

Addis Ababa University
School of Graduate Studies

**Third Party Interventions in
Response to the Crisis in Somalia**

By
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SOMALIA

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Table of Content

	Pages
Acknowledgments	i
Acronyms.....	ii
Abstract.....	iii
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction.....	1
1.1 Background.....	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....	2
1.3 Hypothesis.....	3
1.4 Research Questions	4
1.5 Methodology.....	4
1.6 Data Collection Analysis.....	5
1.7 Objectives and Significance of the Study.....	5
1.8 Scope and Limitation of the Study.....	5
1.9 Organization of the Study.....	6
CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework.....	7
2.1 Literature Review.....	7
2.2 What Constitutes as Internal Conflict.....	9
2.3 Resolving Internal Conflicts.....	11
2.4 The Concept of Third Party Intervention.....	13
2.5 Third Party Interventions and Internal Conflicts.....	14
2.6 Forms of Third Party Interventions.....	16
2.7 Effects of Third Party Interventions.....	16
CHAPTER THREE: Background to the Somalia State Crisis.....	19
3.1 A Brief History of Somalia.....	19
3.2 Causes to Somalia State Crisis.....	20
3.2.1 The Colonial Legacy.....	20



3.2.2 The Clan Politics in Somalia.....	21
3.2.3 Barre's Ruthless Personal rule.....	24
3.2.4 The Ogaden Debacle and loss of Somalia Nationalist Sentiments.....	26
3.2.5 The Proliferation of many clan-based opposition Military groups.....	28
3.2.6 The Impact of Cold War.....	31
3.3 The Somalia State Crisis.....	32
CHAPTER FOUR: Challenges to Third Party Interventions in Somalia.....	36
4.1 Major third party interventions in Somalia, since 1991.....	36
4.2 Problems with the Humanitarian-Military Intervention in Somalia.....	45
4.3 Challenges to the Reconciliation Attempts in Somalia.....	51
4.3.1 Regional Rivalry.....	51
4.3.2 Land of Regional Proxy Wars.....	55
4.3.3 Donors' lack of sufficient and effective assistance to facilitate state building attempts.....	57
4.3.4 Violations of the Arms Embargo.....	58
4.3.5 Lack of Skillful Management and Functional Strategies with the Peace Conferences	59
4.3.6 The U.S.-led Counter-Terrorist Operation in Somalia.....	61
4.3.7 Lack of commitment from parties to the conflict in Somalia.....	63
CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion.....	67
<i>Bibliography</i>	71



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ACRONYMS

ARPCT	Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
ICG	International Crisis Group
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NSC	National Salvation Council
RRA	Rahanweyne Resistance Army
SDM	Somali Democratic Movement
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SNM	Somali National Movement
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SRRC	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSA	Somali Salvation Alliance
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SYL	Somali Youth League
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNA	Transitional National Assembly
TNC	Transitional National Council
TNG	Transitional National Government
UN	United Nations
UNITAF	United Nations International Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Mission for Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USC	United Somali Congress
USF	United Somali Front
WFP	World Food Program

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Abstract

The end of Cold War has witnessed an increasing number of intra-state conflicts in the world, especially in Africa, despite the hope given by the New World Order that claim the improvement of the international community's ability to genuinely address the political, economic and social problems in the world. The crisis in Somalia, which lasted for more than a decade, is also a victim of this scenario. As a result, the Somali people are in torment, devastated from internal conflicts, which resulted in deaths, displacement, and also human right abuses. However, the various international community attempts to resolve the crisis in Somalia has achieved very little, as a result of different challenges originally from external and internal factors. Externally, the peace bringing attempts are obstructed by selfish regional and global power interests, lack of unified action from the international community in supporting the peace process and also problems with the inapplicable peace strategies that do not resemble the Somali political culture. While internally, it is due to lack of commitment from national actors to conflicts in Somalia, who are benefiting from the anarchic nature of the state, and also who are not interested with the coming of a central and unified Somalia which might not serve their interests.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1 Background

Nowadays we can say that, with the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War, the “New World Order” announced by President George Bush has not become a reality. There is near unanimity among many scholars and critics concerning the situation of “New World Disorder” in which Africa finds itself (Geraci, 2001: 1).

The majority of contemporary research seems to show us that, since the end of the Cold War, Africa has been marked by increasing conflicts of internal nature (Michael, 1996: 235). It has been a continent in which we find the highest occurrence of intra-state wars. Confronted with these tragedies many foreign policy decision makers are faced with decisions over whether, when and how to intervene in intra-state conflicts (Gurr, 1994: 347). However, public opinion would not allow policy-makers to ignore these human tragedies without response, since the combination of human misery with the transparency of the media makes it difficult for outside governments not to do anything (Miall, 1999: 33).

During the Cold War, interventions were largely considered as a means to expand the superpowers’ spheres of ideology, and also a way through which their competition could be exercised without any direct threat of nuclear war (Khosla, 2004: 12). However, the end of the cold war came with the hope that the international community would be able to develop intervention strategies and create international security which

is free from geo-political calculations and ideological competitions, and thus be more genuine in dealing with conflicts on their own terms (Kassimir, 2001: 267). There was optimism that with the end of the Cold-War, the international community would develop a means to manage intra-state wars.

However, this has been tested wrong in the case of Somalia. The very mission that was supposed to be a turning point in the paradigm of intervention turned out to be on the contrary to the optimism. Instead of being a reference that would have opened a new path for the international community with regards to intra-state wars, the “failed” US-UN intervention in Somalia has brought a considerable degree of pessimism (Geraci, 2001: 2).

Other than the US–UN peace mission there has also been various interventions in Somalia as a result of the internal conflict. But most of the peace processes launched since 1991, including the US–UN peace mission in 1992, came from several incompetent, contradictory, and sometimes competing directions (Yoh, 2003: 90). As a result these interventions failed to bring a solution to the conflict taking place in Somalia.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Somalia has been a victim of severe internal conflict for quite some time. In reality the conflict in Somalia dates back to the 1960’s, mainly due to competition over political power, and the economic benefits it generates. This became aggravated during the 1980’s when Siad Barre continued to harness state power for his own clan’s interests. However this escalated and turned into a severe conflict and chaos. This in turn

led to the disintegration of Somalia, after the overthrow of military ruler Mohammed Siyaad Barre. Ever since then, Somalia has been under the rule of warlords and militias for years and has not had a functioning national government. And, this state crisis in Somalia resulted in massive loss of human lives since 1991 (Kinfe, 2002: Viii).

However, the international community has never neglected the crisis in Somalia. As a result there have been many external interventions in attempting to resolve the crisis. Starting with the Djibouti peace initiative in 1991 and the US-UN peace mission in 1992, there have been dozens of third party interventions in Somalia, including interventions from IGAD member countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea and Djibouti; the Arab countries like Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Sudan, and also some European states (Yoh, 2003: 90). But these attempts have not brought the problem in Somalia to its rest. Still there is no functional government in Somalia. Although, the TFG that is led by president Yusuf seems to be playing the role of government, it has become more evident that without the support it wields from its Ethiopian counter-part the TFG is not strong to stand on its own. Still, it's difficult to say that the problem in Somalia is resolved. Even, recently there was conflict witnessed in Somalia, which resulted in hundreds of death and more than 200,000 displacement of residents (<http://news.bbc.co.uk>).

1.4 Hypothesis

The failure of third party interventions to bring peace in Somalia came as a result of global and regional powers rival interests, misguided use of intervention strategies, and also lack of commitment to the peace processes by the national actors to the conflict including the warlords and clan leaders.

1.3 Research questions

The research tries to find answer to the following questions. These are:

- What constitutes as internal conflict?
- What are the definitions, kinds and effects of third party intervention?
- What are the nature and causes of Somalia's internal conflicts?
- What attempts have been made by the international community in resolving the conflict in Somalia?
- What are the challenges to the third party interventions in Somalia?

1.5 Methodology

In order to address the problem under study, the study intends to employ descriptive approach. It describes and interprets what is. While describing the existing situation conditions and events which took place in the past will be considered in order to their relation with the present situation. And also, the relationship between various variables and their nature are examined. In doing this, the study gives a systematic explanation for the failure of various third party interventions in resolving the crisis in Somalia. As a result, the study will employ qualitative method of data analysis because it will help the researcher to organize and describe subjective data in a systematic way.

1.6 Data Collection Analysis

The study will mainly depend on secondary data sources. These include books, journals, published and unpublished articles, periodicals and Internet sources.

1.7 Objective and Significance of the Study

The study tries to assess the various third party interventions that took place in response to the crisis in Somalia. And, to identify factors responsible for the failure of these third parties' attempt to resolve the conflict in Somalia. As to the significance of the study, it will serve as an additional input to the already existing knowledge. Moreover, it could help other researchers in their endeavor of further studies on problems of conflict resolution in relation to external interventions, and could also generate ideas that can have greater impact in the search for solution.

1.8 Scope and Limitation of the Study

The study focuses on some of the major third party interventions that occurred in Somalia since the downfall of Siyaad Barre's regime, in 1991, to the Eldoret peace accord.

While conducting this study the author has come across to a number of limitations including lack of adequate reference materials, page limitations, and constraints in terms of time and financial resources. Moreover, the conflict in Somalia is very unpredictable and various developments are being witnessed day after day, so there was a serious challenge to incorporate what is going on currently.

In support of these, writers like Richard Jackson (2001: 325) also argues that, even though, conflict resolving interventions by super powers are mostly subservient to their national interests, these interests will be reflected on the peace process causing a detrimental long-term effect on the conflict management process. To him, motives other than geopolitical interests that have ethical and humanitarian nature will lead to a positive outcome.

Although, the above scholars focus on motives of interveners in order to explain third party interventions in internal conflicts, there are also second group of scholars. These scholars suggest that while intervening to resolve intra-state conflicts, factors that question the strategy and methods of interventions, which helps in understanding outcomes of external interventions, should be taken into account (*ibid*: 7-8).

In this regard, writers like Regan (1996: 352-353), for example, suggests that the third party intervention strategies are critical to the achievement of long-term peace. To him, the pursuit of mixed strategies with which, interveners can apply as much pressure points as possible are more likely to manipulate the belligerents in favor of working towards peace rather than the continuation of hostilities.

Another writer like Mezzell (2006: 8) also emphasizing on the commitment of interveners argues that:

In the post-Cold War era, international efforts have been largely focused on initial-phase activities such as the provision of peacekeeping troops and the signing of peace accords, while neglecting longer-term efforts such as political and economic development, thus assuring that many peace settlements begin to disintegrate after a brief period.



