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ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT
MANAGEMENT

**The Ethiopian Developmental State Approach and the
Role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in
Democratic Governance: A Study on Selected Local NGOs**

**A Thesis Submitted to School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa
University in Partial Fulfillment for the Master of Arts Degree in Public
Management and Policy**

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June, 2017

**SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university, and that all the sources of materials used for the thesis have been acknowledged.

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List of Abbreviations

ChSA	Charities and Societies Agency (Ethiopia)
CRDA	Christian Relief and Development Association
CSF	Civil Society Fund
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CSP	Civil Society Proclamation
DS	Developmental States
EC	European Commission
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECA-AUC	Economic Commission for Africa – African Union Commission
ENPC	Ethiopian National Planning Commission
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front
EWLA	Ethiopian Women’s Lawyers Association
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FSS	Forum for Social Studies
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
HDI	Human Development Index
HRCO	Human Rights Council (Ethiopia)

HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council (South Africa)
ICNL	International Center for Not-for-profit Law
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGOs	International NGOs
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan)
MOFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (Ethiopia)
NBE	National Bank of Ethiopia
NGOs	Non- Governmental Organizations
NSA	Non State Actors
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
SOEs	State Owned Enterprises
TE	Transparency Ethiopia
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UN-ECA	United Nations - Economic Commission for Africa
VECOD	Vision Ethiopian Congress for Democracy
WB	World Bank

Abstract

The developmental state approach has been getting currency after the 'East-Asian miracle' has been taken as a success story by different scholars, analysts and the international community. Nowadays, a global focus is also being given on building a democratic-developmental state in developing countries including Ethiopia. In this case, in addition to building its own institutions, a particular state is expected to work closely with non-state actors including the civil society which will enable it to achieve its democratic and developmental goals.

The main purpose of this study was to identify, describe and produce an analysis of the Ethiopian developmental state approach and the potential role local NGOs in democratic governance. A semi-structured and in-depth interview schedules have been prepared and distributed to a purposefully selected four local NGOs, one consultation forum and concerned government institution. The selected NGOs have been operating for more than ten years, so that their activities can be assessed vis-à-vis the Ethiopian developmental state approach that has become an official government's paradigm in the last ten years or so.

The results of the study showed that, the role of local NGOs in democratic governance is important and can promote a democratic developmental state's agenda. Additionally, the government should play a vital role by strengthening the playing ground for non-state actors including the civil society and achieve a democratic developmental state's objective.

The paper contributes to a better understanding of the importance of and attitude towards local NGOs in the realm of a democratic-developmental state paradigm. Based on the results, it can serve as a basis for further research in the field.

Key words: *Democratic-Developmental states; local NGOs; Democratic Governance.*

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

For centuries, the State has been the most important socio-economic and political institution in societies, albeit to various degrees. In recent times, there has been renewed and increasing interest in the role of the State in the development process of African countries. The potential of the developmental State to contribute to Africa's development has rapidly and progressively achieved prominence in political and development discourse (Gedion 2015).

Taking the developmental states success stories of East-Asian tigers - Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and particularly that of Japan as global economic forces, the re-reading of the role of the State in the development process has got prominence. And this approach of state-led organizing and managing economic development is getting currency as a dominant way to get out of socio-economic backwardness by many developing countries including Ethiopia.

Cognizant of the above facts, the government of Ethiopia officially claims to follow a "democratic developmental state approach". This can be observed taking some instances. Nothing demonstrates this intention more strongly than the late Prime Minister's issuance of the draft of his master's thesis entitled "African Development: Dead ends and New Beginnings" in 2006. This was reinforced by his official statement made in 2010 saying that 'Democratic Federalism is one of the two pillars of our national renaissance. Together with the establishment and consolidation of an effective developmental state in our country, it has enabled us to begin the long road back to the frontiers of our civilization.' (Sehen and Tsegaye 2012).

Additionally, the official statement of the government can be found in the first Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP-I, 2010-2015) in its 3rd objective stating, "Establishing favorable conditions for sustainable state building through the creation of stable democratic and developmental state." (FDRE-GTP-I 2010, p.7).

Meanwhile, the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can be said to have begun active life and become as one of the socio-economic actors in Ethiopia, back to the 1970s when the country saw a devastating famine in Wollo and Tigray and both the international and local NGOs undertook relief and rehabilitation works (Desalegn et al. 2010).

Since then, the development of NGOs saw three phases: full engagement in relief and humanitarian work; the de-linking of relief and humanitarian work and focusing on basic services provision; engagement in governance, advocacy and human rights in addition to the service delivery (ibid).

Since their emergence as important actors in the modern Ethiopian socio economic and political phenomenon, NGOs in particular, continuously shaped their relationships with the incumbent governments in the periods that they have emerged and engaged. However, the view towards NGOs by governments has usually been based on many factors such as the competition provided by the NGO sector for the resource received from the international community and donor organizations, the strength of the NGO sector and the existing ideological orientation of the states towards who really represents the interests of the general public (Clark,200) . Hence, the relationship between the NGO sector and the state has never been easy.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Even though the developmental states in the East Asian tigers have been taken to achieve a remarkable success in economic development, they also have been criticized for being very much authoritative not democratic and autonomous not being embedded with society. The implementation of the developmental state plans was almost entirely dependent on discipline and the interventionist power of the state to guide the industrialization process. And some writers suggested that the developmental paths were predominantly designed on the premise that ‘Western democratic values were foreign and a luxury unsuited for the promotion of development in Asia’ (for instance Mohamed, 1994). And this has been familiarly known by many writers (for instance, Carothers, 2007), as the ‘sequencing fallacy’ to mean; development first and democracy later, (there will be a trade-off between development and democracy).

However, the above arguments have been very much criticized by many analysts based on the very nature of the East Asian developmental states which emerged as a result of distinct social, economic, political and cultural contexts which worked well in the 20th century demands and not work well to meet the 21st century demands. The 21st century social, political and economic trajectories have changed and new interests and demands have risen that are related with issues such as good governance, capability expansion, entertaining democratic values and civil/political rights. And to coup-up with these new demands, many developing countries’ states including Ethiopia are being pushed towards attaining the prescribed demands.

For instance, Edgheji 2010 suggests that the most important missing links with regard to the Asian development is the centrality of political institutions to sustain accelerated, equitable growth. The Asian developmental states ran into crisis in 1990s because they ignored the importance of political institutions including those public deliberations - such as consultative mechanisms that would enable the broader citizenry to influence and even determine development agenda.

A top-down policy-making process and authoritarian developmental states are unsustainable in the long run, and hence it is important that the would-be developmental states think of building such a state to be based on democratic governance (2010 p.9). Additionally, according to Mkandawire, a key feature of a democratic developmental state would include; robust state and societal institutions characterized by a *state-society nexus* that strongly emphasizes democratic oversight as a critical basis for the attainment of socially desirable development outcomes (Mkandawire 2003). And in the African context, in the 21st century, the developmental state needs to be anchored with democratic governance (Mkandawire 2010).

In a similar vein, with his important contribution of '*embedded-autonomy*', Evans has clearly stipulates that the embeddedness required form the 21st century is not similar to that of the 20th century in that, states need to build a more stronger relations with the civil society not only with the private sector as in the 20th century counterparts. According to (Evans 2010) in order to be able to create effective state-society linkages, the state must facilitate the organization of institutions in the "civil society." The 20th century developmental state's interaction with industry gave industrial elites a reason to become a more collectively coherent class. The 21st century developmental states must do the same for a much broader cross-section of society.

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) also prescribed for the African states including Ethiopia to follow the Malaysian type of development after the unsuccessful attempts of the SAP programs by the IMF and WB in the 1990s. But, at the same time the Commission set standards to design and implement the states' national development strategies based on Western democratic values. It explicitly suggested that the political leadership, private sectors and the *civil societies* in each African state need to collaborate with the committed professional bureaucracy to legally influence the direction of development (ECA, 2011).

In the realm of the broader civil society, the NGO sector has profoundly played a benchmarking and leading role as the third sector representing the interests of those sections of the society whom have not properly enjoyed the benefits from social, political and economic fruits.

They have persistently represented themselves as humanitarian and relief service workers, basic service providers such as health and education, working as voices for those sections of the society in issues like promoting justice, propagating democratic governance, advocating representation of interests in policy agendas and so on.

Cognizant of the above facts, the government of Ethiopia claims to promote a ‘democratic developmental state’ approach either formally or informally. For instance, the government in its official development plan clearly stipulates, “Establishing a stable *democratic and developmental state* and thereby creating a suitable environment for successive development endeavors; Strengthening the civil service and *civic societies* so as to strengthen democratic institutions.....” is one of its objectives.(GTP-I, 2010 pp.11).

Yet, as in many African countries, (except for Botswana and Mauritius), the Ethiopian developmental state is constantly being challenged by many cross-cutting issues. For instance, (Gedion 2015) suggests that, the challenges that Ethiopian government would need to address as the preconditions for establishing a democratic developmental state are; weak commitment to the democratization process, corruption and weak civil liberties. Additionally, a bulk of recent literature suggests that the government has been engaged in a more repressive and suppressive activities by passing rules and regulations which will restrict the activities of the civic society including the NGO sector.

For instance, since the Charities and Societies Proclamation of Ethiopia (CSP) No. 621/2009 has been enacted in February, 2009, it has been under much criticisms from the civil society, the international and local NGOs and the international donor organizations. Similarly, the International Center for Not-for-profit Law (ICNL), in its Ethiopian NGO law Monitor report 2009, asserts that the law is one of the most controversial NGO laws in the world. The Proclamation, among other things, restricts NGOs that receive more than 10% of their financing from foreign sources from engaging in essentially all human rights and advocacy activities. Yalemzewd et al. 2009 also noted that the Proclamation’s restrictions on ‘Ethiopian Resident’ and ‘Foreign’ NGOs will deprive Ethiopians of vital services by arguing that the government intends to use the CSO law as a means of rendering independent NGOs ineffective.

Here, there seems to be a contradiction among the above arguments. On the one hand, the Ethiopian government officially claims to follow a “democratic developmental state approach” and according to (Evans 2010), NGOs harmonize their relation with those kinds of states. On the other hand, the NGO sector has been consistently claiming the government’s action as restrictive and oppressive in many of the instances.

This leads us further into probing the concept of democratic developmental state. The concept of democratic developmental state denotes that a given state can be a developmentalist and at the same time advance democratic values for the two can arguably reinforce each other. And many writers (for instance, Matlosa, 2005) suggest that for a sustainable economic nationalism, which is a key for the existence and functioning of a developmental state, democratic governance is necessary.

Hence, this calls for a more systematic understanding of such issues as to; how can a democratic-developmental state be expressed? And more importantly, what could be the potential role of the NGO sector (particularly those of locally based NGOs) in democratic governance? And the focus of this study is towards assessing and describing these and related issues.

1.3. Objectives of the study

1.3.1 General objective

The main objective the research is to identify, describe and produce an analysis on the Ethiopian developmental state approach vis-à-vis the role of the NGO sector in democratic governance that can promote a democratic-developmental state's agenda by focusing on the cases of selected local NGOs.

1.3.2. Specific objectives

There are also other specific objectives that this study intends to achieve, these are:

- To examine the theoretical and practical ground on which the Ethiopian developmental state and the NGO sector relation is based on.
- To explain the prospects and the challenges that the Ethiopian developmental state approach has brought about which have important implications for the NGO sector in general and the selected NGOs in particular. And more importantly;
- To provide a critical analysis on the potential roles that the selected NGOs can play in democratic governance that can promote a democratic-developmental state's agenda.

1.4. Research questions

In order to achieve the outlined objectives, this study seeks to answer the following questions:

- How can the relationship between the NGO sector and the developmental state be analyzed both theoretically and practically?
- What are the basic prospects and challenges the current Ethiopian developmental state has brought about for the NGO sector in general and the studied NGOs in particular?
- What potential roles that the selected NGOs can play in democratic governance that can promote a democratic developmental state's agenda?

1.5. Research design and methodology

1.5.1. Research design

The literature on social science research classifies the research design according to the purpose of the study as: descriptive; explanatory and exploratory. As (Robson, 2002) prescribes, the object of descriptive research is 'to portray an accurate profile of persons, events or situations. This may be an extension of, or a forerunner to, a piece of exploratory research or, more often, a piece of explanatory research.

However, mere description of the situation is not enough, the research objectives guide us to go further and explain to draw conclusions from the data we are describing. There is also a need to evaluating data and synthesizing ideas related to the situation. The emphasis here is on studying a situation or a problem in order to explain the relationships between the variables.

Additionally, (Saunders et.al, 2009) argue that description in management and business research has a very clear place. However, it should be thought of as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. This means that if our research project utilizes description it is likely to be a precursor to explanation. The nature of this study first dictate us to properly describe and portray the main issues related with both the Ethiopian developmental state and the NGO sector so as to have a clear picture of the situation. Hence, this study will employ both descriptive and explanatory research designs.

1.5.2. Research strategy

Again, the nature of the study and the issues to be raised and explained guide us to employ an appropriate strategy/method to gain in-depth knowledge of the developmental state and NGOs relationship and the resulting implications. Hence, a *case study* is found an appropriate strategy.

As Morris and Wood argue, ‘The case study strategy will be of particular interest to you if you wish to gain a rich understanding of the context of the research and the processes being enacted. The case study strategy also has considerable ability to generate answers to the ‘why?’ as well as the ‘what?’ and ‘how?’ questions (Morris and Wood, 1991, cited in Saunders et.al, 2009).

1.5.3. Sources of data

Because a Case research is a method of intensively studying a phenomenon over time within its natural setting in one or a few sites, multiple methods of data collection, such as interviews, observations, prerecorded documents, and secondary data, may be employed for deriving rich, detailed and contextualized inferences about the phenomenon of interest (Bhattacharjee 2012).

Hence, both primary and secondary sources of data will be used to gather pertinent information on the issues under the study. The primary data will be collected by producing and conducting semi-structured and in-depth interviews with officials and key informants of the selected local NGOs, the policy and consultation forum and the Charities and Societies Agency.

The selected NGOs are:

1. *The Ethiopian Human Rights Council (HRCO)*
2. *The Ethiopian Women’s Lawyers Association (EWLA)*
3. *Vision Ethiopian Congress for Democracy (VECOD)*
4. *Transparency Ethiopia (TE)*

The consultation forum is:

5. *Forum for Social Studies(FSS)*

The government agency is:

6. *The FDRE-Charities and Societies Agency (ChSA)*

Hence, a total of twenty interview schedules have been conducted using the interviewer-guided semi-structured questions presented to the respondents and an in-depth interview schedules have also been conducted with the organization's representatives.

Having in mind the purpose of obtaining the most reliable and sufficient system level information that can show how the developmental state approach manifests itself and the activities of the NGO sector be described, secondary data will be collected from various government proclamations, policies, books, publications, journals and annual reports of different organizations. In addition, other online materials will also be fetched from the internet.

1.5.4. Data collection techniques

In order to gather pertinent data to describe and explain the problems and objectives of a study, an appropriate collection method should be employed. As Cooper and Schindler, 2008 clearly state, "Where it is necessary for you to understand the reasons for the decisions that your research participants have taken, or to understand the reasons for their attitudes and opinions, you are likely to need to conduct a qualitative interview.

Semi-structured and in-depth interviews provide you with the opportunity to 'probe' Answers, where you want your interviewees to explain, or build on their responses." (Cooper and Schindler 2008, cited in Saunders et.al. 2009).

Additionally, while collecting secondary data; reliability and convenience explain the selection of the source of data. A review of official documents has the edge of providing objective and verifiable information on a subject (Berelson, 1952 sited in Marshall & Rossman, 2006), specifically for quantitative records and study on official policies and programs.

Hence, in order to collect the primary data from the different officials and key informants in the data center, it is found appropriate to use *semi-structured and in depth interview methods*. Additionally, in order to collect pertinent secondary data, review of official documents from the government agencies, the selected organizations and other documented sources will be employed.

1.5.5. Sampling

In order to meet the objectives set and questions raised, the NGOs and respondents working there have to be selected in such a way that they are representative and very much related with the issue at hand. Meanwhile, other concerned bodies such as governing/regulating body officials, those working on policy matters related with the NGOs, policy and consultation forums will also be approached to gain their opinions on the matter. Hence, *purposive sampling* method is found appropriate for this.

Following (Newman's 2005) explanation, '*Purposive or judgmental sampling* enables you to use your judgment to select cases that will best enable you to answer your research question(s) and to meet your objectives. This form of sample is often used when working with very small samples such as in case study research and when you wish to select cases that are particularly informative.'

1.5.6 Data analysis

The data collected from the above sources using the corresponding techniques will be analyzed by qualitative description. Here, in the case studying of the NGOs on one hand and the features of the developmental state with its implications on the other, need to be analyzed with an in-depth data from secondary documents and primary sources. Hence analyzing these data without compromising one source for the other is of particular importance. This is called *content analysis* (Dawson2002). Dawson also suggests that by using this method, the researcher systematically works through each transcript assigning codes and themes, which may be numbers or words, to specific characteristics within the text.

More specifically, a theory driven deductive qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2000) will be used where prior formulated aspects of analysis, originating from the theoretical concept of developmental and/or democratic-developmental state approach and the role of the NGO sector in democratic governance will be built up based on the literature review. This is going to be used in connection with the selected documents as well as the data from the primary sources.

The data collected from the primary sources of audio recorded-in-depth interviews in each case were first transcribed and categorized in to different themes and responses from the semi-structured interview schedules will be classified in to different groups of responses. In some respects the quantitative data from secondary sources has been analyzed using simple statistical methods such as tables and graphs.

1.6 Significance of the study

There have been many studies by different local as well as international researchers and policy analysts on issues related with the Ethiopian developmental state and its structure. There are also a bulk of studies on the civic society in general and the NGO sector in particular operating in the country. Additionally, other fellow researchers usually focused on the 2009 CSP legislation and its impact on different groups of CSOs.

However, as long as the knowledge of this student researcher is concerned, many of the studies did not give due emphasis on relating the potential role that those local NGOs can play in democratic governance within the framework of a democratic-developmental state. This might emanate from the classical theoretical stand suggesting NGOs don't have a substantial role in this type of state structure as has been observed in East-Asia and elsewhere.

This study tries to provide an argument by analyzing the activities of the local NGOs in democratic governance issues such as; nurturing and maintaining democratic values, human rights, good governance, peace building, advocacy and other related issues in a developmental state structure in such a way that can strengthen the effort of making this state's agenda both democratic and developmental.

By way of doing this, the study tries to re-emphasize on the recently held international as well as continental theoretical argument for the potential role of locally based CSOs in strengthening human capability and democratic governance that can promote a democratic developmental state's agenda. Hence, this is believed to contribute to the existing local knowledge and effort by showing that this theoretical view should also be entertained in linking both the local NGO sector and the state on democratic governance issues. This is also believed to initiate other fellow researchers to go further in the area.

1.7. Scope and limitations of the study

As it has been outlined in section 1.3, the study concentrates on the role of local NGOs (Ethiopian Charities) in democratic governance that can promote a democratic-developmental state's agenda. Hence, it will not consider the other groups of NGOs such as Ethiopian Resident charities and foreign charities in to the analysis even though their operation might be incorporated in some respects.

In the study, the contributions and activities of the selected NGOs that have been given emphasis are engaged in issues of human rights, governance, accountability, law maintenance and peace building. However, they can also have other contributions which might not be addressed in the analysis. Additionally, there can be other CSOs who might be engaged in the above issues either directly or indirectly. Yet, the study is limited only to CSOs groups that the 2009 CSP have given them an exclusive right of engaging in the above democratic and governance activities.

Even though financial and material contributions of the government institutions and the local NGOs can be taken as an important indicator for their role, it was very difficult to find and present the financial data. Such data were not both properly recorded and organized by the government agency, nor were most organizations willing to provide them. Hence the available option to take was to fetch the data from secondary sources from other related bodies.

Due to time and resource limitations, the study has been limited to local NGOs that are headquartered in Addis Ababa. This study will not address the activities of other civic societies such as religious organizations, international or foreign organizations, traditional associations like “Edir”, “Ekub” and other similar cultural or religious professional associations.

1.8. Organization of the paper

This paper is organized in to five chapters. The first chapter provides an introduction of the whole study in terms of establishing the background, the research problem, objectives and the resulting questions and the methodologies followed. It also shows the significance and the scope and limitations that have been encountered.

The second chapter reviews the related literature to get a broad understanding of the meaning and defining features of developmental states within in the context of 20th and 21st century variants before it goes on to describe the Ethiopian developmental state approach. It has also gave due emphasis to describe the nature and arrangement of the NGO sector, its theoretical relationship with the state and their potential role in democratic and governance issues.

Chapter three provides the raw data presentation focusing on the responses from the government agency, the NGOs and the consultation forum. Here, the responses are organized in to themes with respect to the objectives of the study and the questions rose. Chapter four is dedicated to analyzing and interpretation based on the responses from chapter three and related data from secondary sources. Chapter five finally summarizes the findings from the study and provides the conclusion and the possible recommendations that have been forwarded.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter primarily deals with presenting the basic theoretical concepts of developmental states, NGOs and the relationship between them. A focus is given towards analyzing and comparing the defining features of democratic-developmental states vis-a-vis the Ethiopian state's approach. Additionally, the role of locally based NGOs in democratic and governance issues that have implications for a democratic-developmental state will be presented.

2.1 Developmental states: Concepts and Basic features

The notion of development and developmental states has been one of the most fiercely debated issues in the development discourse for the last 60 years or so. The debate on the concept is mainly concentrated towards issues like, what is meant by development and role of the state in development. Even though the state has been more or less at the center of a nations' success or failure in development, its role has mainly been determined by, the nature and arrangement of basic factors of development (labor, capital, technology and entrepreneurship), the influences of internal as well as external political, economic, cultural and social forces and the politico-economic and ideological orientation of the period. The following sub-sections deal with these.

2.1.1 The concept of a developmental state

There seems to be no one agreed-upon and inclusive definition of what a developmental state is. However, a body of literature provides alternative conceptual framework stemming from their disciplinary inclination (economics, political science, public policy, sociology and so on) and the differences in the respective contexts in time and geographic coverage. However, it is possible to identify certain communalities related to the role of state in economic development.

