

**AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE
CULTURE AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
REFORM IN AMHARA NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE CIVIL SERVICE BY USING
THE FEDRRAL REFORM PROJECT AS A TERM OF REFERENCE**

BY

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Declaration

This work has not previously been submitted in any form to the university or to any other body whether for the purpose of assessment, publication or for any other purpose. Save for any express acknowledgements, references and/or bibliographies cited in the work, I confirm that the intellectual content of the work is the result of my own efforts and no other person.

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ABSTRACT

Although the new public management (NPM)-inspired performance management reform has been embraced in Ethiopian civil service since 2001, no attempt has been made by scholars and practitioners to empirically investigate the institutionalization status of such an intervention and its relationship with the administrative culture that is presumed to shape and influence civil servants behavior within the civil service. In other words, those extant empirical studies on performance management reforms in Ethiopia have rarely made references to the nature of administrative culture and its relation with the institutionalization process of performance management reform. Where there have been some references, they often based on no more than anecdotal evidence and as such do not provide a systematic basis for assessing the real influence of administrative culture on the institutionalization of the reform. This research was thus undertaken to look for empirical evidence of the nature of administrative culture and its relationship with the institutionalization status of the performance management reform in the Ethiopian civil service with a particular focus on the state level civil service of the Amhara National Regional State (ANRS).

In so doing, the study has adopted a cultural approach to studying the administrative reforms and defining administrative culture as values, beliefs, norms, and practices of civil servants; and principally a quantitative methodology that incorporates to some degree the qualitative approach was employed in investigating the administrative culture within the civil service in question. The institutionalization level of each aspect of the performance management reform, including the overall performance management reform, was also assessed and the relationships between this reform institutionalization measures and the administrative cultural orientation of civil servants were examined.

The analysis of the data revealed that performance management reform failed to take root within the civil service of ANRS partly because the administrative cultural orientations of the majority of civil servants appeared incompatible with the reform requirements. The research particularly revealed that high power distance, strong uncertainty avoidance, and collectivistic orientation were incompatible with the performance management reform which sought to manage individual performance without considering the unequal distribution of power, collectivistic orientation and fear of innovation or new ways of doing things. The research has also demonstrated that the low performance orientation culture and political patronage in the civil service were the other stumbling blocks to the performance management reform to take root in the civil service of the ANRS because they were opposed to meritocracy which is the central element of the performance management reform.

The findings of this research support the thesis that administrative culture matters and sustained applicability of a Western-rooted performance management system cannot be taken for granted in a non-western context. It is therefore recommended that in order for the performance management reform to take root, the reformers should engage in the redesign of the reform to comply with the hard to change aspects of the prevailing administrative culture within the civil service. At the same time, they should come up with a cultural change program with the purpose of weeding out obstructive elements of the administrative culture within the civil service in question.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANRS	Amhara National Regional State
BOCS	Bureau of Civil Service
BOFED	Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
CSA	Central Statistics Agency
CSRFP	Civil Service Reform Program
EPRDF	Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
GOE	Government of Ethiopia
HRM	Human Resource Management
NPM	New Public Management
OECD	Organization for Economic Development
PA	Performance Agreement
PD	Power Distance
PM	Performance Management
PB/N	Political Bias/Neutrality
PR	Performance Review
UA	Uncertainty Avoidance
USA	United States of America

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the background of the research, statement of the problem and objectives of the study. A brief discussion of the research methodology, research significance and scope of the study is also presented, followed by an outline of the way the dissertation is structured.

1.1 Background of the study

Administrative reform has preoccupied many governments since the 1980s (Caiden 2007; Caiden and Sundaram, 2004; Larbi, 2003, 2006). The search has long been for efficient and effective public organizations that place the highest priority on public service delivery while achieving value for money. Many countries, particularly those in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and some developing nations in conjunction with some international organizations, embarked on changing the nature of the state through a number of similar policy initiatives (Caiden and Sundaram, 2004; Flynn, 2002; Hope, 2002; Ohemeng, 2009). This has led to a convergence of policies around the issue of imposing limits on state action that would apply to both developed and developing nations.

Many African countries have joined this global trend of reforming administrative systems to meet the challenges of the 21st century, and thus a number of reform policies have been implemented in many of these countries as part of this movement. In fact, the movement has evolved into a new model of public governance, with its theoretical perspectives shaped by the tenets of New Public Management (NPM), and thereby has been transferred to these countries mainly by major global financial and political institutions (Bissessar, 2002; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Larmour, 2002; Ohemeng, 2009).

A key component of this new public governance model is performance management, and this concept has become an issue of central and critical concern to political leaders and public and private sector managers (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008; Larbi, 1999, 2006; Mupazvirih, 2003). The reason, it has been argued, is that the success of reform policies depends on the competence with which they are applied to measure organizational and individual efficiency. Furthermore, it

is believed that the success of all other reform policies, such as privatization, contracting out, partnerships, civil service restructuring, the introduction of competition in public services, and so on, depends on their application to the measurement of both organizational and individual performance as an instrument to assess the success of reforms in developing countries (Ohemeng, 2009).

There are two broad notions of performance management that are discernible in the literature on the subject (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010: 72). In the first notion, performance management is taken to be the strategic direction of the whole organization, starting with stakeholder orientation and extending to planning, budgeting and management; but in the second notion performance management is tied up with human resource management. In other words, in the former, all activities of the organization are subject to measurement and the main preoccupation is with outcomes rather than inputs, processes or even outputs. In the latter, performance management is used mainly as a tool of individual performance management system that enables employees to perform their roles to the best of their abilities with the aim of achieving or exceeding established targets and standards that are directly linked with the organization's objectives (McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009; Grote, 2002; Pynes, 2004). Then, since the performance management reforms in many African countries (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; De Waal, 2007: 2), including the one under review in this study, focus on individual performance management system, it is this latter notion of performance management system that the present dissertation is concerned with.

Performance management¹ system is a continuous and flexible process, which involves managers and those whom they manage acting as partners within a framework that sets out how they can best work together to achieve the required results. It is based on the principle of management by contract and agreement rather than on management by command. This, it relies on consensus and co-operation rather than on control or coercion (Armstrong, 2006:497).

¹Like any other social science concepts, 'performance management' defies a single definition (see section 2.2). For the sake of clarity, in this study, it refers to an integrated individual employee's performance assessment system that is based on the assertion that all work performance stems from and is driven by the corporate objectives. These are then broken into functional/departmental objectives. Individual objectives shoot out from these and all are monitored and reviewed on an ongoing basis with a formal review or appraisal conducted semi-annually. The results of this are then linked to reward and punishment. The researcher acknowledges that the term performance management in the above notion also used to refer the performance assessment at project and organizational level.

Performance management is an unavoidable element of organizational life (Armstrong, 2006; Brown, 1988; Longenecker & Fink, 1999). There are many decisions in modern organizations that largely depend on performance management, and it is widely used in most organizations (Burkhalter & Buford, 1989; Davis, 2001; DeNisi, 1996; Wanguri, 1995). Performance management is an important process by which organizations attempt to direct themselves (Kreitner, 1998; Landy & Farr, 1983), and it has been considered a key component in the success of organizations for most of the twentieth century (Grote, 2002; Pettijohn, *et al.*, 2001; Starcher, 1996). To be specific, performance management allows organizations to inform their employees about their rates of growth, their competencies, and their potentials. It enables employees to be intentional in creating their individual developmental goals that help towards their personal growth.

There is little disagreement that if performance management is done well, it serves a very useful role in reconciling the needs of the individual and the needs of the organization (Cleveland, Landy & Zedeck, 1983; Conry & Kemper, 1993). If used well, performance management is an influential tool that organizations need to organize and coordinate the power of every employee of the organization towards the achievement of its strategic goals (Grote, 2002; Lewis, 1996). It can focus each employee's mind on the organization's mission, vision and core values.

As it was stated previously in this section, many countries in Africa have embraced the global trends of performance management reforms and actually carry out these reforms under the guise of NPM (Bissessar, 2002; Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Flynn, 2002; Hope, 2002; Larbi, 1999, 2006; Larmour, 2002; Ohemeng, 2009; Polidano, 1999; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). However, the picture portrayed about the institutionalization² of NPM-inspired performance management reforms in African countries is not positive (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; Langsen, 1995; Larbi, 2006; Makumbe, 1997; McCourt, 2006; McCourt & Ramguttty-Wong, 2002; Ohemeng, 2009; Polidano, 1999; Schick, 1998). Though the implementation of performance management reform process started off with an explosive and effective beginnings in many of those African countries, it nevertheless fails to really take hold or be used in any meaningful way; and then it

² To operationalize the concept and for the purpose of this research, 'institutionalization of performance management reform' is meant to evaluate the extent to which activities and actions prescribed in the Ethiopian government performance management reform policy become a normal and usual practices of employees' performance management practices in the civil service under investigation (for details, see section 2.5) .

fails to become a sustained effort of the public sector in these countries (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; Langsten, 1995; Makumbe, 1997; Mendonca & Kanungo, 1996; Ohemeng, 2009; Polidano, 1999). Even in many developing countries, particularly in Africa, a reversal of performance management reform has been recorded. In this regard, De Waal (2007:2) and McCourt and Eldridge (2003: 216) declare that in most government machineries of African countries the implementation of performance management system has been characterized by a reversal trend because in performance management system promotions are linked to performance, while in many African countries promotion is still linked to seniority or to relations. Failure to institutionalize NPM-inspired performance management system in the public sector of the African world has remained a stark reality.

Now the question is, why does the African world fail to institutionalize NPM-inspired performance management reforms? Several studies have identified common impediments to the successful institutionalization of NPM-inspired administrative reforms, including performance management, in African countries. These impediments include lack of strategic visioning and leadership; lack of a sustained political and leadership commitment; lack of institutional capacity; poor management practices; declining public service ethics; low civil service moral; lack of stakeholder participation; corruption; lack of reform consensus among domestic constituents; poor working conditions; lack of accountability relationship and so on (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; De Waal, 2007; Dzimbiri, 2008; ECA, 2003; Kingudu, 1998; Langsten, 1995; Larbi, 2006; Makumbe, 1997; McCourt, 2006; McCourt & Foon, 2007; Mossis, 1996; Mutahaba and Kiragu, 1998; Numberg, 1995; Ohemeng, 2009; Polidano, 1999).

Notwithstanding the explanatory power of the above factors for the limited success of the institutionalization of NPM-inspired performance management reforms in the African world, extant literature on the relationship between performance management and culture, mostly in the context of private sector, also highlighted that culture can be an important explanatory variable for the difficulties that non-western countries encountered to institutionalize such Western-rooted performance management reforms (Bjorkman and Lu, 1999; Earley, 1993; Earley and Stubblebine, 1989; Fletcher and Perry, 2001; Gelfand, *et al.*, 2004; Harrison, *et al.*, 2000; Jackson and Schuler, 2003; Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Ramamoorthy and Carroll, 1998; Schneider and Barsoux, 2003; Triandis and Bhawuk, 1997). As it is argued in this body of

literature, it is less likely for members in organizations of non-western nations to go easy with performance management, as the science of performance management is laden with Western values and assumptions that may not be compatible with values and assumptions in other cultural contexts (for details, see sections 2.7 and 3.5).

In fact a number of scholars in the arena of policy research also questioned the sustained applicability of Western-originated management practices in non-western countries and thereby have suggested the need to investigate the phenomenon of culture as an explanatory variable in different cultural contexts, particularly in Africa (Budhwar and Debrah, 2001; Christensen and Laegreid, 2007; Daniels, *et al.*, 2004; György, 2004; Jackson and Schuler, 1999; Kamoche, *et al.*, 2004; Lachman, *et al.*, 1994; Mendonca and Kanungo, 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Piercy, *et al.*, 2004).

On top of this, it should be also borne e in mind that, of all the factors affecting human resource management (HRM), perhaps none is more potent than culture (Budhwar and Debrah, 2001; Kamoche, *et al.*, 2004; Kanungo, 1995). This is because the values underlying HRM are not based on individual country's values. This point has been elaborated by Kanungo as shown below:

„. . . because many of our human resource management tools have been developed primarily within a context of economically developed nations, most have never been appropriate for use in developing countries. Traditional US-based HRM theories, in particular, with their lack of contextual embeddedness, their strong individualistic orientation, and their emphasis on freewill . . . mismatch what is most salient about the nature of work and human systems in developing countries' (Kanungo, 1995:11).

Given the preceding discussions, it is reasonable to suspect that culture may be ingrained and expected to influence the institutionalization of performance management reforms in the public sector of African countries within workplace cultural contexts. One cannot undermine the power of cultural variables because social arguments tied to cultural orientation of employees within an organization can potentially have an instrumental side, that is, cultural norms and values can be useful (Christensen, *et al.*, 2007; Karyeija, 2012). Employees can feel more loyal and function better because the institutional aspects of their activity are emphasized (Christensen, *et al.*,

2007:56). One must not simply blame and criticize public servants, but must assess their cultural orientations and scientifically investigate whether or not such cultural orientations of public servants facilitate or hamper reforms to be institutionalized. This is because these reforms and practices have evolved within the context of Western culture and may not be expected to be a norm just like that in the different cultural environment of non-western countries. Thus, it is pertinent to investigate whether or not culture affects the institutionalization of performance management reforms in the public sectors of African countries.

Over the years, however, few studies have been done on the relationship between culture and institutionalization of performance management reforms (De Waal, 2007; Karyeija, 2012; McCourt and Foon, 2007; Murphy and Cleveland, 1995; Ohemeng, 2009). Where there have been some studies, they have generally been lumped together with other reform policies or with reforms in general, thereby creating a gap in the literature on whether or not culture matters and what is to be done to handle this trend from a cultural perspective (Ohemeng, 2009).

Therefore, this dissertation is intended to partially fill in the above knowledge gap in this area through the investigation of the relationship between administrative culture³ and institutionalization of NPM-inspired performance management reform; and thus the study is aimed to unravel which cultural dimensions in the host administrative culture influence the institutionalization of such reform in the Ethiopian civil service by taking state level civil service of the Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) as a specific context of the study. At this juncture, it is important to briefly describe the research site, i.e., ANRS, before proceeding to explain statement of the problem.

1.2 Research Site: An Overview of the ANRS

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) has a parliamentary system of government. It comprises the federal government, two autonomous city administrations (i.e., Addis Ababa City and Diredawa City) and nine national regional states; namely, Tigray national regional state, Afar national regional state, Amhara national regional state, Oromiya national

³'Administrative culture' in this dissertation refers to values, beliefs, norms and practices of civil servants and is measured along five cultural dimensions namely, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, performance orientation and political biasness/neutrality (for details, see section 2.6).

regional state, Somalia national regional state, Benshangul Gumuz national regional state, Southern nations, nationalities and peoples national regional state, Gambela national regional state and Harari national regional state. Since the present research, as stated earlier, focuses on the ANRS, this section provides general information on the region's geography, population and economy. Besides, because of their direct relevance to the present study, civil service profile and HRM system in ANRS have been included in the discussion.

1.2.1 Geography

The Amhara National Region State (ANRS) is located between 9°20' and 14°20' North latitude and 36° 20' and 40° 20' East longitude and has an area of 154,708 square kilometers that is the third largest land size of the nine regions in the country. The region borders Tigray in the north, Afar in the east, Oromiya in the south, Benishangul Gumuz in the southwest and Sudan in the west (BOFED, 2012).

ANRS is divided into 10 administrative zones, 3 city administrations and 140 *weredas*. There are about 3,429 *kebeles* (the smallest administrative units) (BOFED, 2011). Decision-making power has recently been decentralized to *weredas* and thus the *weredas* are responsible for all development activities in their areas. The 10 administrative zones are North Gonder, South Gonder, West Gojjam, East Gojjam, Awie, Wag Hemra, North Wollo, South Wollo, Oromiya and North Shewa. The 3 city administrations are Bahir Dar city, Gonder city and Dessie city (BOFED, 2011).

The historic Amhara region contains much of the highland plateaus above 1500 meters with rugged formations, gorges and valleys, and millions of settlements for villages surrounded by subsistence farms and grazing fields. In this region are located the world-renowned Nile River and its source, Lake Tana, as well many other historic sites including Gonder and Lalibela. Interspersed on the landscape are higher mountain ranges and crater cones, the highest of which, at 4,620 meters, is Ras Dashen.

1.2.2 Population and Economy

Based on projected data, the population size of the Amhara region is about 21 million in 2013 and when compared to the other regions, it has the second largest population size (CSA, 2007). According to the projected data, out of the total population of the region in 2013, 50.2% are males and 49.8% are females. The difference between the two sexes is only 0.4%. With regard to the ethnic group composition of people living in the region, 91.47% are ethnically Amhara, 4.85% are Agaws, 2.62% are Oromo and only 0.22% are Tigrie (CSA, 2007).

With regard to economy, the region's economy depended highly on agriculture. According to the annual statistical report (2011) issued by the ANRS Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (BOFED), 78% of the region's gross domestic product (GDP) is from the agricultural sector. The contribution of the service and the industry sector is only 13% and 9% respectively (BOFED, 2011).

1.2.3 ANRS Civil Service

1.2.3.1 The Civil service and Civil Servants

The Amhara national regional state civil servants proclamation No. 171/2010 defined civil service organizations in the region as any regional government office established at any level of the administration as an autonomous institution by a proclamation or regulation and fully or partially financed by government budget.

Civil service in the region is isometrically organized at state, zonal and *wereda* levels. The focus of the present study is the state level civil service of ANRS which comprises 20 government machineries, of which 15 are designated as bureaus and the rest as other executive bodies (Agencies/Authorities) (ANRS, 2010). Table 1.1 below shows these civil service organizations.

Table 1.1: Civil Service Organizations at State Level in ANRS

Civil Service Organizations at State Level in ANRS	
Bureaus	Agencies/Authorities
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Agriculture Bureau 2. Trade and Transport Bureau 3. Finance and Economic Development Bureau 4. Environmental Protection and Rural Land Administration Bureau 5. Water Resource Development Bureau 6. Industry and Urban Development Bureau 7. Education Bureau 8. Health Bureau 9. Justice Bureau 10. Administrative and Security Affairs Bureau 11. Culture and Tourism Bureau 12. Civil Service Bureau 13. Women's, Children's and Youth's Affairs Bureau 14. Labor and Social Affairs Bureau 15. Technical and Vocational Bureau 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Revenue's Authority 2. The Rural Roads' Authority 3. The Sport Commission 4. The Government Affairs Communication Office 5. The Information and Communications Technology Development Agency

Source: Government of ANRS (2010)

According to the aforementioned proclamation, 'civil servant' in the region means a person employed permanently by a government office; this includes women civil servants, provided, however, that it shall not include the following: government officials with the rank of deputy heads of bureau and with other equivalent ranks and above; leading members of the councils of the region, the nationality zone and *woreda*; regional courts' judges and prosecutors; members of the regional police and other employees governed by the regulation of the regional police; and appointees and employees excluded from the coverage of this proclamation by other appropriate laws (ANRS, Proclamation No. 171/2010).

1.2.3.2 Number and Composition of Civil Servants

Number of Civil Servants

As shown in Table 1.2 below, the number of civil servants who are working on a permanent basis in the ANRS civil service was 61, 625 in 2003/04; 81,612 in 2004/05; 81,808 in 2005/06; 109,247 in 2006/07; 117,109 in 2007/08; 123,355 in 2008/09; 162,895 in 2009/10; 170,951 in 2010/11; 229,759 in 2011/12; and 238, 483 in 2012/13. The growth rate of the civil servants was 32.75% in 2004/05, 0.24% in 2005/06, 34% in 2006/07, 2.28% in 2007/08, 5.25% in 2008/09, 32.05% in 2009/10, 4.95% in 2010/11, 34.4% in 2011/12, and 3.79% in 2012/13.

Even though the growth rate of the civil servants in ANRS was not that much visible up to 2006/2007, it has increased at an incredible rate starting from 2006/07. In the past 10 fiscal years, that is from 2003/04 to 2012/13, the size of the civil servants has grown from 61,625 in 2003/04 to 238,483 in 2012/13, and this portrayed that the number of the civil servants in terms of personnel has increased by 176,858 (nearly by 287%).

Table 1.2: The Number of Civil Servants in ANRS

Year	2003/4	2004/5	2005/6	2006/7	2007/8	2008/9	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13
No. of civil servants	61, 625	81,612	81,808	109,247	117,109	123,355	162,895	170,951	229,759	238, 483

Source: Civil Servants' Statistical Report (BOCS, 2013)

According to the statistical report (2012/13) issued by the ANRS Bureau of Civil Service (BOCS), the civil servant to population ratio in ANRS was 1:178, 1:147, 1:108, 1:105, 1:82 and 1:81 in 1996/97, 1998/99, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2011/12, and 2012/13, respectively. This indicates that the ratio of the regional civil servants to the total population of the region had improved from time to time and in the past 16 years (1996/97 to 2012/13); that is, it had improved from 1:178 to 1:81 ratios. It meant that in 1996/97, one civil servant was expected to serve 178 citizens, whereas in 2012/13, one civil servant was expected to serve only 81 citizens. This

implied that the burden of the civil servant in terms of the number of customers to be served has decreased by 97 customers in the past 16 years.

Composition of Civil Servants by Sex, Profession and Ethnic Group

As demonstrated in Table 1.3 below, the share of professional science was 14.41%, 0.04% for administrative group; 14.99% for sub-professionals; 0.11% for clerical and fiscals; 0.89% for trade and crafts; 42.36% for teachers; 9.44% for health professionals; 3.54% for appointees; 7.6% for specially assigned; and 1.79% covered by those positions which were not stated in 2012/13.

Table 1.3 also revealed that the percentage of male and female civil servants in ANRS civil service was 63.25% and 36.75% respectively in 2012/13. The sex-wise composition of the civil service is not going in line with their percentage in the population. In other words, the difference between the numbers of the two sexes in the population is only 0.4% but in the civil service males account for 63.25% and females account for 36.75% and hence there is big difference between males and females (26.5%).

Table 1.3: Composition of the Civil servants in ANRS by Types of Profession and Sex in 2012/13

No	Category of civil servants	Male		Female		Sum	
		No	%	No	%	No	%
1.	Professional science	25,357	10.63	8,999	3.77	34,356	14.42
2.	Administrative	61	0.025	26	0.01	87	0.04
3.	Sub professionals	17,695	7.41	18,057	7.57	35,752	14.99
4.	Clerical& Fiscal	114	0.047	142	0.059	256	0.11
5.	Trade & Craft	2,083	0.873	42	0.027	2,225	0.89
6.	Custodial & Manual	7,832	3.28	3,692	1.54	11,023	4.83
7.	Teachers	64,172	26.9	36,851	15.45	102,023	42.36
8.	Health professionals	10,170	4.26	12,343	5.275	22,513	9.44
9.	Appointees	6,803	3.85	1,646	0.69	8,449	3.54
10.	Specially Assigned	13,184	5.525	4,942	2.072	18,126	7.6
11.	Not stated	3,370	1.4113	903	0.378	4,273	1.79
	Sum	150,841	63.25	87,642	36.74	238,483	100

Source: Civil Servants' Statistical Report (BOCS, 2013)

As it was stated previously in this section, out of the total of 21 million people living in the ANRS, 91.47% are ethnically Amhara, 4.85% are Agaws, 2.62% are Oromo and only 0.22% are

Tigrie. As it is revealed in the Table 1.4 below, the involvement of Amhara ethnic group in the civil service is 89.09%, that of the Agaw is 6.61%, of Oromo is 2.6% and of Tigrie is 1.54%. Therefore, different ethnic groups residing in the region are represented in the civil service in a proportionate fashion to their population size.

Table 1.4: Composition of the Civil servants in ANRS by Ethnic Group in 2012/13

No	Ethnics	Male	Female	Sum	%
1	Amhara	133,552	78,909	212,461	89.08
2	Agew	10,427	5,347	15,774	6.61
3	Oromo	4,028	2,071	6,099	2.6
4	Tigrie	2,507	1,170	3,677	1.54
5	Guragie	54	16	70	0.03
6	Harerie	36	20	56	0.023
7	Kembata	9	5	14	0.005
8	Argoba	76	12	88	0.04
9	Wolayita	22	5	27	0.01
10	Gunuz	3	0	3	0.001
11	Hadiya	4	3	7	0.002
12	Gamo	2	1	3	0.001
13	Shinasha	22	8	30	0.01
14	Afar	10	3	13	0.005
15	Silte	2	2	4	0.001
16	Somali	2	0	2	.00083
17	South Nations	31	7	38	0.01
18	Himitegna	4	3	7	0.002
19	Kimant	50	60	110	0.04
Sub total		150,841	87,642	238,483	100

Source: Civil Servants' Statistical Report (BOCS, 2013)

1.2.3.3 Human Resource Management in ANRS Civil Service

The federal constitution of Ethiopia (1995) lists down the federal powers and the state (regional) powers but leaves residual powers to the states (Article 51-52). Part Five (Article 50(2)) of the federal constitution states that the federal government and the states have their own legislative, executive and judiciary power. With regard to the establishment and administration of the civil service, Part Five (Article 52(2)) of the federal constitution states that all national regional states have a power to establish their own civil service and to enact and enforce laws and policies that best advance civil service's self-administration.

In line with the above provisions, ANRS government issued the region's civil servants proclamation in 2001 and later amended the same proclamation in 2010. For the implementation of this proclamation, the regional government BOCS issued a comprehensive HRM manual in 2004. The purpose of the HRM manual is to declare how different functions of HRM should be

performed in the region's civil service institutions. The manual also aims at ensuring merit-based personnel administration and equal employment opportunity in the region. This manual has two volumes and is currently used as a guiding legal framework of HRM practices in the regional civil service. The first volume of the manual deals with the execution of recruitment, selection, training, performance appraisal, salary increment, reward, promotion and transfer. The second one concerns with the handling of disciplinary measures.

Bearing the above in mind, the following section briefly describes the recruitment and selection, training and development, reward and performance appraisal practices in ANRS civil service based on the guiding regulatory provisions.

Recruitment and Selection

According to the ANRS civil servants proclamation No 174/2002 and No. 171/2010 Article 16 (1 and 2), each regional, zonal and *woreda* level government office has the right to advertise every vacant position. Moreover, every government office may solicit graduates of higher educational institutions for recruitment in cooperation with institutions. In doing this, each office shall follow the regional HRM manual. The vacancy announcement should be widely advertised to attract the best candidates from the labor market. Exceptionally, for those civil servants having social and health problem, for employees who upgrade themselves based on their office manpower planning, position like top-level manager executive secretary, cabinet members' driver and cashier, it is possible to assign without advertisement.

However, those employees who were assigned in this manner must fulfill the minimum requirement of the vacant post (BOCS, 2004:7). Furthermore, the recruitment and selection committee of each office should conduct selection and appointments based on merit (BOCS, 2004: 11-13).

Training and Development

In the region, every government office shall have the duty to identify the training needs of the office and to prepare plans and budget for training as well as to furnish information thereon to the BOCS. The BOCS in turn shall train HRM staff based on the training needs of government offices and coordinate and support other training needs of the government offices. In addition to

this, to make training of civil servants effective, the BOCS shall issue a policy with regard to the conditions of civil servants training both locally and abroad (ANRS Proclamation No 174/2002, Article 50 (1and2) and No. 171 /2010 Article 58 (1 and 2)).

Reward

Individuals and organisations operate in a symbiotic relationship, whereby each rewards the other-employees by their productivity, and employers by their salaries. Clearly, the rewards available are important to both parties since they form the basis of the development and maintenance of good relationships between the two. With respect to reward, section 13 (subsection 13.6) of the HRM manual in ANRS, states that an employee shall be rewarded based on performance-related pay system provided that his/her performance result is above satisfactory. Specifically, as stated in the civil servants HRM manual (section 8.3), if an employee's performance result is outstanding (95-100 points) or high (80-94.9 points) for the first time, the organization prepares a thank-you letter and puts it on the notice board together with his picture and if he/she repeats this result again, he/she will get a reward of 50% and 75% of his/her salary for outstanding and high performance respectively (BOCS, 2004:39-41).

Performance Appraisal

With regard to employees' performance appraisal, for the period prior to the year 2001, the Ethiopian civil service institutions, including civil service institutions in ANRS, were using the annual confidential appraisal report which was a closed system of assessing individual performance. The appraised individual never received feedback on how he or she fared in the appraisal. The appraisal was confidential and thus open to abuse and susceptible to favoritism, corruption and tribalism. Cognizant of this fact, the national task force⁴, which was commissioned by the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) to diagnose and take stock of the problems facing the civil service across the country, undertook an in-depth review of the practices of employee performance evaluation under annual confidential report system from *woredas* (districts) to federal levels for the period of two years (i.e., 1996-1998). The task force found a

⁴ The national task force was composed of representatives from both the federal and regional governments to tenure sustainability of the changes to be introduced into the civil service (Government of Ethiopia, 2001a).

number of weaknesses in annual confidential report system and recommended that civil servants needed to be assessed on their actual performance in relation to well defined targets and tasks agreed upon between themselves and their supervisor (Government of Ethiopia, 2001b).

In line with the recommendation of the task force, the federal government of Ethiopia reformed the annual confidential report system and introduced a performance management (PM) policy in September 2001 to improve the performance of civil servants in Ethiopia. With this policy, individual performance is managed in a six-monthly cycle, implying two such cycles in a financial year. The performance management process consists of three steps. Step 1 involves planning for performance and focuses mainly at the organizational level. Step 2 involves translating organizational objectives into individual objectives and targets. Step 3 is the assessment of performance (for details, see section 2.4) (Government of Ethiopia, 2001c).

In view of the fact that experts from ANRS were represented in the national task force and the problem of the annual confidential report system in ANRS was also similar to that of the federal government, conducting a distinct PM reform at the regional level was not considered desirable by the government of ANRS (Government of ANRS, 2001). As a result, the government of ANRS did not carry out a PM reform independently. Rather, the ANRS government legitimized the PM reform policy developed by the federal government in November 2001 (Government of ANRS, 2001). This is the reason for the current study to use the Ethiopian federal government PM reform project as a term of reference in investigating the relationships between administrative culture and institutionalization level of performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS.

1.2.3.4 Justifications for Selection of ANRS as Study Site

It is accepted in the literature that a number of factors affect researchers' choice of the context of their studies. These, in turn, can be of a theoretical or pragmatic nature (Sarantakos, 1998). Out of the two, it is the following pragmatic factors that influenced the present researcher's choice of state level civil service in ANRS as a context for this study:

- Easy of contacts with informants;
- Access to the context, to a great extent; and

- The need for first-hand data (researchers are usually compelled to investigate contexts which require first-hand information, rather than conducting a study in contexts that are researched).

Having described the research site, the next section presents the statement of the problem in the present study.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

The Ethiopian civil service is a century-old, initially organized in the crude form of the 20th century European civil service model (Alemayehu, 2001:2-4). As civil service is the reflection of the country's political and economic system, it is expected to serve the purpose of the incumbent government of the country. After overthrowing the Dergue regime in May 1991, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) leadership (1991-present) seized power. The political and economic systems of the government became a multi-party democracy and a market-driven economy respectively. The changing role of government witnessed federalism and devolution. Therefore, the role of civil service has changed. The main role of the civil service is to serve the incumbent government impartially and competently. Therefore, introducing a civil service reform that works for Ethiopia was a top agenda of the present government (Abay, 2011; Sirgut, 2006).

Right after coming to power, the current government of Ethiopia (i.e., EPRDF) initiated a first-phase reform program (1991-1996) to overhaul and enhance the civil service system through a retrenchment and redeployment programs (Government of Ethiopia, 2001a).

In November 1996, a national task force was commissioned by the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) to diagnose and take stock of the problems facing the civil service across the country. The task force undertook an in-depth review of the management arrangements and operations of the civil service from *woredas* (districts) to federal levels and submitted its report and recommendations to the government, in February 1998. The report identified a number of weaknesses in the ways the civil service manages its financial and human resources and delivers services to the public and on how top management set strategic priorities and monitor and evaluate performances in the implementation of governmental development policies, programs

and projects. It also identified that there is no proper arrangement in place to ensure ethics and tackle corruption, embezzlement and fraud in government (Government of Ethiopia, 2001a).

Following recommendations from the task force, the government initiated its second phase programs in the form of comprehensive Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP). The CSRP was divided into five subprogram components including: (a) Expenditure Management and Control, (b) Human Resource Management, (c) Service Delivery, (d) Top Management Systems and (e) Ethics. Of particular interest here is the performance management reform which is part of the human resource management sub program.

In line with the recommendation of the task force regarding what could be done to address the problems of the annual confidential report system of employees' performance evaluation, the government introduced a performance management reform policy in September 2001. The Ethiopian civil service employees' performance evaluation system was for many years based on the annual confidential appraisal report which was a closed system of assessing individual performance (Government of Ethiopia, 2001b, 2001c).

The task force noted that civil servants needed to be assessed on their actual performance in relation to well-defined targets and tasks agreed upon between themselves and their supervisors. Otherwise, as the task force argued, the closed appraisal system was based on a subjective assessment which only considered behavior and personality, but was untenable as an effective measure of individual performance. The task force, therefore, suggested that in order to motivate civil servants to perform and increase general productivity, a performance measurement tool that could link results to specific civil servants should be introduced (Government of Ethiopia, 2001b).

Another compelling reason to change the appraisal system was because it was 'closed', that is, the appraised individual never received feedback on how he or she fared in the appraisal. The task force's report indicated that because the annual confidential appraisal system was strictly confidential, it was open to abuse. Since it was inaccessible to the objects of the appraisal, it was susceptible to favoritism, corruption and tribalism. This, the task force argued, would undermine the very essence of the performance management system (Government of Ethiopia, 2001b).

There was also a third reason for reforming the appraisal system. Given that the introduced performance management was not unique, the task force's report indicated that it was a result of learning about best practices from elsewhere. In fact, performance management system was particularly sponsored by the World Bank policy briefs and discussed in the recommendations for civil service reforms across the African continent (Karyeija, 2012). Civil service reforms were the final aspects of NPM, which focuses on the basic issues of internal organizations and it is into this category that the performance management system falls (Minogue, 1998: 23).

It was on the basis of the foregoing reasons that the government of Ethiopia reformed the annual confidential appraisal system and introduced a performance management reform policy in September 2001. However, during the early days of the reform implementation, a number of major problems, such as failure to link individual performance management with institutional strategies and objectives, a non-participatory approach in the development process of the system, taking job descriptions as the sole basis of performance evaluation, the exclusion of important criteria for performance measurement, e.t.c., were observed (Government of Ethiopia, 2003).

To overcome the above problems, the implementation manual was issued and training of trainers was organized and provided for those who were expected to implement the program. To this end, different workshops were organized and evaluations were made on the progress of the implementation. However, the implementation evaluation report of 2004 revealed that the implementation of the PM reform was not that much successful in attaining its intended objectives. The major problems identified were:

- The ratings of employees' performance were not based on concrete evidence;
- The development of the system was not based on strategic plans of the institutions;
- Important preconditions, like improvement in the working process and other systems, attitudinal change in the work culture, adequate skill about the technicality of the new system and appropriate information system were not in place;
- Lack of top management support was another challenge. Performance management system, unlike other sub-programs, demands the commitment of the top management, which is presumed to be lacking in the Ethiopian civil service, at large;
- The very concept of performance management was found to be wrongly perceived by the civil servants. Though its main objective is to develop institutional as well as individual

performance, the way the implementation process took place changed its objective and it was taken as a political tool. This brought about resistance from civil servants. (Government of Ethiopia, 2004).

Consequently, the government was obliged to establish a national training and implementation taskforce to strengthen the implementation process with the specific task of providing process-oriented consultation in the development and implementation of the system. Despite this effort, subsequent evaluation reports from the task force (Government of Ethiopia, 2005, 2006) and documented evidence from independent reports and researches (Abay, 2011; AH Consultant, 2010; Sirgut, 2006; Solomon, 2005) have indicated that the implementation of the system is at best described as achieving of modest success.

Though the government reports and independent researches on the implementation of performance management reform in Ethiopia may not be exhaustive and comprehensive enough to certainly talk about the status of the reform institutionalization, one can reasonably make such a statement of policy evaluation: *While performance management policy initiatives have been developed since 2001, the institutionalization of the reform remains problematic.*

Why does this thing happen? Although explanations can range from lack of resources and skills to political conditions as documented by the extant government reports and independent researches in Ethiopia (Abay, 2011; AH Consultant, 2010; Government of Ethiopia, 2003, 2004; Sirgut, 2006; Solomon, 2005), general theoretical literature on the relationship between performance management and culture suggests that a successful institutionalization of the former requires an understanding of those significant cultural factors and facts of the society in question. More interestingly, it has been argued that the state-of-the-art of the human resource management practices that originated in the Western world need to be modified or their modes of implementation need to be 'fit' the cultural values and practices of employees in non-western nations (Mendonca and Kanungo, 1996). Thus, examining administrative culture within the civil service and its relationship with the institutionalization status of performance management reform could be imperative.

Culture and its influence on management practices, especially private sector management, have been well-addressed in the literature on the subject (Lunnan, *et al.*, 2005; Vance, 2006).

Unfortunately, this is not the same in the literature dealing with the public sector. Then, the question that needs to be asked is whether or not culture affects the institutionalization efforts of performance management in the public realm (Ohemeng, 2009).

It is important to note that various administrative interventions that the Ethiopian government adopted to improve the performance of the civil service nation-wide have been evaluated (see, for instance, AH Consultant, 2010). However, no attempt has been made either by scholars or by practitioners to investigate and understand the relationship between the adopted interventions and the administrative culture and whether or not administrative culture affects the now prevailing institutionalization status of the adopted interventions. In other words, the evaluations of all the reforms implemented in the past usually focus on whether the goals and objectives of the reforms have been achieved, and they mostly fail to take account of the concept of administrative culture.

In order to understand how the civil servants respond to reforms in general and performance management reforms in particular, it is imperative to explore not only whether they are enthusiastic or reluctant to go through the reforms but also why they respond the way they do (Christensen, *et al.*, 2007; De Waal, 2007; György, 2004; Karyeija, 2012; McCourt and Foon, 2007; Ohemeng, 2009). From a cultural perspective, it could be interesting to find out whether or not administrative cultural orientation of civil servants has an influence on the institutionalization status of performance management reforms in the civil service. Hence, the present researcher deems it imperative that a study of this nature be undertaken to understand the relationship between performance management reform and administrative culture in the specific context of the Ethiopian civil service.

In short, by focusing on administrative culture, the researcher hopes to find out if certain aspects of administrative culture influence efforts geared to a successful institutionalization of performance management reforms in the Ethiopian civil service with a particular reference to the state level civil service of ANRS.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

1.4.1 General Objective

The general objective of this study is to empirically examine the relationship between administrative culture and institutionalization of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of this study are:

- To assess the extent to which performance management reform is institutionalized within the state level civil service of ANRS.
- To identify the main features of administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS.
- To examine whether or not administrative culture affects the institutionalization status of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.
- To highlight how the NPM-inspired performance management reform may be better managed in relation to administrative culture in the civil service under study.

1.5 Research Questions

This dissertation attempts to address the above objectives by seeking answers to the following research questions:

1. To what extent is performance management reform institutionalized within the state level civil service of ANRS?
2. What are the main features of administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS as measured by the cultural dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, political bias/neutrality and performance orientation?
3. Does administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS affect the institutionalization level of performance management reform? Which cultural dimensions

within the civil service do have a significant effect and on which aspects of the performance management reform institutionalization?

1.6 An Overview of Research Methodology

This section presents an overview of the research methodology adopted for undertaking the present research. Details are set out in chapter four. In order to achieve the main aim of this research which requires an assessment of the institutionalization status of performance management reform and features of administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS so that empirical examination of the relationships between administrative culture and institutionalization level of performance management reform can be undertaken, an overall positivist orientation was adopted.

However, reliance on such a purely quantitative research approach may not be fully adequate to elaborate complex phenomena such as culture and its relationship with management practices (Kiessling and Harvey, 2005: 22). For this reason it was considered justifiable to incorporate within this overall positivist paradigm an element of the qualitative approach to satisfy this requirement for a conciliatory approach.

Therefore, in order to assess the institutionalization status of performance management reform and features of administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as well as to empirically examine the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization level of performance management reform, the present study largely used quantitative data obtained through survey and then utilized the qualitative data obtained through an in-depth interview to elaborate upon the survey results.

1.7 Significance of the Study

This study investigates the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization level of performance management reform in Ethiopia with a particular reference to the state level civil service of ANRS. The researcher hopes that the findings of this study will be useful for improving policy formulation and analysis in ANRS in particular and in Ethiopia in general, as it demonstrates the importance of administrative culture in policy

implementation. Such insights would also be useful for other developing countries, particularly for those which have a similar administrative cultural context with the one investigated under the present study.

Most importantly, this is the first study to focus specifically on the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization of performance management reform in Ethiopia. Other studies that have been done by scholars such as Solomon (2005), Sirgut (2006) and Abay (2010, 2011) mostly focus on whether the goals and objectives of the reform have been achieved. To the best of the researcher's knowledge, there is no an objective discussion or a structured attempt to investigate and understand the nature of administrative culture and its relations with the institutionalization level of performance management reform in Ethiopia. For that matter, there is a dearth of research on this subject in developing countries in general (De Waal, 2007; György, 2004; Karyeija, 2012; McCourt and Foon, 2007; Ohemeng, 2009). Hence, this study was designed to partially fill the existing gap in literature and sheds light on the connection between these two variables within the context of the state level civil service of ANRS.

Since the NPM-inspired performance management reform has been conceived as a permanent strategy geared towards improving the performance of civil servants in Ethiopia, it is deemed appropriate that its extent of institutionalization and relationship with administrative culture be understood, lest the problem of the intervention institutionalization is only attributed to other factors that have little effect on the behavior and mindset of civil servants. This study, therefore, departs from the commonly accepted ways of evaluating public sector reforms that have already been undertaken, as it seeks to develop a proper understanding of the relationship between the institutionalization of performance management reform and administrative culture. As such, it contributes a new understanding to how NPM-inspired reforms, such as performance management, could be managed to benefit the civil service in ANRS in particular and in Ethiopia in general.

The overall lack of management skills and expertise often makes it less viable for developing countries to develop complex structures such as sophisticated management systems. They, therefore, concentrate more on introducing and copying tools and systems from the Western

world which may not always be suited to local circumstances in developing nations. This raises the question whether Western techniques like performance management systems are suitable for developing countries. It is, therefore, interesting to note that a recent review of the last twenty years of empirical research on management grounded in a cultural perspective showed that most studies focused on developed countries (95 percent) and that only a small portion (five percent) of the studies tried to test the cultural perspective of management in developing countries (Farashahi, *et al.*, 2005). As a result, there is little structural research on cultural effect on management in developing countries, which is surprising because many of these countries offer a highly dynamic environment which is a good testing ground for new theories, techniques and concepts of business and management (De Waal, 2007; Ohemeng, 2009). Performance management can be regarded as one of those theories whose validity needs to be tested in a developing country's context, as this context can be more dynamic and be completely different from a developed country's context (Ahmed, 2012; De Waal, 2007; Ohemeng, 2009). This study is an attempt to explore and map out part of that very field. Thus, the study is theoretically significant because it empirically examines whether or not administrative culture within the civil service affects the institutionalization of performance management reform in Ethiopia, a developing country.

Lastly, this study might help us to understand why public administration in developing countries has experienced problems with the institutionalization of management strategies and techniques imported from developed ones. Culture can be used as an explanatory variable in management studies, as it can cause differences and affect the 'transferability of management and organizational practices' (Lachman, *et al.*, 1994: 40). Without an appreciation of culture, management theories and practices adopted from outside the national setting of the organization may be inappropriate to local needs and circumstances. As Lachman, *et al* (1994: 53) argue, 'Imported' practices may fail to take root or be ineffectively implemented, if they are inconsistent with the culture of local settings'.

1.8 Scope of the Study

This study is limited in scope with the understanding that neither time nor money would allow for a comprehensive study of administrative culture and its effect on the institutionalization of

administrative reforms in the entire civil service of the Ethiopian government. Thus, the study is restricted to investigating the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.

1.9 The Content of the Dissertation

The dissertation consists of seven chapters, including this chapter. The summary of the next six chapters are given below.

Chapter Two reviews the literature on the theoretical terrain of performance management and administrative culture and identifies performance management implementation challenges with a particular focus on cultural barriers. The chapter also addresses the key concept of new public management (NPM) and its relation with performance management system.

Chapter Three provides the theoretical and analytical framework of the study. The instrumental and institutional perspectives of studying administrative reforms are discussed in this chapter. This chapter establishes that there are supporting arguments and empirical evidences, albeit arguments are cross-cultural in nature and empirical evidences are mainly anecdotal, to argue that the institutionalization level of performance management reform in the civil service is attributable in part to the administrative culture within the civil service. The chapter, finally, presents the analytical framework that underpins the empirical work of the present study.

In Chapter Four, an outline of the research methodology adopted for undertaking this research is presented; in this case a quantitative research methodology, with aspects of the qualitative approach incorporated to support and improves the research design. Arguments are presented justifying this choice of a conciliatory approach and the specific research methods.

Both Chapter Five and Chapter Six present the empirical data, i.e., analysis and interpretation of the data collected from the state level civil service of ANRS. Chapter Five presents the survey results on the institutionalization status of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. The chapter also presents survey results on the features of administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS along the cultural dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, performance orientation and

political neutrality/ bias. The bivariate correlation between measures of administrative culture and the institutionalization level of performance management reform is also presented in this chapter.

Chapter Six explores the relationships between administrative cultural orientation of civil servants and the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS to determine whether or not administrative culture has an influence on the institutionalization of performance management reform. The discussion under this chapter addresses the influence that power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, political neutrality and performance orientation cultural dimensions exert on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. Further, evaluation for existence of correlation between civil servants administrative cultural orientation and their social background is also presented, with the intention being to get an insight into how NPM-driven reforms should be managed in relation to culture.

After summarizing the entire research, Chapter Seven – the final chapter, outlines the main findings of the research. A critical reflection of the entire research process, highlighting the limitations of the research and aspects where there is potential for improvement, are provided. The chapter concludes with some implications both for policy makers and for future research.

1.10 Summary

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that culture can be used as an explanatory variable in management reform studies, as it can cause differences and affect the transferability of management and organizational practices. Scholars have argued that uncritically transplanting management processes and practices developed in the West to developing countries will doom such processes to failure. Culture and its influence on management practices, especially the private sector management, have been well addressed in the literature. Unfortunately, this is not the same in the literature dealing with the public sector. The question that needs to be asked is whether or not culture affects the institutionalization of performance management in the public realm and it is within this context that this research is being undertaken. This chapter has set out the objectives and the research questions of the study. The scope and the research methodology to be applied are also briefly outlined.

In line with the structure proposed for this dissertation, the following chapter presents the review of related literature on the theoretical terrain of performance management and administrative culture.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews the literature on the theoretical terrain of performance management and administrative culture and identifies performance management implementation challenges with a particular focus on cultural barriers. In doing so, it commences with the definition, evolution, purposes, processes and values of performance management. The key concept of the new public management (NPM) and its relation with performance management follows. Next performance management reform in Ethiopia is profiled and the chapter then situates the conceptions of the institutionalization of performance management reform in the context of the present study. A literature review covering culture follows, the aim being to identify administrative cultural dimensions that have great relevance to the investigation of administrative culture and its effects on the subject of the present study. Finally, the chapter identifies the major challenges of the performance management reform implementation with a particular focus on cultural barriers.

2.1 Performance Management: Overview, Definition, Evolution and Purposes

As organizations are human groupings constructed to achieve specific goals, their performance is the total sum of the performance of individual employees in the organization. Traditional public administration models did not pay significant attention to the measurement of performance (De Waal, 2007; Dzimbiri, 2008). Individual employees were appraised confidentially, without targets, and the approach was historical, with no opportunity to improve. Performance appraisal, as appraisal in the traditional public administration model is called, laid much emphasis on behavioral or personality characteristics, such as loyalty, dependability, punctuality, honesty and so on, as central attributes for the evaluation of an individual employee. Individual performance was never linked to departmental, divisional and organizational strategic goals and objectives (De Waal, 2007; Dzimbiri, 2008).

The urge to evaluate, measure and monitor the performance of public institutions and employees has been the concern of politicians, public sector managers and users of public services. Consequently, interest in performance management and the need to develop appropriate

performance management processes and measures has been increasing in the past two decades (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008; Dzimbiri, 2008; Ohemeng, 2009). In an effort to improve the performance, efficiency, accountability and effectiveness of public sector organizations, governments have adopted a variety of public sector reforms, and one of these is the performance management system.

In the past, performance management has never been more critical of government, public sector and not-for-profit organizations than it is today. For many organizations across the world, performance management is on the top of their management agenda. To help this process along, many governments have introduced legislations and frameworks to improve the management of performance in government and not-for-profit organizations (Marr, 2008:2).

The term performance management (PM) has been variously defined by different authors. However, most definitions frequently refer to performance management as a process of aligning or integrating organizational and individual objectives to achieve organizational effectiveness (Armstrong, 2009). Then, though there are many definitions of the term performance management, for the purpose of the present study, presenting only some of them will suffice to show their commonality and thereby establish the conception of performance management in the context of this study.

Performance management is a continuous and flexible process, which involves managers and those whom they manage acting as partners within a framework that sets out how they can best work together to achieve the required results. It functions as a continuous and evolutionary process, in which performance improves over time. It provides the basis for regular and frequent dialogues between managers and individuals about performance and development needs. It is mainly concerned with individual performance but it can also be applied to teams (Armstrong, 2006, 2009).

Performance management is the system through which organizations set work goals, determine performance standards, assign and evaluate work, provide performance feedback, determine training and development needs and distribute rewards (Briscoe and Claus, 2008:121).

Performance management is communication: a manager and an employee arrive together at an understanding of what work is to be accomplished, how it will be accomplished, how work is

progressing toward desired results, and finally, after effort is expended to accomplish the work, whether the performance has achieved the agreed-upon plan. The process recycles when the manager and employee begin planning what work is to be accomplished for the next performance period. Performance management is an umbrella term that includes performance planning, performance review, and performance appraisal (Plachy and Plachy, 1988: 11).

Performance management is a formal management system that provides for the evaluation of the quality of an individual's performance in an organization. It is a process with a four-phase model: performance planning, performance execution, performance assessment and performance review (DeIpo, 2005: 27).

Performance management is a system that enables employees to perform their roles to the best of their abilities with the aim of achieving or exceeding established targets and standards that are directly linked with the organization's objectives (McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009; Grote, 2002; Pynes, 2004).

Wescott (1996:26) defines performance management within the public sector as a system which links organizational goals to work plans, appraisal, capacity development, pay and incentives for individuals and teams.

Performance management is a means of getting better results from the organization, teams and individuals within an agreed framework of planned goals, objectives and standards (Armstrong and Murlis, 1994:8).

The performance management is the process by which the company manages its performance in line with its corporate and functional strategies and objectives. The objective of this process is to provide a pro-active closed loop system, where the corporate and functional strategies are deployed to all business processes, activities, tasks and personnel, and feedback is obtained through the performance measurement system to enable appropriate management decisions (Bitici, Carrie and McDevitt, 1997:47).

Performance management is a range of practices an organization engages in to enhance the performance of a target person or group with the ultimate purpose of improving organizational performance (DeNisi, 2000: 219).

Performance management is a broad set of activities aimed at improving employee performance (DeNisi and Pritchard, 2006: 258).

The essence of performance management is the development of individuals with competence and commitment, working towards the achievement of shared meaningful objectives within an organization that supports and encourages their achievement (Lockett, 1992: 5).

Performance management is about 'directing and supporting employees to work as effectively and efficiently as possible in line with the needs of the organization (Walters, 1995: 3).

It is clear from the above definitions that although there are some differences in the use of the term performance management, most definitions frequently refer to performance management as an integrated system where management and employees work together in setting objectives, assessing and reviewing how these are being met, and rewarding good performance.

In this dissertation, performance management is defined as *an integrated individual employee's performance assessment system that is based on the assertion that all work performance stems from and is driven by the organization's objectives. These are then broken into functional/departmental objectives. Individual objectives shoot out from these and all are monitored and reviewed on an ongoing basis with a formal review or appraisal conducted at least annually. The results of this are then linked to reward and punishment.*

Performance management represents a relatively new management concept with its roots traceable to Anglo-Saxon management (Sparrow and Hiltrop, 1994). It was just as late as the 1980s that it truly emerged as a stand-alone concept (Armstrong, 2009; McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009).

Performance management evolved from the *management by objectives* (MBO) approach, first popularized by Peter Drucker (1954) (Grote, 2002; McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009; Rudman, 2003). MBO was a scientific approach with an emphasis on achieving results that were linked to established targets. Management by objectives is a continuous process of:

- Reviewing critically and restating the company's strategic and tactical plans;

- Clarifying with each manager the key results and performance standards he [or she] must achieve, and gaining his [or her] contribution and commitment to these, individually and as a team member;
- Agreeing with each manager on a job improvement plan that makes a measurable and realistic contribution to the unit and company plans for better performance;
- Providing conditions (an organization structure and management information) in which it is possible to achieve the key results and improvement plans;
- Using systematic performance review to measure and discuss progress towards results;
- Developing management training plans to build on strengths, to help managers to overcome their weaknesses and to get them to accept responsibility for self-development; and
- Strengthening the motivation of managers by effective selection, salary and succession plans (Armstrong, 2009: 26).

Both MBO and performance management hold a number of similarities, including the requirements for distinguishable job-based goals and development objectives to be achieved (Fowler, 1990). However, performance management has evolved considerably in the interim. MBO tended to be only applied to management, whereas performance management is applied to all staff – it seeks to integrate all organizational actors in the pursuit of improved performance (Armstrong, 2009; McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009; Rudman, 2003).

The purpose of performance management differs from organization to organization depending on the objectives to be achieved. However, most authors do agree that it can serve two main purposes in an organization, namely, developmental and administrative purposes (Armstrong, 2006; McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009; Milkovitch, *et al.*, 1991; Moussavi and Ashbaugh, 1995; Rudman, 2003). In the case of administrative, the purpose is, on the one hand, to serve as a basis for personnel decisions (on salary increases, promotions, transfers, termination and disciplinary action), ensuring an equitable distribution of opportunities, avoiding prejudicial treatment of protected minorities (Kreitner, 2006), advising employees on job performance and status of their abilities, and documenting criteria for allocating organizational rewards (Rudman, 2003). On the other hand, the developmental purpose serves to give feedback on performance to employees, identify employees' training needs, provide opportunity for organizational diagnosis and

development, facilitate communication between employees and administrators, establish an inventory of actual and potential performance within an organization and improve communication about actual work and tasks between different levels of authority in the job hierarchy (Pynes, 2004; Thomason, 1991). Besides, performance management assists organizations in providing a basis for managing both organization's and employees' expectations. This is achieved by enabling individuals and organizations to clarify the nature of the psychological contract between them (Armstrong, 2009; Longenecker and Gioia, 1992).

The performance management system under review in this study is rooted in Management By Objective (MBO), and as an individual performance management tool, what occurs in these types of performance management systems is that realistic goals driven from organizational goals are set, plans are laid out to show how the goals will be achieved, and employees should participate actively in both the goal-setting and action-planning stages. There is then a regular review of individual progress towards the goals in a participative way with a formal review or appraisal conducted semi-annually. The results of this are then linked to reward and punishment.

2.2 Performance Management: Process and Values

It can be argued that performance management is essentially a process, one of managing performance. It can be regarded as a natural function of managing that involves the activities of planning, monitoring, analyzing, reviewing and rewarding performances (Armstrong, 2009; Bitici and McDevitt, 1997; Grote, 2002; McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009; Price, 2000; Rudman, 2003; Sparrow and Hiltrop, 1994).


As stated before, the term performance management has been variously defined by different authors. Likewise, different authors propose different steps, frameworks or models for performance management. However, most authors frequently explain performance management process to include the following steps: performance planning, performance review (regular and formal), and rewarding and recognition of performance (Grote, 2002; McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009; Price, 2000). Then, among the various models of performance management an attempt was made to select and present only a few with the aim of showing their commonalities pertaining to the subject under study.

To begin with, McNamara (2008:183 -188) suggests fourteen (14) steps as the typical performance management steps. They are generally followed in sequence, but rarely followed in exact sequence. These typical steps in a comprehensive performance management system as suggested by McNamara (2008: 183 -188) are numbered as below.

1. Review organizational goals to associate preferred organizational results in terms of units of performance, that is, quantity, quality, cost or timeliness.
2. Specify desired results for the domain as guidance; focus on results needed by other domains.
3. Ensure that the domain's desired results directly contribute to the organization's results.
4. Weight, or prioritize, the domain's desired results.
5. Identify first-level measures to evaluate if and how well the domain's desired results were achieved.
6. Identify more specific measures for each first-level measure, if necessary.
7. Identify standards for evaluating how well the desired results were achieved (for example, if performance is below expectations, meet expectations and exceed expectations).
8. Document a performance plan including desired results, measures and standards.
9. Conduct ongoing observations and measurements to track performance.
10. Exchange ongoing feedback about performance.
11. Conduct a performance appraisal or performance review.
12. If performance meets the desired performance standards, then reward for performance.
13. If performance does not meet the desired performance standards, then develop or update a performance development plan to address the performance gap.
14. Repeat steps 9 to 13 until performance is acceptable, standards are changed, the domain is replaced, management decides to do nothing, etc.

Likewise, Torrington, Hall and Taylor (2008) suggest the stages of a typical performance management as shown in figure 2.1 below.

Figure 2.1 Stages of a Typical Performance Management System



Source: Torrington, *et al.*, (2008: 299).

Grote (2002:21) describes four steps as the typical performance management steps. They are generally followed in sequence shown below (Grote, 2002:21):

Step 1: Performance Planning. At the beginning of the year, the manager and the individual get together for a performance-planning meeting. In this an hour-long session, they discuss what the person will achieve over the next twelve months (the key responsibilities of the person’s job and the goals and projects the person will work on) and how the person will do the job (the behaviors and competencies the organization expects of its members). They typically also discuss the individual’s development plans.


Step 2: Performance Execution. Over the course of the year, the employee works to achieve the goals, objectives, and key responsibilities of the job. The manager provides coaching and feedback to the individual to increase the probability of success. He creates the conditions that motivate the employee and resolves any performance problems that arise thereof. Midway through the year—perhaps even more frequently—they meet to review the individual’s performance, thus far against the plans and goals that they discussed in the performance-planning meeting.

Step 3: Performance Assessment. As the time for the formal performance appraisal nears, the manager reflects on how well the subordinate has performed over the course of the year, assembles the various forms and paperwork that the organization provides to make this assessment, and fills them out. The manager may also recommend a change in the individual's compensation based on the quality of the individual's work. The completed assessment form is usually reviewed and approved by the appraiser's boss. Others—perhaps the department head or the compensation manager—may also review and approve the assessment.

Step 4: Performance Review. The manager and the subordinate meet, usually for about an hour. They review the appraisal form that the manager has written and talk about how well the person performed over the past twelve months. At the end of the review meeting they set a date to meet again to hold a performance-planning discussion for the next twelve months, at which point the performance management process starts a new.

As far as Price (2000) is concerned, the main components and steps of performance management are as shown in Figure 2.2 below:


Figure 2.2 Components and Steps of Performance Management System



Source: Price, 2000: 181

It is apparent from the above discussion that, many of the pertinent models for performance management involve similar components and steps. Most of these models assert that the formulation and cascading of the corporate's strategic plan, performance agreement, performance review and rewarding for performance are the building blocks of the performance management system. These common steps of performance management have been best set out based on the model of performance management system developed by Armstrong (Armstrong, 2009), as presented below in Figure 2.3, and will be briefly discussed under four different headings in the pages that follow.

Figure 2.3 Performance Management Sequence



Source: Armstrong (2009:74)

Formulating and Cascading of Organization Strategic Plan

One of the essential premises of performance management system is that the formulation and cascading of strategic plan is an essential prerequisite for the successful performance management (Armstrong, 2009; Marr, 2008; Price, 2000). Although there are numerous definitions of strategic planning, most authors conceptualize strategic planning as a disciplined effort to produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organization is, what it does, and why it acts as it does (Hill and Jones, 1995; Marr, 2008). Typically, strategic planning includes the following components: setting a vision for the organization; scanning the external environment; assessing internal capabilities; and establishing goals, performance measures, and implementation plans (Hill and Jones, 1995; Marr, 2008).

Price (200:181) argues that as long as integration is at the heart of the performance management concept, the performance management system must start with the process of defining the vision and mission and translating these into actionable goals and objectives of the organization. Many authors agree with this presumption when they state that the performance management system links organizational vision, missions, values and strategic goals to divisional, departmental and individual goals, objectives and tasks/targets (Armstrong, 2009; Hanekom, *et al.*, 1987; Hughes, 1998, 2003; Marr, 2008; McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009; Rudman, 2003).

Strategic planning usually requires broad-scale information gathering, generation and exploration of alternative courses of action, and an emphasis on the future implications of near-term decisions, and, as such, it should be the role of top management of an organization (Hill and Jones, 1995; Longenecker and Gioia, 1992; Price, 2000). However, while it should be the role of senior executives and directors to formulate the strategic plan, this process should be one of engagement with the wider employees to ensure understanding and clarity about strategy (Armstrong, 2009; Marr, 2008; McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009; Rudman, 2003). Marr (2008:25) remark that ‘managing and delivering performance in an organization is about engaging everyone in the strategy and its execution so that organizational performance becomes everyone’s everyday job. The starting point for good performance management is therefore a shared understanding and clarification of the strategic context of the organization. We cannot expect people to understand and implement our strategy if they don’t know what the strategy is’.

