

**Political History of Tigray:
Rivalry for Power (1910-1935)**

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**By Hagos G/Yohannes
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**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
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**Political History of Tigray:
Rivalry for Power (1910-1935)**

By

Hagos G/Yohannes Hadera

Adviser: Tecele-Haimanot G/Selassie (Ph.D.)

Approval by Board of Examiners:

Adviser

Examiner

Examiner

DECLARATION

I, the undersigned declare that this thesis is my work and that all sources used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Name: Hagos G/Yohannes Hadera

Signature: _____

Place and date of Submission: Addis Ababa University
College of Social Sciences
Department of History

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Key to Transliteration System

I. The seven orders of the Ethiopic alphabet are represented as follows:-

1 st order	u	=	Bä
2 nd order	u<	=	Bu
3 rd order	u=	=	Bi
4 th order	v	=	Ba
5 th order	u?	=	Bé
6 th order	w	=	Be
7 th order	x	=	Bo

II. Regarding the sixth form in the above list, it must be noted that the “e” will be suffixed to the letter only if the letter is vocalized or stressed. Otherwise it would not be required at all. As a general rule also, the “e” is not required when the sixth form is the last letter of a word.

Example: SUl`	=	Mämher
wÉ`	=	Bedder

III. Palatalized sounds are represented as follows:

g	=	Š
†	=	Č
-	=	Ň
¶	=	Ž

Ě = J

IV. Glottalized sounds are represented as follows:

k = Q

Ö = T

Ú = Č

ç/i = S

â = P

® = Ā = (Pronounced as in Tigriña Agamā)

N = H = (pronounced as in Tigriña H_uaramat)

α = Kh (pronounced as in Tigriña Ākhora)

V. Germination is indicated by doubling consonants:

E.g: Kābbādā Tāsāmma

IV. General Examples:

ʌ}	= Abatā	Mĭ	,	Lej
ʌ[Ö©	= Arāgawi	S"Ñh	,	Māngāša
ʌnm	= Aqaqi	™™	,	Nōñño
¯c=Uv	= Asimba	×Ā~	,	Taytu
¯š^	= Ākhora	ìHĀ'ì	,	Sāhaynāš
¯ÒS	= Āgamā	ewPf	,	Sebhat
Á'Ṭ	= Dājjazmač	â?Øae	,	Pétros
Ú'Ú'	= Čärčär	²u"p	,	Zānābāwārç
Ñ»	= Gāž			

OS[^] = Humära

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PREFACE

The period between 1910 and 1935, in Tigray, was a period of complex games of political rivalries and alliances among the various chiefs and strong individuals. However, almost no attempt had been made to study the political history of Tigray, especially taking political history of Tigray between 1910 and 1935 as a main theme. Many studies, however, have a passing reference to the rivalries among the regional nobility in the region. It is Haggai Erlich who made an attempt in relation to this period. But his attempt is mainly limited to the period from 1930 to 1935 and dealt mainly with the Ethio-Italian relations. He also depended mainly on British and Italian Foreign Office documents and sources by paying little attention to local sources (mainly to the oral sources).

The problem which this thesis will attempt to solve will, therefore, be the existence of a wide gap in the literature on the study of the political history of Tigray in general and the period between 1910 and 1935 in particular. Particular attention is also given to the internal power struggle among the Tigrean chiefs and the relation, which their struggle had with the activities of the central government.

The principal purpose of this theses is to make an attempt to reconstruct the political history of Tigray between 1910 and 1935, to identify and analyze the various historical materials and arouse further scholarly interest in the topic, to contribute to fill some of the gaps in the literature about the political history of Tigray, in the twenty five years before the Italian

aggression of 1935, to meaningfully put the political history of Tigray in the broader context of Ethiopian history (because some of the events were either generated or were profoundly affected by factors which could be considered national), to contribute to fill some of the gaps in the literature on the study of regional political history of Ethiopia and will be able to relate the implementation of the imperial government's centralization process in Tigray and other parts of Ethiopia.

In the thesis I have, therefore, attempted to:

- assess the nature of the internal power struggle among the Tigrean chiefs and the struggle between the Tigrean chiefs and the central government;
- identify and assess the different attitudes of the Tigrean chiefs to the power struggle between *Lej Iyasu* and *Ras Täfäri*, and their relation in regard to the problem of *Lej Iyasu* and the campaign against *Ras Gugsä Wällè*;
- identify and assess the objectives and results of the marriage alliances with *Ras Täfäri* (later Emperor Haylä-Sellassè) made with the major Tigrean rivals in the period;
- identify the central government's attitude to the traditional local rivalries in Tigray;
- identify and assess the Italian policies and activities in Tigray and how the political game in Tigray became a factor contributing to the making of Italian aggressive policy and enabled foreign penetration into the interior parts of the country.

The study is based on written (primary and secondary) and oral sources. The written sources include archives, theses, journals, manuscripts and books of European and Ethiopian languages, collected from different areas. Materials, which could be sources for the political history of Tigray are not, however, exhaustively consulted. This was due to many factors. The

main problem was the problem of having access to the archives of the Ministry of Interior. I regret this lapse. The other problem was the problem of interpreting materials written in Italian language, although I have made an attempt to solve the problem by learning the language to myself and by seeking the help of others. Due to the existence of immense Italian sources for the period under discussion and due to the existence of Italian language problem, I cannot, therefore, claim that the Italian sources are exhaustively utilized.

The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first provides a background, which highlights the political conditions of Tigray from the death of Emperor Yohanned IV at Mätäma (1889) up to the Battle of Koräm (1909). The second focuses on the conditions, which led to the Battle of Äkhora (1914) and the death of *Ras Sebhat* and his two sons. The third chapter deals with the relations between the escape of *Lej Iyasu* to Tigray and the Tigrean chiefs' rivalry, and their relation with the central government in relation to the problem of *Lej Iyasu*. The fourth chapter seeks to examine the causes and the results of the rebellion of *Däjjäč Kassa Seyum* and his ultimate fate. The next chapter deals with the relation between the Tigrean chiefs' rivalry and the centralization process, and the different attempts made for marriage alliances among the Tigrean chiefs and the leading members of the central government. The last chapter analyzes the Tigrean chiefs' rivalry and its impact on Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.

This thesis cannot, however, make the claim that it is exhaustive and complete; much remains to be done. It is only a preliminary attempt hoping that it would highlight a plausible interpretation of the internal rivalry among the chiefs in Tigray.

ABSTRACT

Following the unexpected death of Emperor Yohannes IV, *Negus* Menelik was crowned Emperor and the political ambition of some of the Tigrean chiefs to crown *Ras* Mängäša as Yohannes IV's heir was barred, and Tigray entered into a political turmoil. The continuous efforts to regain the throne and the rivalries among the Tigrean chiefs were, therefore, the major factors affecting the course of events after the death of Emperor Yohannes IV.

After *Ras* Mängäša's death, the principal antagonists in Tigray- *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé, *Ras* Sebhat, *Ras* Gugsa Araya, *Däjjac* (later *Ras*) Seyum were involved in constant power struggle and engaged in rivalry to influence the central government to gain favour and to obtain the overlordship of the whole province of Tigray.

During the last reshuffles in the administrative posts of the country made by Emperor Menelik, on 22 April 1902, *Däjjazmač* Abatä Bwayaläw was appointed *Wagšum* and governor general of Tigray in the presence of *Däjjac* Seyum, *Däjjac* Abreha and *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé. *Däjjac* Abreha rebelled opposing the appointment of *Däjjac* Abatä as an overlord of Tigray and was, however, defeated at the Battle of Koräm, in October 1909.

The power struggle among the Tigrean nobility continued after the Battle of Koräm, which led to the Battle of Äkhora, on 25 February 1914, in which *Ras* Sebhat and his two sons were killed. The causes and the consequences of the battle are discussed in the thesis.

The relation between the Tigrean chiefs (mainly *Ras* Seyum and *Ras* Gugsa) due to the deposition, escape and arrest of *Lej* Iyasu was also attempted to be identified in the thesis.

In Tigray the son of *Ras Seyum*, *Däjjac̣ Kassa Abba Yelaq*, rebelled against his father and against the central government in 1918 and he achieved initial victories. The thesis, therefore, attempts to give a highlight on the causes and results of the rebellion of *Däjjac̣ Kassa Abba Yelaq*.

Ras Seyum and *Ras Gugsa*, who were both the grandsons of Emperor Yohannes IV, remained rivals to gain the title of *Negus* of Tigray until the death of *Ras Gugsa* in 1933. They attempted to gain popularity and influence in the central government and to win the favour and support of the central government at the expense of one another. Emperor Haylä-Sellassé unable to impose an effective control over Tigray, however, attempted to achieve an internal balance of power, and finally succeeded in preventing any one of Yohannes IV's descendants from becoming *Negus*, through diplomacy and marriage ties. Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, aware of the potential trouble and danger from Tigray by *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsa* for being deprived of their legitimate patrimony, attempted to placate them by marriage ties to the Shewan royal family, by bonds of matrimony. As a result marriage ties were arranged between the children of the Emperor with the children of the two grand-sons of Emperor Yohannes IV, although it had little effect on the loyalty, especially, of *Däjjac̣ Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa*.

At the time when the Tigrean chiefs were conducting their rivalries, the Italians, who never forgot the ignominy of their defeat at the Battle of Adwa, worked hard to woo the Tigrean chiefs to their interests. Thus, they finally succeeded to gain *Däjjac̣ Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa's* defection to their side, which facilitated their penetration in to the Ethiopian interior.

CHAPTER ONE

I. BACKGROUND

1.1 An Overview of the Political History of Tigray from the Battle of Mätäma to the Battle of Koräm

After Emperor Yohannes IV's unexpected death in 1889¹ *Ras Mängäša*, together with *Ras Alula*, led his men back to Tigray. But the designation of *Ras Mängäša* as the successor of Emperor Yohannes IV was not fully accepted by the Tigrean chiefs. By the time *Ras Mängäša* arrived at Mäqällä, the capital of Tigray, civil unrest had already started as the news of the death of Emperor Yohannes IV spread.² Thus, division and rivalry developed among the different chiefs of Tigray and Emperor Yohannes's army entered into disarray after the Battle of Mätäma. This paved the way for a power struggle among the chiefs of Tigray who failed to form a united front.³ Hence Tigray entered into political turmoil⁴ and the Tigrean notables were in a precarious situation.

Negus Menelik crowned himself as Emperor of Ethiopia and the political ambition of some of the Tigrean notables to crown *Ras Mängäša* as Emperor Yohannes's heir was barred.⁵ Hence the geo-political center of the Ethiopian Empire shifted from Tigray to Shewa.⁶ The continuous efforts to regain the throne lost to the Shewans and the rivalries among the Tigrean notables were, therefore, major factors affecting the course of events and relations with the new Emperor based in Shewa after 1889.⁷

After the death of Emperor Yohannes IV, the sharp split within the Tigrean nobility, the rinderpest epidemic, followed by the Great Famine, were in no condition to sustain any real

opposition to Menelik's claim to the throne.⁸ The political crises due to the intermittent civil wars that followed the death of Emperor Yohannes IV, which devastated the region, could hardly be attributed to a single factor, namely the irresponsibility of the notables of Tigray alone. One of the most important elements to be considered was the attitude of Emperor Menelik II towards the situation in Tigray, whereby the Emperor let the chaos to take its course.⁹ To explain the effect of the internal power struggle and rivalries in Tigray and Emperor Menelik II's attitude towards the situation, *Nägadras* Gäbrä-Hiwät Baykădañ wrote as follows:

... fÓ_ uÇÓT@ U"K=j Ñ>²? δiV Öð...M:: ¼fU ¼fU wfH@É u²=Áκ »Ñ: ¼KT S"Á` »Ñ"U:: c"< ÝT>•`vt"< ÓÇ"-c ÁMp ¼Éa MTf" ¼T>Scj\ ö^jκ Áu³K<:: ... vÑU LÁ ÉI'f cðKκ ¼K?KAκ "Ñκ S}[u=Á [ejfJ" É[e:: G<K<U S_f ucLU c=• Ueÿ=>~ fÓ_ Ó" ið" "uÈ »M}KÁfU:: vLv,κª ²"f` ð`e u`dt"< c=ªÑ< Á•^K<:: Ueÿ=<U ¼fÓ_ vLÑ` »Ö? U"K=j Á×Mªf"< [¼ScK"< ugª"< "Ñ<Y LÁ w²< Áð`ÇM... fÓ_ vÖ? U"K=j }ÓÇ u=vM Ncf "c:: ð`e u`c< SeTTf eL× }uLg ð"l=: fÓ_ " ¼T>ÁIM Á`u™κ 'ÑÉ ð`e u`c< Ý)eTT ²É K=ÔÆf »Á%oMU:: »Ö? U"K=j Ó" v"Ç=f 'Ñ` K=ßS< ¼}Ñv "c:: ¼fÓ_ " I'w ð"Á I'vt"< »MqÖ\jU:: ufÓ_ S_f gð, vLÑκ" c=ÁÖñ ¼'u[" "uÈ G<K< c=ÑvL†"< U["< c=jS<f c=gMS<f 'u\...¹⁰

. . . Tigre, during the time of [Emperor] Menelik II was absolutely ruined. Wherever you go [in Tigray], one cannot get a developed village. The number of traces of her ancient development exceeds those of the present . . . Poverty reigned in the region until it became an area of mockery to others. When every part of the country [Ethiopia] live in peace, Tigray was not, however, relieved from bandits and robbers. Her chiefs always live in fighting against each other. The poor Tigrean peasant, however, thought that Emperor Menelik had caused the conflict among the Tigrean nobles and they highly blamed the Shewan Emperor [Menelik II] for that . . . It would be incorrect if one concludes that Tigray was ruined by Emperor Menelik II. It is, however, ruined due to lack of agreement among the Tigrean chiefs themselves. No one can attack such a tribe of warriors [Tigray] if had harmony within itself. Emperor Menelik II, however, should be blamed for one thing. He did not consider the Tigrean people as his own people. Whenever a bandit, who had been making people suffer, surrendered to him [Emperor Menelik II] he would receive him and pardoned him and then would give him appointments and rewards.

After his coronation Emperor Menelik II appointed *Däjjäč* Seyum Gäbrä-Kidan (also known as *Abba Gobäz*),¹¹ the son of *Ras Bitwädäd* Gäbrä-Kidan and *Etégé* Denqenäs, the sister of Emperor Yohannes IV and ex-wife of Emperor Täklä-Gyorgis¹², as the overall governor of Tigray by which he added one more divisive element to Tigray. *Däjjäč* Seyum joined hands with *Šum Āgamä* Sebhat who had already rebelled against *Ras Mängäša* and in about mid-January 1890 fought at Zeban-Če'a, a village near Hawzèn. The fighting lasted for about three days and claimed the life of many people.¹³

When *Ras Mängäša* submitted to Emperor Menelik II he might have expected that Emperor Menelik would offer him the crown of Tigray. But Emperor Menelik II, while promising him that he might earn it by loyalty and service to him against Italy, only recognized his title of *Ras*¹⁴. In Tigray *Ras Mängäša* sought Italian and British support for his aims to assume the title of *negus* and have over Tigray the same absolute power that Täklä-Haymanot had over Gojjam and which Menelik had earlier exercised over Shewa.¹⁵ This was stubbornly refused by the Emperor as he felt that *Ras Mängäša*'s real intention was the emperorship. It was a combination of Emperor Menelik's refusal and the absence of external support that led *Ras Mängäša* to feel rancour against Emperor Menelik thereafter. Emperor Menelik must have indeed made a critical error in his refusal to name *Ras Mängäša* *negus*. The grant of the title could have cost the emperor very little while, on the other hand, it might have softened the bad feelings between him and the Tigreans. Emperor Menelik was unwilling to let that power out of his hands. Because the designation of *Ras Mängäša* as *negus* would have enabled him to appoint his subordinates as *Rases* and *Däjjazmačes*. Emperor Menelik was, therefore, cautious not to give such privileged title to any one but only to confirm the title of *negus* already granted to

Negus Täklä-Haymanot of Gojjam by Emperor Yohannes IV, in 1881.¹⁶ Emperor Menelik II made a proclamation in December 1898 deposing *Ras* Mängäša and nominating *Ras* Mekonnen of Harar governor of Tigray. He also drew his last ax on the Tigrean dynasty, on 18 February 1899, by removing and exiling *Ras* Mängäša to Ankobär, until his death in 1906¹⁷ and exiling *Ras* Sebhat to Harar until 1909.¹⁸ Täklä-Sadiq Mäkurya in relation to the detention of *Ras* Mängäša writes as follows:

^e S"Ñh YfÓ_ }e} < ᵛÇ=e ᵛuv SØ} < ¶"Ç=Ub† < "Á ᵛI@ U"K=j Ñu<: ᵛI@ U"K=j Ó" G<Kf Ñ>?? gō}l
dÄd"MI u=k` "Á'@ S×I ᵛG<"U UI|f vÄ`ÓMI Ze}— gō}l ᵛ¼[Ö"<" S"Óe," ¶"n"nKI wK"< uÓµf "Á ᵛ"φu`
L"D†"<:19

Ras Mängäša marched from Tigray to Addis Ababa to be pardoned by Emperor Menelik. Emperor Menelik, however, sent *Ras* Mängäša to Ankobär to be detained by arguing that you [*Ras* Mängäša] had rebelled against me two times and after you failed in your rebellion you came to submit; if I pardoned you again you will rebel for a third time and shake my already stabilized government.

Ras Mekonnen, the emperor's nephew, was appointed governor of Tigray.²⁰ He was believed to be the man best able to diffuse the explosive situation and ensure the security of the area, which had worried Emperor Menelik for a long time²¹. On 31 January 1899 *Ras* Mekonnen named *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé governor of North-Western Tigray, i.e. Adwa and its surroundings as well as Šerä,²² because the latter had rebelled against *Ras* Mängäša until his submission to *Ras* Mekonnen in January 1899. Hence contributed to the fall of *Ras* Mängäša.²³ *Ras* Mekonnen also appointed *Däjjac* Tädla Wahed temporary *Meslänè* of the areas around River Wär'e and Amba Alajä; *Däjjac* Hagos Täfäri to Āgamä and Keltä Awal'lo; *Däjjac* Tädla Abbagubän to parts of Indärta, Azäbo and Arho.²⁴ *Ras* Mekonnen also made an *Awaj* (decree), in his name, to be announced in all parts of Tigray about the appointment's he made and called on the remaining

minor rebel chiefs to submit to him or to his appointees.²⁵ Quoting Martini, *Ras Mekonnen's Awaj* reads:

*Capi ed armati che vogliono seguire Ras Mangescia sono liberi di farlo: quelli che vogliono restare al loro paese devono presentarsi ai capi da me [Ras Mekonnen] nominati: chi non si presenta a nessuno sarà considerato come ribelle.*²⁶

Chiefs and armed men, who want to follow *Ras Mängäša*, are free to do so; those who want to remain in their areas have, however, to present themselves to the chiefs named by me [by *Ras Mäkonnen*]. He who does not present himself to any one will be considered a rebel.

Emperor Menelik gave parts of the region between *Wär'e* and *Täkazè* to *Däjjac* *Gäbrä-Sellassè*²⁷ and confirmed the title of *Däjjazmac*, which had been given to *Gäbrä-Sellassè* by *Ras Alula* in 1897,²⁸ towards the end of 1900.²⁹

With the growth of this state of affairs in Tigray *Däjjac* *Gugsa* (the son of *Araya-Sellassè* and the nephew of *Ras Mängäša*), and *Däjjac* *Seyum Mängäša* emerged as the leading rebel leaders in Tigray.³⁰ *Däjjac* *Gugsa* was the governor of *Raya-Azäbo* appointed by *Ras Mängäša* in 1897.³¹ *Däjjac* *Seyum* had also been appointed governor of *Tämbèn* by his father in the same year.³² It was not also uncommon for *Ras Mekonnen* to make them fight against each other by sowing seeds of discord among the rebels.³³

After *Ras Mekonnen* ruled Tigray for about 18 months, *Ras Wällè Biṭul* was appointed as a new governor of Tigray in May 1900.³⁴ In May 1902 *Ras Wällé*, however, left Tigray and returned to *Yäjjju*. After the governorship of *Ras Wällè*, Emperor Menelik divided Tigray into three parts which were then given to native Tigrean appointees in July 1902.³⁵ The area from the River *Wär'e* to the *Märäb* River, which includes North-Western Tigray (*Adwa*, *Aksum*, and *Šerä*) was confirmed to *Däjjac* *Gäbrä-Sellassè*; *Tämbèn*, *Indärta* and its adjacent areas, *Keltä-*

Awla'lo as well as Raya-Azäbo (at the time known as Inda-Mäḵoni) were given to *Däjjac* Abreha Araya (1873-1917). Āgamä was given to *Šum Āgamä* Dästa (d. 1914)³⁶.

Although Tigray was now placed under native chiefs, jealousy and feelings of rebellion were still alive among many of them. The two descendants of Emperor Yohannes IV, *Däjjac* Seyum Mängäša and *Däjjac* Gugsa Araya-Sellassè were offended to see *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè, *Däjjac* Abreha Araya and *Šum Āgamä* Dästa elevated to the above-indicated posts. It appears that these two *Däjjazmačs* (grand-sons of Emperor Yohannes IV), together with many other minor rebel chiefs, continued their opposition against the new and faithful appointees of the government.³⁷ They particularly threatened *Däjjac* Abreha, because he had assumed overlordship of the areas which had been their traditional power base.³⁸ Hence, in September 1902, *Däjjac* Seyum Mängäša and *Däjjac* Gugsa Araya marched to Mäqällä in an attempt to occupy the capital by attacking *Däjjac* Abreha Araya. Both sides fought for three days at a place called Āddi-Šum Dehun, in the outskirts of Mäqällä. The fighting ended with the defeat of *Däjjac* Gugsa and *Däjjac* Seyum who retreated to Täm̀bèn³⁹. Thus, throughout the period the three appointees of the central government had serious security problems in their own respective territories. They were all the time threatened by the rebels.⁴⁰ According to Cipolla, *Däjjac* Seyum used to declare the *Ketät* (mobilization) at least once a month with the intention of making war on the neighbouring lands in order to gain the governorship of the whole of Tigray⁴¹ and to rule over his father's province by defeating the other notables.⁴² In relation to this Cipolla wrote:

*[Seium] Fa rullare il Kitet ossia aduna la sua gente in armi una volta quasi ogni mese, col proposito di muovere guerra ai vicini e dice di volere, ottenere assolutamente il governatore del Tigre [in about 1906]*⁴³

Seium] declares *Kität*, i.e. he assembles his people to take up arms, almost once in a month with the purpose to enter into war against his neighbours, and he states that he absolutely wants to obtain the governorship of Tigray for himself.

The central government kept its usual indifferent attitude towards the situation in Tigray. So as it had imposed its indirect control over Tigray, it did not attempt to solve the problem of turbulence in it.⁴⁴

The descendants of Emperor Yohannes IV, who considered *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè as an intruder and a usurper, were particularly hostile to him. To this effect Cipolla wrote: [*Gebra Sellassè*] *È nemico mortale di Seium*⁴⁵ [Gäbrä-Sellassé] is the mortal enemy of [Ras] Seyum]. When *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè was in Addis Ababa, in 1903, *Däjjac* Seyum and *Däjjac* Gugsa got the opportune moment to launch an attack on *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé, entered Adwa, and looted the town in June 1903 in his absence.⁴⁶ The rebels were also joined by *Däjjac* Abreha Hagos and *Däjjac* Hagos Täfäri who resented the appointment of *Šum Āgamä* Dästa over the whole of Āgamä district.⁴⁷ This led Emperor Menelik II to take urgent measures. Emperor Menelik II, therefore, sent *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè with about 12,000 troops against the 3,000 rebel forces.⁴⁸ *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè entered Adwa, on 11 December 1903, triumphantly with hardly any resistance.⁴⁹ *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè then began peace negotiations with the rebels. *Däjjac* Seyum and *Däjjac* Gugsa Araya submitted to *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè on 27 December 1903 and on 28 December 1903 respectively.⁵⁰ *Däjjac* Seyum Mängäša went to Addis Ababa with *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè to pay homage to Emperor Menelik II. Emperor Menelik II, therefore, made *Däjjac* Seyum governor of Keltä-Awla'lo and, later, added Tämbèn and Abärgällä to him by taking

them from *Däjjac* Abreha, who was now left with only Indarta and Inda-Mäḵoni.⁵¹ Gär'alta was also given to *Däjjac* Gugsa as a fief.⁵² From this time onwards *Däjjac* Seyum started to prove his loyalty to the central government. Even after his father's death at Ankobär, in December 1906, *Däjjac* Seyum showed no opposition to the government.⁵³ Nevertheless, this betrayal of *Däjjac* Seyum signaled the beginning of inter-family friction and rivalry with *Däjjac* Gugsa Araya, which became a dominant feature of Tigrean politics in the 1920s and 1930s.⁵⁴

After *Ras* Mängäša's death in 1906 the principal antagonists: *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè, *Ras* Sebhat Arägawi, *Däjjac* Gugsa Araya-Sellassè, *Däjjac* Abreha Araya-Sellassè and *Däjjac* Seyum Mängäša, were involved in constant power struggle, and in the rivalry to influence the central government to gain favour and grant one of them the overlordship of Tigray.⁵⁵ From among these Tigrean chiefs *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè, however, established a strong and lasting relationship with Emperor Menelik II.⁵⁶ He was one of the highest and most trusted appointees of Emperor Menelik II⁵⁷ and as an expression of his affection, Emperor Menelik II gave *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè one of his grand-nieces [*Wäyzäro* Amaräč] as a wife,⁵⁸ and in November 1906 gave him areas in northern Tigray as *restä-gult*.⁵⁹ For the names of the areas over which *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè was appointed refer to Appendix I.⁶⁰

Däjjac Gugsa, who had already been frustrated at *Däjjac* Seyum's betrayal and submission, decided to give up his rebellion. Accordingly, in July 1907, he went to Addis Ababa allegedly with *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè. Emperor Menelik II received him in a spirit of reconciliation. To *Däjjac* Gugsa's dismay, Emperor Menelik in what amounted to exile sent him to Wälläga as a district governor in *Ras* Dämes's governorate. *Däjjac* Gugsa remained there until 1916 when he was brought back by Empress Zäwditu, his step mother, who then appointed him

as governor of Raya-Azäbo and Bora-Seläwa, bestowing up on him the title of *Ras*.⁶¹ *Ras* Gugsä remained a faithful vassal of the central government throughout Zäwditu's reign. He demonstrated his enthusiastic loyalty to the diarchy in capturing *Lej* Iyasu in 1921 for which he was made *Leul* in 1930 – hence *Leul-Ras*.⁶²

1.2 The Battle of Koräm

Däjjäč Abreha was the son of *Ras* Araya the Elder who was the governor of Indärta during the period of Emperor Yohannes IV⁶³ and maternal uncle and chief councilor of Emperor Yohannes IV.⁶⁴ In 1902 Emperor Menelik II promoted him as governor of Tämbèn, Indärta and Inda-Mäköni. *Däjjäč* Abreha expressed his loyalty to the central government between 1902 and 1906 through his relentless efforts to subdue the two rebels: *Däjjäč* Seyum and *Däjjäč* Gugsä Araya⁶⁵.

