The Ethiopian Nation-State and Contending Nationalisms in a Global Era

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"History is the present. That is why every generation writes it anew. But what most people think of as history is its end product, myth."

E.L. Doctorow, US novelist.

"All history is necessarily written from the standpoint of the present, and is, in an inescapable sense, the history not only of the present but of that which is contemporaneously judged to be important in the present."

John Dewey, US philosopher and educator.

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It is the amalgamation of "local" and "global" assistances that brought this work into fruition (just like its subject matter, "nationalism"). Though the bulk of material aid I have been bestowed upon has been immensely helpful, positive, encouraging words and constructive comments have sometimes been even more exciting prodders towards my accomplishment. Some have even toiled with me in all of these spheres. Those who have contributed in all or some ways included my mother, my advisor, brothers and sisters, classmates, friends, interlocutors, university professors and other scholars, residing in Ethiopia, abroad, or simply in a "transnational" space. I dare not to mention any name lest, by revealing some and leaving out others, I should upset the latter. To all, I would just say: thank you, not because I believe you deserve only this, but because I hope you don't expect from me everything you deserve, and not even more than this! And I thank you for that, too!

Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations

CUD	Coalition for Unity and Democracy
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESUE	Ethiopian Students Union in Europe
ESUNA	Ethiopian Students Union in North America
OFDM	Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement
OFFNA	Oromo Football Federation in North America
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONC	Oromo National Congress
OPDO	Oromo People's Democratic Organization
ORA	Oromo Relief Association
OSA	Oromo Studies Association
TBOA	*Tokkuma Bartoota Oromoo Awropa*, Union of Oromo Students in Europe (UOSE)
UONA	Union of Oromos in North America
WWEWSG	World-Wide Union of Ethiopian Women's Study Group
WWFES	World-Wide Federation of Ethiopian Students
WWUES	World-Wide Union of Ethiopian Students

Chapter One
Introduction

A. Background and Statement of the Problem

"Globalization", writes Noble (2003: 6), "has become the buzzword...for the latter half of the twentieth-century". It has dominated the discourse of academicians and practical lives of the human race alike. It has permeated the subject areas of almost all disciplines, foremost among them being the social sciences. In this particular research, its politico-sociological aspects as reflected in the ethnicist and nationalist politics of a country, unfolding along a long-running plane of history, will be investigated.

Does globalization homogenize our world or does it hybridize it? This has become a major topic of controversy among scholars of the sociology of globalization for the last two or three decades. In a very general way, one group of scholars argues that socio-cultural globalization is simply another name for the centuries-old Western capitalist imperialism or the universalization of some of its lofty concomitant ideals like the nation-state system. Just as in the other aspects of the globalization process, the West or capital is invading, compressing and assimilating other cultural ethos of the world. In this sense, it is a process of "uniformization" that we are experiencing in the world--all others melting away and getting incorporated into a capitalist, consumerist culture or yielding to other tenets of those powers with much influence in the world. According to this view, "parochial" identities such as ethnic or religious affiliations, to mention but a few, are withering away. This very much reminds us of the modernization paradigm of the 1960s.

But a host of other scholars have--in more recent years--marshaled their arguments to confront this view, which they dubbed

as both "simplistic and outmoded" (variously expressed by different scholars, for example, Smith, 1995; Kivisto, 2002; Bernal, 2004, etc). Our post-Cold War world in particular has been witnessing an ever-ascendant spiral of "parochial" identities. Ethnicity, nationalism and religiosity are defying simplistic-mode analyses. While, on the one hand, some of these "localized" identities seem to get re-enforced in contradistinction to globalization, others are resurging through it. Neither is the attitude that westernization is encompassing the world quite valid, given that other cultures are still dominant in some parts of the world and, interestingly, some of these are even infiltrating the West itself. Therefore, the scholars assert, globalization never homogenize the social identities of the world; it rather further hybridizes them.

In this piece of research work, these debates will be partially analyzed in the context of a particular case study, one consisting of nations and nationalisms, which is intimately associated with the "global-local" debate. By taking the Ethiopian nation-state, and the Ethiopianist and Oromo nationalisms as instances, it seeks to unravel the simultaneous interplay of local and global ("glocal") factors in the process of the construction of nations and nationalisms.

B. Methodology and Methods

The paper employs the qualitative, analytic approach to research. More specifically, its study techniques comprise of all the three strategies in qualitative design. It is in at least some ways an explanatory, interpretive and critical study. As one following the explanatory design, it aspires to respond partly to the question why the Ethiopian nation-state and Oromo nationalism emerged some where during the modern era. Whereas a number of factors may come to the fore to explain these phenomena, I will specifically focus on the "external" factor and the way

it interacted with the "internal" elements both in terms of imagination and action.

As McNabb (2004) states, not all research theorists agree that human events or actions can be defined by the causal explanations that are part and parcel of explanatory research. They propose, in addition to this, the interpretive research where an interpretation of a phenomenon is arrived at by developing meanings of social events or actions. Coming to my case, I study the construction of the meaning of nationalism among the Ethiopian and Oromo nationalists, both in the homeland and the diaspora. In doing so, I seek to employ a deconstructionist* or a "de-mystificationist" paradigm, where, in this case, the words that make up national or ethnic discourses are teased apart "in order to reveal hidden meanings, looking for what might be omitted or included only implicitly" (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2006: 122). The primary goal of this method (interpretation) is given as "to provide many–layered descriptions and interpretations of human experiences. To achieve this goal, interpretative research looks at the way humans make sense out of events in their lives --as they happen, not as they are planned" (McNabb, 2004: 345).

Finally, the paper is a critical study, too. The primary objective of this kind of research, which is closely connected to the interpretive one, is to help people change their beliefs and actions as part of a process of helping them become aware of the often unconscious bases for the way they act or their beliefs (*Ibid*: 346). I follow a deconstructionist path (see above) in order to exactly achieve this end. Attempts at naturalizing and normalizing the Ethiopianist and Oromo (OLF brand) discourses have undergone (in the present paper) wide-ranging (although inexhaustive) critical evaluations, locating them into Hobsbawm's "invented tradition"

* In employing this term, I don't wish to go into a philosophical gymnastics of Derridian sort. My sense of the term is just that of Caputo (1997: 32) who defines it as, "Whenever deconstruction finds a nutshell -- a secure axiom or a pithy maxim -- the very idea is to crack it open and disturb this tranquility. Indeed, that is a good rule of thumb in deconstruction. *That* is what deconstruction is all about, its very meaning and mission, if it has any. One might even say that cracking nutshells is what deconstruction *is*".

and Anderson's "imagined communities" models. As part of this critical approach, the traditional idea that called for the social scientist to remain "disinterested" is partly rejected, replacing this with the concept of the active, change-oriented researcher whose emphasis is on motivating change processes in social groups and individuals. Here, the researcher strongly believes that positive peace (or "justpeace" as termed by Lederach, 2005) should be rigorously instituted in Ethiopia in order to embed a sustainably violence-free institutional framework or platform that satisfies all contending parties. Of course, globalization is of several benefits in this regards. All these reflections are made in a so-called objective manner, as far as the interests of the conflicting groups are concerned. I constantly refuse to be entrapped by the outlooks of either of the parties to the conflict.

In some parts of the thesis, a case study approach is chosen as the research method. This is the case, for instance, with our "contending nationalisms" and "diasporic transnationalisms", which are taken to refer to Ethiopianist and Oromo (OLF brand) nationalisms and transnationalisms. Secondary sources, documents and unstructured interviews are extensively used in the study. One data-gathering method has been slightly important while writing the thesis, viz., archival studies, which involves the study of historical documents in order to establish an understanding of the circumstances that characterized an event or period.

C. Hypotheses

The thesis is meant to prove three central propositions. They are:

- Globalization has played a decisive role in the formation and development of the Ethiopian nation-state and Oromo nationalism: strictly speaking, both of these phenomena can be

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seen as syntheses of internal ("local") and external ("global") factors.

- ❖ Globalization per se does not weaken, in fact may facilitate, people's fixation in either Ethiopian or Oromo nationalisms; it only reconfigures these nationalisms spinning them out on a transnational\ "glocal" space.
- ❖ Thus, if nations and nationalisms are not duly reclaimed in some ways (to be indicated later), the global era is likely to witness neither the reconfiguration (which contending ethnonationalisms in Ethiopia generally demand), nor the "nationalization" (which Ethiopianist nationalists require) of the Ethiopian nation-state.

These propositions are of course built upon concepts, a fact which draws them nearer to theories than to hypotheses. Through the pages of the thesis, all of these concepts are operationalized into different variables in order to make them suitable working hypotheses.

D. Objectives

I have one general and several specific objectives in mind while accomplishing this work. They can be stated as follows:

General objective:

- Apply the concept of "glocalization" to analyze the formation, development and future of the Ethiopian nation-state and the Oromo nation and respective nationalisms and show that both neither have been purely locally constructed nor were antique in nature.

Specific objectives:

- to deconstruct nationalism by uncovering to what extent both the Oromo and Ethiopian(ist) nationalisms are social constructions and invented traditions;

- to show how both are constructed and developed in a supra-local, transnational space in terms of both discourse and action; to define how "local" and how "global" they are\ have been at the same time;
- to show that both are likely to get solidified, not dismantled, in a global era, only adjusting themselves to the new global situation;
- to indicate some of the political implications of the globalization of ethno-nationalisms to the "nation"-state of Ethiopia;
- to demonstrate the role of diasporas in homeland politics, and
- to look for general ways and means of exploiting globalization for the benefit of striking a balance between the interests of the different ethnic contestants in Ethiopia, in the homeland and in the diaspora.

I don't feel, as a closing remark, assured that such an ambitious project with so small a size (proportionally) would be free from limitations. I should admit, most importantly, that some of the points I have raised in the paper are left not-so-well-elaborated. I hope this may be understandable given the constraint the page limits for theses in our department might impose upon me. Anyway, I have tried my best to present clearly discernible themes running through all the body of the thesis. It is my humble wish that a timely, non-conformist, and non-partisan work as this might get an encouraging appeal from the larger Ethiopian-related community, especially those well-equipped with critical minds and empathic senses.

Definition of terms

It seems a fashion among scholars of today to hold that a precise definition of "nation" is pretty difficult. I am but compelled to join them, too. The major controversy is born out of the fact that nations are comprised of a mixture of objective and subjective features (cf., *inter alia*, Hutchinson & Smith, 1994; Calhoun, 1997). Some scholars emphasize the former category-- that a nation is so if all or most of its members speak the same language, embrace the same religion, enjoy the same history and culture and so on. Others say nations can only be defined subjectively by their members. While I do not wish to fall into an unjustifiable "either-or" bifurcation, I strongly believe that primarily nations are "psycho-political constructs" (Heywood, 2002: 106). Anderson (1989) was soberly right when he called them "imagined communities".

Ethnicity is another difficult term to define. It follows the same bisected path--it has objective and subjective aspects (see, for instance, Hutchinson & Smith, 1996; Kivisto, 2002). Some scholars prefer to distinguish ethnicity from nation by according the former an apolitical attribute in contrast to the latter. For them, a nation is a politicized ethnicity. Others claim that nation has a broader shed of meaning than ethnicity, which may form a subset within the former. The latter claim may make some sense, but the former doesn't content me as it is. Whereas divorcing ethnicity [or, more appropriately, ethnogenesis=the process of forming an *ethnie* (ethnic community)] from politics does not seem agreeable, it may be legitimate to consider nations as "politicized ethnicity" if we limit our conception of "politics" to struggle for political independence, statehood and self-determination.

With regards to the way of defining nationalism, too, important differences are manifest. Some equate it with "national sentiment", others with nationalist ideology and language, still others with

nationalist movements. I think a synthesis of all these is possible. Following many nationalist leaders and scholars, the movement brought together the vital aspirations of the modern world for autonomy and self-government, for unity and autarchy and for authentic identity (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:4). But I do not agree with the strict distinction some scholars make between "cultural" nationalism and "political" nationalism, since it gives a sense of considering the former as something politically innocent.

Nationalisms may acquire civic or ethnic characteristics. One would be rightly suspicious of such a distinction because so-called civic nationalisms mostly attain their distinct features from some pre-existing ethno-cultures. But still the mode of presenting identity creates some divergences. Civic nationalisms at least stand to appear as if they have transcended ethnic loyalties. Ethnic nationalisms do not. These latter phenomena may be termed as ethno-nationalisms to clearly show their ethnic appeal. Apart from that, the term "nationalism" alone can also be generically applied to describe the same phenomena.

Finally comes the case of "nation-states". Strictly speaking, no but few states in our world today are nation-states proper. In almost all, different ethno-cultural groups exist which render the term "multi-nation" or "multi-ethnic" a more suitable nomenclature. But many scholars still do not follow the stricter path in qualifying states, organizations (like the United *Nations*), disciplines (Inter*national* Relations) and so on, even if they do admit these terminologies prove to be defective in close examination. Therefore, it seems that one's attitudes towards the different ethno-cultural groups within a state, rather than the mere qualification of the state as "nation" or "nation-state", is what should be of a paramount importance to us. But, as will be shown later in this thesis, if, in our usage of the term "nation", we really mean it, that should be subjected to rigorous academic scrutiny. (This is what I

modestly tend to do when the term is taken seriously to refer to either old-day entities (empires, communities...) or even modern-day states.

Some more essential elaborations on the theories and other definitive qualities (like modernity) of nations and nationalisms are made in the inside pages of the thesis.

Chapter Two

Globalization and Identity/Locality Formation: Glocalization?

It may be true that the discovery of the "true" self may "help us to sleep well at night" (Hall, 1991b: 43), but its laborious scientific study is not so promising. The intricacies encompassing the subject identity surely renders its investigation quite sophisticated and lengthy. Even more so, in an unprecedentedly global age, where it hits its record in terms of complexity and delicacy. In this brief theoretical exposition, we will treat only a few, but conspicuous points in that regard. Let's take identity itself initially, as a prelude to our major topic of discussion, namely, globalization and identity.

It has been in the long tradition of the study of identity to argue about its constructionist or primordial origin. The assertions in favour of the unproblematical nature and security of particular identities as the basis of claims to some sort of fundamental giveness of identity make up the former paradigm. However, against such "temptations", it is quite clear, for others, that identity is the outcome of complex series of social processes, and does not arise spontaneously but is learned and re-learned over time (Preston, 1997: 4). It is this latter paradigm which seems to constitute a point of wide agreement in one of the fastest growing bodies of literature in the social sciences (Poppi, 1997: 289).[1]

Implicit in the above discussion is the impermanence of identity. Identity formation involves construction and re-construction throughout the life-course of individuals and groups and through their different faces, roles and circumstances (Melucci quoted in Kennedy, 2001: 2-3). Identity is always in the process of formation. "Though we have always known it a little bit", writes Hall (1991b: 47), "we have always thought about ourselves as getting more like ourselves everyday." These themes will permeate all the coming sections of this thesis.

Once we have skimmed over these features of identity, among many others, we can now turn to our topic of understanding the same in the light of another complex phenomenon in our social world: globalization.

2.1 Globalization and Identity: The "Homo-Hetero" Debate

From the outset, let me take sides on some aspects of the contentious concept of globalization (particularly, the sociology of globalization). I know that globalization as a process towards a global (economic, cultural or political) community has come into question by some writers (such as Hirst and Thompson, 1996)--and they are partly right. They have indeed contributed a great deal to disclosing the real weaknesses of the "hyperglobalist position" (Held, 2002:2). Some of these writers use the term "globalization" to examine how nation- states fit into patterns of history that are potentially global in reach and into a macro-sociological theory that aims to be all-encompassing (Shroeder,1999:71). On the other hand, however--and herein lies their misjudgment--the writers have also tended "to throw out the baby with the water" (Held: p.2) in that they have not just corrected the "hyper", but also lost touch with what has changed. I, then, also do subscribe to the idea that globalization is a "matter of increasing long-distance inter-connectedness, at least across national boundaries, preferably between continents as well" (Hannerz quoted in Shuerkens, 2003:212). I don't see it wise to exclusively claim either of the extreme views. In short, globalization, seen both as an actual process and as an expression of a pattern of history that is potentially global will be used to analyze issues to be raised throughout the paper.

I am, finally, in sympathy with the historical definition of globalization (Dutceac, 2004) that places the events currently observed in the *longue durée*. What we experience today is not discontinuously new;

it has been going on for decades and centuries, only in different forms and varying degrees of intensity. Accordingly, I also have no difficulty in accepting the unique features of the currently prevailing condition of globalization. Most scholars associate the end of the Cold War with the period of high impetus of globalization (Dutceac, p.21), although some others place it around the early 1980s (Hirst and Thompson, 1996).

The general thrust of the discussion under the above heading will be in accordance with Featherstone's and Lash's (1995) notion that the rise of the globalization problematique represents the spatialization of social theory. While this may seem to resonate with the claims of post-modernity--privileging the spatial over the temporal--the latter never escaped the opportunity of being viewed from a temporal vantage point. It can well be examined as a paradigm developed in the pre-modern, modern and post-modern chain of socio-political theoretical framework. In this context, the concept of globalization represents an important shift in transmuting this temporality into a spatial frame of analysis (*Ibid*: 1).

Perhaps the debate which becomes most relevant to this framework--in connection to "identity"--is the one which encases the homogenization-heterogenization problematique. One can safely categorize under the advocates of the former stance those perspectives rooted in the well – known modernization paradigm. This paradigm is, risking an abrupt summary, known to have been a historical legacy that was based on the fundamental assumption that the evolution of modern industrial societies signaled the demise of certain forms of solidarity and the rise of new forms, predicated in no small part on the idea that individuals would be increasingly free from the ascribed particularistic identities characteristic of traditional or pre-modern societies and would enter a world based on individual achievement and universal values (Kivisto, 2002:20). Accordingly, the modernization of traditional societies is constituted by a bundle of core processes such as nation-state formation, social differentiation, individualization, capitalist development, political

modernization and secularization (Spohn, 2003: 267). Modernity's straight path is seen to be the fate--a "graceful" fate!--of all societies of our world.

Some writers have extended this approach further to underpin their discourse of globalization theory. Here, globalization (and globality) is taken to be a consequence of modernity (See, for example, Giddens, 1990). It is seen as a multidimensional generalization of the Western model of modernity and, with it, the dissemination of the nation-state, capitalist production and the homogenization of national cultures. For some scholars (for example, Mann, as paraphrased by Spohn, 267-69), the spread of ethnic and religious nationalism is seen as a part of the conflicting process of nation-state formation with a secular culture in a multicultural setting. For others (such as Poppi, 1996), it is explained (or explained away?) as "the unfinished agenda" of modernization. But for all modernist "homogenizers" one thing is clear: they would at least implicitly invoke a scenario of convergent development; and globalization does serve as a spectacular engine to this end.