Once an organization's strategic plans have been clearly formulated, the various teams (departments/programs) within the organization must begin to work on the goals that they need to reach in order to attain the organizational objectives laid out in the strategic plan (Longenecker and Gioia, 1992; Price, 2000). A way to achieve this is by cascading the organization-wide strategy with its objectives down into the organization in order to create departmental and business unit objectives. These objectives can then be further broken down into individual performance plans with a clearly articulated ownership and accountability (Katy, 2008; Marr, 2008; McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009).

Thus, the starting point of a performance management system should be setting out the organization's missions, aims and values. Following this, the organization's objectives are identified, and these need to be intrinsically linked to, and support, the firm's missions. These objectives should be cascaded down into the organization in order to create departmental and individual objectives. The end result should be integrated objectives across all organizational levels and personnel.

Performance Agreement

Performance agreement is the bedrock of an effective performance management system (Grote, 2002:22). It involves the agreement between the manager and the individual on how the latter is expected to perform in terms of results and behaviors (Armstrong, 2009; Grote, 2002; Rudman, 2003). It also incorporates any performance improvement plans that may be necessary, and a personal development plan (Armstrong, 2006:259). It is argued that the performance agreement should specify targets that are S.M.A.R.T (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-specific). This enables the employee to feel a sense of accomplishment, as it is easy to check whether a target has been attained (Erasmus and Van Dyk, 2003: 145; Gibb, 2002).

The agreement is the basis for managing performance throughout the year and for guiding improvement and development activities. It is used as a reference point when reviewing performance and the achievement of improvement and development plans (Armstrong, 2009; Grote, 2002; Rudman, 2003).

Many authors agreed that communication, dialogue, and agreement between the manager and the individual are at the heart of the performance agreement due to the ideology of arriving at jointly

agreed goals and objectives (Armstrong 2009; Longenecker and Gioia, 1992; Grote, 2002; Marr, 2008; McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009; Price, 2000). Grote (2002:72) rightly noted that: ‘One of the primary reasons that formal performance review discussions are so awkward is that they are conducted in a vacuum. If the manager and the individual haven’t had a good discussion about requirements and expectations, if they haven’t talked about goals, if they haven’t had a meaningful dialogue about core competencies, then it will be impossible for the manager to honestly and ethically assess how well the individual has done in meeting those non discussed objectives’.

Thus, performance agreement is not just a top-down process in which managers tell their subordinates what they think about them, set objectives and institute performance improvement plans. It is not something that is done to people. As Grote (2002) emphasizes, performance management should be something that is done for people and in partnership with them.

Performance Review

Performance management is a continuous process that involves informal reviews as required and formal review, as mandatory (Armstrong, 2009; Price, 2000). As Plachy and Plachy (1988:157) explained: ‘Performance review occurs whenever a manager and an employee confirm, adjust, or correct their understanding of work performance during routine work contacts.’ It is the best way to manage performance. But it is still useful to have a formal review once or twice yearly. It is a focal point and a ‘stocktaking’ opportunity for the consideration of key performance and development issues and provides the basis for performance and development planning and agreements (Armstrong, 2006, 2009).

Informal reviews are the processes by which performance is managed throughout the year (Armstrong 2009; Longenecker and Gioia, 1992; Grote, 2002). Performance is reviewed as it occurs by the individual as well as the manager, comparing what happened with what should have happened. Informal feedback can take place whenever a manager comments on a piece of work or an action taken by an individual at work (Armstrong, 2009; Grote, 2002; Rudman, 2003). Whenever appropriate, managers meet individual members of their teams to provide feedback, initiate coaching or other learning activities, and agree for revised goals or any corrective action required(Armstrong, 2009; Rudman, 2003).

As Pynes (2004:245) rightly noted, it is important that employees receive feedback throughout the performance management cycle, not only when it is time to review the formal evaluation. Having ongoing reviews allows the employee to provide detail on how they are progressing and the manager can provide details on any organizational changes that may impact on the achievement of these objectives. It also allows one to see how their performance to date is being viewed and what might be required to engender improved performance (Williams, 2002).

Formal reviews are meetings in which performance is analyzed more systematically. They include an overview and analysis of performance since the last review, comparing results with agreed expectations and plans (Armstrong, 2006, 2009). Other measures of an individual's performance may also be included in these performance meetings. In fact, some thinking goes so far as to say that '360- degree feedback has, arguably, revolutionized performance management for the better' (Peiperl, 2001: 142).

The level of performance achieved is assessed so that individuals know where they stand, and in many cases, it is rated (Armstrong 2009; Longenecker and Gioia, 1992; Grote, 2002). Formal reviews are usually documented on paper or recorded on a computer (Armstrong 2009; Grote, 2002). They can provide the basis for decisions on performance pay, promotion, inclusion in talent management development programs, training, performance and development plans, and action to deal with poor performance (Armstrong, 2009; Marr, 2008).

Formal performance review happens on a one-to-one basis – a get-together of the manager and the individual. This should be a conversation involving dialogue and joint analysis of performance. It should be constructive and forward-looking, not a top-down judgmental affair (Armstrong, 2009; McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009; Price, 2000).

The review should be rooted in the reality of the employee's performance. It is concrete, not abstract, and it allows managers and individuals to take a positive look together at how performance can be developed in the future and how any problems in achieving goals and meeting performance standards can be resolved. The review should involve both the manager and the individual. As Rudman, (2003:103) noted, a review made by a manager without any discussion with the employee might fulfill an administrative need, but will have little impact on the employee's performance or motivation, or on the relationship between manager and

employee. Therefore, individuals should be encouraged to assess their own performance and become active agents for change in developing that performance (Armstrong, 2009; McDonnell and Gunnigle; 2009; Price, 2000).

Rewarding Performance and Managing Underperformance

Rewarding high performers and managing under-performers is among the building blocks of the performance management system (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005; Grote, 2002; Ketty, 2008; Rudman, 2003; Pynes, 2004). Performance management system relies on the premises that employees who are performing at high levels should be rewarded and those who fail to meet performance standards should be provided with training or, if necessary, be dismissed (Pynes, 2004:225).

The performance management system provides management with important information for making strategic decisions on employee's promotions, training and development activities, compensation decisions, and retention or separation (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005; Pynes, 2004). Performance management system relies on performance reviews to make decisions on performance related-pay, promotion and other rewards as well as to manage under-performers (Armstrong, 2009; Keety, 2008; McDonnell and Gunnigle; 2009).

Many authors agree that no performance review has much point unless it leads to actions or decisions (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005; Grote, 2002; Ketty, 2008; Marr, 2008; Rudman, 2003; Pynes, 2004). Marr (2008) argued that, in order for performance management to be taken seriously, performance must have consequences. Both good and bad performance must have some sort of effect. If not, people will realize that performance management initiatives are not really important and have no real meaning (Marr, 2008:222). Similarly, Keety (2008:45) indicates that performance management system hopes to increase individual employee's productivity by giving managers the carrot of performance pay and the stick of under-performance proceedings.

Notwithstanding the important role that rewarding performance and managing under-performance play in the performance management process, some authors stress that although performance management is an important part of the reward system, its developmental aspects are much more important (Armstrong, 2009; Sparrow and Hiltrop, 1994; Torrington, *et al.*, 2008;

Williams, 2002). In fact, bodies of work have taken place arguing for and against the inclusion of reward, particularly pay, in performance management system. The main argument for this is that all parties take the process more seriously (Chase and Fuchs, 2008; Gunnigle, *et al.*, 1998; Ketty, 2008; Rudman, 2003; Pynes, 2004), while the main argument against is that pay becomes the central issue to the detriment of the developmental aspect of performance management (Armstrong, 2009; Sparrow and Hiltrop, 1994; Torrington, *et al.*, 2008; Williams, 2002). Linking performance to pay is a market-based approach to gaining employee's commitment, whilst simultaneously helping 'to align managerial interests with shareholder's values and shift downside risk to the employees (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005: 17).

It is clear from the preceding paragraphs that performance management system is based on the assertion that all work performance stems from and is driven by the organization strategic plan. These are then broken into functional/departmental objectives. Individual objectives shoot out from these and all are monitored and reviewed on an ongoing basis with a formal review or appraisal conducted at least annually. The results are used to reward performance and to manage under-performance.

Moreover, the foregoing discussion on each component of the performance management system clarified that values like involvement, dialogue and agreement are at the heart of the performance management system and needs to be in place if the system is required to work in practice. These values, as explained by Armstrong (2009) and Winstanley and Stuart-Smith (1996), refer to beliefs that:

- The management of the organization has the overriding responsibility for creating the conditions in which high performance is achievable;
- Everyone is concerned with the improvement of performance; it is the joint responsibility of managers and their teams and they are mutually dependent on one another to attain this purpose;
- People should be valued for what they are as well as what they achieve;
- The needs of individuals as well as those of the organization must be recognized and respected;
- Individuals should be given the opportunity to express their views about the objectives they are expected to achieve;

- Individuals should understand and agree to the measures used to monitor their performance and should be able to track their own performance against those measures;
- Individuals have the right to obtain feedback on their performance and to comment on that feedback; and
- Individuals should know how and why decisions affecting them emerging from performance reviews have been made, and should have the right to appeal against those decisions.

These values are sound, straightforward and obvious enough (Armstrong, 2009; Winstanley and Stuart-Smith, 1996), but they also represent one of the challenges to the implementation of the performance management system across countries, as they are rooted in Western culture (Fletcher, 2001; Mabey, *et al.*, 1998: 149). Indeed, a number of scholars questioned the sustained applicability of Western management practices in developing countries and have called to investigate the phenomenon of organizational culture as an explanatory variable in different cultural contexts (Daniels, *et al.*, 2004; Kamoche, *et al.*, 2004; Lachman, *et al.*, 1994; Mendonca and Kanungo, 1996; Piercy, *et al.*, 2004; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Thus, it is reasonable to suspect that culture is ingrained and expected to influence the implementation of performance management practices within a society's cultural contexts. This issue will be further discussed in this chapter. However, before that, it would be worthwhile considering how the performance management concepts came to be practiced in the public sector under the rubric of new public management.

2.3 New Public Management and Performance Management

Performance management is one of the administrative reforms that evolved in the West and has been transplanted across-cultural borders into a variety of administrative settings (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2004; Ingraham, 1997; Larbi, 1999, 2006; Ohemeng, 2009; Polidano, 1999; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2001; Vallance; 1999) including Ethiopia, in order to improve the efficiency of a country's civil service. Administrative reform is defined as the deliberate use of authority and influence to apply new measures to an administrative system so as to change its goals, structures and procedures with a view to improving it to developmental purposes (UNDP, 2006:1). Khan defines administrative reform as 'those efforts which call for or lead to major changes in the

bureaucratic system of a country intended to transform the existing and established practices, behaviors and structures within it' (Khan, 1980:57).

Administrative reforms are deliberate, purposive and willed attempts to transform administrative practices for better government (Caiden, 2007:43). They are part of a broader civil service reform package that seeks to rectify the mistakes and unfulfilled promises made by bureaucrats (Cheung, 2005). A civil service reform implies developing the capacity of the civil service to fulfill its mandate and it is defined to include issues of recruitment and promotion, pay, performance management and related matters.

Administrative reforms are continuously being transferred from one state to another. In this respect, Ingraham (1997) points out that 'Western reform solutions have found their way into the reform agendas of nations in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa under the rubric of new public management' (Ingraham, 1997:328). She further goes on explaining the commonality of such reform ideas across national boundaries. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) too agree that over the past decade, the occurrences of such policy transfer, under the guise of new public management, have increased. Many countries have used the new public management (NPM) guiding principles during the 1980s and 1990s to reform their public service (Caiden and Sundaram, 2004; Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Hughes, 1998; Polidano, 1999). Ethiopia has also followed this reform path.

Hughes defines NPM as a 'concerted program of public sector reform aimed at replacing administration by management, replacing formal bureaucracy by markets and contracts as far as possible, and reducing the size of the public sector' (Hughes, 1998: 148). Dunleavy and Hood (1994) argue that NPM constitutes a move away from the dominant paradigm—what they label Progressive Public Administration—to two directions. First, it is lowering the concentration of rules limiting the freedom of public officials handling resources (money, staff, contracts, etc.), and second, it is removing the barrier between the public sector and the private sector in terms of personnel, structure, and business methods.

NPM has become a collective term for a bundle of particular management approaches and techniques, many of which are borrowed from the private-for-profit sector (Larbi, 1999:22). It is a rising body of managerial thought (Ferlie, *et al.*, 1996). Some writers (e.g. Pollitt, 1990) have

even characterized it as an ideological thought system based on ideas generated in the private sector and imported into the public sector organizations. NPM is inspired by economic theories and normative values and is characterized by increased market orientation, devolution, managerialism and the use of contracts (Christensen and Laegreid, 2005). It seeks equilibrium between making the government efficient and accountable, on the one hand (Minogue, 1998:17), and the creation of market mechanisms for the delivery of services, on the other hand (Hernes, 2005; Hughes, 1998).

Although there has been some debate over the precise nature of the NPM (Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Flynn, 2002), the classic formulation of it holds that it comprised seven doctrines (Hood, 1991:4-5). These are a) hands-on professional management; b) emphasis on explicit standards and measures of performance; c) stressing the importance of output controls by focusing on results rather than on procedures; d) dis-aggregation of units in the public sector by breaking up large entities into corporate agencies in order to increase efficiency; e) greater competition in the public sector through contracts and tendering; f) using private sector management styles in the public sector; g) greater discipline and parsimony in resource use. It is from this broad perspective that the concept of performance management is linked with the emergence of NPM, particularly with points (a), (b) and (c). In this respect, Taylor (2001: 179) observes that the performance management concepts correspond in a significant manner with the new public management model, with regard to their components and values. Taylor then outlines the key elements of both as follows:

- Importance of line manager;
- Emphasis on performance and its measurement;
- Employee's commitment through individualization/incentivization;
- Strategic integration; and
- Flexibility.

Mosley (2008) concurs with the foregoing observations and even presents this linkage aptly when he states that, under NPM performance management is usually applied within the framework of management by objectives (MBO), which, according to Mosley (2008) entails:

- The definition of a limited number of organizational goals and corresponding performance indicators;
- Delegation of performance targets to subordinate levels of the organization;
- Flexibility in the sense of low density of generally binding bureaucratic rules and procedures. Managers and operating units at regional and local levels are relatively free in their choice of strategies and programs to achieve the agreed performance targets for their units; and
- Monitoring and controlling performance against targets. In contrast to traditional bureaucratic administration, the emphasis is on outputs/outcomes against targets rather than on controlling inputs and adherence to detailed regulations.

In fact, many authors explicitly positioned performance management as one of the key elements of NPM and the concept has become an issue of central and critical concern to political leaders and public and private sector managers (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008; Hood, 1991; Hope, 2002; Larbi, 1999, 2006; Ohemeng, 2009; Polidano, 1999; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). The reason, it has been argued, is that the success of reform policies depends on the competence with which they are applied to measure organizational and individual efficiency. Furthermore, it is believed that the success of all other reform policies, such as privatization, contracting out, partnerships, civil service restructuring and introduction of competition in public services and so on, depends on their application to the measurement of both organizational and individual performance as an instrument to assess the success of reforms in developing countries (Ohemeng, 2009).

Having discussed the link between NPM and performance management, the performance management reform in Ethiopia has been profiled under the next section.

2.4 Ethiopian Civil Service and Performance Management Reform

The Ethiopian civil service is a century-old, initially organized in the crude form of the 20th century European civil service model (Alemayehu, 2001:2-4). As civil service is the reflection of the country's political and economic system, it is expected to serve the purpose of the incumbent government of the country. The 1960s are taken as a remarkable period in the history of the Ethiopian civil service. During this time, Emperor Haile Selassie undertook a series of institutionalization and restructuring measures. His aim was focused mostly on bringing about an

effective and efficient civil service governed by homogeneous rules and procedures. The civil service made structural and functional changes during this political period, especially after the issuance of the Public Services Order No. 23/1961, which was later amended by Legal Notice No. 20/1962 and created the Central Personnel Agency (CPA) currently named Ministry of Civil Service (MOSEC). It is an organ of the Federal Government Administration, which is responsible in all matters related to federal civil servants' recruitment, selection, promotion, transfer, salary increment, position classification, salary scale and exclusive right to issue regulations after approval by the council of ministers (Alemayehu, 2001:2-4).

Notwithstanding all the positive things presented in the preceding paragraph, there were significant problems in the civil service of the imperial period in Ethiopia. These were the lack of strong participation from the concerned organs, especially in the preparation of position classification, salary scale and job descriptions, and lack of trained personnel to prepare these things and an inclusive policy as well. Furthermore, the absence of strict devotion to the civil service rules and regulations and of political intervention in personnel matters were seen as the chronic problems of the imperial era (Paulos, 2001:7), which was replaced by the Dergue (1974-1991), as the nature of its civil service has been assessed hereafter.

To begin with, the Dergue was a highly centralized unitary government following a Soviet-inspired centralized economic planning and command economic system. Throughout this period, there were no fundamental reform measures propagated to change or modify the functioning and management of the civil service. Except for the introduction of a few reform measures, the civil service operated under the various orders and decrees issued during the reign of Haile Sellassie (Paulos, 2001:7)

As Atkilt (1996: 46-47) puts it: 'although it continued to be directed by identical administrative rules and regulations, the civil service excessively grew in volume and quantity and it was centralized and at the same time not structured. The civil service was neglected; political attachment and patronage rather than meritocracy were prevalent; discharge of civil servants was based on political ground. There was also low morale of civil servants due to incommensurable pay and working conditions'. Moreover, during the Dergue regime the rate of corruption had escalated until it becomes uncontrollable. Outright plunder, giant commissions, bribes, and

misappropriation characterized the period. Consequently, the above-stated problems could give rise to the fall of the administrative system of the Dergue regime.

In 1991, the incumbent government seized power. The political and economic systems of the government became multi-party democracy and market-driven economy respectively. The changing role of government witnessed federalism and devolution. Therefore, the role of the civil service is changed. The main role of the civil service is to serve the incumbent government impartially and competently. Therefore, introducing a civil service reform that works for Ethiopia was a top agenda of the government (Abay, 2011; Sirgut, 2006). Right after coming to power, the current government of Ethiopia (i.e., EPRDF) initiated a first phase (1991-1996) to overhaul and enhance the civil service system through a retrenchment and redeployment program (Government of Ethiopia, 2001a).

In 1996, the government established a task force aiming to assess problems in the civil service system and to recommend plans forwards. The task force found that the orientation, attitude and work practices of the bureaucratic machinery were ill-suited to the needs of the new policy environment of the country. Some of the problems included lack of clear national service delivery policy; attitudinal problems; insufficient recognition of citizens' rights; lack of accountability; excessively hierarchical organizations; giving priority to the convenience of providers, not users; more concern on inputs and routine activities, less on achieving tangible outputs; lack of consultation with clients, and lack of complaint-handling mechanism (Government of Ethiopia, 2001a).

Consequently, the government initiated its second phase (1996-2003) program in the form of a Comprehensive Civil Service Reform Program (CSRPF) that included five major sub-programs: top management system reform, human resource management reform, expenditure management and control reform, ethics reform, and public service delivery reform. Of particular interest here is the performance management reform which is part of the human resource management reform sub-program.

In line with the recommendation of the task force regarding what could be done to address the problems of the annual confidential system of employees' performance evaluation, the government introduced a performance management reform policy in September 2001. The

Ethiopian civil service employees' performance evaluation system was for many years based on the annual confidential report, which was a closed system of assessing individual performance (Government of Ethiopia, 2001b, 2001c).

The task force noted that civil servants needed to be assessed on their actual performance in relation to well-defined targets and tasks agreed upon between themselves and their supervisors. Otherwise, as the task force argued, the closed appraisal system was based on a subjective assessment which only considered behavior and personality, but was untenable as an effective measure of individual performance. The task force, therefore, suggested that in order to motivate civil servants to perform and increase general productivity, a performance measurement tool that could link results to specific civil servants should be introduced (Government of Ethiopia, 2001b).

Another compelling reason to change the appraisal system was because it was 'closed', that is, the appraised individual never received feedback on how he or she fared in the appraisal. The task force's report indicated that because the annual confidential appraisal system was strictly confidential, it was open to abuse. Since it was inaccessible to the objects of the appraisal, it was susceptible to favoritism, corruption and tribalism. This, the task force argued, would undermine the very essence of the performance management system (Government of Ethiopia, 2001b).

There was also a third reason for reforming the appraisal system. Given that the introduced performance management was not unique, the task force's report indicated that it was a result of learning about best practices from elsewhere. In fact, performance management system was particularly sponsored by the World Bank policy briefs and discussed in the recommendations for civil service reforms across the African continent (Karyeija, 2012). Civil service reforms were the final aspects of NPM, which focuses on the basic issues of internal organizations and it is into this category that the performance management system falls (Minogue, 1998: 23).

It was on the basis of the foregoing reasons that the government of Ethiopia reformed the annual confidential report system and introduced a performance management reform policy in 2001. With this policy, the government of Ethiopia aims to start a process whereby performance management will form an integrated part of its activities. The objective of this policy on performance management is to provide guidelines for civil service institutions on how individual

civil servant's performance should be managed. The goal of the performance management system within the civil service is to appraise, manage, develop and reward individual performance based on predefined results, in order that the individual would be able to contribute to the achievement of organizational goals and objectives. As per this performance management policy, the information obtained through the performance management system shall be used to inform about decisions on rewards, promotion and skills development of employees (Government of Ethiopia, 2001c).

Within the extant body of literature on the human resource management, performance management is mainly concerned with individual performance, but it can also be applied to teams (Armstrong, 2009:73). Similarly, the Ethiopian government policy on performance management is mainly concerned with the performance of individual staff members. With this policy, individual performance will be managed in a six-monthly cycle, implying two such cycles in a financial year. The performance management process consists of three steps. Step 1 involves planning for performance and focuses mainly at the organizational level. Step 2 involves translating organizational objectives into individual objectives and targets and Step 3 is the assessment of performance (Government of Ethiopia, 2001c). Each of these steps has been described in the respective headings that follow.

Step 1: Planning for Performance

Both supervisor and subordinate should understand the vision, mission and strategic objectives of the organization, the significance of the performance management, how it is conducted in the organization and what influence it could have on the staff member's future. The supervisor should communicate to the staff member how the strategic direction of the organization for the year translates into requirements for the project/department he or she supervises and for the job of the staff member, in turn. Therefore, the following shall be in place and up to date in order for the manager to be able to plan and manage the performance of a staff member:

- The strategic plan of the organization;
- The objectives for each project/department; and
- A job profile for the staff member's job, which incorporates the job description and job specifications.

Step 2: Individual Objectives (Performance Agreement)

The performance management system links the objectives of the organization with the operational activities of each individual to ensure increased, efficient and effective service delivery. Objectives or targets are the means of stating what is to be achieved by an individual as well as how it is linked to the broader objectives of the organization. Objectives specify in precise terms how an individual is going to contribute to the organization in reaching its objectives.

In this phase of the process, the expected results or outputs that the staff member will be responsible for in the next 6 months are defined. Specific objectives and standards of performance must be defined. Performance measures and indicators that enable the supervisor to assess the extent to which objectives and standards of performance have been achieved must also be identified. Both supervisor and subordinate must jointly discuss and agree for the objectives, standards and performance measures and express their agreement in signature. Training, development and support that the subordinate will need to enable him/her to reach the agreed upon objectives must be discussed, identified and agreed by both parties.

The objectives on which the staff member will be evaluated and training, development and support that the subordinate will need to enable him/her to reach the agreed upon objectives should be established through a process of consultation between the individual and the supervisor before the commencement of the evaluation period, and all of these should be clearly documented in the form of a performance agreement. Both parties should express their agreement in signature. Objectives should be based on the strategic plan of an organization, departmental objectives and individual's job description, and they should be specific, clear, measurable, result-oriented, achievable, with expected outcomes, performance standards and time-scales linked to each objective.

Step 3: Performance Assessment (Performance Review)

Performance should be monitored and assessed in order to: determine the progress made or obstacles faced in achieving objectives and targets; enable supervisors and subordinates to deal immediately with the performance problems; identify and provide the support needed; modify

objectives and targets; and ensure continuous learning and development. Performance should be reviewed both informally and formally, as briefly presented below.

Informal Assessment

Part of the process of the performance management is the continuous monitoring of performance by both the supervisor and the subordinate. The supervisor must meet informally with the staff member as and when required to manage performance. In this regard, performance will continuously be informally assessed to enable supervisors and subordinates to identify and meet development and improvement needs as they arise.

Formal Assessment

For effective performance management, performance must also be reviewed more formally and systematically on defined basis. Performance management aims to optimize an individual's excellence and achievement, in order to contribute to achieving the organizational goals and objectives. Two formal bi-annual performance assessments must take place. During the formal assessment session, the supervisor and the subordinate must systematically review the performance delivered within the specific period in line with agreed objectives. The supervisor must give the subordinate constructive and systematic feedback on his/her performance and development over the specific period of time. Feedback from peers shall be in place whenever necessary. The formal assessment session must also allow the staff member to give critical feedback to the supervisor in particular and to organization in general. Feedback must be summarized in writing and signed by both parties. Staff members have the right to refuse to sign a performance assessment results if they are not satisfied and should then use the grievance procedure. Since the bi-annual performance assessment session also involves planning for the following period, it should also entail a robust discussion on the future performance between the supervisor and the subordinate.

The formal performance assessment session is also a formal overview of progress made in reaching objectives and targets and, therefore, it involves the evaluation of the existing performance agreement and rating of the employees' performance accordingly. The rating shall

make use of the following categories of performance: ‘outstanding’; ‘above satisfactory’; ‘satisfactory’; and ‘unsatisfactory’.⁵

It is on the basis of the above-mentioned performance levels that each civil service institution should decide as to whether employees should be promoted to a particular post within the organization or the civil service at large; whether they need specific training to enhance their performance; whether they can be confirmed or whether the probation period should be extended; and, most importantly, whether they deserve any monetary rewards for the manner in which they execute their duties and responsibilities. Employees who are rated at ‘outstanding’ or ‘above satisfactory’ performance levels shall qualify for the monetary rewards.

For staff members who fail to meet the required standards of performance (rated ‘unsatisfactory’), the supervisor in consultation with the authorized body of the organization shall consider further training and consultation to the staff members in question or initiating disciplinary actions including dismissal. Any of these alternative courses of action must be subjected to due analysis of the reasons behind the staff member’s failure to meet the required standards of performance.

So far the government of Ethiopia has issued two performance management directives with the purpose of ensuring the activities and actions prescribed in the above performance management policy are a normal business of the employee’s performance management in the civil service. The first directive was issued in 2001 and the second and most recent being the civil servants’ performance management directive 2011, issued in October 2011. These performance management directives, in line with activities and actions prescribed in the original policy, provide detailed procedures in relation to how performance planning (performance agreement), performance review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers should be undertaken in the civil service. Table 2.1 presents major provisions as stipulated in the most recent performance management directive.

⁵ Since October 2011 performance ratings in Ethiopian civil service have been made to include the use of multi-source (subordinate, superior and peers) competence ratings in which each employee’s competence is measured against three civil services-wide competence criteria, i.e., participation in feedback, attitude towards rent-seeking and work ethics. And a result thereon accounts for 40% of an individual’s total performance evaluation results (GOE, 2011).

Table 2.1: Civil Servants' Performance Management Directive 2011

Provisions on performance agreement

Section (1) Article (4) stipulates the following basic governing principles in relation to performance plan (i.e., performance agreement between a supervisor and his/her subordinate on what the latter is expected to perform and development plan thereon) in the civil service:

- Performance plan of civil servants should consider strategic plan of the organization, departmental goals in which they work and their job description.
- Performance plan of civil servants should be a result of open dialogue and joint discussion between the staff and their supervisors.
- Civil servants should set work objectives that are challenging and measurable in terms such as volume, time, units, cost, etc.
- Employees should openly discuss with the supervisor on the training and development requirements and other areas where further assistance is needed.

Section (3) Article (16) stipulates the following duty and responsibility of an employee during performance agreement:

- Employee should engage in joint discussion with his or her supervisor while agreeing on performance targets by considering organizational plan, departmental goals and his or her responsibility.
- Employee should prepare a performance development plan, i.e., support (training and other performance development assistance) that he or she needs to achieve agreed targets and should jointly discuss and agree for these with his or her superior.

Section (3) Article (14) stipulates the following duty and responsibility of a supervisor during performance agreement:

- Supervisor should prepare a performance plan (goals to be achieved) for each subordinate under him/her by considering organizational plan, departmental goals and subordinate's responsibility and should jointly discuss and agree for the same with the subordinate.

Section (3) Article (13) stipulates the following duty and responsibility of government organizations in relation to performance plan:

- Each government organization should device mechanisms for the functionalities of its employee's performance development plan.

Table 2.1: Civil Servants’ Performance Management Directive (Continued)

Provisions on performance review

Section (2) Article (8 and 9) stipulate the following provisions in relation to how performance review should look like in the civil service:

- Supervisor and employee should regularly discuss performance progress on agreed goals preferably on bi-weekly bases.
- Performance progress discussion between the supervisor and employee should focus on both observed strengths and weaknesses.
- Supervisors should give continuous feedback and performance improvement suggestions to their subordinates
- Employees should exchange critical feedback whenever requested to do so.
- Formal performance appraisal should take place twice a year, i.e., at the end of January and July
- Supervisor and employee should discuss performance achievements based on agreed goals and the discussion should identify both strengths and weaknesses and this should be documented and signed by both parties. Any disagreements here shall be referred to the supervisor or the manager appraising or the head of department.
- Supervisor and employee should discuss on performance plan for the next performance period during formal performance appraisal

Provisions on rewarding performers and managing under-performers

Section (2) Article (11) stipulates the following provisions in relation to rewarding high performers and managing under-performers in the civil service:

- Employee with performance rating of ‘outstanding’ (95-100 points) and ‘high’ (80-94.9 points) shall qualify for the available rewards (for instance money, prize, further education opportunity and so on). Monetary reward is subjected to the availability of funds
- Employee with performance rating of ‘weak’/‘unsatisfactory’(less than 60 points) should be provided with performance improvement training and consultation.
- Employee who has two consecutive ‘weak’ performance rating should cease his or her services

Source: GOE, Civil Servants’ Performance Management Directive 2011

It is apparent from the above performance management directive that the performance management policy which was in effect from 2001 onwards has been conceived as a permanent strategy geared towards improving the performance of civil servants in Ethiopia.

It is also clear from the preceding discussion that the performance management policy that the Ethiopian government attempts to institutionalize within the civil service from 2001 onwards is rooted in performance management approach known as management by objectives (MBO) and is similar with the Western-rooted performance management system that was discussed in section 2.3 of this chapter. Hence, it is in the light of this policy context that the Ethiopian civil service experience on institutionalization of performance management reform should be understood and appraised. Therefore, as shown in the next section, the operationalization and assessment of performance management institutionalization in the present study uses the above policy framework as a frame of references.

2.5 Performance Management: Institutionalization

When New Public Management-oriented reforms are implemented in public organizations, there are different ways to assess the effects of these reforms. One rather a broad approach is to look at whether the reforms have changed the decision-making behavior of central political and administrative actors or their role enactment in general (Christensen and Laegreid, 2005; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Often the focus in such studies is on whether reforms have resulted in changed patterns of influence and on how they have affected political control and democracy. The second approach is to examine the institutionalization of new management systems connected to NPM (Christensen and Laegreid, 2005; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). One of such central systems under review in this study is performance management system. Now the question is, what do we mean by the institutionalization of this system?

The common standard dictionary definition of the term institutionalization is plainly ‘to make something an established custom or an accepted part of the structure of a large organization or society because of having existed for so long’. Based on this definition, institutionalization can be considered as carrying out of deliberate and sequential set of activities directed towards putting a strategy or a policy into effect in a regular base, making it occur in sustainable manner.

While the conceptualization of the term institutionalization might be different in a number of works, there is a consensus among scholars on the usage and conceptualization of the term in relation to reforms (Cummings, *et al.*, 2001; Faizal, 2005; Kereji, 2011; William, 2003). E. William in his study ‘institutionalization of police reform’ defines institutionalization as ‘an expression of how well the organization has adopted the reform’. Is the reform business as usual? Is that just the way we work? He further goes on to explain that ‘Institutionalization of a reform occurs when the reform becomes a way of regularly conducting reform business’ (William, 2003:124). In a similar vein, Cummings and his colleagues define institutionalization of a reform as ‘getting those prescribed activities and actions of the reform endure in an organization’ (Cummings, *et al.*, 2001:47). They also add that institutionalization of reform occurs when the reform becomes a routine way of conducting reform business and when certain values, norms, and structures associated with the reform are incorporated into an organization (Cummings, *et al.*, 2001:47). Faizal (2005) and Kereji (2011), focusing on institutionalization of performance appraisal reform in the civil service, define institutionalization of performance appraisal reform as the extent to which rules, regulations, actions and activities prescribed in the appraisal reform become a regular way of managing employee’s performance in the civil service.

It can be deduced from the foregoing paragraphs that, the evaluation of the success or failure of reform institutionalization should focus on assessing the extent to which the reform prescribed activities and actions become a routine way of conducting reform business, in our case the activities of managing employee’s performance. The extant evaluative researches on the institutionalization of performance management reforms in developing countries also support this understanding of policy institutionalization (see, for instance, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; Faizal, 2005; Kereji, 2011). Thus, to establish the concept and for the purpose of this research, examining the institutionalization of performance management reform is meant to evaluate the extent to which activities and actions prescribed in the performance management reform policy (regulatory frameworks) are routinely carried out by civil servants and thus become the normal and usual practices of employees’ performance management practices within the civil service under investigation. Accordingly, the successful institutionalization of performance management reform in the present study means the following (see section 2.4 for details on the policy contents):

1. Performance agreement is a norm within the civil service. This includes:

- Manager and subordinate always engage in open dialogue while determining goals or objectives that the latter is expected to perform;
- Manager and subordinate's agreement on goals or objectives is always based on the strategic plan of an organization and departmental goals
- Agreed goals or objectives are result-oriented and stated using 'SMART' mnemonic, i.e., specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound (i.e., mutually agreed performance criteria are result-oriented and based on 'SMART' mnemonic); and
- Manager and subordinate always engage in joint discussion while determining training, development and support that the latter needs to meet the agreed goals and the organization acting accordingly.

2. Performance review is a norm within the civil service. This includes:

- Manager and subordinate regularly engage in genuine discussion on the performances of the latter throughout the performance period (i.e., manager and subordinate jointly assess performances and fix problems as they arise);
- Manager always provides critical face-to-face feedback to the subordinate at times of events;
- A manager regularly encourages and assists subordinates through coaching and mentoring throughout the performance period (i.e., managers' function as coach and mentor);
- Manager and subordinate always engage in a conversation involving dialogue and joint analysis of performance while conducting formal performance review (i.e., formal performance review is participatory rather than a top-down judgmental affair);
- Manager and subordinate's discussion on formal performance review usually focuses on planning for the future rather than simply dwelling on the past (i.e., formal performance review is future-oriented);
- Manager and subordinates are usually critical in their exchange of feedback while conducting formal performance review;

- Employees always give honest and critical comments on the performance of other employees whenever required (i.e., genuine peer evaluation is in place); and
 - Manager evaluates the performance of subordinate only on the base of agreed performance criteria.
3. Rewarding high performers and managing under-performers is a usual practice within the civil service. This includes:
- Employees who are meeting or surpassing agreed performance are provided with financial or non-financial rewards (i.e, high performers are rewarded);
 - Subordinate’s entitlement to promotion is based on his or her accomplishment of agreed performance and organization acting accordingly (i.e., promotion is based on individual performance rather than other criterion);
 - Employees who fail to meet agreed performance are provided with the necessary support and training (i.e., under-performers provided with training that alleviates the performance gap); and
 - Manager invokes disciplinary actions including dismissal against subordinate who received the necessary support but failed to meet the agreed performance and organization acting accordingly (i.e., poor performers are penalized).

It is worth to mention that the above activities and actions, which are included in the performance management policy of Ethiopian government, are similar with the Western-rooted performance management system that was discussed in section 2.3 of this chapter. The main proposition of this study, institutionalization of performance management reform may suffer from administrative cultural incompatibility, arises from such similarities. Keeping this in mind, it is imperative to have a clear understanding of the phenomenon of administrative culture as briefly assessed under the subsequent section.

2.6 The Phenomenon of Administrative Culture

Clearly, there are supporting arguments and empirical evidences, albeit arguments are cross-cultural in nature and empirical evidences are mainly anecdotal, to argue that the institutionalization level of performance management reform in the civil service is attributable in part to administrative cultural orientation of civil servants (see sections 2.7 and 3.5). This

represents the main proposition that this research seeks to explore. As a first step in this direction, it is necessary to understand the theoretical and practical implications of this phenomenon of administrative culture as attempted to show in the subsections that follow.

2.6.1 Administrative Culture: Definition

Before defining administrative culture, we must be clear about what culture is. Culture is a phenomenon that encompasses people's behavior patterns, solutions to problems, moral values, ethnic consciousness, attitudes and traditions (Karyeija, 2012). Culture can be defined as a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (Schein, 2004:17).

Another well-known definition takes culture to be patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1978 cited in Hofstede, 2001). This definition is akin to Bodley's (1994) simplified representation of culture as 'what people think, what they do, and the material products they produce'.

According to Tayeb (1988:42), 'Culture is a set of historically evolved learned values, attitudes and meanings shared by members of a given society'. While Hofstede (1997) refers to culture as the collective programming of the mind, which distinguishes the members of one group or category of the people from another, Fays (2003) considers it as complex set of shared beliefs, values and concepts which enables a group to make sense of its life and provides it with directions on how to live. Culture is also defined as shared motives, values, beliefs, identities and interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of members of collectives that are transmitted across generations (House, *et al.*, 2004: 15).

Other researchers are also taking a broader view of culture. Leung and his colleagues (cited in House, *et al.*, 2006) have recently introduced the notion of social axioms, which they define as general beliefs. *Therefore, culture could mean shared views, perceptions, beliefs, values, and practices that characterize a given society.*

The notion of culture can be applied to any size of social unit like at the civilization level, e.g., Eastern and Western cultures, at country level, e.g., Mexican culture and Indian culture, within country level, e.g., ethnic culture, occupational culture and administrative culture (Schedler and Proeller, 2007). Out of these, the main concern of this study is administrative culture as indicated by the heading of the present subsection.

Many definitions of administrative culture have been elaborated before: Pollitt and Bouckaert take administrative culture to refer to beliefs, values, attitudes and expectations that the civil servants have about what is ‘normal’ and ‘acceptable’ in that organization— the way they do things in the civil service. It, therefore, provides the context for ethical relations within the public sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 68). Karyeija defines administrative culture as the shared values, beliefs, norms, traditions and practices of civil servants (2012:4). Administrative culture is understood as a pattern of beliefs, attitudes, and role understandings that prevail among members of the public service (Schroter and Rober, 1997: 110). Henderson sees it as ‘the general characteristics of public officials, i.e., shared values, attitudes and beliefs’ (Henderson 2005:41). Zhuplev and Shein believe administrative culture manifests itself in behavioral norms, adopted and adhered to by participants of the governance process at the macro and micro levels (Zhuplev and Shein, 2005:109).

Wilson defines administrative culture as a persistent way of thinking about the central tasks of an organization and the human relationships within it (Wilson, 1989:110). Anechiarico explains it as a transmissible pattern of beliefs, values and behavior in a public service organization that concern the organization’s role and relationship to the public (Anechiarico, 1998: 16). It has also been described as the interpretative profile of the significant underlying structure, which includes practices, shared views, and value systems amongst functionaries; it is embedded in the way societies address and interpret their problems and includes the collective reflection and sharing of historical memories, myths and symbols, as well as past cleavages (Nef, 2005:232).

From the preceding definitions, it becomes apparent that administrative culture is all about the values, beliefs, norms and practices of civil servants. Thus, *administrative culture in the context of this dissertation refers to values, beliefs, norms and practices of civil servants.*

2.6.2 Administrative Culture: Operationalization

Administrative culture is a promising candidate as an explanatory factor of performance management reform patterns – despite the concept ‘administrative culture’ being inherently difficult to measure and operationalize (György, 2004:498). There is the need to have a clear understanding of administrative culture in relation to reform institutionalization (see section 3.4 for details). As indicated in the above subsection, administrative culture as used in this thesis refers to the values, beliefs, norms and practices of civil servants. Thus, the conceptualization of administrative culture in the present study is more than just a set of values. It takes a holistic view of culture as more than just a set of values and beliefs, consisting rather of values, beliefs, norms and actual ways in which civil servants are routinely doing things in the civil service. Recent well-known studies of culture have used this conception, including those by Cameron and Quinn (2006), House, *et al.*, (2004) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2007).

The conventional wisdom on culture dictates that culture in workplace context (administrative culture in the present study’s context) can be operationalized by the use of measures reflecting two kinds of culture: (a) beliefs of members of organization with respect to what the norms, values and practices are in an organization (practice-based approach); and (b) beliefs of members of organization with respect to what the norms, values and practices should be in an organization (value-based approach) (Cameron and Quinn, 2006; Hofstede, 2001; House, *et al.*, 2004; and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2007).

There is general acceptance that values can be inferred from practices and the practice-based framework for measuring cultures has been helpful in deciphering cultures in workplace context (Hofstede, 2001). The extant explanation for the general relationship between practices and values is that people behave in a particular way because they hold particular views on how things should be. However, the recent and up to date large-scale cultural study by House, *et al.*, (2004), published in a book of 800-pages, found both counter-intuitive and counter to conventional wisdom. They discovered that, for seven cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, power distance, institutional collectivism, gender egalitarianism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance orientation, and humane orientation) cultural values and practices are negatively correlated. These findings constitute an important caution to researchers against assuming a simple linear relationship between values and practices and reducing the concept of culture into a

simple practice or value category. Thus, the present researcher concurred with this recent finding, and applied a synthesized measure of administrative culture, i.e., values, beliefs, norms and practices of civil servants with regard to various dimensions of administrative culture. Indeed, notable researchers have advocated a synthesis of value and practice to evolve a more holistic framework for an understanding of culture and its effects (Cameron and Quinn, 2006; House, *et al.*, 2006; Karyeija 2012; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2007).

2.6.3 Administrative Culture: The Dimensions

A number of writers have argued for the existence of two particularly strong models to understand administrative culture in public administration: ‘Most public administrative systems seem to be guided either by the Rechtsstaat model or by the Anglo-Saxon notion of the ‘public interest’; very few systems fall between these two models, which appear to be inherently inconsistent and irreconcilable’ (Pierre, 1995, cited in Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).

From the Rechtsstaat perspective, the state is a central integrating force within society, and its focal concerns are with the preparation, promulgation, and enforcement of laws. It follows from this that most senior civil servants will be trained in the law and, indeed, that a large and separate body of specifically administrative law will have been created. In such a culture, the instinctive bureaucratic stance will tend to be one of rule-following and precedent, and the actions of both individual public servant and individual citizen will be set in this context of correctness and legal control (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 82).

By contrast, the ‘public interest’ model accords the state a less extensive or dominant role within society (indeed, use of the phrase ‘the state’ is rare within originally ‘Anglo-Saxon’ states such as Australia, New Zealand, and the UK). ‘Government’ (rather than ‘the state’) is regarded as something of a necessary evil, whose powers are to be no more than are absolutely necessary, and whose ministers and officials must constantly be held to public account by elected parliaments and through other means. Of course, the law is an essential component of governance, but its particular perspectives and procedures are not as dominant as within the Rechtsstaat model. All citizens are under the law, but law is usually in the background rather than the foreground, and many senior civil servants have no special training in its mysteries. Civil servants are regarded as simply citizens who work for government organizations, not as

some kind of special caste or cadre with a higher mission to represent ‘the state’. The process of government is seen as one of seeking to obtain the public’s consent for (or, at least, acquiescence in) measures devised in the public (general, national) interest. It is recognized that different social interest groups compete with one another, sometimes in fiercely adversarial ways. In this context, government’s job is to play the part of a fair and trusted referee, and not to get drawn in on one side or another. Fairness and independence of the play of sectional interests are therefore key values, with pragmatism and flexibility as qualities which may be prized above technical expertise (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 68).

What are the implications of each of these approaches for public management reform? According to Pollitt and Bouckaert, it is reasonable to expect that Rechtsstaat systems would be ‘stickier’ and slower to reform than public interest regimes. This is because management change would always require changes in the law and, culturally, because senior civil servants who are highly trained in administrative law may find it more difficult than generalists to shift to a ‘managerial’ or ‘performance-oriented’ perspective (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 68).

However, Pierre’s categorization of administrative culture into two distinct camps attracted strong criticisms, and is beginning to look obsolete (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). More recent work argues that the polar classification of Rechtsstaat versus public interest is too crude and that nowadays not a few, but most, civil service systems are mixtures (Demmke and Moilanen, 2010; Hood and Lodge, 2006, cited in Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).

There is therefore much more to administrative culture than just a bipolar scale running from Rechtsstaat to public interest—as the expansion of writing about organizational cultures and traditions over the past two decades testifies (see, for instance, Aycan, 2005; Hofstede, 1997, 2001; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; House, *et al.*, 2004; Jamil, 1994; Schein, 2004; Schwartz, 1999; Trompenaars, 1993; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2007). Thus, it is worth to move beyond the bipolar scale of understanding administrative culture and directed our attention on selection of some other known cultural dimensions. In this regard, cultural dimensions provided by Hofstede (1997, 2001), Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997), Schwartz (1999) and GLOBE project (2004) are frequently encountered in the literature dealing with culture and public management reforms (see, for instance, De Waal, 2007; Flynn, 2002; Karyeija, 2012;

McCourt and Foon, 2007; Ohemeng, 2009; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Therefore, the subsequent paragraphs will present cultural dimensions given by these scholars and identify those that will be used in the present study.

Cultural dimensions by Geert Hofstede

Geert Hofstede, based on his study that covers more than 70 countries including Ethiopia, identified five cultural dimensions that had an impact on the way organizations are managed (Hofstede, 1997, 2001; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). These cultural dimensions are power distance, individualism/collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity/femininity, and long term/short term orientation.

Power distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. In organizational context, it is the difference between the extent to which a boss can determine the behavior of a subordinate, and the extent to which the subordinate can determine the behavior of the boss (Hofstede, 2001: 209; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005:54). Hofstede and Hofstede argue that in an organization where there is large power distance, power is centralized as much as possible in a few hands and subordinates expect to be told what to do. There are a lot of supervisory personnel, structured into tall hierarchies of people reporting to each other. Compensation systems show wide gaps between top and bottom in the organization (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: 55). Subordinates usually accept power relations that are more authoritarian and paternalistic. Alternatively, with a small power distance, inequalities among people are minimized and the less educated people hold more authoritarian values than more educated persons.

Individualism versus collectivism: Individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family only. Collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede, 2001: 225; Hofstede and Hofstede 2005: 399-401).

Uncertainty avoidance: uncertainty avoidance concerns the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations (Hofstede, 2001: 218). It refers to the degree to which individuals in a culture experience stress and anxiety in the face of uncertainty and therefore engage in efforts to enhance predictability within their environments (De Luque, *et al.*, 2004). This dimension may be weak or strong. For instance, bureaucracies in cultures where there is great uncertainty will tend to create formal rules and believe in their correctness in order to reduce uncertainty. The bureaucrats resist change, new policies and so forth, and worry about the future. Whereas civil servants who work in weak-uncertainty countries tend to easily accept and even welcome new policies; in countries where uncertainty-avoidance is strong, it is common to respond with apathy and resistance and to reject new policies (Karyeija, 2012; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).

Masculinity versus Femininity: ‘Masculinity stands for a society in which gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be tough, assertive, and focused on material success; women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. Femininity stands for a society in which social gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender and concerned with the quality of life’ (Hofstede, 2001: 297).

Long-term versus short-term orientation: Long-term orientation stands for the fostering of virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular, perseverance and thrift. Its opposite pole, short-term orientation, stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past and present, in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of ‘face’ and fulfilling social obligations (Hofstede, 2001: 359; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: 399-404).

Cultural dimensions by Shalom H. Schwartz

The second author who has provided clear variables for studying culture is Schwartz. Schwartz argues that national cultures differ in the degree to which they emphasize embeddedness, intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy, hierarchy, egalitarianism, mastery and harmony. These seven orientations operate as a basis upon which his three dimensions are stated; embeddedness vs. autonomy, hierarchy vs. egalitarianism, and mastery vs. harmony (Schwartz, 1999).

Schwartz's *hierarchy vs. egalitarianism* value dimension bears considerable similarity to Hofstede's power distance dimension. If we look at the hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism dimension, high hierarchy values support the unequal distribution of power, roles and resources (social power, authority, humility, wealth). By contrast, egalitarian cultures value equality, social justice, freedom, and responsibility. Egalitarian culture emphasizes transcendence of selfish interests in favor of voluntary commitment to promoting the welfare of others (equality, social justice, freedom, responsibility, honesty) (Schwartz, 1999: 27-28). Schwartz argues that 'the pursuit of power values is likely to be more acceptable in cultures where Hierarchy and Mastery values are emphasized and the use of power and prestige to reward workers is likely to be a more effective motivator'. However, he adds, '...the pursuit of these values and their use as motivators is more likely to arouse individual or organized opposition where Harmony and Egalitarianism values are important' (Schwartz, 1999: 43-44).

The *embeddedness vs. autonomy* dimension focuses on the relationship between the individual and the group. It seeks to explain the extent to which an individual behaves responsibly. Cultures that emphasize embeddedness stress the individual as meaningful in terms of being a member of closely knit groups. As such, it is prudent to avoid disrupting the status quo. Embeddedness or conservatism is a cultural value that emphasizes the maintenance of the status quo, propriety, and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidarity of a group or the traditional order (social order, respect for tradition, family security, wisdom) (Schwartz 1999: 27). The opposite pole of this dimension, autonomy, describes cultures in which the person is viewed as an autonomous, bounded entity who finds meaning in his or her own uniqueness, who seeks to express his or her own internal attributes (preferences, traits, feelings, motives) and is encouraged to do so (Schwartz, 1999: 27).

Mastery vs. harmony captures how cultures at the mastery end of this value dimension emphasize self-assertion. This is characterized by ambition, success, daring and competence. There is a strong desire to master and change the natural and social order so as to subject it to one's will. On the other hand, cultures that value a high level of harmony emphasize fitting harmoniously into one's environment, 'a world at peace', unity with nature and the world of beauty (Schwartz, 1999: 28). Cultural values that prize a high level of harmony are closely associated with Hofstede's masculinity/femininity, and uncertainty-avoidance value dimensions.

Cultural dimensions by Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997:19) argue that every culture distinguishes itself through the specific solutions it chooses to overcome certain dilemmas. Dilemmas can be classified according into three categories: relations with people, relations with the passage of time, relations to nature. The authors expound upon these three categories by elucidating seven dimensions: Universalism vs. Particularism; Individualism vs. Communitarianism; Neutral vs. Emotional; Specific vs. Diffuse; Achieved status vs. Ascribed status; Attitudes towards time; and Attitudes towards the environment.

Universalism vs. Particularism (rules versus relationships): The Universalistic culture is roughly: ‘What is good and right can be defined and always applies.’ In particularist cultures far greater attention is given to the obligations of relationships and unique circumstances. For example, instead of assuming that the one good way must always be followed, the particularist reasoning is that friendship has special obligations and hence may come first (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997:19).

Universalistic cultures normally focus more on rules than on relationships. For instance, there is a conception – true or false – that some American employees compete for better job positions and strive to climb up in the hierarchy and earn more money. They do this without caring for colleagues or being concerned about relationships. In comparison, particularistic cultures like China focus heavily on relationships. Thus, when working with people from a particularistic culture, universalists should build informal networks and create private understandings. They should also seek fairness in doing business by treating each case as a specific and unique entity (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997).

Individualism vs. Communitarianism (the group versus the individual): Do people regard themselves primarily as individuals or primarily as part of a group? This cultural dimension is similar with Hofstede’s individualism/collectivism typology. In communitarian culture, the decision-making process is usually longer because everyone concerned must agree and a consensus must be achieved. On the other hand, in individualistic societies there is great respect for individual opinions; therefore people vote. It is also worth stressing that organizations with an individualist orientation are intended to serve owners and stakeholders; profits and ties are

legal and abstract, regulated by contracts. By contrast, in communitarian cultures, an organization's growth is an end in itself and the whole society shares in it (everyone is a stakeholder) (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997: 65-70). How does all this bear upon implementing NPM reforms? First of all, in an individualistic culture, methods can be used to increase an individual's performance. These include pay for performance, management by objectives (MBO), individual assessment and praising those who perform well. In a communitarian culture, one would need to emphasize teamwork and extol the whole group to avoid favoritism.

Neutral vs. Emotional or Affective culture (the range of feelings expressed): Should the nature of our interactions be objective and detached, or is expressing emotion acceptable? Members of cultures which are affectively neutral do not telegraph their feelings but keep them carefully controlled and subdued. In contrast, in cultures high on affectivity, people show their feelings plainly by laughing, smiling, grimacing, scowling and gesturing; they attempt to find immediate outlets for their feelings (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997:80).

In affective cultures, thoughts are revealed and transparency is used to release people from tense situations. In neutral cultures, by contrast, people are cool and physical contact is almost taboo. This latter dimension suggests that people in neutral cultures need recognition and that there is a high propensity to stick to the matter at hand – whatever it may be. Affective cultures, by contrast, prefer people to be warm and they want to keep family members together. Individuals, not the organizations they represent, matter the most in this dispensation (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997:82-88).

Specific vs. Diffuse orientation (the range of involvement): According to the *specific vs. diffuse* orientation, we can distinguish one culture from another by analyzing the extent to which relationships are specific to the job or matter at hand, or diffuse due to the multiplicity of people's lives. In specific-oriented cultures, a manager segregates out the task relationship she or he has with a subordinate and insulates this from other dealings (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997:90). It is, therefore, expected that within the *specific* culture, relations between people are purposeful and direct, operations are transparent, and individuals tend to have

principles and moral standards that are most definitely learned, i.e., there is no semblance of an ‘innate moral standard’ (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997).

Achievement vs. Ascription: In the *achievement vs. ascription* orientation, status is critical. Status describes the position of individuals in their society. The fundamental issue is what someone does and is. There are big differences on how societies respect status. In achievement-oriented societies, a person is considered successful by virtue of his or her job and accomplishments. Members of such a culture interact with people by relating to their professions and roles in society. In order to have a high position in society, one must possess excellent skills, knowledge and talent (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997:113-120).

In ascriptive cultures like what we find in China, people tend to measure the behavior of others based on the groups into which they were borne , their birth right, gender, caste, age, interpersonal relationships and position in society. Status is usually accorded to those who are highly qualified, older, or more experienced. Senior employees are highly respected because of their length of service and titles. In achievement-oriented cultures, the individual must represent and make commitments to the company, whereas in the ascriptive culture this is disallowed unless you are the owner of that company or organization. In cases of dysfunctional decisions, only those high up in the authority pyramid can contest them, whereas in the achievement-oriented culture, decisions can be challenged on technical and functional grounds by anyone – regardless of where an individual stands in the chain of command (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997:113-120).

In an ascribed culture, a senior or higher official does not entertain arguments by juniors even how valid these arguments may be. They prefer their subordinates to obey and carry out their orders without raising any questions. In turn, subordinates also do not want to take any initiatives to solve the problem and they usually just follow the order whatever comes from the top. Because of the status-oriented attitude, administrators always have a tendency to expand their organization in terms of the number of staff and authority, irrespective of its importance (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997:113-120).

Attitudes towards time: The importance of time is dependent on a person’s cultural background. Cultures handle time differently and an individual’s cultural background will significantly affect

his or her conception of time. Time can be perceived as linear, i.e., passing in a straight line, a sequence of disparate events, or it can be perceived as circular by combining the past, present and future (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997). Another concept is the notion of monochronic and polychronic time. Monochronic time follows the notion of ‘one thing at a time’ and ‘time is money’, while the polychronic concept focuses on multiple tasks being handled simultaneously. In this case, time is subordinate to interpersonal relations. Meanwhile, with respect to managing organizations, certain things are future-oriented, for example planning, mission statements and strategic objectives, and when motivating staff, the present is seen in light of future performance.

In their dimension of *Attitudes towards environment*, Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) identify two views about nature: a) nature should be controlled and used, or b) go along with nature and live in harmony with the environment. Some cultures are motivated ‘from within’, in the sense that what affects their lives, the origins of vice and virtue and so forth, are seen as residing within each individual. Other cultures look at nature as something to be feared and emulated, since the forces of nature are more powerful than individuals. Looking at the internal control/external control distinction, one can see that these differences are helpful in understanding policy reforms. In the case of internal control, members are compelled to act aggressively vis-à-vis the environment. Those who express their conflicts and show resistance are believed to have deep convictions. They want to be in control and feel uneasy when the environment appears uncontrollable. By contrast, those who see life as motivated externally are often flexible and willing to strike compromises. They tend to focus on *the other*, i.e., the customer or colleague (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997:155).

Cultural dimensions by GLOBE Project

A recent study on global leadership and organizational behavior effectiveness (The Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness - GLOBE - Project) led by Robert J. House provides another interesting framework for studying culture. The GLOBE team defined culture ‘as shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of members of collectives that are transmitted across generations’ (House, *et al.*, 2004: 15). Since these are psychological attributes, this definition can be used at both the societal and workplace levels of investigation. These

cultural attributes are referred to as cultural dimensions: uncertainty avoidance, power distance, institutional collectivism (collectivism I), in-group collectivism (collectivism II), gender egalitarianism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance orientation, and humane orientation.

Power Distance is summarized by these authors as the *degree* to which members of an organization or society expect and agree that power should be unequally shared (House, *et al.*, 2004: 25).

House, *et al.*'s definition of *Uncertainty Avoidance* summarizes Hofstede's definition of this dimension as follows: Uncertainty Avoidance reflects the extent to which members of an organization or society strive to avoid uncertainty by reliance on social norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices to alleviate the unpredictability of future events (House, *et al.*, 2004: 25). The first two dimensions deal with *authority*. Uncertainty Avoidance deals with the authority of the rules. Power Distance deals with the authority of *persons* (Hofstede, 2001: 147).

Institutional Collectivism, also termed *Collectivism I*, reflects 'the degree to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective action' (House, *et al.*, 2004: 25). *In-group collectivism*, also termed *Collectivism II*, refers to 'the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty and cohesiveness in their organizations or families' (House, *et al.*, 2004: 25). This dimension measures group (family or organization) collectivism: *pride* and *loyalty* to family and/or organization and family and/or organizational cohesiveness (House, *et al.*, 2004: 25).

Gender Egalitarianism is defined as the extent to which an organization or a society minimizes gender role differences (House, *et al.*, 2004: 25).

Assertiveness is measured by 'the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in social relationships' (House, *et al.*, 2004: 25).

Future Orientation is defined as 'the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies engage in future-oriented behaviors such as planning, investing in the future, and delaying gratification' (House, *et al.*, 2004: 25).

Performance Orientation refers to the extent to which an organization or society encourages and rewards group members for performance improvement and excellence (House, *et al.*, 2004: 25).

The last dimension, *Humane Orientation*, reflects ‘the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies encourage and reward individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others’ (House, *et al.*, 2004: 25).

Cultural dimensions in the present study

The dimensions of national culture as elaborated by Hofstede, Schwartz, and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner focus mainly on how we can conceive culture from a national perspective and focus on work-related societal culture and relational dimensions. This notwithstanding, many researchers (for instance, Ahmed, 2012; De Waal, 2007; Karyeija, 2012; Messner, 2012; Jung, 2008; Ohemeng, 2009; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011) not only applied the same dimensions in workplace context but also provide empirical evidence for the relevance and usefulness of national cultural dimensions to the workplace level of analysis. Indeed, previous empirical researches on the culture domain (see, for instance, Hofstede, 1997, 2001; House, *et al.*, 2004; Jamil, 1994; Tayeb, 1988; Trompenaars, 1993; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997) asserted that employees’ cultural orientation at workplace is a reflection of the wider societal culture in which they belong. Scholars like Aycan (2005) and Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) also argue that national culture provides an ideological context for organizations, affecting such factors as (a) organizational values, (b) role expectations of job incumbents, and (c) standards used in judging the job performance of incumbents.

In this study, the researcher adopts the cultural dimensions of power distance (closely associated with hierarchy vs. egalitarianism by Schwarz), uncertainty avoidance (closely associated with mastery vs. harmony by Schwarz and attitudes towards environment by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner), individualism/collectivism (closely associated with embeddedness vs. autonomy by Schwarz and individualism vs. communitarianism by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner) and performance orientation. In addition to these dimensions, political bias/neutrality is included in the present study.

Accordingly, administrative culture in this dissertation is measured along five cultural dimensions namely, *power distance*, *uncertainty avoidance*, *individualism/collectivism*, *performance orientation* and *political bias/neutrality*. It is for three reasons that the present researcher chooses these dimensions, as described below.

