

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS:THE CASE OF GUMZ AND OROMO
IN KAMASHI AND EAST WALLEGA ZONES

BY
AYNALEM GETACHEW

JUNE 2009

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INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS: THE CASE OF GUMZ
AND OROMO
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A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO
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
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WELLEGA PROVINCE, ETHIOPIA
 A BOUT 1969



- GIMBI Awraja
 Mendi Weredo
- Rivers
 --- Boundaries
 ——— Roads
 - - - Tracks
 ▲ Mountains
 ● Towns

- of villages:
1. Shiba
 2. Bagole
 3. Kurka
 4. Karsa
 5. Agalo
 6. Kameshi
 7. Dimto

Location of Benishangul Gumuz in National S




TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>ACRONYMS</i>	IV
<i>ABSTRACT</i>	V
<i>CHAPTER ONE</i>	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. Description of the Population and the study area.....	1
1.1.1 <i>Background information</i>	1
1.1.2 <i>Study area/site selection/</i>	2
1.2 Statement of the problem.....	4
1.3 Objectives of the Study.....	5
1.3.1 <i>General Objective</i>	5
1.3.2 <i>Specific Objective</i>	5
1.4 Significance of the study.....	6
1.5 Research method and Field Experiences.....	6
1.5.1 <i>Data collection</i>	6
1.5.1.1 <i>Secondary data collection</i>	7
1.5.1.2 <i>Participant Observation</i>	7
1.5.1.3 <i>Semi-Structured interview</i>	7
1.5.1.4 <i>Focus group Discussions</i>	8
1.5.1.5 <i>Case Study</i>	8
1.5.2 <i>Field Experience</i>	9
<i>CHAPTER TWO</i>	12
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.....	12
2.1 Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations.....	12
2.2 Ethnic Conflict.....	17
2.3 Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia.....	20
2.4 Federalism.....	22
2.5 Ethnic Federalism the Ethiopian Experience.....	23
2.6 Migration.....	26
2.7 Rural- rural Migration in Ethiopia and Its relations to Conflict.....	28
<i>CHAPTER THREE</i>	30
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF GUMZ- OROMO RELATIONS.....	30
3.1 Historical Background.....	30
3.2 Pre 1974 Gumz- Oromo Relations.....	33
3.3 Post 1974 Relations.....	38
3.3.1 <i>The Origin and Development of State Farms in former Wallega Administrative Region</i>	39
3.3.1.1 <i>The Closure of the State Farms</i>	42
3.4 Social and Economic Relations of the Gumz and Oromo.....	42
3.4.1 <i>Social Relations and Social Networks</i>	42
3.4.1.1 <i>Michu</i>	43
3.4.1.2 <i>Religion</i>	44
3.4.1.3 <i>Abelige</i>	45

3.4.1.4 Harma Hodha	45
3.4.1.5 Marriage	46
3.5 Economic Relations	49
3.5.1 Access to Land Resource	49
CHAPTER FOUR	53
ETHNIC FEDERALISM, MIGRATION AND CONFLICT NEXUS:.....	53
4.1 Ethnic Federalism and Administrative Limit	53
4.1.1. Ethnic Federalism	53
4.1.2. <i>Administrative Limits</i>	60
4.2 Change in Gumz Ways of Life	67
4.3. Ethnic Federalism and the Inflow of Migrants towards Gumz Land	72
4.3.1 Oromo and Amhara Migration towards Gumz land	72
4.3.2 <i>The Link between Migration and Conflict</i>	78
4.4 Availability of Arms and Ammunition.....	83
CHAPTER FIVE	84
CONFLICTS BETWEEN GUMZ AND OROMO AND THEIR	
SETTLEMENT	84
5.1 Conflict and its Aftermath	84
5.2. The Re-institution of Customary Dispute Resolution Mechanisms	91
CHAPTER SIX	95
CONCLUSION.....	95
REFERENCES	99
APPINDICES.....	105

Acronyms

BGNRS	Benshangul-Gumuz National Regional State
BPLM	Benishangul People Liberation Movement
COR	Council of Representative
Derg	Acronym for Military Committee
EPLF -	Eritrea Peoples' Liberation Front
EPRDF -	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESM	Ethiopian Student Movement
MEISON	Amharic acronym for All Ethiopian Socialist Movement
OLF -	Oromo Liberation Front
OPDO -	Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization
TPLF -	Tigray People's Liberation Front
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
WADE	Wallega Agricultural Development Enterprise

ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with ethnic conflict between Gumz and Oromo, focusing on change and continuity of their relationship with the change in the countrys political development. The scanty literature that existed on the history of Gumz gives varied historical record, regarding their settlement. Some indicated that the Gumz setteled in the lower Dedessa valley in the 19th century and on the other hand there is literature who argues that they are indigenous to the lower Dedessa valley, and they resisted the 16th century Oromo expansion.

Therefore the two groups have a strong historically developed relationships starting from 17th century, if we take the second group of literature. When we look at their relations in the recent period, or the 20th century they had one serious conflict in 1952, which both groups remember. But they had serious conflicts since 1990s, which is the initating factor of this research. The main objective of this research is to identify the triggering factors from the main causes of conflicts. To achieve such an objective qualitative approach mainly of ethnographic orientation is used.

The finding indicates that the main cause of the Gumz- Oromo conflict is the political restructuring of the country. Since 1990s EPRDF takes ethnicity as a major criterion for redrawing the political map of the country. Therefore, the self-government shaped by the government had divided different ethnic groups, who were in the past living within the same administrative boundaries, into different regional states. The new states wanted to guard this power from 'outsider' or other ethnic groups. The constitiutional right of all citizens to freedom of movement and to reside anywhere in the country is seen as a threat, by the local people, to political and economic entitlement. The exising ethnic division, historical memories of suppression and myth of origin were used as strong stimuli of group mobilization by the political elites to put a check on other group advance.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Description of the Population and the study area

1.1.1 Background Information

Benishangul-Gumuz National Regional State (BGNRS) was established in 1994 on the basis of Transitional Government Charter. Previously the southern part of BGNRS belonged to Wallega while the area beyond the Blue Nile to Gojjam. It stretches along the Sudanese border between 09.17⁰ and 12.06⁰ N. The Western and Eastern limits are given by the longitudes 34.10⁰ and 37.04⁰E, respectively. Gumz¹, Berta, Shinasha, Mao and Como were organized under Benshangul Gumz Regional State. It is found in western part of the country and bordered by Amhara in the north and east; Oromia in the east and south; Gambela in the southwest and Sudan in the west (Regional Atlas 2007).

The indigenous people of BGNRS are Nilo-Saharan origin except the Shinasha, who belong to the Cushitic language family. However, there are also other ethnic groups living in the region. The indigenous Berta constitutes 26% and Gumz 23%; Amhara 22.2%; Oromo 12.8% and others including the indigenous Shinasha, Mao and Como 14.9% (Regional Bureau of Culture and Information 2003: 3). According to the Central Statistics Agency Population Census of 2007, the region has a population of 670,847 and out of this 90.08 % reside in rural area and 9.92% in urban areas. The spatial distribution varies from zone to zone i.e. 45.20%, 44.01%, 10.8% lives in *Assosa* Zone (includes Mao Como Sp.Wareda), *Metekel* Zone, and *Kamashi* Zone, respectively (CSA, 2008; Regional Atlas 2007).

¹ In this study the term Gumz is used rather than the derogatory term shanqilla or any clan names because first it is the name currently employed by the concerned people and second the people themselves prefer to be called by this name and it has no derogatory connotation for them. 'Shanqilla' a derogatory term was used by highlanders to call all the speakers of Nilo-Saharan language family (indicative of skin color and social status that is black or slave)

The total area of the Region is estimated to be about 50,380Km² and the region is divided in to two parts by the Blue Nile. The Northern part – *Metekel Zone* comprises an area of 26, 560 Km² , the Southern part – *Assosa Zone, Kamashi Zone* and *Mao-Como Special Wareda* – 23,820 Km² The Region is administratively divided into three zones, which that are *Assosa, Metekel, and kamashi*, and 18 normal and two special Waredas. The region's elevation ranges from 580 to 2,731 masl. The highest peak is the *Belaya* plateau in *Dangur Wareda*, the lowest where the Blue Nile crosses the Ethio-Sudanese border. The major part of the region – about 75% - is lowland (*Kolla*, below 1500 masl.), 24% midland (*Woyna Dega*, 1,500-2,500 masl) and only 1% is highland (*Dega*, above 2,500masl) (Regional Atlas 2007).

1.1.2 Study area/site selection/

The nature of Gumz-Oromo conflict forced me to take two Waredas, one each from Kamashi zone of Benshangul Gumz and East Wallega zone of Oromia regional states. Of the five Waredas of *Kamashi zone, Belojeganfoy Wareda* was selected as my main site-specific research because of the conflict of its inhabitants with Oromia *Wareda of Sasiga, Diga, Gida KIRAMU, Limu* and *GutuGida* inhabitants. From these waredas of East Wallega Zone, *Sasiga* was selected because of its relations to the 1994 and 2008 conflicts and also for that *Sasiga* shares five of the nine *Belojeganfoy qebelles* bordered by east and west Wallega zones. Two main and two supplementary locales of research were selected for the ethnographic fieldwork based on their relations to the 1994 and 2008 conflicts.

Belojeganfoy Wareda is situated in the south-east of Benishangul-Gumz, and covers an area of about 1,880 km². It borders with Oromiya Region in the south, east and north-east, *Kamashi Wareda* in the west, and *Yaso Wareda* in the north-west. Most parts of the *Wareda* fall into an altitude range of about 1,100 to 1,450 masl. It is predominantly covered by *Combretum-Terminalia* woodlands. However, large cleared areas are found in *Anger Shenkora qebelle*. The surrounding areas of *Oromiya/Sasiga Wareda/* are almost completely cleared for cropping. The land was cultivated by state farms during the *Derg*.

After the fall of the *Derg*, most state-farms were closed and in 1990s East Wallega Zone administration obtained ownership right over the former Wallega state farms.

According to the 2007 Census, the population of *Belojganfoy Wareda* was 24,993 and that of *Sasiga* is about 81,809. Out of the total population of the two *Waredas* 2,386 and 8,371 people live in the urban area of *Belojganfoy (Soge town)* and *Sasiga (Galo town)*, respectively. The settlement pattern of *Belojganfoy Wareda* is scattered. Villages are spread all over the area. They are often small, comprising not more than 5-30 houses. There are several villages of *Belojganfoy Wareda* situated in *Oromiya qebelles* because the people are Gumz or Berta. These villages, as well as some other areas of *Belojganfoy (e.g., Arjo qebelle)*, mostly get school and health service from facilities in Oromia. The *Wareda* comprises currently 10 *qebelles*. It is predominantly inhabited by Gumz people. Oromos are also represented in considerable numbers. *Angere Shenkora, Saidalecha*, and *Belojganfoy* of Gumz *qebelles* are predominantly inhabited by Oromo and Gumz. *Saidalecha qebelle* is also inhabited by Bertas. In recent times, Gojjame people have immigrated into *Belojganfoy* and *Sasiga Waredas*.

Sasiga Wareda of east *Wallega* zone has 28 *qebelles*, of which 12 are found in lowland area. The lowland part covers 40 % of the *Wareda* that is 37,526 hectares and it's bordered by Benshangul Gumz regional state to north and west, *GutuWayu Wareda* in the north and east and *Dega Wareda* in the south and west. The low laying *qebelles* of the *Wareda* were predominantly used for state farm during the *Derg* regime. The settlement patterns also followed this development, as the predominant population is of Oromos that come from different part of Oromia to work on the farm through the coercive action of the state in 1970s and starting from 1980s people came voluntarily in search of job and land.

Both *Waredas* do not have road access. The only road in to the villages is through what was cleared for the state farm. The road accesses to *Belojganfoy* are all passing on their major length over the territory of *Oromiya*. During the rainy season, many roads are difficult or not at all passable. The *Wareda* centre *Soge* is connected by road with the

main roads *Neqemte – Ghimbi and Neqemte - Bure* (Bureau of Planning and Economy: 2001).

1.2 Statement of the problem

The coming to power of EPRDF in May 1991 created a landmark in Ethiopian history as far as ethnic questions are concerned. For the first time, the government policy formally recognized ethnicity as a fundamental instrument to defend the rights of ethnic groups and as a remedy to the biases of the past. Constitutionally, the country's political map was redrawn and ethnic-based federal arrangement was instituted. This resulted in the establishment of nine regional states.

Benshangul Gumz regional State (Region Six) was formed in 1994 with Assosa as its center following this political restructuring. *Gumz, Berta, Shinasha, Mao and Como* ethnic groups comprise the State. The historically marginalized ethnic groups at this historical moment are able to secure economic and political rights over their own territories. They tend to guard this self-government from outsiders or other ethnic groups. Other ethnic groups are considered threats to the newly found self-administration and the political leaders have mobilized their communities to keep the other ethnic group outside of their regional state.

Gumz have been exposed to both seasonal and permanent highland Oromo and Amhara migration and settlements. Gumz economic activity (shifting cultivation), their settlement pattern and endowment with varieties of natural resources facilitate both seasonal and permanent migration of highlanders. Migration in contexts where there is competition over resource and power can create conditions in which others perceived as a threat thereby resulting in an increase both in latent and violent conflict (Durham 1989:139).

Ethnic tension actually is not a recent phenomenon in Ethiopia. However, I share the argument that Markakis, forwarded in his article; "Ethnic Conflict and the State in the Horn of Africa" like he said defining conflict *a priori* as 'ethnic' is dubious. It certainly is

a factor in the conflict (Markakis, 1994: 217). As Newman (1978) clearly indicated, ethnicity, like any other social construct could be manipulated to satisfy individual's or groups' needs. It can possibly be used to mobilize action for personal or group political, social and economic interests.

There is no agreement among academics on the source of conflict because it is an inter-play of a number of factors, which they broadly categorize as political, economic and cultural. Although the causes of conflict are contentious, the conflict between the Gumz and the Oromo caused considerable casualties to both human life and property. A report suggests that over 175 people were killed and more than 63,000 were displaced (Ministry of Federal Affairs, 2000 EC/2008). This brings up critical questions, which need thorough investigation: Why did the long period of mutual co-existence between these ethnic groups break down? What are the new phenomena with disruptive impact on inter-ethnic relationship?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

1.3.1 General Objective

The general objective of this study is to explore ethnic interaction and to identify the main cause of Gumz-Oromo conflict.

1.3.2 Specific Objective

1. Explore the historical relationship between Gumz and the Oromo groups as a means to understand their contemporary relationship.
2. Investigate how economic and political changes at local and national levels have affected the relationship between Gumz and Oromo people.
3. To investigate the impact of migration on the relationship between ethnic groups and its relations to Gumz and Oromo conflict.
4. To review state, (local and Federal) interventions in resolving conflict.

1.4 Significance of the study

Ethnic conflict, including violent one has become international problem; it is the concern of both the developing and developed countries. Therefore researches which focus on ethnic conflict, particularly of violent type add to the peace study of the country and at large to the Horn of Africa.

It will also contribute academically, towards better understanding of ethnic relations particularly of the Gumz and the Oromo. And it may also serve as a specific work for large scale comparative studies on the issue.

It is important to identify the triggering factors from the main causes of conflict so as the intervention strategies (peaceful resolution, conflict management, development, and for policy and strategies) would place its remedy up on concrete ground. Since finding the main cause is the objective of this research, it will be a good reference for governmental and non governmental organizations working in the study area.

It may also contribute to the understanding of the role that state policy plays in maintaining and/or disrupting inter-ethnic relations.

1.5 Research Method and Field Experiences

1.5.1 Data Collection

Throughout the research period, a combination of different data-collection methods were applied, including secondary literature review, participant observation, semi-structured interviews with key informants, focus group discussions, and extended case studies. Field data collection tools such as field note-taking, tape recording, photographs were made so as to record various important discussions. Methodologically, this thesis is based on a qualitative approach mainly with anthropological and to some extent historical orientations. Informants were selected on the basis of their knowledge about the issues concerned, their positions as local elders, as leaders of traditional social organizations, as heads of religious institutions, and positions in government offices.

For the fieldwork among Gumz and Oromo groups field assistants were employed. As Berreman (1962) described, the background and the social acceptance of field assistants among the study group enable an ethnographer to win the confidence of the groups, to cross to their back-region information and reduce informants' attempt to conceal their secrets. To this end, assistants were selected in accordance with their familiarity with the community, their knowledge about the geographical sites, and to some extent based on the levels of their acceptance within their respective community. Most of my informants, both Gumz and Oromo, speak Amharic. The direct quotes included in the text are taken from my Amharic speaking informants.

1.5.1.1 Secondary Data Collection

Secondary source materials both on the concepts and practices relevant to the research were reviewed. Data were collected from different government and non governmental organizations. The government institutions include Benshangul Gumz Regional State Administration and Security Department, Planing and Program Service, Disaster Prevention and Population Settlement office, *Kamashi* zone administration and security office. Oromia Regional State Administration and Security office, *Sasiga Wareda* Administration office and the zonal Agricultural Office.

1.5.1.2 Participant Observation

I observed the day to day activities of the people and observed different market days and activities, religious conference and joint committee meetings, which basically help in understanding and building the data on the socio-economic relationship of the group concerned.

1.5.1.3 Semi-Structured Interview

An in-depth interview was conducted with numerous key informants. They include local Gumz, Oromo and Amhara informants in Anger Meti, Anger Shenkora, Belojeganfoy, Seyedalecha of Gumz qebelles and Hora Watta, Handura Belo and Beredu Belo qebelles of Oromia. Informants from government, non-governmental and private institutions were

also interviewed at their respective offices, which include higher officials of the two regional states.

Information on cause of conflict, on ethnic relationships, on factors of migration and the reaction of indigenous community towards migrants was collected using such a method. Informal conversations were also used in order to uncover the back-region information of a group.

1.5.1.4 Focus group Discussions

I conducted three separate focus group discussions, with the Gumz, Oromo, and Amhara because the villagers did not want to talk in the presence of other ethnic groups. I arranged a focus group discussion which comprises six Oromo and six Gumz informants on one market day at *Sayedalech qebelle*. What happened was while the Gumz members of the groups started talking about their relationship with the Oromo and how they were treated, the Oromo group members did stay quite. I tried to get them involved in the discussion but they kept saying that 'let us forget the past and think about our future'. Some even left without saying a word. Later they told me that it was a bad thing to do, and they think such a confrontation will cause violent conflict.

Focus group discussions were held in order to obtain qualitative data as well as to validate and probe crucial points of already obtained data. Several informants, elders' traditional leaders, the *Abba quoro*, former employees of the state farms, former *qebelle* leaders, government workers excluding local authorities and religious leaders have participated during group discussions held in different contexts, especially at local market places.

1.5.1.5 Case Study

Case-history was developed on Gumz-Oromo relationship (socio economic relationship) basically which indicates its change and continuity through the change in local and central politics. Experience of migrant also presented which indicated factors that lead to decision of migration.

1.5.2 Field Experience

My fieldwork started on December 15, 2008 by going to the Regional States to get research permits and to do preliminary assessment. From December 15th 2008 to January 6th 2009 I managed to secure permits from East Wallega Zone and *Sasiga Wareda* and also from Benishangul Gumz Regional, Zonal and Wareda offices (*Belojeganfoy wereda*). Securing permits was not difficult as, it did not take me more than half an hour in both offices. The challenge came when I went down to the *qebelle* level. I chose two main and two supportive *qebelles* for my study but also visit and talk to the local community in other *qebelles* of the two *Waredas*.

At first it was difficult to convince Gumz *qebelle* officials at *Anger Meti* (which the Oromo call it *Legahaya*). They were suspicious of me and all the paper that I had with me (support letters from the School, the regional, zonal and also *Wareda*). Although I did try my best to clarify the purpose of my study, the officials ignored me and engaged in heated discussion. Since I did not speak Gumz I could not understand what they were saying or fighting over. They both speak Amharic and directly communicate with me when they wanted. It was a scary experience. Finally they told me to stay put and told me not to speak to any person or move out of the house until they decide on the issue. So I spent two days with out doing much and on the second day they came to where I stay (My host was Gumz leady called Garetu Gameda she is a nice girl with big heart. She is married and has a little boy, Abeyothe) and told me that I can start doing what I came for and told me that they are sorry for the misunderstanding.

There were mixed reactions from the Gumz community towards me and the topic of the study. The time of my fieldwork is right after the 2008 Gumz-Oromo conflict. At the time the Federal Police arrested and charged so many Gumz and who were all in Federal Prison that is Addis Ababa. So coming from Addis Ababa to study the relationship and conflict made every body anxious about it. For some, I was an attorney who came to investigate and build evidence against the accused Gumz, and for others I was a spy sent

by the Oromo. So every time I met up with individual Gumz, the first thing they asked me about was my ethnic background and whether I speak Oromiffa or not.

In Oromia *qebelles* too I was attached to different institutions and so many people came to tell me their court cases, including divorce issues, some also came to complain about the aid distribution, which they assumed that I came to look-over. For some, I was also a journalist and I was forced to listen to several peoples' grievances. In both groups suspicion and reluctance were overcome through diligent and continuous explanation of the purpose of the study and by presenting myself as a neutral researcher, without any political or ethnic attachments. It was also through assistants to whom the informants and government officials had a sense of belonging and trust, that I developed a good relationship with both Gumz and Oromo villagers. However, the 'sensitivity' of the topic itself made my informants skeptical to reveal themselves. Thus, the names of informants are all kept anonymous.

After building rapport with the two communities, I collected the first round of data between January 23 to February 22, 2009. In the mean time I had to come to Addis Ababa for a short period, so I did on February 22 and continued to the 4th of March. Starting from 5th of March to 2nd of April continued on developing my data. Finalizing my field work, I came back to Addis Ababa to do the analysis. At the same time I was able to communicate with people who came to Addis to stand as witness on the federal court, Oromia regional authorities, and Gumz members of Parliaments.

It was not easy to arrange an interview with Oromo officials for several reasons, of which one is fear of taking responsibility of the assumed consequences of the information that they imparted. Here, it is important to present one incident, which I encountered at the time. It was made possible through some effort to talk to an important official of the Oromia Regional State. He did not want the interview to be recorded and I agreed with his terms. He told me that he allowed me to interview him because the research is an academic one and it will not be used for public consumption, unlike the independent research results, which is going to be published and will be available for the public,

according to him that the accademic papers will be shelved. Unlike the Oromo, Gumz officials will as far as arranging every possible person and document to see and talk to the researcher.

For most of the local people including officials of the two zones and regional staff, it is difficult to imagine let alone see a woman like me engaged in such kind of activity without a man following. So, where ever I go, the first question was 'Are you alone?' And 'How your family let you take such a risky endeavor?' .Such an attitude has both advantage and disadvantages. The advantage was I got access to most of the things without much difficulty because most of the people admired me for taking such a role, and they were willing to help me out. The disadvantage and what annoyed me was that they think that I am physically weak and unable to pass through the challenges of the environment. When I went down to the rural villages, local people and *qebelle* officials were very much concerned about how I am going to go to different villages, because they thought that I could not walk four hours, I just had to prove them wrong.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The focal areas of the conceptual framework are in the domain of ethnicity, ethnic relations, ethnic federalism and migration.

2.1 Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations

Ethnicity remains to be a key concept in anthropology and sociology for many years but still there exist uncertainty as to its meaning. The word 'ethnic' originate from the Greek ethnos, which in turn derived from its adjective ethnikos. The word ethnos has a number of meanings which change emphases depending on different contexts and at different period of the Greek history: "Ethnos; Number of people living together, body of men; particular tribes; of animals, flocks ;(after Homer) nation, people ;(later) foreign, barbarous nation; non-Athenians, (biblical Greek) non-Jews, Gentiles, class of men, caste, and tribe"(Fenton, 2003; 14). The word ethnic comes in to English with several changes in spellings and had the meaning of foreign people and of being distinguished from Jewish and Gentile i.e. heathen (Ibid; 15).

Ethnicity has been defined differently by different scholars, for some it is 'objective' or 'primordial' and for others it is 'situational'. Sokolovski and Tishkov (1996); Kaufman (2000) cited in Wolde-Selassie (2002) categorized the paradigms into three approaches: Primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. But many of the theoretical accounts grouped into primordialism and situationalism, merging the arguments of the instrumentalism and constructivism under one category and cataloging it by either of the terms or several related others such as circumstantialism, constructivism, interactionism and subjectivism. Then again primordialism also takes various other related variant terms such as essentialism, naturalism, objectivism and socio-biology (Banks, 1996; Wolde-selassie, 2002; Thompson, 1989).

Primordialists view ethnicity as an objective given that is bound to be natural and innate to human identity. They assert that expressions of ethnicity fulfill the human psychological need for identity. There exist two different strains of primordialists: the one that stresses on the biological basis of ethnic sentiment, and the other that advocates the socially and historically produced primordial ties (Thompson, 1989; 11-12).

Primordialism has been criticized for presenting a static and naturalistic view of ethnicity that mystifies emotion and reduces cultural and social behaviour to biological drives. The primordial assumption ignores change and dissolution of ethnic groups, not to speak of the more modern processes of fusion of ethnic groups through intermarriage. In addition, primordialists underemphasize people's passions and strong dedication to rational values, sense of duties, classes and other socially constructed supreme goals (Thompson 1989: 181).