It is now quite needless to say that modernization's linear path has been discredited from different angles, and need not be treated here any more[2]. Its offshoot, "the globalization-as–homogenization" perspective has also met with sharp counter-arguments. In contrast to the former's simplification of reality, we have been witnessing since recent times a steep rise, not decline, of "parochial" life-worlds. Ethnic and religious nationalisms, to mention but a few, have riven across almost all parts of our world today. Explanations in defiance of the homogenizers' paradigm do vary: a general defensive reaction of non-Western societies to the intensifying forces of Western-dominated globalization[3]; the incessant quest for a permanent "home" within a rapidly moving ocean of existence and its corollaries[4]; and a manifestation of the multiple modernization processes of different societies in their own path of development[5]. All these perspectives, however much they differ in their conceptualizations

of identity construction, do share the view that the world we are currently encountering can indeed be characterized by increasing, mind-boggling complexity.

Heterogenizers would tend to dispute(say, Said, 1978) that a system existed; disclaim (say, Hall, 1991a, 1991b) the distinction of "universal" and "particular", considering the "global as the self-presentation of the dominant particular" (Hall, 1991b: 67). What we have is just the (re-) production of different particulars. For such incontestable heterogenizers as Jan Pieterse (1995), globalization is seen as hybridization, in which forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new form in new practices. It is not a condition for modernization, but instead an historical epoch, co-existing with post- modernity. Modernity, for its part, is contemporaneous with an earlier period of the hegemony of the nation-state. After having disowned both functionalist modernization theory and Marxist dependency theory for their modernist tendency of the nation-state period, Pieterse concludes that true globalization theory is the post-modern analysis of hybridity (see the summary by Featherstone, *et. al*, 1995: 5).

It would indeed be, at least as far as I am concerned, as difficult to yield to a wholesale acceptance of all these heterogenist assertions as to bend to a wholesale rejection of all. I don't think one can miss to realize some tendencies of maintaining traditional life-worlds as reactive moves against "colonizing" waves of socio-cultural domination. Similarly, and more convincingly, contemporary, say, ethnic communities and identities in many regions of the world did not and will not fade away with the inevitable advance of global modernity, but rather represent critical aspects of that particular region's experiences of modernity itself.[6] This "multiple modernity" paradigm would particularly emphasize that such growth in sub-and supra- national nationalism, especially in the non-Western world, can be attributed to the multiple forms of modernity, modernization and democratization in reaction to the former world-wide

imposition of state secularism, western or eastern type (Berman, *et. al.*, 2003; Eisenstadt, 2000; Spohn, 2003) .

Contrariwise, we would find these assumptions taking us not too far. For instance, the representation of different identities (either those to be "creolized"[7]or those to settle as "distinct" identities) as contradictory and confrontational (for instance Giddens, 1990; Hall, 1991a) does not necessarily correspond to reality. In a similar vein, heterogenization should not be taken as the only typical feature of the globalization process /global system, any more than its apparent opposite, homogenization. In our world today, similar processes of localization are taking place universally, and universalizing processes are being played locally, reflecting a situation where homogenization and heterogenization can never be seen as mutually exclusive expressions of reality but as the two faces of the same movement.

It is, then, I think, clear that the crudity these bifurcations create in our understanding of the globalization-identity/locality dynamics should be redressed. This can take place only when we seek for another concept that can transcend this aporia. We will discuss the features of this concept and its ability to grasp the intricate process of identity/locality construction in the next section.

2.2 Transcending the Global –Local Counterpoise

The concept that will diffusely inform my arguments to come will be represented by the term "glocalization" (globalization + localization), a term frequently associated with the renowned sociologist, Roland Robertson (1995). I have chosen this concept not because I failed to detect any flaws in its analytic capacity. I have managed to do a few. Rather, its relatively exquisite congruity with reality in general and to my test cases in particular would make it seem to me more dependable than other relevant concepts in the field. In the following lines, I will try to

reiterate selectively the meaning and implications of the term as expounded by Robertson himself, along with some reflections of my own.

Robertson (1995) makes a spring board of the concerns I have already mentioned in the earlier lines. He specifically finds unpalatable the attempts of some social theorists who, while analyzing the very idea of globalization, counterpoise the "local" with the "global". This counterpoise is stretched over two, but very much interwoven, fronts: on the one hand, the "global" is analytically considered in distinction to the "local", as if the former has to be studied and lived in its own terms just as the latter. This is revealed in the expressions (common in numerous texts and discourses), among others, "the global *and* the local", "the global *and* the tribal", "the international *and* the national" and "the universal *and* the particular". On the other hand, in close connection with the above evaluation, the "global" is presented as being at loggerheads with the "local" and vice versa. This "tensing" way of drawing the global-local dynamics (and, globalization as the opposite of localization) would mean that if ever the two meet, then it is a clashing encounter that we come across. Hence the ideas such as "the global *versus* the local", "the international *versus* the national", "the universal *versus* the particular" and so on. For some, these alleged oppositions are simply puzzles; for others, the second of the items in tension in each pair is a reaction against the first, while, still for others, they are merely contradictions. It is exactly these "abstractions" which, for Robertson, expose the "lagging behind real life" of academic disciplines, which induced him to introduce the concept of "glocalization" "firmly"--as he says--into social theory.

Such forked imaginations of the global and the local (and by extension, homogenization and heterogenization), in Robertson's view, neglect two things. First, they neglect the extent to which what is called "local" is in large degree constructed on a trans-or supra– local basis. In

other words, much of the promotion of locality is in fact done from above or outside. "Even in cases where there is apparently no concrete recipe at work", he (p.26) writes, "there is still... a translocal factor at work". He maintains that the contemporary assertion of ethnicity and nationality is made within the global terms of identity and particularity.

The second point is concerned with the problem Robertson identifies in the little attempt to connect the discussion of time-and-space to the "thorny" issue of universalism–and–particularism. In spite of the few serious efforts (by the theme of post-modernity) to resist the tendency of granting much concern to "universal time" and that of the downplaying of the attention "particularistic space" deserves, universalism has been persistently posed counter to particularism. Besides, the emphasis on space is frequently expressed as a diminution of temporal considerations (p.26).

Based on these assumptions, then, the question worth- asking for Robertson is not whether the universal and the particular can be interrelated but how they in fact do so. In an attempt to respond to that question, he goes on to attend to the subject as to what is actually going on. Hannerz (1990), among others, helps him in some respects. He remarks that for locals diversity "happens to be the principle which allows all locals to stick to their respective cultures." At the same time, cosmopolitans largely depend on "other people" carving out special "niches" for their cultures. Thus, "there can be no cosmopolitans without locals" (Hannerz, 1990: 250). In the same vein, Robertson (p.30) maintains that globalization has involved the reconstruction, in a sense, the production, of "home", "community" and "locality". To that extent, he continues, the local is not best seen as a counterpoint to the global. Indeed it can be regarded, subject to some qualifications, as an aspect of globalization. Consequently, for a "glocalizer" like Robertson, Barber's (mentioned in *Ibid*, 33-34) strict (contra) distinction between "tribalism" and "globalism", or "McWorld" homogenization versus a "Jihad world"

heterogenization is simply shallow. This way of defining the global suggests that the global lies beyond all localities, as having systemic properties over and beyond the attributes of units within a global system. It defines the global as if the global excludes the local.

Robertson tries to illustrate his thesis with examples. His example about the formation of the nation-state is especially relevant to my test case. He emphasizes that nationally organized societies, and the "local" aspirations for establishing yet more nationally organized societies, "are not simply units":

> within a global context. Both their existence, and particularly the form of their existence, is largely the result of extra-societal--more generally, extra-local--processes and actions... Much of the apparatus of contemporary nations, of the national-state organization of societies, including the form of their particularities--the construction of their unique identities--is very similar across the entire world, in spite of much variation in levels of development. (p.34)

Nation-states, in other words, are representative examples of "glocal" entities, coming into existence in a typically "glocal" way. This is why the same scholar concludes (p.34) that "they are the most tangible of contemporary sites of the interpenetration of particularism and universalism.

Robertson is therefore persuaded to recommend the substitution of the term "globalization"--in whose employment he perceives major weaknesses--by the concept of "glocalization". In doing so, he believes, one can transcend the tendency to cast the idea of globalization as inevitably in tension with the idea of localization (also resolve the homo-hetero distinction). Instead, he draws a circular cause-and-effect spiral where globalization has involved the creation and the incorporation of locality, processes which themselves largely shape, in turn, the globalization of the world as a whole.

At any rate, Robertson is never alone in many of what he says. With minor degrees of divergence in terms of depth and focus of

emphasis, other scholars have also tried to read the "global"- "local" dynamics through somewhat similar prism[cf. Appadurai, 1996; Shuerkens, 2003; Kivisto, 2002; Luke, 1992; Nedpogaeo, 2001, among many others). I chose to consider his position in some detail because it is succinctly stated and has been quite widely disseminated (let's not also forget that he is, in addition, credited with introducing the term "globalization" into sociology (Sklair, 2001)). But the primary reason for my recapitulation of his ideas is that I almost fully embrace the "glocalization" concept as elaborated by him, and consider it a useful -- to a great extent--tool of analysis for the arguments I will be developing in the next sections.

But I am of the opinion that few points need further remarks, since I am not fully content that Robertson has given them the emphasis they deserve. The first is the issue of power. This should be stressed in two areas. For one thing, the free use of the term "glocalization" may, I think, sometimes, obscure behind it the nature of the power balance lingering among the identities in question. Here, I would like to admit that any maker (in the sense of "ingredient") of a "glocal" reality may not be skimmed off from its co-maker. Rather, the interaction may evolve into another reality, where it won't be possible to distinguish between the "real" identity from that which has "evolved". But still, where a blending of formerly distinct cultures occurs there may be a possibility to contemplate some sort of power relationship between the here-to-fore distinct entities. My concern is just to note the significance of taking into account the "politics of globalization" which includes, but is not only limited to, John Streets' (1997) conception of the term (in which case is composed of institutional practices, policy process and ideology).

Similarly, it is worth-noting that not all identities/cultures can go "global" or undergo a "glocal" construction process. Globalization, as indicated by Poppi (1997:297), "is responsible for selectively sieving which markers of difference can be deployed in the process of

constructing the international division of ethnic and cultural labour". To his credit, Robertson, if at times neglects, but is not oblivious of this fact; he has it that "flying globally" depends on issues of power (p.39). Unfortunately, he once again relapses to his ideal of "freedom", when he suggests that the latter is manifested particularly in the social construction of identity by the appropriation of cultural traditions. My response is once again Poppi's. In his (p.297) own words, "not all cultural traits can sing in the multicultural chorus, only some." Some others are forgotten, still others repressed. The question of power steps in once again.

Let's, finally, return to the homo-hetero debate. We have seen that these simultaneous trends are, *in the final* analysis and *when seen in a wider scale,* complementary and interpenetrative. My intention here is just to underline the italicized phrase/clause. This is because, as acknowledged by Robertson himself (p.40), the two trends certainly can and do collide in concrete situations. In any case, my conviction is that we should develop a holistic insight of the situation we study in order to arrive at the validity of our former contentions. Put otherwise, at a specific juncture, we may feel we have a collision between the two forces, but no sooner will we go on forging a comprehensive outlook towards the matter than we discover another (other) junction(s) where the "homo" and the "hetero" (or the global and the local) go interlaced in harmony. At this instance, one may find Jan Pieterse's (1992, 42) perception of the globalization process in plural terms helpful. (He speaks of globalizations.) He conceives the plurality of globalizing either in terms of its multidimensionality as a process, in terms of its multiple modes and agents and dynamics or impulses, or still by differentiating between globalization as policy and project (see p.46). We can find this useful, useful to vindicate our "glocal" analytic project.

We will see, in the subsequent chapters, how the glocalization concept can be used to analyze the formation and development of a nation-state and contending nationalisms. Such a practical usage of this concept is undertaken to make special cases about the Ethiopian nation-state, Oromo nationalism and Ethiopianist nationalism. By following a politico-sociological approach to the study of globalization, I will try to show how the "local" and the "global" factors have synthesized to form, develop and maintain these phenomena.

Chapter Three

The Glocal Making and Discourse[8] of the Ethiopian Nation-State

By now, the concept of "glocalization" is ready for use. In this chapter, I will try to make an inquiry into the formation of the modern Ethiopian "nation"-state in the light of this concept. The result might appear fascinating, not least because it challenges two well-entrenched assumptions about the Ethiopian nation: in the first place, it has been widely believed (especially until counter-histories began to emerge in the 1960s) that the Ethiopian nation is an age-old entity (3000 years of "nationhood"), with a linear uninterrupted historical development. Secondly, this development has been drawn to have unfolded in a predominantly/fully local setting, of course with interactions with the outer world, but that interaction having no significant impact in the self-identity of the Ethiopians. In the following lines, I will show how glocalization can help us to come up with an alternative insight regarding the same issues. For one thing, and prior to directly tackling the "globo-local" dynamics, the attempt to construct the Ethiopian nation is a modern phenomenon, and any endeavor to name the older entity an "Ethiopian nation" is anachronistic. Also, and more importantly, this attempt at making Ethiopia a "nation" has been accomplished not in a purely local, nor in a merely global, but in a glocal space. At any rate, my treatment of the issue will be very brief and only clue-giving. Among other things, I have depended on analyzing only few selected, but virtually representative, incidents/trends in Ethiopian history to substantiate my cases. I intend this work to serve as a preface for on-coming analyses of nation-state formation which tend to benefit from the informative value of glocalization.

3.1The Polymorphic Nature of the Ethiopian Nation-State Formation

How did the Ethiopian nation-state come into being? Specifically, how relevant is our "glocalization" concept to explain this process (if at all we agree on a *process* of nation-state formation)? As noted above, we will try to proffer here only a partial treatment of the issue, the full-fledged analysis being reserved for up-coming efforts in that regard. We will begin our discussion with the parenthesized clause above: the nation-state formation *as a process.*

Let's re-take our reflections on the origins of identities (which we began in the earlier chapter), in this case those of national identities. Two apparently polarized positions emerge: whether the nation is somewhat "natural" or primordial in origin, or is socio-politically constructed under particular historical circumstances. To be sure, primordialism remains a significant pole of attraction for some, but especially its cruder nineteenth-century versions have largely been discredited (Spencer and Howard, 1999:87). At the other end are those who have argued that nationalism has to be seen as socially constructed in particular ways at different times. Sundry views can be said to make up the social constructionist camp, and the distance between some forms and versions of social constructions and primordialism can vary to a striking degree (*Ibid*: 88).

Some writers (for example, Spencer and Howard, 1999) seek to counter-balance one view with another within the constructionist paradigm to the extent beyond what seems to me to be fair. I have in mind the frequently cited works of Anthony D. Smith (1989), on the one hand, and those of Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm (1983) and Anderson (1991), on the other. Anthony Smith is quoted to have claimed--which he did--that modern nationalism did not appear *ex nihilo*, but has clearly pre-modern antecedents, represented by ethnic cores. On the other side of the spectrum, the "modernists," forming the latter camp, emphasize

incorporation" was historically achieved by administrative and fiscal means, and by the mobilization of sections of the population for inter-state warfare. An upper class *ethnie*, in other words, managed to involve a relatively strong and stable administrative apparatus, which could be used to provide cultural regulation and thereby define a new and wider cultural identity. While, in practice, inter-cultural interpenetration might occur in the process, it is the upper-class culture that consistently sets its stamp on the state and on the evolving national identity (pp. 147-151).

It seems that the genesis of what we lately called the "Ethiopian nation" fits strikingly into this theoretical framework. Whether one subscribes to what Teshale Tibebu (1995) calls the "Aksumite" paradigm or the "Orientalist Semiticist" paradigm[10], the here-to-fore dominant historical narrative considers the Axumite (or Geez?) civilization as the "core" or "lineal ancestor" (Kinfe, 2001) of present-day Ethiopia. According to Teshale, the Geez Civilization, which consists of the *geber* system, *tabot* Christianity and the Axumite ideological thrust, "is the larger envelope that defines the overall Ethiopian civilization project" (p.3). All the "empire-builders" of the "Solomonic Dynasty" who succeeded one after the other since the 13th century invoked this "cultural core" as their spiritual and political base while pushing with their kingdom afar. Between the early fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the predecessor kingdom was significantly reconsolidated and more other lands conquered, and the Abyssinian-Christian culture was diffused to all regions of the empire under control. Kings from the Amhara ethnic group dominated this phase of expansion, and there was a conscious effort to bring conquered peoples firmly under the sway of the Amhara-and-Christian-dominated culture (Keller, 2005; Tadesse, 1972).

Now, I would like to render problematic one concept--"ethnic/cultural core"--in these elaborations at two levels: theoretical and practical. At the level of theory, I agree with Spencer and Howard (1999)

who rejected Smith's conceptualization of the "ethnic core" as constant and apolitical. Quoting Anthias and Yuval-Davis, the above writers considered both ethnic and national collectivities as equally "imagined communities" in Anderson's sense. They further indicated the potential political and ideological conflicts which may be part of the process of establishing an ethnic community (p.105).

In a similar vein, concerning the specific Ethiopian case, I do not agree with the unproblematic assertions of some writers who refer to the "cultural/national core" while discussing the origins of the Ethiopian nation-state formation. Typical among them is Zewde Gebre Sellasie. In his *Yohannes IV* (1975:1) the writer has it that "the idea of the nation-state evolving over a lengthy period is inapplicable to Ethiopia....[The central theme of Ethiopian history] has been the maintenance of a cultural core which has adapted itself to the exigencies of time and place, assimilating diverse peoples." I would interpose that this borders on a misperception, on Zewde's part, of what has been going on in the region in question.

The "cultural core," firstly, should not be taken for granted, for it by itself came to emerge in a processual manner. While referring to the Axumite kingdom, which was based on trade and conquest, we could not speak of a centralized bureaucratic empire, but a patrimonial conquest empire, held together by force, particularistic loyalties and trade. Its close trading links with the Roman Empire contributed to the adoption of Christianity as the official religion during the middle of the fourth century (see, for example, Keller, 2005). But for the Christian religion and the Geez language to become the objects of transmission throughout the parcelized kingdom, it surely meant a process, not a spot event. In other words, the so-called "cultural core" itself was an "imagined community", whose process of acculturation cannot be clearly distinguished from that of the lately conquered peoples. There is no strict

borderline line between the "core community" and the "alien community" later embraced by the kingdom.

When we develop our argument a bit further, we can tackle another problem in Zewde's understanding of the formation of the Ethiopian nation-state. This concerns his rejection, *in toto*, of the applicability of the idea of polymorphic development of the nation-state to the one in Ethiopia. I think this is an over-simplification of a rather complex phenomenon. The author, as we have glimpsed above, has in mind just two, distinct stages in whose completion the nation-state took its today's form: that of the "cultural core" and that of dissemination of the same to other "foreign" lands. Nation-states, I stress, *a la* a host of scholars of nationalism (Hobsbawm, Anderson, Gellner...) undergo a never-ending social process of construction and reconstruction, imaginings and re-imaginings. They rest on exercises of "social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative, if only because historical novelty implies innovation" (Hobsbawm, 1983:76). Israeli nationalism or nation, to take an example, must be novel, whatever the historic continuities of Jews since the very concept of territorial states of the currently standard type in their region is a uniquely recent creation. What we call "mother-tongue" is only metaphorically so, not literally, since the standard national language of literal type are largely constructs of varying, but often brief, age (*Ibid*). We should not be misled by a yet understandable paradox: modern Ethiopian discourse claims to be the opposite of novel--"rooted in antiquity"--and the opposite of constructed--"natural". Whatever the historic or other continuities embedded in the modern concept of "Ethiopia", these very concepts themselves must include a constructed or "invented" component. The development of secular equivalent of the church, the invention of public ceremonies, the mass production of public monuments, the meticulous selection of only "useful" histories and the deliberate forgetfulness of "harmful" ones, the promulgation of

national heroes and so on can be included under this category. Needless to say, the ever-changing imagination of the territorial extent of the Ethiopian state should not be forgotten in this connection.