First, several studies have used the first three of these cultural dimensions (*power distance, uncertainty avoidance and individualism/collectivism*) and researchers have proposed that managerial practices can be analyzed based on employees' cultural orientation along these cultural dimensions (Aycan, 2005; Budhwar and Debrah, 2001; Flynn, 2002; György, 2004; Hofstede, 1997; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; House, *et al.*, 2004; Kamoche, *et al.*, 2004; Karyeija, 2012; Mendonca and Kanungo, 1996; Ohemeng, 2009; Peters, 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Therefore, the present researcher uses these studies as a point of departure for the current study. Notwithstanding this, *performance orientation* and *political bias/neutrality* are also included as additional cultural dimensions in the present study. Performance orientation is included in the present study due to the fact that it is intuitively linked to performance management system. Political bias/neutrality is included in the present study since empirical evidences (see, for instance, Karyeija, 2012; Jamil, 1998) suggest that the attitude of civil servants towards politics is an important aspect of administrative culture that either facilitates or hampers reform implementation.

Second, these cultural dimensions are mirrored in the civil service (House, *et al.*, 2004; Islam, 2005; Karyeija, 2012; Ohemeng, 2009), and hence it is relevant to use them as measures of administrative culture within the civil service under investigation. Third, these cultural dimensions represent work-related psychological attributes and hence it is appropriate to use them at workplace levels of investigation (House, *et al.*, 2004).

In sum, it is the above dimensions that this dissertation adopts to measure administrative culture and to clear up its relationship with the institutionalization status of the performance management reform in state level civil service of ANRS. Having discussed administrative culture phenomena under study, the next section presents challenges to institutionalization of performance management in developing countries with a particular focus on culture.

2.7 Performance Management: Challenges and the Impact of Culture

2.7.1 Challenges

It has been shown in a vast body of literature on the subject that many countries in the developing world have a 'coercive need' for result-based performance management reforms and

actually carry out these reforms under the guise of NPM (Bissessar, 2002; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Flynn, 2002; Hope, 2002; Larbi, 1999, 2006; Larmour, 2002; Ohemeng, 2009; Polidano, 1999; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).

However, the picture portrayed about institutionalization of NPM-inspired performance management reform in developing countries is not positive (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; Langseth, 1995; Larbi, 2006; McCourt, 2006; Makumbe, 1997; McCourt and Ramguttty-Wong, 2002; Ohemeng, 2009; Polidano, 1999; Schick, 1998). Many developing countries have set out to design an NPM-inspired performance system but aborted the effort before it was completed, or they completed the design but failed to move on to the implementation stage; still others have gone through the motions of installing a system but to no good avail. Sometimes, the system has been partly implemented in some countries but fails to really take hold or be used in any meaningful way; then, it may be maintained in a halfhearted way or be abandoned at some point (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; Langseth, 1995; Makumbe, 1997; Polidano, 1999). Failure to institutionalize the system has remained a stark reality.

Now the question is, why does the developing world fail to institutionalize NPM-inspired performance management reforms? Several studies have identified common impediments to the successful institutionalization of NPM-inspired administrative reforms, including performance management, in African countries. These impediments include lack of strategic visioning and leadership; lack of a sustained political and leadership commitment; lack of institutional capacity; poor management practices; declining public service ethics; low civil service moral; lack of stakeholder participation; corruption; lack of reform consensus among domestic constituents; poor working conditions; lack of accountability relationship and so on (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; De Waal, 2007; Dzimbiri, 2008; ECA, 2003; Kingudu, 1998; Langsten, 1995; Larbi, 2006; Makumbe, 1997; McCourt, 2006; McCourt & Foon, 2007; Mossis, 1996; Mutahaba and Kiragu, 1998; Numberg, 1995; Ohemeng, 2009; Polidano, 1999).

Notwithstanding the explanatory power of the above factors for the limited success of the institutionalization of NPM-inspired performance management reforms in the African world, extant literature on the relationship between performance management and culture, mostly in the context of private sector, also highlighted that culture can be an important explanatory variable for the difficulties that non-western countries encountered to institutionalize such Western-rooted

performance management reforms (Bjorkman and Lu, 1999; Earley, 1993; Earley and Stubblebine, 1989; Fletcher and Perry, 2001; Gelfand, *et al.*, 2004; Harrison, *et al.*, 2000; Jackson and Schuler, 2003; Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Ramamoorthy and Carroll, 1998; Schneider and Barsoux, 2003; Triandis and Bhawuk, 1997). In fact, some researches that have been done on developing countries' human resource management practices rightly questioned the sustained applicability of Western management practices in non-western nations, though most of such studies were not specific to performance management (Aryee, 2004; Budhwar, 2004; Budhwar and Debrah, 2001; Kamoche, *et al.*, 2004; Mendonca and Kanungo, 1996; Munene, *et al.*, 2000)

Having the above general discussion, the next section presents the review of relevant literature and empirical references to the development of overall understanding on potential impacts that culture has on the institutionalization of performance management practices.

2.7.2 The Impact of Culture on Performance Management: Cross-Cultural Research

Culture and its influence on organization and management, especially private sector management, have been well-addressed in the literature (Lunnan, *et al.*, 2005; Vance, 2006). Unfortunately, this is not the same in the literature dealing with the public sector (Ohemeng, 2009). Notwithstanding this, reviewing the available literature that have been written on the private sector contexts will be relevant here to grasp the importance of culture as an explanatory variable for the difficulty that developing countries encountered to institutionalize such Western-rooted performance management reforms (Ohemeng, 2009). However, before reviewing such researches, it is important to briefly describe the major dimensions of cultural variation that have received attention from most of such researches.

Based on the pioneering work of Hofstede (1997, 2001), there are five dimensions of the cultural variation that have received attention from most of researches. These include: (1) *individualism/collectivism*, individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family only. Collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede, 2001: 225); (2) *power distance*, is the extent to

which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally (Hofstede, 2001: 209). It describes the extent to which ascribed hierarchy and social status are accepted and expected in society (Carl, *et al.*, 2004); (3) *uncertainty avoidance*, concerns the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations (Hofstede, 2001: 218). It refers to the degree to which individuals in a culture experience stress and anxiety in the face of uncertainty and therefore engage in efforts to enhance predictability within their environments (De Luque, *et al.*, 2004); (4) *masculinity/femininity*, which refers to the extent to which the dominant values in society are masculine (e.g., assertiveness, acquisition of money and things) versus feminine (e.g., nurturing, caring for others), and there is inequality between the sexes (Hofstede, 2001: 297); and (5) *future or long-term orientation*, which describes the extent to which people in a culture live and plan for the future as opposed to the present (Ashkanasy, *et al.*, 2004; Hofstede, 2001). Having this in mind, the researcher now turns to the review of cross-cultural empirical literature on the relationship between performance management and culture.

It is worth noting that a significant proportion of the research uncovered on the relationship between culture and performance management is cross-cultural. For instance, Davidson (1998) studied the extent to which Western and Eastern values have shaped the performance management practices of Malaysian managers, and Thorthon (2012) studied the effect of Western values on the performance management practices in china and found that whilst performance management was positively related to organizational performance, adopting it as a strategic HRM technique in China could be a serious challenge due to the Chinese traditional culture of harmony and egalitarianism (Thorthon, 2012: 84). The cultural dimension was found to be an important factor whose effects were difficult to quantify but indisputable, and that inadequate strategic approaches were adopted by Eastern managers in dealing with this dimension.

James, *et al.* (1996) provided an interesting piece of research on culture, also addressing the effects of national cultural differences in performance management practices. This was a qualitative study that sought to compare the bureaucratic orientation of ‘Western’ managers and Nepalese managers, and its effect on performance management effectiveness. Although bureaucracy represents a significant aspect of culture, it is only one of several dimensions along

which differences may exist. As the research provided no theoretical basis for focusing on bureaucratic orientation, it is open to the criticism of being too narrow.

A similar study was also conducted by Phua and Rowlinson (2004), although in this case, the study was more firmly grounded theoretically. Drawing on social identity theory, this study focused on individualist-collectivist orientations of Chinese and Anglo-Saxon senior managers and the effects of these orientations on performance evaluation bias and consequently on in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination.

Another study of culture within this same context is reported in Skitmore, *et al.* (2004). This was in fact a report of two studies conducted simultaneously examining cultural diversity among 'Far Eastern' and 'Anglo' managers and its impact on goal setting aspects of performance management. Karyeija (2012) also found that culture had a profound influence on the implementation of performance management which was developed in other contexts', this is because these management philosophies and practices were already embedded with cultural beliefs, norms, values and assumptions that were not compatible with the new context into which they were being introduced. Unlike the previous studies discussed earlier, this was a mixed study delving into performance appraisal reform implementation and the cultural barriers in Uganda.

It is worth noting that most cross-cultural researches in relation to performance management suggest that the largest cultural differences may arise as a function of individualism-collectivism (Wright, *et al.*, 2003:26). Within Western contexts, performance management practices tend to focus on the individual employee, with pay and incentive systems being tied to individual performance (Wright, *et al.*, 2003:29). However, in collectivistic cultures, it is much more common for performance management to be focused on the group rather than on the individual. For example, Earley (1993:347) found that while the performance of individuals in individualistic cultures is higher when they work alone rather than when they work in a group, the opposite was true for individuals in collectivistic cultures. Triandis and Bhawuk, (1997:18-20) pointed out that in individualistic cultures such as the US, rewards that recognize individual accomplishment are highly motivating, whether they are monetary or non-monetary. In contrast, in collectivistic cultures, like Japan, individual awards can cause disharmony among group members, and thus rewards that satisfy needs for affiliation are more motivating.

Aryee (2004) has explained how these cultural factors affect human resource management in developing countries, particularly in Ghana. As a collectivist society, Ghanaians seek meaning in life largely through social relationships, through identifying with the group in which they are embedded, and participating in its shared ways of life. This group is defined in terms of the extended family into which all Ghanaians are borne and whose interest they are socialized to promote. The extended family is characterized by a high degree of reciprocity in the exchange of both moral and material support. For example, it is the moral obligation of employed members of the family to financially support the aged and less fortunate members. When exported into an organizational context, the distinctions between in-group and out-group, and the associated obligation to help one's in-group members, have been noted to undermine the goal-oriented meritocratic purposes of a bureaucratic organization. This is because it encourages particularistic rather than universalistic organizational practices. For example, the decision to hire, reward, and promote should be based on the universal principle of an employee's contributions to organizational goal attainment. However, in a particularistic context, such personnel decisions are based on non-merit considerations such as kinship ties (Aryee, 2004).

Thus, performance management systems that are focused on individual performance, coupled with individual-focused reward systems, tend not to be used as much in collectivistic contexts (Ramamoorthy and Carroll, 1998; Triandis and Bhawuk, 1997). Furthermore, promotions decisions in collectivistic, high power distance contexts tend to be based more on seniority than on merit (Ramamoorthy and Carroll, 1998: 582). Imported human resource management practices that strive to promote employees based on merit regardless of seniority can be met with great opposition in collectivistic cultures in which elders would lose face when placed under the supervision of more junior individuals; similarly, those in junior positions might feel that they lack credibility to be in the more senior position (Harrison, *et al.*, 2000: 498).

More fundamentally, the very notion of 'effective' performance is culture-bound. In individualistic cultures, such as the US, evaluation criteria are objective, quantifiable, and observable, and they focus primarily on employee's productivity (Jackson and Schuler, 2003). In contrast, performance evaluation in collectivistic cultures focuses more on social and relational criteria such as awareness of duties and obligations, willingness to work hard for the group, ability to maintain harmonious relationships, and conformity (Gelfand, *et al.*, 2004). Gelfand and

his colleagues, in their comparative study of performance management practices between US and Asian firms, found that while US laws protect employees from being evaluated on their character traits rather than what they do, in many Asian firms employees are judged on their integrity, loyalty, and morality. In other words, result-based performance management can, at times, be at odds with the cultural emphasis that is placed on character appraisal (Gelfand, *et al.*, 2004).

As for methods of evaluation, 360-degree evaluation methods, which are popular in low power distance and individualistic cultures such as the US, tend not to be as effective in high power distance or collectivistic cultures (Gregersen, *et al.*, 1996). To explain, it is inappropriate for subordinates to evaluate their superiors in high power distance cultures, as it undermines the supervisors' authority (Gregersen, *et al.*, 1996:722). In collectivistic cultures, 360-degree evaluation is ineffective because individuals are likely to provide team members with consistently high evaluations as a result of both in-group bias and a desire to maintain group harmony (Bjorkman and Lu, 1999: 21). Individuals tend to also be inaccurate (and reluctant) judges of their own behavior because of tendencies toward self-effacement biases (Markus and Kitayama, 1991:236). Finally, there is also a tendency to avoid performance evaluation so as not to damage social face and harmony. Rather, there is a tendency in collectivistic cultures to be indirect in nature, as individuals strive to maintain harmony and social face; thus, feedback is usually delivered in indirect, subtle, and non-confrontational ways, thereby making formalized face-to-face feedback sessions unlikely and ineffective (Fletcher and Perry, 2001).

According to Mendonca and Kanungo (1996), all the critical activities in performance management require the manager to function as a coach and mentor to his subordinates, but high power distance undermines mentorship and promotes sycophancy. Performance management practices assume that employees have control over their environment and can achieve goals, performance can be objectively measured, and those managers and their subordinates can engage in open dialogue about objectives. Yet, the idea of mutually established objectives can be ineffective in high power distance contexts in which subordinates feel they have little control over the goals they are asked to achieve, and two-way dialogues with the boss seem untenable (Schneider and Barsoux, 2003).

2.7.3 Implications for the Current Study

Clearly, there are supporting empirical evidences, albeit cross-cultural in nature and mainly anecdotal, to argue that the institutionalization level of performance management reform in the civil service is attributable in part to cultural orientation of civil servants. This notwithstanding, it should be borne in mind that most of cultural studies in relation to performance management practices are cross-cultural, they often focus on comparisons between national cultures and applicability of Western-originated performance management practices in non-western contexts. As such, they use national or geographical boundaries to represent overly broad units of analysis, sharing a universalistic view of national culture. Using the nation state as a unit of analysis is overlooking individual differences that exist within the country.

Indeed, according to scholars like Schwartz (1992), any nation or subgroup in a nation may be characterized by a distinct cultural value pattern, profile or cultural standard. Dorfman and Howell (1988) and Karahanna, *et al.*, (2005) suggest that culture may show how much an individual takes from the different cultures that the individual is part of. Triandis (1972) argues that culture indicates the perception of that individual of the shared cultures one belongs to. Berry (1990) also envisages that people may develop attitudes and beliefs that embrace various concepts in their new environment when they go through the process of acculturation. Furthermore, Tung (1995) suggests that culture is not static and it evolves over time. These suggestions imply that while national culture reflects the generally accepted modes of behavior defined or regulated by the objective conditions in the society an individual is in, each individual as a member of the society may also display different practices that are developed along his/her subjective perception of the historically brewed elements of the cultural systems in that society.

In the present study context, the above situation suggests that there is a possibility for individual differences in cultural orientation. In fact, there are empirical evidences that revealed individual differences in cultural orientation within a relatively homogeneous sample in the same country. For example, Iguisi (2009), in his study of work culture in three cement companies of Nigeria, found that relative to non-managers, managerial employees in Nigeria were exhibited low power distance, high individualism and low uncertainty avoidance. Also, in Uganda, Karyeija (2012) reported a significant difference among civil servants in their administrative cultural orientation (power distance, uncertainty avoidance and political neutrality) along demographic variables,

i.e., age, work experience and educational level. Nevertheless, it should also be borne in mind that the presences of individual differences in cultural orientation do not render the use of culture to be a useless tool for analyzing reform phenomena. Rather, such differences represent a good opportunity for objective examination of the relationship between culture (as measured through individuals' perceptions, attitudes and values along various cultural dimensions) and the institutionalization of reform under investigation (refer to chapter 6 for details).

In sum, it seems clear from the foregoing sections that the successful implementation and effectiveness of Western-originated performance management system tend to be culture-bond. This implies that the performance management practices which have been identified as best practices for employees' management within the Western literature may not necessarily be successfully institutionalized in other cultural contexts.

2.8 Summary

In this chapter, the researcher presented the general theoretical terrain of the performance management system and cultural phenomenon under study. Performance management system is constructed upon certain premises which are embedded in the Western context. It is clear from the preceding subsections that culture can be used as an explanatory variable in performance management studies as it can cause differences and affect the transferability of Western-inspired performance management practices. The review of empirical literature on the relationship between performance management and culture has demonstrated that there is sound basis for proposing that culture does have an adverse effect on the institutionalization of performance management reforms in non-western cultural contexts.

Although there is a possibility for perceptible individual differences in cultural orientation within a relatively homogeneous sample, published commentary indicates that the majority of employees in most African countries are still characterized by cultural orientation of high power distance, strong uncertainty avoidance and finding of security in collectivist thinking as opposed to Western-style of individualism (Budhwar and Debrah, 2001; Hofstede, 1997, 2001, Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; Kamoche, *et al.*, 2004; Mendonca and Kanungo, 1996; Ohemeng, 2009). Moreover, as stated in the previous section, the presences of individual differences in cultural orientation do not render culture to be a useless tool in analyzing the reform phenomena since

such differences represents a good opportunity for the objective examination of the relationship between culture and management practices. This implies that an investigation into cultural phenomena as an explanatory variable for the arguably limited success of performance management reform institutionalization within the civil service under investigation is a viable line of enquiry.

Keeping the above implications in mind, the next chapter presents theoretical framework upon which the impact of administrative culture on institutionalization of performance management system in the present study will be examined.

CHAPTER THREE

THE THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

3.0 Introduction

As the title indicates, this chapter presents a theoretical and analytical framework for examining the effect of administrative culture on the institutionalization status of performance management system within the civil service under investigation. It commences with the discussion of two perspectives of studying administrative reforms in organizations; namely the *instrumental* and the *institutional/cultural*, perspectives as espoused by Christensen, *et al.*, (2007). The purpose is to put both performance management and administrative culture in a broader context. The performance management is analyzed from the instrumental perspective, while the administrative culture is discussed from the institutional/cultural perspective. According to Christensen *et al.*, (2007), these perspectives are useful for analyzing change and reform in organizations. These perspectives are therefore discussed in order to understand and analyze administrative culture and its influence on the institutionalization of performance management reform in the civil service under study.

Thereafter, the chapter focuses on scholarly arguments, literature and empirical referents to aid the development of appropriate propositions on the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the civil service under examination. Finally, the chapter presents an analytical framework that guides the collection and analysis of empirical data in this research.

3.1 The Instrumental Perspective

The instrumental perspective works within the *logic of consequences* where explanations start with the idea of organizations as instruments; they are concerned with ‘clarifying goals and means-ends conceptions of the organizations’. With regard to reforms, the instrumental perspective focuses on reforms that concern structural features (a cultural approach, by contrast, focuses on stability and change in cultural features). The logic of consequentiality is based on calculating the return expected from alternative choices (Christensen, *et al.*, 2007). The actor chooses among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective

objectives while being conscious that other actors are doing likewise. Actions and outcomes are products of rational and calculating behavior designed to maximize a given set of preferences. Thus, the logic of consequentiality refers to actions oriented towards maximizing goals or preferences. It is based on the means-ends calculation and takes other actors' strategies into consideration. It also exhibits instrumentalism in the sense that purpose-oriented actions are carried out within predictable and stable environments. The standard for evaluation is the degree to which actors choose the best means to achieve some preconceived goals. It is based on calculation and the concern is to solve problems effectively.

The logic of consequentiality is associated with anticipatory choice. It presupposes the following sequence: 1. What are my values? 2. What are my alternatives? 3. Choose the alternative that has the best consequences (March and Olsen, 1989:23). According to Christensen, *et al.*, (2007), performance management can be seen as a structural-instrumental tool for political and administrative leadership. This is because it is a control technique and satisfies a-three-point criteria: a) it operates on clear and consistent goals which act as a basis for measuring performance; b) control techniques measure results on specified indicators that are reported to the senior, and performance measurement systems (like the performance appraisal) allow this through testing outcomes; c) results have consequences in terms of reward and punishment to the individual employees (Christensen, *et al.*, 2007:130).

Performance management reforms are conceived within the instrumental perspective and thus, when applied to a different context, they may fail to take root because of the civil servants' existing institutional values and norms, which may not be consistent with the assumptions of the reforms. Reformers introduce performance management reforms based on the assumption that they are dealing with a functional bureaucracy with a structure and a clear set of rules and regulations to control work. Such reforms also operate on the assumption that a civil service organization has a well-defined division of labor, a merit-based recruitment, linear careers, a hierarchy among offices, and norms that govern relationships (Karyeija, 2012).

Within this approach, the bureaucratic organizational form marked by hierarchy, division of labor and routines is very important. The hierarchy, characterized by superior-subordinate relations, is often tied to a career system where members are promoted on the basis of qualifications, merit and performance. Additionally, the division of labor ensures the existence of

rules and procedures about who shall carry out tasks and how they should be accomplished (Christensen, *et al.*, 2007). In order to measure merit and performance, the performance management becomes a very important tool. One would suppose that if rules are followed, then the institutionalization of the performance management system will be easy. However, regardless of what one does, there may always be constraints.

According to Zey (1998), there are four main constraints that a rational actor faces. First, the actor is constrained by the scarcity of resources; given that each actor possesses different resources and in different proportions, this constrains the actions taken. Second, there is the constraint of opportunity costs; Friedman and Hechter (1993 cited in Zey, 1998: 2) note that these are costs associated with foregoing the most attractive course of action. An individual actor may choose the second most valuable end or goal in instances where resources are scarce. Third, the actor may be constrained by institutional norms. These norms may be societal, organizational or family-centered. The actor can be constrained by these norms when choosing the best course of action. Finally, there are constraints related to information. Within the rational choice theory, it is assumed that an actor has sufficient information to make the desired choice among alternatives. By implication, the quality of information available is the major constraint, more so than the quantity, in that Zey writes: ‘the ability to control the source, amount, content, and accuracy of information has never been a stronger constraint on rational decision making’ (Zey, 1998: 3).

3.2 The Problem of the Instrumental Approach

The instrumental approach is rooted in the rational choice theories that cannot explain the origins of culture and social norms. Rational choice theory, in ‘its standard basic version, treats preferences as given, makes their origins irrelevant and focuses solely on how preferences yield forward-looking choices’ (Hollis, 1994:187). There is a general tendency to assume that preferences are universal and perceived similarly in all contexts, i.e., choices are context-free. Preferences, however, may be context-dependent. This means they are a product of one’s environment. They are a result of the way a person is socialized. Scott (2000) argues that individuals are socialized into all sorts of value judgments, and they will always have their preferences determined by the value judgments into which they have been socialized.

Human nature is designed in a way that is goal-oriented; decisions or actions are taken when the situation is ‘satisficing’ (this hybrid term, coined by Herbert Simon, combines ‘satisfy’ and ‘suffice’ and implies adequacy rather than optimality) (Scott, 2000). This restricts us to the argument that actions and decisions are taken in a situation where we use the available information, but this information may not be complete and, as such, there are some constraints. These constraints may be institutional rules of procedure, funding or hierarchy. In effect, therefore, there are situations through which human action may be explained by the cultural approach. As would be described under section 3.3 below, in addition, constraints may arise out of cultural considerations. Actors’ beliefs, attitudes, values and perceptions may constrain their own actions. Culture can therefore be used to define an actor’s choice, or it can be used as a constraint on the actor’s behavior, or better still, it can characterize the actor’s response to the constraints of others (Karyeija, 2012).

3.3 The Institutional/Cultural Perspective

The cultural perspective coincides with the *logic of appropriateness*. This means that when acting in public situations, one will not primarily act rationally according to careful deliberation of pro and contra arguments, but according to norms and values built on equality and considerations of applicability (Christensen, *et al.*, 2007).

The logic of appropriateness is a central feature of the cultural perspective. What is appropriate for a civil servant to do is defined by the institution to which he or she belongs and that definition is transmitted through socialization. Rules are followed and roles fulfilled while an individual is taking action. Behavior is driven by rules. Actions are seen as a result of matching a situation to the demands of a position. For instance, actions are based on what the actor is supposed to do and: his or her awareness of the role that must be played in whatever situation is at hand (March and Olsen, 1989). Thus the logic of appropriateness is contextual; actors emphasize social obligation in a specific situation. Behavior is intentional and action stems from necessity. The actor relies on intuition rather than on calculation to take action. Intuition is informed through training, education, socialization and experience. Choice of action is also based on morality and obligation. Bureaucrats, for example, may maintain consistency between their behavior and a conception of themselves in their professional roles. As creative actors, the bureaucrats will execute standards of procedure, fulfill role expectations, satisfy commitments,

and define virtue and truth, in relation to the performance management. Thus identities are formed, situations classified and rules are applied (March and Olsen, 1989:10-12).

The logic of appropriateness associated with obligatory action assumes that human beings take reasoned action by trying to answer three elementary questions: What kind of a situation is this? Who am I? How appropriate are different actions for me in this situation? (March and Olsen, 1989). That is, actors end up doing what they consider appropriate in a given situation. So what could be the culturally appropriate behavior in relation to the institutionalization of performance management reform? If the majority of civil servants have similar cultural orientation, i.e., norms and values that are invariable with the requirements of performance management system, such a cultural orientation may hamper the overall institutionalization of the performance management reforms in civil service. This is because people within public organizations can reject or likely pay minimal attention to reforms as long as the reforms threaten their cultural norms and values (Christensen, *et al.*, 2007).

From a cultural perspective, the majority of public servants may prefer stability and therefore may resist reforms. This is because reforms are sometimes incompatible with the host culture and unsuitable for the recipients. Other times, the reforms may clash with the values that majority of members within an organization cares about and is committed to (Christensen, *et al.*, 2007). This means that the performance management reform may embedden if its underlying norms do not conflict with the existing cultural norms. These scholars further argue that, from this perspective, reform happens slowly as it seeks to strike an appropriate balance between old and new norms. In developing countries, informal systems co-exist with formal rules, but when the informal rules take precedence, the formal rules are ignored; time and resources are diverted to beat the system, distrust the government and to routinized corruption. As a result, civil servants will ignore performance outputs (Schick, 1998). All these aspects have implications for the institutionalization of the performance management reform. For instance, when there is less attention given to performance outputs and outcomes, then the idea of performance management reform loses meaning and eventually fails to take root.

Given the preceding discussion, it is imperative at this juncture to see trends of the cultural approach in studying public management arrangements as well as problems thereto.

3.3.1 Trends and Problems of the Cultural Approach in the Study of Public Management Arrangements

Probably the earliest modern study that explicitly focused on cultural aspects in the public sphere was said to be conducted by Almond and Verba (1963) as cited in Schedler and Proeller (2007). In this study on civic culture, their basic interest was to explain why in the 1920s and 1930s democracy was able to stabilize in some countries but not in others. In the wake of behavioral sciences, the civic culture was the first systematic attempt to explain polity outcomes with cultural variables (Laitin, 1995:168). Almond and Verba studied the social and cultural forces interlinked with political institutions and thereby they introduced new concepts, such as political culture and civic culture, to explain political behavior. In their elaboration of the concept of political culture, Almond and Verba (1980) stressed political knowledge and skill, as well as feelings and value orientations toward political objects and processes—toward the political system as a whole, toward the self as participant, toward political parties and elections, bureaucracy and the like. Civic culture, on the other hand, describes the interaction between personal and political satisfaction and public trust. Both concepts are crucial to institutional stability as they account for the acceptance or rejection of public organization (Schedler and Proeller, 2007).

This approach thus devotes special attention to behavior influenced by non-political and cultural institutions, such as social environment, school, or workplace. The authors argue that unless a society's political institutions are congruent with its underlying political culture, those institutions will be unstable. Based on this assumption, Almond and Verba have examined public attitudes and competence and thereby concluded that the civic culture is a mixed political culture. It consists of both modern and traditional traits, incorporating active participation as well as tributary behavior, either supporting or rejecting the public organization (Almond and Verba, 1963, cited in Schedler and Proeller, 2007: 190). Within the socio-cultural approach, culture represents an independent variable which influences outcomes concerning democracy and administration through a changing hierarchy of values (Inglehart, 1997). Although culture is a conservative element in social evolution, it gradually adapts to ongoing changes in values. This can enable an amplification of the citizen's political competence through social transformations,

e.g., better accessible and improved education and lower costs for political information, which in turn is able to modify political culture (Schedler and Proeller, 2007).

In the meantime, this notion of political culture has been broadened and elaborated by the authors themselves as well as by others, and especially also has included attitudes toward public policy, and opened the notion of culture beyond the limitation to ‘a set of attitudes’ (Laitin, 1995). Eckstein (1988) inquired how authority relates to culture and showed how cultural change can give rise to political change. Inglehart (1997) found that nearly all societies that rank high on self-expression values are stable democracies, whereas the evidence suggests that a culture that is high on tolerance, trust, subjective well-being and an activist outlook is conducive to the emergence and survival of democracy, rather than it would support the other way around thesis of democracy fostering self-expression values. Putnam (1993)—even though his work was not a representative of the cultural approach, his results are in line with this approach—investigated under what conditions public institutions serve the public interest and then he argued that the success or failure of democratic institutions reflects the degree to which a culture of trust and participation is present. The conclusion of this study leads to the appraisal that democratic institutions cannot be built from top-down (or at least not easily). They must be built up in the everyday traditions of trust and civic virtue among its citizens (Laitin, 1995).

Intriguing as the study of political culture is, it is only of indirect interest to scholars of public management. Of much more interest should be studies with a clear focus on public administration and its functioning (Schedler and Proeller, 2007). Anechiarico (1998) studies the differences in anti-corruption policies in the Netherlands and the United States and found that different societal values are leading to diverse civil society phenomena, most importantly a higher level of civic engagement of Dutch citizens compared to their US counterparts (Anechiarico, 1998:20-24). This results in considerable differences in administrative culture and problem solving policies, although both administrations are based on bureaucratic structures and processes. He then concludes that:

‘Administrative culture is not an autonomous, causal factor in the public sector. Administrative culture is both the sum of historical and political factors and an indicator of the contemporary interaction of political and structural forces’ (Anechiarico, 1998: 29).

The cultural approach treats culture as a given; it may be possible for a society to enhance or change its 'social capital', but it is not possible to deliberately and systematically develop social trust, nor to radically depart from established rules and norms (Fukuyama, 1995; Lane, 1998). Culture is seen as a way in which individuals can confer shared meanings and hence make sense of social interactions. Even if the nature of that culture may be relatively fluid and subjective, it provides a persistent boundary, horizon or 'segment' to the life world of individuals and clusters thereof. A range of researchers have not only found geographically-based, usually national, differences in deep-seated values about what is good or bad, honest or dishonest, fair or unfair, etc., they also point to the inter-relation between cultural-level and individual-level values: each individual will be different but the aggregation of their approaches makes what is acceptable and desirable in one country different from what is acceptable and desirable in another (Fukuyama, 1995; Lane, 1998). In addition, what happens at the organizational level is also affected by these values (see for instance, Hofstede, 1997; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; House *et al.*, 2004; Schein, 2004; Schwartz, 1999; Trompenaars, 1993).

From an organization theory and public management point of view, the cultural approach can be described as contextualist approach (Schedler and Proeller, 2007). March and Olson (1989) see the major theoretical significance of contextualist ideas in their general inclination to see the causal links between society and polity as running from the former to the latter, rather than the other way around. The analogical application of this rationale to public administration and public management outcomes could imply that organizations, structures, and management practices will only be supported (and successful) when they are congruent with the existing culture.

Typical research settings of this approach seek to explain institutional outcomes by cultural attitudes and tradition (Christensen and Laegreid, 1999; Schedler and Proeller, 2007). In this body of literature, culture is most often seen as something stable (Schedler and Proeller, 2007).

The cultural approach is widespread in public management and administration research, especially in comparative administration and international public management (Schedler and Proeller, 2007: 191). The neglecting of cross-cultural differences, it is argued for instance, has led international organizations such as the OECD or the World Bank to promote 'one-size-fits-all' solutions to developing countries, with sometimes disastrous effects (Arellano-Gault, 2000:409).

According to Caiden and Sundaram (2004: 376), when countries have relied on foreign experts, the outsiders have too often ignored domestic circumstances and confused matters by incorporating their foreign values. Imposed reforms (by elites) have been formally adopted but informally evaded. In the same vein, Mendonca and Kanungo (1996) have warned that uncritically transplanting management practices developed in the West to developing countries will doom such processes to failure.

By the same token, Christensen and Laegreid (1999) argue that reforms implemented within public organizations have to be put through a compatibility test. As they state, ‘those that are incompatible with the traditional political-administrative cultural norms and values will be modified or opposed, whereas those that are more compatible gradually will be implemented’ (Christensen and Laegreid, 1999: 172). This indicates that people within public organizations can embrace reforms for as long as they do not threaten their cultural norms and values. Schick (1998) has even argued that most developing countries should not implement public management reforms as demanded by international organizations, *inter alia*, for reasons of cultural differences.

In sum, trends of the cultural approach to the study of public management arrangements provide a support for the use of cultural variables as an explanatory factor in reform studies both within and across cultures. However, as most of the cultural studies in relation to reforms are cross-cultural, they often focus on comparisons between national cultures and reform success/failure. They use national or geographical boundaries to represent overly broad units of analysis, sharing a universalistic view of a national culture. Using the nation state as a unit of analysis is overlooking individual differences that exist within the country. Indeed, according to scholars like Schwartz (1992), any nation or subgroup in a nation may be characterised by a distinct cultural value, pattern, profile or cultural standard. In a similar vein, other scholars have empirically found individual differences in cultural orientation within a relatively homogeneous sample in the same country. For example, Iguisi (2009), in his study of work culture in three cement companies of Nigeria, found that relative to non-managers, managerial employees in Nigeria were exhibited low power distance, high individualism and low uncertainty avoidance. Also, in Uganda, Karyeija (2012) reported significant differences among civil servants in their

administrative cultural orientation (power distance, uncertainty avoidance and political neutrality) based on demographic variables, i.e., age, work experience and educational level.

The above ideas notwithstanding, it should be borne in mind that the presences of individual differences in cultural orientation do not render the use of culture to be a useless tool for analyzing reform phenomena. Rather, such differences should be taken as a good opportunity for an objective examination of the relationship between culture (as measured through individual's perceptions, attitudes and values along various cultural dimensions) and the institutionalization status of the reform under investigation (as measured through individual's perceptions and experiences on the nuts and bolts of the reform). Thus, for scholars of public management, the consequence lies in a need to have a clear conceptualization of administrative culture that takes into account the possibility of cultural orientation differences that may exist among civil servants and implications of such possible differences for analyzing public management arrangements. Indeed, it is important now to conceptualize administrative culture in relation to reform institutionalization as has been briefly reviewed under the subsequent section, i.e, 3.4.

3.4 Administrative Culture: Conceptualization

Administrative culture is a promising candidate as an explanatory factor of performance management reform patterns—despite the fact that concept of ‘administrative culture’ is inherently difficult to conceptualize (György, 2004:498). There is a need to have a clear understanding of administrative culture in relation to the bureaucracy. Jamil (1994) argues that in order to explain and understand culture in a bureaucracy, two categories may be useful; these are *culture is what organization is*’ and *culture is what organization has* (Jamil, 1994:277). In this section, the researcher relates Jamil’s understanding of culture to the context of the present study. Thereafter, the researcher shall re-state the operational definition of administrative culture as used in this dissertation.

3.4.1. Administrative Culture as „What Organization “Has” “

According to this perspective, culture is a formal, prescribed, and normative behavior of people which can be created, altered, manipulated and measured in order to enhance organizational effectiveness (Jami, 1994: 277). This approach assumes that an organization itself can produce distinct cultural values and norms. These values and norms can be changed in order to respond to

environmental changes such as changes in market, technology, professional norms and values to optimize the benefits of the organizations (Deal and Kennedy, 1982). In other words, organizational culture can be changed by changing management practices. This dimension is similar to ‘Weberian legal rational bureaucracy’, ‘scientific management theory’, ‘human relation school’, and ‘new public management principle’, all of which claim that there is a universal applicability of theory, regardless of differences in societal culture and politico-economic environment (Jamil, 1994: 277).

Jamil (1994) elaborated that administrative culture may vary within the national context if culture is what organization ‘has’. For example, the culture of one government organization is different from the culture of other organizations, or the culture of public organizations that deal with clients directly is different from the administrative culture of policy-making organizations within the same country. The attitudes and role understanding of administrators may depend on an administrator’s nature of job, formal position, contact net, institutional belongings, level and kind of education, career and recruitment pattern, party affiliation, social background and profession rather than on socio-cultural and political settings of an organization (Jamil, 1994:290-291).

3.4.2 Administrative Culture as „What Organization “IS” “

This dimension of understanding culture assumes that culture is seen as a fixed entity embedded in society, and therefore, cannot be consciously manipulated and managed (Jamil, 1994:279). Organizational culture is a mere reflection of societal culture, and change in organizational culture is likely to be brought about by changes in society. In this context, it is expected that socio-political norms may determine administrative practices in public organizations. If culture is what organization ‘is’, organizational culture may differ more across cultures (Jamil, 1994:279).

According to this perspective, organizational culture is isomorphic with national culture and cannot be easily changed by leadership. The underpinning argument within this understanding of organizational culture is that organizations are a reflection of societal cultures. This kind of relationship has been explored by a number of scholars (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005; Jamil 1994; Tayeb 1988; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2007). From these studies, a clear relationship between societal culture and organizational culture is determined, and the main

source of values and preferences is the wider society and its culture rather than that of the organization.

The distinction between these two dimensions can be summarized in the following manner:

	<i>Administrative culture is</i> What organization 'is'	<i>Administrative culture is</i> What organization 'has'
Influenced by	Society	Multiple factors such as education, age, type of job, and so on
Social norms are	Strong	Weak
Interpersonal relationship influenced more	Societal norms	Organizational norms
Room for management is	None/ little	Some/large
Change in organizational culture is likely to be brought about by change	Society	Management strategy
Organizations differ more	Across culture	Within culture

Adopted from: Administrative culture: A mode of understanding public administration across-culture by Jamil (Jamil, 1994:279).

3.4.3 Re-conceptualization of Administrative Culture

If we conceptualize administrative culture from the perspective of 'what organization has', it becomes a flexible entity because it is dependent on other factors such as age, type of education, duration of service, studying abroad, place of birth, and gender. Moreover, the administrative culture will vary across government organizations, i.e., the beliefs, values, norms and practices held by civil servants of one government organization will be different from those in other government organizations; and thus we may conclude that it is fragmented. On the other hand, when we perceive administrative culture from the perspective of 'what organization is', culture becomes a fixed entity because values and norms are institutionalized and organizational members within the same nation share common beliefs, values, norms and practices. In such institutionalized environments, socio-economic variables such as age, gender, place of birth, types of organization, duration of service and education may have little influence on administrative culture; and thus we may conclude that administrative culture is unified and integrated. Such a culture may be very difficult to change because it has already been institutionalized.

Given these two perspectives, it is of interest to establish how and where the two perspectives confront one another in the context of the civil service under investigation. Provided that administrative culture within the civil service matters on the institutionalization status of performance management reform, one can maintain two presuppositions. The first presupposition would be that if administrative culture is unified and integrated, then those background variables, i.e., age, gender, educational level, job category, work experience, etc., may have little or no influence on civil servants' perceptions of administrative culture and also performance management reform is unlikely to take root in the civil service for the foreseeable future. Hence the reform should be redesigned to comply with the prevailing administrative culture of the civil service. On the other hand, if the views and perception of civil servants on administrative culture differ along their socio-economic characteristics, i.e., age, gender, educational level, job category, work experience, etc., then the situation may offer a window of hope: if reform agents recognize the culture that impeded the institutionalization of performance management reform, they can engage in the cultural change program in the civil service to increase the success rate of reform institutionalization.

In line with the above presuppositions, evaluation for existence of correlation between civil servants' administrative cultural orientation and their socio background will be undertaken in the context of the present study, the intention being to get an insight on how NPM-driven reforms should be managed in relation to culture. This notwithstanding, administrative culture in the present study is taken as the values, beliefs, norms, traditions and practices of civil servants.

Having theoretical bases established and administrative culture re-conceptualized, the next section focuses on literature and empirical referents to aid the development of appropriate propositions on the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the civil service under investigation.

3.5 The Propositions for Empirical Analysis

It is evident from the first chapter that the main aim of this research is to establish empirically whether or not administrative culture has an influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS. Therefore, this section primarily focuses on the development of propositions that allow the present researcher to explore

the associations between administrative culture and the institutionalization level of performance management reform in the context of the state level civil service of ANRS. Before proceeding to the development of such propositions, however, this section begins with a review of empirical referents on the main features of the society (national) culture in Ethiopia, the intention being to develop a proposition that allow me to explore whether or not the main features of administrative culture⁶ (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance and collectivism) in the state level civil service of ANRS are similar to the main features of the national culture in Ethiopia.

A significant amount of research supports the thesis that national culture impacts employees work related cultural values, preferences, attitudes and perceptions. Specifically, as demonstrated in chapter three, many researchers have been provided empirical evidence that sustained the assumption that workplace cultural orientation of employees along the cultural dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance and collectivism is a reflection of the wider societal culture in which they belong (Hofstede, 1997, 2001; House, *et al.*, 2004; Jamil, 1994; Tayeb, 1988; Trompenaars, 1993; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997). At this juncture, therefore, it is imperative to review empirical referents on the main features of Ethiopian national culture in terms of the cultural dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance and collectivism.

Hofstede, based on his study that covers more than 70 countries including Ethiopia, evaluated how values in the workplace are influenced by national culture. He identified the dominant features of national culture of the surveyed countries in terms of power distance, individualism/collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity/femininity (Hofstede, 1980, 1991). Hofstede placed Ethiopia within the '*East Africa countries cluster*' that consists of Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Ethiopia. Each country in this cluster is given the same average score for each culture dimension index as found for Ethiopia (Hofstede 1991:55).

Hofstede findings revealed that Ethiopian's national culture is characterized by a high level of power distance and uncertainty avoidance, collectivism and feminine values. High power distance denotes that people in Ethiopia accept a hierarchical order in which every person has a

⁶ Given the lack of systematic research on the main features of the cultural dimensions of performance orientation and political bias/neutrality at the national level in Ethiopia to inform prediction development, no propositions appear appropriate and investigation of the features of these dimensions is exploratory.

place and which requires no additional explanations. Hierarchy within organization is perceived as mirroring intrinsic inequalities, acceptance of centralization, and anticipation by subordinates to be told what to do. According to Hofstede's findings, Ethiopia is considered as a collectivistic country. High collectivism denotes that people in Ethiopia prefer for lasting dedication and loyalty to the in-group (close family, extended family, extended relationships). They also tend to believe that everyone should take responsibility for fellow members of their group to maintain a harmonious interdependence and the interpersonal relationships should be collective and close. High collectivistic orientation in Ethiopia reflects loyalty is dominant and prevails over majority of other rules and regulations. Hofstede's (1980, 1991) findings revealed high preference for avoiding uncertainty in Ethiopia. This implied that society maintained strict rules of behavior and belief and is intolerant of unconventional behavior, thoughts and suggestions.

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) explored national cultural differences and how they affect the process of doing business based on a sample of 22, 500 managers and 7, 500 general administrative staff from 50 countries including Ethiopia. Findings for Ethiopia reveal that the national culture of Ethiopia is characterized by relatively high level of particularism (greater attention is given to the obligations of relationships and unique circumstances); relatively high level of communitarianism (prime orientation to group goals and objectives than the self); tendency to hide emotions in business contacts (relatively low on affective culture); high level of mixing private and business affairs (relatively high on diffuse culture); significance of ascribed status (accord status to people on the basis of age, class, gender, education, and so on) and relatively weak attitudes that people have control over their future.

Semaw and Mamman (2004) observed that national culture in Ethiopia is characterized by high power distance, strong uncertainty avoidance and collectivistic orientation. According to their observations, Ethiopians' have norms, values and beliefs which assume that people have their station in life and thus inequality is fundamentally acceptable. These authors also observed that because of strong uncertainty avoidance, Ethiopians' often prefer people who are cautious, not risk-takers. Similarly, rules and regulations are considered very important and should be strictly followed. The role of experts and people with authority is considered very important and their views are considered correct. Consensus making is considered vital for the health of society (Semaw and Mamman, 2004). With regard to collectivistic orientation, Semaw and Mamman

(2004) observed that social groups such as family, social class, race, organizations and teams all take precedence over the individual in Ethiopia. They also observed that, in Ethiopia, one's identity is based on group membership and collective views are considered better than individual opinion (Semaw and Mamman, 2004).

Webster (2006) has investigated the dominant features of national culture in Ethiopia with the aim of understanding the influence of national culture on stakeholder interactions in rural water, sanitation and hygiene promotion projects. The research was based on twenty one narrative interviews with water project experts and end users from the regional states of Amhara, Oromiya and Southern nations, nationalities and peoples. Based on his findings, the author has identified the following main features of Ethiopian national culture: strong hierarchy; high importance attached to social status and power; high uncertainty avoidance; high concern for public self-image (face saving behavior); relationship orientation; favoritism for friends and acquaintances; a strong degree of belief in God; and high context communication which hides the meaning within the context of the communication.

Krishna and Habtamu (2007) used an adapted version of Hofstede's questionnaire with the aim of exploring the relationships between national culture and preferred style of leadership. The research was implemented among industrial workers on the sample from two countries, Ethiopia and India. The empirical findings (regarding culture) of this study confirmed Hofstede's findings concerning high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance and collectivistic orientation in Ethiopian society. Janssen and Fikre (2009) also used an adapted version of Hofstede's questionnaire with the aim of exploring work related cultural value differences between Ethiopians and Netherlands. The research was conducted on a sample of postgraduate students in the field of business and economics. The estimated results for Ethiopia on each of the cultural dimensions confirmed findings from Hofstede's original research. More specifically, Ethiopia is typified by high power distance, strong uncertainty avoidance and emphasis on collectivistic orientation.

The foregoing empirical referents suggest that despite the diversities in languages, settlement areas, historical background and some customs, the ethnic groups in Ethiopia reflect tremendous amount of similarities in various cultural aspects. Specifically, results of the above studies illustrate Ethiopians as having high powered distance, high uncertainty avoidance and

collectivistic orientations. Thus, established on the foregoing empirical referents on Ethiopian national culture and studies that sustained the assumption that national culture impacts workplace cultural orientation of employees, the following proposition was developed:

Proposition 1: Like the national culture in Ethiopia, administrative culture in the state level civil service of ANRS is characterized by high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance and collectivistic orientation.

3.5.1 The Relationships between Administrative Culture and Institutionalization of Performance Management Reform

In the following subsections, the researcher presents the propositions for analysis of the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization of performance management reform in the context of the civil service under investigation and the basis for formulating them.

3.5.1.1 Power Distance

Power distance is the extent to which members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally (Hofstede, 2001; House *et al.*, 2004). In the context an organization, power distance is the difference between the extent to which a boss can determine the behavior of a subordinate and the extent to which the subordinate can determine the behavior of the boss (Hofstede, 2001: 209; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005:54). This is closely connected with the norms which exist in a given culture about equality and inequality (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005).

In instances where a society has large power distance, then it follows that organizations may as well be considered to have large power distance tendencies (Karyejja, 2012). Power is centralized as much as possible in a few hands and thereby subordinates expect to be told what to do. There are a lot of supervisory personnel, structured into tall hierarchies of people reporting to each other. Compensation systems, which include basic salary, benefits, incentives, housing facility, etc., show wide gaps between top and bottom in the organization (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005:55). Employees with high power distance orientation usually expect and accept power relations that are authoritarian and paternalistic. They often show respect to their superiors

based on the positions their superiors formally hold in the organization. This has a number of implications for the institutionalization of performance management reform, which relies heavily on a participative appraisal process – goal setting, interview and review.

In the subsections below, more detailed literature bases and reasonings for the potential links between power distance and the institutionalization of performance management reform is presented.

a) High power distance and performance agreement

Performance agreement is the bedrock of an effective performance management system (Grote, 2002:22). It involves the agreement between the manager and the subordinate on what and how the latter is expected to perform. It has been well-noted that participation, dialogue, and agreement between the manager and the subordinate are at the heart of the performance agreement due to the ideology of arriving at jointly agreed goals and objectives (Armstrong 2009; Longenecker and Gioia, 1992; Grote, 2002; Marr, 2008; McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009; Price, 2000). However, a high power distance culture may militate against these aspects of performance management system.

In high power distance cultures, where there is a great deal of respect for the elderly (respect for age), status and people in authority, there is a high degree of subservience to the elderly and authority figures in organizations (Budhwar, 2004). Social distance between superiors and subordinates is marked, with a sharp distinction and status difference between the management and the rank-and-file employees. Workers are expected to do their work and follow the management's instructions and directives. Subordinates rarely question or challenge those in authority, they do not express their opinions openly—but there is no shortage of opinions privately (Budhwar, 2004). Therefore, the idea of the mutually established objectives can be difficult to put in practice in the high power distance contexts in which the subordinates are expected to be merely followers and in which two-way dialogues with the boss seem untenable (Schneider and Barsoux, 2003).

With a large power distance, the bureaucracy is highly centralized, juniors are not expected to challenge authority openly or to participate in decision-making but to take orders (Karyeija, 2012; Munene, *et al.*, 2000). Yet, given that the performance agreement is expected to be

participatory, then it may not succeed well in a hierarchical environment characterized by a large power distance. This hierarchy that defines power relations is accentuated by wide compensation disparities and civil servants who cherish status symbols (Karyeija, 2012). It may also express itself in other ways such as *gender and generational differences*, whereby men and the elderly are generally considered culturally superior (Hofstede, 1997). Studies linking culture and performance management indicate that performance management in low power distance countries is more successful than in high power distance countries because low power distance countries do not have much tolerance for status and power differences, and consequentially, employees have a higher tendency to participate in performance agreement and review (Bjorkman and Lu, 1999; Earley, 1993; Earley and Stubblebine, 1989; Fletcher and Perry, 2001; Gelfand, *et al.*, 2004; Harrison, *et al.*, 2000; Jackson and Schuler, 2003).

The performance management works on the premise that the manager and the employee can engage each other in conversation without fear, as peers; but scholars, like Karyeija (2012), rightly ask that how this can be achieved within a large power distance cultural orientation where subordinates expect that only the superior gives instructions and commands. In fact, in large power distance cultures, those in lower ranks are not expected to actively participate in the performance agreement (Kirkbride and Westwood, 1993; Schneider and Barsoux, 2003) and it can be difficult for the idea of the mutually established objectives to take root in high power distance contexts (Schneider and Barsoux, 2003). It has also been observed that performance management, which is rooted in the MBO philosophy, reflects an American value position, in that it presupposes that the subordinate is sufficiently independent to have a meaningful dialogue with the boss (for there is not too high power distance) (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005:273).

In short, the performance management system may not fit with the high power distance culture because the subordinate with a high power distance cultural orientation may find it difficult to meet the manager and set his or her own goals in open dialogue with the manager.

b) High power distance and performance review

Performance management is a continuous process that involves ongoing reviews throughout the year and formal review once or twice yearly (Armstrong, 2009; Price, 2000). The ongoing performance reviews (informal reviews) are the processes by which performance is managed

throughout the year (Armstrong 2009; Longenecker and Gioia, 1992; Grote, 2002). The ongoing performance review requires the manager to give regular feedback to the subordinates and to function as a coach and mentor to the subordinates. Formal reviews are usually documented on paper or recorded on a computer (Armstrong 2009; Grote, 2002). They can provide the basis for decisions on performance pay, promotion, training, performance and development plans and actions to deal with poor performance (Armstrong, 2009).

According to Mendonca and Kanungo, all the critical activities in performance management require the manager to function as a coach and mentor to his subordinates, but high power distance is ‘certainly not compatible with this nature of the manager-subordinate relationship’ (Mendonca and Kanungo, 1996). The implication, therefore, is that the high power distance cultural orientation may clash with essential values of the performance management, which require that in order to be successful, there is mentoring and coaching within the performance management process, whereby the interaction between managers and subordinates is personalized and supportive. According to Karyeija, this is not usually the case in high power distance culture; instead *sycophancy* arises in order to smooth out the relationship. Sycophancy is manifested in many ways such as by flattery and by imitating the boss. It is intended to create an impression of a servile person and to win favour from the boss, which holds true also in the context of the performance management (Karyeija, 2012). Thus, sycophancy may deter the manager from forwarding negative (critical) feedback to the subordinates in the high power distance culture.

Formal performance review happens on a one-to-one basis – a get-together of the manager and the individual. This should be a conversation involving dialogue and joint analysis of performance. It should be constructive and forward-looking, not a top-down judgemental affair (Armstrong, 2009; McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009; Price, 2000). Fletcher and Perry (2001) observe that formal performance reviews and feedback on results in the large power distance cultures will most often be conducted by a person with a relatively more power than the subordinate, while in the low power distance cultures formal performance reviews are less dependent on superiors. In large power distance cultures, subordinates expect to receive performance feedback in a more directive manner; therefore, supervisors are expected to initiate feedback and employees are less likely to seek it from their superiors. In low power distance

cultures, by contrast, feedback may even be sought by the subordinate. But when large power distance deters juniors from demanding feedback, it undermines the core values of the performance management system because that system is designed so that those involved will relate to each other without feeling an unequal power distribution. This is because ‘it may not be the case that employees with a high power distance cultural orientation expect or desire to participate in the feedback and evaluation processes’ (Fletcher and Perry, 2001:136).

One of the negative outcomes of large power distance is that it perpetuates *corruption*. Hofstede writes: ‘power distance adds to the frequency of corruption, as larger power distances stand for fewer checks and balances against power abuse’ (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005:63). He further notes that countries with large power distance cultures are more likely to bribe compared to small power distance countries. It is this assumption that tempts scholars like Karyeija (2012) to argue that if an employee with high power distance cultural orientation finds it rewarding to bribe the boss to get a positive evaluation, the individual will go ahead and do it. And as long as other factors are brought into play, insofar as performance review is concerned, then subjective judgments take precedence over objective judgments and thus will undermine the spirit of the performance review which should be rooted in the reality of the employee’s performance.

c) *High power distance and rewards*

Performance management system relies on the premises that employees who are performing at high levels should be rewarded and those who fail to meet the performance standards should be provided with training or, if necessary, be dismissed (Pynes, 2004:225).

Hofstede notes that privileges and status symbols are normal and popular in large power distance cultures but frowned upon in small power distance societies. He adds that visible signs of status in large power distance cultures contribute to the authority of the bosses. By contrast in the small power distance cultures privileges for higher-ups are basically undesirable; for instance, everyone should use the same parking lot, toilets and cafeteria (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005:56). The desire for status symbols may also have some effects on the performance management system. For instance, Karyeija (2012) argues that in a large power distance culture, those in power would like to see the performance management as another exercise that contributes to their authority. This is because the formal performance review results are supposed to be used for

personnel decisions such as promotion, demotion and salary increment. Therefore, given that the manager is in charge of determining the future of the subordinates, it becomes an effective tool and is cherished. On the other hand, in small power distance cultures, we would expect that the performance management would only be looked at as a tool for assessing and communicating performance, with a minimal expectation that it will accentuate the power of the manager (Karyeija, 2012).

It is clear from the foregoing literature review that there are sound arguments and empirical evidences, albeit arguments are cross-cultural in nature and empirical evidences are mainly anecdotal, to argue that the institutionalization level of performance management reform in the civil service is attributable in part to the administrative cultural orientation of civil servants in relation to power distance. The literature review suggests that high power distance cultural orientation would have a negative influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform. Thus, to empirically examine the influence that power distance cultural dimension exerts on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the civil service under study, the following proposition was developed:

Proposition 2: Administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by power distance dimension, exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and on performance agreement, review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers aspects of the reform in particular.

3.5.1.2 Uncertainty Avoidance

Uncertainty avoidance reflects the extent to which members of an organization or society strive to avoid uncertainty by reliance on social norms, rituals and bureaucratic practices to alleviate the unpredictability of future events (Hofstede, 2001; House, *et al.*, 2004). The concept denotes a deficit in the knowledge about what the future may hold. It expresses the extent to which people either tolerate ambiguous situations or need formal rules (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). Uncertainty avoidance culture may be weak or strong. Bureaucracies in strong uncertainty avoidance cultures are more likely to create and maintain rules than those in weak uncertainty avoidance cultures, and people in the strong uncertainty avoidance cultures will tend to avoid situations that may not be easy to tackle (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005).

A strong uncertainty avoidance culture seeks to structure social systems (politics, education, and business) where order and predictability are paramount, and rules and regulations dominate. In such culture, risky situations create stress and upset people (De Luque, *et al.*, 2004; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). Next, the present researcher raises arguments in the literature and empirical evidences that support the potential link between uncertainty avoidance and the institutionalization of performance management reform as presented under the subsections (a–c) below.

a) *High uncertainty avoidance and performance agreement*

Performance management is concerned with the encouragement of productive discretionary behavior. As defined by Purcell and his associates, ‘discretionary behavior refers to the choices that people make about how they carry out their work and the amount of effort, care, innovation and productive behavior they display’ (Purcell, *et al.*, 2003, cited in Armstrong, 2006). This implies that a successful performance management system requires both the manager and the subordinates to be innovative, adaptive to the new changes and risk-takers. This is particularly important in a performance agreement stage of the performance management cycle where both the manager and the employee are expected to set challenging goals and innovative ways to achieve the goals.

Mendonca and Kanungo (1996) argue that the relatively high uncertainty avoidance in the developing countries implies that civil servants are unwilling to accept organizational change. Bureaucrats are reluctant to take personal initiatives outside of the prescribed roles and avoid taking risks. This eventually becomes a severe constraint on effective performance management. And yet involving subordinates in the setting of challenging and difficult goals is a key tenet of performance management. In cultures with strong uncertainty avoidance norms, emotions are displayed in a way that everything different is dangerous (Karyeija, 2012). People resist changes and worry about the future.

By contrast, cultures with a weak degree of uncertainty avoidance are open for new challenges and changes. People have less feelings of uncertainty about the future and like to avoid excessive rules and formalities. They are more likely to stimulate innovations and emphasize new ideas. When performance management is introduced into the high uncertainty avoidance culture, civil

servants may resist reforms because they have to learn something new. There exists a fear of the unknown and about their ability to adapt to it. As de Jager (2001) argues, ‘Most people are reluctant to leave the familiar behind. We are all suspicious about the unfamiliar; we are naturally concerned about how we will get from the old to the new, especially if it involves learning something new and risking failure’ (de Jager, 2001:24). This is also a familiar phenomenon within the performance management system. For instance Karyeija (2012), in his study of the relationship between administrative culture and performance appraisal reform in Uganda’s civil service, found that there was a fear mentality among the majority of civil servants with regard to developing new skills and behavior that are required in a new work setting. According to Karyeija’s (2012) findings, it is such fear mentalities that lead most civil servants in Uganda to reveal resentment-based resistant behavior such as not setting SMART goals, giving fraudulent self-evaluations and not being as transparent as possible.

b) *High uncertainty avoidance and performance review*

The argument for a formal performance review is that it provides a focal point for the consideration of key performance, motivational and development issues. It is a means for considering the future in the light of an understanding of the past. Performance review is forward-looking. It focuses on planning for the future rather than dwelling on the past. But it also takes into account when making these plans what has been achieved and, more importantly, how it has been achieved (Armstrong, 2006, 2009). However, these ideals of performance review may be difficult to be practiced in the high uncertainty avoidance cultures where constant needs for rule-following and limited belief in one’s ability to control the environment are taken to be the accepted norms.

It is well known that civil servants who are subjected to rigid and complex rules seldom take the initiative. They are also rarely accountable for their behavioral patterns and actions’ (Jabbara and Jabbara, 2005). Some of the implications of this kind of structure are: a) issues concerning performance management reforms that are not covered by rules are ignored due to lack of flexibility and innovation; b) time is wasted when a document passes through many hands before it is signed by a supervisor; c) obsession with rules perpetuates itself by the establishment of more formal rules; d) whenever there is dispute over an issue, or if a manager makes instructions, there is greater reliance on rules than on expertise to determine the best way forward and e) civil

servants are constrained by the existing rules because they may be punished for not following the rules and standing orders to the letter, that is, they may be held *ultra vires* for exceeding the bounds of their jurisdiction (Karyeija, 2012). Then, how do these aspects of rule-following affect the performance management reform?

For one thing, as Hofstede and Hofstede point out, this kind of reform, which is part of the MBO philosophy, reflects American values in that it presupposes that both superior and subordinate are prepared to accept some ambiguity (low uncertainty avoidance) (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005:273). This implies that both manager and subordinate should appreciate flexibility in rule application and the need for deviant ways of achieving goals as long as such practices are geared towards the benefit of the organization. However, a constant need for enhancing predictability in high uncertainty avoidance cultures may make the issue of flexibility and deviation from the prescribed ways either an unwanted business or a point of wrongdoing in the formal performance discussion.

Etounga-Manguelle (2000:68) argues that Africa is plagued by what he terms the *tyranny of time*: the ‘African is anchored in his ancestral culture . . . without a dynamic perception of the future, there is no planning, no foresight, and no-scenario building . . . no policy to affect the course of events’. This seems a harsh statement on the state of affairs in Africa, but it is generally perceived that there is little concern for proactive or future planning while there is excessive concern for maintaining the status quo (Umeh, 2005:122). Implications for the implementation of performance management reform are immense. It is conceivable that the manager and the subordinate operating within this mindset are likely to focus on the past rather than on planning for the future in the formal performance review and on the need to maintain continuity. The idea that performance management review allows both managers and individuals to take a positive look at how performance can be developed in the future also seems unattainable. For as Terence Jackson postulates, Western systems reflect a future, objective and performance orientation, whereas the ‘African’ management systems reflect the status quo and continuity with the past (Groeschl, 2003; Jackson, 2006:83).