For those who consider it as 'subjective' or situational, ethnicity is relative and to some extent situational and also an aspect of social relations. Variation in expression and the idea of choice in the expression of ethnic identity is the basic assumption of situational ethnicity (Eriksen, 2001:266; Banks, 1996:24-27).

Scholars like Glazer, Moynihan's (1975) and Cohen (1978) cited in Banks (1996), consider ethnicity as an instrument, that group use to assert economic and political interest rather than being psychological. According to Banks, for Cohen ethnic identities develop in response to functional organization requirement. He defines it as a particular form of informal political organization. According to him boundaries are invoked in order to guard economic interest or "symbolic capital" of the group.

Political ethnicity is goal-oriented ethnicity, created by internal organization and stimulated by external pressure and held not for its own sake but to defend an economic or political interest. Banks also underlined that for Cohen, such ethnicity needs to be created upon some pre-existing cultural identity rather than being invented out of thin

air, but will only come into being when the situation are right, rather than being a 'natural' occurrence (Banks,1996;35).

Scholars like Donald Horowitz (1998) classified ethnic theories as soft and hard views depending on the nature of group affiliation. According to him no one adhere to the two extremes. For hard view ethnic groups are ascriptive, firmly bonded entities that are based on a strong sense of commonality, are hostile to and desire to dominate outsiders, are liable to pursue conflict behavior based on passion and engender a great willingness on the part of group members to sacrifice for collective welfare. For the soft views, ethnic group are entities whose boundaries are tricky and malleable whose solidarity is based on the material rewards they provide their members rather than on diffuse affection, and vulnerable to strategic manipulation. According to him the hard view ethnic affiliation as made of stone, and for the soft view ethnic affiliation made of putty. Horowitz summarized the whole theories of ethnic conflict as such that if ethnic group loyalty supersedes loyalty to the other groups, the whole phenomenon must be primordial.If politicians benefit from calculative behavior, or if groups struggle over resources, the whole phenomenon must be instrumental (Horowitz, 1998: 2).

According to Horowitz merging the two theoretical views in the study of ethnic conflict, and make the foundation of ethnic loyalty, the relations between passion and interest, and the significance of institutional context at the center of analysis. Banks also shows the problems of finding a unitary theory on the issue saying:'The more recent theories have sought either to add theoretical vigor from another source or to insist that the specific context of ethnic manifestations is vital to analysis' (Banks, 1996:43).

Scholars like Fenton (2003) argued that there can not be a theory of ethnicity, nor can "ethnicity" be regard as a theory. He argued that "there is not a single unitary phenomenon 'ethnicity' but rather an array of private and public identities which coalesce around the idea of descent and culture". He further discerns that the context in which ethnic identity found are multifold and multiform and it is the content that matter most than the ethnicity. He pointed out that identity most of the time affected by external co-

ordinate of ethnic action rather than internal features of ethnic identity, so he said that our interest should be directed to the 'co-ordinates' which he said forms part of the explanation of why ethnicity has become a focus of action (Fenton, 2003; 136, 179-181).

According to Erikson (2002; 4) all anthropological approaches agree that ethnicity has something to do with the classification of people and group relationships. He argued that for ethnicity to come there need to be two or more group that have contact and knowledge of each other as being culturally different from themselves. Barth (1969) argues that speaking of ethnic group as an isolated entity is an absurd assumption. For Narroll (1964) cited in Barth, 'ethnic group defines as largely biologically self-perpetuating, shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms, makes up a field of communication and interaction and has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order' (Barth 1969:10).

Barth points out that the intensity with which a group profiles itself as an ethnic group, and with which individuals stress their ethnicity, generally increases when there is intense spatial geographical and social contact between groups. The most isolated "traditional" group of people is probably the least ethnically self-defined.

Bromley (1975), cited in Banks also stresses that the interaction of different groups which consolidates ethnic identity. So for Bromley ethnicity is fundamentally an aspect of relationship not as a property of a group (Banks, 1996; 19). Knutsson (1969:99) also argue that ethnicity is not a universally applicable term but rather the representation of a wide range of interrelations in which the dominant reference is to an ethnic status ascribed on the basis of birth, language and socialization. So for him the studies of ethnic interrelations are the study of ethnic processes that is the emergence, continuation and change.

For ethnicity to exist there need to be minimum of contact between different groups. There needs to be an idea of each other as being culturally different. If and only if the cultural difference of such a relations considered important in day to day interaction of the group and made socially relevant, the social relationship have an ethnic element. There will be systematic distinction between insider and outsider: between US and THEM (Eriksen, 2002; 12, 13, 19).

Barth (1969) argues that ' the persistence of ethnic group in contact entails not only criteria and signals for identification, but also a structuring of interaction which allows the persistence of cultural difference'. According to Barth inter-ethnic social interaction governed by systematic set of rules. What is relevant to interaction in any social situation is prescribed. ' Stable inter-ethnic relations presuppose a structuring of interaction: a set of prescriptions governing situations of contact, and allowing for articulation in some sectors or domains of activity, and a set of prescriptions on social situations preventing inter-ethnic interaction in other sectors and thus insulating parts of the cultures from confrontation and modification' (Barth1969:16).

According to Eriksen (2002), ethnic relations are fluid and negotiable: that their importance varies situational. Park (1950) cited in Eriksen 2002 stressed that:'ethnicity, and ethnic conflict(or race prejudice), was an aspect of the relationship between groups and that it was caused by threats, real or imaginary, to an existing 'ecological pattern' of mutual adjustment. In other words, the social mobility-down wards or up wards of any ethnic group would lead to tension in relations to the other groups' (Eriksen, 2002; 21).

Looking at the phenomenon and facts of other culture, through ones own cultural perspectives, as a strange and absurd is of course as natural as the difference themselves. The problem will rise when these real and imagined difference are elevated in to the main thing and converted in to a hostile psychological attitude. Ethnic prejudices or stereotypes encourage friction between ethnic groups and also encourage minorities to develop emotionally charged attitude to their own language and peculiarity of cultures, which

naturally bring them close together and make them stand by each others in accord (Ismagilova, 1978; 81, 82).

Stereotypes of group characteristics, aptitudes and disabilities amplify whatever intergroup differences have been identified. Many of the traits imputed to out group members are threatening. The putative differences that accompany intergroup differentiation also provide reason for group mobilization. Not only do ethnic groups seek favorable evaluations, but the favorable outcomes they seek in competition are endangered by the presence of traits, such as diligence, clannishness, or intelligence, that they sense in their adversaries, even as they prefer their own mix of attributes. When Stereotypes are invidious, that is threatening to positive group evaluation; conflict is likely to be severe (Horowitz, 1985 cited in Horowitz 1998: 20).

2.2 Ethnic Conflict

Conflict is a clash, competition, or mutual interference of opposing or incompatible forces or qualities (as ideas, interests, wills) "(Gove 1976 cited in Assefa, 2006:52).

For lawyers, the term "conflict" is considered synonymous with dispute defined as conflict or controversy, conflict of claims or right; an assertion of right, claim, or demand on the one side met by contrary claims or allegations on the other"(Black 1951 cited in Assefa,2006:50).

For political scientists, the term "conflict" is defined as" antagonistic encounters or collisions of interest, principles, idea, policies or programs that characterizes many of the interactions carried on within or between political systems"(Plano 1973 cited Assefa 2006: 52).Others define the term "conflict" as a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resource in which the aim of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals (Kolbo,1964 cited in Assefa,2006: 53).

Among the obscure elements in ethnic conflict theory is a lack of acceptable definition. Most definitions embody an element of struggle, strife, or collision, but some go further and suggest that conflict entails the struggle for mutually exclusive rewards or the use of incompatible means to a goal. Lewis Coser cited in Horowitz (1985:95) defines conflict

"as a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals."

Shale (2004:2) defines ethnic conflict as a conflict between two or more ethnic groups over resources, identity, borders or against oppression. According to Yamskov and Tishkove,1999 cited in Hussein (2005;9) for Yamskov an "ethnic conflict is a dynamically changing socio-political situation caused by the rejection of existing status quo on the part of significant number of people representing one or several local ethnic groups." Tishkov sees "ethnic conflict as any form of civil clash within or across state boundaries when at least one of the warring parties is mobilized and organized along ethnic lines or on behalf of certain ethnic group". Hussein also cited Brown 1997 as saying that "ethnic conflict is dispute about important political, economic, social, cultural, or territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities" (Hussein, 2005:9)

There exist two formulation of ethnic conflict, for primordial theorists, the primordial attachments inherent in ethnicity cause an action or conflict. For instrumentalists actions have material causes and ethnicity can be a by-product or a resource in achievement of other events but does not cause actions.

For primordial theorists ethnicity is a powerful affiliation, both because similarity is valued and because genetic origins and early socialization are powerful sources of similarity or, that signal similar features: appearance, customs, gestures, language, clothing, tastes, and habits. This feature is what leads individuals to submerge their own identities in the collective identity, and to favor in group members and make sacrifice for them (Horowitz, 1998; 16).

For instrumentalists ethnic conflict is conflict created by elite. Elite manipulate ethnic identity in their hunt for power. Some instrumental theoreticians, however, go further, claiming that elite do not merely maneuver the process according to existing ethnic concurrence, but more or less shape them in view of their own material interest, with wide scope to stimulate conflict and violence. According to Horowitz these broader

claims are highly contestable on the basis that, what elite can do and what interests they can pursue can be restricted by the group interactions. 'The strong perceptual basis of ethnic affinities and disparities is underappreciated by many constructivists. By the same token, the freedom of elites to foment conflict and violence is limited by their followers' definition of the situation and what they are willing to fight over' (Ibid;19).

Bell's, (1975) cited in Horowitz(1989:22) forwarded that ethnicity is salient "because it can combine an interest with an affective tie" and it is easy to see that, once the affective side of ethnic affiliations is recognized, those affiliations will also become "a strategic site". Patchen, 1995 cited in Horowitz 1998:23 explain this phenomenon as:

Just as the families simultaneously an emotional and an economic unit, so the ethnic group takes on instrumental tasks, but it can not be described solely in terms of, or be reduced to, the performance of those tasks, even though this performance should make the affiliation more rewarding and therefore more valuable than before.

It is not unanticipated given the compelling power of group affiliations if an individual could find ethnicity useful vehicles for the pursuit of their own interest. But it is impractical to reduce groups to the fulfillment of individual goals or to reduce affect to instrumental behavior. According to Horowitz (1998:23) reducing passion to interest can lead to cribbed view of the emotion. For him denying "an independent role to affect might be to expect a proportionate (that is, reasonable) response to stimuli such as grievances, whereas ethnic conflict is frequently characterized by disproportionate responses: Excessive fears of harm and excessive reaction to harm".

Horowitz indicated that it is impractical to subscribe purely to the primordial or instrumental views. I think it's difficult to reject human reaction against the assumed or presented danger towards individual or collective interests. It is also difficult to take instrumentalist assertion that ethnic identity maintained for reasons that are economic and political rather than psychological. I believe it has some psychological and instirumental attachements. I agree on the assertion of instrumentalist that ethnicity is a means to an end rather than a cause for ethnic conflict. But their claim on the capacity of the elite to manipulate and shape the group in to their own views of material or political interest is

unrealistic and reduced rationality of human beings so I am in agreement with Horowitz's assertion that the freedom of elites to stimulate conflict and violence is restricted by their followers' definition of the situation and what they are willing to fight over.

2.3 *Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia*

The Ethiopian state took its modern shape by the end of the 19th century and its formation was a blend of Emperor Menelik II's successful diplomacy and military strategies. The net effect of the process of state formation put more than 80 ethnic and linguistic groups under the newly created state of Ethiopia. Since the creation of the modern Ethiopia, Menelik II (1889-1913) and Emperor Haileselassie I (1930-1974) attempted to build cultural homogenization through policies of assimilation, centralization and one language policy (Donham, 1986; Knutsson 1969).

The emergence of ethnic consciousness and mobilization in the Ethiopian context related to social, political and economic reasons rather than the primordial sentiment. However primordial factors such as common descent, ancestral linkage, language have become a foundation for the development of solidarity and political mobilization by the elites. According to Berhanu (2008), Merera (2003) and Assefa (2006) there are three intellectual perspectives in Ethiopian political debate in connection to ethnicity: The first perspective believes that the Ethiopian society has reached a stage of common identity by nurturing a common Ethiopian nationalism eliminating primordial attachments and loyalties. The second perspective believes that Ethiopia is a home for numerous distinct ethnic groups that need to get some form of political representation and self-administration. The third perspective argues that the Ethiopian state was established through a series of conquests and colonization of various nations and societies such as Oromo and Somali that lay beyond its jurisdiction.

The third and the extreme version of the Ethiopian nationalist group, which claims that Ethiopia is a colonial empire and just like other western colonial empire need to undergo decolonization. It was started by the Eritreans in the north and in south the Oromo and the Ethiopian Somalis of the Ogaden developed their own colonial thesis. The other

extreme, which is termed as 'nation building thesis' represented largely by the Amhara elites, according to Merera 'one Ethiopia' is their motto and consider those who recognize the rights of marginalized ethnic groups as anti-Ethiopian. (Merera 2003; 2008; Assefa 2006; Berhanu, 2008). The national operation thesis which was developed in the 1960 with the Ethiopian Student Movement, advocate the rights to self-determination, including secession for the various ethnic groups that are marginalized or oppressed by Amhara groups.

Prior to 1991, some regional liberation movements from Eritrea, Tigray, Oromo and Somali described the central rule as an 'Amhara rule', and organized to fight against it on ethnic basis, which gave an advantage for the movements to mobilise significant supporters and fighters (Berhanu 2008:18). The success of a struggle that takes ethnicity as its base changed the political structure of the country from the age-old tradition of imagining and symbolising "Greater Ethiopia" to the practice of a political structure articulated under the ideology of 'Formal Ethnicism'.

Currently, critics on ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia are pointing accusing finger towards EPRDF government state structure. It is argued that the "self-government" structure created by the government had separated different ethnic groups, who were in the past living within the same administrative borders, into different regional states and limited their access to common resources like pasture lands (Asebe 2007; Assefa 2006; Asnake 2004). The drawing of administrative boundaries has become an aggravating factor to environment-induced conflicts. Asnake (2004) characterizes some of the post-1991 conflicts as "environment-cum-ethnic" (note the explicit insertion of ethnic factor), particularly conflicts between settled minorities and regional majorities, and between communities sharing regional boundaries. There are also some who attribute ethnic conflict in the Horn of Africa to competition over scarce resources (Hussein 2002:1). According to Hussein Jemma, the root causes of conflict in the country and particularly Guji-Gedeo for example is over resource which also exacerbated by division along ethnic line coupled with resource redistribution.

2.4 Federalism

State restructuring has become a global happening. These are current movements intended to reorganize structure of state in reaction to demands of communities for recognition of their identities and increased participation in the political realm. The majority of the world states are multinational, so for such states finding mechanisms which they use to administer the various people peaceably together under democratic system of governance has an important place. Clapham (2006:231) suggests that "Federalism", in one form or another provides an obvious constitutional format through which these objectives may be achieved.

Therefore, the federal theory, which aims at balancing political autonomy and unification, appeal to multi-ethnic states as a means of managing their ethno-linguistic diversity or minority nationalism. Many countries had experimented and still are experimenting federal option and other forms of territorial autonomy in order to contain ethno-linguistic group and to reduce inter-ethnic tension and conflict. "Nevertheless, attempts aimed at redesigning state structures could also lead to inter-ethnic tensions as patterns of relationships between communities experience change because of state restructuring processes"(Asnake 2004:51).

Scholars like Osaghae (1996); Watts (1998); Young (1994); Kimenyi (1998); Horowitz (1985); and Harris and Reilly (1998) cited in Asnake 2004 forwarded federalism as an alternative method for multi-ethnic nation, which have been overwhelmed by inter-communal conflict and tension. Federalism is taken as an answer for governing deeply divided multi- ethnic, multiracial and multi religious countries. It has been proposed particularly of ethnic federalism as a means of harmonizing ethnic claims in Africa. These systems are believed to give concrete recognition and political expression to territorially distributed diversity. Federalism is an effective means of managing conflict where the boundaries of the states match the boundaries of the main concentration of the relevant ethnic, religious or language groups. This is because it makes an ethnically heterogeneous political society less heterogeneous through the creation of homogeneous subunits.

According to Assefa (2006:273) federalism also provides wider options for conflict management, be it economic, political or structural. Multiple layers of government provide alternative means for dealing with problems. He argues that conflict of one form or another is often inherent to federalism in the process of trying to accommodate diversity but the success of federations is not to be measured in terms of purging social conflict instated it has to be measured in their capacity to control and management of conflicts.

Other theoretician like, Basta Fleiner (2000) and Cornell (2002) cited in Asnake 2004 on the other hand reveal their doubt about federalism as a means of managing ethno-linguistic diversity. For them federalism will tend to be anti liberal and anti majority, prone to conflict and disintegration, deter country wide free mobility of citizens ,when particularly modeled on the basis of ethno-linguistic diversity. According to these scholars in such structures every tolerable conflict could easily turn into an ethnic conflict and it could encourage ethnic mobilization, augment secessionism and even direct to armed conflict.

2.5 Ethnic Federalism the Ethiopian Experience

Ethiopia has witnessed a major turning point in the area of national politics since early 1990s. One of the major changes is that Ethiopia adopts ethnic based federalism by putting an end to the centralized system of administration. In Ethiopia, political history ethnicity appears in 1960s when the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) for the first time rose up with ethnic/nationality questions against the century old ethnic domination. Since then, the already existing elements of ethnic common characteristics, language, psychological makeup, and history, experience of domination, customs and sometimes myth of origin were activated as strong stimuli of group mobilization by different elites (Turton 2006: 12 Asebe 2007:16 Merera 2003, 2008).

The country is currently experimenting with a federal form of government, which officially advocates decentralization of power in favor of ethno-linguistic regions. Followed by the establishment of nine regional states in 1993/4, and complemented by

the ratification of the new federal constitution in 1995. The objectives of this experiment are; first to create a country of equal nation, nationalities and people. Second to put an end to authoritarian rule by democratization and third is that to bring about a solution to the age-old crisis of the Ethiopian state and society characterized by conflict and also political instrument that serves the management of the country conflict ridden ethnic relations (Merera 2006:119 Asnake 2004:52).

There are around eighty ethno-territorial group in Ethiopia, with enormous size difference. But none of which have definite territorial and linguistic boundaries. In the political restructuring only the six ethnic groups (Amhara, Tigray, Harari, Oromo, Afar and Somali) have "Mother State" named after them. None of them are culturally and linguistically homogeneous. The remaining three states are made up of mixture of small ethnic group, for example Benshangul Gumz happens to have been established taking the Berta, Gumz, Shinasha, Mao and Como ethnic groups as its part. None of these ethnic groups form an over all majority of the state's population and none of them considered large enough to establish its own regional states. These arrangements generate ethnic conflict in the multiethnic western and southern regions of the country (Turton 2006:18)

The position of minorities in regional states is also taken as a shortcoming to federalism. The six major nationalities have their own states even in these states there exist minorities, so potential for local political and economic oppression over minority group always exists. Where there is no dominant ethnic group on the states structure the possibility occurs for a minority also to exercise authority over the majority (Assefa 2006:136,137).

Ethiopian Federalism is often said, took its ideas from Soviet theory of nationalities, unfortunately, the very same time those models, the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, had just fallen apart. Kymlicka argued that rejecting the idea of ethnic federalism as a remnant of an absolute Soviet ideology is misleading. He stresses the fact that many aspect of Ethiopian constitution can be seen as consistent with the most progressive developments within Western democracies (Kymlicka 2006:54).

The decision to restructure the country on the basis of ethno-linguistic criterion has been challenged by both Ethiopian and international commentators. Abbink (1997) argued that the idea itself is out of favor and cited Eric Hobsbawm saying "national self-determination" is an idea whose time is past. He insisted that the very bases of the states have been defined on shaky ground that is ethnicity and language. Merera, (2003) has considered it as a divide-and rule policy. Some also argued that it plays a divisive role in nation building project and it promotes group identity and focuses on group rights at the expense of individual rights. This group considers politicized ethnic identity creates hatred, violence between different ethnic groups.

On the other end, there are individuals who applaud the ethnic federalism; Young (1998:203) claim that ethnic based local administration historically and politically sound despite their current difficulties and added that 'it is highly innovative and even daring approach. Kymlicka (2006:58) stresses the fact that federalism reinforces identity and authorize border to such an identity. So according to him if such a process and its results considered erroneous then there is no successful multinational federalism in the world. To him institutionalization of ethno-national identities is not, in and of itself, either good or bad. What is important is that the process is peaceful and democratic.

It was the basis of federation that is predominantly a contentious point than the adoption of federal system, which is more or less a matter of consensus between the various groups in the country. EPRDF argued that ethnic federalism (redrawing of boundaries along linguistic criterion) is one way of resolving ethnic tension whereas others suggested geographical and economic criteria and forwarded the American style territorial federal system as the best one(Assafa 2006 :237).

In a multicultural country like Ethiopia I believe ethnic federalism is practical and if it is applied together with other principles of democracy it will help to reduce conflict and also change the already problematic ethnic relationship in the country.

2.6 Migration

Migration is generally taken to involve the permanent or quasi-permanent relocation of an individual or group of individuals from a place of origin to a place of destination. The classification of population movement depends predominantly on the time, distances the movers take and factors that motivate people to migrate. Population mobility takes widely varied dimensions: spatial, temporal and motivational dimensions. The most significant elements of the spatial and temporal dimension of population movements are distance and direction. The distinction that has been made in the motivational factors is that between voluntary and involuntary forms of movement. It is difficult to make a clear distinction between voluntary and involuntary population movement. Different case studies suggested the existence of other motivational dimension which is called impelled, where the mover retains some degree of power to decide whether or not to leave (Parnwell 1993:16, 18, 24).

The cause of migration is complex. To consider one like population growth or environmental degradation as the main cause makes it unrealistic, because population growth alone can not make people to leave their home. According to Wenzel:

A number factors including but not limited to socio-cultural, ethnic, agro-ecological, political economy, resource scarcity and conflict, peer and kin pressure, social network, population pressure and processes of social differentiation, act in harmony to cause migration that often results in conflict and population displacement (Wenzel 2002 cited in Tesfaye 2007: 21).

Wenzel also underlines the difference between long term and short term causes as well as endogenous and exogenous factors that can cause migration, conflict and population displacement. Climate change or greenhouse effect can be taken as exogenous factors, 'environmental degradations, the depletion of resource base, social structures, social network disruptions, food scarcity, population growth and the resultant diminishing holdings, government policies, political power and entitlements' on the other hand can be regarded as endogenous and exogenous factors (Ibid:22).

Push-Pull model of migration developed by scholars like Lee (1966) highlighted the various factors influencing the decision of potential migrants. Those factors, which attract migrants to a destination area, are considered as "pull factor" and those, which repel the migrants from the source area and encourage them to leave as "push factor" (Lee 1966 cited in Tesfaye 2007:55). Wood (2001:44) also made distinction between factors which predisposes toward migration and precipitate migration. Factor that predispose towards migration create stressful situation which would force people to consider migration, but those that precipitate it immediately direct to migration.

A group of "push factors" play collective role in causing migration. Migration is not a moment decision, but rather a process that takes a long time to materialize. The "cut-off point" for people to reach decision to migrate differs from individual to individual due to variation in migration behaviors, coping capacities and social networks. Migration usually is taken as last resort in sequence of responses or coping strategies. The degree of change and the technical capability of a community also determine the adaptation of adverse climatic impact. The same environmental failure might affect neighbors or even members of the same family differently depending on their socio-economic status (Tesfaye 2007:22; Wood 2001:48).

Suhrke (1992) cited in Wood (2001:44) insists on the inter-relationships of factors; "Environmental change, as a proximate "push" factor in migration, must be discussed in relations to income inequality, changing land use, government development schemes and ethnic conflict". For Ismagilova (1978), migration can not be considered a mechanical process of the mixing of diverse ethnic group and swift mutual assimilation. Every thing depends on the existing conditions and decades old traditions. For him even the size of the migrant shape the interaction with the host community;

It is one thing when a few people come from one district to find work (as a rule they quickly adapt themselves to the alien environment and in time may become completely assimilated) and quite another thing when such a group is rather numerous.....In several cases the migrant are forced to cling together by the not always benevolent attitude of the local population and by fear of conflicts.....not only does this position not lead to detribalization but on the

contrary it intensifies ethnic self awareness and the feeling of belonging to one's people, not to mention ethnic prejudices and biases (Ismagilove, 1978:203).

Reuveny (2005:5) argues that migrants particularly of environmental migrants can cause conflict. First they produce competition for economic and natural resource by which they pressure the destination economy. When pressures are high, people may attempt to secure resources by force, particularly when there are underdeveloped property right institutions. Second, when environmental migrants and residents belong to different ethnic groups, the influx of many newcomers within short period of time may upset ethnic balance. Host countries may fear separatism, and migrants may attempt to reunify with their home country, thus promoting aggressive nativist responses. If there existed, long-standing ethnic disputes are likely to be more prone to conflict than other situations. The political elite might take such tension of the host and migrant community and mobilize them to achieve their own political or economic ends.

2.7 Rural- Rural Migration in Ethiopia and Its relations to Conflict

As the history of long migration shows, people move from densely populated highlands such as the long settled and degraded northern highlands and settle in distant low-density areas. Such kind of population movement precipitates competition and armed conflict with the host communities. Assefa (1999) and Tesfaye (2007) indicated that waves of migrants from Wello highlands began settling in the lowlands of Northeast Wallega in 1960s and over the period of the 1970s and 1980s, the migrants established legal rights to the lands they occupied and thereby de-legitimized the claims of the indigenous Oromo people over their ancestral lands.

