



ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE

CENTER FOR FEDERALISM AND GOVERNANCE STUDIES

**Accommodating Exogenous Communities at Local Level:
The Case of Gura-Ferda *Woreda* of SNNPRS and Pawe
Woreda of BGNRS**

By

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Studies**

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**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
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Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and all the sources of material used for the thesis have been dully acknowledged.

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ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
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Glossary of terms

Awuraja-An administrative unit below province

Fitawurary-A traditional title given for land lords before 1974

Kebele-The smallest administrative unit that recognized by the regional constitutions

Mender-An administration unit below the *kebele* level that is not recognized by state constitutions and equivalent to village

Shitu-An indigenous tree that used to produce quality charcoal in southwest dense forest areas

Sigsega-An Amharic term which equivalent to ‘Substitution’

Teklay Gizat-The name given for provincial administrations during the Imperial regime often for 14 provinces

Wodo Sefari-The so called ‘illegal’ settlers called themselves in Gura-Ferda

Woreda-The third tier of government that established under Art 50(4) of the FDRE constitution

Acronyms

ANDM-	Amhara National Democratic Movement
ANRS-	Amhara National Regional State
BGNRS-	Benishangul Gumuz National Regional State
BGPDP-	Benishangul Gumuz Peoples Democratic Party
BNWEPDUP-	Benishangul North Western Peoples Democratic Unity Party
Boro-SPDM-	Boro Shinasha Peoples Democratic Movement
BPLM-	Berta Peoples Liberation Movement
CoR-	Council of Representatives
CSA-	Central Statistics Authority
EPRDF-	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic movement
ESM-	Ethiopian Students Movement
FDG-	Focus Group Discussion
FDRE-	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GNRS-	Gambela National Regional State
GPLM-	Gumuz People Libration Movement
HoPR-	House of People Representatives
ISEN-	Institute of the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities
KPDM-	Komo people's Democratic Movement
MPDM-	Mao Peoples Democratic Movement
NEBE-	National Electoral Board of Ethiopia
NNP-	Nation, Nationalities and Peoples
OLF-	Oromo Liberation Movement

OPDO-	Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization
SEPDM-	Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement
SNNPRS-	Southern Nation, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State
TPG-	Transitional Period Charter
TPLF-	Tigrean People Liberation Front

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Abstract

Ethiopia has adopted what is often referred to as ethnic federalism which aims to accommodate the ethnic diversity of the Ethiopian people principally, if not exclusively, through territorial mechanisms. It establishes nine ethnically demarcated regional states and provides the establishment of sub-regional territorial and political units for intra-regional ethnic minorities based on the same federal principle. Implied, or assumed to have been implied, in this federal arrangement is a notion of endogeneity in a sense only that only those ethnic communities that are viewed as endogenous to a specific territorial area are considered to be entitled for self-government either at regional or sub-regional level. This leaves out the millions who are considered to be exogenous without clear constitutional protection. A qualitative approach with purposive sampling techniques was employed during data collection. Interview, Focus group discussion and field observation was employed in this thesis. Among exogenous communities (not necessarily ethnic communities) in such constitutional quandary are those who moves to the areas now make parts such regions as Benishangul-Gumuz and SNNP as part of the villagization and resettlement of programs of the imperial and Derg eras. These communities are mostly found in clearly demarcated territorial areas which are equal or larger than a woreda in terms of territorial and population size. And, despite being of different ethnic background, the settlers have over the years developed a sense a community. Yet, they seem to have no constitutional protection and under the mercy of the endogenous communities of each region. Regardless of the position of the Constitution regarding such communities, this thesis undertook to investigate whether and how such communities are in practice accommodated in the regions they are found. To this effect it selected the Pawe woreda of Benishangul-Gumuz and Gura-Ferda woreda of SNNP. The so called exogenous communities are found in the majority in both of these woredas. However, they are treated differently. In Pawe woreda, where members of the exogenous community constitute over 99 percent of the population, they are allowed to have full control over the political and administrative institutions of the woreda. They are represented in the regional government and, compared to members of the exogenous communities living in other parts of Benishangul-Gumuz region, are least harassed by members of the endogenous communities. The situation is starkly different in Gura-Ferda. There, despite them being in majority, members of exogenous communities are excluded from the political institutions of the woredas. And they suffer from actual or threat of eviction.

Chapter One

1. Introduction

1.1. The Problem

There has been a multi-directional population movement in Ethiopia since time immemorial. People have been moving from place to places both individually or as a group. For instance the Oromo movement of 16th Century was one of the greatest population movements in the history of the country. People move in search of farming and grazing land, after their lands become barren due to frequent soil erosion, environmental degradation, and the like. People also have been moving from place to place for trade, to conduct war, in search for better life and better job for centuries.

The historical population movements were hardly initiated or sanctioned by government. An officially sanctioned population movement began with the Southward expansion of the Ethiopian Empire during Emperor Menelik's era (1889-1913). People moved from the north to the south as administrator, priests, soldiers and the like. The southward population movement was mainly to forcefully incorporated areas of the present-day Oromia and South Nation Nationalities and Peoples Regional state.¹

The population movement also continued during Haile Selassie's regime. Around this time both 'spontaneous' and 'planned' resettlements took place.² In the 1940's and 1970's a large number of people moved from the over populated and degraded highlands of Northern Ethiopia to less intensively used and less densely populated areas of the South.³ The resettlement processes became formalised in the process of villagization programs during the *Derg*. The *Derg* implemented villagization and resettlement programmes with the view to reducing the effects of famine in Northern Ethiopia.⁴ Hence settlers selected from Wello, Tigray and North Shewa were taken to different resettlement sites in Southern and South Western part of the country, often against their will.

¹ Zemelak and De Visser (2017) 'the (mis) management of Ethno-linguistic diversity in Ethiopian cities' 16(3) *Ethno-politics*.

² Dejen (2011) *Impact of resettlement on woody plant species and local livelihood: The Case of Gura-Ferda Woreda in Bench Maji Zone, South west Ethiopia* (thesis submitted for MA in Sociology, Addis Ababa university) 7.

³ *Ibid*

⁴ Desalegn (1988a) 'Peasant Survival strategy in Ethiopia', *Nordiska Africa institute press*, & Weldeslasie (2002). *The dynamics of socio economic differentiation and change in the Belles-valley (pawe) resettlement area, North western Ethiopia*, (Thesis submitted for MA in sociology, Addis Ababa university).

Among settlement sites so established are the Gura-Ferda and Pawe *woredas*. The Gura-Ferda *woreda* is found in Bench-Maji zone of SNNPR and it is the result of the villagization programme of the *Derg*.⁵ Planned resettlement in Gura-Ferda *woreda* started in 1980s by transferring drought affected rural households from Northern parts of Ethiopia.⁶ The first settlers faced many challenges since the area was inaccessible and far from basic services. They overcame those challenges and made the area liveable. This attracted many exogenous settlers to the area. After 1991, through intra-regional resettlement policy many people from Hadiya, Kambata and Wolayta settled in the area. Now the *woreda* is the home for Amhara, Sidama, Wolayta, Kambata, Guragie, Hadiya, Bench, Gedeo, Me'ent, few Oromo and others.

Pawe is a *woreda* which is found in the present day Benishangul-Gumuz region. It was established as part of the *Derg's* Pawe or Belles valley resettlement project. Those who were settled in this area were brought from parts of the country which were affected by drought and those having chronic farmland shortage. Those who were brought to this settlement sites included those from the Amhara, Oromo, Tigre, Kambata, and Hadya communities. According to the 2007 Central Statistical Agency report, the Amhara constitute 79.71% of the population of the *woreda* while those from Kambaata, the Hadiya, Agaw-Awi, the Oromo, and Somalis make up 8%, 4.5%, 3.05%, 2.22%, and 1.92% of the population of the *woreda*, respectively.⁷ Those from other ethnic groups make up 0.6% of the population.

Following the ouster of the *Derg* from power and the coming to power of EPRDF in May 1991, the territorial and political structure of the country was revised. The country became a *de facto* federation with the adoption of the Transitional Period Charter in 1991 which recognised the right to self-government of every ethnic community of the country.⁸ Proclamation No 7/1992 was issued by the Transitional Period Government (TPG) recognized 63 communities as 'Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' capable of exercising self-government. Along the settlement pattern of ethnic communities, the proclamation created 12 regions. Addis Ababa and Harar, the 13th and 14th regions were created based on different principle. Forty-six of the 63 communities were given the right to self- government at *woreda* level or above. The remaining 17 ethnic groups were considered as "minority nationalities"

⁵ Yonas (2013) *Implication of Ethiopian federalism on the right to freedom of movement and residence: Critical analysis of the law and the practice* (Thesis submitted for LLM, Addis Ababa University) p.95.

⁶ Moti (2011).

⁷ Central Statistics Authority (2007).

⁸ Seyoum (2015) 'Self-rule and societal security in Ethiopia: A case study of Majang in Gambella region', *Center for Federal studies*, Addis Ababa university) p.153.

and their right to adequate representation in *woreda* councils was recognised.⁹ In 1995 this arrangement was constitutionally entrenched with little change.

The Ethiopian federal system aims to accommodate Nation, Nationalities and Peoples which are assumed to be endogenous to specific areas. The endogenous communities are allowed to establish self-government at regional or sub-regional levels, including at Nationality zone and special *woreda* levels.¹⁰ The federal principle is silent concerning communities who, as described above, moved or were forced to move, to parts of the country where, as a result of the federal dispensation, they are viewed as exogenous. As per some of the regional constitutions they are now referred to as ‘other people’, ‘non-founder’, ‘non-indigenous’, or ‘non-natives’.

1.2. Research questions

Against the above backdrop this study raises and seeks to answer the question that, given the ethnic federal system of the country, how are, if at all, exogenous communities, especially those that are found territorially concentrated and in majority, politically and culturally accommodated at local level? The study seeks to answer this question by taking Gura-Ferda and Pawe *woredas* as case studies.

With a view to answering the main question stated above, the study also raises other related questions including:

- Are exogenous communities a ‘minority’ who are entitled for accommodation?
- Does the federal constitution contain a principle for accommodating exogenous communities?
- Is local government envisaged to play a role in this respect?

⁹ Proclamation No 7/1992, A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of National /Regional Self-governments, Negarit Gazeta 51st Year No 2, Addis Ababa, 14th January 1992.

¹⁰ For instance, the Benshangul-Gumuz constitution identified five endogenous ethnic communities with the power to administer them as Gumuz, Berta and Shinasha with nationality zones status and Komo and Mao as a single special *woreda*. The Amhara regional constitution also identifies Agew-Awi, Agew-Hemra and Oromo as indigenous communities of the region and establishes a nationality zone as well as one special *woreda* for these communities. The SNNP is territorially divided along ethnic lines with almost all of the sub-regional territorial and political units being ethnic based nationality zones and special *woredas*. The only exception is the recently established and controversial ‘Segen zone’ which is simply an administrative zone.

1.3. Significance of the study

This study conducted a deep understanding about the accommodation of exogenous communities at local level. Beyond creating deep understanding about the issue, its significance will have value in showing mechanisms of promoting peaceful co-existence among endogenous and exogenous ethnic groups. The introduction of ethnic federalism to ensure ethnic self-administration followed by the displacement of exogenous ethnic minorities in different regional states in general and Gura-Ferda and Pawe in particular needs attention and deep observation.

The study shows how local governments can accommodate both endogenous and exogenous ethnic groups in different aspects as they are the smallest tiers of government in Ethiopia in general and Gura-Ferda and Pawe in Particular.

1.4. Argument

The study, based on the two case studies, argues, there are two approaches in terms of politically accommodating exogenous communities. The Pawe case shows a generous approach towards exogenous communities by establishing a *woreda* in the area where they are found territorially concentrated by allowing them to be in charge of the political and administrative institutions of the *woreda*. The Gura-ferda case is the opposite. In this *woreda* the exogenous communities are excluded from the political and administrative institutions of the *woreda*. However, there is a perception that those who are not from endogenous communities are not entitled to political inclusion. Even the establishment of the Pawe *woreda* and the inclusion of the members of the exogenous communities is viewed as a grant from the regional state rather than a result of the constitutional right of those from the exogenous communities.

1.5. Literature Review

The Ethiopian federal system focuses on accommodating territorially settled ethnic groups as ultimate sovereign power holders and full entitled self-determination including and up to secession. These territorially organized ethnic groups are autonomous at regional, *zonal*, *woreda* and even *kebele* level. According to Vander Beken and Yonatan, the logic of Ethiopian federalism is to empower or to fulfil the right to self-determination of particular

ethnic groups but within one regional state, many minorities exist.¹¹ The federal and regional constitutions as well as the political system are largely insensitive about ethnic communities outside their ‘mother region’.¹²

The right to self-determination of Nation, Nationalities and people as provided by Article 39 comprises four components. These components are the right to speak, write and develop one’s own language, to express, develop and promote one’s own culture, and preserve history; the right to full measure of government (self-rule); equitable representation in state and federal government (shared-rule) and the right to self-determination and secession.¹³ The above rights are exclusively granted to territorially concentrate ethnic groups to satisfy certain ethnic demands. For Van Der Beken territorial accommodation of diversity have its own disadvantages.¹⁴ First it creates the endogenous and exogenous differentiations which lead to the exclusion of exogenous ethnic community at regional and local level. Second the exogenous ethnic communities are not always concentrated in a specific area and became ‘non-owners’ to the host region. Third the establishment of new sub-regional territorial entities will lead to a dispersion of scarce resources, thus undermining government efficiency. For him constitutional revision is fundamental not only to accommodate the exogenous ethnic communities but also to accommodate intra-unit minorities which didn’t have territorial autonomy.¹⁵

According to Zemelak Ayele and J de Visser,¹⁶ following the introduction of Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, the institutional mechanism to accommodate urban residents which are not belongs to the dominant ethnic community in the respective region became nightmare. There is no mechanism to ensure the political participation of ‘non-autonomous’ communities in Ethiopian cities and municipalities.¹⁷ Through historical reason and population movement of the country, the Ethiopian cities are more heterogeneous as compared to the rural areas of different regional states. Researchers mostly focused at urban areas in which the exogenous communities settled paramount.

¹¹ Van Der Beken and Yonatan (2015) ‘Empowerment and exclusion: the legal protection of internal minorities in Ethiopia’, *Centre for Federal studies*, Addis Ababa university, p.53.

¹² *Ibid*

¹³ FDRE constitution, Art. 39.

¹⁴ Van Der Beken (2009) *Federalism and the accommodation of ethnic diversity: the case of Ethiopia*, p. 9

¹⁵ *Ibid*.

¹⁶ *Supra* note 1, p.29.

¹⁷ *Ibid*.

Most researches in Gura-Ferda are focused on the impact of population movement on environment and sociological aspect of the endogenous-exogenous relations as well as the resettlement program and its impact to the respective locality (Dejene, 2011; Abeje, 2011; Desalegn, 2008). Extended researches are conducted in Benshangul-Gumuz regional states concerning to the accommodation of diversity at regional level. The exogenous ethnic communities in Benshangul-Gumuz regional state live either together with the endogenous communities or separate *woreda* administrations. For instance, the Amhara live in both Asossa zone and Pawe special *woreda*. The Agaw-Awi predominantly lives in Metekel zone. The Oromos live in both Asossa and Kamashi along with the endogenous groups.¹⁸ The absences of institutional mechanism to accommodate exogenous ethnic communities exist in this region (Asnake, 2009; Zemelak, 2014; Wende, 2015; Van Der Beken, 2015; Ayalew, 2011).

Extensive studies are not held on the issue of exogenous ethnic communities in Ethiopia, however, thesis, dissertations, researches and studies concerning the accommodation of exogenous ethnic groups are depended on urban studies. These findings mostly depend on urban governance as well as national and region based. The study area that I am concerned is predominantly occupied by the exogenous ethnic communities at urban and rural areas. The second gap of other literatures is that no one compares and contrasts the two local governments which the other people predominantly occupied the study area.

1.6 Scope of the study

As a result of historical population movement in Ethiopia, exogenous peoples are scattered in different regional states of the federation. These communities live either in a majority in a certain *kebeles* and *woredas* or in minority to the host region. The two *woredas* are located in the two extreme far areas of Southern Nation, Nationalities and People's Regional State and Benishangul-Gumuz National Regional State of Ethiopia. The study is confined to Gura-Ferda and Pawe *woredas* as they are dominated by the exogenous communities. This study assesses the political, economic and cultural accommodation of the exogenous communities in these *woredas*.

¹⁸ Mesfin (2011) *Federalism and conflict Management in Ethiopia: case study of Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State* (Dissertation submitted for the degree of PhD in Peace studies, university of Bradford) p.178.

1.7 Research Methodology

The research approach will be purely qualitative with a descriptive research type and comparative method. In the following sections a deep discussion of the methodology part is discussed.

1.7.1 Comparative Research method

This study assesses the accommodation of exogenous communities at local level with special emphasis of the two study areas in a comparative approach. The comparative method is widely used by students of comparative politics to develop and test theories applicable beyond boundaries of a single society but has also been extensively used to analyse a wide array of political issues within a single country, particularly within federal structure.¹⁹ Comparative research method in its broadest sense is the process of discovering similarities and differences among phenomena.²⁰ The way that the study areas have to be chosen as comparative approach is that the two local governments have similarities and differences in many aspects. The selection and comparability of two local governments emanates from their historical resettlement site and the exogenous dominance over endogenous communities. Comparative research method in spite of its attractiveness as an important way of finding empirical relationships among several variables, it faces some critical challenges such as multiplicity of variables and small number of cases.²¹ To overcome these limitations increasing the number of cases as much as possible and combining two or more similar variables and focusing on comparable cases are recommended.²² My study will look at empirical evidences of accommodation of non-indigenous communities at local level in the case of Gura-ferda and Pawe *woredas* where these communities live in a majority.

1.7.2 Case selection

Comparability of the cases in two or more areas is a key component in comparative study. Thus the two local governments share similarities in many ways. Some of the similarities are outlined as follows.

¹⁹ Asnake (2009) *Federalism and Ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: A comparative study of the Somali and Benshangul- Gumuz regions* (Dissertation submitted for the degree of PhD in political science university of Leiden) p.16.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Lijphart(1971) 'Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method', *The American Political Science Review* 65(3) p.685 cited by Asnake Kefale (2009)) *Federalism and Ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: A comparative study of the Somali and Benshangul- Gumuz regions* (Dissertation submitted for the degree of PhD in political science, university of Leiden) p.16.

²² *Ibid.*

First, their historical significance as selecting for the site of forced and volunteer resettlement areas. Gura-ferda in Southern, Nation, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNPRS) and Pawe in Benshangul-Gumuz National Regional State (BGNRS) are the biggest resettlement areas in the respective region. At the beginning, both Gura-ferda and Pawe/Beles valley were not comfort for agriculture and surplus production. Later the place changed in to productive area due to hard working habit of the exogenous communities.

Second, due to historical and government sponsored resettlement program in these areas, multi-ethnic composition is visible in different *kebeles*. For instance in Gura-ferda; Amhara, Oromo, Kambata, Hadya, Wolayta, Kafficho etc. live with the endogenous Me'enit, Sheko and Majang. Likewise in *Pawe*, the Amhara, Oromo, Tigre, Kambata, Agaw, Hadya, etc. live together in different *kebeles*.

Besides to these similarities, the two local governments have their own differences. The major difference was Pawe exercised self-autonomy as a special *woreda* in Benshangul-Gumuz regional state while later changed in to regular *woreda* level. In the case of *Gura-Ferda*, at the beginning, it was merged with Sheko *woreda* but later established as an independent *woreda* level by endogenous Me'enit, Sheko and Majang communities.

1.7.3 Sources

Throughout the course of the study, different data collection methods were applied. For the purpose of this research both primary and secondary data collection method was applied

Primary data including direct personal interview, indirect oral interview, focus group discussion and observation were applied to this study. Secondary sources including published and unpublished sources were deeply analyse in the course of the study. Documents at different tiers of government and reports as a primary sources and, journal articles, previously conducted research papers had been used in the study.

1.7.4 Data Collection Techniques and Tools

1.7.4.1. Sampling Techniques

As a qualitative research, to gather relevant information, the research applied the non-probable sampling techniques. The focus area of the study needs to have special knowledge and experience of the respondents on what and how the exogenous communities accommodated in the two *woredas* both in political and cultural aspects. Hence, the

researcher used purposive sampling technique for identifying key interview respondents. Moreover, the researcher applied snowball sampling techniques that involve identifying people with relevant characteristics to obtain information from the respondents. The respondents were also help in identifying relevant respondent who have better experience and knowledge about the subject of the study.

The focus area of the study, Gura-Ferda *woreda* is the home for Amhara, Sidama, Wolayta, Kambata, Guragie, Hadiya, Bench, Gedeo, few Oromo and others.²³ Nonetheless, the *woreda* and also the zonal respective offices do not have the demographic data which could have indicated the where about of the local people before and after the resettlement. On the other hand Pawe *woreda* is dominated by the exogenous communities consists of Amhara, Kambaata, the Hadiya, Agaw-Awi, the Oromo, and Somalis and other ethnic groups. Hence the total population of exogenous communities of this *woredas* are double than the exogenous and dominated people who live in the area respectively. Therefore, the researcher purposefully selects these *woredas* due to the ethnic composition and reality of the existing situation in the area.

1.7.4.2 Data Collection Tools

A. In-depth interview

Interview is the main primary data collection tool to obtain first-hand information that used to cross checks the information with the secondary data which primarily collected from documents. In-depth interviews held with the selected community elites, dignitaries and elderly people. In order to identify the issues of focus and the resourceful people, I was employed informal interviews with different people from the *woreda* to the *kebele* level to identify key informants. Hence, an exogenous person who was identified through snow-ball sampling techniques was interviewed. Accordingly, 10 of 20 *kebeles* in Pawe *woreda* and 8 of 13 exogenous dominated *kebeles* in Gura-Ferda were under survey. The key informants were asked open-ended questions that design to allow the interviewee to converse and reply the questions freely and to look short and precise answers respectively. Interview with the settlers were recruited based on age, relevance to the information and ethnic composition. Semi-structured interview were also employed to *woreda* administrators, former *woreda*

²³ Abeje (2011) *Differential livelihood and adaptive strategies of spontaneous and organized resettlement in Gura-Ferda, south western Ethiopia* (SNNPR) (Thesis submitted for MA in sociology, Addis Ababa University) p.58.

administrators, *woreda* councils, *kebele* council, respective government tourism and communication office, *woreda* administrator office, the respective *woreda* agricultural offices etc.