Lastly, one should question as to what exactly is referred to by the "cultural core" of the Ethiopian nation-state. It should be pointed out, at this juncture, that it may be untenable to cite pointedly just one "core." Does it refer to, for example, the Christian-Geez cultural compound as used to exist during the Axumite period, or the Amharic-Christian ethno-religious synthesis as began to emerge during the so-called Solomonic era or both or none? What I wished to lay bare is that, academically speaking, it is doubtful whether a single, constant and apolitical "cultural core" did exist; instead the production of "cultural/ ethnic core" is a discursive phenomenon used to justify a nationalist undertaking, which renders the former a fluid and multiple, and, above all, a politically-loaded concept to be determined by the nationalist move of the time. It is to this point we will now turn.

3.2 Nationalist Discourse[11] and the Ethiopian Nation

Typical of a nationalist discourse is to invent the past. The nationalist tries to sustain and strengthen his/her "imagined community", carrying with him/her Mao Zedong's (quoted in Finneran, 2003:21) motto, "let the past serve the present". Return to the past takes two interrelated forms. In the first place, history is used to justify a particular form of identity as being the only worth-identifying with one for all the members of the imagined community. All the rest is castigated outright as "artificial" and "harmful". Secondly, history serves the need to immerse the nation backward and forward, into the ocean of timelessness. This effort "naturalizes" for the community its national identity (see Allan and Andrew, 1999; Sorenson, 1993...).

When the notion of a "single unified common culture" is under commotion at a point in time, the response may be to invoke a past where this unity did exist, a unity which is passed down to us in the form of history and memory(Spencer and Howard, 1999: 106). A key nationalist argument often formulated as an apolitical claim about culture is that nations share a common past or, at any rate, memories. Ethiopian nationalist discourse is replete with such instances. That all Ethiopians share a common past and destiny is not only a "fact" but also a matter to be proud of. Any attempt to adopt a "new" identity--whether in ethnic or religious form--is as denigrable as it is abhorable. It should be fought against at all costs because it challenges what is seen as a "sacred truth" of national history.

The Ethiopian nationalist discourse traces the history of the country to the ancient kingdom of Axum (and, at least formerly, its dynasty to Queen Sheba)[12] which, pending its time, rivaled the then major powers in glory. Weakened and then fallen, it was succeeded by the Zagwe Dynasty. The Axumite kingdom had to wait for the year 1270 to be "restored" by a "descendent" of King Solomon of Israel, and embed in the country's political history the line of the long-lasting "Solomonic" Dynasty. This discourse proposes a fixed identity, deeply rooted in the ancient past, which has persisted to the present. Antiquity is confronted with authenticity in equivalence, rendering the "Ethiopian" identity unalterably essential throughout time (Sorenson, 1993).

The works of the American sociologist, D. Levine, who has invariably supported this discourse, ideally represent the binary, but highly interrelated, cast of this narrative. For Levine, Ethiopia is not only antique, but is so *as a nation*[13], too. In a recent article (2004), he argued that nationalism in Ethiopia predated that in Europe by a millennium! Drawing from the definition of Gorski, Levine emphasized that historic Ethiopia did evince all the ingredients of what we today consider as a "nation". Integrally, in an earlier and well-known work, *Greater Ethiopia*

(2000), he had portrayed the unity of the Ethiopian peoples, resting on inter-ethnic interaction, the existence of a number of pan-Ethiopian cultural traits and a characteristic mode of response to the intrusion of alien peoples. These pictures, no doubt, help to loom large Ethiopia as a representation of a unified historic civilization.

What concerns us here most is the politics of history telling. As a number of scholars have amply shown, history telling is never politically innocent. It is rather a discursive construction within which certain preferred representations of "the nation's past" are organized with the aim of naturalizing a specific time_space politics. It exists as a mode of interpreting national space--an interpretation which is by itself a site of cultural contestation between memories and counter-memories. Nationalist memories are always selective. What is remembered indeed may be less important than what is left out. In the end, then, nationalist discourse involves not only collective memory but also collective forget-fullness (Allan and Andrew, 1999; Calhoun, 1997).

Academically speaking, one would but be deeply suspicious of Levine's assertions. For one thing, we should be well aware of the fact that the word "nation" has acquired versatile sheds of meaning with the passage of time. Greenfeld (1992) lists no less than nine referents of the term. The "nation" which used to be employed to refer to a certain community of common origin (Calhoun, 1997) should be distinguished from the one we are having in this modern world of ours. Nationalism, according to Greenfeld (p.166), locates the source of individual identity within a "people", which is seen as "the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty and the basis of collective solidarity". "A crucial thread in the development of nationalism", as Calhoun briefs (1997:69), "was the idea...that political power could only be legitimate when it reflected the will, or at least served the interests of the people subject to it". This was well- embodied in the idea that legitimacy "ascended" from the people, an idea shaped decisively in Europe by republican thought (*Ibid*). As

sovereignty rests with the people, divine or natural rights of kings to rule over their subjects was diametrically rejected in a nationalist setting. It does not seem persuasive to argue that all these elements were existing in ancient and medieval (or even for the most part of "modern") Ethiopia. After all, hereditary and Solmonic-descent-invoking kings swayed aristocratically over peoples vertically dissected along political and religious hierarchies. The nobility and the clergy indisputably held the rein of decision-making and guidance for their subjects. In such a society, it is quite absurd to assert that "sovereignty resides in the people [and] it is one and indivisible, imprescriptible and inalienable" (the 1793 French constitution, cited in Calhoun, p.78). Levine quotes "the people" and "the nation" from the *Kibre Negast* to show that these concepts existed during olden times. What matters, however, is not that these terms were in use, but whether their modern import did indeed pervade the ordinary discourse of the society in reality. It is an almost unanimous opinion of scholars that "nationhood" and "nationalism" are modern phenomena--which Levine himself does admit--and to speak of the contrary needs to substantiate arguments empirically. We should be careful not to understand terms anachronistically.

It would indeed be a flat exaggeration to construe the history of Ethiopia as one of a nation-state, strictly speaking. Generally speaking, "Ethiopian nationalism", as Teshale Tibebu observes (1995:108), "was a popular consciousness in times of foreign aggression. Otherwise it was the parish, at best the region, that defined one's identity." The disunity can perhaps be vividly seen, ironically, in the battlefield, where, as described by the Italian commander-in-chief, Pietro Badoglio (in *Ibid*: 109):

> each chief, with such fighting men as he has been able to gather round him, and each individual soldier, thinks only of getting back--each for himself and as quickly as possible--to *his own village* and *his own house*, in hope of saving

whatever can be saved. This kind of army can never be reunited and used again.

It was exactly this problem that modern-day Ethiopian/Abyssinian emperors wished to overcome by creating a national army. This was best brought into effect by the (chronologically) last one of them, Emperor Haile Selassie, who understood that "he either create a national army and destroy the regional private armies of the nobles once and for all, or perish" (*Ibid*: 110).

The Ethiopian nation-state formation consistently failed to stride on an all-inclusive path. After all, the socio-cultural image of "Ethiopia" has been moulded (and widely seen) after the self-image of the Amhara, ethnically and religiously speaking. As the Ethiopianist writer Levine would acknowledge (1965:298), "it is clear that any attempt to understand the nature of the Ethiopian political system must begin with the fact of Amhara dominance." To be sure, he adds (p.263) that, "the sense of Ethiopian nationhood is... in part [sic] the effect of identification with a legendary and historical national [I would call 'regnal', from 'kingdom'] dynasty shared by all Amhara." More blunt in stating the ethnic and religious exclusiveness of the Ethiopia identity-formation is Teshale Tibebu. He remarks (pp.48-49): "So was born modern Ethiopia, with the defeat of the Oromo, Walayta, Kaffa, Gurage, etc...with the...victory over...the pagan and Muslim south. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a new era began in Ethiopian history, that of modern Ethiopia."

Ever since, a considerable proportion of the members of this "nation" have always escaped assimilation. Writing in 1965, Levine pointed out that a significant section of the total population of Ethiopia remained unidentified with the suzerainty of the Amahara monarchy. It must be assumed, as he put it (p.271), "that many Muslim and pagan tribesmen remain alienated from it." Even when we discard the notion of

contending ethnonationalism, therefore, the sense of nationhood among the ethnically not-so-politicized population was quite inchoate, if at all it existed. This time also the same author's conclusion is striking (p.272):

> It is true that that national government is scarcely perceived as an embodiment of the will of a united Ethiopian people, for feelings of solidarity among the peoples of Ethiopia are still very weak. Regional, ethnic and religious differences remain the paramount foci of orientation for the vast majority of the population. Such differences are accentuated by the traditional notions of Amhara superiority and sense of exclusiveness.

It would, then, be difficult to assert that the Amhara succeeded in building an effective nation-state after their own image. In the end, "the efforts of the Amhara kings were rather limited in scope; [one thing they triumphed at was that] they managed to retain their Monophysite Abyssinian identity in their heart-lands" (Smith, 1994:148). In reality, Ethiopia remained a multinational state.

Coming to my on-going critique of Levine's statements, it would be useful to add that even the modern phenomenon of "nationhood" appeared historically in multiple phases. Edward Carr (1945) suggested three. In the first phase, when the secular arm of the "nation" emerged predominant--of course relying on the principle *cuius regio, eius religio* -- the nation was identified with the person of the sovereign. In the second and the third, the full-fledged concept of "sovereign people" and secularism emerged in the process, the difference between the two being only in the relationship between the political and the economic powers. In our case, we can take notice of Tewodros's "Ethiopia" in labour to give birth to the first-stage-nation, which she actually failed to do so. Tewodros, among other things, strived to put the church under his control--in vain--but did not hesitate to be identified with the "nation". [He called himself "the husband of Ethiopia and the fiancé of Jerusalem" (Rubenson, 1966)]. These were not significantly altered till the reign of Haile Selassie, where the on-going process of relative secularization of

the state culminated in putting the church under political control. But still neither full state secularization nor the divorce of the nation from the Sovereign was achieved.

Levine's thesis also seems to lend allusion to the oft-noted notion that, in Ethiopia, it is the nation which made the state and not the other way round. Here, I would prefer to borrow from Chaim Gans (2003) his two concepts, "statist nationalism" and "cultural nationalism". For Gans (p.7), in the former type, states create a homogeneous national culture for the sake of realizing other political, economic and distributive ends. In this case, the national culture is the means, and the values of the state are the aims. In the latter brand, members of groups sharing a common history and culture have a fundamental, morally significant interest in adhering to their culture and in sustaining it across generations (and, in some cases, creating a state of their own). National culture is the aim here, the state being the means. Gans pointedly exhorts his readers to differentiate between these two versions of nationalism while analyzing specific cases.

Whereas I think that his two concepts are certainly useful, I don't share his concern that they should always be seen distinctly. In many instances, the two forms of nationalism are found simultaneously and inseparably. The Ethiopian case is a good example. It would be understandable to argue that an ethno–religious (Amhara-Christian) community sought in history, ideologically and culturally motivated, to sustain its values and fortify its state. On the other hand, one would not be mistaken in contending that in the process of expanding and consolidating the state, the community was striving to secure other ends, particularly economic. In order to satiate its economic appetite safely and steadily, it set out to assimilate, and thus "nationalize", the alien, conquered peoples. In the process, the "nation" made the state and the state made the "nation" (i.e., if at all it is proper to label it so).

One would be no less cautious of endorsing Levine's "patterns of unity of the peoples of Ethiopia". In my view, many of his contentions beg either doubts or outright objections. The so-called "pan-Ethiopian" traits are very general (see Sorenson, 1993) and are by no means conterminous with the boundaries of today's Ethiopia; they do overlook abounding dissimilar traits amongst the peoples of later-day Ethiopia; they do ignore the subjective criteria of categorizing identity; some of the traits indicated are only derivatives of others and need not be recounted, and so forth.

Similarly, the "pattern of continuous process of interaction of the peoples of Ethiopia" does flatly ignore the peoples' interaction with "others", too--these "others" perhaps being the ones with whom an Ethiopian tribe may have had the most intimate relationship.[14] Finally, the argument that the "Ethiopian" tribes waged war with one another and therefore had a unified sense of identity is a futile attempt to teleologically prove their later–day unity under a common state. After all, won't these occasions prove that they (the peoples) had distinct and clashing identities and hence stand as pretexts for fencing localities, and, in today's parlance, for fighting for the right to self-determination?

Regardless of their status in terms of intellectual rigour, however, the statements made by Levine have/had a timely political relevance and significance. He usually tries to alert those "concerned" (those with a dint of allegiance to the "Ethiopian nation") to an ongoing or approaching "undesirable" trend, or console them of any "unwarranted" anxiety about the arrival of such a trend. His articles have been mostly written with the objective of "correcting misconceptions" that Ethiopia will be disintegrated after Haile Sellassie(1971); discrediting the Eritrean movement for its alleged lack of cross-cultural unity(1965); criticizing the policies of the EPRDF government that are not in line with the Ethiopianist agenda (2000, 2004), etc. No doubt, Levine, just like many other Ethiopianist writers, endeavors to invoke and/ or recreate the past in order to help the maintenance of the Ethiopianist traditional

discourse. This is clear from one of his articles which appeared in 1965: "It seems to me clear that by embracing the notion of themselves as a unified people, Ethiopians have nothing to lose but a misguided and impoverished sense of their own historical experience" (p.15).

3.3 The Glocal Formation of the Modern Nation-State: The Era of Emperor Tewodros

The centuries commencing from the 17th one saw a decline in the power of the monarchy; that of the regional lords continued to grow. "By the second half of the eighteenth century", Bahru notes (2002.10), "the emperors in Gondar merely reigned; they did not rule". This period in Ethiopian history, known as the "Zemene Mesafint", is taken conventionally to bridge the old and the modern Ethiopian state.

For many commentators on Ethiopian history, it was Emperor Tewodros who is considered to have inaugurated the modern history of this region. Rubenson(1966: 90) explains why: "Tewodros is the father of modern Ethiopia in the sense that he conceived the idea of a united, strong, and progressive Ethiopian state, *the peer of any other state in the world*" (Emphasis mine). I would stress the phrase, "*any other state in the world*", since, in my opinion, it succinctly expresses the "glocal" dynamics being played on the Ethiopian plane and, in particular, in the mind of Tewodros, during the latter's time.

Tewodros had, briefly put, basically two programmes of achieving his aim at modernization. The first was the re-constitution of the traditional institutions of the land--a re-constitution which entailed the organizational unity of the Church, the end of doctrinal divisions, and the restoration of Episcopal authority (Crummey, 1969:459). This included the expulsion of Catholic missions if Tewodros felt they had created hard times to the bishop of Ethiopia (*Ibid*). The second flank of his mission was directed at the elimination of the abuses of the Zemene

Mesafint. He fragmented traditional administrative divisions and thus deprived many local princes and kings of their bases of power. Administrators mostly recruited by him were responsible for collecting tithes and taxes on behalf of the sovereign and were instrumental in Tewdros's efforts to break the power of patrimonial, feudal lords (*Ibid*; Bahru, 2002; Keller, 2005). In any case, centralization and fortification of the state's power were the immediate targets of his programmes.

But what could account for that? The attempt by Tewodros to forge "national" unity was a direct response to the challenge which growing foreign pressure posed for a deeply divided Ethiopia (Rubenson, 1975). This challenge had two elements: Egyptian and European. In order to forestall these challenges, he began to create a disciplined, professional state army for the first time, salaried, clothed and equipped by himself. For achieving his objectives, Tewodros went far in his efforts to rely on European assistance. The quest for an assistance of this sort could indeed be regarded as the pivot of Tewodros's policy. In fact, this reliance on foreign support was extended to the curiosity of introducing European technology and values in general into his country (Bahru, 2002).

We can contemplate, in these incidents, interesting modes of interaction between the "global" and the "local". The European state system had predated Tewodoros's era by far. The programme of "nationalizing" states, too, had, by and large, been flourishing before the former's time. Tewodros's most coveted nation, England, was even unprecedented in this regard. According to many scholars of nations and nationalism, the English nation-state and the full ideology of "Englishness" were extant by the sixteenth and seventieth centuries (Seton-Watson, 1977; Greenfeld, 1992; Smith, 1989). It was this English notion of the nation--a unified, individualistic, civic entity--which was later inherited by Britain's colonies in America, and, afterwards, became characteristic of the United States. It was also this unified and

prosperous organic whole (the "nation-state") that clicked on the eardrums and mind of Tewodros.

Many of what he did--creating national army, encouraging the use of Amharic as a national language, stressing the construction of roads rather than of churches--is best interpreted by Rubenson as :

> Clearly...this was not a return to the past but an attempt to meet the challenges of the future, and *there is more than one suggestion in it that Tewodros was acquainted with the concepts of post-Reformation European nation-states and absolutism* (p.173). (Emphasis mine)

This is substantiated by the fact that during the Emperor's time, knowledge about Europe and the Europeans had increased in the country (*Ibid*) and, above all, he was passionately overtaken by some of their values. This went to such an extent that he had the guts to express himself in these words: "Do not believe I am an Abyssinian at heart; no, I am as one of you [Europeans]". "No doubt, you have heard of our, the Ethiopian people's, ignorance and blindness" (quoted in *Ibid*: 178). Crummey (1969: 462) has another interesting quote. The Bishop, Abuna Salama, speaking for Tewodros, announced that Ethiopia "must now become like one of the kingdoms of Europe." In this connection, Crummey's comments are also illuminating:

> Here we have an idea distinctive in Ethiopian history, and one which deserves, in the strictest sense of the term, the use of the word "modern". The idea that Ethiopia should emulate the technological [only?] achievements of Europe is one which sharply distinguished Tewodros from his predecessors among the Mesafint, and, indeed amongst the emperors. This is not to say that his predecessors were not interested in foreign technology--both Webe and Sahela Sellase definitely were. But to them it was something exotic, something which was to be incorporated into a traditional framework. They saw no necessity for re-making Ethiopia, for transforming its society.

All these do illustrate that Tewodros was toiling to implant the seeds of the modern nation-state--as in Europe--in his own country. [This, of course, does not preclude the fact that, in all his modernizing efforts, he "drew on the past for inspiration" (Rubenson, 1975: 174)].

