, some possible scenarios are suggested. Finally, the concluding part will review some of the main focuses of the research.

CHAPTER TWO

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework of Peace and Peaceful Resolution of Conflict

Introduction

Due to space and time constraints, the theoretical and conceptual framework of this study is limited to the discussion of idealist and realist perspectives of peace and some major methods and strategies of peaceful resolution of international conflicts and related concepts.

A lot has been said about peace. Its essence and conception have largely embedded both in oral traditions of societies and in written documents. With reference to literature, theories of international relations occupy a distinctive position. Accordingly, the researcher will assess peace from realist and idealist perspectives. The images these theories conceive of international relations are of great significance. On the other hand it is important to state that these theories are not mutually exclusive in all facets. Yet, the dissimilarity in point of view and stress are extensive.

2.1 Realist Perspective

Realism as one of the dominant theories of international relations strives to explain 'international behavior in terms of national interest without regard of the moral sentiments' (Hollis and Smith, 1991:10).

Indeed, realists' preoccupation is on security and power⁴. There is no guardian to protect the survival of each state in the atmosphere of competitive and anarchical world. Even though dominant states remain the main orientation of realist assumption, security and power have been concern of all states whether they are powerful or weak, big or small.

As has been mentioned one of the great concern of realist is the conception of international relations in terms of anarchy⁵, where the struggle for power and peace



predominate. Hence, in this competitive environment, which is primarily self-help, most states tend to accumulate power within the limit of their reach. Due to this, states should be prepared for war so that they guarantee their existence according to realists. These and other hostilities have generated fear, as affirms Henderson (1998:315), 'leading some countries to follow the dictum of a Roman general from centuries ago, "If you want peace, prepare for war."' Consequently, in such atmosphere, peace could seem as a distant reality and it is viewed as the absence of war. In this respect, Steans and Pettiford assert that the realist outlook of peace is stipulated in negative terms. To make it clear, for realists peace is a state of affairs defined as the absence of war 'rather than the existence of something' (Steans and Pettiford, 2001:34) Realists' perspective of peace mainly centers on states rather than citizens. The attention of realists lies on the method to avoid war. Besides, the correlation between peace and security is not precise (Ibid.). They equate peace with the absence of overt violence namely war. This is the traditional conception of peace and it is categorized as a negative peace. On similar spectrum, Jeong (200:24) describes negative peace as 'the absence of direct violence such as war' and explains it in a more elaborate manner which goes 'the notion of stable social order is a form of negative peace.'

Here it has to be underlined that realists' preoccupation rests with the stability of international realm not that of domestic one. However, this does not mean that they ignore domestic stability confined to the territory of the state as they are felt humble in promoting the idea of strong state to survive. Then it seems that it could be internally a strong state which can manifest itself strong as a state internationally.

On the other hand, the issue of negative peace raises pertinent questions in this regard, i.e. the issue of positive peace and what it conveys both from the realist perspective in particular and other intellectual parameters in general. Positive peace does not sound well in the camp of realist. They are very critical of positive peace in the sense that they adamantly question whether it is possible to attain such type of peace for at least two reasons; one, because of human nature; and two, the power structure of the world could not allow positive peace to be established. This is well stated by Jeong (2000:26) in the

following manner:

Realist critiques of positive peace argue that, in considering human nature and the power structure of the world, it is unrealistic and, thus, meaningless to equate peace with social justice. The emphasis on social justice can lead us to murky issues concerning an ideal society.

According to the same author, realists approach appears to give due consideration to control the 'symptom of violence' rather than trying to establish social justice.

Barakat, (1970:143) argues that third party's involvement in the peace process is motivated by pragmatic evaluation of its own national interest and trying to achieve them as the driving urge. For realists international relations signify a place where states compete for power to promote their own interests (Smith and Baylis, 2001:4). Although idealists underscore the existence of harmony between the interests of states, realists reject this contention and assert that 'there is no essential harmony of interests among nations. Instead, they posit that nation-states often have conflicting national objectives' (Dougherty and pfaltzgraff, 1981:84)

Realists are cynical about the validity and importance of 'universal moral principles'. As a result, they advise states and their leaders not to sacrifice their national interests by giving their commitment to useless ideals (Dunne and Schmidt, 2001:142). This is as to realists what every state does in order to survive. Accordingly, the involvement of state in peaceful settlement of dispute of a given state may seem to promote universal ideals which attempt for instance to minimize the suffering of humankind and help them to settle their conflict peacefully. In reality however every state seeks to maintain and promote its interest. In this sense involvement is motivated and reinforced by state's intention to secure its own interest. Yet no one denies that the interests should be within the capacity of a state.

National interest could be maintained either by achieving immediate economic/material

gains or intangible gains which indirectly boost state's long-term interests. With regard to intangible gains which most or all states seek to secure may be prestige. However this is dependent upon the success of the party to bring a positive result or avert the conflict. In this sense, for instance, it could be argued that the involvement of the U.S. in the Middle East peace process might be in pursuit of its economic interest together with the maximization of its prestige. This could equally work for idealists.

2.2 Idealist Perspective

Although idealism is known by various names and has many dichotomies within it, the writer of this thesis preferred to use idealism throughout the discussion. Having said this, it is pertinent to assess what the advocates of idealist theory conceive about peace.

Theory of political idealism was developed with its own image of international relations during, and particularly in the aftermath of WWI. But its origin is not restricted to the period mentioned. The wind of idealism had been blown over different corners of the globe since antiquity (Goldstein, 2001:14). Accordingly, its development to full scale theory of international relations marked the period where human miseries had become rampant. This was because of World War I which culminated in heavy loss of human lives and properties at the time. This situation had motivated many scholars and politicians of the time, especially U.S. President Woodrow Wilson to echo the necessity of peace, attacking the wrath of war. They witnessed lots of calamities with their own eyes (Ibid: 19)

Hence, advocates of idealist perspective came up with four conditions in their search for peace. These are:

- a) Conflict was a ridiculous act and should not be used as a cogent instrument of state policy;
- b) WWI was the outcome of secrecy and authoritarianism;
- c) Conflict situations created misapprehension among leaders and prevented democratic liability among the states; and
- d) The deep - rooted hostilities could be rectified by the propagation of democracy and self - rule (Ibid. 18)

Consequently, the above points reflect idealists' reward for the prevention of conflicts by propagating democracy and openness. Thus, the unilateral act of decision-makers would come under scrutiny which in turn helps the spread of democratic accountability. Doing these helps to avert mistrust which could lead to conflict. Besides, they emphasized the role of self-rule to the prevention of conflict. Apparently, idealists seem to give considerable attention to both internal and external situations of a state.

And, it is essential to look into the proposition made by one of the famous proponents of this intellectual drive, Woodrow Wilson. In his theory of democracy he argued that peace is an outcome of democracy while war as the result of dictatorship (Vasquez, 1998:33). As to the essence of this theory, the public benefits nothing from war or violence but from peace. And this could be clear as the masses become enlightened. Thus education and interaction of the public would be a key in facilitating peace by achieving victory over its enemies: ignorance and prejudice are a suitable ground for violence. Furthermore, the propagation and the expansion of democracy would empower the public to prevent 'sinister interests' from initiating wars or conflicts. In addition to that Vasquez (Ibid.33-4) has succinctly observed the underlying assumption of this theory in particular and idealist in general as regard the role international institutions could play:

. . . the institutions that prevented violence at the domestic level could be created at the global level to resolve disputes nonviolently. These ideas were embodied in the League of Nations, Permanent Court of International Justice, and in the emphasis on international law, arbitration, disarmament, collective security. . .

From their broader outlook, idealist notion of peace could seem to conform to positive peace rather than negative peace, which is explained by the absence of overt violence or war (positive peace will be discussed below).

Generally what fundamentally differentiates idealists from realists lie in their assumption of human nature. Their assumption is that human beings by their nature are good and so they dislike war in favor of peace. It is the environment that could make people bad even such people can be corrected (Goldstein, 1991:19)

Within the framework of these theories one may need to examine the meaning of the term peace. The definition of the term given below could, nonetheless, be situated in idealist perspective. This is said because as demonstrated above this intellectual thought presents peace in a positive sense, i.e., peace as a notion to mean more than the absence of violence. There is no universal definition of peace that could be palatable to everyone equally across the board. Conceptions of peace given by various scholars illuminate their line of argument and the objective condition of the time when the notion was advanced. Although this is the case, it does not mean that there are no defining elements that characterize peace. The basic elements that explain peace will be clear from the following discussions.

According to Jeong (2000:23) peace is more than the absence of war or violence. It encompasses a great deal of issues that could assure the positive human conditions. Having such peace in place as to same author means deterring the 'loss of life and human capacity. Thus, peace ultimately has to be obtained by changing social structures that are responsible for death, poverty and malnutrition'. Similarly and comprehensively Rourke (1998:4-5) conceives peace as:

Preventing such violence as armed conflict, military occupation, intervention by one country in the affairs of others, and, in general reducing the role of threat of force in human affairs, it also means the "enjoyment of economic and social justice, equality, and the entire range of human rights and fundamental freedoms".

Rourke (Ibid.) continues to observe that peace is a collective relationship maintained among societies and states based on mutual faith and collaboration. It is the respect for shared benefit and interests of the entire nations. In the same manner, Jeong (2000:25) emphasizes on the importance of equality, justice and the elimination of all forms of discriminations if one seeks to achieve positive peace. For peace to be realized, says the same author, equality is a critical ingredient of peace otherwise its absence facilitate various sorts of strains. In addition, reducing of all forms of injustice or discriminations based on class, ethnic, tribal, religion, racism and sex, are prerequisite for its realization.

Hence, as to Jeong (Ibid.) equality implies 'social and legal rights' and it is 'both a means and a goal of positive peace for individuals and groups'. On the other hand, Cowen (1975:23) equates negative peace as 'compatible with inertness of bomb -flattened city or the docility of prison. 'He maintains that peace is not only the absence of conflict but it could exhibit a ' just ordering of human relations designed to promote joy and fullness of life for free human being'

Despite there has been no rigorous commitment from the UN itself as some argue, one of its branch i.e. General Assembly came up with a Declaration named Peoples' Right to Peace (1984) in which among other things, observes Alston (2001:279-80) that it affirmed peoples have inviolable right to peace. On top of that UNESCO in its rigorous efforts of championing for the people's right managed to came up with a draft Resolution titled as "Declaration on the Human Right to Peace as the Foundation of the Culture of Peace". In this draft it was postulated that every person has the right to peace which is inherent in human nature and demanded for its due recognition and implementation by all concerned parties. To this end, in the proposal it was confirmed that:

Violence in all its forms is intrinsically incompatible with the right of every human being to peace; since inequalities, exclusion and poverty are liable to lead to violation of international peace and internal peace, the right of every human being to peace requires the promotion of social justice through appropriate national and international policies aimed at sustainable human development (Alston, 2001:280).

The necessity of peace has been emphasized in a number of UN⁷ documents namely, UN Charter, and UDHR⁸ (1948) and UN views peace as "'the enjoyment of economic and social justice, equality and the entire human rights and fundamental freedoms within society'" (Jeong, 2000:25).

Coming back to the notion of peace again, Jeong conceives peace as a collective goal. Peace without justice as to him 'could disguise violence' and such:



*type of peace only transient and cannot solve the problem . . .
Accordingly, peace which is based on justice necessarily refers to a
situation where individuals and groups can freely define, pursue and
attain their goals without affecting the freedom of other intervals and
groups... (Ellipses mine).*

From the aforementioned discussion, one could understand that peace particularly positive peace constitutes many ranges of issues that facilitate better life in social - economic and political spheres. It could be achieved and maintained by abolishing various forms of discriminations and in turn facilitates the improvement in social equality and economic equity as well as political participation. As a result, positive peace can be possible given that the following defining qualities exist: the elimination of tension or violence, respect, recognition and implementation of the principles of equality, equity, justice and democracy, compromise and respect for collective action contrary to unilateral action to mention a few. Then it is likely to argue that to achieve and maintain positive peace is a tiresome task. Rather it is a negative peace to which the realists in favor, seems compatible with the reality in the ground.

One may ask the motivational backing for the third party's involvement in the peace process of a given nation. In this respect, idealists believe that a state should follow a foreign policy that promotes cooperation and ethical standards (Rourke, 1991:27). As to them people and their countries have the capacity to realize cooperation. Hence, idealists disagree with the realist metaphor which charges that advancing ethical policy frameworks endanger national interest⁹ again as to idealists' nations should cooperate to minimize the danger, which threatens the existence of human kind. Rourke (Ibid.28) observes that 'in contrast to realists, idealists are prone to believe that humans and their countries are capable of achieving more cooperative, less conflictive relations.'

These propositions seem to support the involvement of state in dealing with peaceful settlement of dispute of an intractable to reduce the misery of the people. That means a degree of humanitarian considerations matters for idealists (Frankel Joseph, 1969:76). Besides, it suggested that countries maintain their interests by promoting ideals. This is

so because as to idealists there is a harmony of national interests of states (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1981:84). So it seems that the involvement of the third party is partly the outcome of this policy objective.

2.3. Third party's Involvement and its Role in the Peace Process

2.3.1 Peace Process

Classical Dictionary of Modern Politics (1994:230) defines peace process as a 'general term for the full range of diplomatic efforts undertaken in an attempt to resolve a particular regional or bilateral conflict'. Saunders on his part defines it as 'a political process in which conflicts are resolved by peaceful means.' He further stated that peace process is a combination of 'politics, diplomacy, changing relationships, negotiation, mediation, and dialogue in both official and unofficial arenas' (Saunders, 1995:83). Similarly, Sela and Ma'oz (1997:17) defines peace process as a gradual effort designed to settle conflict peacefully by building confidence between conflicting parties with or without the help of mediator/s. It is the process whereby conflicting groups exchanges conflict for peace.

According to Saunders (Ibid) Peace process is the continuous efforts made by a given party external to the conflict. It could be motivated (if such party does not have a secret agenda) to reverse the situation into its normal position or negative peace and beyond that, if possible. From this stance it seems that an effort exerted towards achieving positive peace appears an issue more pertinent to the domestic actors primarily government and forces in contradictions, civil societies and so forth. Actually, such efforts need positive external support.

2.3.2 Third Party's Involvement

In some cases the term involvement is used to designate the ingress or the entrance of self-motivated forces to manipulate the conflict situation of other country or party without declared or tacit consent of the parties to the conflict. Contrary, Young (1967:34) defines intervention or involvements as any action taken by an actor that is not a direct

party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself. In the same manner, involvements for the purpose of this research could be defined as a move taken to resolve conflict by a party that is not directly involved in the conflict. Its move may either be invited by the conflicting groups or international /regional organization or self initiated.

The role of third party (here third party is defined as an actor which is not a direct party to the conflict) is essential to reconcile conflicting parties and transform conflict prone environment to a negative peace. This effort may be a crucial step towards a long journey to a positive peace.

According to Fisher *et al*, (2000:118) the role of the third party is to clarify the process or activities and guide the parties in a way to terminate conflict, which they are entangled with. Equally crucial, mediator may play the following decisive roles. For instance, it ensures contact and guarantees precise communication, which in one way or the other help to maintain the peace process keeps going. Besides, it helps to create a favorable atmosphere for the conflicting parties to hold series of meetings by offering neutral setting and by setting agendas with their full recognition. Furthermore, it suggests alternatives and process for the ultimate termination of the conflict. On top of that, securing resources and ensuring support for an accord. Moreover, it assists and persuades parties not to dropout or exit from the talk or if such happens facilitate an environment for reentry (Ray, 1992:108/127)

On the other hand, third party involvement would give a mediating party an opportunity to get substantial information and other important ingredients about the country or the region, which in one way or the other help the mediating country to strengthen its position Vis-à-vis the disputants

In addition, even though the interpretation of both idealist and realist differ in explaining such involvement, the two however agree that states or third parties do what they do to

maintain their own interests. Similarly, Wendt (1999:113-14) has observed that 'states act on the basis of perceived interests' yet he acknowledged that 'interests should not be seen as an exclusively "Realist" variable. What matters is how interests are thought to be constituted'. In the same manner, these theories could better explain the reality if they are used together as the reality seems to situate between the two. Accordingly, Osgood (1953:449) had similar opinion which reads as follow: a 'true realist must recognize that ideals and self-interest are so closely interdependent that, even on the ground of national expediency, there are cogent arguments for maintaining. Ideals are as much an instrument of national power as the weapons of war'.