At the beginning of 1907 *Däjjäč* Abreha introduced a new and special levy (tax) known as *Čeralahmi*.⁶⁶ One of my informants, *Ato* Kehešän, informed me that *Däjjäč* Abreha had introduced a new type of taxation which would make a cow to pay tax: according to the words of my informant “LQT> fñw' ĀwHM” [Let the cow pay tax].⁶⁷ The *Čeralahmi* tax was to be levied on every one who owned a cow. The amount varied depending on the number of cattle one owned: a farmer who owned one cow had to pay one thaler.⁶⁸ Some sources indicate that the new tax was introduced to raise money for an ambitious building programme of the present palace, Abreha Castle, in Mäqällä.⁶⁹ This new type of tax faced opposition and the people of Āgamä and Keltä-Awla'lo refused to pay. *Däjjäč* Abreha then punished severely the people of Ašebi-Därä, in Keltä-Awla'lo, for refusing to pay the new tax. The central government was, however, displeased with what *Däjjäč* Abreha had perpetrated in Ašebi-Därä⁷⁰ and, according to my

authority.⁷⁶ Empress Taytu endangered *Lej Iyasu*'s power in 1909-1910 and became the *de facto* head of state. The time after 1909 was, therefore, marked by the absence of any one individual at the helm of the state with real authority.⁷⁷

Emperor Menelik made his last reshuffle in the administrative posts of the country. According to this reshuffle, *Däjjazmač Abatä Bwayaläw* (1871-1917) was made *Wagšum* and governor general (overlord) of Tigray in April 1909,⁷⁸ transferring him from *Kämbata*, to which he had been attached for a long time (1896-1909).⁷⁹ *Ras Sebhat* was also released from Harär prison where he had remained for about eleven years and was appointed over *Āgamä* by the orders of Empress Taytu as part of the government's reshuffle in the Imperial court.⁸⁰ As a result, Tigray was found divided among *Däjjac Abreha Araya*, *Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassè Barya-Gaber* and *Ras Sebhat Arägawi*, all of them under the governorship of *Wagšum Abatä*.⁸¹

When *Däjjac Abatä* was named *Wagšum* and overlord of Tigray, *Däjjac Abreha Araya* together with *Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassè*, *Däjjac Seyum* and all the provincial governors were called to Addis Ababa early in 1909 to hear Emperor Menelik's arrangements for the succession.⁸² Even though *Däjjac Abreha*'s immediate reaction to *Däjjazmač Abatä*'s appointment over Tigray was not clearly known, he had, however, nominated a group of elders as his representatives who went to the palace to appeal against *Däjjazmač Abatä*'s appointment asking the Emperor to review the appointment he made over Tigray. But his request was not accepted.⁸³ Sources explain that *Däjjazmač Abatäs* appointment as supreme governor of Tigray, by Emperor Menelik, was attributed to the grave mistake of *Däjjac Abreha* who had mutilated the people of *Ašebi-Därä* for refusing to pay the *Čeralahmi* tax, as this act had vexed Emperor Menelik II.⁸⁴

Consequently, while *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè remained in Addis Ababa *Däjjac* Abreha, under the pretext that he would go first and prepare a reception in honour of the newly appointed *Wagšum* Abatä, went to Mäqällä and then rebelled rejecting the authority of *Wagšum* Abatä⁸⁵. *Däjjac* Seyum had also returned to Mäqällä.⁸⁶ At the beginning of October 1909, *Däjjac* Abreha marched south wards from Mäqällä to Koräm to stop the approaching newly appointed governor over Tigray.⁸⁷ According to Corrado Zoli, *Däjjac* Abreha rebelled, claiming that he was the legitimate heir of Emperor Yohannes IV after the death of *Ras* Mängäša,⁸⁸ since he was the Emperor's cousin. *Däjjac* Abreha strongly insisted that Wag should be administered under Tigray instead of Tigray under Wag.⁸⁹ *Däjjac* Abreha has said, according to Mekonnen that "It is a humiliation to see Tigray being governed by Wag while I am alive."⁹⁰

Many Tigrean chiefs, although they did not want to fight against *Däjjazmac* Abatä, expressed negative feelings against the Shewan-dominated government in general and were bound to be offended in particular by *Däjjazmac* Abatä's appointment as an overlord of Tigray.⁹¹ This was not only because *Däjjazmac* Abatä was a Shewan but also because he bore the title of *Wagšum*.⁹² This title had traditionally belonged to the hereditary rulers of Wag-Lasta, descendants of the Zagwè Kings.⁹³

When *Wagšum* Abatä started his journey to Tigray he was accompanied by *Ras* Sebhat.⁹⁴ *Däjjac* Abreha marched south to Koräm and fought against *Wagšum* Abatä. The Battle of Koräm started early in the morning of 7 October 1909. The reluctance or refusal of many of the notables of Tigray, to support *Däjjac* Abreha in the campaign against *Wagšum* Abatä brought a serious shortage of man power for *Däjjac* Abreha's army⁹⁵. The rebellion of *Däjjac* Abreha gained no support both from the Tigrean notables and from the people, particularly from the people of

Indārta due to the *Ĉeralahmi* tax.⁹⁶ It was, according to Marcus, *Däjjac* Dästa, son of *Wagšum* Guangul who supported *Däjjac* Abreha in his rebellion.⁹⁷ In addition to the modern weapons of *Wagšum* Abatä's soldiers⁹⁸, *Ras* Sebhat's active participation on the side of the *Wagšum* enabled him to gain the upper hand in the fighting.⁹⁹

Annaratone, who was called from Dässè to Koräm to take care of the wounded, writes about the Battle of Koräm as follows:

*La lotta fu breve, accanita, violenta, sanguinosa . . . nell'ultimo combattimento invece i caduti furono qualche migliaio con numerosissimi feriti; circa il 31.5% dei combattenti*¹⁰⁰

[The fighting was short, relentless, violent, and bloody ... In the last fighting, the fallen were nearly one thousand with many wounded: about 31.5% of the fighters.]

According to Zoli, about 2000 people died and about 1000 wounded from both sides during the bloody war.¹⁰¹ Important followers and notables, most of whom were close relatives of *Däjjac* Abreha lost their lives at the battle. *Qäñazmac* Kämbeľhatu (*Däjjac* Abreha's Indärasè and war general and the governor of the town of Mäqällä and its outskirts), *Däjjac* Abreha's brothers: *Däjjac* Täfäri Araya (governor of Saĥarti) and *Däjjac* Rädä Araya (governor of Dedeba) died at the battle. Late, in the afternoon of 10 October, *Däjjac* Abreha himself had been slightly wounded and was captured¹⁰² by *Ras* Sebhat.¹⁰³ After his capture at Koräm *Däjjac* Abreha was sent to Addis Ababa and sentenced to life imprisonment.¹⁰⁴ This was, however, changed and *Däjjac* Abreha was released about the end of 1911.¹⁰⁵ *Däjjac* Abreha died, on 16 May 1918, in Addis Ababa.¹⁰⁶

Däjjac Seyum was in Tämbèn when the Battle of Koräm was fought. When the central Government ordered him to help *Wagšum* Abatä, *Däjjac* Seyum accepted the order willingly,

because he wanted to avenge his defeat at Āddi-Šum-Dehun by *Däjjac* Abreha. But he met *Wagšum* Abatä four or five days after the battle.¹⁰⁷ According to Cipolla, *Däjjac* Seyum was closely following the fighting between *Wagšum* Abatä and *Däjjac* Abreha in order to put himself immediately on the side of the winner.¹⁰⁸ In relation to *Däjjac* Seyum's stand Arnaldo Cipolla wrote the following:

*Quando Abraha si porto contro Abata, Seium segui di qualche tappa la marcia del Tigrino scoprendo ogni giorno una scusa nuova per giustificare il suo atteggiamento di temporeggiatore. Riusci in tal modo ad evitare di comprometersi attendendo il risultato del duello tra I due piu grandi avversari, per poi mettersi con il vincitore.*¹⁰⁹

When Abreha went against Abatä, Seyum followed the march of the Tigreans, maintaining some degree of distance, discovering every day a new excuse to justify his delay. In this way he was able to avoid compromising himself, waiting for the result of the fighting between the two biggest opponents and to put himself in the side of the winner.

However, it is more likely that *Däjjac* Seyum was willing to help *Däjjac* Abatä to have *Däjjac* Abreha defeated so as to prove his loyalty to the central government.¹¹⁰ Although *Däjjac* Seyum did not participate in the fighting against *Däjjac* Abreha, he was given the areas of *Däjjac* Abreha (Indäarta) besides his former areas of Tämbén and Abärgällä after the battle.¹¹¹ *Ras* Sebhat's active participation at the Battle of Koräm made him appear as a dignitary of the central government and apparently began to rule Āgamä with better administration than ever before¹¹².

1.3 An Overview of Tigray from the Battle of Koräm to the Battle of Ākhora

The Battle of Koräm had important consequences both in Tigray and in the central government. After the battle *Wagšum* Abatä went to Mäqällä and stayed there for few months. *Däjjac* Abreha, although *Däjjac* Abatä defeated him, aborted Empress Taytu's plan for Tigray in

particular and her national political ascendancy (1908-1910) in the country in general by inciting the battle.¹¹³ *Wagšum Abatä's* victory at the Battle of Koräm precipitated the power struggle that ensued between Empress Taytu and the Shewan nobility. His resounding victory over *Däjjac* Abreha backfired on the Empress. Hoping that her brother would rule Tigray effectively and fearing at the growing prestige and popularity of *Wagšum Abatä*, Empress Taytu induced the Council of Ministers to issue an order to *Wagšum Abatä* to hand over the province of Tigray and to surrender weapons in his possession to *Ras Wällè* in Yeju. Hence, *Ras Wallè* was appointed as the new overlord of Tigray for the second time (from the end of October 1909 to March 1910).¹¹⁴ At this time, according to Täs fayohannes, there was also a rumour that *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè was also removed from his governorate of Adwa, Šerä, Aksum, and Haramat.¹¹⁵ This act of the Empress was a humiliation both for *Wagšum Abatä* and *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè. *Wagšum Abatä*, as one of Emperor Menelik's generals of the early days and staunchly loyal to Emperor Menelik, may not have had any personal grudge against the Empress. But, because of the respect he enjoyed among the Shewan nobles, she might have considered him a threat to her power.¹¹⁶ *Wagšum Abatä* protested to his fellow Shewans against the order of the Empress to hand over the province of Tigray and to surrender weapons in his possession to *Ras Wällè* in Yeju.¹¹⁷

Wagšum Abatä started his journey to Addis Ababa with his victorious army in January 1910 without leaving a deputy in Tigray. It is said that *Ras Wällè* had refused to accept the offer to him of governor of Tigray. But his refusal could probably have been due to the great hostility to him, in Tigray.¹¹⁸ Hearing that *Wagšum Abatä* was marching to Addis Ababa the Empress sent her force under the leadership of *Azaj Zämanuel* and *Wagšum Abatä's* march was halted at

Jerru.¹¹⁹ This was because the Empress wanted to prevent *Wagšum* Abatä from joining hand in the intrigues which were being conducted against her in Addis Ababa.¹²⁰

At this time Empress Taytu had controlled all the activities of the central government that the agent of the American Legation in Addis Ababa expressed the dominant role still played by the Empress, in his letter, to the Secretary of State (Washington), of 15 January 1910, as follows:

*For the time being, the queen maintains her supremacy at the Gibbi and I am credibly informed that practically every decision now arrived at by the government is at her instigation, or subject to her consent...*¹²¹

The rather ambitious activity of Empress Taytu had certainly aroused the feeling of some people like *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè in particular and the Shewan and Tigrean chiefs in general.¹²² At this juncture, the regent and the Shewans who were worried much and infuriated even more about the Empress's aims and nepotistic policy of political appointment decided to take all effective measures to strip her of all powers.¹²³ Consequently these discontented chiefs with the initiative of *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè and the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, *Nägadras* Haylä-Gyorges, and several of the Shewan and Tigrean chiefs who had suffered more from the caprices and dislikes of the Empress conducted the *coup d'état* against Empress Taytu.¹²⁴ They revoked almost all her appointments and some of her marriage arrangements. They also made a series of arrests of members of her faction.¹²⁵

According to the manuscript written by Täsfayohannes, there circulated a prophecy, of obscure origin, recounting that a person born from Tigray would snatch the imperial throne from Emperor Menelik.¹²⁶ This, according to Täsfayohannes, produced considerable hatred against *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè from the Empress. Although it has not been established the prophecy was

Fitawrari Habtä-Gyorgis and *Ras* Dämesè by stating that how you can keep silent while Empress Taytu was playing tricks with the government and snatching the governorship from you. He then made oath with them [to oppose Empress Taytu's interference in government affairs]. . . . [He told the Shewan nobles that] why Empress Taytu is playing tricks with the government while Emperor Menelik has [already] told us that *Lej* Iyasu is his heir and told us that if he betrays you let him give birth to a black dog and if you betray him let you give birth to a black dog . . . Hence they told Empress Taytu that it is the duty of *Lej* Iyasu to make *šumšers* (reshuffles) [in the government not you] and asked her to simply carry the duty of taking care for Emperor Menelik's health. The person who took the role of spokesman is *Kebur Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè. When Empress Taytu replied to him that why he should care while he was an alien [a person from Tigray not from Shewa] person *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè replied that it was Emperor Menelik who had brought all of us [in Addis Ababa], none of us was born in Addis Ababa.]

My informant, *Däjjac* Zewde Gäbrä-Sellassè also confirmed the above statement and told me that when *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè requested Empress Taytu not to intervene in state affairs she insulted him by saying “ ብሉ ” [shepherd] and he replied that “ ሳይት ከሆንን ሆንን ለሆንን ሆንን ” [had it not been for Emperor Menelik we all had been shepherds].

The defeat of Empress Taytu's group, on 30 March 1910, was a clear indication that the Crown Prince, *Lej* Iyasu [1896-1935] was on the ascendancy.¹³⁴ After the coup d'etat, Empress Taytu was, therefore, made to have the duty to care for Emperor Menelik's health and all state affairs were entrusted to *Ras* Tässäma and the Crown Prince, *Lej* Iyasu.¹³⁵

In May 1910 *Ras* Wäldä-Giorgis was appointed over Begemeder and Tigray.¹³⁶ Under his command in Tigray were: *Ras* Sebhat (governor of Āgamä), *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè (governor of Adwa, Šerä, Tämben, Haramat, Indäarta, Keltä-Awla'lo, Gär'alta), *Däjjac* Gugsä Araya (governor of Abärgällä and Bora-Seläwa) and *Däjjac* Abära Tädla (Inda-Mäkoni, Wäjjärat and Azabo).¹³⁷

When *Lej* Iyasu came to power *Däjjac* Abreha, who was his brother-in-law was released towards the end of 1911.¹³⁸ Paradoxically *Wagšum* Abatä was jailed while *Däjjac* Abreha was

released. Following *Däjjac* Abreha's defeat at the Battle of Koräm Tigrean chiefs' need for the throne of Emperor Yohannes IV was subdued. After the Battle of Koräm *Däjjac* Gugsä Araya and *Däjjac* Seyum Mängäša emerged as the two powerful local rulers under the central government.¹³⁹ After the death of *Ras* Sebhat and the defeat of *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè in 1914 *Däjjac* Seyum Mängäša was, however, left as a *de facto* ruler of all parts of Tigray for a while.

Shortly before March 1914 an order was sent by *Lej* Iyasu to all the chiefs to come to Addis Ababa, evidently for the purpose of being present at his coronation. As a result an invitation was, therefore, sent to *Däjjac* Seyum to come to Dässe for the coronation. The best chance for *Däjjac* Seyum was to accept the invitation and in return to be sent to Tigray as viceroy.¹⁴⁰ He accepted the invitation and attended the ceremony. Thus he was excluded from being a possible future rival to the throne of Ethiopia.¹⁴¹ *Däjjac* Seyum Mängäša, during the coronation of *Ras* Mikael, was made *Ras* and Tigray was allotted to him. By making this appointment, it was thought that the Tigrean chiefs would not rise any objection to the overlordship of *Ras* Mikael.¹⁴² A process of elimination of the rival claimants to supreme authority in Tigray in the meantime reduced their number to only potential and principal families that were equally influential and mutually hostile.

CHAPTER TWO

THE BATTLE OF ĀKHORA

2.1 Prelude and the Causes of the Battle of Ākhora

Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassè was one of the youngest and educated councilers of Emperor Menelik II. The family of *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè could trace its genealogical root to one of the most important families in Tigray, that of *Šum Āgamä Wäldu*.¹ [Refer Appendix:II]. His father *Däjjac* Barya- Gaber who was the appointee (*Balāmual*) of Emperor Tewodros II ruled over an extensive territory, which extended from Färäs-May to Akalä-Guzay during the reign of Emperor Yohannes IV. Barya–Gaber died in March 1889, at the Battle of Mätäma² while Gäbrä-Sellassè was only about fifteen years old.³ *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè was educated at an Italian mission school near Massawa⁴ and spoke Italian.⁵ His Italian language ability was so great that it was expressed by Cipolla as follows: *Un capo interessante che parla benissimo la nostra lingua è Degiac Gabresillasie, capo di Adwa...*⁶ [An interesting chief who speaks our language very well is *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè, the chief of Adwa...]. Emperor Menelik gave him the title of *Däjjazmač*.⁷

Ras Sebhat was also the descendant of *Däjjac* Sebagades from Āgamä, who governed Āgamä from 1818 to 1831,⁸ and of *Šum Āgamä Wäldu* and was also the maternal uncle of *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè.⁹ The family of Sebagades, at the period under discussion, was headed by *Ras Sebhat Arägawi*, the hereditary prince and governor of Āgamä.¹⁰

The period before 1914 for *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè witnessed a period of cordial relations with some of the Tigrean chiefs and a time of hostility with others. The descendants of Emperor Yohannes IV namely *Däjjac Seyum* and *Däjjac Gugsa Araya* considered *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassè as an intruder and a usurper and were hostile to him.¹¹ His hostility with *Däjjac* Seyum (his

future father-in-law) was high. To this effect Cipolla wrote: ... [*Gabresellasi*] è nemico mortale di seium ... [Gabra-Sellasse] is the mortal enemy of [*Ras Seyum*].¹² Some others, such as *Ras Sebhat*, were envious of his relation with the Italians and his acceptance at the court of Emperor Menelik.¹³ *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassè* had the favour and support of Emperor Menelik who seemed to trust him more than any of his Tigrean colleagues. It was probably this special favour and attention of Emperor Menelik that made the other Tigrean chiefs jealous of *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassè* and made them to try and find all means of antagonizing him with the central government.¹⁴

After the defeat of *Däjjäč Abreha* at the Battle of Koräm and after the *coup d'etat* plotted against Empress Taytu, in which *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* played an active role, *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* was made governor of north western Tigray (Aksum, Adwa and Šerä) as well as Haramat, which had been under *Däjjäč Abreha*, until the end of 1909¹⁵. As a result of the reshuffle, Āgamä, which was under *Šum Āgamä Dästa*¹⁶ was given to *Ras Sebhat* in 1909, after he was released from his detention in Harar.¹⁷ At the Battle of Koräm *Ras Sebhat*, because he had some old grudges against *Däjjäč Abreha*, fought on the side of *Wagšum Abatä* against *Däjjäč Abreha*. His active part at the Battle of Koräm made him appear as a dignitary of the central government.

Shortly before the death of Emperor Menelik II *Ras Sebhat* and *Ras Seyum*, due to the existence of some grudges and jealousy,¹⁹ accused *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* of intriguing and making secret agreements with the Italians against the security of the central government.²⁰ This accusation rose again after the death of Emperor Menelik II and after *Lej Iyasu* assumed power.²¹ The short reign of *Lej Iyasu* which was generally characterized by a number of dissatisfactions

half promise of the governorship of the district to *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé and played *Ras Sebhat* against *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé by his promise to bestow the former's district of Āgamä on the latter.³¹ This got to the ears of *Ras Sebhat* and naturally roused his suspicions and dislike of *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé, who, moreover, had never been popular with the other chiefs of Tigray by reasons of his being a *ranker* and of comparatively, low birth, while they had inherited their districts from their forebears.³² Personal rivalries and the scramble for regional positions, therefore, complicated the relation between *Ras Sebhat* and *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé. Supporting the existence of such a rivalry Täsfayohannes wrote that *Ras Sebhat*, at one time said to *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé in Addis Ababa that: #...¾'@“¾' e- vLvff [u]»Ñ^” ĀÁM...\$³³ [whether it is my lordship or yours will be confirmed in our country (Tigray)].

In such unreliable situation, *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé who might have been exasperated by the frequent accusations made against him by the Tigrean chiefs and who was rather always cautious and on the alert made an all-round preparation for a possible clash against his opponents. To this effect he increased his relations with the Italian authorities in Eritrea to a closer degree of intimacy and friendship and requested them for modern rifles and ammunitions.³⁴ His request was accepted. Some *informants* told me most emphatically, and the Italians themselves accepted it in their report that it was an undoubted fact that they had supplied *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé with about three thousand rifles and about three hundred thousand ammunitions³⁵ a little before January 1914.³⁶ These new rifles which fired nine bullets were commonly known, in Tigray, as *Wäčäfo* or *Gäbrä-Sellassé Āynät* [Like that of Gäbrä-Sellassé].³⁷

The Italians attempted to justify their supply of arms to *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé. According to the sources *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé wanted to re-inforce himself with arms, three

years before the conflict with *Ras Sebhat* that he wanted to buy arms. Count Colli told him that he could get the rifles from the Italian government through Eritrea at a price of four dollars each.³⁸ The sources further indicate that *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé either because he had not paid for them or for some other reasons did not draw the rifles from Asmara until 1914 just before the battle with *Ras Sebhat*.³⁹ Other sources explain that the number of the rifles was about two thousand and that they were a clear gift.⁴⁰ The point is that, on Count Colli's own showing, the Italian government supplied *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé with a large number of arms. The transaction was unknown to any body and the Eritrean governors were not arm sellers and the inference is that they gave the arms to *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé, for some political reasons. There was also an Italian political agent in Adwa on intimate terms with *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé. The Italian agent must, therefore, have passed the rifles, supplied by the Italian government, to *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé, not long before the fight with *Ras Sebhat*.⁴¹

Worried about *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé's close contact with the Italians and his acquisition of the new rifles⁴² and partly because of either conflict of interest or jealousy of one kind or another *Ras Sebhat* and *Däjjac* Seyum renewed their accusation of *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé of intriguing with the Italians against the security of the central government,⁴³ after the death of Emperor Menelik II.

Count Colli, who was *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé's friend,⁴⁴ emphatically denied any recent gift or sales of arms to *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé. Count Colli who was aware of the rumours of Italian supplies of arms to *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé, however, told Major Dodds that *...ill disposed persons were bringing up a matter of three years ago when Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé was supplied with some arms by the Italians.*⁴⁵ Based on the grant of these rifles, there were also rumours that

Dajjac Gabra-Sellasse was instigated to revolt by the Italians with whom he was always in the best of terms.⁴⁶ But it was a rumour, of course, in which there can be no foundation. The fact that *Lej* Iyasu had asked the advice and assistance of Count Colli, to solve the conflict in Tigray,⁴⁷ shows that the government did not attach any importance to the rumour that the Italians were instigating *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to rebel.⁴⁸ It is also interesting to remember at this time that *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé fought against his country at Adwa in 1896 on the side of the Italians.⁴⁹ In relation to this, Corrado Zoli writes that

*...Degiac Ghebresselase, che era stato educato nella colonia Eritrea, era stato nostro soldato, aveva lealmente combattuto per la nostra causa e, in seguito alla pace del 1896, era ritornato apertamente in servizio del suo paese,...*⁵⁰

[Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé who was educated in the [Italian] colony of Eritrea was our soldier, he fought for our cause with loyalty, and then due to the peace of 1896 he returned to serve his country...]

Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé was, in consequence, imprisoned for some time but afterwards reinstated.⁵¹ The Italians were also considering *Ras* Sebhat as their great enemy, at the time under discussion.⁵² Under this circumstances it would not be, therefore, surprising that rumours were current that *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé was being assisted by the Italians and had crossed to their territory for protection later on.⁵³

After the death of Emperor Menelik II and the coming to power of *Lej* Iyasu, rumours reached the ears of *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé that *Ras* Mikael would be appointed an overlord of Wällo and Tigray. As a result *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé told *Ras* Sebhat and *Däjjac* Seyum of the rumours and expressed his annoyance of *Lej* Iyasu's plan to place Tigray under the overlordship of Wällo.⁵⁴ Thus *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé called on *Ras* Sebhat and *Däjjac* Seyum to help him

oppose the appointment of *Ras* Mikael as an overlord of Wällo and Tigray.⁵⁵ This, therefore, seems to have touched the feelings of *Ras* Sebhat, *Däjjac* Seyum and *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé that they made a pact against any immediate "Amhara" overlord,⁵⁶ and to restore Emperor Yohannes's crown.⁵⁷ They also made an oath not to betray each other by stating ህወይት ስልጣን ላይ የሚመዘኑትን ሁሉም ገደብ ለመጠገን ይደረግዎታል። [Let he who betrays be reduced to the size of *teff* and to the thickness of a needle],⁵⁸ near Adwa at a place called *Ādi Mahläka* (ገደብ ስልጣን).⁵⁹ *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé had also assured *Ras* Sebhat and *Däjjac* Seyum that he would bring rifles from the Italians for their plan.⁶⁰ The sources disclosed that these three Tigrean chiefs had further planned to make *Däjjac* Seyum the overlord of Tigray and *Ras* Sebhat and *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to be under him.⁶¹ Tsehay Haile had quoted what one of his *informants* had told him about what *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé had secretly corresponded with *Ras* Sebhat and *Däjjac* Seyum as follows:

ገደብ ስልጣን ላይ የሚመዘኑትን ሁሉም ገደብ ለመጠገን ይደረግዎታል። ገደብ ስልጣን ላይ የሚመዘኑትን ሁሉም ገደብ ለመጠገን ይደረግዎታል።⁶²

Negus Menelik is dead. I [Gäbrä-Sellassé] am the son of princes [descended from] and you are also the son (descendant) of princes; but Däjjac Seyum is the son (descendant) of an Emperor. Let us crown Däjjac Seyum and hit the Shewans

Some of my *informants* do not want to disclose the contents of the pact reached among the three chiefs. They simply prefer to inform me that three of them had a secret [ህወይት ስልጣን ላይ የሚመዘኑትን ሁሉም ገደብ ለመጠገን ይደረግዎታል][They had a secret].⁶³ They were only few of my *informants* who disclosed that the pact was not to accept an “Amhara” overlord over Tigray.⁶⁴

According to the general belief of my *informants*, *Ras* Sebhat who was looking for any opportunity that would offer him a chance to damage *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé's reputation made use of this intrigue to work hard in accusing *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé of having the intention of

openly defying *Lej Iyasu's* rule⁶⁵ in general and the appointment of *Ras Mikael* as an overlord of Wällo and Tigray in particular.⁶⁶

The call of *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* to *Ras Sebhat* and *Däjjac̣ Seyum* to oppose *Ras Mikael's* appointment as an overlord of Tigray and Wällo also reached the ears of *Ras Mikael*.⁶⁷ According to my informants *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé*, later on, wrote a letter to *Ras Sebhat* in relation to their agreements. The letter was, however, sent forth to the central government by *Ras Sebhat* as evidence of *Ras Sebhat's* earlier accusations of *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé's* intrigues against the central government.⁶⁸ The letter was again sent back to *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* by one of his friends in the central government, to show him that his plans were disclosed.⁶⁹ Hence, *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* understood that *Ras Sebhat* was working hard to accuse him of intriguing against the government.⁷⁰

Täsfayohannes Berhanä, who was one of the trusted followers of *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé*⁷¹ wrote the cause for the conflict between *Ras Sebhat* and *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé*, in his manuscript, as follows:

[Á' Ṭ N̄w[YLc?] ^e ewHfU Ò` }Ç=e }uv }'ÓÓ[< 'u': [^e ewHf] ¼'@ " ¼'e- vLv'f'f [u] >Ñ^<" ÁuÁM wK"< 'u' Á" wK" >L[n̄U ¼4T> "É-f u=J" [^e T>">?M"] MĪ- >ÁÑvU 'u' wK"< ¼4J"<" ÁMJ"<" ¼4iñ "Á >"Æ I^ ÁØI[" "Á ß^ ÁpØ" H²V LÃ H@Á"< Ÿ×K=Á" Óu"„_ }Ñ"-< "ÁK< "Á ^e T>">?M ÁLLŸ< ÈS:: Ñ@, < [Á' Ṭ N̄w[YLc?] Ó" ĀI G<K< c=J" uiTÓK?... "p ¼4Ö¼4I " @ K?L >MMU }v, "†< Ÿd†"< ÁU KSóce >MðMÓU... u=LD†"< ÁLK<f }i@ U"K=j S< }ªM" Kgª }"Ñ³U wKªM uTKf }ij"< }×Mª†"<:: KM@<M e;U ÁÓV w[f u=ðMÑ< ¼4ðKÑ<f" ÁIM MeØ-f }i@ U"K=j ¼4ðKÆM" u7 w` }"É ÖS'Í H>dw >K" "ðM "e- u²=I ĀcKñ " @ u²=I ^e "MÁ Ñ>Ä`Ñ>e" " ÒKG< >MÒ Ó" G<L< }"VfU G<L< }"É"U "Ó²=>wH@` KcÖ"< ĀJ"M u=K<ª†"< "¼4ªKK< ^e ewHf Ò` S;[< u=ŸÆ"..." Á"ª ÖS'Í T"<×f ÓÉ J'v†"<... }"<Ø }ªÒ":⁷²

Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé had exchanged words of discord with *Ras Sebhat* in Addis Ababa... *Ras Sebhat* has also boasted against *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* by saying that my lordship and your's would be seen (identified) in our country [Tigray]. He did not end it by saying that only, but

told [Ras Mikeal] that if he [Gäbrä-Sellassé] loves you [Ras Mikeal] he should have married your daughter. [Ras Sebhat] further wrote to Ras Mikael against Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé by reporting what Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé had done and even that he had not done. He also reported to Ras Mikeal that Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé had met the Italian governor [of Eritrea] at Hazämo. My master [Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé], however, by arguing that Ras Sebhat is his father [elder], was in need of solving the problem through the mediation of elders without bloodshed. [Ras Sebhat] However, succeeded to have Ras Mikael and Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé be quarrelled by lying against Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé. Ras Sebhat told Ras Mikael that Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé had said to them [Ras Sebhat and Ras Seyum] that because Emperor Menelik is dead a Shewan should not rule us again. He further stated that, he also told Ras Seyum that if you want guns I will give you in the amount of what you need, I have guns which Emperor Menelik allowed me to buy in the exchange of one gun for seven birr, you would mobilize this way [in southern Tigray] and I shall mobilize and fight against Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis [in the western Tigray direction], in the war we all will not perish (die) and, at the same time, we all will not be alive, the throne (power) will, therefore, be to the lucky who survived the fighting. When [Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé] shared the above opinion with Ras Seyum, Ras Seyum vacillated in his stand and betrayed us after he had a discussion with Ras Sebhat ... Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé was forced to fight ... and we had finally fought [against Ras Sebhat].