The literature provides us with some of the most important theoretical foundations and conceptualization of developmental states prescribed by major contributors. Writers such as Chalmers Johnson, Peter Evans, Adrian Leftwich, Ha-Joon Chang, and Omano Edigheji, to name some, have articulated their arguments based on the developmental role of the state in socio-economic transformation.

Chalmers Johnson, arguably the most cited author on the subject, introduced the phrase 'developmental state' in his 1982 seminal book: '*MITI and the Japanese Economic Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925– 1975*'.

Johnson used it to differentiate between alternative types of capitalism, where also he questioned the conventional view on the role of state in economy. In his argument, Johnson pointed out that the state was at the center crafting and coordinating the Japanese ‘economic miracle’ (Johnson 1982). From this important juncture on, many scholars and practitioners provided alternative definitions based on the basic elements and characteristics of a developmental state not on the concept of the term itself.

And this was taken as one of the gaps in conceptualization by contemporary scholars such as Edigheji, who has provided an alternative encompassing definition as:

A developmental state is one that authoritatively, credibly, legitimately and in a binding manner is able to formulate and implement its policies and programs. This entails possessing a developmentalist ideology that privileges industrialization, economic growth and expansion of human capabilities. Such a state also has to be able to construct and deploy the institutional architecture within the state and mobilize society towards the realization of its developmentalist project (Edigheji, 2010, p.4).

Edigheji’s definition looks not only at the political and institutional dimensions, but it also incorporates the ideological perspective. It stresses on the state power to emerge with a binding process based on its ideology.

2.1.2. Defining Features of developmental states

The literature has identified two major features: *a developmentalist ideology*; and *a structure* that pertains to the requisite institutions, norms and standards that can support development processes. ECA-AUC (2011) suggests that developmentalist ideology implies strong orientation and political commitment towards development that manifests in overall government decisions. On the other hand for development intentions to take effect, certain institutions with administrative and technical capacity are required including the building of political, administrative and technical capacity to support development projects.

Some writers like (Weiss, 2010) have analogized these two features as the ‘*software*’ and ‘*hardware*’ of developmental states. Further, the following more specific features of developmental states can be identified, mainly based on the experiences of the East Asian countries in the post Second World War era. It shall be noted, however, that none of these features is necessary or sufficient in itself for a developmental state to exist.

I. Vision-guidance and committed political leadership

This is taken as one of the most important elements of a developmental state's "software". The literature puts the role of the political leadership at the forefront in the East-Asian experiences. As the ECA-AUC's 2011 observation outlines, "Capable (but not necessarily authoritarian) leadership constitutes a primary agency in the construction of a developmental state. It must be a leadership that defines and articulates a clear developmentalist vision and an economic agenda for the country; outlines plans and strategies for achieving the goals; builds an elite coalition for support and ownership; builds the technical capacity to elaborate and sustain the agenda; and mobilizes popular support" (ECA-AUC 2011).

Circumstances which give rise to a development-oriented political leadership can be quite diverse. Based on the initial experiences of East Asian countries, Johnson and other analysts link the origin of such political leadership to conditions of "systemic vulnerability" comprising three major elements, namely a broad coalitional commitment, scarce resource endowment and severe security threats (Musamba 2012). According to Johnson Such developmental coalitions, generated and come to the fore because of the desire to break out of the stagnation of dependency and underdevelopment; the truly successful ones understand that they need the market to maintain efficiency, motivate the people over the long term, and serve as a check on institutionalized corruption while battling against underdevelopment" (Johnson 1987, cited in ECA-AUC 2011, p. 97).

Other writers such as Fritz and Menocal suggest that the commitment of the political leadership was motivated by regional competition, nationalism and the desire to 'catch up' with the West. As a result, development was regarded as a 'national project' of the first priority. Such determined political elites were either relatively uncorrupted or limited personal gains to non-predatory corruption which did not impede investments and the expansion of national productivity (Fritz/Menocal 2006: 8-9).

II. Relatively autonomous, efficient and effective state bureaucracy

Relative autonomy of a state and its bureaucracy is also taken as an important milestone of developmental states of the East Asian success stories. The ECA-AUC 2011's report conceptualizes state autonomy in a way that it is about the capacity of the state to formulate policies independent of contending social forces, to serve the best interests of the country as perceived by the managers of state power (ECA-AUC 2011, p. 98).

It implies that the state has a high degree of capacity to generate and analyze information, on the basis of which it can independently formulate and implement its policies without being captured by sectional interests. State autonomy is the antithesis of state capture. In reality, however, complete state autonomy is often unrealizable.

An important description of this attribute of the state has been prescribed by Peter Evans in his familiar articulation of the concept as; “embedded state autonomy”. Evans used it to describe a situation in which the state has relative independence but responds and coordinates with non-state actors and institutions, especially the private sector and civil society. It requires the system to perform the task of balancing between being able to understand and forecast the needs of the economy (by being embedded in the private sector) and being sufficiently autonomous to prevent being trapped by the rent seeking behavior of businesses that are after short cuts through government favors than sweating to win competition of the market (Evans 1995).

However, Evans adds, “the most commonly articulated means for states to achieve internal cohesion or coherence is to be endowed with robust, effective, and rule-following Weberian bureaucracy characterized by professionalism, discipline and technical skills as the core of their administrative competence” (Evans, 1995 p. 12). Additionally, long-term career rewards created commitment and a sense of “corporate coherence” that gave the bureaucratic apparatuses a certain kind of autonomy.

Yet, realistically speaking, the developmental states did not enjoy a perfect autonomy argues ECA-AUC, 2011, as the experience of Japan and Korea showed, rather than the complete state autonomy that existed in the industrialization phase, there was a dense network of ties among the state, the private sector and civil society, in which the state was the “guarantor” of the interests of those groups within the context of broad national objectives of economic development.

III. State’s institutional capacity with competent bureaucracy

In addition to being autonomous and embedded, the bureaucracy needs to be capable and competent in order to organize and lead the other non-state sectors towards the national development agenda. Hence, the UN-ECA, 2005 report suggests the capacity of public institutions, especially the bureaucracy, is crucial to economic performance in a developmental state. The bureaucracy constitutes the “soft underbelly of the state”, which advises the political executive and formulates and implements public policies. Professionalism, discipline and technical skills are core issues in administrative competence and capability (UN-ECA, 2005).

Some studies, (for instance, UNCTAD, 2009) attributed the success of the South East Asian developmental countries to the presence and entrenchment of a powerful, highly competent and independent bureaucracy, endowed with a high degree of prestige, legitimacy and authority that enabled it to implement policies and strategies in accordance with nationally defined developmental agendas, including through forging productive ties with the private sector.

However, ECA-AUC 2011, argues, the bureaucracy or the bureaucratic elites are not the only players in developmental governance. There are other relevant institutions and actors supportive of a developmental state, including the central bank, other financial regulatory authorities, and the judiciary. Their capacity is directly related to the capacity and performance of the state.

IV. Effective national development planning

In addition to the above distinctive features, the existence of full-fledged national development planning has been instrumental as the experiences of the East-Asian pioneers suggests. A developmental state uses an effective planning and coordination mechanisms to gear the generation and use of labor, capital and other resources as well as the activities of different bodies in different sectors towards the realization of the vision set.

At the center of coordinating and organizing the execution of those development plans, the role of pilot agencies comes in to picture. For instance, In Korea, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) is considered the “brain and engine of the Korean economic miracle” and as Chang 2010 argues the EPB was the quintessential ‘pilot agency’ of the developmental state representing a typical example in coordinating the activities of Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI), the Banks and State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Chang 2010, p. 89).

Even though it did not have as much power as its Korean counter -part, due to the constraints imposed by the Japan’s Ministry of Finance, the role of MITI is taken as a hallmark for the development of the nation. Similarly, the role of pilot agency was played by Industrial Development Bureau (IDB) which was a coordinating committee, rather than a coherent ministry or agency (ibid).

Proposing even more power for the pilot agencies, ECA-AUC (2011) suggests that, besides creating a pro investment macroeconomic environment, supervision of financial institutions and providing incentives for the private sector, the agency may also set target against which a carrot and stick method of motivation may be applied – rewarding those who met the target and punishing those who failed.

V. Commitment to build human capacity

A developmental state often reinforces its human capacity and invests in social policy and programmes. These dimensions include investment in quality education, health-care services, economic and social infrastructure and, in some cases, land reform. In most East Asian economic models, “social policies are always important ingredients in the arsenal of developmental States.

In much of the developmental state analysis, workers are considered as one of the very essential inputs for industrial policies to work. Particularly in the early stages, the late comers depend much on labor intensive industries with learned technologies. The learning effect (i.e. copying, analyzing, applying and improving), enables the late industrializers to transform much faster than the early industrialized countries (Amsden1989, cited in Ayenachew 2014). On the other hand, one of the peculiar characteristics of developmental states is the need for effective bureaucracy with capable bureaucracy to make and implement decisions. This obviously requires well trained high quality staff in the bureaucracy.

2.1.3. Variants of developmental states

In the above section, we have seen some of the defining features of developmental states primarily based on the 1950's -1980's East-Asian experiences. The dominant development literature extensively relied on the socio-political and cultural conditions that existed in countries such as Japan, South-Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as enabling factors for having successful economic and social development. This is taken as ‘the typology of 20th century developmental states’.

However, many development analysts (for e.g. Evans 1995; 2008, Mkndwire 2004 Meyns and Musamba 2010 and Edgheji 2005;2010) suggest that relying on those East-Asian experiences is not always plausible since the 21st century states are faced with another kind of socio-economic and cultural conditions and challenges. Hence, looking closely towards the socio-political and economic situations of the 20th century developmental states vis-à-vis the 21st century counterparts is always important in drawing an analytical frame work and explanation.

I. The 20th century ‘classical’ developmental states

The literature explaining about the 20th century developmental states primarily relies heavily on East Asian countries. ‘Typical’ examples include the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Brazil can also be cited as one of the outstanding examples of a developmental state that successfully achieved macro-economic stability, export-led industrialization, spiraling economic growth, expansion of infrastructure, and greater social welfare. Less obvious examples include the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden).

While a variety of 20th states have played important roles in promoting development, (argues Evans 2008) theorizing with regard to the 20th century developmental state has drawn most heavily on post-World War II East Asia (e.g., Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). The East Asian Tigers (including the “city state tigers” of Hong Kong and Singapore) managed to change their position in the world economic hierarchy, moving from “underdeveloped” to “developed” in the course of two generations.

In this regard, Chang 2010 also argues that the ‘classical’ developmental state is an ideal type derived from the East Asian- more specifically Japanese-experience between 1950s and 1980s. Yet, there were variations, even within East Asia. For instance, the Korean state pursued some of the market defying selective industrial policies intervening in the affairs of the private sector. The Taiwanese state did not have to intervene in the private sector as in Korea and Japan since there was a weaker private sector. The Taiwan’s state-financed R&D played a more important role. Singapore also used different model by combining free-trade, a welcoming (albeit carefully targeted approach) to foreign direct investment (FDI) and a massive SOE sector (one of the largest in the non-oil producing world, producing 22% of GDP, when the world average is 9-10%) (Chang, 2010). Explaining the unique cultural context of Japan, Chalmers Johnson, in his MITI and the Japanese Miracle, states that:

“...The economic miracle occurred because the Japanese possess a unique, culturally derived capacity to cooperate with each other. This capacity to cooperate reveals itself in many ways; lower crime rates than in other, less homogenous societies; subordination of the individual to the groups; intense group loyalties and patriotism, and, last but not least, economic performance. The most important contribution of the culture to economic life is said to be Japan’s famous “consensus,” meaning virtual agreement among government, ruling political party, leaders of industry, and people on the primary of economic objectives for the society as whole—and on the means to obtain those objectives.” (Johnson 1982, in Woo-cummings eds. 1999).

Chang further argues that the classical developmental state was not however confined to East Asia. During the same period, under similar political conditions, France used a very similar strategy of economic development involving (indicative) planning by the Commissariat General du Plan (CGP- the planning commission), sectoral industrial policy led by elite bureaucrats and aggressive use of SOEs (Chang 2010).

In the same vein, Chang also contends that the Scandinavian countries have also practiced a variety of developmentalism since the 1950s. In Scandinavia except in Finland until the 1970s, political hegemony was with the left, and political legitimacy was derived from the welfare state and full employment, rather than rapid growth. So, even though the Scandinavian countries do not fit the classical developmental state ideal type, there is a good reason to describe them as developmental state, if not the classical variety (ibid).

More interestingly, the US is also taken to follow a developmentalism intervention in the post-WW-II period. For instance, in his formulation of the developmental state theory, Johnson juxtaposed the Japanese developmental state with the 'regulatory state' of the US. Additionally, Block 2008, argues that the US has had a very strong 'developmental network state' (as opposed to a 'developmental bureaucratic state of East Asian kind), by applying many of the developmentalist projects to be pursued under the guise of 'defense' policy. Many of the sectors where the US has international competitiveness have been developed through public funding of R&D and public procurement for 'defense' (computers, semiconductors, aircraft, Internet) and 'health' (drugs, genetic engineering) (Block 2008, cited in Chang 2010).

Having overviewed the developmental states in East Asia, the Scandinavia, France and somehow the US, one needs to pose the question, how much is China a developmental state? Does it fulfill the requirements to be called one? Does the Chinese government use developmental state theory as the main ideology of the state? These important questions have been addressed by Andrzej Bolesta by relying on the basic theoretical analysis of developmental states.

In his argument, Bolesta suggests that, based on the developmental state analysis, most of the features inherent in the East Asian states, shows that China is also a developmental state (however, with a different nature). The Chinese state is neither Socialist nor capitalist but an interventionist one. The Chinese authorities conduct a developmental policy via industrialization, in an undemocratic environment. It is the state who supervises the economic changes of the country and intervenes where necessary, although its power is by no means absolute. Constant improvements of the public administration will probably prevent the type of bad management that has been prevalent in India, or the chaos of political rotation that has dogged Mexico and Brazil (Bolesta 2007).

In more general terms, the 20th century ‘developmental-bureaucratic states’ of East Asia and developmental-welfare states of Scandinavia have had their own peculiar features as extensively explained and analyzed by different development theorists. Many of the literature focus on the nature of the East Asian experience as being successful in achieving economic development but being criticized of poor state-society relations, being highly authoritarian and un-democratic. This lends itself to the argument that in building a successful developmental state, it is therefore required to build a political system and bureaucracy as the East Asians have built.

In this line, Ha-Joon Chang suggests; the fact that the Korean, Singaporean and Taiwanese states were all dictatorial has prompted many people to think that a developmentalist model is practically rejecting democracy, and therefore unacceptable to a country committed to democracy. However, this is not true even in relation to the classical developmental states of Japan and France where both were credited of being democratic in the post- WWII period (Chang 2010).

Additionally, Peter Evans also argues; “Despite the ambivalent character of the 20th Century developmental states relations with industrial elites, ties to these elites were not balanced against connections to other social groups. To the contrary, civil society as a whole was excluded from the process of “state-society synergy.” Private industrial elites were seen as key collaborators in enabling industrial transformation as well as key sources of information regarding the feasibility of specific industrial goals. Other social groups were peripheral, if not threatening to this exclusive state-society partnership” (Evans 2008, p.7).

Hence, the basic vision of the 20th Century developmental state remains compelling. A coherent capable state apparatus is paired with dense ties to private entrepreneurial elites to produce forward-looking investments that enhance productivity, grow incomes and lead to increased well-being. It is characterized by being much authoritative not democratic and strong in being autonomous not being embedded with society. And this has initiated many in the development discourse to provide an alternative model of a developmental state.

II. The 21st century developmental states

So far, it has been emphasized on the ‘classical developmental states’ by which the East Asian model pre-dominated the development discourse. The features and basic elements of the then 20th century East Asian developmental state typology have prompted many in the academics to forward an argument in which; any country opting to construct a developmental state by emulating on the East Asian model needs first to build the pre-requisite institutional organizations as found in the East Asian counterparts.

However, other theorists forward a counter argument for the above, emphasizing on the important issue that developmental States have no single model, however, they have emerged in history through many trials and much error; hence no easy template or “one-size-fits-all” formula may be used to construct them. Additionally, based on the assumption that the political, economic, and social conditions that have prevailed in the 20th century classical developmental states is not similar to the 21st century conditions, and also provided an alternative model which can properly function in the 21st century would-be developmental states. In the following subsection, the theoretical aspects will be briefly presented mainly based on the analysis provided by writers such as Evans, Mkndwire, Edgheji, and others.

The capability-expanding 21st century developmental states approach (Peter Evans)

In his important contribution of ‘*embedded-autonomy*’, Evans has clearly expressed what the 20th century classical developmental state looked like. By further extending his argument, the embeddedness required from the 21st century is not similar to that of the 20th century in that states need to build a more stronger relations with the civil society not only with the private sector as in the 20th century counterparts.

Evans in his 2008 and 2010 important works prescribed a new typology of 21st century developmental sates based on three theoretical strands of growth and development. The implications of taking the strands of the “modern economics” of development and applying them are important in answering the question, “What is the most effective role for the state in the process of development?” Development in the current century will differ from the 20th century version along a wide variety of dimensions, looking at the changing sector dynamics is a way of highlighting the differences.

Focusing on the declining centrality of manufacturing and the increasingly strategic role of services provides an empirical bridge between changes in development theory and the transformation of the role of the developmental state. This also shows growth and productivity as driven primarily by changes in the stock of ideas and in people’s capacity to take advantage of them (i.e., levels of education and training) (Evans 2008).He further argues:

Accelerating economic growth in 21st century requires expanding access to the existing stock of ideas, increasing effective utilization of this stock and generating of new ideas suited to a country’s specific circumstances. All of this depends on the expansion of human capabilities. Left to themselves, markets will not deliver an optimal supply of capability-expanding services.

Only aggressive and efficient entrepreneurial engagement by public institutions can deliver what is needed. At the same time, states must find ways to resist the traditional logic of political economy which pushes them to overprotect monopolies control of the existing stock of ideas, restricting access and utilization and thereby reducing both growth and well-being (Evans 2008, p. 17).

Hence, the most obvious starting point for more aggressive state action is ramping up the effective delivery of capability-expanding services. Since all modern states play a central role in the provision of health and education, this is a task which public institutions cannot escape in any case. The question is whether they undertake it in the aggressive developmental fashion warranted by its central economic importance. Since the under-remuneration of capability-expanding services is also a distortion that reduces the wellbeing of a growing portion of the workforce, aggressive action in this arena is a growth strategy with immediate positive welfare effects (ibid).

Hence, argues Evans, in order to be able to create effective state-society linkages, the state must facilitate the organization of counterparts in “civil society.” The 20th century development state’s interaction with industry gave industrial elites a reason to become a more collectively coherent class. The 21st Century developmental state must do the same for a much broader cross-section of society.

It won’t be easy, says Evans, “Civil society” is a complicated beast, full of conflicting particular interests and rife with individuals and organizations claiming to represent the general interest. Still, shared interests in capability expansion are broad and deep. In addition, since capture is less of a danger in building ties with non-elites, the public institutions can concentrate on the positive side of this political project.

Thus, as a concluding remark, Evans forwards: Institutional approaches to development remind us that these changes cannot be achieved simply by re-formulating policy goals. Transforming public institutions is the only way to produce a state with the capacity to meet 21st Century requirements. Additionally, for the capability approach, deliberative institutions and the broad based connections between state and civil society that they entail are the only way to ensure either the flows of information necessary to guide the allocation of public resources or the “co-production” necessary for the effective delivery of capability expanding services. And countries that do manage to move in the direction of the required institutional transformations will be rewarded with more productive and dynamic economies. They will also better enable their citizens to “lead the kind of lives they value – and have reason to value” (p., 18-19).

Other Arguments for the 21st century democratic-developmental states

Even though it was not a principal point of discussion, some contributors to the developmental state debate did reflect on the development – democracy relationship. For instance, Leftwich has made the issue one of his academic concerns. In his argument, he shares the widely-held view that “there is no necessary relationship between democracy and development” (Leftwich 2000, p.133). They operate at counter-purposes and, therefore, require different institutions. In other words, development is a long-term process directed towards radical change, while democracy operates on short-term premises involving compromise and consensual decisions (p.182).

Musamba 2010, reemphasized that Leftwich’s argument does not dispute that development states have also emerged under democratic rule, but sees this occurring essentially under dominant-party or consociational democracy, i.e., democracies with authoritative, if not autocratic leadership. He refers to Botswana and Mauritius respectively under these headings. In his view developmental states are more likely to emerge under non-democratic autocratic rule. In short, he argues, “there have been some democracies and some non-democracies that have been developmentally successful, and it is therefore crystal clear that regime type (that is, democratic or not) has had little to do with it” (Leftwich 2000, quoted in Musamba 2010 p.40).

In a similar vein, White (1998) provided an argument based on the East-West block conflict of the “Cold War” and made the “arguments about the hypothetical developmental advantages of authoritarianism irrelevant” in many countries where autocratic rule is not an option any more, while democracy has become widely accepted (White 1998). White also discusses three areas of action for the institutional design of a democratic developmental state: state institutions, political society, and civil society, but he expresses skepticism about the prospects for their realization.

Omano Edigheji has submitted an explicit argument in favour of a democratic development state. He sees a weakness in the conception of what he calls the “classical developmental state” in that it “paid no attention to the nature of the political regime”, while implying on the basis of East Asian experiences that their development performance was related to the undemocratic nature of their states (Edigheji 2005 p 18).

Embarking on the feasibility of building a developmental state in South Africa as in elsewhere, Edgheji (2010) also forwards a counter-argument on the “sequencing fallacy” of first development and then democracy. The achievements of the East Asian development ‘miracle’ have been mistakenly taken by many in the development literature to emphasize on the importance of having competent and efficient bureaucracy for successful development.

However, (argues Edgheji), ‘competent bureaucracy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a developmental state. That the Asian developmental states were born in the context of authoritarianism does not mean that all developmental states must be autocratic. History gives us examples of many autocratic regimes characterized by developmental failures as well as many democratic states with developmental successes (such as the Scandinavians) that have achieved social, economic and political freedom’ (Edgheji 2010, p. 8).