The impact of high uncertainty avoidance culture is not limited to the forward-looking aspect of the performance review. It has also influence on the backward aspect of the performance review. Performance management practices assume that employees have control over their environment

and can achieve their goals (Schneider and Barsoux, 2003). As Groeschl argues, the level of control becomes important when reviewing past performance. He further notes that ‘control of the environment’ is a cultural characteristic linked to uncertainty avoidance, for it concerns the extent to which people think they have/lack control over their environment (Groeschl, 2003 :70).

Empirical evidence confirms that the level of control over the environment could influence the formal performance review, particularly reviewing past performance. For instance, in India, the uncertainty avoidance evidenced through *karma* (inevitable fate) has been used as a rationalization for accepting a sub-standard performance of the subordinates. This characteristic of uncertainty avoidance and lack of control could have a negative impact on reviewing past performance (Groeschl, 2003:72) because it would mean that supervisors are not giving the necessary feedback to their employees, or that the feedback is rationalized in such a way that makes it inoperative. As long as feedback fails to have the effects the promoters of the performance management systems expect and desire, it suggests that the performance management system is not functioning.

c) *High uncertainty avoidance and rewards*

Since one of the critical purposes of the performance management is using it as a basis for rewarding high performers and managing under-performers, it is important to understand the impact uncertainty avoidance has upon the implementation of this aspect of performance management reform. According to Mcfarlin and Sweeney (2001:75), there is a strong correlation between uncertainty avoidance and bonuses. These scholars note that countries with a weak uncertainty avoidance culture favour the idea that bonuses should be linked to performance, whereas countries with a strong uncertainty avoidance culture are less likely to use the variable of performance bonuses because bonuses would create more ambiguity than supervisors are willing to accept. This is significant because the performance management system favors rewards and bonuses based on individual performance, as opposed to general rewards across the board, which are preferred by all in the weak uncertainty avoidance cultures. Moreover, managing under-performers through the provision of identified skill gaps will be less likely to happen in the high uncertainty avoidance contexts, as training will likely focus more heavily on organizational rules and policies in order to enhance predictability (De Luque, *et al.*, 2004;

Gelfand, *et al.*, 2004). Hence, we may presuppose that a high uncertainty avoidance culture may impede the successful institutionalization of performance management system that intended to reward high performers and manage under-performers.

It clear from the foregoing literature review that there are supporting arguments and empirical evidences, albeit arguments are cross-cultural in nature and empirical evidences are mainly anecdotal, to argue that the institutionalization level of performance management reform in the civil service is attributable in part to the administrative cultural orientation of civil servants in relation to uncertainty avoidance. The literature review suggests that strong (high) uncertainty avoidance cultural orientation would have a negative influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform. Thus, to empirically examine the influence that uncertainty avoidance cultural dimension exerts on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the civil service under investigation, the following proposition was developed:

Proposition 3: Administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by uncertainty avoidance dimension, exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and on performance agreement, review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers aspects of the reform in particular.

3.5.1.3 Individualism/Collectivism

Individualism/Collectivism reflects the extent to which members of an organization or society identify themselves as either an individual or a member of a group (Hofstede, 1997, 2001; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). It differentiates between cultures in which an individual's personal attributes and uniqueness are central to identity and those in which an individual's relationships with and obligations to others are the focus of identity (Gelfand, *et al.*, 2004). Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in groups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede, 1997, 2001; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). In an organizational context, collectivism represents the extent to which organization members emphasis relationship

than task, the extent to which organization members prefer harmony and cooperation to confrontation and competition and the extent to which organization members prefer group-based work and reward to individual ones (Hofstede, 1997, 2001; House, *et al.*, 2004).

Unlike the previous two cultural dimensions, the impact that individualism/collectivism has on the performance management practices is well captured by those extant body of theoretical literature pertaining to the private sector (see section 2.7). However, its impact on public sector context in general and on reform context in particular is less understood. Therefore, in the subsequent paragraphs, an attempt has been made to assess the likely impact that individualism/collectivism has on the institutionalization of performance management reform in the context of the civil service under investigation.

a) *Individualism/Collectivism and performance agreement*

It is well noted that the performance agreement, the agreement between the manager and the subordinate on what the latter is expected to perform, should specify targets/goals that are SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-specific) (Erasmus and Van Dyk, 2003: 145; Gibb, 2002). Performance management system requires managers to evaluate subordinate's performance based on such agreed targets. However, one must question whether such lofty expectations play out in practice in collectivistic cultural contexts. It is reasonable to expect that the idea of defining individual performance in light of results can be met with great opposition in a collectivistic culture in which individual's social and supportive orientation are more valued than what he or she actually does.

More fundamentally, the very notion of 'effective' performance is culture-bound. In individualistic cultures, such as the US, the evaluation criteria are objective, quantifiable, and observable, and they focus primarily on employee's productivity (Jackson and Schuler, 2003). In contrast, performance evaluation in collectivistic cultures focuses more on social and relational criteria such as awareness of duties and obligations, willingness to work hard for the group, ability to maintain harmonious relationships, and conformity (Gelfand, *et al.*, 2004). Gelfand and his colleagues (2004) found that while individualistic cultures discourage employees from being evaluated on their character traits rather than on what they do, in many collectivistic cultures employees are judged on their integrity, loyalty, and morality. In other words, a performance

agreement that intended to arrive at SMART objectives can, at times, be at odds with the cultural emphasis that is placed on character appraisal (Gelfand, *et al.*, 2004). Hence, we expect that the institutionalization of performance management reform, which requires civil servants to set what is expected from them in terms of specific and measurable objectives, may suffer from cultural incompatibility in countries with a collectivistic culture like Ethiopia.

b) Individualism/Collectivism and performance review

Performance review is nothing more than the provision of timely and critical feedback to employees (Armstrong, 2009; McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009; Price, 2000). The performance of timely, ongoing feedback is highlighted by the very fact that unforeseen events occur. This may require a reappraisal of objectives. Having ongoing reviews allows the employees to provide details on how they are progressing and the manager can provide details on any organizational changes that may impact on the achievement of these objectives. It also allows one to see how their performance to date is being viewed and what might be required to engender improved performance (Williams, 2002).

It can be provided, on a one-to-one basis, by managers informally during the year or formally at a formal performance review meeting in which it will play an important part. It can be given by colleagues, subordinates or customers as part of a 360-degree feedback system (Armstrong, 2006, 2009:116). However, the extent to which this takes place in practice in a collectivistic culture is questionable.

It is well noted that in a collectivist culture, as opposed to individualistic culture, individuals strive to maintain harmony and social face which are considered to be socially desirable behavior (Fletcher and Perry, 2001; Gelfand, *et al.*, 2004; Hofstede, 1997; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). Jones, *et al.*, (1996) bring to our attention the difference between African and Western countries in terms of these cultural aspects, by stating that:

'In Western societies conflict and confrontation of idea tend to be accepted as normal and even desirable as the source of creativity. Trust and openness are asserted as desirable organizational features. Many African societies, in contrast, retain strong elements of traditional values emphasizing a concern for the quality of relationships, the desirability of consensus, and tolerance of individual weakness' (Jones, et al., 1996: 466).

Therefore, there may be a tendency to avoid critical and negative face-to-face feedback in collectivistic contexts like Africa so as not to damage social face and harmony. Rather, as Fletcher and Perry found, there is a tendency in collectivistic cultures to be indirect in nature, as individuals strive to maintain harmony and social face; thus, feedback is usually delivered in indirect, subtle, and non-confrontational ways, thereby making critical face-to-face feedback sessions unlikely and ineffective (Fletcher and Perry, 2001). This implies that in a collectivistic culture like Ethiopia, one may not be critical of a person in his or her presence. Consequently, giving negative or critical feedback—in fact, any face-to-face performance review—may be difficult for many managers. It may be considered as an attempt to ruin someone else's career.

As for methods of evaluation, 360-degree evaluation methods, which are popular in low power distance and individualistic cultures such as the US, tend not to be as effective in high power distance or collectivistic cultures (Gregersen, *et al.*, 1996). To explain, it is inappropriate for subordinates to evaluate their superiors in high power distance cultures, as it undermines the supervisors' authority (Gregersen, *et al.*, 1996). In collectivistic cultures, 360-degree evaluation is ineffective because individuals are likely to provide team members with consistently high evaluations as a result of both in-group bias and a desire to maintain group harmony (Bjorkman and Lu, 1999).

In principle, performance review is supposed to be undertaken regularly. However, in practice, members with a collectivistic cultural orientation are not undertaking performance evaluation regularly. There is potential and covert resistance to evaluating and discussing individual performance in such cultural contexts. Evaluating the work of groups, sections, or departments is more acceptable than evaluating the performance of an individual worker (Earley, 1993; Ramamoorthy and Carroll, 1998; Triandis and Bhawuk, 1997). Hence, we expect that the institutionalization of performance management reform, which requires regular and critical performance review to happen on a one-to-one basis as well as the employees to be critical in evaluating each other's performance, may be less likely to be successful in countries with collectivistic cultures like that of Ethiopia.

c) Individualism/Collectivism and rewards

The performance management system provides the management with important information for making strategic decisions on employees' promotions, training and development activities, compensation decisions, and retention or separation (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005; Pynes, 2004). Rewarding high performers (monetary and non-monetary rewards including promotion) and managing under-performers is among the building blocks of a performance management system (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005; Grote, 2002; Ketty, 2008; Pynes, 2004; Rudman, 2003). However, a collectivistic culture may adversely affect the sustained applicability of these aspects of performance management system in developing countries.

Aryee (2004) has explained how these cultural factors affect human resource management in developing countries, particularly in Ghana. As a collectivist society, Ghanaians seek meaning in life largely through social relationships, through identifying with the group in which they are embedded, and participating in its shared ways of life. This group is defined in terms of the extended family into which all Ghanaians are borne and whose interest they are socialized to promote. The extended family is characterized by a high degree of reciprocity in the exchange of both moral and material support. For example, it is the moral obligation of employed members of the family to financially support the aged and less fortunate members. When exported into an organizational context, the distinctions between in-group and out-group, and the associated obligation to help one's in-group members, have been noted to undermine the goal-oriented meritocratic purposes of a bureaucratic organization. This is because it encourages particularistic rather than universalistic organizational practices. For example, the decision to hire, reward, and promote should be based on the universal principle of an employee's contributions to organizational goal attainment. However, in a collectivistic context, such personnel decisions are based on non-merit considerations such as kinship ties (Aryee, 2004).

The adverse effect of a collectivistic culture becomes even more acute in matters relating to discipline (Budhwar, 2004). It is the norm in most of Sub-Saharan African countries for a transgressor awaiting disciplinary action to send a powerful delegation consisting of cultural and local potentates to the home of the manager to plead on behalf of the 'victim'. As part of the plea, the manager will be reminded of the economic and social damage the impending disciplinary action will do to the person's family (both immediate and extended), kinsmen,

village or even entire ethnic group. Such a situation creates problems in the discipline of employees in organizations as, culturally, it is expected that the manager will forgive the transgressor, or be deemed to be a wicked, unfeeling, insensitive and uncaring person. Consequently, managers often fail to invoke disciplinary action against employees for even gross misconduct because they do not want to incur the wrath of the employees and become unpopular in the organization (Budhwar, 2004). The issue of respect for the elderly also makes it difficult for a young manager to discipline older subordinates (Kamoche, *et al.*, 2004).

The above two paragraphs highlight that there is an empirical evidence for the adverse impact that a collectivistic culture has on the sustained applicability of performance management practices in Africa. Therefore, it is important here to take the issue further and understand the possible effects of this dimension of culture on institutionalization of the performance management system, which aims at promoting individual rewards.

It is well recognized that any decisions on performance-related pay, promotion and other rewards as well as actions towards under-performers in performance management system should rely on the results of individual performance reviews (Armstrong, 2009; Keety, 2008; McDonnell and Gunnigle; 2009). However, there is potential and covert resistance to evaluating and discussing individual performance in a collectivistic culture (Earley, 1993; Ramamoorthy and Carroll, 1998; Triandis and Bhawuk, 1997). Thus, performance management reforms that focused on individual performance, coupled with individual-focused reward systems, tend not to be a norm in collectivistic contexts.

Researchers suggest that the socially desirable forms of behavior like maintaining of group harmony in a collectivistic culture may militate against the application of individual rewards. In individualistic cultures such as the US, rewards that recognize individual accomplishment are highly motivating, whether they are monetary or non-monetary. In contrast, in collectivistic cultures like Japan, individual awards can cause disharmony among group members, and thus rewards that satisfy needs for affiliation are more motivating (Erez, 1994; Money and Graham, 1999).

In collectivistic cultures, where group membership is the central aspect of one's identity, employees prefer to work in a group and share rewards accordingly, unlike what holds true in

individualistic cultures (Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1997; Hofstede, 1997; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). As a result, a performance management system aimed at rewarding individuals for their performances can be met with great opposition in collectivistic cultures (Earley, 1993; Ramamoorthy and Carroll, 1998; Triandis and Bhawuk, 1997). Where the individuals subsume their individuality within a group identity, individual performance review and individual performance based pay schemes will become an empty ritual (Flynn, 2002:73). Furthermore, promotions decisions in collectivistic contexts tend to be based more on seniority than on merit (Ramamoorthy and Carroll, 1998). Imported performance management practices that strive to promote employees based on merit regardless of seniority can be met with great opposition in collectivistic cultures in which elders would lose face when placed under the supervision of more junior individuals; similarly, those in junior positions might feel that they lack credibility to be in the more senior position (Harrison, *et al.*, 2000). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the institutionalization of performance management reform that aims at promoting rewards and promotion based on individual performance may not be successful in the collectivistic countries like that of Ethiopia.

It is clear from the foregoing literature review that there are supporting arguments and empirical evidences, albeit arguments are cross-cultural in nature and empirical evidences are mainly anecdotal, to argue that the institutionalization level of performance management reform in the civil service is attributable in part to the administrative cultural orientation of civil servants in relation to collectivism. The literature review suggests that a collectivistic cultural orientation would have a negative influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform. Thus, to empirically examine the influence that a collectivistic cultural dimension exerts on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the civil service under investigation, the following proposition was developed:

Proposition 4: Administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by individualism/collectivism dimension, exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and on performance agreement, review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers aspects of the reform in particular.

3.5.1.4 Political Bias/Neutrality

This section focuses on the interface between politics and administration, that is to say, between political leaders and civil servants. The issue that is highlighted here is the extent to which bureaucrats retain political neutrality or become politically biased.

Political neutrality denotes civil servants' performing their jobs professionally and without bias towards politicians. On the other hand, political bias connotes a partisan bureaucracy that is more loyal to the interests and preferences of the ruling party (Karyeija, 2012). In an extreme case, political bureaucrats may resemble bureaucracies in socialist countries (i.e., in the former Soviet and East European countries) where bureaucrats were also active members of the socialist party (Karyeija, 2012). According to Putnam (1975), attitudes of bureaucrats may be classified into classical and political bureaucrats. A *classical bureaucrat* is more rule-oriented, while the *political bureaucrat* is more program-oriented. A classical bureaucrat may dislike political influence and intervention by political leaders in the daily affairs of the bureaucracy. They are likely to be more distrustful of politicians. In contrast, a political bureaucrat is more sensitive to political signals and guided by preferences of the party in power; they are also more trustful of politicians (Putnam, 1975 cited in Jamil, 1998).

If a bureaucracy is more classical, the bureaucrats' dispositions to reform measures by the government may vary from being positive to negative. To secure positive responses, their cooperation needs to be nurtured by making them active participants in the implementation phase. In contrast, the politically biased bureaucrats' natural inclination is to support government policies. Their positive disposition is natural and taken for granted (Jamil, 1998:97).

Bureaucratic attitudes along classical and political dimension may also develop because of the way bureaucrats are selected. In those systems where bureaucrats are recruited by a public personnel agency usually called the public service commission, bureaucrats are likely to be more classical. They are recruited on the basis of merit through a competitive selection procedure, and classical bureaucrats are expected to be loyal to professional norms and standards (Karyeija, 2012). Bureaucrats in these systems have tenure of service (Karyeija, 2012). These features of bureaucracy and the pattern of recruitment are almost common in most of African countries, particularly in those which once were British colonies (Karyeija, 2012). Karyeija further

observes that the bureaucrats in these countries perceive politics as mainly concerned with narrow personal interest gains. The politics in these countries has been characterized by unrest and instability, which in turn influences administrative culture.

Classical bureaucrats generally have a more negative attitude to politics than political bureaucrats (Jamil, 1998:97). Jamil argues that due to weakness of politics—imbued with factionalism, opportunism and narrow interest gain in most of African countries—it is not surprising that the civil servants have a negative attitude towards politics (Jamil, 1998:98).

Now the question is how such a negative attitude of bureaucrats towards the politics affects reform institutionalization? Though there is a dearth of empirical evidence in this area, research that was done on the Ugandan civil service by Karyeija (2012) is most vital to be considered here. Karyeija (2012) found that Ugandan civil servants want to keep aloof from the politicians; they dislike political interference and therefore resist the performance appraisal reform because it is perceived as a tool of the ruling regime. This resistance manifests itself in various ways; and the performance appraisal is not conducted. Even when the appraisal is conducted, it is not done on time. In relation to other activities, the performance appraisal is given minimal attention, which shows that there is no commitment to the appraisal system (Karyeija, 2012:168). Yet, in order for the performance management reform to take root, it needs commitment and not sabotage.

The above-quoted researcher further argues that the recent politicization of the bureaucracy, especially of middle and top level bureaucrats by the party in power in Uganda, adds more problem than solution to the institutionalization of performance appraisal reform in the country:

‘Because the civil servants in Uganda are not politically biased and overwhelmingly loyal to the ruling regime, the ruling political elite have opted for patronage to neutralize them. This has undermined the importance of the performance appraisal system which should ideally lead to promotions (Karyeija, 2012:168).

Given reforms are politically driven, we expect that high political neutrality orientation of civil servants, coupled with political patronage in the civil service, would have a negative influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform. Thus, to empirically examine the influence that political neutrality dimension exerts on the institutionalization level of

performance management reform within the civil service under examination, the following proposition was developed:

Proposition 5: Administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by political bias/neutrality dimension, exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and on performance agreement, review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers aspects of the reform in particular.

3.5.1.5 Performance Orientation

Performance orientation is the degree to which society and an organization encourages and rewards its members for performance, excellence, and innovation (House, *et al.*, 2004: 25). Of obvious relevance to performance management are the cultural beliefs regarding whether work performance and reward are linked, as well as whether orientation around innovation and performance improvement are rewarded. Organizations with a high performance orientation emphasize results and reward good performance and innovation. Organizations with a low performance orientation emphasize loyalty and belongingness and reward seniority and experience over individual performance, view merit pay as potentially destructive (House, *et al.*, 2004).

Swiss (2005) argued that information and capacity to improve without performance-based rewards will often lead to inertia. For example, if a manager or a front-line worker has information that indicates a shortfall in expected results, but they are not motivated to take responsibility to improve results, such information is of little value. This may explain why some employees pay little attention to results. A number of studies have documented the importance of and the benefits of linking performance to rewards in order to successfully institutionalize performance management in organizations (Fletcher and Williams, 1992; Marr, 2008; Rynes, *et al.*, 2005; Swiss, 2005).

Baird (2012) empirically examined the association between rewards and performance management implementation in the public sector, thereby concluding that ‘performance management systems are take roots in an organization when there is a connection between the results of the performance management system and the reward system of the organization’

(Baird, 2012: 176). Indeed, scholars like Marr (2008) rightly argued that ‘In order for performance management to be taken seriously, organizations should first overhaul their low performance orientation culture. This is because for performance management to be embedded, performance must have consequences. Both good and bad performance must have some sort of effect. If not, people will realize that performance measurement and performance management initiatives are not really important and have no real meaning’ (Marr, 2008: 225).

The above-mentioned literature review points to performance orientation culture as having a positive influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform. Hence, we expect that the current institutionalization level of performance management reform in the civil service under examination may be associated with the degree of performance-oriented culture thereon. Thus, to empirically examine the influence that performance orientation culture exerts on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the civil service in question, the following proposition was developed:

Proposition 6: Administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by performance orientation dimension, exerts a positive and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and on performance agreement, review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers aspects of the reform in particular.


3.6 The Analytical Framework of the study

It has been demonstrated in the discussion made so far (refer to sections 3.1 – 3.5) that there is sufficient theoretical basis and empirical evidences, albeit such evidences are mainly cross-cultural and anecdotal, to argue that the institutionalization level of performance management reform in the civil service would be attributable in part to the administrative culture within the civil service, i.e., cultural orientation of civil servants in relation to power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, performance orientation and political bias/neutrality.

The task is, therefore, to identify administrative culture within the civil service, to determine the institutionalization status of performance management reform and to establish empirically whether or not administrative culture within civil service has an influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform. To help achieve this, on the bases

of the foregoing discussions, the analytical framework that depicts the potential effects of five administrative cultural dimensions (refer to section 3.5) on the institutionalization level of the three core elements of performance management reform (refer to section 2.5) was developed and presented in Figure 3.1 below. This analytical framework thus provides a useful basis for focusing attention on specific contextual and substantive variables in this research. Collection of data on these various variables will make it possible to assess administrative culture within the civil service, to determine the institutionalization status of performance management reform and to establish empirically whether or not administrative culture within the civil service has an influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in this research.

Figure 3.1 Analytical Framework of the Study



3.7 Summary

This chapter's aim has been to develop a theoretical and analytical framework for studying the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization of performance management reform in the context of the civil service under investigation. Many factors possibly justify the success or failure of performance management reform institutionalization, but the chapter focused on administrative culture, grounded in the cultural approach to the study of public management reform for the development of an analytical framework that can facilitate a better understanding of this phenomenon.

Accordingly, the chapter has discussed how administrative culture may influence the institutionalization of performance management reforms operating in different cultural settings. It analyzed the possible categories for aggregate behavioral patterns, orientations, values and beliefs of civil servants, and the possible influence of these variables on the institutionalization of performance management reform. As such, five variables were elucidated: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, performance orientation, and political bias/neutrality. These variables and their likely influence on the institutionalization of performance management reform were proposed and diagrammatically presented in the analytical framework, which underpins the empirical work of the present study.

The next chapter discusses research methodology, identifying and discussing the most appropriate choices for pursuing the research questions.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.0 Introduction

This study investigates the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization level of performance management reform in Ethiopia by taking the state level civil service of ANRS as a research context. As explained in chapter one, in view of the fact that the problem of the annual confidential report system in ANRS was similar to that of the federal government, the ANRS government legitimized the performance management reform policy developed by the federal government in November 2001 (see section 1.2.3.3 for details). Thus, the present study utilizes the Ethiopian federal government performance management reform policy as a frame of reference for investigating the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.

It is well noted that the choice of a research approach should consider the main objective that we set out to illuminate (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2009). It is evident from the first chapter that the main objective of the present study is concerned with investigating the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization level of performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS. To help achieve this, a quantitative methodology, which incorporates to some degree the qualitative approach, was adopted. This chapter details the processes followed and justifies this.

4.1 Research Paradigm

Investigating the relationships highlighted in the analytical framework requires a consideration of the principal research paradigm within which the research is to be undertaken and the research methods that are appropriate within this paradigm. At present, there are two major research paradigms: the qualitative paradigm (phenomenological or interpretive) and the quantitative paradigm (positivist). It has been observed in Walker (1997) that parts of the process of undertaking re-search which literally means ‘to search again’ is to review problems from

different perspectives. The choice of the research methodology should enable this process to take place, and should allow the systematic and objective gathering, processing and analyzing of data (Walker, 1997) to provide the new perspectives required.

In order to achieve the main aim of this research which requires an assessment of the institutionalization status of performance management reform and features of administrative culture within state level civil service of ANRS so that empirical examination of the relationships between administrative culture and institutionalization level of performance management reform can be undertaken, a principally positivist orientation was adopted. It was evident in the literature review and theoretical framework (refer to chapters 2 and 3) that scholars' suggestions for potential relationships between culture and the institutionalization of a performance management system are more of subjective and based on anecdotal evidences. It was also evident that the researches that have objectively addressed the relationships between culture and the institutionalization of performance management reform in the public sector context are very rare. Therefore, in order to provide objective evidence and new perspectives, which is the essence of undertaking a scholarly research, the quantitative approach was considered appropriate.

However, reliance on such a purely quantitative research approach may not be fully adequate to elaborate complex phenomena such as culture and its relationships with management practices (Kiessling and Harvey, 2005: 22). For this reason, it was considered justifiable to incorporate within this by and large positivist paradigm an element of the qualitative approach to satisfy this requirement for a conciliatory approach. This approach is consistent with Denison and Mishra's (1995) methodology for investigating the relationship between organizational culture and effectiveness and is also consistent with the arguments of Raftery, *et al.*, (1997), Kumaraswamy, *et al.*, (1997) and Liu (2002) in favor of some degree of methodological liberalism in synthesizing paradigms where appropriate in general management research.

Therefore, in order to assess the institutionalization status of performance management reform and features of administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS as well as to empirically examine the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization level of performance management reform, the present study largely used the quantitative data

obtained through survey and then utilized the qualitative data obtained through in-depth interview to elaborate upon the survey results.

4.2 Deductive and Inductive Research

In discussions concerning methodological choices, one often distinguishes between induction and deduction. Deductive research is an approach in which a conceptual or analytical and theoretical structure is developed and then tested by empirical observation, and thus particular instances are deducted from general inferences. The deductive method is referred to as moving from the general to the particular (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Inductive research is an approach in which theory is developed from the observation of empirical reality, and thus general inferences are induced from the particular instances (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).

The logic of this research was that a number of propositions were derived from the thorough review of the extant body literature on the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization of performance management reform. The propositions were then tested empirically in the context of the state level civil service of ANRS and conclusions were developed which could be applied to the overall population of the study. This is moving from the general to the particular and is deductive research.

4.3 The Research Design

Consistent with the research paradigm described above, the research design included two main data collection techniques: First, a self-report questionnaire was developed with the aim to gather quantitative data pertinent to the first two research objectives. Second, semi-structured interviewing was employed to gather more qualitative and contextual information in line with the third research objective. In other words, explanatory sequential design (quantitative data collected before qualitative data) was preferred to guide the investigation into relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization level of the performance management reform in the context of present study.

For details of data collection procedures, analysis and reporting, see the quantitative and the qualitative approaches discussed separately in the following sections.

4.4 The Quantitative Approach

A quantitative approach to this research was considered necessary because, as noted in Walker (1997), empirical research provides strong evidence for explaining phenomenon. More appropriately, in the context of this investigation, this kind of research enables the present researcher to establish whether or not administrative culture affects institutionalization of performance management reform, and which cultural dimensions are significant, in a scientific way, thus allowing the objective of explanatory assertions about the sample, and by inference the population, to be achieved (Babbie, 1990; Czaja and Blair, 1996).

In conducting quantitative research, three main approaches are typically employed. These approaches as identified by Burns and Grove (1993:37) are desk research, experimentation, and survey. In the present research, the survey research design was adopted as described below.

4.4.1 Survey Research

Survey research helps to answer questions such as ‘What do you think/feel/believe about...?’ or ‘How many times have you/do you...?’ (Whiteley, 2002: 345). Survey research includes cross-sectional and longitudinal studies using questionnaires or structured interviews for data collection, with the aim of generalizing from a sample about a population (Babbie, 1990; Burns and Grove, 1997; Creswell, 2003). Although it also has limitations such as low response rates (for questionnaire surveys) and the risk of bias, this strategy offers the opportunity to explore a broad range of issues such as those envisaged in this research.

In this research, therefore, the survey research design was adopted to provide, as indicated by Creswell (2003), a quantitative description of perceptions, attitudes or opinions of the population by studying a sample of that population. Specifically, a cross-sectional questionnaire survey of civil servants was adopted with the questionnaire designed to elicit information about the institutionalization level of performance management reform and features of administrative culture within the civil service under investigation. This information was then employed in the statistical analysis of the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization status of performance management reform within the civil service in question.

In the subsections below, brief explanations on the unit of analysis, the design and development of the survey questionnaire, the pilot phase of the study and the survey sampling procedures are presented.

4.4.1.1 Unit of Analysis

The main aim of this research is to empirically establish whether or not administrative culture (i.e., values, beliefs, norms and practices of civil servants) within the state level civil service of ANRS has an influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform (i.e., the extent to which activities and actions prescribed in the performance management reform policy are routinely carried out by civil servants). From this, it can be seen that the appropriate unit of analysis for the research is civil servants, with the survey enquiring into individual civil servant's perceptions, beliefs, values and attitudes with respect to five dimensions of administrative culture and his or her perceptions and experiences of performance management (PM) practices centered on three aspects of the PM reform.

4.4.1.2 Survey Questionnaire Design

According to Enarson, *et al.*, (2001:73), the most commonly used data collection instrument in survey research is questionnaire. The design of survey questionnaire can be grouped into two categories: electronic and paper-based. In the present study, the paper questionnaire was designed in a booklet format. Given its relatively lengthy size, particular emphasis was placed on the structure of the questionnaire. Roberson and Sundstrom (1990) suggest that special attention should be paid to the structure of questionnaire surveys. The central issue to be considered at this stage is the need for a clear structure, regarding the various sections of the questionnaire.

In line with the above suggestion, it was decided to structure the questionnaire into three parts. The first part contains questions about the participant's demographic background. The questions relate to respondent's age, gender, job position, educational level, work experience, organization identity and place of birth. Part two comprises fifty eight questions intended to assess the prevailing administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS. There were five sections to this part of the questionnaire, and these sections assessed the perceptions, beliefs, values, attitudes and practices of civil servants with respect to the five key dimensions of

administrative culture. The last part comprises twenty one questions intended to measure the institutionalization status of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. There were three sections in this part of the questionnaire, and these sections assessed civil servant's perceptions and experiences of performance management (PM) practices centered on three aspects of the PM reform.

Survey questions can be grouped into two categories: close-ended and open-ended questions. With the close-ended questions, the respondents are asked to choose answers from a set of alternatives; with open-ended questions, the respondents are expected to answer in their own words (Edwards. *et al.*, 1997:24). In survey research, researchers usually prefer to use close-ended questions because the alternative answers are set in a way that can easily be quantified by the researcher (Whiteley, 2002: 345). Hence, in this study, close-ended questions were used.

4.4.1.3 Survey Questionnaire Development

In order to develop the questionnaire, relevant measures for all the variables in the study were sourced from existing studies or developed by the researcher. All measures are described below.

Measurement for the Independent Variables

The following five administrative culture dimensions were used as independent variables in the present study. The measurement for each of these is explained below.

Power Distance (PD)

Power distance represents the extent to which members of an organization or society within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally (Hofstede, 2001; House *et al.*, 2004). It encompasses the organization members' attitudes towards hierarchy, expectation and perception of command-based superior-subordinate relationship and beliefs and attitudes towards status symbolism (Hofstede, 2001; House, *et al.*, 2004). Thus, power distance is operationalized as the civil servants' beliefs, attitudes and perceptions regarding: 1) hierarchy 2) superior-subordinate relationship and 3) status symbolism.

The 14 items were designed to capture the civil servants' power distance cultural orientations centered on three *PD* indicator concepts: hierarchy, superior-subordinate relationship, and status

symbolism. This fourteen-item construct was designed based on a synthesis of items developed by Schwartz (1999), Hofstede, (2001), House, *et al.*, (2004) and Karyeija (2012). The questionnaire statements of the instrument were anchored to a five-point scale ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. All items were worded in the same context that high mean scores indicate high power distance orientation and low mean scores indicate low power distance orientation. After the validation of items through factor analysis, the average score for each of the three indicator concepts was aggregated and divided by three to create the index or composite variable of power distance. The distribution of the 14 items between the three *PD* indicator concepts, together with a sample item per concept, is presented in Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1: *PD* Indicator Concepts with Sample Items

PD indicator concepts	Number of items	Sample item
Hierarchy	4	Hierarchy within organization is necessary because people have to know 'who has authority over whom'.
Superior-subordinate relationship	7	Subordinates should be told what to do.
Status symbolism	3	I believe that managers at all levels should be entitled to privileges like car and big offices.

Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)

Uncertainty avoidance reflects the extent to which members of an organization or society strive to avoid uncertainty by reliance on social norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices to alleviate the unpredictability of future events (Hofstede, 2001; House, *et al.*, 2004). An uncertainty avoidance cultural orientation encompasses the degree to which members of the organization are rule-oriented, the degree to which innovation and risk-takings are appreciated and the extent to which members tolerate change and ambiguity (Hofstede, 2001; House, *et al.*, 2004). Thus, uncertainty avoidance is operationalized as the civil servants beliefs, attitudes and perceptions regarding: 1) rule orientation 2) innovation and creativity, and 3) change and ambiguity.

The 14 items were designed to capture the civil servants' uncertainty avoidance cultural orientations centered on three *UA* indicator concepts: rule orientation, innovation and creativity,

and change and ambiguity. This fourteen-item construct was designed based on a synthesis of items developed by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997), Hofstede, (2001), House, *et al.*, (2004), Karyeija (2012), and Messner (2012). The questionnaire statements of the instrument were anchored to a five-point scale ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. Except one item (i.e., UAQ7 — Most civil servants need to be busy and work hard), all items were worded in the same context that high mean scores indicate a strong uncertainty avoidance orientation and low mean scores indicate a weak uncertainty avoidance orientation. Therefore, item seven was reversely coded. After the validation of items through factor analysis, the average score for each of the three indicator concepts was aggregated and divided by three to create the index or composite variable of uncertainty avoidance. The distribution of the 14 items between the three *UA* indicator concepts, together with a sample item per concept, is presented in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2: *UA* Indicator Concepts with Sample Items

UA indicator concepts	Number of items	Sample item
Rule orientation	4	Organization rules should not be broken, even when the employee thinks it is in the organization's best interests.
Innovation and creativity	5	I believe that subordinates feel more comfortable to work under close supervision than independently.
Change and ambiguity	5	Disagreements can unleash aggression and should therefore be avoided in my organization.

Collectivism

Collectivism represents the extent to which members of an organization emphasis relationship rather than task, prefer harmony and cooperation to confrontation and competition, and prefer group-based work and reward to individual ones (Hofstede, 2001). Thus, collectivism is operationalized as the civil servants' beliefs, preferences and perceptions regarding: 1)

relationship vs. task orientation 2) harmony and cooperation vs. confrontation and competition and 3) group vs. individual modalities of work and reward.

The 14 items were designed to capture the civil servants' collectivistic cultural orientations centered on three collectivism indicator concepts: relationship vs. task orientation, harmony and cooperation vs. confrontation and competition, and group vs. individual modalities of work and reward. This fourteen-item construct was designed based on a synthesis of items developed by Schwartz (1999), Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997), Hofstede, (2001) and House, *et al.*, (2004). The questionnaire statements of the instrument were anchored to a five-point scale ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. All items were worded in the same context that the higher mean scores indicate collectivistic orientation and the lower mean scores indicate individualistic orientation. After the validation of items through factor analysis, the average score for each of the three indicator concepts was aggregated and divided by three to create the index or composite variable of collectivism. The distribution of the 14 items between the three collectivism indicator concepts, together with a sample item per concept, is presented in Table 4.3 below.

Table 4.3: Collectivism Indicator Concepts with Sample Items

Collectivism indicator concepts	Number of items	Sample item
Relationship vs. task orientation	4	I believe that individual social and supportive orientation is more emphasised than what he or she actually does in my organization.
Harmony and cooperation vs. Confrontation and competition	7	Competition can unleash aggression and should therefore be avoided.
Group vs. individual modalities of work and reward	3	I believe that group welfare is more important than individual rewards.

Political Bias/Neutrality (PB/N)

Administrative cultural dimension of political bias/neutrality is operationalized as the civil servants' attitudes and perceptions towards politicians (i.e., the extent of trustfulness or distrustfulness of politicians) and the extent to which civil servants prefer the business of the civil service to be independent of politicians' interventions and influences.

After reviewing the relevant literature for available measures (e.g., Putnam, 1975; Jamil, 1998; Karyeija, 2012), it was considered appropriate to use the twelve-items construct developed by Karyeija (2012). This is because the construct was developed in the context of the civil service and hence fit with the context of the present study. The questionnaire statements of the instrument were anchored to a five-point scale ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree.

This twelve-item construct assesses civil servants' political cultural orientations centered on two *PB/N* indicator concepts: relationship between politics and the civil service, and the civil servants' perceptions and attitudes towards politicians. Five of its items assess civil servants' beliefs and preferences, regarding the relationship between politics and the civil service, while the remaining five items focus on the civil servants' attitudes and perceptions towards politicians. In Karyeija's (2012) study, the construct exhibited good reliability that exceeded .70. In line with Karyeija (2012), one item (i.e., PLTQ5 — It is an advantage for the public sector if top civil servants share the political views of the ruling government) was reversely coded. The remaining eleven items were worded in the same context that high mean scores are associated with political neutrality and low mean scores are associated with political bias (Karyeija (2012). After the validation of items through factor analysis, the average score for each of the two indicator concepts was aggregated and divided by two to create the index or composite variable of political bias/neutrality. The distribution of the 12 items between the two *PB/N* indicator concepts, together with a sample item per concept is presented in Table 4.4 below.

Table 4.4: PB/N Indicator Concepts with Sample Items

PB/N indicator concepts	Number of items	Sample item
Relationship between politics and the civil service	5	Civil servants should always remain neutral in relation to political parties.
Civil servants' perceptions and attitudes towards politicians	7	Politicians think more about their welfare than that of the citizens.

Performance Orientation

Performance orientation culture is operationalized as the civil servants' perceptions on the extent to which work performance and rewards are linked and the extent to which orientation around innovation and performance improvement are encouraged within the civil service. Civil servants' perceptions on performance orientation culture were measured with a construct originally designed by House, *et al.*, (2004). This comprises four items assessing the extent to which individuals perceived that their organization encourages and rewards work performance as well as orientation around innovation.

The original seven-point scale of this construct was changed to a five-point Likert scale, ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree and the questionnaire statements were prefaced accordingly. In House, *et al.*, (2004) study, the construct demonstrated good discriminant validity based on factor analysis. It also exhibited high reliability that exceeded .90. All items were worded in the same context that high mean scores are associated with high performance orientation culture and low mean scores are associated with low performance orientation culture (House, *et al.*, 2004). After the validation of items in this scale through factor analysis, the average score for each of valid items was aggregated and divided by the total number of valid items in that scale to create the index or composite variable of performance orientation culture.

Measurement for the Dependent Variables

The institutionalization statuses of each aspect of the Ethiopian government performance management reform, including the overall performance management reform, were used as

dependent variables in the present study. The institutionalization of performance management reform is operationalized as the extent to which activities and actions prescribed in the performance management reform policy (regulatory frameworks) are routinely carried out by civil servants and thus have become a normal and usual practices of employees' performance management within the civil services under investigation (refer to sections 2.4 and 2.5 for details on reform policy).

It has been demonstrated in chapter two that the Ethiopian government performance management reform policy stipulated activities and actions that should be followed by civil servants, regarding three aspects of performance management (PM) practices: performance agreement, performance review, and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers. Thus, it was considered appropriate to use the reform policy as a frame of reference and to develop items that assess the institutionalization level of PM reform centered on its three aspects.

Accordingly, 21 items were designed to capture civil servants' perceptions and experiences of PM reform centered on three aspects of the PM reform. All items were anchored to a five-point scale ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. All items were worded in the same context that high mean scores indicate high level of PM reform institutionalization and low mean scores indicate low level of PM reform institutionalization. The distribution of the 21 items between the three aspects of PM reform, together with a sample item per aspect, is presented in Table 4.5 below.

Table 4.5: PM Reform Aspects with Sample Items

PM reform aspect	Number of items	Sample item
Performance agreement	6	I usually engage in joint discussion with my supervisor while agreeing on tasks and objectives that I have to accomplish during a given performance management cycle.
Performance review	10	I and my supervisor usually focus our discussion on planning for the future rather than simply dwelling on the past during formal performance review meetings.
Rewarding high performers and managing under-performers	5	My eligibility for any reward practices like salary increment or training opportunity in my organization is only based on performance than other criterion.

It is important to remind that the present study proposed that administrative culture, as measured by the five independent variables, has a significant influence on the institutionalization level of each aspect of the PM reform, including the overall PM reform. Therefore, it was considered necessary to create an index to the institutionalization level of each aspect of the PM reform as well as to the overall PM reform.

As shown in Table 4.5 above, six items were designed to capture civil servants' perceptions and experiences of PM reform with regard to the performance agreement aspect of the performance management reform. After the validation of items in this scale through factor analysis, the average score for each of valid items was aggregated and divided by the total number of valid items in that scale to create the index of the institutionalization level of performance agreement. Ten items were designed to capture civil servants' perceptions and experiences of PM reform with regard to the performance review aspect of the performance management reform. After the validation of items in this scale through factor analysis, the average score for each of valid items was aggregated and divided by the total number of valid items in that scale to create the index of the institutionalization level of performance review. Five items were designed to capture civil servants' perceptions and experiences of PM reform with regard to rewarding high performers' and managing under-performers' aspect of the performance management reform. After the validation of items in this scale through factor analysis, the average score for each of valid items was aggregated and divided by the total number of valid items in that scale to create the index of the institutionalization level of rewarding high performers and managing under-performers.

Finally, the average score for each aspect of the performance management reform was aggregated and divided by three to create the index of institutionalization level of the overall performance management reform.

Demographics

A set of demographic details were included in the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to indicate their age, gender, place of growth, educational level, job position, organizational identity and work experience in the civil service. Age was measured in years using three categories: 1= 18-30, 2= 30-45 and 3= >45. Gender was measured as 1= female and 2= male. Place of growth was measured as 1= urban and 2= rural. Organization identity was measured using two

categories: 1= bureau and 2= agency\authority. Level of education was measured using three brackets: 1= diploma, 2= BA degree and 3= MA degree and above. Job position was measured using three categories: 1= clerical, 2= non-managerial professional and 3= managerial. Work experience was measured in terms of service years using three categories: 1=1-5, 2= 5-10 and 3= >10. All these demographic variables were used as control variables in the regression analysis. Their association with respondents' administrative cultural orientation was also examined.

It is important to note that, within the framework of correlation analysis, four of the seven demographic variables were recoded for meaningful statistical analysis and interpretation. Age was recoded into two categories: 1= young age (18-30, and 30-45) and 2= old age (>45). Job position was recoded into two categories: 1= non-managerial employees (clerical and non-managerial professional) and 2= managerial employees. Level of education was recoded into two categories: 1= graduate (diploma and BA degree) and 2= postgraduate (MA degree and above). Work experience was recoded into into two categories: 1= < 10 years (1-5 and 5-10) and 2= > 10 years (refer to section 6.4).

4.4.1.4 Pilot Study

According to Burns and Grove (2003: 42), a pilot study is often defined as 'a smaller version of a proposed study, and is conducted to refine the methodology'. The pilot study helps to identify possible problems in the proposed study and allows the researcher to revise the research instruments before the actual study (Burns and Grove, 2003: 42). It, in other words, helps the researcher to get a better understanding of the frame of references relevant to the questionnaire and the wording of the questions (Mark and Peter, 2001:78).

The literature suggests that the characteristics of the pilot sample should resemble those of the target population (Burns and Grove, 2003; Mark and Peter, 2001). As far as the pretest sample size concerned, it is generally recommended that this be small (Zaltman and Burger, 1975). Other authors offer more specific sample sizes. For instance, Burns and Grove (2003) suggest the pretest sample size should account for 10% of the main sample.

Accordingly, the pretesting of the questionnaire considered the above issues. The first step included the distribution of the pilot questionnaire to three academics in Bahir Dar University.

The questionnaire was handed individually to each academic and they were asked to review the items of questionnaire and give feedback on the clarity of content and layout. Overall, the feedback was positive. But based on their feedback on the need of more clarity for some items under the second section of the questionnaire, the items were improved. This was done by the inclusion of simple explanations and examples for items that need more clarity.

Following this, the second phase of the pilot study included the distribution of revised questionnaire to a sample of forty employees working in four civil service units (Bureau of Civil Service, Bureau of Industry and Urban Development, Bureau of Culture and Tourism, and Bureau of Youth's and women's Affairs) in order to test for completion time, content clarity and layout. A feedback form was attached at the end of the pilot questionnaire. Twenty eight responses were received. The average completion time was reported to be twenty five minutes, with respondents indicating completion time no more than thirty minutes. This was considered acceptable given the size of the questionnaire. They also commented on the questionnaire's layout and they characterized it as satisfactory and non-problematic. Finally, they reported no apparent problems with the relevance, content and structure of the questionnaire. As a result of this second phase of pretesting, no further amendments were made.

4.4.1.5 Survey Sampling Procedures

The survey in the present study sought to obtain civil servants' experiences and perceptions on the extent to which the performance management reform has been institutionalized within the civil service of ANRS and their administrative cultural orientations and thereby to describe both the status of the reform institutionalization and the administrative culture within the state level civil service of the region in the view of their own employees. The number of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS during the study period was 2334 (BOSC, 2013). This number of population excludes the police, prisons, army, and local government.

Researchers in survey research usually determine their sample through a process termed *probability sampling* (the selection of research subjects by random sampling procedures using simple, systematic, stratified, cluster sampling or multi-stage sampling) (Polit and Hungler, 1989:168; Singh, 2007: 103).

In the case of simple random sampling, every unit of the population has equal probability of being selected. In the case of systematic random sampling, the unit is selected on a random basis and then additional sampling units are selected at an evenly spaced interval until all desired units are selected. Stratified random sampling, also sometimes called proportional or quota random sampling, involves dividing the population into mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive subgroups/strata and then taking a simple random sample in each subgroup/strata. Stratified random sampling can be further subdivided into (i) proportionate stratified random sampling, where each stratum has the same sampling fraction, and (ii) disproportionate stratified random sampling, where each stratum has different sampling fractions, that is, disproportionate numbers of subjects are drawn from some stratum compared to others. Cluster random sampling signifies that instead of selecting individual units from the population, the entire group or clusters are selected at random (Singh, 2007:103).

All the methods of sampling discussed so far are examples of simple random sampling strategies. In most real-life social research, however, researchers need to use sampling methods that are considerably more complex than simple random sampling. A multi-stage sampling is one of such complex sampling strategies'. A multi-stage sampling, as the name suggests, involves the selection of units at more than one stages. The number of stages in a multi-stage sampling strategy varies depending on convenience and availability of suitable sampling frames at different stages (Singh, 2007:107).

In line with the multi-stage sampling approach, this thesis adopted a three-stage multi-stage sampling approach, using proportionate stratified random sampling. The discussion below presents the sampling procedures.

Stage I: This stage involved the selection of organizations as primary sampling units (PSUs). In other words, this first step involved the categorization of all government organizations within the state level civil service of ANRS according to the categories stipulated in the government organization structures act of ANRS and the selection of those representatives. This stage resulted in a total of 20 government machineries, of which 15 are designated as bureaus and the remaining 5 as agencies (Government of ANRS, 2010). Seven bureaus and two agencies which nearly account for 50% of the total civil service institutions at the state level in ANRS were

chosen by the researcher based on a proportionate stratified random sampling technique. Table 4.6 below presents all the civil service organizations at the state level in ANRS, and Table 4.7 depict those organizations sampled in the present study.

Table 4.6: Civil Service Organizations at the State Level in ANRS

Civil Service Organizations	
Bureaus (Stratum I)	Agencies/Authorities (Stratum II)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Agriculture Bureau 2. Trade and Transport Bureau 3. Finance and Economic Development Bureau 4. Environmental Protection and Rural Land Administration Bureau 5. Water Resources Development Bureau 6. Industry and Urban Development Bureau 7. Education Bureau 8. Health Bureau 9. Justice Bureau 10. Administrative and Security Affairs Bureau 11. Culture and Tourism Bureau 12. Civil Service Bureau 13. Women’s, Children’s and Youth’s Affairs Bureau 14. Labor and Social Affairs Bureau 15. Technical and Vocational Bureau 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Revenue’s Authority 2. Rural Roads’ Authority 3. Sport Commission 4. Government Affairs Communication Office 5. Information and Communications Technology Development Agency

Source: Government of ANRS (2010)

Table 4.7: Sampled Civil Service Organizations of ANRS

Sampled Civil service organizations	
Bureaus (Stratum I)	Agencies/Authorities (Stratum II)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Trade and Transport Bureau (BOTT) 2. Industry and Urban Development Bureau (BOIUD) 3. Education Bureau (BOE) 4. Culture and Tourism Bureau (BOCT) 5. Civil Service Bureau (BOCS) 6. Women’s, Children’s and Youth’s Affairs Bureau (BOWCY) 7. Labour and Social Affairs Bureau (BOLSA) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Revenue’s Authority (RA) 2. Information and Communications Technology Development Agency (ICA)

Source: Result of Proportionate Stratified Random Sampling

Stage II: This stage involved the selection of departments (work processes) within each of the sampled organizations. It involved the categorization of all departments (work processes) within each of the sampled organizations on the bases of the two basic categories of departments (work processes) in the civil service and then the selection of those representatives. These categories were core work processes (main departments) and support work processes (support departments). Appendix 4 presents the categorized departments in each of the sampled organizations. Table 4.8 presents those departments (work processes) selected from both strata in each of the sampled organizations. The selection was made through the proportionate stratified random sampling technique.

Table 4.8: Sampled Work Processes (Departments) in the Study

Acronyms of names of sampled organization	Sampled core work processes (50% of the total)	Sampled support work processes (50% of the total)
1. BOTT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Market Development 2. Trade Inspection and Regulation 3. Trade Licensing and Registration 4. Transport Service Development 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Human Resource 2. Plan and Program
2. BOIUD	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Urban Planning and Beautification 2. Urban Good Governance and Capacity Building 3. Industry Development 4. Housing Infrastructure Development 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Finance and Procurement 2. Plan and Program
3. BOE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public Relations 2. Education Quality Inspection and Assurance 3. Educationa Information and Communications Technology Development 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Plan and Program 2. Internal Audit
4. BOCS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Civil Service Reform and Change Management 2. Human Resource Development 3. Human Resource Planning and Management 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Human Resource 2. Internal Audit
5. BOLSA	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Social Problem Prevention and Controlling 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public Relations
6. ICA	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Networking and Website Development 2. Information Systems Development 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Plan and Program

Table 4.8: Sampled Work Processes (Continued)

Acronyms of names of sampled organization	Sampled core work processes (50% of the total)	Sampled support work processes (50% of the total)
7. RA	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tax Collection and Monitoring 2. Tax Education and Communication 3. IT Administration and Development 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Revenue Planning and Research 2. Internal Audit
8. BOCT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Heritage Protection and Tourism Development 2. Tourism Service Provider Organizations Competence Assurance 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public Relations
9. BOWCY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Gender and Youth Affairs 2. Child Rights, Care and Protection 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Human Resource 2. Finance and Procurement

Source: Result of Proportionate Stratified Random Sampling

Stage III: This final stage involved the selection of survey respondents within each of the sampled departments (work processes). It involved the categorization of all civil servants within each of the sampled departments (work processes) according to the three basic current job categories of civil servants and then the selection of those representatives. These categories are managerial employees (Heads of core and support work processes/departments), non-managerial professional employees (Experts) and clerical employees (Secretary and File clerk). Appendix 5 presents the number of civil servants within each of the sampled departments (work processes) according to these categories. This notwithstanding, the selection of survey respondents at this final stage was not random but based on census. Due to the manageability of the sample frame as such, all employees from each strata in the sampled departments (work processes) were selected, as random sampling at this level was not feasible as it was initially intended. This decision was also made to maximize the response rate, which is widely recognized as being low in most of survey research. Table 4.9 below contains the number of those sampled respondents in this way in each of the sampled organizations under the study.

Table 4.9: Sampled Survey Respondents

Sampled organization	Managerial employee (core process owner and support process owner)	Non-managerial employee (professional\expert)	Non-managerial employee (clerical worker i.e., secretary and file clerk)	Total
BOTT	6	25	6	37
BOIUD	6	24	6	36
BOE	5	23	5	33
BOCT	3	13	3	19
BOCS	5	26	5	36
BOWCY	4	23	4	31
BOLSA	2	9	2	13
RA	5	20	5	30
ICA	3	13	3	19
Total	39	176	39	254

Source: Result of Census

In sum, the survey participants in the present study were 254 civil servants from 9 state level government units in ANRS. The questionnaire survey was administered to the participants between December 2012 and April 2013. The survey administration was facilitated by the HR department within each of the nine government units. In the section below, brief explanations on the collection, preparation and techniques of quantitative data analysis are presented.

4.4.2 Quantitative Data Collection, Preparation and Analysis

4.4.2.1 Quantitative Data Collection

A total of 254 questionnaires were distributed to the survey participants, 196 of which were returned. Of these, eleven non-usable questionnaires were identified (see subsection 4.4.2.2 for

details`)). As a result, 185 questionnaires were found to be usable, representing a usable response rate of 73%.

4.4.2.2 Quantitative Data Preparation

The careful preparation of data is fundamental for conducting an honest analysis and for producing undistorted statistical results (Field, 2009; Hair, *et al.*, 1998). This involves a series of data screening, aiming at resolving problems commonly associated with missing data, presence of outliers, non-normality, nonlinearity, heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity and independence, which are crucial particularly in the framework of multiple regression analysis. The above issues were taken into consideration during the data screening process as described hereafter.

Missing Data

Eleven partially completed questionnaires were identified. These questionnaires contained missing scores on a number of variables which accounted for 30% of the dataset for those variables. Given high percentage of the missing scores identified in these questionnaires (Field, 2009), it was decided to exclude those cases from statistical analysis.

Outliers

The term *outlier* refers to a case with an extreme value on one variable (i.e., univariate outlier) or with a combination of extreme values on two or more variables (i.e., bivariate or multivariate outlier) that are likely to distort correlations and regression weights, and to lead to both Type I and Type II errors (Field, 2009; Hair, *et al.*, 1998). Two approaches are usually employed to detect the potential existence of outliers or influential cases. The first includes the use of graphical analytical tools such as frequency distributions, box plots and Q-Q normal probability plots.

This notwithstanding, the use of more quantitative methods is highly recommended for detecting accurately potential outliers and their exerting influence on correlations and regression weights (Field, 2009). Within the framework of multiple regression analysis, the most common method for detecting outliers is to examine the size of standardised residuals. A second more comprehensive approach involves a case-wise diagnostic analysis such as the use of Mahalanobis

distance, Cook's D (i.e., Cook's Distance), DFFITS (i.e., Welsch-Kuh Distance), and DBETAS which focus on both the leverage of the independent variable(s) and the residuals of the dependent variable.

Following Field's (2009) recommendation, all independent and dependent variables were tested for both univariate and multivariate outliers and their exerting influence based on an examination of the size of residuals and case-wise diagnostic analysis. The results of all regression analyses indicated the absence of outlying residuals (i.e., points with standardised values above 3 or below -3, $p < .001$, two-tailed test) (refer to Appendix 6). Furthermore, the analysis met the criteria set by Mahalanobis, Cook's D, DFITS, and DBETAS. Specifically, the largest Mahalanobis D value was found to be 11.34 which is well below the cut-off value of 25 (Field, 2009). Similarly, the largest Cook's D value was found to be .069 which is also well below the cut-off value of 1 (Field, 2009). Moreover, none of the largest DFITS or DBETAS values exceeded a value of 1. This provided strong support for detecting no influential cases (Field, 2009).

Normality, Homoscedasticity, Linearity, Multicollinearity and Independence

There are a number of key assumptions associated with the multiple regression procedures. These assumptions must be met for the results of regression analysis to be claimed as an accurate representation of the observed data or the situation in the population under the study (Hair, *et al.*, 1998). Hence, to draw conclusions about a population based on a regression analysis done on a sample, these five assumptions should be considered: Normality, Homoscedasticity, Linearity, Multicollinearity, and Independence (Field, 2009; Hair, *et al.*, 1998).

Hair, *et al.* (1998) has indicated that the principal measure of result errors in regression analysis is the *residual*, which is the difference between the observed and predicted values for the dependent variable. Analysis of the residuals is thus the principal means of identifying violations of the assumptions.

In the framework of regression analysis, the data were tested for normality by looking at the histograms and normal probability plots. The histograms showed a bell-shaped distribution, thereby indicating that the assumption of normality was not violated. The normal probability plots of expected cumulative probability against observed cumulative probability also showed

points generally lying close to the straight line, indicating that the residuals are approximately normally distributed, thus confirming the conclusions drawn from histograms.

The data for all regressions were also tested for linearity and homoscedasticity by looking at the standardised residual scatterplots. The random distribution of data points indicated that there was no evidence of a non-linear relationship and therefore the linearity assumption was not violated. The plots showed that the variance of residuals was fairly equal at each level of the predicted value, thereby providing support that the assumption of homoscedasticity was not violated.

In addition, the data for all regressions were assessed for collinearity by inspecting both the tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) values for all variables in all regressions. All tolerance values were well above the recommended cut-off point of 0.1. Similarly, all VIF values were well below the cut-off point of 10, suggesting therefore no violation of the multicollinearity assumption (Field, 2009). Finally, the data were further assessed for independence of the error terms by inspecting Durbin-Watson statistic values for all variables in all regressions. All values were very close to 2, indicating that independence assumption was not violated (Field, 2009).

Based on the results of the above diagnostic tests, the data met the conditions for regression analysis. For complete view of results of all the above diagnostic tests, see section 6.4 of chapter 6.

Establishing Validity and Reliability of the Measures

From a statistical standpoint, in order to assess the validity of a scale (i.e., the extent to which a scale measures what it intends to measure), scale items must be highly interrelated or internally consistent and must also reflect a single underlying construct (De Vaus, 2002; Field, 2009).

These two conditions refer to the reliability and validity of a scale. It is noteworthy that reliability is a necessary but insufficient condition for validity; a measure can be reliable without being valid, but it cannot be valid without being reliable (Field, 2009).

Validity can be defined as the agreement between a test score or measure and the quality it is believed to measure (Kumar, 1999; Trochim, 2002). Specifically, construct or factorial validity, an overarching term viewed by most researchers to encompass all forms of validity, 'is a term used to indicate that the test scores are to be interpreted as indicating standing on the construct

measured by the test' (Field, 2009; Trochim, 2002). It is therefore the type of validity most researchers recommend for social research.

Field (2009) proposed two key criteria for construct validity, namely convergent validity and discriminant validity. Convergent validity refers to the extent to which two or more measures of the same theoretical construct correlate highly. Discriminant validity is the degree to which measures of different constructs are distinct. There are two statistical procedures which are used to assess the discriminant and convergent validity of a measure. Factor analysis is particularly relevant to the discriminant validation of a scale, whereas Cronbach's alpha or reliability coefficient is regarded as the most widely used estimate of the convergent validity of a scale (Field, 2009). The remaining part of this section describes the steps taken to establish both the validity and the reliability of measurement instruments employed in the present study.

Factor Analysis

In the light of the importance of construct validity, as explained above, it was considered important to assess the discriminant validity of the measuring instruments. For this purpose, exploratory factor analysis was conducted. Before going to factor extraction, it was considered important to verify the sampling adequacy for the analysis (Field, 2009). In line with Field's (2009) recommendation, the KMO and Bartlett's test of sphericity were conducted. As can be seen from Table 4.10, the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, $KMO = .88$ ('superb', according to Field, 2009) and Bartlett's test of sphericity $\chi^2 (7.243) = 1653, p < .001$ indicated that correlations between items were sufficiently large for principal component analysis.

Table 4.10: KMO and Bartlett's Test results

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.	.880
Bartlett's Test Approx. Chi-Square	7.243E3
of Sphericity	
df	1653
Sig.	.000

In accordance with the guidelines proposed by Field (2009) and Hair, *et al.*, (1998), the following factor analytic techniques were utilized for examining the discriminant validity of the measures. In the exploratory factor analyses, principal component analysis (PCA) was specified as the method of factor extraction and Varimax rotation of the original factor matrix was used in all instances. Prior criterion was used to determine the number of factors to be extracted (Field, 2009). Finally, items with the factor loadings of .40 and with no cross-loadings above .30 were considered significant (Field, 2009; Hair, *et al.*, 1998). The results of factor analyses for both the administrative culture and performance management reform measurements are described below, with the factor structure for the administrative culture measurements being first presented in Table 4.11.