After the rumours of the secret agreement among the three Tigrean chiefs got to the ears of Ras Mikael, he sent a message to Däjjac Seyum informing him that both of them are the sons of Emperor Yohannes IV and requesting him to recognize his appointment as an overlord of Wällo and Tigray and promised him to give his daughter in marriage.⁷³ Ras Mikael, therefore, seemed to have succeeded in his efforts, so that, on 27 January 1914, Ras Sebhat and Däjjac Seyum denounced Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé as a rebel in Mäqällä and in Adwa.⁷⁴ In this manner Ras Sebhat and Däjjac Seyum ingratiated themselves with the central government. Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé, however, made an announcement, on 28 January 1914, at Hawzén, of his unchanged loyalty to Lej Iyasu and Ras Mikael⁷⁵ and wrote a letter to Lej Iyasu requesting permission to come to Addis Ababa to give an account of himself against the accusations made against him.⁷⁶ Consequently Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé was ordered to come to Addis Ababa to give

an account of himself,⁷⁷ on 5 February 1914.⁷⁸ When *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé wrote a letter to *Lej* Iyasu asking such permission *Ras* Mikael had also sent a message to *Ras* Sebhat informing him that *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé's aim to come to Addis Ababa was to attack him that he ordered *Ras* Sebhat to prevent the coming to Addis Ababa of *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé, by any means.⁷⁹ When *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé heard of the correspondence between *Ras* Sebhat and *Ras* Mikael he was furious with and demurred the order to come to Addis Ababa to give an account of himself and gave as his reason that he feared *Ras* Sebhat would usurp his territory in his absence.⁸⁰

Täklä-Sadiq Mäkurya wrote why *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé demurred the orders from the central government to come to Addis Ababa and gave an account to the accusations from *Ras* Sebhat against *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé as follows:-

uMí Ác< ²S' S"ÓYf ¼Éªª ¼i_ " Ó³f ÁíTᵢ Nw[eLc? }g<S" < c=Ñ²< " <eØ " <eÖ<" Ýᵢ=×MÁ S"ÓYf }LMŸªM ¼T>M " _ ᵠÇ=e ᵠuv }cT:: u²=l Uj"Áf 'Ñ" ᵠ×", KSS'S " Á ᵠÇ=e ᵠuv ᵠ"Ç=SÖ< ¼T>M f³" }LKðL†"<:: ᵠ`d†"<U "Á ᵠÇ=e ᵠuv Ñ<µ ÈU["< XK< u%EL Ÿªe ewHf" ŸMí†"< ŸÁíTᵢ ᵠeÑÈU ¼q¼ mU 'uª†"< ᵠ"@ "Á ᵠÇ=e ᵠuv eH@É ᵠÑ_ " ᵠÉªª ÁÁ²<w—M wK"< c=ÁS~ qÁ} "< ÁíTᵢ Nw[YLc? "Á ᵠÇ=e ᵠuv SU×f" f} "< SXJÁ ᵠ"Ç=LjL†"< K? fª ᵠÑ ᵠÑ» LŸ<uf:: ᵠ=fÁáÁ " <eØ ¼S"Dªª~ ᵠ`e u`e SªÒf Kᵢ=×MÁ ØpU ¼T>cØ eKSJ< 3000 ÖS'í uðØ'f LŸL†"<... ᵠ"Ç=Á"<U ᵠ"ÚU`MHK" wK"< }eó c×D†"<..⁸¹

[During the reign of Lej Iyasu, when Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé was administering Adwa and Šerä there were rumours, in Addis Ababa, of his secret correspondence with the Italians. As a result, in order to investigate the truth an order was sent to Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé to come to Addis Ababa to give an account of himself. After he had started his journey towards Addis Ababa, because he had some grudges with Ras Sebhat and Däjjäč Asgädóm (Ras Sebhat's son), he feared that they would occupy Adwa after he came to Addis Ababa. After he had hesitated in his decisions, for a while, he changed his mind and demurred to come to Addis Ababa and requested the Eritrean governor to send him arms. The civil war among the Ethiopian chiefs was favourable to the Italians that they immediately sent him about 3000 guns. . . They also gave him promise for additional guns.]

Count Colli told Major Dodds that he was in telegraphic communication with the disaffected chiefs of Tigray and he had advised them all, individually, to bring their grievances for settlement to Addis Ababa and on no occasion to attempt to settle them by open hostilities.⁸² According to the sources, Counti Colli had also been asked by *Lej Iyasu* to use his influence to persuade *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassié* to come to Addis Ababa to give an account of himself,⁸³ which he did with the result *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* promised to come in if the other chiefs were also ordered to do the same.⁸⁴ Consequently the order was issued and *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* started his journey, after hesitating for a while,⁸⁵ with his large army.⁸⁶ *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé's* hesitation to come to Addis Ababa was due to the fear that during his absence his opponents may act to modify the situation in Tigray.⁸⁷

A few days after quitting Adwa news reached *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* that *Däjjac̣ Seyum* intended to oppose his journey to Addis Ababa.⁸⁸ *Däjjac̣ Seyum* had really marched towards Hawzén.⁸⁹ It was also reported that *Ras Sebhat*, *Däjjac̣ Abära Hagos*, *Fitäwrari Germay Mängäša*, *Šum Tämbén Maru*, attacked Hawzén and destroyed any thing they got in the house of *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* and threatened to invade Adwa. On the news of this invasion *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* was forced to return and protect his territory from his enemies.⁹⁰ He again demurred to come to Addis Ababa and sent a telegraphic message to Addis Ababa asking what steps he should take with *Däjjac̣ Seyum* and *Ras Sebhat*.⁹¹ Failed to comply with the order to come to Addis Ababa, thereby, got himself into disfavour with the central government. *Ras Mikael* who was then at Wärrä-Ilu, on his way to Addis Ababa, was ordered to quit Wärrä-Ilu and to return to Dässé to watch proceedings and to await further orders from the central

government.⁹² *Ras Mikael*, therefore, appeared to have fulfilled the instructions and remained in Dässé awaiting further orders.⁹³

When the central government attempted telephone to *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellassé in reply to his earlier telephone message the line was found cut, and although the interruption was only a temporary one, *Ras Sebhat* took the opportunity to throw further suspicion on *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellassé by denouncing him that he has purposely cut the line.⁹⁴ *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellassé was then openly considered a rebel and was opposed by *Ras Sebhat* with whom *Däjjac̣* Seyum had thrown in his lot.⁹⁵ *Ras Sebhat*'s activity was a means of expressing his personal grievances and advancing his own interests. He was primarily interested not in the case of the central government but in finding a pretext to further accuse *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellassé and to gain favour for himself from the central government.⁹⁶ To this effect *Ras Sebhat* worked assiduously to undermine *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellasse.⁹⁷ On 8 February 1914 *Ras Sebhat* was said to have invaded *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellassé's village in Däbrä-Damo which was under the governorship of one of his followers named *Fitäwrari Bereš*.⁹⁸

Although the central government was imploring *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellassé through the service of the Italians to come to Addis Ababa and give his accounts as a test of loyalty, *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellassé continuously demurred the orders.⁹⁹ Owing to *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellassé's repeated refusal to come to Addis Ababa, and worried too much about the worsening conditions in Tigray, orders were consequently sent to *Däjjac̣* Seyum, *Ras Sebhat* and *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis*, the governor of Gondar, to force *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellassé to come to Addis Ababa, if he would not do so voluntarily, from the central government.¹⁰⁰ As a result, on 14 February 1914, *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* had received orders to proceed at once with his troops to restore order in Tigray by

forces of arms.¹⁰¹ On 22 February 1914, in comply with the order, *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* in turn ordered all his available riflemen to assemble at his residence at Dänqäz, close to Gondär.¹⁰² *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* and his army, which had been compared to "a swarm of locusts" in number,¹⁰³ was ready to march to fight against *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé*, on the grounds that the latter did not obey *Lej Iyasu*.¹⁰⁴

Eventhough *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* had married the daughter of *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* (*Amaräč*)¹⁰⁵, *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* was hostile to *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* and the Italians while he was friendly to *Ras Sebhat*.¹⁰⁶ To this effect the Italian agent in Adwa has reported, to the Italian Legation in Addis Ababa, that *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* has declared to him his hatred against *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* and towards his march to Tigray as follows:

*... Non posso accettare Ras Uoldeghiorghis né come padrone né come giudice né come conciliatore perche é notoriamente accerimo nemico ... Se Ras Uoldeghiorghis riuscirà a venire in Tigray Potrà occupare il paese ma non riuscirà mai a prendere me ed il Tigray sarà tutto sottosopra... Ora mi sono assolutamente convinto che tutto ciò che é accaduto é stato voluto in Addis Ababa per togliermi di mezzo mettere in Tigray Ras Uoldeghiorghis nemico mio e degli Italiani.*¹⁰⁷

I cannot accept Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis as a chief nor as a judge not even as a mediator because he is notoriously a fierce enemy... If Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis will be able to come in to Tigray he could occupy the region but he will never be able to take me, and Tigray will totally be up side-down... Now I am totally convinced that all what happend was ordered from Addis Ababa to get me out and put, instead, in Tigray Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis, my enemy and the enemy of the Italians.

Through the good office of Count Colli,¹⁰⁸ *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* had again actually started his march for Addis Ababa, on the morning of 21 February 1914, hoping the other chiefs (*Ras Sebhat* and *Däjjac̣ Seyum*) would follow him immediately.¹⁰⁹ It was then hoped that a

peaceful settlement was in view¹¹⁰ and the order which was given to *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* was cancelled immediately.¹¹¹

2.2 The Conduct of the Battle of Ākhora and its Results

While *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* has been ordered to remain inactive and to return to his headquarters as soon as *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* was on his way to Addis Ababa, on the evening of 21 February 1914, *Däjjäč Seyum* had marched against *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé*.¹¹² This might be accounted for the fact that the government had issued prior orders to both *Ras Sebhat* and *Däjjäč Seyum* to attack *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* if he did not start his march to Addis Ababa. *Däjjäč Seyum* in compliance with this order might have marched towards *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* in ignorance of the latter's departure.¹¹³ *Däjjäč Seyum*, however, desisted from taking action on hearing that *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* had resumed his journey.¹¹⁴

Meanwhile news again reached *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* that *Ras Sebhat* was marching on Adwa¹¹⁵ and had invaded his territory.¹¹⁶ *Ras Sebhat* who was considered as the author of every intrigue against *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé*, his persistent enemy,¹¹⁷ had obviously acted aggressively against the orders of the central government by invading *Gäbrä-Sellassé's* territory, of Hawzén¹¹⁸ and in attempting to intercept *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé's* march to Addis Ababa.¹¹⁹ According to *Täsfayohannes*, who had been an eye-witness to all the activities and the relations of the Tigrean chiefs,¹²⁰ *Ras Sebhat's* forces had raided Hawzén, *Däjjäč Gäbrä Sellassé's* territory, and spoiled the feast and *Täj* prepared for his reception.¹²¹ *Ras Sebhat* also sent a letter of challenge to *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Selassé* stating: ሂዕላ ምስላምታ ስገራ ስገራ [If you are a hero come and fight].¹²² In reply to

cannon which he himself was firing against *Ras Sebhät*'s forces and the cannon helped him to gain an upper hand in the fighting.¹³⁴

Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé, however, grieved sincerely over the demise of his uncle (*Ras Sebhät*).¹³⁵ *Däjjäč Libän* (*Ras Sebhät*'s grand-son) was captured at *Ākhora*¹³⁶ that *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* grieved by the casualties of the battle was said to have asked *Däjjäč Libän* if the result was "good" stating: #l ¶"K=u" ¶²=œÊ fPĀi;\$ [Hey the Libäns, is this good?] and *Däjjäč Libän* is said to have answered to *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé*'s question by stating: #' K=u" °°] œ³/ô[eŸ<"Uu` °Çl+Ê œ"<N=Å ¶¼;\$¹³⁷ "I, Libän, though I did not made the heap be fallen, I moved down a lot].

After the death of *Ras Sebhät* his remaining followers dispersed abandoning the battle field.¹³⁸ After the fighting was over and after the condition was normalized *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* personally, it is reported, walked into the battle field and identified the corpse of the three chiefs (*Ras Sebhät*, *Däjjäč Asgädom* and *Däjjäč Araya*) and ordered that they be buried at the monastery of Gundagundo.¹³⁹ *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* released the captives to bury their master. After he was released, *Däjjäč Libän* joined *Däjjäč Seyum* with some of *Ras Sebhät*'s followers.¹⁴⁰

After the fighting in *Ākhora*, *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* did not proceed to *Āgamä* himself. Only few of his chiefs pillaged Adigrat.¹⁴¹ *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé*, then, went to *Hahaylä* and occupied a position near Inda Abba-Gärima¹⁴² for another possible confrontation, probably with *Däjjäč Seyum*.

Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé, it appeared, reported the fighting himself and asked the central government for a doctor to attend to the numerous wounded. *Lej Iyasu* and other officials of the central government, however, accused *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* of the incident and it is said that

Lej Iyasu was furious at the whole affairs and emphatically refused the request.¹⁴³ On hearing of the incident orders were, however, sent to *Ras Mikael*, *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* and *Däjjac Seyum*, immediately, to mobilize their army and be in readiness for further orders.¹⁴⁴

The battle of *Ākhora*, thus, according to the words of Tsegay Berhe

*... brought an end to one of the strongest and colourful Agame chiefs from the house of Subagadis. It also marked the end of 'Agame prominence in both the regional and national politics.*¹⁴⁵

After the Battle of *Ākhora* there was great joy in the camp of *Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé*. As an expression of the success of *Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé* in defeating *Ras Sebhat*, it is said that, a reciter named *Wäyzäro Täklä* (a lady from *Hahaylä*) has recited the following in Tigriña:

YŠÄ Ńu`"ÄU œw ̄š^'
 SĴi" œM̄M"KAU cKe+*U œ`<^'
 œv juÉ Ńw\ Öu= ""Uu` ²Äđ~ œ<^:..¹⁴⁶

How did you treat them at Ākhora?
You identified and picked out the main three,
Abba Kebäd Gäbru [Gäbrä-Sellassé] is susceptible to provocation.

2.3 The Battle of *Gidära* and its Results

After the death of *Ras Sebhat* and his two sons became known, there was a movement of troops from *Āgamä* and *Haramat* to encircle *Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé*.¹⁴⁷ *Däjjac Seyum* mobilized his forces from *Indärta*, *Raya-Azäbo*, *Keltä-Awla'lo* and *Āgamä*, also marched on *Adwa* from *Mäqällä*¹⁴⁸ and stationed near *Inda Abba-Sahma*.¹⁴⁹ *Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé* who left the scene of his victory over *Ras Sebhat* took up a position east of *Adwa* near *Inda Abba-Gärima* in readiness for *Däjjac Seyum*.¹⁵⁰ This action on the part of *Däjjac Seyum* was not countenanced by the

central government which sent orders to *Däjjac̣* Seyum not to attack *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellassé but to await orders and *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis, who had been ordered to advance to Tigray.¹⁵¹ *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis, of whose intention the government was suspicious, did not arrive due to the fact that the government had countermanded the order.¹⁵² This was apparent from the fact that Abunä Pétros has been ordered by *Lej* Iyasu to proceed at once for an attempt to make peace between the chiefs.¹⁵³ Abunä Pétros, however, has returned to Adwa without seeing either of them.¹⁵⁴

While the memory of the Battle of Ākħora was still fresh and most of the wounded men were still suffering from their wounds, a fighting took place between *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellassé and *Däjjac̣* Seyum at a place called *Gidära* (also called Āddi-Bahri),¹⁵⁵ on 3 March 1914, in which the former was defeated.¹⁵⁶ At *Gidära* *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellassé fought with only about a thousand tired and exhausted followers against about 15,000 of *Däjjac̣* Seyum's.¹⁵⁷ *Däjjac̣* Seyum encouraged by the news of the mobilization of *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis fought the battle strongly.¹⁵⁸ *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellassé, however, abandoned by his tired and exhausted followers was easily defeated.¹⁵⁹ Many people died at the fighting. The casualties from both sides were very great,¹⁶⁰ which Täsfayohannes portrayed it as follows: #..._d u_d }'vu[" ¼'"' >Öx ¼)c× Mwe ScK:;\$ [The corpse of the dead piled up, one on the other, and seemed a washed cloth stretched on the edge of a river (to be dried)]. *Däjjac̣* Bärhé Wädi Mešäla, follower of *Däjjac̣* Seyum died.¹⁶¹ *Fitäwrari* Mäsfen, follower of *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellassé was wounded. *Däjjac̣* Gäbrä-Sellassé himself was also wounded, although it was slight.¹⁶² A splinter of a stone had injured his eye and he had later asked for a medical aid from the Italians.¹⁶³

Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé, once he had lost the upper hand in the battle, made good his escape and with a handful of soldiers has taken refuge in a fortress near Adwa¹⁶⁴ and later went

to Ragayellé.¹⁶⁵ *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé's defeat at Gidära was attributed to the desertion of many of his followers during the fighting.¹⁶⁶ At Gidära *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé encountered *Däjjac* Seyum with tired and exhausted soldiers.¹⁶⁷ Many of his followers among whom the most noted ones such as *Däjjac* Täklä-Haymanot of Damo-Gälila, *Däjjac* Yaynešät and *Däjjac* Imbayä of Na'adir joined the camp of *Däjjac* Seyum.¹⁶⁸ Some of *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé's men who were captives of the fighting declared that they were misled by their master who told them that *Ras* Sebhat was in rebellion against the government and they were made to believe that their master was in the right.¹⁶⁹

As a result of *Däjjac* Seyum's victory over *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé there seems to be a lot of *fukära* and meritment in the camp of *Däjjac* Seyum. Exchange of poems praising *Däjjac* Seyum also took place. In response to one of the poems recited in the camp of *Däjjac* Seyum, apparently insulting *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé, *Wäyzäro* Täklä had said the following in Tigriña in a rather exaggerated tone, most of the time praising *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé:

'+ ›v juÉ ÓÄÄ 'uM_i* iPóÄ ÁÖÖXÄ'
 x[^] eK^o æe'n'UuÄ cw><f æÄSKdÄ'
 ||"Ä || }"u?" cP'+ æc'n'UuÄ cw><f æÄSKdÄ'
 jM} æ<L°KA ¯ÖS Ñ' ¯M|| æc'n'UuÄ cw><f æÄSKdÄ'
 wSf[¾]e ueSæw ›=K< wSÉö° P^dÄ'
 æv juÉ Ñw\ " <"É æK- SdÄ'
 Ph|\ Ä"o\ "c< φMddÄ'
 æv juÉ Ñw\ ||"ÓÇ=I ¾K"<U SdÄ::
 YSv juÉ Ñw\ 'uKÉ ÄwHM Äw}^'
 YSÄ Ñu`"ÄU æw ¯§^'
 æv juÉ Öu="UuÄ ?Äð~ ¨<^'
 YSÄ Ñu`"ÄU æw ÑÄ^'
 fî<f "<¯M"ÄU w"Üö w"ÍÓ^::
 ||"Ä || " <" æÄfî"Ä ¯²^'

x^ cK^a'<" œĀfj'Ā ^2Λ'
 ŸSv ;uÉ 'uKĒ ĀwHM Āw]Λ'
 œv ;uÉ []]M°M Ÿ<Λ'
 Āp×fj' œUH>' ; œw ÑÇU œ"wΛ:..170

Did you call Abba Kebäd, my lord a scribe?

The women of Bora and Seläwa sent their men but none was spared,

The women of Indärta, Tämbén and Selharti sent their men but none was spared,

The women of Keltä-Awla'lo, Āgamä and Gär'alta sent their men but none was spared,

He [Gäbrä-Sellassé] first used machine-guns and then plough with canons,

Can there be a man the like of Abba Kebäd Gäbru [Gäbrä-Sellassé].

He [Gäbrä-Sellassé] mows and his servants (soldiers) heap,

Thus there can never be the equal to Abba Kebäd Gäbru [Gäbrä-Sellassé].

Can the like of Abba Kebäd Gäbru [Gäbrä-Sellassé] be called a däbtära,

How did you tackle (treat) them at Ākħora,

Abba Kebäd cannot be dealt with provocations,

How did you tackle (treat) them at Gidära,

You humiliated them all with Wäčäfo and with Wejjegra.

The women of Indärta don't boast,

The women of Tämbén don't boast,

The women of Bora and Seläwa don't boast,

Can the like of Abba Kebäd be called a däbtära,

When Abba Kebäd senses fury,

Let you educate your children and sent them to monastery.

Likewise from the camp of *Däjjac* Seyum a certain reciter recited the following in Amharic, most probably in reply to the above long poem, fulminating against *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé who happened to escape wounded:

}[] []"Í= U"< œM}[]'
 []%aÖ H@Ā []%}]"ÑL[]'
 ĀS<" []%[]dc uÑu[]'
 >YS^ "[]Ā []eLU x[]:..171

*How can be denied about his defeat (defeat of Gäbrä-Sellassé),
He fled away sensing harassment,
Pouring out his blood in floods,
Made his way to Asmara, a muslim land.*

This was directed to *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé to make it clear that he was defeated and finally retreated.

Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis has again been ordered with about 50,000 men¹⁷² to proceed to Tigray with instructions to capture *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé and restore order.¹⁷³ He entered Adwa ten days after the Battle of Gidära.¹⁷⁴ Some of the most important chiefs in Addis Ababa including *Ras* Dämesé, *Däjjäč* Bälča, and *Däjjäč* Kassa¹⁷⁵ were also under orders to hold themselves in readiness to go to Tigray.¹⁷⁶ *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé then retreated across the Märäb River when he heard the news of the coming of *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis to Tigray.¹⁷⁷ The order to march to Tigray was given to *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis before the news of *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé's defeat was confirmed and has not been cancelled.¹⁷⁸ With the help of *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis *Däjjäč* Seyum managed to establish a relative peace and order in Tigray.¹⁷⁹ *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis sent his army as far as Märäb River in search of *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé.¹⁸⁰ *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé was, then, forced to move to Ragayellé, in the Eritrean-Ethiopia border, and stayed for most of his refuge life until about the end of 1918.¹⁸¹ *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis asked the Italians to hand the fugitive over to him. The Italians, nevertheless, seemed to be unwilling to hand over their long time friend¹⁸² and denied emphatically *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé's entrance to Eritrea and their protection to him.¹⁸³

According to different sources, the death of *Ras* Sebhat and the escape of *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé were considered as fortuitous events and a solution to the problem in Tigray. *Däjjäč*

Gäbrä-Sellassé, after his escape, was not looked upon as a further source of trouble. This was because *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé did not have the chance to raise troops to make another problem and his capture, although presenting difficulties owing to the impregnable position of the fortress in which he had taken refuge, could only be a matter of time.¹⁸⁴

Däjjäč Seyum in defeating *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé had solved a difficulty for the central government and for him, and was fostering hopes of acquiring the areas of both *Ras Sebhat* and *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé.¹⁸⁵ *Däjjäč* Seyum understood that he had nothing to gain but everything to lose by opposing the authority of the central government.¹⁸⁶ He then started working towards strengthening relation with the central government, in a way that would support the extension of his territory. This hope had, therefore, influenced *Däjjäč* Seyum's future attitude towards the central government.¹⁸⁷

2.4 The Central Government's Handling of the Conflict in Tigray and the Subsequent Attempts for the Extradition of *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé.

The manner in which the government has dealt with the problem in Tigray could be open to severe criticism. The central government, in handling the situation, has shown extra-ordinary lack of decision and judgment in taking its measures for the restoration of order and justice by condemning *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé as a rebel on the words of *Ras Sebhat* alone.¹⁸⁸ In condemning *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé with out sufficient evidence and favouring the representations of *Ras Sebhat*, the government made a great error to which the subsequent strife and bloodshed could be attributed. Had the government had given definite and pre-emptive orders to the chiefs to come to Addis Ababa, with out showing prejudice to one or the other in

giving the orders, or had it had the courage to adopt the measures of *laissez-faire* and left the matter to the priests, the Tigrean incident would in all probability have been avoided.¹⁸⁹

The indecision of the central government had also been very marked in its dealings with *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* to whom the government has given orders to proceed to Tigray on three separate occasions and immediately afterwards countermanded its orders.¹⁹⁰ The central government has shown a strange weakness in issuing coherent or decisive orders in connection to *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis*.¹⁹¹ On three occasions it ordered the *Ras* to go to Tigray and after each order it cancelled the instructions.¹⁹²

The reason, on the part of the government, in holding large reserves in readiness at Addis Ababa for trouble in Tigray and its indecision to the role of *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* could only be supposed that the government had mistrusted the intention of *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* since the beginning of the conflict in Tigray. It was also apparent that while recognizing *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* as a proper person to carry out any measures for the restoration of order adopted by the central government, in his position as an overlord of the northern provinces, it feared letting him enter the disaffected area. The vacillating orders to him showed both the recognition of his authority and the central government's mistrust of his intentions.¹⁹³ Why the central government feared *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* can, however, only be surmised. In the first place the central government might have feared that *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis Aboyä*, who was the son of *Wäyzäro Ayahlušem* (daughter of King Sahlä Sellassé) and cousin of Emperor Menelik II,¹⁹⁴ could, if he chose, be the most powerful claimant to *Lej Iyasu's* throne,¹⁹⁵ that he might side with *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé*, who was married to his daughter, *Wäyzäro Amaräč*,¹⁹⁶ and with him defy the central government; or the central government might have realized the danger of the Tigrean

chiefs resenting outside interference by uniting themselves to oppose *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis*.¹⁹⁷ That is, if *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* was sent on a punitive expedition against any of the Tigrean chiefs it might have the result of raising the Tigrean chiefs together against the central government. It was suspected that although they might have differences among themselves the Tigrean chiefs would sink their differences in their "common" cause against the central government.¹⁹⁸ Thus, general revolt in Tigray might also have had far-reaching results in the other parts of the country against the newly established government of *Lej Iyasu*.¹⁹⁹

Since the death of *Ras Sebhat* and the escape of *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* the objections to the entry of *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* in Tigray, however, had to a large extent be removed. It was unlikely that the Tigrean chiefs were strong enough, with the loss of *Ras Sebhat* and *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* to contemplate opposing *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis*.²⁰⁰ But whatever their reasons were, it cannot, unfortunately be doubted that the lack of coherent or decisive orders and decisions brought about the unnecessary loss of life and bloodshed.