2.4 Concepts of Conflict and Conflict Resolution

Conflict is a usual human behavior; no one is immune to it. It has been and will remain with us because no two people are alike and have the same bent of mind at one particular time unless by dint of chance. Our needs, feelings, interests, deeds, etc. can never coincide that we never cease to enter into a conflict situation. Matthews, Rubinoff and Stein say "...conflict is inherent in world politics, for it is an inevitable consequence of relationships and interaction among groups of people who live in a condition of anarchy"(1989:2 ellipses mine). They argue that conflict is also a competition for scarce goods, such as territory and resources, or the pursuit of mutually incompatibles values and objectives. Similarly, Mesfin defines conflict as follows:

There is a general agreement that conflict, which may be called by different names, is not only inevitable but also necessary for the development of any society... A society in which there is absolutely no conflict is inconceivable (1999: 116, ellipses mine).

Conflict can be fatal when it develops in to violence; this is its worrisome aspect. Another scholar, Abdulhamid, in his paper entitled "*Can Fiscal Federalism Preempt Potential Conflicts in Ethiopia?*" says that:

Conflict is said to progress to violence triggered by: competition over access to resources, the existence of cultural differences, dynamics of ethnic composition of a territory, low level of development, old hatred

discuss on the methods and strategies of peaceful resolution of conflict that have more relevance to the case under study.

2.5 Peaceful Methods and Strategies of Conflict Resolution

Peaceful methods of conflict resolution have long been available. The mechanisms for peaceful resolution of disputes gathered pace mainly since the advent of the 20th century (Jeong, 2000:167). The League of Nations Covenant stipulated that disputes and conflicts between members need to be resolved with arbitration, judicial settlement or inquiry by the council of the League. And,

When we see Article 33 of the UN charter it calls on parties to any dispute whose continuation could endanger international peace and security to " First of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements" or other peaceful means of their choice. Hence, we can deduce that peaceful settlement of disputes in international law mainly emanated from the league of Nations covenant and the united nations Charter. However, the former fenced peaceful settlement of disputes methods to only arbitration, judicial settlement of disputes and inquiry. the latter, the United nations added negotiation, good offices, mediation and conciliation as an additional means of amicable settlement of disputes.

In fact Negotiation and mediation have played a major role in Israeli - Palestinian peace process. So, I will focus on the relevant methods of conflict resolution for the purpose of this study.

2.5.1. Negotiation

According to Miall, et.al (1999:22), 'Negotiation is the process whereby the parties within the conflict seek to settle or resolve their conflicts.' It consists basically of discussions between the interested parties with a view to reconciling divergent opinions (Shaw, 1997:750:721). Negotiations are usually conducted through diplomatic channels or government- to government levels when each side believes that the benefit of

and history of injustice, widespread patterns of settlement, political ambitions of ethnic entrepreneurs, and the perception that political and social discrimination exist(2003:3).

In general we can say that the scarcity of resources is the major factor for conflict to arise. It may ignite group grievances. Some may feel more marginalized than others and may be involved in violent conflicts.

According to Atilo, however," No factor has been as influential as the geographical location..."in conflict (2003:15). He further argues, "Territoriality is one factor that exacerbates conflict" (2003:17, ellipses mine). Besides, he does not deny the importance of resources as far as conflict is concerned.

Having said this much about what conflict is and how it evolves in to violence, I think it would be fruitful to go straight to some aspects of conflict resolution. There are some people who hope to eliminate conflict altogether. However, that is impossible. To this, Matthews, Rubinoff and Stein say that "[a] few conflicts are settled, other simply fade way, and some are transcended as the participants join together to focus on new issues and new agendas. But as old conflicts are settled, new conflicts appear" (1989:3).

"The development and implementing of peaceful strategies for settling conflicts-using alternatives to violent forms of leverage-is known by the general term conflict resolution" (Goldstein, 2001:147). Conflict resolution is a process that finds a peaceful solution to the conflict and it may involve series of official and unofficial peace activities depending on the extent of the problems or the failure of contending parties to strike a deal.

Mail, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999:22), define conflict resolution as a task undertaken to translate 'actually or potentially violent conflict into peaceful (non-violent) processes of social and political change'. It is 'to maintain and sustain peace by building and rebuilding civil society and state institutions to allow for transparency and accountability'. It is a time consuming instrument. According to Mail, Ramsbothm and Woodhouse (Ibid.) and as reality also indicates conflict resolution is a never -ending



assignment since 'new forms and sources of conflict arise' time and again which signifies that it is impossible to eliminate conflict.

According to Mesfin, to manage conflict"... entails first the recognition of the grievances of groups; second, the disposition to redress those grievances by some mutually agreed formula; and third the conviction on the part of all concerned that conflict can and must be managed for the common good,..." (1999:187, ellipses mine). What we can understand from this is that addressing conflicting parties' grievances is the most important part of conflict resolution.

In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, both sides do not accept one another let alone recognizing their grievances. To this, Rothman quotes Benvenisiti (1987:6) as saying,"[the] inability of both sides to accept the legitimacy of the other side even as an enemy, let alone as a partner for peace negotiations is central to understanding the failure of traditional diplomacy in its attempt to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute"(1992:10).

According to Ray, (1992:118) once international conflict arises, it could be prevented from escalation and inflicting more damages through managing the conflict. Although some writers try to differentiate between conflict resolution and conflict management, Ray contends that the difficulty of assuming a task of conflict resolution which does not at a given point begin with managing conflict. So it may be argued that conflict management is one of the steps of conflict resolution (Ibid).

In this connection, the point to be made is that conflict resolution involves prevention as well. On the contrary, Ray (Ibid.) emphasizes on the dissimilarity of these concepts and observes that prevention deals with a latent conflict while resolution is geared to rectify a manifest one. And he argues that banning 'arms flow into conflict region' as an element of prevention. Nonetheless, does resolution of conflict be successful without limiting instruments, which help to escalate conflict? With this point in mind among other things, it was and still the flow of large number of arms that have been militating against the Middle East peace process.

Having said this much on the concepts related to conflict resolution, herein below I will

compromised solutions outweighs the losses incurring from non- negotiation (Jeong, 2000: 168). Other characterize official and formal negotiations between governments as Track- one Diplomacy (Bendahmane and McDonald, 1995:1-5). Again, the peace efforts made to resolve the Israeli - Palestinian conflict also fits to this concept of resolving conflict as the two sides have made several negotiations in the past since 1990.

According to Braddy (1991:30) in negotiations there must be both common interests and issues of conflict as with out common interest there is nothing to negotiate for and with out conflict there is nothing to negotiate about. Likewise, when both sides resorted to resolve their differences through peaceful means their common interest will be to resolve the dispute through peaceful means rather than through force and violence.

There is also what is called the 'Negotiators Dilemma' in negotiation processes which basically entails the questions of revealing versus concealing interests (AArow et al.,) Parties have a strong incentive to ascertain each other's true interests. At the same time, bargainers deem it advantageous to practice secrecy and delays (Ibid). The concept of Negotiators Dilemma might have been reflected in the various negotiations in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process starting from the Oslo negotiation to the other negotiations aimed at the implementation of the Oslo accords. The Camp David negotiation on final status issues can be a case where the negotiators dilemma was unraveled.

According to Braddy (1991:20-24) there are two schools of thoughts in negotiation. The negotiation is an art school argue that the process of negotiation is incremental , or trial and error and place great emphasis in understanding the substance of particular negotiation and are less concerned with the identification of common patterns across cases. Whereas those who belong to the negotiation is a science school argue that the process of negotiation can be described by a concession convergence model which suggests that parties make a series of concessions from their initial positions to reach agreement. As will be seen in the forgoing analysis the negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians encompass the application of both school of thoughts at varied occasions.

The other and most recent approach to diplomacy is track- two diplomacy. According to Montville (1995a:9), who first used this term in his 1980 article, track- two diplomacy is defined as unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations which aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict.' More over Montville in his other writings (2005b:255-269) stressed that the theory of track- two diplomacy recognizes, for increasingly apparent psychological reasons, the limitation of government leaders as they have to sometimes follow the emotional attitudes of their constituencies and public opinion in formal negotiations. Thus track- two diplomacy will be pivotal in underpinning track- one diplomacy by paving the way for the leaders to negotiate from an emboldened position. Therefore, track- two diplomacy may seem relevant to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict case where public opinion often exerts immense pressure on both sides of the negotiating table. The negotiation between opposition party member in the Israeli Knesset and former cabinet minister Dr. Yossi Beilin and the Palestinian Authority and their promulgation of a document called the ' Geneva Accord' can be a case in point in this regard ([www. mideastweb.org/ geneval.htm](http://www.mideastweb.org/geneval.htm)).

The other approach in negotiations is that negotiations or peaceful resolution of conflicts well not be successful if they do not take in to account the power relations among the parties (Zartman,1991:310). Of course, as one may look into the paper the signing of the Oslo accord would not have been possible if it had not taken in to account the power relations. Palestinians often say that the Palestinians are now claiming 22 percent of the historic Palestine, a much diminished claim as compared to that of pre- 1967 war between the Arabs and Israel which left East Jerusalem and many west Bank areas to be under Israeli occupation till to date. Mohammed Dahlan, former Intelligence Chief in the Palestinian Authority, in a BBC Hard Talk interview (25 January 2006) has reiterated the Palestinians disappointment on the pressure by Israel and the Americans to further concede to this 22 percent claim of the historic Palestine.

According to Mitchell (1981:218-223), there are two broad approaches or strategies in negotiations. The first involves an attempt to reach a settlement by ' fractioning' the issues

and the second involves solving the issues by as 'package deal'. The negotiation between Israel and Palestinians had both components. The Oslo accord had various phases of negotiations in which the thorniest ones the final status issues such as Jerusalem, refugees settlements, border and water were put aside to be discussed at the latter time. Thus, this was a typical case of 'fragmented' approach. On the other hand, the Camp David negotiation of July 2000 on the final status issues between the Palestinians and Israel can be said as the one which was guided by the 'package deal' approach as can be attested by the motto then that 'nothing is agreed unless everything is agreed'.

2.5.2 Good Offices and Mediation

Good Offices and Mediation are the other methods of resolving disputes. According to Hoffman, as cited in Jeong (2000:181), Mediation is defined as 'a process in which parties to a dispute attempt to reach a mutually agreeable solution under the auspices of a third party.' Besides according to Bercovitch and Houston, as cited in Jeong (2000:181), mediation is an extended form of negotiating whereby a third party interferes and actively participates to change the dynamics of a particular conflict. Good offices are related to a situation where a third party opts to influence the opposing sides to enter in to negotiations and the difference between good offices and mediation are that the former is involved in influencing the disputing parties to negotiate while the latter entails active involvement in the negotiation of that third party (shaw,1997:723).

Moreover, Mediation refers to a process of conflict resolution that involves the help of a third party. Although it may include positive and negative inducements it is voluntary and the conflicting parties retain control over the outcome (Miall, et.al, 1992:22). Mediation occurs on many different levels and can refer to very different types of third-party intervention. In most cases the mediator acts as a neutral facilitator of the process of communication, and remains impartial between the parties and with regard to the outcomes of the conflict. This sort of mediation is sometimes referred to as 'soft' or 'pure' mediation.

The fact that there are mediators can lessen the intensity of tension and anxiety in a conflict situation for they can create good communications between the parties to the

conflict thereby reducing the effects of fear, anger and suspicion. This is because the role of the mediator is to serve as a medium, helping to facilitate dialogue, to go between the parties to the conflict, and to slowly bring them towards some kind of resolution.

The major task of a mediator is changing parties' images of each other if good communication is to be achieved. And, the process of mediation should be followed by direct negotiations between the parties once the mediators are successful in creating mutual tolerance and a conviction to reach an agreement. (Miall, et.al, 1999; Jeong, 2000; and Mitchell, 1981)

However, the strength, attitudes and resources of the third party is crucial in determining that third party's success either in mediation or good offices approach to peaceful resolution of conflicts (Deutsch, 1973:376). This concept or method of peaceful resolution of disputes happens to be a typical one used to solve the Israeli- Palestinian conflict after the 1990s. In particular, the American mediation has played an indispensable role in the signing of the Oslo Accords or the Declaration of Principles. Afterwards the roles of America, Egypt, Jordan and the European Union as well as Russia and UN through the Quartet have helped in breaking various stalemates in the peace process.

Conflict resolution is a broader approach which may also constitute peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-building and peace enforcement mechanisms. These are strategies, which are important to redress the following three interrelated conflict components, which Mitchell (1981:16) has stated below:

conflict situation-the existence of perceived mutually incompatible goals; conflict attitudes-those psychological states . . . that frequently accompany and arise from involvement in a situation of conflict' or negative perception /misperception evolved during the conflict and the conflict behavior-the actual behavior of the opposing parties resulting from their possession of mutually incompatible goals and their attempts to achieve

those goals.

The following table tries to show how conflict resolution strategies apply for against those stated conflict components in an effort to resolve conflict.

Table1. A Framework for Conflict Resolution

Problem	Strategy	Target Group
Conflict behavior	Peace-keeping (military activity)	Armed group ('warriors')
Conflict situation	Peace-making	Decision-makers ('leaders')
Conflict attitudes and perceptions	Peace - building	Ordinary people ('followers')

Source: Adopted from Ryan, 1995:104 and Mitchell, 1981:16 (with modification).

2.5.3 Peace-keeping

According to Rourke and Boyer (1998:439) peace-keeping is a mechanism geared to prevent conflict through the use of military force which creates a buffer zone between the warring factions. Ryan (1995:103) also maintains the same opinion and further added that the identity of those forces separated 'could be state agents, paramilitaries, militia, guerrilla groups or even mobs. What they will share is a desire to use violence against the other side as a way of conducting their conflict'. Peace - keeping is the best strategy to terminate violent conflict as any effort directed to resolve conflict could not be successful unless violent behaviors are handled. To prevent conflict it primarily requires preventing physical contact of the warring factions through the interposition of supposed to be impartial policing forces. However, it does not provide the intended result unless it is supplemented by peace - making and building. Peace - keeping on its own only gives breathing or cool - off period (Ibid. 106) for the mediating parties to work the activities of peace - making without neglecting peace building as well.

As already stated, peace - keeping is an activity executed to contain the warring groups apart. So neglecting this activity to include in the conflict resolution strategies will

damage the efforts of peace - making and building. This is so because such condition gives a chance for those forces wants to work against the aim of the resolution. Again, peace-keeping forces are crucial in ensuring stability (Ibid.). Thus, the failure in this respect could mean the prevalence of further instability since lack of impartial forces to regulate the destructive behaviors of armed groups facilitates this condition. The Israeli-Palestine experience for instance apparently suggests this reality. The efforts of resolving conflict in the Middle East have not been supported by this strategy, which have given a chance for those forces to resist the peace process and in effect has prolonged the process for more than half a century. The Middle East peace processes roll up for more than half a century because among other things, it has not been supported by peace-keeping strategy.

2.5.4 Peace - Building

For Fisher, et al (2000:14) peace - building is a strategy to 'address the causes of conflict and the grievances of the past and to promote long - term stability and justice'. It is aimed at redressing the past mistakes rather than conflict behaviors (Ibid.). That is to say giving concern and solving issues, which promote conflict behaviors such as unequal access to resources, discrimination and oppression. It is a process, which targets people.

In sum, it is an effort to rectify structural contradictions. Accordingly, failure to ignore this activity could negatively impact the resolution effort. To this end, Ryan (1995:118) for instance, maintains:

If peace - making and peace -keeping is attempted without proper peace-building the ordinary people will be left out of the peace process, and this can harm attempts at conflict resolution if decision - makers lose the support of their communities because they appear to be too ready to talk peace' and he has further continued stating that 'if progress is to be made in peace - making, that the attitudes and values of ordinary people be addressed by anyone interested in conflict resolution (Ibid. 120).