Table 4.11: Factor Structure: Administrative Culture Measurements

	Component				
	1	2	3	4	5
PDQ1 Hierarchy within organization is necessary because people have to know 'who has authority over whom'.	.732	.192	.062	.251	-.018
PDQ2 Hierarchy in my organization reflects the differences in quality between those people higher-up and those that are further down in the hierarchy.	.759	.099	.125	.157	-.027
PDQ3 Subordinates often show respect to superiors on account of the latter's position than actual performance and knowledge.	.710	.173	.081	.121	.177
PDQ4 Elderly members in organization should be respected.	.627	.075	.293	.283	-.067
PDQ5 Officials rely more on formal rules and superiors than on subordinates and experts for decision-making.	.773	.217	.080	.189	.195
PDQ6 Subordinates should be told what to do.	.683	.191	.122	.264	.246
PDQ7 Top officials seldom ask employees' opinion before making a decision.	.788	.147	.012	.167	.133
PDQ8 Subordinates do not expect to be consulted when decisions are made.	.653	.126	.291	.158	.195
PDQ9 Superiors and subordinates consider each other as unequal.	.554	.042	.119	.005	.132
PDQ10 A superior demands respect and obedience from his subordinates.	.642	.101	.270	.098	.076
PDQ11A superior should take care of his subordinates as his/her own family members.	.698	.099	.201	.202	.123
PDQ12 Office work is of a superior nature than manual work.	.548	.047	.281	.087	-.055
PDQ13 Privileges and status symbols for top officials such as big cars, big offices, and secretaries, are normal and popular. They are not frowned upon.	.608	.125	.029	.290	-.165
PDQ14 I believe that managers at all levels should be entitled to privileges	.523	.233	.053	.278	-.055
UAQ1 Rules should not be broken, even when the employee thinks it is in the organization's best interests.	.558	.397	.064	.148	-.254
UAQ2 'Agree to Disagree' is not welcomed.	.265	.553	.056	.213	.235
UAQ3 Instructions for operations are highly important for employees on the job.	.210	.559	-.123	.277	.008
UAQ4 Standardized work procedure should be in place.	.145	.565	.008	.268	-.117
UAQ5 Most civil servants have a strong emotional need for rules.	.548	.472	.082	.090	.044
UAQ6 Deviant idea is suppressed by reference to rules and procedures.	.273	.556	.073	.109	.228
UAQ7 Most civil servants need to be busy and work hard.	-.138	.391*	.192	.104	.129
UAQ8 It is better to follow known standards than experiment with new ideas.	.209	.671	.161	-.026	.154
UAQ9 Innovation is not appreciated.	.197	.633	.046	.110	.104
UAQ10 Risk-taking is less valued.	.251	.565	.031	.275	.020
UAQ11 Most employees have suspicious attitude towards change.	.138	.506	.011	.261	-.005
UAQ12 I believe that subordinates feel more comfortable to work under close supervision than independently.	.128	.584	.073	.106	.079
UAQ13 People do not have enough control over the directions their life is taking.	.267	.449	.274	.171	.167
UAQ14 Disagreements can unleash aggression and should therefore be avoided.	-.011	.519	.176	.155	.216

Table 4.11: Factor Structure (Continued)

	Component				
	1	2	3	4	5
COLQ1 Social relationship among employees through traditional networks is popular.	-.048	.104	.398*	.118	-.115
COLQ2 Individual social orientation is more emphasized than what he actually does.	.154	.585	.341	.098	.114
COLQ3 Who you are (personality and background) is more important than what you do.	.117	.553	.323	.229	.184
COLQ4 Direct criticism is rare.	.159	.435	.341	.198	.274
COLQ5 Harmony should always be maintained and direct confrontations should be avoided.	.114	.250	.614	.003	.224
COLQ6 Cooperation is more important than competition.	.010	.234	.579	.026	.276
COLQ7 Working with others to get job done is more preferable to working individually.	.178	.103	.645	.149	.036
COLQ8 Taking joint responsibility is more preferable to personal responsibility.	.230	.038	.733	.158	.061
COLQ9 Group success is more important than individual success.	.274	.093	.650	.180	-.067
COLQ10 Competition can unleash aggression and should therefore be avoided.	.126	.105	.394*	.147	.117
COLQ11 I feel uncomfortable to share my opinion with the group when the opinions are unpopular.	.220	.103	.617	.026	.117
COLQ12 Employees should pursue their goals after considering the welfare of the group.	.157	.200	.631	.178	-.067
COLQ13 Promotion is usually based on non-performance criteria.	.118	.107	.395*	.075	.159
COLQ14 Group welfare is more important than individual rewards.	.092	.420	.477	.278	-.079
PLTQ1 In administration of civil services, technical considerations must be given more weight than political factors.	.416	.102	.164	.651	.085
PLTQ2 Civil servants should always remain neutral in relation to political parties.	.226	.027	.122	.713	.089
PLTQ3 The interference of politicians in the business of civil servants is a disturbing feature of public life.	.217	.261	-.018	.689	.169
PLTQ4 Decision-making is a preserve of those in power.	.265	.117	.109	.694	.142
PLTQ5 It is an advantage for the public sector if top civil servants share the political views of the ruling government.	-.091	.193	.135	.237	-.174
PLTQ6 Ethiopia needs a new generation of political leaders.	.259	.068	.200	.697	.098
PLTQ7 I am not considering Ethiopian political leaders to have specialized political roles.	.287	.106	.104	.740	.207
PLTQ8 Politicians think more about their welfare than that of the citizens.	.226	.130	.151	.766	.160
PLTQ9 The civil servants and not the politicians guarantee reasonable public policies.	.211	.209	.083	.716	.065
PLTQ10 Local self-government is the best for adapting local services to local needs.	.087	.121	.142	.632	.021
PLTQ11 Although parties play an important role in a democracy, often they exacerbate political conflicts.	.021	.263	.015	.287	.008
PLTQ12 Most political leaders cannot be trusted.	.198	.134	.110	.676	.242
PORQ1 In my organization, employees are encouraged to strive for continuously improved performance.	-.064	-.128	-.065	-.121	-.816
PORQ2 In my organization, major rewards are only based on performance effectiveness.	-.032	-.057	-.005	-.223	-.755
PORQ3 In my organization, being innovative to improve performance is rewarded.	-.104	-.188	-.048	-.230	-.721
PORQ4 In my organization, employees are encouraged to set challenging work goals.	-.014	-.134	-.281	-.142	-.678

* Items exhibited loadings very close to .40 and cross-loadings well below .30 (i.e., below .20). Therefore, they were considered significant (Mark and Peter, 2001:208).

As shown in Table 4.11, most of the 58 items that comprise the five variables measuring the five dimensions of administrative culture were loaded into the right constructs with expected factor loadings above .40 and with no cross-loadings above .30, which provided a strong support to

prior classifications and evidence of high discriminate validity. The first factor included fourteen items corresponding to the 'power distance' variable. The second factor included twelve items that refer to the 'uncertainty avoidance' variable. The third factor comprised ten items corresponding to the variable of 'collectivism'. The fourth factor, which included nine items, refers to the 'political bias/neutrality' variable, while the fifth factor included four items corresponding to the 'performance orientation' variable. Six items (i.e., UAQ1, UAQ5, COLQ2, COLQ3, COLQ14 and PLTQ1) exhibited cross-loadings above .30, while the remaining three items (i.e., COLQ4, PLTQ5 and PLTQ11) exhibited loadings well below .40. Accordingly, those nine items were excluded from index-creation and subsequent statistical analysis.

The next step involved the evaluation of the discriminant validity of the 21 items corresponding to the institutionalization measures of PM reform. All items were entered in a factor analysis to test the extent to which they were loaded into distinct constructs. The results of this analysis presented in Table 4.12 provide support for the discriminant validity of these measures.

Table 4.12 indicates that most of the 21 items that comprise the three variables measuring the institutionalization level of the three aspects of PM reform were loaded into the right constructs with expected factor loadings above .40 and with no cross-loadings above .30, which indicated a high discriminate validity. The first factor included five items corresponding to the 'performance agreement' variable. The second factor included seven items that refer to the 'performance review' variable. The third factor comprised four items corresponding to the variable of 'rewarding high performers and managing under-performers'. Five items (i.e., PAGQ6, PRVQ3, PRVQ5, PRVQ8 and PRWQ3) exhibited cross-loadings well above .30. Accordingly, those five items were excluded from index-creation and subsequent statistical analysis.

Table 4.12: Factor Structure: PM Reform Institutionalization Status Measures

	Component		
	1	2	3
PAGQ1 I usually engage in joint discussion with my supervisor while agreeing on tasks and objectives that I have to accomplish during a given performance management cycle.	.796	.210	.069
PAGQ2 Objectives that I have to meet during a given performance management cycle are usually mutually agreed rather than imposed by my supervisor.	.795	.241	.203
PAGQ3 I and my supervisor usually refer to strategic plan of our organization and/or our departmental goals during performance agreement.	.764	.270	.199
PAGQ4 I and my supervisor usually set challenging work objectives during performance agreement.	.695	.250	.231
PAG5 I usually engage in joint discussion with my supervisor while agreeing on my performance development plan.	.642	.280	.205
PAGQ6 Performance development plan for a subordinate is usually functional.	.682	.445	.314
PRVQ1 I and my supervisor discuss my performance of agreed objectives on a regular basis.	.232	.428	.257
PRVQ2 I and my supervisor usually discuss both my strengths and weaknesses in achievement of agreed objectives during our informal performance review meetings.	.219	.629	.196
PRVQ3 Most of the time my supervisor directly criticizes me at times of events (any instance of poor performance due to my own fault).	.286	.603	.464
PRVQ4 I openly speak about a problem on the side of my supervisor or organization to my supervisor at times of events (any instance of poor performance due to problems on the side of my supervisor or organization).	.218	.663	.190
PRVQ5 My supervisor usually provides constructive feedback to me.	.455	.531	.368
PRVQ6 I usually engage in joint discussion of performances with my supervisor during formal performance review meetings.	.231	.604	.255
PRVQ7 I and my supervisor usually focus our discussion on planning for the future rather than simply dwelling on the past during formal performance review meetings.	.246	.654	.124
PRVQ8 My supervisor does not desist from openly expressing negative but critical face to face feedback during our formal performance review meetings.	.401	.685	.318
PRVQ9 I do not desist from openly expressing negative but critical face to face feedback to my supervisor during our formal performance review meetings.	.218	.667	.256
PRVQ10 I usually forward honest feedback regarding my colleagues' performance.	.276	.776	.249
PRWQ1 In my organization, identification of high and low performers using formal performance review is a common phenomenon.	.234	.249	.609
PRWQ2 My eligibility for any reward practices like salary increment or training opportunity in my organization is only based on performance than other criteria.	.271	.262	.762
PRWQ3 My eligibility for promotion in my organization is only based on performance than other criteria.	.229	.455	.682
PRWQ4 In my organization, provision of training for under-performers is a norm.	.237	.224	.847
PRWQ5 In my organization, it is common to take disciplinary action including dismissal against poor performer.	.240	.135	.751

Reliability of Measures

The reliability of a measure is defined as ‘the correlation between the variable as measured and another equivalent measure of the same variable’ (Mark and Peter, 2001:163). In order to

establish the reliability of measures, the Cronbach's alpha coefficient or reliability criterion was employed. This is regarded as the most commonly used estimator of the internal consistency or reliability of multi-item measures and is also appropriate for questionnaires using Likert-type scales (Field, 2009; Kumar, 1999). Cronbach's alpha values can range from 0 to 1, with 0 translated into zero reliability and 1 translated into 100% reliability. According to Field (2009), the reliability of a scale is considered sufficient when Cronbach's alpha level is at least .70 or higher.

As shown in Table 4.13, the reliabilities of all measures were found to be well above the cut-off criterion of .70, hence indicating high reliability.

Table 4.13: Reliability of Measuring Instruments

Measuring instruments	Cronbach Alpha	Number of items
Power Distance	0.933	14
Uncertainty avoidance	0.873	12
Collectivism/Individualism	0.841	10
Political Bias/Neutrality	0.921	9
Performance Orientation Culture	0.859	4
Performance Agreement	0.898	5
Performance Review	0.915	7
Rewarding High Performers and Managing Under-performers	0.903	4
Overall Performance Management	0.955	16
Overall Administrative Culture	0.940	49

4.4.2.3 Quantitative Data Analysis

Having completed the data preparation and established the discriminant validity and reliability for all measures, the next step in the research process involved the analysis of quantitative data. Data analysis refers to '... the systematic organization and synthesis of research data and testing research hypothesis' (De Vos, *et al.*, 2002:199). Data analysis gives a meaning to data collected during the research (Burns and Grove, 2003: 98). The two available methods of data analysis in survey research design are descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics enable us to

obtain an overall picture of the research data and assist by presenting the data in a user-friendly and orderly way (Durrheim, 2002; Whiteley, 2002). Inferential statistics are used to test the research propositions and thereby to make inferences about the study population (Durrheim, 2002; Whiteley, 2002).

Several data analysis techniques were used to address the research questions and propositions. The descriptive statistics encompassed frequency distributions, measures of central tendency such as means and medians, and measures of dispersion such as the standard deviation. These were employed to develop a thorough understanding of the nature of the data and thereby to address the first two research questions.

Given the relational character of the third research question and propositions formulated in the present study, statistical procedures aiming at testing for the proposed relationships were used. In particular, the proposed relationships were examined using correlational analyses. These included Spearman's correlation and hierarchical multiple regressions with demographic data as control variables. These two correlational analysis techniques are described below.

Correlation Analysis

The first statistical procedure applied to assess the existence of relationships between the independent and dependent variables was the test of correlation. The two widely used correlation techniques in empirical research are that of Pearson's product moment and Spearman's correlation (Field, 2009). They measure how variables or rank orders are related. They are useful for determining the strength and direction of the association between two variables which could be positively related, not related at all, or negatively related (Field, 2009). The correlation coefficient (r) lies between -1 and $+1$. If the r is close to -1 or $+1$, the two variables are close to a perfect linear relationship, and when the r is close to 0 , there is little or no correlation (Field, 2009).

One of the assumptions of Pearson's product moment is that the data is normally distributed. It has been shown in section 4.4.2.2 that the data met this condition for regression analysis. The regression analysis is, however, considered quite robust against violations of the normality assumption (Field, 2009; Hair, *et al.*, 1998). Therefore, it was considered necessary to use more

strong tests of normality to decide upon the most appropriate type of correlation technique in the present study. Following Field's (2009) recommendation, all variables were checked for normality based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test statistics. These test results showed that some administrative culture variables did not conform to the assumption of normality (refer to Appendix 7). Therefore, to assure robust comparisons, the non-parametric Spearman's correlation coefficient was employed.

Bivariate correlation is symmetrical. In this sense, it cannot demonstrate whether changes in a dependent variable are accounted for by changes in one or more independent variables. Partial correlation can provide some evidence of the predictive effect that one independent variable can have on a dependent variable while controlling a second or more independent variables. However, when the goal of the research is to assess the effect of two or more independent variables on a dependent variable, partial correlation becomes redundant, thereby requiring the use of multiple regression analysis.

Regression Analysis

This can be viewed as an extension of correlation analysis. Multiple regression analysis is essentially the derivation of a regression model with two or more independent variables. It is a method for studying the effects and the magnitude of the effects of more than one independent variable on one dependent variable (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000). This is what makes the multiple regression analysis particularly appropriate in this research which seeks to examine the influence of various dimensions of administrative culture (independent variables) on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and, in particular, on each of the components of the reform (dependent variables) in the context of the state level civil service of ANRS.

There are three major types of multiple regression analysis, namely standard regression, hierarchical or sequential regression, and stepwise or statistical regression (Field, 2009). In the present study, the second type was used for examining the proposed relationships. This is due to the fact that hierarchical regression models allow the researcher to control the advancement of the regression process according to a specified theoretical rationale, whereas standard multiple regression is to a large extent a 'shotgun approach', and stepwise regression is 'based solely on

statistical criteria’, and therefore ‘the meaning or interpretation of the variables is not relevant’ (Field, 2009).

4.5 The Qualitative Approach

As can be observed from the main research objective and the propositions, the main focus of this research was to empirically establish whether or not administrative culture has an influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS. From this, it can be seen that a quantitative approach, which uses regression analysis framework, is more vital to this research. However, it was considered logical to incorporate elements of qualitative approach within this research since reliance on a purely quantitative research approach may not be fully adequate to elaborate complex phenomena such as culture relationships with management practices (Kießling and Harvey, 2005: 22).

It is worth to note that relationships revealed in the regression analysis do not confirm causality per se for reasons discussed in Field (2009) such as the third variable problem and therefore require further elaboration based on qualitative evidences. Qualitative approach used in the present research was thus intended to elaborate upon regression results. In the two subsections below, brief explanations on the present study’s qualitative data collection, preparation and techniques of analysis are presented.

4.5.1 Qualitative Data Collection: Tool and Procedure

Interviews were adopted as an appropriate method for collecting of the qualitative data required to enable the elaboration or confirmation of regression results. It is on record that interviews are the most widely used qualitative methods in organizational research (Yin, 2009). Bell (1999:99) defines an interview as a conversation between interviewer and participant with the intention that a researcher can elicit certain information from the participant. Similarly, Cohen and Manion (1994:277) considered the interview as a conversation initiated with the particular goal of gathering information and managed directly by the interviewer.

There is a certain protocol to be followed in the preparation for interviews with any research population. In this respect, Minichiello, *et al.*, (1990) provide a useful continuum of interviewing

methods, based on the degree of control required by the interviewer, these being: structured, semi-structured, and unstructured interviews.

In this study, the semi-structured interview was adopted. The specific type of interview chosen in this study was the face-to-face verbal interchange. The questions (refer to Appendix 3) are also of a nature that demanded a developed interaction between the respondent and the interviewer.

With regard to recruiting interview participants, the strategy adapted to access data was purposive sampling. The purposive sampling technique helps the researcher to reach potential informants who hold prosperous data that better explain the question at hand (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The sampling process was guided by the purpose of generating supportive qualitative evidences to the regression results from experiences and perspectives held by different categories of research participants. This demanded the researcher to address informants who have been in the civil service for a long time and from different job categories.

In the civil service, there is a clear lining up with respect to the job category and work experience factors and, as a result, the interview was aimed at generating data from experienced civil servants from different job categories. An attempt was also made to ensure that participants are from different civil service units. Therefore, grasping diverse experiences along these stratifying factors was vital to secure strong qualitative evidences to elaborate the regression results.

Members of human resource department in each of the civil service unit helped in locating participants with a rich work experience from different job categories. Civil servants known to the researcher in some of the civil service units too were engaged in the same help. However, none of them introduced the researcher to the interview candidates face-to-face for ethical reasons. After getting the names of the prospective interviewees, the researcher contacted the candidates in person. After the possible list of interviewees was prepared, the researcher contacted each for further examination. The first encounter with each of them was made to explain the purpose of the study and build confidence in the whole process of the interview. The second day was devoted to work on identifying mutually convenient time and place for conducting the interview.

Rather than seeking a specific number of interviewees, data were collected until no further evidences for the elaboration of the regression results were identified in subsequent interviews. Added to these, the interviewees were not limited to a specific time frame and, as a result, they were able to reflect on the issues for as long as they needed.

Twenty individuals from different civil service units and job categories agreed for the interview. However, a total of fourteen (14) interviews were conducted and considered for the study. Each participant’s interview lasted approximately fifty minutes to one hour and twenty minutes. These participants had an average of 10 years of working experience in the civil service. They were from seven units in the civil service sector. These units were Bureau of Civil Service, Bureau of Education, Bureau of Trade and Transport, Bureau of Industry and Urban Development, Bureau of Culture and Tourism, Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs, and Revenue’s Agency. Table 4.14 shows the number of interviewees and their positions.

Table 4.14: Distribution of Interviewees According to Position

Job position	Number of interviewees
Manager (process owner)	5
Human resource manager	2
Non-managerial employee (Expert)	5
Administrative secretary of bureau head	1
Driver of vice bureau head	1
Total	14

Given the aim of the interviews was to generate supportive qualitative evidences for the regression results, the contents were decided to focus on participants’ views with regard to the influence that various aspects of administrative culture have on institutionalization process of the performance management reform. Emphasis was given to personal experiences of the interviewees regarding the issue at hand.

Regarding the interview procedure, the interviews were held in an environment suitable for note taking and with consent of the respondents. With the exception of the interview with a driver, all of the interviews were held in the office of the interviewees. Interviews were conducted after the official working hour. Interview with a driver was held in the researcher office in Bahir Dar University as per the choice of the interviewee. All interviews were held in Amharic and a field notebook was used to record the data as none of the interviewees were willing to be tape recorded.

4.5.2 Qualitative Data Analysis

Qualitative data analysis requires the huge amount of information to be summarized, described, and examined for patterns of relationship so the phenomena being studied can be explained and constructed (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Strauss, 1987). Qualitative data analysis can also be viewed as the process of organizing, categorizing, and meaningfully interpreting the data (Creswell, 2003).

Creswell (2003: 190-195) provides a six-step general guide for data analysis in qualitative research:

1. Organize and prepare the data for analysis, including transcribing interviews, optically scanning material, typing up field notes, or sorting and arranging data into different types depending on the source of information;
2. Read through all the data to obtain a general sense of the information and to reflect on its overall meaning;
3. Begin detailed analysis with a coding process;
4. Use the coding process to generate a description of the setting or people as well as categories or themes for analysis;
5. Advance how the description and themes will be represented in the qualitative narrative; and
6. Finally, make an interpretation or meaning of the data.

Qualitative data analysis in the present study primarily follows a guideline by Creswell (1998). The material to be analyzed consisted of expanded version of filed notes taken during the

interview. To ensure that the expanded notes represented the original notes taken during the interview, each interview was expanded on the same date after the interview took place. This also helped the researcher to easily remember the context in which the statements were made, such as irony and particular body language.

For the analysis, the present researcher started with reading through all the interviews to get an overview, whereupon the researcher went back to each interview expansion note and read them carefully. In this second reading, a coding was done ascribing relevant statements in the interview a code that described the main essence of it. Codes emerged from this step were then grouped into theoretically determined categories (i.e., power distance vs. performance management, uncertainty avoidance vs. performance management, collectivistic orientation vs. performance management, political neutrality vs. performance management and performance orientation vs. performance management) which were then interpreted and used to supplement the results from the regression analysis.

The above analysis notwithstanding, content analysis (Bell, 2005; Erdener and Dunn, 1990) was also partially employed as a method of data analysis, with the purpose being revealing the relative importance or otherwise of certain topics from managerial and/or non-managerial interviewees' point of view.

In this study quotes were used as primary method of reporting results from qualitative data analysis. It is important to note that all interviews were held in Amharic language and expansion notes were also written in Amharic language. In order to prevent bias in the data because of translation, therefore, analyses were conducted on the Amharic data. Only after the analysis completed that quotes were translated to English.

4.6 Ethical Considerations

Ethics is mostly associated with morality and deals with issues of right and wrong among groups, society or communities. It is therefore vital that everyone who is involved in research should be aware of the ethical concerns (Babbie, 2005:61). A basic principle for guiding ethical consideration for research includes respondent's being fully informed about the aims and benefits of the research, granting of consent and voluntary to participate in the research (Enarson,

et al., 2001:133). Babbie (2005:61) stressed the importance of ensuring the anonymity of the respondents and their protection against any physical and psychological harm.

In this research, all the above ethical requirements were followed throughout all phases of the research. Before collecting data, permission was granted by the relevant organizations. The participants were asked to participate voluntarily and given the chance to withdraw from participation if they chose to do so. Participants were told that answering and returning the questionnaire assumed their consent to participate in this study. All participants were assured that anonymity and confidentiality of the responses was guaranteed.

4.7 Summary

The chapter has provided an analytical overview of the research process. It set out arguments in favor of a conciliatory methodology involving both qualitative and quantitative approaches. In terms of the specific research tools for data collection, questionnaire surveys and interviews were adopted.

The development and administration of the survey instrument was described. The quality of quantitative data was ensured by conducting a series of statistical tests that are crucial in the framework of multiple regression analysis. Having established the quality of quantitative data, scales were assessed for construct validity. The results of factor and reliability analyses indicated that all scales were both valid and reliable.

With regard to the interviews, it was indicated that the purposive sampling technique was used. The processes by which qualitative data were collected, prepared and analyzed were described. Finally, ethical issues involved in this study were presented.

Having identified the methodology, the subsequent two chapters present the results of this empirical study undertaken in the state level civil service of ANRS with the aim to assess the institutionalization status of performance management reform, features of administrative culture and the relationships between them.

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA PRESENTATION

5.0 Introduction

It is evident from the first chapter that, by far, an assessment of the influence of administrative culture on institutionalization status of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS is at the core of the research objectives of the present study. In order to address this core objective, it is necessary to assess the institutionalization status of performance management reform, to identify features of administrative culture, and to examine the bivariate correlation between them within the state level civil service of the ANRS; and these results then form a base for regression analysis in the next chapter.

As indicated in the previous chapter, the questionnaire queried respondents about their perceptions, beliefs, values and attitudes with respect to the five key dimensions of administrative culture and their experiences and perceptions on the extent to which they routinely carried out activities and actions prescribed in the performance management reform policy (i.e., measures of the institutionalization status of performance management reform). The sections following the respondents' profiles in this chapter will thus present and analyze the institutionalization status of performance management reform and the main features of administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS based on the survey results. By so doing, this chapter achieves the first and the second objectives of this research, which were respectively to assess the institutionalization status of performance management reform and to identify the main features of administrative culture within state level civil service of ANRS.

An evaluation of the bivariate correlation between administrative culture and the institutionalization level of performance management reform is also presented, the intention being to preliminarily assess the validity of the analytical framework which depicted that administrative culture (independent variables, i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation, political bias/neutrality and performance orientation) has an influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform (dependent variables, i.e., the institutionalization level of performance agreement, performance review, rewarding high performers and managing under-performers and the overall performance management reform).

5.1 Respondents' Profiles

This section presents the profiles of the participants of the study by age, gender, educational attainment level, job position, duration of service in current employer and in the civil service at large and place of growth.

5.1.1 Distribution of Respondents by Age

Figure 5.1 indicates that most of the respondents aged between 31-45, thereby representing 44.3% of the total respondents in the study. The remaining 24.3% and 31.3% of the respondents were in the 18-30 age bracket and above 45 years of age respectively.




Figure 5.1: Distribution of Respondents by Age

5.1.2 Distribution of Respondents by Gender

Figure 5.2 shows that 62% of the respondents were male and about 38% were female. It is worth remembering that these figures are reflected in the gender composition of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS. According to ANRS Bureau of Civil Service, in 2012, male civil servants accounted for 67% of the total civil servants in the state level, while female civil servants comprised only 33%.




Figure 5.2: Distribution of Respondents by Gender

5.1.3 Distribution of Respondents by Educational Attainment

Figure 5.3 indicates that about half of the respondents (47.57%) hold Bachelors' degrees, whilst 22.7% hold postgraduate qualifications (Masters' degree and above). About 30% of the respondents (29.73%) hold only Diploma. These figures demonstrate the need to hold at least diploma level of academic qualification to be eligible for non-manual jobs in the civil service.




Figure 5.3: Distribution of Respondents by Educational Achievement Level

5.1.4 Distribution of Respondents by Organization

As indicated in Figure 5.4, the majority of the respondents were from government organizations designated as bureau (80%). About 20% of the respondents were from government organizations designated as agency or authority. This is consistent with organization categories stipulated in the government organization structures act of ANRS. According to this act, 2010, government organizations designated as bureaus accounted for 75% of the total government organizations, and government organizations designated as agencies or authorities comprised only 25%.




Figure 5.4: Distribution of Respondents by Organization

5.1.5 Distribution of Respondents by Current Position in the Civil Service

Figure 5.5 indicates that 16.2% of the respondents hold managerial positions within their organizations. Of the remaining, 57.5% served as professional experts and 16.2% were clerical employees.




Figure 5.5: Distribution of Respondents by Current Position

5.1.6 Distribution of Respondents by Duration of Service in the Current Employer

Figure 5.6 indicates that about 22% of the respondents had job tenure at their current employer, ranging between 1 and 5 years. About 45% of the respondents had job tenure between 5 and 10 years, while 34% had job tenure of above 10 years.




Figure 5.6: Distribution of Respondents by Duration of Service in Current Employer

5.1.7 Distribution of Respondents by Duration of Service in the Civil Service

Figure 5.7 indicates that the majority of the respondents had served above 10 years in civil service in general (57%), followed by respondents (32%) with 5-10 years of service. Only 11% of the respondents reported that they had been working in the civil service in general for less than five years. These relatively longer years of work experience in civil service are evidence of the fact that the respondents are in a position to provide the information requested in the questionnaire.




Figure 5.7: Distribution of Respondents by Duration of Service in Civil Service

5.1.8 Distribution of Respondents by Place of Growth

Figure 5.8 indicates that 60% of the respondents were borne and brought up in urban areas. The remaining 40% of the respondents reported that they were borne and grew up in rural areas.




Figure 5.8: Distribution of Respondents by Place of Growth

5.2 Institutionalization Level of Performance Management Reform within State Level Civil Service of ANRS

One of the objectives of this research, as stated repeatedly, is to assess the institutionalization status of the performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. As explained in chapters 1 and 3, the performance management system under investigation is similar with that of the NPM-inspired human resource-related performance management system, and it consists of three main elements. These are performance agreement, performance review, and rewarding and managing performances.

It has also been shown in Chapter One that despite the fact that this performance management system has been implemented since 2001 in the entire civil service of the government of Ethiopia, including ANRS, the extent to which its constituents (i.e., performance agreement, review and reward) became the normal and usual practices of civil servants remains unknown. In other words, the question of the institutionalization level of the reform remains under-investigated. This is the main reason for the objectives of the present study to include the assessment of the extent to which the performance management reform is institutionalized within the state level civil service of ANRS. This section, therefore, presents empirical results that depict the institutionalization level of each constituent of the performance management reform within state level civil service of ANRS. Composite indexes that reflect the institutionalization level of each constituent of the performance management reform, including the overall performance management reform, are also presented under the subsequent subsections.

5.2.1 Institutionalization Level of Performance Agreement

Performance agreement is the bedrock of human resource-related performance management system (Grote, 2002:22). It involves the agreement between the superior and the subordinate on what the latter is expected to perform in terms of results and behaviours (Armstrong, 2009; Grote, 2002; Rudman, 2003). It also involves the joint discussion and agreement between the manager and the individual on the latter's performance development plan (Armstrong, 2006:259). Similarly, the performance management system that has been implemented since 2001 in Ethiopian civil service, including civil service in ANRS, requires the superior and the subordinate in the civil service to engage in joint discussion and agreement while deciding on

what the latter is expected to perform as well as on what training and support he or she needs to meet the expectation. However, the survey results in Table 5.1 revealed that, in practice, the majority of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS have rarely followed these requirements.

Table 5.1: Institutionalization Level of Performance Agreement

Statement	‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly Agree’ (%)	Both ‘Agree’ and ‘Disagree’ (%)	‘Disagree’ and ‘Strongly Disagree’ (%)	Median	Mean	SD
a) I usually engage in joint discussion with my supervisor while agreeing on tasks and objectives that I have to accomplish during a given performance management cycle.	27.6	18.4	54.1	2	2.52	1.180
b) Objectives that I have to meet during a given performance management cycle are usually mutually agreed rather than imposed by my supervisor.	21.1	21.6	57.3	2	2.51	1.059
c) I and my supervisor usually refer to strategic plan of our organization and/or our departmental goals while agreeing on objectives.	28.6	30.8	40.5	2	2.77	1.064
d) I and my supervisor usually set challenging work objectives during performance agreement.	21.1	17.3	61.6	2	2.39	1.094
e) I usually engage in joint discussion with my supervisor while agreeing on my performance development plan.	23.2	21.1	55.7	2	2.48	1.114
f)* In my organization, agreed performance development plan for a subordinate is usually functional.	16.2	17.3	66.5	2	2.29	1.010

* Item was excluded from index creation (refer to section 4.4.2.2).

Table 5.1 indicates that more than half of the respondents openly declared that they do not usually engage in joint discussion with their supervisor while agreeing on objectives that they are expected to perform throughout the period of the performance management cycle (54.1% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (a)). At the same time, the majority of the respondents did not believe that goals or objectives that the subordinate is expected to perform

are usually agreed by the superior and the subordinate within the state level civil service of ANRS, perhaps because of the imposition of goals by the superior, as reported by 57.3% of the respondents who ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (b). A significant number of respondents also reported a negative perspective concerning the regular use of strategic plan of an organization and departmental goals as a base for determining individual objectives within the civil service. In this regard, about 41% of the respondents confessed that they rarely refer to strategic plan of their organization and their departmental objectives while preparing their performance targets (40.5% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (c)). Moreover, only 21% of the respondents believed that they usually set challenging work objectives, implying that setting of challenging goals at an individual level is a rare practice in the state level civil service of ANRS (61.6% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (d)).

Table 5.1 also shows that the majority of the respondents admitted that they do not usually engage in joint discussion with their supervisor while agreeing on performance development plan (55.7% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (e)). This clearly demonstrated that the performance management reform ideals of manager-and-subordinate’s engagement in joint discussion to agree for training, development and support that the latter needs to meet the agreed goals is largely neglected by the majority of civil servants in the state level civil service of ANRS. Indeed, as we can infer from Table 5.1, even in circumstances where agreed performance development plan for the subordinate is in place, it usually remains a paper-exercise in the state level civil service of ANRS (66.5% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (e)). This could be one of the reasons as to why the majority of civil servants pay little attention to performance development plan in the state level civil service of ANRS.

Essentially, from the statistics presented in Table 5.1, it can be concluded that the current institutionalization status of the performance agreement aspect of the performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS is generally low. This is borne out by the index results presented in Table 5.1.1.

5.2.1.1 Index for Institutionalization Level of Performance Agreement

On a scale of 1–5, the institutionalization level of performance agreement has a mean of 2.53 (total sum of the mean for 5 items divided by 5) and a median of 2.2 (see Table 5.1.1). The

measure of central tendency employed to calculate index was the mean, although the median would theoretically have been the more accurate measure because the data was ordinal. However, the mean was used, as the nature of the data was such that the mean is a close estimate of the median. This is borne out by the results shown in Table 5.1.1. The mean is also easier to determine and interpret, and it can be employed in various other calculations. Besides, as in the case of other similar researches (see, for instance, Ahmed, 2012; Hofstede, 2001; House, *et al*, 2004; Karyeija, 2012), the data scales used in this study, i.e., ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’, can be considered quasi-interval scales, implying that the mean is a reasonable and valid measure.

On a scale of 1–5, a dichotomous category is envisaged; the mean scores below 3 are classified as low, whereas the mean scores above 3 are classified as high. Following this logic, it appears reasonable to conclude that the performance agreement constituents are not followed by the majority of civil servants as a way of managing performance agreements in the civil service, and hence the institutionalization level of performance agreement within the state level civil service of ANRS is generally low. This notwithstanding, high standard deviation recorded for all performance agreement items indicates that there are some civil servants who embraced the performance agreement constituents as a usual way of managing their performances within the state level civil service of ANRS. (Standard deviation is higher than 1.00 (see Table 5.1)).

Table 5.1.1: Descriptive Statistics for Institutionalization Level of Performance Agreement

N	185
Mean	2.5373
Median	2.2000
Standard Deviation	0.9295

5.2.2 Institutionalization Level of Performance Review

It has been well noted in the literature that performance management, unlike the conventional performance appraisal, is a continuous process in which managers and individuals frequently engage in joint discussions and dialogues on the performance of the latter throughout the year and in fact formally once or twice a year. It requires manager and individual to regularly

(informally) meet and to jointly review and discuss progress towards results. It also requires manager and individual to have a formal review meeting once or twice yearly, which serves as a focal point and a 'stocktaking' opportunity for the consideration of key performance and development issues and provides the basis for performance and development planning and agreements (Armstrong, 2006, 2009). It has been also well noted that performance review should be a conversation involving dialogue, exchange of critical feedback and joint analysis of performance (Armstrong, 2009; McDonnell and Gunnigle, 2009; Price, 2000).

Perhaps, performance review is one of the most important features of the performance management reform that has been implemented since 2001 in the civil service of the government of Ethiopia, including ANRS. According to this performance management reform policy and subsequent regulatory provisions (GOE, 2001, 2011):

- Supervisor and employee should regularly discuss performance progress on agreed goals, preferably on a bi-weekly basis;
- Performance progress discussion between the supervisor and employee should focus on both observed strengths and weaknesses;
- Supervisors should give continuous feedback and performance improvement suggestions to their subordinates;
- Employees should exchange critical feedback, whenever requested to do so;
- Formal performance appraisal should take place twice a year, i.e. at the end of January and July;
- Supervisor and employee should discuss performance achievements based on agreed goals and the discussion should identify both strengths and weaknesses and this should be documented and signed by both parties.
- Supervisor and employee should discuss on the performance plan for the next performance period during formal performance appraisal.

However, the survey results in Table 5.2 revealed that, in practice, the majority of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS do not regularly follow the above provisions as a way of reviewing their performances.

Table 5.2: Institutionalization Level of Performance Review (Regular and Formal Review)

Statement	'Agree' and 'Strongly Agree' (%)	Both 'Agree' and 'Disagree' (%)	'Disagree' and 'Strongly Disagree' (%)	Median	Mean	SD
a) I and my supervisor discuss my performance of agreed objectives on a regular basis.	29.7	14.1	56.2	2	2.6	1.129
b) I and my supervisor usually discuss both my strengths and weaknesses in achievement of agreed objectives during our informal performance review meetings.	20.5	14.1	65.4	2	2.23	1.111
c)* Most of the time, my supervisor directly criticizes me at times of events (any instance of poor performance due to my own fault).	23.8	17.8	58.4	2	2.48	1.118
d) I usually openly speak about problem on the side of my supervisor or organization at times of events (any instance of poor performance due to problems on the side of my supervisor or organization).	15.1	15.7	69.2	2	2.19	1.001
e)* My supervisor usually provides constructive feedback and supportive guidelines to me throughout the performance management cycle.	22.7	21.1	56.2	2	2.49	1.064
f) I usually engage in joint discussion of performances with my supervisor during formal performance review meetings.	31.4	16.8	51.9	2	2.66	1.165
g) I and my supervisor usually focus our discussion on planning for the future rather than simply dwelling on the past during formal performance review meetings.	17.8	13.0	69.2	2	2.31	0.978
h)* My supervisor usually expresses negative but critical face-to-face feedback to me during formal performance review (i.e., he/she does not desist from openly expressing negative but critical face-to-face feedback).	25.4	18.9	55.7	2	2.45	1.137
I) I usually express negative but critical face-to-face feedback to my supervisor during formal performance review (i.e., I do not desist from openly expressing negative but critical face-to-face feedback).	15.7	15.7	68.6	2	2.20	1.026
j) I usually forward honest feedback regarding my colleagues' performance.	15.1	16.2	68.6	2	2.17	1.037

* Item was excluded from index creation (refer to section 4.4.2.2).

As can be read in Table 5.2, most of the respondents admitted that they do not usually hold a regular performance discussion with their supervisor, implying that a regular discussion between manager and subordinate on the performances of the latter is a rare phenomenon in the state level civil service of ANRS (56.2% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (a)). At the same time, about two third of respondents openly declared that they do not equally discuss both their strengths and weaknesses in the achievement of agreed objectives during those rare informal performance review meetings with their supervisors. This implies that the majority of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS either evaded the regular performance discussion or performed it in a very subtle way (65.4% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (b)). Indeed, the majority of survey participants in this study confessed that they do not usually exchange critical feedback with their supervisors even at times of events like poor performance (58.4% and 68.9% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statements (c) and (d) respectively). Moreover, most of the respondents revealed that their supervisors do not usually provide them with constructive feedback and supportive guidelines throughout the performance management cycle (56.2% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (e)). All of these suggest that the reform ideals of informal performance review between superior and subordinate are largely unmet in the state level civil service of ANRS.

The majority of survey participants admitted that the reform ideals of informal performance review between superior and subordinate have failed to take root in the state level civil service of ANRS as shown above. Likewise, respondents have also openly declared that they rarely follow the performance management guidelines on how the formal performance review should be carried out in the civil service. Table 5.2 indicates that more than half of the respondents openly declared that they do not usually engage in joint discussion with their supervisor during formal performance review meetings (51.9% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (f)). This suggests that formal performance review between superior and subordinate in the state level civil service of ANRS is mostly a top-down judgment affair. Table 5.2 also shows that the overwhelming majority of respondents revealed that most of the formal performance review meetings between superior and subordinate have evaluative than developmental nature in the state level civil service of ANRS (69.2% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (g)). Finally, Table 5.2 indicates that majority of civil servants refrain from exchanging critical and negative feedback with supervisors and between themselves during formal performance review

in the state level civil service of ANRS (55.7% and 68.6% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statements (h) and (I and j) respectively). Again, these findings imply that there is a huge disjuncture between the performance management reform prescriptions of how formal performance review should be done and how the majority of civil servants actually doing these in the state level civil service of ANRS.

Essentially, from the statistics presented in Table 5.2, it can be concluded that the current institutionalization status of the performance review aspect of the performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS is generally low. This is borne out by the index results presented in Table 5.1.2.

5.2.2.1 Index for Institutionalization Level of Performance Review

On a scale of 1–5, the institutionalization level of performance review has a mean of 2.34 (total sum of the mean for 7 items divided by 7) and a median of 2.2 (see Table 5.2.1). The measure of central tendency employed to calculate index here was also the mean, although the median would theoretically have been the more accurate measure because the data was ordinal. However, the mean was used, as the nature of the data was such that the mean is a close estimate of the median. This is borne out by the results in Table 5.2.1. Besides, the data scales used in this study, i.e., ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’, can be considered quasi-interval scales, implying that the mean is a reasonable and valid measure.

On a scale of 1–5, a dichotomous category is envisaged; the mean scores below 3 are classified as low, whereas the mean scores above 3 are classified as high. Following this logic, it appears reasonable to conclude that the performance review constituents are not embraced by the majority of civil servants, and hence the institutionalization level of performance review in the state level civil service of ANRS is generally low. This notwithstanding, high standard deviation recorded for almost all performance review items indicates that there are some civil servants who embraced the performance review constituents as a usual way of managing their performances within the state level civil service of ANRS. (Standard deviation is higher than 1.00 (see Table 5.2)).

Table 5.2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Institutionalization Level of Performance Review

N	185
Mean	2.3375
Median	2.2000
Standard Deviation	0.8677

5.2.3 Rewarding High Performers and Managing Under-performers

The performance management system provides management with important information for making strategic decisions on employee’s promotions, training and development activities, compensation decisions, and retention or separation (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005; Pynes, 2004). Rewarding high performers (monetary and non-monetary rewards, including promotion) and managing under-performers is among the building blocks of the performance management reform policy in Ethiopia. The performance management reform policy and subsequent regulatory provisions of the Ethiopian government stipulate the following major provisions in relation to rewarding high performers and managing under-performers in the civil service (GOE, 2001, 2011):

- Employee with performance rating of ‘outstanding’ (95-100 points) and ‘high’ (80-94.9 points) shall qualify for the available rewards (for instance money, prize, further education opportunity, and so on). Monetary reward is subjected to the availability of funds;
- Employee with performance rating of ‘weak’(less than 60 points) should be provided with performance improvement training and consultation; and
- Employee who has two consecutive ‘weak’ performance ratings should cease his or her service.

However, the survey results in Table 5.3 revealed that, in practice, these aspects of the performance management reform are also largely unmet in the state level civil service of ANRS.

Table 5.3: Institutionalization Level of Rewarding High Performers and Managing Under-performers

Statement	‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly Agree’ (%)	Both ‘Agree’ and ‘Disagree’ (%)	‘Disagree’ and ‘Strongly Disagree’ (%)	Median	Mean	SD
a) In my organization, identification of high and low performers using formal performance review is a common phenomenon.	16.8	18.9	64.3	2	2.34	.970
b) My eligibility for any reward practices like salary increment or training opportunity in my organization is usually based on my performance than other criteria.	16.2	12.4	71.4	2	2.25	.974
c)* My eligibility for promotion in my organization is usually based on my performance than other criteria.	13.0	13.0	74.1	2	2.16	.924
d) In my organization, provision of training for under-performers is a norm.	16.2	11.4	72.4	2	2.22	.987
e) In my organization, it is common to take disciplinary action including dismissal against poor performer employees.	19.5	14.1	66.5	2	2.31	1.052

* Item was excluded from index creation (refer to section 4.4.2.2).

Table 5.3 clearly indicates that the vast majority of employees reported disagreement with the statements about the regularity of rewarding high performers and managing under-performers in the civil service. For instance, about two third of the respondents did not see the differentiation between high performers and under-performers being a common phenomena in the state level civil service of ANRS (64.3% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (a)). In fact, about three fourth of the respondents openly declared their belief that their eligibility for any reward practices like salary increment or training opportunity and for promotion in the civil service is not usually based on their performance (71.4% and 74.1% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statements (b) and (c) respectively). Yet, the performance management policy and directives require civil servant’s reward and promotion to be only based on performance effectiveness.

As Table 5.3 demonstrates, the overwhelming majority of the respondents revealed their disagreement with the statement which states that provision of training for under-performers is a usual practice in the civil service (72.4% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (d)). Finally, Table 5.3 indicates that it is rarely that poor performers in the civil service are subjected to disciplinary measures (66.5% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (e)).

Essentially, from the statistics presented in Table 5.3 it can be concluded that the current institutionalization status of rewarding high performers and managing under-performers aspect of the performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS is generally low. This is borne out by the index results presented in Table 5.3.1.

5.2.3.1 Index for Institutionalization Level of Rewarding High Performers and Managing Under-performers

On a scale of 1–5, the institutionalization level of rewarding high performers and managing under-performers has a mean of 2.28 (total sum of the mean for 4 items divided by 4) and a median of 2.0 (see Table 5.3.1). The measure of central tendency employed to calculate index was the mean, although the median would theoretically have been the more accurate measure because the data was ordinal. However, the mean was used, as the nature of the data was such that the mean is a close estimate of the median. This is borne out by the results in Table 5.1.3. Besides, the data scales used in this study. i.e., ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’, can be considered quasi-interval scales, implying that the mean is a reasonable and valid measure.

On a scale of 1–5, a dichotomous category is envisaged; the mean scores below 3 are classified as low, whereas the mean scores above 3 are classified as high. Following this logic, it appears reasonable to conclude that the institutionalization level of rewarding high performers and managing under-performers in the state level civil service of ANRS is generally low. Notwithstanding this, however, relatively high standard deviation recorded for all items points to some differences among civil servants with regard to their perceptions on the institutionalization level of rewarding high performers and managing under-performers in the state level civil service of ANRS. (Standard deviation is nearly 1.00 (see Table 5.3)).

Table 5.3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Institutionalization Level of Rewarding High Performers and Managing Under-performers

N	185
Mean	2.2784
Median	2.0000
Standard Deviation	0.8767

5.2.4 Institutionalization Level of Overall Performance Management Reform

Having evaluated the institutionalization level of performance management reform along performance agreement, performance review, and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers, it was considered necessary to develop an index of an overall performance management reform institutionalization level based on an aggregation of the institutionalization level of each aspect of the reform.

On a scale of 1–5, the institutionalization level of the overall performance management reform has a mean of 2.38 (total sum of the mean for the three aspect of performance management reform divided by 3) and a median of 2.1 (see Table 5.4.1). The measure of central tendency employed to calculate index was the mean, although the median would theoretically have been the more accurate measure because the data was ordinal. However, the mean was used, as the nature of the data was such that the mean is a close estimate of the median. This is borne e out by the results in Table 5.4.1.

On a scale of 1–5, a dichotomous category is envisaged; the mean scores below 3 are classified as low, whereas the mean scores above 3 are classified as high. Following this logic, we can conclude that the institutionalization level of the overall performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS is low.

Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics for Overall Institutionalization Level of Performance Management Reform

	N	185
Mean		2.3844
Median		2.1286
Standard Deviation		0.8151

Going by the evidence presented so far, it appears reasonable to expect that the limited institutionalization status of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS is attributable to a number of factors, of which administrative culture could be one. The present study proposes that administrative culture, as measured by power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation, political bias/neutrality and performance orientation, has a significant effect on the institutionalization status of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. At this juncture, therefore, it is imperative to identify the features of administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS along the dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, political bias/neutrality and performance orientation.

5.3 Administrative Culture within State Level Civil Service of ANRS

In this section the researcher attempts to identify the main features of administrative culture (i.e., perceptions, beliefs and attitudes of civil servants) within the state level civil service of ANRS along the five main cultural dimensions proposed in chapter three: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, political bias/neutrality and performance orientation. Similar to the reform questions, the respondents were asked to agree or disagree for a number of statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 denotes ‘ Strongly disagree’; 2 means ‘Disagree ’; 3 means Both ‘agree and disagree’; 4 means ‘Disagree ’ and 5 means ‘ Strongly Agree’. Each dimension has a set of indicative concepts, and the indexes reflect the dominant feature of administrative culture with respect to each dimension within the civil service (see section 4.4.1.3 for details).

5.3.1 Power Distance (PD)

As explained in chapter Four, 14 items were designed to capture civil servants' power distance cultural orientations centered on three PD indicator concepts: hierarchy, superior-subordinate relationship and status symbolism. This section, therefore, presents and discusses the survey results according to each of these concepts. Thereafter, the index for power distance will be presented.

5.3.1.1 Hierarchy

Table 5.5: Percentage Distribution of Civil Servants' Perceptions, Beliefs and Attitudes about Hierarchy

Statement	'Agree' and 'Strongly Agree' (%)	Both 'Agree' and 'Disagree' (%)	'Disagree' and 'Strongly Disagree' (%)	Mean	SD
a) Hierarchy within an organization is necessary because people have to know 'who has authority over whom'.	68.6	6.5	24.9	3.71	1.294
b) Subordinates in my organization often show respect to superiors on account of the latter's position than actual performance and knowledge.	58.9	11.4	29.7	3.44	1.305
c) Elderly members within organization should be respected.	60.0	11.9	28.1	3.44	1.136
d) Hierarchy in my organization reflects the differences in quality between those people higher-up and those that are further down in the hierarchy.	67.0	8.1	24.9	3.51	1.187
Average				3.54	1.037

Table 5.5 indicates that nearly 70% of respondents believed that hierarchy within the organization is necessary because people have to know 'who has authority over whom' (68.6% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (a)). This reflects that most civil servants under study recognize a hierarchical order in which everyone has a place and which requests no additional explanation. Therefore, it is little surprise that the majority of subordinates' respect for their superiors is a result of position than performance in the state level civil service of ANRS (58.9% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (b)). Table 5.5 also indicates that the majority of civil servants under study were of the view that elderly members within an organization should be respected (60% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (c)). This again suggests that age may

be another important criterion for subordinates' respect for superiors as long as there is a countable difference of age between them.

Moreover, the majority of the respondents reported an agreement to the statement which states that hierarchy reflects the differences in quality between those higher-ups and those lower-down in the hierarchy. It is a significant revelation that 67% of the respondents regard hierarchy as an expression of the quality of the employees (67% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (d)). Why is this so? One plausible reason, to borrow it from findings in Karyeija (2012), is that the higher your office, the more resources you have access to and the more people will expect from you; and the higher your position the more likelihood that you will be considered for an even higher position, thus also the higher your quality in relation to your peers.

Taken together, the above findings indicate that there is a high acceptance of hierarchy by the majority of civil servants and the respect is a result of power differences, age and probably relations, and hence high power distance cultural orientation.

5.3.1.2 Relations between the Superiors and Subordinates and Participation

Table 5.6: Percentage Distribution of Civil Servants' Perceptions and Beliefs on Relations between the Superiors and Subordinates and Participation

Statement	'Agree' and 'Strongly Agree' (%)	Both 'Agree' and 'Disagree' (%)	'Disagree' and 'Strongly Disagree' (%)	Mean	SD
a) In my organization, superiors and subordinates consider each other as unequal.	60.5	14.1	25.4	3.54	1.264
b) I believe that a superior always demands respect and obedience from his subordinates.	55.7	15.7	28.6	3.44	1.192
c) A superior should take care of his subordinates as his own family members.	67.6	9.2	23.2	3.71	1.161
d) Subordinates should be told what to do.	55.7	10.8	33.5	3.30	1.279
e) In my organization, subordinates do not expect to be consulted when decisions are made.	58.9	10.8	30.3	3.46	1.319
f) In my organization, officials rely more on formal rules and superiors than subordinates and experts.	58.9	15.1	25.9	3.51	1.237
g) In my organization, top officials seldom ask employees for opinion before making a decision.	65.9	7.6	26.5	3.59	1.121
Average				3.51	.9870

As pointed out by Mendonca and Kanungo, with a high power distance cultural orientation, ‘managers do not consider subordinates to be people just like me; neither do the subordinates view their managers as people just like themselves’. In the same way, findings of this study seem to corroborate this. Table 5.6 indicates that 60% of the respondents revealed their agreement with the statement which states that superiors and subordinates consider each other as unequal (60.5% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (a)). This suggests that there are distinctions and status differences between superiors and subordinates, at least in the minds of majority of civil servants, in the state level civil service of ANRS. This could be one of the reasons as to why the majority of the respondents are of the belief that a superior always demands respect and obedience from his subordinates (55.7% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (b)).

Moreover, two third of the respondents reported their firm belief that a superior should take care of his subordinates as his own family members (67.6% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (c)). This finding clearly implies that the majority of the respondents prefer supervisors in positions of authority to assume the role of a parent and consider it an obligation to provide support and protection to them. It also suggests that they may prefer to reciprocate such care, support and protection by showing loyalty, deference and compliance to the supervisors.

It is clear from Table 5.6 that the majority of civil servants under study commonly expect their superiors to make decisions about rules, procedures, policies and performance. This finding is corroborated by the revelation that more than half of the respondents expect to be told what to do and do not expect to be consulted when decisions are made (55.7% and 58.9% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statements (d) and (e) respectively). In fact, the results indicate that the majority of civil servants would like their superiors to convey more information to them and make more decisions for them.

Table 5.6 also indicates that nearly 60% of respondents were of the opinion that officials in the civil service rely more on formal rules and superiors than subordinates and experts while making decisions (58.9% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (g)). At the same time, nearly two third of the respondents perceived top officers in the civil service as people who are *not* obliged to listen to everyone in the workplace before making a decision. Indeed, they reported that top officials in the civil service seldom ask employees for opinion before making a decision (65.9% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (h)).

Taken together, the above findings indicate that the majority of civil servants under study perceive the power of decision-making is largely in the hands of top management and they prefer seeking guidance, direction, affection, and patronage from their superiors in all matters. The findings also suggest that in the mind of the majority of civil servants superiors are expected to exercise absolute power and questioning their decision is an unwanted business.

5.3.1.3 Status symbolism

Table 5.7: Perceptions and Beliefs on Status Symbols as an Indicator of high Power Distance

Statement	'Agree' and 'Strongly Agree' (%)	Both 'Agree' and 'Disagree' (%)	'Disagree' and 'Strongly Disagree' (%)	Mean	SD
a) Office work is of a superior nature than manual work.	63.7	11.4	24.9	3.63	1.159
b) In my organization, privileges and status symbols for officials such as big cars, big offices and secretaries are normal and popular. They are not frowned upon.	62.7	17.3	20.0	3.57	1.121
c) I believe that managers at all levels should be entitled to privileges like car and big offices.	65.9	9.2	24.9	3.65	1.216
Average				3.64	.8783

Perceptions and beliefs of organization members towards status symbols are a very useful indicator of power distance (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). At least 64% of respondents contended that office work is superior to manual work as shown in statement (a). This suggests that the majority of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS associated the dignity of labour with white collar jobs; the higher the position, the more the prestige. At the same time, majority of the respondents were very positive to the proposition that privileges and status symbols are normal and popular (62.7% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (b)). The majority of respondents even believed that officials at any position should be provided with privileges (65.9% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (c)). In fact, it is a common knowledge that in most of government ministries, bureaus and agencies a big off-road official vehicle, a big unshared office, free phone access, and secretaries are popular and these are not frowned upon.

Going by the evidence presented so far with regard to power distance, it appears reasonable to conclude that although there are low power distance oriented civil servants, the majority of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS have high power distance orientation. This is borne out by the index results in Table 5.7.

5.3.1.4 Index for Power Distance

On a scale of 1–5, power distance has a mean of 3.56 (total sum of the average mean for 3 indicator concepts of power distance divided by 3 (the number of indicator concepts)) and a median of 3.83 (Table 5.7). The measure of central tendency employed to calculate index was the mean, although the median would theoretically have been the more accurate measure because the data was ordinal. However, the mean was used, as the nature of the data was such that the mean is a close estimate of the median. This is borne out by the results in Table 5.8. Besides, as in the case of other similar researches (see, for instance, Ahmed, 2012; Hofstede, 2001; House, *et al*, 2004; Karyeija, 2012), the data scales used in this study, i.e., ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’, can be considered quasi-interval scales, implying that the mean is a reasonable and valid measure.

On a scale of 1–5, a dichotomous category is envisaged; the mean scores below 3 are classified as low, whereas the mean scores above 3 are classified as high. Following this logic, we can conclude that the majority of civil servants in the state level civil services of ANRS have high power distance cultural orientation. In other words, administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS is generally characterized by high power distance. Notwithstanding this, high standard deviation recorded for almost all power distance items indicates that there are also civil servants with low power distance orientation within the state level civil service of ANRS. (Standard deviation is higher than 1.00 (see Table 5.5-5.7)).

Table 5.8: Descriptive Statistics for Power Distance

N	185
Mean	3.5613
Median	3.8254
Standard Deviation	0.8712

5.3.2 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)

As explained in chapter four, 14 items were designed to capture civil servants uncertainty avoidance cultural orientations centered on three UA indicator concepts: rule orientation, innovation and creativity, and change and ambiguity. This section, therefore, presents and discusses the survey results according to each of these concepts. Thereafter, the index for uncertainty avoidance will be presented.

5.3.2.1 Rule Orientation

Table 5.9: Perceptions and Beliefs relating to Rule Orientation

Statement	'Agree' and 'Strongly Agree' (%)	Both 'Agree' and 'Disagree' (%)	'Disagree' and 'Strongly Disagree' (%)	Mean	SD
a) Instructions for operations are highly important for employees on the job.	75.7	9.2	15.1	3.91	1.092
b) Standardized work procedure should be in place in my organization.	76.8	9.2	14.1	3.95	1.052
c)* Most civil servants have a strong emotional need for rules.	65.9	9.2	24.9	3.58	1.163
d)* I believe that organization rules should not be broken, even when the employee thinks it is in the organization's best interests.	68.6	11.4	20.0	3.71	1.039
Average				3.93	1.003

*Item was excluded from average and index creation (refer to section 4.4.2.2).

According to Hofstede (2001), employees with strong uncertainty avoidance orientation have a strong need for written and unwritten rules and they also tend to prefer procedures to control predictability of future outcome. In these aspects of uncertainty avoidance, the results from the survey indicate that majority of civil servants under study have a strong need for rules and procedures.

As Table 5.6 indicates, three fourth of the respondents revealed their agreement with the statement which states that instructions for operations are highly important for employees on the job (75.7% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (a)). At the same time, more than 75% of

the respondents expressed their firm belief that standardized work procedure should be in place in their workplace (76.8% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (b)). Moreover, about two third of the respondents were of the opinion that most civil servants have a strong emotional need for rules (65.9% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (c)). Finally, Table 5.8 indicates that majority of civil servants under study did believe that organization rules should not be broken, even when the employee thinks it is in the organization’s best interests (68.6% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (d)).

Taken together, these findings imply that the majority of civil servants under study prefer rules and procedures to results and hence there is a strong uncertainty avoidance orientation.

5.3.2.2 Innovation and Creativity

Table 5.10: Perceptions and Beliefs relating to Innovation and Creativity

Statement	‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly Agree’ (%)	Both ‘Agree’ and ‘Disagree’ (%)	‘Disagree’ and ‘Strongly Disagree’ (%)	Mean	SD
a)* Most civil servants need to be busy and work hard.	60.5	16.2	23.2	2.44	1.192
b) In my organization, innovation is not appreciated.	63.2	13.5	23.2	3.54	1.048
c) In my organization, risk-taking is less valued.	68.1	13.0	18.9	3.65	1.027
d) In my organization, deviant idea is suppressed by reference to rules, procedures and definitions of responsibility.	63.8	17.3	18.9	3.59	1.065
e) I believe that subordinates feel more comfortable to work under close supervision than independently.	60.0	11.4	28.6	3.38	1.010
Average				3.32	.5712

*Item was reverse-coded.

Most civil servants need to be busy and work hard (23.2% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (a)), innovation is not appreciated in the civil service (63.2% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (b)) and risk-taking is less valued in the civil service (68.1% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (c)). Together, these findings could be interpreted to mean that there is a perception among majority of civil servants that limits their ability to change and innovate.

Indeed, the majority of respondents were of the opinion that deviant idea in the civil service is usually suppressed by reference to rules, procedures and definitions of responsibility (63.8% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (d)). Again, this suggests that at least most of the civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS have a perception of intolerance for deviant ideas in their workplace and this could deter them from being innovative and being willing to take self-initiatives in doing works.

It is therefore no surprise that the majority of respondents under study did believe that subordinates feel more comfortable to work under close supervision than independently (60% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (e)).

5.3.2.3 Change and Ambiguity

Table 5.11: Perceptions and Beliefs relating to Change and Tolerance of Ambiguity

Statement	‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly Agree’ (%)	Both ‘Agree’ and ‘Disagree’ (%)	‘Disagree’ and ‘Strongly Disagree’ (%)	Mean	SD
a) I believe that it is better to follow known standards and procedures than experiment with new ideas in my organization.	53.5	15.1	31.4	3.31	1.160
b) In my organization, most employees have suspicious attitude towards change.	58.4	18.4	23.2	3.43	1.046
c) I believe that disagreements can unleash aggression and should therefore be avoided in my organization.	59.5	8.1	32.4	3.43	1.228
d) In my organization, ‘AGREE to DISAGREE’ is not welcomed.	68.1	15.1	16.8	3.68	1.023
e) I believe that people do not have enough control over the directions their life is taking	67.0	10.8	22.2	3.43	1.165
Average				3.54	.8058

As can be seen from Table 5.11, more than half of civil servants under study were of the opinion that following known standards and procedures is better than experiment with new ideas in the civil service (53.4% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (a)). At the same time, 58.4% of the respondents revealed their agreement with the statement which states that most employees in the civil service have suspicious attitude towards change (58.4% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on

statement (b)). These findings clearly imply that the majority of civil servants want their work life to follow a fixed and certain pattern which is a typical characteristic of strong uncertainty avoidance oriented employees.