Another and very possible explanation of the government's mistrust of *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* was due to the fear that *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* and *Ras Mikael*, between whom bad feelings had long been existed, might take this opportunity, where their armies were mobilized, to settle their differences by force of arms.²⁰¹

After the Battle of *Ākhora* and with the knowledge of all the possible problems, the central government reluctantly allowed *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* to enter Aksum,²⁰² on 13 March 1914.²⁰³ The object of *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis*'s movement was to restore Tigray to a normal condition and to install new chiefs in the place of *Ras Sebhat* and of *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé*.²⁰⁴

Lej Iyasu and *Nägadras Haylä-Gyorgis* had brought up, for the first time, for discussion the question of the extradition of *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* and his family with Count Colli, on 28 March 1914.²⁰⁵ Count Colli absolutely refused to discuss the extradition of *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé's* wife and children on the ground that they had committed no offence. With regard to *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* he attempted to convince *Lej Iyasu* that the fugitive was not in Eritrea²⁰⁶ and claimed that they did not know his whereabouts.²⁰⁷ The Ethiopian government, however, firmly believed that *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* has gone over to the Italian territory of Eritrea and asked that he should be handed to the Ethiopian government in accordance with the terms of a treaty that existed between Italian-Eritrea and Ethiopia.²⁰⁸ The treaty referred to was made in February 1904 and by a curious coincidence was signed on the part of Ethiopia by *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* himself.²⁰⁹ *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* who went to Asmara on behalf of the government of Ethiopia, in January 1904, had discussed a possible joint solution to the problem of bandits who were crossing the boundaries of Ethiopia and the Italian colony of Eritrea by committing crimes.²¹⁰ The terms of the treaty state that the Italians shall receive a written guarantee of just treatment and a fair trial for the fugitive they handed over.²¹¹ The Italians expressed that they had been concerned with the concentration of *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis's* forces at the border. The presence of a large number of Ethiopian troops near the Eritrean border had caused much anxiety in the Italian colony of Eritrea. The Italian authorities, it appears, feared that the mobilization of troops and the existence of *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* in the Ethio-Eritrean border suggested the intention of the Ethiopian government to invade Italian territory.²¹² In view of this fear one cannot but wonder to what extent the Eritrean authorities have been associated with *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* in the problem of the Tigrean chiefs and it can only be suspected that they have

meddled rather too far in the Ethiopian politics, and when trouble broke out feared the results of their exhibition of sympathy and possibly of support to their old friend, *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé²¹³ against their "enemy", *Ras Sebhat*.²¹⁴ According to Italian sources *Ras Sebhat* was identified by the Italians as: *...nostro grande nemico Ras Sebhat...* [... our big enemy *Ras Sebhat* ...].²¹⁵

In view of the Italian fear of *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis*'s army, the Ethiopian government, in the course of the discussion, proposed that it would immediately order *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* to quit Tigray and return to Gondar and that it would strictly adhere to the treaty of 1904 and give a guarantee that *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé would be fairly dealt with and be granted a just trial.²¹⁶ As a result *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* was recalled from Tigray in around Easter of 1914.²¹⁷

Sources disclose that *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé was known to be near the Eritrean border. If he crossed it he would have to be surrendered under the existing agreement. This obviously, had been badly seen by the Italian authorities that Count Colli sent a private message to *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé warning him on no account to cross the frontier.²¹⁸ According to an Italian source *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé did not want to submit himself to the central government but to stay with the Italians in Eritrea.²¹⁹ The same Italian source discloses that *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé had said: *Non ho nessuna intenzione di presentarmi al governo Scioano. O morro o staro con voi* [I have no intention to present my self to the Shewan government. I will be with you or will die].²²⁰ The attempts for the extradition of *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé was, therefore, unsuccessful. Thus, on 5 May 1914, *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* left Adwa.²²¹

Meanwhile *Ras Mikael* was crowned *Negus* of Wällo, Tigray and Bägémeder, on 31 May 1914, by Abunä Petros.²²² Since no chief had yet been appointed to the area of *Ras Sebhat* and *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé²²³ *Negus Mikael* gave the title of *Ras* to *Däjjäč* Seyum and made him

governor of Tigray.²²⁴ Thus, winning supremacy over the lords of Tigray, *Ras Seyum* then gave Adwa to his son *Däjjac̣ Kassa Abba Yelaq*, Tämbén to his brother, *Däjjac̣ Germay Mängäša* and Āgamä to *Däjjac̣ Kassa Sebhat*.²²⁵ Hence, it became relatively possible for *Ras Seyum* to govern Tigray in peace until the rebellion of his son, *Däjjac̣ Kassa Abba Yelaq* in 1918.²²⁶ *Däjjac̣ Kassa Sebhat* ruled Āgamä between 1914 and 1918, and from 1941 to 1948.²²⁷

From March 1914 till the coronation of Empress Zäwditu *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* lived in and around Ragayellé. His life as a refuge was rather obscure. Little or nothing is known about it. How and when he was getting his food supply is not also clearly understood. Täsfayohannes who was among the people who followed *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* during his escape, wrote that the Italians were supplying them with substantial quantity of flour²²⁸ and were also conducting repeated cattle raiding.²²⁹

During the campaign of Sägellé, in 1916, *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* was secretly approached by one of the government officials: *Käntiba Wässané Zäamanual*. Taking the political tension at that time it could be inferred that the mission of *Käntiba Wässané* was to woo *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* not to join hands with the pro-Iyasu intrigue against the central government. In Addis Ababa there was a fear that *Ras Seyum Mängäša* who was the brother-in-law of *Lej Iyasu* and who had developed friendly attachment to the family of *Ras Mikael* and consequently also to *Lej Iyasu* was being suspected of hiding *Lej Iyasu* and of joining hands against the central government in the future, supporting *Lej Iyasu*. Due to this great fear and suspicion it seems to be more likely that the central government had a plan to make *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* governor of Tigray in case *Ras Seyum* mobilized his troops in support of *Lej Iyasu*. Presumably, therefore, *Käntiba Wässané's* mission was probably to instruct *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* to take over Adwa on

the back of *Ras Seyum* if he was to mobilize his forces against the central government in support of *Lej Iyasu*.²³⁰

2.5 The Submission of *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé*, the Restoration of his Territories and the Opposition Against him in Tigray

Eventhough it is not definetly clear whether *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* had asked the central government for pardon or the central government itself called him from his place of refuge, *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé*, who had been one of the most respected and trusted officials of Emperor Menelik II,²³¹ re-entered the services of the central government a short time after the coronation of Empress *Zäwditu* and after he had spent about three and half years in the bordering territory of Eritrea as a refugee.²³² Taking the political situations at that time it seems plausible that the central government wanted to have a loyal appointee, in case *Ras Seyum* proved to be on the support of *Lej Iyasu*, to which *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* was the best choice that the central government could make.²³³

Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé's entry from Ragayellé to Addis Ababa took him a long time. The land route could have been much shorter for him than the sea route, but he chose the sea route and travelled from Ragayellé to Asmara and from Asmara via Massawa to Djibouti by sea route and then via Dire-Dawa to Addis Ababa.²³⁴ The reason why he chose the sea route could be because of his fear of a possible attack by some of his enemies along his way to Addis Ababa. In October 1917 *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* had entered Addis Ababa and was assigned to stay for a while at the house of *Ras Tässäma*.²³⁵ *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* had been with his wife, *Wäyzäro Amaräč* when he submitted.²³⁶ *Ras Seyum*, hearing *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé's* journey to Addis Ababa, had marched to Addis Ababa and assured his allegiance to the central government.²³⁷

Then *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé had reconciled with *Ras Seyum* and *Däjjac* Kassa Sebhat at Addis Aläm in October 1917.²³⁸

Soon after his entry *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé was reinstated in his former territory,²³⁹ but resided in Addis Ababa.²⁴⁰ He was soon able to win the favour of the Empress just as he had won the favour of Emperor Menelik II. In 1919 *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé was, therefore, entrusted to go to Jerusalem on the question of the Ethiopian church there.²⁴¹ After he returned, in February 1922, most of his former territories and his honour in Tigray were restored.²⁴²

Soon after he was told about the restoration of his former territory, *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé sent a telegraphic message on 5 *Genbot* 1914 E.C. (13 May 1922) to *Fitäwrari Tädla Sahlu* and *Mälakä-Berhanat* Gäbrä-Sellassé who were his most trusted officials and his proxy in Tigray, instructing them to make an announcement, on his behalf, of his appointment and to keep peace and order until he sent his own representative.²⁴³ The content of the telegraphic message (*Awaj*) sent by *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé, dated 5 *Genbot* 1914 E.C, could be referred to Appendix III.

According to different sources, even though a reciprocal grudge between *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé and *Ras Seyum* continued to exist, their relations seemed to have improved due to the intervention of Empress Zäwditu.²⁴⁴ It was also reported that *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé was assigned to administer Adwa with *Ras Seyum*'s approval.²⁴⁵ An arrangement was also made, later on, for a marriage tie between *Ras Seyum*'s daughter Wälätä-Israel and *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to make the reconciliation between *Ras Seyum* and *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé complete.²⁴⁶

In June 1922 *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé sent, to Adwa, his young rather politically immature son, *Däjjac* Täklä-Haymanot, as his authorized proxy.²⁴⁷ *Däjjac* Täklä-Haymanot was educated in Milan (Italy) together with his brother *Däjjac* Yohannes, who died in Milan in June 1924.²⁴⁸

On his way to Tigray *Däjjac* Täklä-Haymanot married *Wäyzäro* Denqenäs, the daughter of *Ras* Haylu Täklä-Haymanot of Gojjam, in June 1922, at Däbrä-Marqos.²⁴⁹ *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé also sent a document of *šumšer* (reshuffle of appointments) which he had made in his territory with his son, *Däjjac* Täklä-Haymanot²⁵⁰ and warned the chiefs in his domain not to combat with any of the *šums* who were against *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé in 1914 but now ready to submit to him.²⁵¹ On 1 July 1922 *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé also sent a letter to the Italian consul in Addis Ababa informing that he had sent his son to Adwa, as his authorized proxy, and requested the Italian Consul to renew and extend his support, which was given to himself in the past, to his son.²⁵²

Presumably the restoration of *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé's power in Tigray might have produced some kind of jealousy or uneasiness among some of the Tigrean chiefs, mainly *Däjjac* Germay Mängäša and *Šum Āgamä* Kassa.²⁵³ The different telegraphic messages which *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé sent to his loyal chiefs, such as *Fitawrari* Tädla Sahlu and *Däjjac* Haylu, at different times, indicate the existence of opposition against *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé in Tigray immediately after he was restored to power.²⁵⁴ Sources from the American Legation in Addis Ababa also indicate that the appointment of *Däjjac* Täklä-Haymanot as *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé's proxy in Tigray ignited revolt and several of the governors of the nearby districts organized their armies and marched against him.²⁵⁵ The sources further explain that a battle had been fought for a short duration in which *Däjjac* Täklä-Haymanot was defeated and escaped unhurt.²⁵⁶ After the announcement of the restoration of Adwa to *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé there was also a wide spread brigandage in the areas restored to him that people were eagerly awaiting for the arrival of

As soon as he arrived at Adwa *Däjjäč* Täklä-Haymanot called some of his father's important officials and friends like *Gerazmač* Täsfayohannes Berhane, a trusted follower of *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé, *Fitäwrari* Tädla Sahu and *Fitawrari* Alabaš Gäbrä-Sadiq (Gäbrä-Sellassé's former chief judge). All these helped him to re-establish his father's power in Tigray.²⁶⁶ Many people recognized him as a rightful and duly authorized proxy of *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé with the exception of some of his father's arch-enemies like *Ras* Gugsä Araya and *Däjjäč* Germay Mängäša²⁶⁷ to whom *Fitätwrari* Tädla Sahu, *Däjjäč* Haylu Dära, *Mälakä-Berhanat* Gäbrä-Sellassé, officials of *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé, approached to know his attitude towards the appointment of *Däjjäč* Täklä-Haymanot. He had first assured them that he would recognize *Däjjäč* Täklä-Haymanot²⁶⁸ but changed sides later. Attempts for the reconciliation between *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé and *Šum Āgamä* Kassa were also made. These attempts finally resulted in making an oath not to treat each other as hostile partners and laid down the ground for future peaceful relations.²⁶⁹ The attempt for the reconciliation between *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé and *Šum Āgamä* Kassa and the terms which *Šum Āgamä* Kassa accepted²⁷⁰ can be referred to Appendix IV.

The subversive activities of *Ras* Gugsä Araya against *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé which started as early as 1900 was still inherent in *Ras* Gugsä's mind.²⁷¹ *Ras* Gugsä was irritated of the decrease in his command. He needed appointment over Šerä and appealed against the appointment of *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé to his former territory.²⁷² Furthermore *Ras* Gugsä considered the approval by *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé of the appointment, by the central government, of *Däjjäč* Abära Tädla over Azäbo, as an act committed against him. *Däjjäč* Abära Tädla of Azäbo-Inda-Mäḵoni was the friend of *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé²⁷³ and he was favourable

to him that he declared *Kität* (mobilization) in support of *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé on the eve of the Battle of *Ākhora*.²⁷⁴ Hence, since the defeat of *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé *Ras* Mikael had imprisoned *Däjjac* Abära Tädla and gave Azäbo-Inda-Mäkonni to one of his chiefs named *Däjjac* Yemär.²⁷⁵ When *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé was pardoned *Däjjac* Abära Tädla was, however, reinstated over Azäbo.²⁷⁶ The appointment over Azäbo of *Däjjac* Abära Tädla and the decrease in his own territory might, thus, have irritated *Ras* Gugsä causing him to oppose *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé and his proxy in Tigray. Nevertheless *Däjjac* Täklä-Haymanot was able to assume full power as his father's proxy.²⁷⁷

According to the reports of the Italian Colonial Hospital at Asmara, *Däjjac* Täklä-Haymanot, however, died of tuberculosis, on 30 June 1925,²⁷⁸ while he was under medical treatment in Asmara.²⁷⁹ When *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé was told of his son's death he went to Adwa to attend his son's funeral ceremony.²⁸⁰ He then began to administer his territory himself. Certain Tigrean elders also proposed a marriage arrangement between *Ras* Seyum's daughter, Wälätä-Israel, and *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to avoid future hostilities.²⁸¹ Thus, six months after his arrival at Adwa *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé married *Wäyzäro* Wälätä-Israel, in 1925.²⁸² The marriage was primarily designed to cancel the age old enmity between *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé and *Ras* Seyum.²⁸³ By this marriage arrangement *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé, thus, gained the friendship of *Ras* Seyum who was his long time enemy.²⁸⁴

The return of *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to Tigray again produced some kind of jealousy or uneasiness among his enemies. Because of either probably of jealousy or conflict of interest some of the Tigrean chiefs like *Däjjac* Täklä Mäšäša, *Däjjac* Germay Mängäša and *Šum Tämbeñ* Gäbrä-Mädhin²⁸⁵ instigated by his arch-enemy, *Ras* Gugsä Araya,²⁸⁶ were always trying to

antagonize him with the central government. They were constantly and allegedly accusing him of conspiring against the security of the country.²⁸⁷ In 1926 the opponents of *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé accused him of buying new weapons from the Italians and planning to rebel against the central government when he was importing water pipes and other necessary materials to install water taps and construct the well of Mayšum at Aksum.²⁸⁸

In December 1926 there were applications from Tigray addressed to the Regent *Ras* Täfäri, Ičägé Gäbrämänfäsqudus and to *Däjjac* Mulugéta accusing *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé of about twenty-one crimes committed against the central government.²⁸⁹ The points about which *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé was being accused of, according to the application of the opponents of *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé, addressed to *Ras* Täfäri, and to Ičägé Gäbrämänfäsqudus, in December 1926,²⁹⁰ could be referred to Appendices V and VI respectively.

As a result of the accusations against *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé, at different times, *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé was again required to come to Addis Ababa, in July 1927. He was then sentenced for confinement in Méčča (Gojjam) which had been given to him as a fief, after his return from Jerusalem in 1922.²⁹¹ He went to Méčča, on 3 December 1928, and stayed there for about a year.²⁹² He was then pardoned, but this time his years of active participation seemed to have come to an end mainly because of health reasons.²⁹³ Consequently *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé died, on 16 October 1930, at the *Holy* water of Miṭaq Amanuel, at the age of 57 years.²⁹⁴

CHAPTER THREE

THE ESCAPE OF *LEJ* IYASU TO TIGRAY AND THE TIGREAN CHIEFS' RIVALRY

3.1 The Escape of *Lej* Iyasu and the Central Government's Suspicion over *Ras* Seyum.

On 27 September 1916 *Lej* Iyasu was deposed and Emperor Menelik's daughter, Zäwditu, was named Empress.¹ *Lej* Iyasu had been in Harar when he heard of the news of his deposition. He, then, collected his followers to fight against the Shewans who deposed him. The fighting took place at Mä'eso in Harar. *Lej* Iyasu was, however, defeated but managed to escape to the Afar area.²

Different attempts had been made to restore *Lej* Iyasu to power.³ While *Lej* Iyasu was in the Afar area he heard that his father, *Negus* Mikael left Wällo for Addis Ababa to fight against the Shewans.⁴ *Lej* Iyasu, therefore, left the Afar area for Shewa. On his arrival at Ankobär news, however, reached him that his father lost a bloody battle at Sägällé on *Teqemt* 17, 1909 E.C. (27 Oct. 1916) and his father was taken as a captive.⁵

After *Lej* Iyasu heard of his father's defeat at Sägällé he left Ankobär and returned to the Afar areas and later encamped at Mäqdälla.⁶ On his arrival at Mäqdälla, fighting took place⁷ between his forces and the forces of *Ras* Abatä. *Ras* Abatä won the fighting and *Lej* Iyasu escaped. On 27 August 1917, a further fight took place in Wällo between *Lej* Iyasu and *Fitawrari* Habtä-Gyorgis, the Minister of war. The *Fitawrari* won the battle and *Lej* Iyasu escaped again to Awsa.⁸ *Ras* Yemär, *Negus* Mikael's governor of Raya-Azäbo and Inda-Mäḵoni,⁹ and *Fitawrari* Serah Bezu had joined the battle in support of *Lej* Iyasu,¹⁰ but was

defeated. *Lej Iyasu* then began to wander about in the Awsa area, where he lived for about three years.

Immediately after the overthrow of *Lej Iyasu*, *Ras Täfäri* decided to make some arrangements with the major chiefs who might otherwise tip the scales in *Lej Iyasu's* and his father's favour. These were *Ras Dämessé*, whose son was married to one of *Negus Mikael's* daughters, and *Ras Seyum* who was his son-in-law. *Ras Täfäri* must also convince *Ras Haylu* of Gojjan and *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* of Gondar to give practical support instead of just a lip-service to the Shewan army.¹¹ *Ras Täfäri*, therefore, wanted to make sure that while he was fighting in the field there was no treachery in other parts of the country that would stab the new regime in the back.¹² As a result, *Ras Täfäri* wrote to *Ras Seyum*, on 3 *Tiqemet* 1909 E.C [13 October 1916], justifying the overthrow of *Lej Iyasu* and demanding that *Ras Seyum* recognize Empress *Zäwditu* and himself as the rightful authority and the need for his cooperation to preserve the Christian Empire.¹³ By his letter to *Ras Seyum*, *Ras Täfäri* states:

...
 c=
 ›MÖ“
 ¼T>Áeu<uf ”<“ vK<uf xll“Ç=Ö’j!:...¹⁴

. . . *When by the will of God the notables, the people, the Abun and the Içägé discussed and made Empress Zäwditu to assend to her father's throne, they also made me the Crown Prince. Thus, I am delighted and I would like you to share my happiness. This was done because Lej Iyasu neglected the throne and the religion entrusted to him, decided to strengthen the Islamic faith and weaken the government So it is timely, for you, to think for your religion and government that you should be faithful and strong to the central government at your domain. .*
 . [Refere to Appendix VII for the complete text of the letter].

Consequently, on 15 October 1916, *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis*, the governor of Bägemider, since 1910, was ordered to march from Däbrä-Tabor through the Dälanta route to Wällo for a double purpose. Apart from preventing Iyasu from strengthening his position in Wällo, *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis's* march was aimed at forestalling any military support from *Ras Seyum* for *Negus Mikael*, before the Battle of Sägällé and afterwards for *Lej Iyasu*.¹⁵ Different sources describe that as the son-in-law of *Negus Mikael* *Ras Seyum* was said to have been grieved over *Negus Mikael's* defeat at the Battle of Sägällé.¹⁶ In Täkläyäsus's manuscript *Ras Seyum's* and *Ras Haylu Täklä-Haymanot's* grievance of the defeat of *Negus Mikael* at Sägällé was expressed as follows: #^e HÄK<“ ^e eçU u”Ñ<Y T>”)?M ÉM SJ” >?< >Kkc<...\$¹⁷ [*Ras Haylu* and *Ras Seyum* felt sad and cried due to *Negus Mikael's* defeat].

After the Battle of Sägällé when the central government asked *Ras Seyum* to come to Addis Ababa, he was reluctant to accept the order.¹⁸ In Addis Ababa it was feared that *Ras Seyum* who was the brother-in-law of *Lej Iyasu* and who had developed friendly attachment to the family of *Negus Mikael* and consequently also to *Lej Iyasu* was greatly suspected of joining hands with the pro-Iyasu group and would fight against the members of the central government who organized the *coup d' etat* against *Lej Iyasu*.¹⁹

At the time when there was a great suspicion towards the attitude of *Ras Seyum*, there are sources which explain that the central government had approached *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* by one of the government officials, *Käntiba Wässäné Zä'amanuel*,²⁰ who was an Ethiopian Consul at Asmara,²¹ while *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* was a refugee in the Eritrean border areas. Even though the mission of *Käntiba Wässäné* was not very well understood it could be inferred taking the

political tension and the fear of the central government of *Ras Seyum's* attitude into consideration. Even though *Lej Iyasu* was deposed but not captured, there seems to have been fear of the possible revival of *Lej Iyasu's* political power or of a counter *coup d' etat*. Consequently the newly established central government began to watch the would be supporters of *Lej Iyasu* with close eyes. One of the greatly suspected supporters of *Lej Iyasu* was *Ras Seyum Mängäša*. At this time it was feared that *Ras Seyum* would help *Lej Iyasu* to regain power. Thus the central government wished to have a loyal appointee in case *Ras Seyum* proved to be insubordinate. *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* who had shown his loyalty during the reign of Emperor Menelik was, therefore, the best choice that the central government could make.²² Because of this great fear and suspicion it seems, therefore, to be more likely that the new government, set up in Addis Ababa, had a plan to make *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* governor of Tigray in case *Ras Seyum* mobilized his troops in support of *Lej Iyasu*. Presumably, therefore, *Käntiba Wässäné's* mission was probably to instruct *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* to take over Adwa on the back of *Ras Seyum* if he was to mobilize his forces against the central government.²³ It seems under this pretext that *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* was called in 1918. At the same time *Käntiba Wässäné* was also instructed to contact *Ras Seyum* and explain to him why a *coup d' etat* was organized against *Lej Iyasu*. Probably because of this contact or any other unknown reason, *Ras Seyum* did not move in support of *Lej Iyasu*, as it was feared.²⁴

In February 1917 when *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis* was crowned *Negus* of Bägémeder, Tigray was also brought under his jurisdiction.²⁵ After evading the government's order to come to Addis Ababa, for some time, *Ras Seyum* finally accepted the order and in April 1917 he was already in Addis Ababa²⁶ after he had appointed his son, *Däjjac̣ Kassa Abba Yelaq* his *mesläne*.²⁷ The

attitude of *Ras Seyum* towards the central government's order to come to Addis Ababa was explained by Täkläyäsus as follows:

... ^e e_zU Ó" uòf Óv u=K<f " "¼cÖ }efÓa %EL uÓÉ Ñw, 'u`" Ö`Øa }Ç=e }uv }ÿ[S"<.: Ý²=Á u%EL ^e e_zU KHÑ\ KfÓ_ UeK'@ Ml" ÁÍ T< "X" g<V l^c< }Ç=e }uv }ÿ[S:.²⁸

. . . *Ras Seyum* who had hesitated, for long, to accept the order to come to Addis Ababa had finally accepted the order and came to Addis Ababa that he [*Ras Täfäri*] suspected him of complicity [with *Lej Iyasu*] and made him under solemn obligation not to leave Addis Ababa. Hence *Ras Seyum* appointed his son, *Däjjazemač Kassa*, as his proxy and passed the rainy season in Addis Ababa.

In 1918 when it was heard that the son of *Ras Seyum*, *Däjjäč Kassa Abba Yelaq*, rebelled against his father and the central government, *Ras Seyum* was allowed to return to Tigray. It had already been clear that no helping hand had extended to *Lej Iyasu* from Tigray.²⁹

3.2 *Lej Iyasu's* Escape to Tigray; *Ras Seyum's* Attitude towards *Lej Iyasu*; and the Opinions against *Ras Seyum*.