2.5.5 Peace-making

Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999:22) define peace - making as a strategy 'to change the attitudes of the main protagonists'. In addition, Ryan (1995:106) states that peace-making is an effort made to resolve incompatible interests of the contending parties. Conflict of interests could be actual or a perceived one. It is a process geared to target political elites. That means it is an approach that tries to find a political solution to the conflict by redressing actual or perceived conflicting interests (Ibid. 98).

In sum, the above discussion revealed that the aforementioned strategies are inescapable to register a meaningful result in the field of conflict resolution especially when the conflict is supposed to be violent in nature like that of Israeli- Palestinian. Indeed, the weakness in one of the strategies will undermine the efforts taken by the third parties in the other areas.

In the next chapter the efforts of the United States in the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and Israeli- Palestinian conflict in particular together with its policy objectives and role in the peace process will be discussed.

CHAPTER THREE

The United States Policy, Role and Impact in the Middle East Peace Process

3.1 The United States Policy and Its Impact in the Middle East Peace Process

The Middle East ranks as one of the most important areas for U.S. interests. Yet, as one of the world's most unstable regions, its stability is hardly assured. Since the end of World War II, the region has been one of the most volatile flash points in the world, characterized by repeated episodes of large-scale warfare, enormously wasteful expenditures on arms and armies, loss of precious lives and destruction of properties, threats of escalation to involve the major powers, and the disruption of international shipping and commerce (Ovendale, 1992:249).

One of the distinguishing characteristics of a superpower is that its perspective, policy, and impact are global rather than merely regional. But there have been four basic interests that make the Middle East region an area of special importance and special responsibility for American policymakers during the cold war. First and foremost was the need to contain /Soviet influence, check Soviet expansion, and limit the number of Soviet clients in the area. Second, and of growing significance since 1973, has been the need to preserve Western access to the oil of the Gulf, an area containing two-thirds of the world's known petroleum reserves. A third American interest is to limit Arab radicalism and sustain the moderate and pro-Western regimes in the Middle East and the Gulf. Last, but not least, is the long-standing and deeply felt commitment to Israel's security and well-being (Seith P.Tilman, 1982:274).

There is a high degree of consensus within the U.S. foreign policy establishment on the importance of the first three interests, but there is much less agreement on how they relate to the fourth one. There is no clear understanding, let alone a consensus, on how to reconcile America's interests in relation to the Soviets, oil, and the Arabs with its commitment to Israel. Much of the ambiguity, abrupt shifts, and outright contradictions



that have marred American policy toward the Middle East stem from these contradictory interests.

U.S. policymakers have found it immensely difficult, if not impossible, to devise a policy toward the Middle East that would serve the full range of U.S. interests. Since the first three interests are not only compatible but mutually reinforcing, it would be relatively easy to devise a strategy for furthering all of them simultaneously. The one interest that cannot be easily fit into an overall framework was the commitment to Israel. Ideological affinity with the Jewish state is reinforced by the argument, propounded by influential American Jews as well as non-Jews, that Israel constitutes a strategic asset, a bulwark against Soviet penetration and a cornerstone of regional order. Attempts have also been made to develop a comprehensive regional strategy for the United States with Israel as its linchpin. But none of these attempts has been successful in the long run since they were, in effect, attempts to square a circle. In view of the profound antagonism between Israel and the Arabs, American's identification with Israel was bound to arouse widespread Arab hostility toward to United States and drive some Arab regimes into the arms of Moscow (Ibid).

Since American's four basic interests cannot easily be reconciled and since close identification with Israel has adverse effects on America's standing in the region, one would have expected American policymakers to establish a definite ceiling beyond which they would not be prepared to go in support of their ally. But in practice it has been equally difficult to establish some sort of balance between the different strands of American policy. The commitment to Israeli security, largely for domestic political reasons, has all too frequently outweighed the other considerations. As Tillman (1982:276) has concluded:

The issue is essentially domestic-what it comes down to, in concrete terms, is that, owing to the unmatched influence of the Israeli lobby in American politics, Israeli security (or, more exactly, the conceptions of Israeli security held by incumbent Israeli movements) has been permitted to preempt other vital interests in American policy. This,

rather than the undoubted complexity of the issues, or the strategic, economic, or moral stakes of one case as opposed to another, has been the root cause of a chronically unbalanced policy that, despite certain tactical successes, remains a strategic failure.

Among other things, a brief survey of the evolution of the relationship between the United States and Israel since 1948 serves a double purpose. It both exposes the contradictions that plague U.S. policy toward the Middle East and illuminates the impact of that policy on the region. Of the institutions involved in the formulation and conduct of U.S. policy toward the Middle East, Congress is the most susceptible to the influence of the Israeli lobby, while the bureaucracy is the least susceptible; but it is the presidency that holds the key. American foreign policy can be understood only by studying the ideas, attitudes, and preferences of the men at the top, the president and his White House advisers (Spiegel, 1985:14-15).

The foreign policy of the Truman administration was a series of pendulum swings between the pro-Arab bureaucracy and the pro-Zionist White House. Of all the salient questions- partition, trusteeship, recognition of the state of Israel, arms embargo, and disposition of the Negev_ Truman, laboring under strong Zionist pressures in a presidential election year, took a consistently pro_ Zionist line. On all these questions he either overruled or secretly undermines the position of the State Department. In the end, it was not only Truman's critics but even his loyal secretary of state, George Marshall, who charged that he had debased the presidency by playing politics with foreign policy, that he had sacrificed American interests abroad for the sake of electoral advantage (Ibid, 390-394).

Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, perceived Israel as a problem and an obstacle to the development of a global strategy of the containment of communism. The escalation of the military confrontation between Israel and Egypt provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity to leapfrog over the states of the "northern tier" and establish a foothold in the heart of the Arab world. The Eisenhower administration withheld arms from Israel, used the bait of a security guarantee, and

pressed for Israeli concessions in a number of attempts to mediate between the antagonists, but all to no avail (Mordechai Gazit, 1983:54).

In 1956 Israel conspired with France and Britain, behind America's back, to attack Egypt. One of Israel's war aims was territorial expansion. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and the Israeli defense establishment was determined to keep the Sinai Peninsula and particularly the straits of Tiran, in Israeli hands. Eisenhower was no less determined to force Israel to disgorge her gains. By threatening to apply economic sanctions, Eisenhower secured Israel's withdrawal from Egyptian territory. For his forceful leadership Eisenhower gained Arab respect and Arab cooperation within the framework of the doctrine that bore his name and offered U.S. assistance to any Middle Eastern state threatened by international communism. Israel was compelled to base her security not on territorial expansion but on deterrence. The result was ten years of relative stability on the Arab-Israeli front. The lesson to be drawn from the Suez affair is that a determined American president can use pressure to bring Israel to heel and that in doing so he can effectively protect American interests without harming Israel's basic security. It was a lesson and a policy that George Ball later encapsulated in the motto, "how to save Israel in spite of herself." (Ibid)

The election of President Kennedy in 1960 ushered in a new era of better American-Israeli understanding. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy saw accommodation between Israel and the Arabs as essential for the successes of American's own efforts in containing the Soviet Union. Unlike his predecessor, Kennedy cultivated links with the nationalist and radical leaders in the Arab world, notably Egypt President Nasser, and he embraced Israel. In the past Israel has been treated as an embarrassment and a liability. Kennedy accepted Israel as a positive force, consistent with American ideas and worthy of American support (Ibid).

Under President Johnson, the U.S. moved closer to Israel and, simultaneously, away from Nasser and closer to the conservative forces in the Arab world. Admiration by Johnson and other members of the presidential elite for Israel's democratic way of life, pioneering spirit, social and economic achievements, and self-reliance played an important part in

bringing about this shift. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, American diplomacy swung firmly behind Israel's demands for direct negotiations and a formal peace agreement incorporating secure and recognized boundaries. Believing that Eisenhower had made a mistake in letting Nasser off the hook prematurely after Suez, Johnson insisted that the Egyptian president sign on the dotted line before exerting pressure on Israel to withdraw from the newly conquered territories. Johnson also authorized arms supplies to Israel on a steadily growing scale. This policy placed America in the embarrassing position of appearing to support Israel's hold on the occupied territories, while diminishing her leverage over her increasingly powerful ally. It was a special relationship in which Israel was the junior partner but also the principal beneficiary (Spiegel, 1985:17).

The attitudes of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to the Arab-Israeli conflict were determined largely by considerations of global strategy. Israel was accorded a special place in the context of the Nixon Doctrine, which was designed to protect American interests in the third world not by committing American troops-as in Vietnam-but by backing local allies. The deep-penetration bombing raids launched by Israel during the War of Attrition (1969-71) with the objective, among others, of overthrowing the then Egypt's president Nasser should have alerted Nixon to the dangers of upgrading Israel's offensive capability without establishing control over Israel's actions. For instead of putting an end to Nasser and his influence, the Israeli actions fostered a mood of militant defiance and ultimately precipitated direct Soviet involvement in the defense of Egypt, an involvement which from the American point of view could have hardly been less welcome (Avi Shlaim and Raymond Tanter, 1978:8). It was the Jordan crisis of September 1970, however, which brought about a fundamental reorientation of American policy. The successful handling of this crisis, to which Israel contributed by deterring a supposedly Soviet inspired Syrian intervention on the side of the Palestinian group against King Hussein, led to a revised understanding of the political dynamics of the region, in which the U.S.-Israeli relationship came to be seen as the key to combating Soviet influence in the Arab world and to maintaining regional stability. In fact, as William Quandt has demonstrated, Nixon and Kissinger mistook a local crisis for a superpower confrontation. Henceforth, Israel was viewed, not as a liability, but as a

strategic asset and accordingly began to receive American economic and military aid at an unprecedented level. The military balance was seen as the key to stability if not to peace. Arms to Israel and Jordan were given higher priority than new peace initiatives. Important regional trends such as mounting frustration in Egypt, Syria, and among the Palestinians were ignored (William B Quandt, 1977:57-62)

The Yom Kippur War shattered the two major assumptions underlying the Nixon-Kissinger policy: that a strong Israel would deter the Arabs from going to war and that the status quo in the Middle East could be maintained indefinitely in Israel's favor (Avi shlaim, 1976:19). While the war still in progress, Kissinger began to develop a new policy toward the Middle East, a policy which, for the first time, had not just in Israeli component, but also a significant Arab component. This policy committed America to an active and more even-handed role in mediating between Arabs and Israelis and to a step-by-step diplomatic process.

When Israeli intransigence led to the breakdown of the talks for an interim agreement with Egypt in March 1975, President Ford ordered a reassessment of American policy. The purpose behind this reassessment was to extract Israeli concessions as a quid pro quo for American arms. "Hardware for software" was the name of the formula: trading American military hardware for in Israeli diplomatic software. The Israeli government turned this linkage to its own advantage, extracting far-reaching American commitments as the price for showing some flexibility toward Egypt. In a sense, as George Ball quipped in his Article under the title "*The coming crisis in Israeli-American Relations*", Sinai II of 1975 amounted to "a vast real estate deal in which the United States bought a slice of the Sinai Desert from Israel for a huge financial and political consideration and then paid Egypt for accepting it" (George W. Ball, 1979:241)

Jimmy Carter had the dubious privilege of being the first American president to deal, not with the Labor Zionists, but with the right-wing and ultra-nationalist government headed by Menahem Begin- a government that rejected territorial compromise and claimed Jewish sovereignty over the whole "Land of Israel." Much of the credit for the Camp David I Accords and for the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty goes to Carter. But whereas



Carter and Sadat saw the Camp David Accords as the first step in a process that would lead to a comprehensive peace between Israel and her neighbors, Begin saw the peace with Egypt as the end of the road. He was convinced that in return for relinquishing Sinai at Camp David he had secured Israel's right to retain the West Bank. Carter, for his part, was equally convinced that Israel must return to the 1967 borders because the Arab confrontation states were ready for peace, because Palestinians deserved a homeland, and because a "Greater Israel" would generate perpetual instability in the Middle East. In short, he believed that Israel could not have both territory and peace. Carter's inability to induce the Begin government to honor its commitment to seek a solution to the Palestinian problem discredited the Camp David Accords in the eyes of many Arabs, isolated Egypt, and undermined America's credibility as a peacemaker (Boulder, Colorado and Westview, 1996: pp. 233, 248).

When Ronald Reagan entered the White House he immediately emphasized the East-West axis of all international conflicts and embarked on a new policy toward the Middle East based on four main assumptions. The first assumption was that the threat to the security of the oil-producing countries of the Gulf constituted the central problem facing the United States. Second, it was assumed that the Arab-Israeli conflict had become less acute and less significant and that it could therefore safely be left on the back burner. A third assumption was that the Arab-Israeli conflict area and the Gulf are two very distinct areas, each having its own dynamics and its own rules, making it safe for America to neglect one and concentrate on the other. The fourth assumption was that, above all, the states of this area needed defense against the Soviet threat. This was an interesting and internally coherent set of assumptions, but it was somewhat at odds with the political realities of the region. Be that as it may, the operational conclusion drawn from this set of assumptions was that the United States should organize all her allies, whether Arab or Israeli, in a defensive framework designed to check Soviet advances and to protect the oil producers of the Gulf and Western access to the oil. This was the so-called policy of "strategic consensus" of which much was heard in the early days of the Reagan administration (Ibid).

Events quickly forced the administration to recognize that all the conflicts in the Middle East are important, that they are interconnected, and that the complex pattern of international politics in the region cannot be reduced to a simple East-West equation. The Lebanon war was the great eye-opener in this respect.

The Reagan administration was an accomplice in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and it, therefore, has only itself and its ally to blame for the stunning sequence of reverses and disasters that it suffered in the wake of that invasion. To obtain American support for his plan of creating "a new political order" in Lebanon, the Israeli defense minister, Ariel Sharon, emphasized that the proposed Israeli move would have the effect of weakening the pro-Soviet forces in the Middle East: Syria and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Alexander Haig's strong anti-Soviet views, his tendency to the Middle East issues from a globalist perspective, and his conception of Israel as a strong and dependable strategic ally, all facilitated Sharon's task. At their meeting in mid-May 1982 there was no overt collusion, but Haig indicated that the United States would not oppose a limited Israel military operation in Lebanon, provided there was sufficient justification for it. Sharon concluded that he had received the green light from the U.S. secretary of state for military intervention in Lebanon (Zeev Schiff, 1983:37).

America's high-risk approach to the Lebanese crisis stood in marked contrast of Soviet prudence, caution, and reluctance to take unnecessary risks. Whereas the U.S. had presented Israel with a blank check, the Soviet Union limited its commitment to the defense of Syrian territory against attack, leaving no room for hope that it might intervene on the side of Syrian forces in Lebanon. And whereas U.S. deployed troops in Beirut and naval armada offshore under the guise of a peacekeeping force, the Soviets shunned direct military involvement. American's Shi'i and Druze opponents treated the so-called peacekeeping force like any other local militia, and 240 American marines were killed when their headquarters was blown up. It was a heavy and an unnecessary price to pay for ignoring the indigenous political, religious, and ethnic sources of tension and looking for a Soviet shadow behind every tree in Lebanon. Moreover, once the price of the proudly proclaimed intervention in support of the Maronites had become apparent, the

Reagan administration simply cut and run, thereby dealing a terrible blow to America's prestige in the Arab world and leaving the Soviets to reap the benefits (Ibid. 39).

The Lebanon war provided conclusive proof that the Arab-Israeli dispute could not be safely left on the back burner. A belated product of this realization was Regan's peace plan of 1 September 1982, which called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon and the establishment of self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in confederation with Jordan. Begin's government in Israel predictably and emphatically rejected the Reagan Plan. The whole purpose of invading Lebanon was to destroy the PLO and to weaken Palestinian nationalism so as to facilitate the absorption of the West Bank into "Greater Israel". The Begin government used the festering crisis in Lebanon to prevent American-sponsored negotiations on the future of the West Bank from getting under way (Eqbal, 1989:6-7).