But was not Tewodros much cautious, at times even adverse, to the Europeans? Indeed he was. His intransigence towards any kind of uninvited interference in his internal affairs is well-known, just as his fiery response to what he saw as a debasing attitude of Europeans to him. But the interesting thing is this: Tewodros, when reacting to European (or Egyptian) encroachment did so thinking and trying to act as if his country were one of them (a European nation-state) and himself one of their leaders!

This is very much similar to the "reverse discourse" Appiah (in Robertson, 1995:37-8) mentions in his discussion of the decolonization literature of Africa. Railing against the cultural hegemony of the West, the activists are of its party without knowing it. Defiance, he writes, "is determined less by 'indigenous' notions of resistance than by the dictates of the West's own Herderian legacy--its highly elaborated ideologies of national autonomy, of language and literature as their cultural substrate". No doubt, Tewodros wasn't lucky enough to reach all the sophistications of the West; but the fact that his vision outstripped his capabilities was quite conspicuous.

Deeper in Tewodros's psyche, one can perceive *ressentiment*--a psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings (Greenfeld, 1992 :169-170). On the one hand, he wishes to be treated on equal terms. Ethiopia is in no way inferior to Great Britain (Rubenson, 1975). On the other hand, he never hesitates to call himself "blind", "ignorant", "a blind ass" (Bahru: p.37) in his ambitious letters to Queen Victoria and Rassam. The sociological basis for this state of the psyche (*ressentiment*), Greenfeld explains (1992: 170), is twofold:

> The first condition...is the fundamental comparability between the subject and the object of envy, of rather the belief on the part of the subject in the fundamental equality between them... The second...is the actual inequality of such dimensions that it rules out practical achievement of the theoretically existing quality.

This tension involves a creative process which is by definition a reaction to the values of others and not to one's own condition regardless of others. As a result, the new system of values that emerges is necessarily influenced by the one to which it is a reaction. In short, it is always possible to see behind *ressentiment* the values (or any other "foreign" element) they disclaim (Greenfeld: p.170).

Tewodros's "entanglement" with glocalization took another form, too. In order to boost his country's defensive capability against the alleged threat of his enemies, he resorted to the spatial imagination of a Christian solidarity at an international level. His letters curiously sought to globalize his Muslim enemies, and expected a global Christian response to this threat. Accordingly, his appeal was to freshen that global production of a locality which apparently ceased to exist since the end of the Crusades. Tewodros's aim was to fork his policy of confronting his enemies into two: building a strong nation-state and marshalling a viable Christian solidarity, both of which were both global and local at the same time in appeal and production. Although the Europeans found his second appeal not so attractive--and chose to ignore it--this idea of his was not dead with him but was inherited by his successor, Yohannes IV.

3.4 Glocal Formations during Tewodros's Successors

We have dealt with the glocal formations during Tewodros's era in some detail because, as implied earlier, this period has peculiarly pioneered much of the glocal parameters of the periods to come. Accordingly, in the following lines, only a modest discussion of further developments will be made, since, in a sense, the latter can be seen to have been essentially chained in singular continuity with the former. Moreover, my intent in this chapter as a whole is not to narrate history

per se, but deductively making a sense out of that. Therefore, as pointed out elsewhere, barely a few "gems" of history will be raised in the process of theory-verification.

Yohannes IV, too, engaged himself in the global production of localities. At one level, he followed a more liberal politico- administrative but a more fanatic religio-cultural "nation"-building policy. At the same time, the Emperor took the course of intensified diplomatic relations, and, in turn, buttressed his authority and legitimacy with a relatively strong, modernizing army that deterred reckless incursions into Abyssinia by any real or potential enemies (Bahru, 2002; Keller, 2005). Besides, in order to support his efforts to build an invincible "nation"-state, he, just as his predecessor, got involved in another glocal appeal: the discourse of forging an international Christian solidarity. Eventually, succeeding in some of his objectives and failing in some others, Yohannes bequeathed his throne to his successor who, as we shall see, exploited the same glocal dynamics to a profoundly spectacular extent.

Apart from the sort of the projection of identities on a glocal scale as was pursued by both Tewodros and Yohannes, Menelik was distinguished from them in some more aspects of locality production. Three of these can be discerned easily. The first was the expansion to the south.

The motivations behind this move were more than one (see, for example, Bahru, 2002; Markakis, 1974; Asafa, 2005,). The historical drive of Abyssinian kings to expand towards the south is a point not negligible. At the time of Menelik's coronation, Abyssinia was the mightiest power in the region, surrounded in the south by weak petty states. A great motivational factor was the fact that these states had been dominated by the Oromo, the Muslims and the pagans, all of whom had never ceased be recalled with bitterness by the northerners. Especially unforgettable and unforgivable were the Oromo who had occupied a large mass of land, some in the heart of Abyssinia, some other down in the

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south. But all of the Oromo-occupied territories were always regarded as legitimately belonging to the domain of the Solomonic throne. But Menelik's expansionist vision was unsurpassingly wide: "to re-establish the ancient frontiers of Ethiopia up to Khartoum and as far as Lake Nyanza with all the Gallas [sic]" (quoted in Markakis, 1974:23).

One should also never forget economic motives. The south-western region, with its gold, ivory, coffee, spices and slaves was a storehouse of luring items for lucrative trade and for mitigating the intensity of northern famine of the time. The hunger for land also was a factor for, first, north-south migration and, second, for extending territories permanently.

But the most relevant factor to our discussion here is the ominous intrusion of European imperialism into the Horn of Africa. By the time Menelik became emperor, the European colonizers had already laid their claim to the entire coast and were moving further inland, replicating the same rivalrous move they had intensified elsewhere in Africa. Italy claimed the Red Sea coastal region and was making its way to the plateau from the north. The Somali littoral was partitioned among Italy, France and England. In the west, the British occupied the Sudan. Southwards, Kenya had also fallen to their colonial administration. It is clear, thus, that the consolidation of the modern Ethiopian bureaucratic empire coincided with the European powers' so-called scramble for Africa

We find Menelik's expansion related to this latter process in two different versions of historical narratives, both attesting to the glocal formation of the Ethiopian nation- state. What came to be known as the Ethiopian nationalist version would mention that Menelik had "no intention of being an indifferent onlooker –on if the distant powers have the idea of dividing up Africa" (Menelik's own words cited in Seyoum, 1997:76). He rather anticipated them by setting out to successfully "re-unify" the Ethiopian state–empire. In contrast to this version, we find an Oromo nationalist depiction of Menelik's Ethiopia as a "dependent

constructing "Ethiopia" ("nation-building"). It went on doing one of its most paradoxical jobs of "nation-destroying" (from an Ethiopian perspective!) towards the north at about the same time. A province called Eritrea was left to pursue, in the forecoming years, its own path of glocal identity construction--"Eritreannes"--under Italian colonial rule!

Haile Selassie's era saw far more (in number) and relatively unsophisticated instances of glocalizing the Ethiopian nation-state. Perhaps one of the most glaringly pertinent events of these was materialized in Tafari's and later Haile Selassies's success in facilitating Ethiopia's entry into different international organizations (the League of Nations, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, etc). Without doubt, international organizations are embodiments of glocal formations *par excellence*. They are, simply put, modish attempts to organize globally, or at least pan-locally, the valorization and fortification of particularities. With her entry into these organizations, Ethiopia formally became both a subject and an object of this peculiar process.

Internally, nation-building and modernization were innovatively intertwined during this era as well. This is a rather vast and complicated subject exquisitely elaborated by, *inter alia*, Markakis (1974). Here, I will be concerned with only one issue: that of the constitutional system. "It was to be the major historical achievement of Haile Selassie", in the words of Bahru (2002:140), "that he finally succeeded in realizing the unitary state of which Tewodros had dreamt." One of the instruments used to this end is the constitution of 1931, which was adopted after the world nations' propensity towards the same, and partly intended for foreign consumption. The constitution set up the juridical framework of emergent absolutism. Glorifying centralism, the stipulations left the hereditary nobility only with rights over tributary land on the basis of their service to the state. Further, more than Menelik's ministerial system [which was also merely adopted for European consumption and "as in Europe" (*Ibid*)], the constitution was also intended to act as a

vehicle for national integration. The parliament was to be a school of national unity (Bahru, p.141). Here also, the "global" served the "local".

It should be stressed that these are only a few examples taken from a multifaceted trend. What deserves our final and yet special consideration as an instance of glocal moves during Haile Selassie's period is the seminal germination of ethno-national appeals in Ethiopia, challenging not only the Ethiopian rule/government, but also the age-old "standard" history and identity it has fashioned for itself. These developments commenced to take place with the emergence of an educated class, some of whose members started to look at their present and future through a historical prism. They understood the plights of their families and of themselves in ethnic terms, and thus politicized ethnicity in a nationalist form. Their marginalization from the state beaurocracy both as students and as members of an ethnic group, and -- this is the most relevant one to us here--their exposures to international affairs--all contributed to this mental transformation (see the next chapter). Thereafter, the standardized identity and history of Ethiopia was seriously challenged, and this discursive clash then was extended to the battlefront, too. The interesting thing to note here is that both the Ethiopian/Ethiopian regime's front and that of the contending ethnonationalisms went for a glocal tramp, both at the discursive and the battle fronts, in their quest for triumph. The history of nationalism in Ethiopia would thereafter come indisputably to be equivalent to the history of contending nationalisms. By taking an example, the chapters to come in this thesis will specifically deal with these themes.

Before that, let us return to our discussion of nationalist discourse to view briefly how the grand Ethiopianist narrative struggled discursively to outlaw those dissident ethnonationalisms and keep the *status quo* intact. The general picture of external intervention to secure this dominant discourse will finally end up this chapter.

3.5 Misrepresentation of Dissident Ethnonationalisms

Misrepresenting dissident ethnonationalisms is a characteristic ingredient of Ethiopian nationalist discourse, just like any other. Among others, the Eritrean[16] and the Oromo movements[17] have undergone too much of this. The unity of Eritreans to Ethiopians has been underlined on cultural and linguistic bases (Emperor Haile Sellassie, as cited in many works), while the former's nationalist discourse and movement has been vilified as "obscurantist" (Addis, 1984:47), ignorant of "fundamental political and historical factors" (Melaku, 1989: 143), "artificial entity" (Aklilu HabteWold in Sorenson, 1993) and "Arab movement" (presented in various forms by different writers). Finally, the Eritrean struggle for constructing a history has been defied an "invention" whose treatment with nonchalance by Ethiopianist writers is not so "irresponsible" (Bahru, 2000:15).

I can only understand these vituperative expressions within a political framework, as political discourses, rather than as critically examined academic comments. Sorenson's (1993) criticisms against such discourses are worth-noting. Eritrean nationalist discourse rarely projects a unified identity into antiquity; it rather does emphasize its transformation under Italian colonialism. This may not seem strange when seen from the perspective of nation–state formation in the African context, in which all contemporary states are artificial creations of imperialism. As I see it, nationalism, as a general reminder, should not necessarily lean over antique glories and agonies. It can also look for recent history to sustain itself. What is required of it is just to invent *a* past, any suitable past, not necessarily a "timeless" past. The choice is roundly its own.[18] On top of that, Ethiopian essentialism is equally untenable, too. In this connection, let me make it clear that I don't have any problem with the artificiality of Eritrean identity. My problem rests solely with the idea that Ethiopian identity is a negation of the same.

Nationalism's tendency to naturalize its jewels can be vindicated only in its own terms.

Oromo nationalism has been no less underrated. As is the case with Eritrean nationalism, that of the Oromo has also been regarded as only a recent phenomenon, without any historical yeast. Clapham (1988; 1994), Perham (1969) and Marcus (1992) all agree that the rhetoric of "Oromia" as a historic nation is a sole fiction. Nay, it is, for these writers, nearly impossible even today to define any conception of "being Oromo". Gebru (in Sorenson, 1993) replicates this view more precisely when he rejects the appeal of establishing an independent Oromia as a construction erected in a "historic void" and dismisses Oromia as an "abstraction" relating to neither "recent past experience nor to...prevailing objective conditions."

Many of my responses to the misrepresentation of Eritrean nationalism remain valid here as well, especially about the antiquity of nations. In that sense, the Ethiopianist writers are not wrong in claiming that Oromia and Oromo nationalism did not exist in the remote past. What they have missed, rather, is the absence of any logical connection whatsoever between their premises and conclusion. The fact that *Oromumma* (Oromo national consciousness) did not exist in the past by no means can tell us that it does not, or will not, or should not exist. Moreover, and in some contrast to the Eritrean case, Oromo nationalists do trace their nation back into antiquity. Whether this is historically correct or not is not so important from a nationalist perspective. What is instead important to note is that *the past is used to serve the present.* At this very point, Ethiopian and Oromo nationalists follow a very similar logic.

The obvious motive behind these Ethiopianist discourses is to frustrate the Eritrean and Oromo struggles for independent statehood and/or nationhood. They are meant, in other words, to ensure the perseverance of the nation-state as it is sketched out by the Ethiopianist

discourse. This is exactly one plane to discern the global-local dynamics at work: the Ethiopianist narrative, having developed historically following a glocal path, is, as well, styled in recent times to "solve" a "local" problem through a global appeal, i.e., the appeal of nationalist discourse. Yet the second plane is the way the international powers took heed of this "local" struggle for power.

3.6 The External Role

In recent times, the external role in maintaining the *status quo* began with Western scholarship. Whether or not it surely fits into the Oriental Semiticist paradigm (Teshale, 1995), the predominant tendency of the literature under this category, as Sorenson indicates, has been to emphasize Ethiopia's cultural and historical unity, reflecting traditional concerns with Semitic ties, royal chronicles, the imperial state, and the Abyssinian Great Tradition. However, given that more recently oppositional discourses have emerged among some Western intellectuals, the struggle for identity and history among Western scholars on Ethiopia has also intensified.

But more decisively, and perhaps behind and/or in complementary to, this Ethiopianist Western scholarship has dwelled the politico-military role of the big powers. The role of external powers in safeguarding the *status quo* of the ethno-religious power alignment in the Ethiopian empire is well-treated in different bodies of literature. This external help is discussed to have played decisive roles in this line both in the remote past and in the modern history of the empire. The former can best be demonstrated by the stupendous back-up the Portuguese proffered to Christian Abyssinia at the time of its historic 16thcentury subjugation under Muslim rule. Instances to exemplify the latter are of course far more in number and complexity than the former.

In 1916, the alliance between the ruling class in Ethiopia and the Allied Powers brought down Iyasu's government. For the one, Iyasu's novel approach to nation-building, and for the other, his policy of inciting colonial subjects to uprising were seen as inimical actions, which called upon internal-external collusion against the common enemy. Top-notch military aid and training of personnel during Haile Sellassie's regime first by the British, and then by the US, served indispensably to crush down any opposition against the *status quo*. The 1970s and 1980s saw the massive involvement of the Soviet Union and its allies on the side of the military government in its struggle against the various national liberation movements. To date, the rhetoric of the "war on terror" has been skillfully manipulated by the EPRDF-led government to solicit material and political aid from the US, which is said to be partly used for the same cause (See, for example, Asafa, 2000). Indeed, if Ethiopia dares to boast of an uninterrupted *national* historical record of any length of time, then it has also been its guilt for declining to share the credit with the *international*!

To recap: the formation and the resultant image of the Ethiopian nation-state and the nationalism thereof have been, thus, neither antique nor matters of peculiar local development. They have remained to be products of social construction and invention of tradition, which specifically began to take place in the modern era and in the context of globalization. In this sense, Ethiopianist nationalism is in no fundamental way different from those nationalisms which contend it and, ironically, which it never hesitates to "revile" as "modern creations of globalization"!

Chapter Four

The Glocal Making and Discourse of Oromo Nationalism

In the last chapter, we aimed at achieving two objectives at a preliminary level: deconstructing Ethiopian nationalism and integrating the analysis of the formation of the Ethiopian nation-state into the glocal analytic framework. In this chapter, our objective is to correspondingly probe the discursive and formative constructions of Oromo nationalism.[19] We will try to see that Oromo nation/ nationalism, just like its Ethiopian counterpart, is a modern, glocal, creation. In the end, we may have proven that, in the sense mentioned just above, neither of the two nationalisms can be in a position to brag of special history of antiquity and externally "untainted" localism for its respective nation. This is the conclusion which at least deconstruction may seem to lead us to.

4.1 The Oromo "Nation": A Critique

Nationalist discourse, as we have seen earlier, casts a projection into an uninterrupted chain of history for its subjects, "the people", the *ethnie*, as nations. Oromo nationalist discourse is no exception. By way of charting its present and future courses, Oromo nationalism is buttressed by its search for itself, or at least its progenitor, in the past. The struggle for representation of a unique identity and destiny thus takes a form of struggle for a unique and unified history.

An almost ubiquitously running theme in Oromo nationalist discourse is the antique nature of the Oromo ethnic identity/ group. Hinging on this assumption, Oromo scholars like Makuria Bulcha (1996: 49) deplore the "invented tradition" model and reject its power to explain the rise of Oromo nationalism. Instead, the writer claims that there is ample historical and ethnographic evidence to suggest that the Oromo

had a common past and identity as a people /nation (p.50). Besides invoking a unified cultural and linguistic past, he tries to substantiate his argument by maintaining that the Oromo rarely formed alliances with the non-Oromo to fight against "their" Oromo groups and that any intra-Oromo discord was simply a "quarrel", in contrast to "*dula*" (war), which they conducted with "others", non-Oromos. Oromo nationalism, as such, for many an Oromo nationalist, can be uninterruptedly traced back to the old Oromo "nation", to a certain "ethnic core", as stated by the elsewhere-cited A. Smith (see chapter three). Accordingly, these writers consider the discourse about the "invented" nature of Oromo history and identity as a (false) "rhetoric", and take it to be an offshoot of the "erroneous belief that Ethiopia is an ancient and immutably natural entity" (Makuria, 1996: 49).

These assertions, once again, I think, should be taken as parts forming a wider nationalist discourse. As an objective, academic commentator, however, some critiques can be launched against them. But before that, let me make it clear that I do support Makuria's view that Ethiopia as "an ancient and immutably natural entity" is an erroneous rhetoric. I have tried to partially sketch out my arguments in chapter three. I am yet of the opinion that the notion of an "ancient Oromo nation" is nothing different, either. My position alone, then, is quite sufficient to falsify Makuria's argument that those who believe in the invention of Oromo identity do necessarily uphold the theory about the antiquity of the Ethiopian identity. I maintain that both are the same in this respect: they are based on "invented traditions".

As we have briefly seen in the last chapters, to subscribe exclusively to either of the extreme views of the instrumentalists/constructivists and the primordialists is indeed difficult to defend. On the one hand, historical research shows however dim continuities between modern national cultures and their antecedents, and in patterns of geopolitical regions and relations (Calhoun, 1997:30). One can also see that

nationalism derives much of its force from the phenomenological experience of ordinary people that in general their nations/ *ethnies* have always been there. Many of the cherished elements of national cultures are not created by individuals (i.e., elites). In fact, individuals only become persons in social relationships that are already shaped by culture (*Ibid*).