After wondering about, in the Awsa area, for about three years, *Lej Iyasu* left Awsa, in 1919 for Tigray, the territory of *Ras Seyum* who at that time was married to *Negus Mikael's* daughter, *Wäyzäro Täwabäč*.³⁰ The reason why *Lej Iyasu* went to Tigray was because he had the impression that *Ras Seyum* being his brother-in-law would help him to fight against the central government and restore his power.³¹ According to the sources *Lej Iyasu* begged *Ras Seyum* to fight for him but *Ras Seyum* refused to do so.³²

Lej Iyasu, nevertheless, settled first in Šekät at a village named Amäntilla (near Quiha) in Indärta³³ and, according to one of my *informants*, *Ras Seyum* had secretly brought *Lej Iyasu* from Amantilla to Mäqällä later, and he had him hidden at the church of Mädhani-Aläm under the host of the church leader named *Liqä Wäldäyäs Liqä Mädhani-Aläm*.³⁴

Many of my *informants* informed me that when it became evident that *Lej Iyasu* was hidden in Tigray, the central government requested *Ras Seyum* to procure *Lej Iyasu*'s unconditional surrender.³⁵ The same sources also alleged that when the pressure to procure *Lej Iyasu*'s unconditional surrender was increased, on *Ras Seyum*, from the central government *Ras Seyum* was said to have combed the area around Ādigudäm and Arra, superficially, aimed at capturing *Lej Iyasu*.³⁶ It was at this time that the people of Ādigudäm and Arra who were displeased at *Ras Seyum*'s deeds, desperately, composed the following metaphoric verse in Tigreña which blames *Ras Seyum*.³⁷

œ^ ĀÇ=Ñ<ÅU ¶¶Ā'j QTS<'
 SkK ¶¶KA HÇS<.:³⁸

*What wrong is done by the people of Arra and Āddigudäm [to let them be suffer],
 While his escape [Lej Iyasu's] was towards Mäqällä.
 [While there are hiding places in Mäqällä].*

The verse has a double meaning and was composed to uncover *Ras Seyum*'s secret for hiding *Lej Iyasu* in Mäqällä. The first meaning seems to express that what wrong has been done by the people of Arra and Ādigudäm to let them suffer from *Ras Seyum*'s measures while *Lej Iyasu*'s escape was towards Mäqällä, and the second seems to mean what wrong has been done by the people of Arra and Ādigudäm where there were hiding places (HÇS<) in Mäqällä. It was,

therefore, clear that even though *Ras Seyum* did not fight for *Lej Iyasu's* cause against the central government, he was sympathetic to *Lej Iyasu* and had close touch with him until *Lej Iyasu* left *Ras Seyum's* territory to that of *Ras Gugsa Araya*. Major Dodd's report, on 8 June 1920, established beyond doubt that *Ras Seyum's* sympathies were with *Lej Iyasu*³⁹ through the influence of his wife who had persuaded *Ras Seyum* to show a sympathetic attitude towards her brother, *Lej Iyasu*.⁴⁰

While *Lej Iyasu* was in *Ras Seyum's* territory, *Ras Seyum* promised, and also attempted, to use his good office and influence in the central government to procure easy terms of surrender for *Lej Iyasu*.⁴¹ Some sources also explain that *Lej Iyasu* had accepted *Ras Seyum's* good office and sent a message to the central government in 1919, through *Ras Seyum*, in which he stated that he could no longer endure his existence and desired to surrender.⁴² Based on Italian sources, Major Dodds (The British Legation) also reported that by August 1920 *Lej Iyasu* had conducted a long and secret conversation with *Signor Polaire* (Italian Agent at Adwa), at Mäqällä, in which he stated that he was in touch with Empress *Zäwditu* who desired his surrender.⁴³

The central government (probably *Ras Täfäri*) had replied, through *Ras Seyum*, to *Lej Iyasu's* request of surrendering himself, that it would accept his unconditional surrender, but replied that it saw no reason to treat *Lej Iyasu* leniently⁴⁴ and that he should be chained.⁴⁵ *Ras Seyum* was very angry with the reply of the central government because he wished to procure easy terms for *Lej Iyasu's* unconditional surrender.⁴⁶

Worrying too much about the worsening conditions in Tigray and in view of *Ras Seyum's* annoyance with the reply of the central government, the central government considered

did not, therefore, succeed in raising a following sufficient to start a revolt against the central government from Tigray.

However, owing to an ignorance of *Ras Seyum's* real intention⁵² and as long as *Lej Iyasu* remained at large in proximity to *Ras Seyum*, the situation in the north was somewhat obscure that the central government has been inclined to suspect *Ras Seyum* and in consequence had him very closely watched.⁵³ Furthermore, while the central government was inclined to think that an expedition to Tigray was unnecessary and that the problem could be arranged satisfactorily with *Ras Seyum* through emissaries, his rivals (*Ras Gugsä Araya* and *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé*) considered the necessity of conducting an expedition against *Ras Seyum* and *Lej Iyasu*.⁵⁴

Even though it was not clear if he had an ulterior motive, *Signor Piacentini*, was also constantly urging *Ras Täfäri* to take action against *Lej Iyasu* and *Ras Seyum* and to end the problem with *Lej Iyasu* once and for all.⁵⁵ Because of the existence of Italy's insatiable land hunger it could be inferred that this ambition of the Italians could engender a suspicion that Italy welcomed a rupture between the north and the south, that is the central government and Tigray, to serve her own ends. But whether these ends were represented by a desire to rid themselves of *Ras Seyum*, who has always been considered by the Italians as a thorn in their side,⁵⁶ and replace him by some one of their own choosing, or to take the opportunity of a general upheaval of the country to enlarge Eritrea, it was difficult to know.⁵⁷ Italian hatred for *Ras Seyum* and their need to get rid off him could be seen from the reports of De Martino [Eritrean Governor] to the Ministry of Colonies dated 27 March 1917. De Martino reported about *Ras Seyum* as follows: *Ras Seyum credo uomo infido e pericoloso. Distarsi di lui é certo nostro interesse e tale opinione*

*ho manifestato al Conte Colli di Felizzano.*⁵⁸ [I believe that *Ras* Seyum is a treacherous and a dangerous man. I owe interest to be at distance with him and I expressed this opinion to Conte Colli di Felizzano].

The central government gradually, therefore, became aware that as long as *Lej* Iyasu remained at large in proximity to *Ras* Seyum, intrigues and feelings of unrest and uncertainty would continue to hamper the administration of the central government. It thus decided to conduct an expedition to Tigray, in October or November 1920. The expedition was to be demonstrative or punitive depending on intermediate circumstances. It was argued that the expedition was necessary to illustrate the existence and the power of the central government.⁵⁹

On 1 January 1920, *Ras* Täfäri sent a letter to *Ras* Seyum with *Däjjazmač* Dästa Damtjäw (later *Ras*) and other officials by which he tried to persuade *Ras* Seyum of the necessity of handing over *Lej* Iyasu to the central government.⁶⁰ The letter threw light to the existing suspicion of *Ras* Täfäri against *Ras* Seyum's relation with *Lej* Iyasu⁶¹ by stating: "... ስድስት ሀይማኖቶችን ለማስፈራራት ለሰጠው ጥረት ላይ ለሚገኘው ግንኙነት ምክንያት ነው።" [. . . All what worries me is about your loyalty and of your being unsuspected to our throne, which is known to God and all men . . .]. *Ras* Täfäri gave an oracular advice to *Ras* Seyum that as a loyal subject he must act as his loyalty prompts him.⁶³ This was because loyalty required detaining *Lej* Iyasu, and an admission by *Ras* Seyum that *Lej* Iyasu had been in Tigray under *Ras* Seyum's hostage.⁶⁴ [Refer to Appendix VIII for the complete text of the letter].

Owing to the repeated summons of the central government and perhaps knowing well what would await him if he did not do like wise and probably in reply to the above mentioned

letter, a mission from *Ras Seyum*, headed by a priest, was sent and arrived at Addis Ababa in August 1920⁶⁵ to discuss matters fully with the central government.⁶⁶ The mission brought assurance of *Ras Seyum's* continued loyalty towards the central government.⁶⁷

While the conditions were like this the problem was further complicated by the action of *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé*.⁶⁸ *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* who had entered Addis Ababa, from his refuge, after he had been given pardon in 1918, was constantly intriguing against *Ras Seyum* in the hope of achieving the down fall of the Tigrean governor and acquiring the governorship for himself.⁶⁹ In this endeavour he was supported by the Italians who had no liking for *Ras Seyum*. *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* enlisted the aid of the Italian Legation to send two "servants" with letters to Tigray through Asmara. The so called "servants" were in reality Tigrean chiefs who, on arrival in Eritrea, proclaimed their identity and disclosed the purport of the letters they carried.⁷⁰ These letters emanating from *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* informed the Tigreans generally that they should be prepared for a "revolution" against *Ras Seyum* and should join up their hands with the central government's army under *Ras Täfäri* as soon as it arrived.⁷¹ Even though *Ras Täfäri* declared emphatically that the letters were not authorized by the central government⁷² and *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* did so on his own responsibility,⁷³ they were not harmful to the interests of the central government and that *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé* beyond being excluded, for a moment, from the council of meeting of the central government has not been otherwise punished.⁷⁴

3.3 *Lej Iyasu's* Escape to Bora-Selawa; *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsä's* Relations; and the Capture of *Lej Iyasu* and its Consequences on *Ras Seyum*.

the affairs of the north has also diminished⁸³ since the general interest at that time was also centred on the preparations for the feast of *Täskar* (in memory of Emperor Menelik) fixed for 28 January 1921.⁸⁴

When it became clear that *Lej Iyasu* entered into the domain of *Ras Gugsa Araya*, the central government ordered *Ras Gugsa* to capture him. But as rapprochement with the central government was the best precondition to out bid *Ras Seyum* and obtain favour from the central government, *Ras Gugsa* accepted the order to capture *Lej Iyasu*, but expressed his fear of *Ras Seyum* for having a secret understanding with *Lej Iyasu* to declare war on him and of snatching *Lej Iyasu* from him.⁸⁵ He, therefore, requested help from the central government.⁸⁶ *Ras Dästa Damtäw* and other officials were, thus, sent to Tigray to help *Ras Gugsa* capture *Lej Iyasu*.⁸⁷

Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, in his autobiography, wrote *Ras Gugsa's* response to the central government's order to search for and capture *Lej Iyasu*, and *Ras Gugsa's* fear of *Ras Seyum* as follows:

...⁸⁸

. . . *Ras Gugsa* had said that I would have searched for [*Lej Iyasu*] but I am afraid if there exist a secret dealing between *Lej Iyasu* and *Ras Seyum*, and as a result he requested for our help to prevent any attempt from *Ras Seyum* to snatch *Lej Iyasu* [after his capture] from him. As a result, we sent *Lej* [later *Ras*] *Dästa Damtäw*, *Däjjazemač Gétačäw*, *Däjjazemač Haylä-Selassé*, *Fitawrari Waqé*, *Däjjazemač Wäsäné Terfé* and *Däjjazemač Wäldä-Selassé*, to Tigray to help *Ras Gugsa* search for *Lej Iyasu* and bring him to Addis Ababa.

For reasons of political expediency *Ras Gugsä* seems to have exaggerated *Ras Seyum's* sympathy to *Lej Iyasu* at that moment. Thus, *Ras Dästa Damtäw* and other officials were sent to Tigray to help *Ras Gugsä* capture *Lej Iyasu*.⁸⁹

After he left *Ras Seyum's* domain, *Lej Iyasu* was safe for a while up to the time of his capture. But when one of his followers, according to one of my *informants*, named *Aräru*,⁹⁰ was caught in *Mayčäw*, while he was in his way to *Wällo*, he divulged *Lej Iyasu's* hiding place⁹¹: a monastery in *Seläwa*.⁹² As a result, on 28 January 1921, *Ras Gugsä Araya's* forces and a few from the forces of *Ras Dästa Damtäw* left *Mayčäw* to procure *Lej Iyasu's* surrender⁹³ and succeeded in capturing him⁹⁴, by surprise, in a monastery called *Qäbseyä Täklä-Haymanot* around *Seläwa*.⁹⁵ *Lej Iyasu* did not resist when *Ras Gugsä* requested his arrest in a respectful manner.⁹⁶ This was described by the Italian agent at *Adwa* as follows:

*Egli [Lej Iyasu] non oppose alcuna resistenza e si consegna personalmente al Ras che lo dichiarò in arresto dopo esserglisi inginocchiato dinanzi e avergli baciati piedi.*⁹⁷

Lej Iyasu did not offer any resistance and he personally consigned himself to the Ras when the Ras declared the arrest of Iyasu after having himself knelt down and kissed Iyasu's feet.

Ras Gugsä has prostrated himself on the ground and kissed the feet of *Lej Iyasu* as an expression of showing respect to him.⁹⁸ The captive and captor immediately made their way for *Mayčäw* where they arrived at noon, on 31 January 1921.⁹⁹ When *Lej Iyasu* was caught he was poorly dressed. The Italian agent at *Adwa* had also the following to report in relation to the conditions of *Lej Iyasu* while he was caught:

*... Disse che Ligg Jasu fu trovato in un piccolo posto presso una chiesa in condizioni di vestiario pietose tanto che Ligg Desta dovette cedergli il mantello.*¹⁰⁰

He said that Lej Iyasu was found in a small place next to a church, wearing clothes of such horrible condition that Lej Dästa had to give him his own mantle.

After his arrest *Lej Iyasu* was not chained but was firmly watched in *Mayčäw*.¹⁰¹ On 3 February 1921 the capture of *Lej Iyasu* was made known in Addis Ababa¹⁰² with a simultaneous booming of cannons of the imperial army.¹⁰³ But still there was a fear, in the central government, that *Ras Seyum* might attempt to make *Lej Iyasu* free.¹⁰⁴ *Lej Iyasu's* capture, however, removed a potential source of trouble and his safe return to Addis Ababa would allay the government's anxiety. *Ras Täfäri* was anxious to see *Lej Iyasu* sent to Harar where he felt he could be sure of the prisoner's safe detention.¹⁰⁵

To test the loyalty of certain provincial governors and to gain an opportunity to display his power, *Ras Täfäri* conducted a huge military expedition to the north on the pretext to receive *Lej Iyasu* from *Ras Gugsa Araya*.¹⁰⁶ The expedition consisted of about one hundred and twenty thousand men and its destination was *Dässé*.¹⁰⁷ The expedition has the intention of having *Lej Iyasu* delivered to him from *Ras Gugsa Araya*, even at the cost of war.¹⁰⁸

Lej Iyasu was finally handed over, to *Ras Täfäri*, on 21 May 1921¹⁰⁹ ceremoniously, at an assembly of provincial officials who had been cautiously waiting his arrival at *Dässé*.¹¹⁰ He was, then, made fast to chains, heavily guarded by *Ras Täfäri's* own body guards,¹¹¹ and was immediately sent to *Wärä-Ilu*.¹¹² *Ras Haylu* and *Fitawrari Habtä-Gyorgis* remained behind watching the Imperial Army growing daily, until about 120,000 were available, for a campaign against *Ras Seyum*. *Ras Seyum*, however, saw that resistance would be folly and on 11 June 1921 went to *Dässé*, to renew his allegiance to the Empress and the central government.¹¹³ *Ras*

Täfäri, then, returned to Addis Ababa, on 20 July 1921.¹¹⁴ *Ras* Seyum who had been accused of complicity with *Lej* Iyasu¹¹⁵ was ordered to join the march back to Addis Ababa. He was then relieved of his posts and deprived of his province.¹¹⁶ He was also made under solemn obligation not to leave Addis Ababa for some years.¹¹⁷

Ras Seyum's territory of Adwa was taken from him and given to *Däjjaj* Gäbrä-Sellassé;¹¹⁸ and Indäarta was taken from *Ras* Seyum and rewarded to *Ras* Gugsa Araya.¹¹⁹ It was, then, decided that *Lej* Iyasu should be kept in Fečé (Sällallé) under the custody of *Ras* Kassa,¹²⁰ where he remained for about eleven years,¹²¹ until his escape in 1932.

The arrest of *Ras* Täfäri's rival [*Lej* Iyasu] gave *Ras* Gugsa Araya a chance to outbid *Ras* Seyum Mängäša in proving loyalty to the central government, as competition between *Ras* Gugsa and *Ras* Seyum in seeking favour and prestige from the central government was the most important factor in their relations. The central government was fully aware of *Ras* Seyum's attitude, which in fact was known to *Ras* Täfäri himself and he was in consequence likely to remain passive so as not to rouse the central government to action against him.¹²²

CHAPTER FOUR

THE REBELLION OF *DÄJJAČ KASSA ABBA YELAQ*

4.1 The Causes for the Rebellion of *Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq*.

Ras Seyum had been governor general of all parts of Tigray since he had been raised to the rank of *Ras*.¹ He was unchallenged after the death of *Ras Sebhat* and the retreat of *Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé* in 1914.² *Ras Seyum* also made his own appointments in Tigray, by which he gave Adwa, Aksum, and Šerä to his son *Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq*; Tämbén to his brother *Däjjač Germay Mängäša*; and Āgamä to *Däjjač Kassa Sebhat*.³ *Ras Seyum* was working hard to show his loyalty to the central government so that he might obtain favour and influence. When the central government promoted *Ras Gugsä Araya*, by reappointing him to Raya-Azäbo, as a possible counter weight to *Ras Seyum*, *Ras Seyum* wanted to overcome this by seeking marriage alliances and other mechanisms with the members of the central government.⁴ *Ras Seyum*, hence, ruled Tigray in relative peace until his son *Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq* rebelled in 1918.⁵

Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq's rebellion was attributed, by different sources, to different factors. Some of my *informants* attributed the causes for *Däjjač Kassa's* rebellion to his personal character.⁶ According to the different sources *Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq* was restless, ambitious and bold in character,⁷ and had a deep spirit of "Tigrean resistance against Shewan dominance in Tigray".⁸ He was portrayed as a sworn enemy of the "Shewan domination over Tigray" by some *informants*,⁹ who admired and identified him as *habboña*: a Tigreña concept which refers to a specific quality of determination and integrity of objective. In this case they mean that he aimed at restoring the throne of his grandfather, Emperor Yohannes IV.¹⁰

My informant *Fitawrari* Iyasu attributed *Däjjac* Kassa's rebellion to his personal character by stating "ፍጥነት ለመገደብ ለመገደብ ለመገደብ" [. . . aimed to live [rule] after killing his father] and *Qañazmac* Gäbrä-Egezyabehér and *Däjjazmac* Zewde stated that *Däjjac* Kassa *Abba Yelaq* was highly influenced by a "childish" character ["ግሪፍ ለመገደብ ለመገደብ"]¹² [He was influenced by a childish character]. *Gerazmac* Dästa Haylu also identified *Däjjac* Kassa's rebellion to his restlessness ("ግሪፍ ለመገደብ") [because he was restless in character].¹³

There are also sources which attribute the motive for *Däjjac* Kassa *Abba Yelaq*'s rebellion to his personal friendship and admiration for *Lej* Iyasu¹⁴ and, as collaboration with the outsiders was the order of the day, with the Italians.¹⁵ But I could not get sources which could confirm *Däjjac* Kassa's rebellion to be attributed to his personal friendship either to *Lej* Iyasu or to the Italians, with the exception that his step mother was *Lej* Iyasu's sister and with the fact that his father was being suspected of having sympathetic attitude towards *Lej* Iyasu.¹⁶

According to many of my *informants* it seems more plausible to attribute *Däjjac* Kassa's rebellion to his "anti-Shewan" attitude.¹⁷ According to the same sources *Däjjac* Kassa *Abba Yelaq* did not want to be ruled by a "Shewan".¹⁸ The rebellion, according to the *informants* was, therefore, aimed against the central government and against *Ras* Seyum who had recognized the central government's Shewan hegemony over Tigray.¹⁹ In his rebellion *Däjjac* Kassa requested his father to claim all what his grand father, Emperor Yohannes IV, had ruled and refuse openly to acknowledge the authority of Empress Zäwditu and *Ras* Täfäri.²⁰

However, as it was clearly known, unrest in Tigray was always persistent and the political conditions of the area, at that time, contained elements of instability due to the limited

control exercised by the central government. It is, therefore, possible to speculate that the cause for the rebellion of Kassa Abba Yelaq was not different from the existing socio-political conditions at the time. The rebellion was, therefore, a means of his personal grievances and advancing his personal interest than being conscious of his descent from Emperor Yohannes IV.²¹ He was primarily ambitious of increasing his control: "... Cassa che chiaramente mirava ad ingrandire suo Comando"²² [... Kassa who was clearly ambitious to enlarge his territory...], states an Italian source to show the increasing ambition of *Däjjäč* Kassa to advance his control. The appointment of *Ras* Gugsä Araya over southern Tigray by the central government,²³ and the consequent decrease of his father's territory by this appointment, could therefore, be the main cause for the rebellion of *Däjjäč* Kassa Abba Yelaq.²⁴ To this effect, an Italian source states that:

*In Tigray Degiac Cassa, probabilmente d' accordo col padre Ras Seium, non intende cedere il Tigray meridionale a Ras Gugsä, ed ha nominato il Fitawrari Area per prendere il comando delle regioni assegnate dal Governo Etiopico a Ras Gugsä.*²⁵

In Tigray, Däjjäč Kassa, probably agreeing with his father, Ras Seyum, did not want to leave southern Tigray to Ras Gugsä and he nominated Fitawrari Araya as a chief for the region assigned from the Ethiopian government to Ras Gugsä.

4.2 The Battles Conducted During the Rebellion of *Däjjäč* Kassa and their Results

After the rebellion of *Däjjäč* Kassa became known, *Däjjäč* Täka, the representative of *Ras* Seyum in Indäarta,²⁶ sent Mälakä-Berhanat Abreha and *Fitawrari* Wäräs, who were also the followers of *Ras* Seyum, for a peaceful settlement of the problem.²⁷ This plea for a peaceful settlement, however, failed due to Kassa Abba Yelaq's refusal.²⁸ Meanwhile, Kassa Abba Yelaq attacked *Däjjäč* Haylä-Maryam Gäzahañ of Sädäya and *Fitawrari* Bitäw Wäldä-Sellassé of

Imbasänäyti at a place called Da'räka [Ç°¶] around Färäsmay (Hahaylä)²⁹, at the beginning of January 1918.³⁰ *Däjjac* Haylä-Maryam and *Fitawrari* Bitäw were defeated³¹ and retreated. The fighting, according to the *informants*, claimed the life of many people.³²

Furthermore, *Däjjac* Kassa Abba Yelaq declared war against *Däjjac* Germay Mängäša (his uncle), and who was the representative of *Ras* Seyum in Tämbén.³³ They fought a battle at May-Äläqeti in January 1918,³⁴ for a short period of time but with much casualties on the side of *Däjjac* Kassa. At the fighting about hundred people died from both sides.³⁵ At the fighting *Däjjac* Germay had occupied a strategic position that enabled him to inflict heavy casualties against the forces of *Däjjac* Kassa.³⁶ Nevertheless, although *Däjjac* Germay had strategic position the fighting finally ended with his defeat and was forced to withdraw towards Äbbi-Äddi (Tämbén).³⁷ *Däjjac* Kassa, then, followed the retreating forces of *Däjjac* Germay³⁸ and fought against them at a place called Kunalä, in Tämbén. *Däjjac* Germay was defeated again and Tämbén became under the control of *Däjjac* Kassa Abba Yelaq.³⁹ Many people died at Kunalä from both sides. From the side of *Däjjac* Kassa, *Fitawrari* Haylu Wahed, *Qäñazmač* Yelma, *Qäñazmač* Wäldé and others died. From *Däjjac* Germay's side many people were made captives, but were freed immediately.⁴⁰ From among the notables *Däjjac* Araya Abära, *Ras* Seyum's nephew, died fighting against *Däjjac* Kassa.⁴¹

After the defeat of *Däjjac* Germay at Kunalä, *Däjjac* Kassa Abba Yelaq continued his march towards Mäqällä. When he heard that *Däjjac* Kassa Abba Yelaq was approaching towards Mäqällä *Däjjac* Täka, the representative of *Ras* Seyum in Indärta, left Mäqällä to save Mäqällä from destruction.⁴² When *Däjjac* Kassa was informed that *Däjjac* Täka would not fight against

him he entered Mäqällä, on 5 January 1918, unchallenged.⁴³ After he entered Mäqällä he had confiscated arms and the property of the chiefs who had been under his father's command but refused to recognize him as their overlord.⁴⁴ The following poem was composed during the rebellion of *Däjjäč* Kassa Abba *Yelaq* to indicate his victories against *Däjjäč* Haylä-Maryam and *Däjjäč* Gerмай, and the retreat of *Däjjäč* Täka and *Däjjäč* Kassa's control of Adwa, Tämbén and Indärta:

ǃ"Ēf œKI ›v ĀLp "c< ["X]'
 "HĀK T'ĀU (Āk HĀKT'ĀU) wSIQ K"̄<c=c'
 w̄<Ñ@| ǃĀ "jUu?" ÑeÑ>c<::
 Āk Ó`TĀ wÑ<Pf ð[c<'
 w̄<Ñ@| ǃĀ "SkK ÑeÑ>c<'
 Āk }" "w ÆeU œÓKc<'
 }kSÓ cKe} œMÓ œUK=c<'
 "̄<Hu= p`g= œweŌĪ œōc=c<::^{44b}

How are you Abba Yelaq Kassa [Kassa],
Putting [Däjjäč] Haylä-Maryam in chains,
Thereafter he left for Tämbén hastily.
Däjjäč Gerмай was easily defeated,
Thereafter he left for Mäqällä hastily,
Däjjäč Täka retreated to the bushes,
He rested after he retrieved the three alga (domain),
He the giver of money pouring on carpets.

When *Däjjäč* Kassa entered Mäqällä the people from Bora had secretly taken *Ras* Gugsä's son (probably Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä) who had been in Mäqällä with *Ras* Seyum before *Ras* Seyum went to Addis Ababa,⁴⁵ to save his life from any possible measure against him by

Däjjäč Kassa. This event could, therefore, give light to the assumption that *Däjjäč* Kassa's rebellion could possibly be by opposing the appointment of *Ras* Gugsa Araya over southern Tigray and this aim made him to develop hatred against *Ras* Gugsa's son.

According to an Italian report, issued on 9 January 1918 from Asmara, *Däjjäč* Kassa *Abba Yelaq*, in about the beginning of January 1918, had an army amounting to about thousand men.⁴⁶ But the number of his followers had soon increased, in few months, that he claimed his army to be amounting to about six thousand, by the end of March 1918.⁴⁷ From among these about half were with rifles and the rest without.⁴⁸ His followers were mainly from Adwa, Šerä and Aksum.⁴⁹

In Tigray many notables of *Ras* Seyum had refused to support and acknowledge *Däjjäč* Kassa. He, therefore, made some *Šumšers*. *Däjjäč* Mäsfen, who was the governor of Haramat, repeatedly refused orders from *Däjjäč* Kassa to go to Mäqällä and to recognize *Qänazmač Amaha*, who had been the governor of Dallul, therefore, superseded *Däjjäč* Kassa's overlordship⁵⁰ in his command of Haramat. On 26 March 1918 *Däjjäč* Kassa nominated *Fitäwrari* Abay Gäbrä-Täklä governor of Iggällä in place of *Däjjäč* Asäfa, who had refused to acknowledge *Däjjäč* Kassa as his overlord.⁵¹ *Däjjäč* Haylu, who was the governor of parts of Šerä did not follow *Däjjäč* Kassa, in his rebellion, and was awaiting the return of *Ras* Seyum from Addis Ababa, being loyal to him, at Šerä.⁵²

4.3 The Response of the Central Government to the Rebellion of *Däjjäč* Kassa *Abba Yelaq*; *Ras* Seyum's Return from Addis Ababa and his Threatening *Awaj* (Decree).

When the news of the rebellion of *Däjjac̣ Kassa Abba Yelaq* was heard in Addis Ababa both Empress Zäwditu and *Ras Täfäri* were highly worried about the rebellion. They sent a telegram through the service of the Italians, on 17 *Terr* 1910 E.C, to *Däjjac̣ Kassa*. The telegrams of both the Empress and the Regent had almost similar message.⁵³ The telegram contained the usual greetings to *Däjjac̣ Kassa* and stated that *Ras Täfäri* was about to go to Wällo to stabilize the area and made *Ras Seyum* to stay for a while, after *Ras Seyum* had already started his march to Tigray, so that they would depart from Addis Ababa together. The telegram further stated that they heard that *Däjjac̣ Kassa* had fought against *Däjjac̣ Germay*, and requested him to tell them the reason for the fighting and to inform them about the security in Tigray, the conditions of the harvest and any other developments in Tigray through a telephone via Asmara.⁵⁴ The telegraphic message of Empress Zäwditu and *Ras Täfäri* to *Däjjac̣ Kassa* can be read from Appendices IX and X.