Table 5.11 also indicates that nearly 60% of the respondents did believe that disagreements can unleash aggression and should therefore be avoided in their workplace (59.5% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (c)). This clearly implies that the majority of civil servants under study are confrontation avoidant, preferring harmonious and face-saving behaviors. It is therefore little surprise that the majority of civil servants under study perceived the ideals of ‘AGREE to DISAGREE’ as unacceptable in their workplace (68.1% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (e)). This could also be interpreted to mean that the majority of civil servants under study prefer absolute truth to any sort of ambiguous things.

Finally, Table 5.11 indicates that at least more than two third of the survey participants in this study did believe that they do not have enough control over the directions their life is taking (67% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (e)). This suggests that the majority of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS may have an external locus of control and they may likely attribute life outcomes to ‘fate’ or to external forces. It also suggests that the majority of civil servants may not be nurtured to emphasize personal accountability and freewill, with the expectation that their effort and responsibility will result in predictable outcomes within their own control.

Going by the evidence presented so far with regard to administrative cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance, it appears reasonable to conclude that although there are civil servants with weak (low) uncertainty avoidance orientation, the majority of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS have strong uncertainty avoidance orientation. This is borne out by the index results in Table 5.12.

5.3.2.4 Index for Uncertainty Avoidance

On a scale of 1–5, uncertainty avoidance has a mean of 3.56 (total sum of the average mean for 3 indicator concepts of uncertainty avoidance divided by 3 (the number of indicator concepts)) and a median of 3.70 (see Table 5.12). The measure of central tendency employed to calculate index was the mean, although the median would theoretically have been the more accurate measure

because the data was ordinal. However, the mean was used, as the nature of the data was such that the mean is a close estimate of the median. This is borne out by the results in Table 5.12. The mean is also easier to determine and interpret, and it can be employed in various other calculations. Besides, as in the case of other similar researches (see, for instance, Ahmed, 2012; Hofstede, 2001; House, *et al*, 2004; Karyeija, 2012), the data scales used in this study, i.e., ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’, can be considered quasi-interval scales, implying that the mean is a reasonable and valid measure.

On a scale of 1–5, a dichotomous category is envisaged; the mean scores below 3 are classified as low, whereas the mean scores above 3 are classified as high. Following this logic, we can conclude that the majority of civil servants in the state level civil services of ANRS have strong (high) uncertainty avoidance cultural orientation. In other words, administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS is generally characterized by strong (high) uncertainty avoidance. Notwithstanding this, high standard deviation recorded for almost all uncertainty avoidance items indicates that there are also civil servants with weak uncertainty avoidance orientation within the state level civil service of ANRS. (Standard deviation is higher than 1.00 (see Table 5.9-5.11)).

Table 5.12: Descriptive Statistics for Uncertainty Avoidance

N	185
Mean	3.5589
Median	3.7000
Standard Deviation	0.6418

5.3.3 Collectivism

As explained in chapter four, 14 items were designed to capture civil servants’ collectivistic cultural orientations centered on three collectivism indicator concepts: relationship vs. task orientation, harmony and cooperation vs. confrontation and competition and group vs. individual modalities of work and reward. This section, therefore, presents and discusses the survey results according to each of these concepts. Thereafter, the index for collectivism will be presented.

5.3.3.1 Task versus Relationship Orientation

Table 5.13: Respondents Perceptions and Beliefs on Relationship vs. Task Orientation

Statement	'Agree' and 'Strongly Agree' (%)	Both 'Agree' and 'Disagree' (%)	'Disagree' and 'Strongly Disagree' (%)	Mean	SD
a) In my organization, social relationship among employees through traditional networks like EDIR, EKUB, MAHEBER e.t.c. is popular.	76.8	14.1	9.2	3.83	0.796
b)* I believe that individual social and supportive orientation is more emphasised than what he or she actually does in my organization.	65.4	9.7	24.9	3.50	1.094
c)* I believe that who you are (personality and background) is more important than what you do in my organization.	66.5	15.1	18.4	3.58	0.970
d) In my organization, promotion is usually based on non-performance criteria, i.e., seniority, personal connection e.t.c.	58.9	9.7	31.4	3.35	1.151
Average				3.61	.8058

*Item was excluded from average and index creation (refer to section 4.4.2.2).

As a characteristic of administrative culture, one important issue of collectivism revolves around the relative closeness of the relationship between individuals through various social associations (Iguisi, 2009). According to Iguisi (2009), the most common form of social association in most of organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa is the indigenous system of savings and credit. This study provides an empirical support for this assertion.

As can be seen from Table 5.13, the overwhelming majority of respondents revealed their agreement with the statement which claims that social relationship among employees through traditional networks like *EKUB* (rotating credit associations) is popular in the civil service (76.8% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (a)). Such overwhelming agreement could be due to the fact that by subscription to this system of social association, member civil servants provide for themselves what the government and their formal organisations cannot. This system provides fund for activities such as baptisms, weddings, funerals or other occasions.

Most importantly, as argued in Iguisis (2009), members of the associations tend to let collectivistic values, i.e., supportive orientation, harmony, cooperation, emphasis on interpersonal relationship and faces-saving predominate. In fact, this could be one of the reasons as to why the majority of the respondents in the present study did believe that social and supportive orientation is more emphasised than actual performance in their workplace (65.4% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (b)). The same reason could be attributed as to why more than two third of the respondents in the present study hold the view that personality and background is more important than actual performance in their organization (66.5% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (c)).

Given the above findings, it is not a simple guess to say that the majority of civil servants in the state level civil service of ANRS consider the need to focus on relationship than tasks if they are to have a successful career. Nearly 60% of the respondents agreement with the statement which states that promotion is usually based on non-performance criteria is, therefore, not surprising (58.9% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (d)).

5.3.3.2 Confrontation and Competition versus Harmony and Cooperation

Table 5.14: Respondents Perceptions and Beliefs on Confrontation and Competition vs. Harmony and Cooperation

Statement	‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly Agree’ (%)	Both ‘Agree’ and ‘Disagree’ (%)	‘Disagree’ and ‘Strongly Disagree’ (%)	Mean	SD
a) Harmony should always be maintained and direct confrontations should be avoided.	55.7	12.4	31.9	3.36	1.163
b) I feel uncomfortable to share my opinions with the group when the opinions are unpopular.	65.4	14.1	20.5	3.60	1.074
c)* In my organization, direct criticism is rare.	61.6	10.3	28.1	3.38	1.160
d) I believe that competition can unleash aggression and should therefore be avoided.	57.3	12.4	30.3	3.39	1.108
e) I believe that cooperation is more important than competition.	60.5	14.1	25.4	3.48	1.118
Average				3.45	.8322

*Item was excluded from average and index creation (refer to section 4.4.2.2).

According to Hofstede (2001) and House, *et al.*, (2006), organization members with collectivistic orientation tend to prefer harmony over confrontation and they also tend to value cooperation than competition. For such members of organization direct confrontation and competition is more of destructive than constructive. In line with this, the survey result in Table 5.14 suggest that the majority of civil servants in the state level civil service of ANRS are conflict avoidant and place high value to cooperation over competition.

As can be seen from Table 5.14, the majority of the respondents in the survey revealed their agreement with the statement which states that harmony should always be maintained and direct confrontations should be avoided (55.7% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (a)). At the same time, about two third of the respondents openly declared that they feel uncomfortable to share their opinions with the group when the opinions are unpopular (65.4% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (b)). These findings imply that the majority of civil servants under study considered appropriate to deal issues by going through certain rituals, rather than openly confronting the issues. The findings also suggest that the majority of civil servants likely refrain from speaking of their minds in group settings for the sake of maintaining harmonious relationship with their colleagues. Therefore, it is little surprise that the majority of the respondents in the present study perceived the absence of direct criticism in the civil service (61.6% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (c)).

Table 5.14 also indicates that most of the respondents did believe that competition can unleash aggression and should therefore be avoided (57.3% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (d)). This could be one of the reasons as to why the majority of respondents also did believe that cooperation is more important than competition (60.5% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (e)).

5.3.3.3 Group vs. Individual Work and Reward

Table 5.15: Perceptions and Preferences regarding Group vs. Individual Work and Reward

Statement	'Agree' and 'Strongly Agree' (%)	Both 'Agree' and 'Disagree' (%)	'Disagree' and 'Strongly Disagree' (%)	Mean	SD
a) I believe that working with others to get job done is more preferable to working individually.	66.5	14.6	18.9	3.62	1.118
b) I believe that taking joint responsibility is more preferable to personal responsibility.	62.2	15.1	22.7	3.48	0.984
c)* I believe that group welfare is more important than individual rewards.	63.2	11.9	24.9	3.54	1.108
d) I believe that employees should pursue their goals after considering the welfare of the group.	69.7	9.7	20.5	3.70	1.108
e) Group success is more important than individual success.	62.7	13.0	24.3	3.55	1.098
Average				3.59	.8369

*Item was excluded from average and index creation (refer to section 4.4.2.2).

Preferences as to how work and reward system should be arranged are important indicators of the degree of members' collectivistic cultural orientation within organization. According to Hofstede and Hofstede (2005), collectivistic oriented employees prefer group work to individual work and they also place more value to group rewards relative to individual one. Results in Table 5.15 indicate that at least 60% of the respondents in the present study did believe that work and reward arrangements in their organization should have a group rather than individual orientation.

Table 5.15 indicates that two third of the respondents in the survey did believe that working with others to get job done is more preferable to working individually (65.4% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (a)). At the same time, the majority of the respondents did believe that taking joint responsibility is more preferable to personal responsibility (62.2% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (b)). These findings suggest that the majority of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS feel more comfortable to work in groups than individually probably because there is less focus on individual performance. It is not also unreasonable to say that they may prefer to work in an atmosphere where their contribution is ambiguous.

Table 5.15 also indicates that nearly two third of the respondents in the present study were of the opinion that group welfare is more important than individual rewards (63.2% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (c). Moreover, 70% of the respondents did believe that employees should pursue their goals after considering the welfare of the group (67.2% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (d)). It is therefore no surprise that 62.7% of respondents opined that group success is more important than individual success (62.7% ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on statement (e)).

Going by the evidence presented so far with regard to administrative cultural dimension of collectivism, it appears reasonable to conclude that although there are civil servants with individualistic orientation (less collectivistic-oriented), the majority of civil servants in the state level civil service of ANRS are collectivistic-oriented. This is borne out by the index results in Table 5.16.

5.3.3.4 Index for Collectivism

On a scale of 1–5, collectivism has a mean of 3.55 (total sum of the average mean for 3 indicator concepts of collectivism divided by 3 (the number of indicator concepts)) and a median of 3.67 (see Table 5.16). The measure of central tendency employed to calculate index was the mean, although the median would theoretically have been the more accurate measure because the data was ordinal. However, the mean was used, as the nature of the data was such that the mean is a close estimate of the median. This is borne out by the results in Table 5.16.

On a scale of 1–5, a dichotomous category is envisaged; the mean scores below 3 are classified as low, whereas the mean scores above 3 are classified as high. Following this logic, we can conclude that the majority of civil servants in the state level civil services of ANRS have a collectivistic cultural orientation. In other words, administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS is generally characterized by collectivistic orientation. Notwithstanding this, high standard deviation recorded for almost all collectivism items indicates that there are also civil servants with individualistic orientation within the state level civil service of ANRS. (Standard deviation is higher than 1.00 (see Table 5.13-5.15)).

Table 5.16: Descriptive Statistics for Collectivistic Orientation

N	185
Mean	3.5486
Median	3.6667
Standard Deviation	0.6651

5.3.4 Political Bias/Neutrality (PB/N)

As explained in chapter four, a twelve-item construct was designed to capture civil servants political cultural orientations centered on two PB/N indicator concepts: relationship between politics and the civil service, and civil servants’ perceptions and attitudes towards politicians. This section, therefore, presents and discusses the survey results accordingly. Thereafter, the index for political bias/neutrality will be presented.

5.3.4.1 Relationship between Politics and the Civil Service

Table 5.17: Perceptions and Beliefs on Relations between Politics and the Civil Service

Statement	‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly Agree’ (%)	Both ‘Agree’ and ‘Disagree’ (%)	‘Disagree’ and ‘Strongly Disagree’ (%)	Mean	SD
a)* In administration of civil services, technical considerations must be given more weight than political factors.	69.7	10.3	20.0	3.96	1.201
b) Civil servants should always remain neutral in relation to political parties.	61.6	11.9	26.5	3.65	1.251
c) The interference of politicians in the business of civil servants is a disturbing feature of public life.	61.1	14.6	24.3	3.61	1.198
d) Decision-making is a preserve of those in power.	62.2	18.4	19.5	3.76	1.174
e)** It is an advantage for the public sector if top civil servants share the political views of the ruling government.	53.0	14.6	32.4	2.70	1.245
Average				3.67	1.026

*Item was excluded from average and index creation (refer to section 4.4.2.2). ** Item was reverse-coded and also excluded from average and index creation (refer to section 4.4.2.2).

Table 5.17 demonstrates that the majority of the respondents were in agreement with the view that technocrats should take precedence over politicians. According to them, technical considerations must be given more weight than political factors (69.7% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (a)). This suggests that the majority of civil servants in the sample may be aware of the fact that a civil service not governed on a technical basis is weak, and a weakened civil service renders the policy process vulnerable to poorly skilled politicians and consultants (Karyeija, 2012; Mutahaba and Balogun 1992). At least 61.2% of the respondents did believe that civil servants should always remain neutral in relation to political parties (61.2% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (b)). Moreover, the majority of the respondents revealed their agreement with the statement which states that the interference of politicians in the business of civil servants is a disturbing feature of public life (61.1% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (c)). These findings clearly imply that the majority of the civil servants under study prefer independence from the politicians. The findings also suggest that they are of the view that civil service career positions should not be subjected to the direct influence of politicians.

Result shown in Table 5.17 indicates that the majority of civil servants in the present study acknowledge that decision-making is a preserve of those in power (62.2% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (d)). Meanwhile, most of the respondents in the present study give an impression that loyalty to the ruling government is somehow desirable in the civil service, for when asked whether it is an advantage for the public sector if top civil servants share the political views of the ruling government, 53% responded affirmatively (53% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (e)). It is interesting that respondents who want to be independent from politicians also seem to support the need to be loyal to the ruling regime, possibly this is because of the politicization of the civil service.

Taken together, the above findings imply that the majority of civil servants in the present study want to keep themselves aloof from politicians and to support de-politicization of the civil service.

5.3.4.2 Civil Servants' Attitudes and Perceptions towards Politicians

Table 5.18: Civil Servants' Attitudes and Perceptions towards Politicians

Statement	'Agree' and 'Strongly Agree' (%)	Both 'Agree' and 'Disagree' (%)	'Disagree' and 'Strongly Disagree' (%)	Mean	SD
a) I am not considering Ethiopian political leaders to have specialized political roles.	58.4	14.6	27.0	3.48	1.175
b)* Although parties play an important role in a democracy, often they exacerbate political conflicts.	45.4	10.3	44.3	3.11	1.281
c) Politicians think more about their welfare than that of the citizens.	57.3	16.8	25.9	3.66	1.284
d) The civil servants and not the politicians guarantee reasonable public policies.	60.0	16.8	23.2	3.59	1.281
e) Local self-government is the best for adapting local services to local needs.	71.4	16.8	11.9	3.81	0.979
f) Ethiopia needs a new generation of political leaders.	57.3	16.2	26.5	3.55	1.245
g) Most political leaders cannot be trusted.	57.3	16.2	26.5	3.52	1.243
Average				3.60	.9693

*Item was excluded from average and index creation (refer to section 4.4.2.2).

Results in Table 5.18 suggest that the majority of civil servants in the present study tend to distrust the politicians, and consider them unskilled, greedy and selfish. For instance, Table 5.17 indicates that only 27% of the respondents reported that they consider Ethiopian political leaders to have specialized political roles (27% 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree' on statement (a)). This clearly implies that the majority of the respondents view politicians as being unsystematic and unskilled. It could be perhaps for this reason that a significant number of respondents were in agreement with the statement which states that parties play an important role in a democracy but they usually exacerbate political conflicts (45.4% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (b)).

Table 5.18 shows that most of the respondents revealed their agreement with the statement which states that politicians think more about their welfare than that of the citizens (57.3% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (c)). This finding implies that the majority of civil servants in the present study view politicians as being greedy, selfish and corrupted. It also suggests that the

majority of the participants consider the political sphere as a theatre for narrow interests or personal gains orchestrated through soliciting bribes or other favours from those that stand to gain from special economic privileges.

It could be perhaps for the above reasons that the majority of the respondents in the present study revealed their agreement with the statement which states that the civil servants and not the politicians guarantee reasonable public policies (60% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (d)). Moreover, the majority of respondents think that a technocratic civil service and decentralized governance is best (71.4% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (e)). This agreement demonstrates the beliefs that decentralization brings services closer to the people and hence local leaders are held more directly accountable, rather than in a centralized system where the politicians are far removed in terms of physical distance and power.

It is clear from Table 5.18 that most of the civil servants in the present study believe that Ethiopia needs a new generation of political leaders (57.3% 'agree' and 'strongly agree' on statement (f)). With such an attitude, it is understandable that the civil servants take most political leaders to be untrustworthy. It was only a paltry 26.5% who said that politicians can be trusted (26.5% 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree' on statement (g)).

Going by the evidence presented so far with regard to administrative cultural dimension of political bias/neutrality, we can deduce that the majority of civil servants in the present study prefer to be neutral and independent from the politicians. They tend to distrust the politicians, and consider them greedy, corrupt and selfish. They also have modest expectations for the politicians and claim that the country needs a new generation of political leaders.

Therefore, it appears reasonable to conclude that although there are politically biased civil servants, the majority of civil servants in the state level civil service of ANRS are politically neutral. This is borne out by the index results in Table 5.19.

5.3.4.3 Index for Political Bias/Neutrality

On a scale of 1–5, political bias vs. neutrality has a mean of 3.64 (total sum of the average mean for 2 indicator concepts of political bias vs. neutrality divided by 2 (the number of indicator concepts)) and a median of 3.75 (see Table 5.19). The measure of central tendency employed to

calculate index was the mean, although the median would theoretically have been the more accurate measure because the data was ordinal. However, the mean was used, as the nature of the data was such that the mean is a close estimate of the median. This is borne out by the results in Table 5.19. The mean is also easier to determine and interpret, and it can be employed in various other calculations. Besides, as in the case of other similar researches (see, for instance, Ahmed, 2012; Hofstede, 2001; House, *et al*, 2004; Karyeija, 2012), the data scales used in this study, i.e., ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’, can be considered quasi-interval scales, implying that the mean is a reasonable and valid measure.

On a scale of 1–5, a dichotomous category is envisaged; the mean scores below 3 indicate high partisanship and thus more political bias, whereas the mean scores above 3 suggest low partisanship and hence high political neutrality. Thus, the index result suggests that the majority of civil servants in the state level civil services of ANRS have a preference for neutrality and less interference from the politicians, and also have a relatively low level of mutual trust for the politicians. Therefore, we can conclude that the majority of civil servants in the state level civil services of ANRS have perceptions and preferences associated with high political neutrality. In other words, we can refer to administrative culture within the state level civil services of ANRS as high on political neutrality and low on political bias. Notwithstanding this, high standard deviation recorded for almost all items indicates that there are also politically biased civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS. (Standard deviation is higher than 1.00 (see Table 5.17-5.18)).

Table 5.19: Descriptive Statistics for Political Bias/Neutrality

N	185
Mean	3.6378
Median	3.7500
Standard Deviation	0.94301

5.3.5 Performance Orientation Culture

As explained in chapter four, civil servants' perceptions on performance orientation culture were measured with a four-item construct originally designed by House, *et al.*, (2004). This section, therefore, presents and discusses the survey results accordingly, which is followed by the index for performance orientation culture as presented in Table 5.21.

Table 5.20: Perceptions on Performance Orientation Culture in Civil Service

Statement	'Agree' and 'Strongly Agree' (%)	Both 'Agree' and 'Disagree' (%)	'Disagree' and 'Strongly Disagree' (%)	Mean	SD
a) In my organization, employees are encouraged to strive for continuously improved performance.	18.4	16.8	69.9	2.33	1.065
b) In my organization, being innovative to improve performance is rewarded.	16.2	15.7	68.1	2.25	0.986
C) In my organization, employees are encouraged to set challenging work goals.	14.6	23.8	61.6	2.31	0.993
d) In my organization, major rewards are only based on performance effectiveness.	10.3	16.2	73.5	2.15	0.882

Results shown in Table 5.20 indicate that more than 60% of the respondents reported negative perceptions towards the performance orientation culture in the civil service. Table 5.20 shows that about 70% of the respondents revealed their disagreement with the statement which states that employees in the civil service are encouraged to strive for continuously improved performance (69.9% 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree' on statement (a)). This response implies that continuous performance improvement training and development opportunities in the civil service are either very limited or virtually non-existent. It may also suggest that whenever such opportunity comes, its allocation is biased (inferred from 18.4% agreement on statement (a)).

Table 5.20 also indicates that more than two third of the respondents revealed their disagreement with the statement which states that being innovative to improve performance is rewarded (68.1% 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree' on statement (b)). With such perception, it is understandable that the majority of civil servants have little motivation to set challenging goals for themselves. This could explain why only a paltry 14.6% of the respondents revealed their

agreement with the statement which states that employees in the civil service are encouraged to set challenging work goals (61.6% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (c)).

Finally, Table 5.20 indicates that the overwhelming majority of respondents were of the view that reward practice in the civil service is not based only on the performance effectiveness (73.5% ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ on statement (d)). This disagreement demonstrates that the majority of civil servants perceived that reward and promotion practices in the civil service are usually influenced by non-performance factors like seniority, political affiliation and personal connection.

Taken together, the above findings imply that the majority of civil servants under study perceive that the civil service environment is not encouraging and does not reward innovation and performances. It seems that the majority of civil servants perceive that there are no impartial rewards for individual’s performances in the civil service. They also give the impression that rewards in the civil service are mainly based on factors other than performance effectiveness.

Therefore, it appears reasonable to conclude that although there are civil servants who perceive the presence of the performance orientation culture in the civil service, the majority of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS perceive that results are less emphasized and innovation and performance improvement are not encouraged and rewarded in the civil service. In other words, the survey results suggest that the performance orientation culture within the state level civil service of ANRS is generally low. This is borne out by the index results in Table 5.21.

5.3.5.1 Index for Performance Orientation Culture

On a scale of 1–5, performance orientation has a mean of 2.25 (total sum of the mean for 4 items used to assess civil servants’ perceptions on performance orientation divided by 4 (the number of items)) and a median of 2.00 (see Table 5.21). The measure of central tendency employed to calculate index was the mean, although the median would theoretically have been the more accurate measure because the data was ordinal. However, the mean was used, as the nature of the data was such that the mean is a close estimate of the median. This is borne out by the results in Table 5.21. The mean is also easier to determine and interpret, and it can be employed in various other calculations. Besides, as in the case of other similar researches (see, for instance, Ahmed,

2012; Hofstede, 2001; House, *et al*, 2004; Karyeija, 2012), the data scales used in this study, i.e., ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’, can be considered quasi-interval scales, implying that the mean is a reasonable and valid measure.

On a scale of 1–5, a dichotomous category is envisaged; the mean scores below 3 indicate low performance orientation, whereas the mean scores above 3 indicate high performance orientation. Thus, the index result suggests that the majority of civil servants in the present study perceive that results are less emphasized and innovation and performance improvement are not encouraged and rewarded in the civil service. Therefore, we can conclude that the majority of civil servants in the state level civil services of ANRS have low performance-oriented cultural perceptions. In other words, we can refer to administrative culture within the state level civil services of ANRS as low on performance orientation culture. This notwithstanding, a relatively high standard deviation recorded for all items points to some differences among civil servants with regard to their perceptions on performance orientation culture in the state level civil service of ANRS. (Standard deviation is nearly 1.00 (see Table 5.20)).

Table 5.21: Descriptive Statistics for Performance Orientation

N	185
Mean	2.2595
Median	2.0000
Standard Deviation	0.8243

5.3.6 Testing Proposition on the Features of Administrative Culture

An assessment of all the foregoing descriptive statistic outputs with regard to the features of administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS (see Table 5.3.6 through Table 5.21) demonstrated that mean scores corresponding to the index or composite variables of power distance, uncertainty avoidance and collectivism were most appropriate to test the present study’s ‘proposition 1’ compared to the other descriptive statistic outputs. Subsequently, the mean scores corresponding to the index or composite variables of power distance, uncertainty avoidance and collectivism (see Tables 5.8, 5.12 and 5.16) were used to test the present study’s

‘proposition 1’, which was developed to explore whether or not the main features of administrative culture (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance and collectivism) in the state level civil service of ANRS are similar to the main features of the national culture in Ethiopia.

As shown in Tables 5.8, 5.12 and 5.16, administrative culture in the state level civil service of ANRS can be described through: high power distance (with the mean score 3.56); high uncertainty avoidance (with the mean score 3.56) and collectivistic orientation (with the mean score 3.55). Whilst these empirical findings do not necessarily confirm the direct influence that the national culture exerts on the administrative culture in the state level civil service of ANRS, they may be indicative of the underlying causal relationships. What they do confirm, however, is that the main features of administrative culture (i.e., high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance and collectivistic orientation) in the state level civil service of ANRS are similar to the main features of the national culture in Ethiopia (i.e., high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance and collectivistic orientation). Therefore, these empirical findings strongly support ‘Proposition 1’, which states that *like the national culture in Ethiopia, administrative culture in the state level civil service of ANRS is characterized by high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance and collectivistic orientation.*

Going by the evidence presented so far with regard to administrative culture, it appears reasonable to suggest that the majority of civil servants in the state level civil service of ANRS have high cultural orientation on power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivism and political neutrality. It is also possible to argue that the majority of civil servants perceive the state level civil service of ANRS as being low performance oriented. Bearing in mind the relationship between administrative culture and institutionalization of performance management proposed in chapter three, there seems a need for cultural improvement interventions or reform modification for performance management system to take root in the state level civil service of ANRS. However, whether or not it is necessary to devote resources to any effort to improve cultural orientations or to the modification of the reform depends on research demonstrating a clear casual relationship between administrative culture and institutionalization of performance management reform. As part of the process of trying to demonstrate this, the following section presents the analysis of the correlation between administrative culture and institutionalization

level of performance management reform in the specific context of the civil service under investigation.

5.4 Correlations between Administrative Culture and Institutionalization Level of Performance Management Reform within the State Level Civil Service of ANRS

This section presents the bivariate correlations between administrative culture and the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS, the intention being to preliminarily assess the validity of the analytical framework which proposed that administrative culture (independent variables, i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation, political bias/neutrality, and performance orientation) has an influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform (dependent variables, i.e., institutionalization level of performance agreement, performance review, rewarding high performers and managing under-performers, and the overall performance management reform) in the state level civil service of ANRS.

To assess the existence of correlations between the independent variables (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation, political neutrality/bias, and performance orientation) and dependent variables (i.e., the institutionalization level of performance agreement, performance review, rewarding high performers and managing under-performers, and the overall performance management reform), Spearman's correlation was applied (refer to section 4.4.2.3 for details). The resultant correlation matrix produced is shown in Table 5.22 below.

Table 5.22: Non-parametric Correlations between Administrative Culture and Institutionalization level of Performance Management Reform

	Institutionalization level of performance agreement (PA)	Institutionalization level of performance review (PR)	Institutionalization level of rewarding high performers and managing under-performers (R&MUP)	Institutionalization level of overall performance management reform (PMGT)
Power distance	-.257**	-.373**	-.312**	-.334**
Uncertainty avoidance	-.365**	-.402**	-.362**	-.385**
Collectivistic orientation	-.273**	-.281**	-.187*	-.248**
Political bias/neutrality	-.316**	-.354**	-.413**	-.407**
Performance orientation	.580**	.547**	.428**	.572**

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

From the above table, it can be seen that there is evidence to show that all dimensions of administrative culture have an association with the institutionalization level of each aspect of the performance management reform including, the overall performance management reform, in the state level civil service of ANRS.

Summarizing the key findings from this matrix, it can be seen that performance orientation culture has a significant and positive association with the institutionalization level of each aspect of the performance management reform, including the overall performance management reform. On the other hand, administrative cultural dimensions like power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation and political bias/neutrality have a significant and negative association with the institutionalization level of each aspect of the performance management reform, including the overall performance management reform. Bearing in mind the definition of administrative culture and institutionalization of the reform, these findings suggest that civil

servants having perceptions, beliefs and attitudes of high power distance, strong uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation, political neutrality and low performance orientation are unlikely to go through with the prescriptions of the performance management system.

Going by the evidence presented in the above correlation matrix, it appears reasonable to expect that administrative culture, as measured by power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation, political bias/neutrality and performance orientation, has an influence on the institutionalization status of performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS. However, it is worth to note that relationships exposed in the correlation matrix do not confirm causality *per se* for reasons discussed in Field (2009) such as the *third variable* problem. Nevertheless, they do confirm that there are significant linear relationships. It can therefore be inferred from the results that there is sufficient evidence of linear relationships to proceed with investigating whether or not administrative culture matters on the institutionalization status of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.

5.5 Summary

In order to provide a basis for the evaluation of the influence that administrative culture has on the institutionalization status of performance management reform, there was a need to assess the institutionalization status of performance management reform and features of administrative culture in the state level civil service of ANRS. The institutionalization levels of each aspect of the performance management reform, including the overall performance management reform and features of administrative culture along the dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation, political neutrality and performance orientation were thus assessed in this chapter.

Generally, the limited institutionalization levels of each aspect of the performance management reform, including the overall performance management reform found in this research were consistent with other reports and surveys carried out in Africa (see, for instance, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; Karyeija, 2012; Ohemeng, 2009). Survey results suggest that the majority of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS have perceptions, attitudes and beliefs reflecting high power distance, strong uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation and

political neutrality. It was also found that the majority of civil servants maintained a perception of low performance orientation culture in the civil service.

The chapter has thus addressed the first and the second objectives of this research which were to assess the institutionalization status of performance management reform and to identify the main features of administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS.

This chapter also sought to explore the relationships between the administrative cultural orientation of civil servants and the institutionalization level of performance management reform to determine whether or not any significant relationship exists. Spearman's correlation coefficient was employed for this purpose. It was found that significant relationships exist between the institutionalization level of each aspect of the performance management reform, including the overall performance management reform, and each dimension of administrative culture. This finding suggests that administrative culture could be one among the reasons why the majority of civil servants get difficulty to go through with the requirements of the performance management reform in the civil service under investigation.

Having established significant correlations between the administrative cultural orientations of civil servants and the institutionalization level of performance management reform, the next phase of this research focuses on the examination of the data for evidence of the influence of the administrative cultural orientations of civil servants on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. The next chapter addresses this aspect of the research.

CHAPTER SIX

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS

6.0 Introduction

It has been established in the previous chapter that the current institutionalization status of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS is generally low. It has also been established through correlation analysis that the prevailing administrative cultural orientations of civil servants, as measured by power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivist orientation, political neutrality and performance orientation, do have a significant relation with the observed institutionalization level of each aspect of the performance management reform (i.e., performance agreement, performance review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers), including the overall performance management reform.

Whilst none of the relationships exposed in the correlation matrix confirms causality *per se* for reasons discussed in Field (2009) such as the *third variable* problem, they may be indicative of the underlying causal relationships and as such require further exploration. What they do confirm, however, is that there are significant linear relationships between administrative culture and institutionalization level of performance management reform within the civil service under study. It can therefore be inferred from the results that there is sufficient evidence of linear relationships to proceed with regression analysis, with the intention of exploring the casual relationships between administrative culture and institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.


This chapter, therefore, attempts to examine whether or not the prevailing administrative cultures within the state level civil service of ANRS do have an influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform, using multiple regression analysis technique. The qualitative findings of the study, which are intended to elaborate and discuss the regression outcomes, are also presented in this chapter. Further evaluation for existence of correlation between civil servants administrative cultural orientation and their social background is also presented, the intention being to get an insight into how NPM-driven reforms should be managed in relation to culture. By so doing, this chapter empirically tests propositions made in chapter

three, achieves the third objective of this research, and addresses the central research question posed for this study: Does administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS affect the institutionalization status of performance management reform? Which cultural dimensions within the civil service do have a significant impact and on which aspects of the performance management reform institutionalization?

6.1 Briefs on the Research Propositions and Statistical Analysis Technique

The main aim of this research is to empirically establish whether or not administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS has an influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform. To help achieve this, the analytical framework that depicts the potential effects of five administrative cultural dimensions (i.e., independent variables) on the institutionalization level of each aspect of the performance management reform (i.e., dependent variables) in the context of the civil service under study was developed in chapter 3 and briefly presented in figure 6.1 below.

Figure 6.1: Proposed Relationship between Independent and Dependent Variables under Study



Based on theoretical bases and literature review, five propositions were advanced in chapter three to facilitate the examination of the data for relationships between administrative culture and

institutionalization of performance management reform in the context of the present study. The propositions were:

Proposition 2: Administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by power distance dimension, exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and performance agreement, review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers aspects of the reform in particular.

Proposition 3: Administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by uncertainty avoidance dimension, exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and performance agreement, review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers aspects of the reform in particular.

Proposition 4: Administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by individualism/collectivism dimension, exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and performance agreement, review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers aspects of the reform in particular.

Proposition 5: Administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by political bias/neutrality dimension, exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and performance agreement, review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers aspects of the reform in particular.

Proposition 6: Administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by performance orientation dimension, exerts a positive and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and performance agreement, review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers aspects of the reform in particular.

It has been established in chapter 5 that not all civil servants under investigation have a similar administrative cultural orientation, though, the majority of civil servants reported a similar

cultural orientation (i.e., high power distance, strong uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation, high political neutrality and low performance orientation). Likewise, it has been established that there are some differences among civil servants with regard to their perceptions and experiences on the extent to which they regularly follow the prescriptions of the performance management policy and regulation as a routine way of conducting performance management in the civil service (i.e., measures of the institutionalization status of performance management reform).

Therefore, in order for the above propositions to be actually operationalized and tested, it can be interpreted as meaning that the variations in perceptions, beliefs and attitudes of civil servants in relation to the five dimensions of administrative culture have likely contributed to differences in their commitment to institutionalize the performance management reform (i.e., following the prescriptions of the performance management policy and regulation as a routine way of conducting performance management in the civil service). The tasks of testing the propositions are thus simplified to an examination of the data for evidence of significant casual associations between the dimensions of culture and the institutionalization status of the performance management reform measures (i.e., the institutionalization level of performance agreement (PA), performance review (PR), rewarding high performers and managing under-performers (R&MUP) and an overall performance management (PMGT) reform).

To facilitate this analysis, a statistical technique that is widely used in empirical culture research was employed; namely multiple regression (see, for instance, Cooke and Szumal, 2000; Denison and Mishra, 1995; Hofstede, 2001; House, *et al.*, 2006; Ogbonna and Harris, 2000). With regard to the specific type of multiple regression, hierarchical multiple regression analysis technique was employed (refer to section 4.4.2.2 for details).

Having research propositions and statistical analysis technique briefed thus, the subsequent sections present the results of multiple regression analysis.

6.2 Relationship between Administrative Culture and Institutionalization Level of Performance Management Reform within the State Level Civil Service of ANRS

This section presents the results of the multiple linear regressions. Accordingly, the influences of the five dimensions of administrative culture on the institutionalization level of each element of

the performance management reform, including the overall performance management reform, are presented below.

6.2.1 Relationship between Administrative Culture and Institutionalization Level of Performance Agreement within the State Level Civil Service of ANRS

To examine whether or not the institutionalization level of performance agreement aspect of the performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS is attributed to the prevailing administrative culture within the civil service, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was applied to the data, with all five dimensions of administrative culture included as independent variables and the institutionalization level of performance agreement as the dependent variable. All demographic variables were entered in the first step to control their effects on the dependent variable; and the outputs obtained from the analysis have been presented in three tables that follow (Table 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3).

Table 6.1: Regression Analysis Results for Performance Agreement

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics					Durbin-Watson
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change	
1	.435 ^a	.189	.157	.85333	.189	5.899	7	177	.000	
2	.778 ^b	.605	.577	.60423	.416	36.204	5	172	.000	2.088

a. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age

b. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age, Performance orientation, Uncertainty avoidance, Collectivism, Political neutrality, Power distance

c. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of PA

As shown in Table 6.1, the value of R square change for the model generated is .416. This means that even when the effects of demographic variables were statistically controlled, civil servants' administrative cultural orientation in the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by five dimensions, accounts for 42.8% of the variation observed in their commitments to the institutionalization of the performance agreement aspect of the performance management reform

(i.e., following the policy prescriptions on performance agreement as a routine way of conducting performance agreement in the civil service). In other words, this value could mean that, of the potential reasons for the current limited institutionalization status of performance agreement aspect of the reform within the state level civil service of ANRS, 42.8% can be attributed to the administrative cultural orientations of civil servants.

Table 6.2 presents an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to show whether the regression model is significantly better at explaining the institutionalization level of performance agreement than using the mean as the best predictor. The ANOVA gives a highly significant result ($F = 21.948$, $p = .000$), thereby indicating a significant relationship between the institutionalization status of performance agreement and administrative culture. This means that administrative culture can significantly influence the institutionalization level of performance agreement.

Table 6.2: ANOVA for Performance Agreement

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	30.068	7	4.295	5.899	.000a
	Residual	128.885	177	.728		
	Total	158.953	184			
2	Regression	96.156	12	8.013	21.948	.000b
	Residual	62.796	172	.365		
	Total	158.953	184			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age

b. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age, Performance orientation, Uncertainty avoidance, Collectivism, Political neutrality, Power distance

c. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of PA

Table 6.3 indicates the coefficients demonstrating that administrative cultural dimensions (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation and political neutrality) have a significant and negative influence on the institutionalization level of performance agreement. Table 6.3 also shows that performance orientation culture has a significant and positive influence on the institutionalization level of performance agreement. It is clear that all independent

variables have a significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance agreement within the state level civil service of ANRS.

Table 6.3: Coefficients for Performance Agreement

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	1.108	.538		2.060	.041		
	Gender	.105	.138	.055	.759	.449	.882	1.134
	Organization identity	.124	.159	.053	.778	.438	.989	1.011
	Place of growth	-.244	.133	-.129	-1.841	.067	.926	1.080
	Job position	.973	.177	.387	5.484	.000	.920	1.087
	Level of education	.078	.156	.035	.500	.618	.920	1.087
	Age	.137	.162	.068	.843	.400	.695	1.438
	Work experience	.047	.147	.025	.319	.750	.741	1.350
2	(Constant)	1.686	.397		4.244	.000		
	Gender	.184	.098	.096	1.869	.063	.869	1.151
	Organization identity	.074	.113	.032	.657	.512	.978	1.022
	Place of growth	-.225	.097	-.119	-2.307	.022	.864	1.158
	Job position	.487	.140	.194	3.493	.001	.746	1.341
	Level of education	-.006	.124	-.003	-.047	.963	.731	1.369
	Age	.013	.118	.007	.114	.909	.659	1.518
	Work experience	.158	.106	.084	1.490	.138	.717	1.396
	Power distance	-.148	.053	-.159	-3.289	.001	.705	1.417
	Uncertainty avoidance	-.208	.046	-.224	-4.530	.000	.938	1.066
	Political neutrality	-.124	.048	-.134	-2.925	.004	.849	1.178
	Collectivism	-.131	.047	-.141	-2.907	.004	.908	1.101
	Performance orientation	.555	.045	.597	12.229	.000	.965	1.036

a. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of PA

6.2.1.1 Test Results on the Assumptions of Regression

To test the assumptions of the regression, an analysis of residuals was undertaken. Plots of the residuals are shown in Figures 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. The histogram shows a bell-shaped distribution, indicating that the assumption of normality has not been violated. The normal probability plot of expected cumulative probability against observed cumulative probability also shows points

generally lying close to the straight line, indicating that the residuals are approximately normally distributed and thus confirm the conclusions drawn from histogram.




Figure 6.2: Histogram of Standardized Residuals for Performance Agreement






Figure 6.3: Normal P-P plot of Regression Standardized Residual for Performance Agreement

Linearity of the relationship between variables was assessed by examining the six scatter-plots under Figure 6.4. The random distribution of data points indicates that there is no evidence of a non-linear relationship, and therefore this assumption has also not been violated. There is also no evidence of heteroscedasticity in the scatter-plots, thereby implying that the assumption of constant variance is valid.


Scatterplot




Partial Regression Plot




Partial Regression Plot



Partial Regression Plot



Partial Regression Plot






Figure 6.4: Scatter-Plots of Standardized Residual against Predicted Value for Performance Agreement

To test for the independence of the error terms, the Durbin-Watson statistic was obtained (see Table 6.1). Its value of 2.088 is very close to 2, thereby indicating that this assumption has also not been violated. The VIF obtained (well below 10) indicates that there is no collinearity within the data (Field, 2009). Moreover, case by case diagnostics were undertaken and the result indicates that there is no influential case within the data.

Taken together, these test results imply that the regression model produced is an accurate and valid representation of the data and can be applied to the population under study. Therefore, it can be concluded that the administrative cultural orientations of civil servants in relation to power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivist orientation, political neutrality and performance orientation have likely affected the institutionalization level of performance agreement aspect of the performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS.

6.2.2 Relationship between Administrative Culture and Institutionalization Level of Performance Review within the State Level Civil Service of ANRS

To examine whether or not the institutionalization level of the performance review aspect of the performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS is attributed to the

prevailing administrative culture within the civil service, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was applied to the data, with all five dimensions of administrative culture included as independent variables and the institutionalization level of performance review as the dependent variable. All demographic variables were entered in the first step to control their effects on the dependent variable; and the outputs obtained from the analysis have been presented in three tables that follow (Table 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6).

Table 6.4: Regression Analysis Results for Performance Review

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics					Durbin-Watson
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change	
1	.428 ^a	.183	.151	.79949	.183	5.679	7	177	.000	
2	.753 ^b	.568	.537	.59020	.384	30.558	5	172	.000	1.953

a. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age

b. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age, Performance orientation, Uncertainty avoidance, Collectivism, Political neutrality, Power distance

c. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of PR

As shown in Table 6.4, the value of R square change for the model generated is .384. This means that even when the effects of demographic variables were statistically controlled, civil servants' administrative cultural orientation in the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by five dimensions, accounts for 38.4% of the variation observed in their commitments to the institutionalization of the performance review aspect of the performance management reform (i.e., following the policy prescriptions on performance review as a routine way of conducting performance review in the civil service). To put it in other way, this value could mean that, of the potential reasons for the current limited institutionalization status of performance review aspect of the reform within the state level civil service of ANRS, 38.4% can be attributed to the administrative cultural orientations of civil servants.

Table 6.5 presents an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to show whether the regression model is significantly better at explaining the institutionalization level of performance review than using the mean as the best predictor. The ANOVA gives a highly significant result ($F = 18.811$, $p = .000$), thereby indicating a significant relationship between the institutionalization status of performance review and administrative culture. This means that administrative culture can significantly influence the institutionalization level of performance review.

Table 6.5: ANOVA for Performance Review

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	25.409	7	3.630	5.679	.000 ^a
	Residual	113.136	177	.639		
	Total	138.546	184			
2	Regression	78.632	12	6.553	18.811	.000 ^b
	Residual	59.914	172	.348		
	Total	138.546	184			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age

b. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age, Performance orientation, Uncertainty avoidance, Collectivism, Political neutrality, Power distance

c. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of PR

Table 6.6 indicates the coefficients demonstrating that administrative cultural dimensions (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation and political neutrality) have a significant and negative influence on the institutionalization level of performance review. Table 6.6 also shows that performance orientation culture has a significant and positive influence on the institutionalization level of performance review. It is clear that all independent variables have a significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance review in the state level civil service of ANRS.

Table 6.6: Coefficients for Performance Review

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	1.246	.504		2.472	.014		
	Gender	.014	.129	.008	.107	.915	.882	1.134
	Organization identity	.123	.149	.056	.826	.410	.989	1.011
	Place of growth	-.174	.124	-.099	-1.398	.164	.926	1.080
	Job position	.821	.166	.350	4.935	.000	.920	1.087
	Level of education	.041	.146	.020	.281	.779	.920	1.087
	Age	.341	.152	.183	2.243	.026	.695	1.438
	Work experience	-.180	.138	-.103	-1.305	.194	.741	1.350
2	(Constant)	1.808	.388		4.659	.000		
	Gender	.088	.096	.049	.915	.361	.869	1.151
	Organization identity	.074	.111	.034	.664	.508	.978	1.022
	Place of growth	-.146	.095	-.083	-1.536	.126	.864	1.158
	Job position	.346	.136	.147	2.538	.012	.746	1.341
	Level of education	-.073	.121	-.035	-.600	.549	.731	1.369
	Age	.242	.115	.130	2.101	.037	.659	1.518
	Work experience	-.067	.103	-.038	-.649	.517	.717	1.396
	Power distance	-.171	.052	-.197	-3.296	.001	.705	1.417
	Uncertainty avoidance	-.177	.045	-.203	-3.930	.000	.938	1.066
	Political neutrality	-.139	.047	-.160	-2.933	.004	.849	1.178
	Collectivism	-.103	.046	-.112	-2.702	.008	.908	1.101
	Performance orientation	.489	.044	.564	11.043	.000	.965	1.036

a. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of PR

6.2.2.1 Test Results on the Assumptions of Regression

To test the assumptions of the regression, an analysis of residuals was undertaken. Plots of the residuals are shown in Figures 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7. The histogram shows a bell-shaped distribution, indicating that the assumption of normality has not been violated. The normal probability plot of expected cumulative probability against observed cumulative probability also shows points generally lying close to the straight line, indicating that the residuals are approximately normally distributed and thus confirm the conclusions drawn from histogram.




Figure 6.5: Histogram of Standardized Residuals for Performance Review

Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual






Figure 6.6: Normal P-P plot of Regression Standardized Residual for Performance Review

Linearity of the relationship between variables was assessed by examining the six scatter-plots under Figure 6.7. The random distribution of data points indicates that there is no evidence of a non-linear relationship, and therefore this assumption has also not been violated. There is also no evidence of heteroscedasticity in the scatter-plots, thereby implying that the assumption of constant variance is valid.


Partial Regression Plot



Partial Regression Plot



Partial Regression Plot







Figure 6.7: Scatter-Plots of Standardized Residual against Predicted Value for Performance Review

To test for the independence of the error terms, the Durbin-Watson statistic was obtained (see Table 6.4). Its value of 1.953 is very close to 2, indicating that this assumption has also not been violated. The VIF obtained (well below 10) indicates that there is no collinearity within the data (Field, 2009). Moreover, case by case diagnostics were undertaken and the result indicates that there is no influential case within the data.

Taken together, these test results indicate that the regression model produced is an accurate and valid representation of the data and can be applied to the population under study. Therefore, it can be concluded that the administrative cultural orientations of civil servants in relation to power

distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivist orientation, political neutrality and performance orientation have likely affected the institutionalization level of performance review aspect of the performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS.

6.2.3 Relationship between Administrative Culture and Institutionalization Level of Rewarding High Performers and Managing Under-Performers within the State Level Civil Service of ANRS

To examine whether or not the institutionalization level of managing high and low performers aspect of the performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS is attributed to the prevailing administrative culture within the civil service, multiple regression analysis was applied to the data, with all five dimensions of administrative culture included as independent variables and the institutionalization level of managing high and low performers as the dependent variable. All demographic variables were entered in the first step to control their effects on the dependent variable; and the outputs obtained from the analysis have been presented in three tables that follow (Table 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9).

Table 6.7: Regression Analysis Results for Rewarding High Performers and Managing Under-Performers

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics					Durbin-Watson
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change	
1	.420 ^a	.176	.144	.81120	.176	5.415	7	177	.000	
2	.710 ^b	.503	.469	.63895	.327	22.658	5	172	.000	2.295

a. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age

b. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age, Performance orientation, Uncertainty avoidance, Collectivism, Political neutrality, Power distance

c. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of R&MUP

As shown in Table 6.7, the value of R square change for the model generated is .327. This means that even when the effects of demographic variables were statistically controlled, civil servants' administrative cultural orientation in the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by five

dimensions, accounts for 32.7% of the variation observed in their commitments to the institutionalization of the high and low performers management aspect of the performance management reform (i.e., following the policy prescriptions on rewarding high performers and managing under-performers as a routine way of performance management in the civil service). To put it in other way, this value could mean that, of the potential reasons for the current limited institutionalization status of rewarding high performers and managing under-performers aspect of the reform within the state level civil service of ANRS, 32.7% can be attributed to the administrative cultural orientations of civil servants.

Table 6.8 presents an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to show whether the regression model is significantly better at explaining the institutionalization level of managing high and low performers than using the mean as the best predictor. The ANOVA gives a highly significant result ($F = 14.392$, $p = .000$), thereby indicating a significant relationship between the institutionalization status of high and low performers management and administrative culture. This means that administrative culture can significantly influence the institutionalization level of high and low performers' management.

Table 6.8: ANOVA for Rewarding High Performers and Managing Under-Performers

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	24.941	7	3.563	5.415	.000 ^a
	Residual	116.473	177	.658		
	Total	141.414	184			
2	Regression	71.192	12	5.933	14.532	.000 ^b
	Residual	70.221	172	.408		
	Total	141.414	184			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age

b. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age, Performance orientation, Uncertainty avoidance, Collectivism, Political neutrality, Power distance

c. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of R&MUP

Table 6.9 indicates the coefficients demonstrating that administrative cultural dimensions (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance and political neutrality) have a significant and negative

influence on the institutionalization level of high and low performers' management within the state level civil service of ANRS. Table 6.9 also shows that performance orientation culture has a significant and positive influence on the institutionalization level of high and low performers' management. It is clear that, with the exception of collectivistic orientation, all independent variables have a significant influence on the institutionalization level of high and low performers' management within the state level civil service of ANRS.

Table 6.9: Coefficients for Rewarding High Performers and Managing Under-Performers

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	1.770	.511		3.461	.001		
	Gender	-.040	.131	-.022	-.309	.758	.882	1.134
	Organization identity	.050	.152	.023	.328	.743	.989	1.011
	Place of growth	-.240	.126	-.135	-1.905	.058	.926	1.080
	Job position	.865	.169	.365	5.129	.000	.920	1.087
	Level of education	.007	.148	.003	.048	.961	.920	1.087
	Age	.183	.154	.097	1.187	.237	.695	1.438
	Work experience	-.263	.140	-.149	-1.880	.062	.741	1.350
2	(Constant)	2.278	.420		5.421	.000		
	Gender	.056	.104	.031	.541	.589	.869	1.151
	Organization identity	-.004	.120	-.002	-.035	.972	.978	1.022
	Place of growth	-.137	.103	-.077	-1.331	.185	.864	1.158
	Job position	.313	.148	.132	2.121	.035	.746	1.341
	Level of education	-.160	.131	-.077	-1.221	.224	.731	1.369
	Age	.088	.125	.047	.706	.481	.659	1.518
	Work experience	-.104	.112	-.059	-.925	.356	.717	1.396
	Power distance	-.239	.056	-.273	-4.266	.000	.705	1.417
	Uncertainty avoidance	-.185	.049	-.211	-3.809	.000	.938	1.066
	Political neutrality	-.267	.051	-.305	-5.221	.000	.849	1.178
	Collectivism	-.050	.049	-.058	-1.021	.309	.908	1.101
	Performance orientation	.392	.048	.447	8.168	.000	.965	1.036

a. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of R&MUP

6.2.3.1 Test Results on the Assumptions of Regression

To test the assumptions of the regression, an analysis of residuals was undertaken. Plots of the residuals are shown in Figures 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10. The histogram shows a bell-shaped distribution, indicating that the assumption of normality has not been violated. The normal probability plot of expected cumulative probability against observed cumulative probability also shows points generally lying close to the straight line, indicating that the residuals are approximately normally distributed and thus confirm the conclusions drawn from histogram.




Figure 6.8: Histogram of Standardized Residuals for Rewarding High Performers and Managing Under-Performers






Figure 6.9: Normal P-P plot of Regression Standardized Residual for Rewarding High Performers and Managing Under-Performers

Linearity of the relationship between variables was assessed by examining the six scatter-plots under figure 6.10. The random distribution of data points indicates that there is no evidence of a non-linear relationship, and therefore this assumption has also not been violated. There is also no evidence of heteroscedasticity in the scatter-plots, thereby implying that the assumption of constant variance is valid.


Scatterplot




Partial Regression Plot




Partial Regression Plot



Partial Regression Plot



Partial Regression Plot






Figure 6.10: Scatter-Plots of Standardized Residual against Predicted Value for Rewarding High Performers and Managing Under-Performers

To test for the independence of the error terms, the Durbin-Watson statistic was obtained (see Table 6.7). Its value of 2.295 is very close to 2, indicating that this assumption has also not been violated. The VIF obtained (well below 10) indicates that there is no collinearity within the data (Field, 2009). Moreover, case by case diagnostics were undertaken and the result indicates that there is no influential case within the data.

Taken together, these test results indicate that the regression model produced is an accurate and valid representation of the data and can be applied to the population under study. Therefore, it can be concluded that the administrative cultural orientations of civil servants in relation to power distance, uncertainty avoidance, political neutrality and performance orientation have likely affected the institutionalization level of rewarding high performers and managing under-performers' aspect of the performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS.

6.2.4 Relationship between Administrative Culture and Institutionalization Level of Overall Performance Management Reform within the State Level Civil Service of ANRS

To examine whether or not the institutionalization level of the overall performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS is attributed to the prevailing administrative culture within the civil service, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was applied to the data,

with all five dimensions of administrative culture included as independent variables and the institutionalization level of overall performance management reform as the dependent variable. All demographic variables were entered in the first step to control their effects on the dependent variable; and the outputs obtained from the analysis have been presented in three tables that follow (Table 6.10, 6.11 and 6.12).

Table 6.10: Regression Analysis Results for Overall Performance Management Reform

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics					Durbin-Watson
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change	
1	.459 ^a	.211	.179	.73842	.211	6.746	7	177	.000	
2	.804 ^b	.646	.621	.50160	.435	42.316	5	172	.000	2.099

a. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age

b. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age, Performance orientation, Uncertainty avoidance, Collectivism, Political neutrality, Power distance

c. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of PMGT

As shown in Table 6.10, the value of R square change for the model generated is .435. This means that even when the effects of demographic variables were statistically controlled, civil servants administrative cultural orientation in the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by five dimensions, accounts for 43.5% of the variation observed in their commitments to the institutionalization of the overall performance management reform (i.e., following the policy prescriptions on performance management reform as a routine way of conducting performance management in the civil service). To put it in other way, this value could mean that, of the potential reasons for the current limited institutionalization status of the overall performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS, 43.5% can be attributed to the administrative cultural orientations of civil servants.

Table 6.11 presents an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to show whether the regression model is significantly better at explaining the institutionalization level of the overall performance

management reform than using the mean as the best predictor. The ANOVA gives a highly significant result ($F = 26.160$, $p = .000$), thereby indicating a significant relationship between the institutionalization status of the overall performance management reform and administrative culture. This means that administrative culture can significantly influence the institutionalization level of performance management reform.

Table 6.11: ANOVA for Overall Performance Management Reform

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	25.749	7	3.678	6.746	.000 ^a
	Residual	96.511	177	.545		
	Total	122.260	184			
2	Regression	78.984	12	6.582	26.160	.000 ^b
	Residual	43.276	172	.252		
	Total	122.260	184			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age

b. Predictors: (Constant), Work experience , Organization identity, Job position, Place of growth, Level of education, Gender, Age, Performance orientation, Uncertainty avoidance, Collectivism, Political neutrality, Power distance

c. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of PMGT

Table 6.12 indicates the coefficients demonstrating that administrative cultural dimensions (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation and political neutrality) have a significant and negative influence on the institutionalization level of the overall performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. Table 6.11 also shows that performance orientation culture has a significant and positive influence on the institutionalization level of the overall performance management reform. It is clear that all independent variables have a significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.

Table 6.12: Coefficients for Overall Performance Management Reform

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	1.375	.466		2.953	.004		
	Gender	.026	.119	.016	.218	.828	.882	1.134
	Organization identity	.099	.138	.048	.718	.474	.989	1.011
	Place of growth	-.220	.115	-.133	-1.911	.058	.926	1.080
	Job position	.886	.154	.402	5.772	.000	.920	1.087
	Level of education	.042	.135	.022	.312	.756	.920	1.087
	Age	.220	.140	.126	1.569	.118	.695	1.438
	Work experience	-.132	.127	-.080	-1.036	.301	.741	1.350
2	(Constant)	1.924	.330		5.833	.000		
	Gender	.109	.082	.065	1.339	.182	.869	1.151
	Organization identity	.048	.094	.023	.509	.611	.978	1.022
	Place of growth	-.169	.081	-.102	-2.093	.038	.864	1.158
	Job position	.382	.116	.173	3.299	.001	.746	1.341
	Level of education	-.080	.103	-.041	-.772	.441	.731	1.369
	Age	.115	.098	.065	1.169	.244	.659	1.518
	Work experience	-.004	.088	-.003	-.049	.961	.717	1.396
	Power distance	-.186	.044	-.228	-4.224	.000	.705	1.417
	Uncertainty avoidance	-.190	.038	-.233	-4.977	.000	.938	1.066
	Political neutrality	-.177	.040	-.217	-4.398	.000	.849	1.178
	Collectivism	-.102	.039	-.125	-2.767	.006	.908	1.101
	Performance orientation	.478	.038	.587	12.710	.000	.965	1.036

a. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of PMGT

6.2.4.1 Test Results on the Assumptions of Regression

To test the assumptions of the regression, an analysis of residuals was undertaken. Plots of the residuals are shown in Figures 6.11, 6.12 and 6.13. The histogram shows a bell-shaped distribution, indicating that the assumption of normality has not been violated. The normal probability plot of expected cumulative probability against observed cumulative probability also shows points generally lying close to the straight line, indicating that the residuals are approximately normally distributed and thus confirm the conclusions drawn from histogram.




Figure 6.11: Histogram of Standardized Residuals for Overall Performance Management

Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual





Figure 6.12: Normal P-P plot of Regression Standardized Residual for Overall Performance Management


Linearity of the relationship between variables was assessed by examining the six scatter-plots under Figure 6.12. The random distribution of data points indicates that there is no evidence of a non-linear relationship and therefore this assumption has also not been violated. There is also no

evidence of heteroscedasticity in the scatter plots, thereby implying that the assumption of constant variance is valid.


Scatterplot



Partial Regression Plot



Partial Regression Plot








Figure 6.13: Scatter-Plots of Standardized Residual against Predicted Value for Overall Performance Management

To test for the independence of the error terms, the Durbin-Watson statistic was obtained (see Table 6.10). Its value of 2.099 is very close to 2, indicating that this assumption has also not been violated. The VIF obtained (well below 10) indicates that there is no collinearity within the data (Field, 2009). Moreover, case by case diagnostics were undertaken and the result indicates that there is no influential case within the data.

Taken together, these test results indicate that the regression model produced is an accurate and valid representation of the data and can be applied to the population. Therefore, it can be concluded that the administrative cultural orientations of civil servants in relation to power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation, political neutrality and performance orientation have likely affected the institutionalization level of performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS.

6.2.5 Testing Propositions on the Relationships between Administrative Culture and Institutionalization of Performance Management Reform

An assessment of all regression outputs (Table 6.1 through Table 6.12) demonstrated that coefficient outputs were most appropriate to test relationship propositions compared to the other regression outputs. Subsequently, coefficient outputs (see Tables 6.3, 6.6, 6.9 and 6.12) were used to test the present study's propositions on the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.