On the other hand, we can lucidly witness that many aspects of these social worlds are products of human action and subject to potential manipulation (Brass, 1979, 1991). Constructivists do underestimate the power of culture and the force of taken-for-granted identities to get along in the world. As I indicated in my discussion of the formation of the Ethiopian "nation", it would be rare (just to be safe!) "to find cultures so clearly discrete, non-overlapping and distinct that they automatically become the basis for different social groupings" (Calhoun, 1997:32). Rather, ethnic/national identities are mostly multiple, subject to choice, and dependent on the situation in which they find themselves. The issue, as Calhoun rightly states, is not just whether cultural commonalities exist, but how they are constructed and reconstructed as they are called into action by leaders and ideologues. Brass's (in *Ibid*) insight is also remarkable: "The leaders of ethnic movements invariably select from traditional cultures only those aspects that they think will serve to unite the group and that will be useful in promoting the interests of the group as they define them."

The attempt by Oromo nationalists to lean modern-day Oromo nationalism over a historical Oromo "nation", the former being an inevitable outcome of the later, is quite simplistic. Even if we assume that an "ethnic core" did exist (which I always tend to deconstruct), nationalism as a modern phenomenon, needs some socio-political/structural conditions and/or individual agency to emerge. Oromo nationalism partly came out as a byproduct of common fate-sharing among few Oromo elites, who happened to pass through modern

flux. In 1958, he observed that "Oromo" in Jimma meant a "non-Muslim", only to undergo, some decades later, such a radical shift that it became the primary and ethnic object of identification among the people of the same region. In Ambo, staunch "Ethiopians" turned radical Oromo nationalists when the wave of *Oromumma* swept across the people in later years (pp. 40-46). In this connection, it is important to note that in these constantly changing and diversified waves of identity construction, it would just be up to a nationalist of any type to choose out any of the "identities" of a people (at any given time and place), along with the relevant historical saga to (re)create his /her brand of nationalism and mobilize those people on that basis.

The projection of an Oromo "nation" or *Oromumma* into the remote past is as an overstated and anachronistic claim as is that of an Ethiopian "nation" or "nationalism" (as we have seen in the last chapter). There is no way of denying that some people in the past enjoyed some sort of cultural and linguistic commonalities. But here again objective conditions alone won't tell us much. Contrary to Makuria Bulcha's contentions, both Baxter (1983) and Mohammed (1998) write that the Oromo indeed waged wars against one another. In fact, the latter tries to spell out the nation-hood of the Oromo by comparing them to the Amharas, Tigreans ...who also fought one another, and that the Oromo developed their unison mainly due to their common experience of colonial tyranny, which, I think, developed only later historically. Besides, Paulos[20] (1998) convincingly argues that Oromo nationalism went through three distinct stages, represented by the time periods, 1855-1913, 1917-1960, and 1960-1991, respectively. He shows that it was only the third phase which witnessed the development of Oromo ethnonational consciousness, while in the first two phases, regional identifications swayed over ethnic allegiances. Such a vibrant mass movement /ideology as nationalism--risking redundancy--can only be modern. Some Oromo nationalist writers also never belie this fact.

resistant or reactive move to this "global imperialism". Seen as a predominantly local movement, Oromo nationalism is portrayed as a pathetically suppressed and smothered movement, but still destined to diligently penetrate this gloomy blanket and see the glittering light of freedom (i.e., self-determination) at some moment in the future. In this depiction of the Ethiopian-Oromo struggle, we once again come across the picture of a tenuous chasm between the "global" and the "local."

The theoretical part of this paper has tried to debunk such a conception of reality (in this case, the Wallersteinian one (see chapter two), since most Oromo nationalists at least partly and implicitly seem to adopt it in their analyses). I won't treat that here any more. My concern in the following pages is to show how the concept of glocalization helps us to harbor a holistic understanding of the making and discourse of Oromo nationalism. By doing so, I will try to rebut the assumption that a "contradiction exists between subjugated peoples and...globalism" (Asafa, 2001: 390), and argue, by partly drawing on the seminal thesis of Van Heur (2004), in favor of the opposite: when seen holistically, it is not only the Ethiopian state that has followed a glocal path, but so also has Oromo nationalism.

4.2.1 Emergence and Early Development

A recurrent theme in the analysis of the rise of Oromo nationalism is that it originated in the modern institutions, in the capital city of Ethiopia. These specifically included the army, the university, the bureaucracy and the Parliament. It was here that some Oromo "discovered", for the first time, that they all shared common/similar humiliation, language, and values. This implies one indispensable commonality: almost all of the first Oromo nationalists were educated individuals. This is simply in line with the fact that in all nationalisms,

the educated class plays an essential role. It may, to some extent, make sense, then, that "it was the conflict between the Amhara and the educated Oromo that led the latter to Oromo nationalism" (Mohammed, 1996:199).

The post-War period in Ethiopia witnessed the expansion of modern educational facilities. Following his return from exile in 1941, Haile Sellassie's era saw the creation of a Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, the adoption of the first budget for education, and the foundation of the first secondary school in Addis Ababa (Markakis, 1979:147). The efforts in this field went on progressing, albeit sluggishly, within the time frame of 1944 to 1950. At the latter year, higher education was introduced in the form of the University College of Addis Ababa, only to spread out, in the coming years, in some other parts of the country (*Ibid*). It is important to note here that all these developments were meant to modernize the country's institutions (by absorbing the graduates into the state's bureaucratic structure) under the leadership of the Emperor, and thus install modernization in a way that served the traditional polity of Ethiopia (*Ibid*).

The attempt to synchronize modern facilities with the age-old alignment of power could be detected from the uneven representation of the different sections of the Ethiopian society in the educational system. Ethnically speaking, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Amhara and the Tigre were found to be overrepresented in the university compared to their proportion of the total population (Balsvik, 1985:44). The Oromo, on the other hand, whose percentage of the population was approximated at 40, were grossly underrepresented therein, accounting for about 10 percent of the students (*Ibid*). This clearly reflects, but also perpetuates, the subordinate position the Oromo occupied in the socio-cultural domain of the Ethiopian polity. Escaping from simplicity, however, dictates that we should make few investigations as to who (regarding some aspects) these privileged Oromo really were. In terms of geographical specificities, those

Oromiffa-speakers that were lucky enough to pursue higher education usually came from areas like Shewa and Wellegga --areas where, during the 19th century southward expansion/colonization (depending on how you see it), Christianity had become the overwhelmingly predominant faith of the people, and where the latter had participated in the further expansion/colonization southwards (Van Heur, 2004:44). Therefore, among the vast masses of the *afaan Oroomo*-speakers in Ethiopia, only those who had in the first place cooperated with the Ethiopian state were enrolled as students in the university. The others from areas like Arsi, Bale and Sidamo, who were suffering from the *neftenynya-gebbar* system and were either Muslim or pagan, were ignored. Even the educated ones of the Oromo, therefore, were meant/expected to perpetuate the same socio-political structure, only so in a more efficient way.

An issue to be inferred from this discussion is that the political awakening among the students in general and the Oromo in particular could be partly explained from a state-centered perspective. It was by virtue of the students being accommodated within the centre of the state, destined to fulfill the role of government employees, that they, ironically, managed to enjoy a view beyond the Ethiopian state. This was accomplished in two ways. The first took the form of acquiring scholarships to learn abroad. On the initiative of Haile Sellassie, the flow of students going abroad to university went on increasing since the Liberation. Between 1941 and 1959, about 553 men and women returned from higher studies (Balsvik, 1989:21). In the late 1950s and early 1960s, around 1000 students went abroad each year, and this number had doubled a decade later. Ethiopian students made their ways into all continents, in about forty countries (*Ibid*). Along with their studies, these students, having gone through a wide range of experiences and exposures, got deeply engaged in political and quasi-political affairs, which mostly came out to be against the interests of the ruling element at home. The organizational consciousness of students to aggregate in an

attempt to interact, cooperate and act in unison was expressed in regional (ESUE, ESUNA) and world-wide (WWUES, WWEWSG, WWFES) organizations (Fentahun, 1990:49-52).

A shared point of vexation for these students, as personified in the pronouncements of perhaps the most prominent activist of his time, Germame Neway, was Ethiopia's backwardness, *in contrast with* the forward strides taken by several newly independent African states (Bahru, 2002; Balsvik, 1986). Interestingly enough, Germame had in mind the ideas of both "restoring Ethiopia to its former glory" (the "local"?) and "the relative backwardness of Ethiopia *as compared* to *other* countries" (the "global"?) at the same time.

The other direct interaction of Ethiopian students with the external environment was to take place with the advent of scholarship students from other countries in Africa. In the late 1950's, Emperor Haile Sellassie offered 200 scholarship for college studies in Ethiopia (Greenfield, 1969; Balsvik, 1980). The arrivals were from British colonies--Ghana, Nigeria, Sudan Tanzania, and Uganda--wherein an intellectual climate in which the challenge to European colonial rule was most important (*Ibid*). Their countries were just at the brink of experiencing their first freedom years by dint of a long-lasting independence struggle, the form of which they themselves borrowed from elsewhere.[21] "To them", Balsvik writes (p.74), "intellectuals should be instigators and leaders of great movements of opposition and change". The effect of interaction on the Ethiopian students was clearly invigorating: "It led to a re-questioning of earlier values and the construction of new explanatory frameworks that made use of elements provided by the African students: anti-colonialism, Marx and developmental modernization" (Van Heur, 2004:46).

The two points discussed earlier, in addition to modern education inside Ethiopia itself, unleashed a striking paradox. The internationalization of the Ethiopian state (in its quest for modernization) brought along with itself other distinct forms of internationalization,

which, later on, would not only separate themselves from the Ethiopian state (which initially facilitated their "global flight"), but also contend it. The rise of Oromo nationalism, as one type of these contending "glocal formations", should be viewed in this context.

While explaining the formative years of the development of Oromo nationalism among students, Paulos (1998) seems to borrow heavily from one of the instrumentalist conceptions of ethnicity. This version examines elite strategies of maximizing preferences in terms of individual "rational choices" in given situations; the assumption here is that actors generally are curious of goods measured in terms of wealth, power, and status, and that joining ethnic or national communities helps to secure these ends either by influencing the state or, in certain occasions, through secession (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996:9). In accordance with this line of thinking, the writer accords the failure of the Ethiopian state to redistribute privileges to the same extent as it used to do earlier to the students, an emphatic (though not exclusive) power in the explanation of the students' engagement in contending spatial imagination ("Oromia"). "Initially", Paulos (1998:100) writes, "the new elite...made demands for a share of power institutions and arenas created by the modern state. Failing that, members of this group turned to politicized ethnicity as an instrument to achieve this end."

I would, in contrast, put stress on a comprehensive perspective to fully comprehend this phenomenon. True, the unemployment and underemployment of the new graduates did indeed mean exclusion *as students* and thus definitely contributed to their disgruntlement. However, their inability to penetrate upwards into the socio-political pyramid and the discrimination they encountered in their way through the same *as Oromo* was a significant factor, too. Thirdly, the economic- and ethnic- based grudges (their own and those of the communities they came from) took their perfect shape with the students' exposure to modern education and to what used to go around in the world. It is the

interplay of these internal ("local") and external ("global") factors which gave birth to Oromo nationalism in the specific form it happened to take.[22]

This can be stated in another way. The critique against the Ethiopian state knew two directions simultaneously, as Van Heur contends (2004:47). One was to reject the imagination of the Ethiopian state by relegating to another spatial imagination *below* the scale of the state. This latter imagination was concretized in "Oromia", at least for the OLF. The second critique made use of elements *above* the scale of the state in order to criticize this state, and foster a clearer and more invigorated justification for its new imagination. "The spatial imagination of Oromia was thus the result of these different elements on offer", Van Heur concludes (2004: 47):

> the imagination and practices of the Ethiopian state, the structuring mechanisms of the international state system and global discourse of Marxism-Leninism. Through selectively appropriating elements of these discourses, Oromia was discursively constructed: "being Oromo" was now positioned on the crossroads of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and pro-modernist nationalism.

Multifarious proofs bear witness to the fact that modern education and *Oromumma* went hand in hand to create a glocal ethnonationalism in the 1960's and 1970's. The Macha-Tulama Association of 1963, which is considered by many as a landmark in the development of Oromo nationalism, was originally framed by "highly educated, well informed, politically conscious individuals, who knew how to organize the people and mobilize their resources for solving their own problems" (Mohammed, 1998:195). Since its inception right to its disbandment in 1967 by the Emperor, it continued to marshal the knowledge and experiences of Oromo intellectuals from different walks of life. University students along with their wide exposures to international issues joined the association. Mamo Mazamir, a graduate of the Harar Military

Academy, was just one of these. Mamo later turned out to be one of the three prominent leaders (all of whom were intellectual elites, by the way) of the association (and of those who charted for the association an ethno-nationalist agenda). But what distinguished him sparkly from all the other leaders was his wide readings in socialist literature and his profound knowledge about the third world revolutions (*Ibid*). But Mamo was not all alone in all this. Similar developments were also taking place inside the Haile Sellassie University at about the same time. Pending on their alienation by what they were taught in the university about the superiority of Ethiopian culture and civilization and the inferiority of those of the Oromo, Oromo students were willingly recruited for clandestine, informal courses. These students were educated about the "plight of the Oromo people through secret study circles, where they studied philosophy, Marxism-Leninism political economy, social history, revolution, nationalism, etc" (Asafa, 1998:9). "University education", Asafa rightly holds (p.10), "allowed some Oromo students to understand and articulate the accumulated grievances of Oromos, their oppression, humiliation, and status in the Ethiopian empire." Hand in hand with intellectual transformations, Oromo students learned about modern organization techniques and guerrilla warfare tactics (*Ibid*).

4.2.2 Attendant Narrative Constructions

The impacts of transnational lessons on imaginative horizons were quite clear in the discourses of the top-notch leaders and programmes of pioneering Oromo nationalist organizations. The Bale rebellion was a good testing ground for these discursive constructions. Macha-Tulama and OLF leaders re-scaled this event in order to make it part of a globe-wide and historic struggle against feudalism and imperialism. In the 1960s, the above-mentioned Mamo Mazamir wrote a letter to the Bale

rebels in which he said:

> The history of mankind shows that a people who rise in the struggle for freedom and independence, in defiance of death, is always victorious....The life and death struggle of the oppressed masses in the Ethiopian Empire against the hegemony of the Amhara and their allies headed by American imperialism is a scared liberation struggle of millions of oppressed and humiliated people...[So], please, keep up your heroic armed struggle , defending every inch of the Oromo nation to the last drop of your blood. The decisive war of resistance you are conducting in Bale will, despite the maneuvers of imperialism, Zionism and local reaction, be victorious (quoted in Mohammed, 1998:209).

Ponder also how the OLF Political Program described the same event: "Eight years of guerilla struggle in Bale needed the aid of Israeli explosive experts, British Army bridge and road builders, and American Air Force advisers on precision bombing to withstand the insurgents" (quoted in Van Heur, 2004:51). But an even more succinct and larger scale comparison between the "oppressor" and "the oppressed" was given in a pamphlet published at the time of the Oromo study circles:

> To any vigilant observer, the Zionist armed settlement in the homeland of the Palestinians and the armed settlement currently carried out in the annexed territories of Oromo and other Ethiopian nations, is exactly designed and implemented by the same agency. To implement the detestable kibbutz program, the Haile Sellasie regime proceeded with the aid of Zionist experts to measure and register what it claims to be "government land".... The intention of the regime towards the Oromo and other subjugated nations is clear. Its policy is to reduce these nations to a propertyless mass of people just like the black South Africans and Rhodesians (quoted in *Ibid*).

In the above quote, the seemingly "local" dispute between the Ethiopian regime/system and the Oromo masses is re-scaled to fit into the global discourse of class and ethnic struggles. While the former is made to join the ranks of the global oppressors (which makes it "glocal"), the latter are also embraced in the fold of the global oppressed (whose identity turns "glocal", too). It was simply logical, therefore, that support should be given, according to the OLF (1976:13), to "all progressive forces

struggling against imperialism, feudalism, racism and all reactionary forces", including, of course, "the Arab people's struggle against Zionist aggression."[23]

4.2.3 Oromo Nationalism in Action

For some years since the outbreak of the revolution, the Oromo steadily strove to make their way into the Ethiopian state apparatus in different forms. Members of the OLF held important positions within the Dergue regime until 1978/79; the MEISON, considered by many as a haven of Oromo nationalism, played a central ideological and programmatic functions for the Dergue; the ICH'AT, which had at least an Oromo odour (through its leader, Baro Tumsa), affiliated itself with the military regime till its annihilation by the latter, and so on (Andargachew, 1993; Hall, 1977; Halliday and Maxine, 1981). But the need to attend to the interests of the Oromo did not come only from themselves. Others also saw it politic to win over the "Oromo mass" to their organizations. For example, the EPRP, often seen as an Eritrean- and Tigrean-dominated organization, set up an Oromo People's Liberation Organization with support from Somalia (Van Heur, 2004). Nonetheless, after all these efforts by and for the Oromo, the latter never succeeded in holding over a favorable position as Oromo in the Ethiopian state system. Following a sturdy inter- and intra-group infighting for three to four years, the Dergue (and within the Dergue, its later chairman) managed to get rid of all its (his) opponents and took an unprecarious control of state power.

The period after this time was generally appalling for the Oromo masses and for the major organization that claimed to represent them, the OLF. One can just look at what Makuria (2002) calls "forced migration" to understand this. Thousands of the Oromo fled to the neighboring countries to escape the poverty brought on by the new

economic policy, and to avoid conscription and forced labor (p.168). In a limited study conducted in Eastern Sudan between 1981-83 (and reported in *Ibid*), the refugees gave reasons ranging from military conscription and forced labor to political persecution and the fear thereof for their flight from Ethiopia. In 1979 and 1981, the UNHCR estimated the number of Oromo refugees in Somalia alone to be 200,000 to 250,000. From mid-1980s to 1990, 90 percent of all Oromo refugees lived in Somalia, while the rest stayed in the Sudan and Djibouti, and other African countries (*Ibid*). Although the majority of the Oromo migrants were thus to be found in Somalia, it was in Sudan that the OLF was to play its most decisive role. Unlike in Somalia, the OLF and the Oromo Relief Association were able in Sudan to establish a structural connection to the Sudanese state, and thus were able to support the displaced Oromo in a relatively competition-free environment. In this way, the OLF was enabled to conduct its political role of indoctrination side by side with the one related to social security. It was also from here, specifically Khartoum--where its foreign relations office was located--where it reached out to the global, international public (Van Heur, 2004).

What does this imply? Primarily, due to its relocation from Ethiopian land, the OLF was by no means isolated. In fact, its domain was quite enlarged. First, the OLF's activities could no longer be approached from a state-centered perspective, as the formative years of its predecessors could. Secondly--and this is the paradox--*because* of its marginalization and retreat from Ethiopia, it gained unprecedented access to essential equipments for its struggle against the Ethiopian state. Right from its retreat (even prior to that, for that matter) down to the present time, the OLF has launched its activities in the wide structure of globality, thereby gaining a more formidable and relatively free ground for pursuing its objectives.