After he heard of the rebellion led by his son and the incidents that took place, *Ras Seyum* started his march to Tigray from Addis Ababa and arrived at Koräm, on 22 March 1918. *Ras Seyum* was welcomed in Koräm.⁵⁵ Talamonti mentions the reception ceremony arranged, for *Ras Seyum*, in Koräm as follows: *Il ritorno del Ras é accolto con soddisfazione*⁵⁶ [the return of the *Ras* was welcomed with satisfaction]. It was with *Ras Gugsä Araya* and *Däjjac̣ Tädlä* that *Ras Seyum* arrived at Koräm. After they had waited for few days at Koräm they started their march and arrived at Mayčäw, on 30 March 1918. *Ras Gugsä* remained at Mayčäw while *Ras Seyum* and the others continued their march to Mäqällä.⁵⁷

When *Däjjac* Kassa heard of the news and after he had confirmed the certainty of the return of his father from Addis Ababa to Mäqällä he decided not to openly confront his father. He left Mäqällä to Tämbén and then to Adwa through Hawzén.⁵⁸ *Ras* Seyum, hence, entered Mäqällä on 7 April 1918⁵⁹ with out any resistance.

After his arrival at Mäqällä *Ras* Seyum attempted to approach his son through peaceful means and advised him to give up the rebellion.⁶⁰ *Däjjac* Kassa who had been in Tämbén since 13 April 1918 responded to his father's call for peace positively with a letter asking pardon.⁶¹ This request for pardon was not, however, whole hearted. This was manifested in his immediate measure of cutting the telephone line so as to cut *Ras* Seyum's communication with Adwa.⁶² Information from people who had been very close to *Däjjac* Kassa disclosed that *Däjjac* Kassa did not intend to accept his father's call and to submit himself. The letters he wrote to *Ras* Seyum, requesting pardon, were simply to deceive his father,⁶³ so that he could get enough time to prepare for a confrontation against his father.

When *Däjjac* Kassa refused to accept his father's call and when *Ras* Seyum's attempts for a peaceful solution failed, *Ras* Seyum decided to punish his son.⁶⁴ *Ras* Seyum, therefore, issued a threatening *Awaj* (decree) at Mäqällä, on 15 April 1918 that repeatedly declared *Däjjac* Kassa a rebel. Moreover, *Ras* Seyum personally, by a telephone, called on all the notables in Adwa to be faithful to the central government and towards him⁶⁵ and not to support *Däjjac* Kassa's rebellion.

Even after the return of *Ras* Seyum from Addis Ababa the supporters of *Däjjac* Kassa were, however, creating problems. An Italian source explain that *Ras* Gugsa had informed Talamonti that *Fitawrari* Araya of Čärčär had declared his support to *Däjjac* Kassa *Abba Yelaq*⁶⁶

and the people of Särarä-Mellaš (in southern Tigray) rebelled under the leadership of *Fitawrari* Araya of Čärčär. The rebels fought and arrested three sub-district governors who had been sent to administer the area under *Wagšum* Kābādä. The revolt of the people of Särarä Mellaš was very dangerous and threatening to *Wagšum* Kābādä that he asked *Ras* Gugsä Araya for help against the rebels by stating, according to the Italian source, *Se mi aiutate ora bene se no andro direttamente ad Addis Ababa* ⁶⁷ [If you help me now fine, if not I will directly go to Addis Ababa].

Owing to *Däjjäč* Kassa's refusal to submit to *Ras* Seyum, *Ras* Seyum continued his march from Mäqällä westwards to beat him. He arrived at Aksum on 10 May 1918. *Däjjäč* Kassa heard of his father's march also retreated to Ādēt (near Aksum) with his about 2000 armed followers.⁶⁸ After his arrival at Aksum, *Ras* Seyum proclaimed an *Awaj* against *Däjjäč* Kassa and his followers. *Ras* Seyum's threatening *Awaj* as obtained from an Italian source, reads:

*Chi segue degiac Cassa é considerato ribelle, i suoi beni saranno confiscati perdera indulti e Gulti autorizzo i nemici a denunziarli.*⁶⁹

[He who follow *Däjjäč* Kassa is considered a rebel, his goods (property) will be confiscated and he will loss all his gult, and I authorize the enemies be denounced.]

One of my *informants*, supporting the above source, also informed me that *Ras* Seyum had announced that anybody who support *Däjjäč* Kassa would to be beheaded.⁷⁰

When *Ras* Seyum was at Aksum announcing his *Awaj* against *Däjjäč* Kassa, *Däjjäč* Kassa was, however, marching towards the south from Ādēt: either towards the areas which were under the command of *Ras* Gugsä Araya or towards Mäqällä unidentified. By this action he

wanted to divert the direction of his father's march against him. He wanted to return to Adwa, if his father changed his direction towards Mäqällä, following his father's footsteps.⁷¹ At this time, fear reigned in Mäqällä among the people that *Däjjäč* Kassa might return by taking another direction to enter Mäqällä and provoke disorder again.⁷² *Informants* informed me that the news of his rebellion and his "fame" was widely spread that "SiSi ĀwHM 'Ä"⁷³ [His coming was always expected frightfully]. De Martino (Eritrean Colonial Governor) in his report of 10 May 1918 from Asmara to the Minister of Colonies-Rome, wrote that the situation in Tigray was unchanged even after the arrival of *Ras Seyum* in Mäqällä.⁷⁴

Moreover, *Däjjäč* Kassa had asked the Italian agent to allow him to take refuge in the Italian colony of Eritrea in case the forces of his father marched against him.⁷⁵ By the end of May 1918, the followers of *Däjjäč* Kassa had already entered Qohayn (in the Italian Colony of Eritrea).⁷⁶ My *informant* informed me that in Asmara the market was disturbed on three different occasions due to a distant and false threatening information about the rebellion and approach of *Däjjäč* Kassa *Abba Yelaq*.⁷⁷ An Italian agent worried about the situation also wrote that he was cautious about the condition in Tigray and had decided to hold *Däjjäč* Kassa in a place far from the colony supervising (watching) him in case he effectively entered into the Eritrean territory.⁷⁸ This seemed that *Däjjäč* Kassa *Abba Yelaq*'s request to take refuge in the Italian colony of Eritrea would not gain acceptance.

4.4 *Däjjäč* Kassa's Submission to his Father.

After a long process of negotiation *Däjjäč* Kassa and *Ras* Seyum, however, reached a reconciliation, through the mediation of *Däjjäč* Maru Arram of Tämbén (an official of *Ras* Seyum), though the peace was temporary,⁷⁹ in June 1918. At this reconciliation *Ras* Seyum recognized *Däjjäč* Kassa's previous command over Adwa with some increase in his territory in other parts.⁸⁰

Even though *Däjjäč* Kassa had reconciled with his father and the situation in Tigray by August 1918 seemed peaceful, it, however, remained incomplete.⁸¹ This was because, in spite of the agreement for *Däjjäč* Kassa's submission nothing has been said about the return of the arms and the property that he has confiscated from the chiefs who had been under his father's command. Moreover, *Däjjäč* Kassa reached a peace agreement neither with *Däjjäč* Germay nor with *Däjjäč* Abära Hagos, the brother and cousin of *Ras* Seyum respectively,⁸² until October 1918.⁸³

In September 1918 the region was relatively peaceful and *Ras* Gugsa re-entered Mayčäw on 26 September 1918⁸⁴ and towards the end of September 1918 *Däjjäč* Kassa's followers, who had been fugitives, gave up to *Däjjäč* Germay⁸⁵ in Tämbén. In the second half of October 1918 *Däjjäč* Kassa went to Mäqällä and concluded a final reconciliation with his uncle, *Däjjäč* Germay, and with other notables who had opposed him during his rebellion.⁸⁶

4.5 *Däjjäč* Kassa Rebelled Again

When a meeting of the leading Tigrean chiefs has been called in Addis Ababa for August 1919, *Ras* Seyum telephoned to Addis Ababa to say that he and his son, *Däjjäč* Kassa, were reconciled, and they might both come to Addis Ababa.⁸⁷ Moreover, when *Ras* Gugsa of Tigray

arrived at Addis Ababa for the meeting of the chiefs⁸⁸ news had reached Addis Ababa that *Ras Seyum* was travelling to Addis Ababa via Asmara and Djibouti, but on his arrival at Asmara he heard that his son, *Däjjac Kassa Abba Yelaq*, had again risen in revolt, in April 1919, and was compelled to return.⁸⁹ *Ras Gugsä Araya* who arrived at Addis Ababa had also reported that he had almost to flee for his life through the country of *Ras Gugsä Wälé*.⁹⁰

At this time different sources explain differently about the intentions of *Däjjac Kassa Abba Yelaq*'s rebellion. The Daily telegraph of Friday 4 April 1919 reported under the title "Revolt in Abyssinia" the intention of *Däjjac Kassa* in a highly exaggerated tone as follows:

*... the son of Ras Seyum has revolted and declared himself king under the name of King Theodor... and is reported to be very brave. He has gathered a large following.*⁹¹

Other sources also express that *Däjjac Kassa* had aimed to crown himself "Emperor" supported by local chiefs and had fifteen to twenty *Däjjazmačes* under him.⁹²

Even though *Ras Seyum* worked hard to show his loyalty to the central government his immediate return, however, gave the impression that *Ras Seyum* was playing with the central government and was in agreement with his son.⁹³ *Ras Gugsä Wälé* who was said to be on his way to the meeting of the chiefs in Addis Ababa⁹⁴ refused to go to Addis Ababa and it was reported that he was sympathetically disposed towards the "rebels" in Tigray.⁹⁵ The central government which was suspicious of both father and son (*Ras Seyum* and *Däjjac Kassa*)⁹⁶ was, therefore, made to believe that *Ras Gugsä Wälé* was a sympathizer of the "revolutionaries" (*Ras Seyum* and *Däjjac Kassa*).⁹⁷ The impression that *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsä Wälé* were sympathetic to the rebellion was evidently false as there were different sources to the effect that there had been fighting between father and son, and that the later has suffered a serious defeat.⁹⁸

By 2nd May 1919 *Ras* Seyum was reported to be at Mäqällä and *Däjjäč* Kassa was reported to be moving around the Eritrean frontier.⁹⁹ *Ras* Seyum, therefore, organized his men and marched against his son again. *Däjjäč* Kassa and *Ras* Seyum's forces fought at Haṣäbo (near Aksum).¹⁰⁰ One of my *informants* mentioned a name Täs fay Mädäbay who had been from among the followers of *Däjjäč* Kassa who was ordered by *Däjjäč* Kassa to fire on *Ras* Seyum, from a distant place, during the fighting, surprisingly, he had struck at the umbrella of *Ras* Seyum, but missed the *Ras*.¹⁰¹ One can now safely argue, therefore, that *Ras* Seyum was not sympathetic to the rebellion of his son.

Däjjäč Kassa's forces were defeated and forced to retreat to Mädäbay (Šerä). When *Däjjäč* Kassa fled to Mädäbay *Däjjäč* Maru and other officials of *Ras* Seyum followed him. They fought against *Däjjäč* Kassa at Korfaḥo,¹⁰² but through emissaries they asked him that he would be forgiven if he returned to Adwa and if he acknowledged his father's and the central government's power.¹⁰³ *Däjjäč* Abreha Hagos of Šerä and other notables of Tigray acted as mediators promising *Däjjäč* Kassa for a peaceful solution and reconciliation with his father.¹⁰⁴

4.6 *Däjjäč* Kassa's Submission and his Fate

Owing to the repeated plea for peace and perhaps knowing well what would awaited him if he refused, *Däjjäč* Kassa notified that he was about to accept the plea for peace. *Däjjäč* Kassa was then taken to Adwa and expressed penitence to his father, according to Greenfield, *...bearing a stone on his back with a knife tied around his throat - the traditional sign of submission and repentance*.¹⁰⁵ Despite *Däjjäč* Abreha Hagos's promises for pardon from *Ras* Seyum *Däjjäč* Kassa was, however, thrown naked to the ground and punished about hundred lashes on

arrival.¹⁰⁶ According to *informants*, *Däjjäč* Kassa used to punish his opponents forty lashes each but his father beat him eighty lashes.¹⁰⁷ According to Greenfield, *Däjjäč* Kassa did not cry out when he was being punished and afterwards was carried to a nearby hut. The punishment was severe; he was not expected to live at first but later recovered.¹⁰⁸ He was then taken to Mäqällä first, and after few weeks stay at Mäqällä to Addis Ababa, as a test of *Ras* Seyum's loyalty, via Bägemeder and Gojjam fearing that the people of Raya-Azäbo might intercept to free *Däjjäč* Kassa.¹⁰⁹ *Ras* Seyum has, therefore, stamped out the revolt in Tigray and then chained his son,¹¹⁰ and sent him to Addis Ababa. It was *Däjjäč* Täka of Indärta who took *Däjjäč* Kassa to Addis Ababa on behalf of *Ras* Seyum.¹¹¹ *Ras* Seyum has been exasperated by the repeated rebellion of his son and he was anxious to be seen as loyal in the eyes of the central government that he handed over his son whom he had considered as an obstacle to his projected mission of gaining favour and influence in the central government.

Däjjäč Kassa arrived at Addis Ababa, on 1 *Terr* 1912 E.C. (in about the second week of January 1920],¹¹² and was confined in the house first of *Ras* Berru and then of *Ras* Gétačäw.¹¹³ *Ras* Gétačäw was the husband of *Wäyzäro* Astér Mängäša, *Ras* Seyum's sister.^{113b}

On 3 *Yakatit* 1913 E.C.,¹¹⁴ a year after his confinement, *Däjjäč* Kassa *Abba Yelaq* managed to crawl through a window and escaped from the house of *Däjjäč* Gétačäw on a horse. But on his way to Tigray he was intercepted by the countrymen¹¹⁵ in the area between Sälalé and Gendä-Bärät around Adabärga.¹¹⁶ According to Empress Zäwditu's letter to *Ras* Seyum, *Däjjäč* Kassa killed three people, wounded two others and he was finally killed in the confrontation with his five followers,¹¹⁷ on 7 *Yakatit* 1913 E.C.¹¹⁸

Aläqa Kenfä's manuscript describes the escape and fate of *Däjjac* Kassa, although it contains some discrepancies in the number of deaths and the place where *Däjjac* Kassa was killed with the description in the official letter of Empress Zäwditu to *Ras* Seyum as follows:

... ¼"+f 2 [u<° 1913 7U Ák "X Y;U }"Ç=f g`S<x LeÑv wKA ÝÁk Ñ@|t~< ðnÉ }kwKA |¼dk?U ¼UfvM
 c?f >eÑw,, |^—<" Mkk~ wKA ¼T>— SeKA c?f¼a" ÝvÉ u?f ÓMfªf ÝÇ" H@Á... ¼"+f 5 pÇT@ u<MÒ
 ÝcU LÄ vLÑ` Áz"< TKf }^:: ¼"+f 7 c™ Vj:: Ý^f »iYac Ò` Vj... leK<U ÝÁ[~ LÄ u~<ÍÓ^ Ý»Ñ~ LÄ uÙ` }"Ó,
 Vj:: 4 k" _d"< uS_f "Éq c'u} |c< SJ< ¼T>KÁ ÝÇ=e »uv H@É |eÝ=Á¼"< É[e:: ¼ÁÍ Tç Ñ@|t~< »iYac »Á}~<
 |"k:: UeK'@ eKNÁK"< dÄVf ¼S× G<K< ^c<" uÉ"ÖÄ ... S}~<|M:: ÁÁ[Ñ"<"U ¼ð[í ÝT uÉ"ÖÄ |"ÇÁ[Ñ"<
 kØpÖ~<|M... G<K<U }cMuªM ÄvLM:: G<K<U }Ç=e »uv Ñu<... Ñ>Ä`Ñ>e |xf LÄ }ku!::¹¹⁹

On Wednesday 2 Yäkatit 1913 E.C. Däjjac Kassa Seyum after he got permission to have entered a prostitute named Eyärusalém in to his room of detention, and after he made himself free from the quraña, by pretending to sleep, left the room leaving the woman behind in the empty room. On 5 Saturday Yäkatit [1913 E.C.] it was heard that he was caught by the countrymen in Bulga at Käsäm. He died on Monday 7 Yäkati with his four followers. He was killed after he was wounded on his chest by [a rifle named] Wejegra and on his neck by a spear. His corpse remained lying down on the ground for about four days, until people who went to the area, from Addis Ababa, identified that it was Däjjac Kassa's corpse. The followers of Däjjac Gétačäw who went there identified the corpse. Because he [Däjjac Kassa] was shot by a mesläné (government proxy) that any body who arrived before his death beat him up with stones. The shoes that he put on were foreign origin and were beaten while they were being worn. It is said that all [the dead men] were mutilated. All the corpses were, then, made to arrive at Addis Ababa and be buried at the church of St. George.

A letter from Empress Zäwditu to *Ras* Seyum, dated 7 April 1921, explains that although *Ras* Seyum chained up and sent his son to the central government because of his loyalty to the government, the central government refrained from sending *Däjjac* Kassa to the place of his detention and kept him at his sister's house with *Däjjac* (later *Ras*) Gétačäw so that he might be counselled, as he was the son of *Ras* Seyum. The letter further explains that the intention of the central government was to settle the problem with his father by peaceful means when *Ras* Seyum

was the friend of the Shewans and eager for power]. According to *informants* Ras Seyum did not, of course, chain and send his son to Addis Ababa to be killed¹²⁹ but his action was to express his loyalty to the central government by handing over his son.¹³⁰

My *informants* told me that intrigues were woven behind the escape and death of *Däjjac* Kassa.¹³¹ According to these *informants* there was a secret arrangement by some members of the central government, who had hatred against *Däjjac* Kassa, to pave the way for his escape from the place of his detention in the house of *Ras Gétačaw* and the assignment of people to intercept and kill him on his way.¹³² This was expressed by one of my *informants* as follows: #wəhØ' k+KAU-U:: ŃK=*U i'S<Mp 'wK< ŃK=*U əwSŃÇ= i'>RU 'kfK<\$¹³³ [They killed him by conspiring against him. Some made intrigues to let him escape from his place of detention and some others awaited and killed him in his way to escape]. *Aläqa* Kenfä's manuscript also supports the existence of an intrigue in the death of *Däjjac* Kassa.¹³⁴

Many of my *informants* informed me that *Däjjac* Kassa *Abba Yelaq* was portrayed as a sworn enemy of the "Shewans" and was being considered as a moving spirit of "Tigrean resistance against the Shewan hegemony in Tigray", by his supporters.¹³⁵ Hence, after *Ras* Seyum chained and handed over *Däjjac* Kassa to the central government, and more after his death was heard in Tigray, his supporters felt very sorrow and blamed *Ras* Seyum for handing over his son in exchange for his ambition for better post and favour from the central government.¹³⁶ Some of my *informants* are still sensitive about the handing over of *Däjjac* Kassa by *Ras* Seyum and express their feelings by saying #əQK=öU H>xU-U\$ [He [*Ras* Seyum] had handed him [*Däjjac* Kassa] over [to the enemy].¹³⁷

Tigrean elders seem to have different opinions and feelings towards *Däjjac̣ Kassa Abba Yelaq*. Many people, in Tigray, still admire the "bold" character of *Däjjac̣ Kassa Abba Yelaq*.¹³⁸ One of my *informants* informed me that "ገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ" [When his name [*Däjjac̣ Kassa's*] was mentioned market places were being disturbed]. The same *informant* states that *Däjjac̣ Kassa Abba Yelaq* ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ [He was disturbing all parts of Tigray].¹⁴⁰ Some people also related *Däjjac̣ Kassa Abba Yelaq's* character to that of Emperor Yohannes IV and *Ras Seyum's* character to that of *Ras Mängäša* by saying ገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ [Kassa [*Däjjac̣ Kassa*] as Kassa [Yohannes IV] Seyum as *Ras Mängäša*].

According to my *informants* the supporters of *Däjjac̣ Kassa Abba Yelaq* in Tigray, expressing and admiring his bravery, composed many popular verses. One of them reads as follows:

ገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ
 ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ¹⁴² —

*Hey, you made them frightened [though killed],
 Never mind, no one would spare his life from death.*

Many popular verses were also composed which fulminate against *Ras Seyum* for handing over his son and his subsequent death. Some of these verses read:

— ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ
 ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ¹⁴³

*You, the family of Ras Mängäša, how could you be cheated,
 Is your tomb dug in Shewa?*

ገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ ለገሰገሶ

œĀ'Ÿ[Ÿ<U" Éĵ "Ā œxα<U "Ā ^ŋc= S"Ŋh'
 }œc=aU 'k[ĵ œw œ"ϕu` œw+ ʰh'
 "<MÉ"É œc=" ĀeĀÉ'ĵ Tel"ħ:.¹⁴⁴

*Oh, Ras [Seyum] the fool, Ras [Seyum] the fool,
 Don't you remember that of your father's, Ras Mängäša's [fate],
 Who remained chained at the cave at Ankobär,
 How could one's son be sent chained for remembrance (of Ras Mängäša's fate)].*

^ŋc= eĵU œŋ ħ'
 "œv ĀLp "XĒ >c=" ĀcĀÉ "œ"<d'
 "Ā œx" ;'UMe ŋ]uK< 'Ā " _d"< "d:.¹⁴⁵

*You, Ras Seyum the fool,
 How can Kassa Abba Yelaq be chained and sent to Awsa,
 When he say that I shall restore my father's [throne], that of Wäresaw Kassa [Yohannes IV's].*

Mœ^ Éĵ QTS<
 SkK ŋ]KA HÇS<
 œŋ P"m "Æ ŸUÉS 146

*Should the blame [for hiding Lej Iyasu] be directed against the people of Arra,
 While his [Lej Iyasu's] escape was towards Mäqällä,
 You [Ras Seyum], who hung his son as a cat.*

CHAPTER FIVE

TIGRIAN CHIEFS' RIVALRY AND THE CENTRALIZATION PROCESS

5.1 The Centralization Process and the Fate of Tigrean Hereditary Chiefs

It is noted that Emperor Menelik II abolished the political organizations of the conquered people and put appointed governors (mostly war leaders who participated in the conquest of the southern provinces) in power. However, since Emperor Menelik had neither instituted organizational control nor developed modern means of communications for easy check upon newly emerged provincial chiefly families, most of them were in a position to resist later centralization process.¹

The political struggle that characterized Ethiopia from 1906 (when Emperor Menelik II fell ill) up until the death of Empress Zāwditu in 1930 weakened the central government and strengthened the grip of the various feudal lords on their provinces.² The *Rases* were more or less independent in the northern provinces and look up on themselves as kings owing scarcely more than lip-service to an emperor remote in the capital. They paid their own armies, maintain their own customs etc.³ The chiefs were allowed to rule the country with which their families had been associated until some misdeed or act of disloyalty brought deposition.⁴ *Ras Täfäri's* idea has been, therefore, to transfer authority from the old governors, ruling by privilege, to the elective representatives of the people, and to substitute the dues paid in kind to the local chiefs, to a system of taxation, in money instead of livestock and grain, to be paid directly to the capital. In the same way, officials were to receive their salaries from a national treasury instead of from the

provincial *Rases*.⁵ The period was, therefore, characterized by endemic struggle between the central authority and the regional chiefs, the former trying to subdue the various regions and the latter zealously guarding their autonomy and semi-independent existence.

Empress Zäwditu's heir, *Ras Täfäri* had been a leading centralizing figure whose power had grown constantly.⁶ During the period of Empress Zäwditu there were different attitudes towards the administration of the country. Thus, three different groups emerged. The most conservative elements headed by *Fitawrari Habtä-Gyorgis* stood for the maintenance of the old feudalistic structure of government. The progressive group, under the leadership of *Ras Täfäri*, had plans to break the power of the feudal governors in favour of centralized administration, while the faction led by Empress Zäwditu attempted to steer a middle course.⁷ But as these groups were almost equally matched in influence and following, none of them could succeed in achieving its goal. This situation, therefore, allowed the existence of strong provincial rulers with complete power over their subjects and territories.⁸

As heir to the throne, *Ras Täfäri* worked hard to lay the foundation of his power.⁹ The centralization of administration, which had both political and fiscal dimensions, was the corner stone of his policy.¹⁰ To succeed in his policy he had, therefore, to curb the power of the three traditional conservative elements (the church, the regional nobility and the military) which in the past had driven the country to the verge of civil war, or had even destroyed the political entity as in the early 19th C.¹¹

From 1926 onwards, after the death of the Minister of war, *Fitawrari Habtä-Gyorgis*, *Ras Täfäri* was left with only the Empress to oppose his reforms¹² and his position in the central

government was strong enough for him to openly orient his policy on centralization at the expense of the provincial warlords on selective modernization, and on the building of a new state machinery.¹³ Upon coming to power his main goals were to reform the government, modernize the army and police force. He wanted to bring the power of the central government to the provinces, and to follow a gradual clearing out of all the imperial favourites, who had no qualifications for governing except for their military prestige.¹⁴ By his policy, *Ras Täfäri* generally aimed at a systematic erosion of the power of the regional nobility, which he had accomplished from 1916 to 1935.¹⁵ Thus, during his years as regent and heir he demonstrated his political astuteness by pursuing a policy of modernization.¹⁶

On 7 October 1928 *Ras Täfäri* crowned *Negus Täfäri*¹⁷ and, on 2 November 1930, he was coronated Emperor: Emperor Haylä-Sellassé¹⁸ in the presence of the representatives of the countries such as Great Britain, Italy, France, Belgium, the USA, Germany, Japan, Holland, Greece, Sweden, Turkey, Poland and Egypt.¹⁹ Accession to Emperorship was, therefore, an important milestone in his process of introducing the policy of centralization.

On the Ethiopian side no untoward incident has marred the new Emperor's assumption to imperial power. All the provincial governors were summoned to Addis Ababa when *Negus Täfäri* was crowned Emperor. *Ras Gugsä Araya* and *Ras Seyum* have obeyed *Negus Täfäri*'s summons to come to Addis Ababa.²⁰ Almost all the important chiefs and governors attended, with their followers, the coronation ceremony.²¹ The rumours of possible trouble in the north against *Täfäri*'s coronation, therefore, proved unfounded.²²

The important chiefs such as *Ras Kassa*, *Ras Haylu*, *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsa Araya*, were all kept in Addis Ababa, after the coronation of *Negus Täfäri*,²³ until the constitution of 1931, which purported to strip of their powers in favour of the Emperor, was proclaimed.²⁴ Before the coronation it was confidently anticipated that *Ras Kassa*, *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Haylu* would be made kings. This, however, has not been eventuated.²⁵

Once he became emperor in 1930, Haylä-Sellassé began implementing the plan for reform and reconstruction. His basic strategy has been to extend central control gradually over the periphery, while allowing only very few and weak channels from the periphery to the centre so that to eliminate those hereditary chiefs or to limit their power considerably, thereby to concentrate power in his own hands.²⁶ The methods to achieve this goal include improving communications, introducing a regular standing army in place of provincial levies, closer administrative supervision and the shuffling of appointments, well all used to reduce the power of the governors, notably *Ras Seyum Mängäša* and *Ras Gugsa Araya* in Tigray²⁷ and *Ras Haylu Täklä-Haymanot* and *Ras Gugsa Wälle* in Gojjam and Bägémeder respectively.²⁸ For this reason he had risked offending the powerful *Rases*: *Ras Seyum*, *Ras Gugsa Araya* and *Ras Kassa* who considered themselves as possible claimants to the imperial throne.²⁹ They expected to be rewarded, as it was in the olden days, with crowns of their own. They expected that they would be made kings when *Negus Täfäri* was made king of kings (Emperor). But this was what the Emperor did not wish to see in the new Ethiopia, which he was envisaging. He wanted an end not an increase to the system of petty kingdoms proliferating over the country.³⁰

Having thus organized his army, the Emperor began to lay the legal foundation for his centralization scheme. The first thing he did with regard to this was the promulgation of a constitution whose sole purpose was the concentration of power in his own hands and to lay down the principle of imperial control.³¹ He sent messages to all the *Rases* to tell them that it would be formally signed in November 1931 and that their presence was, therefore, required in Addis Ababa to witness the signing of the constitution and also to take their place in the new House of Parliament as the first Senators of the Empire. This was the first move by the Emperor to attack the *Rases* on their ground and break up their feudal powers.³² The constitution of 1931 also confirmed Emperor Haylä-Sellassé's line as the only legitimate line, descended "without interruption from the dynasty of Menelik I, son of King Solomon of Jerusalem and of Queen Sheba".³³ The constitution, thus, gave the Emperor exclusive rights in various spheres of governmental activities, which heretofore were shared by the hereditary chiefs.³⁴ The parliament that was established by the constitution was also to serve as a means to the centralization programme. It was meant no more than a source of legitimacy for the laws made by the Emperor and to submit them for approval by the influential lords from the provinces that filled up the institution.