Peace bringing and state-building attempts in many weak and failing states continue to fall apart because of lack of international commitment on the part of great power states, international organizations, and regional actors (*Ibid*: 9).

In line with the above argument, Duffield as quoted in Timothy Raeymaekers (2005: 3), argue that the humanitarian-development patterns and security-conflict patterns are seen as being intertwined to one another, necessitating grand-scale intervention directed toward a long-term total reconstruction of states and their societies, rather than towards the more limited goals of the provision of humanitarian assistance or the deployment of peacekeeping forces.

Finally, looking at the above different explanations of outcome of interventions it is arguable that there is a difficulty to have a universal understanding of conditions that determine outcomes of third party interventions. However, this study argues that both motives of external actors and also methods and means of the intervention process are responsible in explaining the outcomes of third party interventions.

2.2 What Constitutes as Internal Conflict?

There is a problem of having a universally accepted understanding of what internal conflict is. Many tried to define the term in their own context. As a result, Charles King (1997: 18) wrote that “a surfeit of terms have been used to describe large-scale organized violence within states – insurgencies, coups, revolutions, terrorism, small wars, limited wars, internal conflicts, low intensity conflicts – but no obvious criteria have been set for distinguishing among them.” Determining what counts

as internal conflict is more a matter of political observation than objective realities. For example, King has noted that:

Contemporary historians have already termed the entire period between the first and second World War the age of Europe's 'great civil war'. Chroniclers of the next century may well see the myriad armed struggle in Chechnya, Bosnia, and Tajikistan and elsewhere as part of one great 'war of the communist succession. (Ibid)

To King, labeling an armed conflict has got a little relevance with the nature of the conflict (*Ibid*: 19). Further, Harding (1994: 421) mentions about the use of the phrase 'small wars' for any articles about internal conflicts, by the *Financial Times* in the 1970s. Similarly, Collins (1991: 3-11) explained how the US military doctrine tried to define internal conflicts using many criteria including the character of the belligerents, their goals, their methods or the level of violence that exists. Thus, labeling an internal conflict is frequently determined by the political stance of the observer. Again as King has further observed:

Describing an armed conflict as a 'rebellion' or an 'insurgency' removes any legitimacy from the political aspirations of one of the contesting sides and buttresses the claims of the incumbent government. On the other hand, employing the term 'civil war' indicates that all sides to the conflict have rational political goals which they are attempting to realize through the use of military force. (King, 1997: 19)

Whatever different labels are given in defining an internal conflict, there seems to be a commonality in looking at internal conflicts as a conflict within a given territory of state (Regan, 1996: 338). But this also has a problem on realistic ground. Almost every internal conflict has an external component (Stedman, 1999: 5). This is because of the growing concern over widespread human-rights abuses, the security threat it

might brought to the region and the international economic effects of large-scale internal violence, international actors take the interest in the evolution and outcome of internal conflicts (King, 1997:17). So it would be unrealistic to say that any internal conflict is wholly internal.

Because of the definitional problems outlined before, making generalizations about internal conflicts is extremely risky. However, for the purpose of this study the definition given by Weiss and Collins will be suitable. They see internal conflict as “Large-scale armed conflict within one country fought either between the regime in power and challengers or, in failing states with no recognized authority, between warlords or communal groups.” (Weiss and Collins, 1996, 217)

2.3 *Resolving internal conflicts*

A Dictionary of Conflict resolution (Yarn, 1999:119), gives a definition of Conflict Resolution as “a process by which two parties reconcile their goals to the extent that they are mutually consistent.” It is a more comprehensive term which implied that the deep rooted sources of conflict are addressed, and resolved. This implies that the structure of the conflict has been changed, and there is no more violent and hostile interaction between the parties (Miall, 1999: 21). In this connection, Evans on his part writes:

Conflict resolution is a method of terminating conflict or disputes by way of convincing the parties in conflict to redefine their relationships in such a way as to perceive either that they can realize their goals without conflict or that their goals no longer conflict. (Evans, 1992: 53)

As the concept of conflict resolution has gained more attention, many more conflict resolution attempts are being made. They involve

different kinds of mediators, address different belligerents, and vary in form, duration and purpose. However, it is impossible to point to any objective and universal criteria for what constitutes an internal conflict and what factors will accelerate its end (King, 1997: 21). As Evans further argues:

More can certainly be done by the international community to prevent and resolve interstate conflict, but the currently bigger problem of intrastate conflict has been scarcely tackled at all, either conceptually or practically. (Evans, 1994: 3)

The complexity of internal conflicts makes specific predictions about outcomes very difficult. Roy Licklider (1995: 686) finds that internal conflicts ended by negotiated settlement are more likely to lead to the recurrence armed conflicts than those ended by military victories. On the other hand, those ended by military victories are more likely will led to genocide.

Many factors can be seen as an obstacle to have a negotiated settlement between belligerents. According to Charles King (1997: 25-7) there are three views of obstacles to conflict settlement. These are

In one view, the protracted and often vicious nature of sub state violence, the inability of parties to engage in negotiations and the fragility of peace settlements themselves can be attributed mainly to the powerful emotions of belligerents...A second and more widely held, view holds that the real difficulty with promoting negotiated settlements and their implementation lies in the incompatibility values and identities that belligerents bring to the conflict that becomes hardened by the experience of war itself...[the third set of factor] concerns what might be called the 'structure' of conflict itself: the system of incentives for continued violence and disincentives to settlements which arise during the course of the war itself.

Having said this much about the dynamics of internal conflicts and

the complexity in trying to resolve them, let's now try to see this with in the framework of third party intervention.

2.4 The concept of Third Party Intervention

The more one examines the literature on intervention, the more delusional one becomes. After looking through the different approaches used in a variety of documents, one is obliged to conclude that the concept of intervention is indeed disputable (Rosenau, 1969: 149). The spirit of scientific explanations appears to have had no impact on it whatsoever (*Ibid*).

The concept of intervention is very broad and there seems to be no one universally agreed definition of the term (Thomas, 1985: 9). It is an umbrella referring to a family of related procedure with varying objectives (Stern, 2000: 36). While there is no commonly agreed upon definition of intervention, some of the general characteristics associated with such actions include the provision or withdrawal of various forms of assistance, the attempt to alter other states domestic affairs, and their convention- breaking nature (Khosla, 2004: 10).

At the most general level, Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman used the term intervention "broadly to include any action undertaken to change the course of a conflict process" (2000, 37). For them it covers a wide variety of situations where one actor meddles in the affairs of another. However, the trouble with this broad definition is that it fails to clearly distinguish interventionary behaviors from other types of international action. Rosenau explains the definitional vagueness as:

Often intervention is defined in such a general way that it appears to be synonymous with imperialism, aggression,

different kinds of mediators, address different belligerents, and vary in form, duration and purpose. However, it is impossible to point to any objective and universal criteria for what constitutes an internal conflict and what factors will accelerate its end (King, 1997: 21). As Evans further argues:

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Having said this much about the dynamics of internal conflicts and

colonialism, neo-colonialism, war and other such gross terms that are used to designate the non-cooperative interactions of nations. (1969: 153)

Rosenou also tried to give a definition of third party intervention by emphasizing the convention-breaking nature of the act so that distinctions to be made between regular diplomacy and intervention (1968: 170). Patrick M. Regan (1998: 756) also agrees with the convention breaking nature of military and/or economic intervention. But the problem with this definition is also that it is restricted solely to coercive actions and disregards diplomatic intervention.

Plainly the concept of intervention suffers from a lack of definitional clarity. However, for the purpose of this study the definition of intervention given by Oran Young can serve as a good starting point. Young defines an intervention as:

any action taken by an actor that is not direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself. (1967: 34)

Linking this broad definition to international relations shows that third party involvement can be of varying levels and take different forms; starting from discussion of the problem in international or bilateral forums to a peacekeeping or military intervention.

2.5 Third party interventions and internal conflicts

Third party intervention in internal conflicts can be analyzed from different angles: the rationale behind the intervention, the factors influencing intervention outcomes, the nature of interventions, the degree of success achieved...and others.

Third parties intervene in conflicts as a result of many factors. According to Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse (1999: 33), four factors dictate the occurrence of this phenomenon. These are:

- First, since external factors are causes of many contemporary conflicts, therefore this shows the international community's involvement in the first place.
- Secondly, as a result of the globalizing world we live in, where a situation in one country affects the other, contemporary conflicts affect the interest of regional neighbors and beyond, motivating them to intervene.
- Thirdly, since the public opinions and media transparency of human sufferings makes it difficult for outside governments to abstain from intervening.
- And fourthly, due to the fact that many protracted conflicts need the input of outside resources in order to be resolved.

In short, we could argue that in today's globalizing world, we can't discuss about conflict resolution processes, while excluding external interventions.

However, third party interventions are also influenced by many factors. According to Mitchell (1970: 169) there are four factors that influence interventions: (a) characteristic of the country in conflict, (b) characteristics of the intervener, (c) linkage patterns between the groups in the target and intervener, and (d) the character of the international system.

"the Greater Somalia" that led to tensions and conflict with the neighboring states. But, during the course of the 1960s, Somalia saw not only regional, but growing internal conflict. As a result, Major General Mohamed Siyaad Barre seized power, in 1969, in a bloodless *coup d'état*. Barre's government declared a policy of "scientific socialism", launched ambitious development and infrastructural programs, created an alphabet for the Somali language, and launched a nationwide literacy campaign (*ibid*: 81-87). Even though the Barre regime tried to create a strong and unified Somalia, its efficiency and popular legitimacy gradually deteriorated, especially after the Ogaden defeat leaving the central regime in confrontations with many armed opposition groups. Consequently, Barre fled Mogadishu in 1991 that resulted in a violent state crisis in Somalia (Kinfe, 2002: 25-45).

3.2. Causes of Somalia State Crisis

The Somalia state crisis is a complex phenomenon. It is a crisis that came as a result of a number of overlapping causes that are internal and external in their nature. Many writers on the Somali conflict address these causes from different perspectives. However, for the purpose of this study the author concentrates on six major causes of the Somalia state crisis. These are; the Colonial legacy, Somalia's clan politics, the Siyaad Barre dictatorial and personal rule, the Ogaden debacle and loss of Somalia nationalist sentiment, the proliferation of many clan-based opposition military groups, and the impact of Cold War.