To settle the Lebanese conflict, U.S. secretary George Shultz negotiated the 17 May 1983 Accord, which gave Israel the rights it demanded but totally ignored Syrian interests. When Syria denounced the accord and sponsored attempts to topple Lebanese president Amin Jumayyil, Shultz concluded that Syria was the chief troublemaker in the area. However, the Reagan administration was split in so many ways that its factionalism began to resemble that of the Middle East. The secretary of state advocated the use of force in order to pressure Syria while the secretary of defense expounded the virtues of diplomacy. Shultz argued that Syria would listen to America only if it was made clear that America and Israel stood together. In other words, he saw Israel as a strategic asset(Ibid).

The close strategic cooperation between the U.S. and Israel and the joint policy of toughness vis-a-vis Syria yielded effects opposite to those expected by its proponents. Basically, the American view that there was a Soviet-Syrian- PLO-Druze- Shi'i front that could be checked only by means of an American- Israeli- Maronite front was too simplistic, not least because of the great diversity of interests at play within each coalition. By insisting on the 17 May 1983 Accord, the Reagan administration inadvertently helped to isolate and weaken President Jumayyil and strengthen his Druze

and Shi'a, the administration made the latter more dependant on Syria and helped President Al-Asad to emerge as the real arbiter of Lebanese politics. Furthermore, by treating the Lebanese civil war and Syria's role in it as a local manifestation of the East-West conflict, the administration forced president Asad and his allies ever more deeply into Moscow's embrace. In short, the Reagan administration's handling of the Lebanese crisis was not simply a chapter of accidents but had the elements of a self-fulfilling prophecy (Steven L. Spiegel, 1985:29).

Reagan's own desire to place the whole sorry saga behind him is understandable. But the lessons concerning the American role and impact on the Middle East are too striking to be obscured and too important to be forgotten. In the first place, the Lebanon war showed Israel to be not a bastion of stability but a source of regional turmoil and violence; not a strategic asset for America but a serious liability. Secondly, for all its concern to promote order and stability in this volatile area, by its own actions, the U.S. contributed to the destruction of the Lebanese state and to the collapse of the precarious regional order. The third, and most significant, lesson of the war in Lebanon is that America's uncritical support for Israeli security, as defined by the Israeli government of the day, seriously damaged America's broader interests in limiting the influence of the Soviet Union and its allies and expanding its own cooperation with moderate Arab states.

A new chapter in U.S. - Israeli relations opened with the formation of a Labor- dominated government headed by Shimon Peres following the 1984 elections. The new national coalition government, which included the Likud, carried out the withdrawal from Lebanon and displayed a genuine interest in reactivating the Arab-Israeli peace process. In office, the Labor party adhered to its traditional policy of territorial compromise over the West Bank with Jordan, the so-called "Jordanian option." In the Arab world, including the mainstream of the PLO, the general trend was toward accommodation with Israel. Capitalizing on this trend, King Hussein launched his initiative for an international conference at which the Palestinians would be represented, not by the PLO, but by a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation (James Lee Ray, 1985:pp111-12).

The U.S. government welcomed Hussein's initiative. But one sticking point has been

Hussein's insistence on an international forum that would involve the Soviet Union, rather than direct talks with Israel. Another sticking point has been the American refusal to recognize or hold talks with the PLO until it is clearly on the public record that the PLO has accepted UN resolutions 242 and 338, is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel, and has renounced terrorism. Repeated American assertions that the Palestinians are the heart of the problem lack credibility when no U.S. official can talk to their representatives. Repeated American declarations in favor of direct Jordanian-Israeli negotiations, on the other hand, lack substance when no serious American pressure is brought to bear on Israel to halt the policy of creeping annexation of the occupied territories and to give minimal assurances on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza (Ibid)

Be that as it may, America's irrevocable commitment to the security, strength, and well-being of Israel has been reaffirmed by every American Administration since the modern State of Israel was born half a century ago. It is a permanent feature of American foreign policy. The U.S. commitment to Israel has been broadened and strengthened by the passage of time and the steady development of relations between the two countries (Ibid).

America believed that Israel's security can best be guaranteed over the long term by a policy of continued military strength coupled with a peaceful relationship with its neighbors. Close American cooperation with key Arab states is also considered essential to achieving and guaranteeing that peace. After Camp David I, the issue is no longer whether there can be peace but whether there can be agreement on the terms of peace. In that context, America particularly comes to recognize in new ways the importance of a just resolution of the problem of the Palestinian Arabs for a peace settlement. This is no longer seen as simply a refugee problem; it is a problem of fulfilling the legitimate rights of Palestinian people in ways that enable them to participate in the determination of their own future and to live in peace and security with Israel. It is America's stand that Palestinian for their part must demonstrate a willingness to live in peace with Israel.

Peace is not only the best assurance of a secure and prosperous Israel, but also would strengthen moderate governments in the region and enhance US global, strategic and



pragmatic national interests together with its "moral commitments" and "human concerns". It is crucial to the understanding of U.S. policy in the Middle East to recognize that America's urgent national commitment to Israel security and on the fact that peace is a necessity for U.S. and its allies.

Nevertheless, for a half century, America's primary goal in the Middle East was stability. As it fought the Soviet Union in the Cold War, it pursued to support Middle Eastern governments that rejected Communism. On the other hand, Because of its blatant support of Israel at the expense of Palestinian freedom and human rights the "terrorist" movement multiplied and resentment boiled over into worldwide violence against the United States and its interests including its allies. "Extremists" in Iran seized American hostages, Hezbollah "terrorists" murdered American troops in Beirut and Saudi Arabia, "terrorists" set off a truck bomb at the World Trade Center in 1993, and Al Qaeda bombed two U.S. embassies in East Africa, Kenya(www.ict.org.il/342 Dr Reuven). And, the 9/11 event clearly indicated that Years of pursuing stability to promote peace left the U.S. with neither. As has been explained in this paper, the US alignment and special relationship with Israel has tainted on its image and cast a shadow on its credibility that it is the only country to broker the peace process effectively. This has had a negative impact in the sense that this role of the US and its influence on Israel has been seen by many in the Arab and the Islamic world as an ostensible mediation attempt aimed at protecting the US and the Jewish interest in the Middle East as well as safeguarding the security of Israel (Amanat, 2001:29-30). It is against these backdrops that the US sometimes finds it difficult to strike a balance between being a mediator and a close ally of Israel. It has been to the extent seen that the Palestinian issue to be the main reason for the enhancement of Arab nationalism and for the easy recruitment of terrorists for Al-Qaeda and other fundamentalist groups (Amanat, 2001:30-34). Not only that, the Palestinian question has also become the main obstacle to the real rapprochement between the Arabs and America (Doran, 2003:20). This is reflected by the harsh letter by Jordan's King Hussein to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on March 9, 1997 in response to successive attacks by Israel's border guards on its citizens by saying "In pushing matters to the point of securing a US veto at the UN Security Council, you have ill served the

image and interest of your major ally and benefactor" (Jerusalem Post, March 12, 1997).

The US Congress, if not the US government's position on Jerusalem has also shed a doubt over US credibility on the peace process. For instance, on 14 June 1997 the 423 member US Congress adopted a non-binding resolution to transfer the US Embassy headquarters from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem. To look into the voting pattern, 406 members backed the resolution and only 17 voted against the resolution. It needs to be noted that the US congress has not been a rubber stamp. Rather it has been a strong political force in the US politics which has constitutionally the power of influencing the country's foreign policy directions. Though, this resolution was not binding, politically speaking it shows how the US is so close to Israel in hearts and minds and how its credibility as a broker between Israel and Palestinians is at stake in the face of the US Congress decision to move the American Embassy in Israel from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem, a matter which has been left to negotiations on final status issues (The Egyptian Gazette, 16 June 1997).

Therefore, because of his, when America came up with a 'relatively positive and even-handed' proposal with a view to ending this longstanding conflict between the Palestinians and Israel, even a handful of Arab governments which tend to support such proposal will prefer to either negate or remain silent about it for fear of the Arab public opinion (Doran, 2003:20). It is an established fact that the moment US gives statements regarding the internal political affairs of the Palestinians, the public opinion of Palestinians immediately shifts against that political faction which is supported by the Palestinians even if that political faction had a good deal of support by the Palestinian public before (Al-Amoudi, Al-Hayat Newspaper, BBC interview January 25, 2006).

However, this wedge between the US and the Arab public is partly the result of the genuine feeling of American support to Israel and partly because of Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Iran, Syria and other fundamentalist groups that have been deliberately playing to aggravate the region's animosity towards the US (Doran, 2003:28).

Nevertheless, the United States, instead of addressing the root causes of the problem (one of which is the Palestinian cause), it declared what it calls "War on Terror". Hence, since September 11, 2001, the prime focus of Washington has been the management of

unprecedented U.S. military interventions in the region, which removed regimes from power in Afghanistan and Iraq. And, the notion of Israeli-Palestinian peace as the key to regional stability has been replaced by the war on terror and the insistence on reform and democratization as preconditions of peace. Thus, the spread of democracy, freedom and justice in the Middle East is one of America's strategies in the fight against terrorism, and hence a safer neighborhood for Israel. On the other hand, Bush appeared before the United Nations to declare explicitly for the first time that the United States favored a two-state solution, Israel and a state to be called Palestine, in a final settlement. But that settlement could be reached only with the elimination of incitement and terrorism. And as the main focus of this thesis is on the Roadmap plan to peace, it will be dealt at depth in chapter four.

Be that as it may, among other things, in addition to facilitating and mediating the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation at Madrid and Oslo, America has made relentless efforts to bring about negotiated peace between Israeli and Palestinians. The next section will devote on America's role in the peace process.

3.2 The Role of the United States in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

American-sponsored peace process began with the conference in Madrid in October 30, 1991. The basis of this conference were UN resolutions 242 and 338¹⁰ and the land for peace alternative that was incorporated in them. All the parties to the conflict were there, including the Palestinians who presented their own case for the first time at a major international gathering. In his opening speech, U.S. President Bush pledged to work for a settlement based on security for Israel and justice for the Palestinians (Shlaim, 1995:142).

Yet, no real progress could be achieved during Itzhak Shamir's premiership for Shamir, in line with the ideological position of his Likud party, was insistent that the West Bank was part of the land of Israel and withdrawal is unthinkable. On the other hand, Bush insisted that Israel abandon its envisioning of a Greater Israel and that the building of new Jewish settlements on the West Bank had to stop. Therefore, by making Israelis choose between two difficult choices, U.S. aid and continuing settlement of the West Bank, the American government saw to it that Shamir was defeated in the elections of

June 1992. He was replaced by Itzhak Rabin.

Rabin and his government realized that the occupation was not as politically useful as it used to be because the Intifada began and put the security of Israel and its citizens in jeopardy. Therefore, according to Murphy (1997:124), "The occupation had to be restructured so that the benefits of political control were maintained ..." The first tangible results became apparent in 1992, when prominent Israeli academics and the PLO held secret negotiations in Oslo. Israel initiated the secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway, directly with PLO representatives who had been excluded from the Madrid talks. The Israelis and the Palestinians met 14 times and the culmination of these rounds of talks was the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) on 13 September 1993. The DOP was greeted with hope by the whole world, most Israelis and most of the residents in the occupied territories who were wary of the fighting. The Declaration of Principles was a short document (www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22602).

It only had seventeen articles with four annexes. The DOP was based on mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO. Within three months Israel was to withdraw from the Gaza strip and Jericho and some unspecified areas of the West Bank within a five year interim period during which time the PLO was to form a Palestinian Authority (PA) with municipal powers in areas from which the Israeli troops were re-deployed and that would be no later than 13 July 1994. The Israeli soldiers would be redeployed outside Palestinian population areas so as to be able to protect the settlements. It also stipulated that final status talks will be held between the two parties on issues related to the fate of Jerusalem, refugees, and the settlements. However, territories were not discussed in the document.

"In general, this process is perceived by the Palestinians to be the beginning of the end-from interim self-rule in 'the Gaza- Jericho first' to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital." (Ahrari, 1996:29) This is in spite of the fact that the DOP contained what many Palestinians like Edward Said (1995) considered as being wholly unacceptable concessions. In fact, "The PLO accepted this deeply flawed agreement with Israel because it was weak and had little diplomatic support in the Arab

world. Both Islamist radicals and local leaders in the West Bank and the Gaza strip challenged Arafat's leadership yet only Arafat had the prestige and national legitimacy to conclude a negotiated agreement with Israel." (<http://www.merip.org/Palestine-israel-primer/oslo-accords-pal-isr-primer.html>). Moreover, Rabin and his government did not find a Palestinian State a palatable option; they envisaged autonomous Palestinian territories. Murphy (1997:126) argues that the Oslo Accords were a sham when she writes:

Today, when one sees the reality of the achievements of Oslo, it is difficult not to be cynical. Given that Israel had already embarked upon a policy of restructuring the occupation in 1991 to give responsibility but not power to the Palestinians, to revive the Palestinian economy but not allow full competitive development, it is hard not to think Israel has used the Oslo Accords as a strategic disguise to achieve just that. The Oslo Accords allowed the United States, the European Union and the Arab world to act as if the Palestinian – Israeli conflict was all but over.

Similarly, Edward Said (1995:1) writes:

The 'HISTORICAL BREAKTHROUGH' announced recently by the PLO and the Israeli government is basically a joint decision to signal a new phase of reconciliation between two enemies; but it also leaves Palestinians very much the subordinates, with Israel still in charge of East Jerusalem, settlements, sovereignty, and the economy....

The plan is unclear in its details..., plain enough in its broad outlines.... Israel will allow 'limited autonomy' and 'early empowerment' for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, a small West Bank town ninety kilometers away.... The Israeli army will reposition itself away from population centers, but not withdraw for a while. Israel will control the land, water, overall security and foreign affairs in these 'autonomous' areas.

Hence, as indicated earlier, the Oslo Accords did not bring any peace. So two years after the liberation of Kuwait, the Palestinian problem remained unresolved. George Bush



failed to deliver on his pledge to bring a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He then lost the election and Bill Clinton succeeded him (Ahrari 1996:29; http://www.merip.org/palestine-israel_primer/madrid-conf-pal-isr-primer.html).

On becoming President, Bill Clinton did not hide his pro-Israeli sympathies. He abruptly reversed Bush's seemingly even-handed policy and replaced it with a policy that put Israel first. Israel had to be kept strong while the peace process continued. At the same time Iraq and Iran had to be weakened as one way of protecting Israel on its Eastern front.

The Clinton administration was committed to deepening its strategic alliance with Israel to achieve peace and security in the region. Israel and the U.S. adamantly argued that withdrawing from the occupied territories would involve high risks to Israel's security and that Israel had to know that the United States stood firmly behind it if it was to accept such risks. This was how they tried to justify their position. They believed that real progress in the peace process could only come with such kind of alliance between America and Israel. This is when America, in effect, abdicated its independent role as a mediator in the peace process and took the side of Israel-hence its bias. This bias can be exemplified by the fact that, after the Oslo Accords, Israel received 3 billion US dollars a year while a very modest amount was given to the Palestinians to govern themselves with. Palestinian self-government was only taken as an experiment; it was not seriously endorsed by the U.S. (Ibid).

The rise to power, in May 1996, of a Likud government when Binyamin Netanyahu won the elections was a heavy blow to the Oslo peace process. Netanyahu was vehemently opposed to the Oslo accords. He viewed them as incompatible with Israel's security and its historic right to the "Promised Land"

Though President Clinton maintained an active personal involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, he was only able to score very modest results. He was successful in achieving the Hebron protocol of 15 January 1997 and the Wye River Memorandum of 23 October 1998(see Appendix3). In 1999, when Ehud Barak won the elections, peace in

the Middle East saw a little flicker of light. However, he was much more interested in an agreement with Syria than with the Palestinians because Syria was a military power to be reckoned with whereas the Palestinians were not. Clinton remained all the way behind Barak and made no attempt to play an independent role in mediating the Middle East peace process. So, they envisioned the Camp David II summit together in 2000. It also failed.