Since the working language of the two *woredas* is Amharic, the interview was conducted in Amharic language, and then it translated to English. Before the interview, the respondents were asked whether recording their voice and taking pictures is possible or not. During the interview, the researcher notifies and explains their information used only for academic matters.

B. Focus group discussion (FGD)

It is intended to get information for some of the data that seem to be blurred and may not be fully collected from the in-depth interviews. The focus groups comprised people from different sex and occupational status as well as the same ethnic background of the participants. In so doing, it was attempted to make all the participants have equal opportunity in the discussion. The *kebele* leaders of the identified villages were organisers as one separate FGD in each sample site. FGD was conducted in conflict prone areas of each *woreda*. For instance, in Gura-Ferda, four FGD were conducted at Biftu, Kometa, Aroge Birhan and Kuja *kebeles*. On the other hand, in Pawe, three FGD were conducted in Almu town, *Mender-7* and *Mender-134* 20kms far from the capital. In each FGD, 5-8 discussants were recruited.

C. Field Observation

In addition to the above data collection tools, the researcher was gather data through personal observation directly from the areas for one month to each *woreda* where many exogenous communities are settled. This data collection tools helps the researcher to reach to different situations and circumstances of the disclosed participants. The researcher had observed the settlement pattern of each exogenous community, their cultural practice, the structural arrangement of *kebele*, and the socio-economic and political associations of *kebele* residents.

1.8. Structure of the study

This study has six chapters including the introductory part. Chapter two defines the concept of ethnic minorities.it also discusses to whom minorities belongs to. Next it discusses the management of diversity with special emphasis on accommodation part. This chapter also discusses the concept of ethnic minority accommodation. Then the chapter turns to the

territorial accommodation of ethnic minorities and its institutional features. Lastly, it discusses the non-territorial mechanism of accommodation of ethnic minorities. Power sharing and cultural autonomy are discussed in this regard.

Chapter three explores ethnicity in Ethiopian before and after the introduction ethnic federal system in the country. This chapter briefly discusses the pre 1991 ethnicity and post 1991 ethnicity to the road of ethnic federal system. The Chapter also discusses the restructure of the states and local governments toward ethnic lines. Then is overview the place of exogenous communities in Ethiopian federal system.

Chapter four explores the accommodation/exclusion of exogenous communities in Gura-Ferda. It starts by discussing the geographic, demographic and history of the *woreda*. Then it highlights the institutions and political representation of exogenous communities in the study area. Exogenous representation, in the *woreda* council and executive are also under discussion. The causes and consequence of ethnic eviction followed by endogenous-exogenous conflict also discusses in this chapter. Finally, the concluding remark of the chapter is discussed.

Chapter five also discusses the accommodation of exogenous communities in Pawe *woreda*. This chapter starts by providing a highlight for Pawe *woreda's* geographic, demographic and history. Then the political institutions and representation of the *woreda* to the higher tiers of government will be discussed. The endogenous-exogenous conflict, the grant of special *woreda* status, the lifting of special status and its political, economic and social impacts on the exogenous communities are discussed.

Finally, the comparative conclusion of the two *woredas* based on accommodation of political, economic and social aspects to the exogenous communities are discussed.

Chapter Two

Accommodation of minorities: Conceptual and theoretical frameworks

2.1 Introduction

The aim of this study is to assess whether exogenous ethnic communities are accommodated at local level or not in Gura-Ferda and Pawe *woredas*. This begs the questions that ‘are the exogenous communities under consideration ‘minorities’ who are entitled for political, social and cultural accommodation? This entail requires a discussion on who are considered as minorities, why it is important to accommodate minorities, the institutional mechanisms of accommodating minorities and the role that local government plays in this respect. This chapter is intended to serve this purpose.

The chapter begin by defining the status of being a minority. Accommodations of minorities have got emphasis in this chapter. Management of diversity is a crucial issue in modern federations. Accommodation in this regard is necessary and classified as territorial and non-territorial which are dealt in brief.

2.2 Definition of Minorities

The term ‘minority’ is defined differently. The United Nation Minority Declaration of 1992 defines ‘minority’ as ‘national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity.’²⁴ This declaration stated that the existence of minority is a question of fact and any definition must include both ‘objective factors’ such as the existence of a shared ethnicity, language or religion and ‘subjective factors’ including that individuals must identify themselves as members of a minority.²⁵ Some minorities live together in well-defined areas, separated from the dominant part of the population, others scattered throughout the country, some minorities have a strong sense of collective identity and record history; others retained only a fragmented notion of common heritage.²⁶

The most accepted definition of minorities is given by Capotorti (1979) and Deschenes (1985).For instance Caportory defined minority as follows.

²⁴ UN human rights office of the high commissioner, *Minority rights: international standards and guidance for implementation*, UN, New York and Geneva, 2010.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

*A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non- dominant position, whose members being nationals of the state possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.*²⁷

From Caportories definition of minority there are three important identifying elements of a minority: number, non-dominant position as well as sense of solidarity in order to preserve ones identity. Jules Deschenes (1985) also defines the term minority as:

*A group of citizens of a state, constituting a numerical minority and in a non- dominant position in that state, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and law.*²⁸

From the above stated Deschenes' definition of the concept minority we can identify some important points concerning minorities. The first important point is that being numerically inferior is a critical element of being a minority. Numerically inferiority- to the rest of the other group is not however sufficient. For instance the black majority of South African population was not numerically inferior but they were actual political minorities during the Apartheid regime.²⁹ The other crucial point that Deschenes raised is therefore politically non-dominant position.

Within different perspective the majority-minority distinction of ethnic groups at least seen from two important considerations; the first consideration is numerical size which consisted of more than 50% ethnic composition and, political weight which is situational.³⁰ In some cases, a group which is numerically inferior could be majority if they dominate the rest of the population politically. In this sense Tronvoll notes, minorities need to be understood from the view of power relations: who has control, and in what context this control is exercised.³¹ The

²⁷ Francesco Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (New York: United Nations, 1979) E/CN.4/sub.2/384/Rev.1, UN Sales No E 91XIV.2, 96.

²⁸ Jules Deschenes, Proposal Concerning a Definition of the term Minority/CN.4/sub.2/1985/31, 14 May 1985, p.30

²⁹ Ramaga P (1992) 'Relativity of minority concept' 14(1) *Human Rights Quarterly*, p 85.

³⁰ *Ibid* 22, Zemelak (2014) *Local government in Ethiopia: Advancing development and accommodating ethnic minorities*, p. 60

³¹ Tronvoll (2010) 'Briefing: The Ethiopian 2010 federal and regional elections: re-establishing one party state' 110(438) *African Affairs*, pp. 31-32.

existence of both numerical inferiority and political lowliness made the definition of minority relevant. Concerning to the above definitions given by Capotorti and Deschenes, the two scholars define minority in reference to the 'rest of the population' and 'majority of the state' respectively. As Henrard point out that the definition given by Caportorti is more inclusive for defining several minorities.³² The debate over the definition of minority is, according to Ramaga is relative to place and time in which one should understand. The above explanation of minorities given by different institutions and writers is summarized as the simultaneous existence of the two elements i.e. Numerical inferiority and political lowliness.³³

For the purpose of this thesis, minorities of the two study areas are different. For instance, the exogenous communities in Gura-ferda are dominant in terms of number in the *woreda* but excluded from political representation and executive position by their ethnic group. In this context they are political minority at *woreda* level. On the contrary, exogenous communities in Pawe are political and numerical majority at *woreda* level but they excluded from zonal and regional executive position. These communities are minority at zonal and regional context in BGNRS.

Exogenous communities for the sake of this thesis are peoples that have moved in to the territories of the host (indigenous) region either government or self-sponsored resettlement program for the need of better living standard and securing jobs, moved in to this territories in exercising their constitutional right of Art(34) of FDRE constitution and peoples of the host region not regard as 'non-owners' of the land as well as alienated from political representation as endogenous communities at regional councils and executives.

In the case of deep divided societies where none of ethic community became a majority, each ethnic community became minority and none of them dominate the state politically.³⁴ In this circumstance three types of minorities came in to being: national minorities, regional minorities and double minorities.

National minorities can be seen from two perspectives. States which have homogenous population may have few minorities with giant majority and countries with deep divided society of which no majority have national minorities. Finding universally accepted

³² Henrard (2000) *Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, and the Right to Self-Determination*, Martinus Nijhoff, pp.31-32.

³³ Supra note 29, p. 11, Wheatley (2005) *Democracy, minorities and international law* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.19.

³⁴ Supra note 29,p.108

demarcation between national and ethnic minorities is not an easy task. ³⁵There is an endeavour to lay down the scope and contents of the concept national minority. For instance, as per Art.1 of Recommendation No 1201, ‘national minorities’ are:

*Residents of a state and citizens there of having strong and long lasting ties with that state ,having distinguishing ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics, having a representative number in the state although the members of the group are significantly less than the rest of the citizens and that have the motivation to preserve and perpetuate their distinguishing characteristics.*³⁶

‘National minorities’ are purely a European term and lacks clarity in international instruments.³⁷ It is the European framework to protect national minorities.³⁸In 1994 the European countries together formulated the European instrument to address the protection of ‘national minorities’ however the term is ‘quite’ unknown to the international minority protecting regimes.³⁹ The phrase ,’national minority’ have a contested definition since it is not defined by any international human rights document including those who are concerned to address the issue of national minorities.⁴⁰According to Ramaga, a minority is designed as a ‘national minority’ if it shares its cultural identity with a large community that form a majority at national level and its constituent units.⁴¹ W. Kymlicka defines ‘national minorities’ as a ‘functioning society’ who grouped in their historical homeland before they incorporated in to a larger state.⁴² National minority is rooted in the territory of ‘nation state’ whose ethnic and cultural aspect is differing from the rest of the society.⁴³

The second group of minorities are regional minorities. The concept of regional minority emanates from the interest of minorities to preserve their cultural practices at regional, provincial, sub-provincial and to the lower administrative units. These minorities emerged when they dominate either nationally or in a certain region or province may find themselves

³⁵ Tokuma (2010) *The Legal and Practical Protection of the Rights of Minorities in Self-Administering Nations of Ethiopia: The Case of Oromia* (thesis submitted for LLM, Addis Ababa University) p.28.

³⁶ Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Recommendation 1201(1993), on An additional Protocol on the Rights of National Minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights,1993

³⁷ Supra note 29, p 108.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Preece (1989). ‘Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State Creation: Changing State Practices and Evolving Legal Norms’ 20(4) *Human Rights Quarterly*, 817-837

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Supra note 29, p.109.

⁴² W.Kymlicka (2001) *Politics in the vernacular: Nationalism, multiculturalism, and citizenship*: Queen’s University press, p.54.

⁴³ Supra note 29, p.112.

as minority in another region, province or sub provinces. For instance, the Kukuyus and Luos in many countries in Kenya, English speakers in Quebec, Spanish speakers in Catalonia and the Flemish speakers in Wallonia⁴⁴ Amhara settlers in the remaining eight regional states etc. are considered as regional minorities

The third group of minorities are double minorities. These groups of minorities are the result of both national and regional minorities. An ethnic group may be minority at national and regional level at the same time. In the restructuring of states, provinces and sub-provinces, a certain ethnic group may be majority in these areas and minority prevail at the same time. Minorities in these regions, where national minority dominate the area became minorities in the region. As the result, double minority or minority within minority exist. For instance, Cree-speakers in Quebec, Aran-speakers in Spain⁴⁵ and Argobas in Amhara and Afar.

2.3 Management of ethnic minorities

The choice of possible ethnic management strategies may be examined within the general context of mechanisms for securing conformity between state boundaries and ethnic frontiers.⁴⁶ In the discourse of managing ethnic diversities, there is always a tension between dominant ethnic group and an ethnic minority.⁴⁷ This tension is directly related to ‘centre-periphery’ tensions in economic, territorial, cultural and political resistance.⁴⁸ While the challenge of ethnic minority arises in all parts of the globe, the state’s response to it varies tremendously from region to region.⁴⁹

Nations with different purposes have tried to manage the challenge of ethnic, cultural, racial, religious or other diversity of their people.⁵⁰ The objective of management of ethnic diversity varies from nation to nation according to their objectives they set for addressing different

⁴⁴ Bosire, Ghai and Henders cited in Zemelak (2014) *Local government in Ethiopia: Advancing development and accommodating ethnic minorities*, Baden Baden Nomos Verlagsges, p.61.

⁴⁵ Patten (2004) ‘The rights of internal linguistic minorities’ in Eisenberg A & Spinner- Halev J *Minorities within minorities: Equality, rights and diversity* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.138 cited in Zemelak (2014) *Local government in Ethiopia: Advancing development and accommodating ethnic minorities*, Baden Baden Nomos Verlagsges, p.61.

⁴⁶ Coakley (1992) ‘The Resolution of Ethnic conflict: Towards a typology’ 13 (4) *International Political Science Review*, p.345.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ W.Kymlicka(2004) ‘The Canadian model of diversity in a comparative perspective’University of Edinburg, p. 144.

⁵⁰ Zemelak (2014) *Local government in Ethiopia: Advancing development and accommodating ethnic minorities*, Baden Baden Nomos Verlagsges, p. 79.

challenges. Depending on the particular objective they set to achieve, states used protecting individual rights of members of minority communities, integration, and/or accommodation to deal with the ethnic diversity of their people.⁵¹

Individual rights approach also known as ‘neutrality’ approach is one of the mechanisms of accommodating diversity in which states declare their neutrality towards cultural matters of ethnic minorities.⁵² States which follow this approach strongly believe that identity is a private matter rather a state matter and protecting minority groups will violate the rights of individuals. On the other hand, integration approach is aimed to assure that all groups can participate in social, economic and political life without sacrificing their distinct identities.⁵³ Occasionally this objective is achieved by a representations and participation of political, cultural, social and economic activities in the national institutions.⁵⁴ Ethnic minorities and their culture practices should be given institutional recognition at different tiers of government.⁵⁵ The accommodation approach recognizes the existence of diversity. More details are discussed in the following sections.

2.4 Accommodation of ethnic minorities

Accommodation is a term used to describe the recognition and preservation of ethnic diversity through restructuring of state either territorially or non-territorially to different cultural groups. As Will Kymelicka argued, the definition of accommodation of diversity started with the protection of group rights in that the failure of protecting group rights also leads to the failure of protecting individual rights.⁵⁶

Accommodation approach of ethnic minorities is the most important mechanism of accommodating diversity in a deep divided society. The central government may perhaps react to the demands of ethnic minority by changing its own structure to provide formal recognition of the cultural or ethnic diversity of the state.⁵⁷ In so doing, two important issues came in to reality i.e. the extent to which power remains concentrated in the centre rather than

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Lijphart (2006) ‘The case for power sharing’ in Diamond L & Plattner M F (eds) *Electoral systems and democracy* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

⁵⁵ Horowitz (2001) ‘The Northern Ireland Agreement: Clear, consociational, and risky’ in McGarry J (ed) *Northern Ireland and the divided world: The Northern Ireland Conflict and the Good Friday Agreement in comparative perspective* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 92.

⁵⁶ Kymlicka (1995) *Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights* New York: Oxford University Press, p.89.

⁵⁷ *Supra* note 46, p.346.

being devolved to the minority, and the domain in which concessions are made, political or cultural.⁵⁸

Coakley identified four major accommodations of ethnic diversity. The first approach of this strategy where power is shared at the level of the central government is *consociation*.⁵⁹ Power sharing in a consociational democracy ranges from minority representation in the executive as the case in Northern Ireland in 1973-74, to fully fledged consociational government, where the notion of proportional sharing of posts and of political compromise extends well beyond the domain of government formation.⁶⁰ The second approach is federalism, where autonomy is conceded to component units of the state in accordance with an ethnic principle.⁶¹ The third approach is the protection of group rights. This refers to policies that go further than merely recognising the equality of individual citizens by also conceding additional rights to groups on the basis of certain distinctive ethnic or cultural characteristics.⁶² Fourth, ethnic minorities may be given devolved institutions whose jurisdiction is non-territorial as a non-territorial autonomy or in the form of national cultural autonomy.⁶³

2.4.1 Territorial accommodation of ethnic minority

The meaning of territorial autonomy has no agreed definition among scholars.⁶⁴ This definition ranges from sovereignty, collective power base at regional one in a divided society, the degree of self-rule and devolution of power to a certain arrangement of self-determination.⁶⁵ Beyond the above definition, territorial autonomy has the following definitions given by different scholars in common. First, territorial autonomy established on the 'basis of ethnic criteria' not for administrative, economic or geographic criteria.⁶⁶ Second, territorial autonomy is a transfer of certain political power to territorially organized groups.⁶⁷ Third, territorial autonomy is the transfer of specific mainly culture related competencies to these groups.⁶⁸ In most cases, the federal system is however suitable for accommodating diversities in this case, but other homogenous states also accommodate some minorities.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Supra* note 50, p. 65.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

The central issue of territorial autonomy is the constitutional transfer of power to ethnically grouped political units. In this regard, local governments play a pivotal role for territorial accommodation of ethnic minorities. For instance, if local governments are established along ethnic lines, they are the best mechanisms of accommodating these minorities.⁶⁹ For heterogeneous societies local governments are the real places of accommodating territorial concentrated ethnic minorities by providing full autonomy and transferring relevant powers.⁷⁰ They also are a place where ethnic exclusion is and addressed solved.⁷¹ Geographically concentrated territorial autonomy serves as a means to accommodate a minority ethnic community.⁷² The empowering of ethno national minorities through political autonomy is a characterising feature of federal countries throughout the globe. Sub national minorities such as the Scots and Welsh in the United Kingdom, the Catalans and Basques in Spain, the Flemish and French speaking regions and communities in Belgium, the Quebecois in Canada, in the 1960s are provided with territorial autonomy in a federal or quasi federal arrangement along with the right to use their language and some element of representation in national political process.⁷³

Autonomy has a special attraction for politicians and political movements.⁷⁴ It serves as a device both to bring states together in regional associations and to keep states intact by accommodating and diffusing secessionist claims.⁷⁵ The second issue is particularly serious in multi-national and multi-ethnic states; in many states political stability, social peace and their very future as sovereign entities depend on a satisfactory resolution of ethnically based claims for autonomy.⁷⁶ Autonomy refers to the constitutionally entrenched powers of constituent governments to exercise control over some or all of their own economic, political,

⁶⁹ Supra note 33(2), 2005.

⁷⁰ Frankvotis (2001) 'Pre-conference reading: Towards a mechanism for realization of the right to self-determination' in Kly A N & Kly D (eds) *In pursuit of the right to self-determination* Collected papers & proceedings of the First International Conference on the Right to Self-Determination & the United Nations Atlanta: Clarity Press, p.30 and Lapidoth (1994) 'Autonomy: Potential and limitations' 1 *International Journal on Group Rights*, p.280

⁷¹ Erk and Anderson (2010) 'The paradox of federalism: Does self-rule accommodate or exacerbate ethnic divisions?' in Erk J & Anderson M L *The paradox of federalism: Does self-rule accommodate or exacerbate ethnic divisions?* London: Routledge, pp. 2-4.

⁷² Supra note 50, p. 89.

⁷³ Kymlicka (2007) *Multicultural odysseys: Navigating the new international politics of diversity* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 177; Ronald Watts (2008) *Comparing federal systems* Montreal: Institute of Intergovernmental Relation, p. 165.

⁷⁴ Ghai (2003) 'Territorial options' in Darby J & Mac Ginty R (eds) *Contemporary peace-making violence and peace processes* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.186.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

social and cultural affairs.⁷⁷ The lack of accommodating diversity through autonomy leads to disintegration and leave the space to secessionist groups.

Yash Ghai identified many advantages of autonomy to accommodate diversity in multi-national and multi-ethnic communities.⁷⁸ Firstly it provides political power or self-government to protect the culture and interests of a group with distinct but vulnerable cultures, such as indigenous peoples. There are currently three forms of self-government: territorial/regional autonomy, cultural/ group autonomy and independence. Secondly Autonomy enables a region to exercise considerable self-government without assuming all functions of a state or losing the benefits of citizen nationality. Thirdly autonomy can bring parties round a table and start the process of negotiations, even if the overall agenda is wider. Last but not least autonomy arrangements, because they divide power, also contribute to constitutionalism.

2.4.1.1 Institutional features of territorial autonomy

As discussed above, concentrated ethnic groups need territorially autonomy in their respective homes with relevant political power. Political power as instrument, they establish local government institutions within their demarcated territory as self-rule and they have representations in the above tiers of government through shared-rule.⁷⁹

2.4.1.1.1 Self-rule

Self-rule as a political concept entails that the exercise of political power by the lower tiers of government as enshrined by the constitution of a certain state. More importantly, self-rule has settlement pattern demarcations to ethnically concentrated groups to practice territorial autonomy in their respective boundary.⁸⁰ As Zemelak quoted writers, self-rule includes the establishment of government institutions such as political and administrative organs, and transfer of relevant functions, powers and resources to territorially organized groups for their realization of self-administration.

⁷⁷ Yonatan (2008) Institutional recognition and accommodation of ethnic diversity: Federalism in South Africa and Ethiopia (Dissertation submitted for the degree of PhD in the faculty of Law, university of the Western Cape), p.110.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Yonatan (2010) 'Federalism and intra-sub state minorities: Constitutional principles for accommodating intra-sub state minorities', IACL World Congress Mexico, p. 4.

⁸⁰ Benedikter (2009) *The world's modern autonomy systems: Concepts and experiences of regional territorial autonomy* Bozen: Eurac, p. 19.

The federal constitutions as a guiding principle for ensuring self-rule to concentrated ethnic communities play a role in this regard. These constitutions provide the provision of self-rule for minorities as well as let the responsibility of the regions to decide their internal affairs such as establishing organs of government, formulating regional policies and their political structure.⁸¹

2.4.1.1.2 Shared-rule

Shared-rule is the institutional principles that ensure representation of sub-national units at the central government. Shared-rule is essential for federal states to promote joint rule for some purposes.⁸² According to Benedikter, territorial autonomy does not recognize the representation of ethnic minorities at sub-national and national level⁸³, but Henders argued that territorial autonomy cope with shared-rule at different tiers of government.⁸⁴ This institutional principle finds practical expression through the legislative bodies of the federation, the executive and other important national decision-making bodies.⁸⁵

Shared rule is essential for three reasons.⁸⁶ First, it protects the autonomy of local units from the intervention of national government. Second, representation of ethnic minorities in sub-national and national institutions increases cohesion. Third, shared rule harmonise the 'preference' of local units with national 'priorities'.