Gebre (2003:2005) and Wolde-Selassie (2004) also indicate that because of the massive migration and resettlement of the highlanders the indigenous Gumz lost land, which diminished the ability of the indigenous inhabitants to practice their traditional farming system, slash and burn, which according to Gebre impoverish the Gumz community. Often, the indigenous inhabitants resented and resisted the waves of these migrants. These resentments and grievances cumulated over the years and expressed into disputes and physical conflicts.

One of the coping mechanisms adopted by the highlanders is to move to lower altitudes where pastoralist or shifting cultivators inhabit. Such a move by the highlanders call for a culturally appropriate response by the lowland communities, which according to Seyoum and Tesfu (2002) research finding in Northern Shewa, are military reaction which often results in loss of lives, and destruction of property.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF GUMZ- OROMO RELATIONS

3.1 Historical Background

Gumz are one of the Nilo-Saharan languages speakers on the western border land of Ethiopia. According to Taddesse Tamerat,(1988:9) Gumz lived in the immediate neighborhood of the edge of the plateau occupying the lowland districts of Qwara in Gonder, Matakka in Gojjam, the lower Dabus, the Diddessa, the Angar and the Abbay valleys in Wallega. Cerulli (1956:12) also wrote that Gumz occupy much of the country between Agaumeder in Ethiopia and Fazughli (between lat. 11 -12 degree, and long. 35). According to him small group of Gumz live in Sudan, the vast majority of them are in Ethiopia.

Gumz oral tradition has it that they originally came from Red sea, which in its Gumz name called *Metetecheje*. They had to leave the area because of an epidemic. They came in to the Blue Nile (Abbay) and continued to settle following the river. They even claim to have been in Addis Ababa, which they call *Wallal*, while it was covered by forest. Oral tradition explains encounter and also conflict with the Oromo, which made them to leave Addis Ababa. This oral tradition of Gumz also asserts that in every current Gumz settlement area, like Gonder, Gojam, Tigray and Oromiya, they were the first inhabitants. (G1 age 60; G2 age 56;G4 age 70)² .Scholars who wrote about Gumz, Cerulli(1956), Schuver (1996), Taddesse(1988) ,Tesema(1980) and Weldesselase(2002) agreed with such an oral assertion. Taddesse (1988:10) suggests that Gumz have originally occupied much more extensive land in the east in the direction of Lake Tana basin and source of Abbaya.

Historical writing on Gumz particularly of Gumz of the western Ethiopia is scanty. Because of their greater proximity to the center of state and the state resettlement

² I used through out the paper codes rather than the actual names of my informants: G represents Gumz; O represents Oromo informants and GE and OE indicate Gumz and Oromo elites, respectively. Number is used to differentiate them.

programs Gumz of Metekel figure much frequently in the historical, political and social study documents. Wendy James (1977) forwarded, that it was the travel literature of the nineteenth century Sudan than Ethiopian records, which built up a more detailed picture of the various languages and ethnic groups living in the upper Blue Nile area.

According to Taddesse (1988:8) all speakers of Nilo-Saharan referred as *Shanqella* in all written documents of Ethiopia. How and when this tag comes is yet to be uncovered. They also called as *Barya* in place of *Shanqella* in old document starting from Aksumite period. "The *Shanqellas* are not distinct race or tribe of blacks. It is the Abyssinian appellation for Negroes in general" (Schuver1996:200). According to Cerulli and Taddess, *Shanqella* occurs in Ethiopian records during king Yeshaq (1413-30), as tributaries of the king.

Gumz had been forced to defend themselves from highlander's continuous raid. The rich resource bases (like Gold), big game animals and different plants were the attraction for the kings of the Abyssinian and even Ahemed Gagn continuous attacks. Gumz also fought with the Agaw, Shinasha and even the expanding Oromo clans and the Fung kingdom from the west. According to Taddesse they exerted a fierce resistance against external attacks. Different kings of Ethiopia like Sarsa Dengel (1563-97), Susneyos (1606-32), Fasiladas (1632-67), Yohannes I (1667-82) and Iyasu The Great (1683-1706) had lead army to subdue Gumz people and incorporate their resource rich land. It was during Iyasu The Great era, however, that the Ethiopian state was able to penetrate Gumz land. He had lead several campaigns towards Gumz and made them under his state control (Taddesse 1988:12-13; Cerulli 1956:15).

According to Taddesse the success of Iyasu The Great came particularly by elevating the local Agaw chiefs, to the title of *Fetawrari*, which he delegates the Agaw with the affairs of Gumz. Agaw and Gumz had and still have very intimate interactions particularly of economic. Iyasus successful integration of the Agaw chiefs won him active support and loyalty, which helped him to rule Gumz indirectly. At the same time some leading Oromo groups were also involved in the process of incorporating Gumz land. Like the Agaw the

Oromo at that time had developed patron-client relations with Gumz of Metekel. Taddesse argued that the relations had been the same both in Metekel and Wallega. But there is no documentation for the early development in Gumz-Oromo relations. He emphasizes the existence of reference to *Shanqella* and *Barya* communities among the pre-Oromo inhabitants of western parts of the medieval kingdom of Damote and Bizamo, south of the Abbay (Taddesse 1988:13-14).

The Oromo expansion which is believed to have started in the 16th century, in search of land and water by the different groups of the Oromo clan. The *mecha* group, who migrated west ward, and settled in Wallega area. Tessema (1980) estimated the time that these groups settled in Wallega region to be 1680-1772. According to him these migrant clans faced resistance from the early settlers of the area. Tessema describes such a situation as:

It must be understood that the Oromo migrations were not taking place in to an entirely empty land. It involved considerable displacement of other peoples and the Oromo sphere was only extended by dint of continuous war and blood shade. As a result the Oromo had overrun various kingdoms and social group and absorbed new ethnic elements in the process of expansion from the sixteenth century onwards; and they had in turn been influenced by other cultures because encounters of this magnitude are almost always dual in character (Tesema 1980:13).

Tesema outlined the different groups originally inhabited before the Oromo clans were able to control Wallega. These groups are Agadi, Gabato, Kaza, Mesengo, Shiluk, Mao, Damot, Ganqa and Sinicho. He classified these groups into two, depending on oral tradition that he collected. The Agadi, Gabato, Kaza, Mesengo, Shiluk, and Mao identified as *Shanqilla* and their language constitutes part of the Nilo-Saharan language family. The other group Damot, Ganqa and Sinicho were considered different and had more developed organization of their own. These groups intermarried with the conquering Oromo. From the pre-Oromo settlers that Tesema grouped as *Shanqilla*, the Agadi were completely assimilated and do not have descendants. The Gabato who had been the largest group, their sphere extend to the Dedessa valley in the west and their descendant are living in the hot low land area of Dedessa and Anger Rivers. The Kaza, who were living in the highland of today Horro Gudru *Awraja/District/* were displaced

by Oromo and settled in the hot Abbay valley in Limmu, Amuru and Ghida *Waredas*. The Mesengo and Shiluk are now dispersed and a considerable number of Mesengo now living in Qellem Awraja/District (Ibid: 26-27).

The pre-Oromo settlers who, continuously fought and refused to surrender had to escape to area inaccessible to the Oromo at the time. Therefore, *Shanqilla's* and other ethnic groups were forced to live in a hot and malaria ridden low land areas. But those who gave up the fight or even submitted without resistance were assimilated by the conquering Oromo clans.

3.2 Pre 1974 Gumz- Oromo Relations

Gumz-Oromo relations started in conflict, which forced Gumz to withdraw from the highland and settle in the dry, hot, lowland basins of such rivers as Dabus, Didessa, Anger or in to the hearts of inaccessible forests. For a long time the Oromo groups who settled in Wallega remain in the fertile highland areas except the fact that the low lands have been visited by adventurous Oromos for hunting and for honey collection. So for a long time the social contact of the two groups were minimal (Tesema 1980:14). According to Gumz oral tradition the forest is the home of the various Gumz clans. The oral tradition asserts that the forests were visited by the various people who were interested in hunting big games. So every body who, inhabit and came to the forest had to be cautious in every move they made inside the forest. According to my Gumz key informants killing big animals and *Shanqilla* had been given equal stature for the Oromo. So the Gumz always stayed alert. Chronicle of Warra Bakakree of Naqamtee also asserts this fact:

ዝሆንና ጎሽ ሻንቅላ ይህንን የገደለ ሰው ይቀበታል እንጂ በተተረ ሰው ሰውን በገል መጫ ለመጫ ቢጋደልም ጉማ ይሆንበታል እንጂ አይቀበትም (Tesema and Triulzi ed. 1996)::

When a man killed buffalo, elephant and a slave he will be glorified, but when man kill man, and if *Mecha* (Oromo clan) kill another *Mecha* it will be retribution not glory.

Internal growth and continuous immigration of different Oromo clans forced the highland population to look for land in the forest and the valley. This led to more contacts with the *Shanqilla*. Oromo has a traditional system, the *Gudifacha*, whereby they assimilate the pre-Oromo settlers in times of their expansion to the various parts of the country. *Gudifacha* works for only those groups of people who looked like the Oromo (with similar physical and color complexion) and those groups who had well-developed socio economic system of their own. There were, however, a number of other populations which were physically, linguistically, and culturally so distinct that it was not possible for the Oromo to assimilate them. These included the very many small groups, speaking different Nilo-Saharan languages, who were of very dark complexion, and who were known as *Shanqilla* (Tesema 1980:17).

Gumz-Oromo relations were basically what Taddesse called patron-client relationship. According to him, *Michu* or *mijju*, used for the formal bond of friendship between Gumz and Oromo or Agaw. The different Oromo clans, (for example, *Gutu*, *Fecchasa* and *Lomicca*, had established relationship with Gumz clans *Dekera*, *Dellengua* and *Dubezena*, respectively), so they say the Oromo clans had to provide protection to the clans that they established *Michu* relationships with. In return Gumz had to provide some agricultural product and offer free labor. The basis of such relations did not stand on equal footings starting from its inception. In this relationship the Oromo were superior and exploited the relationship to utilize the resources of Gumz land, which they did particularly during Bekere period. According to Tesema and oral traditions of both groups, Bekere Godana, was the one who incorporated the hot low land, which is locally known as *Handeq* or *Ejjuma Arba*, which literally means "the home of elephants" (Tesema 1980, O1, age 60; O4 age 40).

The tradition about the period between 1800 and the 1870's show that the Oromo of Wollega plateau had established firm relations with the *Shanqilla* of the hot lowland regions. We are told that an increasing number of *Shanqilla* were brought to the highland villages and made stay with the families of the Oromo who captured them in the forest to whom they were forced to render labour services both domestically and out in the fields.....After being kept for some months in the highland a few of the more reliable *Shanqilla* were sent back to their

relatives on whom they impressed the benefits of establishing amicable relations with the Oromo. These persuasions often succeeded, largely because a number of other *Shanqilla* were still held hostage by the highlanders (Tesema, 1980:41).

The free labor which Gumz supposedly provided changed its form through time and relationship that the Oromo established with the highland Amhara kings and later the Shewan conquest. Slavery and slave trade became the rules of the two groups. Many women and men of the black families had been sold and killed on the run. Slave trade that had been practiced in the area for long time is still remembered by Gumz and used by Gumz elites to mobilize the society both for positive and negative ends. Gumz oral tradition had that the Oromo raided Gumz land almost every day and took any woman and man, including little children and sale them to Amhara merchants.

We were also slaves of Oromo, we were sold, both our legs and hands tied up like an animal, in the open market, we were considered as an article of trade, never been taken as a human kind. In Oromo houses, Gumz men worked in the field all day and be on guard for his Oromo master in the evening. Even our *michu* who supposed to protect us and be our friend sold us in an open market (G2 age 56).

The slave trade and the continuous Oromo raid is unforgotten memory of the past. When I asked Gumz girls why they are not willing marrying an Oromo, they bring up such historical facts. Finding an Oromo guy marrying Gumz women still is very rare, even after the tradition of sister exchange marriage by Gumz, which was considered by scholars the main impediment for intermarriage between the two groups discarded as one of the bad traditional practices. It is very easy to the local people to furnish you with names of such a married couple in the zone or even in each district as they are very few. In my research area only two couples happened to be found and I met a couple and the details of the relations will be described later in this chapter.

The slave trade was consolidated with the contact that the Oromo of Wallega established with the highland Amhara kings, particularly of Gojjam king Takla-Haymanot. The incorporation of Oromo into the feudal Ethiopian empire during Minilik II made the demand for the slave trade and slavery to grow rapidly. Abolishing of slavery and slave trade by Ethiopian state had a profound effect on Gumz. With such a change Gumz-

Oromo relationship also changed. According to James (1977:11) the settlement patterns spread out, people moving out of the forest and started settling in the plains.

The population of the minority groups has certainly increased: partly through the fact that the slave-trade no longer drains people away, and partly because considerable numbers of freed and escaped slaves from Ethiopian highlands, and from BeniShangul, have returned to their original communities.

The 1952-53 Gumz-Oromo war is the other historical chapter which is also lingering in the minds of Gumz people. The war of 1952-53, which is locally called *Ye Abbaa Xoonee Tornete* (war led by *Abbaa Xoonee*) which took, according to oral tradition, many life and went on for about a year (according to Tessema 2006, account it took six months). The leader of one of Gumz clan called *Aba Xoonee* refused to pay tax to Oromo authority that he and his people were under, which is claimed as the basic reason for the war.

Abba Xoonee and his people agreed on terms, which the state is oppressive and they had to put an armed resistance against any one who wished to impose any administrative structure or tax over their area and people. Xoonee was sent to spy on *Fitawrari Yemane*, the then Gimbi *awrajja* governor, he found the governor with two body guards and saw only one old rifle at the corner of the office. Xoonee was surprised by what he saw and compared the amount of firearms that his governor possessed with what he and his people had. He concluded that the *awraja* governor's firearms and the number of his guards were no match to the overwhelming number of arms and his people. He considered himself stronger and more powerful than his governor, it did not occur to him that his governor had an arm or even able to secure military support from the central state. He boosted with arms that he acquired from Sudan (Tessema 2006:41; informants G1 age 60; G2 age 56; G6 age 90; O1 age 60; O7 age 50).

At first the governor sent about sixty-eight armed men led by *Qanyazmach* Fayisaa Dheeraa. There were also peasant militia who were recruited from Gimbi, Neqemtee, Arjoo and Horroo Gudruu *awrajas* who followed the army to Abba Xoonee area. Abba Xoonee won the campaign; some notable Oromo fighters lost their lives. The governor, *Fitawrari Yemane*, reported the situation to the then governor of Wallega *Kifle Hager*

H, R, I, G.

and asked for military support, which he was able to secure both from Wallega and Addis Ababa, the Imperial Body Guards sent from Addis(Tessema 2006: 42; informants O1 age 60; O7age 50) .

This war had grave social and economic consequences. Gumz had suffered both socially and economically. They lost the productive personnel in the war, families forced to escape leaving their children and elders had lost their children and left unattended. They only had to depend on hunting and gathering, their subsistence farming was neglected. It also has negative implications and had created hostilities between the Gumz and the Oromo of the surrounding regions. Since that time on there has not been such a war until 1994 between the two groups.

Gumz had no actual contact with the central government of Ethiopia. Their contact and knowledge of government restricted to their Oromo Boku, Moties and chiefs. With the abolition of slavery and slave trade they came to know about Hailesselase I (Ethiopian Emperor from (1930 -1974) and what he represents. The central state also recognized them and tried to make them part and parcel of its administration.

ኃይለሰላሴ የተወለደ ነፃነት ሰጠናል። ይህ ባሪያ ነው ምንድነው የሚባል ቀረ ሁሉም ነፃ ሆነ። ከሰዎች ጋር በሰላም እንድንኖር አደረጉ። ከኦሮሞ ህዝብ ጋር አንድ እንደሆንን በመካከላችን ግጭት እንዳይኖር ሁላችንም በኢትዮጵያ ስም የንጉሱ መሆናችንን ገለጹልን። ኃይለሰላሴ በጊዜ በኩል የመጡ ጊዜ ቁሳ ይዘው ነበር የመጡት። የዚያኔ እምነት አልነበረም አራሳቸው መተወ ክርስትና ሲያነሱ ነበር። በክርስትና እምነት ክርስትና የሚነሳው ህፃን ልጅ ቢሆንም የዚያኔ ግን የ70 ዓመት ሸማግሌ ነበር ክርስትና ሲነሳ የነበረው (G10 age 90)።

The literal translation is that; Hailesselase freed us. The class difference that existed, with in the region dropped. Every one is declared to be equal, no slaves. He told us to avoid conflict and to join hands with the Oromo and that in the name of Ethiopian state every one of us belongs to him. When he came to Gimbi he brought a priest with him. We did not have religion then, so he started christeneing us. According to Christian dogma baptism is for kids, but he did it even for 70 years old.

3.3 Post 1974 Relations

The overthrow of the Imperial regime in September 1974 brought the military Marxists, *Derg*, to power. *Derg* banked its ideology on Soviet style Marxism-Leninism started to change the old social structure. According to Young (1996:534; 1998:193) the most crucial element in this process was the 1975 nationalization of land, which smashed the material basis of the old regime, the declaration of equalities of all cultures and also the proclamation that passed to end ethnic oppression, and the establishment of the institute of Nationalities in 1983, to study the ethnic composition of the country and to draft a constitutional design for local self government, which Young believed that the *Derg* entertained the idea of some type of federal structure, though it was not taken seriously.

Derg responded by establishing in 1976 the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) to the rising demands of ethnic nationalisms. The NDR program included the regional autonomy/or self administration of all nationalities. Merera (2003:83) contends that with the departure of MEISON from the *Derg*, which he believed the harbingers of nationalism quest, ethnic nationalism depicted as a threat to the revolution. On the other hand MEISON and EPRP were considered by Abbink (1997:165) as the forbearer of the class movement. What ever the reason for dropping the question of self-administration and nationalities question, *Derg* started hounding those who held the nationalities question and those who opposed its direction and plan.

Derg acknowledged the equality of Gumz people and even changed the derogatory term *Shanqilla* to *Kaza*, which was given to Gumz by the Oromo and Amhara. *Derg* also took some measures to involve them in the local, particularly of *qebelle* administration. During that time they were able at least in the lower level to manage their internal affairs. Those groups of Gumz who had elementary education selected and trained to be a Cadre and work for the regime. በደርግ ጊዜ ይወሰድ በነበረው እርምጃ ጉምዝ እንደሰው ከሰው እኩል መሆኑ ታወቀ::(informant GE5) "With some measures that the *Derg* took, Gumz were recognized as human and as equal as the rest of the human kind"

They acknowledge the image of great Ethiopia portrayed by the Derg. It was, however, a fearful experience to this people. According to my informants at later times the regime used Gumz men as protectors of the forest and the boundaries. They were supplied with arms and ammunitions. They were used as instrument in fighting Oromo Liberation Front /OLF/and other insurgents. But both Gumz and Oromo like the rest of Ethiopian citizen suffered economically and politically on the hands of the dictator *Derg* rule. Gumz call him (Mengestu the president) the nasty judge. At the end of the *Derg* rule they were accused of harboring the Tigray People Liberation Front/TPLF/ army and they were abused on the hands of the Cadres. Gumz people blame the Oromo for their suffering during those times as they believe that the Oromo is the one that conceived the Cadres with such an idea (Informants G2 age56; G3 age 65; GE4:GE5).

Derg rule came closer to their house with development plan without even considering their livelihood. With the establishment of state farms in the area they lost their land and at the same time were able to benefit from the services and infrastructures that came with it. *Derg* engaged in large scale agricultural activity aiming to alleviate the urgent problems of food shortage and other basic consumption and raw material for the growing industry *Derg* established 51 state farms through out the country.

3.3.1 The Origin and Development of State Farms in former Wallega Administrative Region

There were state farms prior to 1974, basically in the rift valley area; the total sizes ranged from 10-20,000 hectares. The involvement of government in agriculture changed with the change in power politics of the country. Following the 1975 land reform the scale and magnitude of state involvement drastically increased. The state continued to expand both irrigated and rain-fed farms starting from 1977/78. By the end of 1980 the total area under the sector was about 238,200 hectare. These farms were established and expanded at the cost of many peasant, pastoralist and agro-pastoralists livelihood. So many, peasant and pastoralists, were evicted forcefully to make ways for the state farms. "The state allocated sufficient lands in rain fed regions to increase the number and the

size of state farms, the main source being grazing land, land secured from sparsely populated areas and unutilized virgin lands"(Gebru :267).

Wallega Agricultural Development Enterprise (WADE) was established in 1976/77 under the program of "Fetan Irsha" .It went operational with out prior study and extension of other infrastructure, with 1829 permanent and temporary workers. It started cultivating 1930 hectares of land both in Dedessa and Fincha-a. It grew to 10 state farms with the total land area of 49,000hectars, (when it was closed in 1990s it had 17,000 workers). The farms were not highly mechanized and so there existed wide use of labor force, which was forced in the beginning from the various administrative regions. But later changed with the expansion of the farms and increasing payment, which attracted so many to migrate and live close to the farm. Starting from 1980's individuals from different part of the rural Ethiopia came to Wallega state farms looking for permanent or temporary work some also engaged in service sectors (Gebru; Fekadu 1990:12; Informant O3 age 45).

With the establishment of state farm and resettlement that followed the farm in the lowland area the socio-economic relations that Gumz had developed with their Oromo neighbors changed its extent and form. Gumz had never experienced settling this close to their Oromo neighbors. The settlement of Oromo in the lowland used to be seasonal in its character. The farm changed such a tradition and Gumz and other ethnic groups predominantly of Oromo laborers had to live close by. The farm has strict rules and regulation for both the laborers and the settlers alike. People forced to settle in five kilometer distance from the farm and it was outlawed to cross and sent cattle in the farm. Such a restriction and later a development of market within the farm reduced Gumz-highland Oromo contact. The establishment and growth of state farms put a limit in to those social mechanisms that Gumz-Oromo used for long time.

The relations of Gumz and the new settlers in the state farm became more of economical and can be said a trade relations. My Gumz key informant told me that the new settlers were and still considered as guests. To use his own words;" We did not know them, they are guests, we still consider them as guest because we did not know where they came

from, who their clan is. So how can we be *Michu* or *Abba harma* with the people that we did not know anything about their clan"(informant G10 age 90).

The establishment of markets particularly of shops by the labor union made it possible for the Gumz to shop without spending the night in the market area, which reduced the highland Oromo and lowland Gumz relationship. These markets also created other difficulties to Gumz, they were forced to sale on lower price than their Oromo counter parts. At this juncture it is good to look at how the Oromo remember the time by presenting their own words:

የመንግስት ስርሻ ያኔ ሲጀምር እነሱ እራሳቸው እንደ አውሬ ነበሩ። ምንም የሚያውቁት ነገር አልነበረም በኛ ቁጥጥር ስር ነበሩ። ያኔ ብዙም ስርሻ አያውቁም በአደን ነው የሚተዳደሩት እኛ ምንም እየሰጠናቸው አብረውን ይኖሩ ነበር። (O2 age 47)

When the state farm started its operation, they (Gumz) were like animals. And they did know nothing. They were under our control. They did not know plowing and depended on hunting, they did live with us and we provided them food.

Even if there were changes in terms of relations following the state proclamation of equality, Gumz continued to be looked down upon by their Oromo neighbors. The Oromo people consider themselves as civilized and upper class than their Gumz counterparts. On the other hand, they consider Gumz people, as a people who have no knowledge of what so ever and give no value for accumulation of property. So they are termed primitive, wild and cruel. They call them Monkey. The Oromo admire the trust worthiness of Gumz, but despise them for not having food taboo. My men informants from Oromo *qebelles* told me that the non-existence of food taboo is one of the reasons for them not to be interested in Gumz girls. Gumz on the other hand call Oromo's stinky, liar, bandit and cruel. According to my Gumz informants the Oromo like to litigate, they love to take every matter to court and willing to spend every penny that they have even if the claim is a false one.

3.3.1.1 The Closure of the State Farms

Gumz claim that they were the victim of the Derg agricultural expansion. According to them Derg forced them to evacuate and live in the river side far away from the farm. This according to my informants and different literature on state farm expansion and villagization programs had been done without any compensation of any sort. On the other hand the Oromo settlers in the state farm and outside of the farm have different historical narratives on this claim. Oromo settlers in the farm claim that the land was covered by forest and no one except animals inhabited in that area before the establishment of the farm. According to these groups Gumz who are now living surrounding the state farm did come with the growth and expansion of the farm in search of market and other services that came with the farm. According to these settlers the land belongs to Oromo and was administered by Oromo until 1990s. The other group of Oromo acknowledged the fact that Gumz were there before the establishment of the farm, but the settlement was dispersed and that they were not significant in number. This claim and counter claim rose with the change in administrative structure that the country follows, that is ethnic federalism.