Van Heur (p.62) outlines three aspects of "flows and interconnections" to which the OLF intellectuals in Sudan had a

privileged access. To begin with, many of the texts used for the alphabetization courses in *afaan Oroomo* that were conducted in Sudan during the 1980s were printed in and paid by Oromo and non-Oromo actors outside Sudan and Ethiopia. The former were usually Oromo student organizations in Europe and the US. The latter included, for instance, the German Berliner Missionswerks, which provided financial and ideological support to the liberation struggle of the OLF. Second, the OLF in exile provided an important source of information during the Dergue regime for those interested in Oromo culture, society or politics. Research could be conducted either among the Oromo refugees or based on the information to be found in several OLF publications. In this way, knowledge about the Oromo and the OLF could be channeled to the worldwide public--an achievement which could never have been thought of inside Ethiopia, where restrictions render research work almost impossible. Finally comes the personal connections. This involved the movement of actors between Khartoum, and mostly, numerous urban centers in Europe and North America.

Through these interconnections the OLF re-entered into the global in action (after its entry through discourse), and remained entangled with it ever since. Via this entanglement with globality, it aimed to realize two intimately related aims which Geertz (1963:30) concisely puts as:

> The one aim is to be noticed: it is a search for an identity, and a demand that that identify be publicly acknowledged as having import, a social assertion of the self as "being somebody in the world." The other aim is practical: it is a demand for progress, for a rising standard of living, more effective political order, greater social justice, and beyond that of "playing a part in the larger arena of world politics", of exercising influence among the nations.



Thus was created and developed Oromo nationalism, with its territorial obsession resting on the imagined nation of Oromia. It found its enemy

embodied in the so-called Ethiopian nationalism of especially the olden type. The latter, in turn, with its obsessive gaze fixated at the likewise imagined nation of Ethiopia, insistently disclosed its abhorrence and determination to fight against the former. Although with the advent in Ethiopia of a non-Oromo and a non-Ethiopianist (or non-Amhara) rule in the 1990s, both of the contending camps seem to have partially re-directed their struggle towards the incumbent regime in Ethiopia, this is actually so when seen solely at face value. At "heart value", nonetheless, put in a simplified way, through its battle against the EPRDF-led government, one group is fighting against the "ghost" of the other. The OLF and others with more or less similar ideological directions are fighting against the *continuity* of Abyssinian centralization, and the right-wing Ethiopianists against the *discontinuity* of that same stuff. Meanwhile, the government is trying its best to subvert these combatants, among other things, through its ethnic "PDO's", which are expected to speak and act on behalf of their respected localities. Yet, the battle for a differently-ruled Oromia and Ethiopia has continued unabated, both locally and transnationally. The task of the next chapter is to deal with some points pertaining to the more current conditions of the contending nationalisms, but at the transnational level. We will specifically focus on the diasporic dimension.

Chapter Five

The Ethiopian State, Sub-State Nationalism and Transnationalisms

5.1 Transnationalism

Although not without historical precedents and quasi-parallels, modern-day transnationalism, frequently implying multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states, is of unprecedented nature. These systems of ties, exchange and mobility function intensively and in real time while being spread throughout the world. New technologies of various sorts serve to connect such networks with increasing speed and efficiency.

As a field of study, transnationalism represents a topic of rapidly growing interest witnessed in the proliferation of academic articles, university seminars and conferences devoted to exploring its nature and contours. Many scholars have forwarded their wide-ranging conceptions of the term. Kymlicka (2003) perceives what he calls "transnational citizenship" to cover a range of ideas out of which he mentions five: immigrant transnationalism, transnational advocacy networks, international legal authority, transnational legislative/parliamentary bodies, and intergovernmental regulatory authorities. For Vertovec (1999), the meaning of transnationalism is variously grounded upon distinct (but in my view very overlapping) conceptual premises; he scrutinizes six of them: social morphology, type of consciousness, mode of cultural reproduction, avenue of capital, site of political engagement and (re) construction of "place" or locality. Appadurai (1990) conceives the term largely in terms of capital, ideas and images flowing across national boundaries. Accordingly, he identifies five dimensions of global cultural flow: *financescapes* (flow of capital), *ideoscapes* (flow of ideas), *ethnoscapes* (flow of people), *technoscapes* (flow of technology) and *mediascapes* (flow of images). Transnationalism, for Basch (in Bernal,

2004) means a social field created by people who live their lives by participating in more than one nation. While we might never doubt that all these insights are indeed rich, they, nonetheless, either abstract the process of circulation, and thus, tell little about the actual lives and experiences of people (such as Appadurai) or seem to overemphasize migration or movement in general as an essential nature of transnationalism (like Kymlicka and Basch) and fail to capture the sense in which we all live in a transnational era now, whether we choose to or not, whether we migrate or remain where we are (see Bernal, 2004), or both (Vertovec).

As a more useful alternative, I share Bernal's (2004) position on the term. As a matter of fact, "transnationalism" does include the topics, diaspora, the social field of a people which spans more than one nation, or the deep ties among the members thereof. But it does not stop there. According to Bernal, the term refers to the fact of living a life that is not in any real sense circumscribed by a nation. As Ong (quoted in *Ibid*: 5) observes: "'Trans' denotes both moving through space or across lines, as well as changing the nature of something". Hence, transnationalism is taken to mean our frames of reference for our own lives are not constructed on a national basis but in terms of standards, experiences, and concepts that include a larger world. In plainer terms, transnationalism includes "the fact that ideas about citizenship, rights and entitlements, as well as visions of the good life more generally are not constructed wholly in local terms but rather constructed on a broader scale with reference to international standards, concepts and comparisons such that any local discussion of such things automatically implies this larger context" (Bernal, 2004: 5).

This exposé reminds us very much of our earlier concept, "glocalization" and our case studies, the formation of the Ethiopian and the Oromo nationalisms. After having seen, on a theoretical level, the

process of "the universalization of particularism" and "the particularization of universalism", we went into discussing how both of the contending nationalisms have got enmeshed in glocal discursive/locomotive constructions, i.e., once again, involving the universalziation of particularism and vice versa. In other words, when we were traversing glocalization, we were implying transnationalism. Just as the former, the latter, after Bernal's understanding of the term, has a great relevance in understanding the global production of locality. In our brief treatment of the Ethiopian and the Oromo nations/nationalisms, we focused on the earlier/formative stages of these formations. In this chapter, the more recent aspects of this transnational dynamics of nations/nationalism will be discussed. While we will not totally ignore the "ideational" aspect of transnationalism as indicated above, our major focus here will be on the other aspect of the concept, *viz.* that of the social field, the diasporic. This also reflects another limitation on my use of the term here: I will specifically deal with the first and the second categories in Kymlicka's (see above) conception of transnationalism and won't delve into the other ones.

5.2 Diaspora and Transnationality

"Diasporas", wrote Tololian (quoted in Clifford, 1997:283), "are the exemplary communities of the transnational moment." They are deployed in transnational networks built from multiple attachments, involving dwelling, maintaining communities and having collective homes away from home (Clifford, 1997). Along with internal cohesion, migrant groups tend to maintain links with their country of origin, communication with kinsfolk and financial remittances to relatives being the most common forms of exchange (Esman, 1996). Diasporic activities may extend to such areas as playing vital interests in political developments in the

home country and even try to influence them. Thus, beyond retaining their group identity and their institutions over extended periods, migrant communities also maintain continuing links, both material and sentimental, with their country of origin (*Ibid*). As well, the term *diaspora* is a signifier, not simply of transnationality (in its locomotive sense) and movement, but of political struggles to define the local, as distinctive community, in historical contexts of displacement (Clifford, 1997). These diasporic features, especially those involving linkages, become a dimension of international politics.

5.3 Transnationality and the Nation

How does transnationalism affect the nation (-state)? Does it, for instance, turn it immaterial by activating a (nearly) cosmopolitan citizenship/identity? We know of some scholars who have argued in that direction. But many empirical studies conducted in recent times seem to have irresistibly challenged their positions. As these latter studies clearly show, in fact, the opposite is true: transnationalism has strengthened, although transformed, the nation/nationalism.

In my view, Kymlicka (2003) is quite correct in criticizing Janos Kis, who called for getting "beyond nation-building", and for developing a "post-nationalist" conception of political community. Similarly, Bernal (2004) rightly negates, first, Hannerz's view that the rise of transnational connections is causing the nation to decline in importance, and, secondly, Appadurai's contention that we are at the dawn of a "post-national era", in which "the nation-state, as a complex modern political form, is on its last legs" (in Bernal: p.4). For both Kymlicka and Bernal, the transnational era's (misnamed "post-nationalist") "attractiveness depends precisely on the fact that it accommodates nationalist identities and aspirations". The nation-state, as they argue, remains significant not only *despite* global linkages but also *because of* them.

We should remember, first of all, that historically speaking, a unique emphasis on the autonomy of the nation-state, at least in Europe, coincided with and partly was resulted by the pronounced internationalization of the world (Calhoun, 2001). In this, as Calhoun stresses (p.20), may lie some lesson for the present era when

> the acceleration of global processes of capital accumulation, the rapid global transfer of technology, the almost instantaneous spread of cultural products, and huge waves of migration lead many to imagine that the nation-state is likely to vanish quickly into the shadows of history.

Current evidences would re-enforce this lesson. Indeed, in the "network society", to borrow Castell's (1996) depiction of the electronically globalized world, it would be simplistic to predict the end of nationalism. In such a world, the maintenance of ethnic/national identity will become less dependent upon either a territorial base or formal organizations. It will be possible for national/ethnic links to be sustained with others of similar language and cultural background throughout the world (Richmond, 1994). Inter-personal/group networks may be maintained through videophones and other telecommunication links and through mass communication networks as well, overflying the boundaries of nation-states and penetrating any location throughout the world (*Ibid*). These linkages would no doubt bolster national solidarities in an otherwise spatially fragmented plane.

Nationalism is, then, solidified through all the five categories of global cultural flows developed by Appadurai (1996). It is solidified through ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, and ideoscapes (see above). It is also in these very ways that immigrants retain an active interest in, *inter alia*, the politics of their country of origin. Their participation in homeland politics is very "national". "In fact," observes Kymlicka (2003:925), "diasporas are often more nationalist than their co-nationals in the homeland". "It is", he (*Ibid*) continues:

> precisely as members of the nation, born and raised in the homeland, that they assert the right to participate in homeland politics, and work to defend its national sovereignty. There is nothing "post-national" about the way diasporas participate in homeland politics--it is nationalist politics in every recognizable sense.

Predominantly national, thus, as our world is, we cannot deny that the forms of nationalism and the nation (and the nation-state) are unstatic and changing. One of the many consequences of the process of globalization, as O'Byrne (2001:139) states, has been the separation of nation and state, and thus the end of the hyphen between the two. The reason behind this divergence between the nation and the state in the global here and now goes to the fact that they are developing distinct relations to territoriality and territory (Berking, 2003). While the state remains obstinately bound up with its original territoriality and sovereignty, the nation has become remarkably (ultra?) flexible in its handling of the nation-territory alignment. States, no longer exclusively able to guarantee the territorial organization of markets, life-worlds, identities and histories, are forced to compete with a bewildering diversity of providers of identity options (*Ibid*). Consequently, whereas it is premature to speak of the end of the modern state, one cannot miss to consider a significant reconfiguration process of the relation between state, territoriality, sovereignty and identity. Arguably, therefore, nations and nationalisms are constantly *de-territorialized* and *re-territorialized* flexibly on a transnational plane, leaving the state porous to competing "market for loyalties" (Appadurai, cited in Berking, 2003: 254). We will return to these points later in this chapter.

5.4 Sub-State Nationalism and the Nation

As we have seen in the last chapters, "to speak of Ethiopia as a nation-state is to begin with a phantasm" (Matsuko and Sorenson, 2001:26). The period since that of Emperor Haile Selassie alone would evince the unprecedented proliferation of ethnonationalisms contending either the Ethiopian state *per se* or the system of rule. As clarified in our earlier discussions, the conjunction of some of the resultants of failed assimilation and the new global era contributed to the emergence of this phenomenon. One overall effect of this condition was an even more intensified and extended diversification of the Ethiopian socio-cultural context. We have taken one of the most prominent ethnonationalisms to illustrate the formation of a solid challenge to the Ethiopian state/form of rule. In doing so, we have discussed an instance where globalization poses a challenge to the Ethiopian "nation". In other words, we have already seen how sub-state nationalism, as an aspect of globalization, challenges a nation-state.

At this time, let me briefly respond to the suggestion by some scholars that sub-state nationalism is one manifestation of the so-called "post-national" or post-modernist era. The post-modernist critique (as that of the post-national) of the nation-state system would have it that the current rapid proliferation of ethnic nationalisms throughout the world, challenging their respective "nation"-states, can be seen as heralding a new era where nation-state system is under serous commotion. The nation-state discourse, according to this paradigm, as a "grand narrative" of the modern age, is superseded by relativist, alternative discourses of multiple forms.[24] I would rather opt for rejecting these opinions, which I consider are over-statements. Sub-state nationalism, when challenging *any* "nation"-state (say, in a secessionist form) does not challenge *the* nation state, as a global narrative, as a political theoretical category. In fact, it aspires to replicate the nation-

state formula of its *bete noire* (the state it fights against), but to do so, in this case, outside the jurisdiction of the latter. All its discourses are caged in a similar nationalist tone, *par excellence*. In this, I fully agree with Kymlicka (2003) who sees no post-nationalist order of any sort in current ethnonational movements. Where I deviate, however, from his reflections is that while minority nationalism truly does not pose any challenge to *the* nation-state (system), *any specific* minority nationalism *does* pose a challenge to *a* (i.e., *its respective*) nation-state. Oromo nationalism's challenge to the Ethiopian "nation" is a typical example of this.

When the contending sub-state nationalism is a "non-state-seeking" one (Gans, 2004), too, the case is more or less similar. We know that, put in general terms, nation-states are both "nation-building" and "nation-destroying" (Strahle and Kymlicka, 1999). The quest for common nationhood involves the destruction of any preexisting sense of nationhood on the part of national minorities. Those sub-state victims of the "nation-building" process, this time, taking on a non-state-seeking path, challenge the nation or the system of rule in their demand for socio-cultural/economic justice and equality. These sub-state nationalisms, however, are not, once again, against the notion of nationhood *per se*. Their demands are only either the "thinning" of nationalism(Kymlicka, 2003) in order to allow more freedom, or in-state self-determination in the form of, for example, "multination federalism" (Stahle and Kymlicka, 1999), neither of which rule out the nation-state system. As Kymlicka explains (2003:909):

> We have abandoned earlier assumptions that members of the nation should share the same race, religion or lifestyle. Yet these thinner notions of a multicultural or multifaith nation are still very much notions of nationhood: citizens are still expected to speak a common national language[sic], share a common national identity, feel loyalty to national institutions, and share a commitment to maintaining the nation as a single, self-governing community into the indefinite future. Ethnic and religious minorities have been granted equal citizenship rights, not because it no longer matters whether they are

members of the nation, but because they are now seen as (and indeed have become) full members of the nation or "the people".

However, any specific minority nationalism, I underscore, may challenge a certain nation-state. This may occur when, for example, it demands for the re-construction, re-formulation of the cultural underpinnings of the nation. This may require, among other things, the rebuilding of the nation on novel, all-inclusive bases. In the Ethiopian case, those ethnonationalisms which subscribe to the "national oppression" thesis (in contrast to those embracing the "colonial" thesis) (Merera, 2003) do fit into this category. They demand, along with politico-economic, but also socio-cultural transformation of the Ethiopian order of things in a way that includes them all. If we take the notion of "nationhood" to partly rest on cultural elements--and I definitely do--then the Ethiopian "nation" as has been known for long needs fundamental alterations in order to embrace more and more ethnic and religious diversity.

We have by now seen that neither supra-state nationalism (trans-nationalism) nor sub-state nationalism hail a post-nationalist era, although they do hail some sort of transformations in some aspects of either *the* nation, or *any one* nation, or both. In the following sections, we will try to see how all these seem to apply to the Ethiopian-Oromo cases. More specifically, we will try to analyze the Ethiopian and the Oromo nations in the realm of transnationalism. This takes the forms: the transnationalism of the contending ethnonationalism (that of Oromo) and of the Ethiopianist nationalism. I will argue that contrary to both post-modernist and modernist assertions, the logic and appeal of nationalism, on the one hand, will get boosted in both cases, and, by inference, on the other hand, the Ethiopian nation-state, as long as it fails to satisfactorily respond to the "nationality question", is likely to continue tampering with the self-defeating slope of heterogenizaiton, far from integration and

building a viable nation-state, in the new global era. Neither Oromo nationalism nor the idea of the Ethiopian identity it struggles against seems to melt away in the ocean of transnationalism; if anything, they will be strengthened taking other forms. Just as their formation was closely linked to global life-worlds, they have remained so, perhaps more so, throughout, and we are likely to witness the same thing in the years ahead. Glocalization ever seems to hold true.

5.5 The Modern "Ethiopian" Diaspora: Some Remarks

The Ethiopian diaspora has constituted one of the world's largest refugee populations. According to the World Refugee Surveys (in Levine, 2004:5), the Ethiopian refugees in 1981 totaled 1.9 million. In 1983, some 1, 215, 000 Ethiopian refugees were counted in Northeast Africa, more than 10, 000 in the Middle East, tens of thousands in Europe, 10, 000 each in the US and Canada. In that same decade, Ethiopia was one of the top three contributors of refugees in the world. After a short-lasting repatriation of some refugees back to Ethiopia in early 1990s, the immigration went on soaring ever since to the point where the current Ethiopian population in the US alone has approached half a million (*Ibid*).

War, political repression, ethnic tensions, poverty and famine created a huge overflow of refugees from Ethiopia (Matsuoka and Sorenson, 2001). Although intensified during the Dergue's rule, refugeeizaton was in place in the pre-military period, too. Levine (2004) would have us believe that when the 2000-year-old monarchy was overthrown in 1974, a period of revolutionary violence, political repression, chronic civil war, and ethnic fragmentation followed, which resulted in massive migration. This account, virtually akin to the "Greater Ethiopian" thesis, is vulnerable to devastating criticisms of

various kinds. I won't delve into all these. Suffice here to say that all these mayhems and the resulting refugeeization are not exclusive features of the post-Haile Sellasie period; they got intensified later not because (many of) the anti-*status quo* groups (especially the ethnic ones) longed for the *status quo ante* but because they were resolved to dismantle the old order once and for all (not excluding any trace of it). Politicization would dictate that any dint of return to the past would be fought ferociously.