2.4.2 Non-territorial accommodation of ethnic minorities

Within this globalized world ethnic mobilization and intermingling is a day to day activity. In this sense dispersed minorities or territorially scattered minorities do not fare well in modalities of representation that are exclusively based on a single constituency with a 'one person-one vote model'.⁸⁷ Due to this dynamic nature of minorities, non-territorial autonomy

⁸¹Supra note 50, p.73.

⁸²Supra note 77, p. 13.

⁸³Supra note 80, 2009.

⁸⁴ Henders(2010) *Territoriality, asymmetry, and autonomy: Catalonia, Corsica, Hong Kong, and Tibet* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.13.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶Supra note 50, p.78.

⁸⁷ Nimni E. (2015) 'Minorities and the Limits of Liberal Democracy: Democracy and Non Territorial Autonomy' in Malloy, Tove, and Francesco Palermo (eds) *Minority Accommodation through Territorial and Non Territorial Autonomy* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.11.

became a prominent position in the long-running debate about strategies for the management or resolution of ethnic conflict.⁸⁸

Non-territorial autonomy is another way of accommodating regional minorities in a deep divided society. This form of autonomy offers regional minorities' autonomy over certain functions of relevance to them, which recognises their different culture and identity.⁸⁹ The concept of non-territorial autonomy gives rise to two major important questions.⁹⁰ The two questions raised by Coakley are the range of functional areas over which autonomy extends, and the extent to which this autonomy is indeed non-territorial

The origin of non-territorial accommodation of diversity in a federal system, based upon the 'personality principle'⁹¹, as a result of continuous intra-national and ethnic conflicts within a single democratic state framework can be traced back to late nineteenth and early twentieth century Austro-Marxist theories of federalism and national cultural autonomy.⁹²

Non-territorial autonomy could be conceived as internal territorial self-administration as well as policy areas which are vital to national identity such as education, language regulations, taxation matters in these fields and general cultural activities.⁹³ In either form, cultural autonomy could be organised as territorial autonomy or non-territorial autonomy.⁹⁴ Non-territorial accommodation of ethnic minority can be achieved through power sharing in the sense that each ethnic minority are represented in different organs of government. The two most non-territorial options of accommodating diversity are consociational democracy or power sharing and cultural autonomy.⁹⁵

⁸⁸ Coakley (2016) 'Introduction: Dispersed Minorities and Non-Territorial Autonomy' *Ethno politics* 15(1), p.1

⁸⁹ *Supra* note 77, p.149.

⁹⁰ *Supra* note 88, p.1.

⁹¹ Renner called the 'personality principle' because 'it referred to the widest personal choice of its members to partake in a particular national association'.

⁹² Burgess(2009) 'Territorial and non-territorial identities: Multinational federalism in multinational federation', paper for the conference 'multinational federalism in perspective: available model?' *University of Quebec, Montreal*, p. 5.

⁹³ *Ibid*

⁹⁴ *Ibid*

⁹⁵ *Supra* note 50, p. 79.

2.4.2.1 Consociational democracy or power sharing

The Dutch political scientist, Arend Lijphart discovered ‘consociational’ democracy in 1960s to maintain democracies in deep divided societies and he strongly argued that power sharing and democracy are interlinked.⁹⁶ In a consociational democracy, elite cooperation takes the form of executive coalitions in which the leaders of all main social groups are represented; proportional representation in assemblies as well as a proportional allocation of offices and resources; autonomy for social groups in the spheres important to them, such as education; and a mutual veto for groups that see their vital interests at stake.⁹⁷ Democracy in a deep divided society is possible when power is shared instead of monopolized, devolved rather than centralized.⁹⁸ As opposed to Horowitz, Lijphart strongly criticized the majoritarian democracy which leads in to minorities as a permanent opposition. He identified three basic grounds that power sharing as the basic mechanism of accommodation of ethnic minorities in a deep divided society.⁹⁹ The first important point is that power sharing is the best way for societies in a deep division through which power is distributed.¹⁰⁰ The second issue is that in multi-national democracies, power sharing is the best mechanism to alleviate tensions and conflicts.¹⁰¹ Lastly consociational democracy (power sharing) reinforces social divisions instead of breaking them down, at least in the short term.¹⁰²

Consociational democracy has three institutional features. First, autonomy is reserved in group.¹⁰³ Second, each constituent unit are represented proportionally.¹⁰⁴ Third, collective decision is mandatory in the sense that the decision affects them.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore power sharing or consociational democracy creates a probable dominance of minority which is a source of deadlock.

⁹⁶ Bogaards (2006) ‘Democracy and power-sharing in multinational states: Thematic introduction’ 8 (2) *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, p.119.

⁹⁷ Bogaards (2000) ‘The uneasy relationships between empirical and normative types in Consociational theory’, *journal of theoretical politics* 12(4).

⁹⁸ Supra note 54, 2006.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ Supra note 54, 2006.

¹⁰⁴ McGrarry and O’Larry(2007) ‘Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription’ 5 (4) *International Journal of Constitutional Law*.

¹⁰⁵ Andeweg (2000) ‘Consociational democracy’ 3 *Annual Review of Political Science*.

2.4.2.2 Cultural autonomy

Cultural autonomy is a characterising feature of both territorial and non-territorial autonomy but emphasis is for non-territorial autonomy for protecting dispersed minorities, cultural or religious groups in a deep divided society. This system accommodates language, cultural and religious groups through non-political institutional such as special schools for ethnic or religious minorities.¹⁰⁶

When people orient the term culture, they may identify with an ethnic group, religious identity or other cultural traits.¹⁰⁷ The prevalence of ethnic migration along with the increased interest of communities live in different place of a certain state has created multi-cultural societies almost everywhere.¹⁰⁸ Different communities along ethnic and religious lines now exist in most countries due to the changes of the nature of politics. ‘Communal politics’ is becoming legitimate in developed and developing countries, as communities are increasingly recognized as valid groups.¹⁰⁹

2.5 Conclusion

The international organizations, regional organizations and academic literature lack to define minority in agreeable standard. But they define minority based on the criteria depend on time, countries situation whether they are homogenous or heterogeneous, and the way how they response the issue of diversification in their country. From different definitions given by organization and scholars, one can understand the relative nature of minority definition.

States may use different mechanisms to manage diversity within the country. Some states use to eliminate diversity to build a nation state within a single culture and language, others used to accommodate diversity by recognizing cultural groups. Minorities can be accommodated either territorially or non-territorial mechanisms of power sharing and through cultural autonomy. To accommodate minorities, territorial and non-territorial accommodation is sound due to the nature of minorities either territorially concentrated or scattered in different territories.

¹⁰⁶ Supra note 50, p. 81.

¹⁰⁷ Erik Lane & Svante Ersson(2005) 15.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

Chapter Three

Ethiopian ethnic federalism: Origin and structure

3.1 Introduction

The accommodation of exogenous communities in the Ethiopian regions is at issue because the Ethiopian federal system is designed to accommodate the ethnic diversity of the Ethiopian people. The federal system seek to accommodate the various ethnic communities by establishing self-government in the territorial area they are found. The idea is for each ethnic community to be a master of its 'home'. Yet amidst the ethnic communities with their own regions and local units are exogenous communities. The right of the exogenous communities are directly or indirectly impacted on by the decisions and actions of the political organs of the regions and ethnic local governments within which the exogenous ethnic communities are found. In order to fully understand this dynamic, it is necessary to have a good understanding of the origin of the Ethiopian federal system how it is structured and how it operates. This chapter is intended to provide that background.

3.2 Ethiopia and ethnicity: Pre-1991

Leaving aside the debate on whether Ethiopia has history of millennia, there is an agreement among historians that 'Modern' Ethiopia was conceived by Emperor Tewodros II and realised by Emperor Menilik II. The political discord along ethnic lines is also linked to the manner that Modern Ethiopia was realised by Menilik.

Menilik created the Ethiopia we know through territorial expansion to the southern part which was undertaken both diplomatically and through brutal force. The expansion was followed by population movement from the northern parts of Ethiopia to the south. It also involved confiscation of the land from the endogenous communities and transferring same to the settlers, the imposition of Amharic as the sole language with state recognition and the introduction of Orthodox Christianity as the only state sanctioned religion. The inter-ethnic discord in Ethiopian emanates from these. The settlement in large number of exogenous communities in Southern Ethiopia also began around this time.

Emperor Haileselesie, who came to power in 1931, undertook several reforms to centralise and consolidate the control of the centre on the southern regions. He promulgated the 1931

Constitution in which he abolished the privileges of regional and local rulers. He also undertook several legislative measures to the same effect.

The expansion and centralisation process that is described above led to the marginalisation of the various ethnic communities in Southern Ethiopia. The accommodation of these communities, along with other economic matters, hence became a political issue beginning from the 1950s. The Ethiopian Students movements specially made the ‘nationality question’ a central political issue.

The political turmoil of the 1970s that involved ethnic, economic, social issues led to the 1974 popular revolution that resulted in the demise of the imperial regime. The Revolution was however ‘hijacked’ by the military *Derg*, installed itself as the provisional since a committee of soldiers, known as the provisional government of the country. The *Derg* not only failed to address ‘the nationality question’ but some of the political and economic measures it took intensified the problem, including villagisation programme in which communities were uprooted and transferred to other parts of the country. Concerning to this, Abute puts his idea as *Derg* established the largest resettlement sites in Africa.¹¹⁰

Derg, after controlling the state power in 1974, faced two major social challenges in the rural Ethiopia. These challenges were severe drought and famine in Northern Ethiopia and shortage of farmland in Southern Ethiopia. To alleviate these challenges, the military junta used resettlement program as the only solution to the people. Besides the above two chronic problems, the program was part of its plan for rapid rural transformation and greater control over peasant farmers.¹¹¹

According to Tadesse, Mengistu’s government aimed at to settle people throughout the country except Eritrea and Tigray.¹¹² Unlike the previous population movement conducted both during Menelik and Hailesilase’s era, the *Derg*’s resettlement was multi-directional in nature. The resettlement program had the core objective of systematic land use and recovery program through collective and coordinated efforts.¹¹³ To achieve these objectives, people

¹¹⁰ Abute 1997 *The dynamics of socio economic differentiation and change in the Belles- valley (pawe) resettlement area, North western Ethiopia*, (Thesis submitted for MA in sociology, Addis Ababa university.

¹¹¹ Tadesse. (2009) ‘Planning Resettlement in Ethiopia’ in Alula Pankhurst and Pigué Francios (eds) *Moving People in Ethiopia, Development, Displacement and the State*. Janes Curry, Boydsell and Brewer Ltd. UK, p.117.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Id* 116, Abute 1997 *The dynamics of socio economic differentiation and change in the Belles- valley (pawe) resettlement area, North western Ethiopia*, (Thesis submitted for MA in sociology, Addis Ababa university, and National Villagization coordinating committee 1987.

from Wollo, Shewa, Oromo from Shewa and Wollo, Gojjam and Gonder from the North and Kambata, Hadya, Guraghe Wolaita etc from the south settled to the West, south west and North West of the country.

The inability of *Derg* to respond the nationality question resulted the outset of the regime from power. The total collapse of the regime came in to being in 1991 and a new regime with a new ideology and state structure is realized.

3.3 Ethnicity in post-1991 Ethiopia

The visible challenge of a new regime in Ethiopia was the restoration of state effectiveness, legitimacy and trust among different cultural groups. To do this EPRDF planned to address the past unjust relations based on ethnicity.¹¹⁴ EPRDF coordinated and facilitated the establishment of Transitional government followed by national peace and democracy conference in July 1991.

With little discussion and debate on the preparation and adoption of TGE charter on the restructuring of new regions, it established the boundary commission composed of ten member from six political parties.¹¹⁵ The commission based on the data of Institute of the Study on Ethiopian Nationality (ISEN) which established in 1983 and own observation, submitted the proposal to council of representatives (CoR). Based on the proposal, the CoR debated and issued proclamation No 7/1992 that established 14 new regions mainly on language.¹¹⁶ This proclamation ensures the *de facto* federal structure in the state. Due to deep division and diversification, not all ethnic groups can enjoy a region status and several ethnic groups with similar language and culture merge together to form a bigger region.¹¹⁷ The restructuring of regions and the incorporation of some territorial domains were not free from claims and counter claims among political parties.

The 1995 FDRE constitution ensured the *de jure* federal structure that promotes self- rule and shared-rule for endogenous ethnic communities at different tiers of government. The restructuring of regional states, nationality zones and special *woredes* under ethnic lines made

¹¹⁴ E.Keller (1995) 'Remaking the Ethiopian State' in Zartman W (ed) *The disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 125.

¹¹⁵ Assefa (2015) 'Territorially based cleavages and constitutional responses in Ethiopia: Implications for the region' in Asnake Kefale and Assefa Fisseha (eds) *Federalism and local government in Ethiopia*, AAU p.25.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ Gebrehiwet (2011) *The practice of fiscal federalism in Ethiopia :a critical assessment, 1991-2012, an institutional approach* (Dissertation submitted for PhD in economic and social science university of Friburg, p. 47.

the country as a federation of ethnic groups in which more than 80 Nations, Nationalities and Peoples join.¹¹⁸ On the other hand, with the absence of 50+ numbers among ethnic groups made the country as a ‘nation of minorities’. The regions were restructured and demarcated based on settlement patterns, language, identify, and consent of the people concerned¹¹⁹ but the core arrangements of the federal structure is ethnicity.¹²⁰

Although ethnicity has a core value for restructuring the regional and local governments, but other criteria’s are in line with ethnicity. For the creation of states and establishment of local governments, uniform criteria were not applied and two programmatic approaches came in to implementation.¹²¹

For instance, states with a majority of ethnic groups such as Amhara, Tigray, Afar, Oromia and Somali established based on ethnicity whereas states with a non-dominant group such as SNNPRS, BGNRS and GNRS established based on the consideration of politics, economic, settlement pattern, culture and language.¹²² With the absence of majority ethnic group in the federal Ethiopia, the country consists of endogenous minorities, exogenous minorities and double minorities.

The Ethiopian federal system crates tensions between the balance of self-rule for various endogenous ethnic groups and the need to promote free movement of labor and capital to the exogenous ethnic groups.¹²³ The post 1991 experience of the country shows that the evictions of exogenous communities by the national and regional minorities are evident as they gain self -rule from their home.¹²⁴

Ethnic federalism institutionalizes self- determination of endogenous groups with in their territory. Nevertheless, it does not institutionalize the accommodation of exogenous minorities out of their mother region. Institutionalizing self-rule for endogenous minorities does not mean that evicts and excludes exogenous communities in any case.

Eviction and Exclusion of exogenous ethnic groups are prevalent in Oromia, SNNPRS, Gambela, Bensihargul, Amhara etc., which threaten the statehood and unity that lasted before 1991. For instance, the Amhara ethnic groups evicted from Gura-Ferda publically by the

¹¹⁸ Supra note 50, p. 120.

¹¹⁹ FDRE constitution Art 46 (2).

¹²⁰ Supra note 117, p. 49.

¹²¹ *Id* 50.

¹²² *Ibid*.

¹²³ *Id* 33.

¹²⁴ *Ibid*.

order of the Regional government in 2012, Benishangul-Gumuz region also evict the following year.

This thesis argued that the formation of ethnic federalism which its focus area is territorial mechanism of accommodating endogenous ethnic groups have its own limitation. However, the federal arrangement did not include the exogenous communities, the constitutions ensures the individual rights of these communities in each regional state and at least the economic interest of exogenous communities.

3.4 Local Governments for Empowering Ethnic Minorities: Since 1991

Local governments as the third tier of government were created by the respective regional states. The establishment of local government in FDRE constitution placed under Article 39(3) and Article 50(4) as ethnic and regular local governments respectively.¹²⁵ The foundation of ethnic local movements is to ensure the right to self-determination for concentrated endogenous ethnic minorities. These local governments are designed to exercise political autonomy at their territory.¹²⁶

The second types of local government established under Article 50(4) of FDRE constitution. These types of local governments are established by the mandate of the regional states. The regional governments have the options to determine the number of local governments that they establish and may create within their jurisdiction.¹²⁷ The quest for the establishment of regular local government is supported by Article 88(1) of FDRE constitution to promote self-rule at all levels.¹²⁸ ‘All levels’ consisted of the tiers of governments from the federal to the lowest level of governments. As compared to the ethnic local governments the establishment and creation of regular local governments are depends on the mercy of regional governments. The regional governments can create or amalgamate for the sake of financial and security purposes.

The restructuring of local governments had two pragmatic approaches like the restructuring of regional states.¹²⁹ For ethnically homogenous states of Tigrey, Afar, Amhara, Oromia and Somali, the creation of local governments are for the purpose of administrative convenience,

¹²⁵ Supra note 50, pp.129-130.

¹²⁶ Supra note 50, p. 30.

¹²⁷ *Id* 32.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*.

¹²⁹ Supra note 117, p.52.

population size, and settlement pattern.¹³⁰ On the other hand, ethnically heterogeneous states of SNNPRS, Benishargul Gumuz and Gambela, locals were formed along ethnic lines.¹³¹ In SNNPRS, nationality zones, special *woredas* and *woredas* are established by breaking the larger heterogeneous zonal/*woreda* administrations whereas in BGNRS and GNRS, each endogenous nationality is organized at zonal level.¹³²

3.5 The position of exogenous minorities at local level

The Ethiopian federal system is designed for empowering territorially concentrated ethnic minorities without considering exogenous minorities. After the introduction of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, two types of minorities came in to being. The first groups of minorities exist in the five endogenous dominated ethnic groups of Oromia, Amahara, Tigray, Afar and Somali where the region designed to the respective ethnic groups.¹³³ From these regions, Oromia totally excludes the recognition of non-Oromos in its constitution.¹³⁴ Surprisingly, in this region, the non-Oromos / exogenous/ peoples dominated urban local governments but excludes from the three organs of governments. Beyond mis-representation and recognition, ethnic exclusion is prevalent in this region.

On the contrary, the Amhara regional state recognized the non-Amharas by providing self-rule at nationality zones and special *woredas*.¹³⁵ For instance, the regional state recognized the five non-Amharas like Agew Awi, Agew Hemra, Oromo, Kimant and Argoba.¹³⁶ The three non-Amharas of Agew Awi, Agew Hemra and Oromos organized at nationality level where as Kimant and Argoba deserve for special *woreda* status. In the case of Afar and Tigray, though they recognized the existence and self-rule for Argoba and Irob endogenous minorities, the recognition of minorities in these regional states does not mean that they recognize the existence of exogenous minorities.

The second groups of minorities exist in SNNNRS, BGNRS and GNRS. In these regional states, endogenous and exogenous minorities exist with different manifestations. In

¹³⁰ *Id* 53.

¹³¹ *Ibid* 52.

¹³² *Ibid* 52.

¹³³ Assefa (2013) 'Ethiopia's experiment in accommodating diversity: a twenty years balance sheet' Ethiopian journal of Federal Studies, Addis Ababa university press, p.132.

¹³⁴ Revised 2002 of Oromia constitution.

¹³⁵ Assefa (2015) Assefa (2013) 'Ethiopia's experiment in accommodating diversity: a twenty years balance sheet' Ethiopian journal of Federal Studies, Addis Ababa university press, p.133.

¹³⁶ Agew Awi, Agew Hemra, and Oromo's have self-administrative status at nationality zone level where as the Argobas have a special *woreda* status in the region. The grant of Kimant special *woreda* was the result of conflict rose between Amharas and the the Kimant themselves.

SNNPRS, 56 endogenous minorities are reorganized under 14 Nationality Zones and 4 special *woredas*, these minorities are reorganized under the constitutional base of Art 39(3) of FDRE constitution. On the other hand, the 2007 census indicated that more than half million exogenous peoples out of 56 NNP live in the regional state. In this case, the regional constitution is silent on the representation and recognition of these exogenous minorities at local level. Exogenous minorities in this region are the result of the North South population movement since the south March. For instance, exogenous minorities are dominantly existed in Kaffa, Bench Maji, Sheka, Konta, Dawuro and other Nationality Zones and Special *woredas*.

The two regional states of Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambela, were marginalized as compared to other regional states in the past regimes.¹³⁷ To compensate the marginalization of the respective ethnic groups, the regions were organized to empower the dominant endogenous ethnic groups. Due to historical phenomenon, these regions consist of ‘sizable’ exogenous communities. For instance, the BGNRS consists of 43% of these communities. The regional state constitution recognized the existence of these groups without representation. Significant number of exogenous communities exists at Metkel, kamash and Assosa zone. These communities settled in this area due to the 1980s *Derg* resettlement and villegization program. For this reason, power is totally under the administration of exogenous groups.

Accommodation of ethnic minorities helps groups to stay within the federation by letting them to decide by their own way. This accommodation of minorities by itself provides to major challenges to the federation. First, the self-governing unit may demand secession which latter creates little independent states that threaten the unity of the state. The constitution ensured the clause of ‘secession’ without any pre request for the principle of ‘open the door and wall, let’s move freely.’¹³⁸ Second, inefficient administration for territorially organized ethnic groups will emerge. Lack of skilled man-power to rule the politics of each self-rule unit will retard development and growth.

On the other hand, there is no territorial management for exogenous communities, which live in different regional states. Due to historical phenomena of multi-directional population

¹³⁷ Asseffa (2013) ‘Ethiopia’s experiment in accommodating diversity: a twenty years balance sheet’ Ethiopian journal of Federal Studies, Addis Ababa university press, p.134.

¹³⁸ Meles speech quoted in Assefa (2015) Assefa (2015) ‘Territorially based cleavages and constitutional responses in Ethiopia: Implications for the region’ in Asnake Kefale and Assefa Fisseha(eds) *Federalism and local government in Ethiopia*, AAU, p.27.

movement, many exogenous communities live in each regional state. However, some states exclude the existence and recognition of these communities, others recognize without representation. Yet, in some regional states, exogenous communities found territorially concentrated like Gura-Ferda and Pawe *wordas*. Thus, absence of recognition and representation of these groups, make the development partial, a threat for peace and security and create hatred and suspicious between the two groups.

3.6 Conclusion

Federalism became a popular institutional organization in the 21st century for administrative efficiency and accommodating diversity. After the long and bloodshed struggle, the EPRDF led government introduced ethnic based federalism in Ethiopia. The federal system expected to answer the 'nationality question', which was articulated by the ESM and other ethno nationalist groups finally championed by EPRDF. The introduction of Ethnic federalism created indigenous and non-indigenous ethnic communities. The federal system designed to accommodate territorially concentrated ethnic groups without the consideration of exogenous communities.