3.4 Social and Economic Relations of the Gumz and Oromo

3.4.1 Social Relations and Social Networks

According to Tadesse (1988) Gumz -Oromo social relations established since 17th century as patron-client and it was consolidated more in successive years. It has passed through difficult times. The two group live together peacefully and also in distress. Therefore, there existed both cooperation and divergence. Even if the relations started in conflict and subjugation of Gumz by the Oromo, there existed a persistent collaboration and mutual support between the two groups. Systems like *muchu*, *harma hodha*, and *Abelegie* are the means by which the two groups established and consolidated their relations, Tsega (2005) considered *Harma Hodha* as a conflict resolution mechanism. From the information that I gathered regarding such social network they are basically mean to avoid confrontation rather than managing or resolution of it.

3.4.1.1 Michu

Michu is formal bond of friendship. It is also a mutual support system. Theoretically, it has the connotation of reciprocal relationship, with equal standing as its base. However, the reality is completely different from the actual meaning of the system. To start with Gumz-Oromo relations did not start on equal footings. Gumz were subordinate group and considered by the Oromo as primitive and also given derogatory name *Shanqilla*. Even if such a system (network) did not base itself on equal relations it used to facilitate economic interest of the groups.

ሚቹ ማለት ንደኛ ማለት ነው። ንደኛነቱ የደም ጭምር ትስስር ያለበት ነው። ለጠላትነት ሆነ በጋብቻ አንፈላለግም። ለመጽ ነን ማለት ነው። ጉምዝ ደጋ ሲሄድ ሚቹው እርምጃ ቤት ያድራል። ጥጥ፣ ማር፣ ቅል እና አሸት ይዘን እንሄዳለን። እነሱ እኛ ጋር ሲመጡ ጨውና ቡና ይዘው ነው የሚመጡት። ሚቹ ሲቸገር እንገረዳለን መሬት ቆርሰን እንሰጠዋለን። (G1 age 60)

Michu means a friend. It also means blood ties. We could not be enemies and can not intermarry. We are family. When Gumz travels to highland he spends the night in his *michu* houses. He will provide his *michu* with cotton, honey, **qelle** and **Eshet**. When the Oromo come to Gumz they carry with them salt and coffee. When Oromo *michu* face with difficulty Gumz *michu* will help him out, give him land.

It has its own ceremony; the two people who want to be *michu* will organize a feast and call respected elders to process the ritual. They have to be accompanied by other members of their close relatives. The fingers of the two friends will be pricked, and then they hold each others fingers tightly so as the blood of one enters into the other's. After this ceremony, the two friends are considered as biological brothers (G1 age 60; G7:55; O1 age60 O13 age 55).

Oromo had more demand and benefit than Gumz in this relation. Oromo need agricultural product, place to stay when they visit Kolla/low land/ and also agricultural resource like land. But Gumz asks only salt, coffee and a place to stay when they visit the market places in highland Oromo area. In earlier times, before the coming of *Derg*, the Gumz are despised by the Oromo so when they visited the highland markets and wanted to stay in their *michu* houses, they were not allowed to dine and sleep with their Oromo friends but only allowed to sleep on the veranda, not inside the house (G1 age 60; G2 age; 56).

In later times during the *Darg* regime they were allowed to spend the night inside the house. Baxter (1994:173) explains Oromo's attitude towards Gumz in such grim words

saying "sadly, many Oromo are as racist and arrogant about *Shankilla* as Abyssinians have been to them."

3.4.1.2 Religion

According to local tradition the advent of Orthodox Christianity in Wallega goes back to the beginning of Amharan expansion, particularly of Gojjam, which also consolidated with the encroachment and later incorporation of Wallega to the Feudal Ethiopian state. Even if the conquering Ethiopian state resisted other variant of Christianity the local administrators of Wallega were tolerant of these variants (Tesema 1980; Assefa 1999:108)

It was in 1950s that Orthodox Christianity introduced to Gumz. It was started, according to my informants, by the Emperore himself, when he had visited Gimbi area. An Abbun (high priest) called Yakobe, who based in Arjo, built a church for Gumz converts. With the advent of priests and later protestant missionaries of Sweden in the region, so many also baptized by their Oromo friends or acquaintances and the relations became strong. In my research area, the majority of the population are Protestants, particularly of Mekaneyesus Evangelical Church and Full Gospel and some also Orthodox Christians (Region Culture and Information Bureau 2003; G10 age 90; G1 age 60).

Protestantism is the dominant variant in the area. The personnel, mainly preachers, of the protestant church are predominantly Oromo. The synod itself is based in Oromia. Gumz asked to get a separate synod following the Federal structure. Gumz elite also wanted the church ceremonies to be held in Gumz language or at least the prayer songs that are sang by Gumz to be used in the church ceremonies frequently (GE3, GE5). According to my informants they presented their demand to the synod several time but the synod did not react up on it.

Religion can be used as an instrument to mobilize people for various ends and the church can be both a unifying and divisive force. In my research area, the church is not actively engaged in building the needed social integration. It rather perpetuates the existing social difference between the two groups. The attitude of the preachers on issues like ethnic

difference is a main reason for the failure of the church as integrating agent. The church's elder is the main groups of personalities that strictly oppose inter ethnic marriage. One of my Gumz informants had to change the church she was a member because the church elders and members have stigmatized her for marrying an Oromo.

3.4.1.3 Abelige

It is a social network created to serve as kinship like bond between two people. The two individual became God father or a God mother of a son or a daughter. Such bondage will make one, part of a family and it will be a taboo to get married to the families. Such relations can be built between Oromo-Gumz, Oromo-Amhara and also Gumz-Amhara migrants. According to Assefa (1999:70) it is the form of bondage which is used to get access to resource like land and security.

3.4.1.4 Harma Hodha

Harma Hodha is also another social institution which both group benefited from. No one knows when and how it started but from the name, like other institutions that I discussed above, it seems to have originated from Oromo. Its literal translation is that "to suckle a breast". It is a kind of parent-child relationship. According to my Oromo key informants it was meant to help the Oromo securing land in Gumz area, which he said Gumz often provide to his son. Some of Gumz families also benefited from such an arrangement. Most of the elite that came in to the political picture of the country in 1990s were able to join school because some Oromo who had been Abba Harma provided support and had taken their role as a father seriously. Three of my informants in government authority told me that they were able to get education because of their Abba Harma support.

It was done between two families and the child of each group suckle the soon to be second father's right thumb which is simmered with honey and then the two fathers had to prick their hand and drip their blood into the earth to cement their relationship. These indicate that the two men are blood brothers and will not fight, and marry each others relatives; theoretically they are like biological brothers.

3.4.1.5 Marriage

Gumz practice three forms of marriage systems; sister exchange marriage, elopement and abduction. Sister exchange was the most dominant and accepted form of marriage. Marriage within the clan is a taboo and also with the different ethnic networks like *muchu*, *Harmao Hodha* and with the *Abelege*. They are exogamous. Gumz man can marry as many as he can get if he can have a sister for exchange. Gumz men can also take from his relative a woman that he use to exchange if he does not have a sister that he can exchange with. Exchange marriage is practiced according to my informants to protect a family from depleting its labor forces. Such an issue had been the main conflicting issue between and even within the clans (Dessalegn, 1988:32; Informants G5 age 70; G11 age 35). According to my informants such a practice is now discarded as traditional and a practice that equate human with animal or a commodity.

All the social networks that are taken to strengthen the relationship of the two groups have their own negative ends to wards social integrations; it seems to get in the way of intermarriage. The rules of the matter are that one has to be wary whom he/she marry. So these systems had restriction imbedded under, it set hurdles in the already problematic social relations areas.

For long time it was unthinkable for Gumz to marry an Oromo girl. Intermarriage between the two groups started with the coming to power of the Derg, which followed by the declaration of equality of every citizen. But it was and still is a one way traffic. Gumz men marry Oromo girls but the reverses are still one in a million happenings. Gumz girls ask me an odd question that I didn't know the answer for; they say ".Can a Goat mix with a Sheep?". When Gumz start marrying Oromo girl it was taken by the Oromo as insult and a dishonor. The Oromo start making a story that the ladies who married Gumz done it not out of love but they are defeated with the force that they have no power to resist that is Gumz skill on medicine (to make a woman fall for them/herbs of love).

Whatever the reason might be Gumz men are marrying Oromo girls but the reverse is still a rare case. There exist only three couples who broke the taboo and intermarried. From the three couples the two are still together. Such intermarriage is a recent phenomenon before the 1990s there were no single Gumz woman who married Oromo man. I met a couple who is living in *Belojiganfoy* district town *Soge*, they are young and completely in love, they had been beaten, imprisoned, forced to marry other persons but nothing stopped them to get together again.

Breaking the taboo

Case: 1 Merga Gushu, 20 is an Oromo born and grew up in Limu district of East Wallega Zone. He came to *Soge* looking for land. He became a share cropper for Kebre Dufara father. Kebre Dufara, 18 is a Gumz from Debatsa clan. She was a grade nine student and a follower of Full Gospel protestant church when she meets Merga. She was assigned to take care of Merga. Merga, was agreed to provide labor and share quarter of the product. On the other hand Dufara agreed to provide him, land, seed, farm equipments, food and shelter. It is because of this agreement that Kebre was assigned to look after Merga. They became friends, they cared for each other. He buys her things, like books, and cloths. The family then suspected that some thing going on between them. And they take immediate measures, he was taken to prison and Kebre maternal uncles were called, they are called because it is her mother duty to teach who she can marry or not. Marrying an Oromo is a shame for her mother, who failed on teaching her and largely dishonor to the clan. Her uncles hang her up and beat her up continuously. When they stop beating her she will go to prison to talk to Merga. He was also beaten by the police who are also the clan member of Kebre. They released him after holding him for six months knowing that they did not have sexual intercourse. When they find out that she was still a virgin they decided to marry her for an old guy. The arrangement was finished quickly and wedding ceremonies were held. She had to go with him and she did but she escaped and runaway with Merga to his uncle village outside of the wereda.

Merga and Kebre are now living in *Soge* town, close to kebre's family. Kebre families accepted the fact that they can not separate them. But they did not want keber to live in Oromo village with him; they think she will be killed if she dwells in there, they fear that the Oromo (Merga family) will not accept the marriage. They did not even want her to go

with him to see his family. Kebre and Merga managed to change the attitude of their family even if there still are problems and they have to live with the gossip, discrimination, which come from individual and institution, like church and government offices. Kebre changed her membership from the full Gospel to Mekaneyesus. She stopped attending school, because no one is wanted to seat and talk with her. On the other hand Merga application for land, which he can claim according to rules and regulation if he has lived for three years, was unsuccessful because of his marriage to the girl of Debatsa clan. Such a discrimination and disgust is not only held by Gumz. The Oromo also has it. Merga is now forced to associate only with the Gumz because the Oromo's did not want to mix with him.

It has been taken by scholars like Wendy (1986) and others that sister exchange marriage is the main reason for the non-existence of intermarriage between Oromo and Gumz, particularly of the Oromo not marrying Gumz girls. But it is the prejudices that the two groups developed on each others character, cultural practices and even historical relations clearly came out as the main impediment for the intermarriage between the two groups in the finding of my research. People whom I asked, did not at all mention the marriage system as a problem, they rather emphasize on the prejudices that they have to each other.

Gumz women grow up learning that the Oromo is a killer and had enslaved Gumz for a long time and abuses girls which are not their own clan members. One of my Gumz informant said "When you marry an Oromo you will bring disgrace to your family and clan. They were killing and selling us like animals in an open market, and if I marry an Oromo he will not care for me, he will beat me up to death, when Gumz beat me up he did it only to correct and guide me. So I did not want or even imagine marrying an Oromo"(informant G 13 age 45).The girls told me that Oromo men look down up on them and call them slave girls and they used to call them as stinking *Shanqillas*.

3.5 Economic Relations

3.5.1 Access to land resource

In Ethiopia, there are three types of socioeconomic adaptations: sedentary agriculture, nomadic pastoralism, and shifting cultivation. However, the land ownership status of shifting cultivators has never been defined clearly. The agrarian reform of the 1970s, which vested ownership of all rural land in the state, clearly defined land tenure systems in peasant and nomadic areas (Negarit Gazeta 1975 cited in Gebre 2003), which ignore the shifting cultivation system. Even if land is still the property of the people or state, it was not clear that which article applied to such economic activity.

The customary land tenure system of Gumz may be expressed as a communal access system, combining individual possession with communal ownership. Members of Gumz society enjoyed equal access to communally owned territory, such as arable lands, forested areas, grazing land, and riverbanks, as a matter of right. The lineage group (or the sub clan), however, was the most important entity in which major decisions were made and rights and duties exercised. Individual belongs to what may be termed a territorial group. Each territorial group separated into various distinct clans each of which possesses its own land and areas of influence. Clan members know the boundary of their clan property and also expect other clans to recognize it. Trespassing usually leads to clash, some time it will be bloody (Gebre, 2003:3-4; Dessalegn 1988:30-33; Informants, Glage 60; G3age65).

At the beginning of the dry season groups, which might be more than 10 individuals of the same clan or sub clan select forested land for the next season, clear the forest together and burn the wood and grass on the land to make it available for farm and divide to each other by selecting a leader which they call *Abba lega*. The *Abba lega* has the power to divide the land to the group depending on the capacity and demand of an individual. He also has the role of a mediator in times of land dispute (informants).

Gumz are shifting cultivators, move to new places depending on either agronomic factors or by social, political or magico-religious factors. The old land the clan member used for two or more years, basically depending on the soil type, allowed lying fallow for several years (for more than six years). They use simple tools, including the hatchet, sickle; hoe and iron-tipped digging stick and grow sorghum, maize, oilseeds (sesame). They also relied on hunting, gathering, fishing and collecting honey from the forest as supplementary income (Gebere, 2003: Gebre, 2005: Fecadu, 1988:48 and informants). With the implementation of the regional state villagization program they are becoming settled agriculturalist depending only on agricultural products. This change in the way of life of the Gumz creates frustration and competition over resource that is land with their Oromo neighbors.

On the other hand the Oromo are settled agriculturalist, engaged in both livestock rearing and crop cultivation (mixed farming). The Oromo are basically settled in the highland, the reason for the Oromos avoiding the lowland areas were related mainly to the prevalence of malaria. In the earlier time the Oromo had regulated land rights and allocation through the *qabiyee* mechanism. "Qabiyee" means land holding; but as a system it seems to refer to established rights of precedence in the occupation of newly conquered land (Tesema 1980:21). Oromo had communal land right by all clansmen, since land was abundant.

According to Hultin (1994:70) Oromo communities believe that there exists, a mystical and effective bond between people and land that could never be broken, not even by force. The principle that land was associated with and in one form or another belong to, the man who had created it, whether by symbolic or physical labor, was thus valid amongst the Oromo themselves but not in relations to non-Oromo categories or groups. People say first immigrants claimed large areas of land and that the first man to claim an area was regarded as the father of all that land. The incorporation of Oromo into hegemonic Shewan rule changed their land tenure system. In 1910 the government had the land measured and divided into Gasha, parcels of approximately forty hectares.

The partition of land decided by imperial government and implemented by the subordinate Wallega rulers, the local people did not take part in this system of allocation of land.

The Oromo community started to look in to the lowland with population increase and the change in the land tenure. They are using it with agreement and also sometimes with fierce engagement with Gumz. The low land has been a lucrative source of income for the Oromo. At first it provides them with slaves, gold and ivory and then it became the cash crop producing area. They grew ~~cotton~~^{Cattle} going down to the lowland on seasonal basis, which is locally called *dereba*. They cultivate the land that Gumz left to follow or what their *michus* provide them with, produce cotton and other cash crops. In the highland the agricultural product of the Oromo include *teff*, barely, maize, sorghum, beans and peas (Tesema 1980; Assefa, 1999; Tesfaye 2007:44; and informants).

In the lowland both Oromo and Gumz until the establishment of state farm used to work together. Both of them used simple digging material, not the ploughing technique that the Oromo use in the highland. Both of them can call for *Deboo*. *Deboo* is a form of labor exchange and ordered periodically for the purpose of clearing the farm land, digging, weeding and harvesting (Asefa, 1999:83).

In the lowland unlike the highland there was and still is no land measurement and allocation policies. For long time it was the *Abba laga* and the *Abba qoro*, who are responsible for land allotments and tax collection respectively. The system of property ownership among the Gumz was communal ownership. Each family cultivates the land that it has managed to clear at any given time, and enjoyed owner right over it. The principle followed was that of the right of the first occupant. No land re-distribution was carried out in Gumz area since there were neither landlords nor landless element among the people. After the 1990s the *qebelles* seize the responsibility of both land allocation and tax collection. There was and still is no limit on the size and number of individual farm. I was told by Gumz and Oromo alike that an individual can have more than 40 hectare land. An individual can have land both in the lowland and highland and also can have in

both Oromia and Gumz qebeles in the lowland (Dessaiegn 1988:34; Oromo and Gumz informants). On the other hand land in the highland Oromo is fragmented and cultivated for a long time, which I am going to discuss in the following chapter.

The Oromo send their cattle to the low land area during dry season and Gumz also send theirs in the rainy season to protect their cattle from disease. Gumz do not own large livestock herds. Sheep and goat are predominantly raised by Gumz and some rear a few cattle. The Oromo on the other hand rear large number of cattle. It is a prestige rather than its economical importance that the Oromo attached to it. The number is also indicating the wealth one own (Assefa 1999:80; Abebe 2002:180; Oromo informants). Gumz and Oromo supported each other economically through the social network, like *micchu*, *abba harma*. When a Gumz want food grain or salt and coffee he can take it as credit to pay with in one year time. Oromo also take grain by credit until they harvest, because of the climatic variation Gumz harvest earlier than the Oromo

I observed that in the local market either in Gumz *qebelles* or in Oromia *qebelles* the traders are predominantly Oromo and Amhara. Gumz are still dependant on Oromo merchants to acquire commodities. After the clash there was a problem of getting commodities in the local market. Every thing had to come through Oromia region and by Oromo merchant. One of my informant told me that they will starved if they can not get into Oromo markets for a week. After the clash East Wallega Zonal Administration ordered traders and local community not to provide Gumz with any commodities, so it was a wide-ranging crack down to Gumz societies, the district administration and for different governmental and non governmental institution, than the actual conflict.

With the stepping up of EPRDF on the country's politics and the 1990's administrative restructuring of the country implemented, both the political and socio-economic relations of the two groups forced to include new dimensions. It was at this chapter of Ethiopian history that Gumz got a share in the power of the country's political and economical resource, which they never had before.

CHAPTER FOUR

ETHNIC FEDERALISM, MIGRATION AND CONFLICT NEXUS:

4.1 *Ethnic Federalism and Administrative Limit*

4.1.1. *Ethnic Federalism*

The overthrow of the military regime (Derg), in May 1991, brought the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to power. EPRDF is a coalition of ethnic political movements, dominated by the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF), which fought for sixteen years (1975-1991) against the Derg in the northern province of Tigray.

After EPRDF came to power, they organized a national conference in July 1991 with the main objective of establishing a 'legitimate, broad-based' transitional government that can map a democratic transformation for the country. At the conference, the right of nationalities including that of secession was declared and the actual work of the self-administration was left to the government to guarantee it, and also the transitional charter approved with no resistance. The council of representative (COR) was also formed out of the participants of the conference (EPRDF took 32 seats out of the 87 seats, OLF on the other hand manage to get 12). It was during this conference that the transitional Government (TGE) was formed, and Meles Zenawi was elected as the president. The conference was attended by more than two dozen political groups, ethnic based parties including Oromo Liberation Front/OLF/, were conspicuously represented while the multi ethnic parties purposely excluded (Young, 1996:535; 1998: 193; Merera 2003:121).

The TGE issued a proclamation to redraw the administrative map of the country, which initially comprised of fourteen regional states. Later on, Dire Dawa became a special region and administrative pragmatism and political deliberation had forced the merging of five regions of the southern regional state, which reduced the regions to nine. Benishangul Gumz region is one of the regions that was carved out from the former Benishangul, Wallega, and Gojjam provinces, with Gumz, Berta, Shinasha, Mao and Como as its indigenous communities (Young, 1996:535; 1998: 193; Merera 2003:121).

The establishment of Benishangul- Gumz regional state was strongly challenged by OLF even though the Benishangul People Liberation Movement (BPLM) countered it. As part of the opposition movements which had been holding against the Derg rule throughout the country, at the end of 1970's some movements were induced in Benshangul by descendants of the region even though it was not strong in terms of political and military organization than other areas. This movement (which was dominated by Bertas and had no representation from other indigenous people except Gumz) was easily crushed and those who survived had fled to Sudan and established Benshangul People Liberation Movement (BPLM/ Behnene its Amharic acronym). It was just after its establishment that the party commenced the journey of finding allies (interview with key informant; GE5).

In this process the first party they had approached was OLF to no avail as OLF demanded that the people of Benishangul have to declare themselves as "black Oromo". In 1988 they were able to establish contact with TPLF; even though they were not considered as full member as that of Amhara and Oromo movements, but only as affiliate. This relation, however, had served to increase their military and political capacity and later legitimacy in the post Derg TPLF dominated government. The parties also benefited from the ethnic based restructuring (Young 1999:327; informants GE4; GE5 and GE6).

Because of the claim that the Oromo Liberation Front forwarded the relations between the two parties was rocky. This relationship turned in to a hostile one after EPLF had captured the region in 1989 and transferred its administration to OLF. At that time it was assumed that OLF has ethnic affiliation and popular support in the region, which was proved to be the opposite. OLF had continued to force its idea of "black Oromo" upon Gumz students which in turn provided fertile ground to strengthen BPLM as many students joined the party willingly infuriated by such an idea. After two months of OLF control, the Derg was able to re-take it. OLF burned the city (Assosa), looted bank and terrorized the non-Oromo communities before its actual withdrawal (Young 1999:327;

GE4; GE5 and GE6). After EPRDF came to power in 1991, however, it was OLF that was allowed again to control the region. Young put the confrontation of the two parties:

In spite of this legacy the EPRDF made the same mistake and allowed the OLF to assume control of the territory in 1991 when Derg forces fled south. The stage was then set for the territory's second war as the OLF defeated the much smaller forces of the BPLM who were not prepared to accept Oromo hegemony in a region in which Oromo only constituted 12% of the population(1994 census). With the BPLM defeated and the EPRDF otherwise preoccupied with establishing transitional government, the OLF began pursuing its own program in Benshangul. This involved replacing Amharigna with Oromiffa in the schools and punishing those who spoke the language in the streets, terrorizing Amhara and any who opposed them, and propagating the view that the inhabitants of Benishangul were black Oromos, while preparing the ground for an independent Oromia which would include Benishangul. In response, the indigenous population petitioned the EPRDF to intervene, leading to the region's third war in January 1992. The subsequent defeat of the OLF by the EPRDF army left the BPLM in a dominant position in the region (Young 1999:328).

After 1991, OLF still persisted on its idea and tried to restructure Oromia in such a way that includes Benshangul as its constituent part. At the time BPLM/behenen/ competing and even Assosa/the capital/ was administered by this two competing parties (informant GE4; GE5; GE6).

ስንመጣ ከአነግ ጋር አንድላይ እንሆናለን የሚል ነገር አልነበረም። ከአነግ ጋር ግንኙነትም አልነበረንም። አነግ መጀመሪያ ሲገባ የእኛን ህዝብ ሲያርድ ነበር። እኛ ግንኙነት ያለን ከአህዲድ ጋር ነው። አነግ ትግል ላይ እያለንም ያሳድደን ነበር። 1984 ላይ የአነግ እንቅስቃሴ ነበር። እኛና አነግ ግጭት ነበረን ብዙ ሠዎች አተናል። አነግ በአጠቃላይ እናንተ ምርጫ ልታካሄዱ አትችሉም በማለቱ ከወለጋ ወደዚህ ምርጫ አልተካሄደም ነበር (GE5)።

When we entered the country after the downfall of Derg we did not expect to be with OLF. We had not have relations with OLF before. Our relation was with OPDO. OLF had slain our people. OLF used to hunt us when we were in combat. In 1992 there were conflict between OLF and us (BPLM), we lost so many of our people. At that time election was not held in the regions beyond Wallega because OLF refused to recognize us as an independent entity.

EPRDF's relations with OLF, the most important group outside the EPRDF fold, broke down quickly. OLF decided to boycott the election and withdrew from the transitional government at the eleventh hour of the 1992 election. This move on the part of OLF and the resultant armed engagement forced EPRDF to settle on grouping Benshangul under separate regional government rather than link it with Oromia. It was such a decision that

made Bereta, Gumz, Shinasa, Mao and Como to be the component part of the region (Young 1999:328; informant GE4; GE5; GE6).

This arrangement, however encountered resistance from Amhara and Oromo people regional states as the region was carved out of the former Wallega and Gojjam administrative areas. Much of what is now Assosa Zone and Mao -Como special Wereda and also Kamashi Zone were claimed by Oromia. On the other hand Amhara regional state very much wanted Metekel to be under its control.

Kamashi Zone, the research area, was established by incorporating 133 Gumz *qebbeles* from the area previously known as Wallega *Kifle Hager* in 1992/3. These *qebelles* believed to be predominantly Gumz, were later organized to form five *Waredas*, which are, Kamashi, Yaso, Sirba Abbay, Agalo Meti and Belojegamfoy, under Kamashi Zone.