The above argument points to one of the most important missing links with regard to the Asian development- namely the centrality of political institutions to sustain accelerated, equitable growth (suggests Edgheji). The Asian developmental states ran into crisis because they ignored the importance of political institutions including those public deliberations - such as consultative mechanisms – that would enable the broader citizenry to influence and even determine development agenda. A top-down policy-making process and authoritarian developmental state are unsustainable in the long run, and hence it is important that the would-be developmental states think of building such a state to be anchored on democratic governance (2010 p.9).

Similar to Edgheji, Mkandawire has also come out strongly in favour of “a democratic, developmental and socially inclusive order” in Africa. And like Evans Mkandawire also stresses the importance of the states’ ability to persuade key stakeholders to support its development agenda. To stress on the point that there is no contradiction between democracy and development, he outlines the experiences of developmental states in the context of democratic governance. These include Japan, the Nordic countries and the two African countries; Botswana and Mauritius (Mkandawire 2010).

Additionally in his earlier work, Mkandawire outlined four basic characteristics of a developmental state; First, the developmental state is focused by developmental leadership and elite “ideological hegemony”, Second, in terms of institutions, a developmental state requires the capacity to implement economic policies effectively in order “to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development”, Third, state autonomy to devise long-term economic policies without interference from particularistic interests is central to the survival of a developmental state and fourth, such a state needs some social anchoring that prevents it from using its autonomy in a predatory manner (Mkandawire 2001 cited in Musamba 2010 p 42).

Hence, a key feature of a democratic developmental state, according to Mkandawire, would include robust state and societal institutions characterized by a state-society nexus that strongly emphasizes democratic oversight as a critical basis for the attainment of socially desirable development outcomes. And in the African context, in the 21st century, the developmental state needs to be anchored with democratic governance (Mkandawire 2010).

2.2. The Ethiopian developmental state

Even though it has been the subject of debate among many scholars as well as politicians, Ethiopia officially claims to be a developmental state. It has been more than two decades since the concept and some elements of the developmental state model started to emerge in various policies of the country. However, it is about a decade since it started to be openly pronounced by the Ethiopian government and become a subject of heated discussion in academic forums.

The inception of a developmental state approach in Ethiopia

The emergence and inception of a developmental state paradigm as an official government approach in Ethiopia can be seen in different historical, socio-political and economic contexts. However, there are two major issues related with this: the *first* is the country's successive attempt to emulate the developmental paths of different countries and the *second* is the beginning of 21st century global phenomena that led to the failure of the neo-liberal paradigm in Africa.

The politics of emulation in Ethiopia is marked to have begun in mid-nineteenth century with Imperial Russia being the first model for modernization and development. It was then followed by an attempt to copy from the Meiji period of the Japanese Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This process was interrupted by the war with Fascist Italia, and after the Second World War the British Monarchy emerged as a prominent model among other western countries. The 1974 revolution brought the military socialist regime which devotedly followed the Soviet Union as an example (Fantini, 2013, cited in Ayenachew 2014, p22).

The 1991 overthrow of the socialist regime by an armed struggle did not result in turning to western models, as it happened in other countries, rather to “a revised Marxism distinguished especially by adherence to Stalin’s theory of the ‘national question’” (Clapham, 2006, *ibid* p.22). Ethiopia’s shift, in the past decade, to model its development project mainly after the 1970s and 80s industrialization experiences of East Asian countries, with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and more recently China being often mentioned as examples (*ibid* p.22), shows that the search for a developmental model to emulate is still a continuing process.

On the other hand, the developmental state paradigm is taken as part of a global reaction to the failed attempts of the neo-liberalism in many parts of the developing world. The international financial institutions (IFIs) inaugurated Structural Adjustments Programmes (SAPs) as rescue packages for the crisis-ridden African economies. By the mid-1980s and early 1990s, almost every other African State had adopted one form of SAPs or the other. However, many analysts and commentators are of the view that SAPs were more hurtful than helpful to African countries,

and that aggregately, they did not engender any meaningful development in the countries that adopted them (ECA 2013). Coupled with this, the 2007-08 global financial and economic crisis and the resulting government intervention as a form of bail-out strategies in the US and Europe, has led many developing countries including Ethiopia, to embrace the already ongoing emulating of the 'third option' for state-led development (developmental state approach).

Meanwhile, the official inclination of the current ruling party (EPRDF) and that of the government towards embracing this paradigm can be observed in some instances. The most important is, the late Prime Minister's issuance of the draft of his master's thesis entitled "African Development: Dead ends and New Beginnings" in 2006 (Zenawi 2006, p.36). And this was reinforced by his official statement made in 2010 saying that 'Democratic Federalism is one of the two pillars of our national renaissance. Together with the establishment and consolidation of an effective developmental state in our country, it has enabled us to begin the long road back to the frontiers of our civilization' (Zenawi, 2010a). 'Since he was the most influential person in the political and economic landscape of the country, his conviction was a clear indication that developmentalism was about to become a mania of the whole country' (Bøås 2012).

Additionally, the official statement of the government can be found in the first Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP-I) in its 3rd objective stating, "Establishing favorable condition for sustainable state building through the creation of stable democratic and developmental state." (GTP-I, 2010, p.7).

Ethiopia's official move towards embracing the developmental state approach is viewed in two contending arguments by the academics and political discourse. One view claims that the realization of the country's underdeveloped status in many aspects of life, along with the international momentum created by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the conviction of the ruling elites about the eminent national danger of continuing to live with chronic poverty led to the reassessment of the development approaches of the country which ended up favoring the developmental paradigm (Woldegebriel 2013, Ayenachew 2014).

The contrary view puts that, the real reason for the emergence of the developmental state in Ethiopia is the strong political desire of the ruling party to create an excuse for more grips on power and to the establishment of a one party hegemony (Alemayehu, 2009; Hassan, 2008). This view also asserts that the 2005 election crisis was a land mark event for the ruling party to realize the fact that it was losing ground and to take a swift change of strategy by forcefully pushing developmentalism. In doing so, the ruling party maintains not only its power but also its heavy hand on the economy (ibid). However, it should be noted that the ongoing debate is usually based and intensified on the ideological positions of the ruling government and the opposition.

2.3. Non- Governmental organizations (NGOs): an overview

In the above discussions, an attempt has been made to present a comparative view on the defining features of the classical developmental states vis-à-vis the features of 21st century developmental states as discussed in section 2.1.3. However, with respect to the interest of this paper and to materialize the democratic-developmental state agenda of bringing the state-society linkage on board, further discussion on the role of local NGOs and the mechanisms in which a democratic-developmental state entertains these actors needs to be addressed. The following section tries to discuss the role of NGOs in democratic governance by first portraying the theoretical concepts on NGOs and their relationship with the state.

2.3.1. NGOs and CSOs: A note on terminology

In the general literature, the organizations that are the object of this paper are known by a variety of names: the voluntary sector, civil society, non-government, not-for-profit organizations, non-state actors, charities, or private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Many aid actors, particularly among governments in developing countries, refer to ‘NGOs’ and their role in international aid and development cooperation. But the phrase ‘NGO’ is contested terminology, and for many has been subsumed within a broader category of ‘civil society organizations’ or ‘CSOs’. The definition adopted and used by the UNDP suggests:

“CSOs can be defined to include all non-market and non-state organizations outside of the family in which people organize themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain. Examples include community-based organizations and village associations, environmental groups, women’s rights groups, farmers’ associations, faith-based organizations, labor unions, co-operatives, professional associations, chambers of commerce, independent research institutes and the not-for-profit media. ‘NGO’ is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘CSO’, but NGOs should be properly understood as a subset of CSOs involved in development cooperation, albeit often one with no clear boundaries” (UNDP 2013 p.124).

The UNDP further differentiates between International NGOs (INGOs) and NGOs as:

“International NGOs (INGOs) can be seen as a distinct category among non-state actors, which have been very prominent in development cooperation during the past decade....

They constitute a subset of NGOs in which coalitions or families of NGOs, based in various donor and developing countries, have formally associated in an international or global governance structure. These international structures coordinate their 'NGO family' programming at the global level. This characteristic changes the INGO's relationship with a given donor or public in an individual donor country as these organizations develop, finance and promote programmes across donor countries. Some well-known examples are World Vision International, CARE International and Save the Children International" (UNDP 2013 p.124).

The terms *civil society* and *the NGO sector* are not interchangeable. Civil society refers to the large universe of nongovernmental entities found in virtually every society; labor unions and trade guilds, professional associations, grassroots community organizations, cultural affiliations, and other voluntary associations. Significant among subsets of actors within civil society are the NGOs broadly engaged in poverty alleviation and civic education (Clark 2000). Hence, it can be argued that the NGO sector is taken as the subset of CSOs which operates formally (registered by legitimate government institution) in any society.

The emergence of NGOs is associated with the coming to picture of development agenda in the 1960s as suggested by Deborah 2006. "The development era is said to have been launched by President Truman in 1949, and indeed most of the best-known specialized UN agencies were established at around that time. Development NGOs came into being even more recently, though many of today's familiar names-Save the Children Fund, CARE, Oxfam-began their lives as welfare or emergency relief agencies, and either 'converted' to development in the 1960s and 1970s, or at the very least discovered it. Thousands more were spawned as the development industry really took off. As it became better understood that the causes of poverty and vulnerability were structural, and not 'natural', so it became part of NGO lore that development was the best form of disaster prevention, and that a 'developmental' rather than a 'derring-do' response was more appropriate in emergencies" (Deborah 2006, p. 9).

By contrast, argues (Deborah 2006), Civil society has a centuries-long history in Western political thought, dating back to the philosophers of Ancient Greece. It is very much alive and well today, although, as is increasingly obvious, it is a very imprecise term. Like some of its predecessors in the development lexicon-'community', 'participation', 'bottom-up development' it is more often invoked to convey a benign glow than to illuminate debate or practice.

2.3.2. NGOs in Ethiopia: Background and current arrangements

In the above section, a brief terminological definition has been forwarded about the NGO sector and its operational set up. In this section an attempt will be made to reflect on the NGO sector in the Ethiopian context which will be vital to analyze the studied NGOs' contribution and the challenges they faced when engaging in democratic and governance issues.

1. Historical overview of NGOs in Ethiopia

The existence of civil society in Ethiopia is not a new phenomenon. Civil society in the form of self-help system has long existed in the country. However, there is little written information on these systems. The emergence of modern, formal and legal Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) such as trade unions, professional associations and Non-Government Organization (NGOs), is a recent phenomenon.

The voluntary/Non-Governmental sector in Ethiopia has a short history, going back in effect to the last years of the Imperial regime. When the Civil Code containing the law of associations meant to govern all voluntary organizations was issued in 1960, there were hardly any active organizations that may be described as NGOs or CSOs in the proper sense of the word. By the latter part of the 1960s, there were a small number of professional associations registered with the Ministry of Interior, which was then the regulating body, but these were mainly concerned with the basic interests of their members and professions and did not play any significant role in development or other public issues. There were also government supported women' associations, patriotic groups and others but these played a marginal role and had only a muted voice. (Desalegn et al. 2008 p.11).

The sector may be said to have begun active life in the early 1970s when as a result of the devastating famine in Wollo and Tigray and the global publicity it received the Imperial regime was forced to open its doors to international and local NGOs to undertake relief and rehabilitation activities. When the Christian Relief Fund, later called CRDA was formed as an umbrella organization in 1973, it drew about a dozen organizations of which the majority was faith-based groups. The equally tragic famine of the mid-1980s saw more NGOs established in the country to engage in the relief effort (ibid). At the time the Dergue had consolidated its power and established a hard-line 'Stalinist-communist' political and economic system, here too, it allowed NGO interventions grudgingly but kept a watchful eye on the work of the organizations.

Both in the earlier period and later during the Derg, NGOs were engaged primarily in relief operations, however, they were able subsequently to shift from relief work to rehabilitation and later to development activities though in both cases they were expected to conform to the policy framework established at the time (ibid).

Ethiopia's long history as a feudal monarchy and Marxist regime have left most structures of civil society stunted. Indeed, by the time the Dergue collapsed in 1991, virtually all civil society entities had been co-opted or barred from meaningful existence by the regime. The NGO sector then primarily comprised two significant groupings: international relief agencies, tolerated by necessity by the government and the humanitarian wings of the opposition groups operating beyond the government's reach. Authentic national NGOs (beyond small, church-affiliated agencies) barely existed. Other civil society entities had fared no better as professional associations, trade unions, the media, academia, the private business sector, and the like were suppressed by the Mengistu's regime (Clark 2000).

With the fall of the Dergue Regime in May 1991 and the political liberalization during the transitional period, the voluntary sector saw a marked transformation in both engagement and size. Not only was there a sharp rise in the number of CSOs, both national and international, but there was a shift from relief operation to development interventions. By the end of that decade, advocacy organizations had emerged, namely organizations engaged in human rights concerns (including rights of women and children), in promoting good governance and access to justice, in voter education, environmental protections, and public policy reform. It was the first time such organizations had appeared in the country (CRDA 2006, cited in Eman 2012).

II. Current arrangements of NGOs in Ethiopia

For the sake of keeping similarity and clarity in the Ethiopian context, the concept of NGOs should be clarified vis-à-vis their current arrangement as defined by the Ethiopian Charities and Societies Agency (FDRE-ChSA), particularly operational definition by the Charities and Societies Proclamation of Ethiopia (CSP) No. 621/2009. In this regard, the agency has re-registered formerly operating local as well as international NGOs with a new label as; Ethiopian charities, Ethiopian resident charities and foreign charities. Societies are also included as entities operating as; Ethiopian societies, Ethiopian resident societies and Foreign societies, in the vast CSO environment.

According to the proclamation, CSOs formed by citizens and run with support from local sources are given *constitutional protection* and are encouraged to operate in areas related to human rights and democracy, equality of religions and ethnic groups, conflict resolution and strengthening of the justice system. They also have the right to appeal to court from decisions of the Charities and Societies Agency to cancel their registration or suspend them. On the other hand, Ethiopian resident and foreign charities are not allowed to engage in human rights or governance-related activities precisely because they are ‘not the manifestation of citizens’ freedom of association’.

The categorization of CSOs is dependent up on their source of income and area of interest in which the charity or the society opts to engage in. Hence, the law divides CSOs into “Ethiopian Charities or Societies”, “Ethiopian Resident Charities or Societies” and “Foreign Charities or Societies”. The legal definitions of these categories are provided under Article 2 of the CSP as follows:

“ ‘*Ethiopian Charities*’ or ‘*Ethiopian Societies*’ shall mean those Charities or Societies that are formed under the laws of Ethiopia; all of whose members are Ethiopians; generate income from Ethiopia and wholly controlled by Ethiopians. ***However, they may be deemed as Ethiopian Charities or Ethiopian Societies if they use not more than ten percent of their funds which is received from foreign sources***”. Article 2(2).

“‘*Ethiopian Residents Charities*’ or ‘*Ethiopian Residents Societies*’ shall mean those Charities or Societies that are formed under the laws of Ethiopia and which consist of members who reside in Ethiopia; and ***who receive more than 10% of their fund from foreign sources***”. Article 2(3)

“‘*Foreign Charities*’ shall mean those Charities that are formed under the laws of foreign countries or which consist of members who are foreign nationals or are controlled by foreign nationals or ***receive funds from foreign sources***”. Article 2(4)

The major difference between charities and societies is that societies are established to protect the interest of their members while charities are set up to serve the public at large or a given social section (such as women, children, the disabled, etc.) rather than their members. In other words, charities are established to pursue altruistic objectives, while societies primarily promote member interests.

III. Contributions of NGOs in development, democracy and good governance

Since their emergence as the third-sector between the government and the private sector, NGOs have definitely proved to be very instrumental in contributing for the developmental efforts of nations. Particularly, in developing countries like Ethiopia, their role has been very important to the extent that the state and its institutions failed to provide basic services like health, education, food security, water and sanitation and governance and democracy issues like capacity building, justice, conflict resolution, awareness creation and so on. Thus it is important to briefly reflect on their contribution just by taking some variables.

i. Resource mobilization

Resource mobilized by NGOs to finance their projects is done through domestic as well as foreign sources. However, there is a lack of precise and well organized data on how much domestic fund is mobilized by the sector (Dessalegn et al., 2008). The domestic mobilization is done via schemes like; voluntary services, income generating activities (IGA) like building renting, private donations, membership contribution and public collection like Telethons. Yet it can be argued that the domestic contribution is insignificant (due to less domestic income potential) as compared to foreign fund which is very significant.

In terms of foreign funds, according to the 2008 the Non State Actors (NSA) update mapping study done by the European Commission (EC), between 2004 and 2008, NGOs mobilized a total of Birr 9,976,410,395 (US\$1.123 Billion) to implement 2020 projects. In 2014, the operational CSOs implemented 2604 projects with a total budget of Birr 35,761,427,762 (US\$1.788 Billion) coming from foreign funds. In short, both the number of projects and the budget earmarked to implement those projects have increased significantly (EC-NSA mapping report, 2015).

To see the significance of the NGO sector contribution in foreign fund earning, it is found appropriate to compare it with the export earnings of the country from important resource items. As can be seen from the table below, the NGO sector generates the second largest foreign resource next to the Private individual (Diaspora), both earning more than a billion dollars in 2011/12. As stated above the NGO income has reached 1.788 billion dollars in 2014. Between 2004/05 and 2011/12 the NGO earning has increased by 167% while, coffee export increased by 148% and diaspora remittance by 284%.

Table 2.1. Earnings from selected Export items, NGOs and private transfers (In Millions USD)

	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12
Coffee	335.2	354.3	424.2	145.0	528.3	841.8	833.1
Oil seeds	125.0	211.4	187.4	66.9	358.5	326.6	472.3
Chat	100.2	89.1	92.8	55.4	209.5	238.3	240.3
Leather products	67.6	75.0	89.6	49.4	56.4	103.8	109.9
NGO Transfers (cash)*	444.0	497.8	537.4	305.3	860.5	893.5	1186.6
Private Individual transfers (cash)*	350.8	354.9	632.6	415.4	790.3	1066.4	1347.5

Source: (Desalegn et. al. 2010) and NBE, 2013 report.

Note: both NGO transfers and private individual transfers (called “unrequited transfers”) are also made in kind. For the purpose of comparison the in-kind transfers are left out.

* These are remittances sent by the Ethiopian diaspora.

The table also shows that the NGO income sharply increases in all the years except 2007/08 in which all items show a decline due to the existence of the 2005 election-related conflict in the country. Thus it can be said that the NGO sector has a very significant role in foreign funds earnings.

ii. Resource use and distribution

The NGO sector has not only been a potential in resource mobilization but also in its use of resource distribution and project financing. The table below shows the number of active CSOs, the number of projects and the amount of money budgeted to finance the projects in the year 2014 by different regions in the country.

Table, 2.2. CSO numbers, projects and budgets allocated

Region	Active CSOs	CSO projects	Budget in Birr
Oromiya	241	491	11,939,630,929
SNNP	214	595	6,755,640,155
Amhara	159	503	6,516,435,881
Addis Ababa	364	30	3,436,864,734
Somali	57	170	2,661,864,734
Tigray	98	99	2,278,057,291
Afar	44	63	256,807,796
Benishangu-Gumuz	46	68	750,592,329
Harari	33	64	264,000,000
Gambella	26	50	901,530,206
Dire Dawa	61	111	-
Total	1342	2604	35,761,427,762

Source: EC-NSA report 2015.

As can be seen from the above table, there were about 1342 active CSO in the whole country in 2014. All the CSOs were engaged in a total of 2604 projects distributed all over the country. The budget allocated for all the projects is about 35.76 billion birr which is a very significant amount.

iii. Contribution in democratization, human rights and good governance

NGOs' contribution to the democratization process, human rights issues, and good governance is limited. Obviously, some charities that are getting funds from Ethiopian Social Accountability Programme-2 (ESAP2) and European Union Civil Society Fund II(EU-CSF II)are working on some limited rights issues and the improvement of public services, which contain some elements of governance (EC-NSA report 2015). For example, the Human Rights Council continues to work on human rights violation investigation and monitoring. The Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association has been providing legal aid to poor women and capacity building training to government agencies working on gender issues. Vision Ethiopian Congress for Democracy has been implementing projects aimed at consolidating democracy through constructive discourse and civic engagement. On the whole, in each region of the country, the rights advocacy CSOs with on-going projects are very few and their impacts on the democratization process, human rights, and good governance remain extremely limited due to, regulatory restrictions that caused severe budget constraint and self-censorship to operate within their mandate (table, 2.3).

Table, 2.3. Areas of engagement (sector) by NGOs between the year 2004 and 2008.

sector	No. of projects	Budget(Million Birr.2004-2008)
Child development	394	2,139.50
Education	206	621.01
Health	235	1084.52
HIV/AIDS	175	710.96
Integrated urban/rural dev. and food security	336	2,977.75
Water & sanitation	141	573.62
Women & girls empowerment	96	217.73
Environment & Natural resources	74	154.01
Advocacy & peace building	34	44.03
Disability & elders support	35	82.5
Agriculture & agro-pastoral	117	467.95
youth	23	142.05
Social welfare	15	53.83
Capacity building	139	268.33
Total	2046	9,537.79

Source: European Commission (EC) 2008, in Desalegn et al. (2008)

As can be seen from the table above, the majority of funds has gone to human development related sectors (health, education, child welfare), followed by agriculture and food security. These areas are the governments, top priority areas and the NGOs have been complimenting accordingly. There were about 2046 projects and a total of 9.53 billion birr allocated between the years 2004-2008.

Of all this projects and funds only 44.03 Million has been allocated for NGOs working in advocacy and peace keeping. This amount of fund is the lowest of all the sectors and only shares 0.46 % of the total budget. This automatically implies that the government has not given due emphasis for issues related to democratization and governance, and the NGOs with these short fall of budget cannot be actively engaged and contribute towards those issues. Since most of the funding comes from foreign sources, particularly those used by advocacy and human rights organizations, this amount of money might be lost because the proclamation does not allow foreign sourcing of these activities in the country. Hence, the state's priority agenda and the contributions of NGOs are much related in these respects.