As far as the causes of the failure of the Camp David II are concerned, there are two radically different versions. The Israeli version is that Barak presented a most generous package but Arafat rejected it and chose the path to violence. On the other hand, the Palestinian version is that Barak sought to impose on Arafat, with the help of the Americans, an absolutely unfair final status agreement. Many will continue to debate over these two versions for many years to come. I am of the opinion that it was not fair to the Palestinians and that the United States played complex and often contradictory roles at the summit as the principal mediator of the peace deal; as the guardian of the peace process; as Israel's strategic ally; and as Israel's cultural and political partner. This shows, I believe, that Clinton's strong commitment to Israel undermined his credibility as an honest broker and was therefore one of the factors that contributed to the collapse of the Camp David summit of July, 2000. Still, two months after the outbreak of the second Palestinian *Intifada*, Clinton presented a detailed plan for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute at Taba, Egypt in December 2000.

His plan envisaged an independent Palestinian state on about 96 per cent of the West Bank; Palestinian sovereignty over all the Arab parts of Jerusalem except for the Jewish Quarter in the Old City and the Western Wall; and the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland in historic Palestine¹¹, subject to Israel's sovereign decision to absorb them in its own territory. (<http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22678.htm>.) These parameters took the negotiators at Taba, Egypt, a great length to a final status agreement only for Clinton and Barak to be replaced by Bush Jr. and Sharon respectively.

The new American leader was different in two aspects. First, he adopted a let-them-deal-with-it kind of an attitude towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict leaving it to the two sides to solve their own differences whereas Clinton was personally devoted to resolve

the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Second, whereas Clinton had a special bond with the leaders of the Israelis as well as Yasser Arafat, Bush befriended Sharon while cold-shouldering Arafat. He believed that Sharon was justified not to resume talks until there is a complete cessation of violence by the Palestinians. He never commented on Israel's occupation. This was another show of partiality.

On the other hand, the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 on America violently shook the basis of world politics for it had far-reaching consequences for almost all aspects of US foreign policy, including its relations with Israel and the Palestinians. Sharon hoped that the events of 11 September would bring greater sympathy and support for Israel's war against Palestinian militants. He also hoped to make common cause with America in the war against international terrorism. However, two weeks after the attack President Bush issued the strongest statement that endorsed an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. Sharon was committed to keep the whole of Jerusalem under Israeli control that he was reluctant to yield to the Palestinian Authority more than the 42 per cent of the West Bank that Israel controlled; and he envisaged a weak Palestinian entity made up of isolated enclaves with no territorial contiguity. This was why Sharon reacted to America's peace plan with an outburst of anger (<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0cbq0341>).

Israel's reaction to the assassination of tourism minister Rehavam Ze'evi by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, in Jerusalem on 17 October 2001, deepened the crisis in the relations with America. The assassination was a straightforward retaliation for Israel's 'targeted killing' of the leader of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Abu Ali Mustapha in August 2001. Sharon warned Arafat of 'all-out war' unless he handed over the assassins. And without waiting for a reply from Arafat he ordered the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) to reoccupy six cities in the West Bank. The scale and ferocity of the incursion shocked many Israelis. One of those Israelis was Shimon Peres who is a leading advocate of the policy of negotiation as opposed to the policy of retaliation. It appeared to serve the agenda of the extremists in the government and in the army of destroying the peace process by cold-shouldering Arafat and bringing about the

collapse of the Palestinian Authority.

To Sharon's dismay America denounced the move and called on Israel to quit the West Bank cities immediately and without conditions. It also warned Sharon that the war against the Palestinians may have greater implications on American interests that it threatens the coalition against the Taliban regime and Al Quaida. This seemed one big stride to peace in the region. However, Sharon refused to go along with the American demand in a remarkable display of defiance. He was, in the end, compelled to take American interests into account. A gradual withdrawal from the West Bank cities was set in motion.


In order to get American good will, Yasser Arafat was the first Arab leader to denounce the horrific crime of 11 September 2001. He had paid a heavy price for his support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. America knew that it could not count on Arab support in its war against terrorism unless it adopts the "Clinton parameters": a deal that would establish the borders for an independent and sovereign Palestinian state, allow some refugees to return, and divide Jerusalem between Israel and the Palestinians. This would have been a great move by America had it been implemented. But, it was and still is not implemented because of America's blatant partiality towards Israel-hence, no peace in sight.

Currently, when Hamas won the elections in January 25, 2006 in the Palestinian Authority, the U.S., instead of pressuring the government independently, endorsed Israel's strategy of undermining the new government through sanctions and the withholding of tax revenues. A series of attacks from Islamic groups were met with sharp Israeli reprisals, but the conflict escalated after Hamas's military wing kidnapped an Israeli soldier. Bush might have tried to drive a wedge between Hamas government officials, who had edged toward recognizing Israel, and Hamas's military leadership in Syria, but, instead, he treated the two as one, fully backing Israel's offensive in Gaza and its imprisonment of Hamas government officials. When Hezbollah entered the fray and the Israelis responded by holding the Lebanese government responsible, bombing Lebanon's infrastructure and killing hundreds of civilians, Bush and Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice rejected a cease-fire and heralded the war, which had plunged Lebanon into chaos, as the "birth pangs" of a "new Middle East." According to the administration's logic, Israel, in attempting to destroy Hamas and Hezbollah, is fighting the war on terror on behalf of the United States. If Israel really succeeds, it will also accelerate regime change in Syria and weaken Iran--two parties to the conflict with whom the Bush administration, relying on magic and the Israeli military, refuses to talk (*Time*, July 31, 2006:25-26).

Again, it's not a question of whether Israel should have responded to provocations from Hamas's military wing and from Hezbollah, but the role that the United States, the principal outside power in the region, should be playing in trying to resolve the resulting crisis. Will the Bush administration's strategy of urging the Israeli government on work? It's very unlikely--indeed, the government of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert may be backing away from it. Bush's vision of change in the Middle East is apocalyptic. It presumes the transformation of the Middle East through the fire of violence into a simulacrum of the United States. This strategy hasn't worked in Iraq, and it's not likely to work here either. More likely, the Israeli and American actions will simply fuel existing hostility toward both countries in the Middle East and, after a period of rebuilding and recruiting, strengthen the hand of Hezbollah and its champions (Ibid). Of course, many Israeli officials prefer an American administration that regards Israel as a strategic ally to one that places a priority on brokering peace between Israel and its adversaries. But the United States and Israel have both fared better when an American administration has tried to broker peace. Carter oversaw the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt--to Israel's enormous benefit. Support from George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton contributed to the Oslo agreements and to a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan in October 1994. This strategy doesn't presume apocalyptic change; instead, it assumes that over decades, Israel could become integrated economically, if not politically, into the Middle East and that former adversaries could co-exist peacefully, if not happily (*Capital*, Vol. 9.no.467, December 10, 2006).

The eclipse of Arafat's Fatah by the more radical Hamas, and now a two-front war in Gaza and southern Lebanon that is unlikely to achieve the results that the United States



and Israel have hoped for. To be sure, there are complications that this survey of the two strategies ignores--feckless or reckless leaders and unforeseen provocations, as well as ancient hatreds--but it is certainly worth pondering as Bush's "new Middle East" has begun to look even less hospitable than the old.

The next section will assess some of the major previous Middle East peace Initiatives as they may give some insights as to the fate of the current Roadmap Peace Plan.

3.3 Previous Peace Attempts

As indicated in the above section, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has defied any peaceful resolution and is still a hard nut to crack. However, we cannot categorically say that it did not give peace any chance. In fact, numerous final status and peace plans have been forwarded to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a peaceful manner and negotiations were undertaken at different times and places to that effect. The whole world is toiling to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict which is shaking the overall peace in the Middle East. One peace initiative follows quickly after the previous one has failed. Yet, real peace has not been found.

From the beginning, the Israeli- Palestinian conflict was marred by a long-standing refusal of the Arabs to have a politically negotiated solution to it. In fact, they reiterated that they aimed at the destruction of the state of Israel. Israel had its share of stubbornness that it took a number of actions not only to persist, but to persuade the Arabs that it was as firm dealing with them as they were with it. It refused to "allow even a partial resettlement of the Palestinian refugees..." (Ahrari, 1996:24). It also refused to give away land in a gesture of peace and move back to its pre-1967 territory as ordered by the United Nations Resolution 242. And, some of the main peace initiatives and attempts made after 1991 to end the Israeli- Palestinian conflict are discussed below.

3.3.1 The Oslo Accords

Since the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty (1979), various initiatives were put forth by Israel and others to further the peace process in the Middle East. These efforts eventually led to the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference (October 1991), held under American and Soviet auspices, which brought together representatives of Israel,

Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians. The formal proceedings were followed by bilateral negotiations between the parties and by multilateral talks addressing regional concerns. Accordingly, following months of intensive behind-the-scenes contacts in Oslo between negotiators for Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), a Declaration of Principles (DOP) was formulated outlining self-government arrangements of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Its signing, on 13 September 1993, was preceded by an exchange of letters between PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, in which the PLO renounced the use of terrorism, pledged to invalidate those articles in its Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist and committed itself to a peaceful resolution of the decades-long conflict. In response, Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

The DOP contained a set of mutually agreed general principles regarding a five-year interim period of Palestinian self-rule and a framework for the various stages of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The arrangements for Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area were implemented in May 1994; transfer of powers and responsibilities in the West Bank in the spheres of education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism was implemented three months later. The DOP and other agreements signed by Israel and the Palestinians culminated in the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement of September 1995. (<http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rl>.)

This agreement included a broadening of Palestinian self-government by the means of an elected self-governing authority, the Palestinian Council (elected in January 1996) and continued redeployment of the IDF in the West Bank. The Agreement also set out the mechanism governing Israeli-Palestinian relations that would lead to a Final Status Agreement. Under the Interim Agreement the West Bank was divided into three types of areas:

Area A- comprising the main cities of the West Bank: full Palestinian Council responsibility for internal security and public order, as well as full responsibility for civil affairs. (The city of Hebron was subject to special arrangements set out in the Interim Agreement; the Protocol concerning the redeployment in Hebron was signed in January 1997.)

Area B - comprising small towns and villages in the West Bank: Palestinian Council responsibility for civil affairs (as in Area A) and maintenance of public order, while Israel retained overriding security responsibility to safeguard its citizens and to combat terrorism.

Area C - comprising all Jewish settlements, areas of strategic importance to Israel and largely unpopulated areas of the West Bank: full Israeli responsibility for security and public order, as well as civil responsibilities related to territory (planning and zoning, archeology, etc.). The Palestinian Council assumes responsibility with regard to all other civil spheres of the Palestinian population.

The timetable for the implementation of further redeployment phases, as specified in the Interim Agreement was revised on a number of occasions by the two sides, most notably in the Wye River Memorandum of October 1998. Following these agreed revisions; Israel completed the first and second phases of the Further Redeployment (FRD) process in March 2000. The third and final FRD is still under negotiation. As a result of the redeployments, over 18% of the West Bank is currently designated Area A and over 21% is designated Area B, with 98% of the Palestinian population of the West Bank under Palestinian authority (www.jerusalem.org/intifada/).

Final Status negotiations between the parties, to determine the nature of the permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinian entity, began as scheduled in May 1996. Suicide bomb attacks, perpetrated by Hamas terrorists in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv during 1996, darkened Israel's view of the peace process(Ibid). A hiatus of three years followed and Final Status talks were resumed only after the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum (September 1999). Issues to be dealt with include: refugees, settlements, security matters, borders, Jerusalem and more. At the invitation of U.S. President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Barak and Palestinian Authority Chairman Arafat attended a summit at Camp David in July 2000 to resume negotiations. The summit ended without an agreement being reached. However, a trilateral statement was issued, defining the agreed principles to guide further negotiations.

3.3.2 The Saudi Peace Initiative

This peace Initiative was first submitted to the Arab League summit assembled in Beirut

(Lebanon) on 28 March 2002 by Saudi Arabia. And, this Saudi-initiated plan for a comprehensive peace calls for settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other outstanding disputes between Israel and the Arab countries. It suggests that there should be termination of the state of war that has existed for decades between Israel and all Arab countries and recognition of the state of Israel as a sovereign entity in the Middle East. Once this is achieved, according to the plan, there can be a settlement to the Palestinian case. The plan calls more or less explicitly for return of the Palestinian refugees to Israel and that Israel goes back to the 1967 borders. But this plan did not make a significant progress as was Israel rejected this plan.

3.3.3 The Geneva Accord

This is a proposed final status agreement between Israelis and Palestinians initiated by former Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin and former Palestinian Minister of Information Yasser Abed Rabbo. Talks on the agreement were funded, in part, by the Swiss government. Israelis who signed the agreement included Labor Members of the Knesset Amram Mitzna, Avraham Burg, Yuli Tamir and Member of the Knesset Haim Oron, former Member of the Knesset Nehama Ronen; General Giora Inbar, Former Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak and authors Amos Oz and David Grossman(www.trinstitute.org/ojipcr/5_1salla.htm.)

The agreement was based on the understanding that there should be an independent and demilitarized Palestinian state living side by side with Israel. The borders between the two independent states would be based on the 1967 green lines but with slight modifications, giving Israel the Gush Etzion settlements, Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter of the Old City and the settlement of Ma'aleh Edumim. It stipulates that an international religious authority of some sort would control central holy sites in Jerusalem, with the Temple Mount officially under Palestinian sovereignty and the Western Wall and the Jewish Quarter of the Old City under Israeli sovereignty. However, Israel would still decide how many Palestinian refugees would come back to Israel. Other refugees would get compensation from international funds and would be accepted either into Palestine, the countries in which they are currently residing or other countries (Ibid).

3.3.4 Camp David II and Taba Accord

The U.S. President Clinton, in an attempt to bring a conclusion to the final status agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, invited Israel Prime Minister Ehud Barak and President Yasser Arafat to Camp David in July 2000. Barak forwarded Israel's position that going back to its pre1967 borders was unthinkable. Moreover, East Jerusalem was to remain under Israeli control; Israel would annex settlement blocs in the West Bank; and Israel would accept no legal or moral responsibility for the refugee problem. On the other hand, the Palestinians, in the spirit of the Oslo Accords and in accordance with UN resolution 242, demanded Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank and the Gaza strip including East Jerusalem. They also asked Israel to recognize an independent state in the occupied territories. The divergent interests of the two parties in the negotiations made it impossible for them to reach an agreement. The most daunting issue was the status of East Jerusalem which is still a very important religious place for both the Israelis and the Palestinians.

A particularly virulent territorial dispute revolved around the final status of Jerusalem. Although offered much of East Jerusalem, the Palestinians rejected a proposal for "custodianship", though not sovereignty, over the Temple Mount demanding complete sovereignty which for Jews would have meant losing a bond with both the Mount and the attached Western Wall. (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/>).

The initial U.S./Israeli offer at Camp David was unacceptable to the Palestinians and that is why Clinton made a revised proposal in December (2000) and the Israelis came back with a much-improved version at Taba. By the end of January 2001 both sides were closer to agreement than ever before, as the Israeli negotiators themselves acknowledged;

at which point the Israeli electorate replaced Ehud Barak with Ariel Sharon. Once Sharon became Prime Minister, no further negotiations have been possible between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

However, the expectations of a positive outcome to this summit were, however, shattered

that at the end of September 2000 a visit by the then opposition leader, Mr. Sharon, to the Islamic sites on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem provoked the Palestinians and resulted in a renewed outbreak of violence which is referred to as the "al-Aqsa Intifada".

Peace has become illusive and the arduous task of bringing an end to the conflict is still a big challenge to the international community. Yet, we still have hope for a peaceful settlement in accordance with the objectives of the Roadmap Peace Plan which is initiated by the U.S. and endorsed by the Quartet. But, why did previous peace initiatives fail?

3.4 Factors Responsible for the Failure of Previous Peace Efforts

From the previous discussions, we can find out that there were four basic reasons for the failure of the peace processes. First and for most, America, though it is a very important actor in international relations, did not play its role as a neutral party but as an Israeli ally. This was why it could not condemn Israeli acts against international law. It always stood with Israel through thick and thin that Israel felt legitimized for doing what it does.