Table 1 Administrative structures

Weredas of the new Kamashi Zone	Previous Wellega Weredas
Kamashi	Biilaa
Belojeganfoy	Digga-Sasiga
Yaso	Limu
Sirba Abby	Mendi
Agalo Meti	Nejo

Source: adopted by the researcher

From its inception, this arrangement gave rise to claims and counter claims on the ownership of territory among both Oromo and Gumz elites. The Oromo elites claim that the *qebbeles* which were assumed to be originally inhabited by Gumz belong to the Oromo people as the Gumz, who are currently residing in the area are newcomers and even their numbers are said to be insignificant to establish their own administration in former Wallega *Kifle Hager*. The Oromo further claim that the land upto the Dabus River is Oromo land. The Gumz on the other hand claim territories that extend into Ertirea. Even if they did not push further with such an idea, they insisted on having all the

lowland part of former *Wallega Kifle Hager*. However, such a claim and counter claim did not take violent form until 1994.

In 1994 the first violent conflict happened between Gumz and Oromo, which Gumz blamed on members of OPDO military force³. This conflict claimed the lives of 58 Oromo. The Oromo communities and elites on the other hand, accused the then vice president of the Benishangul Gumz Regional State Mekonen Golasa (PhD), of initiating and organizing the attack that the Gumz community launched on neighboring Oromo farmers (for the details see Chapter 5).

The two groups persistently engaged in claims and counter claims over territory, which forced them to revive selective social memories of the group and rephrasing of oral traditions. Gumz had been figured as foreigners, settled in the region during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie in 20th century, as the then governor of *Neqemete* allowed them to inhabit the region. Such lines of argument go with Wallmark's historical reconstruction. According to Wallmark (1981:81), the Bega migrated to Wallegga (Digga Wareda) from Gojjam, specifically the Gubba and Wembera area, beginning about 1880. After 1910 high tax and endless conflict with Amhara, Arab, Agew, Shinasha and Zala push Gumz to leave Gojjam. According to him 1930 was a period of significant migration of the Gumz towards Wallega. On the other hand Tessema (1980) and Abebe (2002) assert that the *Shaniqillas* are indigenous to the place and the Oromo migrants in the 17th century had an encounter with these groups.

³ After EPRDF victory the then rebel force of EPRDF members over took both the political and administrative role of the various regions, so at that time, until after the 1992 election and the establishment of national army OPDO rebel (military) force were in control of Oromia regional administration.

The Gumz, on the other hand, claim to be the first to settle in the region. As one of my key informants told me the Gumz were forced out by highland Oromo and Amhara settlers from different parts of their original settlements:

Our ancestors lived and are buried here. We can show the place of our ancestor's graves, in the place currently occupied by Oromo. What the Oromo are doing is to deny us our right to self-administration. They do not want to accept the fact that we are no longer their servants. Actually who will accept being neglected by the life long servant' (Glage 60).

These assertions also have support from individual Oromos who claim to know that Gumz had been in the claimed area long enough to raise historical claims over the land.

ሸለቆው ውስጥ ከዳር እስከ ዳር ነበሩ። ኑሮአቸው ከደገኛው የተለየና በተጨማሪ መንገድ ይኖሩ የነበሩ ናቸው። በሸለቆው ውስጥ ከአውሬ ጋር ተተላቅለው ነው የኖሩት (interview with Oromo key informant O3 age 45)

They inhabited all through the valley. Their livelihood was different from the highlanders and they lived in despair. They were living together with the animals in the valley.

Both of them told the other to move out and settle in another place. Gumz were told to move out and settle either in Sudan or in Assosa (the capital of the regional state) while they told the Oromo to leave the lowland and retreat to the highlands where the Gumz believes the "Red" Oromo belongs. Gumz charge the Oromo as expansionists and bringers of OLF terror. Oromos reject such an accusation as baseless and they demand their rightful possession of resources that were given to Gumz because of EPRDF restructuring. According to my informants, such restructuring was done without in-depth study on historical and administrative convenience or even symmetries; "We have Gumz village inside our (Oromo) *qebelle*, administered and paid tax to Gumz *qebelles*. Gumz have villages a short distance from Neqemete town, which is not in any way symmetrical to their regional state." (Interview with Oromo elite; OE1)

Oromo elites accept the fact that they at the beginning like every one else in the country had an expansionist attitude, which they said followed the enforcement of the federal structure in the country (informant; OE1). Therefore, they had demanded places both in Assosa and Kamashi zone, which they somehow resolved through the referendum held by the transitional government, even if the result was not satisfactory for both groups. Those places that were assumed to be solved by referendm are still points of contention.

According to Horguelin (1999:17) with the process of regionalization new sources of discontent appeared in the country, what was formerly discontent with the center and the Amhara could well turn into general chaos if states claim what they believe they are entitled to. The Oromo community and elites alike claim that their ancestors since 18th century used to govern all the areas that the Gumz claim to own, which according to my informant makes the Oromo as its rightful owner.

The coming of EPRDF to power and the resultant self-administration and administrative restructuring, changed the relations between the two ethnic groups drastically. The Gumz, who had been marginalized and discriminated by their neighbors and the central government, got the opportunity at the end of the 20th century of self-administering. They embraced the ethnic-based regionalization principle to ensure economic and political control over their region. They wanted to put an end to Oromo domination and envisaged getting all the things that they lost, like land particularly of the state farm. The state farm was later given to the East Wallega Zone by a decision made at the Prime Minster's office. Gumz very much wanted to keep their right to self-administration despite the fact that they are not sure about the future and need more assurance, from the government. Studies indicate that the Ethiopian constitution is the most "minority-friendly" but falls short of proper definition of minority and thus lack adequate protection to indogenous minority groups.

According to Kymlicka, sub state national groups have doubts that the old domination has not been thrown out: Kymlicka further elaborates the apprehension of these groups as:

Sub state national groups still typically feel that the older ideology of the homogeneous nation state has not been fully renounced, and that members of the dominant group have not fully accepted the principle of a multinational state (or have not fully accepted all of its implications).As a result, inter group relations are often highly politicized, as members of both sides are (over?) sensitive to perceived slights and misunderstandings (2006:43).

4.1.2. *Administrative Limits*

During the Imperial regime and until the last years of the military government, both Gumz and Oromo were under the *Wallega Kifel Hagar* (Administrative Region). The territorial restructuring put in place by the EPRDF regime provided territorial autonomy to both groups depending on their settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people. Therefore, the former Wallega Administrative Region was divided into two regions- region six and four (Benshangul Gumz and Oromia respectively), but without drawing any clear-cut administrative boundaries.

There is no clear understanding of the administrative limits of each of the states. The local community at the initial stage had problems of understanding which state they belong, and they tended to sway depending on circumstances and political persuasion. After the restructuring, Oromo communities living in Gumz *qebelles* had paid tax to Oromia for five years without knowing that they are inside the Gumz jurisdiction. The officials of Oromia *qebelles* collected the tax despite their knowledge that they are not eligible to collect tax from individuals who are residing inside Gumz *qebelles*. This trend continues as Oromo communities living in Gumz *qebelles* are forced to pay tax for both states. Such an issue is aggravated because of the poor *qebelle* structure of Gumz.

Several villages, which belong to *Belojeganfoy Wareda* of Gumz, are lying as small islands in Oromiya region far from where the Wareda situated. *Belojeganfoy Wareda* has ten *qebelles*, which are established around the former state farms. On the other hand *Sasiga Wareda* of East Wallega Zone has 12 *qebelles* in the lowlands situated inside and bordering the former state farm. Nine of the ten Gumz *qebelle* of the study area have encountered recurrent boundary related problems with east Wallega *Waredas* namely Sasiga, and Degga. This situation has been aggravated more as the authorities of the two regions have been engaged in planting double administrative structures, like *qebelle*, school, and health offices in the same villages and *qebelles* and both claimed their legal authority in administration and tax collection.

The Oromo elites very much wanted to hold on the land and its resources, which from time to time came out clearly and strongly in various ways like interfering in the administrative affairs of the Gumz, arresting authorities of the Gumz, and obstructing movement in and out of the *Wareda*. The Wareda officials of *Sasiga*, and the local *qebelle* officials tend to ignore the administrative jurisdiction of the Gumz and engaged in tax collection and political propagation, which the Gumz took as an insult and responded violently(Informants GE1:GE2 and GE4).

One envoy -one Arrow

Case 2; 1993, the authorities of Sasiga Wareda sent three militias and two civilian in one of the qebele's of *Belojeganfoy Wareda* (Anger Shenkora/Lega Beyoo), for tax collection and to enlist members for OPDO, without the knowledge of the Gumz authorities. The militias and the civilian envoys of the Wareda were doing what they were told to do when encircled by their Gumz counterparts. Gumz took such an intrusion as an insult and illegal and responded violently and killed four of the envoys. Gumz argued that the Oromos were mobilizing Oromo settlers to plot against them. One of the envoys who was a militia was able to escape. The envoys were attacked by the famous Gumz arrow⁴.

⁴ Both Gumz and Oromo informant told me the same story with out any distortion but with different intentions. The Oromos wanted me to see how the Gumz are killing innocent Oromos and the Gumz on the

In 1993, the Oromo officials in *Bello Central (Handura Bello qebelle)* held the then Vice president of Gumz (Mekonnen Golasa (PhD) on the pretext of having arms in his car. All his belongings including arms, car and even his security guards were held for hours until the then state farm administrator convinced them to think in terms of what it might cost them and the Oromo people in general. The mediating role of the farm administrator resulted in peaceful discharge of the vice president and his security guard. In 1994, again the zonal and *Wareda* officials of *Kamashi* zone were detained by members of OPDO military force while they were traveling to *Soge*. These members of OPDO military force also arrested elders and the remaining *Wareda* officials of Gumz going to *Soge*, by passing their jurisdiction. The Gumz responded by attacking the Oromo villagers, which they killed 58 individuals, they held the village for over a week until the TGE army arrived. (Informants; G6 age 38; G9 age 30; GE2; GE3; O7 age 48; O8 age 50). I will return to this issue later.

The Gumz elites and community alike take such an action as a threat to their freedom and autonomy. They claim that the Oromo community is against their wish to be autonomous and want to drag them back to the past, which the Gumz hated and regret most. Horowitz (1985) asserts that communities that are referred to by the majority people as backward or minority groups who have been marginalized for long are afraid of being controlled by majority groups:

In fact backward ward groups have frequently exhibited severe anxiety about threats emanating from other groups. One form of this anxiety takes is apprehension about being dominated and being turned in to "hewers of wood and drawers of water." Conciliatory leaders are depicted as being excessively generous in granting concessions to ethnic strangers, whose intentions are allegedly, to take control of the country and subordination of the backward group. Every issue can then become a survival issue. A common formulation is that if a certain political demand is not granted, the group "will cease to exist."... To a considerable extent, such apprehensions reflect demographic insecurity (Horowitz, 1985:176-77)

other hand wanted to show me how Oromo leaders interfere in their administrative structure and how they do not want to recognize Gumz's right to self-administration.

The Gumz elites consider and even propagate the claim that Oromo elites purposely push their population to migrate towards Gumz land so that they demand administrative authority over the area through referendum (GE1:GE2:GE3). The fear of domination, which is developed in the mind of Gumz's leaders and elites coupled with inter-ethnic suspicion, aggravated the already tense and antagonistic relations between the two groups. Every little incident or move on the Oromo side is considered by Gumz leaders and elites as a conspiracy to take their land or a means for executing their expansionist tendency. These fears originate from the very nature of the regional restructuring, which organized the majority ethnic group as the owners of the regional states, for example the 'Mother States' like Amhara or Tigray even Oromo has other minority ethnic group with in them.

This apprehension originated not only from established threat but also some psychological projections. The Gumz lost territory that the Oromo has claimed through referendum during the mid 1990's restructuring. For example, in *Kamashi* zone, one of the *qebelle* called *Dimtu* was given to Oromia through referendum held during the transition period. From the start Oromo leaders and elites put a referendum on the table as the sole solution for every border problem that the two regions encounter knowing their advantage in outweighing the Gumz by number. This attitude of the elites reflected on the study conducted by the two Regional states to identify the cause of conflict, the Oromo recommended a referendum as a solution to settle the border issues. To use their wording:

በተጎራባች ቀበሌዎች መካከል እየተከሰተ ያለው ችግር አብዛኛው ከይገባኛል ጥያቄ! አስተዳደራዊ ወሰን በግልጽ አለመቀመጥ እና የመዋቅር መደራረብ ጋር የተያያዘ ሰለሆነ ሁለቱ ክልላዊ መንግሥት ከፌዴራሉ መንግሥት ጋር በመተባበር በሕግ መንግሥቱ መሠረታዊ መርህ አንቀጽ 46 /2/ እና 48 /1/ መሠረት ሕዝብ ውሳኔ (Referendum) ማካሄድ (Oromia 2008 study report)

The persistent problem that existed between the neighboring *qebelles* is related to claim over territory, the ambiguity of administrative limit and the existence of double administrative structures. So the two Regional States in collaboration with the Federal government should hold referendum based on the Constitution articles 46(2) and 48(1).

It is important to point out here that the above mentioned study had been initiated and the first steps of the study were conducted in collaboration with Gumz experts but the writing up was done separately as disagreement arose between them. Despite the fact that Oromia experts had suggested referendum as an important solution for the boundary problems in this study document, the Oromia regional governments officials interviewed expressed their doubt about referendum as a silver bullet to conflict resolution, referring to the poor experiences on the Somali-Oromia border⁵ (informant: OE1; OE2).

The option of referenda is also supported by the Oromo community. The local community in Oromia *qebelles* told me that they are confident that they will not lose their father's land all through Dedessa valley if the issue is handled by the federal government in any possible political border demarcation strategy: either referendum or demarcation through analyzing historical authority trend. With such certainty that the local people are participating in bribing Gumz *qebelle* officials to secure land before the Oromia Administrative body takes control (interview with key informants; O2 age 47; O4 age 40).

Dominance in population number makes a referendum a winning strategy for the Oromo. Gumz leaders and elites on the other hand oppose referenda as a means of demarcating the border, recognizing the fact that referendum makes them vulnerable to lose a considerable amount of their land, including Assosa. Gumz advocate for the employment of historical patterns of settlement and geographical consideration as a criterion.

Befekadu and Diribssa (2005:80), argue that the leaders and the elites of the majority and minority groups tend to be more fanatical and biased than the ordinary members of their ethnic groups. The frustration of the Gumz leaders and the expansionist and chauvinistic attitude of the Oromo leaders is the driving force behind every conflict in the region. Gumz leader's apprehension arises from their historical memories. They were

⁵ The contradiction of Oromia study report and the response of the officials I think came from the interest of the leaders to paint a different picture, because it is definite that if referendum is hold in the area that the Oromo will get most of kamashi zone. Any person can understand by looking at the local structure and settelement patterns that referendum is not a logical solution for the border problem between the two groups.

marginalized economically and politically. Such historical memories are currently in use in mobilizing the Gumz community to defend their regional autonomy. Both groups use historical memories to advance their agendas.

According to Horowitz (1985:170), memories of earlier conflicts, centuries and sometimes millennia old, can be reviewed to fit modern-day conditions. The old hostilities are significant again. Gumz elites use memories of slavery and the 1952 war for mobilizing their community. They told the local community that the Oromo are moving towards their land and will claim its inclusion under Oromia administration and in the future they will take the land through a referendum. They underscore the fact that if they keep allowing the Oromo to settle on their land they will easily be turned to their former status, under slavery and domination. The Gumz elite asked their community according to my informants' whether they want to live free like they are now or to be beaten and sold in an open market like they used to be. My informants told me that the idea of going back to slavery that the majority knows from the stories of their grandfathers and a few also passed through it terrorized them. They said they developed this feeling mainly due to the propaganda that the Oromo promote widely focusing on the Gumz as foreigners who left their home country that is Sudan (informants; G6 age 38; G7 age 55; G8 age 29; G9 age 30).

Conversely, the Oromo elites mobilize their community saying that, "We Oromo's have been disgraced, and pushed around, what is going to be our fate? Our land has been given to the minorities that we used to buy and sell. The minority that we used to chase around have now acquired power and authority which they use to kill us and get revenge" (Oromo key informants; O2 age 47; O3 age 45; O12 age 35). Such agitations on the part of the elite has created anxiety and distrust between the two communities.

The Gumz Waredas and the zones in general have extensive virgin and forest land and also rich in mineral resource like gold, marble and believed to have potential for other minerals (Regional Atlas 2007; GE1; GE2; GE6). According to my Oromo informants, the restructuring of the regions allows the small number of Gumz communities to seize

massive virgin land, which put them (the majority of the Oromo population) in a disadvantageous position, (most of the lowland that the Oromo settled now was used as a state farm for more than 15 years). After the establishment of *Belojeganfoy Wareda* and its *qebelles*, the Gumz started to put restrictions on the activities of their neighboring Oromo (O2 age 47; O5 age 30; O7 age 50; O9 age 30). According to my Oromo informants going in to the forest to get wood or grass became difficult, the forest turned in to place of contention. This led to extensive destruction of the forest. Large number of Oromo community resettled in Gumz *qebelles* and also in the former state farm areas. Oromos are engaged in clearing the forest to make it ready for farm activity. Knowing the advantage of being on the Gumz side to get access to resources, villages like *Shembelele* have willingly joined the Gumz administrative structure:

What matters most ethnicity or economic benefit?

Case 3; *Shembelele* is a village currently under Gumz *qebelle* called *Anger Shenkora* (the Oromo recognize it as *Laga Beyoo*). The inhabitants, of this village are predominantly Oromos. They are closer to the Gumz than Oromo *qebelles* and their farm is also parallel with the Gumz farms. But they were under Oromia *qebelle* called *Hora Waatta*. The *Abaa qoro* of the village decided to join Gumz *qebelle* in mid 1990s, in order to benefit from the new development, infrastructure and virgin land there. Their demands being accepted by Gumz officials and joined the Gumz. After being within Gumz *qebelle* for close to ten years they are now wanted to return to Oromia *qebelle*, they said for the same reason that they joined the Gumz. "in addition to our quest for virgin land, the presence of malaria and the inavailability of medicine in Oromia *qebelle* forced us to join Gumz. Now we understand that such facilities are available in Oromia more than Gumz, our relatives in Oromia *qebelle* benefit from credit scheme but we do not have such opportunities here. Our people in Oromia *qebelle* get more attention from the state than they used to".

This case indicates that people are interested more in economic benefits than in political boundaries and ethnic identity. These interests made people to subject to political persuasion, which substantiate the argument of some instrumentalist, who claims that elites use the situation to foment conflict for their own ends. Therefore, individuals or groups became tools for the elite's political and economic interests. The villagers of *Shembelele* in particular and the Oromo communities that are inhabited in Gumz qebelle in general had not been directly involved and affected by either the 1994 and 2008 conflicts between the Gumz and the Oromo. The conflicts were not with the Oromo settlers in Gumz *qebelles* they were with the Oromo of Oromia *qebelles*. But the Oromo settlers of Gumz *qebelles* had been displaced frightened that they might be the next target. Such massive out-migration of people into Oromia made it possible for the elite to germinate their ideas of referendum.

4.2 Change in Gumz Ways of Life

The Gumz way of life is characterized by shifting cultivation. They also supplement their subsistence farming with hunting gathering and fishing. Gumz mostly inhabit lowland areas and their settlement patterns were and still are dispersed. Because of their economic activities, the Gumz were (in some places still are) mobile and can not stay more than four years in the same place. The pattern of scattered and shifting settlement of Gumz is highly interrelated with geography, economic, and political circumstances.

The development policies of the successive regimes have neglected the Gumz in general and the research area Belojeganfoy of Kamashi Zone in particular along with other peripheral parts of the country. With the change in the countries political structure in 1991 the Gumz were able to take part in the countries economic and political agendas for the first time. This opportunity, presented the necessary economic and political power to change their ways of life and to be part and parcel of the country's economic transformation.

In 1999 the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State started a sedentarization program of Gumuz and other shifting cultivators and the government officials were involved in mobilizing the communities to settle in the planned areas. According to the resettlements study conducted by the Regional Disaster Prevention and Population Settlement Bureau, the objective was to settle the scattered and mobile communities in concentrated settlements and provide them with infrastructure and improved agricultural inputs and others services like schools, and health centers. Gumuz are expected to abandon shifting cultivation. According to the bureau, primary need assessments were conducted and also several meetings were held, which according to the office report helped to identify the communities attitude and the cultural barriers to the villagization program.

Gebre (2003:18) contradicted this idea stating the plan was based on the rapid rural appraisal report, without careful environmental, social or human impact assessment that could help to avoid impoverishment of the community; to use his own words "In the absence of alternative income, decline of yield due to the decline of soil fertility will undoubtedly exacerbate food insecurity. Infrastructure and medical facilities were not in place and are less likely to be developed prior to the planned sedentarization. In the absence of adequate medical services, congestion and poor sanitation may cause health hazards."

Similarly, the plan was not and still is not taking in to consideration, impact on the relations that the community and the region has with the neighboring Oromo state and communities. The program will and is facilitating changes in the Gumuz way of life that is mobility and agricultural activities. With such programmes the Gumuz community became a settled agricultural group like their Oromo neighbors. Therefore, they more or less have the same demand and aspirations, which tends to stiffen the competition over resources like land, water, forest and etc....Here's a case in point:

Case 4: *Anger Meti qebelle* (what the Oromo call Lagahaya) is one of the areas, which as selected to be a resettlement area for the Gumz who were living in *Belojeganfoy Wareda* of former *Meti qebelle* in *Neqemet-Bure road /Uka area/*. This resettlement scheme has two objectives; one is to realize the villagization program of the region, and the second was to relocate the Gumz from conflict risk area, where there existed dual administrative authorities. The idea was at first resisted by Gumz communities. The communities forwarded "so many" what ifs", (if land is scarce, not fertile, if there are settlers there) and with persuasions and so many promises some groups were convinced and have decided to come on one condition if and only if they keep the land that they have in the old *qebelles*.

By the time the Gumz started clearing the forest in the planned village, the Oromo, who used to be laborers in the state farm engaged in clearing the same forest which instigated competition for land and other resources. The resistance towards the resettlement plan was not only from the Gumz side but also from the Oromo too. So the implementation of the plan was followed by individual accusation and clashes on the borders of farm land. Gumz had killed Guraiza (Columbus monkey) and hung its skin which the Oromo said with notes under which reads; if you come close to us you will be dead. This tension was exacerbated and in 2008 turned in to large scale conflict, which took the lives of many Oromo and Gumz (Gumz and Oromo informants).

Oromo settlers did not like such a change of practice and mass settlement of Gumz in the land that they have a claim on. They also understood the plan as an initiative which costs them their land. They also complained about the amount of land that individual Gumz acquires, owing the absence of land allocation system in the Regional State and the relative abundance of land on the their side, compared with their restricted land allocation systems. My Oromo informants told me that the Gumz elites with this villagization strategy turned their people and themselves into a land owning bourgeois.

እኛ የምናውቀው ኢህአዲግ የካፒሊስት ስርአት አራማጅ መሆኑን ነው። እነሱ ግን የመሬት ከበርቴ ሆነው እያሳረሱና እያከራዩ ተቀምጠው ሳይሰሩ እንደልባቸው ይኖራሉ። የፊውዳል ስርዓት ነው እያራመዱ ያሉት። አስራ ስምንት ዓመት ያልሞላው ልጅ ዛሬ እነሱ ጋር የመሬት ባለቤት ነው (Ozage 47)።

EPRDF is a capitalist party that's what we know. But they (Gumz) are a land owning bourgeois, who are living by renting and employing farmers. They are pursuing a feudal system. Adolescent boys whose age is under 18 own land in Gumz areas.

Gumz re-settlers underscored the fact that the benefits resulting from the resettlement program outweighed the disadvantage, being restricted to a limited farm land, which the Gumz related it to lesser productivity and challenging agricultural activities, created because of the change in their life style. According to my Gumz informants, it is after the resettlement that the region is able to make different service provision institutions, like health, and school. Growing encroachment of the highlanders into the lowland reduced the vegetation cover of the region that led to the depletion of wild animals and edible fruits, in away reduced Gumz access to meat and supplementary food stuff. Hunting and gathering is one of the Gumz's livelihood strategy designed to supplement shifting cultivation. The increasing encroachment also caused land shortage for the Gumz way of life. Therefore, it was believed that with the growing population and re-settlement of other ethnic groups shifting cultivation can not be a viable means of livelihood.

Gumz are becoming settled agriculturalist and demand the same services and resources as their Oromo neighbors. With the change in the ways of life, the attitude of Gumz towards land has changed. As they now understand the benefits and the values of land and their demand for land has increased. Residing in forest land, and in the regional state without land policy, make it possible to acquire unlimited amounts of land. The small sizes of the population also helped for large farm seizures. According to both my Oromo and Gumz informants, the Gumz had been giving land to Oromo (using such a social network like Michu, Harma Hodha or Abelige) for free for centuries; this kind of generosity has stopped with the introduction of settled agricultural activity. Rent and sharecropping have emerged as the new ways of economic relations between Oromo and Gumz or other highland migrants.

Traditions or reward

Case5: According to the tradition of the social network, a *richu* of someone's father has an obligation to help his *richu's* son in all means and at all possible times. Therefore, during the *Derg* regime, my informant (O10, age 45, in Anger Shenkora *qebelle*, (Beyoo) acquired land through such a network. He did what he was supposed to do at that time to make an official agreement. He prepared a feast and called the villagers and the elders of the village so as to witness the transfer. Afterward he became the legal owner of that land. He paid tax for more than a decade. Now, with the change in the political structure and the value of land the son of the benefactor started claiming the land. My informant took the matter to the courts, and won the case. But the defendant did not stop there. He took the case to the high court. Before the high court gave the verdict, however, the 2008 conflict erupted. And the defendant used the conflict as an opportunity and seized the land that my informant had left unattended during the clash fearing for his life.