3.2.1. The colonial legacy

The root causes of the present crisis in Somalia can be sought in the colonial history to the partition of the Somali-lands among the European colonial powers – Britain, France and Italy – and Ethiopia



during the European scramble for Africa in the late 19th century (Samatar, 1995: 15). From that colonial legacy problems spread wider, and the Somalis were always confronted with challenges, where every problem led to another.

The large part of Somalia that was under the colonial forces was a victim of balkanization. With the independence of Somalia in 1960, the united Somali state was faced with the problem of incompatibility between the two Somali-lands. This problem of incompatibility between the two entities was a result of different political, economic and social background that resulted from the different colonial experience they went through (Ahmed, 1999: 239). This resulted in a “split national personality” that encouraged division and disintegration in the Somali society (Kinfe, 2002: 54). The divide and rule style that the colonial powers used in Somalia, which was helpful for suppressing opposition to their colonial administration also made the Somali people depended on their clan origins for strength and identity (*ibid*). This made the Somali people to develop a national aspiration on the bases of clan loyalties, by relying on their lineage and family ties, which contributed more to the Somalia state crisis later.

3.2.2. The Clan Politics in Somalia

The Somali society is a homogeneous society and “the Somali identity is defined by a common language (Af-somali), a pastoral economy, adherence to Islam (Sunni), and a patriarchal clan-based political system” (Kinfe, 2002: 1). There is also a widespread Somali belief that all Somalis descend from a common founding father, the legendary Samaale to whom the overwhelming majority of Somalis trace their genealogical origin (Samatar, 1995: 12). Though, the Somalis are united by common decent, the nation didn’t constitute a unitary state before

colonialism. And, this was because of their identity which was primarily based on kinship (Kinfe, 2002: 6). The Somalia society is divided among different clans and sub-clans, and the segmentation will further go down until a household level. As shown in Wikipedia, free encyclopedia, (http://en.wikipedia.org/Somali_clan) the Somali clan and sub-clan groupings are as follows:

- **Darod**

- Awrtable, Dhulbahante, Leelkase, Majeerteen, Marehan, Ogaden and Warsangali.

- **Dir**

- Akisho, Baadimaal, Biyomaal, Dabruube, Fiqi Muxumed, Gaadsan, Gadabuursi, Gariire, Gurguure, Guure, Issa (Ciise), Layiile, Madigaan, Qubeys, Suure and Wardaay.

- **Hawiye**

- Abgaal, Ajuran, Baadicadde, Degodia, Duduble, Gaaljecel, Garre, Habar Gidir, Hawadle, Murule, Murusade, Wadalaan and Xaskul.

- **Isaaq**

- Arap, Ayoup, Garhajis (which is split into Eidagale and Habar Yoonis), Habar Awal, Habar Jeclo and Toljaalo.

- **Rahanweyn**

- *Digil*: Bagadi, Dabare, Garre, Geledi, Jiiddo and Tunni.
- *Mirifle*: Boqorhore, Eelaay, Gasaargude, Geelidle, Hadame, Hubeer, Jilible, Jiroon, Leysan, Luwaay, Xariin and Yantaar.

- Minority ethnic Somali clans

- Ashraaf, Eyle, Midgan, Reerow-Xassan, Sheikhal, Tumal and Yibir.

Even though, the Somalis have a consciousness of their corporate unity, which is rooted in a wide belief of all Somalis descending from a common founding father, internally they are group conscious. As to Samatar, therefore, it's a social system that borders on xenophobia. It is like; genealogy constitutes the center of the Somali social system and is the bases of their preference to internal differences as well as of the unity of thought and actions among Somalis (Samatar, 1995: 12).

Then, clanism came to be seen as the political language that explains the fallouts in Somalia's politics (Compagnon, 1998: 73). And this clan system was further vulnerable to an external manipulation by an unethical head of state, such as Siyaad Barre, who abused the scarce resource of the state to reward and punish the different Somali clans (Samatar, 1995: 13). He favored the clans to which his family belonged to and excluded other clans from top government positions. In the process he destroyed the middle class of other clan members by forcing them into exile and by throwing them into prisons (Adam, 1995: 70). Moreover he poisoned the clan relationships, by setting one clan against the other, through his divide and rule strategy, which led to more disintegration than unity (Kinfé, 2002: 61).

Also, due to the pastoral economic activities in Somalia, which does not produce surplus, compromise and sharing are hardly possible (Mohamoud, 2002: 151-152). Instead, fierce competition for pursuit of scarce resource is the only way of survival. As a result, in the post-independent Somalia, clan consciousness resulted in a competitive interest and exacerbation of conflicts among the different clans for seizure of political and economic power (Prunier, 1988: 104).

pull Somalia out of the mess in which it was so deeply in (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: 76-77). That was when Siyaad Barre came in as a leader of Somalia in a bloodless *coup*.

Barre's regime at first tried to impose scientific socialism in Somalia, focusing on the attempt to reduce inequalities, whether based on tradition or modern social patterns that did have their root in the colonial divide and rule style, which helped the colonial powers ease the internal challenges to their rule (*ibid*: 85). Laitin and Samatar further argued that through this scientific socialism Barre tried to achieve two major political goals: a nationwide language reform in Somalia and the overcoming of societal inequality (*ibid*: 83-84). The decision to write the Somali language helped to reduce the tensions that continued to exist between the Northern and Southern regions. However, Barre didn't pursue much with the Scientific Socialism; rather he turned his attention to the possibilities of national struggle (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: 88). But, as a result of his failure to "liberate" Ogaden from Ethiopia his regime encountered a massive internal opposition, which led him to rely on his clan enclave centralized rule (Kinfе, 2002: 31-32).

According to Kinfе, one of the main reasons of the state collapse in Somalia was Barre's blind centralized rule, which manifested itself in a higher degree of militarizing the state and the absence of any tolerance for the opposition groups (2002: 16-17). Laitin and Samatar have further noted the denial of democracy resulted in a denial of opportunity for the Somali public to participate effectively in the political process and the growth of centralized social control mechanisms that made Barre the unquestioned leader (1987: 96). He made himself President of the Republic, and Chairman of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, which had power to legislate new laws and repeal old ones. And he also made other important appointments based on kinship; like making his son-in-

law, Ahmad Sulaymaan Abdullah, the chairman of the National Security Service, and similar other appointments were also made to leading positions in most government agencies (*ibid*: 81). In such a way Barre tried to create a government structure that is loyal and reliable to his own personal rule.

In order to prolong his rule, where no one questioned his power and where no opposition to his administration was tolerated, he kept on suppressing any opposition that was suspected to be a threat to his administration. As a result, he directed his reign of terror towards his own people by conducting fearful reprisals against one clan after the other (Kilfe, 2002: 18). He persecuted civilian Majeerteen, Issaq and the Hawiye clan members at different times of his rule, in responding to the armed attacks made against his regime by the different clan based opposition fronts (Samatar, 1995: 18-20). As a result, as Adam has noted “Siyaad’s vindictive state terror laid the basis for wars of revenge that postponed civil societies’ ability to create a successor state”, which led Somalia to its state failure at last (1995: 71).

3.2.4. The Ogaden debacle and loss of Somalia nationalist sentiments

The root cause of the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia in the late 1970s goes back to the colonial period in 1887 when Britain ceded the Ogaden to Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia (Samatar, 1995: 17). It was also then that the Somali nationalism started with the emergence of the Somali Dervish resistance led by the spiritual, warrior and poet, Sayid Mahammad A. Hassen, the “*mad mullah*” of British colonial history (Gorman, 1981: 30). However, the Somali nationalism more crystallized when the British facilitated the creation of the Somali Youth League (SYL) in 1943, importing a principle of irredentism to the region (Mesfin, 1977:

8). Nonetheless, the British had no any positive intention to the principle of irredentism or to Somalia. It was just a strategy of Britain to expand its colonial territory in the Horn (Khapova, 1982: 29). As a result, the SYL had put in its constitution the objective of unifying the balkanized Somali nation as its ultimate goal. This was further embraced in the constitution of the successive civilian leaders and also in the Charter of Siyaad Barre regime, which later resulted in a foreign policy crisis of the nation (Mesfin, 1977: 8). Due to this fact, Somalia from the time of independence had firmly established conflicting relationship with her neighboring countries, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: 134-137).

This “Greater Somalia” nationalist policy was symbolized in the post-independent Somalia flag by the five stars, which resembled the five Somali-lands that in a belief of the Somali people would make Somalia’s independence complete. And, in trying to accomplish this, Somalia undertook different approaches, one of which was to give military supports and logistics to an organization operating in Ethiopia under the objective of liberating the Ogaden region, namely, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) (Peter, 1996: 126). However, such effort of the Somali’s didn’t stop at this, trying to use the opportunity of regime change in Ethiopia as a perfect time to strike, in August 1977, Barre made his move on the Ogaden region that resulted in the control of 90% of the disputed territory (Samatar, 1995: 18). But this situation was reversed with the Ethiopian troops retaliating in a massive force that was supported by the USSR and Cuba (Mohamad, 2001: 6). This defeat in the battlefield was a disaster to the Somalia nationalist policy that even resulted in a galvanized internal clan problem (Samatar, 1995: 18). It came as an obstacle to the growing Somali nationalism and cohesion that contributed to the later state collapse in Somalia.

3.2.5. The Proliferation of many clan-based opposition military groups

The defeat of the Somali troops in the Ogaden battlefield often came as a disastrous setback to her military regime. This is because, since military regimes like Siyaad Barre having no popular legitimacy do exist by their use of coercive naked force, and defeat in a military confrontation could discredit their force as an instrument of their power, which later could lead military regimes to their fall (Samatar, 1995: 18).

However, the Barre administration fearing this consequence tried to blame this humiliating defeat on the military force. As a result of his technique in diverting the public attention from the government's responsibility for the Ogaden defeat, and blaming managements in the army for the humiliation, many Somali soldiers and officers were killed by their own government in Jijiga and Dire Dawa fronts, and also in Hargesa, after the Somali troops withdrew from Ethiopia (Mohamed, 2001: 6).