The second reason was the fact that the Israelis and the Palestinians have never accepted one another. For the Israelis, the stark reality is that the Palestinian core objective is the total annihilation of the Jewish state that it is impossible to make peace with them. They believe that the Palestinians are not interested in a peaceful solution except in the destruction of Israel as a whole. On the other hand, the Palestinians see the Israelis as the occupiers. In fact, since 1967, the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been denied the right to self-determination. Their economic growth has been undermined, their water resources have been placed under Israeli control and their land has been systematically and forcefully confiscated. Yet, they are taxed only to receive very modest government expenditures that have resulted in poor health services and educational quality. The pattern of land confiscation and road networks has unfolded a type of "Bantustans" arrangement with pockets of Arab population surrounded by Israeli-dominated territory. How can they then talk peace with Israel? This rejection of both parties is on big hurdle to pass if peace is to be achieved.

The third reason, which by no means is divorced from the second, is the fact that the two parties have always sat to talk at the negotiation table with diametrically opposed and mostly irreconcilable positions. The basic positions that are hard to be reconciled by both are the fates of Jerusalem, the settlements in the occupied territories and the Palestinian refugees in neighboring Arab countries some of whom still keep keys to their homes in Palestine. These issues have haunted each peace process and if they are not addressed in such a way that both sides are satisfied, peace will continue to be illusive.

Lack of justice to the whole conflict is the fourth reason. The creation of a Jewish state in Palestine at the expense of the Palestinian residents in 1947 by the international community due to the Holocaust was injustice at its best. In fact, it clearly showed how hypocritical the international community was. It made it possible for Israel to occupy as much of the land as possible, eliminate Palestinian landownership and residence as much as possible thereby increasing Jewish population and their spread across as much of the land as possible by building illegal settlements in the occupied territories. In short, it created what the Israelis call "facts on the ground", that is, a process of continuing demographic shift from a Palestinian majority population and land ownership to a Jewish one.

The United Nations, the same organization that gave Israel its current position, tried to amend its injustice by resolving that Israel should go back to the "green line" for territory gained by war is inadmissible under international law. Be that as it may, the resolution has not still held water so to speak. In fact, Israel has been steadfastly adamant that its security depends on its control of the occupied territories that it defied many resolutions by the UN for America is always sure to veto any action against Israel. So, the occupation has continued; the humiliation the Palestinians have to face everyday is unmistakably stark.

These four basic reasons have made it impossible for the peace processes to bear fruit up until now. And, from this third chapter, the whole discussion of the U.S. interests, policy and role in the peace process could indicate a typical example of how foreign intervention fails to serve the purposes of peace but only the pursuit of interests. Be that as it may, the current US initiated Roadmap Peace Plan including the challenges and prospects with the Hamas' electoral success in the Palestinian Authority will be analyzed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Roadmap Peace Plan: Challenges and Prospects

4.1 Background to the Peace Plan

Following the swift collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime in Baghdad, the Bush administration released the latest plan on April 30, 2003 for Israeli-Palestinian peace; a document entitled "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."¹²

It is the product of a lengthy genesis, and more particularly, of the interaction of four parties who form the so-called Quartet: the United States, the United Nations (U.N.), the European Union (EU), and the Russian Federation. The declared destination of the "Roadmap" was "a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005."(See Appendix 7).

The two-state solution has been the settlement envisioned by the parties who now form the Quartet ever since 1947 when the U.N. voted to partition British-mandated Palestine into two states, Jewish and Arab. In 1948, the Jewish state, Israel, came into being; the Arab state did not. The Arab state was not established as a result of the disorganization of the Palestinian Arabs; the ambitions of neighboring Arab states, especially Egypt and Jordan, which occupied respectively Gaza and the West Bank; and above all the Arab belief that creating an Arab state would effectively legitimize partition's other offspring, Israel.

For over half a century, final partition through the creation of an Arab state—now called a Palestinian state—has eluded diplomats and peacemakers. In the year 2000, the government of Israel and the Palestinian leadership seemed to be on the brink of



consummating a final agreement for partition and peace. However, once again the Palestinian refusal to legitimize Israel and suicide bombings and counter attacks on the part of Israel led to an eleventh-hour rejection of partition and the launching of a new war, the so-called Al-Aqsa *intifada* (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/pix/b/nea/c9375>)

The Roadmap is yet one more effort to engineer a two-state solution. It is another attempt to achieve, by diplomacy, what has yet to be achieved by history: Palestinian acceptance of Israel. In this respect, it replicates the flaw of the Oslo process. But it has its own flaws, which stem from its genesis. The Oslo process, for all its shortcomings, had only two parties, Israeli and Palestinian, ultimately joined by a third, the United States. The Roadmap is the work of a committee of four, who have just spent the better part of a year working at cross-purposes over Iraq. It has been floated into an objective situation that is not "ripe" and that might actually deteriorate as a result of its own launching. It is, in short, the wrong plan at the wrong time. The Roadmap did achieve a modicum of peace—within the Quartet. What it couldnot possibly achieve in the allotted time is peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

From the start, ambiguity and oscillation have marked U.S. policy towards the war known as the Al-Aqsa *intifada*. The outbreak of the war in September 2000 caught the outgoing Clinton administration still mediating between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) on the contours of a comprehensive peace settlement. Hoping that the eruption could be contained and a peace settlement snatched from the fire, the administration stuck with mediation. It deferred judgment as to which party was responsible for the violence and radiated evenhandedness and a forced optimism about reaching a peace settlement. Palestinian terrorism and Israeli counter terrorism were both condemned as equal parts of a "cycle of violence" and care was taken not to accuse Yasser Arafat of inciting terrorism. (<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0cbq>)

The elusive peace was not reached. Bill Clinton departed office. The new Bush administration set a different course, moving from mediation aimed at a full peace to conflict management. To this end, it pursued an Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire via the Mitchell plan of May 2001 and the Tenet schedule of June 2001¹³. But a cease-fire eluded

the Bush administration just as a peace settlement had eluded the Clinton administration.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Scarred by suicide terrorism and now embarked on a retaliatory war, the United States gave firmer backing to Israeli retaliatory measures and issued sterner criticisms of Arafat's "Terror acts". The United States continued to cite the Mitchell ¹⁴and Tenet plans, urge Israeli restraint, and categorize Palestinian terrorism as the aberrant activity of fringe groups. But the tone of administration statements on the conflict changed perceptibly. "Peace will only come when all have sworn off, forever, incitement, violence, and terror," declared Bush on November 10, 2001 before the U.N. in a speech calling for a two-state solution. Israeli military action remained "unhelpful" at times, but also something the president could "fully understand." And as U.S. mediation aimed at a cease-fire failed, Bush began to express "disappointment" with Arafat's conduct. ([www.heritage.org/Research/Middle East/wm1158.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm1158.cfm))

4.2 The United States Perspective

On June 24, 2002, in a short and dramatic speech in the White House Rose Garden, President Bush signaled a significant shift of policy by writing off the Palestinian leadership (without mentioning Arafat by name) as irredeemably tainted by corruption and terrorism. Bush called for a new Palestinian leadership to engage in a "sustained fight against the terrorists and [to] dismantle their infrastructure" and to institute democratic, market-oriented reform (www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/peace process) Until that moment, Israel had been in a minority of one asserting that Arafat was part of the problem rather than the solution. Bush's speech opened a clear breach in the settled international consensus on the issue. In addition, Bush's statement contained two programmatic elements of prime importance:

- A vision of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (confirming what he had already outlined the previous year); and
- U.S. support for a provisional Palestinian state once the Palestinians produced new, democratic leadership and institutions and fought terrorism.

To these broad proposals, Bush added some specific ones:

- The Palestinian legislature would assume the "full authority of a legislative body";
- The United States, the European Union, and unspecified Arab states would work with "Palestinian leaders" to create a new "constitutional framework" and a "working democracy";
- The United States and various parties in the international community would assist the Palestinians in organizing multiparty elections by the end of 2002, work on a major project of economic reform and development, and increase humanitarian aid;
- Every "leader" and "nation" (with Syria earning a mention at one point) would be summoned to end incitement to violence; publicly denounce suicide bombings; stop the flow of funds, recruits, and weaponry to terrorist groups seeking the destruction of Israel, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah; and establish "closer ties of diplomacy and commerce with Israel";
- "As we make progress towards security," Israel would withdraw forces to positions held on September 28, 2000, and release frozen Palestinian revenues; and
- Israeli settlement activity "must stop."

In outlining the contours of future Palestinian statehood and the necessary conditions for its attainment, Bush also provided some significant clues as to his thinking. Bush believed that:

- Palestinian hopes were being held hostage to "the hatred of a few";
- Terrorists were "trained and determined killers" who wanted to stop the peace process;
- Palestinians suffered from "deep anger and despair," born of being "for decades ... treated as pawns in the Middle East conflict" and "held hostage to a comprehensive peace agreement that never seems to come."(www.heritage.org/Research/Middle East/wm.cfm)

These were the weak points in the Bush vision, for all three notions are flawed.

Palestinian hopes held hostage to a hateful few. Successive Palestinian polls during 2000-3, whether conducted by Israelis or Palestinians, underscore majority Palestinian *rejection* of the legitimacy and permanence of Israel. This is evidenced by support for Hamas in the January 25, 2006 election and an insistence on the "right of return" to Israel of refugees of the 1948-9 war, which could effectively "dissolve" the Jewish state. Generally speaking, this majority is only marginally smaller in the context of the creation of a Palestinian state and Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian hopes are, therefore, *not* held hostage by an extremist fringe. Palestinian opposition to Israel's existence and an irredentist claim to all its territory are popular and rooted in the mainstream ideologies of Palestinian nationalism, Arabism, and Islamism(*See Time, July 31, 2006:18-25*).

Terrorists aim to sabotage the peace process. In fact, the Palestinian leadership seems convinced that negotiations and terrorism can and should be pursued simultaneously. Indeed, it was this strategy that yielded recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which conducted diplomacy even as it planned terrorist acts. Arafat's own career has been a testimony to the effectiveness of this mix.

Of course, terrorism conducted by a negotiating party normally signals a rejection of the publicly stated aims of the negotiations—in this case, a Palestinian state at peace with a neighboring Israel. Bush assumes that alternative Palestinian leaders who proclaim an interest in negotiations are necessarily opposed to terrorism. That assumption is likely to be flawed.

Palestinian anger as the product of being pawns held hostage to an elusive peace settlement. By implying that others have stood in the way of Palestinian statehood and that statehood would diminish Palestinian hostility to Israel, Bush misses the lesson of the Oslo failure.(Ibid) The lesson is that the Palestinians themselves still prefer "justice" to statehood, and it is the Palestinian idea of justice that prevents unambiguous acceptance of a two-state solution negotiated directly with Israel. In this sense, mainstream Palestinian opinion is not moderate, and terrorism draws not upon socioeconomic

frustration but upon the wider aspirations of Palestinian nationalism. This is why the mainstream leadership is unwilling and unable to confront terrorism, which emerges from the center of Palestinian society, not from a violent fringe ([www.heritage.org/Research/Middle East/wm1159.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm1159.cfm).)

In sum, the June 24 speech had its weak points. Nonetheless, Bush set out important preconditions in the sphere of Palestinian political, economic, and social reform and specified that they must be fulfilled before Israel was called upon to reciprocate. But these pre-conditions were whittled away by the Roadmap produced by the Quartet.

But, why the Quartet? What are the precise factors that led the Bush administration to involve the EU, the U.N., and the Russian Federation in its renewed peace initiative? Perhaps the administration thought this would help to contain Arab ferment arising from the newly declared "war on terror." Perhaps it was intended to spread the blame more widely for the continuing failure of mediation. Perhaps it was meant to counter widespread accusation of U.S. unilateralism. All these possibilities have been suggested to explain Washington's decision to subordinate peacemaking, at least in part, to the Quartet. Certainly, the timing of the Quartet's emergence late in 2001 suggests that considerations such as these gave rise to it.

On November 19, 2001, the EU welcomed the fact that "the European Union and the United States are adopting a common approach to the Middle East peace process." The term "Roadmap" was then in fashion in European circles with reference to an action plan to combat international terrorism and caught on for Middle East peace-making as well. The Quartet came into its own in the spring of 2002, in the aftermath of Israel's counter-offensive on the West Bank. The United States, stung by criticism that its own diplomacy had failed, decided to bring the critics into the tent. U.S. secretary Powell, at a Quartet news conference on May 2, 2002, announced that it was "important ... for me to have this unified body of opinion and thought behind me" in working for peace (Ibid).

The Quartet marked a dramatic departure from past U.S. peacemaking. Rarely has the United States sought the active involvement of additional parties in its efforts at mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict. In Washington's most determined peace initiatives—



the successful Egyptian-Israeli process of 1977-9 and the unsuccessful Israeli-PLO process of 1993-2000—Washington kept the U.N. out. It regarded the international body as disruptive, partisan, and deeply hostile to Israel. In the American view, the Europeans never had more than a facilitating role, mostly economic. And the United States always went to lengths to exclude the Soviet Union, predecessor of the Russian Federation.

On April 10, 2002, the Quartet produced its first fruit, a joint communiqué read at a Madrid press conference by U.N. secretary-general Kofi Annan, in the presence of representatives of all four parties. The communiqué affirmed that "there is no military solution to the conflict" and called for a two-state solution based on the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for negotiations leading to Israeli withdrawals and Arab recognition of and peace with Israel (242, 338, 1397) (see Annex 2). It "warmly endorsed" Saudi crown prince Abdullah's peace initiative, in turn endorsed in Beirut by the Arab League (March 27-28, 2002) as a "significant contribution towards a comprehensive peace, including Syria and Lebanon." (The Saudi plan calls for establishing "normal relations with Israel," but only within the context of complete Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines; Israeli withdrawal from "remaining occupied Lebanese territories"; confirmation of a Palestinian "right of return" to Israel proper; and rejection of "all forms of partition [sic] which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries," thus foreclosing any alternative to a "right of return" (<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Middle East/wm1158.cfm>).

In terms of immediate and concrete steps, the Quartet called on Israel to "halt immediately its military operations" and for an "immediate, meaningful cease-fire and an immediate Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian cities" to positions held on September 28, 2000. It required "an end to all [Israeli] settlement activity." It also called for the Palestinian Authority "to act decisively and take all possible steps within its capacity to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure, including terrorist financing, and to stop incitement to violence." To this end, it also urged the parties to agree to a cease-fire as proposed by then-U.S. envoy, Anthony Zinni, who at that time was in the region for this purpose. Lastly, it called upon Arab states to assist in rebuilding the PA and for international donors to contribute to a humanitarian relief effort (<http://www.heritage.org/Research>

Features/issues/issuearea/Isrpal).

To be sure, Bush retained many of these elements in his subsequent June 24, 2002 speech. These elements included a two-state solution, an end to Israeli settlement activity, the Palestinian obligation to fight terror and dismantle its infrastructure, and an international relief effort.

But Bush's speech effectively repudiated the rest of the Quartet's admonitions. He introduced two completely new elements by insisting on new Palestinian leadership and the creation of a provisional Palestinian state. And he altered two existing elements. Bush did not call on Arab states to bolster the PA, whose institutions had been complicit in the violence and incitement. Instead he called on Arab states to cooperate in suppressing terrorism and incitement. And he did not call on Israel to "halt immediately" its military operations and withdraw its forces. Bush expected Israel to do this only "as we make progress towards security."(Ibid).

In sum, the Quartet looked as though it had been bypassed, even superseded, and that it would be compelled to work within the new parameters set by Bush's speech. Instead, every subsequent elaboration of the Quartet's policy has overlooked, overturned, or finessed Bush's conditions, producing a program at odds with it.