Catch you

Case 6: One of My Oromo informants (O6, age 60; Anger Shenkora *qebelle* (Beyoo) was used to work as head of the *qebelle* during the *Derg*. He happened to acquire farm land, which he said was more than 12 hectares, when he was in office. The land was cleared by the Gumz, but not inhabited at the time. Owing to his power my informant took the land and started cultivating the land and paid tax on it (according to the tradition no one may take land that others have cleared). Now with the change in power politics and livelihood, the Gumz benefactor, who had cleared the land, claimed the land on which my informant lived for 20 years. My informant took the matter to the local *qebelle shengo* and the case is under review.

What happened soon after the 2008 conflict was on police investigation. My informant stated that a Gumz, who claimed that land, opened fire on the farm and the house. According to my informant he and his family migrated to Oromo *qebelles* in apprehension and when they learned of the involvement of the Federal

Police they went back just to clean the house. On the aftermath of their return, they were told by the Gumz that unless they evacuate the area, they will get killed and within five minutes their farm was on fire.

The competition on land among the two groups has been exacerbated by the fact that migrants from Gojjam intensively involved in sharecropping and land lease contract with both the Gumz and the Oromo. Gojjam migration towards Wallega Kifle Hagar is not a recent phenomenon. According to Tesfaye (2007:37) it started in 1940s and Assefa (1999) on the other hand refers us to the 1960s. Kloos and Aynalem (1988) put it between 1950s and 1970s. According to these scholars short distance movement of people has been a predominant trend until 1970s; afterwards the long distance became common.

4.3. Ethnic Federalism and the Inflow of Migrants towards Gumz Land

4.3.1 Oromo and Amhara Migration towards Gumz land

Population movement is a natural response of man for various changes related to land and the environment. Thousands of people migrated towards the study area from various district of Amhara and Oromia regional states, the greatest number of migrants came from Gojjam. East and West Wallega Zone also sent large numbers of Oromo, Amhara migrants from Gojjam and Wello.

Information of availability of large untouched forest land and abandoned state farms attracted people to move from different places towards these areas (Belojeganfoy and Sasiga Weredas) since the 1990s. After the closure of the farm and its final transfer to East Wallega Zone, private investors took a sizable amount of the farm, such involvement also attracted migrants both within and outside the regions in search of daily labour.

The reason for migrating towards Wallega or Gumz land varied; from environmental factors to personal problems. My informants from Gojjam presented land shortage and degradation as the main reason for their migration. Migrants from North Shewa also stated land degradation and flooding, while resettlers from Wello and Tigray said the state resettlement program, that brought them to Wallega and when their land in the resettlement area became less productive they moved to Gumz land in search of fertile land. Therefore Oromia, East and West Wallega in particular have been sources for both Oromo and other ethnic group migrants towards Gumz land in addition to the main source, Amhara Regional State particularly Gojjam. The quest for a better life and peer and kin pressures are also push factors that lead to the flight of Gojjam towards *Belojeganfoy and Sasiga Waredas*.

The migration of Oromo, which was started during the 19th century, to the lowland areas of Gumz had a seasonal character. People usually go down to the lowlying region during the rainy season and stay there until they harvest their products. Individuals' also fended to visit the lowland for hunting big game. Later with population growth and degradation of farm land the Oromo started to look for virgin land. It was during the *Derg* regime that the lowland was encroached by highland Wallega Oromo and Amhara from Wello and Gojjam, which is because of the regime extensive state farm and resettlement programs (which ends the seasonal character of Oromo migration towards the lowland). Wallega Oromo from different *Wareda* came looking for a job in the state farm.

The Oromo migration is a continuation of a long historical process of down slope seasonal farm related movement. This movement of people actually changed its seasonal nature through time with the development of state farm. The study area that is *Belojeganfoy Wareda* of Gumz and *Sasega Wareda* of Oromia lowland had been cleared for extensive state farms for more than two decades so it is out of the traditional seasonal migration since 1970s. The establishment of the state farm changed the attitude of the people, which had been influenced by geographical, historical and societal factors.

Pankhurst and Piguet (2004:2-3) illustrate such divergence between the highland and lowland as such that the highlands have benefited from more stable rainfall and have been favorable to agricultural activity than the lowland which is characterized by limited and variable rain fall, shallow soils and difficulty in water availability and human and livestock diseases, notably malaria and trypanosomiasis. The lowland is also characterized by its sparse settlements and shifting hoe cultivation. In contrast, in the highlands intensification of ox plough cultivation and dense settlements resulted in massive soil degradation. Historically, the highland developed land tenure system, allocating land use rights to individuals in contrast to the communal tenure over large areas of land in the lowlands. The long historical development of state formation in the highlands and the egalitarian and autonomous existence of the lowlands, until the late 19th century, which at the turn of the 19th century was encroached upon by highland settlers and the state alike.

The highland Amhara and Oromo regions have been under cultivation for centuries with little or no effort to resuscitate soil quality, which has resulted in extensive land degradation, in some cases beyond recovery. This situation has been further aggravated by rapid population growth. Ethiopian Highland Reclamation study cited in Daniel (1988) indicated that 50% of the highland area is significantly eroded and estimated that by the year 2010, 10 million highland farmers could lose their farm land because of degradation. The same study also indicates that 89% of the country population in 1984 lived in central and northern highlands (which comprise 38% of the country total area). Such a recognized need of highland settlers was attempted to be dealt with through resettlement programs and later in 1996/97 redistribution of land by the Amhara Regional administration.

Decades-long spontaneous migration of the highland settlers later expanded by state sponsored resettlement programs targeted western regions (highland and lowland) of the country, which include Wallega, Illubabur, and Gambella, in which Wallega took a major share (Daniel, 1988:148). Resettlers of Wallega area attracted a great number of other migrants from their countries of origin. According to Assefa (1999:127) large

numbers of migrants have been coming from Gojjam to Wallega since 1991. Like I mention in the previous paragraphs the reason for migration varies from environmental to personal problems, so here it is important to present stories of the migrant in the study area:

Case 7: A1 age, 35 was born and grew up in Gojjam, Mota area. He came to Anger Guten area of East Wallega zone, with his uncle (who came to Wallega in 1984/85 through a state sponsored resettlement program). Land shortage is the reason for him to follow his uncle to this region in 1999. He became *qanja* (share cropper) for Gojjam farmers for three years and work with Oromo as *qanja* from 1993-1995EC (2001-2003) which helped him in getting information about Gumz land and its fertility. In 2003/4 he became a *qanja* for Gumz and became productive and now he is no more a sharecropper. He is able to rent land from Gumz farmer.

A5 age 33, born and grew up in Gojjam He was living with his family even if he is married and has children. He has seven brothers; dividing the land to all was impractical and they work and share the product equally. When he was told that Wallega has extensive land that can be accessed easily, in 2002 he migrated to Wallega and is currently leading his life working as *qanja* to Oromo for the last six years.

Case 8: 140 Gojjam farmers and their families had cleared the forest and settled in one of the Gumz qebelle at the beginning of 1990s, which they planned to establish their own villages with in Gumz administration. At first, no one reacted towards this seizure of the land that both Gumz and Oromo have a claim on. But later the authorities of Gumz qebelles gave options for the group of Gojjam to be integrated with Gumz or leave the regional state. Most of them preferred the latter alternative and moved to the various weredas of East and West Wallega Zones. Some accepted and integrated with Gumz and they were given three to five hectares of land.

A 9 age 40 is one of the 140 resettled family, came to Gumz qebelle in 1998, who preferred to be integrated in to Gumz *qebelle*. He has a small plot of land that he was able to secure at that time. He came to Gumz area following his friends with his wife and a child. When his friends decided to leave Gumz village for Oromia he decided to stay in and settle wherever Gumz authority decided to resettle him. He had sent his wife and child to Gojjam in case things did not work out as he planned it to be but he was able to send money in the next harvest time and within two agricultural season he brought back all his family to the village even though now (after three years) because of the current conflict of Gumz and Oromo he regrets doing that.

Local communities and officials interviewed argued that it was the relative fertility of the lowland that attracts the Oromo from East and West Wallega Zone to migrate towards the lowland than shortage of land. Survey done by Food for Hungry International/FHI/ (international non governmental organization) indicates that termite manifestation and land degradation are prevalent in different Waredas of East Wallega Zone. Migrants from different Oromia *Waredas* and early migrants of Amhara had cleared the lowland in group and seized the land without the knowledge of the Gumz state. The recent Amhara migrants, however, integrated with Gumz settlers and were engaged in sharecropping or leasing of land.

These flows of migrants towards the forestland of Gumz have had a devastating impact on the environment. Clearing the forest to make ways for cultivation is customary practice in the region as a whole. The immigration of massive land hungry Gojjame and growing demand for food and cash crops has encouraged massive engagement in clearing forest land of the *Waredas*. According to my Oromo and Gumz informants the price hike in cereal production encouraged them to convert the forest land to agricultural land, which they say lucrative endeavors adding the good working behaviors and skill of Gojjame migrants. The Gumz argue the Oromo and the Gojjame are responsible the destruction and the Oromo on the other hand blame the Gumz and the Gojjame.

4.3.1.1 Gumz and Oromo Relations with Environment

Human activity is the most important factor in altering environmental relationships of a society while the environment imposes its constraints on human adaptation. The Gumz use very simple technology in their effort to exploit and adapt to their environment. The abundance of land and the low population pressure on vital resources makes it possible for the Gumz community to engage in shifting cultivation.

According to Moran (1982:268), shifting cultivation has the advantage of protecting soil from erosion and leaching. It also reduces fertilizer and pesticide cost and creates new forests that supply a higher net yield. Moran argued in favor of the virtues of the system based on the fact that the maximum biomass is attained within eight years after the field is abandoned. Burning the forest also allows new pasture to rejuvenate and increases its biomass; improve soil fertility, eases work in the field, also in hunting (fires are often controlled by firebreaks surrounding the plot to be burned).

The Gumz have a close attachment to the natural environment, they view the natural environment as a subsistence endowment with sacred meaning. Their knowledge of the natural environment is closely linked with their belief systems. They believe that natural resources are a gifts, blessing and creation of *Yamba* (the supreme deity), who is the source of life and livelihood to the past, present and future generation. Cutting trees without spiritual justification results in a curse. Exploiting the earth without following and exposing or clearing its clothing resulted in retribution by spirit of the earth marked by decreasing fertility and yields, drying up water points and dry temperature (Wolde-Selassie 2004:96-97, Interviews with Gumz elders at *Belojganfoy qebelle*).

The Oromo, on the other hand were settled agriculturalists and known for their conservationist outlook. According to Kassam and Gemetchu (1994:90) traditionally among the Oromo cultivation is restricted to highland that surrounds permanent settlements, it was forbidden to cultivate in the lowland where soil is more vulnerable to erosion. Trees also play an important role in Oromo life. There are strict laws limiting their use. Vegetation is also protected by strong cultural beliefs. Forestland such as

Dukkan, HoraaBunaa, Bobbi, Guuto and Suukko used to be protected and some of them were venerated, particularly Dukkan (Assefa 1999:97).

The Oromo of Wallega being fond of honey make use of every opportunity of hanging a beehive. Honey gathering is important in economic and spiritual aspects. The various types of honey are named after the plant in which beehives were hung in, Badessa, and Ebbica tress are some to mention. *Waredas* like *Sasiga*, *Mendi*, *Naggo Ammuma*, and *Limu* are notable for their honey production (Assefa 1999:98; Abebe 2002:134; Oromo informants).

It is very difficult to establish which group is destroying the forest. The Gumz argue that they are more pro-environment than the neighboring Oromo community. According to the Gumz Oromo community are destructive to the natural vegetation and the land resources. One of my Gumz informants described Oromo relations with the land as similar to that of a termite to land. Oromo community and also Oromo authorities on the contrary accused Gumz of massive engagement in charcoal and fire wood commercial activities, which is destructive. But both groups are in agreement that the Gojjame are more destructive than the others.

4.3.2 The Link between Migration and Conflict

Gumz authorities and local community treat the Amhara and Oromo migrants differently. They welcome Amhara migrants and very much reserved when it comes to Oromo migrants. According to my Gumz key informant, the Amhara particularly of Gojjam migrants want land only to cultivate and support their livelihood, not for political game like the Oromo migrants. "The Gojjame live with us, in our village, they have good working culture, and they are here for work. They showed us how to plough, we did not know the proper way of ox plough until they came to live with us. They made it possible for us to see what we have never dreamt of. They produced more than 30 quintals of *boobie*/ sorghum/ per hectare of land. They changed our financial and material possessions. They are trustworthy" (G2 age 56).

The Gumz give whatever amount of land that the Gojjame want either through lease or sharecropping arrangement. There are three types of share cropping arrangement depending on the type of land and the required input. If the land is virgin and the owner of the land, that is a Gumz provide his Gojjame *qanja* with food, shelter, crop, land and donkey, the *qanja*, Gojjame farmer will take one in four ($\frac{1}{4}$) quintals of the produce. If the Gumz provides him with food (uncooked cereal or other crops) which the *qanja* prepare for himself and land, donkey and crop the *qanja* will take one in three ($\frac{1}{3}$). The other arrangement is that the Gumz provide only land and the produce will be shared equally. Oromo farmers do not take any of these arrangements, they only want to lease or free land that they used to enjoy before Gojjame involvement.

An Oromo can work as *qanja* for another Oromo but not for Gumz, according to my Oromo informants being a *qanja* to Gumz will be the most disgraceful work that an Oromo will take. Such a chauvinistic attitude on the part of the Oromo made their competition for land with the Amhara settlers' strenuous. The Gumz prefer to give land in any way possible for Gojjame for various reasons, the most important of which is for the economic benefits that they deliver. According to my Gumz informant Oromos are termed as lazy and arrogant. Therefore, giving land for the Oromo means looking for lesser benefit or basically making ways for future claimants of the plot. This attitude of Gumz plus the change that the agricultural activity of the Gojjame brought to both the Gumz and the Gojjames livelihood inflame jealousy amongst neighboring Oromos. The relations between Oromo and Gojjame became one of contentious and a partnership. Gojjames also work as *qanjas* to Oromo. All interviewed Gojjame first know Wallega and work for Oromo before they get to know and live with Gumz.

According to my Gojjame informants Oromo community hates the Gojjames who work for Gumz and call them Gumz's donkeys. They also accused them of inciting conflict and providing Gumz with arms and ammunitions. My Oromo informants accused Gojjames of supporting Gumz in cleansing the Oromo people. Gojjames are known to love carrying weapons and that they transfer to Gumz communities. They are considered as smugglers of arms in the region. One Gojjame is currently in federal prison accused of such an

activity. But all my Gojjame informants rejected such an accusation, which they categorized as jealousy on the parts of Oromo community. Gumz informants have also the same attitude towards Oromo's accusation of Gojjame, which they said an act of abomination to their development and positive changes. Oromos also recognized the fact that Gumz livelihood has changed with the coming of Gojjame.

Consequently, during Gumz-Oromo conflict the Gojjame were targeted by both groups. For the Gumz "red" is "red" be they Amhara, Oromo or Shinasha, they are all deceitful. On the other hand, the Oromo hated the Gojjame for both historical and economic reasons. Mass migration of Gojjame in 1990s and mass involvement and domination in Gumz economic activities revived a forgotten historical hatred, which led to harassments and killing of Gojjame.

What made the Gumz collaborate with Amhara with whom they established contact very recently (in 1990s), rather than the long standing neighbors the Oromo is mainly fear of domination than the economic benefit that the Amhara currently provides. Since the establishment of regional states the relations between Gumz and Oromo has been one of a suspicious and contentious:

የቀደመውን ፍልሰት ተከትሎ በፍጥነት ቁጥሩ ከፍተኛ የሆነ ህዝብ በተከታታይ እንዲሠፍር የማድረግና ብዙሃን በመሆን በአካባቢው ያለውን የጉሙዝ ህዝብ አናሳ ነህ፤ እዚህ መሬት የለህም በማለትና የተለያዩ ጫና በመፍጠር ከአካባቢው እንዲሸሽ ያደርጋሉ። ከዚህ በተጨማሪም አካባቢውን በርከት ብለው ከተቆጣጠሩ በኋላ ቀበሌ ይከለልልን፤ ቀበሌውም ወደ ኦሮሚያ አጎራባች ወረዳ ይከለልልን፤ ግብር የምንከፍለው ለኦሮሚያ ነው የሚሉና የመሳሰሉ አመለካከቶች ህገወጥ ፍልሰቱንና ሰፊውን ተከትለው የሚከሰቱ ከእርሻ መሬትና የተፈጥሮ ደን ውድመት በላይም የአካባቢውን የጉሙዝ ህዝብ ህልውና ስጋት ላይ የሚጥሉ በመሆናቸው በሁለቱ አጎራባች ነዋሪዎች መካከል መጠራጠርን ፈጥሯል። በተለይም በ1999 ዓ.ም በክልላችን በያሶ ወረዳና በኦሮሚያ ሀሮሊ.ሙ ወረዳ ቀጥተኛ የግጭት መነሻ ሲሆን በ2000 ዓ.ም ደግሞ በካማሽ ሆንና በኦሮሚያ የምስራቅና ምዕራብ ወለጋ አጎራባች አካባቢዎች ግጭት መሠረታዊ መንስኤ (root cause) ሆኗል። (Gumz study report:2008)

following the the development of the former migration they sent a large number of migrants, so that they became a majority and by telling the Gumz that they are minority and that they have no land to lay a claim on and by putting other

pressures they will force the Gumz out of the land. Then they will ask to establish administrative structure, that is their own *qebelle* and they will demand such a structure to be administered by Oromia Wareda. They will demand to pay tax to the Oromo Wareda. Such trends which follow the illegal migration will endanger, more than the damage that this migrant will do to the land and natural forest resources, the lives of the Gumz community and it has created mistrust on the relationship of the two neighbors. Particularly it became the direct cause of the 2007 conflict of *Yaso and Haro Limu Waredas*, Gumz and Oromo Waredas respectively. It has also become the main reason for the 2008 Gumz and Oromo conflict of Kamashi and East wallega zones.

It is difficult to assume federalism without the existence of territorially distinct groups. What makes the Ethiopian experience challenging is the heavy emphasis on ethnicity and the fact that the various ethnic groups of Ethiopians do not live in the places where the majority of members of their ethnic group reside, for a number of historical, environmental, socio-cultural and political reasons (Assefa, 2006:135). The development of national consciousness of Gumz community, through the change in the political restructuring (ethnic federalism) and involvement in the politics of the country, in the study area led to the expression of antipathy against all non-indigenous communities including Oromo neighbors and Amhara settlers. The civil service and other economic activities of the study area in particular and the regional state in general predominated held by Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups. Starting from the mid-1990s Gumz communities and elite alike very much wanted and even tried to drive out the non-indigenous community from their region. There is widespread concern among Gumz elites on the trends of such migration. According to the Gumz officials if their population numbers fall below a majority the autonomy that the four nationality groups currently enjoying will be at risk.

According to Reuveny (2005:5) there are four reasons that link migration to conflict. I found that one of the reasons that he forwarded fits with my finding even if he used them to indicate conflict between nation states, he state that:

When environmental migrants and residents belong to different ethnic groups, the arrival of many newcomers over a relatively short period of time may upset a precarious ethnic balance. If migrants have brethren in the destination, residents may consider the combined bloc a threat. Host countries may fear separatism, and migrants may attempt to reunify with their home country, thus promoting aggressive nativist responses. Environmental migration situations involving long-standing ethnic disputes are likely to be more prone to conflict than other situations

The 1995 Federal constitution stipulates the right of citizens to live and work anywhere in the country (Art.32), but the practice is different from what the constitution stipulates. Practically ethnic groups, who reside out side of the majority of their ethnic group reside are considered as an outsiders and they are not allowed to participate in economic and political issues of the region. Though the constitution stipulate the right of every citizen to vote and to be elected, practically, one needs to be a member of one of the ethnic group that the Regional State constitute of, which indicates the over emphasis on the self rule rather than the shared one or a particular ethnic background than the Ethiopianness.

According to Ratnapala (1999:113) federal principles are the direct opposite to the one that is implemented in the regional states of Ethiopia. First, it is designed to accommodate all ethnic identities in the country's political system. Second, the Federal system is designed to create a political sphere in which all citizens are respected in all regional states of the country. Third, the Federal system of the country strive for economic development and integration of the country by ensuring free mobility of all individuals throughout the country and creating intercultural relationships among the ethnic groups in the country. The over emphasis on ethnicity made it difficult for the Gumz and the Oromo to work on economic, and sociocultural integration.

4.4 Availability of Arms and Ammunition

It is clear that the culture of the Gumz and the Oromo communities display strong military values. Great social and psychological value was and still is attached to a wide range of signs reflecting military achievement. Gumz's, tough and mobile life style developed rugged individuals, experts in the handling of weapons, which seems to give much value to accusations of arms. According to my Gumz informants Gumz buy arms to mark every birth of son and whenever they marry, which is related to their adaptation system. As hunting was part of their livelihood, owning arms and heroism is directly related to their system of adaptation. Gumz males decorate themselves accordingly on success in hunting big game. To mention some: one who kills a lion hangs *kolba gumba*, a white ornament made of teeth of Warthog and hippopotamus, to his ears (Abeya 2001:104).

The Oromo are known fighters and hunters and some writers Bahrey cited in Taddess (1984) refered them as born fighters. According to Taddess 'the merit of killing an enemy and a large animal is still highly hounered among Guji Oromo and they are ready to do so whenever they get the opportunity'(Taddess 1984: 359). The *Mecca* Oromo of the study area seem to have chaged a lot because of the change in both political and economic structure of their country. But still military skill has great value among the communities.

According to Gumz informants during the *Derg* regime the local communities secure quite a good number of arms both through direct government supply, to fight against OLF, and through illicit trades. After the fall of the *Derg* the ex-solders became the main suppliers, according to my Oromo informants, Gumz were able to acquire Klashnikov, which they used both in 1994 and 2008 conflicts. At the end of 1990s, the Gojjames joined the supplier side of arms and ammunition (O1age 60:O2age 47; O7age 50; O10age 43). After the 2008 conflict, the Federal Police officers massively engaged in disarming the two communities. It was reported that the police was able to collect in a month 166 and 26 arms from Gumz and Oromo communities, respectively (Minstry of Federal Affairs report, 2008).

CHAPTER FIVE

5 CONFLICTS BETWEEN GUMZ AND OROMO AND THEIR SETTLEMENT

As noted earlier, the Ethiopian constitution asserts that ethnic federalism or redrawing the states boundaries along linguistic criteria is one way to resolve ethnic tension that persists in the history of the country. According to Assefa (2006:138) ethnic federalism presented a better political instrument for the management of inter and intra ethnic relations and conflicts. However, it also appears that inter-ethnic tensions and conflict have escorted the federalization practice. Asnake (2004:55) outlined three ethnic conflicts that are related to the federalization of Ethiopia. The first one is inter-ethnic competitions and conflicts in multiple identity regional states, second, tensions in majority-minority relations: and the third one is problems relating to delineation of regional boundaries.

For the last 17 years Gumz and Oromo ethnic groups experienced more than three violent encounters. The main causes of such encounters have been described in the preceding chapter. This chapter, will discuss the triggering factors of the 1994 and 2008 Gumz-Oromo conflict, and look into the regional and federal government's interventions.

5.1 Conflict and its Aftermath

The 1994 conflict was the first of its kind between the two groups after the 1952 Abba Xoonee war. There are two versions of the triggering factor: the Gumz and Oromo versions. Gumz sources claimed that Gumz individuals, whose mother was raped by an Oromo, mistakenly killed an old Oromo lady, on 25th of September, 1994, when they tried to kill the perpetrator. Conversely, the Oromo sources claimed that the Gumz killed an Oromo member of *Bello Central* village and refused to give the corpse. And Oromo villagers were furious by this act and the Gumz added to it by killing another person. The Gumz version seems trustworthy, because the Oromo also admit the fact that the Gumz woman was raped. The man who allegedly killed by the Gumz is a story that happened long time ago. The Oromo villagers take the killing of a woman to members of OPDO military force, rather than that of a man that they claim to be killed by Gumz.

The Oromo community had taken this matter to members of OPDO military force, and they reacted by arresting 11 members of Gumz zonal and *Wareda* officials. The officials were on their way to the *Wareda* town *Soge* for a meeting and when they reached *Bello Central* of Oromo village (one of the villages of *Handura Bello qebelle*, which is the former state farm center) all of them detained. These members of OPDO military force did not stop there. They arrested elders and a head of the *Wareda* administrator going to the *Wareda* town *Soge* by passing their jurisdiction.

Therefore, the Gumz assumed and were also told by their elites that their freedom is at risk and that their future falls on the hands of the Oromo and all the promises of self-administration and the benefits of it is gone astray. Then, on the 28th of September 1994 in the morning war against Oromo summoned. Oromo villages were attacked, in the morning, members of OPDO military force and also securities of the state farm were not able to contain the Gumz force, as the famous Gumz arrows were at work. The Gumz were able to control the village and also decided to change their *Wareda* from *Soge* town to *Bello Central*, to the new conquered land, which they, have a historical claim on. 58 Oromo were killed and more than 30 wounded, hundreds were displaced to different *qebelles* and to the Zonal town of East Wallega, Neqemte. A week later the TGE military force arrived and established the status quo, which the Gumz forced to go to their town, *Soge*.