A Senate and a Chamber of deputies were established. The Emperor was to appoint members of the Senate from among the nobility who have for a long time served the country as princes or ministers, judges or high military officers. Not all the places were, however, immediately filled, but *Ras* Haylu, *Ras* Seyum, *Ras* Dästa and a few others were named soon afterwards. The chamber of deputies was also to be nominated, but "by the nobility and the local *šums* until the people were in a position to elect."³⁵ To further re-inforce his position Emperor

Haylä-Sellassé, therefore, appointed *Ras Seyum*, whom he trusted less than *Ras Gugsa Araya* to the Senate, in order to prevent him returning to Tigray.³⁶ Though the Senate existed in name, its functions were, however, nebulous, virtually every phase of the government being supervised and frequently directed by the Emperor.³⁷ The fact that the greatest nobility as well as local lords were both incorporated, by appointments to the Senate, emphasized the Emperor's need to try and keep them under his eyes in Addis Ababa, and so lessen their direct control in the provinces.³⁸ The government of Ethiopia, at the time was, therefore, to all intents and purposes a one man affairs.³⁹

The Imperial government of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé devised various checks and balance mechanisms to integrate Tigray to the evolving Empire. Although the Tigrean nobility could unite to defend the province against the centralization process, they were often divided among themselves.⁴⁰ The Tigrean noble's internal divisions were also encouraged by the Shewans so that they could achieve an internal balance and prevent any of Emperor Yohannes IV's descendants from becoming the *negus* (king) of Tigray. Emperor Haylä-Sellassé attempted to undermine Tigrean autonomy by dividing authority in the province between two rival descendants of Yohannes IV: *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsa Araya*.⁴¹ The Emperor has broken the power of the old nobility as an independent political force suggesting that the province be administered by paid officials appointed by the central government.⁴² The central government, therefore, reduced Tigray to a semi-autonomous buffer region, but it has never been able to fully control it or deprive its leading families of their centuries old supermacy. As a result the central government had to depend on local leaders and continue the ancient practice of building political loyalty through dynastic marriages in Tigray.⁴³ In some cases the nobility was bought off by

titles or assignments to diplomatic posts. In other cases the nobles were raised to the powerless rank of Senator and compelled to remain in Addis Ababa under the watchful vigilance of the government and far from their regional backers.⁴⁴

In his reign as Regent and Emperor, Emperor Haylä-Sellassé steadily undermined the power of the traditional forces and promoted the authority and bureaucratic apparatus of the central government. Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, unlike Emperor Minelik II, therefore, succeeded in centralizing political power so well that his personal writ ran untrammelled from the palace down to the *Čeqašum*, the lowest organ of government authority.⁴⁵ The church, the regional nobility and the military all have yielded to the inexorable political pressure from the centre.⁴⁶ This was, nevertheless, completely fulfilled after 1941 when the Emperor succeeded in fashioning a modern bureaucracy, armed force, police and a security branch. The Emperor thus routed the regional ruling houses.⁴⁷ The imperial force directly under the control of the Emperor became stronger than the regional armies, and became an instrument of the state. The nobility lost its original character as a military aristocracy. Thus centralization that began during the era of Emperor Tewodros II was nearly completed during the reign of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé.

5.2 The Attitude of the Tigrean Rival Chiefs to the Revolt of *Ras* Gugsä Wälé and to the Public Trial of *Ras* Haylu Täklä-Haymanot.

The year 1930 was critical for *Ras* Täffäri. The Ogaden was in disorder and in the autumn of 1929 there was a serious rising of the peoples of Raya Azäbo⁴⁸ and the Afar.⁴⁹ The northern *Rases* also took advantage of the situation to defy the central government. *Ras* Gugsä

Wälé who ruled Bägémeder and who had long been a thorn in the side of *Ras Täfäri* rebelled. *Ras Seyum* in Tigray and *Ras Haylu* in Gojjam also proved disloyal to the government.⁵⁰

Ras Gugsa Wälé, Queen Zäwditu's husband, felt much aggrieved at *Ras Täfäri*,⁵¹ collected an army and was prepared to march on the capital in a bid for the throne⁵² abetted by the Italians in Eritrea and by *Ras Haylu* and *Ras Seyum*.⁵³ *Ras Haylu* sent him some two hundred pack animals as a token of sympathy.⁵⁴ *Ras Haylu* and *Ras Seyum* proved disloyal to the central government by showing sympathy to *Ras Gugsa*. Endowed with great guile than *Ras Gugsa Wälé*, *Ras Haylu* and *Ras Seyum* urged him to a confrontation⁵⁵ and were standing by ready to give support to the revolt. Ultimately both were bought off before the insurrection even got under way.⁵⁶

Ras Gugsa Araya and *Ras Seyum* were invited to cooperate against the rebellion of *Ras Gugsa Wälé* by the central government. But they moved very slowly to respond to the request of the Emperor.⁵⁷ According to the Italian Consul, P. Franca, the attitude of *Ras Seyum* towards the rebellion of *Ras Gugsa Wälé* was that of "indifference". On one hand he wanted to do his best to be seen faithful in the eyes of *Negus Täffäri* and on the other hand he was slowly mobilizing his forces to get time to see the result of the conflict to give support to *Ras Gugsa Wälé*.⁵⁸ As regards to *Ras Gugsa*, who has long been counted as *Täfäri*'s man but frictions have lately arisen over his mistreatment of his wife (the niece of *Ras Täfäri*),⁵⁹ an evidence that he had secretly promised help to *Ras Wälé* was also discovered,⁶⁰ although Erlich wrote that *Ras Gugsa Araya* had proved his loyalty to the future Emperor.⁶¹ *Negus Täfäri* sent the War Minister, *Ras Mulugéta*, north and dispatched an aeroplane, the first to be used in Ethiopia, to the region.⁶² *Ras Gugsa* was killed

after his troops had been dispersed by the bombs and machine-guns of the French biplanes.⁶³ By the end of March 1930 the rebellion was over.⁶⁴ The defeat and death of *Ras Gugsa Wälé*, at the Battle of Ančäm on 31 March 1930,⁶⁵ was followed by the appointment of *Ras Kassa Haylu*, *Negus Täfäri's* relative and most trusted confidant as governor of Bägémeder.⁶⁶

As the province of Bägémeder had become under the control of the central government with the fall of *Ras Wälé*, the Emperor's campaign against the provincial autonomy seemed to be approaching success in the north. When the war was over *Negus Täfäri* was careful to express gratitude to all who had aided him and was specially generous in his praise of *Ras Gugsa Araya* and *Ras Seyum Mängäša*, although he can have harboured few illusions concerning the part which they had played in the war against *Ras Gugsa Wälé*.⁶⁷ From that time onwards *Ras Seyum* had gradually come round to the side of *Negus Täfäri* by understanding that the introduction of progressive ideas in Ethiopia can hardly be resisted and was, in fact, the country's only hope of preserving its independence.⁶⁸

At the same time *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsa*, both once again in Addis Ababa, found another opportunity to express loyalty to the Emperor. The opportunity was furnished by the public trial of *Ras Haylu Täklä-Haymanot*, the hereditary prince of Gojjam, for engineering the escape of *Lej Iyasu* from prison.⁶⁹

Negus Täklä-Haymanot of Gojjam and *Ras Mikael* (*Lej Iyasu's* father), it is said, were in good terms. *Ras Haylu* who knew very well this relation, won the friendship of *Ras Mikael* by being one of those who initiated the idea that *Ras Mikael* be crowned *Negus*. During the short reign of *Lej Iyasu*, *Negus Mikael's* friendship proved valuable to *Ras Haylu*.⁷⁰ *Ras Haylu's* eldest

daughter, *Wäyzäro Säbläwängél*, had been married to *Lej Iyasu*.⁷¹ When she was divorced from *Lej Iyasu* she had been sent back to her father and brought back with her the only child of the marriage (a daughter).⁷²

When in 1916 *Negus* Mikael attempted to bring back to power his deposed son, *Lej Iyasu*, *Ras Haylu* promised to line up with him against the *coup* makers. At the last moment, probably realizing the hopelessness of the task, he, however, chose to remain neutral. But as his intentions were not secret he incurred the enmity of the new occupants of power at the centre, particularly that of the Regent, *Ras Täfäri*.⁷³

After the coronation of *Täfäri* as Emperor *Haylä-Sellassé*, of the powerful Ethiopian nobles who were forced to submit to the constitution, *Ras Haylu* was not prepared to give in without a fight.⁷⁴ *Ras Haylu* discontented by the centralization process was engaged in secret dealings with such powerful rulers as *Ras Seyum* of Tigray and *Ras Gugsä* of *Bägémeder* in an effort to strengthen his position and be rewarded the title of *Negus*. He complemented this with the amassing of wealth through the imposition of various types of taxes and levies on his subjects.⁷⁵ It was even said that he had established contact with the Italians, probably through their consulate at *Däbrä-Marqos*.⁷⁶ It was true that *Ras Haylu* was accustomed to show much autonomy in his own territorial administration and had on several occasions ignored orders from *Ras Täfäri*.⁷⁷ Angered by the act of the Emperor, for taking away of the district of *Agäw-Meder* from him, *Ras Haylu* engineered the escape of *Lej Iyasu* in 1932 from *Fečé*,⁷⁸ hoping to have him back to power,⁷⁹ and thereby achieve his goal of becoming *Negus* of *Gojjam*, *Agäw-Meder* and *Damot*.⁸⁰ His actions were, however, discovered that he was implicated in the escape

of *Lej Iyasu* from prison and was arrested and punished his contumacy with disinheritance and to life imprisonment, in April 1932.⁸¹

Emperor Haylä-Sellassé was then at liberty to appoint his own officials over Gojjam and proceed with his scheme of centralization.⁸²

Gojjam, which was ruled from the 18thC by its own dynasty and which had been enjoying a certain degree of autonomy in its internal administration⁸³ became, after the imprisonment of *Ras Haylu*, the governorate-general under a direct appointee of the Emperor, *Ras Imeru Haylä-Sellassé*.⁸⁴ Most of the governors under *Ras Imeru* were direct appointees of the central government, both from Shewa and Gojjam, depending upon the allegiance they showed to the Emperor.⁸⁵ The year 1932, therefore, marked the end of dynastic rule in Gojjam with the fall of *Ras Haylu Täklä-Haymanot*, the last dynastic ruler of Gojjam. Gojjam, therefore, became, in the words of Christine Sandford, one of "the model provinces" of administrative reforms of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé.⁸⁶

Although *Ras Haylu* and *Ras Seyum* had a firm friendship,⁸⁷ both *Ras Gugsu Araya* and *Ras Seyum* did their best to praise the Emperor and to condemn *Ras Haylu* as a traitor deserving capital punishment.⁸⁸ There were, however, rumours that *Ras Seyum* would shortly receive the fate of *Ras Haylu*.⁸⁹ The Emperor meanwhile exploited the situation in two ways. He appointed his most trusted man over Gojjam and he further strengthened his position by taking care to publicize *Ras Seyum's* association with *Lej Iyasu* and *Ras Haylu*.⁹⁰

5.3 Emperor Haylä-Sellassé's Centralization and *Ras Seyum-Ras Gugsu* Rivalry

After the death of *Ras Sebhät*, in 1914, until both *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* and *Ras Gugsa* died in the early thirties, they and *Ras Seyum* were involved in constant political machination to influence the central government to grant one of them overlordship of the whole province.⁹¹ *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsa*, both being the grand-sons of Emperor Yohannes IV and of course considered themselves legitimate claimants to the governorship of Tigray and possible claimants to the imperial throne, remained rivals to the end.⁹²

The rival regional chiefs in Tigray were in need of having the title of *Negus*. It laid with the Emperor to confer the title of *Negus* which was not heritable.⁹³ Emperor Yohannes IV crowned Menelik and Täklä-Haymanot *Neguses* of Shewa and Gojjam respectively.⁹⁴ *Lej Iyasu* crowned his father, *Ras Mikael*, *Negus* of Wällo and Tigray.⁹⁵ Empress Zäwditu also gave the title of *Negus* to *Ras Täfäri* and *Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis*.⁹⁶ Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, however, in conformity with his policy of centralization and his desire to curb the power of the hereditary chiefs has refused to give the title of *Negus*, thereby disappointed some regional governors in the country and was able to prevent any one of the descendants of Emperor Yohannes IV from becoming totally supreme in Tigray.⁹⁷

By the time of *Negus Täfäri*'s coronation as Emperor Haylä-Sellassé the only two remaining candidates for supremacy over Tigray were the two grandsons of Emperor Yohannes IV. These were *Ras Gugsa Araya* and *Ras Seyum Mängäša*.⁹⁸ Except in one episode, in 1902 and 1903, when they fought *Däjjäč Abreha Araya* at Āddi-Šum-Dehun (near Mäqällä)⁹⁹ and when they joined hands to invade *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé*'s territory in Adwa and Šerä,¹⁰⁰ *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsa* remained sworn rivals to the end.¹⁰¹ When Emperor Menelik's heir, *Lej Iyasu*,

competed against the central government, *Ras Seyum* was favourable to *Lej Iyasu*. Following *Lej Iyasu's* defeat *Ras Seyum* was slow to discern the growing power of *Ras Täfäri*. *Ras Seyum* failed to surrender *Lej Iyasu* when *Lej Iyasu* was trying to find shelter in his territory, and was consequently to spend most of the 1920s as an exile in the capital. *Gugsa Araya* in contrast was made *Ras* (in February 1918) by the central government, with which he continued to ally himself during the 1920s.¹⁰² Having married the niece of *Ras Täfäri*, *Yäšašwärq Yelma*, in 1921,¹⁰³ he captured *Lej Iyasu* and handed him over to the future Emperor.¹⁰⁴

Ras Täfäri considered *Ras Seyum* as a threat. At a time when many of the powerful nobles were merely awaiting a suitable opportunity to unseat him, *Ras Täfäri* decided to make a tour of the Near East and Europe, and the problem of his authority being undermined in his absence was met by the expedient of splitting his rivals and taking the most dangerous of them to Europe with him. Thus when *Ras Täfäri* sailed to Djibouti in April 1924 his entourage included *Ras Seyum Mängäša*, *Ras Haylu*, *Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé*, etc.¹⁰⁵ *Ras Haylu* was known to be obsessed with the idea of becoming *Negus* of Gojjam, as a step towards becoming Emperor and *Ras Seyum*, a grand-son of Emperor *Yohannes IV*, was also suspected of having ambitions towards the occupation of *Ras Täfäri's* seat.

There were, however, different opinions about the reason why *Ras Täfäri* wanted *Ras Seyum* to accompany him in the tour. Powell and Rey explain that *Ras Täfäri* was advised and warned that his enemies would almost certainly seize the opportunity offered by his absence from the country to plot against him and the proposed journey (tour) might quite conceivably result in his deposition.¹⁰⁶ *Ras Tafari*, therefore, according to the words of Powell, "invited the

more dangerous of his enemies to accompany him—a tempting invitation which, as they know full well, it was not safe to refuse."¹⁰⁷

Although some other sources tried to explain that *Ras* Seyum's accompaniment of *Ras* Täfäri in his tour to Europe as a reflection of his importance and influence at the central government¹⁰⁸ and as *Yäkber Täkätay* (a dignity's follower),¹⁰⁹ considering the political situations at the time it seems, however, correct to think that *Ras* Täfäri wanted *Ras* Seyum to accompany him, in his tour, because he had suspected him of rebellion, and found it necessary to watch and keep *Ras* Seyum close to him.¹¹⁰ Not entirely sure of his position, *Ras* Täfäri after his coronation as Negus was again accompanied on his trip of convalescence by *Ras* Seyum and *Ras* Haylu, in January 1928, when he was ordered by a doctor to go to Djibouti for a chance of air when he suffered from a bad attack of influenza.¹¹¹

In 1926 having married into the Shewan elite by espousing in 1926 *Wäyzäro Aṣädä* Asfaw (his first wife had died in 1924/25) *Ras* Seyum was, however, reinstated over western Tigray with Adwa as his capital.¹¹²

On 14 April 1930, *Nigus* Täfäri ordered the two Tigrean rival chiefs to report to Addis Ababa for the coronation. The coming of *Ras* Seyum and *Ras* Gugsa to the capital for the coronation together with the practically all the other important chiefs of the country¹¹³ was a most obvious sign of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé's supremacy. Belatedly understanding the situation, *Ras* Seyum ordered (in his absence) a huge ceremony to be held in Adwa on coronation day, at which speeches flattering the new Emperor were to be made.¹¹⁴

Beyond the symbolic importance of the chiefs' coming to the capital, the occasion served Emperor Haylä-Sellassé practically. The two Tigrean chiefs and many of the other provincial chiefs were forced to stay until the proclamation, on 16 July 1931, of the country's first modern constitution (which was in itself a step towards centralization at the expense of their power).¹¹⁵

Ras Seyum and *Ras* Gugsa Araya signed the constitution of 1931. The signing of the constitution implies the acceptance and confirmity, by the signators, of Emperor Haylä-Sellasse's line as the only legitimate line descended from the dynasty of Menelik I, and the weakening of the position of the regional nobility, since its primary aim was to lay down the principles of imperial control over local and central government. *Ras* Seyum, *Šum Tämben* Gäbrä-Mädhin and *Däjjäč* Kassa Sebhat were made members of the Senate, by which the Emperor wanted to watch and keep close to him in Addis Ababa and weaken their direct control and influence in the province.¹¹⁶

Meanwhile in Tigray itself, the Emperor started exploiting the absence of *Ras* Seyum and *Ras* Gugsa to strengthen his indirect control of the central government. In June 1931 a postal service was established in Western Tigray.¹¹⁷ In October 1931 the Emperor's Consul in Asmara, *Nägadräs* Wädajo Ali, was given imperial right to re-organize the Tigray customs and to control its monopoly of alcohol.¹¹⁸ More significantly he was also given jurisdiction over the Holy City of Aksum, which had been previously under *Ras* Gugsa's jurisdiction. While the two chiefs were in the capital, the Emperor also exploited the fighting that broke out between the followers of the two chiefs, in their absence, and used it as an opportunity through out the 1930s to send various

envoys to take charge of Aksum. Another important event was the appointment of an Amhara, *Abunä Yesaq*, as a bishop to the province.¹¹⁹

It was only in November 1931 that *Ras Gugsä* was permitted to return to Tigray, after accepting that his deputies be appointed by the Emperor.¹²⁰ On his way back to Mäqällä he passed as usual through Asmara, but this time he started building friendly relations with the Italians. *Ras Gugsä Araya*, renowned in the 1920s for his anti-Italian attitude, was changing his orientation in the face of Emperor Haylä-Sellasse's growing centralism.¹²¹

Meanwhile, *Ras Seyum*, as one of the chiefs of Tigray, was competing with his contemporaries to get favour and influence with in the central government. *Ras Seyum* who was also indecisive like his father, *Ras Mängäša*, competed with other chiefs until he held a superior post to theirs. It was the desire of the chiefs to be superior over their countrymen even if they were under the control of the central government.¹²² *Ras Seyum* was, however, confined to the capital unable to return to Adwa. Aware of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé's suspicions he now did his utmost to prove his loyalty. He made sure that information from Adwa on the coronation of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé as well as on any ceremonies and speeches praising the Emperor would be published in the newspaper, *Berhanena Sälam*.¹²³

Ras Seyum and *Ras Gugsä Araya* were always members of opposing factions. From the fact that both *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsä* were descendants of Emperor Yohannes IV there sprung a deadly personal rivalry, each of them did not want to accept one another as supreme, both politicaly and military.¹²⁴ Their bickerings were sources of great anxiety to Emperor Haylä-Sellassé which at once had realized were a great safeguard to him. While he was anxious that

they should not combine against him, and to that extent was glad of their rivalry, it was a great hindrance to his plan for reform that the two governors would never co-operate.¹²⁵ The co-operation and unity of *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsu* was desired neither by the central government nor by the Italians since both wanted to secure their rule without any opposition in the area.¹²⁶ The Emperor, however, never broke faith with either of the rival chiefs or allowed one to grow stronger at the expense of the other. Yet in all the intrigues, which surrounded him he always managed to think one move ahead of his opponents.¹²⁷ He, therefore, appointed the two cousins each governor of one half of the province of Tigray. *Ras Seyum* was given control of western half of Tigray while *Ras Gugsu* took the eastern half.¹²⁸

Ras Gugsu and *Ras Seyum*, then, knew that their chances to become *Negus* and real masters in Tigray lay in the hands of the central government. The two rival chiefs, therefore, attempted to gain popularity and influence in the central government in different directions and to win the favour and support of the government at the expense of one another.¹²⁹ Each one of them was watching one another's activity for a chance to out bid each other in demonstrating loyalty to the central government. But their loyalties had several times shifted as a result of palace manoeuvres. If one of them received any mark of friendship from either the Emperor or his opponents, the other immediately made overtures to the opposite. Thus, it was never possible to be certain on which side either of the Tigrean chiefs was to be found, while the presence of Italy in the background added yet another imponderable, to what was already an impossible tangled problem.¹³⁰

On 25 September 1932, the Emperor ordered the two Tigrean chiefs to return to their respective territories in Tigray.¹³¹ *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsa* were the only hereditary chiefs, in the empire, left in practical control of the province of Tigray at this time.¹³² Both were also closely connected to the Emperor by the marriage of their children.¹³³ The ostensible reason for their departure was said to be primarily due to the desire to represent the Emperor in receiving the king of Italy during his visit to Eritrea, should he decided to visit the Ethio-Eritrean frontier during his forthcoming stay in Eritrea.¹³⁴ *Ras Gugsa* and *Ras Seyum* had been, however, sent back to their provinces not only to greet the king of Italy on the frontier but also to be present there with large armed force to show the Italian king that Ethiopia had large army.¹³⁵

While *Ras Gugsa Araya* had only been in Addis Ababa for a few months, having come here for the wedding of his son to one of the Emperor's daughters, the departure of *Ras Seyum* has of interest in as much as he had been in Addis Ababa uninterruptedly since before the coronation of Emperor Haylä-Sellässé.¹³⁶ The fact that the Emperor had allowed both the Tigrean *Rases* to leave Addis Ababa might be taken as an indication of the fact that he had felt that their loyalty was not so open to suspicion at that time.¹³⁷ It is also hardly conceivable that the Emperor would have allowed them to depart if he had not been sure of them.¹³⁸ It could also be gone further to say that by the two marriages which had been taken place, between their children, the Emperor had held pawns for their good behaviour.¹³⁹

Emperor Haylä-Sellässé in his centralization process, unable to impose an effective centralization over Tigray, had paid some attentions to the hereditary position of Tigray which was ruled by the two grand-sons of Emperor Yohannes IV, *Ras Gugsa Araya* and *Ras Seyum*,

and where opposition and rebellion was most likely to appear.¹⁴⁰ He attempted to achieve an internal balance of power and finally succeeded in preventing any one of Yohannes IV's descendants from becoming *Negus* without resorting to force but through flexible diplomacy and marriage connections.¹⁴¹ Although *Ras* Gugsa and *Ras* Seyum represented traditional provincialism, Emperor Haylä-Sellassé felt that their mutual opposition effectively neutralized their threat to him.¹⁴² The attempt by the descendants of Emperor Yohannes IV to influence the central government to grant one of them the overlordship of the whole province or any one to be supreme in the province was not, therefore, succeeded.¹⁴³

Although Tigray was not affected directly by centralization, at least her hereditary chiefs now seemingly had strong interest in the constructed marriage connections. The Tigrean chiefs had, therefore, maintained some sort of political autonomy from the central government up to the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian war, though they did not have the power of absolute decision over Tigrean affairs.¹⁴⁴ Tigray had, therefore, remained largely outside the direct administration of the central government until 1935.¹⁴⁵ Unfortunately, for Ethiopia, this preservation of traditional patterns invited foreign involvement that the system was too weak to withstand.¹⁴⁶

5.4 Tigrean Chiefs' Rivalry and the Marriage Connections with the Leading Members of the Central Government

Marriage connection was an ancient practice and was one of the significant factors in the creation of close affinities between the important families and for the building of political loyalty in the reign of Emperor Menelik II. It was often used by political leaders to enlist the support of outstanding personalities as part of their general policy of pacification and consolidation. It was

equally regarded by the notables as a means of winning the favour of their superiors and of strengthening positions already held, as well as of acquiring and maintaining economic benefits. The outcome, nevertheless, was not always satisfactory.¹⁴⁷ Attempts were, therefore, made to tie the Tigrean chiefs with the Shewan ruling house through the traditional mechanism of marriage alliances, in the period under discussion.

Emperor Menelik II married off his daughter, Zäwditu, to the son of Emperor Yohannes IV, young Araya-Sellassé, in October 1882, for political reasons,¹⁴⁸ while she was about six and a half years old.¹⁴⁹ Emperor Yohannes IV tried to put a stop to the continual trouble by marrying his son to the daughter of Emperor Menelik II. By this marriage it was hoped to establish a strong dynasty has not Zäwditu's husband, Araya-Sellassé, died in 1888.¹⁵⁰ This, however, made the marriage alliance useless and the strife be continued.¹⁵¹

Many of Emperor Menelik's previous marriages were prolific, but none of the male offsprings survived. The question of succession was, therefore, a subject of endless speculation and prediction. After his coronation Emperor Menelik also arranged several marriages, probably hoping thereby to secure the throne through the increased loyalty of some of the notables as well as by getting a grand-son as a successor. He, for instance, recognized a twenty-three years old girl, Šäwarägga, as his daughter and married her off to *Ras* Mikael in 1892.¹⁵²

Following 1892, Emperor Menelik II himself did not appear to have been very active in marital politics. However, his wife Empress Taytu brought the art to a new peak of refinement. She raised a few of her kinsmen, the most outstanding being *Ras* Wäle, *Ras* Gugsä Wäle, to high political positions and created a network of conjugal and blood affinities through out the

Empire.¹⁵³ As a result *Wäyzäro* Käfäy, daughter of *Ras* Wälé and niece of Empress Taytu, was married to *Ras* Mängäša Yohannes, following the latter's submission in 1893,¹⁵⁴ after he was made to divorce his former wife, *Wäyzäro* Tafäsäč.¹⁵⁵

In June 1903, when *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé went to Addis Ababa he was welcomed by Emperor Menelik II and established strong and lasting relationship with the Emperor.¹⁵⁶ Recognizing the importance of *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé and as an expression of his affection Emperor Menelik offered *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé *Wäyzäro* Amaräč, one of his grand nieces,¹⁵⁷ the daughter of *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis,¹⁵⁸ although she was still the wife of *Däjjac* Damté¹⁵⁹ and was the mother of a daughter of seven years old.¹⁶⁰ *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé married *Wäyzäro* Amaräč by divorcing his former wife, *Wäyzäro* Mäsäläč,¹⁶¹ the mother of *Lej* Täklä-Haymanot Gäbrä-Sellassé and *Däjjac* Yohannes.¹⁶² According to Annaratone, Emperor Menelik II called *Wäyzäro* Amaräč and said:

*Tu lascerai tuo marito e la tua bambina ed andrai sposa di deggiacc Gabra Sellasse, mio governatore del Tigre. Dono a te questo segno della mia alta imperiale attenzione e benevolenza mettendoti a lato del capo di una cosi grande, ricca e potente regione.*¹⁶³

You will leave your husband and your daughter and you will marry Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé, my governor of Tigray. I offer this to you as a sign of my high imperial attention and benevolence in putting you at the side of a chief of such a big, rich and powerful region.