Based on this distinction, the regional states and local governments were restructured based on ethnicity among the nine regional states, five states named from their dominant ethnic groups. Harari is an anomaly region. On the other hand, SNNPRS as a 'federation with in federation' consists 56 NNP of whom no one is dominant.

The two regions such as BGNRS and GNRS as hitherto marginalized states, given for their indigenous communities as owners of land. In these regions, the non-indigenous communities are significant in number due to the 1980s *Derg* villagization and resettlement program.

As regional states restructured, local governments also restructured for ethnically concentrated groups. In some regional states, exogenous communities are dominate but without territorial management.

Exogenous communities should be recognized and represented whether they are territorially dominated or not in the host region. Absence of recognition and representation resulted eviction and exclusion in the host region. Therefore, institutional mechanism of accommodation should be considered.

Chapter Four

Accommodation/exclusion of exogenous communities: The case of Gura-Ferda

4.1 Introduction

As was indicated in chapter one, the study seeks to investigate whether and how exogenous communities are accommodated at local level. The paper seeks to answer this question based on the case study of Gura-Ferda *woreda* of SNNPRS and Pawe *woreda* of Benishangul-Gumuz. This chapter deals with the first case study.

The chapter begins with a brief description of the Gura-Ferda *woreda*, territorial size, population, demography and the history of the *woreda*. Then it discussed the political institutions and political representations of the *woreda* discussed. Representation of exogenous communities in *woreda* institutions, ethnic eviction and subsequent results, and conflicts in Gura-Ferda discussed in brief.

4.2 Gura-Ferda *Woreda*

Gura-ferda is one of the ten *woredas* in Bench-Maji administrative zone of SNNPRS. It located 602 km southwest of Addis Ababa and 42 Km from Mizan Teferi (the principal town of the zone). Geographically it positioned between 6°49'33"- 6°58'06" N latitude and 35°07'03"-35°25'02" E longitude.¹³⁹ This *woreda* is bordered by Sheko *woreda* in the north, Me'enit Shasha *woreda* in the south, South Bench *woreda* in the west, Surma *woreda* in the southwest and the Majang zone of Gambela region in the northwest. Biftu is the political and economic center of the *woreda*.

4.2.1 Population and ethnic composition

According to the Central Statistics Authority (CSA) Population and Housing Census reports of 1994 and 2007, the total number of population in Gura-ferda was 149 and 35,264 respectively. However, as of the survey conducted by the *woreda* Health Bureau, the population has reached 47,000. This is because of the steady population movement to the *woreda*.

¹³⁹ Belay (2009) 33.

Table 1: Population statistics of Gura-Ferda *woreda*

Sex	1994 PHC	2007 PHC	Survey of <i>woreda</i> Health Bureau(2010)	2014-2017 population projection value			
				2014	2015	2016	2017
Male	90	19,405	-	23,473	24,082	24,669	30,014
Female	59	15,859	-	19,664	20,205	20,761	29,113
Total	149	35,264	47,000	43,137	44,287	45,460	59,127

Source: CSA report of 1994 and 2007 HPC, survey of *woreda* Health Bureau (2010) and 2014-2017 population projection value of CSA

The ethnic composition of the *woreda* could be seen from three major perspectives in which currently they occupy the land of Gura-ferda. The first group of peoples are the Majang, Shako and Me'ent as 'owners' of the *woreda* and considered as endogenous ethnic communities after 1991. The second group of people came and settled in the area due to 1980s forced resettlement program of *Derg*. There were also others who came to the area on their volition. These exogenous communities mainly came from the northern Ethiopia due to the severity of drought and famine as well as shortage of farm land in the host region. Lastly the third group of exogenous communities resettled at Gura-Ferda due to the five years (2003/4-2007/8) policy of intra-regional resettlement program of SNNPRS. This program targeted to resettle the people from densely populated areas of the SNNPRS to sparsely populated areas of the region.

Before 1980s resettlement program of *Derg*, the *woreda* comprises only three ethnic groups namely Majang, Shako and Me'ent.¹⁴⁰ Each of these ethnic groups is found in areas close to *woredas* where their kinsmen are found in majority. For instance, the Me'enits resides around the north-eastern part of the *woreda* ranging from Biftu (the capital) to Kuja (Megenteya). On the north-western portion alongside the *Shako woreda*, Shakos inhabit. At the side of the south on the boundaries of Majang zone the Majang inhabitants occupy. This pattern, can be

¹⁴⁰ Addisu (2016) *large-scale agricultural investment and its impact on local communities: the case of gura-ferda woreda, SNNPRS*, p.33.

assumed, has enabled them to peacefully coexist in accessing the natural resources in their own territory. Later, these ethnic groups struggle for power following the replacement of the *woreda* self-administration since the second wave of decentralization in 2001.

Now, the *woreda* became the place of multiple ethnic and linguistic groups. Therefore, the *woreda* is home for Amhara, Sidama, Wolayta, Kambata, Guragie, Hadiya, Bench, Gedeo, few Oromo and others exogenous settlers. Nonetheless, the *woreda* and also the zonal respective offices do not have the demographic data which could have indicated the where about of the local people before and after the resettlement.¹⁴¹

4.2.2 The history of Gura-Ferda

The conquest of Menelik over Kaffa kingdom in 1897, peoples from the North moved to this huge province including to Bench Maji and Sheka sub-provinces. The existence of non-indigenous communities in Gura-Ferda traced back to the reign Emperor Menelik. The incorporation of the South West region in to the central government opened a new North-South interaction. According to the local old informants, Gura-ferda interact with Gore by slave trade during *Fetawurari* Sike Jawuto who belongs to Me'enit, administered the Me'enit people. The interaction of *Fetawurari* Sike of Gura-Ferda and *Fetawurari* Gamta Gameda of Gore leads the former Baptized and renamed *Fetawurari* Gebre Medihn Sike. Due to this interaction the Oromo ethnic group started to live in this area.¹⁴²

After the death of *Fetawurari* Gebre Medihn Sike, the Me'enit started to quarrel with the imperial regime. The case of the conflict was the government plan to collect firearms arms in the area. This plans of the imperial regime lead to the involvement of exogenous settlers to political position in the *woreda*.¹⁴³ The administrators were appointed from the center either from Amhara or Tigre. This action angered the people and fought against this regime.

The establishment of Gura-Ferda as a *woreda* is traced back to the reign of Haile Selassie. The *woreda* was then within the Mettu awraja (province), in the then Illubabor *Teklay Gizat*.¹⁴⁴ People from the north influx in to this areas till *Derg* came in to power. The

¹⁴¹ Abeje (2011) *Differential livelihood and adaptive strategies of spontaneous and organized resettlement in Gura-Ferda, south western Ethiopia* (SNNPR) (Thesis submitted for MA in sociology, Addis Ababa University) p.110.

¹⁴² Interview with old Me'enit informant, April 2017, Biftu.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Abeje (2010) *Differential livelihood and adaptive strategies of spontaneous and organized resettlement in Gura-Ferda, south western Ethiopia* (SNNPR) (Thesis submitted for MA in sociology, Addis Ababa University) p.56.

establishment of Bebeke green coffee project in Gimira sub-province attracted many settlers from the neighbouring Kaffa province and Amhara migrants to the area.¹⁴⁵

During the Derg era the *woreda* had got its own administration centred at Bibita (1974-1991) while its power took over and became answerable to Sheko *woreda* (1991-2001) after the collapse of the military junta. This administrative structure continued till the second wave of decentralization launched by the federal government in 2001.¹⁴⁶

Since 2001, the *woreda* centered at Biftu for Me'ent, Sheko and Majang as 'owner' endogenous ethnic communities. As the *woreda* claim its own administration in 2001, the authorities of the *woreda* announce for the fertility of the *woreda* for investors and suitability for intra-regional resettlement programs which the ruling party emphasize to alleviate land shortage and effects of draught.¹⁴⁷

4.2.3 Resettlement in Gura-Ferda

The 1980s *Derge* resettlement program made Gura- Ferda the center of resettlement site and it became the biggest site in Bench-Maji zone of SNNPR.¹⁴⁸ The first settlers of Gura-Ferda who came from Wollo, Shewa and other draught affected areas reached in 1985. The government planned to settle 80,000 peoples but failed by the bad weather situation in the area.¹⁴⁹ These settlers were settled at *kutir* 1-7 resettlement site and old Birhan *kebele*. After four years in 1989, the area was affected by draught and streams became dry.¹⁵⁰

Coupled with this natural Disaster, herds of Elephants occupied the village that caused Casualties on property and human life.¹⁵¹ The government decided to resettle these people to different places. For instance, the settlers distributed in to 3 directions.¹⁵² Some group of people resettle to the neighbouring South Bench *woreda* at Zozo No 2 resettlement site. The second group resettled at kafficho zone in Bita Genet and Gojjeb areas. The third group resettled in Oromia region at shebe *woreda* of Jimma zone. Following settlers' arrival to Gura-ferda, self-sponsored settles were moved from the North to this area and settled out of

¹⁴⁵ Interview with Me'ent nationality, April 2017, Biftu.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 57.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 57.

¹⁴⁸ Yonas (2013) *Implication of Ethiopian federalism on the right to freedom of movement and residence: Critical analysis of the law and the practice* (Thesis submitted for LLM, Addis Ababa university) p.193.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Tikesh, April 2017, Biftu.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*.

¹⁵² Interview with Amhara settler who lived at Gura-Ferda since 1961, April 2017, Biftu.

the resettlement site. When the government sponsored settler resettled to another resettlement sites, self-sponsored settlers were not moved. They resisted the natural and heard of elephant occupation in the area.

According to local informants, the draught and occupation of herds of elephants were caused by devastating deforestation for the resettlement sites. For this purpose, starting from Abiy Arat green coffee project of Bebeke to *kutir* Amst of west direction which covers more than 20kms was cleared and little hunts by the neighbouring kaficho people constructed for the settlers.¹⁵³ The then chairman of Biftu kebele told me that the Me'enits was ordered to clear the forest to the West and North West of Biftu town.¹⁵⁴

The third and crucial population resettlement in Gura-ferda took place during the Ethiopian People Democratic Revolutionary Front (here after EPDRF) in between 2003/4-2007/8. Initially EPDRF had a negative attitude towards resettlement due to various reasons. As Pankhurst and Piguet, point out why EPDRF had negative attitude towards resettlement was that the drastic consequences and injustices of the Derge resettlement, the suffering, coercion, high death rates and escapes from resettlement camps were often alluded to the TPLF was particularly aware of how supporters were rounded up and taken by force and how many escaped and became refugees in Sudan.¹⁵⁵ However, the government changed its attitude during 1990s for two major reasons. These are resettlement as a possible solution to overcome famine and as desirable and even as a necessary component of a rural development and in particular a food security strategy as noted in the national food security strategy.¹⁵⁶

Accordingly, SNNPRS announces, the government planned to resettle a total of 100,000 heads households with three years (2003-2005), from drought affected sites. These selected settlers will be mainly hosted in the zones and special *woredas* in the western parts of the regions considered as possessing ample space with productive land such as Sheka, Kefa, Bench Maji and Dawro zones as well as basketo and konta special *woredas*.¹⁵⁷ Following this intra-regional resettlement policy of the federal and regional government peoples from Kambata, Hadiya Gurage Wolaita and Sidama, Gedeo resettled in Gura-Ferda *woreda*

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Interview with Tikesh, April, 2017, Biftu.

¹⁵⁵ Pankhurst and Piguet (2003) 'Migration, Relocation and Coexistence in Ethiopia' in Alula Pankhurst and Francois Piguet (eds.) *People, Space and the State: Migration, Resettlement and Displacement in Ethiopia*. Proceedings of the Workshop held by ESSWA, 28-30 January 2003, ESSWA, Addis Ababa.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

4.2.4 Legal versus illegal settlers in Gura-Ferda

The two words came in to practice in the *woreda* after the celebration of Ethiopian millennium in 2008.¹⁵⁸ According to the *woreda* Administrator, there was an influx of people to the *woreda* from Gonder and Gojam in the year between 2006 -2008.¹⁵⁹ The population influx into this area was triggered by the following pushing and pulling factors.¹⁶⁰ First, the over population of Gonder and Gojjam, leading to scarcity of farm land in the areas. Second, the frequent effect of draught in these areas forced the farmers to look for other area which is not affected by draught. The third pushing factor was / is the strategy of Amhara peasants though *Mofer zemet*¹⁶¹, *Ye Ikul Irsha*¹⁶² and *Tigegninet*¹⁶³ which are widely practiced by these farmers.

On the other hand, the influx of the people to Gura-Ferda was triggered by pulling factors such that Gura-Ferda attracted exogenous settlers. Unlike draught occurred in 1989 in Gura Ferda, the post 1989 reality in the *woreda* showed that the *woreda* is suitable for agriculture with seasonal rainfall. Besides to its fertility, the *woreda* become a source of forest spices. Ivory, this became the source of wealth for exogenous settlers. Because of pushing and pulling factor of population movement form the north to south, land grabbing though local agreement, land lease, contract and informal land selling became a frequent phenomenon in this *woreda*.¹⁶⁴ The uncontrolled population movement to this area got serious attention by the local governors. The governors of the *woreda* put a specific period to distinguish ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ settlers to the *woreda*.

¹⁵⁸ Abeje (2011) *Differential livelihood and adaptive strategies of spontaneous and organized resettlement in Gura-Ferda, south western Ethiopia* (SNNPR) (Thesis submitted for MA in sociology, Addis Ababa University) p.114.

¹⁵⁹ Interview with *Woreda* Administrator, April 2017, Biftu.

¹⁶⁰ Abeje (2010) *Differential livelihood and adaptive strategies of spontaneous and organized resettlement in Gura-Ferda, south western Ethiopia* (SNNPR) (Thesis submitted for MA in sociology, Addis Ababa University).

¹⁶¹ *Mofer zemet* means ‘one that migrates with his farming materials not necessarily always.’ Amhara peasants engaged in *mofer zemet* do not permanently settle in the host region. They enter into sharecropping arrangement for a specific farming season. After collecting harvest, they return to their villages.

¹⁶² *Ye-Ikule ersha*, which means, ‘sharecropping’, involves the establishment of a sharecropping arrangement between Amhara farmers who would come to settle in the region and indigenous landowners.

¹⁶³ *Tigegna*, which means ‘dependent’ – in this arrangement an Amhara migrant farmer, first settles in the region as a dependent of another Amhara peasant who secured farming land through a sharecropping arrangement. After a while, such a migrant farmer with the help of family members and friends secures his own plot of farmland through a sharecropping arrangement or informal land purchase.

¹⁶⁴ Abeje (2011) *Differential livelihood and adaptive strategies of spontaneous and organized resettlement in Gura-Ferda, south western Ethiopia* (SNNPR) (Thesis submitted for MA in sociology, Addis Ababa University) p.114

The *woreda* Administration and council set a specific year and date to identify ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ settlers to the place. For this purpose June 30/ 1999 E.C / June 8/2007 put as a reference year. The settlers who came before June 8/2007 were regarded as “legal” settlers whereas those who came after this date and year were considered ‘illegal’ settler and even went to suspect as criminal acts.¹⁶⁵

The word ‘illegal’ settlers which used by the local, regional and federal official was not acceptable to the settlers.¹⁶⁶ These call themselves voluntary settlers or ‘*wado sefari*’ in Amharic.¹⁶⁷ The distinction of settlers by the political elites created hostility and suspicious since 2012.

4.3 Political institutions in Gura-Ferda

4.3.1 *Woreda* council

The *woreda* council is structured under the *woreda* administration office. The *woreda* administration office consists of three organs of *woreda* government. These are the *woreda* council, *woreda* administration council and the *woreda* judiciary. The *woreda* council is the highest power holders in the *woreda* government and accountable to the people who elect them. This council has the responsibility on economic and social affairs of the *woreda* people. Among many responsibilities of the *woreda* council, electing the administrator, vice administrator and the speaker of the house, creating mass mobilization of the residents based on *woreda* development plans and following the agricultural practice of the *woreda* whether it going on timely or not can be mentioned.¹⁶⁸

In light with this, this council came in to being following the 2002 local elections. In the council three endogenous and many exogenous communities are represented. The council seat varies together with population growth in the *woreda*. Starting from 2002 local election, the council seat rose from 80 to 120 members. From these council seats the three endogenous communities consists of 80% while the exogenous communities together holds 20%.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with former *woreda* administrator, April 2017, Biftu.

¹⁶⁶ Interview with Amhara settler, April 2017, Kuja kebele.

¹⁶⁷ Abeje (2011) *Differential livelihood and adaptive strategies of spontaneous and organized resettlement in Gura-Ferda, south western Ethiopia* (SNNPR) (Thesis submitted for MA in sociology, Addis Ababa University) p.114.

¹⁶⁸ SNNPRS constitution Art 83(2).

4.3.2 Woreda executive

The *woreda* executive is the highest law enforcing organ of government and accountable to the *woreda* administrator and the *woreda* council. Its main tasks are following the implementation of federal and regional policies at *woreda* level, leading *woreda* offices, preparing budget plan of the *woreda* for approval to the council, follow and keep the *woreda* security etc.¹⁶⁹ The Gura-Ferda executive is composed of various ethnic communities within a single political party. Endogenous and exogenous ethnic minorities are the members of the executive based on their loyalty to the ruling party. In 2015 local election the endogenous communities' consists of 30.77% while the exogenous communities' consists of 69.23 under SEPDM.

4.4 Political representation

4.4.1 Party in the region

SNNPRS is ruled by one of the EPRDF member party of SEPDM. At the end of the Transitional Period Government in 1994, the five states merged together and form a giant political party named SEPDM. This party ruled the region since then. As the name indicates, the party is responsible to the ethnic minorities of the region but other exogenous communities can be a member. For this purpose, the exogenous communities in Gura-ferda are participated as a member of this party.

4.4.2 Election

Election is one aspect of political participation of ethnic communities in a democratic state. The inclusiveness of election is also fundamental in all aspects. For this reason, the Gura-ferda community participated as electorate and to be elected. The national election encouraged the endogenous and exogenous communities to elect but restricted the right to be elected. In this regard, the endogenous communities are allowed to be elected for HoPR and state council while the exogenous communities banned from such rights. According to the proclamation No 532/2007 Article 20(1) Gura-Ferda merge with Sheko and Yeki *woredas* for membership to the HoPR.¹⁷⁰ In this regard, the candidates are elected from the three ethnic groups while the majority exogenous communities are excluded to become a candidate from HoPR.

¹⁶⁹ Revised SNNPRS constitution(2002),Art 88(2).

¹⁷⁰ Proclamation No 532/2007 Art 20(1), a proclamation to amend the electoral law of Ethiopia.

In local elections, both the endogenous and exogenous communities are allowed to be a candidate for *Kebele* and *woreda* institutions. For instance, majority of the *kebele* exogenous residents are represented in exogenous communities dominated areas such as Abiy hulet, Abiy Arat, Kometa and Aroge Berhan *kebeles*.

4.5 Representation of exogenous communities in the *woreda* institutions

The people of Gura-Ferda are represented at *kebele*, *woreda*, zonal and regional level. But the *woreda* has no representative at Council of Nationalities in the region and house of federation at federal level. This happens due to the existence of the three nationalities in the neighbouring zone and *woredas* at a majority. For instance, the Me'enit majorities live in the Me'enit Goldia and Me'enit shasha *woredas*. So the Me'enit of Gura-Ferda is represented by the majority Me'enits by these *woredas*. The Shekos also represented by their lines at Sheko *woreda*. The Majang also represented by the Majang majority at Majang Nationality Zone. The exogenous communities have not allowed being represented at regional and national houses.

The *woreda* has one representative for the regional council. Representation to the House of People Representatives considered the population number resides in an electoral region that the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia ruled. According to the former president of the Bench Maji Zone, representation to HoPR considers the number of endogenous and exogenous communities live in the *woreda*.¹⁷¹ But the endogenous and exogenous communities live in Gura-Ferda do not fulfil the required number set by NEBE. Therefore, Gura-ferda, Sheko and Yeki *woredas* elect a single representative to HoPR.¹⁷² Exogenous communities do not allowed to be a candidate and to be a member of HoPR on the government side. Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement (SEPDM) played a role to recruit candidates.

4.5.1 Representation at *woreda* council

Representation to the *woreda* council is based on ethnicity. The three endogenous communities hold 100 seats or 83.3% whereas 20 seats or 16.7% are reserved for the exogenous communities.

¹⁷¹ Interview with Tsegaye Mamo, October 2016, Mizan Teferi.

¹⁷² Interview with former zonal president, Tsegaye Mamo, October 2016, Mizan Teferi.

Table: 2, ethnic composition in Gura-ferda *woreda* council

Ethnic group	Number of seats	Percentage	Remark
Sheko Me'enit Majang	100	83.3%	Endogenous
Amhara Bench Gurage Oromo Kembata Sidama Hadya Keffa Tigre	20	16.7%	Exogenous

Source: *Woreda* council office, 2017

As shown Table 2 above more representation is given for the three endogenous communities while the exogenous communities are less represented in the council. This representation is on the principle of accommodation of territorially grouped minorities. With this representation, one can simply ask how the exogenous representation in the executive is better than the endogenous one. The *woreda* administrator is elected from the member of the *woreda* council whereas the other executives can be appointed out of the council. On the other hand, the exogenous communities are well represented at *kebele* councils. For instance the exogenous dominated kebeles such as Kuja, Biftu, Abiy Arat, Abiy Hulet and Birhan, the representation of these communities ranges from 75-95%.¹⁷³

4.5.2 Representation in the *woreda* executives

Gura-ferda is a regular type of local government which established under the provision of Art 50(4) Of FDRE constitution.¹⁷⁴ The endogenous Me'enit, Sheko and Majang are the 'owner' of the *woreda* whereas majority exogenous settlers are considered to be 'non-owners'. In this *woreda*, owner and non- owner dichotomy does not affect the representation of exogenous communities to the *woreda* executive position.¹⁷⁵ Ethnic composition, population size and ethnicity etc. have no place to be a member of the executive. According

¹⁷³ Interview with the respective Kebele chairmans, April 2017.

¹⁷⁴ FBRE constitution Art 50(4).

¹⁷⁵ Interview with SEPDH Head of the *woreda*, April 2017, Biftu.

to the *woreda*'s SEPDM head, being a 'revolutionary'¹⁷⁶ is enough to be a member of the executive. The *woreda* has 26 Bureau and vice.