It was decided by the two states to establish joint committees that work towards peace and mutual benefits and development. The members of the joint committee were the two zonal administrators, police and administration and security officers. Another joint committee was also established to look into the matter and identify the damage and the perpetrators. Both the regional states and the transitional government did not respond towards the findings and recommendation by the joint committee. According to my Oromo informants the report was discarded and those who participated in the fact investigation were later transferred to other *Waredas*.

The joint committee members of the two zones started to squabble on issues like the meeting place, and the medium of the meeting. The Oromo wanted every meeting to be held in their administrative areas and the Gumz demanded rotation of the place, they also demanded Amharic to be used in meetings. Such type of disagreement took much of the time during the initial period.

After solving issues of place and language, they engaged in looking at issues of contention. Almost all of the agendas of the committee meeting were focused on issues of boundary dispute. The boundary issue had more importance to the Gumz than to the Oromo, so members of east and west Wallega zone most of the time relaxed and attended meetings without any preparation, which the Gumz members interpreted as a strategy on the Oromo side to buy time for their population to dominate the Gumz *Waredas*. Members of east Wallega zone presented issue like Ethio- Eritrean war, to avoid the boundary issues at hand(GE2; GE4;GE5).These and the attitudes and biases of the two regional state members made the relations of the joint committee more complicated.

Gumz members accused Oromo members looking down on them and rejecting all the ideas that they presented without even coming up with alternative ideas. According to Gumz members the Oromo zonal officials sent to the meetings individuals that have no prior knowledge of the matter and people who do not have any negotiating power, or ordinary civil servants. This was also taken by the Gumz as contempt on the part of Oromo officials (GE2; GE4; GE5). The Oromo members on the other hand criticized the Gumz for they lacked self-confidence and even commented that the historical marginalization of the Gumz community contributed greatly for their insecurity (OE1; OE2).

After the 1994 conflict, the relations of Gumz and Oromo became at odds. Dispute between individuals began to be the concern of the villagers or at large the *qabelle* members. Therefore, the regional states agreed to expand the presence of joint committee at the *Wareda* and *qebelle* levels. At *qebelle* level elders of the *qebelle* became the dominant members. The meeting of the *qebelle* joint committee decided to be attended

every week, which was not practical as most of the elders had to walk more than five hours to attend such meetings, and return to their home most of the time disappointed either by the agenda, which are usually set by the *qebelle* or *Wareda* officials, or the nonappearance of their counterparts and most of the time *Wareda* officials. The *Wareda's* and *qebelle's* joint committee members' relations were also a replica of the zonal joint committee that is full of disagreement and prejudices.

In 2007, the relations between the two groups in the study area became tense than ever before. Five Oromo committee members were killed by Gumz in Yaso *Wareda* of Kamashi zone (outside of the study area) on may 20th, 2007. According to Oromo and Gumz informants, on the meeting held in Oromia prior to the killing, the joint committee members decided to go to the village that Oromo community presented claim on ownership of the land, which the Gumz granted for investement. When the Oromo committee members reached the village their Gumz counterparts were not there so they decided to wait. After some time a group of armed Gumz came and killed them all. Then the zonal officials retaliated by sending armed force, police and special force and according to Gumz sources 11 Gumz were killed (Gumz and Oromo informants ;Gumz study report 2008:14).

This event forced the Ministry of Federal Affairs to get involved in a matter the ministry preferred to be indifferent. With the Federal Affairs mediating role the two groups agreed to solve the problem by themselves and also agreed to study the main causes of their conflict, identify the perpetrator and re-settle the displaced. Each state sent five members to form a study group. The group conducted study from March to May 2008. They started analyzing the data they had collected. It was then that they disagreed on terms. They have different versions on the term that led to their divergence. According to Gumz committee members, the difference began when the Gumz stressed that the basic cause of the conflict is federalism and the relative fertility of land resource on the Gumz sides but the Oromo members rejected this by saying that the cause is establishment of dual administrative structure and the acquisition of sizable land by few Gumz community (informants GE6; GE7).

The Oromo committee members, on the other hand, stated the disagreement emerged because the Oromo forwarded referendum to resolve the border issue. They also stressed that Gumz committee members resigned when they knew that the findings implicated them (informants OE1 OE2). Therefore, they both decided to do it on their own. At the same time conflict was fueling up within the local communities, particularly between *Angere Meti* (Gumz *qebelle*) and *Hora Waata* (Oromo *qebelle*).

The violent conflict was initiated after two members of Gumz were attacked by the Oromo in a village called *Mender Arate* on the 4th of May 2008 caused by a quarrel that aroused in work place where they both were working as loaders. . The local Oromo community and Sasiga *Wareda* administrators took the attacked Gumz to Neqemte hospital and arrested the attackers. When rumors of the release of the attackers from detention reached Gumz village; the villagers were infuriated by such an act and wanted to revenge. *Belojganfoy Wareda* administrators immediately took the attacked Gumz from *Neqemte* hospital to *Soge* town without the knowledge of the relatives, with a pretext that they did not get appropriate medical treatment, and this made things worse. Small group of armed Gumz villagers went to *Mender Arate* but then Gumz elders came to rescue. The elders promised to the villagers to bring the news of the attacked and to hold discussion with Gumz and Oromo officials about the perpetrators.

The elders did what they promised and the relatives knew where and how their boys were. The authorities also agreed to discuss the matter with the communities but they did not come at the proposed meeting day, which set off the Gumz community and started preparing for attack and they killed according to the Ministry of Federal Affairs report 98 Oromo villagers.

According to the Ministry's report, and Oromo informants, an organized group of Gumz (200 in number) escorted by trained and experienced demobilized military personnel of the *Derg* and discharged members of Federal Police,(members who left the force because of disciplinary problems) launched an attack on May 18, 2008. My Oromo informants

even mentioned that this group was sponsored by other regional state, which they did not want to disclose, and used Abaay gorge as their basis.⁶ Gumz community members and elites alike opposed such accusation, and they insisted that there were no organized force; the attackers were settlers of the two *qebelles* (Anger Meti and Anger Shenkora). They admitted on the other hand that former members of *Derg* soldiers and federal police members, local officials and militias were taking part. According to my Gumz informants, it was because the Gumz resisted the fierce fight launched by Oromia Special Police Force that the Oromo constructed such a story.

Starting from 20th of May 2008, Oromia Special forces retaliated by killing 77 Gumz who settled inside and outside of the actual conflict area. According to my Gumz, Oromo and Amhara informants, the force that supported by the local militia and community massively attacked Gumz settlers. Such a charge also presented in the Ministry of Federal Affairs report which indicated the involvement of the special force and the tactic they used to disarm the villagers. So this force supported by the local community launched its attack in different settlement areas for about 10 days. My Oromo key informant (who were in Neqemte on the 18th of May, when the conflict started and he left Neqemte in 22nd of May to check up on his families who were at the time reside in Arjo when he heard the news that the conflict spread towards other *qebelles*). He saw the force mobilized from Neqemte and when he was in Arjo he also recognize the fact that the force beaten and killed the families of the former Regional Vice President (Mekonnen Golasa /PhD/), who is accused almost by my entire Oromo interviewees as the architect of both the 1994 and 2008 conflicts.

Oromo zonal and regional official that I interviewed denied the involvement of the special force and said that the Ministry's report is erroneous. According to the officials the region formally discarded the report in a meeting held at the Prime Minister's Office. According to the officials, the report that they will going to accept is only that come from

⁶ The regional state that the Oromo informants accused of supporting the Gumz is the Amhara National Regional State, it is a serious accusation but to my understanding such an accusation might arise from the cordial relations that the states have achieved through the year. The Gumz had been in conflict with the Amhara in the 1990s in Metekele Zone, but they are able to mend their difference and work towards peaceful cooperation

the Federal Police, claiming that they had called for Federal Police not for Federal Affairs. According to proclamation No.359/2003 federal intervention can be requested by the state council or highest executive organ of the region to the Prime Minister through the Ministry of Federal Affairs (Article 4/2003). The proclamation also states in article five sub article one, that "the Prime Minister shall deploy the Federal Police or defense force, or both to arrest the deteriorating security situation taking in to consideration the gravity of the situation. The force to be deployed shall be under the command of the concerned federal organ:" I learnt that the Federal police do not have any intention to compile report for public consumption and the report compiled by the Ministry comprised information collected by the Federal Police.

All these offensives and counter-offensives resulted in the killing of 98 Oromo and 77 Gumz villagers and displacements of 49,588 Oromo people and 18,630 Gumz (Federal Affairs Report, 2008:10-14). The affliction of other ethnic groups is neither reported by the two regional states nor the Ministry does (the Ministry's report indicate the existence of abuse on other ethnic groups). But my informants told me that others particularly the Gojjame, mainly those living with and working for the Gumz, were also targeted by the Oromo. I was told by an Oromo who is residing in *Anger Central (Oromo village)*, that more than five Gojjame's were killed and buried by Oromo, which the Federal Police exhumed.

The Federal Police arrived on the third day of the conflict, but unable to contain it immediately. The conflict continued for ten more days after the force had arrived in the area. When they finally managed to contain and fully secured peace in the two zones, they started to facilitate for the two regional states to form a committee and work towards peace and security. They launched full scale investigation and arrested a number of Oromo and Gumz local people and *qebelle's* and *Wareda's* officials (Gumz and Oromo informants; Federal Affairs report, 2008). They arrested according to the report 333 people who were suspected of involving in the conflict, which lists *Wareda* officials, *qebelle* officials, Militias, Civil servants, farmers, students of the two *Wareda* and police forces of Belojganfoy *Wareda*, but not Oromia police and special force. At the same

time, they worked with the regional committee towards the resolution of conflict through traditional ways and by organizing peace conferences.

The intervention of the Federal institutions was a firefighting work which could not sustainably address the core reasons for violent conflicts. Federal institutional intervention was demanded since 2002 by both regional states long before the actual conflicts, but not materialized (Appendix 1). The report that compiled by Oromia Regional State also put the unreceptive response of the ministry as a reason for prolonging the conflict between the two regions (Oromia study 2008:70).

The federal force involved in disarming the villagers. Even if the force believed that it effectively disarmed the area, both groups afraid of each other and especially Oromo villagers afraid that the force only collected what the Gumz confessed to own. This force also had conducted criminal investigation that resulted in the lawsuit of 147 Gumz and one Amhara. This process also created some contention between the groups that both groups claimed those who predominantly involved in initiating the conflict were not behind bars. According to Gumz informants, police had arrested Gumz authorities and ordinary people alike but failed to do so with the Oromo, which instill anger and dismay amongst the Gumz. They also developed suspicion on the very structure that they believed liberate them from domination and slavery. Gumz community and elite alike started questioning where their places in the federal structure. Gumz elite believed that because they are an affiliate to EPRDF they have secondary status than their EPRDF members of Oromo neighbors.

5.2. The Re-institution of Customary Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

Both the Gumz and the Oromo have customary dispute resolution mechanisms even if their values and applicability have reduced through time, especially after *Derg* massive involvement in villagers' lives. Gumz community's relative autonomy than their Oromo neighbors allowed them to use their customary dispute resolution for inter-ethnic and intra-clan and lineage level conflicts.

Mangima is the customary conflict resolution mechanism of the Gumz. The Oromo also have similar mechanism called *Gumaa Araarsa*. In these institutions elders play a predominant role, their decisions is binding hence the reconciliation will be concluded with ceremonial oath. To show that they fully accept the decision of the elders, the conflicting parties have to come with the sheep that is going to be killed in the river side, where the ceremony usually commences, so that the two groups touch each others hand with blood. And afterwards the killed sheep will be thrown into a river with the intention that it will take away all the feeling of remorse and indignation. The touching of the hands with blood symbolizes that they no longer gripped in the blood feud. They swear by burying a different type of insects, which symbolizes that what happend to the insect also happens to those who violate the agreement. They swear using grass, fire, cereals, and bullet; the procedure will be concluded by breaking a radius and swearing: "If we violate the agreement, let us be killed, our bones being broken in the same way."

The initiative and support of the Ministry made it possible for the two groups to organize such customary ways of reconciliation in different *qebelles* even if the results seem to be delicate. Both groups suspected the other of violating its vow; this suspicion is also surrounded by rumors.

When I reached *Anger Meti* (Gumz *qebelle*), where the conflict started, on December 25th 2008 that means after five months of the reconciliation the two group still not crossed each other's boundary. I was also forced to take other roots, which took me three days instead of two hours walking distance, in order to get to Oromo *qebelle* that is Hora Watta. It is also the same for Oromo living in Hora Watta. The communities: Gumz, Oromo, and Amhara that are living in Gumz *qebelle* did not want to cross to Hora Watta and no one was willing to take the risk of taking me there too. While I was there the Gumz were expecting attack from the Oromo side.

My Gumz informants told me that, the ceremony was not held in a proper manner since the Oromo elders did not bring in the sheep expected of them, symbolizing they were not interested in the reconciliation. As they (the Oromo) are mostly affected by the

conflict according to my Oromo informants' reconciliation need to be done more, at the village levels. The village level reconciliation has to do with those directly affected by it. Such kind of uneasiness appears in all *qebelles* of the two Wareda, even if the degree varies exceedingly. In recognition of such facts the regional states ordered the *qebelle* level committees to work on village level reconciliation, which is not materialized yet.

on 13th of February 2009 I was taking part in one of the *qebeelle* level committee meeting in Hora Watta, people particularly elders and *qebelle* officials from Gumz and Oromo were in attendance except two but very important *qebelles* (which are members of the committee) leaders and elders and also the two *Wareda* representatives. The attendant waited for them and later decided to start meeting without them. The meeting started with prayer. The prayer was presided by both Gumz and Oromo preachers. The agenda was presented by the head of the *qebelle* (on issues of displacees, on issues of rumors, on theft and security) but the local people complained about the agenda items saying that the meeting was an important event for both Gumz and Oromo communities since it was the first time after the May 2008 conflict that such a local level meeting organized. So according to the communities concerned the needed agenda was reconciliation and how to build mutual relations.

What happened was that the committee leaders, the agenda setters, did not understand or know what the community wanted. People in Oromia and Gumz *qebelles* very much wanted to have reconciliation at the village level and so that they will be able to resume normal life, which is to go to their farm without fearing for their life. Such disagreement on the agenda and the question of implementation of any decision in the absence of the two district representatives, the meeting looked like a child game in the eyes of the community which they decided to abort.

Resolving the conflict and the mechanism to do it came from the state, particularly from the federal institution, that is from the Ministry of Federal Affairs, neither the local state nor the local community initiate the customary dispute resolution as a way forward. As I indicated in this chapter both the local community and the states not committed to make

this work. For example the local elders did not bring with them the sheep that was expected of them. The local elders or community alike did not discussed on the issues concerned. Therefore it is difficult for both group concerned to reach consciences on what happened unless and other wise they are able to discuss about it. All the conference that was held in the regions is a public relations work, which had no meaning in the local lifes.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

Since 1991 federalism has been presented as a way of managing ethnic relationship and ethnic conflict even if it's not equally accepted. There exists an opposite view that ethnic federalism will inevitably strengthen rather than minimize ethnic conflict. The federalization process has been also escorted by both intra and inter-ethnic tension, and conflict. Ethnic conflicts that are related to the federalization of Ethiopia are categorized by Asnake (2004:55) as: inter-ethnic competitions and conflicts in multiple identity regional state, tensions in majority- minority relations, and problem relating to delineation of regional boundaries.

The 1995 constitution stipulates the right of every citizen to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence⁷ and also the right to vote and to be elected without any discrimination based on color, race, nation, nationality, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion or other status⁸. The knowledge of a local language became the criterion on a candidacy by the 1995 proclamation no 111⁹. In spite of these constitutional stipulations a more primordial classification is embraced in politics of group entitlement. This practice was also validated by the EPRDF notion of group empowerment. Other citizens of different ethnic background or those who do not like to associate themselves with any ethnic group (mixed origin) have practically no place in regional states that are different from their mother states. The crisis in Gambela, Benishangul-Gumuz, Harari

⁷ Article 32(1) the federal constitution states any Ethiopian or foreign national lawfully in Ethiopia has, within the national territory, the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence, as well as the freedom to leave the country at any time he wishes to.

⁸ Article 38(1) states that every Ethiopian national, without any discrimination based on color, race, nation, nationality, sex, language, religion, political or other option or other status, has the following rights:

- a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly and through freely chosen representatives;
- b) On the attainment of 18 years of age, to vote in accordance with law;
- c) To vote and to be elected at periodic elections to any office at any level of government: elections shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.

⁹ Article 38 of proclamation 111/1995 stating the criteria on candidacy

- a) Any person registered as an elector shall be eligible for candidacy where he lives
- b) Is versed in vernacular of the national region of his intended candidature.

People, the SNNPRS and partly in Oromia regional states, are the reflection of such contradiction between practice and constitutional stipulation (Assefa 2006:276-285; Dereje 2006:215-217; Asnake 2004:61-62; Assefa 1999:119; Young 1998:199; Abbink 1997:171-172).

Federal System of administrative structure needs a territorially defined diversity. Therefore, the Ethiopian constitution requires regional state to be territorially defined in order for them to be granted mother state or local government. But it has not been easy to trace the boundaries of such territories since there have been considerable population movements in many parts of the country, which became a reason for violent conflict between regional states. The findings of this research also indicate that Gumz and Oromo have territorial claim over the former Wallega province, which is now divided in to Benshangul-Gumz and Oromia regional states. They both argue that they are the first settlers of the land and tell each other to go out from the area. Because of the intricate nature of the settlement patterns of the two groups drawing clear territorial demarcation could be a difficult undertaking.

There existed an over emphasis over self-rule than common Ethiopian identity from the setting up of the federal restructuring. Such emphases over self-rule and territoriality make the relations between Gumz and Oromo one of apprehensive and divergence. It is historical fact that their relations were highly asymmetrical regarding access to political power and economic resources, even if collaboration in socio-economic spheres existed for a long time. Scholars like Kymlicka argued that in multinational federations the lived experience of inter group relations is not often taken as a model of constructive inter cultural exchange. It came to light in response to the claims of sub state national identities, but it also is inclined to strengthen and institutionalize those identities, and to reinforce the sense of boundaries (geographical and cultural) between groups. Hence the system tends to reduce intercultural contact over time. At worse, the relations between different groups are tarnished with feeling of antipathy and frustration (Kymlicka 2006:43).

Gumuz elites developed a sense of insecurity about being able to hold on to the self-rule, that they acquired through EPRDF led ethnic restructuring, without being dominated by the contending Oromo groups. Such an apprehension on the said of Gumuz made them to mobilize their community to defend their right of self-rule. To this end, they use historical memories of the past. In these respects, Markakis, in his situational viewpoint based in the context of the Horn of Africa, concludes that: 'an ethnic group as a political actor is a product of the situation, not of history, and what mobilizes its members to take collective action is concern for future prospects, not an atavistic attachments to the past' (Markakis 1994: 236).

The finding of this research indicates that the Regions particularly the study area is experiencing what Asnake termed as tensions in majority- minority relations, it is similar but not the same as Asnake describe it to be (what Asnake and other scholars talking about minority groups who are living outside of what their ethnic group inhabit). Here Gumuz and Oromo are separate entities with their respective states since 1990s. Before that Gumuz were a minority under the Wallega Regional Administrative structure. The 1995 Constitution stipulate that 'states shall be delimited on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned'. According to Gumuz officials such an article does not guaranty the autonomy of a minority group like Gumuz. They assert that if their population number is below a certain number when compared to the 'outsider' Oromo in this case, the self government of Gumuz will sized to exist. Therefore the assertion is that the constitution did not have any guarantee for multiethnic state (minority group) like Benshangul-Gumuz, where none of the members are a majority to establish their own Mother state like Oromo or Amhara states.

Therefore, putting a check on Oromo's encroachment of land and other resource is taken as one way of defending the self-rule. According to Gumuz political elites, if their population numbers fall below a certain number the autonomy that the four nationality group currently enjoying will be at risk. The increasing Oromo population in the region is considered by Gumuz as a threat to the regional autonomy, as they are assumed to be a means to an end to their leaders' expansionist strategy. The Oromo eliets and ordinary

communities alike argue on issues of ownership over the former Wallega Administrative Region on historical basis. Such a claim is further exacerbated by the activities of the two political elites, they massively engaged in mobilizing the local community against each other and also involved in planting dual administrative infrastructures. The ambiguous nature of the administrative limit makes it possible for the two groups to involve in such an activity.

Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State and the research area in particular, is the center of attraction and contention, as it is endowed with natural resources. Information of availability of large untouched forest land and abandoned state farms attracted people to move from different places towards these areas (Belojeganfoy and Sasiga Weredas) since the 1990s. Migrants from different *Waredas* of Wallega and from Amhara particularly of Amhara from Gojjam compete over Gumuz land, which change the economic relations of Gumuz and Oromo. Amhara Migrants particularly of Gojjame becoming the new partners in individual Gumuz economic and social lives. The involvement of Gojjame in the region changes the value of land and in turn creates competition over land. The Oromo lost their advantage of expanding their farm in to the lowlying part, which in a way force the Oromo to compete with Amhara in order to get land from the Gumuz. The Gojjame's are working for both Gumuz and Oromo as a sharecropper. Therefore the relations of Oromo and Amhara in the study area are one of cooperation and divergence.

Supporters of federalism argue that federalism provides wider options for conflict management. According to them multiple layers of government provide alternative means for dealing with problems, but in the study area both the states and federal structure failed to provide the needed structural or political means for conflict management. The local authority engage more in activating rather than solving it, they were unable to negotiate on issues since they accuse each other, Gumuz accuse the Oromo authorities looking down on them and the Oromo on the other hand accuse of Gumuz being insecure.

The needed interventions of the federal institution came late after things went out of hand and after hundreds were killed and thousands displaced. The federal intervention brings in to the table a customary conflict resolution mechanism though the result seems delicate, since both suspect each other of breaching the agreement.