2.4. Relationships among states and NGOs

The bulk of literature presents the relationship between NGOs and states dominantly being shaped by the situation where the state becomes weaker and NGOs are taken as alternatives in the provision of basic services to local communities in different times. However, the view towards NGOs by governments is usually based on many factors such as the competition provided by the NGO sector for the resource received from the international community and donor organizations, the strength of the NGO sector and the existing ideological orientation towards who really represents the interests of the public. The following section presents a brief theoretical framework and some empirical evidences in developmental states.

2.4.1. States and NGOs: a theoretical framework

There is no doubt that with increasing demands on the state by the citizens, the state can no longer be the only provider of goods and services. It is also true that the support and interest in NGOs grew as a result of failure by state agencies to deliver services. Thus, the state and NGOs need each other. In their relation with the state, Clark (1991) provides a liberalist view in terms of three options; they can *complement reform and/or oppose* the state.

In their role of *complementing the state*, they act as the implementers of development activities. In this case as argued by Thomas, (1992) NGOs fill the gaps left by the public service. The role of the state becomes more of an enabler rather than the provider of services. In their *reforming role* NGOs are seen as agents of advocacy and contribute immensely to policy dialogue. NGOs are able to represent the interest of the people they work with and in this case can ensure that policies are adapted to real life situations. Finally, NGOs can *oppose the state*. They can do this by acting as watchdogs and holding the state accountable. This can be achieved through severable methods including lobbying or even overtly supporting groups which are adversely affected by the policies of the government (Thomas, 1992).

From the foregoing, it is clear that NGO-government relationships are complex and diverse and are likely to affect the management of NGO activities. The relationship is affected by the specific contextual factors which may include the nature of NGOs objectives and strategies, the area of operation of an NGO, the behavior of the donor and the nature and character of the regime (Turner &Hulme, 1997). These relations also differ from country to country. In some countries some regimes are favorable to NGOs while in others the relations are antagonistic.

In order for NGOs to realize their potential contribution and to efficiently manage their activities, a healthy relationship between them and government is essential. This healthy relationship can be conceivable only if both parties share the same objectives. If the government's commitment to poverty reduction is weak, then NGOs are likely to see collaborating with government counter-productive (Lekorwe and Mpabanaga 2007). In the same vein, dictatorial governments will be wary of NGOs which tend to be sympathetic to the poor. In this case NGOs will not value a positive relationship with government and may choose to go their own way and make all attempts to make life difficult for government agencies.

However, in cases where the government has a positive social agenda which resonates with the NGOs, there is potential for a strong, collaborative relationship. But even where there is room for cooperation, jealousies and mistrust between NGOs and government is deep rooted. Governments always have fear that NGOs will erode their political power and NGOs also mistrust the motivation of government officials (Fowler 1992).

Weak states can become hostage to the most powerful groups in a society, creating a real obstacle to development. This links to the arguments presented earlier in this essay about the impact of neoliberalism on the way in which the role of NGOs in development is conceptualized. International NGOs, argues Whaites, in effect contributed to the strengthening of civil societies at the expense of the state when they took advantage of the shrinkage of government services that was brought about by structural adjustment programmes.

In the recent discourse on the relationship between NGOs and states, a more emphasis is given to a detailed analysis on the factors affecting the two sectors in different political-economic situations. For instance, (Teamy 2007) provided detailed theoretical as well as empirical evidences on relationships between governments and non-state providers of services. In this case the main factors that are taken to influence the relations are:

- i. *Institutional conditioning factors* including: Historical influences, Legislative frameworks and policy objectives and standards, Globalization forces, Donor influences and State regime type.
- ii. *Nature of organization* including: different levels of government, NGOs origins and values, internal management of NGOs, boundaries of operation, the position of NGOs in the civil society and the state, networks, alliances, coalitions, linkages of NGOs and governments, key individuals/leaders.
- iii. *Agenda of engagement* including: incentives for collaboration, pre-conditions for collaboration and the design of relationships.

iv. *Nature of the relationships* including: dimensions of the relationship, roles of participants, formal and informal interactions, modes and strategies of interactions, accountability, autonomy and room for maneuver.

v. *The effects of the relationships* namely ‘isomorphism’ on the NGOs and the state relations.

2.4.2. States and NGOs relations in the 21st century

The 21st century has brought with it various types of state-models, interest groups, financial and economic challenges, terrorism and counter-terrorism ideologies and actions, global integration and disintegration and other cross-cutting issues which were not present in similar forms in the 20th century. Given these facts, the state-society relation in many African countries is being shaped with the above issues.

The relationship between states and the civil society in general and NGOs in particular in many countries is taken to be shaped by different factors. Some of the factors as argued by (Moyo 2009) are contextual, historical, political, cultural, social and even economic. There are also contextual issues which shaped the relations.

The first is that, globally, there is a decline in good governance resulting in serious backlashes to the democratic governance project. This is amid an increase in multi-polarity and pluralism. Perhaps the contradictions of democracy are best captured by this moment in world history where the existence of plural societies, multiparty politics, free media and other features of democracy have led to increasing focus on accountability which in turn has resulted in negative response from those scrutinised, for example, the *state* (Moyo 2009).

The second factor relates to the decline in internationalism and unilateralism. The demise of the unipolar world has led to emerging economies assuming prominence in world affairs, providing some developmental models that others in the South find resonance in. The rise of BRICS, CIVETS among others is a contextual development that has ramifications beyond global power relations. It is worth mentioning that many African countries that have closed down the space for their citizens in development and governance processes have also adopted ‘Looking east’ (developmental state) policies (Moyo 2009).

And the third factor worth mentioning here is the rise in regulatory mechanisms that are aimed at controlling as opposed to creating enabling environments. These factors are important in understanding the configuration and the subsequent governance of the public sphere defined here as that space in society where citizens congregate freely and discuss issues of common interest. It is that space institutionalized to regulate the state by influencing political, social and economic life. However with the rise in terrorists' activities, the space for human rights has given way to the state's defence of human lives. However more often there has been a thin line between genuine counter terrorism initiatives and pretexts for political interests. The anti-corruption drive has also given states enough room to regulate the space for civil society (Moyo 2009).

2.4.3 An example of the developmental state support for locally based NGOs: Botswana's experience

This sub-section tries to shade some light on how an example of African developmental state, Botswana has supported the local CSOs operating in the country. This has gone to the extent of funding them in order to actively engage them in areas related to the democratic-governance of the country.

NGOs in Botswana are emerging against a background of a country that has done very well in terms of socio-economic development and management. As pointed out by Molom and Somolekae (1999), NGOs in Botswana are more interested in welfare issues than issues relating to politics and good governance.

The reasoning behind this perspective is that they find such matters too political. However, the authors further argue that there are other NGO sectors that advocate for political issues including issues dealing with democracy, good governance, legal, constitutional and human rights. Examples include women NGOs which advocate for the promotion and empowerment of women, provision of educational opportunities for school drop outs, operating day care centres, while human rights NGOs advocate for democracy, good governance, legal and constitutional rights (Molom and Somolekae, 1999).

However, the NGO sector has not always been fully engaged in the socio-economic and political matters of the country. As noted by Maundeni (2005) a lot has happened since 1996, including socio-economic and political changes that have occurred in Botswana. The civil society has transformed as well in terms of structure, core roles and the overall management of their engagement and activities.

However, the effective management of these NGOs is affected by financial and managerial constraints. Against these backdrops, the government of Botswana has shown its commitment to provide financial support to the NGO sector with other donors such as the European Commission (EU). The Government of Botswana has long recognized the role that the Non-State Actors (NSAs) have in national development. Vision 2016, Botswana's long-term strategy, singles out the principle of partnership with civil society and the private sector as a key factor to achieve the development target to become a 'prosperous, just, open, democratic and accountable nation'. It recognizes the important role played by the NSAs in socio-economic development and calls for the strengthening of their capacities to ensure that they can play their roles much more effectively together with State Actors (SAs) (EU report 2013).

Table 4.2 complimentary funding by EU and Government of Botswana for 10th EDF project (2011-16).

Title/Number	Empowerment of non -state actors in Botswana BW/FED/022-316	
Total cost	EUR 10, 000 000: European Union contribution : EUR 8, 000 000 – A Envelope Parallel co-financing (in kind): Centre of Development for Enterprise (CDE): EUR 500, 000 Government of Botswana: EUR 1, 500 000	
Aid method / Method of implementation	Project approach : Partially decentralized management. Joint management with the Centre for the Development of Enterprise (CDE)	
DAC-code/ Sector	15150	Democratic participation and civil society
	92010	Support to National NGOs
	25010	Business support services and institutions

Source: adopted from EU report on Empowerment of Non-State Actors in Botswana 2013.

From the above table it can be observed that the government of Botswana has provided a fund of about Euro, 1,500,000 to finance the 10th NSA project in collaboration with the European Union.

Even though the amount is not that much significant, it shows the commitment by the government to support the NGO sector and civil society who are engaged in democratic participation, governance and justice issues.

This kind of cooperation and contribution to rights-based local NGOs is not usually observed in many African countries. This might be the reason why Botswana is considered as one of the most successful countries in emulating a democratic-developmental state approach by many analysts and can be taken as a good lesson to those who merely claim themselves as ‘democratic-developmental states’.

2.5. NGOs and Democratic governance

In the subsequent sections, an attempt has been made to provide the role and engagement of NGOs in different sectors. And it has been made clear that the contributions from the NGO-sector have been substantial. Since the focus of this study is towards the role of NGOs in Democratic governance within in a democratic-developmental state, it is found appropriate to provide a framework on issues related with democracy, development and governance.

2.5.1. The concept of democracy in brief

The concept of democracy has received an extensive treatment in the social sciences literature. It is generally conceived as voters, through regular elections, choosing their leaders. A classical definition in this regard is that offered by Huntington who conceives a political system as being democratic, “to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote” (Huntington 1991, cited in Edgheji 2005). This has become the dominant way in which democracy is conceived.

Expanding on this definition, Dahl (1971) identifies seven key criteria that are essential for democracy, or what he prefers to refer to as ‘polyarchy’. These include:

- Control over governmental decisions about policy constitutionally vested in elected officials
- Relatively frequent, fair and free elections
- Universal adult suffrage
- The right to run for public office
- Freedom of expression

- Access to alternative sources of information that are not monopolized by either the government or any other single group
- Freedom of association (i.e. the right to form and join autonomous associations such as political parties, interest groups, etc. (Dahl 1971, cited in Menocal 2007).

Dahl's definition of formal democracy includes the basic civil liberties that should, in principle, guarantee that the democratic process is inclusive, free of repression and enables citizens to participate in an informed and autonomous manner.

However, many analysts have found that relying on the above '*minimalist*' definition of democracy cannot quite capture the challenges besetting regimes that have undergone a transition but have yet to consolidate their incipient democratic structures. As a result, a growing number of democratization experts are turning towards a more substantive definition of democracy, one that gives greater prominence to the role and importance of accountability (Menocal 2007).

Here, three dimensions of accountability are usually distinguished: (i) vertical accountability, which enables citizens to hold their political leaders to account through the electoral channel at specified points in time; (ii) horizontal accountability, which refers to accountability mechanisms that exist within the distinct bodies of government itself, whereby state institutions are authorized and willing to oversee, control, redress and, if need be, sanction unlawful actions by other state institutions (O'Donnell 1996); and (iii) societal accountability, which refers to the (ongoing) watchdog functions of civic associations, other NGOs and an independent mass media over the actions of the state (Schedler et al. 1999).

2.5.2. Defining and understanding governance

The meaning and concept of governance has been excellently expressed in the work of (Fenta 2007) which used many sources as reference. It is found appropriate to borrow from his work.

“The word governance, which literally means government and its existence of power and control, is not new. Dethier (2000), for example, mentioned that Sir John Fortescue had published a book called ‘The Governance of England’ in 1470, an indication of how the word has been used in the public sector. However, its use in discussions about social organization other than government is a comparatively recent development (Dwivedi, 2002).

From the late 1980s and early 1990s onward, governance has progressed from obscurity to widespread usage, constituting an important element of 'new' decentralization and local governance reforms.

Not surprisingly, there are still differences in understanding with regard to its meaning (Plumetre and graham, 1999). One of the reasons for this is its broad character that encompasses many related concepts, including among others: democracy and development, popular participation and development, accountability and transparency as well as equity (Devas, 2004; Wolman, 1990).

Traditionally, political scientists have used governance to express the nature of the relationship between the 'RULES, RULERS and RULED' (Olowu 1999, 2002a). Soremekun (2000) shares the above understandings and provides further elaboration. According to him, governance refers directly to the ruler-ruled relationship, which has three dimensions: the functional, the structural and the normative. *Functionally*, governance deals with how the rules are made legitimized and enforced. Structurally, it comprises three distinct institutions, the ruler or the state, the ruled or the society and the rules or law. In essence then governance embodies the quality of the relationship between the state and social institutions. Finally, its normative dimension highlights the values associated with governance, which include transparency, effectiveness, accountability, predictability, legitimacy, popular participation and plurality of choices. The above definitions incorporate important elements such as rule of law, accountability, participation and transparency. However, it is clear that governance is perceived as a phenomenon that takes place within the public domain, it moreover emphasizes the exercise of authority by leaders in government position to promote social and economic development (Olowu and Wunch 2004; Tegegn and Kassahun, 2004).

Until relatively recent times, the standard view of government was that it had the authority and the necessary capacity to govern effectively and to implement policies and plans. At the end of 1980s and especially since 1990s, this view has been challenged (Devas, 2004). Governance is not synonymous with government; it recognizes the limitations of government and thus transcended the public sector (Ivanova, 2005). It represents broad, inclusive and pluralist view when undertaking societal affairs. In this regard, governance includes a full range of activities involving all (state and non-state) actors in society (Dwivedi, 2002).

From the above definitions, it is clear that according to the current understanding of governance, government is one among many societal 'players' or actors that are concerned with public issues. Other actors such as NGOs, the private sector, and religious organizations are actively involved in the policy formulation and management of societal development (IOG and York university, 1999).

This transcendence beyond the public the public sector does not only refer to other societal actors' involvement in public affairs, but also to changes in the functions of government. It has to perform functions that were not in the past considered as belonging to government. Such functions include strengthening institutions for collective decision making, facilitating and forming partnerships to achieve common goals, ensuring fair participation and representation of interests between a ranges of groups as well as adequate arbitration between them (Gilbert et al., 1996). In general, governance refers to the 'hollowing out' of the state and a style of governing in which the boundaries between public, private and voluntary actors are shifting and becoming opaque (Helmsing, 2000; Rhodes, 1999).

Governance makes boundaries between mainstream societal actors opaque as well as those between the governors and the governed, as the latter are involved in the formulation of the policies and rules that govern them (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001)" (Fenta,2007). And according to the EU(2004), the roles of the civil society actors particularly of NGOs in policy making and advocacy as a means of promoting democratic governance is very important.

2.5.3. The potential roles of NGOs in democratic governance

In the above discussions it has been clear that development and democratic governance reinforce each other particularly for emerging countries that opt to embark on developmental and democratic efforts. But, the basic concern for this paper is on how NGOs come in to this picture and what exactly their role is in a democratic developmental state approach.

Many writers suggest that the Support for NGOs in their democratizing role is often framed by a liberal democratic view of politics in which the strengthening of NGOs is beneficial for bolstering civil society and enhancing state legitimacy. The outcome of NGOs' involvement in the politics of development is far less predictable than the liberal democratic view imagines, and that the contributions made by different types of NGOs to development differ spatially and temporally. And (Mercer 2007) argues that whether NGOs strengthen or weaken the state and/or civil society is a highly subjective issue.

However, there are basically three central arguments made in favour of NGOs' role in strengthening civil society and democratic development within the literature on NGOs and democratization. First and foremost, by virtue of their existence as autonomous actors, NGOs are said to pluralize (and therefore to strengthen) the institutional arena. More civic actors means more opportunities for a wider range of interest groups to have a 'voice', more autonomous organizations to act in a 'watchdog' role vis-à-vis the state, and more opportunities for networking and creating alliances of civic actors to place pressure on the state (Mercer 2002).

Secondly, NGOs are said to work with grassroots organizations that are often comprised of poor and marginalized groups. In this respect they both widen (in social and geographical terms) and deepen (in terms of personal and organizational capacity) possibilities for citizen participation. At the same time, NGOs represent the interests of marginalized groups within the wider public arena, campaign on their behalf and seek to influence public policy (ibid).

Thirdly, NGOs are said to check state power by challenging its autonomy at both national and local scales, pressing for change and developing an alternative set of perspectives and policies. A recurring theme in the literature is the important role played by the NGO sector in democratic transitions and democratic consolidation in a number of countries. An active civil society that encourages greater participation across all sectors of society will also aid decentralization, particularly in those countries with ‘marked ethnic divisions and deeply rooted local identities’ (World Bank, 2000), encouraging development to be carried forward by consensus, and calling attention to the need for policies to address ‘social dislocations’.

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to provide the picture of classical developmental states with their defining features. Additionally, the recently prescribed 21st century democratic-developmental states with their distinct characters have been portrayed. Here, the most important issue with respect to the role of local NGOs was taken to be the inclusiveness, capability expanding and democratic character of the incumbent state so that it can entertain the potential role of all non-state actors including local NGOs.

The chapter has also given due emphasis for issues such as: giving the current picture of locally-based NGOs in Ethiopia, their contributions in governance related activities and their relationship with the government. Additionally, the theoretical background of the relationship between states and NGOs and some examples with reference to the democratic-developmental state relation with local NGOs has been presented. This is believed to give an appropriate working framework for the following chapters concerned with data presentation and analysis.

CHAPTER THREE

DATA PRESENTATION AND DESCRIPTION

In this chapter, an attempt will be made to describe and present the data collected. The data collected through the primary sources via semi-structured and in-depth interviews with the officials of the selected organizations will be presented thematically and analyzed qualitatively. Additionally secondary data will be presented as deemed necessary.

3.1. A brief profile of the selected local NGOs (Ethiopian Charities)

As it has been tried to be explained in chapter one, the objective of the study is to describe and make analysis of local NGOs' role in democratic development within the context of the Ethiopian developmental state approach. The Ethiopian government has officially stipulates the role of NGOs in general and the Ethiopian Charities in particular, in the Civil Society Proclamation (CSP), who are opting to engage in issues related with democratic governance, human rights, promotion of justice and peace building. Hence, the following four CSOs are found to be directly related to the issues according to their activities and engagement.

I. The Ethiopian Human Rights Council (HRCO)

The Ethiopian Human Rights Council (HRCO) was established in October 1991 by 32 Founding members from academia, business and the professions. It is an independent and non-partisan non-governmental organization. (It has been re-registered in Dec 11, 2009 by the FDRE-Charities and Societies Agency, under the category of 'Ethiopian Charities'. (HRCO, organizational profile, found on official brochure) Its *principal objectives* are the promotion of:

1. The democratic process
2. The rule of law and due process
3. Respect for human rights

Apart from struggling for the objectives outlined above, EHRCO aims to fight against ethnic or any other kind type of prejudice and animosity, religious intolerance, violence and armed struggle. It is also engaged in peaceful struggle against any type of dictatorship which is a violation of the fundamental civil rights of the people. It is also committed to the rule of law and stands against rule of persons whatever their rationale for the monopoly power may be.

So far, EHRCO is taken as one of the oldest, formal, and non-governmental organizations that monitors and reports issues related with human rights violations by the functionaries of the incumbent regime. It has so far produced 140 reports and a 170-page book entitled: “*Democracy, Rule of law and Human Rights in Ethiopia: rhetoric and practice*” in April 1995.

II. The Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA)

EWLA is a non-profit and non-partisan voluntary organization founded by a group of Ethiopian women lawyers in 1995 following the ratification of FDRE constitution. EWLA is managed by an electoral board and full membership is also available to non-legal women and men professionals, who support the objectives and concerns of EWLA. It has re-registered as an Ethiopian Charity in Nov 16, 2009. ([https:// www.ewla-net.org](https://www.ewla-net.org)).

Objective: EWLA’s overall objective is to improve the status of Ethiopian women and gradually eliminate the legal, economic, social and political inequalities existing between men and women.

Mission: Its mission is to promote the economic, political, social and legal rights of women and to that end assist them to secure full protection of rights under constitution of the FDRE and other international human rights conventions.

Specific objectives: as defined in its article of association it pursues the following:

- The elimination of all forms of legally and traditionally sanctioned discriminations against women;
- The ensuring of equal treatment of women with men in education, employment, access to public services and benefits;
- The advocacy of remedial and affirmative measures for women to redress accumulated consequences of discriminations.

EWLA functions with the generous grants provided by a consortium of donors. Currently the head office is located in Addis Ababa with branch offices in Assosa, Bahirdar, Diredawa, Adama and Gambella. The regional offices staffs are supported by trained voluntary committee members at the woreda and zonal levels, providing a structure to reach women throughout Ethiopia.

III. Vision Ethiopian Congress for Democracy (VECOD)

VECOD was established by five scholars from Addis Ababa University who have considerable experience relevant to civic education. According to the official company profile, the organization conception started after the leaflet was prepared and distributed among students and teachers in Addis Ababa University with the question “what should be the role of the intellectuals besides the paid task they have? (VECOD quarterly magazine Feb., 2016 vol.1)

After the question has been raised, some men and women scholars were gathered together who were from different ethnic groups and started to find ways to involve as many scholars as possible to answer the question; there it came the idea of establishing VECOD. The legal registration was done under no.1006 as a non-partisan civic NGO on January 30, 2003. It has re-registered as an Ethiopian Charity in June 20, 2010. (ibid)

Vision: the vision of VECOD is to see Ethiopian citizens living with freedom and prosperity in a democratic system capable of participating in all social, economic and political decision making process that affect their life. Its specific objectives are:

- Foster democratic values and practices so as to enrich civic empowerment;
- Sensitize the public on the aims, objectives and practices of human rights, constitutional law and self-government.
- Monitor democratic processes including human right abuses.
- Perform human resources development and humanitarian activities.

VECOD is currently undertaking various activities related with its objectives primarily with the financial contributions of members and other donating partners and non-financial support from volunteers.