Table: 3, 2010 and 2015 local election and ethnic composition in Gura-ferda *woreda* executive

Ethnic Community	2010	%	2015	%
Sheko	7	13.46	3	5.77
Me'enit	13	25	11	21.15
Majang	1	1.92	2	3.85
Amhara	4	7.69	8	15.38
Bench	4	7.69	5	9.61
Tigre	1	1.92	2	3.85
Oromo	2	3.85	3	5.77
Kembata	2	3.85	1	1.92
Sidama	1	1.92	2	3.85
Hadya	2	3.85	3	5.77
Keffa	15	28.85	12	23.08
Total	52	100%	52	100%

Source; *Woreda* SEPDM Bureau document, 2017

NB: the position for each head of bureaus is not secured for ethnic group. Therefore, within five-year term office, the ethnic composition of the executive may increase or decrease. The data is collected from the beginning of each election term.

As can be seen from the table, in 2010 local election the percentage of endogenous communities in the executive was 40.08%. However, in 2015 local election, the percentage in the executive fallen to 30.77%. On the other hand eight exogenous communities are represented in the executive. The percentage of exogenous communities in 2010 local election was 59.62% and increased to 69.23% in 2015.

In 2015 local election, the involvement of exogenous communities in the executive increased due to the conflict occurred in the *woreda*. Although the number of Kafficho ethnic group decrease from 28.85%to 23.08%, other ethnic group increase their membership to the executives. For instance, Amhara representation in the *woreda* executive rises from 7.69% in 2010 to 15.38% in 2015. While the *woreda* is designed to empower the three endogenous groups, their position in the executive is below 50%. The Me'enit communities representation in the executive fallen from 25% in 2010 to 21.15% in 2015. At the same time, the Shekos

¹⁷⁶ Being a 'revolutionary' in this context implies that to be a member of the *woreda* executive one should have a strong commitment to the party membership and its ideology. The other criteria to be a revolutionary is his/her capacity to lead Bureaus by the party's ideology.

reduced from 13.46% in 2010 to 5.77% in 2015. On the contrary, the Majang rose from 1.92% in 2010 to 3.85 in 2015.

In the table above which showed the representation of endogenous and exogenous communities in the executive did not consider any criteria other than political loyalty to the ruling party. Both the indigenous and non-indigenous members of the executive are nominated by SEPDM/EPRDF of the ruling party. SEPDM ruled the *woreda* since its establishment. Although the exogenous communities greater in number, any affiliate did not represent these communities. The exogenous communities are the majority in term of population however, in terms of political relevance to participate in decision-making they are in minority. The absence of proper representation and decision making rights made them unable to protect their interests and exposed them to eviction.

4.6 Ethnic Eviction in Gura-Ferda

4.6.1 The road to eviction of Amhara ethnic group

The dichotomization of Amhara settlers as ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ as discussed in 4.2.4, the *woreda*, zonal and regional government of SNNPRS decided to exclude the so called ‘illegal’ settlers belonging to the Amhara ethnic group. For this purposes, 12,000 exogenous Amharas profile was checked by the respective *kebele* administrations.¹⁷⁷ The final approval of eviction was sent from the then regional president of SNNPRS, Ato Shiferaw Shigute. This eviction was later supported by the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in his parliamentary speech. He adds peoples from Gura-Ferda those who came from East Gojjam were evicted because they were ‘illegal’ settlers.¹⁷⁸

From the constitutional principles, every person has the right to movement and accumulates property under FDRE constitution Art 32.¹⁷⁹ The eviction of Amhara settlers as ‘illegal’ was far from the constitutional provision of Art 40(4) of FDRE constitution and other legal documents. Other than ‘illegality’ the eviction may have a political motive for¹⁸⁰ first, the fear of exogenous dominance over the *woreda* later may ask for self-rule for¹⁸¹ special *woreda* status, as the case of Pawe, Second, the fear of local administrators for the

¹⁷⁷ Interview with Former Agricultural Bureau head, April 2017, Biftu.

¹⁷⁸ Yonas (2013) *Implication of Ethiopian federalism on the right to freedom of movement and residence: Critical analysis of the law and the practice* (Thesis submitted for LLM, Addis Ababa university)96

¹⁷⁹ FDRE constitution Art 32.

¹⁸⁰ Interview with Amhara settler, April 2017, Biftu kebele.

¹⁸¹ Interview with non-indigenous settler, April 2017, Kuja kebele.

domination of the *woreda* economy by exogenous communities. Third, to minimize the political influence of exogenous communities, for that matter the *woreda* is designed for the three endogenous communities as ‘owners’. There was a controversy about the number of evicted individuals among the ruling party, the opposition party, and national and international human rights reports. For instance the *woreda* administration reported that 3000-4000 peoples were evicted as being an ‘illegal’ settler. On the other hand, the opposition parties and human right organizations extended the number to 10,000. The evicted individuals resettled at Matama, and few of them fled to Wollega, others returned back to Gura-Ferda.

In the place of those who were evicted, the Zone began a process of resettlement of people, commonly known as ‘substitution’ (*sigsega* in Amharic) from neighbouring zones. The land which left by the evicted ones were located in Mergin village and the road along *Koy kebele*

According to the former *Kuja kebele* chairman, peoples from Kaffa Zone, Shei Bench *woreda* and from the two Me’enit *woredas* recruited to occupy the empty land which left by the evicted ones.¹⁸² For this informant, besides to the peoples who recruited from their home to settle to this place, other 54 individuals were also sent to the *kebele* by a letter approved by the signature of a *woreda* administrator.¹⁸³ Against the objective of ‘*sigsega*’ program, these peoples were government officials, richest men and the like.¹⁸⁴ The issue was not far from the knowledge of the zonal government and intervene to the issue. The zonal government see the issue as land grabbing and the case went to the court. Some 400 hectares entered in to the *woreda* land bank, some cases are still continued in the court.¹⁸⁵

The 2012 Ethnic exclusion in Gura-Ferda was targeting those Amhara settlers who came to the area after June 8/2007. The exclusion of Amhara ethnic groups in the area was rooted form the flowing causes.

¹⁸² Interview with former *kuja kebele* chairman, April 2017, *kuja kebele*.

¹⁸³ *Ibid*

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid*

¹⁸⁵ Interview with *woreda* administrator, April 2017, Biftu.

4.6.2 Tenant system in Gura-ferda

The 1980s resettlement program of *Derg* created good opportunities for voluntary settlers to the area. As soon as they reached the targeted *kebele*, they were given identification cards to the settlers; in return the settler gave incentives as a reward for these *kebele* officials.¹⁸⁶ The second step of these settlers planned to seize land for farming. To gain this land, the peasants used different strategies.¹⁸⁷ First, they cleared the forest and make it suitable for farming. Second they rented land from the neighbouring endogenous Me'enit, Shako and Majang nationalities. Third they engaged in informal land marketing as a buyer from these ethnic communities. Lastly they tried to gain land if the chairman of the *kebele* was from their line (favouritisms). Through the above mechanisms, the settled became owners of huge land and accumulated large amount of wealth. On the contrary the endogenous Me'enit, Sheko and Majang are more hunters' and gatherers than farmers.¹⁸⁸ They rent and sold with little incentives in return they prefer to retreat back to the dense forest areas.¹⁸⁹

According to Me'enit informant, the three ethnic groups depend for their livelihood on bee hiving, hunting and gathering. The savant land (arable land) was sold to the settlers and by the responses the endogenous communities got money. Moreover, the endogenous nationalities lacked farming skill hence resorted to selling and renting out their lands to the settlers.¹⁹⁰ Among the three endogenous ethnic groups, Me'enit practices small scale farming using traditional farming instruments to dig rather than ploughing using oxen.¹⁹¹

By suing the favourable condition, the settlers captured a large tract of land as informants said up to 50 hectares.¹⁹² The one who seized such amount of land is not obliged to live in the area rather he employed labour employers from the endogenous ones and from his home region.¹⁹³ Within a few years, the settlers accumulated wealth and became rich. One the other hand, the one who came to Gura-Fereda as labour employer became the owner of a land and employed another labour employer form his home region.

¹⁸⁶ Interview with Kuja Kebele chairman, April 2017, Kuja kebele.

¹⁸⁷ Interview from the former woreda administrator, April 2017, Biftu.

¹⁸⁸ Interview with Tikesh, April 2017, Biftu.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ Interview with the woreda Agricultural extension expert, April 2017, Biftu.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid*

¹⁹² *Ibid*

¹⁹³ Interview from the Sheko nationality, April 2017, Aroge Birhan *Kebele*.

The settlers are also active in coffee plantation, and collecting spices from the forest and other cash crops. Still the endogenous communities lacked to produce cash crops in large amount but restricted for consumption only. They only supply forest honey to the market and this is negatively impacted due to the prevalence of coffee plantation in the area which required the clearing of the forest.¹⁹⁴

According to informants, settlers especially Amhara settlers accumulated wealth from land of Gura-Ferda but they did nothing for the development of the *woreda*. The life of the endogenous communities remain the same as it was and it is better to say lost the previous sources including forest honey, wild animals for food and materials for luxury goods, one informant said that.

*The arrival of settlers made us under economic control of them. Even though they taught how can we plough and use land, we lost our land for their own benefit. Thanks to the government, we became the owner of our land since 2012. The endogenous Me'enit and Sheko starts to out of the dense forest and plough for survival. But still we do not believe that tenancy is removed due to the existence of many investors in Gura-Ferda.*¹⁹⁵

4.6.3 Deforestation as a cause of eviction

With the exception of the neighbouring Me'enit ethnic group, the remaining two endogenous ethnic groups are agro- pastoralists. Unlike the neighbouring Me'enit, Me'enits in Gura-Ferda also practices agro pastoralist economy. The common character of these endogenous ethnic groups is that the primary source of their food is the forest and forest related products.¹⁹⁶ Forest for these groups is not merely a natural resource but also the basis of their life as agro pastoralist group.¹⁹⁷

The establishment of resettlement site in Gura-ferda during 1980s disturbed the life and the livelihood of these endogenous communities. For instance before the arrival of settlers, forest honey was produced in large amount at Aroge Birhan, Kometa, Badika, Bazuka and Uyka *kebeles* that dominantly occupied by Sheko and Majang ethnic groups. This forest honey was

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ Interview with Me'enit nationality, April 2017, Pelia kebele.

¹⁹⁶ Abeje (2011) *Differential livelihood and adaptive strategies of spontaneous and organized resettlement in Guraferda, south western Ethiopia* (SNNPR) (Thesis submitted for MA in sociology, Addis Ababa University) P.118.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

used beyond the *woreda* consumption. According to the *woreda* forest prevention, development and small irrigation expert, the reason for the prevalence of dense forest in Gura-Ferda was first, poor agricultural practice of endogenous communities, second, traditional and customary conception of endogenous communities for preserving forests, third, for its source of food for this group and lastly religious worshipping related to forests.¹⁹⁸

The deforestation of forest came into reality following *Derg's* resettlement program to the *woreda*. The settlers were grouped in to two categories in deforesting and protecting the environment. The settlers who settled form *kutir* 1- *kutir* 7 resettlement sites were highly deforest so as to expand their farm land.¹⁹⁹ The West ward starting from Biftu to the Dima road and North West of the main road is cleared due to resettlement sites. On the contrary, both governments sponsored and voluntary settlers at Aroge Birhan resettlement site chose to plant coffee rather participating at farming.²⁰⁰ These help the forest from deforestation. According to the *Woreda* Agricultural Bureau report, before 1980s, the *woreda's* forest coverage was 100% following the arrivals of settlers, the forest coverage diminished forms 56-65% until 2012.

4.6.4 New threats of Deforestation in Gura-ferda

The counter argument of Amhara evictions in Gura-Ferda is narrated in the following way. Deforestation as an official reason was used to evict exogenous Amhara settlers from Gura-Ferda. The political elites at *woreda*, zonal, regional and federal level echoed the reason for eviction of Amhara settlers by deforestation, but other new threats were/are observed in the *woreda*. From my field observation and the report of the *woreda* Agriculture Bureau, there are two major new threats of deforestation in the *woreda*.²⁰¹

The first threat of deforestation emanated from the endogenous Me'enit, Sheko and Majang nationalities. Among the three endogenous ethnic groups, the Me'enit and Sheko are known in charcoal and timber production. For this purpose, they cut down the indigenous and special charcoal plants known as '*shitu*' tree. The second new threat for deforestation is the *woreda's* plan to open up this locality to investors. For instance investors who invest coffee and spices highly deforest and make trees sparse. According to the *woreda* Agricultural

¹⁹⁸ Interview with the *woreda* forest prevention, development and small irrigation expert, April 2017, Biftu.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid*

²⁰⁰ Interview with Head of Agriculture Bureau, April 2017, Biftu.

²⁰¹ Personal observation, April 2017, interview with *Woreda* Agricultural Bureau expert, April 2017, Biftu.

Bureaus, until 2017, 37 investors are investing in the *woreda* either for cereals or cash crops, or for these investment projects 24, 1973 hectares are allotted.²⁰²

Besides to the above caused for the eviction of Amhara ethnic group from Gura-Ferda, other eviction is also targeted against the Amhara ethnic groups in different regional states. The Amhara eviction in these states could be laid down in to major historical and political narrations.

The first reason for Amhara targeted eviction and exclusion in Oromia, SNNPRS, Gambela and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states is associated with Meneliks expansion to the South and South West of the country and the employed system of *Neftegna* (warrior).the political elites in these areas directly associated the Amhara ethnic group with this system. The second reason that the Amharas evicted in these regional states is that the absence of strong Amhara based political parties in the home region.large number of Amharas live out of the region but exposed to actual and threat of eviction in the host region. ANDM lacks strong supervision of its kins in these regions. The party system has also roles for Amhara evictions in different regions particularly in Oromia and SNNPRS. The conception of the same ideology among EPRDF member parties to protect the peoples in these regions does not work as it intended by the party.

4.7 Endogenous and exogenous conflict in Gura-Ferda

Gura-Ferda bordered with Gambela National Regional State and Sheko *woreda* over more than 75% of its land. Due to its natural border with these adjacent neighbours, the problem occurred in these areas also affect peace and security of Gura-Ferda *woreda*. In the South West part of the two regional states such as Gura-Ferda and Sheko from Bench Maji zone, Yeki form Sheka zone and Majang Nationality Zone form Gambela National Regional State are conflict prone areas. All the conflicts in these areas lied down on three major reasons.²⁰³ First, the incorporation of Yaki *woreda* to SNNPRS under the decision of the border demarcation commission in 1996, second the desire of the establishment ‘special’ Sheko/Majang zone by uniting Majang and Sheko under a single rule, lastly, the historical marginalization of the two groups. The endogenous-exogenous conflict in Gura-Ferda was facilitated by the existence of these endogenous ethnic communities in two self-administering

²⁰² Interview with *woreda* forest protection, development and small irrigation expert, April 2017,Biftu.

²⁰³ Seyoum (2015) Federalism at the margins of the Ethiopian State: the lived experience of the Majang people, PP. 90-95.

units. Besides to their existence between self-administering units, its border demarcation also contributes a lot since 1991. There had been three major violent conflicts between the endogenous Sheko / Majang and the exogenous communities.²⁰⁴

4.7.1 The first endogenous-exogenous conflict: Sheko/Majang Versus exogenous communities (1991-1993)

Endogenous-exogenous conflict before 1991 in this region is less evident in literatures and researches. This does not mean that no conflict between endogenous and exogenous ethnic communities. For instance, for cultural pride, the endogenous communities attacked and killed exogenous communities during 1985-1991. In response to this measure, the exogenous Amharas took revenge by killings, burning houses and looting cows.²⁰⁵ The visible and organized conflict came in to reality after ethnic federalism introduced the country in 1991. For this phase of conflict, Gura-Ferda was answerable to Sheko *woreda* 1991-2001. Therefore, the conflict occurred in Sheko included the conflict in Gura-Ferda.

According to Seyoum, the Majang and Sheko in Yeki *woreda*, the Sheko in Bench-Maji zone and Majang in GNRS believed that they are discriminated, marginalized and dominated by the respective political authors.²⁰⁶ This feeling of dissatisfaction to the respective administrative unit was deteriorated by unwillingness interest of the regional and federal government to their question.²⁰⁷ The hopeless response of the two higher government triggered Majang and Sheko of yeki, Sheko of Bench-Maji and Godere of Majang to regain their lost territory in the ethnic based border demarcation in post 1991.²⁰⁸ The plan was to establish special zone by merging Sheko of Bench-Maji, Yeki of Sheka and Godere of Majang.

According to the informant, during the time of government change in 1991, Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLA/M) controlled up to Mizan Teferi. This is part of SPLA/M claim to Mizan Teferi in order to establish 'Greater Nilo Sahana Kingdom' in the region. The Sheko Majang fighters attacked the exogenous Amhara ethnic groups at Aroge Birhan

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Interview with a Sheko Nationality, April 2017, Bazuka Kebele.

²⁰⁶ Seyoum (2015) Federalism at the margins of the Ethiopian State: the lived experience of the Majang people, p.94.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

Kebele.²⁰⁹ By the incident, 6 exogenous communities were killed by Sheko/Majang ethnic groups.²¹⁰ The TPLF fighters controlled the area by clearing the SPLA/M fighters beyond Baro River. The Sheko/Majang group returned to Birhan kebele for further attack against exogenous communities. During this action, the rich settlers were targeted and killed by this group.²¹¹ Late informed EPRDF fighters surround this group and all groups which consisted of 43 members of Sheko/Majang killed by this fighter, with little casualties of human sacrifice.²¹² This conflict was culminated by the EPRDF forces.

The 1993 Sheko/Majang against Shekicho ethnic group conflict in Tepi town was took place by the rumour that the Shekichos take a military measure against these groups.²¹³ This conflict showed the strong alliance of Sheko/Majang of which Tepi of Yeki and Godere of Majang become under their control for temporary.²¹⁴ This conflict covered the whole Yeki *woreda* and Sheko *woreda*, and the adjacent Majang of Godere and Majang of Gura-Ferda.

The attack was not confined against the Shekichos but it included the exogenous settlers at Tepi town, Sheko *woreda* and Godere *woreda*. According to informant the exogenous settler at Kometa and Aroge Birhan *kebeles* were the victims of the violent conflict that took place in 1993.²¹⁵ The conflict expanded up to Mizan Teferi town and Gura-Ferda *kebeles* temporarily.²¹⁶ The informant added that the Sheko/Majang forces attacked both exogenous settlers and Me'enits in Gura-Ferda. This conflict reached its climax when other internal and external forces sided with each force.

According to the former administrator of Gura-Ferda *woreda*, the wrong perception emanates from federal forces intervention is that the Sheko/Majang believed that the government forces sided with the Shekicho and exogenous settlers.²¹⁷ On the contrary, behind the Sheko / Majang forces Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and SPLA/M were suspected as a back force for this conflict.²¹⁸

²⁰⁹ Interview with Amhara settler, April 2017, Aroge Birhan kebele.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

²¹² *Ibid.*

²¹³ Seyoum (2015) Federalism at the margins of the Ethiopian State: the lived experience of the Majang people, p. 94.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵ Interview with Amhara settler, April 2017, Kometa kebele.

²¹⁶ Seyoum (2015) Federalism at the margins of the Ethiopian State: the lived experience of the Majang people ‘ p.94.

²¹⁷ Interview with former *woreda* administrator, April 2017, Biftu.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*

In the conflict, many civilians and members of the Sheko/Majang fighters, and members of the government forces lost their life.²¹⁹ According to Seyoum's finding in the area eight peoples from the Majang died at police station, not only the Majangs but also 100 peoples who were suspected as the opponents of Sheko/Majrg forces were killed including Shekichos and exogenous settlers.²²⁰ The biggest loss went to the government national defence force and the endogenous Sheko community.²²¹

Seyoum argued that the highlanders (exogenous) communities were behind the Sheko and Majang for autonomous administration. He added that his informants believed that the exogenous communities played a significant role by organizing them in to a single front.²²² Their belief was that the establishment of Sheko/Majang autonomous administration helped the exogenous communities to secure their land possession and get new land from the two communities.

On the contrary, the Me'enit and exogenous informants agreed that the establishment of Sheko/Majang front was the result of OLF and SPLA/M forces. The two forces claimed this land for their political consumption. For instance OLF claimed that the Majang and other Gambela nationalities were black Oromos. At the same case, SPLA/M demanded territory up to Mizan Teferi. The other informants added that in Godere, Sheko and Yeki *woredas*, the exogenous communities exceed in number than the indigenous ones. In addition, the resources are under the control of the exogenous communities in these *woredas*. So the Sheka/Majang needed the expulsion of exogenous communities so as to control the resources of these *Woredas*. According to informants the Sheko/Majang against Shekicho conflict always affect the livelihood of exogenous settle at Gura-Ferda *woreda*.

4.7.2. The second endogenous - exogenous conflict at Gura-Ferda: Second Phase of Decentralization as a source of conflict (2002)

Following *woreda*'s restructuring, tensions began between Sheko/Majang and Manja on one side and Shekicho and exogenous settlers on the other side.²²³ Before the outbreak of the conflict, attempts were made to stabilize the tension by the then regional president Abate

²¹⁹ Seyoum (2015) Federalism at the margins of the Ethiopian State: the lived experience of the Majang people 'p.95.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² *Ibid.*

²²³ FGD with non-indigenous Amhara settlers, April 2017, Kometa kebele.

Kisho.²²⁴ In the case of Gura-Ferda, it gains its former self-administration for the three endogenous communities of Me'enit, Sheko and Majang. Nevertheless, the exogenous communities are greater than the endogenous in number, the Sheko/ Majang believed that they marginalized and excluded from development. According to Amhara informant, the Sheko / Majang started to attack on the border of Gura-Ferda and Sheko as well as the border of Gura-Ferda and Majang Nationality Zone.²²⁵ The existence of Sheko and Majang nationality in Gura-Ferda made the conflict sever.²²⁶

The Sheko/Majang attacked from the direction of Aroge Birhan and kometa *kebeles* against Me'enit and exogenous settlers. By the conflicts, loss of human life from the side of Me'enit and exogenous was server.²²⁷ Besides to loss of human life, houses were burnt. As compared to the conflict took place in Tepi town, Gura-Ferada case was not sever and controlled by the peace keeper.²²⁸

In the case of Gura-Ferada, the tension between the Sheko and Me'enit is still existed. The reason of the tension is the two groups demand over it. Following the incident the Majang were forced to retreat back to the Majang Nationality Zone, the Shekos were minimized from the *woredas* executive position and the Me'enit came in to *woredas* political position.