Being dissatisfied with Barre's poor management of the Ogaden war, in April 1978, a group of military officers, led by Colonel Mahamad Sheikh Usmaan, attempted to overthrow the government in Mogadishu. But, the coup attempt failed and as a result it led the government to undertake repressive measures against army officers and civilians. Consequently, hundreds were imprisoned while 17 high ranking officers, including Colonel Usmaan, were executed in Mogadishu, on 26, October 1978 (Samatar, 1995: 18). As the result, many officers and soldiers of the Somali army fled to Kenya and from there to Ethiopia. And in the spring of 1979, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) composed of the fleeing army officers, led by Abdullahi Yusuf, was formed as the first opposition group to fight the military regime in Somalia (Mohamed, 2001:

7). The SSDF was predominantly from the Majeerteen clan, which was welcomed in Ethiopia, given a head quarter and a military support while it also got military hardware, logistic supplies and training supports from Libya. And it was not long before the armed front started cross-border clashes with Somali forces, which gradually grew into a high scale conflict around the border (*ibid*). This armed rebellion marked the starting of civil war in Somalia in 1978.

Another opposition front emerged in 1981 that challenged the Barre regime in the name of Somali National Movement (SNM) (*ibid*: 8). Founded in London by intellectuals, businessmen and religious leaders, the SNM was primarily an Issaq based organization which has a strong secessionist policy of de-linking from the Mareahan dominated state (Samatar, 2001: 19). Like SSDF, SNM also established its bases in Ethiopia and got military supports from here. It started by conducting military operations along the North-Western border of Somalia, and generally increased military attacks inside the country, which culminated in a full-scale war later (Mohamed, 2001: 8). In a response the Barre government started to take major repressive measures against the Issaq clan. Many Issaq's were imprisoned and many more were killed both in towns and in the villages of the regions of North-West, Logdher in Sanag and Mogadishu (Samatara, 1995: 19). But this made the SNM to continue its armed attacks against the government with more determination.

In 1989, two other oppositions groups also took up arms against the Barre regime; namely the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) - an Ogadeni clan dominated opposition group, and the United Somali Congress (USC) - a Hawiye clan dominated military faction (Mohamed, 2001: 9).

As a result, around the end of 1980s, proliferations of many opposition groups were witnessed and challenges to the regime increased. The SNM in the north and SPM and USC in the south led a strong armed struggle against Barre, defeating many of his forces (Kine, 2002: 44). And finally, in January 1991, Siyaad Barre and his Mereahan guards were driven out of Mogadishu by the Hawiye guerrillas of the United Somali Congress (USC) that supported by a mass uprising in Mogadishu. However this was seen by many people as a new start for Somalia to bring a lasting peace, if not for the mistakes made by the USC that further aggravated the civil war leading to the state collapse.

According to Mohamad these mistakes are, first the revenge taken by the members of the Hawiye clan groups of USC, targeting the civilian Darod clan members that Barre's sub-clan belongs to, which led the Darod clan groups to organize themselves in Kismayo to counter the USC attack that gave the post-1991 conflict an inter-clan dimension; and the second mistake of the USC was that they established a transitional government, led by Ali Mahadi, without consulting major opposition groups in the country (2001: 11). This angered most of the opposition groups primarily the SNM, SSDF, SPM and Aideed supporters within the USC, and also most of the Somali people who were not ready to take the imposition of another government upon them (*ibid*). As a result, the SNM in the Northwest declared secession from Somalia, while the rest of Somalia rested in the hands of various warlords struggling for political as well as economic power. This further resulted in destabilizing country and dashing the hope of bringing a peaceful united Somalia. According to Kine it was this "absence of national parties transcending clan divisions" that contributed to the Somalia state collapse (2002: 62).

3.2.6. The impact of Cold War

In many instances, developing states were affected by the “Cold War legacy,” as the rival superpowers, US and USSR, instigated conflict, or supported anti-democratic regimes as means of advancing their own geopolitical interests in parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Mezzell, 2006: 6). The same is true in the case of Somalia. Due to its strategic position as a gate way to the Red sea and its closeness to the Middle East Somalia attracted the superpowers interest significantly. Barre benefited from this by playing the superpowers, one against the other. First the USSR and then the United States aided Barre economically and militarily (Kinfе, 2002: 62). Moreover Somalia managed to get other assistances from various countries and international institutions like; Italy, China, the UN, World Bank and the Arab League (Adam, 1995: 75). As a result of these external assistances the Barre regime like other dictatorial regimes of the Horn states, began to give much attention to his external legitimacy, disregarding the internal socio-political challenges that are responsible in the long run for the state collapse. He felt that as long as he got the external supports, he could remain in power despite internal opposition to his rule that resulted in a distastefulness of a central government power in Somalia, which led to disintegration rather than cohesion under a central rule (Kinfе, 2002: 62). Other than this, the external factors also contributed to the state collapse in another way. In the late 1980s following the end of Cold War there was a drastic cut of US assistance to Somalia (*ibid*: 25). These withdrawals and assistance cuts made the increased internal conflict for deposing the Barre regime in Somalia to be more devastating. Adam further strengthening this view writes:

In the world after the Cold War, internal protests and external donor pressure can facilitate non-violent regime transition,

without endangering state collapse. In Somalia, an abrupt stoppage of all aid followed a history of much aid. Modest assistance might have facilitated formation of flexible interim administration. (1995: 78)

In general, the international factor contributed to the Somalia crisis, by prolonging the Barre ruthless rule and also by not giving the Barre opponents a considerable amount of assistance early enough to drive Barre out of Somalia without much bloodshed.

3.3. The Somalia State Crisis

Somalia's state crisis came as a result of Siyaad Barre's disposal, in 1991. his downfall was finally precipitated by the emergence in 1989 of a Hawiye clan-based (USC) and the Ogadeni dominated (SPM) military fronts. The two oppositions are responsible for driving Barre out of Mogadishu.

In 1990, as the downfall of Barre came closer, the SNM, SPM, and USC created an alliance at the Ethiopian brokered agreement in Dire-Dawa (Mohamed, 2001: 10). However, this alliance was unable to retain and control the country. As a result, in the North SNM declared the secession and independence of North-Western Somalia, named as Somaliland. While in the Southern part of Somalia the situation of lawlessness and destruction was increasing (Kinfе, 2002: 24). The power vacuum that came as a result of Barre's withdrawal has created a new destructive situation among the different factions in Mogadishu and surrounding areas.

As quoted in Samatar (1995: 21-22), in February 1991, the report of a European Non-Governmental Organization fact-finding mission described the situation in Mogadishu and adjacent regions as:

a popular insurrection, not a military takeover. Therefore almost everyone got hold of guns... Armouries are empty. Police have no weapons. There is no army as such. The elders of clans do not seem to be able to control many of their armed youth, and there are conflicting inter-clan interests [within the Hawiye] which prevent their elders from acting jointly together to improve security.

The report further showed that the economy of Somalia as being in a state of confusion, and the main source of income was from purchase of looted goods and illegal weapons. The administration of the cities was under the control of various tribal militias. While the presidential palace was controlled by certain militias, the port was controlled by others; and the same goes for the Air ports and other different strategic places (*ibid*, 22).

Jonathan Mathrope also described the situation in and around Mogadishu, in *Montreal Gazette* entitled "Beyond Hope" as:

This is a town with no law, no government, no water, no electricity, no fuel, no food. There is chaat (or catha edulis, a narcotic herb that Somalis are fond of eating) which depress the appetite and the trade flourishes... And there are guns. (21 March, 1991: 21)

The situation in the capital Mogadishu was deteriorating quickly, as the power vacuum was filled by warlords and lawlessness that was subjected to intensive looting of government properties and destruction of infrastructures. As a result the fall of Barre regime was followed by a collapse of Somalia's civil and political institutions.

The situation in Mogadishu further heightened as a result of the split within the USC sub-clans that resulted in violence in the city. This conflict among the USC divisions lasted for three months, resulting in a

massive loss of human lives and destruction of state infrastructures, and also displacement of Somali habitats.

Copson further explained the suffering in Mogadishu as:

The ensuing struggle between USC leader Ali Mahdi and his erstwhile military commander, General Mohammed Farah Aideed, divided the city and brought untold suffering to its people, who were largely cut off from the outside world. (1994: 56)

However, as a result of the 1991 conflict in the country and the followed famine and drought, it is estimated that the losses of lives in Somalia run as high as 350,000 (*Ibid*: 50). But, this statistics didn't stop as it was. Instead, with the long standing instability, famine and conflict ever since the downfall of Barre in Somalia, there has been a massive increase in the number of civilians' death and also in the number of population displacement, internally and externally (UNHCR, 2006: 59).

When it comes to security, due to its anarchic nature, Somalia has provided a safe heaven for terrorism (Kinfu, 2002: 466). However, this made the security threat to grow to an international level. As a result, neighboring countries like Ethiopia and Kenya have been the frontline victims of violence that transcended Somalia's boundaries.

Even though recently it has been claimed by the TFG that Somalia has begun to experience its peace, but still there are internal problems in Somalia. The recent relative stability in Somalia due to the military defeat of the Islamic Courts councils by the TFG and Ethiopian troops does not mean that the Somalia's woe is over. The military victory dismantled only the most visible part of the Islamic Courts. "There is now a political vacuum across much of the Southern Somalia, which the inefficient TFG

is unable to fill" (ICG, 2007: 1). And also, elements of the Islamic Courts, including the Shabaab militants and their al-Qaeda associates are still believed to be operating on Somalia's soil (*Ibid*). Other than challenges from elements of the Islamic Courts and its militias, there is also resistance from different clans and warlords towards the TFG. This includes resistance from the Hawiye's claiming that the TFG is a Darod dominated government, and also lacks credibility since its alliance with the neighboring Ethiopian government, which in their eyes is considered to be an enemy state (*Ibid*, 19). Some influential warlords like Hussein Aideed and others also did show their dissatisfaction with the TFG. It's seen in their issue statements and press releases condemning the transitional government and also in acts of withdrawing themselves from various government positions they have been given (<http://news.bbc.co.uk>). And, as a result of the recent fighting between the Islamic Courts supporters on the one hand and Ethiopian-TFG coalition on the other side, the UN refugee agency estimated the death of hundreds and displacement of more than 200,000 Somalis (*Ibid*).

CHAPTER FOUR

Challenges to Third Party Interventions in Somalia

In this chapter the author tries to show some of the major third party interventions that took place while attempting to bring solution to the crisis in Somalia. It further analyzes the major problems and challenges that existed during the attempts that have been undertaken so far to ameliorate the effects of the crisis in Somalia and also to reconcile the conflicting parties in the country. The problems of these third party interventions in responding to the crisis in Somalia are addressed in two parts. The first being the problems with the military intervention in Somalia that lasted from 1992-1995, while the second part looks at the problems and challenges with the reconciliation attempts starting from the Somalia state collapse in 1991 up to the present time.