4.3 Quartet's Response

The Quartet's response to the Bush speech arrived three weeks later. On July 16,2002 in New York, the Quartet issued its second joint communiqué. It began by explicitly reaffirming its first statement of April 10. But although it also explicitly supported Bush's two-state vision, it repudiated it in detail. Specifically, it:

- Reaffirmed Arafat as "the recognized, elected leader of the Palestinian people," thus ignoring Bush's call for new leadership;
- Renewed its call for "immediate" Israeli withdrawal and progress in moving "towards security";
- Affirmed a process of parallel Israeli and Palestinian steps that wholly discarded Bush's emphasis on Palestinian performance in fighting terror and ending

incitement and violence;

- Called for immediate Israeli release of frozen Palestinian funds, omitting Bush's caveat on first establishing new Palestinian institutions, accountability, and auditing; and
- 1 Commended its own "action plan," thereby sidestepping the requirement that Palestinian statehood emerge as the outcome of negotiations (although towards that end, it "reaffirmed" the need for a "negotiated settlement") ([http:// en.Wikipedia.Org/wiki/road-map-forpeace](http://en.Wikipedia.Org/wiki/road-map-forpeace)).

The Quartet did pay tribute to the idea of Palestinian reform—by welcoming Arafat's announcement of a 100-day reform program. The Quartet thus remained committed to Arafat, this time as reformer. Similarly, the Quartet welcomed the supposed willingness of Arab states to contribute to peacemaking—not by fighting terror, but by "helping Palestinians build institutions of good government and democracy." Since these states did not themselves possess such institutions, this call had no meaning. Lastly, the Quartet simply ignored Bush's call for a provisional Palestinian state, with all the geographical, political, and military limitations this implied.

In essence, then, the Quartet's New York statement amounted to a repudiation of Bush's vision, ignoring each innovation in the president's speech as if it had never been spoken. It did not call for new Palestinian leadership; it did not envision a provisional Palestinian state; it did not call for Arab state action against terror and incitement; and it did not predicate Israeli easing of security measures on improved security and progress in Palestinian reform.

How did the United States react to the Quartet communiqué of July 16, 2002? The State Department, as a party to the very document that neutralized the Bush proposals, reacted inconsistently. This was most evident in the case of Arafat's standing. The U.S. secretary of state Powell, questioned immediately upon The UN delivery of the joint communiqué, admitted the issue of Arafat's future had not even been discussed and, a little later, that each side had its own views on Arafat. When Powell was queried about the idea of a new Palestinian prime minister, he confirmed that the United States would not deal with

Arafat but anticipated working with "other Palestinian leaders who now seem to be coming to the fore and acting with some authority." These were hardly unequivocal statements, especially when one recalls that the United States, while shunning Arafat, continued (like the Israelis at times) to deal with some of Arafat's old guard of senior officials (<http://www.heritage.org/Reaserch/Middle East/>)

On September 17, 2002, the Quartet issued a third communiqué following a meeting of its principals, as well as representatives of five Arab states (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria), the Palestinians, and Israel. In announcing the Quartet's policy, or Roadmap as it was now dubbed, Annan spoke of producing a "performance-driven and hope-driven" plan, a formula suggesting that the needs of Israelis and Palestinians were both being taken into account. The Roadmap would aim for nothing less than the ambitious goal of achieving a "final and comprehensive settlement within three years"(Ibid).

Implementation of the Roadmap would occur in three phases. The first phase (then scheduled to end in May 2003) would deal with Palestinian security reform, Israeli withdrawals, and support for Palestinian elections to be held the same year. There would also be an ad hoc liaison committee to "review the humanitarian situation and identify priority areas." The second phase (beginning in mid-2003) would deal with creating a Palestinian state in provisional borders and a new constitution as "way stations" on the road to a final settlement. The third phase (2004-mid-2005) would consist of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a final settlement. During this final phase, Palestinian political and economic reform would be paralleled by Israeli measures to improve Palestinian lives, permitting resumption of economic activity, lifting curfews and closures, releasing Palestinian revenues, and ending all settlement activity. The Palestinians would work with both the United States and Arab states to reform their security services and combat terrorism.

- 2 The September 17, 2002 communiqué arguably reduced two of the four discrepancies between the Quartet's position and the Bush vision. It implicitly endorsed the idea of a new Palestinian leadership produced by elections held in accord with a new constitution and international monitoring. It also called for an

Israeli halt to settlement activity only in the third phase, following the establishment of the conditions and reforms first outlined in the Bush speech. And it acknowledged Bush's idea of a provisional Palestinian state (without, however, quite endorsing it) by proposing that the definition of the borders of that state be deferred to final status negotiations. But it also left one discrepancy in place. It required immediate Israeli withdrawals in parallel with Palestinian steps rather than as a result of them ([http:// en. Wikipedia. Org/wiki/road-map-forpeace](http://en.Wikipedia.Org/wiki/road-map-forpeace)).

4.4 The Main Components and Objectives of the Peace Plan

A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution draft document to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict was published on April 30, 2003. It should have represented a further and final effort to end discrepancies with the Bush speech. After all, history has demonstrated that the success of any Arab-Israeli peace initiative lies in the extent to which the U.S. president is committed to it—and even that may not be sufficient. But with the roadmap, the Quartet went sharply into reverse. The Roadmap actually discarded precisely the provisions of its own third communiqué (September 17) that were intended to align it more closely with the Bush speech.

The Roadmap, as circulated in October, 2002 and published in April, 2003, described the three phases as follows:

4.4.1 Phase One (October 2002-May 2003). According to this draft, the Quartet's plan was now to include a broad-based Palestinian cabinet, an empowered prime minister, an independent election commission, a committee to draft a constitution, and reopening of Palestinian institutions in east Jerusalem. Israel would facilitate travel of Palestinian officials, improve humanitarian conditions, end "actions undermining trust, including attacks in civilian areas, demolitions of terrorists' homes, and immediately resume monthly release of Palestinian revenues." Israeli withdrawals were to commence and be completed ahead of Palestinian elections, projected for the first half of 2003. A freeze on Israeli settlement activity, including the natural growth of existing settlements, was also a requirement. Arab states in turn were asked to "move decisively to cut off public/private funding of extremist groups." Palestinians were required to issue an unequivocal

declaration of Israel's right to exist and call for an immediate end to all violence against Israelis.

4.4.2 Phase Two (June-December 2003). Creating a Palestinian state with provisional borders would be the main project during this phase, which now included the establishment of a monitoring mechanism; convening an international conference; launching Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on provisional borders; restoring the multilateral talks of the Oslo period; approving a new Palestinian constitution; the collection of illegal weapons; disarming so-called "militant groups"; and "further action on settlements," presumably by dismantling some of them.

4.4.3 Phase Three (2004-2005). Negotiations aimed at a final settlement remained the goal of this phase, which was to include an international conference. The conference was to approve the Palestinian state with provisional borders established as a result of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. It would also launch negotiations between the parties of a final settlement to be concluded in 2005 and to address outstanding questions of borders, Jerusalem, refugees, and settlements. Arab states were then expected, in line with the Saudi plan approved at the Beirut summit, to accept "normal relations" with Israel.

It is instantly apparent that this draft Roadmap subtly undoes those aspects of the Quartet's third communiqué (September 17) that had incorporated some of the innovative elements of Bush's program. As a result, the Bush vision and the Roadmap are not at all in alignment, and the evidence for this conclusion is to be derived from the detail of the first two phases of the roadmap. ([http:// en. Wikipedia. Org/wiki/road-map-forpeace](http://en.Wikipedia.Org/wiki/road-map-forpeace)).

The first phase deviates from Bush's conditions in a fundamental way. Israeli steps on security, settlements, withdrawal, and resuming cooperation with the Palestinians are brought *forward* to occur in this first, tentative phase, rather than in the third phase and as a *response* to verified Palestinian steps. No explanation is offered in the Roadmap for these major revisions. Furthermore, serious curbs are to be placed on Israeli retaliatory measures against "terrorists", approximating an outright ban, regardless of how legal, proportionate, or necessary such operations might be.

The second phase has finessed Bush's original proposal of a provisional Palestinian state

with a proposal for a Palestinian state with provisional borders. This is a crucial difference: the state thus created would enjoy full legitimacy, possibly as early as fourteen months from the start of the Quartet's schedule. Verification of Palestinian reform, compliance, dismantling of terrorist groups, and ending incitement are to be subject to the briefest of tests, with many proposed mechanisms but no clear standards of performance.

In the Quartet's formulation, the possibility of the reelection of Arafat or his cohorts, or appointment of his acolytes, is not excluded. In fact, so long as Arafat remains a factor, much of what the Roadmap envisions can proceed only with Arafat's knowledge and consent. A renewed Palestinian declaration on Israel's right to exist, the explicit cessation of terror, and even the appointment of a prime minister, all depend upon him. As it stands, then, the Roadmap could divert the process on a bypass road around Bush's vision of a post-Arafat era in Palestinian politics.

From the time of the Roadmap's unveiling, the U.S. government maintained the pious fiction that Bush's vision and the Quartet's Roadmap were one and the same. But the White House has not always been blind to the contradiction. In November 2002, Israeli elections were called for January 2003, and Iraq began to consume all of Washington's energies. The administration, therefore, opted to defer publication of an authoritative version of the Roadmap. At first, the State Department would not confirm rumors that the United States and Israel were agreed on postponement. Eventually, Powell indicated that the administration "thought it wiser" to await the outcome of Israeli elections. A meeting of the Quartet leaders in Washington, on December 20, 2002, indicated that a gap remained between Bush, who regarded the Roadmap as subject to further revision, and other Quartet members who preferred to see it as fixed. Bush indicated that he was "strongly committed to the vision that I outlined on June the 24th ... The Roadmap is not complete yet, but the United States is committed to its completion." In contrast, the Russian foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, opined that "we have a good document, and the most important thing is to implement." (Ibid)

Following Ariel Sharon's reelection on January 28, 2003, Powell made the barest of hints that the Roadmap might not be the sole basis on which the United States hoped now to

proceed, referring to "the Roadmap and other tools that we have." A few weeks later, he noted that Bush "remains committed to the vision of his June 24 speech." On March 14, Bush himself outlined his vision in terms that amounted to a reiteration of that speech, even before he had referred to the Roadmap by name. Rather than emphasizing discrepancies between the positions of Washington and other Quartet members, Bush chose to focus on goals, stating that "this Roadmap will set forth a sequence of steps toward the goals I set out on June 24th, 2002, *goals shared by all the parties*" (emphasis added). He also indicated the Roadmap as such was not final, since "we will expect and welcome contributions from Israel and the Palestinians to this document that will advance true peace." Presentation of the Roadmap only awaited the appointment of a Palestinian "prime minister." ([http:// en. Wikipedia. Org/wiki/road-map-forpeace](http://en.Wikipedia.Org/wiki/road-map-forpeace)).

On March 18, 2003 one day before hostilities commenced in Iraq, the Palestinian legislature approved the appointment of a prime minister, pending his selection by Arafat. The U.S. welcomed the appointment as "another positive step," although it amounted to less than what the United States would have liked to see. "And the greatest disappointment," U.S. Secretary Powell added, "has been the area of security, ending the violence, and so there is a disappointment that that portfolio seems to remain wholly in the hands of Chairman Arafat." The official subsequently confirmed by Arafat was Mahmud 'Abbas (also known as, Abu Mazen), secretary-general of the PLO executive committee. Nevertheless, and as Powell observed, Palestinian decisions in the military and foreign policy realm remain subject to Arafat's approval. The most cautious reaction to Abu Mazen's appointment must be that, as a genuine reformer and a political moderate interested in a permanent two-state solution, he is unproven. The same applies for new ministers, such as Hani al-Hasan, now "interior minister," who regards murderous attacks on Israeli civilian settlers as legitimate military action; or Muhammad Dahlan, the new "state security minister," whose personnel, when he was preventive security chief in Gaza, perpetrated attacks on Israeli civilians.

On May 26, 2003, Israel acceded to international pressure for movement forward on the roadmap and announced its qualified acceptance of the plan, citing fourteen reservations. The roadmap is now *the* peace plan for Israelis and Palestinians. Where does this leave

U.S. policy for advancing an Israeli-Palestinian peace?

Neither Bush's vision nor the Quartet's Roadmap fully addresses the core problem, which is the Palestinian refusal to accept Israel as a permanent, Jewish state. Consequently, either initiative runs the risk of dealing, at best and imperfectly, with symptoms (terrorism) rather than root causes (no Palestinian consensus for a permanent peace with Israel). When we see the contents of the Roadmap peace plan, there are unaddressed issues. For example, if terror attacks continue, what is the criterion for deciding that the Palestinian leadership acted "decisively" against them? If on the other hand, Israel does not dismantle settlements, what will happen? Therefore, the roadmap may be criticized, and may fail, for the same reasons as the Oslo accords - many words, with no mechanism to enforce the agreement.

The Palestinian Authority accepted the Roadmap, but so far has not implemented key provisions such as combating terror effectively. The Israeli government accepted the roadmap, but with fourteen reservations and has likewise not implemented key undertakings of its own for Phase I, especially the freeze on settlement activity and removal of illegal outposts. Thus, there were critics and skeptics, at the outset, who said that the Road Map followed a piece-meal and gradual approach to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, repeating the same approach that failed both the Israelis and Palestinians in the past. There was no enforcement mechanism and indicative measures if the timetable was not honored. It failed to provide a detailed explanation and definition of a permanent status agreement (International Crisis Group, Middle East Report no. 14, 2 May 2003: 1-4). Above all, when seen from the practical implementation process point of view, the continuation of the conflict, violence and terror, the death of Yasser Arafat and some complications afterwards in establishing an influential Palestinian leadership, the slow pace of Palestinian political reform, and Israel's build up of what it calls 'security fence'¹⁵ and what the Palestinians called 'wall of separation' and 'wall of confiscating of land' were primarily responsible for the failure of the Road Map to peace.

In a nutshell, the three phases of the Road map were not to be implemented in isolation. They are rather sequential and the first phase fails to be materialized fully as violence still persists there.

However, it should be noted here that the peace plan, that envisions two-states, has got

the support of not only the Quartet members but also many others. UN resolution 1397 calls for a Palestinian state alongside Israel (see Annex 3).

On the contrary, in addition to Israeli radicals (right wing groups); Hamas and its supporters bitterly opposed and sabotage previous efforts as well as the two-state solution (for peace). So, issues become more complicated following the coming into power of Hamas after electoral victory in the Palestine Authority in January 25, 2006. Thus, one may ask as to what are the prospects of Palestinian statehood and peace after Hamas' electoral victory? In the following section I will try to analyze the challenges of Hamas victory and the ways out.

4.5 The Challenges and Prospects of Israeli-Palestinian Peace

After Hamas' electoral victory in the Palestinian Authority in January 25, 2006, peace and peace process seem to be bleak though may not totally be dark. It seems there is no prospect for peace with Hamas while Hamas leaders continue to assert that it will never make peace with Israel under any circumstances. We should not ignore harbingers of change, but we can't ignore what Hamas leaders say most consistently. Since the election of Hamas, an unprecedented barrage of rocket fire has fallen on Israel, and an Israeli soldier was kidnapped on Israeli soil. This is the Hamas response to Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. It doesn't require much imagination to predict the response of Hamas to withdrawal from the West Bank (www.nytimes.com/2006/11/01/opinion/yousef).

From the moment Hamas took power in the Palestinian Authority, three strategic approaches have been used to analyze the impact of this success on the two-state solution which is envisioned in the Roadmap Peace Plan and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. One approach believes that both sides entered a political impasse combined with a social and economic impasse in Palestinian society. The second approach states that Hamas' success will move the Palestinians from a strategy of impotence, which did not lead to the fulfillment of Palestinian's rights, to a strategy of Jihad and resistance, thereby securing these rights. The third approach considers Hamas' success as an opportunity that includes a challenge to move towards peace and reconciliation between Israel and possibly the entire Islamic world.

Here, the question may be raised as to how will a political resolution move towards a Palestinian state beside Israel? As uncertain as the situation, I believe three possible scenarios may answer the above question. As we have roughly seen in this study several political plans are in the offing, some of them leading to Palestinian statehood and some not. The three following scenarios are likely (taking into consideration the position of Israel), but none of them lead to a Palestinian state beside Israel.

Scenario I: The Third Violent Intifada

Israel partially disengages with the settlements, with the continuation of the occupation (the realignment plan of Prime Minister Olmert of Israel). This scenario includes dismantling all the settlements east of the wall, while keeping the Israeli Army in the area for security reasons and, at the same time, keeping the big settlement blocks and Greater Jerusalem in the hands of Israel. This scenario was moved from the Israeli political table after last war of July 2006 in Lebanon.