4.7.3 The third endogenous versus exogenous conflict: The Kometa conflict (2014)

The 2014 conflict was sever and brutal in the history of Gura-ferda *woreda*. According to sources obtained from the area, the conflict had no uniform cause. Some informant's stated that, the killing of Sheko man by the exogenous man at Kometa *kebele* triggered the Sheko/Majang against exogenous conflict in the area.²²⁹ Others agreed that the conflict was planned by the Sheko/Majang joint force to restore the lost territory by the 1996 border demarcation commission and the 2002 district level decentralization in to their hoped territory.²³⁰ As discussed earlier, the Sheko/ Majang force planned to establish autonomous special zone by merging Sheko, Yeki and Godere *woredas*. From this perspective Gura-Ferda

²²⁴ Seyoum (2015) Federalism at the margins of the Ethiopian State: the lived experience of the Majang people, p.99.

²²⁵ Interview with Amhara settler, April 2017, Kometa Kebele.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Interview with Me'enit nationality, April 2017, Biftu.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ FGD with Kometa settlers, April 2017, Kometa kebele.

²³⁰ FGD with Aroge Birhan settlers, April 2017, Aroge Birhan Kebele.

was split from Sheko in 2001 but their interest remains unchanged. The third group of informants agreed that the conflict was planned and assisted by the Gura-ferda *woreda* officials.²³¹ These informants added that the *woreda's* economy is vested by the exogenous settlers with large plots of land. The *woreda* officials targeted to exclude these people as they did in 2012. The last group of informants agreed that the conflict was assisted by the external forces.²³² These informants in common agreed that the conflict was against the endogenous Me'enit and exogenous communities. The involvement of the *woreda* officials including the *woreda* justice and security head was visible and caused the death of over 16 national defence forces in Kometa forest.²³³ Eye witness at kometa told me that a single Majang sniper man killed these forces over trees. The victims of the conflict were exogenous settlers such as men's, women's children and labourers, who employed at investment farm and coffee project, and the Me'enit endogenous communities. Accurate data are not existing concerning to the peoples who died from the Me'enit's and exogenous communities. But rough data's from the informants showed that more than 1000 endogenous and Me'enit's were killed at Kometa *kebele*.²³⁴

The conflict was stabilized following the deployment of national security force in the area. At the beginning, the national defence force was exposed to risk due to the geography of the area and conspiracy of the *woreda* officials sided to this irredentist group.²³⁵ Later on these forces controlled the area. This conflict was not only confined in Gura-Ferda, Bench-Maji zone. But it had covered the Majang and Sheka zones. In Gura-Ferda, peoples were evicted from kuki, uyka and kometa *kebeles*.²³⁶

After the incident, the actors of the conflict were identified and detained. Surprisingly, the Gura-Ferda *woreda* and *kebele* officials were the actors of the conflict. The federal government accused them as 'terrorists' and arrested at Mizan Teferi town. The case is still at the court but the then administrator of the *woreda* released from prison but still on progress. Beyond the issue of exogenous communities at Gura-Ferda, the political tension raises between the Me'enit and Sheko communities at Biftu. The former administrators of the *woreda* who belongs to the Me'enit ethnic group arrested due to his role in the 2014 conflict at Kometa *kebele*. The Shekos with Majang claim over political power leads to Sheko's

²³¹ FGD with Biftu town settlers, April 2017, Biftu.

²³² FGD with Abiy Arat Kafficho settlers, April 2017, Bebek.

²³³ *Ibid.*

²³⁴ Interview with Kambata settler, April 2017, Kometa *kebele*.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

leadership at Gura-Ferda *woreda*. Since 2014 the Sheko rule the *woreda* as administrator. But the exogenous communities suspect as a threat against them.²³⁷

4.8 Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter, how resettlement program contribute for the formation of exogenous minorities in Gura-ferda, the nature of ethnic eviction against exogenous Amharas, the endogenous-exogenous conflict and the political participation of exogenous communities in Gura-Ferda was planned to discuss. Through the course of this discussion the following findings are delineated.

The establishment of Bebek Green coffee project, 1980s *Derg* resettlement program, the 2003/04/2007/08 intra-regional resettlement program and the 2015 zonal 'sigsega' program to the land who left by the 2012 evicted settlers was contribute a lot for the prevalence of exogenous communities in Gura-Ferda at a majority. After 1991, the *woreda* merged with the Sheko *woreda* as a land for majority Shekos and minority Me'enits based on their number in the *woreda*. The merging of the two *woredas* made the endogenous Me'enits and exogenous settlers out of significant political participation and access to social services. The replacement of the former *woreda* status created a new opportunity for Me'enits and exogenous communities in political participation and access to social service.

The distinction of exogenous settlers as 'legal' and 'illegal' settlers in the *woreda* resulted the eviction of many exogenous Amhara settlers in the *woreda*. This eviction deteriorated the long lasting cohesion, brotherhood and existence between these groups. At the same case the eviction is against the constitutional principle of the country.

The endogenous-exogenous conflict in this *woreda* resulted from the strong interest of the Sheko/Majang ethnic group in the region. These two ethnic groups want to establish an autonomous special zone by merging Yeki, Sheko, Gura-Ferda of Sheko and Majang dominated areas and Godere *woreda*. *Due* to the last three conflicts many exogenous communities evicted and threatened by Sheko/ Majang irredentist groups. The government should solve the problem permanently by fulfilling the interest of these groups either by granting an autonomous special zone or through fair representation to the respective level of government.

²³⁷ FGD with Biftu settlers, April 2017, Biftu.

The political participation of exogenous communities is confined to the *kebele* and *woreda* administration units. They are more represented at *woreda* executives than *woreda* council. They are represented more than 50% in the *woreda* executive but represented less than 20% at the *woreda* council.

Chapter Five

Exogenous communities in Pawe *woreda*

5.1 Introduction

As was indicated in chapter one, the study seeks to investigate whether and how exogenous communities are accommodated at local level. The paper seeks to answer this question based on the case study of Gura-Ferda *woreda* of SNNPRS and Pawe *woreda* of Benishangul-Gumuz. This chapter deals with the second case study.

The chapter begins with a brief description of the Pawe *woreda*, territorial size, population, demography and the history. Then it discussed the political institutions and its representation to the respective tiers of government. The representation of exogenous communities in *woreda* institutions also discussed in this chapter. The Gumuz-settler conflict and its subsequent result of ‘special’ *woreda* status followed by deprivation of the status also overview in this chapter. Lastly the impact of the deprivation of special status to the exogenous communities is discussed in brief.

5.2 Beles Valley/Pawe *Woreda*

Belles Valley/Pawe *woreda* was formerly part of Gojam province (*kiflehager*) in Metekel sub-province (*awuraja*)-one of the seven administrative sub-provinces (*awurajas*). After 1991 political change of the country it became one of the seven *woredas* in Metekel zone of Benishangul-Gumuz regional state (here after BGRS).

Pawe *woreda* is one of the 20 *woredas* of BGRS and of seven *woredas* in Metekel Administrative Zone in the region. This *woreda* is located in North East direction of the region and far from 512km to the regional capital, Assosa, 588km from Addis Ababa and 226km from Bahir Dar. Pawe also borders with Jawi and Dangur *woredas* in the North, Mandura from South, Amhara National Regional State from the East and Dangur *woreda* from the West.

The *woreda* covers an estimated areas of 64,300 hectare of which 26,340 hectare land used for farming, 11,000 hectare is covered by forest, 7,749 used for grazing land and 6,400

hectare land is out of usage.²³⁸ The remnants of the huge arboreal and dense bamboo trees indicated that the *woreda* was covered by trees which later cleared following 1980s resettlement program. Without any emphasis, Pawe is the ‘water roof of Ethiopia’ that consists beyond 16 rivers including Beles River, Gilgel Beles, Abat Beles, Chankur, Charanguach, Ali Spring, Tikur Wuha, Alipapawa, Midmida, Keteb etc.

Since the end of 2008 Pawe (special) *woreda* is merged with Metekel zone while it had a special status and was directly accountable to the regional state. Its deprivation of the special status and subsequent merge with Metekel zone is issue of contestation among the concerned parties.²³⁹

5.2.1 Population and Ethnic composition

Pawe was one of the biggest population resettlement sites in Ethiopia which comprises different ethnic groups both from the north and the south part of the country. The selection of Metekel especially Pawe as a resettlement center was very controversial due to the fact that the area was not well studied by the commission.²⁴⁰ Following the *Derg*'s decision, two kinds of settlers-those who were famine victims from North Showa, Wollo and Tigray and those who suffered from chronic land shortages in South of Showa (currently SNNPRS), Gonder and Gojam came in to the area.²⁴¹ The arrivals of settlers in this area threaten the livelihood of endogenous Gumuz ethnic group. Later the settlers were affected by the harsh environment and many of them died and relocated voluntarily. Due to this reason the population growth of the *woreda* used to depend on the environment and fluctuate accordingly. The population categories currently inhabiting the area are re-settlers, urban dwellers and forced/voluntary migrant farmers.²⁴² The objective of this study is not narrating the history of resettlement rather how these settlers became political minority and how they treat in the area even if they are majority in number. Still the population number is increasing in this area due to the influx of the society from settlers' origin.

²³⁸ Pawe *woreda* Agricultural Bureau Report, 2016/17.

²³⁹ This issue will be discussed in chapter five.

²⁴⁰ Pawe *woreda* Agricultural Bureau Report, 2016/17.

²⁴¹ *Ibid*

²⁴² Welde Selasie Abute(1997) *The dynamics of socio economic differentiation and change in the Belles- valley (pawe) resettlement area, North western Ethiopia*, (Thesis submitted for MA in sociology, Addis Ababa university), P.65.

According to the CSA report of 1994, 2005 estimated projection and 2007 population and housing census, Pawe *woreda* consists of 29,051; 49,758 and 45,552 populations respectively.

Table 4: Population statistics of Pawe *woreda*

Sex	1994 PHC	2005 estimated census	2007 PHC	2014-2017 Population projection value by CSA			
				2014	2015	2016	2017
Male	-	25,320	23,265	30,014	30,991	32,059	33,273
Female	-	24,438	22,287	29,113	30,213	31,215	32,315
Total	29,050	49,758	45,552	59,127	61,204	63,274	65,588

Source: 1994, 2007 CSA report, 2005 estimated census and 2014-2017 population projection value of CSA

Pawe as epicentre of 1980s resettlement program of *Derg* in north-west Ethiopia had diversified ethnic composition which consists of both Northern²⁴³ and Southern²⁴⁴ settlers in the area. As clearly illustrated, Pawe can be said as a land of settlers which consists of 99% of exogenous communities. The diversification and majority existence of exogenous communities in the area can be seen from two perspectives. The first perspective emanates from *Derg's* huge resettlement program to the area from the North and South directions. The second perspective is the influence of settlers on endogenous Gumuz ethnic group resulted incompatibility of culture between natives and new comers. In so far the Gumuz retreat back to forest area as their livelihood is depending on it. Therefore, *Dergs* resettlement program made Pawe as a home of diversified ethnic groups as shown in the following tables.

The population in Pawe are diversified and represent different ethnic backgrounds and way of life. Based on the report given by CSA in 2007 Population and Housing Census, the ethnic composition in the *woreda* is as follows.

²⁴³ Northern settlers are peoples who settled the area in 1980s due to *Derg's* resettlement program. These peoples came from mainly from Wollo, Shewa, Gojam, Gonder, Tigray and Sekota wollo

²⁴⁴ Southern settlers are peoples who settled the area since 1980s due to resettlement program of the *Derg* government. These peoples came from Kambata, Hadya some parts of Guraghe and Sidama in current SNNPRS.

Table: 5, Endogenous ethnic composition in Pawe *woreda*

Ethnic group	Population number	Percentage (%)
Shinasha	159	0.34%
Gumuz	146	0.32%
Berta	132	0.29%
Mao	39	0.09%
Komo	16	0.04%
Others	45,060	98.92%
Total	45,552	100%

Source: CSA, 2007

Table: 6, Exogenous ethnic composition in Pawe *woreda*

Ethnic group	Population number	Percentage (%)
Amhara	36,309	79.71%
Kambata	2,111	8%
Hadiya	2,050	4.5%
Agew-Awi	1,390	3.05%
Oromo	1,009	2.22%
Somalis	873	1.92%
Others	1,806	3.96
Total	45,552	100%

Source: CSA, 2007

From the above two tables, the number of endogenous ethnic groups²⁴⁵ are insignificant in terms of number and counted not more than 1% in the study area but the exogenous ethnic communities²⁴⁶ consists of almost 99% from different ethnic background.

²⁴⁵ The 1992 BGRS constitution clearly stated that Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao and Komo as indigenous ethnic groups and 'others' as non-indigenous ethnic groups.

²⁴⁶ These groups came from Amhara (Wollo, Shewa, Gonder, Gojam), south (Kambata, Hadya, Wolaita, Guraghe) Oromo mainly from Shewa and Wollo.

5.2.2 History of Pawe *woreda*: Pawe as a land of settlers

According to local informants, the name Pawe originated from the neighbouring Awignik speakers of Agaw community means an ‘empty land’. Through oral tradition and historical excavation, the present day Awi Nationality *Zone* was part of Gumuz land.²⁴⁷ The incorporation of Gumuz land to the central government in 1890s, the Agaw was nominated as administrator of the Gumuz land on behalf of Negus Tekle Hymanot.²⁴⁸ Had the right to administer over the Gumuz territory, the Agaw named the areas by their own language such as Pawe and Jawe.

Informants in Pawe *woreda* strongly agree that the founder of the *woreda* were the settlers who came from the North and South part of the country. Before the arrival of the settlers, the land was covered by arboreal trees and bamboos with huge wild animals and reptiles.

*When we arrive in 1985 in this area, even human beings, birds were not here. The birds arrived after we reach in this locality. The area was fully designed for resettlement program starting from Megenteya to Mambuk.*²⁴⁹

The recruitment of settlers to the settlement sites had two mechanisms. For one hand, volunteer settlers of North Shewa particularly from Yifat and Timuga as well as Kambata, Hadya, Wolaita and Guraghe arrived on their will. On the other hand, forced settlers from Wolo, Gojam, Gonder and Oromo of Shewa and Wollo formed this *woreda* as the first settler. The establishment of Pawe *woreda* came in to reality in 1985 by 48 villages (*Menders* in Amharic). For administrative purpose, the *woreda* was restructured in-to-20 *kebeles* with different ethnic composition. The Kambata, Hadya, Agaw Tigra and Oroma consist of a majority population number next to Amhara.

The Gumuz endogenous communities in the *woreda* are not influential in terms of political, economic and cultural activities and less in number. The reason behind the absence of Gumuz community influence over the settlers emanates from different perspectives. First, the arrival of settlers to this area influence the livelihood of endogenous Gumuz community as their lives depend on hunting and gathering as well as bee hiving.²⁵⁰ Second, the frequent conflict

²⁴⁷ Pankhrust 1997:91 Getu (1992)4.

²⁴⁸ Benyam and Alemseged (2014) Center periphery relations in Benishangul Gumuz regional state, Adama University, p.4.

²⁴⁹ Interview with Seid Muhe, Feb, 28, 2017, Mender-7.

²⁵⁰ Abute (1997) *The dynamics of socio economic differentiation and change in the Belles- valley (pawe) resettlement area, North western Ethiopia*, (Thesis submitted for MA in sociology, Addis Ababa university).

between the Gumuz ethnic community and settlers especially the 2000 conflict affected their existence together with the settlers and force them to retreat back to beyond Ali spring of the border land of ANRS and BGNRS. Third, the cultural incompatibility between the indigenous Gumuz and the settler forced them to sight another alternatives. The radical culture of feeding habit of Gumuz community and the conservative feeding culture of settlers especially the northerners contradict each other and latter serve as a source of cultural violation over the endogenous ones. Traditionally, the Gumuz customary feeding style is differ from the settlers in that the later depend on restricted foods such as *Injera*, bread etc. Finally, the search of new alliance and identity lines to the neighbouring brothers at Mandura *woreda* diminish their socio-economic, political as well as number superiority at Pawe *woreda*. Today, some endogenous Gumuz community live in a little village called Manjare near Felege-Selam *Kebele*.²⁵¹

5.3 Political institutions

5.3.1 Woreda council

The *woreda* council is the highest legislative organ of the *woreda* government in Pawe *woreda*. This council is composed of various exogenous communities who represent different ethnic interests. In relation to this, the council membership is based on the first-past-the –post electoral system. In this regard the four EPRDF member parties represent their ethnic groups in the *woreda*. Since 2010 local election, these parties nominate their candidates and became member of this council. However, the council seat varies from one local election to the other local elections. The following table shows party composition in the *woreda* council.

Table 7: Party composition in Pawe *woreda* council

No	Political parties	No of seats	%
1	ANDM	85	70.84
2	SEPDM	25	20.83
3	TPLF	5	4.17
4	OPDO	5	4.17
	Total	120	100

Source: *woreda* council, 2017

²⁵¹ Interview with Woreda administrator and field observation, Feb, 2017.

As shown in table 7 ANDM consists of 70.84%, SEPDM 20.83%, TPLF 4.17 and OPDO has got 4.17 in the council. This percentage may vary from term to term.

5.3.2 Woreda executive

The *woreda* executive is the highest law enforcement organ on *woreda* matters. The executive is directly accountable to the *woreda* administrator and the regional administrator. The composition of the executive in this *woreda* is based on ethnic composition and population size. The following table shows ethnic composition in the *woreda* executive by the respective political parties.

Table 8: Party composition in Pawe *woreda* executive

No	Political parties	No of executive	%
1	ANDM	12	46.16
2	SEPDM	8	30.76
3	TPLF	2	7.7
4	OPDO	2	7.7
5	Others	2	7.7
	Total	26	100

Source: *Woreda* administration office, 2017

From table 8 ANDM controlled almost half of the executive position while the remaining political parties represent in the executive based on their population number in the *woreda*.

5.4 Political representation

5.4.1 Parties in the region

The first political party that represent the North West region of the present day BGNRS was Berta People's Liberation Movement(BPLM) which established in 1989 to struggle the *Derg* government at Sudan.²⁵² Majority of this party were Berta's and some were from the Gumuz ethnic group. Like other ethnic based liberators, the BPLM search an ally from Ethiopia and formed a cooperation agreement with Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). OLF's greater

²⁵² Asnake (2005) *Federalism and Ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: A comparative study of the Somali and Benshangul-Gumuz regions* (Dissertation submitted for the degree of PhD in political science, university of Leiden), p.160.

ambition to the North of Assosa divorced their cooperation and BPLM search for other alternatives with Tigrean People Liberation Front (TPLF) in 1990. After this party got training from TPLF, they fight with the *Derg*. In 1991 when EPRDF controlled the country, the mandate to rule the area is given for this party. BPLM didn't sustain its power because of the emergence of other ethnic based political parties in the region and internal division within the party. This resulted political instability between 1992-1995.²⁵³ Asnake identified four dimensions for this instability in the region. First, the conflict between OLF and BPLM. Second, the conflict between OLF and EPRDF while OLF withdrew from Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). Third, the conflict between EPRDF and some factions of BPLM. Last, the conflict among the endogenous ethnic groups for power rivalries. The emergence of ethnic based political parties in the region contributed for the establishment of Gumuz People's Liberation Movement (GPLM), Shinasha People's Democratic Movement (Boro-SPDM), Mao People's Democratic Movement (MPDM) and Komo People's Democratic Movement (KPDM).²⁵⁴ These establishments of ethnic based political parties in the region undermine the power of BPLM.

Proclamation No 7/1992 established 14 regional states with a city administration. BGNRS is one of 14 regions and established by merging former Assosa and Metekel sub-provinces of Wolega and Gojam provinces.²⁵⁵ Due to the conflict between EPRDF and OLF in the region, the regional state was formed in 1993 with conflict of interests among endogenous political elites. The conflicting party of the Berta and Gumuz agreed by providing the president office for Berta and the capital to the Gumuz at Pawe, Metekel zone. But the conflict between the Gumuz and settlers moved the capital from Pawe to Assosa.

The regional government established in 1993 by the newly formed regional party known as Benishangul North Western Ethiopia People's Democratic Unity Party (BNWEPDUP) under the control of BPLM.²⁵⁶ Internal division and coup of the president was one of the characterizing features within BPLM. Until 1995, three presidents were removed from the regional presidential position.

²⁵³ Asnake (2005) *Federalism and Ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: A comparative study of the Somali and Benshangul- Gumuz regions* (Dissertation submitted for the degree of PhD in.....university of Leiden), p.159.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁵ Asnake (2005) *Federalism and Ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: A comparative study of the Somali and Benshangul- Gumuz regions* (Dissertation submitted for the degree of PhD in political science, university of Leiden), p. 160.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

In 1995, the federal government restructured the politics of the region and the regional president elected from the Gumuz line. Relative peace and security was seen from 1995-2000 when Gumuz administered the region. But the Berta refused the leadership of the Gumuz over the regional state.

The dispute over regional power between the Berta and Gumuz leads another dimension in the region. The Berta, who is not allowed the political dominancy of Gumuz over the regional state, wanted to exit and establish a regional state based on the FDRE constitution of Art.47. The federal government intervene and settled the conflict. Through negotiations, informal power sharing implemented within Benishangul Gumuz people's Democratic Party (BGPDP).²⁵⁷

The three administrative zones are dominated by the endogenous groups that dominate the zones. For instance the Metekel administrative zone is dominated by the Gumuz and Shinasha officials. Against the above competition over regional power among endogenous ethnic groups, the region consists of 46% exogenous ethnic groups.

The issue of representation for almost half of the exogenous ethnic groups in the region was/is controversial still now. The dominant exogenous ethnic communities in the region are Amhara, Oromo, Tigre and Peoples from South during *Derg's* resettlement program. The endogenous political parties in the region didn't want the representation of exogenous communities for different reasons.²⁵⁸ First, the intention behind ethnic federalism as a self-rule for indigenous groups. Second, the fear of the dominancy of large exogenous population in the region. Last, to limit the political role of the exogenous ethnic groups.

By observing the marginalization and misrepresentation of the exogenous groups, different political parties establish their office at Assosa since 1993. The first political party that establish its office at Assosa was ANDM. The number superiority of Amhara settlers in Metekel and Assosa zone triggered the party to establish its office in the region. Following ANDM, the other political parties like TPLF, OPDO and SEPDM establish their office in the region as affiliate party to BGPDP.

²⁵⁷ Asnake (2005) *Federalism and Ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: A comparative study of the Somali and Benshangul- Gumuz regions* (Dissertation submitted for the degree of PhD in political science, university of Leiden), p.167.

²⁵⁸ Asnake(2005) *Federalism and Ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: A comparative study of the Somali and Benshangul- Gumuz regions* (Dissertation submitted for the degree of PhD in political science, university of Leiden), p.173.