As shown in Tables 6.3, 6.6, 6.9 and 6.12, power distance exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance agreement ($B = -.159$, $p < .005$), performance review ($B = -.197$, $p < .005$), rewarding high performers and managing under-performers ($B = -.273$, $p < .001$) and overall performance management reform ($B = -.159$, $p < .005$). Therefore, the results provide full support for 'Proposition 2', which states that *administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by power distance dimension, exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and performance agreement, review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers' aspects of the reform in particular.*

As shown in Tables 6.3, 6.6, 6.9 and 6.12, uncertainty avoidance exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance agreement ($B=-.224$, $p<.001$), performance review ($B=-.203$, $p<.001$), rewarding high performers and managing under-performers ($B=-.211$, $p<.001$) and overall performance management reform ($B=-.233$, $p<.001$). Therefore, the results provide full support for ‘Proposition 3’, which states that *administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by uncertainty avoidance dimension, exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and performance agreement, review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers’ aspects of the reform in particular.*

As shown in Tables 6.3, 6.6 and 6.12, collectivism exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance agreement ($B=-.141$, $p<.005$), performance review ($B=-.112$, $p<.01$) and overall performance management reform ($B=-.125$, $p<.01$). On the other hand, Table 6.9 shows that the effect of collectivism was found to be negative but insignificant on rewarding high performers and managing under-performers ($B=-.058$, $p=.309$). Therefore, the results provide strong support for ‘Proposition 4’, which states that *administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by individualism/collectivism dimension, exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and performance agreement, review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers’ aspects of the reform in particular.*

As shown in Tables 6.3, 6.6, 6.9 and 6.12, political neutrality exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance agreement ($B=-.134$, $p<.005$), performance review ($B=-.160$, $p<.005$), rewarding high performers and managing under-performers ($B=-.305$, $p<.001$) and overall performance management reform ($B=-.217$, $p<.001$). Therefore, the results provide full support for ‘Proposition 5’, which states that *administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by political bias/neutrality dimension, exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and performance agreement, review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers’ aspects of the reform in particular.*

Finally, as shown in Tables 6.3, 6.6, 6.9 and 6.12, performance orientation culture exerts a positive and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance agreement

($B=.597$, $p<.001$), performance review ($B=.564$, $p<.001$), rewarding high performers and managing under-performers ($B=.447$, $p<.001$) and overall performance management reform ($B=.587$, $p<.001$). Therefore, the results provide full support for ‘Proposition 6’, which states that *administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS, as measured by performance orientation dimension, exerts a positive and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in general and performance agreement, review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers’ aspects of the reform in particular.*

6.3 Discussion: The Influence of Administrative culture on Institutionalization Status of Performance Management Reform within the State Level Civil Service of ANRS

The multiple regression analysis revealed that administrative cultural dimensions (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation and political neutrality) have a significant and negative influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. It also revealed that performance orientation culture has a significant and positive influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform. Whilst this does not necessarily prove causality in the state level civil service of ANRS, these results may indeed be indicative of an underlying causal relationship and therefore require further discussion. Indeed, the present researcher found supportive evidences from the analysis of interviewees’ responses which suggest that cultural perceptions and beliefs of civil servants actually contribute to the difficulties that they encountered to follow the guidelines of the performance management policy and regulations as a normal business of doing performance management in the civil service. The following subsections are, therefore, devoted to discussing the actual influence that each dimension of administrative culture has on the institutionalization status of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS on the basis of qualitative responses.

6.3.1 High Power Distance and Institutionalization Level of Performance Management Reform

The multiple regression analysis revealed that power distance orientation exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within

the state level civil service of ANRS. Whilst this does not prove causality, it is significant that civil servants with perceptions, beliefs and attitudes of high power distance are likely to be the ones who do not adhere to the guidelines of the performance management reform as a routine way of managing their performances in the civil service. These results may indeed be indicative of actual causal relationship and therefore require further examination.

As explained in chapter four, power distance cultural dimension encompasses the organization members' attitudes towards hierarchy, expectation and perception of command-based superior-subordinate relationship and beliefs and attitudes towards status symbolism.

It has been also shown in chapter 5 that the majority of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS have high power distance cultural orientations which, among others, include high respect for those in the top of hierarchy and expectation and perception of command-based superior-subordinate relationship. It is, therefore, imperative to analyze the mechanisms through which these cultural orientations actually influenced civil servants' commitment to the performance management reform.

Hierarchy is a major component of large power distance. Coinciding with this power distance, an analysis of interviewees' responses provides some evidences that demonstrate the actual influence that high power distance has on civil servants' commitment to performance management reform, which demands superiors and subordinates to engage in joint discussion and open dialogue while agreeing on goals and reviewing performances. For instance, subordinates who perceive the importance of hierarchy as a tool for exercising power within the state level civil service of ANRS often show respect for their superiors based on the positions that their superiors formally hold in the organization and have less desire to challenge authority openly or to engage in open dialogue in decision-making. They also tend to perceive managerial decision as unquestionable, and all of these perceptions and beliefs are found to deter them from engaging in open dialogue and joint discussion with managers while agreeing on goals and reviewing performances. Here is what one non-managerial civil servant said:

'There is no joint discussion and open dialogue. The usual thing for me is that, at the beginning of the performance management cycle, my boss prepares the performance plan (objectives that I am expected to achieve bi-annually) and I just put my signature accordingly. As far as I know, this is the way how others are also doing in this organization. My friend, you should know that in this organization manager's decision is final and irreversible and hence personally I don't have any reason to engage in a dialogue or discussion with my supervisor on my performance plan'.

And another non-managerial employee said:

'There is almost an absence of joint discussion and open dialogue between us (subordinates) and our boss in the decision of what each of us is expected to achieve in our department. The common thing in our department is that he (the boss) prepares a performance plan for each of us using a performance agreement form issued by HR department and simply informs us to prepare work plan accordingly. He rarely invited us to meet with him for discussion on the performance plan. In fact, most of us here also do not show interest to have a discussion with the boss even in a case where we have a disagreement on the content of our performance plan. Simply we talk about disagreements among ourselves. I can't deny you that I am not feeling comfortable to openly opposing any of my boss's decisions because he likely considers it as disrespect'.

Although very limited, the research established evidence that demonstrates managerial employees' perceptions of hierarchy also lead to problems on the institutionalization efforts of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. According to the performance management guidelines, superiors and subordinates should engage in joint discussion and open dialogue while agreeing on goals. There must be a genuine agreement between the supervisor and supervised within the overall objectives of the organization. But performance agreements within the state level civil service of ANRS, in practice, dominated by supervisors. Here is what one managerial employee said:

'The usual thing in my department is that each employee participates in the development of his or her performance plan. For that matter, I always order them to bring their own draft performance plan. However, as a manager, it is my obligation to decide on the final content of each employee's performance plan. Otherwise, I am the one to take responsibility if my department does not meet its goals'.

Sentiments in the above quote suggest that hierarchy leads to the imposition of goals and also demonstrate that there are managers in the civil service who believe that decision-making is a preserve for them and should not be questioned. As such, the researcher found that failure to routinely follow performance management guidelines may not even be conscious, but a consequence of following what is considered an appropriate behavior and practice.

In addition to beliefs and perceptions related to hierarchy, the study also found evidence that demonstrates civil servants' cultural orientations related with expecting and accepting command and order relationship seriously hamper their tendency to go through with the prescriptions of the performance management policy in the civil service. Non-managerial interviewees indicate that there is a high propensity for the 'command and control' method of directing activities, yet the performance management system promotes the view that people should discuss the variables upon which their success will be measured. The researcher found that command and control cultural orientation in the civil service actually made the performance management to be useless, particularly at lower job categories. To illustrate this point, we quote from one non-managerial respondent:

'How can I determine what I am expected to do? I am a driver and it is my boss who knows what I should be doing and indeed I always do only what he tells me to do. I am ok with that'.

As this comment clearly demonstrates, the driver does not even see the need for the ideals of performance agreement at all. The above quoted view was also explained by HR manager during an interview but in different way:

'Institutionalizing performance management is very difficult at lower level job categories like office secretary and drivers. For instance, a driver of the bureau head in this organization knows that although, on paper, he is supposed to be judged according to accident rates, keeping the car clean and serviced, driving the bureau head effectively and carefully, etc., both he and the bureau head know that he is measured according to the extent to which he provides more private services: transporting the head's children to and from school, driving him to his relatives or friends on weekends and holidays, purchasing food from the market and completing other errands'.

The above comments suggest that civil servants do not worry about the performance management system as long as they assist, and are agreeable to, the boss. This also calls into question whether or not the cultural orientation of top officials themselves is supportive to the performance management process.

From the foregoing discussion, one can conclude that there is actual causal relationship between high power distance and limited institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.

Taking account of the results of the regression coefficients and the above analysis of interviewees' responses, we can reasonably conclude that with high power distance cultural orientation of the majority of civil servants, it is less likely for performance management reform to be institutionalized in the state level civil service of ANRS. Planned cultural change programs or modification of the reform itself are therefore called for.

6.3.2 High Uncertainty Avoidance and Institutionalization Level of Performance Management Reform

The multiple regression analysis revealed that uncertainty avoidance orientation exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. Whilst this does not prove causality, it is significant that civil servants with perceptions, beliefs and attitudes of strong uncertainty avoidance are likely to be the ones who do not adhere to the guidelines of the performance management reform as a routine way of managing their performances in the civil service. These results may indeed be indicative of actual causal relationship and therefore require further examination.

As explained in chapter four, uncertainty avoidance cultural orientation encompasses the degree to which members of organization are rule-oriented, the degree to which innovation and risk-taking are appreciated and the extent to which members tolerate change and ambiguity.

It has been also shown in chapter 5 that the majority of civil servants in the state level civil service of ANRS have high uncertainty avoidance cultural orientation, thereby reflecting, among others, less innovation orientation, a high risk aversion and a strong need for rules and regulations. It is, therefore, imperative to analyze the mechanisms through which some of these

cultural orientations actually influenced civil servants' commitment to performance management reform.

High risk aversion and less innovation orientation is one component of strong uncertainty avoidance cultural orientation. Mendonca and Kanungo (1996) argue that relatively high uncertainty avoidance in the developing countries implies that civil servants are unwilling to accept organizational change. Bureaucrats are reluctant to take personal initiatives outside of the prescribed roles and avoid taking risks. This eventually becomes a severe constraint on effective performance management. And yet, setting challenging and difficult goals is a key tenet of performance management. Analysis of interviewees in the present study provides a support for this argument.

Most of non-managerial respondents give the impression during the interviews, that they have a problem to set challenging goals for themselves perhaps for fear of risking failure. One non-managerial civil servant even asked me a rhetorical question:

'Why should I worry myself by setting a challenging goal? You should know that civil service is full of fault-finders'.

In the quote above, the civil servant has declared that he is risk averse, which is in agreement with what many other non-managerial respondents said. Bearing in mind that 66% of survey respondents also openly declared their perception that employees are not encouraged to set challenging goals in the civil service, the researcher would interpret this quote to mean that most of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS have not been nurtured to the point where they are willing to take risks. They approach the performance management ideals of setting 'SMART' objectives with caution and do not want to be routinely doing this because they fear that they may fail to implement it well. Therefore, they set easy goals which slow down the performance management reform institutionalization.

According to the performance management guidelines, subordinate and superior should jointly discuss and set challenging goals. But because uncertainty avoidance does not encourage risk-taking in the state level civil service of ANRS, neither the superior nor the subordinate seem involved in setting challenging tasks.

In addition to risk aversion and innovation, the researcher also found that rule-orientation aspect of uncertainty avoidance had some actual influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. Karyeija (2012) found that rule-oriented managers in Ugandan civil service consider performance target imposition as an appropriate way of managing certainty and thereby compromised the ideals of genuine discussion with their subordinates in setting performance targets. Empirical evidence in the present study seems to corroborate this finding, as can be inferred from the following quote taken from an honest and genuine managerial respondent:

'My department is sensitive. I am dealing with financial issues. For that reason, I am the one who spelt out what each of my subordinates is expected to do and we do well in that way'.

From this quote, we can deduce that some superiors within the state level civil service of ANRS wish to control uncertainty by imposing the performance targets. Yet, performance management policy expects goal setting in the civil service to be a result of joint discussion and open dialogue between superior and subordinate. The above quote also suggests that some managers in the state level civil service of ANRS are intolerant to alternative ideas, e.g., in the form of a subordinate's suggestions on performance targets, and this may also be responsible for limited institutionalization status of performance management reform.

Interviewees in the present study also noted that some of the regulations that they should adhere to in the civil service imposed a problem for their commitment to the performance management system. For example, one non-managerial employee has expressed his views on this issue:

'We are usually assigned many ad hoc tasks that are not part of our agreed performance plan. It is our duty to do such tasks since we are required by law to carry out tasks as long as assigned by the superiors. Hence, most of the time we do not hold performance review meetings on agreed performance plan. Indeed, we are not also evaluated based on our agreed targets'.

Based on the above quotation, it is possible to infer that some of the administrative regulations in the civil service are inconsistent with the performance management system. In line with the above quote for instance, it's difficult to do a performance review on the basis of agreed indicators when the standing orders explicitly give the superior control over a subordinates' schedule through a clause stating that the subordinate will handle '...any other tasks that may be

assigned by the superiors'. It is also possible that a subordinate could be required to do work outside his job description, and then it becomes practically impossible to evaluate the person on such tasks. This renders the performance management reform itself inconsistent with the administrative culture, and thus constrains its institutionalization.

From the foregoing discussion, one can conclude that there is actual causal relationship between strong uncertainty avoidance cultural orientation of civil servants and limited institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.

Taking account of the results of the regression coefficients and the above analysis of interviewees' responses, we can reasonably conclude that with high uncertainty avoidance cultural orientation of the majority of civil servants, it is less likely for performance management reform to be institutionalized in the state level civil service of ANRS. Planned cultural change programs or modification of the reform itself are therefore called for.

6.3.3 Collectivistic Orientation and Institutionalization Level of Performance Management Reform

The multiple regression analysis revealed that collectivistic orientation exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. Whilst this does not prove causality, it is significant that civil servants with perceptions, beliefs and attitudes of high collectivistic orientation are likely to be the ones who do not adhere to the guidelines of the performance management reform as a routine way of managing their performances in the civil service. These results may indeed be indicative of actual causal relationship and therefore require further examination.

As explained in chapter four, collectivistic cultural orientation encompasses the extent to which organization members emphasize relationship than task, the extent to which organization members prefer harmony and cooperation to confrontation and competition and the extent to which organization members prefer group based work and reward to individual ones.

It has been also shown in chapter 5 that the majority of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS have a collectivistic cultural orientation reflecting, among others, preference for harmony to confrontation, cooperation over competition and group-based work and reward

over individual ones. Despite this fact, qualitative data collected from respondents in the present study provide very little evidences as to how each of these cultural orientations actually influenced civil servants' commitment to the performance management reform. The researcher was only able to establish a supportive qualitative evidence for actual casual relationship between civil servants' preference for harmony and their commitment to the ideals of peer feedback within the performance management reform. This is not, however, to suggest that the other aspects of collectivistic orientation (i.e., high emphasis for relationship than task, preference for cooperation over competition and preference for group-based work and reward over individual ones) do not actually impede civil servants' commitment to performance management reform. What it does indicate, though, is that there was insufficient qualitative evidence in the present study to establish their actual influence on civil servants' commitment to the performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.

It is well noted that in a collectivist culture, as opposed to individualistic culture, individuals strive to maintain harmony and social face which are considered to be socially desirable behavior (Fletcher and Perry, 2001; Gelfand, *et al.*, 2004; Hofstede, 1997; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). Jones, *et al.*, (1996) bring to our attention the difference between African and Western countries in terms of these cultural aspects, by stating that:

'In Western societies conflict and confrontation of idea tend to be accepted as normal and even desirable as the source of creativity. Trust and openness are asserted as desirable organizational features. Many African societies, in contrast, retain strong elements of traditional values emphasizing a concern for the quality of relationships, the desirability of consensus, and tolerance of individual weakness' (Jones, et al., 1996: 466).

Therefore, it has been suggested that the ideal of peer feedback tends to be difficult to take root in collectivistic culture because individuals are unlikely to provide team members with genuine and honest feedback as a result of both in-group bias and a desire to maintain group harmony (Bjorkman and Lu, 1999; Gregersen, *et al.*, 1996). The present study found a very strong support for this assertion as being true in the context of the state level civil service of ANRS.

There was overwhelming agreement among qualitative respondents that cultural obligation in relation to the need to maintain harmony makes it difficult for the performance management

ideal of peer feedback to take root in the civil service in question. Almost all non-managerial employees interviewed in this study openly declared that it is impossible for them to give a negative feedback to their colleagues. One non-managerial employee has the following to say:

'It is almost impossible for me to give a negative feedback to my colleagues either in writing or face to face. I know that doing so will hurt them. Most importantly, you should know that such feedback exchange between subordinates is not a good idea since it damages our good social relationship both within and outside the organization'.

And another employee said:

'I always forward only a positive feedback to my colleagues. They are the ones with whom I am working and living here. How can I officially say you have such and such problems or other things that possibly disgraced them in this organization? I do this only privately'.

Even another employee said:

'To be honest I always give a positive feedback and high score to my colleagues irrespective of the truth. Even I did this for the one that I personally quarreled with'.

Three out of seven managers interviewed also admitted that cultural obligation in relation to the need to maintain harmony makes it difficult for them to be critical in exchange of feedback with their employees. One of these line managers in particular stated that:

'I usually feel uncomfortable to forward negative feedback to my employees because they usually take such feedback to be personal. Even, most of the times, I forward feedback on bold mistakes in soft manner'.

The sentiments contained in the above quotes are echoed by most of the respondents and suggest that the importance of socially desirable behaviors like maintaining harmony and face saving among the majority of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS is invariable with the ideal of peer feedback and, in fact, with face-to-face performance review which require both parties to be critical in evaluating performances. Moreover, the above quotes tempt us to question the appropriateness of the use of multi-source (subordinate, superior and peers) competence ratings which were included in the performance management system of the civil

service in 2011 (refer to chapter 3). Indeed, the above quotations suggest that it is not only inappropriate, but it may prove to be more damaging than beneficial.

In sum, the peer feedback and performance review exercise may appear to be working in the state level civil service of ANRS, but the aims and goals would largely remain unmet – hence a challenge to the institutionalization of performance management reform process. The absence of critical feedback and the reticence to express negative facts all lead to the failure of the exercise to be routinely followed by civil servants; it becomes a rather distasteful ritual, something only to be endured.

From the foregoing discussion, one can conclude that there is actual underlying causal relationship between collectivistic cultural orientation of civil servants and limited institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.

Taking account of the results of the regression coefficients and the above analysis of interviewees' responses, we can reasonably conclude that with the collectivistic cultural orientation of the majority of civil servants, it is less likely for performance management reform to be institutionalized in the state level civil service of ANRS. Planned cultural change programs or modification of the reform itself are therefore called for.

6.3.4 High Political Neutrality and Institutionalization Level of Performance Management Reform

The multiple regression analysis revealed that political neutrality exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. Whilst this does not prove causality, it is significant that those civil servants with perceptions, beliefs and attitudes in favor of high political neutrality are likely to be the ones who do not adhere to the guidelines of the performance management reform as a routine way of managing their performances in the civil service. These results may indeed be indicative of actual causal relationship and therefore require further examination.

As explained in chapter four, administrative cultural dimension of political bias/neutrality represents civil servants' attitudes and perceptions towards politicians (i.e., the extent of

trustfulness or distrustfulness of politicians) and the extent to which civil servants prefer the business of the civil service to be independent of politicians' interventions and influences.

It has been also shown in chapter 5 that the majority of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS exhibited high political neutrality orientation, i.e., they prefer to be neutral and independent from the politicians and they tend to distrust the politicians, consider them greedy, corrupt and selfish. It is, therefore, imperative to analyze the mechanisms through which high political neutrality actually influenced civil servants' commitment to the performance management reform.

However, as readers can imagine, it is tremendously difficult to get a straightforward qualitative evidences here due to sensitization problem. Nevertheless, the researcher found some qualitative evidences that support the results of the multiple regression analysis which revealed that political neutrality is negatively associated with the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.

It has been argued in Karyeija (2012:168) that because the civil servants in some African countries are not politically biased and overwhelmingly loyal to the ruling regime, patronage is on the rise. There are supportive evidences for the prevalence of high patronage in the civil service of Ethiopia. For instance, Paulos (2009) has found out patronage to be rising rather than reduced in Ethiopian civil service. He goes further to indicate that, despite the government has formally announced that ministerial (at federal level) and bureau head (at regional levels) positions to be occupied by political appointees and the rest of the positions in government by apolitical professionals, there were no practical measures taken to remove political appointees from the middle and lower echelons of the federal and regional civil service structures to date (Paulos, 2009).

Markakis (cited in paulos, 2009) also notes that nearly all the officials in the state administration, from *kebele* (lowest administrative unit) to the federal government, are EPRDF members, having joined the party before or soon after election in their posts. This politicization of the bureaucracy has also been confirmed by the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. In his speech on the 4th EPRDF congress (September 2001) he notes: 'Deployment of human resources was based on

networking. People were demoted or promoted depending on the wishes of the power holder' (EPRDF, 2001:15 cited in Paulos, 2009).

Non-managerial interviewees in the present study were also of the view that patronage became almost normal in the civil service of ANRS, as confirmed by one employee who said:

'Almost all people in managerial positions within the civil service in our region are assigned because of loyalty to the party. I think everybody here knows the fact that being a party member is important to get a position here in the civil service'.

The sentiments contained in the above quotes are echoed by all non-managerial respondents and suggest that party membership is almost a prerequisite to be posted to managerial position in the civil service. Undoubtedly, this leads civil servants to play more of politics than to implement the performance management system. Therefore, there is little surprise for limited institutionalization status of performance management reform since its ideal of merit-based promotion is compromised due to patronage in the civil service.

Interview data also revealed that subordinates in the civil service developed mistrust due to patronage and in turn feel uncomfortable to genuinely express their views in performance agreement and review meetings. When asked why he did not openly express problems on the side of his superior or organization at performance review meetings, one of the non-managerial respondents said:

'... How can I do that in this organization? If you do that, everything will be done against you.... you will be labeled as 'tsere-limat' ('anti-development thinker') and 'kirai sebsabi' ('rent seeker')'.

The above quote suggests that civil servants may be afraid to speak their mind regarding the weaknesses on the side of officials or organization because they may be labeled as *anti-development thinker and rent seeker* which are words that the ruling party politicians frequently apply in labeling any of their opponents' being civil society, think-tanks or opposition parties within the country. Therefore, it is better for civil servants not to be seriously concerned about prescriptions of the performance management policy rather to become serious and end up being labeled an enemy of the ruling government.

In addition to patronage, civil servants' negative attitude towards politicians may also actually contribute to the limited institutionalization level of the performance management reform. For instance, Karyeija (2012) found that Ugandan civil servants dislike politicians and therefore resisted the performance appraisal reforms because they perceived it as a tool of the ruling regime. This may also be true in the state level civil service of ANRS. Civil servants' resistance to go through with the performance management guidelines, to borrow findings in Karyeija (2012), may be a kind of passive-aggressive protest against government. After all, in our discussion of administrative culture in chapter five, at least 57.3% of the respondents stated that the country needs a new generation of political leaders.

Going by the evidence presented so far, one can conclude that there is actual underlying causal relationship between political neutrality and limited institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.

Then, based on the results of the regression coefficients and the above analysis of interviewees' responses, we can reasonably conclude that performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS failed to take root in part because of high political neutrality amongst the civil servants and because they may also have less support for the incumbent government. Planned cultural change programs or modification of the reform itself are therefore called for.

6.3.5 Low Performance Orientation Culture and Institutionalization Level of Performance Management Reform

The results of the multiple regression analysis implied that low performance orientation culture is associated with the limited institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. Whilst this does not prove causality, it suggests that civil servants who perceive absence of performance orientation culture in the civil service are likely to be the ones who do not adhere to the guidelines of the performance management reform as a routine way of managing their performances in the civil service. These results may indeed be indicative of actual causal relationship and therefore require further examination.

As explained in chapter four, performance orientation culture represents civil servants perceptions on the extent to which work performance and reward are linked and the extent to

which orientation around innovation and performance improvement are encouraged within the civil service.

It has been shown in chapter 5 that the majority of civil servants within the state level civil service of ANRS have perceptions reflecting the prevalence of very low performance orientation culture in the civil service. They perceived the absence of a link between work performance and reward in the civil service. They also perceived that innovation and performance improvement in the civil service are neither encouraged nor rewarded.

One wonders if the above perceptions will not actually influence civil servants' commitment to performance management reform. Indeed, most of the qualitative respondents took these perceptions as justifications for the limited institutionalization level of performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS as explained hereafter.

To begin with, most of the interviewees noted that the absence of a link between work performance and reward in the civil service renders the performance management system to be not seriously taken by most civil servants. In this respect, HR manager eloquently explained the issue as follows:

'Majority of employees have little motivation to pay attention to the performance management system in the civil service because the system is not still linked to meaningful reward. As you may know, government never fulfills its promises of monetary award to high performers since 2001, despite this was informed to civil servants to be a case. Through time civil servants learnt that government's promise is not only an empty ritual but also one's being high or low performer in the civil service is meaningless'.

The above comment suggests that the absence of a link between work performance and reward in the civil service leads the majority of civil servants to consider performance management reform as something which is not really important and has no real meaning and hence a challenge for performance management system to take root within the state level civil service of ANRS. Two out of five line managers interviewed also attributed the absence of a link between work performance and reward to be an important reason for difficulties that they encountered to enforce their employees to go through with the performance management system in the civil service, as nicely confirmed by one manager:

'I get difficulty to enforce subordinates under me to regularly follow the performance management procedures. If it is in private sector, I can do that through controlling rewards, for instance, by denying bonus to those who fail to go through with the performance management procedures. Here in the civil service, rewards to control are very limited. In fact, reward like certificate of recognition is available. However, this is less valued by most of my subordinates'.

From the above quote, one can infer that some managers within the state level civil service of ANRS are unable to enforce employees to comply with the guidelines of the performance management policy since they felt that the performance management system did not give them the ability to dole out meaningful rewards and sanctions.

In addition to the absence of a link between work performance and reward in the civil service, non-managerial respondents strongly believed that the prevalence of non-merit-based promotion practices within the civil service is another challenge to their commitment to the performance management system. They openly declared in the interview that promotion practices based on non-merit criteria like, personal connection, seniority and political affiliations in the civil service, lead them to consider the performance management system as having little value and hence their paying little attention to following its guidelines. Even one highly disappointed non-managerial respondent had the following to say on the issue:

'Who cares about the performance management? You will follow it; and performing high, compete for promotion, yet end up with seeing someone politically affiliated or friend of officials get promoted. Whenever further education opportunity comes, the issue of performance management would be raised, but at the end of the day, the opportunity is hijacked by officials themselves. Following the performance management procedures in my organization, for that matter in the civil service, is simply a waste of time'.

The above quote clearly implies that some civil servants' commitment to performance management system in the state level civil service of ANRS is highly constrained by their perceptions or the actual prevalence of non-merit-based promotion practices in the civil service. It also implies that some civil servants equate following the performance management guidelines to a waste of time, since they felt that performance management has little or nothing to do with their career development in the civil service.

Non-managerial respondents also raise problem related with the absence of performance improvement culture as a justification for their limited commitment to go through with the guidelines of the performance management system. The case in point is that of the performance development plan. According to the performance management guidelines, each civil servant should prepare performance development plan, consisting of training and development that he/she needs to achieve agreed goals, and this should be discussed and agreed with his or her superior. However, qualitative evidence in the present study revealed that most civil servants found this to be irrelevant and have not exercised it at all because they never received training as per their performance development plans. One non-managerial respondent wonders why he should regularly prepare a performance development plan while, in practice, he never received training according to his plan.

From the foregoing discussion, one can conclude that there is actual underlying causal relationship between performance orientation culture and limited institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.

Based on the preceding analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data, we can reasonably conclude that cultural perceptions of civil servants in relation to performance orientation actually contribute to the difficulties that civil servants encountered to follow the guidelines of the performance management policy and regulations as a normal business of doing performance management in the state level civil service of ANRS. Improvement in performance orientation culture is therefore called for.

It is abundantly clear from the foregoing discussion that administrative cultural orientations, i.e., high power distance, strong uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation, high political neutrality and low performance orientation, actually constrained civil servants from being committed to the performance management system and hence proved to be actual challenges to the institutionalization of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.

6.4 Administrative Culture within the State Level Civil Service of ANRS: Do Background Variables Matter?

Whilst not all civil servants exhibit the same cultural orientation along administrative cultural dimensions assessed, the qualitative findings shown in preceding subsections have demonstrated that cultural orientations (i.e., high power distance, strong uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation, political neutrality and low performance orientation) held by the majority of civil servants actually impaired the institutionalization of performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS. These findings also provide a justification for the call for planned cultural change programs or modification of the reform itself in the civil service under study. However, as explained in chapter 3, to arrive at sound suggestions on which these calls should be emphasized in civil service under investigation, there is a need to statistically evaluate whether or not civil servants' social background, i.e., age, gender, educational level and so on, have significant relationship with their administrative cultural orientations.

The justification for the need of such statistical evaluation, as explained in chapter three, is twofold. First, if administrative culture is unified and integrated, then civil servants may have strong similarity in their administrative cultural perceptions, regardless of the differences in their socio-demographic background. In other words, socio-demographic variables may have no influence on civil servants' administrative cultural orientations. This ideal situation suggests that administrative culture in the civil service may be very difficult to change because it has already been institutionalized. In order for the performance management reform to take root, therefore, redesign of the reform to comply with the prevailing administrative culture in the civil service should be given a high priority.

On the other hand, if administrative culture is fragmented, then civil servants may have significant differences in their administrative cultural orientations along background variables, i.e., age, gender, educational level, job category, work experience and so forth. In other words, socio-demographic variables may have influence on civil servants' administrative cultural orientations. This ideal situation suggests that administrative culture in the civil service can be changed through a planned cultural change program because it is somehow fragmented rather than institutionalized. In order for the performance management reform to take root, therefore,

the cultural change program aims at fitting administrative culture in the civil service with the reform requirements should be given a high priority.

Bearing the above points in mind, an evaluation for existence of correlations between civil servants' administrative cultural orientations and their social background was undertaken. In order to get a meaningful result as to whether or not civil servants' social background has association with their cultural orientations in relation to the five administrative cultural dimensions assessed before, seven background characteristics were considered: a) gender (female versus male), b) age (young (below 45) versus old age (above 45)), c) place of growth (urban versus rural), d) level of education (graduate (diploma and BA) versus postgraduate (MA and above)), e) job category (non-managerial (clerical and professional) versus managerial), f) organization identity (bureau versus agency) and g) year of service (below 10 years versus above 10 years).

A statistical procedure applied to assess the existence of relationships between civil servants' administrative cultural orientations and their social background characteristics was the test of Spearman's correlation (refer to section 4.4.2.3 for details). Correlation matrix produced is shown in Table 6.13.

Table 6.13: Non-parametric Correlations between Civil Servants' Social Background Characteristics and Administrative Culture in State Level Civil Service of ANRS

	Power distance	Uncertainty avoidance	Collectivistic orientation	Political bias/neutrality	Performance orientation
Age	.050	-.112	.058	-.054	-.089
Gender	.138	.090	.096	.108	-.115
Organization identity	-.066	-.100	-.077	-.049	.018
Job category	-.294**	-.198**	-.235**	-.359**	.188*
Education level	-.418**	-.184*	-.182*	-.217**	-.026
Work experience	.143*	.019	.028	.065	.022
Place of growth	.048	.081	.154*	-.171*	.023

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

According to Table 6.13 given above, there was no significant correlation between age and the administrative culture variables. This indicates that it does not matter whether civil servants are young or old with regard to their beliefs and perceptions of administrative culture. The same holds true for gender as background variable. Table 6.14 also indicates that the nature of organization to which civil servants belong has no significant association with their administrative cultural orientations.

With regard to job category, there was a positive correlation between the job position and the performance orientation culture ($r = .188^*$). In this study, it implies that it matters whether civil servants have a position or not in their perceptions of performance orientation culture in the civil service. The positive association may be attributed to the fact that relative to non-managers,

managerial employees in the civil service are provided with further education opportunities and have access to training opportunities abroad, and thus they may perceive such opportunities as encouragement of performance in the civil service.

Table 6.13 also shows that there were negative correlations between the job position of employees and the remaining four administrative culture dimensions. This means that people with managerial position are associated with low power distance ($r = -.294^{**}$), low uncertainty avoidance ($r = -.198^{**}$), low collectivistic orientation ($r = -.235^{**}$) and low political neutrality ($r = -.359^{**}$). Job position's negative association with power distance, uncertainty avoidance and collectivistic orientation is also reported by previous research in the culture domain. Igusi (2009), for instance, in his study of work culture in Nigeria, found that relative to non-managers, managerial employees in Nigeria exhibit low power distance, high individualism and low uncertainty avoidance. A negative association of managerial position with political neutrality in the present study suggests that most people in managerial position in the civil service are politically biased and loyal to the ruling regime. It also indirectly suggests the prevalence of higher political patronage in the civil service.

With regard to education, there was a negative correlation between the level of education and administrative culture, which implies that higher levels of education are associated with low power distance ($r = -.418^{**}$), low uncertainty avoidance ($r = -.184^*$), low collectivistic orientation ($r = -.182^*$) and low political neutrality ($r = -.171^*$). In other words, the more educated the civil servants are, the less hierarchical they are, the less they are governed by rules, the less they are group-oriented and the less they are politically neutral.

A negative association between educational level and political neutrality represents perhaps one of the most surprising findings of this study, as it seems to suggest that the highly educated the civil servants are, the more they become politically biased. Although this outcome appears to contradict logical thinking (see, for instance, Jamil, 1998), there is one possible reason why such an outcome is evident in the present study. Possibly, it is because they think it may pay off in terms of their being considered for the top jobs in the civil service which are political appointments.

There was a significant positive correlation between work experience and power distance ($r = .143^*$), with many years of service being associated with large power distance. This implies that the more the civil servants stayed in the civil service, the more they were associated with large power distance.

Finally, as can be seen from Table 6.13, there were two significant correlations between place of growth and administrative culture; especially place of growth and collectivistic orientation ($r = .154^*$) and place of growth and political bias/neutrality ($r = -.171^*$). This implies that the more rural a person's origin is, the more the collectivistic orientation and the more the political bias they express.

Going by the evidence presented in Table 6.14, it seems that administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS is more unified than being fragmented. Except for the variables of job position and education level, the other variables have limited or no association with civil servants' administrative cultural orientations. Moreover, results in Table 6.14 indicate that with the exception of the association between education level and power distance ($r = -.411^{**}$), all other significant associations obtained were weak ($r < .3$). These findings suggest that administrative culture in the state level civil service of ANRS may be very difficult to change because civil servants' perceptions and beliefs in relation to administrative culture seem deeply rooted in the civil service. Therefore, the calls for deep study of administrative culture and redesign of the reform accordingly seem more justifiable than the other way round in the context of the state level civil service of ANRS.

6.5 Summary

This chapter sought to explore the influence that administrative culture has on the institutionalization status of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. Multiple regression and analysis of qualitative data obtained through semi-structured interview were employed for this purpose.

It was found that significant associations exist between administrative cultural dimensions (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation, political neutrality and performance orientation) and the institutionalization level of performance management reform

within the state level civil service of ANRS after the effects of background variables were statistically controlled.

Cultural dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation and political neutrality were found to exert significantly negative influences on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. Performance orientation was also found to exert a positive and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the civil service in question. The statistics confirm that these findings are not just due to chance but are real. Indeed, qualitative data collected through interviews were generally concurred with these findings, even though some managerial respondents expressed skepticism.

It is abundantly clear from the above results that all the five propositions (i.e., propositions 2 through 6) advanced in chapter three are supported by the empirical evidences. Whilst not all civil servants exhibit the same cultural orientation along the administrative cultural dimensions assessed, the findings of the study support that administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS is more unified than being fragmented. These findings also provide a justification for the calls for in-depth study of administrative culture and redesign of the reform accordingly in the state level civil service of ANRS.

This chapter has thus addressed the final two objectives of this research which sought to investigate the relationship between administrative culture and the institutionalization status of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS and to highlight how NPM-inspired performance management reform should be managed in relation to culture respectively. Importantly, this chapter addressed the central research question posed for this study: Does the administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS affect the institutionalization status of performance management reform? Which cultural dimensions within the civil service do have a significant influence and on which aspects of the performance management reform institutionalization?

In the next chapter, the summary, implications and conclusion of this research will be described respectively. The limitations and the contributions of the research will also be presented.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

7.0 Introduction

After summarising the processes of entire research, this final chapter outlines the main findings and the conclusion of the research. Accordingly, the chapter provides an overview of the study, re-stating the three main research questions and highlighting the methodology used to investigate them. The chapter also presents a summary of the main findings, followed by limitations of the research. Finally, it provides some implications for policy makers, and some implications for future research.

7.1 Overview of the Research Problem, Framework and Methods

7.1.1 The Research Problem

Many countries in Africa have embraced the global trends of performance management reforms and actually embarked on these reforms under the guise of NPM since 1980's. However, the picture portrayed about the institutionalization status of NPM-inspired performance management reform in many African countries is not positive. It has been established in empirical studies that though the implementation of the performance management reform process started off with an explosive and effective beginnings in many of African countries, it fails to really take hold and, to become a sustained effort of the public sectors in these countries (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; Langsten, 1995; Makumbe, 1997; Mendonca and Kanungo, 1996; Ohemeng, 2009; Polidano, 1999).

This state of affairs has inspired a significant amount of research into investigating factors influencing the institutionalization status of performance management reform in the public sectors of African countries. Studies conducted in this field so far have focused mainly on the influence of such factors as institutional capacity, training, reward, resources, structure, staff motivation and management and political commitment (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; De Waal, 2007; Dzimbiri, 2008). On top of these, it has been suggested, mainly on the basis of private sector experience and anecdotal evidence, that 'softer' factors such as *administrative*

culture also have a significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform by virtue of the influence they have on the way employees approach Western-inspired management practices.

Over the years, however, few deliberative and systematic studies have been done on the relationship between administrative culture and the institutionalization level of performance management reforms in the contexts of the public sector in African countries (De Waal, 2007; Karyeija, 2012; McCourt and Foon, 2007; Murphy and Cleveland, 1995; Ohemeng, 2009). Where there have been some studies, they have generally been lumped together with other reform policies or with reforms in general, creating a gap in the literature on whether culture matters (Ohemeng, 2009). This shows that there is a gap in the knowledge on whether or not administrative culture matters in the institutionalization of performance management reforms. To this end, this research has undertaken an investigation into administrative culture and its relationship with the institutionalization status of performance management reform in Ethiopian civil service with a particular reference to the state level civil service of ANRS. Specifically, this study attempted to address the following basic research questions:

1. To what extent is performance management reform institutionalized within the state level civil service of ANRS?
2. What are the main features of administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS as measured by the cultural dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, political bias/neutrality and performance orientation?
3. Does administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS affect the institutionalization level of performance management reform? Which cultural dimensions within the civil service do have a significant effect and on which aspects of the performance management reform institutionalization?

7.1.2 A Research Framework of Administrative Culture and Institutionalization of Performance Management Reform

For research to be undertaken, it is necessary to evolve appropriate frameworks based on review of existing theoretical frameworks and a body of recent literature on the specific subject of research. It has been established in the literature that many factors are responsible for limited

institutionalization status of NPM-inspired performance management reform initiative. These factors could be categorized into two main frames of reference: first, the structural-instrumental approach, which works within the logic of consequentiality – where employees are in control and rational calculation; and second, the institutional approach (cultural and mythical perspective) that operates within the logic of appropriateness – where a person acts in conformity with ‘what feels fair, reasonable and acceptable in the environment the person works within’ (Christensen, *et al.*, 2007:3). But despite this categorization, when it comes to analyzing reform institutionalization, it is more beneficial to use a specific frame of reference. This study, thus, focused on one such frame of reference, namely administrative culture, and in so doing, falls within the larger scope of the institutional approach.

On the bases of the literature reviews on culture (refer to chapters 2and3) and performance management (refer to chapter 2), a research framework was developed, showing the relevant dimensions along which administrative cultural orientation of civil servants manifests, and how these dimensions of administrative culture subsequently influence the institutionalization level of performance management reform in the civil service.

On the basis of the framework, five fundamental propositions were proposed for testing. These propositions were: power distance cultural orientation exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform; uncertainty avoidance cultural orientation exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform; collectivistic cultural orientation exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform; political bias/neutrality exerts a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform and performance orientation exerts a positive and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform. All these propositions were advanced in the context of the state level civil service of ANRS. The next phase of the research involved the testing of these propositions.

7.1.3 A Methodology for Investigating the Relationships between Administrative Culture and Institutionalization Status of Performance Management Reform

Chapter four considered the overall research paradigm within which the relationships highlighted in the analytical framework were to be investigated and the research methods appropriate within this paradigm. This fourth chapter set out arguments in favour of a conciliatory methodology involving both a qualitative and a quantitative methodology. In terms of the specific research methods for data collection, questionnaire surveys and interviews were employed in this study.

A cross-sectional questionnaire survey of civil servants was adopted with the questionnaire designed to elicit information on the institutionalization level of performance management reform and on administrative culture that exist within the civil service. The sample for the questionnaire aspect of the study was considered in the light of the advice in the literature, and the comprehensive procedures put into place by the researcher to obtain the final sample that could offer generalisation of results to a wider population.

Following a successful pilot of the questionnaire, minor modifications were made to the questionnaire based on the feedback, and the major survey was conducted on a randomly selected sample of 254 civil servants, representing all civil servants working within the state level civil service of ANRS. Altogether, 185 questionnaires were analysed, representing a usable response rate of 73%.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 14 experienced civil servants chosen from seven units in the civil service sector in line with the proposed methodology. The data collected supported the fundamental relationships highlighted in the analytical framework.

7.2 Summary of Findings

7.2.1 An Analysis of Institutionalization Status of Performance Management Reform and Features of Administrative Culture within the State Level Civil Service of ANRS

7.2.1.1 An Analysis of Institutionalization Status of Performance Management Reform

One of the objectives of this research was to assess the institutionalization status of the performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. As explained in

chapters one and three, the performance management system under investigation is similar with that of the NPM-inspired human resource-related performance management system and it consists of three main elements. These are performance agreement, performance review and rewarding high performers and managing under-performers.

It has also been shown in chapter one that despite this performance management system was in effect since 2001 in ANRS, the extent to which its constituents, i.e., performance agreement, review and reward became the normal and usual practices of civil servants remains unknown. In other words, the question of the institutionalization level of the reform remains under-investigated. To this end, in chapter five, analysis of the data collected was undertaken to address the question of the institutionalization status of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. In doing so, descriptive statistics were utilised.

The analysis carried out to assess the institutionalization status of performance agreement aspects of the performance management reform revealed that the reform ideals of open dialogue and joint discussion between superior and subordinate while deciding on what the latter is expected to perform as well as what training and support he or she needs to meet the expectation are not yet taken as a regular way of managing performance agreements by the majority of sampled civil servants. It was found out that performance targets and development plans are in most cases imposed by superiors rather than mutually established. Similarly, the analysis carried out to assess the institutionalization status of performance review aspects of the performance management reform revealed that the reform ideals of regular performance review meetings and performance discussions between superior and subordinate are largely unmet by the majority of civil servants in the state level civil service of ANRS. The survey result showed that majority of sampled civil servants rarely hold a regular performance discussion with their supervisor implying that regular discussion between manager and subordinate on the performances of the latter is a rare phenomenon within the state level civil service of ANRS. It was also found that formal performance review between superior and subordinate within the state level civil service of ANRS, in most instances, is a top-down judgment affair and has evaluative than developmental nature.

When data collected on the institutionalization level of rewarding high performers and managing under-performers was analyzed, it was found that the majority of sampled civil servants felt that

differentiation of high performers from the poor ones and acting accordingly is largely ignored in the state level civil service of ANRS.

Generally, the limited institutionalization levels of each aspect of the performance management reform, including the overall performance management reform, found in this research were consistent with other research reports and surveys carried out in Africa (see, for instance, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; Karyeija, 2012; Ohemeng, 2009).

7.2.1.2 An Analysis of Features of Administrative Culture

In chapter five, analysis of the data collected was also undertaken to identify administrative culture (i.e., perceptions, beliefs and attitudes of civil servants) within the state level civil service of ANRS along the five cultural dimensions which were proposed in chapter three: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation, political bias/neutrality, and lastly, performance orientation. With regard to power distance, it was found that the majority of sampled civil servants have high power distance cultural orientation which, among others, includes high respect for those in the top of hierarchy, appreciating of status symbolism, accepting inequality, and expectation and perception of command-based superior-subordinate relationship.

Concerning uncertainty avoidance, it was found that the majority of sampled civil servants have high uncertainty avoidance cultural orientation reflecting, among others, less innovation orientation, high risk aversion and strong need for rules and regulations. In relation to collectivistic orientation, it was found that the majority of sampled civil servants have collectivistic cultural perceptions and beliefs reflecting, among others, preference for harmony over confrontation, cooperation over competition and group work and reward over individual ones.

With respect to performance orientation culture, it was found that the majority of sampled civil servants maintain perceptions reflecting the prevalence of very low performance orientation culture in the civil service. They perceived absence of a link between work performance and reward in the civil service. They also perceived that innovation and performance improvement in the civil service are neither encouraged nor rewarded. In relation to political neutrality versus bias dimension, the survey result revealed that the majority of sampled civil servants are

politically neutral, i.e., they prefer to be neutral and independent from the politicians and they tend to distrust the politicians, considering them greedy, corrupt and selfish.

In a nutshell, evidence from respondents captured by the survey with regard to features of administrative culture suggested that the majority of civil servants in the state level civil service of ANRS have perceptions, attitudes and beliefs reflecting high power distance, strong uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation and political neutrality. It was also found that the majority of civil servants maintained a perception of low performance orientation culture in the state level civil service of ANRS.

Having the institutionalization status of performance management and features of administrative culture identified, chapter five also sought to explore the correlations between administrative cultural orientation of civil servants and the institutionalization level of performance management reform with the aim to determine whether or not any significant relationship exists. Spearman's correlation coefficient was employed for this purpose. It then was found that significant relationship exists between the institutionalization level of each aspect of the performance management reform, including overall performance management reform and each dimension of administrative culture, thereby suggesting that administrative culture may indeed contribute to the reasons why the majority of civil servants get difficulty to go through with the requirements of the performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS.

7.2.2 An Analysis of the Influence of Administrative Culture on the Institutionalization of Performance Management Reform

Having established clear correlations between administrative cultural orientations of civil servants and the institutionalization level of performance management reform, the next phase of this research focused on the examination of the data for evidence of the influence that administrative culture has on the institutionalization status of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. This was presented in chapter six and addressed the final two objectives of this research which sought to investigate the relationship between administrative culture and the institutionalization status of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS and to highlight how NPM-inspired performance

management reform should be managed in relation to culture. Multiple regression and data collected through semi-structured interview were employed in the analysis.

It was found that significant cause and effect relationships exist between administrative cultural dimensions (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation, political neutrality and performance orientation) and the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS.

Cultural dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic orientation and political neutrality were found to exert a negative and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS. Performance orientation was also found to exert a positive and significant influence on the institutionalization level of performance management reform within the state level civil service of ANRS. The statistics confirmed that these associations are not just due to chance but are real. Indeed, causalities have actually been established through analysis of qualitative data.

Whilst not all civil servants exhibit the same cultural orientation along the administrative cultural dimensions assessed, the findings of the study support that administrative culture within the state level civil service of ANRS is more unified than being fragmented. In general, it was found that administrative culture matters. The calls for in-depth study of administrative culture and redesign of the reform accordingly in civil service of ANRS are therefore justified.

7.3 A Reflection on the Research and Limitations of the Study

7.3.1 A Reflection on the Research

This research has achieved its aim of investigating into administrative culture and its effects on the institutionalization of performance management reform in the state level civil service of ANRS. In undertaking this study, a number of choices have been made which have ultimately influenced the methodology adopted, data collected, analysis undertaken and consequently, the findings. Whilst these choices have facilitated the achievement of the objectives of this research, they have also imposed some constraints on the research.

For instance, studies of administrative culture attempt to answer a number of key questions about a group of civil servants, typically in relation to *what*, *why* and *how* they have developed

particular perceptions, beliefs and attitudes (see, for instance, Christensen, *et al.*, ; Karyeija, 2012; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). To address the objectives of this research, the choice was made to focus on the question relating to *what* perceptions, beliefs and attitudes civil servants have along with those five administrative cultural dimensions. This choice is amenable to a quantitative approach which was thus adopted for this study. By making this choice, the study was, as a result, limited to a simple examination of features of administrative culture within the civil service. Although this was adequate for the purpose of achieving the research objectives, it failed to allow the deeper insights into the underlying assumptions which, for some researchers, is the very essence of administrative culture. Compounding this limitation was the number of dimensions of administrative culture addressed in this study, which further precluded an in-depth examination of any particular dimension of administrative culture. To derive the maximum benefit from a study into a phenomenon like culture, perhaps a more appropriate approach for future research may be to focus on only one dimension of culture, asking all the *what*, *why* and *how* questions to unearth the underlying assumptions behind administrative cultural orientation of civil servants. This approach is more suited to a qualitative methodology and will address a different set of objectives.

Within the main quantitative phase of the study, data on the institutionalization level of performance management reform was collected by means of a questionnaire survey administered to both managerial and non-managerial informants. The inclusion of managerial employees is supported by empirical evidences (see, for instance, Iguis 2009; Karyeija, 2012). However, it raises questions of whether they answer questions of such nature honestly, especially considering the highly politicized nature of the civil service in developing nations. Research of this nature will benefit more from the perceptions of non-managerial civil servants, and therefore, researchers should target non-managerial civil servants. Again, as indicated in chapter four, 185 sets of usable data were generated from civil servants working in nine government units of ANRS. Whilst this was adequate for the purposes of the present research, a bigger sample size from the entire civil service of the country would be necessary in the future research to draw firmer conclusions about the results in terms of the existence of a cause and effect relationships between the dimensions of administrative culture and reform outcomes.

From the above discussions, it can be seen that whilst the research undertaken has addressed the objectives set out and drawn inferences about the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization of performance management reform which can be applied in other similar studies, there is still huge potential for improving such studies to provide deeper insights into the influence that administrative culture has on the institutionalization efforts of Western-oriented administrative reforms in Ethiopian civil service in general and ANRS in particular.

7.3.2 Limitations of the Study

Besides those highlighted in the preceding section, there are some other potential limitations that should be borne in mind when interpreting the findings of this research.

It has been noted in Babbie (1992) that theoretical concepts almost never have perfect indicators. Any given concept has several possible indicators and whilst theory and empirical evidence facilitate the identification of the most useful indicators, they do not give absolute guarantees that these indicators are indeed the best. In this research, a number of indicators have been utilised as proxies for the measurement of administrative culture, and as noted above they may not be perfect indicators. Moreover, every empirical indicator has some defects (Babbie, 1992). Although this is a potential limitation, it is also important to emphasise that significant theoretical and empirical evidence were adduced to support the choice of these indicators.

Again it was impossible to ascertain whether or not all the respondents, specifically managerial respondents, answered the questions with candour. Thus, as recognised in Hammond (2006), if the respondents failed to answer the questions honestly and to the best of their recollection as envisaged, then the results may not be a true reflection of the population. However, the application of case-wise diagnostics and qualitative evidences helped to obviate the potential bias.

Given that the focus of the empirical aspects of this research was entirely on the civil service of ANRS, and given the possibility of civil servants' differences in administrative cultural orientation as obtained in the present study, it is entirely plausible that there may be some differences in the findings if this study is replicated in another jurisdiction. Indeed, this aspect is recommended as a potential area for further research.

7.4 Implications of the Study for Policy and Additional Research

7.4.1 Implications for Performance Management Reform

The study establishes that administrative culture matters for a performance management reform to be institutionalized in the civil service. In order for performance management reform to take root, therefore, either reformers should come up with cultural change program with the purpose of fitting administrative culture in the civil service with the reform requirements or they should engage in the design or redesign of the reform to comply with the prevailing administrative culture in the civil service.

In other words, public sector reformers should pay attention to the compatibility between NPM-inspired performance management reform requirements and the prevailing administrative culture within the civil service. They should note that performance management reform should be consistent with the host administrative cultures, and this can be done in two possible ways: a) by carrying out a cultural adjustment program, whereby the civil servants are taken through a process of unlearning certain norms and practices and being indoctrinated and educated with norms and values that may ease the process of the NPM-inspired performance management system; and b) by reviewing the performance management system so that it can accommodate and acknowledge the context and thus become sensitive to the host administrative culture.

The above points notwithstanding, reformers in ANRS should note that administrative culture within the regional civil service seemed deeply rooted than they might imagine and hence fitting all elements of administrative culture in the civil service with the performance management reform requirements could be expensive and lengthy endeavour. For instance, efforts to bring an individualistic orientation among civil servants could be a futile exercise since the majority of civil servants seemed socialized to a collectivistic orientation during their childhood. The same may also holds true for power distance and uncertainty avoidance. Hence, reformers in the region must first carry out a comprehensive cultural study so that the existing performance management system can be redesigned with a clear understanding of cultural expectations. To put it differently, reformers need to thoroughly study the administrative culture and modify the reform accordingly, so that it can have a better chance of being institutionalized. However, this is not to suggest that administrative culture within the civil service of ANRS is a deadlock and hence no

need for efforts to change any aspects of the culture. Indeed, reformers must deliberately develop an understanding of obstructive elements of administrative culture such as the absence of performance orientation culture and prevalence of patronage in the civil service and come up with specific programs to achieve cultural changes in these dimensions of culture in the civil service.

7.4.2 Implications for Further Studies

Based on the findings and the limitations that have been noted, the study suggests possible implications for future research that might be needed in order to better understand administrative culture and its role on performance management in the entire civil service of Ethiopia.

Because this study focused on a single region in Ethiopia, the results and implications drawn from it may have limited application to the entire civil service of the country. Therefore, other research is necessary to expand the generalizability of the findings.

Given the possibility of civil servants differences in administrative cultural orientation as obtained in the thesis, it is also entirely plausible that there may be some differences in the findings if this study is replicated in another jurisdiction. Hence, replications involving different regions would be necessary in future research to draw firmer conclusions about the results in terms of the existence of cause and effect relationships between the dimensions of administrative culture and the institutionalization of performance management reform. Such studies will also allow for comparative analysis to be undertaken.

By addressing several dimensions of administrative culture, this research was unable to delve into the details of any particular dimension of culture to unearth issues relating to *how* and *why* particular cultural orientations arise. For some researchers this is the very essence of culture. A key suggestion, therefore, is that for future research in this domain, rather than addressing several dimensions of administrative culture superficially, researchers must identify a specific dimension of culture and investigate this to a great depth to unearth the underlying assumptions and beliefs that inform a particular orientation. Inductive ethnographic approaches are preferable for this sort of research, and will enable cause and effect relationships between administrative culture and reform outcomes to be established more clearly.

It has been found in this research that political neutrality is associated with limited institutionalization of performance management reform, thereby corroborating a finding in Kereji (2012) that civil servants' high political neutrality is one of the factors influencing reform performance in civil service. Unfortunately, beyond suggesting patronage and passive resistance as a supportive justification for this association, this study does not go further to inquire into the underlying causes of this relationship and how it can be mitigated. Given the importance of political culture in the civil service and its detrimental influence on reform outcomes, such research will represent a significant contribution to knowledge.

Although administrative culture was the main focus of the present study, the adoption of other perspectives in order to understand performance management institutionalization represents a valuable area of study to pursue. The application of more perspectives would not only enable us to capture a holistic picture, but it would explain also the extent to which culture contributes to the success or failure of performance management institutionalization relative to the other variables.

7.5 Contribution of the study

Building on the existing knowledge on administrative culture, this research has provided greater insights into administrative culture within a civil service context, in particular providing empirical evidence on the relationship between administrative culture and institutionalization status of performance management reform in the civil service. Thus, it extends the existing knowledge on administrative culture and the relationship between administrative culture and reform implementation in public sector.

Studies on civil service reforms in Ethiopia have not previously been conducted on the nature of administrative culture and its relation with the institutionalization status of performance management reform. This study, therefore, fills the knowledge gap concerning administrative culture and its relation with the institutionalization status of performance management reform in Ethiopia, providing knowledge on features of administrative culture and the relationship between administrative culture and the institutionalization status of performance management reform in the civil service of the second largest region of Ethiopia (i.e., ANRS).

It is worth to note that reformers in Ethiopia mentioned culture without any detail, but in the form of statements such as ‘resistance’, ‘attitudinal problem’ and ‘civil servants’ orientation’, as a reason for some of the civil service ills in the country (see section 1.3). In other words, culture is just being utilised as a ‘black box’ reason for most of the civil service ills in Ethiopia. This research has thus made significant contribution by bringing the discussion of culture in the civil service towards more empirically grounded discourse. Although this research was unable to delve into the details of the box, it has revealed that we need to investigate and understand this culture empirically. Moreover, the study has demonstrated that the existing administrative culture needs adjustment. Reformers must, therefore, pay much more attention to administrative culture than ever before.

Studies grounded on cultural perspectives have largely been done in the context of developed countries (Farashahi, *et al.*, 2005). Moreover, few deliberative and systematic studies have been done on the relationship between administrative culture and the institutionalization level of performance management reforms in the context of public sector in African countries (De Waal, 2007; Karyeija, 2012; McCourt and Foon, 2007; Murphy and Cleveland, 1995; Ohemeng, 2009). This study’s exploration of administrative culture and its relationship with performance management reform in the context of Ethiopia, a developing country, therefore, enriches this area of study.

By empirically investigating the relationship between administrative culture and NPM-inspired performance management reform, this research has provided some evidence that administrative culture does matter for Western-rooted performance management reform to take root in non-western context. The findings can thus be used as a basis for recommending or encouraging the need for sensitivity to administrative culture while importing Western performance management reform ideals to non-western context. It can also be used as a basis for encouraging policy researchers to devote more attention to the ‘softer’ aspects such as administrative culture in order to evolve more comprehensive frameworks for a better understanding of the relationship between culture and reform implementation.

Finally, this research demonstrated that beyond the existing generic national culture frameworks, it is possible to develop reliable civil service-specific frameworks that can be employed successfully in research and yield meaningful outcomes. Indeed, the framework developed in this

research is itself unique to this research, and hence represents a contribution that can be adopted by other researchers for application in further research.

7.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, this research has explored empirically the relationships between administrative culture and the institutionalization status of NPM-inspired performance management reform within the civil service of ANRS and has found that administrative culture significantly impeded the performance management reform institutionalization therein. The study demonstrated that performance management reform failed to take root in the civil service of ANRS because administrative cultural orientations of the majority of civil servants appeared incompatible with the reform requirements.

The research revealed that high power distance orientation, collectivistic orientation and strong uncertainty avoidance were incompatible to performance management reform which sought to manage individual performance without considering the unequal distribution of power, collectivistic orientation and fear of innovation or new ways of doing things. The research has also demonstrated that low performance orientation culture and high political neutrality in the civil service were the stumbling blocks for performance management reform to take root in the civil service because they were opposed to meritocracy which is the central element of the performance management reform.

The conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that administrative culture matters and the institutionalization of NPM-inspired performance management system cannot be taken for granted. The researcher thus contends that in order for performance management reform to take root, reformers should engage in a redesign of the reform to comply with the hard to change aspects of the prevailing administrative culture in the civil service. At the same time, they should come up with cultural change program with the purpose of weeding out obstructive elements of administrative culture in the civil service.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1 – Survey Questionnaire

COVER LETTER OF QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY

AN INVESTIGATING INTO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION STATUS OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT REFORM

Dear Sir or Madam,

I am conducting a research to investigate the relationship between administrative culture and institutionalization status of the performance management reform in the Ethiopian civil service by taking civil service in ANRS as a context of the study. The study seeks to analyze the extent to which this reform is institutionalized in the civil service using administrative culture as an explanatory variable. The study is for academic purposes, as a partial requirement for a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Public Management and Policy at Addis Ababa University.

I am therefore kindly requesting you to answer this questionnaire. The questionnaire will require you to consider your experiences on how you usually conduct performance management in your organization as well as your personal work related values, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions and use that as a basis for responding to the questions. Your contribution will be most invaluable. **You are assured that individual responses will not be identified and the information obtained from this survey will be kept strictly confidential and used for research purposes only.** Upon request, you will receive a copy of a report detailing the results of this research. If you require any further information or clarification, I will be pleased to answer your questions. Contact details are provided below.

I do appreciate that the questionnaire will take some of your valuable time. However, without your kind and expert input the ambitions of this study will not be realised. It is my hope therefore that you will be able to assist me in this research by completing and returning the questionnaire.

Thanking you in anticipation.

Yours Sincerely,

Alazar Amare (PhD candidate)

Tel: 0911732879

Email: alaazare21@yahoo.com or alazaramare@gmail.com

QUESTIONNAIRE

The Questionnaire consists of three parts. Part one requests personal information about you and is required for statistical analysis and follow-up purposes only should the need arise. Part two requests your work related values, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions in relation to five dimensions of administrative culture ; power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, political neutrality/biases and performance orientation. Part three requests your experiences based opinion on how you usually conduct performance management in your organization.

PART ONE: PERSONAL (BIBLIOGRAPHIC) DATA

Please Mark „X“ before your Choice for Each Question.