IV. Transparency Ethiopia (TE)

Transparency Ethiopia is a non-profit, non-partisan; non- governmental, membership based civil society organization that aims to fight corruption, to make sure that transparency and accountability gains acceptance as standard style of work in all societies. It was established and has become a legal civil society organization as of October 19, 2002 pursuant to the Ministry of Justice legal notice number 404 and the associations registration regulations, legal notice number 321/1995. TE has re-registered as an Ethiopian charity by the FDRE ChSA in February 05, 2010 under registration no. 1457. (<https://transparencyetiopia.org>)

TE's overall objective is to establish a broad based coalition against corruption and strive to root it out from public services through education and stimulation of public services, through education and stimulation of public awareness and concern. Some of its specific objectives given to it by Article 6 of the regulation establishing it are to:

- Be able citizens aware and exercise about their rights and obligations granted by the constitution.
- To enable society create corruption free culture.
- Fully apply effort to sensitize a transparent and accountable culture among government officials and non-governmental/civil society leaders.
- Enable preventive laws of corruption offence, easily identified and rooted in the society.

Based on its mandate of fighting all forms of corruption in the public, private and civil society sectors, as well as promoting good governance and integrity in public and corporate affairs, TE's activities covers four strategic areas: institutional building, networking and coalition building, awareness training and public education and as well as research and advocacy.

3.2 Responses to the basic issues raised in the interview

This section is devoted to presenting and describing some of the basic themes that have aroused about the Ethiopian developmental state approach and the role of the selected NGOs in democratic governance. In order to grasp the perceptions, opinions, and stands among the NGOs and the regulating body (the FDRE-ChSA), the researcher has divided the interview schedule in to three categories (see the Annex part), and the responses are described in terms of these basic categories of themes.

3.2.1. Issues concerning the Ethiopian developmental state approach

This part of the interview focused on the views that the organizations have on the general concept of the developmental state approach and the international experience, the claim that the Ethiopian government is following this state approach and the notion that democratic governance can be achieved through continuous effort between state and civil society so that a democratic developmental state's objective can be achieved.

I. The general perceptions about the concept of a developmental state

From the interviews conducted with the six organizations, the respondents clearly put their organization's stand on the concept focusing on the role of government in development.

For instance the respondent at VECOD suggested that, it is a typology of the East Asian states approach in which once has been successfully implemented, however the state style has deficiencies in entertaining civil liberties and democratic values. The respondent added that it would have been best if it had incorporated some elements of democratic values in which non-state organizations like theirs strive for.

The respondent at HRCO clearly put that, it is one of a state formations in which their organization see it as a deficient state approach. He suggested that, "if we look at China for example, the country has a remarkable success in economic growth; however it is repeatedly being criticized for the lack of political freedom of its citizens. Even though it can potentially fulfill one of the pillars of rights (which is the right to development), it can't fulfill all the aspects of human and political rights per se. Hence, as a human rights organization, we criticize it as a deficient and democratically weak state approach."

The respondent at EWLA also prescribed that their organizational attitude towards this kind of state formation is dependent on how it can achieve an inclusive development in which most proportion of the public can benefit. If this state can successfully do that, they would support it to the extent that they will participate in the developmental efforts.

The respondent at the TE responded that they have no problem with the type of the state and its formation. However, they evaluate the state with respect to its achievement in development, democracy, good governance and other values that the public need. Hence, according to the respondent the Ethiopian state approach should also be judged in this regard and their organization is not in a position to provide a full-fledged and objective opinion for the issue. According to him it should be left to objective research-based analysis and dialogues.

However, an opinion given by the respondent at the FDRE-ChSA seems different from the above responses. According to him, as one of a governmental institutions, and as one which is guided by the incumbent government's policies and procedures, the agency takes the developmental state approach as an ideological orientation and a state formation which is guided by an economic development-first agenda and this according to the respondent is "important to countries like Ethiopia who strive to catch-up with the already developed countries."

II. Opinions on the claim that “the Ethiopian government is following a democratic-developmental state approach”.

This part of the question was somewhat similar to the above part of the question. However it grasped some attention from the NGOs-respondents’ point of view since they are engaged in democratic and governance issues. The issue is also related with on the on-going debate by scholars, policy researchers and political elites.

For instance, the respondent at HRCO forwarded that his organization see the claim by the Ethiopian government as “rhetoric”. Since the government is usually engaged in issues related with economic growth and not in human development, there has not been a full-fledged development in which citizens benefit from the economy and claim their rights. In his words; “democratic rights are inseparable, development and democratic values must be kept together so that, we as civilized societies must entertain without compromising one with the other.”

Similar to the above response, the director at VECOD focuses on the facts rather than the claims. He suggested that it would have been good if the Ethiopian government follows both a democratic and developmental agenda. However, he says:

“Building only infrastructure does not necessarily ensure a full-fledged development in which most part of the public benefit from according to their efforts and being merit-based. Our organization welcomes and will be the first to support the government’s effort in any dimension if it entertains both democracy and development; however the facts on the ground suggest there are many gaps in this respect.”

Another similar response has been forwarded by the respondent at TE. He rather focused on the states achievement in the basic aspects of development which includes economic development, fair distribution of income, existence of rule of law, eradication of poverty and existence of accountability and responsibility. He adds that as a transparency organization, their organization see the achievement of the state in an all-encompassing development should be evaluated with respect to the maintenance of rule of law and accountability so that people can fairly benefit from the economic growth and entertain their rights.

The respondent at EWLA chooses not to give a direct reply; rather she indirectly puts her perception; “We are not in a position to give a supportive or an opposite idea for such a claim. However we feel that the government is putting an effort in such issues like building infrastructures, roads, schools and other development projects.

However, the issue of democracy has been given little emphasis in the government's agenda. And we believe that our organization has been part of the process since its establishment.”

Contrary to the above opinions, the respondent at the FDRE-ChSA suggested that, the claim of the government following a democratic developmentalism is fully entertained by the agency. The agency is also guided by its ideology and added that, since the agency's establishment, the guiding principles and rules are centrally focused on the achieving the objective of building a democratic developmental state's institutions. Since, their organization has been established by the proclamation to oversee the activities of NGOs and civic organizations and other democratic institutions in development and good governance, they don't only accept the claim, but also strive to achieve it from the very beginning.

3.2.2. Opinions on the achievement of GTP-I's objective of strengthening democratic and civic institutions

Even though this issue can be assessed in its own dimension, it was the researcher's intention to grasp the organization's subjective opinions on whether the objective has been achieved since it is directly related with their activities. Additionally, it was the maturity period of the plan (at the end of the year 2015). In this respect almost all the CSOs forwarded that they have not actually done a formal and research-based evaluation, instead they preferred to give their opinion based on the 'results of the objective.'

A response given by the respondent at HRCO draws an opinion from 'the facts on the ground' in relation to the environment for democratic institutions of the country and Civic Society Organizations like theirs working in issues related with; the maintenance and nurturing of human and democratic rights, rule of law, accountability and responsibility and good governance, free and fair election activities. In his words;

“...We automatically reject the claim that this objective has been successfully achieved. This is not because we just want to oppose the claim; it is because we have not seen such an effort in strengthening democratic institutions, even governmental institutions like the office of the ombudsman, the independent justice system the independent election board. We have also been struggling very much for our survival since the enactment of GTP-I. Thanks to our committed staff and supporters we would have perished long before like other CSOs. Let alone strengthening us, it has been very difficult to operationally continue our activities.”

The directress at EWLA suggested that they are not in a position to provide a formal evaluative opinion on the GTP-I's objective. However, it is possible to suggest that the government has formulated a CSO legislation to provide general and formal guidance to monitor CSOs. And this can be taken as one of the mechanisms to operationalize the objective. However, it can be difficult to provide a scientific and research based analysis on whether this legislation has brought about good results or failures since it needs a deeper insight. Thus according to her, it is not as easy as it seems to provide an evaluative judgment on the issue.

The executive director of VECOD forwarded that, from the very beginning they believed that the whole GTP-I's objectives are derived by very ambitious targets that cannot simply be achieved in the five-year period. Yet, he also suggested that they have not come up with a formal evaluative judgment on this issue. However he continues, "...Since the 2005 national election, the operational space of democratic institutions like free civic societies, democratic institutions and free media has been at the stake and it is observable to see a narrow political and democratic space in these years hence, it is possible that the democratic institutions have not been properly strengthened."

The respondent at the TE also suggested that this objective has been one of the most important one in relation to their organization's activity. As a CSO striving for the maintenance of rule of law and accountability, the strengthening of these kinds of institutions would reduce much of the efforts that they are contributing. However according to the respondent, they have seen an increased institutional arrangement and budget allocated to some of the governmental institutions but not to their capacity and quality of the service that they can provide. Hence, there can be seen some positive effort in some regard and a gap in other respects.

According to the official at the FDRE-ChSA, the objective of strengthening the civic societies and democratic institutions to build a democratic developmental state can be taken as a valid target and a good step forward from the government's side. In this regard, one of the manifestations of the objective can be observed in the contribution of mass-based and professional societies in policy consultations even to the extent of challenging the government and its institutions. Thus, according to him, the agency's evaluation of the whole GTP-I document and particularly the above objective suggests that it has been achieved in general terms though there are some areas taken as gaps.

3.2.3. Issues related to the role of local NGOs in democratic governance

In this part of the interview, the questions raised and the opinions forwarded by the respondents are directly related to the issues of democratic, governance and developmental activities of the selected organizations. Based on their activities, experiences and facts on the ground the NGOs and the governing agency provided their respective opinions.

1. Opinions on Article 14(5) of the CSP, (engagement of local NGOs in democracy, human rights, law, and peace building issues)

Article 14 (5) of the 2009, CSP lists activities that are reserved only for Ethiopian Charities:

- 1. The advancement of human and democratic rights;*
- 2. The promotion of equality of nations, nationalities and peoples and that of gender and religion;*
- 3. The promotion of the rights of the disabled and children's rights;*
- 4. The promotion of conflict resolution and reconciliation; and*
- 5. The promotion of the efficiency of justice and law enforcement services.*

(Proclamation No. 621/2009, Negarit gazeta p.4521)

This part of the question was raised to grasp the attitudes of the respective NGOs towards the pros and cons of (article 14(5) of the 2009 CSP), which articulates the engagement in issues related with democracy, human rights, justice and law enforcement, and promotion of peace in the country is only permitted for Ethiopian Charities (local NGOs).

The director at VECOD forwarded his organization's position by portraying some facts. According to him the exclusive right of engaging in the democratic issues that should be done by only Ethiopians, can be taken a valid decision from the government's side. However, in order to actively participate in those issues, needs a substantial amount of resources. But the Ethiopian charities like them have been constrained by the proclamation not to raise more than 10% of their funds from foreign sources and only stick to local sources, which is usually challenged by the fact that citizens' awareness and capacity have not yet been developed as needed to participate voluntarily.

A similar response has been given by EWLA. The respondent suggested that the reason given by the government on this issue was based on past incidences which were related to “some rent seeking behaviors by some organizations” who have been participating by raising funds from foreign sources.

In this case, the government has been continuously claiming that “these organizations have been engaged in issues that are taken as ‘the dangers for the national peace, security and constitutional system.’ Yet, they are exploiting the funds from abroad in these matters. Hence, this work should only be given exclusively to Ethiopian charities that can’t raise more than 10% of their income from foreign sources.” However, adds the respondent, “we don’t have any opposition with the reasons given by the government, our problem arises where the limitation of the fund-raising from local sources did not consider the reality on the ground.

“Since we don’t have a developed system of local fund raising, voluntarism, and sponsorship activities, this will be very difficult for us to actively participate and execute our projects properly. Additionally, the government itself does not provide any kind of financial support to local NGOs in which even countries like Kenya have managed to do so. Hence, given all these challenges, this proclamation poses a big constraint from our side.”

The response given by the director of HRCO directly points towards issues which have been portrayed in the above responses. He forwards that giving the exclusive right of participating in advocacy related issues to Ethiopian charities has nothing bad in it if we take it just on its face value. But the inherent problem is related with the government’s decision that NGOs can’t raise enough funds from foreign sources given the fact that internal capacity is weak. He adds;

“This proclamation has been very controversial since its enactment. I think this could have something to do with the government’s political and ideological orientation. We believe that the government has a strong intention of maintaining control of all sections of the society including NGOs so that it can consolidate its power without “strong opposition and danger to its authority.” Hence, from the very beginning it knows that local NGOs can’t survive much with the prevailing condition and it can eventually redirect the sources of funds from abroad to its agenda in the name of following a developmental state agenda.”

Contrary to the above, the respondent at FDRE-ChSA does not accept the above claims. He opposes the idea that ‘local sources are weak for mobilizing the civic society for democracy-related issues.’ “This part of the proclamation was intended towards giving the engagement and participating in democracy, law maintaining and human rights issues to locally-based CSOs since this is an internal matter in which the solution must come from citizens themselves and their organizations.” Hence, he adds “there is no problem in the article. We take this as weak part of local NGOs very much depending on foreign sources which usually leads to rent-seeking activities. We believe that any contribution, even five cents has to be mobilized and used wherever the source comes from. But the government does not accept engaging in internal-political matters with dependence from foreign sources which can be used illegally.”

II. Engagement of local NGOs in building democratic governance

Engagement of local NGOs in democracy and governance issues has been explicitly and exclusively been given to Ethiopian charities in the 2009 CSP. And this part of the question has been forwarded to assess the extent to which the NGOs are engaged in these matters.

A response given by the director at EWLA suggests that their organization can be taken as role model for engaging in human rights, (particularly women’s rights) and justice maintenance and enforcement (particularly concerning women) which has a direct and indirect impact on democratic development. She adds that:

“Our organization has played a pivotal role in the newly adopted Ethiopian Family law and criminal code by strongly participating in forums, policy dialogues and presenting research-based policy options which can better benefit the target group at large. This can directly or indirectly result in developmental justice and good governance which can have a good impact on the disadvantaged groups like women.”

The director of HRCO responded that their organization has actually been engaged in human rights and law related issues which have a direct and indirect contribution to democracy and good governance and hence democratic development. However, he says “..... since there is no strong and proper system to engage us in those issues we are participating on related matters such as feeding up optional policy researches to the government at large, actively participating in policy dialogues and forums, publishing and distributing human rights-related materials to the public and so on”. According to him the current government does not like an active engagement of non-governmental institutions in the above issues and deliberately narrows the political space to keep track of those who are opting to engage in.

The director of VECOD argued that his organization has been engaged in the above issue from the day his organization has been established. He adds...

“our objective is mainly focused on awareness creation on issues related with civic engagement, good governance, accountability, free political activities and capacity building for those section of the society taken as disadvantaged in this areas particularly the youth. Hence we can comfortably argue that we have been definitely engaged in governance matters. The strategies we have been following are preparing awareness creation trainings in different regions, preparing forums and dialogues for political parties on these issues, participating and advocating on ethics, leadership skills and nurturing national pride of citizens.”

A study by Dessalegn et al., 2008 and the EU-NSA mapping report, 2015 suggest that the major areas in which CSOs are engagement of democratic-governance are:

1. Promotion of Public awareness and participation

2. Monitoring democratic process, rule of law and violations of rights

3. Contribution to Improved Policies, Laws and Programs.

The CSOs engaged in governance issues, either as core areas of intervention or as part of ‘development’ activities, typically undertake awareness raising initiatives to inform the public and bring concerns of their ‘targets’ to public discussion forums. The thematic areas on which CSOs/NGOs public awareness raising work cover a range of issues including child rights, women’s rights, democracy, corruption, voter education, access to justice, etc.

1. Promotion of Public awareness and participation

The following strategies have been used as a means to raise the public awareness about governance issues by the CSOs:

- Publication and dissemination of IEC materials (posters, leaflets, brochures, etc.).
- Dissemination of legal and other documents; e.g. the FDRE Constitution; translation of international human rights instruments into local languages and distributing among the public.
- Conducting voter education to sensitize and mobilize the public to participate in elections.
- Organizing debate forums among contending parties to ensure access to information to the public on the programs and plans of action of different parties.

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For instance VECOD has undertaken various activities from the year in the last twelve years. The organization has been engaged in the above listed issues with the financial contributions of the World Bank's social accountability project, the EU-CSF I & II and voluntary services provided by its founding members. The following table shows some of the activities.

Table 3.1 various governance related activities by VECOD (2003-2013)

No.	Program activities	year	No.of sessions	No.of participants	Areas of program activities
1	Civic and voters education	2003	34,000 activities	5,063,800	All over the country
2	Exercising freedom of expression	2003	3	500	Hawassa, Addis Ababa & Nazareth
3	Democracy & human rights training	2003	460	26,942	Bahirdar, Debre-markos, Assosa, AA. & Gambella
4	Leadership & management skills training	2003	47 th round	16,926	46 in Addis Ababa and 1 in Gmabella
5	Election observation May 15, 2005	2005	150 stations	200	Hawassa, Addis Ababa, Dessie & Nazareth
6	Training on violence against women & children	2006	4	525	Hawassa, Addis Ababa & Nazareth
7	Practical approach to stop violence against women	2006	8	229	Addis Ababa
8	Civic & ethical education	2009	100	3,009,600	Bahirdar, Debremarkos, Kombolcha & Addis Ababa
9	Social Accountability project	2013	500	35,000	Gambella
	Total		35,272	8,396,200	

Source: adapted from 13th year- 48th round Graduates Magazine Feb, 2016

As the table above shows, VECOD has been engaged in various governance activities from the year 2003-2013. The organization has undertaken more than 35,272 sessions and has benefited more than 8 million participants. This can be taken as a substantial effort.

Similarly, Transparency Ethiopia (TE) has undertaken the following activities:

- *Awareness creation via panel discussion:* with an agreement between TE and Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption in 2007 a project entitled “deepening knowledge on corruption via panel discussion” has been undertaken for 12 months’ session.
- *Ethics training for public officers:* with an objective of raising awareness on matters relating to Ethics and anti-corruption in National development, law promulgation process and business transaction through trainings, lectures and seminars, a training has been given for FDRE House of Peoples representatives (HoPRs) in 2008.
- *A weekly Amharic Radio Program:* TE has produced and sponsored a 20 minutes Amharic radio program on corruption issues which has been broadcasted on FM 98.1 since April 2008.

Forum for social studies (FSS) has also undertaken the following activities:

- With the broad objective of reaching out the wider public, the organization has launched a radio outreach programs to disseminate the activities to the wider public. For instance:
- In 2001, FSS has been running a program on FM radio known as ‘*Dewel*’ in collaboration with Fredrich Ebert Stiftung (FES)
- In 2008, side byside with the ‘*Dewel*’ program it has also launched a similar program on medium wave (MW) radio channel with intent to reach the wider public that will be involved in informed public discourse on development issues.
- The two radio programs have been featuring FSS activities and programs as well as a range of development issues, including poverty, employment, education, health, environment, gender, urban housing problems, energy, street children, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), etc.
- In 2006, yet another radio program known as ‘*Jember*’ has been launched in the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) following an agreement between FSS and the mass media agency of the Regional Government. The program has been scaled up in 2010 to include the following issues:
 - Environmental degradation in Alaba (field report)
 - The Justice system in Alaba, traditional versus modern system of justice (field report)
 - A unique traditional system of protecting indigenous trees.
 - Internal migration and subsequent cultural disorientation in (SNNPR).

2. Monitoring democratic process, rule of law and violations of rights

Despite constitutional recognition of access to justice and legislative measures imposing pro bono duties on advocates, affordable and quality legal services are not available for most Ethiopians. This, coupled with capacity and efficiency limitations in judicial and administrative institutions, has made access to justice the privilege of the few. The situation is particularly dire for the resource poor and other vulnerable groups. In response to this gap, an increasing number of CSOs/NGOs are engaged in the provision of legal aid services in Ethiopia. The services of many of these organizations focus on the needs of specific social groups such as women, children and persons accused of crimes concurrently targeted by other interventions. The following are some of the more extensive legal aid services made available by CSOs/NGOs:

EWLA for instance has undertaken the following activities in this regard:

- Legal advice, counseling and representation provided to victims of Gender Based violence (GBV) in criminal and civil cases in Addis Ababa, Nazareth, Dire Dawa, Awassa, Gambella, Assosa, and Bahir Dar.
- The number of people who accessed the legal system and protected their rights through the legal aid services is very substantial. For instance, nearly 70,000 clients throughout Ethiopia received legal aid services between 1996 and end of 2007.
- EWLA has extensive experience of using selected cases of gender based violence to demonstrate and change gender biased substance and interpretation of the law. In one instance, the organization successfully exposed widespread tolerance of the most serious forms of violence against girls within the justice system through appellate consideration of a controversial case involving a girl convicted for the murder of a man who had abducted and raped her. The subsequent public and official scrutiny has made tangible contributions to changes in attitude and practice among law enforcement and judicial personnel.

HRCO for instance has undertaken the following activities:

HRCO can be taken as the leading organization in Ethiopia to monitor, publicize and report human rights violations, and fight for the people to full realization of rights under the Constitution.

- In this regard, the organization has published 39 regular reports and more than 140 special reports (until March, 2016) by deploying its field observers.
- The organization has called for an end to forced displacement of citizens that has been carried out based on ethnicity in some parts of Ethiopia like West Shoa zone of Oromia, and Afar region in November, 2015.

- HRCO has also been closely monitoring the recent human rights violations in the National Regional state of Oromia following the April 2014 protest against the newly proposed integrated master plan for Addis Ababa and the surroundings towns.

3. Contribution to Improved Policies, Laws and Program.

The situation of the poor and disadvantaged sections of society, including their exclusion from decision-making processes affecting their lives, is for the most part caused by structural problems. As such, the problems that plague their lives can best be addressed through pro-poor government policies, laws, institutions and programs. On the flip side, measures that did not take into account the real and felt needs of the poor and disadvantaged may become irrelevant for their lives or even aggravate the situation.