Among the three administrative zones and twenty *woredas*, Pawe is the only *woreda* which administered by the four affiliate parties of BGPDP. Until 2010, the *woreda* was administered by ANDM. The reason behind the control of ANDM over Pawe are the geographic proximity of the *woreda* to ANRS, the historical resettlement site and most government and self-sponsored settlers were from Amhara, the presence of unresolved border demarcation between the two regional states left for ANDM. Lastly, ANDM have a strong interest over Pawe.

The other EPRDF member parties entered the *woreda* following the 2010 local election. The key *woreda* position is still occupied by the ANDM and other political parties have their own representation according to their population size.

5.4.2 Election

Pawe conducted two types of elections as the schedule of National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). The creation of BGNRS by proclamation No 7/1992 made the hitherto marginalized minority to the status of ‘owner nationalities’ and the exogenous ethnic groups to new minorities.²⁵⁹ Unlike the regional level, in Pawe, the settlers are unconstitutional owners of the land while the endogenous are still minorities at this *woreda*. The settlers at Pawe participated for electing and to be elected to/for Regional council and *woreda* council. Concerning to representation to HoPR the Benishangul Gumuz regional state has seven regular²⁶⁰ and two special²⁶¹ constituencies. Therefore, exogenous representation for Pawe is dominated by Gumuz and Shinasha dominated Metekel regular constituency.

the people of Pawe elect four for regional council members and 120 for *woreda* council. In these elections, population size matters for each position. The candidates are nominated by the four parties while the opposition party has the right to nominate candidates based on its criteria.

In 2005 and 2010 elections, ANDM with Coalition and Unity to Democracy (CUD) compete but the former beat the latter. Since then no opposition party compete for different houses in the *woreda*. The complexity of election in the *woreda* observed in local elections for *woreda*

²⁵⁹ Asnake (2005) *Federalism and Ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: A comparative study of the Somali and Benshangul- Gumuz regions* (Dissertation submitted for the degree of PhD in political science, university of Leiden), p.168.

²⁶⁰ Regular electoral constitutencies include Metekel, Kamash, Sherkole, Daleti, Bambasi, Assosa megele ,and Assosa Hoha and Hobesha.

²⁶¹ Special constituencies include Shinasha special and Mao Komo special.

and *kebele* councils. Each member parties need better representation in each house. What complex the election is, the existence of diversified communities in each *kebele*. For *woreda* and *kebele* council members, each party registered its candidates. During election some ethnic groups may not have representation in *woreda* council. In fact, the election for *kebele* council is nominal rather real. Some *kebele* candidates are not aware of their membership for a certain political parties.

5.5 Political representation of exogenous communities in government institutions at *Woreda* level

5.5.1 Representation in the *woreda* council

Table: 9, 2010 and 2015 ethnic composition of the council in Pawe *woreda*

No	Ethnic groups	No of seats in the <i>woreda</i> council for each ethnic group			
		2010		2015	
		Seats	%	seats	%
1	Amhara	87	73.11	80	66.67
2	Hadya	9	7.57	13	10.83
3	Kambata	10	8.40	12	10
4	Agew	5	4.20	5	4.17
5	Tigre	5	4.20	5	4.17
6	Oromo	3	2.52	5	4.17
	Total	119	100	120	100

Source: Pawe *woreda* council, 2017

As shown from the above table, the Amhara ethnic community representation in the *woreda* council reduced from 73.11% in 2010 to 66.67% in 2015. On the contrary, the representation of Hadya, Kambata and Oromo's representation in the council increased from 7.57%, 8.40% and 2.52% in 2010 to 10.83%, 10% and 4.17% in 2015 respectively. The representation of Agew and Tigre remain constant in the two local elections.

5.5.2 Representation in the *woreda* executive

The *woreda* executive is the lowest executive branch of Ethiopia. In BGNRS, the exogenous ethnic groups are not represented at the regional and zonal executives. Most exogenous politicians of the region have advisory role for different office heads. Unlike the regional and zonal representations of exogenous ethnic groups, in Pawe, the whole executives are dominated by the settlers. According to *woreda* administrator, the nominations to executive positions are based on three criteria's. The first is membership to the winner political party. Second, population size. lastly, efficiency to lead bureaus effectively. The *woreda* has 26 executive positions as head of bureaus and other 26 vices. The following table shows the power distribution to ethnic groups for the *woreda* executives.

Table: 10, 2010 and 2015 executive power distribution for each ethnic group in Pawe *woreda*

No	Ethnic groups	Seats of Executives			
		2010		2015	
		Seats	%	Seats	%
1	Amhara	13	54.17	10	38.46
2	Kambata	5	20.83	4	15.38
3	Hadya	3	12.5	4	15.38
4	Agew	1	0.42	2	7.7
5	Oromo	1	0.42	2	7.7
6	Tigre	1	0.42	2	7.7
7	Shinash*	-	-	2	7.7
	Total	24	100%	26	100%

Source: Pawe *woreda* Administrator office, 2017

* These executives are come in to power by replacing the Amhara positions following deep reform in the *woreda*

As shown from the above table, in 2010 local election, the Amhara constituted 54.17% of the executive position and reduced to 38.46 in 2015 local election. At the same time, the Kambata position reduced from 20.83% in 2010 to 15.385 in 2015. These two ethnic groups constituted the first and second largest population number in the *woreda*. The prevalence of

other BGPDP affiliate parties in the *woreda* contributes the decrement of these political party members in the executive. On the other hand, the Hadas increase the executive representation from 12.5 in 2010 to 15.38, the Agaw, Oromo and Tigre from 0.42% in 2010 to 7.7% in 2015. The only endogenous ethnic group represented in the executive is Shinasha. They represented from null in 2010 to 7.7% in 2015.

5.6 Endogenous versus exogenous conflict in Pawe *woreda*

As a result of the dichotomy of ethnic groups as owners of the region and others, BGRS is not far from conflict and ethnic exclusion against the exogenous communities. Members of the Gumuz community were unhappy following the arrival of the settlers in the Beles valley resettlement scheme. As explained in the previous topics, the marginalization of the endogenous Gumuz by infrastructures and related social services, they express their grievance by attacking the settlers who located at the border village of Gumuz. The border village of Almu, Felege selam, *Mender-134* and the adjacent *kebeles* dominated by the Kambatas were affected by the conflict of the two groups. Until the outset of *Derg* in 1991, the conflict was slow and not as such violent. According to the informant at Almu town, the settlers-Gumuz conflict reached its peak after the demise of *Derg* in 1991. 1991-1994 was characterised by violent conflict between settlers and the Gumuz in Pawe *woreda*.

The Gumuz-settler conflict had two major phases as explained by the informants in Pawe *woreda*.²⁶² The first conflict broke out in December 25, 1991 when a Kambata man shot and killed a Gumuz man. This happened at the Gumuz village of Manjare during the mourning of Gumuz man. The killing of Gumuz man by the Kambata's man resulted the sacrifice of many lives on the side of Kambata and Hadya innocent men, women and children . According to the informant, at least 80 Kambatas and Hadyas and not more than two Amharas were killed by the Gumuz. The following day, December 26, 1991, my informant added, the Gumuz organized and attack the Kambata and Hadya village which cause many casualties of human life. Sadly, the children were burnt and killed at *Mender-3*. Not only the children but also the Protestants in their church were the victim of this attack.

The second conflict which was 'horrible' in the history of Pawe *woreda* was the September 11, 1992 conflict between the Gumuz and settlers. The Gumuz gunmen mobilized to revenge the killing of Gumuz woman by the settler prior to September 11, 1992. At the morning,

²⁶² Interview with a woman, April 2017, Felege selam kebele.

Saturday market at Felege Selam *kebele*, the Gumuz started to fire their bullet against the settlers. Unexpectedly, 56 settlers were killed and many wounded. After the incident, the Gumuz retreat back to their village and at least three Gumuz were killed. After two weeks of preparation and organization, the settlers march to attack the Gumuz and Shinasha ethnic groups. In the settler-Gumuz conflict, the shinasha elites were suspected as a back force for the Gumuz community.²⁶³ According to informants at Almu town, instead of attacking in front of settlers, the Shinasha elites encourage the Gumuz to fight with the settlers through material and moral supports. The informants reasoned why the shinasha support the Gumuz against the settlers is as follows. First, the intention to control the resource of Pawe as they are the owner of the region. Secondly, the previous suppression by the Amhara ruling class triggered them to fight and cleanse indirectly by using the Gumuz as a weapons. Thirdly, the prevalence of *Zonal* seat at Almu town created their ambition to expand northward of their area.

Later on, on September 19, 1992 settlers organized themselves and took a retaliation measure which resulted loses of officials and communities both of the Shinasha and Gumuz ethnic groups. The measure was started by killing the administrator of the zone and officer of anti-malaria office from the Shinasha ethnic group and a Gumuz official. The killing of these officials triggered the conflict between the settlers on one hand and, the Gumuz and Shinasha on the other hand. One informant at Almu town remembered the occasion as follows.

*I came this area in 1992 from Amhara Sayent, Wolo. When I came to Pawe, there was hostility between the settlers and the Gumuz. The reason of the conflict was the killing of a Gumuz woman by the settler. The Gumuz killed more than 56 settlers but only two were from the Gumuz side. We know that the killing of settlers by the Gumuz had a strong attachment with the shinasha. Two weeks later, the armed settlers entered in to the office of the zone and woreda at Almu town, the then headquarters of Metekel zone. The settlers killed what they have got from the Gumuz and Shinasha ethnic group. Since then they know who we are and respect us.*²⁶⁴

²⁶³ Interview with Amhara settler, April 2017, Almu town.

²⁶⁴ Personal interview, Feb 4, 2017, Almu.

5.6.1 The Gumuz-settler conflict and the establishment of Pawe ‘special’ *woreda*

5.6.1.1 Land as a source of conflict

Competition over natural resources is one of the frequent causes of conflict between the endogenous and exogenous communities at Pawe *woreda*. It is mainly over land and related issues that the conflict erupts among members of the Gumuz and settlers in the study area. The informants in the study area witnessed that the conflict erupt for the sake of searching farm land, grazing land, water and forest (woodland). However, what is bolded by the informants in Pawe is that the major causes of the conflict is competition over land and land related issues.

The settlers especially the Amhara ‘ethnic migrants’ in BGRS could be classified as *Moferezemet*, *ye-Ikul Irsha* and *Tigegna* according to their activities.²⁶⁵ These three activities are targeting to use the Gumuz land either temporarily or permanently. Besides to the above practices by the settlers, the Gumuz who relatively have fertile and large plots of land rent out and sometimes sell their land to the settlers who have insufficient and not land at all for different reasons. This practice later serves as a source of conflict at farming and harvesting season.

The Gumuz-settler conflict towards land escalates during farming season. The source of this conflict is the contract of rent towards their land.²⁶⁶ At the same farming season, they may rent out the same land for more than two settler farmers. Unfortunately, the conflict turned to settler-settler rather than settler-Gumuz. The other land related conflict provoked during harvest season. The FGD discussants at *Mender-134* near the Gumuz village depict that the Gumuz community asks additional payment for their land rent during this season.²⁶⁷ Refusing to pay additional payment to the Gumuz will follow a minor conflict between the two parties.²⁶⁸

The conflict over land also provoked on the issue of sold land. Against the federal and regional constitutional provision of land which prohibited the selling of land, informal

²⁶⁵ Asnake (2005) *Federalism and Ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: A comparative study of the Somali and Benshangul- Gumuz regions* (Dissertation submitted for the degree of PhD in political science, university of Leiden), p.222.

²⁶⁶ Interview with *woreda* administrator, Feb 2017, Almu.

²⁶⁷ FDG discussion, April 2017, Mender 134.

²⁶⁸ Interview Feb 2017 Almu town.

farmland marketing took place between the periphery of the ANRS and BGNRS borders. Pawe shares the large land mass coverage of the two regional states and became the center of farm land marketing. The process of land selling and its end result caused severe ethnic conflict between the settlers and the Gumuz ethnic group.

5.6.1.2 Political elites and state government as a source of conflict

Due to its geographical location and huge historical resettlement site of the *Derg* regime, different political elites, the ANRS and BGNRS have different conflict of interests at Pawe *woreda*.

The Shinasha, Gumuz and the settlers' political elites have different interests towards Pawe *woreda*. For instance, the Shinasha political elites at Metekel seek to maintain better political position based on their merit than through quota that limits each ethnic group's access to power based on their total population. The Gumuz elites in contrast would like to maintain the quota system of power distribution for being they have significant population and lower educational status. Settlers' political elites on the other hand wanted to maintain their *woreda's* special status which prevents them from endogenous intervention and influence at *zonal* level. These different interests escalated the triangular conflict among the three political actors in this *woreda*.²⁶⁹

The BGNRS in general and its council in particular played a significant role for the conflict at Pawe *woreda*. The decision of the council to grant the special *woreda* status and took away the special *woreda* status to regular *woreda* status with Metekel zone lacked procedures. At the beginning, the granting of special *woreda* status to Pawe was aimed at to stabilize the settler- Gumuz conflict.

Besides to BGNRS, the ANRS and its incumbent political party, ANDM played another role in the conflict. The ANRS's role in the conflict could be seen from two perspectives. According to informants at border of Pawe in *Mender-134*, the prevalence of contested boundary and administration in the border area, conflict is usual between the settlers and the Gumuz ethnic groups. The border of the two regional states is not well demarcated due to various reasons. The possible reasons might be the prevalence of conflict of interests in the border area still exists without any solution. To mitigate conflicts, the two regional states established a joint peace committee to the adjacent *woredas* of the two regional states. For

²⁶⁹ Interview with former *woreda* administrator April 2017, Pawe town

instance, Pawe *woreda* in Metekel (BGNRS) and Jawe *woreda* in Awi zone (ANRS) establish this committee. The principal task of this committee is working on managing border conflicts. The other reason that ANRS and its incumbent party involved in the conflict at Pawe *woreda* is the *woreda* was directly administered by ANDM which won the 2005 national and local election in the *woreda*. Until 2010 ANDM had a strong control over the *woreda* later the other three political parties joined and represent their respective ethnic groups.

5.6.1.3 Regional constitution as a source of conflict

The ethnic oriented politics and administrative region that categorizes the inhabitants of BGNRS in to endogenous nationalities and exogenous dichotomy introduced in post 1991 Ethiopia is frequently mentioned by the settlers as underlying contributing factor of conflict²⁷⁰ occurred in Pawe *woreda*.

Article 2 of the 2002 revised constitution of BGNRS explicitly classifies ethnic groups which are ‘owners’ of the region from ‘non-owners’. It reads ‘[e]ven though it is known that there are also other ethnic groups, the ‘owners’ of the region are Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao and Komo.’ It is obvious that the dichotomy in to ‘owners’ and otherwise ‘non-owners’ is meant to delineate some rights/privileges exclusive to ‘owners’. This very distinction has reversed the traditional basis of power relationships between the Gumuz and settlers in Pawe *woreda*.

The establishment of regional state that gives exclusive right to the endogenous nationalities has negatively affected peace by making them the sole decision maker on everything at *zonal* and regional level. Endogenous and exogenous dichotomization has created disparity and discrimination based on ethnicity.²⁷¹ This disparity and discrimination is reflected in accessing government job, education and other social services. In most Gumuz and Shinasha dominated areas of Metekel *zone*, the settlers’ claim that the BGNRS constitution made them defenceless and victims of political decision and fight for survival. In the case of Pawe settlers, the influence of the constitution in the *woreda* is minimal but they affected at zonal and regional level.

²⁷⁰ Desalegn Amsalu (2014) ‘Awi-Gumuz interethnic relations: from integrative traditional institutions to exclusionary ethnic federalism’ in Eloi, Ahmed Hassen and Thomas O(eds) *proceedings of the 18th international conference on Ethiopian studies* Vol.2,p.112.

²⁷¹ Interview with Amhara settler, April 2017, Almu Town

According to informants in Pawe *woreda*, the ethnic based politics and regional administration that prevails in the aftermath of EPRDF's seizure of power in Ethiopia has brought the Gumuz and the Shinasha ethnic group in Metekel while it made them to be second class citizens. This is assured that no settler has representative at the zonal executive. The Gumuz and the Shinasha dominates the *zonal* executive power.

5.6.2 Granting 'special' *woreda* status as a remedy for the conflict

The above land, political and ethnic oriented conflicts that provoked between the endogenous Gumuz ethnic group and exogenous settlers gave a new chapter for the settlers. From 1987-2000 E.C (1993-2008) Pawe was special *woreda*.

Since 1991, much strives has been witnessed between BGNRS and the settlers for the need of representation to secure their rights at different tiers of government. While the endogenous ethnic groups have their own political representation at local, *zonal* and regional level, the exogenous groups do not. This is assured in 1996 and the revised 2002 BGNRS constitution that do not guarantee the representation of 'non-owners'.

For different reasons, the 1996 BGNRS constitution was revised in December 2002. The revised constitution was more considerate for the protection of non-owner ethnic groups. Art 45(3) of the revised constitution states 'representation of others [non-owner] groups shall be given special considerations'.

The confrontation between the settlers on one hand and Gumuz and Shinasha on the other hand at Pawe had been culminated by granting Pawe special *woreda*, autonomously self-administrative entity which had not been under any *zone* in the region. But the designation of Pawe special status has been already lifted reversing the debate to original status and implying that there is to be no 'special' reserve for exogenous ethnic communities.

5.6.3 Lifting of 'special' *woreda* status

The deprivation of special *woreda* status to regular *woreda* status on March 7, 2008 was made on the basis of two considerations.²⁷² The first reason was for the realization of the 2002 revised constitution of the region which articulated the establishment one special *woreda* in the region. The constitution has an intension to establish Mao-Komo special *woreda* with nationality councils. The constitution also pave the way for implementing the

²⁷² Interview with *woreda* administrator, April 2017, Almu.

proclamation enacted to establish the Nationality council in which the status of ‘other peoples is not yet articulated.

The second reason for the decision to make away pawe’s special *woreda* was to be responsible for the question of the people and their representatives.²⁷³ According to the March 7, 2008 regional council’s minute, the peoples and representatives of Pawe have asked to be incorporated in to Metekel zone to access governmental services easily. According to *woreda* administrator, the intention behind the decision of the regional council is ensuring good governance, fostering development by evaluating and monitoring the local administrators closely as well as providing improved governmental services to the public in nearby than letting the people to spend a lot by traveling to Assossa.

At the opposite direction of the council’s logic, some regional and *zonal* officials echoes as there is no nationality which deserves a special status because they are neither endangered nor unique, the Amharas have amhara region and the some to other ethnic groups that found in Pawe and hence Pawe has no ground to deserve a special *woreda* status.²⁷⁴

Nevertheless the informants at Pawe *woreda* confirmed that the deprivation of the special status is far from the above reality. For instance one informant at *Mender-7* speaks like this

*As I am the representative of the people for my kebele no one asks to incorporate to Metekel zone, the issues of deprivation of special woreda status was discussed between us and the representative of government officials at different tiers of government, but the people disagree and the meeting was dispersed without any agreement later we heard that the special woreda status left out.*²⁷⁵

Like the above informant, most informants in the *woreda* interpreted the decision of the council in the opposite direction. For them, the decision is the long lasting conspiracy of the endogenous political leaders to make Pawe in their direct hand. The decision is the official intrinsic plan to control all the resources in Pawe and feel discontent which possible other source of conflict. Beyond its deprivation the issue is what Pawe *woreda* got impacts in politics, economy, social service and job opportunities.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁴ Asnake (2005). *Federalism and Ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: A comparative study of the Somali and Benshangul- Gumuz regions* (Dissertation submitted for the degree of PhD in political science, university of Leiden),

²⁷⁵ Interview April 2007, Pawe town.

5.7 The impact of deprivation of ‘special’ *woreda* status to exogenous communities

5.7.1 Political impact/representation

During the period of Pawe special *woreda* status, 1987-2000E.C/1993-2008/, the *woreda* was directly accountable to the regional government. Due to its accountability to the regional government, the budget in each fiscal year was directly allocated by the regional government. While *woreda* status the budget is distributed on behalf of the zonal administration together with the seven *woredas*. According to the *woreda* council public relation expert, the negative impact of the deprivation of special *woreda* status was seen from budget constraint and absence of subsidy as compared to the previous status. In fact, in BGNRS, the zones have administrative status than nationality status. In each zone there is no council to approve the budget to each *woreda* rather they distribute what the regional council provide.

On the other hand, the *woreda* administrator puts his argument as the deprivation of special *woreda* status has no political impact at Pawe *woreda*. He further added that Pawe had four representatives at regional council before and after 2008. Second, as before 2008, the *woreda* administrator is directly accountable to the regional president. Lastly, the *woreda* council is also accountable to the regional council. But he criticized that the absence of pawe representatives at zonal level. The zonal executives at Metekel are the Gumuz and Shinasha which excludes the settlers’ majority in Pawe and in some extent the remaining six *woreda* settlers.

The settler informants have seen the political impact of the deprivation in different perspectives. In FGD at *Mender-4* (Felege selam *kebele*) the discussants agreed that the deprivation of special *woreda* status in 2008 helped the Gumuz and Shinasha involvement in the *woreda* politics and later they may control the whole activity of the *woreda* as they do at Pawe hospital. These discussants argued that the Pawe hospital is totally occupied by the shinasha following the *woreda*’s special status deprivation.

5.7.2 Economic impact

Unlike other regional states, the economy of the region both at towns and rural areas shores by the exogenous ethnic communities. Likewise, in Pawe *woreda*, the settlers controlled the whole economy either being as a merchant or farmer. The *woreda* is known in its natural

resources and suitable for industry and investment. The rich settlers of the *woreda* actively participated in hotel and tourism in the service sector, agricultural sector and light industry sector. But the licence to invest in the *woreda* is difficult for the settlers.²⁷⁶ According to informants at Almu town, they participated in a bid at the zonal level but the regional government didn't approve it. They added that no one compete them but no permission from the regional bureau.²⁷⁷ The other informant on the other hand confirmed that the deprivation of special *woreda* status has no economic impact on settlers.

5.7.3 Impact on the provision of social services

Unlike other rural *woredas* of Ethiopia, Pawe can be said as the first road networked *woreda* and had pipeline water supply among 48 *Menders* in the resettlement site. Infrastructurally, before 1991, Pawe was much better than major towns of Ethiopia. The major infrastructures like road, pure water, bridge, irrigation, electricity and major shades were the feasible character of the *woreda*. The expansion of infrastructure in the *woreda* was escalated due to *Derg's* massive resettlement scheme and the establishment of Beles project by Salini constructori.