The results of this scenario, which was supported by the leaders of the centrist Kadima Party and justified by the unwillingness to make concessions to a Hamas-led government, will include: continuation of the occupation, continuation of the separation between the West Bank and Gaza, continuation of the wall and the build up of the big settlements blocks and all the other aforementioned policies. With that, the Palestinian response will be a refusal to recognize the existence of Israel as an independent state until it recognizes the same right for the Palestinians. The strong likelihood of a third violent Intifada cannot be excluded in this scenario, with the idea of Jihad gaining more support. If this scenario is presented as an offer for negotiation with the Palestinian President Abu Mazen, and considering the aftermath of the war in Lebanon, it will be considered a non-starter; therefore Israel will either implement it unilaterally with all the results mentioned above, or remove it completely from the table. If implemented unilaterally by Israel, this scenario might lead the Palestinians to dissolve the PA and to replace it with a National Unity leadership that will lead the resistance against Israel ([www.heritage.org/Research/Middle East/wml159.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wml159.cfm)).

Scenario II: Palestinian state with provisional borders

Palestinian state with provisional borders as stated in the second stage of the Roadmap will be formed but Violence will continue. Israel partially disengages with the settlements, along with the establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders as stated in the second stage of the Roadmap. This scenario is less likely than the first, because the Israeli government might consider the establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders in the area east of the wall as a concession to Hamas. In the unlikely chance that this scenario will be implemented, the Palestinians will consider it problematic because it includes the same deficiencies as scenario one, therefore the results will be Jihad, resistance and a third violent Intifada. This option will not be considered by Abu Mazen as a basis for negotiation. While he has declared several times that he wants to negotiate about the permanent status, it should be noted that the state with provisional borders is an option and not obligatory according to the Roadmap.

Scenario III: An International Peacekeeping Force

Israel partially disengages from the settlements and transfers the area east of the wall to an International Peacekeeping Force but resistance and violence will continue to be Palestinians reaction. This scenario has the same deficiencies as the previous ones. It will create Palestinian resistance against Israel in order to "liberate" Jerusalem and the big settlement blocks. It might also lead to clashes between the Palestinians and the international forces, which will be considered by the Palestinians as a new occupying power and also as protectors of the Israeli occupations in the other areas retained by Israel.

Alternative Scenario

This alternative scenario is built on the assumption that both peoples have an equal right to exist and also equal rights with regard to peace, security and personal safety for all citizens on both sides. With these assumptions, the above-mentioned challenge of working with Hamas for political moderation and democratization should be transformed into a plan of action, in which all parties concerned should take part.

On the one hand, the Israeli disengagement process should be pushed to its logical end to become a full disengagement from the Israeli settlements (or keeping some of them while making 1:1 land swaps according to the Clinton parameters). A full withdrawal of the Israeli Army, while establishing an International, Islamic and Arabic coalition for the democratization and moderation of Hamas and for helping the Palestinians in state building should also be part of such a plan. This coalition will include but not limited to the Quartet, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Such a coalition will not be rejected by Hamas who, in their electoral platform stressed the importance of cooperation and security coordination with "the Arabic and Islamic Nation."
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Features/issues/issuearea/Isrpal>)

The idea here is to use the good offices of the Arab and Islamic moderate countries to help the Israelis and Palestinians out of their impasse. From its perspective, Israel might want to withdraw for security and demographic reasons, but does not want to do so in a way that seems to grant success to Hamas, while Hamas and all the Palestinians want to end the occupation. While the two sides cannot fulfill each other's wishes for now, the U.S. has all the power of influence on Israel, can do it for them.
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Middle East/wm1159.cfm>)

The hand over of the West Bank and Jerusalem to the UN Peacekeeping force might also be done in one, two or three stages. During these stages the process of building trust between the Israelis and Palestinians will be promoted in a way that will lead them to get together in order to answer the 'peace question'. The moment they answer this question, the Peacekeeping force should withdraw. The work of this Peacekeeping force might begin after a UN Security Council decision that calls for its establishment. This is an option for short term arrangements and also for future reconciliation.

CONCLUSION

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most longstanding and intractable conflicts in modern times that is lasted for about sixty years. The reason for this is cross-sectional. The creation of a Jewish state after partitioning Palestine into a Jewish and Palestine State by the United Nations, in the Arab enclave of the Middle East has been the primary factor. This was found to be completely unacceptable for the Palestinians and the Arabs and led to the eruption of three major wars—in 1948, 1967 and 1973—between the Arabs and Israel. The other reasons for the aggravation of the problem can be cited as regional and the then super-power rivalry which prevailed then and the current American dominance of the world order. The schism and the influence of die-hards in the Israeli and Palestinian political entities have also their role for the continuation of the conflict.

However, throughout the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the geopolitical landscape of the world and the Middle East had changed. This was manifested by the break-up of the Soviet Union which led to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of America, Israel's strategic ally, as the sole superpower. Hence, there emerged the realization in the Arab world that it is difficult to solve their dispute with Israel by war as the previous three major wars were not certainly in their favor. The alleged possession of nuclear weapons by Israel has further complicated the Arabs' resolve to defeat Israel. Of course, Israel has neither denied nor accepted this allegation on its possession of nuclear arsenal as it follows the policy of 'Nuclear Ambiguity'. Due to the support to Saddam Hussein in his invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing gross erosion of political support and financial assistance from many of the Arab states, the PLO got weakened. The occupation of Palestinian lands since 1967 and its aftermath, that included Palestinian suffering and human rights violations, further isolated Israel and tarnished its stature in the international scene. The eruption of the first intifada in 1987 and its fall out had also wreaked havoc on Israel by, *inter-alia*, further worsening its security situation.

Having prudently assessed the above inter-linked aspects and finding window of opportunity, the United States felt that it was a fitting occasion to bring both Israelis and Palestinians on board to a ferry of peace. Within this in view the United States started to

mediate the two sides towards the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s through secret meetings and by adopting shuttle diplomacy with the aim of finding amicable solution to the problem. However, a tangible attempt to find an amicable solution to the conundrum took place after the commencement of the Conference held in Madrid in 1991 between the Arabs and Israel. Representatives of the PLO participated as part of Jordanian delegation since Israel did not recognize the PLO. This Conference laid the basis and paved the way towards further meaningful attempts for solution to the problem and as a result the Oslo Accord was signed after tough and trying negotiations on the part of both sides.

There is no gainsaying that the initial implementation of the Oslo accords brought an ambience of hope and positive results on the ground to both sides. Both sides started to reap the dividends accrued from their determination to pursue peace in their quest to resolve their longstanding conflict. The Palestinians for the first time started to administer themselves in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank with the establishment of Palestinian Authority under the chairmanship of the late Yasser Arafat. The Israelis on their part started to live in an atmosphere of relative peace and tranquility. Israel registered an unprecedented prosperity during the 1990s mainly as it attracted massive foreign investment. PLO recognized Israel's right to exist.

At the same time, both sides have also faced domestic resistance to the peace efforts. In Israel, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was killed by a young extremist Jew who opposed the peace process. In the Palestinian Authority, extremist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad did not only oppose but repeatedly sabotaged the pace process by attacking Israeli civilian and military targets.

However, the Oslo peace accord could not stand the test of the Camp David negotiations of July 2000 on the final status issues such as Jerusalem, refugees and settlements. Had these negotiations successfully completed, it would have been a major step in ending the chapter of violence, conflict and war, and opened up a new chapter of peace, respect and cooperation between the Arabs and Israel and the Palestinians and Israel. However, for reasons mentioned in the paper, the Camp David negotiation tragically failed. Not only



that, it brought with it violence and the second intifada which has been going on till to date. In this sense, the failure of Camp David and the resumption of violence and counter-action between the Palestinians and Israelis are linked, though it may not be the only reason as mentioned in the relevant part of the paper. Therefore, the Oslo Accord failed to satisfy the aspirations of Palestinians and Israelis alike to live in peace and security side by side because of the incessant violence that got started after the Camp David debacle.

After the failure of Camp David, other efforts were made to revive the peace process. The Taba Talks of January 2001 between the Palestinian Authority and the then Labor leadership in Israel did not result in a concrete official and committing deal. It rather resulted in no more than an issuance of a joint statement, in which both sides declared that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement. The Saudi Peace Initiative endorsed by the Arab League in its Summit in Beirut in March 2002 was rebuffed then by Israel. However, in recent times the Israeli government has started to show change of heart and is saying that there are positive elements in the Saudi Peace Initiative which can be used as a basis for peace talks.

The recent Road Map to Peace formulated under the auspices of the Quartet and accepted by both Israel and Palestine did not meet the expectations either. It must be understood clearly that the Road Map has three phases which are sequential and inter-connected. Thus, Phase I has not been implemented fully and timely. In fact, its main component, viz., the cessation of violence has not yet been implemented, let alone phase II and Phase III, which includes Agreement on Permanent Status issues which was slated to be accomplished by 2004-2005. Therefore, technically speaking, the Road Map can be said to have faced the same fate as its predecessors. The Gaza Disengagement Plan implemented by the ailing former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2005 did not produce the requisite Peace to both sides. In other words, the efforts made to restore the peace process after the failure of Camp David had little impact in breaking the deadlock.

The change in the political situation in the Palestinian Authority as a result of the death of Yasser Arafat and the election of Hamas in January 2006 to power has only added fuel

into the already volatile situation. As it is well known, the Hamas led government has not denounced violence and recognized Israel's right to exist. As a result, Israel and the major actors in the peace process, the US and EU has refused to talk with the Hamas led government and have suspended their economic assistance. In fact, more recently this and related internal factors have forced Hamas to share power, and form coalition government, with moderate Fathah. This might be taken as a positive move towards solving the Palestinian internal and external political problems.

With regard to the involvement and role of the United States, it should be born in mind that America has played an active role in the United Nations in support of the establishment of Israel. As we mentioned earlier, it has been the staunchest ally of Israel, especially since the mid 1960. It has scuttled and vetoed several UN Security Council resolutions against Israel. The United States has been providing 3 billion USD to Israel annually in the form of aid, 1.2 billion USD of which is earmarked for economic purposes and 1.8 billion USD for military means (www.miftach.org). The unflinching and strong support and alliance of the United States with Israel emanates, mainly, from the following strategic thinking.

1. The US has always attempted to control the Middle East, an oil rich area which has been quite important in world economy. And, one way of doing it is by supporting an alien Jewish state in the Arab enclave of the Middle East.
2. Ideologically the US sees itself as the vanguard and promoter of liberal democracy. As Israel is the only democratic country in the Middle East, the US considers it as an opportunity to assist Israel so that it can be a beacon of democracy in the Middle East.
3. There are around 6 million Jews in the US. More important than this sheer number of population is that most of them are economically rich and control key positions in the US government, Congress and the Senate. Therefore, the strong Jewish lobby in the US has more often than not the capacity to influence US foreign policy towards the Middle East, Palestinians and Israel (www.irb.co.uk).

Hence we can say that the US is devoted to promoting and protecting its vested interests in the Middle East region. Thus, it used to play complex and often contradictory roles in the Middle East peace process as the principal mediator of the peace deal; as the guardian of the peace process; as Israel's strategic ally; and as Israel's cultural and political partner.

At the same time it has become an established fact that without the involvement of the United States, the Israeli-Palestinian peace would have hardly been commenced in the first place. The Madrid conference and the Oslo peace process was able to take off because of the US involvement. The Road Map to Peace Plan has been spearheaded by the United States. Obviously, the main reason for the United States indispensability in the peace process has been that it is the sole superpower which can make a visible difference if it invests its political and financial capital to the peace process without bias and in the utmost serious manner.

On the other hand, though the United States has laid out a two states solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and as the fact that today's international terrorism is the result of the indignation and resentment of the Arab and Islamic world, it very much necessitates bringing about a solution to this conflict as part of a broader strategy of winning the war on terror. On the contrary, the fact remains that the United States since 9/11 is investing much of its political and financial capital on its war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. And, the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues are also taking a heavy toll on the US. This has surely had its own negative ramifications in diverting US attention and in attaining a lasting solution to the conflict.

The hypothesis that was raised in this study is proved right (in chapter three in general and in section 3.4 in particular) for it ascertains that although United State's role has been integral and indispensable, it being the sole superpower today, has never been neutral and unbiased in the Middle East peace process. Its controversial role in the peace process is considered as one of the major factors responsible for the failure of the different peace efforts. America's approach to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations was in such a way that it would be working with Israel but not against the later. Moreover, instead of addressing

the root causes of the conflict (such as issues related to territory or land, refugees, Jerusalem, water, settlements) by working in accordance with previous UN resolutions and International Laws, it focused in addressing the symptoms of the problems (such as violence, terrorist acts and instability) by working hand-in-hand with one of the conflicting parties, Israel. Its main focus seems to be stability of the region rather than resolution of the conflict. In addition, it emphasizes on peace through security of Israel instead of security of Israel through peace. And, the Peace process remains to be a 'process' for so long without bearing meaningful result. Hence, when all the above facts and scenarios are summed up it can be, arguably, said that among other factors, the United States controversial role has negative impact in the peace process; and the chances for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the near future are remote and at best can only be figments of imaginations. And, I hope the findings of this research give answers to the research questions; and in a nutshell, the objective of this paper was met.

Thank You!!!

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
APPENDIX : 2

MAP OF ISRAEL



Source - <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/wo>

Map 2: Pre-1967 Borders




Israel before June 1967

Source: www.israel-mfa.gov.il.


MAPS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

MAP OF THE GAZA STRIP



<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gz.html>


MAP OF THE WEST BANK



<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/we.html>

APPENDIX: 4

MAP OF LEBANON



Courtesy of The General Libraries, the University of Texas at Austin



Appendix 5

Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements

September 13, 1993

The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles:

ARTICLE I

AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

ARTICLE II

FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD

The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

ARTICLE III

ELECTIONS

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.
2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.
3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

ARTICLE IV

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed at that time, as security performance and cooperation progress. Israel also freezes all settlement activity, consistent with the Mitchell report.

At the outset of Phase I:

- Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to end armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel.
- Israeli leadership issues unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel, as expressed by President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against Palestinians everywhere. All official Israeli institutions end incitement against Palestinians.

Security

- Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.
- Rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption.
- GOI takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other measures specified in the Tenet work plan.
- Relying on existing mechanisms and on-the-ground resources, Quartet representatives begin informal monitoring and consult with the parties on establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism and its implementation.
- Implementation, as previously agreed, of U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (U.S.–Egypt–Jordan). Quartet support for efforts to achieve a lasting, comprehensive cease-fire.
 - All Palestinian security organizations are consolidated into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister.
 - Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts progressively resume security cooperation and other undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan, including regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of U.S. security officials.
- Arab states cut off public and private funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror.
- All donors providing budgetary support for the Palestinians channel these funds through the Palestinian Ministry of Finance's Single Treasury Account.
- As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF.

security cooperation - an agreed-upon schedule to implement the complete redeployment of IDF forces to positions held before September 28, 2000.


Demonstrable on-the-ground redeployment will be initiated within the first 48 hours of this one-week period and will continue while the schedule is being forged.

6. Within one week of the commencement of security committee meetings and resumption of security cooperation, a specific timeline will be developed for the lifting of internal closures as well as for the reopening of internal roads, the Allenby Bridge, Gaza Airport, the Port of Gaza, and border crossings. Security checkpoints will be minimized according to legitimate security requirements and following consultation between the two sides.

Demonstrable on-the-ground actions on the lifting of the closures will be initiated within the first 48 hours of this one-week period and will continue while the timeline is being developed.

The parties pledge that even if untoward events occur, security cooperation will continue through the joint security committee

Map 4: the Israeli offer made in May, 2000, prior to the Camp David 2 Summit.



<http://www.mideastweb.org/campdavid%20orient>

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis dissertation is entirely my own work and that it has never been submitted as an exercise for a degree of any other university and that all sources of materials used for it have been duly acknowledged.

Abebe Getachew