4.1. Major third party interventions in Somalia, since 1991

In June 1991, President Hussan Guiled Aptidon of Djibouti sponsored the first peace conference, which was held in Djibouti between the prominent representatives of the SSDF, SPM, USC and SDM (Mohamed, 2001: 12). An agreement was reached for an immediate cease-fire and also to include parties like SNM and USF, who missed out on that conference, to participate on the second peace conference that was to be held on 15th July 1991 (*ibid*).

which killed the spirit of the Djibouti peace process to be implemented and exacerbated the civil war in Somalia.

The struggle between the two USC sub-factions to control Mogadishu was one of the worst of its kind ever fought in the city, which resulted in a loss of thousands of innocent civilian lives and also destruction of government infrastructures (Amnesty International Report, 1993: 258). This conflict increased the agony of the city; it continued for almost four months before elders negotiated a cease-fire, in early 1992. There was no winner party in this deadly confrontation for control of the capital. However, as a result of the humanitarian crisis, the UN had begun to provide humanitarian aid in the country, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in March 1991 (Samatar, 1995: 20). But, since the security situation in Somalia was very unstable, the NGOs were forced to withdraw their personnel on a number of occasions (*ibid*).

Though the need for humanitarian aid and the capacity to provide this assistance were there, the main problem was the volatile security situation in the country where there was looting of aid supplies by armed militias and also attacks on the air and sea ports, which came as an obstacle to the delivery of aid in Somalia. The 1993 Amnesty international report describes this humanitarian crisis and the obstacles in providing humanitarian aid to civilians as follows:

At least 300,000 people, mostly children, died of starvation caused by the fighting, breakdown of government, famine and obstruction of the flow of international relief aid. Nearly a quarter of the six million populations fled the country. A large part of the famine relief supplies brought into the country was stolen at gunpoint by armed groups, some linked to clan-based political groups, who killed anyone presumed to be

opposing them, including relief agency workers (Amnesty International Report, 1993: 258)

In responding to the problems, the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, called for the Security Council to authorize action in Somalia and, in December 1992, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 794 authorizing the United Nations International Task Force (UNITAF) – led by the United States – "to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia "(Ganzglass, 1997: 22-23). "Operation Restore Hope was [then] launched under the sponsorship of what came to be known as United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)" (Samatar, 1995: 20).

Though, at the initial period of UNOSOM, UNITAF showed success in creating a relatively secure environment for a safe delivery of food aid, since the operation had no mandate to address the bigger problem in Somalia, the potential for continued conflict remained high in the country (*ibid*).


Following the complication of the situation in Somalia, after the UN military intervention, the UN called for two reconciliation conferences between the armed factions in Addis Ababa (*ibid*). The first peace conference resulted with the agreement on ceasefire and procedures of disarmament signed by the warlords on 8th January 1993 (*ibid*).

On 15th March 1993, the second Addis Ababa conference that aimed at creating a Transitional National Council was opened. "All parties had participated in the conference, including the breakaway Somaliland and a number of other newly established unarmed factions" (Mohamad, 2001: 13). The conference sought to broker a deal that

addressed two issues. These were the formation of a Transitional National Council (TNC) and also a creation of other Transitional political and administrative structures that could guide the country to elections (Kinfe, 2002: 76). However, "the declaration that the TNC would be the 'sole repository' of Somali's sovereignty disappointed the people of the Somaliland, who were at the time involved in a National Reconciliation conference of their own at Borama" (*ibid*). As a result, all participants, except the Somaliland representatives, signed the Addis Ababa Peace deal.

Despite the agreement reached between the warlords in creating regional administrations, when it came down to implementation some of the faction leaders failed to act in accordance with the peace deal, most notably Mohamed Farah Aideed. This, as a result created a gap in the Addis Ababa peace effort. According to Mohamad (2001: 13-14), Aideed's reluctance to implement the project was due to two reasons: one, was because he didn't like the idea of the UN involvement in the process of administration rebuilding saying that only he has the legitimate authority to nominate administrations in areas that are under his control; and the other reason was, because he was worried about the arrangement of the TNC, which would minimize his influence and place him in a minority position in the suggested central government.

As result of all these, Aideed began to spread propaganda against UNOSOM, saying that it has an imperialistic intent, which led the UN troops to attack Aideed's Radio station that was followed by a swift retaliation from Aideed's militia forces on the UNOSOM center, resulting in the killing of 24 Pakistani Peacekeepers, on 5th June 1993 (*ibid*: 14). Then, the Security Council's issued a warrant of arrest on Aideed, and the task of chasing him was entrusted to the UNOSOM. Consequently, this incident led UNOSOM II to its failure. As a result of which the UN




peacekeeping forces withdrew from Somalia leaving a vacuum for the continuation of the civil war, which also came to be an obstacle to the implementation of the Addis Ababa peace deal.

However, despite the disastrous end of the US-UN humanitarian military intervention, other forms of third party intervention to resolve conflicts in Somalia continued. Another attempt was made at creating a conducive environment to bring the Somalia factions to reconciliation once again by Ethiopia, in Sodere. It was known as the Sodere Peace Process. At this conference, which was a six weeks long reconciliation process, the 26 factions came into an agreement on 3rd January 1997, which declared, the establishment of a National Salvation Council (NSC), whose forty-one members have been selected among the participants (Kinfe, 2002: 132-133). And this council will embark on a preparatory course of action leading to the establishment of a Transitional Central Authority (TCA) of Somalia. In the peace deal they also declared a five point program showing their dedication and undivided effort to promote the peace process attempts in Somalia. In addition, they also agreed to make a National Reconciliation conference in Bosasso, in Somalia, to approve the institution of the TCA (*ibid*: 134-135).

According to Kinfe (2002: 139-140) this conference was one of the most important mediation processes on many counts. This is because, it was the first constructive dialogue made after the failure of UNOSOM II, and was also a peace process that brought together virtually all the clan faction leaders of Somalia. In addition, it was also the only process that was based on the concept of power-sharing.

At any rate, after the Sodere peace deal, while it was still pending, another reconciliation conference was called by Egypt, in Cairo, in November 1997. The conference was attended by the Aideed group and



the National Salvation Council (NSC), which was formed in January 1997 at the Sodere conference (Mohamad, 2001: 16).

At first, the agreement seemed to represent an important step in the drive for peace in Somalia. Unfortunately, the withdrawal of General Gebyo of SPM and Colonel Abdulahi Yusuf of SSDF from the conference spoiled it. This was because of the strong view that the conference strengthened the position of the Hawiye clan while weakening the representation and political weight of the Darod clan. And the other problem of this conference was its rejection of Bossaso as a venue of the main National Reconciliation Conference (NRC), which came as a disappointment to the Darood clan groups (*ibid*). This in general killed the spirit of the peace process.

However, the Somalia peace creation attempt by third parties didn't stop at this. After almost eight years of unsuccessful effort for a peaceful solution in the war-torn nation since the removal of Siyaad Barre in September 1991, the Djibouti President Ismael Omar Gheulleh who was the chairman of IGAD at the time, called for a more inclusive peace conference to be held in Arta (Djibouti), which his government would sponsor (*ibid*, 17). Unlike the previous international peace agreements, which tried to reconcile the Somali faction leaders, this time president Gheulleh wanted the faction leaders to give up their power to the civil societies to shape the country's future (Kinfe, 2002: 340). In order to do this, president Gheulleh relied on a combination of the external and internal pressure from the weak Somali public and the donors against the disobedient and unconvinced Somali faction leaders (*ibid*).

Gheulleh's plan was welcomed by the international community like UN, EU, IGAD, the Arab League and US (*ibid*: 343). However, the

initiative was rejected by many Somali faction leaders and only one of them – Ali Mahadi Mohamad – attended the conference (*ibid*: 341). In August 2000, the first meeting of Somalia's transitional parliament had taken place despite the ongoing power struggle between the country's rival factions. Following the four months of continuous negotiations, an interim Transitional Government based on a federal arrangement, and a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) based on clans was elected (Mohamad, 2001: 18).

On 25th August 2000, the TNA elected Abdiqassim Salat Hassan as an interim president (*ibid*). But, since the militia leaders remained fiercely opposed to the Djibouti peace conference, this made the task of the new president more difficult.

As a result, in an effort to stop Abdiqassim's continued attempt to establish his government in Somalia, an exceptional coalition of faction leaders of Mogadishu, southern regions and Rahenwein Resistance Army (RRA) meeting was held in EL-Berd, Bakol region, in January 2001 (*ibid*: 21). In this meeting it was agreed on to form an anti-Abdiqassim administration coalition, and to hold further meeting. As planned, the coalition again met in March 2001, in Awassa (Ethiopia), where they formed an organization named Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), and agreed on the principle of 'bottom-up' administration rebuilding approach (*ibid*). The establishment of regional administrations prior to the formation of any central government, which is a counter act to Abdiqassim's effort. As a result, this coalition kept on making the implementation of the Arta peace process more difficult, by blocking passes around Mogadishu; by opening attacks on Abdiqassim's officials and also many other intimidating acts that crippled the TNG.

With the failure of the Arta Conference to bring a functional government in Somalia, the IGAD meeting in Khartoum, in January 2002, called for a new peace conference, the Eldoret peace conference (ICG, 2002b: 2). After more than a decade as the only country in the world without any functioning central government and many unsuccessful national-level peace initiatives since 1991, the Eldoret Declaration raised hopes that resolution of the Somali crisis may now be within reach.

The IGAD summit established and mandated a Technical Committee, made up of delegates from the three frontline states – Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya, to arrange and organize the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference. While Ethiopia and Djibouti were both suspected of backing opposition Somali factions, the chairmanship of the technical committee was given to Kenya (*Ibid*).

This technical committee came up with several innovations, including a three-phase process in which the reconciliation process will be delivered. The first phase of the Eldoret Conference began on 15th October 2002 at Eldoret, Kenya and ended with a declaration on cessation of hostilities, and Ceasefire signed by most of the factions (*Ibid*: 3).

The second phase began on 2nd December 2002. This phase was to provide a blueprint for whatever government emerged from the talks. However, over the following two years, the peace process encountered long-standing disputes over the size and composition of representation in the talks, and disagreement over who controlled the selection of members of parliament, which created crises that prompted walkouts and boycotts by some key political leaders (ICG, 2004a: 4 - 7).