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APPENDIX ONE



የቤኒሻንጉል ጉሙዝ ብሔራዊ ክልላዊ መንግሥት ምክርቤት
 The Benishangul - Gumuz National Regional State Council

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በኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፑብሊክ
 የፌዴራል ጉዳዮች ሚኒስቴር
 አዲስ አበባ

ጉዳዩ:- ስለድንበር አካላለልን በተመለከተ

ክልላችን በሽግግር ወቅት አንደክልል ራሱን ችሎ ሲቋቋም በወቅቱ ከአግራ ብሄራዊ ክልላዊ መንግሥት ጋር የድንበር ማካለል ሥራ በገለልተኛ አካላት አማካኝነት አንዲካለል የተደረገ ሲሆን በተመሳሳይ ክልሮችም ብሄራዊ ክልላዊ መንግሥት ጋር የድንበር ማካለል ሥራ ለማከናወን ብርቱ ፍላጎት ቢኖረንም አስከፊውን ድረስ ምንም አይነት የድንበር ማካለል ሥራ ስለአልተሠራ በልዩ ልዩ መልኩ የሚገለጹ ችግሮች ተከስተዋል።

በበኩላችን ከድንበር ጋር የተያያዙ ችግሮች በኃላፊነት ስሜትና በጥንቃቄ ተጠገተው በገለልተኛ እሴት ለአንዳንድ ለመጨረሻ ጊዜ አንዲፈቱ ካሁን ቀደም ለተወካዮች ምክር ቤት፣ ለፌዴሬሽን ምክር ቤት፣ በጠቅላይ ሚኒስቴር ጽ/ቤት ለክልል ጉዳይ ዘርፍና አንዲሁም ለኦሮሚያ ብሄራዊ ክልላዊ መንግሥት ጥያቄ ያቀረብን ቢሆንም አምስት ዓመት ሙሉ ጥያቄአችን ምላሽ ሳያገኝ ቆይቷል። ስለዚህ ችግሩ ተባብሶ ወደከፍተኛ ደረጃ ከመሸጋገሩ በፊት የሁለቱ ክልሎች የጋራ ድንበር ለዘለቄታው የሚበጅ መላ አንዲፈለግለት በእኩብሮት አናሳስባለን።

2-8-94
 ማግኛላተው

ከሠላምታ ጋር

 ያረጋል አዲሽሸም
 ርዕሰ መስተዳድር

የጠቅላይ ሚኒስቴር ብሄራዊ ክልላዊ መንግሥት
 ጽ/ቤት



ከሚኒስትር
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 ተደጋጋሚ ሲሆን
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ከገንዘብ ሪፖርት
 ደብዳቤ ቁጥር 22/9/94

ለቤተሰብ ጉዳይ ለሥራ ላይ ክልል
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ጉዳይ:- በ14-08-94 ዓ.ም. ለአ.ት.ዩ.ጽ.ደ ካርታ ሥራ ባለሥልጣን የጻፋችሁትን ደብዳቤ
 ይመለከታል

ከላይ የተጠቀሰው ደብዳቤ ግልባጭ ተመዝግቦልን ተመልክተንዎልን። በመሠረቱ ድንበርች
 የሚካለሉት ለአስተዳደራዊ ጉዳይ እንጂ በክልሎች መካከል አለምአተፍ ድንበር መሰል
 ለመከለልና የህዝቦችን መብትና ጥቅም ለመጋፋትና ለማጓደል አለመሆኑ ከግንዛቤ ውስጥ
 ማስገባቱ አስፈላጊ ይመስለናል።

በመሆኑም በኛ በኩል ህዝቡ ወደ ፈለገበት ክልል ለመተዳደር እንደሚያመችው መወሰን
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ከሰላምታ ጋር
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ቢኒሻንጉል ጉሙዝ ክልላዊ ግንባታ ሙከራ ድርጅት/ቤት

BENISHANGUL-GUMUZ NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

*T.C. 10.448/01/7-14

Ref.No 12-4195

Date

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ለኢ.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ .የፌዴራል ጉዳዮች ሚኒስቴር
አዲስ አበባ ፣



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ከክልላችን የካማሽ ዞን ጋር ድንበርተኛ ከሆነው የኦሮሚያ የምስራቅ ወለጋ ዞን ጋር አገናንቷ የፀናተና ሌሎች ችግሮችንም በጋራ ለመፍታት የጥምር ኮሚቴ ተዋቅሮ አገቅብቃሌ ሲደረግ ቆይቷል።

ይሁን እንጂ ይህ መልካም ጅምር ከታህሳስ 1994 ዓ.ም. ጀምሮ ምክንያቱ ባልታወቀ ሁኔታ መፈረጡንና በተጎራባኞች ወረዳዎች

- በአርሻ መሬትና የድንበር ይገጠናል
- በደን ጭፍጨፋና ህገ.ወጥ የጣውላ ገግቷ
- ለኢ.ገሽስተሮች ቦታ በመምራት
- በጉልበት ሥራ ሰብዥ በርካታ መታወቂያና አድራሻ የሌላቸው በዘኔዎች መበራከት
- ህገ.ወጥ የጦር መሣሪያ ገግቷና
- በግብር አሰጣሪ ረገድ ከፍተኛ ስፋት ችግር መፈጠሩን የካማሽ ዞን መስተዳድር ጽ/ቤት መጋቢት 03 ቀን 1995 ዓ.ም. በቁጥር እስ/278/4095/14 ከግልልን ደብዳቤ መረዳት ተችሏል።

ስለሆነም በክልላችን በኩል መሆኑን ችግሮችን ለመፍታት የጋራ መድረክ እንዲፈጠር ብንጥርም ውጤታማ ስላልሆነ ሚኒስቴር መ/ቤቱ ችግሮች ተባብሰው የከፋ ደረጃ ከመድረሳቸው በፊት ሁለታችንም ተገራግጥ ክልሎች አገናኝቶ በግወጣናት ዘላቂ መፍትሄ ይገኝ ዘንድ የጠኑትን አገዳያዊ ለካላባባት።

ግልጻጭ ፣  

ከሰጠታ ጋር

ጋራ መስተዳድር

- ለካማሽ ዞን መስተዳድር ጽ/ቤት
ካማሽ ፣

ዛሬ ክልሎች በተለያዩ መንገድ በመደገፍና በመተጋገዝ በደህነት በረሃብ በበጎና ደንቀርና ሳይ ዘምተው አስደሳች የህዝብ ትስስር እየተፈጠረ እያለና የኦሮሚያ ክፍለ በላካባቢው በሰላም ቀበሌ/ሠፊና ሰም መሬት አያለው ይህ በክልላችን መሬትና ወሰን የሚካሄደው ህገ ወጥ ሆኖ የደን ጥፍጨፋና ህዝብን የማፈናቀል ክንቁፍ ወደ ከፋ የብሔረሰቦች ግጥትና ደም መፋሰስ ከማምራቱ በፊት አስቸኳይ የደንበር መከሰስ ሥራ እንዲከናወን ደግመን እናሳስባለን ::

08/8
9/95

ከሠላምታ ጋር
ሥነ ምግባር
ፊ.ጋ.ላ. አዲስ አበባ
ግንባታ ማህተም

15

ገቢዎች

- > ለህዝብ ተወካዮች ምክርቤት
- > ለፌዴሬሽን ምክርቤት
- > ለጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ሰዩ ጽ/ቤት
- አዲስ አበባ
- > ለኦሮሚያ ብ/ክ/መንግሥት
- አዳማ



ቢኒሻንጉል ጉሙዝ ዘላላጅ ግንቦት ጠቅላይ ርዕሰ ሚኒስትር

BENISHANGUL-GUMUZ NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

*T.C 11/21/01/59-14

Ref.No 01/8795

Date

16

ጠቅላይ ጉዳዮች ሚኒስትር
አዲስ አበባ

ጉዳዩ፡- ክሮሚያ ብ/ክ/መንግሥት ጋር በሚዋሰኑ የክልላችን አካባቢዎች ስለሚታዩ አሣሣቢ ሁኔታዎች

የክልላችን የአሰራር ዘንድ የካማሽ ዞን መስተዳደር እንዲሁም የማሉ - ኮሞ ልዩ ወረዳ ክሮሚያ ክልል ጋር ኩታ-ገጠም ሲሆኑ በቤጊ ወረዳ የባረው ውዝግብ በሽግግር ጊዜ በህዝብ ውሳኔ ሲፈታ በአሰራር ዘንድ የራዳዮ-ሰድጊቱ ወረዳ ችግርም በጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ጸ/ቤት የክልል ጉዳይ ዘርፍ አገዛዥ የደንበር መካሰስ ተደርጎ መፍትሔ ማግኘቱ የሚታወስ ነው ::

ከካማሽ ዞን ጋር የሚዋሰነው የክሮሚያ ክልል የደንበር ሁኔታ ገን ዘላቂ እልባት እንዲያገኝ በህዝብ ተወካዮች ምክርቤት፣ ሰፊዲሬሽን ምክርቤትና ለሚኒስትር መ/ቤታቸውም በተደጋጋሚ ሦስተኛ ወገን ባለበት ሠላማዊና ዲሞክራሲያዊ መፍትሔ እንዲሠጥ ብናመለከተም መቋቋሚ ባለመገኘት በአስተዳደርና የፀጥታ ሥራ፣ በደን ይዘታና በእርሻ አጠቃቀም በርካታ የህዝብ እቤታ ክልላዊ መንግሥታችን ከመቀበሉም በላይ የችግሩ አሣሣቢነት ከጊዜ ወደ ጊዜ እየገደፈ መጥቶ የክሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግሥት በካማሽ ዞን በበሉ-ጅጋንፎ ወረዳ በአንገር ሰንኮራ ቀበሌ በክልላችን መሪት ነዋሪዎችን በማፈናቀል መሪት ስኢንቨስተር በመምራትና ህገ ወጥ ሠፈራ በማካሄድ ላይ ይገኛል ::

የሃገራችን የቀደመት ሥርዓቶች መደበኛ ሠራዊት በማሠማራት የጉምዝ ብሔረሰብ መኖሪያ የባረውን አካባቢዎች በጋይሰ በማሰባሰብ ለመንግሥት እርሻና ለሠፈራ በማዋል ቀደምት ነዋሪዎች ሰብሮ እመቺ ባለሀገነ ተራራ ላይ እንዲሸሸገ ማድረጋቸው ሳይቀድሙ እዲህ ሊጠቀሙ በመከባበርና በመደጋገፍ እየገነባን አደሰን ቀደምት ነዋሪዎችን መኖሪያ የማሳጠቱ ሂደት መከሰተ በእጅግ አዛብጥናል ::

[Handwritten Signature]
የፈ.ጋ.ሪ. አካባቢ ጉዳዮች ሚኒስትር

07/8
95

Tel. 107/75-01-42 ፖስታ 44 Fax 107/75-08-42 አሰላ Assosa
መልሱን ሲጻፉልን የቺን ደብዳቤ ቁጥር ይጥቀሱ።
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ቢሽንጉል ጉሙዝ ክልላዊ ስገገስት ሰብአዊ ፍ/ዘ/ት

BENISHANGUL-GUMUZ NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

ቁጥር 12250/01/ክ-14
Ref.No
ቁጥር 2219885
Date

Handwritten signature/initials

ሌዕኤራል ጉዳዮች ሚኒስቴር

እዲስ አበባ ፣

ጉዳዩ/ የኦሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግሥት ለያካፊደ ያለውን ሕገ ወጥ የሕዝብ ሠፈራን ይመለከታል

ክልላችን ከኦሮሚያ ብሄራዊ ክልላዊ መንግስት ጋር በሰማሽ ዘንግ፣ በአሰጣጥ እና በሚገኝ ጉዳይ ለየ ወረዳ በኩል ለሌ የወሰነ ክልል በሚሻገሩ ሦስት የሚሞሉ ሲሆን በነዚህ ክፍል ገጠም ቦታዎች ላይ የኦሮሚያ ክልል መንግስት ሕገ ወጥ የሕዝብ ሠፈራ እና የመሬት አጠቃቀም በመጀመሪያ ችግር ከመጣ በፊት ለሌላው አገልግሎት ቀደም ሲል በቁጥር 10448/01/ክ.14 በቀን 12/04/95፣ በቁጥር 11711/01/ክ.14 በቀን 01/08/95 ዓ.ም. በተፃፈ ደብዳቤዎች የደንበር መክላል ሥራ እንዲከናወን ማሳወቃችን ይታወቃል።

በዚህ መሠረት ለሁለቱ ክልሎች ችግር አልፎ ለመስጠት ሚያዝያ 30 ቀን 1995 ዓ.ም. በሚኒስቴር መ/ቤትም በተጣራ ስብሰባ የሁለቱ ክልሎች ከፍተኛ የአመራር አካላት በመገኘት ለችግር መፍትሄ ተደመ ገዘገዙት የሚያመቻቹ ኮሚቴ አንዲቋቋም በስምምነት ላይ ደርሶታል። በዚህ መሠረት የሁለቱ ክልሎች ወሰን ሳይሆን ሠፈራ አገልግሎት ለማግኘትም በተጠቃሚ ሥፍራዎች ከ5.8 ኪ.ሜትር በረቀ ሥፍራ ብቻ ሕዝብ የሚከፈሉ ሥራ አገልግሎት ስምምነት ላይ ደርሶን ነበር።

ይሁን እንጂ የኦሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግስት የተደረገውን ስምምነት በመጣስ በሰማሽ ዘንግ በሁኔታዎቹ ወረዳ ሕዝብ ለሥፈራ ከመሆኑም በላይ የኦሮሚያ ቦታዎች ለኢንቨስትሜንት እየሰጠ መሆኑን ይርዘታል።

በዚህ የተቋቋመው የጋራ ኮሚቴ የወሰነ ደንበር ሪፖርት ቀርቦ ውሳኔ ላይ እስኪደርስ ድረስ ለየተሃሄደ ያለው የሕዝብ ሠፈራ ሆነ ለኢንቨስትሜንት እየተገጠ የሚገኘው የኦሮሚያ ቦታ በአስቸኳይ እንዲያቀም እንዲደረግ እናሳዘን።

ግልጽ ፣

- ለሕዝብ ተወካዮች ም/ቤት
 - ለሌዕኤራል ሚ/ር ልዩ ጽ/ቤት
- እዲስ አበባ ፣
- የኦሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግስት
- እዳግ ፣

ከህግምታ ጋር
[Handwritten signature]
የሪፖርት አቅጣጫ ስም
ርዕስ መስተጻ፫ር

Tel. /07/75-01-42 ፖስታ 44 Fax /07/ 75-08-42 አሰሳ Assosa
መልሱን ሲጽፉን የኛን ደብዳቤ ቁጥር ይጥቀሱ።
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ቢኒሻንጉል ጉሙዝ ክልላዊ ግንባታ ስተላይት ር/ቤት
BENISHANGUL-GUMUZ NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

*TC 12422/03/51-14
Ref.No 25/5/95
Date

ሰ.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ የጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ስዊ ጽ/ቤት
አዲስ አበባ፣

ጉዳይ፡- ከኦሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግሥት ጋር በሚዋሰን የክልላችን አካባቢ ስለተፈጠረ
የሰፈራ አስመገባባት፣

በድርቅ የተጉዳ ወገኖችን በተለያዩ አካባቢዎች የማሰፈር እንቅስቃሴ ከተጀመረባቸው በታዎች መካከል የኦሮሚያ ክልል ምስራቅ ወሰን ዞን አንዱ ነው። የኦሮሚያ ክልል ምስራቅ ወሰን ዞን ከክልላችን ካማሽ ዞን ጋር ኩታ-ገጠም በመሆኑ የወሰን ደገባኛው ውዝግብ እንደነበር በቁጥር 11711/01/ከ14-01/08/95 ዓ.ም በዓፍነው ደብዳቤ ማስታወቃችን የሚታወስ ነው ።

እሁንም ከካማሽ ዞን መስተዳድር በቁጥር አሰ/11/5025/14 በቀን 22/08/95 ዓ.ም በተፃፈ ደብዳቤ በዞኑ ከሚገኙት ወረዳዎች በበሉጋንፎ ወረዳ በዳሰቻቡ ደንጋይ ቀበሌ ከዞኑ አውቅና ውጭ ከ4000 ህዝብ በላይ የምስራቅ ወሰን ዞን መስተዳድር ማሰፈራን ሪፖርት አድርጎልናል ። ሁለቱ ዞኖች ባደረጉት ውይይትም “መሬቱ የኦሮሚያ ክልል ስለሆነ፣ የበሉጋንፎ ወረዳ የመንግሥት አርሻ መሬት በሙሉ መንግሥት ስለሠጠን አስፈረናል።” የሚል ምላሽ ከኦሮሚያ ወገን እንደተሰጠውም ዞኑ በሪፖርቱ አክሱ ገልጾልናል ።

ባለፉት አምባገነንና ጨዋና መንግሥታት የቢኒሻንጉል ጉሙዝን ህዝብ ለመንግሥት እርሻና ሰሠፈራ ፕሮግራም እያሉ በተደጋጋሚ ህዝቡን እያፈናቀሉ ለአስከፊና ለመሪ ሃር ሊዳርጉት ነበር ። በተለይም ደግሞ በቀድሞ አጠራር ወሰን ክፍለ ሀገር ተብሎ በሚጠራው በለው እና ዲዳሣ እርሻ ሰማት የተባሉት የጉሙዝ፣ የበርታ፣ እና የማሕ ህዝቦችን ከቦታው በማፈናቀል የተመሠረተ የመንግሥት አርሻዎች እንደነበሩ የሚታወስ ሲሆን ቀደምት ነዋሪ የነበሩት ብሔረሰቦችም ለነርሱ ጉዳይ ለሆነ ተጋራጅ ጉዳይ መሰረት የሚከታተሉ ሲሆኑ ቅድሚያ ።

Tel. /07/75-01-42 ፖስታ 44 Fax /07/75-08-42 አሰሳ Assosa
መልሱን ሲጽፉን የኛን ደብዳቤ ቁጥር ይጥቀሱ።
Please Quote Our Ref.No. When Replying

57-14



የቤኒሻንጉል ጉሙዝ ክልላዊ መንግስት መስተዳድር ምክር ቤት

THE BENISHANGUL - GUMUZ REGIONAL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

ቁጥር 10-670/ገ.ገ.1/ገ.14
Ref.No
ቀን 17/9/99
Date

በኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ
ለጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ጽ/ቤት
አዲስ አበባ ፣

ጉዳዩ:- ከጋራ ድንበር ጋር የተያያዙ ችግሮች ወደ ከፋ ሚና
ለየተሸጋገሩ መሆናቸውን ስለማሳወቅ!

ክልላችን አገራዊ ከሆነው ከኦሚያ ብሔራዊ ክልላዊ መንግሥት ጋር ይጠናቃል። የጋራ ድንበሮቻችን ሕዝብን ማዕከል አድርገው እንዲካለሉ ባለመደረጋቸው የተለያዩ ችግሮች ተከስተዋል።

በክልላችን በተለይ ከካማሺ ዞን ጋር የሚዋሰኑት አካባቢዎች እስከአሁን ሊካለሉ ባለመቻላቸው ዘርፈ-ብዙ ችግሮች ተፈጥረዋል። ህገ-ወጥ ሰፈራ፣ ፍልሰት፣ እስከፊ የደን ጭፍጨፋ፣ አልፎ ተርፎ ሥር የሰደደ የድንበር ላይ ግጭት የአካባቢው መለያ ሆኗል።

በመሠረቱ ከፍ ብሎ በተጠቀሰው አካባቢ ጎልተው የሚታዩትን መሠረታዊ ችግሮች በጋራ ለመፍታት የተወሰነ ጥረት የተደረገ ቢሆንም ጊዜያዊ ችግሮችን ከማቃለል የዘለለ ተጨባጭ ውጤት የሚያስገኝ ሥራ ባለመሰራቱ ግጭቶች ተባብሰው ወደከፋ ሚና ደርሰዋል። ስለሆነም ከፍተኛ የሕዝብ ንብረት ወድሟል። የሰው ሕይወት ጠፍቷል። እሁን ባለው ሁኔታ ወደ ከፋ የብሔረሰቦች ግጭትና ደም መፋሰስ እንዳይሸጋገር ከፍተኛ ሥጋት ፈጥሯል።

በሌላ በኩል የክልላችን መንግሥት ከድንበር ጋር የተያያዙ ችግሮች በመሠረታዊነት እንዲፈቱ ብርቱና ያላሰለሰ ጥረት ሲያደርግ ቆይቷል። የጉዳዩ ባለቤት ከሆነው ከኦሚያ ብሔራዊ ክልላዊ መንግሥት ጋር በተጥታ በመገኘት የጋራ መድረክ በመፍጠር የጋራ ችግሮቻችን ደረጃ በደረጃ እንዲፈቱ በአካልና በጽሑፍ በተደጋጋሚ አላስበናል። ይሁንና ከክልሉ መንግሥት ወትታዊና አፋጣኝ ምላሽ አይሰጠንም። ዘገታም ቢሆን የሚሰጠን ምላሽ አጥጋቢና ችግር ፈች አይደለም።

ሌላ
ያረጋገጥ አይሸሸም
ርዕሰ መስተዳድር

ከዚህም በላይ የችግርን አሳሳቢነት በመገለጽ በፌዴራል መንግሥት ደረጃ እንዲታይና በተለይ ዋናው ችግር መፍትሔ እንዲያገኝ ለተለያዩ የመንግሥት አካላት በየጊዜው አሳውቀናል። በዚህም በኩል ተጨባጭነት ያለው ርምጃ አልተወሰደም። በመሠረቱ ትናንሽ ችግሮች በየደረጃውና በየወቅቱ ካልተፈቱ ወደአልተጠበቀ ክፍተኛ ችግር ሊሸጋገሩ እንደሚችሉ መታሰብ ነበረበት። አልሆነም።

በመጨረሻ አሁን ባለው ሁኔታ ከድንበር ጋር በተያያዘ ስለጠፋው የሰው ሕይወትና ንብረት በትክክል ተጠቅቶ እስከምናሳውቅ ድረስ በፌዴራል ደረጃ ገለልተኛ ወገን ተሰይሞ ለአካባቢው ሕዝቦች ዘላቂ ሠላምና ጥቅም የሚበጅ መፍትሔ እንዲፈለግለት አጥብቀን እንጠይቃለን።

ለግንዛቤ እንዲረዳ በየጊዜው ከተለያዩ አካላት ጋር ያደረግናቸውን መጻፍቶች ፎቶ ኮፒ በማድረግ ከዚህ ደብዳቤ ጋር አያይዘን ልክናል።

26/10/99

ከማክበር ሠላምታ ጋር

የረጋል አይቮሽም
ርዕሰ መስተዳድር

ገልጻል

- ♦ ለፌዴሬሽን ምክር ቤት
- ♦ ለፌዴራል ጉዳዮች ሚኒስቴር
አዲስ አበባ፣
- ♦ ለቢ.ኒ.ሻንጉል ጉሙዝ ክልላዊ መንግሥት ምክር ቤት
አሰሳ፣

97-14



የቤኒሻንጉል ጉሙዝ ክልላዊ መንግስት መስተዳድር ምክር ቤት

THE BENISHANGUL - GUMUZ REGIONAL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

ቁጥር 10.79/ገ.ጊ/ገ.14
Ref.No
ቀን 29/9/23
Date

ለኦሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግሥት መስተዳድር ምክር ቤት

ፊንፊኔ

ጉዳይ:- ስለወሰን አካላል

84

ክልላችን በምሥራት ክላሮሚያ ጋር በካሚኒስትሮች ማኅበር ልዩ ወረዳና በአላላ ዞን ከተወሰኑ ወረዳዎች ጋር የሚዋሰን ሲሆን የሁለቱ ክልሎች የጋራ ድንበር /ወሰን/ በውል ተለይቶ ባለመታወቅ በድንበር ይገባኛል ምክንያት ተደጋጋሚ የድንበር ግጭቶች በመከሰታቸው ይህን ችግር ለመፍታት የጋራ ኮሚቴ ተቋቁሞ ተገቢውን ጥረት ሲያደርግ ቆይቷል።

ሆኖም እስካሁን በተደረገው ጥረት ዘላቂ መፍትሄ ባለማስገኘቱ በተለያዩ ጊዜያት ብልጭ ድርግም እያለ በአዋሳኝ አካባቢዎች ችግሮች እየታዩ ይገኛሉ በመሆኑም ችግሩ ወደ ገደብና ብጥብጥ ላይሸጋገር ዘላቂ መፍትሄ ሊፈለግለት ስለሚገባ፡-

- በክልል ደረጃ ሁለቱም መንግሥታት/ የቤኒሻንጉል ጉሙዝ ክልላዊ መንግሥትና የኦሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግሥት በድንበር አካባቢ ያለውን ችግር ለመፍታት ሠነድ ቢፈራረሙና በዚያ ውስጥ የድንበር ማከላለጥ ሥራ ቢነተት፤
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- ሀገራዊ ሠራራና ፍልሰትንም በተመለከተ በስምምነቱ ተካቶ ዘላቂ እልባት እንደበይሉት ለማድረግ የሁለቱም ክልል መሪዎች በመነጋገር ስምምነት ተፈርሞ ችግሩን ለዘላቂነት ለመፍታት ወደ ሥራ የሚገባበት ሁኔታ ቢፈጠር የክልል መንግሥታችን መሻት ስለሆነ በዚህ ጉዳይ ላይ ክልሉ አስተያየቱን እንዲያሳውቀን በማክበር እናግሰዋለን።

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APPENDIX TWO





Legend

- Village
- ⚕ Existing health
- 🏪 Existing market
- ⚡ Existing water point
- ⚙ Existing grinding mill
- 🎓 Existing School
- 🌊 River
- ⬜ Woreda boundary
- 🛣 Proposed Road
- 🛣 D56
- 🛣 DGP
- 🛣 Existing Roads
- ☀ All Weather
- ☀ Dry Weather
- ⬜ Kebele

- Proposed Health facilities**
 - 🏥 Health Center, 1st Five Year
 - 🏥 Health Center, 2nd Five Year
 - 🏥 Health Post, 1st Five Year
- Proposed Livestock facilities**
 - 🏠 Village Veterinary Center, 1st Five Year
 - 🏠 Animal Health Post, 1st Five Year
- Proposed school**
 - 🎓 Secondary School, 2nd Five Year
 - 🎓 2nd Cycle school, 1st Five Year
 - 🎓 1st Cycle School, 1st Five Year
- Proposed market center**
 - 🏪 Village Market
 - 🏪 DC Market
 - 🏪 Kibria Market
- Proposed Storage**
 - 🏠 Storage, 1st Five Year
- Proposed Grinding mill**
 - ⚙ Grinding mill, 1st Five Year
- Proposed PTC**
 - 🏠 Farmer Training Center, 1st Five Year
- Proposed DA house**
 - 🏠 Proposed DA house, 1st Five Year
- Proposed water facilities**
 - 🌊 Shallow Wells, 1st Five Year
 - 🌊 Shallow Wells, 2nd Five Year
 - 🌊 Spring Development, 1st Five Year
- Proposed Bridge**
 - 🌉 Bridge
 - 🌉 Trail Bridge

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Local Markets in Gumz and Oromo Villages



Plate no.1
Gumz man buying tobacco in local Oromo
Market at *Bereda* market



Plate no.2
Gumz woman heading to wards market
Carrying *Bobe* /Sorghum/ and Mango



Plate no.3
Gumz woman and man drinking *Arkie*
in a market place called
Saydalecha(Gumz *qebelle*)



Oromo local *Arkie* sailor /Alcohol /in local Gumz market at
Saydalech qebelle

Qebelle Committee meeting in Hora Waata and BeloDedesa
(Oromo and Gumz qebelles respectively)



Plate no.4

Praying before they start the meeting, the prayer was presided by both Gumz(left) and Oromo (right)



The head of Hora Waata qebelle presenting the agenda for the meeting of the committee
(both Gumz and Oromo)



Plate no.5 Committee meeting

Displaces in Oromia Qebelles



Plate no. 6

Waiting on the raw to get the monthly aid ration at *Bereda* (Oromo qebelle)



Plate no. 7

Former State farm store turned into displacees house.

It is partitioned using malaria net that displaces provided with.

The Result of 2008 Conflict in Gumz Qebelles

After the 2008 conflict Gumuz and Oromo villagers obtained immediate relief assistance from government and non governmental organization. East Wallega zone with the support of other organization fully engaged in rehabilitation of the displaced people. The Kamashi zone of Benishangu Gumuz on the other hand failed to do that. So these huts are the Gumuz hut, which was burned during the conflict and the family is now living in a far away village with their relative.



Plate no.8 At Seydalecha qebelle




Plate no. 9 Anger Shenkora qebelle



This thesis is my original work, has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Name Aynalem Getachew, June 2009

Signature



Place and date of submission:

June 2009

Advisor

Name -----

Signature-----