A study commissioned by The Six Agency Group Ethiopia (SAG) – a consortium of six Nordic international FBOs and CRDA has identified the following as the governance, democracy and human rights issues around which the selected organizations have conducted advocacy activities:

- Human rights education for law enforcement and judiciary
- Forced migration and law enforcement
- Equal rights of women in the family, during succession and pension
- Implementation of laws and policies for the protection of the rights of women.
- Equal rights of women in the family, during succession and pension
- Implementation of laws and policies for the protection of the rights of women.
- User rights in natural resources
- Land rights
- ESC rights (the right to adequate food, housing health and education)

Advocacy initiatives of CSO/NGOs mainly use the existing public participation framework, the judiciary and public consultation mechanisms to convince policy makers, members of parliament/councils and government officials at various levels on the need for new pro-poor policies, laws and other measures or review of existing ones.(Dessalegn et al 2008 pp.87)

The following are some of the more prominent examples:

- A number of CSO/NGOs working on women’s rights, gender and child rights issues including EWLA have played an instrumental role in initiating public dialogue and influencing decision makers in the process leading up to the revision of the family law and Penal code;

III. Participation of local NGOs in policy consultations with other stakeholders

This part of the interview question was raised to gain an in-depth insight on the extent to which the selected NGOs have participated in consultation of policy formulation and appraisal which in effect has either a direct or an indirect impact on democratic development endeavors.

The respondent at the EWLA forwarded that this is one of their good contributions which can be taken as their strong part. The directress elaborates; “as i have clearly put it in the above section, we have been actively engaged in the formulation and amendment of the new family law and criminal codes that have a direct impact on the rights of women. Even though our focus area is on gender related issues, this does not mean that we haven’t contributed to the general democracy and good governance issues.”

The respondent adds, “Since women are half of the population and play an important role in the family, fighting to the observance of their rights means working for the observance of the benefits that can arise from democratic and development fruits if any.” And in fact, this will have a resulting effect on the general public interest. The strategies they have been following to achieve the above targets are;

- Working on gender related researches by our volunteer professionals.
- Feeding these research results on consultation forums and policy dialogues and;
- Making the gender issue as an issue in policy formulations and executions.

The above are not the only ones; the respondent suggested that they have been actively engaged in nurturing the public awareness about gender issues by advocating in the media and publishing and distributing materials on these matters on other incidences.

The respondent at HRCO clearly put that since their focus area of engagement is human rights and law related matters, they have been working in these issues by producing internal researches and publicizing the results to the general public by which ever means they have. The most important strategies they employ include:

- Directly observing and documenting human rights violations by governmental bodies in different parts of the country.
- Preparing and publicizing the documented evidences to the government and other stakeholders using the media conference.
- Continuously following up human rights and other violations if any, and playing a watchdog role in publicizing the issues to the public.

- Participating in policy dialogues and consultations which have an important input to the observance of human and democratic rights.
- By actively advocating on human rights and other related issues so that violations can be stopped and the society can benefit from any developmental and democratic efforts.

However, the director suggests; “our role have been minimized in the recent years due to the fact that government lacks willingness on the active participation of other non-governmental bodies on human rights and related issues.”

The executive director at VECOD suggested that they have actively been engaged in various activities that are related with democratic development policy. He adds in general terms from all the activities:

- 60% of our activities are geared towards creating and developing democratic citizens.
- 30% of our activities are aimed at creating and developing democratic leadership.
- 10% of our activities are aimed at creating and developing democratic governance.

The above activities are directly or indirectly related with democracy, human rights and developmental justice. Hence he suggests “we can comfortably say that we have been engaged with the issues for the last thirteen years. The strategies that we have been following were focused on preparing workshops, trainings and sessions to different sections of the community in different parts of the country.” However, “our activities have been minimized in recent years because of the reduced financial support from foreign sources. This is because of the 2009 CSP’s the 90/10 financial source mobilization that influences our engagement. This does not mean that we did not have any internal gaps as such. Because of the financial deficiencies, our staff member engagement has been reduced and our commitment has been influenced”.

IV. Contribution from the government’s side in supporting the local NGOs

This part of the interview question was forwarded to grasp if there were any kind of contribution from the government side that can support the Ethiopian charities in their activities which are left to them exclusively. This can include financial, logistical and other forms of support which are directed specifically to the local NGOs.

In this case, the director at the VECOD forwarded that the support from the governmental bodies including regional and *woreda*-level administrators are usually confined to providing meeting halls for free in different workshops, sessions and trainings that we have produced so far which can be taken as a positive support.

Yet, he adds; “our main challenge are related with financial sources which can be very instrumental in executing our projects and programs. In fact, since the 2009 proclamation which confined the source of our income to be raised 90% locally, many of our strategic projects and programs have been frozen. Additionally, we have closed many of our branches in different regional states; many of our staff has left the organization because of financial scarcity and other administrative cost related issues.”

“...However, one important decision has been taken from the government’s side, which is, taking the financial source gained from the EU-CSF-II to be left as a local source in addition to the 10% foreign financial support. Yet again, if the EU CSF has been taken as a local source for the Ethiopian charities, it would have been better to take the World Bank social accountability program-II as a local source for the Ethiopian charities instead of directing it to the Ethiopian-resident charities. This, we take it as a mistake from the government’s side.”

The director at the HRCO on the other hand suggested that their organization has not received any kind of contribution from the government. Instead he adds; “we would have been better-off if we were taken back to the time of pre- 2009 period. This is because in those times we have been engaged in many projects and programs that have been aimed to address many human rights and legal issues. Since the enactment CSP, our financial resources have been circumvented. For instance, the government has frozen more than eight million Ethiopian birr in our bank account which could have been used to execute many projects. And we are now feeling that the government is giving back our own finance little by little in the form of EU-CSF-II which is a kind of political game.”

He additionally forwards that they take the EU fund as a political will from the government’s side which can be terminated at any time if this will shifts to the opposite. Hence, their organization does not receive any kind of positive support that can add value to their contribution. Instead of taking the foreign source as a local source (which is in fact paradoxical), it would have been better for them to be given their rights back in the time of pre-2009 period.

The respondent at EWLA addresses the issue from different angle. She suggested that because of their objectives, they are closely working with different government stake holders such as the Ministry of Justice, the Police, office of Prosecutor and other legal bodies at different levels of governmental administration. And in this case, they are still getting the needed support that they are asking. Yet, she suggests;

“What we are asking is what we can afford. As a result of the enactment of the CSP, many of our programs and projects in different parts of the country have been terminated since the projects needed a substantial amount of financial sources. After the proclamation, our financial sources have been minimized substantially since many of our support have been gained from the foreign aids in addition to voluntary services from our staff. Our contribution has been confined to only providing legal aids to women who desperately needed our support. We could have been engaged in many projects that can have important role in democratic justice and legal issues if we have gained the support that were in place before the proclamation.”

In his regard the deputy communication director at the FDRE-ChSA provides his own opinion about the above issues. He suggests that the agency does not have any kind of intention to weaken the Ethiopian Charities, instead it has been working towards properly monitoring their activities so that the beneficiaries from the services provided can gain the maximum benefits they can by putting proper regulations in place.

Since the enactment of the proclamation, the Ethiopian Charities have been continuously opposing the 90/10 and 70/30 financial regulations which are in fact sensitive to many stakeholders. And by considering this, the government has decided to redirect the financial support from the EU fund to the Ethiopian Charities with an agreement reached. However, it was a mistake by the MOFED to redirect the funds from the WB SAP-II to the Ethiopian resident Charities. This will be corrected in the future when the program life span is matured and the next phase is launched in the future”.

Additionally he suggested that the government has been giving many logistical supports to the CSOs in the form of tax-free importing of equipment in different times which can be taken as a good contribution. The government has also been providing a relatively cheap office rent and meeting halls at different times and this will be strengthened in the future.

V. Contribution of local NGOs in initiating and strengthening the civil society

This part of the question is geared towards assessing the role of formally organized NGOs in strengthening and initiating the general civil society given their professional expertise and organized institutional set up at their disposal.

In this direction, the respondent at EWLA shares the positive idea of the above premise with the existing facts that they are experiencing. She forwards; “we believe that our organization has been working with strong tie with different civil society groups including mass-based groups, community-based groups like *edirs* and women and youth associations in our effort of awareness creation on Gender-based violence (GBV) and fighting for the maintenance of the right of women in the society.”

The respondent further adds that; “due to our objective of working for the legal rights of women, we needed to work with different groups either formally or informally. The strategies we have been following include; using different group meetings in the civil society for awareness creation; building the capacity of different mass-based groups to achieve our objectives indirectly and providing logistical and legal aids and support in preventing gender-based violence and degradation of the rights of women.”

However, the respondent adds; “even though we have been strongly working with different groups of the civil society, it doesn’t mean that we have done enough already. Due to lack of strong financial and other logistical supports, we are not currently working as we have been aiming to contribute. This might in fact weaken the whole civil society particularly those we have been working with strongly. Thus, if we are given the necessary support from concerned stake holders (particularly the government), we are ready to provide our best to initiate and strengthen the civil society.”

The response by the director of HRCO can be taken with different direction. He suggest; “this part of our contribution can be taken as our weaker part, not only because of our internal lack of effort but also the weakened efforts by other similar organizations and groups.” He adds; “before the enactment of the CSO proclamation and during that period, there were some attempts to build and strengthen the whole civil society by forming different networks such as; CSO-coalition, CSO-forums and CSO-networks and CSO-working groups. Yet, this has not strongly and persistently continued for a long time.”

He further elaborates; “the main reason here is the lack of willingness and full commitment with in individual organizations to work as a group. There was a need to just make an effort for the survival of own organization. This might be one of the reasons that we as local NGOs could not stand and properly defend the government’s suppressive and repressive actions including the CSO legislations at the time of its enactment. Look here now, we all are in tough time with-out standing for our survival and waiting for other external miracle to save for our existence.”

The respondent at VECOD suggested that they have been trying to work with different groups of the society including the youth and women. However, they have not achieved their target in this regard because of lack of resources and in some ay lack of full commitment towards these issues. Yet, some attempts have been taken to initiate and work in collaboration with other similar civic society organizations. However, this has not also been achieved due to the fact that the individual organizations including them have been weaker in this regard and lack of full commitment. Thus he generalizes; this can be taken as their weaker part not to initiate the civil society in general.

3.2.4. Major internal strengths and weaknesses of the selected NGOs

This part of the question has been raised to assess the gaps and existing strengths of the organizations so as to evaluate these with external opportunities and treats for their activities particularly in their democratic development contribution.

Keeping this in mind, the response given by the directress at EWLA focused on internal weaknesses rather than strengths. She suggests “even though it is difficult to make a self-evaluation and generalize without a third party involvement, we can just make some suggestions. From what we can see our major weakness is in the area of minimized male involvement in our activities. This is somewhat related to the values and missions of the organization which focuses on women’s legal right. However, we are now working to strategically include a fifty-fifty approach in bringing our male counterparts to board.”

Continuing with her explanation about their strengths; “we feel that we have many committed staff and volunteers who have been contributing and still continuing with that to achieve our objectives. If it was not for this we could have frozen as an organization by now. Additionally, the lack of properly mobilizing and recruiting volunteers and financial resources can also be taken as another weakness. Thus, we hope that we will keep our strengths and get rid of our weaknesses by working as a team.”

The director of HRCO also provided a similar opinion in this regard. His responses... “It would have been better if this was analyzed by other third party so that a genuine and logical evaluation could be forwarded. As far as my knowledge and my colleagues’, our major weakness concentrates around our existing human resource and financial capacity to execute our existing and future projects. Of course, the financial gap also arises in relation to the above mentioned restrictions by the government in the form of different restrictive laws and procedures, particularly which of the 2009 CSO legislation in which we could not raise more than 10% of financial resource from foreign sources who in fact were our main project partners and supporters. The other is related with our deficiency in mobilizing those who could support our objectives and hence contribute in financial and other terms.”

On the other hand, he continued.... “The major strength that we have come across is the diligent and committed staff that we have for a longer period of time. By the way, the existing professionals that we have can be engaged in other duties and gain a better income and opportunities with their expertise. Yet, because of our aim to achieve the purpose of human rights existence and building up the culture of fighting for it, we are still bound-up by this purpose and continue with this for the future. If we were not committed enough till this day, we would have perished long ago given the repression by the government.”

3.2.5. Major recommendations forwarded by the organizations

This part of the interview schedule was set up to give the representatives of the selected organizations a chance to reflect on the important points that can be put in place so that the organizations can achieve their objectives. In this case, important recommendation points can be forwarded as solutions to the problems and challenges that have arose in the activities of the organizations.

The director of HRCO forwarded the following recommendations:

- “The most important issue that needs an immediate solution is the amendment of the CSO legislation and other points included in the 2009, Proclamation. Since our activity is directly or indirectly related with different stakeholders and financial supporters, the relationship between us and third parties is somehow complex and hence need to be guided based on our mutual interest and hence the regulations need to have some room for flexibility.”

- “The other is, the country’s National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) such as the Office of Ombudsman and Ministry of Justice to play their discretionary role in strengthening CSOs like us, working in human rights issues. This will benefit us in providing our best in strengthening democratic development.”
- “As an influential body, the government should facilitate the playing field for CSOs by providing the necessary inputs with the standard of the Paris Convention of CSOs since Ethiopia is one of the signatories.”
- “We and Other similar CSOs should work together by forming different types of networks particularly when our common agenda needs a more influential power to challenge the government decisions.”
- “We believe that human rights and democratic issues are directly related with the participation of the general public in voluntarism. Hence we need the public to support us to criticize us and to show us the different options that we can’t oversee.”

The directress of EWLA forwarded the following recommendations:

- “First of all since the Parliament is the supreme institution in legislative matters, we would like it formulate proclamations and laws that take the gender issue in to consideration so that policies and procedures can properly accommodate the issue in the execution process.”
- “Though our stakeholders are many, the main influential ones are governmental institutions. For instance, the Ministry of Justice, the Federal Court with its different levels, the Police and whom we are closely working with. Thus, we forward our recommendations for these institutions to mainstream the Gender and the Gender Based Violence(GBV) issue in their activities and their system so that it can contribute to access to justice.”
- “There are other local NGOs who in general work on the preservation and strengthening of human rights and particularly women’s rights as their thematic area. Hence, we believe that we can make a good influence on policies and laws by strengthening our network and work together continuously.”
- “In addition to these, there are some policy research institutions and forums that can bring the gender issue as an agenda. And in doing so, we would like them to properly present it so as the benefits of women in particular can be maximized.”

- “In addition, we would like the educational system to take the above gender related issues seriously and include these in the educational curriculum.”
- “In general, a development that does not participate women cannot move forward for long since women are half of the population and strong household headers. Thus the government institutions should properly consider this in policy formulation and execution so that access to justice and developmental benefits can be properly addressed.”

The communication director of ChSA forwarded the following recommendations

- “The first recommendation that we can forward is related with the internal organizational set-up of local NGOs. We believe that they need to first practice democratic system by themselves instead of making propaganda on the government’s democratic governance. Their leaders should be elected and assume authority in democratic terms. There are situations their leaders make these organizations as their own company (PLC) by taking control of all the activities un-democratically. And the agency by its mandate will in the future monitor this situation properly.”
- “We would like the misconception that the agency is just a monitoring and evaluating and sometimes a punisher of CSOs. This agency is not like that it is a governmental institution has been set up by proclamation to execute proclamations and laws drafted by the highest body of the nation that is the FDRE parliament. Hence, we would like to work together with the CSOs in different matters in the future.”
- “In addition to this, we would also like to urge on the CSOs to focus on their own internal capacity and drift away from the over-dependence on foreign sources. As we all know, every nation has its own interest and might not stand for others full-heartedly. Hence, it is best for the CSOs to re-direct their focus in internal sources.”
- “We have some curiosity that some local NGOs are working for bodies who would like to propagate the neo-liberal ideology as the only option for the country and make an attempt to forcefully make an agenda in different scenarios like the national election periods. Hence, we think that these organizations should not work for this cause and contribute their own by actively initiating the public in democratic values and constitutional governance.”
- “Last but not least, we wish to see many CSOs and associations with stronger organizational set-up to actively participate and mobilize the public for democratic and developmental agendas. We would also like them to continue their effort to the extent that they can influence policies and strategies that the government issues at different times. This to an effect will benefit us all in democracy and development fruits.”

3.3. General views of the consultation forum on the issues raised

To grasp the views from the consultation forum's perspective, a semi-structured interview schedule has been prepared and conducted with informants the organization. The views from the respondents' side have been presented thematically in the following manner.

3.3.1. Views concerning the Ethiopian developmental state approach

This part of the question was forwarded to bring forward the views of the forum regarding the Ethiopian state approach with respect to the researches they have undertaken by different members of the forums concerning the debated issue.

The respondent at FSS suggested that this is a rather difficult and debated issue which can be analyzed subjectively and objectively. However, in her view the Ethiopian government has been undertaking developmental efforts with the objective of eradicating poverty and attaining economic growth. For instance, ADLI, PASDEP, PRSP, and GTP-I have been undertaken to achieve the prescribed goals. However the extent to which these have achieved their target is left to researches and development discourse. However, according to her, in comparison to the other typical developmental states, the Ethiopian government will have to work hard to be a developmental state in practical terms.

3.3.2. Opinions concerning the role of local NGOs in nurturing the civil society

This part of the question has been forwarded to bring forth the subjective and objective views regarding the role of NGOs, in particular that of the local ones with respect to their operation and activities by both the respondents from the forums.

The respondent at FSS has suggested that this issue is somewhat complex due to the complex nature of the civil society and an objective opinion might not be forwarded easily. However, the respondent points to the facts based on different researches that have been taken by many researchers in the area. For instance, many formally organized NGOs have been contributing positively towards promoting and bringing forth the agenda of the civil society by employing different mechanisms. This has been strongly promoted prior to the issuance of the CSP. The proclamation has been in criticisms from many stakeholders including the CSOs themselves, donor organizations and the international community.

Yet, the respondent also argued that the issue of controlling and monitoring the activities of NGOs cannot be taken for granted since there were some signs of rent-seeking behaviors regarding the NGO sector.

However, the proclamation should not be used as an instrument to suppress and influence the activities of those genuine NGOs who are trying to work towards democracy and development. There is still a lot to be discussed and researched on the positive and negative impacts of the regulation and the resultant laws. Thus, the CSOs contribution in nurturing the civil society should be viewed from different directions.

He adds that, the government has been issuing and proclaiming different laws in order to control the civil society activities. Some people are in support of the government since there were some NGOs that has been aligned with different opposition parties instead of being non-partisan. However, there are also many others who oppose the governments' activities by arguing that this is one of the instruments to curb the democratic efforts of the civil society.

And according to him this can be one of the reasons that the reduced the movements of the civic organizations. Even though the resulting effect can be viewed from different perspectives it can be said that the NGOs movement has been stronger in the pre-2005 period and has been substantially minimized in the post-2005 period.

3.3.3. Preparing research and consultation forum regarding the role of local NGOs in democratic governance

In fact, this is the part that any consultation forums have to be engaged in with the basic objectives of preparing and communicating research based dialogues and consultations that can address the multi-faceted challenges in different sectors. In this regard, the forum should have been engaged in research-based dialogues on the role of the civil society in socio-economic and democratic and governance issues.

Keeping this in mind, the respondent at FSS has pointed out that their organization has been engaged in preparing dialogues, research based-workshops, trainings and capacity building programs for CSOs for the past fifteen years or so. The respondent adds that the multi-purposed research and public debates have been organized and communicated to the CSOs, governmental organizations and donor organizations to basically address the impacts of/and challenges on the activities of CSOs all over the country. However the respondent adds that many of the researches conducted did not usually take the role of NGOs in democracy and governance related issues partially, but the whole picture of their role in socio-economic and political development have been discussed deeply.

Some of the capacity building activities of FSS regarding NGOs are listed below:

- In 2004 FSS conducted a six-day research methodology program for civil society organizations, government agencies, staff and members of the parliament and the chamber of commerce.
- During 2008-09, FSS launched a series of training workshops for state and civil society development actors as a pilot project. These regional training workshops focused on the principles, methods, types and best practices of advocacy by civil society and other state actors.
- The most prominent dialogue has been held in 2008, where FSS has celebrated its 10th year anniversary. An international conference regarding the CSOs activity and the enabling environment to facilitate their contribution has been discussed. In the program, many prominent researchers from different internationally-based advocacy organizations have presented different workshops. Additionally many prominent members of FSS have also presented focusing the enabling environment for the civil society sector.
- FSS has also designed a short term training program in project-cycle management in 2009/10 period for CSOs who reorient their programs due to restrictions on right-based advocacy in the CSO-law.
- In 2012, FSS conducted a research through the partnership with Atos consulting regarding the CSOs impact on beneficiaries all over the country taking the cases of 26 CSOs operating in different sectors including democracy and governance issues.

These were not the only contributions concerning the civil society. There has also been different research based conferences and dialogues held at different times which can be cited as examples. However, all of the activities cannot exhaustively be presented here due to the time and space limitations.

3.3.4. Producing public dialogues that participated both governmental and non-governmental actors

This part of the interview focused on assessing the extent to which the consultation forums has been engaged in preparing and operationally addressing the issues regarding the activities of CSOs to the general public.

Taking this point in mind, the respondent at FSS suggested that the organization has been using the program of the public dialogues as their main activity to bring on board the decision makers at the governmental bodies and the wider public to discuss policy and development issues. The respondent adds that they have organized different symposiums and panel discussions involving researchers, policy makers, the civil society, and members of the public.

The respondent also portrayed that as part of its mission to promote a participatory policy space and advancing informed debates on important development issues, FSS played a leading role in bringing on board the civil society organizations to bring their input in to the then PRSP in 2001-2002. This has helped in establishing the Poverty Action Network of Ethiopia (PANE) which was set up with the objective of monitoring the implementation of PASDEP.

The respondent referred to the main policy dialogues that have been conducted on important development issues including but not limited to;

I. Environmental policy dialogues series including,

- Environment and Environmental change in Ethiopia in 2003;
- Economic Development and its Environmental impact in 2003;
- Grassroots discussion on Experiences of Environmental protection;

II. Inter-Generational Transfer of Knowledge (IGTK)

- In 2005, FSS has launched the IGTK Public dialogue series (phase-I)
- In 2009, in the view of the popularity that the IGTK series has enjoyed and the number of issues still not covered, FSS decided to organize a second round.