The third phase of the peace process focused on power-sharing negotiations. It initially encountered disputes over the allocation of seats by sub-clans, control of the nomination process, and selection of individual members of parliament, which delayed the inauguration of a 275-member parliament for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (ICG, 2002b. 6).

By mid-September a full parliament was selected, followed by the election of Abdullahi Yusuf as President of TFG in 10 October 2004. President Yusuf selected Ali Muhammed Gedi to serve as Prime Minister (ICG, 2006: 3). However, despite the widespread acceptance of the newly elected TFG by the international community, it encountered resistance internally from the Mogadishu based opposition factions, which resulted in crippling the interim government to produce any incentive in the peace process in Somalia.

4.2. Problems with the humanitarian–military intervention in Somalia

The story of the United Nations Operation in Somalia began with the organization's efforts to facilitate humanitarian aid to the people trapped by civil war and famine, and developed into an extended attempt to help stop the conflict (United Nations, 1996: 287). However, these massive international efforts beginning in 1992 to improve the destructive effects of the Somali civil war and to reconstitute a functioning government in that country brought some notable achievements, but they were overshadowed by grievous failures (Laitin,

2001: 1). These problems that led the UN operation to its failure can be seen from different point of views.

One of the most intimidating problems to the humanitarian-military intervention in Somalia was the crisis of legitimate authority existed in the county (Menkhaus, 1997: 43). "The shattered society and collapsed state engendered the shortage of legitimate and authoritative political representatives able to broker and enforce peace accords at the national level" (*Ibid*). This left the leadership of the operation to look for any powerful groups in Somalia for a partnership, and ended up with the different faction leaders. But, since the warlords were more concerned with maximizing their legitimacy through manipulating the operation, rather than working for a peaceful and united Somalia, they misguided the United Nations mission in the country.

Another thing that was clearly lacking with the UN mission in Somalia was a coherent overall humanitarian – political – military game plan to provide the parameters for a more powerful UN mandate to establish a secure environment. As Kiefe (2002: 92) put it, the international community's response to the conflict and humanitarian crisis in Somalia was like a guinea-pig test, and its syndrome was that the policies of the operation were driven more by the "international political concerns of experimentation" rather than the reality on the ground. For instance, the UNITAF deployment provided the force necessary to impress the warlords but it lacked the political objectives to cause them to back down (Ganzglass, 1997: 29). No effort was made by the UNITAF to disarm the warlords, since it was more concerned for the security of its own than bringing peace in Somalia (Kiefe, 2002: 91). Instead it sought the warlords' cooperation thus giving them the symbol of legitimacy. However, reliance on warlords to implement the humanitarian program certainly eased the crisis in an efficient way, but

the cost was the giving up of authority, in Somalia, to military units whose leadership had little interest in legitimate government. The warlords manipulated the UN operation and intervention into their own means of gaining legitimacy and boosting credibility (Ganzglass, 1997: 29). “The goals of the humanitarian relief mission, while impressively fulfilled, undermined the chances for a political settlement, and therefore set the stage for an ignominious exit by the international gendarmerie” (Laitin, 2001: 1). Thus, the goal of providing immediate humanitarian relief came as an obstacle to the later political solution undermining the goal of building a legitimate authority.

The other most evident operational problem, especially for the UNOSOM II, comes from the divided command structure, with each part of the command having somewhat different goals, where the UNOSOM leadership reached their own judgment regardless of what has happened in the UN (Day, 1997: 15). When the Task Force Ranger was deployed to capture Aideed, it had its own chain of command that did not go through either the US or the UN channels in Somalia (Laitin, 2001: 4). Even though the UN Resolution 837 required a full legal investigation before anyone could point a finger at any group or individual, and Howe promised to do just that; however, simultaneously and secretly, he called for help from the elite counter-terrorists of the Delta Detachment to snatch Aideed for trial, which put the UN operation at more risk (Bolger, 1995: 6).

There was a problem of command over the trend of national contingents to seek guidance from their governments before carrying out orders in the UN operation (Laitin, 2001: 4). This reached levels of near treason when the commander of the Italian group opened negotiations with Aideed when the UNSC had instructed UNOSOM II to hunt him

down (*Ibid*). Nearly all of the problems in plan implementation can be traced at least in part to this ambiguous command structure (*Ibid*).

Another main problem of the UN operation in Somalia was its shortsightedness and inability to consult regional actors bordering Somalia. As quoted in Kinfe (2002: 101), the Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi criticized the UN operation in Somalia, at the time regarding “its inability to consult the countries of the sub-region and to take stock of the regional wisdom”. The UN should have worked in cooperation with regional actors since they are more close to the problem and might be a positive input in the resolving process.

The other problem with the UNOSOM operation was; there was a shortage of skilled manpower that is capable of handling the mission well. Howe (the commander of UNOSOM II) was authorized to have a staff of 800, but it took months to reach 100, and he described the applicants as a bunch of people no one wants (Laitin, 2001: 14). And on top of that the UN managerial capacity with regard to UN operation in Somalia was very poor. There were no manuals, regulations and doctrines for the UNOSOM leaders to refer to, and also little considerations were given, from the UN and US, to the long-term issue of peacekeeping in Somalia (Day, 1997: 13-14). This led the operation to its inconsistency and also the danger of impartiality that failed the mission.

Another problem with the UN intervention was, despite its status to stay neutral in its operations of conflict resolution, the UN in Somalia did lose this sentiment as a result of many incidents that undermined its role in the country. For instance, there was a decisive support given to one of the faction leaders by the UN. On 25 June, 1992, an Antonov aircraft with UN markings, which had been under charter by World Food Program, was witnessed to have illegally carried Somali currency and

military equipment from Nairobi for delivery to Ali Mahdi, faction leader in Mogadishu, which was seen by many warlords as UN's impartiality in the conflict and led them to be disobedient to its operations in the country (United Nations, 1996: 291).

On top of this, the UN's view of looking at Somalia as its trusteeship and making decisions for Somalis on their behalf, without a legal basis to it, made the Somali society as well as the warlords furious towards the UN intervention in Somalia. The UN gave a *de facto* authority to itself to make decisions on behalf of Somali people (Kinfu, 2002: 78). This was seen in the UN announcement of the deployment of 3000 troops to Somalia while Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for Somalia, was in delicate negotiation with the warlords concerning the first 500 troops (Laitin, 2002: 7). It gave the feeling that Somalia is again under a colonial rule. On another incident, at the handoff of the Somali baton by UNITAF to UNOSOM on May 4, 1993, the newly assigned Special Representative of the Secretary General, Admiral Howe, declared in the absence of any Somali Transitional Government that the 1962 Somali Penal Code would be the law enforced by UNOSOM II, showing that the UN was playing a trusteeship role which was seen by many Somalis, especially by the factions like Aideed as unacceptable (Ganzglass, 1997: 29).

There was also distrust in the purpose of the whole operation. For the one thing, distrust was directed at the Chief-Executive of the United Nations, who had, as a Foreign Minister in Egypt worked closely with Siyaad Barre. As a result of the lack of trust between the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, and some of the Somalia Warlords like Aideed, the UN operation became unacceptable to the Somalis, since they believe that it was a subservient to the UN secretary General's ambition (Hirsh and Oakley, 1995: x). Hirsh and Oakley also

observed “not only did Aideed have long standing distrust with Boutros Ghali, he believed that [US Admiral] Howe had deliberately tried to embarrass him” (*Ibid*).

However, since Aideed was too obsessed with his ambition to become Somalia’s leader, the UN concluded that he will never be satisfied with genuine power-sharing. So, the UN decided to marginalize him from the reconciliation attempts that it was trying to implement in the country (Kinfe, 2002: 110). Consequently, this embittered the relationship between the UN troops and Aideed. However, with the UN’s decision to seek Aideed’s arrest, following the ambush of the Pakistani troops, the UN gradually deteriorated into another belligerent party to the conflict in Somalia (Oakley, 1993: 53). As a result “UN attempts to marginalize militia leaders, particularly Aideed, were politically naive and explosive, violated the UN’s stated neutrality, led to the armed confrontation in June 1993, and setback reconciliation efforts” (Menkhaus, 1997: 55).

Finally with regard to the humanitarian – military intervention in Somalia, it is recognizable that despite its success in saving lives (approximately 100,000 lives were saved according to Clarke and Jeffery), the operation witnessed elements of failure, like lack of credibility, lack of impartiality and also lack of rigorous diplomatic work, needed before the deployment of the peacekeeping troops, which were necessary for the successful outcome of the operation. However, these problems led the operation, in the end, to not come close to what anyone could have seen as a desirable outcome – its political failure.

4.3. Challenges to the reconciliation attempts in Somalia

The role played by third parties in the Somalia conflict resolution attempts is of high importance. However, despite the various peace initiatives to reconcile the different warlords in the war-torn country, it was also witnessed that none of these attempts brought a considerable peace and stability to the Somali people. Although the thorough detailed explanation of its failure is hard to deal with, the following section tries to analyze as to what major factors contributed to the failure of these peace initiatives in Somalia.

4.3.1 Regional rivalry

Contemporary Somali politics cannot be understood in isolation from the regional politics which shapes political outcomes of the country (Menkhaus, 2003: 15). Despite many peace initiatives and political reconciliation attempts by various regional and global powers, very little has been achieved in Somalia. This is, as a result of the interveners' vested interest that goes beyond the genuine ambition for building peace in Somalia, which tended to favor one faction over the other (Yon, 2003: 90). "Peace making in Somalia has long been hostage not only to the irascible warlords, but also to the interests of regional powers" (ICG, 2004b: 10). These incompatible regional interests have been critical in delaying national reconciliation and a political resolution to Somalia's problems.

This regional rivalry is - one which can at times worsen into a virtual proxy war inside Somalia - between Ethiopia on the one hand and Egypt and the Arab states on the other (Menkhaus, 2003: 15). Both

Ethiopia and Arab neighbors in the region are struggling to exert and extend their influence in the country. The Arab states seek a strong central government in Somalia, one which can serve as a counterbalance to Ethiopia in the region. On the other hand, Ethiopia fearing the return of a strong central state which could again take up Somali irredentist claims on the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, or which could become an Arab/Islamic country that could threaten her national security, meddle in Somalia politics attempting to shape it in favor of her interest (*Ibid*).