Another critique of mine of Levine's account of the Ethiopian diaspora pertains to his depiction of the same as a socio-culturally compact whole, replicating a similarly compact nation of the homeland. He tends to understate any discord concerning identification, zooming in instead the unity of the members of the "Ethiopian" diaspora in all their activities (religious, political, economic and social) and their common desire to perpetuate "their" nation, in all its aspects, amidst the wave of globalization. By implication, besides, globalization does not hamper, Levine believes, if not buttress, the solidification of Ethiopian nationalism; it only does so in a different form: the Ethiopian nation is "reconfigured", not stunted. Admittedly, globalization, as already discussed, does not necessarily weaken the nation or nationalism. Further, on a practical level, it also, in congruence to Levine's perception, does not trap up the Ethiopianist movement as we will see below. But what the same author fails to realize is that globalization is a double-edged sword. While globalization only reconfigures the Ethiopian nation, it also cherishes and sustains those contending ethnonationalisms, and also--this often tends to be forgotten--other versions of Ethiopian nationalism, that challenge the old conception of the Ethiopian "nation", in no uncertain terms (as we have already seen in chapter two and will extend it further below). This challenge is reflected at the home front which, at least for the time being, is more diversified then ever, and in the "Ethiopian" (some of whose members have been so only before

migration) diaspora, which is configured into distinct nations or alternative views of the same nation, the one tending to exist independent, mostly in some form of friction, to the other. The diaspora is, therefore, a partial reflection of the divided home.

As noted elsewhere, for the subjugated groups in Ethiopia, the "phantoms of the Ethiopian state" consisted of not just misleading versions of history: they were also objects of dread. The version of Ethiopian nationalism as promoted by the northern highlanders did not provide a stable and satisfying sense of identifying and belonging for subalterns within the state borders (Matsuoka and Sorenson, 2001). Since, for these subalterns, the Amhara-imposed national identity was never open and easily capable of reform, it should be fought against insistently. As part of this struggle, counter-discourses have been proposed, constructing different histories and different versions of national identity. When Ethiopia went on producing refugees during the Dergue and the EPRDF era, these discourses and counter-discourses have been transplanted into the diaspora, too. To borrow a symbolic expression from Matsuoka and Sorenson (2001:78), "not everyone [in the diaspora] was haunted by the same ghosts: the divisions that shattered Ethiopia were reproduced in diaspora, with the result that a population collectively identified by outsiders as 'Ethiopia' was internally divided into opposing factions with contrasting images of the phantasmagorical homeland."

In the following lines, I will try to shed some light on few discursively selected diasporic features and the literature thereof, of two contending nationalisms. I would like to re-note that since nationalism may occur in continua, as do Ethiopian and Oromo nationalisms, I have to be specific as to which brand of nationalism I have in mind. By "Ethiopian nationalism", I mean "Abyssinian fundamentalism" (De Waal, 1996, see also note 11), and Oromo nationalism by and large stands for the OLF brand.

5.5.1 "Ethiopianist" Transnationalism[25]

It was immediately after the demise of the military regime that an era of large-scale political activism set in among the Ethiopian diaspora (except TPLF supporters). Abyssinian fundamentalist nationalism was among the foremost of these. Ethiopianists in the diaspora awakened to activism, sensing a crisis in terms of the nation and identity that had given them a sense of pride, despite their exile. The revival of mythico-histories intensified as the exiles debated Ethiopia's future and national identity. Discussions raged in public meetings, just as in pamphlets, newspapers, magazines and radio broadcasts, and on the Internet. Anti-TPLF/EPRDF campaigns flooded in. The (re)creation of the past, as an essential feature of the production of nationalist narrative, markedly enveloped all these activities. As part of this mythico-historical narration, "deliberate forgetfulness" of particular events, like those that might seem detrimental to the image of a "voluntarily unified Ethiopia", was actively adopted. The "ghost" of Emperor Haile Sellassie was resurrected in cyberspace, as an act of "electronic memorial", while his son, who had crowned himself as Emperor Amha Selassie, was seen as a refuge to those who sensed an on-coming threat, that of the "endangered" tradition.

This rhetoric of an "endangered Ethiopia" became a rallying point for Ethiopianist nationalists in the diaspora. A case in point was the response to the ascendance and /or control over the state of ethnonationalist movements of which the Eritrean case was quite prominent in the early 90s. As Eritrea's independence came out to be a *fait accompli*, solid oppositions were voiced, considering the move as an existential threat to the "3000-year-old indivisible state". Every effort was undertaken to, first, frustrate this "divisive plot" and, then, to "regain" the "lost" territory of Ethiopia. Although neither of the objectives was to come to pass, Eritrean independence aided to effectively muster robust

nationalist will that would be employed in other instances, too, when the need arises.

Diaspora involvement in home politics has lingered ever since. Numerous public demonstrations have been organized, in England and the US, to protest practices in the host country and at home, that emigrants have found offensive. Diaspora communities have played active roles in the organization of opposition political parties, several of which are located in transnational spaces. The 2003 convention of around seventeen parties in Washington called the First Ethiopian All-Party Conference (although "Ethiopian", not all participants in the conference necessarily subscribed to the "Greater Ethiopian" thesis), can be cited as an example. But perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of Ethiopianist nationalism in a glocal space can be instanced by the movement (demonstrations, conferences, press releases, petitions...) that flooded many Western countries in 2005, orchestrated by the CUD and its supporters, against the EPRDF-led government. This is a topic which yet waits for a full-scale study. But this sharp rise in the nationalist sensation of some diasporic communities would remind us that none of the alternative mythico-histories about this region, Ethiopia, is yet outdated; indeed, competing "ghosts" would seem to continue haunting the different peoples associated with Ethiopia.

Diaspora connections with the homeland take place profoundly via extraordinary technologies of transportation and communication. These networks of communication are as helpful among diaspora communities as they are between the latter and the homeland. No longer bounded by territory, but by access to requisite software and hardware, electronic media have helped the creation of virtual neighborhoods. News-centered and discussion-oriented websites[26] have effected the goal of upholding and promoting the sought-after politics and culture of Ethiopia. Some of these websites offer lively forum for interested Ethiopians in many countries to negotiate national and sub-national identities, and strive to

)me sub-national claim to citizenship and rebuild, on a specified a fragmented national community from afar. So, Ethiopianist ıalism, in a globalizing world, is reconfigured now in three parts: and, diaspora and cyber-country (Levine, 2004:12).

5.5.2 Oromo Transnationalism: the Modern Diaspora

Whereas slavery and slave trade were the reasons behind forced ation of the Oromo in the past, other political and economic factors ɔ responsible for that in the modern period (Makuria, 2002). itically speaking, modern Oromo refugeeization was a glocal ɔmation. Martha (2006) applies the model that the birth of nation-tates (which is a global process) is intimately intertwined with the birth)f refugees (which is construed as forming locality), to explain Oromo ɔefugee production. In her view, "the same globalizing movements that congeal Ethiopia into a nation-state also produce an exodus of Oromo refugees" (p.245). The Oromo struggle for national liberation is seen as a localizing counter-hegemonic response to the globalizing processes of colonial oppression.

As far as I am concerned, while the attempt at blending the "global" with the "local" in the explanation of this same issue is no doubt commendable, few corrections, however, are needed in order to reach at a more comprehensive picture of the issue at hand. Alternatively, it would be more persuasive to apply the global-local dynamics both to the nation-state formation and to the refugee production, *each time*, than to split up the two ("global" and "local") and apply the one to the nation-state formation and the other to the refugee production. Nation-states, in their own terms, are both global and local (see chapters two and three), just as community/identity formation on the part of refugees is. (The locality is discursively and locomotively glocally constructed.) In this sense, Oromo refugeeization, seen as part of the grand process of Oromo

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nationalization, is a glocal construction.

Large-scale Oromo exile from Ethiopia, for political reasons, went unabated since the Macha Tulama and Bale movements, the milestones in the development of Oromo nationalism. In both cases, those surviving the government crackdown either went underground or left the country, some of whom rejoined the Oromo struggle in the early 1970s (Makuria, 2002). During the Dergue's decades of state of emergency (1970s and 1980s), too, Oromo nationalists were chased after dubbed as "counter-revolutionary", "narrow nationalists" or "anarchists". Many fled to neighboring countries and to Europe, North America and Australia as well. In most recent times, the case is not much different. Since the departure of the OLF and other anti-EPRDF Oromo organizations from the Transitional Government and the electoral process in 1992, the diaspora has been the major site of action for different nationalist movements (*Ibid*). In short, political struggles accounted for one of the major factors that led to a massive diasporic fixation of the Oromo and the movement *Oromumma*.

At this moment, let me examine the appropriateness of Makuria's (2002) term, "forced migration", a term which has recently been called into question by Van Heur (2004). For this latter writer, migration created a range of new possibilities that had not been available before for the development of Oromo nationalism (p.62). Thus, since exile does have its advantages in this world of globality, the migration of the Oromo, especially that of the OLF, should not be seen as "forced", but in the words of Abbink (1995:154), as "self-inflicted". For my part, I feel some corrections need to be made. To begin with, Oromo migration could not be exclusively explained by political factors. Apart from political and religious confrontations, war, forced conscription and labor, and economic policies (like the villagization program) pursued by the Dergue regime were all responsible for the massive exodus (Makuria, 2002; Sorenson, 1996). It would be understandable in this case to qualify the

migration with "forced" since the Oromo peasant is, for instance, otherwise particularly reluctant to leave his *qeyee* (village), which, above all, forms a crucial part of his/her destiny (Makuria, p.181).

In the political realm, my position lies somewhere between Makuria's and Van Heur's. In contrast to the former's view, I don't believe that the exclusion and exile of Oromo nationalist elements like those in the OLF is fully "forced". We know that the positions of some Oromo nationalists have always remained uncompromising towards those of the incumbent regimes in Ethiopia. When they (the former) have failed to meet their *maximum* targets within the Ethiopian state system, they have preferred exodus to either compromise or armed struggle confined to the borders of the state. They have been well aware of the fact that exile provides them with some of the necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for freely fostering their nationalist activities and launching more promising strikes against the government of the day (we will come to this point *infra*).

But, on the other hand, and contrary to Van Heur, I, at the same time, don't share the idea of "self-inflicted exclusion", taken literally. It seems absurd to allege that the OLF, for example, would have chosen to risk the lives and properties of its members and its supporters, and would have opted for happily abandoning its spatial imagination, Oromia, had it found its demands fulfilled (especially in the 1990s). Therefore, I would venture to say that its exclusion and exile were "forced" to the extent that they became a reality only when it (the OLF) saw it impossible to realize most or all of its dreams within the state structure of Ethiopia.

This would take me to another critique of mine of Van Heur's tendency of considering the diasporic site as an end in itself and, adjacently, that the bone of contention between the EPRDF and the OLF is not the state, but what he calls, drawing from Bourdieu, the "specific habitus" (2004:78). Elaborating further, he disagrees with Markakis

(1994), in whose view the struggle in the Horn is for gaining (a share of) state power, and, through it, access to scarce resources. Van Heur rules out the state as a/the target of the OLF, and is content with the idea that the state is the unintended victim of clashing networks (between EPRDF and OLF). I think this is off the track. Whereas it seems true, as indicated above, that the diasporic site is comfortable for the OLF's activities, I simply cannot see why the latter would be indifferent to any opportunity of controlling Oromia in the least. One would dare to say that the major theme reverberating in the overall transnational network of the movement is the liberation of Oromia, which, if accomplished, would not only boost the movement's legitimacy, but can also serve as an additional site in--nay, as the nub of--the global Oromo network. Consequently, I also do bring the state back into picture in the struggle between Oromo nationalists and the Ethiopian state. The state here can be either the Ethiopian state or the State of Oromia. The former can be taken as a means while the latter is the officially declared target of the anti-Ethiopian state Oromos. Apart from these, Van Heur is justified in criticizing Markakis's "materialism" which is fixated on "scare resources". But he is justified not because Markakis's "materialism" should not have been fixated on the state, but because the latter's conception of "the struggle for the state" is fixated on scarce resources. It won't seem persuasive to argue, as does Markakis, that the economic factor is behind all inter-group struggles in the Horn. The quest for cultural, intellectual and religious freedom and equality should not be neglected.

Diasporic Activities and Connections

Oromo nationalism in the diaspora is propped up by the activities of various organizations (Makuria, 2002). The TBOA and the UONA (with the aim of, *inter alia*, reviving and promoting the Oromo people's culture and history) have contributed to the Oromo struggle in the area of socio-

cultural, linguistic and historical studies. The OSA has also shared the same responsibility by producing over half a dozen conference proceedings on similar areas, along with its role in serving as an important forum for the exchange of information and experience among Oromo scholars at home and in the diaspora. Humanitarian activities and literacy campaigns in *afaan Oroomo* have been in large part carried out by the ORA. The task of spiritual guidance has been entrusted to many Oromo religious organizations which began to emerge only a decade ago in the Horn, Europe, North America and Australia. Last but not least, sport is also not relegated to an apolitical corner. Escorted by numerous other nationalist bodies like the OSA, the Oromo Church Gathering, the Oromo Convention and Oromo musical concerts, the OFFNA smoothes football's entry into the "mansion" of "hard politics".

In the diaspora, the Oromo are constantly learned to be so. In his examination of this processes in several meetings organized by the OSA, Sorenson (1996) shows that the major elements of this mentorship are, emphasis on a fundamental ethnic identity that is revealed beneath the superficial imposition of foreign culture; assertions of complete unity among all Oromo; stressing links to the past; appealing for support from the audience; and rejecting alternative political views (other than that of the OLF) as inauthentically Oromo. Identity is directly linked with acceptance of only one political position, and any dissenting voice is considered as that of a traitor. Essential differences are drawn between Abyssinians, Amharas or Ethiopians, and the Oromo. In those meetings, it is common to observe testimonials where people narrate the stories of their "conversions" from being "Ethiopians" into being "Oromos". Learning to be Oromo also includes the exhortation of the audience to march against all those seen as the enemies of the Oromo, including the government in Ethiopia.

Finally, we will pause at transnational connections. Oromo nationalists in the diaspora do maintain contact with relatives and fellow

nationalist elements in Ethiopia and in other countries through different media. The "use of mass information technologies is rendering it possible for Oromo communities scattered around the world to create networks for information sharing and resource mobilization in order to make their claims heard and felt by the international community" (Makuria, 2002: 205). Print, electronic and digital media are used by dedicated individuals among the diaspora and in the homeland to feed the collective imaginations of Oromo people throughout the world (Gow, n.d.: 3). These intersecting flows can be subsumed under what Appadurai (1990, 1996) calls "mediascapes" and "ideoscapes".

5.5.3 Conclusion

In our brief discussion of the two nationalisms, we alluded to three interrelated themes which both share at once. One theme is the transnational terrain of nationhood or the ways in which nationhood is reconstructed and sustained by Ethiopianists' and Oromo nationalists' relations to one another across borders. A second theme is the nationalization of the transnational or the ways in which certain transnational phenomena can serve to reinforce the national. Thirdly, one can also mention the transnationalization of the nation or the ways in which the nation is spinned out on a de-territorialized space. These themes for sure re-enforce the efforts exerted by a number of scholars in moving beyond the simple question of whether transnationalism means a decline of the nation to theorizing the complex relationship between transnational phenomena and nationhood (Bernal, 2004).

Our discussion of the Ethiopianist and the Oromo transnationalisms would finally suggest that it is unlikely that we witness in the near future the retreat or neutralization of the challenge posed by the one to the other simply due to its entrance into the field of globality. Sociologically speaking, these movements have been

accustomed to the new global condition and are hence best suited to survive any territorial fragmentation. Nationalisms and counter-nationalisms are globalized, and if not duly reclaimed, as a result, the struggle for history and identity in Ethiopia will tarry in a glocal space.

Chapter Six

Conclusion: What Next?

This paper has tried to analyze the dynamics of the construction of nation and nationalism in the context of the globalizing world. We have applied the concept of glocalization to achieve this end. Globalization, both in its older, simpler, and more recent, more complex forms midwived the birth of the Ethiopian nation-state and the Ethiopianist and the Oromo nationalisms. It also shored up the contending nationalisms, or else got interweaved with them ever since. We may be well-justified, thus, at this time and place, to rethink the wisdom caged in the maxim "think globally, act locally" when applied to nations and nationalisms. Instead, the latter two phenomena seem to follow this pattern: "think glocally, act glocally". This can be taken to represent the gist of the analyses propounded in the last chapters. This also illustrates Fred Halliday's (2001: 454) apt proposition that "nationalism is not an alternative to globalization, but an intrinsic part of it".

But our discussions manifested not only the status of nationalism in a global era but also the actual and potential conflictual relations between contending nationalisms related to the Ethiopian (nation-) state, and maintained in a glocal plane. Globalization strengthens not just nationalisms but *contending* nationalisms. This still remains to be our concern in this concluding chapter. I put forward a query: can there be ways by which globalization promotes nationalism(s), but not conflict thereof? Or, more optimistically, what are some of the ways, at the level of ideas, where globalization can be used as a panacea to the antagonistic relationship between the Ethiopian and Oromo nationalisms? And, how can the deconstruction of nations and nationalisms help us in doing that? All these inquiries are obviously based on the prime assumption that conflict does not necessarily follow

from the globalization of nationalisms. I believe that our ways of handling it is of crucial importance.

Before I move on further, I would like to make two statements. First, my discussion on the "benefits of globalization" is limited to the level of ideas and concepts. I won't raise issues in, for example, international politics and international law. Secondly, this chapter is not one of recommendations, strictly speaking. I bend to just express my imaginations of how better to manage contending nationalisms in a very general way. Comprehensiveness and detailed analyses are not my concerns here.

In a treatise on globalization and ethnic conflict in the context of the EU, Dutceac (2004) argues that globalization not only is irresponsible for the proliferation of ethnic and nationalist conflicts but also may act as a harbinger of peaceful inter-ethnic coexistence. She tries to demonstrate her case by looking into the EU, "a good reflection of globalization processes" (p.25). She cites the cases of Macedonia and Hungary in their search for membership in the EU, and how this would bring about inter-group harmony within each of those countries. This has been achieved by the EU system in two ways: the conditionality about respecting minority rights in each country and EU's potential in creating a wider, "European" identity. Thus, for Dutceac, the EU promotes peaceful nation-building policies through its tight conditionalities and the possibility of weakening state nationalism.

My evaluation of Dutceac's statements is mixed. Her generalization that globalization cannot cause (promote) inter-ethnic antagonism is unfounded, as her study is confined to just the European region, and her theory may crumble when facing the reality beyond that (like the Ethiopian case). At the same time, however, one can learn something from her study: that conflict is not an inevitably natural consequence of the globalization process, and that the latter can be methodically used to

build a framework of mutual concurrence. But a more cogent criticism would deal with Dutceac's allusion that (state) nationalism is on the verge of collapse. I have shown in the preceding chapters that this is not what the general trend would exhibit. More interestingly, her own case studies do not lead us to this conclusion. For instance, Hungary sees membership in EU as the "fulfillment of its 'homeland nationalism', via the elimination of the borders that so unjustly separated their national community in 1920" (Dutceac, 2004:34). Hungary is not required by the EU to lose its identity or dilute its national aspirations, but just to respect ethnic minorities and enforce their collective rights all throughout the region. This also means that sub-national identities are also given the respite to foster. Therefore, the EU as an agent of globalization does not erase nationalism but only forges the conditions of dovetailing otherwise antagonistic identities.