1. Gender [1] Female [2] Male

2. Age [1] 18-30 [2] 31-45 [3] > 45

3. Education

[1] Certificate/ Diploma [2] Bachelor Degree [3] Masters Degree and Above

4. Job category

[3] Managerial (core or support process owner, process coordinator, team leader or case manager)

[2] Expert/professional

[1] Office secretary and administrative clerk

5. Organization you belong

[1] Bureau (designated as Buerau)

[2] Agency\autourity (designated as Agency\authority)

6. Working years in current organization

[1] 1-5 years [2] 5-10 years [3] More than 10 years

7. Working years in civil service in general

[1] 1-5 years [2] 5-10 years [3] More than 10 years

8. Where have you grown up? [1] Urban area [2] Rural area

PART TWO: ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE

I. ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE – POWER DISTANCE

Administrative culture within the civil service can be assessed by soliciting of civil servants' level of agreement/disagreement/ with the following statements which are intended to measure employees work related beliefs, attitudes and perceptions. Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements on a scale from 1 to 5, whereby 1 represents 'Strongly disagree', 2 'Disagree', 3 'Both agree and disagree', 4 'Agree', and 5 'Strongly agree'. **Please Mark „X“ on a scale that best represents your level of Agreement for Each statement.**

Items to measure power distance	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Both agree and disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Hierarchy within organization is necessary because people have to know who has authority over whom.	1	2	3	4	5
Subordinates often show respect to superiors on account of the latter's position than actual performance and knowledge.	1	2	3	4	5
Elderly members within organization should be respected.	1	2	3	4	5
Hierarchy in my organization reflects the differences in quality between those people higher-up and those that are further down in the hierarchy.	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization, superiors and subordinates consider each other as unequal.	1	2	3	4	5
I believe that a superior always demands respect and obedience from his subordinates	1	2	3	4	5
A superior should take care of his subordinates as his own family members.	1	2	3	4	5
Subordinates should be told what to do.	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization, subordinates do not expect to be consulted when decisions are made.	1	2	3	4	5

Items to measure power distance	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Both agree and disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
In my organization, officials rely more on formal rules and superiors than on subordinates and experts.	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization, top officials seldom ask employees for opinion before making a decision.	1	2	3	4	5
Office work is of a superior nature than manual work.					
In my organization, Privileges and status symbols for officials such as big cars, big offices, and secretaries, are normal and popular. They are no frowned upon.	1	2	3	4	5
I believe that managers at all levels should be entitled to privileges like car and big offices.	1	2	3	4	5

II. ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE – UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE

Administrative culture within the civil service can be assessed by soliciting of civil servants' level of agreement/disagreement/ with the following statements which are intended to measure employees work related beliefs, attitudes and perceptions. Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements on a scale from 1 to 5, whereby 1 represents 'Strongly disagree', 2 'Disagree', 3 'Both agree and disagree', 4 'Agree', and 5 'Strongly agree'. **Please Mark „X“ on a scale that best represents your level of Agreement for Each statement.**

Items to measure uncertainty avoidance	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Both agree and disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Instructions for operations are highly important for employees on the job.	1	2	3	4	5
Standardized work procedure should be in place in my organization.	1	2	3	4	5
Most civil servants have a strong emotional need for rules.	1	2	3	4	5
I believe that organization rules should not be broken, even when the employee thinks it is in the organization's best interests.	1	2	3	4	5
Most civil servants need to be busy and work hard.	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization, innovation is not appreciated.	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization, risk-taking is less valued.	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization, deviant idea is suppressed by reference to rules, procedures and definitions of responsibility.	1	2	3	4	5
I believe that subordinates feel more comfortable to work under close supervision than independently.	1	2	3	4	5
I believe that it is better to follow known standards and procedures than experiment with new ideas in my organization.	1	2	3	4	5

Items to measure uncertainty avoidance	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Both agree and disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
In my organization, most employees have suspicious attitude towards change.	1	2	3	4	5
I believe that disagreements can unleash aggression and should therefore be avoided in my organization.	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization 'AGREE to DISAGREE' is not wellcomed.	1	2	3	4	5
I believe that people do not have enough control over the directions their life is taking.	1	2	3	4	5

III. ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE – INDIVIDUALISM/COLLECTIVISM

Administrative culture within the civil service can be assessed by soliciting of civil servants' level of agreement/disagreement/ with the following statements which are intended to measure employees work related beliefs, attitudes and perceptions. Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements on a scale from 1 to 5, whereby 1 represents 'Strongly disagree', 2 'Disagree', 3 'Both agree and disagree', 4 'Agree', and 5 'Strongly agree'. **Please Mark „X“ on a scale that best represents your level of Agreement for Each statement.**

Items to measure collectivism	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Both agree and disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
In my organization, social relationship among employees through traditional networks like <i>EDIR</i> , <i>EKUB</i> , <i>MAHEBER</i> e.t.c. is popular.	1	2	3	4	5
I believe that individual social and supportive orientation is more emphasised than what he or she actually does in my organization.	1	2	3	4	5
I believe that who you are (personality and background) is more important than what you do in my organization.	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization, promotion is usually based on non-performance criteria, i.e., seniority, personal connection e.t.c	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization, harmony should always be maintained and direct confrontations should be avoided.	1	2	3	4	5
I feel uncomfortable to share my opinion with the group when the opinions are unpopular.	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization, direct criticism is rare.	1	2	3	4	5
I believe that competition can unleash aggression and should therefore be avoided.	1	2	3	4	5
I believe that cooperation is more important than competition.	1	2	3	4	5

Items to measure collectivism	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Both agree and disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
I believe that working with others to get job done is more preferable to working individually.	1	2	3	4	5
I believe that taking joint responsibility is more preferable to personal responsibility.	1	2	3	4	5
I believe that group welfare is more important than individual rewards.	1	2	3	4	5
I believe that employees should pursue their goals after considering the welfare of the group.	1	2	3	4	5
Group success is more important than individual success.	1	2	3	4	5

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE – POLITICAL BIAS/NEUTRALITY

Administrative culture within the civil service can be assessed by soliciting of civil servants' level of agreement/disagreement/ with the following statements which are intended to measure employees work related beliefs, attitudes and perceptions. Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements on a scale from 1 to 5, whereby 1 represents 'Strongly disagree', 2 'Disagree', 3 'Both agree and disagree', 4 'Agree', and 5 'Strongly agree'. **Please Mark „X“ on a scale that best represents your level of Agreement for Each statement.**

Items to measure collectivism	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Both agree and disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
In administration of civil services, technical considerations must be given more weight than political factors.	1	2	3	4	5
Civil servants should always remain neutral in relation to political parties.	1	2	3	4	5
The interference of politicians in the business of civil servants is a disturbing feature of public life.	1	2	3	4	5
Decision-making is a preserve of those in power.	1	2	3	4	5
It's an advantage for the public sector if top civil servants share the political views of the ruling government.	1	2	3	4	5
Ethiopia needs a new generation of political leaders.	1	2	3	4	5
I am not considering Ethiopian political leaders to have specialized political roles.	1	2	3	4	5
Politicians think more about their welfare than that of the citizens	1	2	3	4	5
The civil servants and not the politicians guarantee reasonable public policies.	1	2	3	4	5
Local self-government is the best for adapting local services to local needs.	1	2	3	4	5
Although parties play an important role in a democracy, often they exacerbate political conflicts.	1	2	3	4	5
Most political leaders cannot be trusted.	1	2	3	4	5

V. ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE – PERFORMANCE ORIENTATION

Administrative culture within the civil service can be assessed by soliciting of civil servants' level of agreement/disagreement/ with the following statements which are intended to measure employees work related beliefs, attitudes and perceptions.. Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements on a scale from 1 to 5, whereby 1 represents 'Strongly disagree', 2 'Disagree', 3 'Both agree and disagree', 4 'Agree', and 5 'Strongly agree'. **Please Mark „X“ on a scale that best represents your level of Agreement for Each statement.**

Items to measure collectivism	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Both agree and disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
In my organization, employees are encouraged to strive for continuously improved performance.	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization, being innovative to improve performance is rewarded	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization, employees are encouraged to set challenging work goals.	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization, major rewards are only based on performance effectiveness.	1	2	3	4	5

PART THREE: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

I. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT – PERFORMANCE AGREEMENT

The institutionalization status of staff performance management reform within the civil service can be assessed by soliciting of civil servants’ fact based opinion on the following statements which are intended to assess how in practice employees usually conclude performance agreement in civil service. Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements on a scale from 1 to 5, whereby 1 represents ‘Strongly disagree/Very untrue’, 2 ‘Disagree/untrue’, 3 ‘Both agree and disagree/ Somehow true and Somehow untrue’, 4 ‘Agree/True’, and 5 ‘Strongly agree/Very true’. **Please Mark „X“ on a scale that best represents your level of Agreement for Each statement.**

Items to measure performance agreement	Strongly disagree (Very untrue)	Disagree (True)	Both agree and disagree (Somehow true and Somehow untrue)	Agree (True)	Strongly agree (Very true)
I usually engage in joint discussion with my supervisor while agreeing on tasks and objectives that I have to accomplish during a given performance management cycle.	1	2	3	4	5
Objectives that I have to meet during a given performance management cycle are usually mutually agreed rather than imposed by my supervisor.	1	2	3	4	5
I and my supervisor usually refer to strategic plan of our organization and/or our departmental goals while agreeing on objectives.	1	2	3	4	5
I and my supervisor usually set challenging work objectives during performance agreement.	1	2	3	4	5
I usually engage in joint discussion with my supervisor while agreeing on my performance development plan.	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization, agreed performance development plan for a subordinate is usually functional.	1	2	3	4	5

II. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT – PERFORMANCE REVIEW

The institutionalization status of staff performance management reform within the civil service can be assessed by soliciting of civil servants’ fact based opinion on the following statements which are intended to assess how in practice employees usually conduct performance review in the civil service. Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements on a scale from 1 to 5, whereby 1 represents ‘Strongly disagree/Very untrue’, 2 ‘Disagree/untrue’, 3 ‘Both agree and disagree/ Somehow true and Somehow untrue’, 4 ‘Agree/True’, and 5 ‘Strongly agree/Very true’. **Please Mark „X“ on a scale that best represents your level of Agreement for Each statement.**

Items to measure performance review	Strongly disagree (Very untrue)	Disagree (True)	Both agree and disagree (Somehow true and Somehow untrue)	Agree (True)	Strongly agree (Very true)
I and my supervisor discuss my performance of agreed objectives on a regular basis.	1	2	3	4	5
I and my supervisor usually discuss both my strengths and weaknesses in achievement of agreed objectives during our informal performance review meetings.	1	2	3	4	5
Most of the time, my supervisor directly criticizes me at times of events (any instance of poor performance due to my own fault).	1	2	3	4	5
I usually openly speak about problem on the side of my supervisor or organization at times of events (any instance of poor performance due to problems on the side of my supervisor or organization).	1	2	3	4	5
My supervisor usually provides constructive feedback and supportive guidelines to me throughout the performance management cycle.	1	2	3	4	5
I usually engage in joint discussion of performances with my supervisor during formal performance review meetings.	1	2	3	4	5

Items to measure performance review	Strongly disagree (Very untrue)	Disagree (True)	Both agree and disagree (Somehow true and Somehow untrue)	Agree (True)	Strongly agree (Very true)
I and my supervisor usually focus our discussion on planning for the future rather than simply dwelling on the past during formal performance review meetings.	1	2	3	4	5
My supervisor usually expresses negative but critical face-to-face feedback to me during formal performance review (i.e., he/she does not desist from openly expressing negative but critical face-to-face feedback).	1	2	3	4	5
I usually express negative but critical face-to-face feedback to my supervisor during formal performance review (i.e., I do not desist from openly expressing negative but critical face-to-face feedback).	1	2	3	4	5
I usually forward honest feedback regarding my colleagues' performance.	1	2	3	4	5

III. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT – REWARDING HIGH PERFORMERS AND MANAGING UNDER-PERFORMERS

The institutionalization status of staff performance management system within the civil service can be assessed by soliciting of civil servants’ fact based opinion on the following statements which are intended to assess employees’ perceptions on how rewarding high performers and managing under-performers practices looks like in the civil service. Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements on a scale from 1 to 5, whereby 1 represents ‘Strongly disagree/Very untrue’, 2 ‘Disagree/untrue’, 3 ‘Both agree and disagree/ Somehow true and Somehow untrue’, 4 ‘Agree/True’, and 5 ‘Strongly agree/Very true’. **Please Mark „X” on a scale that best represents your level of Agreement for Each statement.**

Items to measure reward and managing underperformer	Strongly disagree (Very untrue)	Disagree (True)	Both agree and disagree (Somehow true and Somehow untrue)	Agree (True)	Strongly agree (Very true)
In my organization, identification of high and low performers using formal performance review is a common phenomenon.	1	2	3	4	5
My eligibility for any reward practices like salary increment or training opportunity in my organization is usually based on my performance than other criteria.	1	2	3	4	5
My eligibility for promotion in my organization is usually based on my performance than other criteria.	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization, provision of training for under-performers is a norm.	1	2	3	4	5
In my organization, it is common to take disciplinary action including dismissal against poor performer employees.	1	2	3	4	5

THIS IS THE END OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE – THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME

Appendix 2 – Survey Questionnaire (AMHARIC VERSION)

አዲስ አበባ ዩኒቨርሲቲ

ቢዝነስና ኢኮኖሚክስ ኮሌጅ

ድህረ ምረቃ ት/ቤት

ለሦስተኛ ድግሪ ማሟያ ጥናታዊ ጽሁፍ መረጃ ለመስብሰብ የተዘጋጀ መጠይቅ

ጠና ይስጥልኝ ስሜአልአዛር አማረ ይባላል ፡ ፡

የመጣሁት ከአዲስ አበባ ዩኒቨርሲቲ ሲሆን በአሁን ሰዓት በዩኒቨርሲቲው የድህረ ምረቃ ት/ቤት በህዝብ ስራ አመራርና ፖሊሲ የጥናት መስክ የዶክትሬት ትምህርቴን ለማጠናቀቅ ጥናታዊ ጽሁፌን በመስራት ላይ እገኛለሁ ፡ ፡

የምርምር ጽሁፍ አላማ በኢትዮጵያ የሚገኙ የሲቪል ሰርቪስ ተቋማት ወስጥ ያለውን አስተዳደራዊ ባህል (Administrative Culture) በመለየት በተቋማቱ ወስጥ ባለው የሰራተኛ አፈጻጸም ምዘና (Performance Management practice) ስርአትና ነባራዊ አውነታ ላይ ያለውን አዎንታዊና አሉታዊ ተጽዕኖ ማወቅ ነው ፡ ፡ የጥናቱ ውጤትም በዋናነት በሀገሪቱ የመንግስት ተቋማት ወስጥ ከተቋማቱ የአስተዳደር ባህል አንጻር የሰራተኛ ምዘና ስርዓት ምን መሆን እንዳለበት ለማመልከት ያለመ ነው ፡ ፡ በዚህ መሰረት ይህንን ጥናት ለማሳካት የሚያስፈልጉኝን መረጃዎች ለመስብሰብ ይረዳኝ ዘንድ ይህንን መጠይቅ አዘጋጅቻለሁ ፡ ፡

በመሆኑም ይህንን መጠይቅ እርሶ እንዲሞሉልኝ በታላቅ ትህትና ስጠይቅ ላረጋግጥለዎ የምወደው ከመጠይቁ የሚገኘው መረጃ ለትምህርታዊ አላማብቻ የሚውልና በጥንቃቄ ለጥናቱ ብቻ የሚውል መሆኑን ነው ፡ ፡

ማስታወሻ

1. መጠይቁ ሦስት ክፍሎች አሉት ፡ ፡ ክፍል አንድ እንደሚገኘውም ጥናት ለዚህ ጥናት አስፈላጊ የሆኑ የመላሾችን የግል መረጃዎች ለምሳሌ ፆታ፣ ዕድሜ፣ የት/ደረጃ ወ.ዘ.ተ ለመዳሰስ የተዘጋጀ ሲሆን ክፍል ሁለት የሲቪል ሰርቪስ ተቋማትን አስተዳደራዊ ባህልን ለመዳሰስ የተዘጋጀ ነው ፡ ፡ ክፍል ሦስት የሰራተኛ ምዘና ነባራዊ ሁኔታ ለመዳሰስ የተዘጋጀ ነው ፡ ፡
2. በመጠይቁ ክፍል ሁለት እና ሦስት ወስጥ የተካተቱት ጥያቄዎች የበዙ ቢመስልም ጥያቄዎቹ በመሉ የማመለሱት ('X') ምልክት በማድረግ ስለሆነ ከወዲሁ እንዳይሰለቹ በታላቅ ትህትና እጠይቃለሁ ፡ ፡

በመጨረሻም መጠይቁን በቅንና እውነተኛ ፍላጎት እንደሚሞሉልኝ ያለኝን እምነት ከአደራ ጭምር እየገለጽኩ ወድ ጊዜዎትን ሰውተው ይህንን መጠይቅ ለመሙላት ፈቃደኛ ስለሆነ እጅግ ከወዲሁ አመሰግናለሁ ፡ ፡

ከፍል አንድ፡ -የ መላሻችን የታ፡ እድሜ፡ የ ስራ ደረጃ ወ.ዘ.ተ ለ መዳሰስ የተዘጋጀ

መመሪያ፡ -እባክዎ ለእያንዳንዱ ጥያቄ ከተቀመጡት አማራጮች ፊት ለፊት ባለው ሣጥን እርሶን የሚገልጸው ላይ የ ('X') ምልክት ያድርጉልኝ

1. የታ

ወንድ ሴት

2. እድሜ

18-30 31-45 ከ45 በላይ

3. የት/ደረጃ

ዲፕሎማ/ስርትፍኬት መጀመሪያ ድግሪ የማስተርስ ድግሪና ከዛ በላይ

4. የስራ መደብ መጠሪያ

አመራር (ቡድን መሪ/ኬዝ ማናጀርና ከዛ በላይ)

ባለመያ (ኤክስፐርት/አፊሰር/ባለመያ)

የፅህፈትና የቢሮ አስተዳደር ሰራተኛ

5. የሚሰሩበት መ/ቤት

በቢሮ ደረጃ የተቋቋመ በባለስልጣን ደረጃ የተቋቋመ

6. አሁን ባሉበት መ/ቤት የሰሩበት ዓመት

1-5 ዓመት 5-10 ዓመት ከ10 ዓመት በላይ

7. በመንግስት መ/ቤት በአጠቃላይ የሰሩበት ጊዜ (በሲቪል ሰርቪስ ተቋማት በአጠቃላይ)

1-5 ዓመት 5-10 ዓመት ከ10 ዓመት በላይ

8. የልጅነት ግዜ ወን ያደጉበት ቦታ

ገጠር ከተማ

ክፍል ሁለት፡ -የ ሲቪል ሰርቪስ ተቋማትን አስተዳደራዊ ባህልን ለመዳሰስ የተዘጋጀ

መመሪያ ፡ - ከዚህ በታች በተመለከተው ሠንጠረዥ ውስጥ በሲቪል ሰርቪስ ተቋማት ውስጥ ያለውን አስተዳደራዊ ባህል የተቋማቱ ሰራተኞች ከሰራ ጋር ግንኙነት ያላቸው የተለያዩ ጉዳዮችን በተመለከተ ካላቸው እምነት፤ እይታና አስተሳሰብ አንፃር ለመዳሰስ የተዘጋጁ በርከት ያሉ ዓ.ነ ገሮች ተካተዋል ፡፡ በመሆኑም እርሶ ከራሶት ልምድ እይታና አመለካከት አንፃር ለእያንዳንዱን ዓ.ነ ገሮች ያለዎትን ስምምነት በእያንዳንዱ አረፍተ ነገር ትክክል ከተቀመጠት አምስት የስምምነት መለኪያዎች ማለትም ፡-1.በጣም አልስማማም 2. አልስማማም 3. እስማማለሁም/አልስማማምም 4. እስማማለሁ 5. በጣም እስማማለሁ ከሚሉት አንዱን በመምረጥ በእያንዳንዱ ዓ.ነ ገር ትክክል X ምልክቶች በማድረግ ምላሾችን ይሰጡ ፡

ምሳሌ፡ - ለ መጀመሪያ ዓ.ነ ገር በጣም ከተሰማው በዓ.ነ ገሩ ትክክል 5 ቁጥር ላይ የ X ምልክት ያደርጋሉ ፤ በጣም ካልተሰማሙ 1 ቁጥር ላይ የ X ምልክት ያደርጋሉ ፤ ወ.ዘ.ተ ማለት ነው ፡ ስለዚህ በስምምነት መጠን ለእያንዳንዱ ዓ.ነ ገር በትይዩ ካሉት አምስት ቁጥሮች መካከል በመምረጥ የ X ምልክት እያደረጉ ይመልሳሉ ማለት ነው ፡

ማስታወሻ፡ -1ኛ ሁሉንም ዓ.ነ ገሮች ሲመልሱ እንደ ዓ.ነ ገሮች ይዘት በግልዎት እይታ አስተሳሰብና አመለካከት አንፃር እንዲሆን በትህትና እጠይቃለሁ፡፡

2ኛ.ለየትኛውም ዓ.ነ ገር ትክክል ወይም ስህተት የሚባል መልስ የሌለ ከመሆኑም በላይ የእርስዎ መልስ ጥሩነትንም ሆነ መጥፎነትን በጭራሽ አይለካም፡፡ በመሆኑም በእውነተኛነት እንዲመልሱልኝ አጥብቄ እጠይቃለሁ፡፡

ተ/ቁ	ዓ.ነገር	በጣም አልሰማም	አልሰማም	እስማማለሁ	እስማማለሁ	በጣም እስማማለሁ
1	በኔ እምነት በአንድ ተቋም ውስጥ የሰልጣን ደረጃ ተዋረድ መኖር አስፈላጊ ነው። ምክንያቱም የተቋሙ ሰራተኞች ማን ማን እንደሚሆኑ ለማን ተጠሪ እንደሆነ ማወቅ ስላለባቸው።	1	2	3	4	5
2	በዚህ መ/ቤት የሰልጣን ደረጃ ተዋረድ ከላይ ባሉ ሰዎች (ለምሳሌ አመራሮችና ሰራ ሃላፊዎች) እና ከታች ባሉ ሰዎች (ለምሳሌ፤ ፀሃፊ ፤ ሹፊር ወ.ዘ.ተ) መካከል የሰራ ልምድ እውቀት ወ.ዘ.ተ ልዩነት እንዳለ ያሳያል።	1	2	3	4	5
3	በእኔ እይታ በአንድ ተቋም ውስጥ ሰራተኞች በአብዛኛው ጊዜ ለሰራ አለቃቸው ከበሬታን የሚሰሩት አለቃ በመሆኑ እንጅ የሰራ አፈፃፀምና ያለውን እውቀት መሰረት በማድረግ አይደለም።	1	2	3	4	5
4	በእኔ እምነት በአንድ ተቋም ውስጥ በእድሜያቸው 74(ዘለግ) ያሉ ሰራተኞችን መከበር አለባቸው።	1	2	3	4	5
5	በዚህ መ/ቤት የሰራ ሃላፊዎች ወሳኔዎችን ሲያደርጉ በሰራቸው ካሉ ሰራተኞች ምክር ከመወሰድ ይልቅ የበላይ ሃላፊዎችን ሃሳብና ያሉትን ሕጎች መሰረት ማድረግ ይስተዋልባቸዋል።	1	2	3	4	5
6	በዚህ መ/ቤት አብዛኛው ሰራተኛ የሰራ ሃላፊዎች ወሳኔዎችን ሲያደርጉ (ለምሳሌ፤ አዲስ አሰራር፤ ሕግ፤ ደንብ ሲያወጡ) እኔን ያማክሩኛል ብሎ አይጠብቅም።	1	2	3	4	5
7	በዚህ መ/ቤት ሰራተኛውና የሰራ ሃላፊዎች እንደኩል አይተያዩም።	1	2	3	4	5
8	በእኔ እይታ የሰራ ሃላፊዎች ከሰራቸው ካሉ ሰራተኞች ክብርና ትዕዛዝ ተቀባይነትን ይፈልጋሉ።	1	2	3	4	5
9	በእኔ እምነት በየትኛውም ደረጃ ላይ ያሉ የሰራ ሃላፊዎች ከሌለው ሰራተኛ የተለየ ነገር ግን ህጋዊ የሆነ ጥቅም ጥቅም ለምሳሌ የተሻለ ቢሮ በሰራ ላይ የሚጠቀሙት መኪና፣ ወ.ዘ.ተ ተቋሙ ሊሰጣቸው ይገባል።	1	2	3	4	5

10	በእኔ እምነት ሰራተኞች ከሰራ አለቃቸው ምን መስራት እንደሚጠበቅባቸው በግልጽ ሊነገራቸውይገባል፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
11	በዚህ መ/ቤት ከፍተኛ ባለስልጣኖች (የቢሮ ሃላፊ/ም/ሃላፊ) የሰራ ወሳኔዎችን (ለምሳሌ አዲስ አሰራር ሕግ ወ.ዘ.ተ) ከማድረጋቸው በፊት የሰራተኞችን እስተያየትና ምክር የሚጠይቁት ግፋት ቢል እንዳንዴ ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
12	በዚህ መ/ቤት ከፍተኛ የሰራ ሃላፊዎች (የቢሮ ሃላፊ ም/ሃላፊ ወ.ዘ.ተ) ከሌላው ሰራተኛ በተለየ መልኩ ጥሩ በሰራ ላይ የሚጠቀሙበት መኪና ፤ ትልቅ ቢሮ ፤ ፀሃፊ ወ.ዘ.ተ በመ/ቤቱ ወሰን ላይ የሚገኙት ሆኖታልም የሚጠበቅም ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
13	በእኔ እምነት አንድ የሰራ ሃላፊ በስሩ ያሉትን ሰራተኞች እንደቤተሰቡ አባላት መንከባከብ አለበት፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
14	በእኔ እይታ የቢሮ ላይ ሰራ ከጉልበት ስራ (ለምሳሌ ጥገና፣ ፅዳትና ጥበቃ፣ ወ.ዘ.ተ) የተሸለ ተመራጭነት አለው ወይም ይልቃል፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
15	በእኔ እምነት ማንም ሰራተኛ የተቋሙን ህጎች መጣስ በምንም ታምር የለበትም፡፡ (ለተቋሙ ጥቅም ነው ብሎ ቢያስብም እንኳን)	1	2	3	4	5
16	በዚህ መ/ቤት ላለ መስማማት፣ መስማማት (Agree to Disagree) የሚባል አስተሳሰብ እንደ ጥሩ ተደርጎ ሲወሰድ አይስተዋልም፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
17	በእኔ እምነት አንድ ሰራተኛ ስለሚሰራው ስራ እንዴት መስራት እንዳለበት የሚያብራራለት የሰራ መመሪያና ማብራሪያ በጣም አስፈላጊ ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
18	በእኔ እምነት በዚህ መ/ቤት ወጥ የሆነ የሰራ ሂደትና አሰራርን የሚያሳይ ማንኛውም መኖር አለበት፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
19	በእኔ እይታ ስመስከተው አብዛኛው የመንግስት ሰራተኛ ለሚሰራው ስራ ሕግና ደንብ ባያስፈልገውም እንኳን የሆነ መመሪያም ቢሆን እንዲኖርለት የመፈለግ ሁኔታ ይታይበታል፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
20	በዚህ መ/ቤት ከተለመደው በጣም ወጣ ያለ የአሰራር ሃሳብ ባለው የማይላላ የሰራ ህግና ደንብ ምክንያት ሲጨለቅ ይታያል፡፡	1	2	3	4	5

21	በእኔ እይታ ስልመከተው አብዛኛው የመንግስት ሰራተኛ እራሱን ቢዘማድረግና ጠንካራ ሰራተኛ መሆን ይፈልጋል ::	1	2	3	4	5
22	በእኔ እምነት በዚህ መ/ቤት አዳዲስ ነገሮችን በየጊዜው ከማምጣት ይልቅ በደንብ የሚታወቀውን የአሰራር አይነት በስርዓት መከተል ጠቃሚ ነው ::	1	2	3	4	5
23	በዚህ መ/ቤት ስራ ላይ ሊወልድ የሚችል ፈጠራ የታከለበት አሰራር (innovative work idea) ሰራተኛው እንዲያፈልቅ ብዙም አይበረታታም ::	1	2	3	4	5
24	በዚህ መ/ቤት ሃላፊነትን ወስዶ በድፍረት ወጤቱ ከተሳካ ወጤታማ ካልተሳካ ኪሳራ ሊያስከትል የሚችል ውሳኔን ወይም ድርጊትን መፈፀም (risk taking) ዋጋ ተስጥቶት ሲበረታታ አይታይም ::	1	2	3	4	5
25	በዚህ መስሪያ ቤት አብዛኛው ሰራተኛ ዘንድ ለለውጥ (Change) ያለው አመለካከት በጥርጣሬ የተሞላ ነው ::	1	2	3	4	5
26	በእኔ እይታ አብዛኛው ሰራተኛ ያለ አለቃ ድጋፍና ቁጥጥር ከሚሰሩ ይልቅ በቅርብ ድጋፍና ቁጥጥር ስር ሲሰሩ የተሻለ በሰራው ስራ የመተማመን ስሜት ይኖራቸዋል ::	1	2	3	4	5
27	በእኔ እምነት የሰው ልጅ ህይወት በየትኛው አቅጣጫ ልትወስደው እንደምትችል እራሱ በበቂ ሁኔታ ይቆጣጠራታል ብዬ አላምንም :: ድርሻው የፈጣሪ ነው ::	1	2	3	4	5
28	በእኔ እምነት «በነገሮች ላይ አለመስማማት» ግጭትና ቅራኔዎችን ስለማያስከትል በዚህ መስሪያ ቤት መወገድ አለበት ::	1	2	3	4	5
29	በዚህ መስሪያ ቤት በሰራተኞች መካከል በተለያዩ መልኩ በዕቁብ ማህበር በመጠራራት ወ.ዘ.ተ ማህበራዊ ግንኙነት የተለመደ ነው ::	1	2	3	4	5
30	በእኔ እይታ በዚህ መስሪያ ቤት ከምትሰራው ስራ ይልቅ ያለህ የማበራዊና የተባባሪነት ባህሪያት የበለጠ ትኩረት ይደረግበታል ::	1	2	3	4	5

31	በእኔ እምነት በዚህ መስሪያ ቤት ከምትሰራው ስራ ይልቅ ያንተ ማንነትና ባህሪያት በጣም አስፈላጊ ናቸው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
32	በዚህ መስሪያ ቤት ፊት ለፊት በቀጥታ እንደ ሰራተኛ የሰራ ሃላፊውን ወይም የሰራ ሃላፊው ሰራተኛውን ወይም ሰራተኛ ሌላ ሰራተኛን መተቸት የተለመደ አይደለም፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
33	በእኔ እምነት በዚህ መስሪያ ቤት ተስማምቶና ተቻችሎ መኖር ሁሌም መኖር ያለበትና ፊት ለፊት መግጠም የሚሉት ነገር መወገድ ያለበት ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
34	በእኔ እምነት ከእርስ በርስ ውድድር (Competition) ይልቅ ትብብር (Cooperation) አስፈላጊ ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
35	በእኔ እምነት በቡድን መስራት በግል ከመስራት ይልቅ ተመራጭ ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
36	በእኔ እምነት በግል ሃላፊነትን ወስዶ ስራን ከመስራት ይልቅ በቡድን ሃላፊነትን ወስዶ እንደ ቡድን መስራት ይመረጣል፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
37	በእኔ እምነት በዚህ መስሪያ ቤት ከግል ስኬት ይልቅ የቡድን ስኬት አስፈላጊ ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
38	በዚህ መስሪያ ቤት የደረጃ ዕድገት አሰጣጥ በአብዛኛው ጊዜ ከስራ አፈፃፀም ይልቅ በስራ ቆይታ በግል ትወወቅ ወ.ዘ.ተ የሚመሰረት ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
39	ከቡድን አባላቶቼ የተቃረነ ሃሳብ በሚኖረኝ ጊዜ ሃሳቤን በግልጽ ለአባላቶቼ መንገር ጥሩ ሰሜት አይሰማኝም፡፡ መንገር ብዙ ጊዜ አልፈልግም፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
40	በእኔ እምነት በዚህ መስሪያ ቤት ውስጥ ያለ ሰራተኛ የራሱን የሰራ ግብ መምታት ያለበት የቡድኑን ጠቅላላ ግብና ጥቅም በማስቀደምና ግምት ወስጥ በመከተት መሆን አለበት፡፡	1	2	3	4	5

41	በእኔ እምነት እርስ በእርስ በሰራተኞች መካከል ውድድር አላስፈላጊ ግጭትና ቅራኔ ስለሚፈጥር መወገድ አለበት፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
42	በእኔ እምነት ግለሰብን ካማከለ የማበረታቻ ስርዓት በዚ/መ/ቤት ቡድንን ያማከለ ጥሩና አስፈላጊ ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
43	በእኔ እምነት በሲቪል ሰርቪሱ ውስጥ ከፖለቲካ አመለካከት ይልቅ እወቀትና ችሎታ ቦታ ሊሰጠው ይገባል፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
44	በእኔ እምነት የመንግስት ሰራተኛው (ሲቪል ሰራተኛ) እንደ ህዝብ አገልጋይነቱ ለየትኛውም የፖለቲካ ፓርቲ (ገዢ/ተቃዋሚ) ወገን ተኛ መሆን የለበትም ገለልተኛ መሆን አለበት፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
45	በዚች ሀገር የመንግስት ሰራተኞች ፕሮፌሽናል ስራ ውስጥ የፖለቲካኞች ጣልቃ ገብነት አላስፈላጊ ተፅዕኖ በሰራተኛው ላይ እያሳደረ ይገኛል፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
46	በዚች ሀገር ወሳኔ የመስጠት ስልጣን ስልጣን ላይ ባሉት ሰዎች ቁጥጥር ስር የዋለ ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
47	በእኔ እምነት በአንድ የመንግስት ተቋም ውስጥ ያሉ ትልልቅ ባለሙያዎች የገዢውን ፓርቲ ሃሳብ የሚጋሩ ቢሆን ለተቋሙ ስራ መፋጠን ጥሩ ነገር ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
48	በእኔ እምነት ይህች ሀገር አዲስ የፖለቲካ ትውልድ ያስፈልጋታል፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
49	አሁን በሀገሪቱ ያሉ የፖለቲካ መሪዎች ለዚህ ሀገር ፖለቲካ እድገት ለየት ያለ ሚና እየተጫወቱ ነው ብዬ አላምንም፡፡	1	2	3	4	5

50	የዚች ሀገር ፖለቲከኞች ከህዝብ ጥቅም ይልቅ የራሳቸው ጥቅም የሚያስቡናቸው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
51	በእኔ እምነት ከፖለቲከኞች ይልቅ ልምድና ዕውቀት ያላቸው የመንግስት ሰራተኞች ህዝቡን የሚጠቅም ፖሊሲ /policy/ ሊያወጠና ሊተገብሩ ይችላሉ፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
52	በታችኛው የመንግስት መዋቅር (ወረዳ/ ቀበሌ) የነዋሪዎቹን ፍላጎት ያማክላል አገልግሎት ለመስጠት በነዋሪዎቹ በራሳቸው የተመረጠ አስረዳደር ከየትኛውም ሌላ አስተዳደር የመሾም ዘዴ (በማዕከላዊ/በክልል መንግስት በቀጥታ ከሚሾም) በላይ ወሳኝ ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
53	በእኔ እመነት በዚች ሀገር የተቀዋሚ ፓርቲዎች መኖር ለዲሞክራሲ እድገት አስፈላጊ ቢሆንም የፖለቲካ ግጭትን ያባብሳል፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
54	በእኔ እምነት የፖለቲካ መሪዎችን ማመን ከባድ ነው/ እምብዛም የሚታመኑ አይደሉም፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
55	በዚህ መስሪያ ቤት ሰራተኞች የስራ አፈጻጸማቸውንና ክህሎታቸውን በተከታታይነት እንዲያሳድጉ ይበረታታሉ ድጋፍም ይሰጣቸዋል፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
56	በዚህ መስሪያ ቤት ወሳኝ ማበረታቻ ለምሳሌ የትምህርት ዕድል በወጭሀገር ወይም ከፍተኛ የስራ ሃላፊነት ቦታ ሲኖር ለሰራተኛው የሚሰጠው በስራ አፈጻጸም በሳየው ወጠኑ ብቻ ተመስርቶ ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
57	በዚህ መስሪያ ቤት የስራ አፈጻጸምን ለማሻሻል ፈጠራ የታከለበት ዘዴን መጠቀም ማበረታቻ ሽልማት ያሰጣል፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
58	በእኔ እምነት በዚህ መስሪያ ቤት አብዛኛው ሰራተኛ በስራ ዕቅዱ የሚያስቀምጠውን ግብ ፈታኝ ግብ (Challenging goal) እንዲሆን አድርጎ መሆን አለበት፡፡	1	2	3	4	5

ከፍል ሦስት፡ - የ ስራተኛ ስራ አፈፃፀም መመዘኛ ስርዓት በሲቪል ስርቢያ ተቋማቱ ወሰን ስምን ያህል ደረጃ እየተተገበረ እንደሆነ ለመዳሰስ የተዘጋጀ

መመሪያ ፡ - ከዚህ በታች በተመለከተው ሠንጠረዥ ወሰን የ ስራተኛ ስራ አፈፃፀም መመዘኛ ስርዓት በሲቪል ስርቢያ ተቋማት ወሰን ስምን ያህል ስር እንደሰደደ ከተቋማቱ ስራተኞች እይታ አንፃር ለመዳሰስ የተዘጋጁ በርከት ያሉ ዓ.ነ ገሮች ተካተዋል ፡፡ በመሆኑም እርሶ ከራሶት ልምድ አንፃር ለእያንዳንዱን አ.ነ ገሮች ያለዎትን ምላሽ በእያንዳንዱ አረፍተ ነገር ትክክል ከተቀመጠት አምስት አማራጮች ማለትም ፡ -1. በጣም አልሰማም (በጣም ከእውነት የራቀ ነው) 2. አልሰማም (ከእውነት የራቀ ነው) 3. እስማማለሁ/አልሰማም (በተወሰነ እውነትነት የሆነ /በተወሰነ እውነት ያልሆነ ነው) 4. እስማማለሁ(እውነት ነው) 5. በጣም እስማማለሁ (መሉ በመሉ እውነት ነው) ከማሉት አንዱን በመምረጥ በእያንዳንዱ ዓ.ነ ገር ትክክል X ምልክጽ በማድረግ ምላሾችን ይሰጡ ፡

ምሳሌ፡ - ለ መጀመሪያ ዓ.ነ ገር በጣም ከተሰማው ይም በጣም እውነት ነው ካሉ በዓ.ነ ገር ትክክል 5 ቁጥር ላይ የ X ምልክት ያደርጋሉ ፤ በጣም ካልተሰማው ይም በጣም ከእውነት የራቀ ነው ካሉ 1 ቁጥር ላይ የ X ምልክት ያደርጋሉ ፤ ወ.ዘ.ተ ማለት ነው ፡ ስለዚህ ከተሞክሮዎት በመነሳት ለእያንዳንዱ ዓ.ነ ገር በትይዩ ካሉት አምስት ቁጥሮች መካከል በመምረጥ የ X ምልክት እያደረጉ ይመልሳሉ ማለት ነው ፡

ማስታወሻ፡ -1ኛ ጥያቄዎቹ የርስዎን የ ስራ አፈፃፀም ወይም የ ተቋማት የ አፈፃፀም ስርዓት ጥሩ ወይም መጥፎ ብሎ ለመገምገም የተዘጋጁ ባለመሆናቸው በእውነትና በቅንነት እንዲመልሱልኝ በትህትና እጠይቃለሁ ፡

2ኛ. መልሶዎን በተግባር እየሆነ ያለውን እንጅ መሆን አለበት ብለው የሚያስቡትን ባለመሆኑ በተግባር ከራሶት አፈፃፀምና እይታ አንፃር እንዲመልሱልኝ በትህትና እጠይቃለሁ፡፡

ተ/ቁ	ዓ.ነገር	በጣም አልሰማም (በጣም ከእውነት የራቀነው)	አልሰማም (ከእውነት የራቀነው)	እስማማለሁም (በተወሰነ እውነት የሆነ / በተወሰነ እውነት ያልሆነው)	እስማማለሁ (እውነት የሆነው)	በጣም እስማማለሁ (መሉ በመሉ እውነት የሆነው)
1	በአብዛኛው ጊዜ የሥራ አፈፃፀም ውል ከማድረግ (ከመፈፀሙ) በፊት በሥራ ውሉ ውስጥ ላይ መዘግባቸው ስለሚጠበቁ ብኝ ግቦች ከአለቃዬ ጋር ግልፅ ወይይት እናደርጋለን፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
2	በአብዛኛው ጊዜ በሥራ አፈፃፀም ውሉ ውስጥ የሚቀመጡት ግቦች የሚወስኑት በአለቃዬ ሳይሆን በእኔና ባለቃዬ የጋራ ወይይትና መተማመን ላይ በመድረስ ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
3	በአብዛኛው ጊዜ የሥራ አፈፃፀም ውል በማድረግ በት ጊዜ በሥራ አፈፃፀም ውሉ ውስጥ የሚከተቱ ግቦች ከተቋሙና ከሥራ ክፍላችን ግቦች ጋር ለማስተሳሰር እኔና አለቃዬ በቅድሚያ የተቋማችን መሪ ዕቅድ (Strategic Plan) እና የሥራ ክፍላችን ዕቅድ እንመረምራለን እንወያያለን፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
4	በአብዛኛው ጊዜ እኔና አለቃዬ በሥራ ውሉ ውስጥ የምናካትታቸውን ግቦች የምንቀርፃቸው ከፍተኛ ጥረት (Challenging) /ፈታኝ/ የሚጠይቁ አይነት እንደሆኑ በማድረግ ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
5	ለሥራዬ አስፈላጊ የሆኑ ስልጠናና ድጋፎች በተመለከተ በአብዛኛው ጊዜ በሥራ ውሉ ውስጥ ከማካተቴ በፊት ከአለቃዬ ጋር ወይይት እናደርግባቸዋለን፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
6	በዚህ መ/ቤት ለሥራተኛው የሥራ አፈፃፀም የሚረዳ የስልጠናና የድጋፍ እቅድ በሥራተኛውና በኃላፊው የተዘጋጀ ስራ ላይ ሲወል ማየት የተለመደ ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
7	በሥራ ውሉ መሰረት የሥራ አፈፃፀም ሁኔታዬን በተመለከተ በአብዛኛው ጊዜ ከአለቃዬ ጋር በተከታታይ በመገኘት ወይይት እናደርጋለን፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
8	በሥራ ውሉ መሰረት የሥራ አፈፃፀሜን በተመለከተ ከአለቃዬ ጋር የምናደርገው ተከታታይ ወይይት በአብዛኛው ጊዜ ደካማን ምጠን ካራንም ጎን እኩል ትኩረት በማድረግ ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5

9	በስራ አፈፃፀም ወቅት በራሴ ምክንያት (ከአቅም በላይ ሆነ ም አልሆነም) ደካማ አፈፃፀም ወይም ጥፋት ሲከሰት የስራ አለቃዬ በአብዛኛው ጊዜ ጥፋቴን በቀጥታና በግልፅ አንስቶ ለራሴ ይነግረኛል፡፡ (ይከፈዋል/ታልብሎ ሲቆጠብ አላስታወልም) (ለምሳሌ ይሄ ችግር በራስህ/ሽ አቅም ማነስ የተከሰተ ነው ወ.ዘ.ተ)	1	2	3	4	5
10	በስራ አፈፃፀም ወቅት አፈፃፀሜ ላይ በስራ አለቃዬ ምክንያት ወይም በተቋሙ በራሱ ችግር የተፈጠረ እክልን በማመለከት በአብዛኛው ጊዜ ያለምንም ፍርሃት የችግሩ መነስኤ አለቃዬ ወይም ተቋሙ እንደሆነ በግልፅ ለአለቃዬ እገልፅ ለታለሁ፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
11	የስራ አለቃዬ በአብዛኛው ጊዜ ለስራዬ አጋዥ የሆኑ ተከታታይ ድጋፍና ምክር ይሰጠኛል፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
12	በአብዛኛው ጊዜ ከአለቃዬ ጋር ለመደበኛ የስራ አፈፃፀም ምዘና (ጥር/ስኔ) በምንቀምጥበት ጊዜ ስለአጠቃላይ የስራ አፈፃፀም ሰፊ ያለ ግልፅ ወይይት አናደርጋለን፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
13	መደበኛ የስራ አፈፃፀም ምዘና (ጥር/ስኔ) ከአለቃዬ ጋር በምናደርግበት ጊዜ ካለፈው የስራ አፈፃፀም በተጨማሪ በአብዛኛው ጊዜ ስለሚቀጥለው የስራ እቅድ ትኩረት ሰጥተን በጋራ እንወያያለን፡፡	1	2	3	4	5
14	መደበኛ የስራ አፈፃፀም ምዘና በማድረግበት ጊዜ አብዛኛውን ጊዜ አለቃዬ አስተያየቶች (Positive) ከሆኑ አስተያየቶች በተጨማሪ አሉታዊ (Negative) አስተያየቶችንም በቀጥታና በግልፅ ፊት ለፊት ይነግረኛል፡፡ (ለምሳሌ እዚህ ላይ ደካማነት ለይነት አስተያየት)	1	2	3	4	5
15	መደበኛ የስራ አፈፃፀም ምዘና (ጥር/ስኔ) ከአለቃዬ ጋር በማድረግበት ጊዜ አለቃዬን ሊያስከፋ (ሊያስቆጣ) የሚችል ነገር ግን መናገር ያለብኝ ነገርን በአብዛኛው ጊዜ በቀጥታ ፊት ለፊት ለአለቃዬ እናገረዋለሁ፡፡ (ለምሳሌ የአለቃዬን ድክመት ወይም የተቋሙን ችግር)	1	2	3	4	5
16	የስራ ባልደረቦቼን (የቡድን አባላትን) የእያንዳንዳቸውን የስራ አፈፃፀም በተመለከተ በፅሁፍም ሆነ በቃል አስተያየት ወይም ወጣት በምሰጥበት ጊዜ በአብዛኛው የምሰጠው ትክክለኛና የአወጎት የተሰማኝን ነው፡፡	1	2	3	4	5

17	በዚህ መ/ቤት በስራ አፈፃፀማቸው ጥሩ የሆኑትን ደካማ ከሆኑት መለየት የተለመደ ተግባር ነው።	1	2	3	4	5
18	በእኛ መ/ቤት እኔን ጨምሮ አንድ ሰራተኛ በአብዛኛው ጊዜ ለማንኛውም አይነት ማበረታቻ ሽልማት ለምሳሌ ለጥሩ አፈፃፀም ምስክር ወረቀት፣ የትምህርት እድል፣ ወ.ዘ.ተ ብቁ የሚሆነው በስራ አፈፃፀም ወጠታ መሰረት ብቻ ነው። (ለምሳሌ የግል ትውውቅ ከአለቃ ጋር ያለ ግንኙነት ወይም የፖለቲካ ፓርቲ አባልነት ወ.ዘ.ተ ቦታ የላቸውም)	1	2	3	4	5
19	በእኛ መ/ቤት እኔን ጨምሮ አንድ ሰራተኛ በአብዛኛው ጊዜ ለደረጃ እድገት ብቁ የሚሆነው በስራ አፈፃፀም ወጠታ ብቻ ነው። (ለምሳሌ የግል ትውውቅ ከአለቃ ጋር ያለ ግንኙነት ወይም የፖለቲካ ፓርቲ አባልነት ወ.ዘ.ተ ቦታ የላቸውም)	1	2	3	4	5
20	በዚህ መ/ቤት በስራ አፈፃፀማቸው ውጤት መሰረት የማሻሻያ ስልጠና ለሚያስፈልጋቸው ስልጠና መስጠት የተለመደ ተግባር ነው።	1	2	3	4	5
21	በዚህ መ/ቤት በስራ አፈፃፀማቸው በጣም ደካማ ወጠታ ያመጡ ሰራተኛን ቅጣት መቅጣት /ከደመወዝና ደረጃ ቅነሳ እስከ ማሰናበት/ የተለመደ ነው።	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix 3 – Interview Guide

Qualitative Interview Questions that Collaborate and Expand on the Quantitative Survey Data

Introduction

Provide a brief profile; in particular how long you have worked within the civil service, current position within the current organization and tenure within current organization

1. The Ethiopian government policy on PMS and subsequent guidelines specified four activities/procedures/actions/ to be under taken by civil service institutions to manage the performance of individual employees. These are formulation of strategic plan and cascading of the same, performance agreement, performance assessment (regularly and formally twice a year) and use of assessment information to reward good performers and to manage under-performers. Is your organization/ANRS civil service/ policy on performance management of employees is similar to this policy to date? If not why and what it looks like? (For concerned officials only).

2. Questions relating to the relationship between institutionalization status of performance agreement and administrative culture

- According to PM policy and subsequent guidelines, Manager and subordinate should engage in joint discussion and open dialogue while setting of goals or objectives that the latter is expected to perform. And goals should be mutually agreed. Is that the way how you usually practice here? If not, what is common and why? Do you consider fear of open dialogue (disagreements) with superior, superior claim of decision making power or kind of personal relationship between superior and subordinate as a challenge for open dialogue in goal setting practices in your department? If so, did these considerations influence the way how you usually conclude performance agreement with your supervisor? Please explain.
- According to PM policy and subsequent guidelines, setting of challenging goals on the side of subordinate in collaboration with manager is at the heart of the system. Is that the way how you usually practice here? If not, why? Do you think a problem here is related with risk of failing to achieve challenging goals? Please explain?
- According to PM policy subsequent guidelines, Manager and subordinate should engage in open dialogue to agree for training, development and support that the latter needs to meet the agreed goals. Is that the way how you usually practice here? If not, why? Do you think a problem here is related with performance improvement culture in civil service i.e., limited training opportunity or ways of training opportunity allocation? Please explain.

3. Questions relating to the relationship between institutionalization status of performance review and administrative culture

- According to PM policy and subsequent guidelines, Manager and subordinate should engage in regular discussion on performances of the latter throughout the performance period. Is that the way how you usually practice here? If not, why?
- According to PM policy and subsequent guidelines, regular performance discussion between subordinate and superior should focus on both strengths and weakness of performances. Is that the way how you usually practice here? If not, why? Do you feel that you and your supervisor usually desist from discussing of weaknesses? If so, what do you think of the reasons?
- According to PM policy, Manager and subordinate should engage in a conversation involving dialogue and joint analysis of performance at formal performance review. Is that the way how you usually practice here? If not, why? Do you consider fear of open dialogue (disagreements) with superior, superior claim of decision making power or kind of personal relationship between superior and subordinate as a challenge for open dialogue in formal performance review? If so, did these considerations influence your conversation during formal performance review? Please explain.
- According to PM policy and subsequent guidelines, Manager and subordinate should exchange critical feedback at times of events (any instance of poor Performance) as well as during formal performance review. In other words, both parties should not desist from openly expressing of negative performance related facts. Is that the way how you usually practice here? If not, why? Do you consider the need to avoid confrontation and the need for harmony influence this situation? If so, did these considerations influence your way of forwarding feedback during performance review? Please explain.
- According to PM policy and subsequent guidelines, employee should forward critical and honest feedback about his/her colleague's performance whenever asked. Is that the way how you usually practice here? If not, what is common to you? Why? Do you consider the need to avoid confrontation and the need for harmony influence this situation? If so, did these considerations influence a kind of feedback that you give for your colleagues? Please explain.

4. Questions relating to the relationship between institutionalization status of rewarding high performers and administrative culture

- According to PM policy and subsequent guidelines, reward practices like salary increment or other non financial rewards including further education opportunity should based on individual performance than other criterions or across the board. Is that the usual case in your organization? If not what is common and why? Do you consider personal and political connection as a source of influence for reward

practices in this organization? If so, did these considerations influence your commitment towards performance management system? Please explain.

- According to PM policy and subsequent guidelines, promotion practice should be based on individual performance than other criterion. Is that the usual case in your organization? If not what is common and why? Do you consider personal and political connection as a source of influence for promotion practices in this organization? If so, did these considerations influence your commitment towards performance management system? Please explain.
- Is it common in this organization to take disciplinary action including dismissal against poor performer subordinate based on formal performance review results? If not why?

5. Questions relating to the relationship between political culture and institutionalization level of performance management reform

- Do you feel a politicization of civil service (patronage) from your organization or civil service wide perspective? Do you think that such situation influence the institutionalization level of performance management reform in your organization (i.e., open dialogue in performance agreement, critical feedback exchange in performance review, genuine performance ratings, reward and penalty)? If so, please explain with examples?
- How do you express the political commitment of government towards performance management reform? Do you think such commitment influence institutionalization level of performance management reform in your organization? How?
- Is/are there other culture related factors that you thought to explain institutionalization level of any aspects of performance management reform in your organization or your personal commitment towards the reform? Please explain?

Appendix 4 – Core Work Processes (Main Departments) and Support Work Processes (Support Departments) in Each Sampled Organization under Study

Name of Sampled Organization	Core Work Processes	Support Work Processes
1. BOTT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Market Development 2. Trade Inspection and Regulation 3. Trade Licensing and Registration 4. Transport Service Development 5. Consumer Protection 6. Public Relation 7. Transport Service Operation 8. Road Safety 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Human Resource 2. Plan and Program 3. Internal Audit 4. Finance and Procurement
2. BOIUD	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Urban planning and Beautification 2. Urban Good Governance and Capacity Building 3. Industry Development 4. Housing Infrastructure Development 5. Urban Land Development and Management 6. Construction Industry Regulation and Capacity Building 7. Investment Promotion 8. Land and land Related Property Registration 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Finance and Procurement 2. Plan and Program 3. Human Resource 4. Internal Audit
3. BOE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public Relation 2. Education Quality Inspection and Assurance 3. Educational Information and Communication Technology Development 4. Teachers Development 5. Curriculum Development and Implementation 6. Educational Supplies 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Human Resource 2. Plan and Program 3. Internal Audit 4. Finance and Procurement
4. BOCS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Civil service Reform and Change Management 2. Human Resource Development 3. Human Resource Planning and Management 4. Good Governance Monitoring 5. Public Relation 6. Civil Service job organization and evaluation 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Human Resource 2. Internal Audit 3. Finance and Procurement
5. BOLSA	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Social Problem Prevention and Controlling 2. Employee-Employer Relation Management 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public Relation 2. Plan and Program
6. ICA	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Networking and Website Development 2. Information System Development 3. Human Resource Development 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Plan and Program 2. Public Relation
7. RA	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tax Collection and Monitoring 2. Tax Education and Communication 3. Information Technology Administration and Development 4. Customer Service 5. Tax Auditing and Regulation 6. Public Relation 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Revenue Planning and Research 2. Internal Audit 3. Human Resource 4. Finance and Procurement
8. BOCT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Heritage protection and Tourism development 2. Tourism Service Providers Competence Assurance 3. Cultural Value Care and Development 4. Park Development 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public Relation 2. Plan and Program
9. BOWCY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Gender and Youth Affairs 2. Child Right Care and Protection 3. Women Youth Association 4. Project Preparation and Monitoring 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Human Resource 2. Plan and Program 3. Internal Audit 4. Finance and Procurement

Appendix 5 – Number of Civil Servants in Each Sampled Work Processes (Departments) under Study

Name of Sampled Organization					
1. BOTT	Name of Work Process	Managerial Employee (Process owner)	Non- Managerial Employee (Expert)	Non- Managerial Employee (Secretary/clerk)	Total
	1. Market Development	1	7	1	9
	2. Trade Inspection and Regulation	1	3	1	5
	3. Trade Licensing and Registration	1	4	1	6
	4. Transport Service Development	1	4	1	6
	5. Human Resource	1	4	1	6
	6. Plan and Program	1	3	1	5
	Total	6	25	6	37
2. BOIUD	Name of Work Process	Managerial Employee (Process owner)	Non- Managerial Employee (Expert)	Non- Managerial Employee (Secretary/clerk)	Total
	1. Urban Planning and Beautification	1	5	1	7
	2. Urban Good Governance and Capacity Building	1	5	1	7
	3. Industry Development	1	4	1	6
	4. Housing Infrastructure Development	1	4	1	6
	5. Finance and Procurement	1	4	1	6
	6. Plan and Program	1	2	1	4
	Total	6	24	6	36
3. BOE	Name of Work Process	Managerial Employee (Process owner)	Non- Managerial Employee (Expert)	Non- Managerial Employee (Secretary/clerk)	Total
	1. Public Relation	1	4	1	6
	2. Education Quality Inspection and Assurance	1	6	1	8
	3. Educational Information and Communication Technology Development	1	6	1	8
	4. Plan and Program	1	4	1	6
	5. Internal Audit	1	3	1	5
	Total	5	23	5	33

**Appendix 5 – Number of Civil Servants in Each Sampled Work Processes (Departments)
under the Study (continued)**

Name of Sampled Organization	Name of Work Process	Managerial Employee (Process owner)	Non- Managerial Employee (Expert)	Non- Managerial Employee (Secretary/clerk)	Total
4. BOCS	1. Civil service Reform and Change Management	1	6	1	8
	2. Human Resource Development	1	6	1	8
	3. Human Resource Planning and Management	1	4	1	6
	4. Human Resource	1	7	1	9
	5. Internal Audit	1	3	1	5
	Total	5	26	5	36
	5. BOLSA	Name of Work Process	Managerial Employee (Process owner)	Non- Managerial Employee (Expert)	Non- Managerial Employee (Secretary/clerk)
1. Social Problem Prevention and Controlling		1	6	1	8
2. Public Relation		1	3	1	5
Total		2	9	2	13
6. ICA	Name of Work Process	Managerial Employee (Process owner)	Non- Managerial Employee (Expert)	Non- Managerial Employee (Secretary/clerk)	Total
	1. Networking and Website Development	1	6	1	8
	2. Information System Development	1	4	1	6
	3. Plan and Program	1	3	1	5
	Total	3	13	3	19
7. RA	Name of Work Process	Managerial Employee (Process owner)	Non- Managerial Employee (Expert)	Non- Managerial Employee (Secretary/clerk)	Total
	1. Tax Collection and Monitoring	1	8	1	10
	2. Tax Education and Communication	1	4	1	6
	3. Information Technology	1	3	1	5
	4. Revenue Planning and Research	1	3	1	5
	5. Internal Audit	1	2	1	4
	Total	5	20	5	30

**Appendix 5 – Number of Civil Servants in Each Sampled Work Processes (Departments)
under the Study (continued)**

Name of Sampled Organization	Name of Work Process	Managerial Employee (Process owner)	Non- Managerial Employee (Expert)	Non- Managerial Employee (Secretary/clerk)	Total
8.BOCT	1. Heritage Protection and Tourism Development	1	6	1	8
	2. Tourism Service Providers Competence Assurance	1	4	1	6
	3. Plan and Program	1	3	1	5
	Total	3	13	3	19
9.BOWCY	Name of Work Process	Managerial Employee (Process owner)	Non- Managerial Employee (Expert)	Non- Managerial Employee (Secretary/clerk)	Total
	1. Gender and Youth Affairs	1	6	1	8
	2. Child Right Care and Protection	1	5	1	7
	3. Human Resource	1	4	1	6
	4. Finance and Procurement	1	8	1	10
	Total	4	23	4	31

Appendix 6 – Normality Test for Administrative Cultural Dimensions

Tests of Normality

	Kolmogorov-Smirnov			Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Power distance	.151	185	.000	.931	185	.000
Uncertainty avoidance	.070	185	.029	.979	185	.007
Political bias/neutrality	.077	185	.009	.982	185	.019
Collectivistic orientation	.091	185	.001	.957	185	.000
Performance orientation	.071	185	.023	.966	185	.000

Appendix 7- The Size of Standardized Residuals

Casewise Diagnostics^a

Case Number	Std. Residual	Institutionalization level of PA	Predicted Value	Residual
1	2.598	4.33	2.7413	1.59207
80	2.564	4.00	2.4291	1.57091
102	2.861	3.67	1.9136	1.75308
113	2.184	4.00	2.6615	1.33853
133	2.258	4.00	2.6164	1.38360
136	-2.267	1.17	2.5557	-1.38906
140	-2.318	1.33	2.7536	-1.42025
145	-2.442	1.67	3.1628	-1.49616
161	-2.624	1.00	2.6076	-1.60759
173	-2.251	1.33	2.7127	-1.37940

a. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of PA

Casewise Diagnostics^a

Case Number	Std. Residual	Institutionalization level of PR	Predicted Value	Residual
1	2.121	4.00	2.7391	1.26090
37	-2.207	1.60	2.9118	-1.31179
79	2.164	4.50	3.2136	1.28637
80	2.911	4.00	2.2694	1.73061
102	2.734	3.40	1.7749	1.62515
121	2.064	3.00	1.7729	1.22711
123	2.056	4.00	2.7778	1.22223
133	2.301	3.90	2.5323	1.36768
136	-2.375	1.00	2.4117	-1.41169
145	-2.732	1.30	2.9243	-1.62430
161	-2.440	1.00	2.4503	-1.45030

a. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of PR

Appendix 7- The Size of Standardized Residuals (continued)

Casewise Diagnostics^a

Case Number	Std. Residual	Institutionalization level of RandMUP	Predicted Value	Residual
1	2.306	4.20	2.7153	1.48468
37	-2.252	1.00	2.4498	-1.44981
80	2.852	4.00	2.1640	1.83602
111	2.482	3.60	1.8583	1.94166
115	2.078	4.00	2.6622	1.33781
118	-2.256	1.00	2.4524	-1.45241
131	2.450	3.40	1.8224	1.57757
133	2.921	4.00	2.1195	1.88052
136	-2.017	1.00	2.2987	-1.29872
143	-2.172	1.00	2.3980	-1.39803
175	2.268	3.40	1.9399	1.46014

a. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of R&MUP

Casewise Diagnostics^a

Case Number	Std. Residual	Institutionalization level of PMGT	Predicted Value	Residual
1	2.675	4.14	2.7341	1.40880
37	-2.289	1.67	2.8720	-1.20531
80	2.847	4.00	2.2899	1.51008
102	2.644	3.14	1.7504	1.39244
121	2.181	3.00	1.8513	1.14873
123	2.130	3.95	2.8306	1.12180
133	2.838	3.95	2.4580	1.49433
136	-2.617	1.05	2.4259	-1.37833
140	-2.147	1.57	2.7019	-1.13051
145	-2.698	1.48	2.8967	-1.42050
161	-2.437	1.14	2.4261	-1.28321

a. Dependent Variable: Institutionalization level of PMGT