When we see the rivalry between Ethiopia and other Arab actors, primarily Egypt, the rise and fall of the Islamic Courts was only the most recent episode of the long historical cycle (ICG, 2007: 2). This rivalry goes back to the time of the colonial era, when Ethiopia took over Ogaden, and Egypt forces representing Ottoman Empire occupied the northern Somali coast. In the post-independent Somalia also Egypt and other Arab actors used to support the successive Somali governments, while Ethiopia on the contrary backed the disparate Somali factions that ultimately overthrew the Barre regime (*Ibid*).

Even in the post-1991 devastated Somalia, the Arab–Ethiopia rivalry in the peace process was also witnessed. There was a hijacking of peace process by Egypt (Cairo) in 1997, while the Soderre peace process (1996) at which the diverse group of faction leaders – except SNA leader, Hussein Aideed – agreed to establish an interim national institutions, and set a venue at Bossasso for the following meeting to implement the peace deal was still pending. Egypt called many of the same faction leaders on a parallel peace conference at Cairo (1997), to reconcile them with Aideed. However, a call for peace by Egypt was criticized for its purpose of nothing more than to promote her own interest in the region (Kinfu, 2002: 252).

At any rate, the Cairo peace process was a failure, as stated by the two co-chairmen of the National Salvation Council (NSC), who walked out from the conference, quoted in Kifle's book (*Ibid*), due to Egypt's biased and lack of sincerity in seeking a resolution to the Somali crisis that resulted from her sole aim in promoting her own agenda. As a result, this intervention by Egypt in the Somalia peace process aiming to promote her own interest in the country led both the Soderre and Cairo peace processes to a failure.

The other contested peace process was the Arta peace process (2000), hosted by Djibouti, which was supported by many international organizations and also countries like Egypt. It led to the establishment of the Transitional National Government led by Abdiqassim, which appeared, to some, at the time to be a development. But even at the Arta peace process, it was alleged that Djibouti tried to impose her interest as to guide the outcome of the peace deal in favour of her own interest. Mohamed (2001: 18) noted that the dominant Djibouti tycoon Abdirahman Bodhe's influence on the peace process in maneuvering the campaign spirit; the clan-oriented procedural orientation that was imposed on the peace process by Djibouti; and finally, the Djibouti mediators' rejection and ignoring of any genuine proposals about the peace conference, which was brought forward by the Somali participants or any other party, all in all showed Djibouti's interest in pursuing the peace process in her own agenda.

In addition to this, the Arta-based TNG came to be accused by Ethiopia of its close relation to the Islamist fundamentalist and terrorist groups, which led Ethiopia to help the creation of countering group to the interim government. As a result, Ethiopia played a mid-wife role in the formation of the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council

(SRRC), in 2001, a coalition of faction leaders opposed to the TNG (ICG, 2007: 3). As been told in the ICG report (2002b: 2) “Political dynamics in the south continued to be defined in terms of polarization between the TNG and its allies on one side and the SRRC on the other side”.

As the competition between these two groups intensified, it led to more fragmentation between the Somalis, while making the interim Government of Abdiqassim to be crippled in the establishment and reconstructions of institutions in Somalia that resulted in deadlock (*Ibid*).

As a result of the failure of the Arta conference to restore a functional government in Somalia, the IGAD member states began to look for a new initiative with which to address the country’s crisis. However, this time, with Ethiopia and Djibouti each backing opposing Somali factions, responsibility was given to Kenya, which at the time was generally remained neutral in the Somali conflict (*Ibid*). In this peace process, which was hosted in Kenya (Eldoret), in 2002 that had three phases of reconciliation plan, which led to the formation of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004, similar regional contests have also been witnessed. The technical committee from the IGAD member states (Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia) under Kenyan chairmanship, which was supposed to manage the peace process, was alleged to be manipulated by the Ethiopians (*Ibid*, 3). “Ethiopia's dominance of the IGAD Technical Committee and close involvement in conference mechanics such as organization of the daily agenda and screening of delegates produced an increasingly noticeable bias in favor of the SRRC” (ICG, RoA, No. 79, 2004: 4). In this regard, the dominant perception among delegates and observers at Eldoret was that the peace process has come to be dominated by Ethiopia right from the start (*Ibid*). As a result, in this peace process it came to be the Ethiopia backed SRRC that had the

After the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrea boarder conflict in mid-1998, rival Somali factions received increasingly large delivery of weapons from the two warring countries, which sought to secure Somali allegiance to their respective causes. While they fought bloody battles along their disputed boarder, the two countries have also opened a second front in Somalia by proxy, each backing Somalia factions (ICG, , 2006: 20). Eritrea backed Hussein Mohamed Farah Aideed, son of the general who stood his ground against U.S. troops in Mogadishu, while Ethiopia threw its weight behind a number of factions opposed to Aideed, notably the RRA (*Ibid*). As a result conflict escalated as power struggles within the country exacerbated by these military support that was given by both Ethiopia and Eritrea to the contending parties.

Also after TFG's inception, in 2004, despite official denials, persistent and credible reports confirmed that Ethiopia has been providing the interim government with military materials and training, while Eritrea was also alleged to have delivered a considerable amount of arms shipment and military support to Somalia, mainly to leaders aligned with the Islamic Courts (*Ibid*). And, later with the rising confrontation between the Islamic courts and TFG, the proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea even has taken a different form when Ethiopia intervned militarily in Somalia to counter the Islamic Courts, and supporting the TFG, while Eritrea was also alleged to send in armed military troops into Somalia, supporting the Islamic Courts (*Ibid*). Thus the confrontation between the TFG and the Courts came to be seen as a second front in a wider Ethio-Eritrean conflict, one which threatens to escalate at any time.

4.3.3 Donors' lack of sufficient and effective assistance to facilitate state building attempts

There was absence of sufficient financial support from donors for the implementation of peace deals and state-building attempts in Somalia (Kinfе, 2002: 467). For instance, when the interim president, Abdiqassim Salat, was inaugurated in Djibouti on 27 August, heads of state from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Yemen attended, along with senior representatives from Kenya, Egypt, Libya, France, United Nations and the European Union; and was welcomed as an important step towards a comprehensive Somali reconciliation (Mohamed, 2001: 20). But, despite this demonstration of international and regional support there was lack of confidence from donors, especially western countries, in the newly elected government. After ten years of a devastating civil war, where various faction leaders have claimed political hegemony, the new government has to prove itself, so that it could receive a significant amount of external financial assistance. "Little financial support has been received by the TNG except from Saudi Arabia which had donated some money in the year 2000" (Kinfе, 2002: 467). What was seen here was the case of a hen and egg thing – which one comes first? As a result, the TNG has not benefited from the receipt of substantial amounts of external financial assistance, which came as an obstacle for the state-building attempt.

There was also lack of balanced donor's assistance between the center and the periphery regions in Somalia that matches Somalis' relatively decentralized and energetic civil society (Adam and Richard, 1998: 11). "Donors, including NGOs, have very little experience with decentralized development" while contributing to the state building process in Somalia (*Ibid*). There is a concentration of aid through the center that lacks decentralized donors' effort to train and develop local

institutions, which will be of values to the state building process in Somalia.

4.3.4 Violations of the arms embargo

There was a lack of unified voice and action by the International community and this created a scenario in which the warlords can exploit this weakness skillfully (Kinfe, 2002: 205). The steady flow of arms and ammunition that fuels the conflict in Somalia is one consequence of lack of unified action by the international community, which came as an obstacle to the reconciliation attempts (ICG, 2004a: 13).

In January 1992 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 733 deciding that:

All states shall, for the purpose of establishing peace and stability to Somalia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until the Council decides otherwise.
(UN, 1992)

Nonetheless, despite the embargo imposed on Somalia there are continuous and deliberate violations described in different reports. These independent experts have typically showed “either the failure of the international community to honor their obligation under Chapter Seven of the UN charter to enforce the embargo, or provision of arms and ammunition by governments themselves” (ICG, 2004a: 13).

According to information obtained from the 2006 report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia, unofficial support of States came as one of the fundamental sources that the conflicting actors in Somalia use to obtain their military related support in violations of the arms embargo

(UNSC, 2006: 9). An increasing number of States and non-state actors are involved in providing arms and military-related support to the different military factions in Somalia in violation of the arms embargo. The contributions include arms and ammunition and military equipment such as trucks, uniforms, military rations and medical supplies; and also military training, advice and direction are also being provided by States. (*Ibid*: 10)

The continued arms flow created an increasing rate of overall militarization of the Somali people, particularly in central and southern Somalia (*Ibid*: 30). "This pattern of militarization and the trend towards increasing volatility greatly increases the chances of more fighting and the resulting loss of life" (*Ibid*). These, as a result, have created a situation in Somalia where conflicts have escalated and mistrust among factional leaders heightened, which has pushed further the hope for reconciliation.

4.3.5 *Lack of Skillful Management and Functional Strategies with the Peace Conferences*

In the absence of either a Somali state authority or any recognizable political leadership, various peace initiatives were persistently undermined by disputes over the question of - Who is legitimate to represent whom in Somali peace conferences? This was central to nearly every failed peace conferences in Somalia (Menkhaus, 1997: 57). However, in many cases the focus on militia leaders rather than legitimate community leaders in the search for peace was misguided (*Ibid*: 54).

In this regard, as to Menkhaus (*Ibid*), the UN in its attempt to promote reconciliation "lacked an adequate understanding of the nature

of the Somali political culture and hence worked against rather than with indigenous practices of conflict management”. Consequently, the UN paved the way for the manipulation of successive peace processes by faction leaders (ICG, 2004a: 10). In the Addis Ababa peace conferences the UN targeted the warlords because they were seen as the real leaders of Somalia; but the UN failed to understand that the warlords’ legitimacy in their area of influence was based on coercion, and for such reasons the warlords cannot genuinely represent the people (Samatar, 1995: 20). Instead the UN ignored the fact that clan elders customarily play a critical role in reconciling conflicts and can genuinely represent the Somalis.

As a result, the attention given by the third parties towards the warlords as legitimate and essential elements in any of the reconciliation attempts they brokered was one of the problems that have destroyed the genuine representations of Somalis in the peace accords, which resulted in a dead end.

Other than the mediators’ misguided way of selecting representatives of the peace process, lack of skillful handling of the peace conferences by third party mediators was also witnessed. The Arta conference as to Mohamed (2001:19) “really lacked an intellectual role to act professionally in processing, analyzing, negotiating and making decisions on issues on the agenda”.