I think it is also this particular lesson regarding the EU's experience that seems relevant to us, at least for the time being. Abandoning the futile idea that nations and nationalisms will decamp to the debris of history, we have to rather search for a minimum ground where hither-to clashing nationalisms may transcend the impasse that stood in the way to moderateness and mutual empathy. In a sense, globalization should be made to say yes to nationalism and no to conflict.

In his quest for coming up with a nearly-universal solution for the globalized phenomenon of inter-ethnic conflicts and claims, Isajiw (1994) focuses on three elements that make up democracy expanded to reduce inter-ethnic conflicts or incorporate diverse ethnic identities into existing nation-states. These elements are recognition, negotiation and multicultural type of policies and structures. By suggesting concrete examples of countries/nations from all around the world which attempted to embrace these elements into their body politic, he shows both that the same have become globalized concepts and also that they can serve as effective means of dealing with diversities constructively.

Needless to say, Isajiw had been preceded and has also been followed by a host of scholars who variously tackled the issue of integrating multiculturalism into the nation-state/democratic framework. But the fact that I saw it fit to discuss in some detail something of his three concepts prodded me to mention him above. I aim at briefly dwelling on "recognition" --which he also emphasizes for its all-inclusive and fundamental aspect--yet not as philosophized by him (he actually does not do that) but by another frequently cited theorist in the field, Charles Taylor (1992).

The "politics of recognition", according to Charles Taylor (1992), has come to mean two rather different things, connected, respectively, with two major changes he elaborately describes. With the move from a vertical, hierarchical conception of "honor" to a horizontal, all-inclusive dignity has come a politics of universalism, emphasizing the equal dignity of all citizens. By contrast, the second change, the development of the modern notion of identity, has given rise to a politics of difference to which there is a universalist basis as well, since everyone should be recognized for his or her unique identity. What makes the two different is that with the politics of equal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, "an identical basket of rights and immunities" (p. 38); in the politics of difference, we are asked to recognize the unique identity of this individual or group, i.e., what makes them distinct from everyone else. This is because "it is precisely this distinctness that has been ignored, glossed over, assimilated to a dominant or majority identity" (Taylor, 1992: 38)

There is an interesting case with this concept of "politics of difference", viz., its glocal nature. "We give", states Taylor (1992:39), "due acknowledgment only to what is universally present--everyone has an identity--through recognizing what is peculiar to each." Concisely put, "the universal demand powers an acknowledgment of specifity." We are

back with out rhetoric of "glocalization" even in our trial to reshape some of its (undesirable?) effects.

Now, let's question whether the two types of recognition ever collide and, if so, where? The response would be in the positive. For the one ("politics of dignity"), the principle of equal respect requires that we treat people in a difference-blind manner, for the intuition that humans command this respect focuses on what is the same in all. For the other ("politics of difference"), recognition and even fostering of particularity are quite fundamental. The first reproaches the second that the latter violates the principle of non-discrimination. The second, in its turn, claims that the first negates identity by forcing people into a homogeneous mold that is untrue to them. Moreover, it (the second) continues, the supposedly natural set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture. "Deference blindedness", therefore, is itself a form of discrimination, "a particularism masquerading as the universal" (*Ibid*: 44). Such liberalism is beset with pragmatic contradiction.

I believe that Taylor's concepts of recognition are of utmost relevance to our concern here. As pointed out in chapter three, the formation of the modern Ethiopian state resulted in the subjection of different ethnic groups to various forms of political, economic and cultural domination and oppression. The imposition of centralized state control was directed at ensuring the cultural and political hegemony of the ruling Amharic elite in state affairs. Non–Amhara ethnic groups were not, except for some selected ones, accommodated in national politics as per an explicit policy to that end. "The key aspects of the domination involved coercive assimilation and homogenization of the non–Amhara ethnic groups without integrating them as equals" (Aklilu, 2006:88). "Instead", as Markakis (1974:111) further remarks, "Amhara culture was implicitly presented as the defining trait of the 'Ethiopian' nationality [and] Ethiopian identity was at a fundamental level based in the Amhara

language and Ethiopian Orthodox religion". In such a situation, to downplay the worth of the politics of difference, as do some, if not all, Ethiopianist nationalists of today, may be tantamount to disclosing the yearning one has for the perpetuation of ethno-linguistic subordination of the bygone years. The call for building a "difference-blind" Ethiopian nation is rightly seen by some to be a cry for reviving a particularistic, narrowly-defined Ethiopian identity in disguise.

I am of the opinion that, generally speaking, the implantation of the politics of recognition in the minds of peoples and in relational structures can be the only alternative point of hope where the different sub-identities of the Ethiopian nation can rally behind. Only it can fulfill the demands of the competing nationalisms to the extent that no one's interests can go to rule out the interests of others. It may help to preserve the national unity of the country, on the one hand, and the demands of different ethnic groups regarding self-determination, on the other. I think this has to convince the secessionist groups, too, if at all we all long for a Horn of Africa where the occurrence of violence is immensely reduced while and at the same time "justpeace" (Lederach, 2005) takes roots.

I share some of the critical outlooks of many authors towards the claim by the incumbent regime in Ethiopia that it has championed the right of the hither–to subjugated groups while also maintaining the unity of the Ethiopian state. I won't delve into this issue in depth. I just would like to emphasize my agreement with Aklilu's (2006) charge that the EPRDF has subtly shifted the model of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia from that of "holding together" to that of "putting together". He draws from Alfred Stephan (cited in p.86), who explains what these two (plus one more) models of federalism mean: "*Coming together* federations are bargained-based and body-politic constitutive efforts involving an agreement by sovereign political entities to establish a political union while preserving political autonomy". *Holding together* federations, in

contrast, are voluntarily introduced from above with the aim of preserving the political unity of an already formed polity by devolving power and autonomy to subnational units in a unitary state. The *putting together* model is distinct from the two in that it does not involve either bargained agreement or voluntary consensus and is largely based on coercive imposition by a centralizing power. This, it seems, is a non-democratic form of federation.

The EPRDF's transition period promise of "holding together" pact and power sharing with the participants in the July 1991 "Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference" is clearly contrasted with its later-day gradual resort to obstructionist measures against other political groups and subordination of the regional states to its political and fiscal control. In the end, the ethnic federalism in Ethiopia indicates only limited difference from a centralized political administration. This would severely scar and put to question the government's desire to install the "politics of recognition" in the body politic of the country.

How can, next, our attempt at "deconstructing" nationalism help us to come out of the predicament (the one regarding contending nationalisms)? It revivifies the luster of criticality and possibility. I concur with Spencer's and Howard's (1999) insight that there should be a more critical engagement with nationalism at every level than many now seem prepared or able to do. "Under the guise of 'taking nationalism seriously', there is a tendency to attribute to it a more permanent and more objective weight and a more automatic claim on spontaneous affections and loyalties than it necessarily warrants" (Spencer and Howard, 1999: 115). Two reflections need stress as implications of this. One is the recognition that instead of the idea of a reified common culture ostensibly shared by all citizens within a given polity, there can be many interacting cultures shaping and reshaping each other and supporting the creation of new commitments and loyalties. This, it should be made clear, does not necessarily mean or lead to the undoing

Indeed, promising transformations are getting under way in some of these areas. The case with Oromo nationalism is a good example. The amplification of the voice of Oromo nationalism in a global era has been accompanied by a process of differentiation within the movement itself, thereby making it difficult for *Oromumma* to be subsumed under the caption of the OLF. This is luminous both in Ethiopia and in the diaspora. The major basic difference within Oromo nationalist discourse came out to be between those advocating secession and those calling for self-determination within the state structure of Ethiopia. In the homeland, this distinction has remained well-known ever since the coming into being of moderate Oromo parties representing the latter camp (recently, like the ONC, the OFDM and even the EPRDF'S OPDO). The diaspora has become even much more diversified in the articulation of Oromo nationalism especially of late. Van Heur (2004: 87-8), for instance, writes:

> The OSA, for example, which has always been close to the philosophy of the OLF, is no longer the only academic organization, but has to share this place with the recently formed Oromian National Academy. At the same time, one can observe an "islamization" of the secular discourse of the OLF....Feminist Oromo-writers now address the male-dominated character of the OLF and traditional Oromo culture. Oromo Online, the...website closely related to the OLF, is...complemented [or counterweighted?] by a whole range of community organizations that involve more local representations of Oromo ethnicity....

All these developments do validate our earlier stance that nationalism is always in a constant process of making and re-making, and that this process can never come to a close. But more importantly, these diversifications may lend us some sort of reason for becoming sanguine about the future of contending nationalisms in Ethiopia. We may be able to witness the emergence of more moderate voices in the years head. But unless the same diversification in the basics and tone of Ethiopian nationalism takes place at the same time, our optimism may get stalled in the minimum, if not smothered entirely. We are at this

moment in a dire need of listening to more sensible (moderate, all-inclusive), but formidable, versions of Ethiopian nationalism, reasonably accommodating, among others, all the hither-to subjugated groups in Ethiopia. It is the junction of moderates that creates an ideal condition for negotiation and empathy. After all, as Charles Taylor (1992) correctly argues, identity is always formed dialogically, not in isolation. The identity, I would add, held by one entity does impact on its counterpart, and a hardliner is quite likely predisposed to confront his/her kind albeit in a different camp.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, our world saw a rather large number of cases in which various parties to inter-ethnic conflict have offered recognition to those to whom they refused to accord it for decades before (Isajiw, 2004). These recognitions of course are of different types: recognition of rights to self-determination, recognition of land claims, recognition of cultures, language, recognition of worthy negotiation partnership, etc. But all these tend to render the politics of recognition a global reality in practice, not to mention its global celebrity as a respected and recognized idea in international documents and discourses. But, principally, the philosophy behind it as digested by Taylor (1992) rests on the view that takes all humanity as its domain. It is also here that it turns "glocal" with its emphasis on the "particular". By making the best out of what glocalization necessarily or may proffer us, we must step-up both our projects of nation-building and multiculturalism simultaneously. Right at this point, I join company with some of the critics of Taylor (let's say, Milstein, 2003; Benhabib, 2002) who censure his conception of "culture" as static and discrete. I believe many of our cultures (notably, what we call "our national or ethnic cultures") are and should be negotiable, so that multiculturalism and national identity can be re-fashioned harmoniously.

Notes

1. However, as will be made quite clear in chapters three and four, I reject any extremism in adopting any of these paradigms. I believe each one has some particles of truth in it just as both suffer form some drawbacks. Anyhow, I have a greater sympathy with the constructionists.

   I have deliberately cut short my discussion on the approaches to the study of identity in this chapter, since I will be going into the topic in all but perhaps the fifth chapter.
2. One can refer to the bulky literature produced by, for instance, dependency and world-system theorists.
3. This view is represented primarily by post-modernists and "Wallerstenians" (from Immanuel Wallerstein). While the claims of post-modernists and the counter-claims of their critiques abound in scholarly works (see, for instance, Craig Calhoun's *Critical Social Theory*), for a brief critical treatment of Wallerstein's view, one can refer, among many others, Leslie Sklair's, *Globalization*, pp.40-42, and Albert Bergesen's, "Turning World-Systems Theory on its Head", pp.67-83. My special problem with these views is not that reactive moves never occur in inter-group interactions but that, a) these alone won't explain fully all forms of identity constructions, and b) behind or beside every reactive move there is also an interpenetrative and complimentary companionship in the making.
4. See, for instance, Hall, 1991a, 1991b. I am somewhat skeptical of the tendency to consider the recent era of globalization as being radically unique in compelling us to live in a condition of homelessness or rootlessness. (For elaborations, see Robertson, 1995:35).
5. This "multiple modernity" approach is best represented by Eisensdadt, 2000 and Spohn, 2003. For criticisms, see Schmidt, 2004. I regard this approach highly useful for its analytic capacity

to study the development of non-Western societies. However, I personally would a) sense an aroma of teleology in that it carves out inevitable, linear continuities in the processes of the transformations of socio-cultural traditions of societies, and b) tend to disagree with its attribution of the rise of ethno-nationalisms in non-Western societies always to the imposition of state secularism.

6. This view, very similar to, if not exactly alike, the "multiple modernity" approach referred to above, is well-presented in Berman, Bruce, *et. al, Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa.*
7. "'Creolization' appears in writings on globalization and post-modernism as a synonym of hybridity and syncretism to depict the mixtures occurring among societies in an age of migration and telecommunication" (Stewart, 2002).
8. Throughout my thesis, I will use the term "discourse" to signify:

> the way in which we use language to construct meaning or the way in which we infuse words with meanings or significance....Discourses inform or create concrete practices, which become part of discourses. Or we might say discourse is itself a practice. A discourse is not about a "real" thing, or event, or category of persons like "woman". Discourse creates the thing it speaks of, because it invests meaning into an empty term like "woman" and, in so doing, creates a "real" category of people whose lives are then profoundly shaped by the concrete practices that flow from this same meaning (Steans & Lloyd, 2005: 247, 139).

9. This is not, however, to underrate the differences in the views of these two camps on other aspects of the nation. For instance, Eric Hobsbawn's (1990) confidence in the imminent demise of ethnicity and nationalism (in a more and more globalizing world) clearly collides with Anthony Smith's (1995) conviction that the nation and its nationalism "is likely to remain the only realistic and widespread popular ideal of community" (back cover).

10. The "Aksumite paradigm", which the author believes to have been elaborated by the Ethiopian Orthodox Monophysite Church and its

patrons among the notables, disagrees with the "Orientalist Semiticist" paradigm, which was developed by the European Ethiopic-Semitic philologists (he includes other social scientists, too), on two grounds: the racial identity of Ethiopians and the Sabean origin thesis. In both of these issues, the former paradigm's stance is that Ethiopians are not outlandish to Africa, and that no Sabeans crossed to Ethiopia to "civilize" the Ethiopians.

Teshale's typology has some defects. Most importantly, not the views of all European scholars of Ethiopia can safely fall under the "Orientalist" paradigm. D. Levine (1971) (whom Teshale categorizes under the promoters of such a view) and N. Finneran (2003), for instance, do not believe that the Axumite civilization was extra-African in origin.

11. Ethiopian nationalism is, and is willed to be, multifarious. Different groups in Ethiopia seek to fashion the image of the country after their own interests. Each cherished socio-cultural image of Ethiopia is willed to be the basis of "Ethiopian" nationalism. As far as my usage of the term is concerned, however, it is meant to refer to the one based on the hither-to dominant image of Ethiopia as an ancient entity (or nation), with a long, uninterrupted historical tradition and an essential cultural (Amharic-Christian) identity (see also note 12 below). It can be variously termed as "Ethiopianist" nationalism, "right wing Ethiopian nationalism" or "Abyssinian fundamentalism" (This last term being a concoction by De Waal, 1994). I use these terms (and simply "Ethiopian nationalism") interchangeably throughout.

12. Myth-making in the nationalist narration of Ethiopian history begins here. Historically speaking, however, this story of the Queen

of Sheba, according to Bahru Zewde (2000: 4), could not be taken seriously by any "self- respecting historian"! Contemporary nationalists may not seem to take this myth seriously, though they have unflinchingly retained the discourse about the "antique" historical projection of the "Ethiopian nation" along with its "cultural core" and "specific, essential identity" almost intact.

13. Cf. the position held by Adrian Hastings (1997) on this issue. He seems to agree with Levine in all aspects but two: a) He admits that the "national" consciousness was limited to only the Amharic people, and b) The Ethiopian state is with a continuous history of 1,500 years, not 3000.

14. Even in the late 19th C, Bahru, for instance, makes a mention of the trade links between Wallaga and Sudan, and (present-day) southern Ethiopia and the coast of Somalia.

15. This incident, in particular, and the over all image of Ethiopia as an "old, independent, African nation" in general, served, in later years, as a fundamental package of psychological recourse for the global producers of other localities, too. Two such highly inter-related productions turned out to be formidable in the 20th century. These were Pan-Africanism and Ethiopianism, both encumbering blacks outside the territorial scale of Ethiopia. For a full treatment of the latter movement, see Nelson, Gresham, "Rastafarianism and Ethiopianism".

16. This is only a conventional way of naming the Eritrean nationalism. Strictly speaking, though, it cannot be regarded as an ethnonational movement since Eritrea itself is a multiethnic nation.

17. See the next chapter for a full treatment.

18. One more counter-argument to the claim that "since 'Eritrean nation' is a recent creation, it does not deserve to be called so", would be to wonder how long it should take for a certain people to legitimately claim a nation?

19. Different movements have scrambled for representing the Oromo masses. The Macha-Tulama Organization, the OLF, the IFLO, the ULFO, the OPLO, the OLC, the OPLF, the OPDO, the ONC, the OFDM... all have spoken on behalf of some or all of the Oromo at different times. Some have managed to keep rank with their contemporary others, while (bloody) clashes have characterized the relations between some others. In this particular chapter, my special focus will be on the OLF and its brand of Oromo nationalism. Any view in line with the intellectual/ideological underpinnings of this brand of nationalism will be an object of consideration, regardless of the fact that the holder of that view is a member of the OLF or not.

20. whose instrumentalist interpretation of the rise of Oromo nationalism I, however, do not share. See page 56 above.

21. Their resistance movement was as nationalist as that of the colonialist one. See chapter two above.

22. This is also my critique of the emphatic assertions on the part of many Oromo writers (for example, Makuria, 1996:57) that it was colonialism that created *Oromumma*. My reflection is that the causal relationship between what is called colonialism and Oromo nationalism is not automatic. Series of learning and teaching processes should take place in order to create a nationalist

upsurge. The very conception of Menelik's conquest as a colonial encounter and the sequential mobilization of people on nationalist basis required, in the first place, the knowledge of how people thought and acted somewhere else in similar situations. The writings of revolutionary thinkers and leaders in many parts of the world were crucial in this respect, too.

23. But had the Bale rebellion, on whose behalf glocal discourse was instantiated, itself been "innocent" of the same transnational imagination? Definitely not! Let us consider this speech delivered by the Bale insurgents:

> We shall not surrender, for we have gone out for a *jihad* in God's cause. You have to remember that *the conflict between us and you is just like that between the Vietnamese and the Americans.* One of us may be destroyed, but we shall persevere in our struggle to regain our land. We would rather die than submit ourselves to you. Our struggle is gaining force like a gathering storm (Gebru, 1991: 155). (Emphasis mine.)

24 Quite a lot has been written on the post-modernist paradigm. For an excellent up-to-date and comprehensive discussion of this movement, one can refer to Stuart Sim (ed.) (2005), *The Routledge Companion to Post-Modernism.*

25 This section partly depends on Matsouka and Sorenson, *Ghosts and Shadows*; Levine, "Reconfiguring the Ethiopian Nation in a Global Era" and some materials appearing in various Ethiopianist websites.

26 The news-centered websites include: www.imperialethiopia.org/news and www.ethiopiafirst.com. Two discussion-oriented ones are EEDN and *Ethiopian Review.*

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N.B. The abbreviations "n.d." and "n.p.d." stand for "no date" and "no publication data", respectively.

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis dissertation is entirely my own work and that it has never been submitted as an exercise for a degree of any other university and that all sources of materials used for it have been duly acknowledged.

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