In terms of road, each former 48 *Menders*, for administrative purpose restructured in to 20 *kebeles*, connected each other. The pocket *kebeles* connected with the main road passing through from *Megenteya* to *Jawe woreda*. Surprisingly, each *Mender* has internal squares that connect one village to the other village within the same *Mender*. The problem is that the current government do not maintain the road. Before the introduction of URAP in post 1991, the project was realized by the *Derg* government.

The source of *woreda's* pure water is Ali spring or traditionally known as Biga River at the fringe of ANRS and BGNRS near *Mender-134*. Before 1991, the river feeds all *kebeles* through pipe with free fee. Due to lack of maintenance and protection, only Almu town access the spring water and other *kebeles* choose other alternatives. In some *kebeles* water through fee starts but they refuse to pay and use spring water in their locality. Still the *woreda* is abandoned more than 16 springs but needs utilization.

The two most crucial questions of the rural *kebeles* are access to farm land and electricity. FGD at *Mender-134* discussed that, even though they are young and able to produce a

²⁷⁶ Interview with Amhara settler, Feb 2017, Almu town

²⁷⁷ Interview Feb, 2007, Almu.

desirable production, these two social services threaten them. In terms of land, the inability of the *kebele* to access land to them and lack of border demarcation between Pawe of BGNRS and Jawe of ANRS hinder access to land. For instance, informant in *Mender-134* depicted that

*As a farmer, my families' livelihood is depended on agriculture. I have only 1.5 hectares which is not much with my family members. I have when I reached this area in 1985. Still this piece of land uses my family. Its fertility reduced, my future fate is gone to Addis Ababa as a daily labourer.*²⁷⁸

On the other hand, inaccessibility of electricity to the rural *kebeles* curtailed the youngsters to participate in timber, barber and related activities.

5.7.4 Job opportunities

Job and educational opportunities are the two crucial agendas of settlers of Pawe in post 1991. Employment and joining colleges for both teacher training and Agricultural institutions became rare after ethnic dichotomization of the regional state.

The issue of employment and educational opportunities have different viewpoints among different informants. The *woreda* administrator on one hand puts his evidence by explaining the federal and regional constitutions. He added, employment and educational opportunities are guided by the principle of affirmative action. In this case 'double' affirmative action will be employed. For instance, the five indigenous ethnic communities have 5% affirmative action. Besides to this girls and impaired individuals of these ethnic groups may be advantageous for other affirmative action. The indigenous Gumuz and Shinasha ethnic groups are advantageous for this affirmative action.

On the other hand, settler informants at Pawe *woreda* considered that the deprivation of special *woreda* status clearly marginalize them from joining government institutions within the region. One informant puts his idea as

Pawe is known by producing educated individuals. The woreda frequently got a leading position in educational achievement at zonal and regional levels .But after they complete their program at college and university level, the zonal and regional

²⁷⁸ Interview, Feb 2017, Mender-134.

*bureau didn't employed them. Most educated natives of Pawe woreda employed in the neighbouring Amhara and Oromia regional states.*²⁷⁹

Creating job opportunity for citizens is not the problem of pawe *woreda* but it is the problem of the whole regional state. During my investigation at Pawe *woreda* civil service bureau, educational and culture, tourism and government communication bureaus, the indigenous Gumuz and Shinasha are almost none in each institution.

5.8 Conclusion

At the beginning, fundamental questions were outlined for the discussion part of this chapter. The findings of this discussion are concluded as follows.

Pawe is founded by the settlers who came from the North and South part of the country due you to the *Derg's* massive resettlement program in 1980s. These communities became non-indigenous ethnic groups following the introduction of ethnic federalism in 1991. The ethnic dichotomy became institutionalized in the 2002 revised constitution of the regional state. Unlike other regional state constitutions, the BGNRS constitution recognizes the existence of non-owner ethnic groups but lack to define the representation of these groups at different tiers of government. In this regard settlers are settled as a majority in Pawe *woreda* and they constituted 99%. Unlike the regional and zonal representation, these communities are represented at *woreda* and *kebele* level.

The endogenous-exogenous conflicts in Pawe *woreda* is rooted from resources, marginalization and representation to the respective level of government. The Gumuz, Shinasha, the settlers and the ANRS and BGNRS are the actors of conflict in this area. These actors have their own interest in the study area. The granting of special *woreda* status to pawe was targeted to stabilize the conflict broken between the settlers on one hand and the Gumuz and Shinasha on the other side. This temporarily provides peace and security in the area. The deprivation of this status in 2008 caused tensions between the settler and the regional government. The granting and lifting of the special *woreda* lacked procedure.

The exogenous communities are well represented at *kebeke* and *woreda* level in Pawe. Representation in the *woreda* executive and council is based on clear criteria's such as population number, ethnicity and performance.

²⁷⁹ Interview, Feb 2007, Felege selam kebele.

Chapter Six

Finding of the study and Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

The principal question that this study sought to answer was whether and how exogenous communities that are found territorially concentrated and in majority, politically and culturally accommodated at local level? To answer this question, other related questions were raised and discussed including; are exogenous communities a ‘minority’ who are entitled for accommodation? Does the federal constitution contain a principle for accommodating exogenous communities? Is local government envisaged to play a role in this respect? were under discussion.

To answer these questions, in chapter two, the concept of minority was discussed with a view to determining whether exogenous communities can be considered as ‘minority’ which deserve accommodation. Different forms of accommodation of minorities were considered in this chapter. Territorial autonomy and its institutional arrangements such as self-rule and shared rule, and non-territorial autonomy such as power sharing and cultural autonomy were highlighted.

In chapter three the discussion provided the background of Ethiopian federalism in general and its origin and structure in particular. This chapter also discussed the role of local government for accommodating territorially concentrated ethnic minorities. This chapter also discussed whether the federal and regional constitutions contain a principle for accommodation or not in this respect.

Chapters four and five dealt with the political, economic and social accommodation of exogenous communities in Gura-ferda and Pawe *woredas* in practice. Based on the above listed questions and discussions in each chapter the following major findings are discussed in the two study areas.

6.2 Accommodation of exogenous communities in Gura-ferda

Exogenous communities in Gura-ferda are highly affected by the power of the endogenous communities in political, economic and cultural activities. In the following sub-sections, these variables are discussed in brief.

6.2.1 Political Accommodation

In some federal experiments power is vested in different forms. In some situations, the majorities seize the power, in others power distributed through proportionality and with rare situations power may under the control of the minorities. The Ethiopian federal experiment in exogenous dominated areas showed that power is under ethnic minorities. This is clearly shown in Gura-Ferda.

Since 2001, following the second wave of decentralization, Gura-ferda was split from Sheko *woreda* and became under the joint administration of Me'enit, Sheko and Majang ethnic communities. Still the *woreda* status of Gura-ferda and the ownership of three ethnic groups are controversial. For instance, the Me'enits has two giant *woredas*, the Shekos has one *woreda* and the Majang also has a Nationality zone in GNRS. On the contrary, the exogenous communities who occupied 13kebeles of 21 and dominant in number in the *woreda* are excluded to exercise their political rights. The possible reasons that Gura-ferda left for the ownership of the three endogenous communities will be first, the remoteness of the area from the exogenous home region dominantly Amharas, the ANRS has no influence in Gura-ferda unlike Pawe. Second the plan of the zonal and regional government to weaken the dominance of exogenous communities in the *woreda*. Third, the three endogenous communities and their neighbouring ethnic communities demanded Gura-ferda. For instance, the GNRS demanded Gura-ferda as part of Majang and SNNPRS demanded Dima of GNRS. In this regard Gura-ferda serves as a focal point for the two states. As a result of this contestation between the two regional states, The Majang becomes the owner of the *woreda* but part of SNNPRS. On the Sheko side, the Sheko together with Majang need Gura-ferda as part of the future autonomous Sheko/Majang special zone which is the source of conflict in the area. In this respect some parts of Sheko joined to Gura-ferda and become owner of the *woreda*. The Me'enits who always asks the legitimate ownership of Gura-ferda has other interests. The Me'enit wants to establish Me'enit dominated *woreda* at Gura-ferda. The present Me'enit dominated *kebeles* of Gura-ferda was part of Me'enit *woreda* before 2001. In order to accommodate the three ethnic communities' interest, the zonal and regional officials established Gura-ferda for these ethnic communities. Lastly, the absence of institutional accommodation of exogenous communities even if they are in majority, in the federal and regional constitutional set ups, encouraged the officials to exclude exogenous communities from ownership of the *woreda*.

The political accommodation of exogenous communities in Gura-Ferda varies accordingly. Since 2001, the *woreda* is ruled by the Me'enits and Shekos alternatively. The coming to power of the two ethnic communities in the *woreda*, treat exogenous communities differently. With historical proximity between settlers and endogenous Me'enits, the Me'emit officials treat and include exogenous communities to the *woreda* executive power. On the contrary, the Shekos implemented exclusionary practice towards exogenous communities. This exclusionary experience of Sheko officials against the exogenous communities rooted from economic dominance of the latter, cultural incompatibility between them, difference religious practices between them and the previous unbalanced power relations during Haile Selassie and *Derg* regimes.

Following the 2012/13 ethnic exclusion in Gura-ferda, the Amharas diminished from *woreda* executive power and the neighbouring Kafficho become dominant in the executive. The 2014 conflict in the *woreda* however, increases the representation of the exogenous communities in the executive increase. To be a member of the executive, with the exception of the *woreda* administrator, vice administrator and speaker of the *woreda* council, all positions are vacant for each ethnic communities. Unlike other ethnic local governments, membership to the executive does not consider ethnic composition, population number and ethnic dichotomy. The only criteria to be asked for these members are membership to the ruling party (SEPD). (SEPD).

Unlike representation in the executive, representation in the *woreda* council is based on ethnic formula. The *woreda* council is dichotomized as endogenous and exogenous or 'owners' and 'non-owners' of the *woreda*. In this dichotomization, the numerical minority endogenous communities such as Me'emit, Sheko and Majang together constitute 80% of the seat in the *woreda* council. Among these groups the Me'enits constitutes a majority whereas the Sheko and the Majang constitute the seat respectively. The *woreda* administrator, the vice administrator and the speaker of the *woreda* council elected from these members and should be a member of the council. In most cases, the *woreda* administrator and the vice administrator are elected from the Me'emit and Sheko ethnic community whereas the speaker of the house, may not always, from the Majang.

On the contrary, the exogenous communities' consists of 20% seats in the council. Representation of exogenous communities in the *woreda* council is vague. Its vagueness emanates from the diversification of exogenous ethnic communities in the *woreda*. The *woreda* council regulation is silent about which ethnic group constitutes in what amount. Just

it states that the ‘other’ people constitute 20% of the council seat. This vague situation of the *woreda* council regulation may lead to a membership of a one ethnic community among exogenous groups in to the council. The reservation of the council seat to the exogenous ones may strengthen the influence of these groups on the exogenous ones. But their small number in the council curtails them being influential in *woreda* decisions.

The exogenous communities’ membership to the executive and the council is not the result of institutional frameworks of the *woreda*, zonal, regional and federal structure but it is the free will of the respective government official decisions. Therefore, representation in each position is not secured but tentative to reduce turmoil’s in the area.

6.2.2 Economic Accommodation

In Gura-Ferda exogenous communities have been evicted for various reason. This together with periodic conflicts that arise in the area, have economically harmed the exogenous communities. Once the conflict broke out, looting, plundering and theft became common. So, the exogenous communities often transfer their assets to the home regions. This instability restrains the exogenous communities from investing permanently in the *woreda*. Furthermore, this situation undermines the development of the *woreda*.

In recent years, some 37 investors participate in Agricultural sector. All investors are exogenous peoples who they participate in coffee and spice plantation, and cereal production. But they are not secure due to the frequent conflict occurred in the area.

Exogenous communities who provide the largest economic share of the *woreda* should have got protection from the respective officials and security offices however, it is clear that since 2012/13 ethnic eviction, these people have developed suspicion and lack of trust one another.

6.2.3 Cultural Accommodation

Amharic is the working language of the Gura-Ferda *woreda*. The language also serves as school instruction other than endogenous ethnic groups. The choice of Amharic language for government offices and school instructions is designed to manage different ethnic communities in the *woreda*.

Concerning to cultural show of ethnic minorities in the *woreda*, exogenous communities has no chance to show their cultural practices at zonal and regional practices. There is a mechanism that the six endogenous ethnic communities show their cultural practices at Mizan-Teferi town. This program held every year under the responsibility of zonal

government communication, culture and tourism department. This department invites the Bench, Me'etit, Sheko, Surma, Dizi and Zilmamo ethnic minorities. In this festival, the endogenous Majang and the exogenous communities were/are excluded in the ceremony.

What is concluded in this situation is that the exogenous communities can show their cultural practices in *woreda* schools but barred from zonal festivities. They are excluded at zonal, regional and federal festivities that aimed to empower culturally concentrated ethnic minorities.

6.3 Accommodation of exogenous communities in Pawe

Pawe is a regular type of local government which established under Art 50(4) of the FDRE constitution. Following ethnic dichotomization by the regional constitution, the *woreda* belongs to Gumuz ethnic community; however, the exogenous communities are dominant politically, culturally and economically in the *woreda*. In this sub-section, the political, economic and cultural accommodations of exogenous communities are summarised.

6.3.1 Political accommodation

Based on the BGNRS constitution, the exogenous peoples are not owners of the land but the constitution recognizes their right for political representation. In this regard, the constitution added that the representation of exogenous communities is determined by the law. The regional constitutional framers considered the presence and roles of exogenous communities; however, the law is not formulated as prescribed in the constitution. This provision is the outcome of the presence of exogenous communities in the regional state, not at all, in almost at equal number with the endogenous communities. Among many *woredas* that exogenous communities dominate numerically, Pawe is the one and the most exogenous communities dominated area.

The exogenous communities in Pawe are the result of the selection of Pawe as a huge resettlement site of the Derg regime from both the North and the South part of the country. Although the *woreda* is diversified among different exogenous communities, ANDM had a strong control and interest in the *woreda* up to 2010 national election. ANDM's strong interest and control of Pawe could be seen from political, economic and cultural angles.

The political motive of ANDM towards Pawe rooted from the desire to incorporate the *woreda* to the Awi Nationality zone. Until recent years, ANRS tried to negotiate with BGNRS officials but failed. The BGNRS officials on the contrary have strong interest

towards Pawe. In this respect, political solutions are mandatory to overcome future conflicts in the *woreda*.

Administrative feasibility was another political oriented interest of ANRS over Pawe. Geographically, Pawe found 226kms from Bahir Dar whereas 512kms far from Asossa. This reality initiated ANRS demand Pawe for the protection of the interest of Amhara dominated ethnic communities. The other strong interest of ANRS over Pawe emanates from economic perspective. The *woreda* is rich in natural resource with suitable arable land. On the contrary, the shortage of land and reduction of soil fertility in the region, ANRS seeks to observe another land such as Pawe. The BGNRS officials on the opposite side wanted to keep the economic interest of the region. The *woreda* is the leading among tax collected areas in the region.

Culturally, the regional constitution is silent for the cultural practice of exogenous communities in the region. Based on the above diversified interest of the two regions, the Shinasha officials with their Gumuz colleagues planned to lift the special *woreda* status in 2008. The deprivation of 'special' status to *woreda* status affects the exogenous communities in terms of infrastructures and access to social services. At the beginning, granting 'special' status to exogenous communities was out of the federal and regional constitutional provisions. Whether exogenous communities found in a majority or not, self-rule is not guaranteed by the Ethiopian laws rather the regional government used it for stabilizing the conflict between the Gumuz community and the settlers. The deprivation of special status was also constitutional because the regional constitution didn't recognize the existence of Pawe special *woreda* other than Mao-Komo special *woreda*.

In the case of political participation, the roles of exogenous communities are not beyond advisory position in the regional executives. In the regional council Pawe have four representatives whereas at zonal level no exogenous communities represented in the executives. The Gumuz and Shinasha dominated the zonal executive position in all aspects.

Unlike the regional and zonal governments, the Pawe's political power is under the control of the exogenous communities. They constitute almost 90% of the total population and power is shared among the exogenous communities. The basis of power sharing is on the criteria of population number, ethnic composition and efficiency to lead bureaus.

6.3.2 Economic accommodation

Economically the *woreda's* settlers have much better living standard than the indigenous communities. The settlers accumulate property for their livelihood. The recent trends of the *woreda* showed that the overpopulation movement to the *woreda* affects the economic potential of settlers. In this regard shortage of farmland in the *woreda* and the inability of the *woreda* to create job opportunities for the young and productive young generations are the threat of the *woreda*.

6.3.3 Provision of Social services and accommodation of exogenous communities

Provisions of social services in Pawe are much better than those rural regular local governments. Better provision of social services in this *woreda* rooted from the *Derg* government. In terms of language, the working language of the *woreda* is Amharic. Amharic also serves as the language of primary education instruction in the *woreda*.

Infrastructural distribution of the *woreda* is much better in that each rural *kebeles* connected by road and easily interacting every place and time. The problem is severing in the provision of pure water and electricity provisions. The *woredas* attempt to provide pure water had got strong resistance from the communities in that in the former this provision was with free fee.

6.4 Overall conclusion: Lesson taken

The federal as well as the regional constitutions acknowledge and accommodate territorially concentrated ethnic groups in its provisions. BGNRS and SNNPRS constitutions are formulated for this purpose. Against this background, in the two regional states, an exogenous community dominates few *woredas* in a majority. In this regard, at the beginning of this thesis, whether the exogenous communities live in a majority in these regions are accommodated at local level or not was discussed. Based on this fundamental question the following comparisons are made.

In the two *woredas*, the exogenous communities are represented in government institutions at different degrees. In Pawe, all government institutions are controlled by the exogenous communities in the *woreda* council and executive. Membership to the *woreda* institutions for each ethnic group depends on population size which is determined by the local elections. This further prevents the exogenous communities from eviction and exclusion by the endogenous

communities. The involvement of EPRDF member parties as affiliate to BGPDP that keeps the interest of these communities in the *woreda*.

On the other hand, absence of proper representation of exogenous communities in Gura-Ferda leads to ethnic eviction and exclusion by the endogenous communities. The absence of affiliate parties in the *woreda* also undermines the representation and influence of exogenous communities in the *woreda*. The existence and political representation in the *woreda* council and executive is not secure in Gura-ferda.

The absence and presence of Affiliate political parties in the two study areas affect the accommodation of exogenous communities. The prevalence of affiliate political parties such as ANDM, TPLF, OPDO and SEPDM in BGNRS made the exogenous communities as self-autonomous entity while the absence of the first three parties in SNNPRS made the exogenous communities in Gura-Ferda out of political game.

In all remarks, exogenous communities are better accommodated in Pawe than Gura-Ferda. Politically, the settlers in Pawe are more represented than settlers in Gura-Ferda. This makes settlers in Pawe are more decision maker than settlers in Gura-Ferda in *woreda* matters.

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Appendix

Interview Guiding Questions for Data Collection

The interview consists of two major parts. The question for interviews are structured as in-depth interview for non-indigenous residents for the two *weredas* and key informant interview guiding questions for politically nominated officials and government institutions.

Part one; An In-Depth Interview Guiding Questions

I, Melese Chekol, a masters student at Center of Federalism and Governance Studies of College of Law and Governance of Addis Ababa University-am writing a master's thesis titled *Accommodation of exogenous communities at local level; The case of Gura-Ferda and Pawe woredas*. Some information from you is critical for the successful completion of the thesis. I ask for your willingness and cooperation in providing me relevant information. I thank you for your time and cooperation beforehand. I assure you the information will provide me with- will be used only for academic purposes.

Thank you

Section one: -Interview Guiding Questions for exogenous Residents

1. When did you start to live in this area?
2. Are you viewed as indigenous or as non-indigenous of this *woreda* (for *Pawe* only)?
3. Why did you come here (if not born there)?
4. Do you have allowed to elect and to be elected in your *kebele* and *woreda* level?
If yes! how?
If no! Why?
5. Do you have the right to possess land and other properties as indigenous communities in your *kebele*?
If yes! how?
If no! why?
6. How do you explain the security of accessing land and accumulating property for a longer period?
7. Are you equal beneficiary of accessing services such as receiving seeds, fertilizers and other inputs of farming as compared to the indigenous communities (for farmers)?
If yes! how?
If no! Why?
8. How do you accessed social services like electricity, education, water etc. in your *kebele*?
9. How do you explain the level of political participation of non-indigenous peoples in your surroundings?
10. Do you think that non-indigenous peoples are treated equally with indigenous ones?
If yes, mention the areas of participation that they treat equally?
If no, what are the areas that exogenous people mistreated as compared to endogenous peoples?

Part two: - Key-Informant Interview Guiding Questions

Section one:-Interview Guiding Questions for *Woreda* Administrator

1. Do non-indigenous communities in your *woreda* participate in election process?
2. How many exogenous individuals are the members of the executive at *woreda* level in %?
3. Given the regional constitution identified the five ethnic communities as indigenous (for pawe *woreda* only), what is the political status of those not belonging to these ethnic communities?
4. Is there any mechanism to accommodate the interest of non-indigenous people at *kebele* and *woreda* level?
If yes! How?
If no! Why?
5. What is the reason that your *woreda* (for Pawe only) was reduced from special *woreda* status to ordinary *woreda* status?
6. What is the impact on exogenous communities?
7. Does it have impact on political representation of non-indigenous communities?
8. What are the benefits and burdens that the *woreda* gain after it reduces to *woreda* status?
9. What are the criteria's that distinguish the indigenous from non-indigenous in your *woreda* (particularly for pawe)?
10. What were the causes of the exclusion of non-indigenous ethnic communities (particularly the Amharas) from Guraferda *woreda*?
11. How do you evaluate the political contribution of non-indigenous ethnic communities in your *woreda*?
12. How non-indigenous communities represent at cabinet level? Did they represent in group as non-indigenous or for each non-indigenous ethnic group like Amhara, Agew, Kambata etc?

Section two: - Interview Guiding Questions for *Woreda* Council

1. How many political parties in *woreda* council? Any independent member who ran on non-partisan basis?
2. Are there the members of exogenous communities in the *woreda* council? How many
3. Did NIC have better representation while the *woreda* was a liyu *woreda* ?
4. Are there representations at zonal and regional level, how much in number in zonal and regional levels that represent your *woreda*?
5. What is the cause of dispute between indigenous and non-indigenous communities in Gura-Ferda?
6. Are there any mechanisms to enhance the cultural practice of exogenous communities in your *woreda*?