Also the ICG report (2002b: 6) elaborates such similar problem in the case of Eldoret peace conference as follows:

The lack of capable conference leadership poses the single greatest threat to the success of the process. Indecision, arbitrariness and lack of diplomatic finesse routinely transform minor hitches into unmanageable crises. Such



21). However, in order to achieve the anti-terrorist goals, as the ICG report (*Ibid*: 2) suggests “a revitalized peace initiative should focus on reducing regional tensions and building a process to reconstruct the state as the most direct way both to achieve reconciliation and to counter terrorism in Somalia”. But the short-term military oriented policies that was being followed by the US government towards the counter-terrorism mission, was an impediment for further reconciliation in Somalia, since it complicate the situation in Somalia where distrusts among the warlords further escalated.

In the absence of a functional government through which counter-terrorism measures can be taken, the US forged ties to militia leaders and some businesspeople, in hopes that they could serve as local partners for monitoring foreign al-Qaeda activities in the country and, when possible, apprehending suspected terrorists (Menkhaus, 2007). And in this regard, the warlords in and around Mogadishu formed what they called the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT). However, this counterterrorism agenda further created distrust between the militias and the Islamic Courts Units, who were alleged to have terrorist connections, which brought them into confrontation with each other and triggered the fighting that ultimately brought the Courts to control most of Southern Somalia (ICG, 2006: 7). As a result, a bipolar politics that were antagonist towards each other and to some extent unstable within themselves was created. These are the Mogadishu-based, anti-Ethiopian, Habar-Gedir dominated Islamic Courts against the Baidoa-based, pro-Ethiopian, Majeerteen and Abgal dominated TFG.

As a result, attempts to use local allies as military proxies, to counter terrorism, likely produced more conflict and setbacks for Somalia’s slow process of political reconciliation and reconstruction. As the ICG report (2002: 2) put it “local hopes that the counter-terror

agenda might provide the impetus for renewed international leadership in the restoration of functional, responsible government in Somalia were short-lived". So the short-term policies for eliminating terrorist threats in Somalia created increased long-term threats. It further fragmented the hope for bringing a united Somalia government by further complicating the Somalia politics.

4.3.7 Lack of commitment from parties to the conflict in Somalia

One of the fundamental obstructions to peace in Somalia has been the historical rivalry among the clans-based warlords. The Hawiye, for instance do not trust the Darood because of the dominant Government roles played by them since independence, in 1960 (Kinfе, 2002: 57). On the other hand, the Darood believe they're born to be Somalia's leaders, since they have higher historical experience by virtue of their past leadership role and the fact that they have more educated people who are capable of leadership (*Ibid*).

However, both the Darood and Digil-Mirifile clans are also equally concerned about the emergence of the Hawiye as a dominant force, since a political tract published allegedly smuggled out of the inner circle of the Farah Aideed group, which declared the inviolable right of the Hawiye to be Somalia's leaders (Kinfе, 2002: 58). This showed the unacceptability of any of the state building attempts that led to a formation of a government, which was dominated by a clan other than theirs, by each clan (*Ibid*). As a result, this explains why the ambition of the clan-based faction leaders, the clan elders, religious leaders and members of clans and sub-clans to power is deep-rooted, which came to be an obstacle to the reconciliation processes in Somalia (*Ibid*: 471).

The recent confrontation between the Islamic Courts and the TFG can also be seen from this perspective. As noted by the ICG report (2006: 19), many Hawiye perceived the TFG as a Darod dominated government that wants to take its revenge upon the Hawiye clan and impose its rule upon them, and also as a defender of the interests of the neighboring Ethiopia, who in their eyes, was considered to be an enemy state. This led the newly established TFG not to be trusted and credible among the other clans, which came as a roadblock to the Interim Government to be functional in the country.

The other problem with the Somalis is the fact that there have been clashes among the various warlords and clans competing for economic control and political hegemony. Except Somaliland, in the rest of Somalia different conflicts witnessed to have taken place at different regions and different times (ICG, 2002b:2). As a result, almost all peace deals that have undertaken in the past were followed by an escalation of war between the different Somali factions resulting in violations of ceasefire agreements reached by the warlords at different times, which came as an obstacle to the peace initiatives to go further.

And, also powerful vested interests in continued instability, conflict, and anarchy undermined reconciliation efforts and threatened “peace constituencies” (Menkhaus, 1997: 43).

The other problem with the warlords was that their non-stop smuggling of warfare in to Somalia, which increased the distrust among the warlords that gave a reason to break the peace deals leaving the peace attempts in a deadlock. Although the UN Security Council set up a committee to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo, the flow of weapons into Somalia did not stop (UN, 1996: 289). As a result, in 1992 the two Somali factions, Ali Mahdi’s and Aideed’s factions, had

difficulties to come to an agreement, since they were accusing each other for receiving arms from some of the countries in the region (*Ibid*). There were also many incidents where arms were being smuggled into Somalia that violated UN Security Council Resolution 751, which placed an arms embargo on Somalia in 1992.

As a result, these flows of arms contributed to the ongoing militarization of central and southern Somalia, which made the country much vulnerable to armed conflicts making the reconciliation attempts that are sensitive to breaking of ceasefires difficult to be achieved.

Mohamoud (2000: 164) explain the factional leaders' lack of commitment as:

They are not corporate groups but rather a collection of individuals representing different vested interests and contradictory political agendas. Thus they lack corporate class interests, commitments and determinations. Much worse, each one of them keeps his own secret agenda hidden behind the camouflage of 'concern for broader national interests'. In public, they pay lip-service to overriding national issues, while in private they strategise their personal pursuits.

So, the warlords are, in a sense, not what they seem to be. They are always working to the fulfillment of their private interest, rather than promoting peace in Somalia. As a result they became comfortable with the existing anarchy in the Somalia, which dictate their lack of interest for a united Somalia state-building attempt.

As a result, this study finds that the failure of various conflict interventions to reconcile belligerent parties in Somalia largely came from both external and internal factors to the conflict in Somalia. Externally the peace bringing attempts are obstructed by selfish regional and global power interests, lack of unified action from the international community

in supporting the peace process and also problems with the inapplicable peace strategies that do not resemble the Somali political culture. While internally the lack of commitment from the Somali belligerents to the conflict, who are benefiting from the anarchic nature of the state, and also who are not interested with the coming of a central and unified Somalia which might not serve their interests.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion

The Republic of Somalia has been without an effective government and engulfed in high level of violence and civil war for the past fifteen years. However, the Somali state crisis has its roots in the historical and political legacies of the country. These include the Colonial legacy, Somalia's clan politics, the Siyaad Barre dictatorial and personal rule, the Ogaden debacle, the civil war in Somalia, and the Cold War.

Since the disposal of Siyaad Barre in 1991 the faction leaders that were responsible for the expulsion of Barre, rather than bringing relief and better life to the nation, paved the way for political power struggles, clan hostilities, competition and violence. This resulted in loss of many lives, destruction of property, human-rights' abuses and massive population displacement. Somalia has consequently become a state in an immense crisis.

However, external actors, other than being causes to the crises in Somalia, were also involved in efforts to bring a solution to the crisis. Throughout the crisis period in Somalia, since 1991, third party attempts have been made towards a peaceful solution, although most attempts were unsuccessful. Despite the many attempts by third parties to bring peace in the war-torn country, the people of Somalia are still in anguish, waiting in vain for peace to come. However the elements that contributed to the failure of third party interventions in Somalia can be addressed from two parts. These are the problems with the military intervention in Somalia, and the problems and challenges with the diplomatic reconciliation attempts.

The author concludes that, the failure of the UN to bring about reconciliation in Somalia was a result of lack of thoroughly planned, long-term state-building attempt. It is a problem with any quick-fix solutions. It lacked a coherent overall humanitarian – political – military game plan. As a result, that put the international gendarmerie response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia a trial-and-error test that compromised the following political intervention. It lacked sensitivity with political issues which compromised the following political mission.

From the findings analyzed in the previous chapter, it can be concluded that failures of diplomatic interventions in Somalia are results of problems with third parties, belligerents to the conflict, the relationship between the third parties and belligerents to the conflict, and the intervention strategies.

It can be concluded that, in view of the political background of the conflict and fragility of peace in Somalia, the regional stakeholders played a crucial role in spoiling the peace bringing initiatives for the country. They have been using Somalia as their battlefield for their own conflicting interest in the region, which even sometimes has got nothing to do with the poor and devastated Somalia. However, the impacts of external powers rivalry interest do not end with the regional powers. Even the USA, a country that swore to never set afoot in Somalia again, as a result of the shameful experience it had at the time of the UNOSOM operation, tried to impose her Anti-terrorism agenda on the country. As a result, since this anti-terrorist agenda of the US is based on a short-lived military operation has its repercussions of further complicating the already deteriorated Somalia politics. This further extended the situation in Somalia to take a religious dimension, strengthening fundamentalism, which further worsened relationships with in the Somalis.

Moreover, there has been lack of unified action by the international community, which manifests itself in violations of the arms embargo imposed by the UN on Somalia. As a result, there has been certain state and non-state actors, who preferred to utilize their resource by providing armaments and military trainings to the conflicting parties in Somalia, rather than contributing politically and financially to the state-building attempts in the country. Further, donors' lack of sufficient and effective assistance to facilitate peace and state building attempts in Somalia contributed to the unrealized hope of reconciliation.

In addition to the above, the dysfunctional strategies of pursuing peace processes, combined with unskilled management of the peace conferences also led the various promising initiatives to end up in a deadlock. As a result, the peace accords lacked the ownership feeling from the Somalis, which made it difficult to be implemented in the country.

Finally, much being said about the external challenges to the peace bringing attempts, there is a need to talk about the national actors fallouts. In order for any conflicts to be resolved at least there should be good-will and commitment from the conflicting parties to try the option. However, with the Somali warlords and other influential groups, including clan leaders there has been lack of prioritizing Somalia's peace and unity before their own individual or clan interests for political and economic power. This is a result of long experienced distrust among different clans, and also the deep-rooted ambition of the clan-based faction leaders, the clan elders, religious leaders and members of clans and sub-clans to seize power in Somalia. There are also powerful vested interests especially from the warlords and other illegal businessmen, in continued instability, conflict, and anarchy that undermined reconciliation efforts.

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
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
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Affirmation of Originality

I affirm that this is my original work except those acknowledged in the text. To the best of my knowledge the whole or part of the work has not been submitted for MA Degree at Addis Ababa University or any other university.

Signature