III. Culture and Development (2009-2011)

The respondent suggested that this program has been going for two years starting from March, 2009- February, 2011. And different dialogues have been presented by different researchers and presenters of FSS. Many of the issues concentrate around the cultural factors for or against development and its cultural dimensions. Public debate on Climate change, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development in Ethiopia. In 2010, in keeping track record of organizing successful public forums, debates and consultations on development and policy issues, FSS initiated a new bi-monthly dialogue series. Some of the dialogues conducted include:

- Climate change in Ethiopia: local manifestations impacts and National responses;
- Climate change and agriculture in Ethiopia
- Climate change impacts and adaptation policy issues in urban areas of Ethiopia.

The respondent also reaffirmed that the contribution of the civil society and the governmental bodies has been substantial. Important inputs have been forwarded by many of the NGOs working on related issues. Additionally representatives from different government bodies have provided their input to the dialogues which were instrumental.

And according to the respondent this has shown them that different stakeholders can be brought up on board for dialogues on common developmental issues and provide their own input for good purpose even though there can be some differences in their institutional set-up.

3.3.5. Major recommendations of the respondents at the forum regarding the role of Local NGOs in democratic governance

This part of the interview was forwarded to gain an insight in to the major recommendations that can help in issues including; minimizing the challenges faced by the CSOs and providing some coping mechanisms; how to strengthen the role of local NGOs in democratic development; how can the government can properly monitor the organizations without pressurizing them; and the mechanisms that both parties can work together.

In this sense, the respondent at the FSS forwarded the following major recommendations;

- *Regarding the role of CSOs:* the respondent suggested that FSS has been engaged in different research based dialogues on the potential contributions of the organizations at different times. And different contributors forwarded their own subjective assessment. Hence, there cannot be as such an overall and all-encompassing evaluation.

Yet the respondent reaffirmed that the nature of the civil society sector is too much complex in its nature and there has to be some mechanism to properly map the sector in order to examine their potential role. Hence as far as this issue is concerned, locally based NGOs have been engaged in democratic and governance related issues though their efficiency is still under question. Thus they have to continue in participating on those issues since it is an important contribution to the socio-economic and political development of the country.

- *Regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the CSOs:* the respondent at FSS mentioned that the strength and weaknesses of any organization can be viewed from many perspectives. However, in general terms, the NGO sector particularly those who are engaged in democracy and governance issues are in big challenge and need to be stronger than ever. She suggested that from her point of view the CSOs have a relatively well capacitated professional staff if committed will benefit the organizations in a big deal. Additionally, the organizational structure not being too bureaucratic and being project-based can also benefit the organizations.
- Coming to the weakness part, the respondent suggested that the NGO environment have been said to be much based on foreign fund instead of being voluntary based.

- Additionally, there can be seen a great deal of engagement in rent-seeking behaviors in some of the organizations and their staff which should be dealt with in order to achieve their objectives of filling the gaps of the government.
- *Regarding the potential role of the government:* the respondent has also highlighted some of the roles that can be played by the government in order to strengthen the civil society sector. First of all there should not be any pre-generalization regarding the CSOs without considering their activities as useful or harmful. Secondly, there could be some gap in the government and its institutions; hence, the contribution of the CSOs should not be taken for granted without evaluating them logically. Thirdly, the government should also see the way to assess the impacts of the 2009 legislation make an effort to fill the gaps in it so that all parties could benefit.

These were not all the recommendations that have been forwarded by the respondents. Since the issue is related with many aspects of other related aspects from the NGOs side, there were some points deliberately left out which were not much related with the purpose at hand.

In general terms, this part of the paper tried to link the theoretical argument that has been presented in chapter two with the practical situation on the ground focusing on the activities of the selected NGOs and the government representative body as well as the formal policy directions of the government.

From the discussions, it can be observed that the issue of a democratic-developmental state approach that Ethiopia claims to follow is perceived differently from different angles. And the mechanisms by which the role of locally based NGOs in democratic governance to be amalgamated in this state structure are also viewed differently by different actors. On one hand, the government's official stand to entertain the activities of CSOs can be seen in different policy documents and official responses and opinions from the representing body. On the other hand their practical application is observe differently by different stake holders including the CSOs themselves and other concerned bodies.

However, it can be said that the role and engagement of local NGOs in democratic and governance issues have been substantial particularly prior to the issuance of the 2009 CSP. Yet, after the proclamation and other legislations have been in effect, their role has been minimized due to lack of financial sources and other constraints. This can have an implication on the move towards laying down the foundation for a democratic-developmental state in the country.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRITATION

In chapter three, a focus has been given to present and discuss the data gathered from both primary and secondary sources. Since it is important to analyze and interpret the data set from the sources to provide the basic themes and their implications to the objectives and questions of the study, this chapter will try to provide some insight to achieve this purpose.

4.1. Regarding the view on the Ethiopian developmental state approach:

Objective-3 of GTP-I (2010-2015)

“Establish favorable conditions for sustainable state building through the creation of stable democratic and developmental state.” (GTP-I, document, page 7)

As it has been discussed in chapter two, the issue of development and developmental states has been deeply argued by different policy analysts. And the issue of whether the Ethiopian government is actually following a developmental state approach has also been debated by different local academicians and analysts. Since the objective of this paper is not to provide an objective reflection on this debated issue, it has only tried to present the main arguments from different perspectives.

As far as the opinion of the respondents from the local NGOs is concerned, the state approach followed by the current government is being criticized for the lack of entertaining democratic values and governance related issues. Whether these opinions arise from the reality on the ground or the subjective perception has to be seen with scrutiny. Yet, from the basic themes that arise, it can be said that the current government’s approach is continuously being under question in many respects.

For instance, many of the respondents have forwarded that there is a lack of full-fledged development effort by the government and is being continuously criticized for it. According to them, a development that can benefit major part of the public has many manifestations. Some of them are; equal rights to the basic human needs, equal rights to basic economic resources, nurturing human development and maintenance of democratic values.

Most of the respondents accepted that there is an ongoing effort in building huge infrastructural projects by the government. However, they don't take this as enough for an all-encompassing development which has many other manifestations.

However, the direction of a response by the FDRE-ChSA about this issue can be based on the very stand of the ruling government's political-economy ideology that guides the whole government institutions including the agency. From the responses, it can be deduced that the issue of development and democracy has many perspectives. And for developing countries like Ethiopia, this approach has benefited much in which a Neo-liberal approach which is propagated by many of the local CSOs has not accomplished.”

Yet, whether the Neo-liberal approach is propagated by the selected NGOs or not is also another issue. As far as this issue is concerned, the selected NGOs have been operating for more than fifteen years with different situations. Their establishment has been related with locally-based volunteerism. They have also been working with different western-based and other donor organizations in which the government has also been working with. Their establishment is also taken as based on 'non-partisans' principle in which the government is continuously criticizing them for being affiliated with some local and 'foreign-based' opposition parties which makes them 'non-partisan'.

Thus one can see that the view towards this issue among the two parties is revolving around more of a political and ideological perspective between the government on one side and the selected NGOs on the other, rather than on objective analysis of the principles that a democratic-developmental state approach is based on.

4.2. Regarding the achievement of GTP-I's objective of strengthening democratic and civic institutions:

Strategy 3.6 of GTP-I (2010-2015)

“...Establishing a stable democratic and developmental state and thereby creating a suitable environment for successive development endeavors; Strengthening the civil service and civic societies so as to strengthen democratic institutions; establishing a system for citizens' access to information; Strengthening the effectiveness of the justice system in terms of its ability to discover the truth through legal procedures; amending laws to ensure that implementation and interpretation of the laws is done in conformity with the constitution;...

...Ensuring independence, Transparency and accountability of courts and the judicial system; Strengthening law enforcement institutions by human resource, knowledge, skill and equipment; Carrying out integrated activities to enhance the public's understanding and awareness of constitutional issues; and augmenting the custom and tradition of peaceful resolution of disputes will be given special emphasis over the coming five years.”

(GTP-I, document, page 11)

The main objective of the plan and the strategy to achieve the objective has been viewed from different perspectives from the respondent's side. This issue is also related with many aspects including but not limited to; what are democratic institutions and civic society organizations, what should be their institutional arrangement and how they can participate in nurturing civic and democratic rights as well as democratic governance.

With these differences in mind, the respondents' perception can be seen with two different aspects. The first is that, the views from the CSOs concentrates around the manifestations of building democratic institutions including government-based and other civic societies. And almost all the selected NGOs have a stand that this objective is far from being achieved. The organizations' point of view circulates around the strengthening of civic societies and the whole environment for democratic activities that they are engaged in. According to them, for the objective to be achieved, the government has a big role in creating a plausible environment for civic organizations like them working in human rights, rule of law, accountability and transparency of government institutions and good governance.


The second aspect is the view from the governments side on what should be the arrangement of democratic and civil societies. According to the response by the agency the civil societies that the government tries to give more emphasis and strengthening effort are those societies who usually work towards achieving the targets of their members (such as women and youth associations). On the other hand, from the government's perspectives democratic institutions are those such as the Justice system, the office of ombudsman, the electoral board and the media. And these institutions have been strengthened and from the NGOs perspectives they have not been strengthened enough to cultivate a democratic environment.

Additionally, many of the organizations suggested that the required playing ground and environment has not been properly established for them to properly operate. Their engagement is usually dependent up on the government's willingness which might be subjected to different socio-economic and political situations.

In general terms, the political-economic situations in the country can be taken to be favorable to those CSOs who have been engaged in both developmental and democratic activities prior to the end of 2000's. In those periods, both the number and engagement of local as well as international NGOs can be taken very substantial.

As can be seen from fig. 4.1 below, the general trend in the growth of both national and international NGOs has been very remarkable. For instance, the number of both NGOs has been not more than 70 in 1994, and it has increased to 1742 in 2007. Which shows that there has been an increase of more than 1900 NGOs within 13 years only (an average increase of more than 100 NGOs in every year). The figure also shows that locally based national NGOs has been greater in number (except in 1994) and has also been much greater in the year 2007.

Figure 4.1 the growth of national (NNGOs) and international (INGOs) (1994-2007)



Source: adapted from Dessalegn et al., 2008 & Ministry of Justice, 2007.

Additionally, the year between 2000 and 2007 can be taken very favorable to local NGOs since their number has substantially increased from 246 to 1742 (an increase of 1496 and average yearly increase of 213). This can be related to different internal and external political-economic situations. It can be said that the general operating environment for local NGOs was favorable.

This figure also has an implication that the environment for the engagement of civil society organizations has been getting better and better for every year from 1994 afterwards. As reaffirmed by Dessalegn et.al. 2008 and EU-NSA report 2008, there were also remarks of:

- Growth in the numerical strength of the sector as a whole.
- Growth in the strength and activism of local or national organizations, and the relative decline of international NGOs.
- Growth in diversity: in the post-1990s there were not only relief and development organizations but also those that undertook human rights, governance and advocacy programs, voter education, environmental advocacy, and public policy investigation and monitoring activities.

However, the story is different particularly, after the 2009 CSP has been enacted. In a similar vein, the government has officially claimed to follow the developmental state approach in which there comes an argument “government has to be in the for-front of every aspect of activity” be it economic development or democracy and governance. The following table shows how the whole story has changed in the post-2009 period:

Table 4.1: Number of registered charities in Ethiopia; (2009-2015)

Charities	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
Ethiopian Charities	47	34	8	4	3	9	3	108
Ethiopian Resident Charities	722	396	277	220	196	137	114	2062
Foreign Charities	170	69	23	24	29	26	27	368
Total	939	499	308	248	228	172	144	2568

Source: adopted from FDRE-ChSA, January, 2016

As can be seen from the table above, the number of all the three typologies of charities has been much greater in 2009 (at the time where the CSP proclamation has been enacted). However, after that period, the number of CSOs has been declining year after year. For instance the total number of charities has been 939 in 2009 and has been reduced to only 144 in 2015.

Except for a stable growth of foreign charities after the 2010 period, both the number of Ethiopian charities and Ethiopian resident charities has been reduced to an average of 93.6% and 84.2 % respectively. And in 2015 only 3 Ethiopian charities have been registered by the FDRE-ChSA, which can show the challenge of entering in civil society sector.

As discussed in chapter three, Ethiopian charities are those charities that cannot raise more than 10% of their income from foreign sources and are those who can exclusively be engaged in democratic, human rights, and governance issues. And their number has been declining substantially. According to the data from the above table there were only 108 organizations operating until August, 2015 (without considering those who could be in the process of closing down). But there were about 2062 Ethiopian-resident charities with much greater number in relation to Ethiopian charities. These charities can raise more than 10% of their income from foreign sources but cannot be engaged in the above issues as the Ethiopian charities.


On the other hand, as shown in fig.4.1, there were 2268 registered national NGOs until 2007 (locally-based without restrictions in raising both from local and foreign sources). And there were also 617 international (INGOs) until 2007 and the total number of NGOs until 2007 has reached 2885. And the total number of NGOs (including the registered 56 foreign adoption charities) has reached to 2624, in 2015. In relation to the growth of total number of NGOs in the seven years (from 2009-2015), the growth in the total number of NGOs in the first thirteen years from (1994-2007) can be said remarkable.

Figure 4.2 below, also shows another story of the situation where the total number of re-registered (at the time where the CSP proclamation has been enacted by the Federal Charities and Societies Agency), and the newly registered Charities. Many CSOs have also changed their activity and engagement to coup-up with the criteria that requires the organization either to continue with their current operation or to engage in new operation that they have not been engaged before the proclamation.

In the figure, one can see that there was a marked decline in the Ethiopian Charities where only 38 organizations have been registered in the six years period (an average of only six organizations per year). There is also a decline in foreign charities from 203 in 2009 to 165 in 2015 (with an average of 27 organizations per year). However, a substantial increase in registration has been observed on the Ethiopian-resident charities from 877 in 2009 to 1185 in 2015 (an average increase of about 197 organizations per year).

One of the reasons for this has been due to a change in direction of engagement of CSOs that have already been engaged in democratic-governance issues to this category since there was no limitation to raise funds from local and foreign sources. Yet, in relative terms, the whole reduction in the growth of CSOs can be observed in the period and particularly that of the Ethiopian Charities has been marked well.

Fig.4.2 number of re-registered and newly registered charities (2009-2015)



Source: adapted from the data, FDRE-ChSA January, 2016

Hence from the GTP-I's objective point of view, one can see that instead of nurturing and establishing the whole environment for the CSOs to be engaged in governance activities, the state approach followed in the aftermath of the end of the year 2000s' has not been much conducive for the CSOs to be flourished.

Even though it is difficult to map the exact number of civic society organizations operating in the whole country, the above figures can be reflective of how much the CSO sector has become under much more difficulties for operation. The condition particularly, for those CSOs that are the interest of this study (Ethiopian charities), have been more difficult and un-conducive to actively participate in the right-based issues. This situation has negative implications on strengthening democratic governance and promoting a democratic developmental state's agenda.

4.3. Regarding the engagement of locally-based NGOs in building democratic governance

The issue of building democratic governance for a state striving to follow a democratic-developmental state is very important. As shown in chapter two, many policy analysts and international organizations prescribed that the essence of a democratic developmental state relies on whether that state established a political-economy that entertains many sections of the society. This is manifested by an all-encompassing development, fair distribution of income and the mechanism to entertain the claim the benefits from the development fruits. In this case, apart from the main role of government institutions, the private sector and the civic society will also play an important role in building democracy and good-governance at that particular state.

Keeping the above argument in mind, the extent to which the selected organizations have contributed towards the democracy-good governance areas has been presented using both primary and by some examples making use of secondary data. From the primary data collected it has been noticed that the engagement of the selected CSOs has been remarkable particularly prior to the end of 2000's period and has substantially declined afterwards though some efforts is still going underway. The following box can show some insights;

Box.1 *EU-NSA mapping report on: Contribution of CSOs in Democratization, human rights and good governance, 2015.*

CSOs' contribution to the democratization process, human rights issues, and good governance is limited. Obviously, some charities that are getting funds from CSF II and ESAP II are working on some limited rights-issues and the improvement of public services, which contain some elements of governance. For example, the Human Rights Council continues to work on human rights violation investigation and monitoring. The Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association has been providing legal aid to poor women and capacity building training to government agencies working on gender issues. Vision Ethiopian Congress for Democracy has been implementing projects aimed at consolidating democracy through constructive discourse and civic engagement. On the whole, the rights advocacy CSOs with on-going projects are very few and their impacts on the democratization process, human rights, and good governance remain extremely limited due to, regulatory restrictions that caused severe budget constraint and self-censorship to operate within their mandate.

From the primary and secondary data collected, it can be deduced that the most important areas that have been engaged by the CSOs were; Promotion of Public awareness and participation, monitoring democratic process, promoting rule of law, exposing violations of rights and advocating for Improved Policies, Laws and Programs.

There were also many strategies followed by particular organizations compatible with their structure. There are a number of cases where CSOs/NGOs successfully initiated and contributed to the development and adoption of pro-poor policies, laws, structures and programs by engaging institutions of the federal government and regional government structures.

However, there can be seen a similar kind of approach followed by the CSOs. Many of them usually use the existing public and government institutional set-up instead of trying to form another system of reaching the public and the policy makers. Hence this can be taken as one of the gaps in this respect. Additionally, the selected CSOs under the study usually concentrate their engagement around the cities and towns except HRCO and FSS. This can be attributed to many factors like financial, logistical and human resource deficiencies. Though their efficiency and effectiveness can be addressed in other studies, it can be said that in order to achieve their targets and strengthen their efforts, there is still much to be done.

4.4. Regarding the Contribution from the government's side in supporting the local NGOs

In developing countries like Ethiopia who are opting to follow a developmental state approach, the role of the government is very influential in every aspect of life. In this respect the support that can be gained from the government's side is also important in strengthening NGOs particularly the local ones with establishments depending usually on local-based resources. In this case since, the local NGOs (Ethiopian Charities) who are engaged in issues related with democracy, human rights, good-governance and advocacy are required to raise greater than or equal to 90% of their income from local sources, the government can do much in supporting.

However, many analysts and fellow researchers have come up with a study that these organizations have faced difficulties in their operation. Particularly in raising the required fund from local sources is tough due to many reasons including but not limited to; insufficient capacity to make the public aware about the CSO's activity, lack of local financial resources, lack of volunteerism culture and government's hindrance in their effort and related challenges.

Given these facts, the selected CSOs were interrogated about the contribution of the government in their activities. And from the data collected through the primary and secondary sources, the CSOs have suggested that they have not been provided with enough support, even some CSOs claimed that their bank accounts have been frozen in the aftermath of the 2009 CSP. Yet, some of the CSOs have taken some positive effort from the government's side particularly the taking of the EU-CSF-II as a local source (not to be included as foreign source).

For instance, HRCO has been granted 200,000 Euro in 2014 for a project to support more than 3000 men and women victims of human rights violations for two years. Similarly EWLA is currently running a project in various regions of the country with the aim to enhance gender equality through mitigating Gender Based Violence (GBV) with the support of EU CSF II. VECOD has also launched the second phase civil society project in 2014 with the support of the fund that aimed at creating an open-eyed society and consolidating democracy through constructive discourse and civic engagement. The following box somehow reflects on how this fund has been substantial to the CSOs. The following box also shows some of the contributions from the EU-CSF II project for local NGOs engaged in right-based issues.

Box.2 *EU-NSA mapping report on: Contribution of CSOs in Democratization, human rights and good governance, 2015*

The Civil Society Fund II Programme is a joint initiative of the European Union and the Ethiopian Government with the overall aim of increasing the role of CSOs in the development and democratization process of Ethiopia with a total budget of 12 million Euro. The grant making focuses on Ethiopian Non State Actors (NSA) engaged in non-profit areas. Grants are provided for implementation during a maximum period of 2 years and with an average size of 175,000 Euro.

Similar to the previous Programmes, CSF II enjoys the status of “domestic funding” With regard to the CSO law, hence remains accessible to CSOs working on key governance areas.

However, many of the organizations see the fund as a good contribution from the European Union not from the Ethiopian government. Instead, they consider it as a political will from the government that can be discontinued at any moment. Yet, it can be said that this fund has supported the organizations to execute some of their projects.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter has three sections. The first section is dedicated to summarize the main theme and the findings of the study. The second section tries to conclude the basic implications of the results from the study and the last section will provide the researcher's subjective opinion on what could be the possible solutions to address the main gaps found on the issues raised.

5.1. Summary of findings

The main purpose of the study was to identify, describe and produce an analysis of the Ethiopian developmental state approach vis-à-vis the potential role of the NGO sector in democratic governance that can promote a democratic developmental state efforts. The study focused on the cases of some selected local NGOs who have been engaged in issues related with strengthening of democratic and governance activities including; human rights, peace building, rule of law, civic engagement, advocacy and others.

The study employed a case study strategy and purposive sampling method to select the NGOs who are relevant to the study. Thus, four local NGOs one consultation forum and one government representing body have been selected accordingly. The selected CSOs have been operating for more than ten years, so that their engagement and activity can be assessed vis-à-vis the Ethiopian developmental state approach that has become an official government's paradigm in the last ten years or so. This can help in analyzing the change of strategies by the government in its effort to emulate the Democratic-developmental state approach with respect to CSOs and whether the role of the selected NGOs has been entertained in nurturing democratic governance.

In a nutshell, the study tried to answer the following basic questions related with its objective.

- How can the relationship between the NGO sector and the developmental state be analyzed both theoretically and practically?
- What are the basic prospects and challenges the current Ethiopian developmental state has brought about for the NGO sector in general and the studied NGOs in particular?
- What potential roles that the selected NGOs can play in democratic governance that can promote a democratic developmental state's agenda?

In order to address the above questions and meet the objectives, both primary and secondary data have been employed. Primary data has been gathered by making use of semi-structured and in-depth interview guides that have been prepared and conducted using face to face interview schedules with respondents and key informants. Additionally secondary data have been employed in order to portray and support relevant issues and discussions. The data collected from both sources have been presented, analyzed and interpreted by using a qualitative description method. Additionally, some basic statistical and quantitative description has also been used in order to give it more strength to the discussions.

The basic themes and the findings of the study are summarized as follows:

I. The Democratic-developmental state argument

To articulate the case for the democracy-development nexus, many development analysts have argued that both issues reinforce each other and one cannot be stable with the expense of the other. According to the analysts, particularly those who gave emphasis for the would-be African developmental states, the relationship between development and democracy should not be undermined because of the ‘sequencing fallacy’. This fallacy argument has taken dominance at some point by taking some ‘success stories’ of developmental states of East-Asian countries particularly those who were taken as authoritarian and undemocratic states.

However, this case has been challenged by contemporary development analysts arguing that democracy and development should not be built at the expense of one another since this did not help even the ‘East Asian tigers’ whom have been challenged by the 1990s-Asian crises. Thus, according to these analysts, even though the developmental success stories of the Asians have thought many developing countries a good lesson, their approach must be revitalized by bringing the democratic values back in to board and reinforce each other so that a good outcome in both spheres can be secured.

The argument for a democratic and developmental state in Africa and other developing countries has also been propagated and prescribed by the international organizations like the UN-ECA and in which this paradigm would be beneficial if adopted by African countries that opt to catch-up with the already developed nations.

According to this argument, the role of the state in organizing and managing resources and mobilize the public towards a consensus-based developmental agenda has been very instrumental in the East-Asian experiences. Hence, what is needed now is to learn from this and to strengthen

the approach by adding a new element (democratic governance) to strengthen both democracy and development in the nations.

Some of the prominent arguments explained in this regard are:

- The capability-expanding 21st century developmental states approach (Evans)
- The feasibility of building a democratic-developmental state in African countries (Edgheji)
- A democratic, developmental and socially inclusive order in Africa (Makndwire)

These and other related arguments stressed in this study have concluded that the democratic-developmental state approach can be feasible if certain basic features of this state system are properly established. This mainly includes ‘a robust state and societal institutions characterized by a state-society nexus that strongly emphasizes democratic oversight as a critical basis for the attainment of socially desirable development outcomes.’

II. The relationship between the state and NGOs

In this study, it has been pointed out that for NGOs to realize their potential contribution and to efficiently manage their activities, a healthy relationship between them and government is essential. Yet, this relationship between the two is subject to different socio-economic and political contexts. Many analysts in the area have provided their own arguments and this has also been presented in the study.

One of the views (a liberalist one) argues in terms of three options; NGOs can *complement reform and/or oppose* the state. The other argument focuses on the extent to which the government’s agenda in development and democracy is legitimate or not. Also the other argument circulates around the strength and weakness of a governing state and the NGO sector in a particular country. Thus, most of the ideas revolve around the competition for resource, power and legitimacy between the two actors that shapes their relationship.

Given the above theoretical and practical arguments, an attempt has been made to present the contribution of the locally based NGO sector in general and the thematic involvement of the selected NGOs in particular.

III. The role of NGOs in democratic governance

The potential role that NGOs/CSOs can play in democratic governance has been argued by many analysts, and the literature has focused on what really constitutes the concept of governance and in what way can the civil society engage in maintaining and promoting democratic governance. Thus, some of the accepted features of democratic values and governance have been explained in some details in chapter two. On the other side, the way that NGOs (particularly locally-based) come in to this picture is related with three basic potential roles;

- First and foremost, by virtue of their existence as autonomous actors, NGOs are said to pluralize (and therefore to strengthen) the institutional arena.
- Secondly, NGOs are said to work with grassroots organizations that are often comprised of poor and marginalized groups.
- Thirdly, NGOs are said to check the state power by challenging its autonomy at both national and local scales, pressing for change and developing an alternative set of perspectives and policies that can entertain both democracy and development.

Hence, given the above potential roles, the study tried to assess the activities of the selected NGOs engaged in related matters. These activities can operationally be engaged by those CSOs who have been given an exclusive right by the 2009, FDRE-CSP for the group known as ‘Ethiopian Charities’. Thus, in the sampling method, those CSOs who had a relatively longer experience of engagement in those activities both prior and after the proclamation have been purposefully selected and studied qualitatively.

5.2 Conclusions

From discussions and field facts of the paper it can be deduced that the main themes that have aroused circulate around these basic issues:

As indicated in many parts of this paper, the official claims of the Ethiopian government in following a “democratic-developmental state approach” can be found in many policy documents such as the GTP-I and formal announcements from the government’s top officials. Hence it can be argued that the government has an expressed interest and commitment to build this state approach. However, the challenge of practically operationalize this state structure is laid down on building the requisite institutions and the political commitment from the leaders to forge linkage with non-state actors such as the private sector, civil society organizations and others.

- The first important issue raised focused on the idea that since the state-society nexus is an important baseline for a democratic developmental state, one of the mechanisms through which a particular state to bring about this nexus is to work closely with the civil society in order to bring about the interests of those sections of the society that demand both democratic and developmental benefits on board.

In this regard, the concerns of this study (local NGOs) as one of the stake-holders in the civil society claimed that the states approach has been very constraining and suppressing (which has been shown by the passing of proclamations and legislations and the results from the primary data) which inhibits their active participation in democratic and developmental efforts.

The contribution from the government's side in strengthening the civic society particularly the local NGOs has been very insignificant. Instead, the sector has been facing challenges from the government's side. Some of the challenges are related to the issuance of different laws and regulations that could make the operating environment for the NGOs very difficult to the extent of their survival.

- The second important issue is: if the civil society is taken as an important ingredient in the state-society nexus of a democratic-developmental state, what roles can the civil society (particularly the local NGOs) play in strengthening democratic governance in the realm of the Ethiopian developmental state? In this case, the role of the selected NGOs has been presented building on their profile and current arrangement.

The results from the study showed that, the role of NGOs in democratic and governance issues has been very vital and can be taken as an important contribution to the overall development of the country. Particularly, the role of the selected NGOs has been very valuable in terms of economic, social and political aspects.

This has been prominent especially prior to the end of the year 2000's, where their activity and engagement could be taken remarkable. The selected NGOs had contributed in many ways for the democratic governance via different strategies. The most important ones are; public awareness creation on democratic and human rights, contribution in strengthening the justice system, monitoring the democratic process, rule of law and violations of rights and contribution to improved Policies, Laws and Programs.

To some extent, the NGOs also had some contribution in policy consultation with other stake holders such as policy consultation forums and other similar NGOs. However, this had not continued strongly due to many internal and external factors.

Some of them are; weakness in making networks with other NGOs, lack of willingness from the NGOs side to work in collaboration, lack of willingness from the government's side to enable the environment for NGO networks, and lack of financial and logistical resources.

Other important issues from the results of the study that need emphasis are:

- The studied NGOs have also worked in initiating and strengthening the whole civil society sector by making use of their positive advantage in professional expertise and networks. However, their engagement has not been as expected due to limitations in financial and logistical resources, an enabling operating environment and internal weaknesses to be committed to work with the civic society.
- The GTP-I plan and the enactment of the 2009 CSP proclamation came in to action at similar periods, which can raise an interest. “If the objective of strengthening the civic society in the engagement of democratic governance has been given important emphasis to the extent of being one objective of the national plan, then how can the proclamation stand in the other direction of making life difficult to CSOs after its enactment?” has been taken as a ‘paradox’ to many of the CSOs.
- One the most debated and a controversial law that has been passed by the government was the 2009 CSP proclamation and its resulting directives. The CSP has been criticized for not taking the situation of the local NGOs’ capacity in raising local financial resources and limiting them to raise not more than 10% of total income from foreign sources if they are to be engaged in democratic and governance issues.
- However, the government has taken the CSP proclamation as an important step in formulating a full-fledged and standardized law for the whole of the civic society. The government’s intention has also been related with controlling and monitoring those NGOs that are engaged in rent-seeking activities and financial in-transparency.
- The contribution from the donor organizations such as the EU in the EU-CSF projects and the WB social accountability programs have been very vital to the selected NGOs who are engaged in the right-based issues in executing certain projects that might not be possible with their current financial capacity.
- One of the policy consultation forums has also been working in collaboration with both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders by engaging in research-based policy dialogues and preparing consultation forums. The NGOs have benefited in some way from the results of the research-based dialogues and consultation forums.

5.3 Recommendations

Like in many developing countries different Ethiopian governments have been devising and following different state approaches to make development a reality and to eradicate poverty from the nation. However, the extent of compatibility of policies and strategies has always been in question not to address the pre-targeted issues.

Given these facts, the current government of Ethiopia has embarked on a developmental state approach as a new paradigm to ‘catch up, the already developed nations taking a model from the East-Asian countries. On the other hand, contemporary policy analysts and the international community are prescribing for a new version of developmental state in which a democratic approach should be amalgamated so that the developmental effort is going to be consistent and stable. Here for the developmental state to be democratic, the state should be based on a state-society nexus and the civil society to play an important role in the democratization and developmental efforts. Based on the above aspects and the results of the study, the following subjective opinions are forwarded:

I. Networking with other similar CSOs

Instead of engaging in similar projects and loosing efficiency, NGOs have to make effort in establishing networks with thematically similar organizations. Additionally making strong networks will give them a capacity to defend for their rights, “unity is strength”.

II. Reducing too much dependency on foreign sources

As explicitly shown in this and other bulk of studies, the NGO sector is said to be very much dependent on foreign financial sources. This in result will make them prone to financial deficiencies when the source dries due to many factors. Additionally, this will reduce what many analysts and the government itself criticizes them for promoting donor’s agenda instead of their own objectives for their target group’s benefits.

III. Promoting volunteerism

The best strategy for coping with the reduced financial resource and too much dependency is promoting and advocating for the culture of volunteerism. This will need to use every opportunity in propagating their targets works done and challenges faced to the public.

IV. Working closely with consultation forums

Consultation forums, particularly those with strong base and stable performance have good insight about the general working environment for the NGOs and this can help the CSOs to analyze their strength and gaps in their operation.

V. Building strategic relations with the government

It has been argued in many studies including this one that the NGO sector and the government see each other's move antagonistically in many instances. Hence the NGOs should narrow the gap in this area and be smarter so that they can devise a relatively better mechanism to collaborate with government institutions.


VI. ChSA should give enough time to harmonize local NGOs with the CSP

It has been almost seven years since the CSP has been enacted by the agency. However, many of the CSOs still have continued to oppose some of the articles in the legislation though any kind of concrete amendment did not take place. Thus the agency has to give enough adaptation periods so that the CSOs can coup-up with the system.

VII. Resilience of engagement within the democratic developmental state paradigm

Even though it can be a tough engagement, local NGOs should persistently that show their activities can be an important ingredient to the democratic developmental state by way of following the above strategies instead of constantly opposing the government and its approach.

Last but not least, there is a need for the country's democratic institutions such as the justice system, the ombudsman, the electoral board, the media and others to be directed by the democratic principles and strengthening the developmental state apparatus via a continuous effort of consultation with non-state actors including the civil society so that genuine NGOs can contribute their own share towards promoting a democratic and developmental state's agenda that can benefit the general public.



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Annex – I Demographic Data of Respondents at the Selected Organizations

Organizations	Gender	Age category	Level of education	Level of responsibility
ChSA	Male	40 - 50 years	First Degree	High- level management
	Male	40- 50 years	First Degree	Middle-level management
EWLA	Female	30 - 40 years	Second degree	High- level management
	Female	40 - 50 years	First Degree	Middle-level management
	Female	30 - 40 years	First Degree	Project management
	Male	40 - 50 years	First Degree	Project management
EHRCO	Male	30 - 40 years	Second degree	High- level management
	Male	50 - 60 years	First Degree	Middle-level management
	Male	40 - 50 years	First Degree	Project management
	Male	30 - 40 years	First Degree	Project management
FSS	Male	50 - 60 years	Third degree	—
	Female	40 - 50 years	Second degree	—
TE	Male	30 - 40 years	Second Degree	High- level management
	Male	40- 50 years	First Degree	Middle-level management
	Male	30 - 40 years	First Degree	Project management
VECOD	Male	50 - 60 years	Second degree	High- level management
	Female	40 - 50 years	First Degree	Middle-level management
	Male	30 - 40 years	First Degree	Project management
	Male	30 - 40 years	First Degree	Project management

Total no. of respondents= 20

Annex-II

Addis Ababa
University
(Since 1950)



**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND
DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT
MASTER'S PROGRAM IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND POLICY**

Respected participants,

This is an interview schedule designed for a thesis research that is being conducted as a partial requirement for an MA in Public Management and Policy at AAU.

The purpose of this interview schedule is to gather pertinent data to scientifically analyze the extent to which local NGOs (Ethiopian Charities) in Ethiopia have played their role and contributed to the democratic development efforts in the Ethiopian developmental state approach by taking the cases of selected local NGOs.

- I hereby, would like to assure you that any information you supply will not be used for other purposes except for academic research.
- The information gathered from this interview schedule will not in any way be shared to third parties, and it will be kept confidential.
- I hope you will provide us important information relevant with the issues raised.

Thank you for participating in the interview!!!

Abdurahman Bedewi Hamid

PART- I. NGO Background

1.1 Name of your organization: _____

1.2 Date of establishment: _____

1.3 Number of branches and regions of operation: _____

1.4 What are the major activities that your organization is engaged in?

Part - II. (Issues concerning the developmental state approach)

2.1. What is your organization's perception on the developmental state approach as a state formation? Please briefly explain.

2.2. What is your opinion regarding this statement? "A democratic-developmental state approach is a way forward for developing countries like Ethiopia who need to 'catch-up to those developed nations'."

Strongly agree agree somewhat agree
Not sure disagree strongly disagree

2.3. Please, briefly explain the reasons for your choice in question no. 2.2.?

2.4. What is your opinion on the claim that the “Ethiopian government is following a democratic developmental state approach”? Please, briefly explain.

2.5. What is your perception on the notion that “democratic development can be achieved through a continuous effort between the state and society”?

Strongly agree agree somewhat agree

Not sure disagree strongly disagree

2.6. Would you please, briefly explain the reasons for your choice in question no. 2.5.?

Part- III. (Issues concerning the role of NGOs in democratic development)

3.1. According to the 2009 Civil Society Proclamation, “engagement in activities related with democracy, human rights law enforcement and peace building of the country is only permitted for Ethiopian charities.” Do you believe this was a logical decision?

Yes we do No we don't Not sure

3.2. Would you explain the major reasons for your response in the above issue?

3.2. Has your organization been directly engaged in issues related with democracy, good governance, human rights or peace building in the country?

Yes it does No it does not

3.3. If your answer to the question above is yes, what kinds of strategies did you employ in your activities and/or contributions?

3.4. Has your organization participated in consultation of policy matters related with democratic development with governmental or other non-governmental bodies?

Yes it does

No it does not

3.5. If your answer to the question above is yes, what kinds of strategies did you employ in your activities and/or contributions?

3.6. Do you think that you have achieved your target concerning the above issue?

Yes we do

No we don't

Not sure

3.7. If your answer to the above question is yes, what were the major strengths that you noticed in your activities?

3.8. If your answer to the above question is no, what were the major challenges that you faced in your activities?

3.9. Did you receive any kind of contribution from the government's side in your activities? If yes, what kinds, if not, what were the major gaps?

3.10. Many writers and analysts suggest that "formal NGOs can contribute towards initiating, strengthening and nurturing the civil society given their potentialities" what is your stand about this statement?

Strongly agree agree somewhat agree
Not sure disagree

3.11. Do you think that you have contributed enough towards initiating the civil society given the existing potentialities on your hand?

Yes we do No we don't Not sure

3.12. If your answer to the above question is yes, what were the major strengths that you noticed in your activities?

3.13. If your answer to the above question is no, what were the major challenges that you faced in your activities?

3.14. In general, what major internal strengths and weaknesses do you notice as an organization in your activities?

Part – IV. Major recommendations

4.1 What possible recommendations do you forward to the government institutions so that you can play your role in democratic development?

4.2 What possible recommendations do you forward to other non-government stakeholders like policy forums which can contribute in your efforts?

4.3 What do you forward as a solution to organizations like yours in their efforts to the democratic development endeavors?

Thank you very much !!!

Annex-III

Interview guide prepared for NGOs

Respected participants,

This is an interview schedule designed for a thesis research that is being conducted as a partial requirement for an MA in Public Management and Policy.

I. NGO Background

1.1 Name of your organization:

1.2 Date of establishment:

1.3 Number of branches and regions of operation:

1.4 What are the major activities that your organization is engaged in?

II. Issues concerning the developmental state approach

2.1 How do you perceive the concept of a developmental state approach?

2.3 Many writers and the international community nowadays are prescribing that “a democratic-developmental state approach is a way forward for developing countries like Ethiopia who need to ‘catch-up’.” What is your opinion regarding this statement?

2.4 What is your opinion on the claim that the “Ethiopian government is following a democratic developmental state approach”?

2.5 The Ethiopian government claims that “establishing a stable democratic and developmental state and thereby creating a suitable environment for successive development endeavors; Strengthening the civil service and civic societies so as to strengthen democratic institutions.....” is one of its objectives.(GTP-I, 2010 pp.11). How do you perceive this statement? Do you think that this objective has been achieved in your regard?

2.6 How do you perceive the notion that “democratic development can be achieved through a continuous effort between state-society linkages in development efforts”?

Annex-IV

Interview guide prepared for the FDRE-Charities and Societies Agency

I. Agency Background

1.1 Date of establishment

1.2 Mandate regarding local NGOs/Ethiopian Charities

1.3 Major duties and responsibilities concerning Ethiopian Charities

II. Issues concerning the developmental state approach

2.1 How do you perceive the concept of a developmental state approach?

2.2 Many writers and the international community nowadays are prescribing that “a democratic-developmental state approach is a way forward for developing countries like Ethiopia who need to ‘catch-in development.’” What is your opinion regarding this statement?

2.3 What is your opinion on the claim that the “Ethiopian government is following a democratic developmental state approach”?

2.4 The Ethiopian government claims that “establishing a stable democratic and developmental state and thereby creating a suitable environment for successive development endeavors; Strengthening the civil service and civic societies so as to strengthen democratic institutions.....” is one of its objectives.(GTP-I, 2010 pp.11). How do you perceive this statement? Do you think that this objective has been achieved in your regard?

2.5 How do you perceive the notion that “democratic development can be achieved through a continuous effort between state-society linkages in development efforts”?

III. Issues concerning the role of NGOs in democratic development

- 3.1 According to the 2009 Civil Society Proclamation, “engagement in activities related with democracy, human rights law enforcement and peace building of the country is only permitted for Ethiopian charities.” What was the basic reason for that?
- 3.2 Many writers suggest that “the engagement of Ethiopian CSOs/NGOs in good governance, democracy, human rights and peace building is a comparatively recent development.” Why do you think this has been the case?
- 3.3 Many analysts and the international community stand for the positive contribution of local NGOs in nurturing the civic society and democratic governance. What is your opinion in this regard?
- 3.4 What is your agency’s evaluation on the contribution of the local NGOs in democratic development? Do you think their role has increased?
- 3.5 If your answer for the above question is yes, what were the basic factors for that?
- 3.6 If your answer is no, what do you think are the major factors for the reduction?
- 3.7 Organizing consultative forums for governmental organs and charities and societies is one of your functions. Has your agency produced such a forum in which the Ethiopian Charities and societies participated? If so what were the major issues that these organizations raise as a challenge in their contribution?
- 3.8 In relation to the above question, do you think that the organizations had a good ground in raising the issues as a challenge?
- 3.9 Many local NGOs who are engaged in issues related with democracy, good governance, legal issues, human rights and peace building are continuously claiming that they are facing many restrictions from the government side. What is your opinion on this?
- 3.10 What would be your role as an agency in strengthening the local NGOs in their contribution for democratic development of the country?

Thank you very much!!!

Annex-V

Interview guide prepared for Policy consultation forum

I. Organizational background

- 1.1 Date of establishment
- 1.2 Number of branches/offices
- 1.3 Major areas of engagement

II. Issues concerning the developmental state approach

- 2.1 How do you perceive the concept of a developmental state approach?
- 2.2 Has your organization produced a research or a policy dialogue regarding a developmental state approach?
- 2.3 If yes, what major developments do you observe concerning the issue?
- 2.4 Many writers and the international community nowadays are prescribing that “a democratic-developmental state approach is a way forward for developing countries like Ethiopia who need to ‘catch-up’ in development.” What is your opinion regarding this statement?
- 2.5 What is your opinion on the claim that the “Ethiopian government is following a democratic developmental state approach”?
- 2.6 The Ethiopian government claims that “establishing a stable democratic and developmental state and thereby creating a suitable environment for successive development endeavors; Strengthening the civil service and civic societies so as to strengthen democratic institutions.....” is one of its objectives.(GTP-I, 2010 pp.11). How do you perceive this statement? Do you think that this objective has been achieved in your regard?

III. Issues concerning the role of NGOs in democratic development

- 3.1 Many writers suggest that “the engagement of Ethiopian CSOs/NGOs in good governance, democracy, human rights and peace building is a comparatively recent development.” Why do you think this has been the case?
- 3.2 Many analysts and the international community stand for the positive contribution of local NGOs in nurturing the civic society and democratic governance. What is your opinion in this regard?
- 3.3 Has your organization ever produced a policy research regarding the role of local NGOs in democratic development?
- 3.4 If your answer to the above is yes, what major potentials and gaps did you observe?
- 3.5 Has your organization ever produced a policy forum in which local NGOs participated in the dialogue? If so, what major developments did you observe in this regard?
- 3.6 Has your organization ever produced a consultative forum concerning democracy and development in which governmental agencies and the civic society participated?
- 3.7 If so, what did you come across in the contribution of the government, the civic societies and other stakeholders in democratic development?
- 3.8 Has there been an opportunity that any local NGO come to your organization in search of a policy advice and/or a dialogue about their contribution in democracy, good governance, human right, and legal issues?
- 3.9 If so, what major challenges and opportunities do you observe from the NGOs perspective in their contribution?

IV. Major recommendations

- 4.1 What possible recommendations do you forward to the government institutions so that local NGOs can play their role in democratic development?
- 4.2 What possible recommendations do you forward to the local NGOs so that they can potentially contribute to the democratic development process?
- 4.3 What do you forward as a solution to organizations like yours in their efforts to the democratic development endeavors?

Thank you very much!!!