This infact indicates to us how much Emperor Menelik needs Gäbrä-Sellassé's friendship either to secure his rule in Tigray or some other reasons.

In 1909 *Däjjac* Abreha Araya was also married to an eleven years old girl, Yätmañu, niece of *Ras* Mikael.¹⁶⁴ In May 1909 *Lej* Iyasu was also married to a six years old daughter of

Ras Mängäša Yohannes and *Wäyzäro Käfäy Wäle*, named *Segé-Roman Mängäša* who was renamed *Aster Mängäša*, latter on.¹⁶⁵ This and other marriages were made in order to mollify Tigray and to represent her hereditary family in the court, in case, *Lej Iyasu* succeeded Emperor Menelik II to power.

Even after Empress *Taytu* was stripped of her power, her methods of rule continued to be practiced. *Ras Täsämma*, and subsequently *Lej Iyasu*, followed her policy and techniques in the formation of alliances to strengthen their power. *Lej Iyasu* himself also took the daughter of *Ras Haylu*¹⁶⁶ and then confirmed his father-in-law in the governorship of Gojjam.¹⁶⁷

When *Ras Täfäri* became regent *Ras Seyum* was ambitious of a marriage arrangement between his son, *Däjjäč Kassa Abba Yelaq*, and *Ras Täfäri's* daughter, *Tänañawärq*.¹⁶⁸ *Ras Seyum* had, therefore, asked *Ras Täfäri* in 1917 for the marriage arrangement between *Däjjäč Kassa* and *Tänañawärq*.¹⁶⁹ It was, however, by ignoring the marriage arrangement that *Däjjäč Kassa Abba Yelaq* rebelled in 1918.¹⁷⁰ Even after he started his rebellion there were efforts to quell the rebellion, by calling *Däjjäč Kassa* to give up his rebellion in return for the marriage arrangement.¹⁷¹ This, however, did not deter *Däjjäč Kassa* from his rebellion. Thus the marriage arrangement was not practically implemented due to *Däjjäč Kassa's* refusal.¹⁷²

Wäyzäro Yäšašwärq Yelma, grand-daughter of *Ras Mekonnen*¹⁷³ was also married off to *Ras Gugsä Araya* in 1921.¹⁷⁴ *Ras Gugsä* divorced off his wife *Gäzačēñ Gäbrä-Hiwät*, who was from *Samrä-Säharti*¹⁷⁵ and married to *Wäyzäro Yäšašwärq Yelma*. He, however, divorced her and they did not have a child from the marriage.¹⁷⁶

In 1926 *Ras Seyum Mängäša* was married to *Wäyzäro Aṣädä Asfaw*,¹⁷⁷ who was the daughter of the grand-son of *Negus Sahlä-Sellassé*: *Asfaw Dargé Sahlä-Sellassé*,¹⁷⁸ after the death of his wife, *Täwabäč Mikael* in 1925.¹⁷⁹

After Empress *Zäwditu's* death, Emperor *Häylä-Sellassé* found himself with the same problem that had exercised the mind of Emperor *Menelik II*: how to keep peace with the descendants of Emperor *Yohannes IV*. The two claimants to the overlordship of Tigray were the cousins, *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsä Araya*. Both were in addition possible claimants to the Imperial throne. From this fact a deadly personal rivalry and the scramble for provincial positions has sprung and complicated their relations, which Emperor *Haylä-Sellassé* at once realized was a great safeguard to him.¹⁸⁰ He has also better acquainted with the situation in the country than to think about trying to further humiliate *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsä*. Understanding the growing tendency of the Italians to achieve subversion, Emperor *Haylä-Sellassé* found it advisable to endeavour to reach at a constructive compromise with *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsä* to be achieved by an old Ethiopian political tradition to bind two of the families of Emperor *Yohannes IV* to him through intermarriages.¹⁸¹ Emperor *Haylä-Sellassé's* awareness of the potential trouble and anger from Tigray by *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsä*, due to the depriving of their legitimate patrimony made him to placate them by marriage alliances to the Shewan family by bonds of matrimony.¹⁸² As a result, marriage alliances were arranged by the Emperor to build a sort of compromise between him and the descendants of *Yohannes IV* through the marriage of his two children to the children of the two grand-sons of *Yohannes IV*.¹⁸³ In joining the Emperor with marriage alliances the Tigrean chiefs must have expected higher offices and other similar appointments by the Emperor.

On 5 May 1932, in a European-style royal ceremony, the Crown Prince Asfa-Wäsän wedded to *Ras* Seyum's daughter *Wäyzäro Wälätä- Israel*.¹⁸⁴ The speeches made on the occasion emphasized the significance of the event.¹⁸⁵ Asfa-Wäsän was the officially proclaimed heir, thus the house of Yohannes IV was again to have a share in the Emperorship. Emperor Haylä-Sellassé was said to be paying an old Shewan debt: in 1882 Yohannes IV had married his son Araya-Sellassé to *Negus* Menelik's daughter, Zäwditu.¹⁸⁶ The fact that the bride groom, Asfa-Wäsän, was a sixteen-years old boy¹⁸⁷ and the bride (who was the widow of *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé) already had two children,¹⁸⁸ did not bode well for the future of the marriage. Nevertheless it was supposed to lay the future constructive coexistence between the Tigrean chiefs and the Emperor.¹⁸⁹ According to Mosley, this marriage arrangement was:

*... a piece of dynastic calculation which took no consideration on the Prince's feeling or, of course, of Seyum's daughter. The idea was to bind the whole of Tigray close to the Emperor and to Shewa.*¹⁹⁰

By marrying his daughter to the Crown Prince, *Ras* Seyum looked forward to the advantages of sharing a grand-child with the Emperor, and hoped that if ever there was going to be a Tigrean *Negus*, he would be the man.¹⁹¹

Ras Gugsä felt defeated and humiliated because of the marriage of *Ras* Seyum's daughter to the Crown Prince and asked the Emperor for a marriage of his daughter to his son, *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä.¹⁹²

Many of my *informants* informed me that Emperor Haylä-Sellassé (*Ras* Täfäri at that time) had promised *Däjjäč* Kassa Sebhat (governor of Āgamä after 1914) for an engagement with his daughter, Zänäbawärq,¹⁹³ while both the couples were in their childhood. Knowing this

well but due to his eagerness to bind his son with the daughter of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, *Ras Gugsa* decided to make an intrigue to have the promise for marriage arrangement between the son of *Ras Sebhat* and the Emperor's daughter futile.¹⁹⁴ According to the *informants*, *Ras Gugsa*, therefore, went to *Däjjac̣ Kassa Sebhat* well prepared for the intrigue that he wanted to make, and "advised" him against the promised marriage and told him that he would, instead, give him his own daughter for marriage, uncommon to the existing custom that a girl's family asked the boy's family for marriage arrangement.¹⁹⁵ *Däjjac̣ Kassa*, according to the same source, as an expression of his respect to *Ras Gugsa* and as it was not the custom of the period to refuse accepting such an offer from a "respected family" such as *Ras Gugsa*, replied in the affirmative.¹⁹⁶ *Ras Gugsa*, therefore, made *Däjjac̣ Kassa Sebhat*, immediately, sign for his acceptance of the marriage arrangement. Having the signed document *Ras Gugsa* went to the Emperor and asked him for his daughter's hand for a marriage to his son, Haylä-Sellassé *Gugsa*.¹⁹⁷ According to the *informants*, when the Emperor replied that he had no daughter which he could give him for marriage to his son, *Ras Gugsa* asked for Princess *Zänäbawärq*.¹⁹⁸ When the Emperor told *Ras Gugsa* that he had already promised *Däjjac̣ Kassa* for a marriage with her, *Ras Gugsa* replied that *Däjjac̣ Kassa* had already made an arrangement for a marriage with his daughter and showed to the Emperor the document which was signed by *Däjjac̣ Kassa* for the marriage arrangement with the daughter of *Ras Gugsa*.¹⁹⁹ The *informants* further state that annoyed by the action of *Däjjac̣ Kassa* the Emperor allowed for a marriage arrangement to be made between his daughter, Princess *Zänäbawärq* and the son of *Ras Gugsa Araya, Däjjac̣ Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa*.²⁰⁰

As evidence of complete equality between the chiefs (*Ras Gugsa* and *Ras Seyum*) and to further stabilize the situation by maintaining the balance of power in Tigray the Emperor's

CHAPTER SIX

THE TIGREAN CHIEFS' RIVALRY AND ITS IMPACT ON ITALIAN INVASION OF ETHIOPIA

6.1 General Italian Policy on Ethiopia

Different sources attempt to explain the Ethio-Italian relations and the role this relation played to the internal rivalries. After the Battle of Dogali the Italians resorted to diplomacy, and in their attempt to make Ethiopia an Italian protectorate, tried to exploit Tigrean-Shewan rivalries for power.¹ After their defeat at the Battle of Adwa the Italians had briefly followed a policy of *retrenchment* in relation to their colonial interests in North-East Africa,² although they never forgot the ignominy of their defeat.³ Italy under Prime Minister Marchese di Rudini reduced her colonial budget by more than half and renounced her policy of expansion which was energetically being followed by Francisco Crispi. These changes, however, did not last long that the Italian changing policies and the *love-hate* relationship with Ethiopia reoccurred at different times.⁴

The Italian policy makers, after the Battle of Adwa, faced a major dilemma between the contradictory options in their relation with Ethiopia. The first was an orientation towards Ethiopian Emperors, aimed at achieving Italian strategic goals in Ethiopia through diplomacy (pacific approach) and in co-existence with the centralization process in Ethiopia. This policy was identified as a *Shoan Policy (Politica Scioana)*.⁵ The other option was a more aggressive design: the policy of subversion in the north which was identified as a *Tigrean policy (Politica Tigrina)*, since Tigray was the main target of this policy.⁶ *Politica Tigrina* was aimed at creating buffer zones between Italian positions in the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia's centre by encouraging

provincialism; to promote decentralization through subversion⁷; and encouraging Ethiopian power game and making it an instrument for Italian influence and penetration.⁸

The Italian Colonial Governor of Eritrea and the Colonial Office were the supporters of the *Politica Tigrina*.⁹ Antonio Baldissera¹⁰ and later Corrado Zoli were doing their best for the subversive option.¹¹ Corrado Zoli was also supported by Emilo De Bono (A Minister of Colonies), himself dedicated to *Politica Tigrina*.¹² The *Politica Scioana* was being followed by the Italian Foreign Ministry and the Italian Legation in Addis Ababa.¹³ Pietro Antonelli¹⁴ and Giuliano Cora, the Italian Foreign Minister to Ethiopia from 1926, pursued the *Politica Scioana*. According to Erlich, Cora saw *Ras Täfäri* a leader who deserves Italian support for his centralization process in the fields such as communication and banking, which culminated in the friendly agreement signed between Italy and Ethiopia, on 2 August 1928. Patrino Di Manchi, who replaced Cora in 1930, also followed the same line until his dismissal in 1932.¹⁵

A more significant aspect of the history of Tigray was the rivalries of the sub regional chiefs and warlords over the whole province. They wanted to maintain their hereditary position vis-a-vis the central government and strengthen their hold and influence over their followers through co-operations with the Italian authorities in Eritrea. Indeed, particularly all the prominent post Mätäma Tigrean chiefs, at one stage or another, joined hands with the Italians seeking alliance or aid against the central government or against their local Tigrean rivals. This was an important aspect of the then existing Ethiopian political reality. It was also a means for the Tigrean rival chiefs to fulfil their old aim of becoming undisputed rulers of Tigray.¹⁶

In the northern provinces of Ethiopia (Tigray, Bägémeder and Gojjam) the long standing feudal rivalry between the hereditary chiefs and the central government was rekindled and manipulated by the Italians, whereby many of the rival chiefs, at one time or another, capitulated to the Italian interests in their bid to restore power taken away from them by the central government.¹⁷

As his main interest lay, of course, in Tigray, Corrado Zoli, a sworn fascist governor of Eritrea, was doing his best to build subversive options backed by the Minister of Colonies, Emilio de Bono, himself a dedicated follower of *Politica Tigrina*. As a result, Corrado Zoli tried to promote relations with *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsa*. In April 1930 when they passed through Asmara, on their way to *Negus Täfäri's* coronation ceremony in Addis Ababa, he tried to smooth the relation between *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsa*. This was in order to pave the way for his policy of *Politica Tigrina*.¹⁸ The Italians were equally embarrassed by the rivalries of *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsa Araya*, for it was quite clear to the Italian authorities in Eritrea that the refusal of the two chiefs of Tigray to act together in any way would be a great hinderance in the penetration either peacefully or militarily, of the province in the Eritrean border. If one of the chiefs was to be won over by the Italians, for instance, that would be sufficient to make the other their implacable enemy. It was, therefore, good policy on the part of the Italian governor at the port of embarkation to attempt reconciliation between the two lords (*Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsa*).¹⁹

As part of the policy of *Politica Tigrina* Corrado Zoli played a part in fomenting the revolt of *Ras Gugsa Wällé*²⁰ and the Italians in general played a role to trigger off an uprising in Tigray

and other parts of Ethiopia so as to precipitate the fall of the Emperor and the Ethiopian Empire.²¹

The two Italian policies (*Politica Tigrina* and *Politica Scioana*) in Ethiopia competed with each other, though the emphasis was sometimes shifting towards one or the other.²² The period from 1927 upto 1932, however, saw the apex of the confusion of the *Politica Tigrina* and *Politica Scioana*. In the early 1932 Italy, however, had abandoned her policy of *Politica Scioana* instead adopted the policy of subversion. Paterno Di Manchi was called to Rome and was not replaced until 1933.²³

The emphasis on the policy of subversion, according to Erlich, was due to the growing of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé's centralization and modernization policies which would not tolerate fascist Italian interests.²⁴ By his centralization, Emperor Haylä-Sellassé wanted to change Ethiopia's traditional political fluidity and to stop the constant competition between the centre and the various provincial chiefs which facilitated foreign penetration.²⁵ The desire of the Italians for an exclusive economic monopoly, and using Ethiopian territory to unite Italian-Somaliland with Eritrea by means of railways; and their encouragement for a separate development of Eritrea, apart from Ethiopia were also the interest of the Italians.²⁶

Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Colonies were, therefore, asked to prepare reports assessing the options in the horn. In 1932 De Bono, who was to play an important role in shaping Italy's policy, left for the region. His report made a strong case for intensive subversion.²⁷ Benito Mussolini recommended an intensive subversive activity to be conducted under the co-ordination of a Political Office, centred at the Addis Ababa Legation,

and an Intelligence Office co-ordinating activities of the various Italian consulates at Adwa, Dässé, Däbrä-Marqos, Deré-Dawa and Gondar. The primary agents of the policy of Italian penetration were the Italian consuls in Ethiopia. They acted on the orders of an especially constituted political bureau, under the supervision of the Italian Military High Command in East Africa. The head of the Ufficio Politico [Political Bureau] was Colonel Vittorio Ruggero who until 1934 had been the military attaché in Addis Ababa.²⁸ Centers for Italian activities were located throughout the Empire. The Italian consulates opened at various times, in the early 20th c., in Adwa, Däbrä-Marqos and Dässé, played an important role in this policy of subversion, as well as in the gathering of vital political and military intelligence.²⁹ Wherever there was a record of discontent and wherever it seemed that chiefs or native population would be susceptible to bribes or promises, there the Italians sent their propaganda.³⁰ Greenfield also explains that Italy had appointed many consuls and agents in places where there was no even a single Italian or any reason for their presence.³¹ These people carried on intensive propaganda, and a vital political and military intelligence activity and stir up feelings in different parts of the country, against the central government.³² Italian propaganda by encouraging separatism and playing on local antagonism, inherent in Ethiopia, to the central government also offered a vision of a free, richer life under Italian rule. Above all the Italians tried to make sure that provincial chiefs would not lead their people against Italy and the outlying inhabitants would not join the arms raised by loyal *Rases* to support the Emperor's guerrilla force in a war with Italy.³³

The Italians aware of the ethnic and religious divisions, that christian Eritreans were Tigreans and not Amhara, worked to their benefit as they encouraged the separate development of Eritrea apart from Ethiopia.³⁴ For about thirty years, before the fascist invasion of Ethiopia in

1935, the Italians, therefore, assiduously wooed the Tigrean chiefs to prepare the ground for the former's invasion of Ethiopia, in Tigray.³⁵

6.2 *Ras Gugsä and the Italians*

Tigray was one of the main targets of the Italian policy of subversion³⁶ due to the *Adwa Complex* (Stemming from Italy's 1896 defeat by Ethiopia on Tigrean soil, any further war with Ethiopia must begin with an invasion of Tigray,³⁷) and the existence of the weakest link in the Emperor's chain of command. The Italians, therefore, worked hard to woo the Tigrean chiefs.³⁸ *Ras Gugsä Araya*, especially, has been assiduously courted by the Italians, as he ruled one of the northern areas on which they had their eye, but his dislike and mistrust of the Italians was too deep in the period up to the end of the 1920s.³⁹

Ras Gugsä Araya, renowned in the 1920s for his anti-Italian attitude was changing his orientation in the beginning of the 1930s, in the face of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé's growing centralism.⁴⁰ From the beginning of the 1930s he had been friendly with the Italians, and until his death in 1933 the Italians counter-balanced the rivalry between him and *Ras Seyum Mängäša* by supporting *Ras Gugsä Araya*.⁴¹ *Ras Gugsä* had started improving his relations with the Italians in Asmara after the coronation of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé.⁴² The need of *Ras Gugsä Araya* for the establishment of relations with the Italians can be understood from one of the letters written to him by Riccardo Astuto, Eritrean Governor, on 9 February 1932.⁴³ (Refer to Appendix XII).

In early 1933 *Ras Gugsä Araya*'s health deteriorated. This enabled him to develop his relations more with the Italians in the open, through their medical services.⁴⁴ An Italian Physician, Dr. Piero Lecco, arrived at Mäqällä on 17 February to take care of *Ras Gugsä* and

stayed with him until his death in 1933.⁴⁵ In his letter to Riccardo Astuto, dated 18 *Meyazya* 1925 E.C (in about the last week of April 1933), *Ras* Gugsä Araya explained the role the Italians played to save his life through their medical service and he had expressed his gratitude to Riccardo Astuto for letting Dr. Piero Lecco to treat him.⁴⁶ The content of *Ras* Gugsä's letter to Riccardo Astuto can be seen at Appendix XIII. Dr. Lecco had also submitted a very long report to the Eritrean governor explaining about the treatment he made to *Ras* Gugsä and about *Ras* Gugsä's plan to ally himself with the Eritrean governors.⁴⁷

6.3 The Death of *Ras* Gugsä and the Continuation of the Rivalry between *Ras* Seyum and *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä.

Ras Gugsä Araya named his son, *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä, his heir just before he died of syphilis on 26 April 1933.⁴⁸ *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä, reasonably, expected that he would succeed his father especially as he was the Emperor's son-in-law. The Emperor no longer thought of him as worthy of great trust after the death of his daughter (Princess Zänäbäwärq) that he did not confirm *Ras* Gugsä's deathbed nomination of his son as his heir.⁴⁹ The Emperor was similarly opportunistic to use *Ras* Gugsä Araya's death to continue his relentless programme of centralization of authority.⁵⁰ The Emperor called *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä to Addis Ababa first to look him over and he must have been also strongly tempted by his coarse manners to disinherit him.⁵¹

Ras Gugsä's death, therefore, upset the balance on which the Emperor's Tigray arrangement rested. *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä was no match for *Ras* Seyum. After the death of Princess Zänäbäwärq, the Emperor at once began to favour *Ras* Seyum.⁵² *Däjjäč* Haylä-

Sellassé journeyed to Addis Ababa and asked for the extension of his territory and for his father's title of *Ras*, but without success.⁵³ A full year of intrigue was, therefore, to pass after the death of *Ras* Gugsa, before the Emperor could make a decision concerning the territories of the late *Ras*.⁵⁴ *Ras* Gugsa's territories had been Āgamä, H_uramat, Gär'alta, Abärgällä, Saḥarti, Seläwa, Bora, Indärta, Keltä-Awla'llo and Inda-Mäḵoni.⁵⁵ After the death of *Ras* Gugsa the two Tigrean chiefs (*Ras* Seyum and *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé) tried to undermine each other's position and gain the Emperor's favour. *Ras* Seyum wanted to be offered the whole of the province while *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa worked to obtain, at least, his father's territories. Members of the Central government, however, worked to persuade the Emperor to weaken both *Ras* Seyum and *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa and install elements of modern administration over Tigray. The Emperor, nevertheless, believed that only traditional leadership could work in Tigray. Of the two rivals the Emperor, however, seemed at first to favour *Ras* Seyum. Meanwhile *Ras* Seyum and *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé started the campaign of defamation, which was customary in such situations.⁵⁶

At this condition, *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa thought that he could gain what he wanted by flattering the Emperor on the one hand and secretly building an Italian option on the other hand. In June 1933, still in Addis Ababa, he wrote confidentially to the governor of Eritrea, Riccardo Astuto, and asked to purchase a house in Asmara.⁵⁷ The Italians considered this a step of great significance and finally *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa was secretly permitted to buy a house in Asmara.⁵⁸ On the other hand *Ras* Seyum was also doing his best to prove his loyalty by making speeches flattering the Emperor as the greatest and most enlightened modernizer, and by demonstrating strong anti-Italian feelings and policy. He, however, remained suspect by the

central government that through out 1933 and the first half of 1934 the Emperor sent all sorts of agents to spy on *Ras Seyum*.⁵⁹

The Emperor's distrust of *Ras Seyum* and *Däjjäč Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä* continued to grow.⁶⁰ *Ras Seyum* and *Däjjäč Haylä-Sellassé* were in general great worry to the Emperor that *Lej Tädlä Haylä* was sent, in August 1934, to visit Adwa, Aksum and Mäqällä and to spy against *Ras Seyum* and *Däjjäč Haylä-Sellassé*,⁶¹ who were accused of establishing cordial relations with the Italians against Ethiopia at that time.⁶² And, on 14 March 1935, a special envoy was also arrived at Aksum from Addis Ababa. This envoy was *Nägadras Wädajo Ali*,⁶³ the former Ethiopian Consul in Asmara and later the Director of the Municipality of Addis Ababa.⁶⁴ *Nägadras Wädajo Ali*, who was a sworn enemy of *Ras Seyum*, was to settle in Adwa and assume imperial responsibility over the whole range of matters. These include political affairs connected to relations with Italy, the telephone and other communications with Addis Ababa; imperial taxes, management of local schools, propaganda in Eritrea among Tigreans and in Tigray itself in order to promote understanding with the central government, control of war materials and finally general supervision over internal affairs including receiving complaints of the population-in the name of the Emperor.⁶⁵

Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, in the face of growing Italian threat, thought nothing of trying conclusions with Tigray's traditional leadership. He, therefore, agreed in May 1934 to make *Ras Seyum*, Emperor Yohannes IV's only surviving grand-son, governor of Tigray in return for the central government's administrative control over the province's finance.⁶⁶ After hesitating for a long time he also made *Ras Seyum* Military Commander of the whole province, in May 1934,⁶⁷

and enlarged his territory by adding Aksum, Bora, Seläwa, Haramat and Gär'alta at the expense of *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä.⁶⁸ On the ground that he was too young and inexperienced to deserve more *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé was officially appointed governor of eastern Tigray on the condition that he would acknowledge his uncle, *Ras* Seyum, as his overlord⁶⁹: a subordination that infuriated him. This appointment include his governorship over the territories of Indäarta, Āgamä, Inda-Mäkoni, Wäjjarat and Azäbo. In times of war he was to be under *Ras* Seyum's command.⁷⁰ *Däjjac* Kassa Sebhat was also appointed over Keltä-Awla'llo, under *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä.⁷¹ The appointment of *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä over Āgamä might be the cause for the worsening of the relations between him and *Däjjac* Kassa Sebhat at this time.⁷²

Although *Ras* Seyum's financial and economic prestige remained unchanged the new arrangement had increased his political and military prestige in Tigray and in the central government.⁷³ *Ras* Seyum, however, lost Sälämt⁷⁴ which was given to the governor of Wälqayet.⁷⁵ Sälämt had been, until then, under the administration of *Ras* Seyum.⁷⁶

The political game, in Tigray, was now open again and this time with Italy's purposeful and intensive interference.⁷⁷ The rivalry of *Ras* Seyum and *Ras* Gugsä ended only in *Ras* Gugsä's death in 1933 was, therefore, perpetuated by *Ras* Gugsä's son, *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä, after *Ras* Gugsä's death.⁷⁸

In early May 1934 *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä came to Addis Ababa and visited Conto Vinci.⁷⁹ As usual he demonstrated his high cordiality and friendship to the Italians. He expressed his discontent of the Emperor's offer of some of his father's territories to *Ras* Seyum and needed their return.⁸⁰ He further expressed, to Conto Vinci, his being discontented of the Shewans for

their control of all the activities of the country, even in the peripheries, where there were intelligent, educated and able men who could bring good results in the administration of the country.⁸¹

On 27 May 1934 *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa also arrived at Asmara, unknown to the representative of the Ethiopian Consul in Asmara, and at the night of 28 May 1934 met secretly with Governor Astuto of Eritrea.⁸² At this time he also declared that he wanted to ally himself with the Italians at the footsteps of his father.⁸³ According to the Italian source,⁸⁴ Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa made a long conversation with Astuto and decided to put himself in the service of the Italians and to be loyal to their orders.⁸⁵ *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa in his conversation also told Astuto that in his stay in Addis Ababa he had understood that Emperor Haylä-Sellassé was purposely fomenting hatred among him, *Ras* Seyum and *Däjjäč* Kassa Sebhat aimed at creating total anarchy in Tigray and when their administration collapsed the Emperor would install Shewans over Tigray.⁸⁶ According to the report of Astuto, *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa wanted to collaborate with the Italians and take orders from them to prevent the *calamity*.⁸⁷

The fact that Aksum, Bora, and Seläwa, which had belonged to his father, were given to *Ras* Seyum Mängäša after *Ras* Gugsa's death; the fact that he was not allowed to inherit his father's title of *Ras* while his rival, *Ras* Seyum, was elevated above him (*Ras* Seyum's appointment as a Military Commander of Tigray) and was more frequently consulted than he was when decisions were taken, made *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa to feel humiliated and became envious of *Ras* Seyum and mistrustful of the Emperor.⁸⁸

Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä asked the Emperor for an increase in his rank and possessions in Tigray and was tartly told that he had proved a bad enough governor of what he had already held, and must learn to rule before he could expand his horizons.⁸⁹ From the moment of this refusal *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé was greatly irked by the treatment he received at the hands of the Emperor⁹⁰ and went over to the Italians.⁹¹ As quoted by Mosley, Marshall de Bono wrote of *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä:

Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé] Gugsä was the son-in-law of the Emperor, but he was a mal-content. The Emperor... had deprived [Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé] Gugsä of a good part of his territories in order to increase the power of Ras Seyum; hence there was little sympathy between the two chiefs of Tigre; indeed there was positive if not manifest enmity. Our intelligence agents and the whole personnel of the consulate at Adwa wisely took advantage of this state of affairs to win [Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé] Gugsä to our side [Italian side].⁹²

The Italians took advantage of the rivalry between *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä and Ras Seyum to worsen the bitterness, which *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä had developed against his father-in-law. The interest of the Italians in Tigray and the fact that *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä was favourably inclined to them made them believe that after his submission other chiefs from nearby places would follow, attracted by high salaries and *honours*.⁹³ It was also Italy's interest to be able to document the defection of chiefs, to show Europe that Italy was not occupying Ethiopia, but "liberating it" from feudalism, and eliminating slavery.⁹⁴ *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä was, therefore, important to the Italians not only because he had held the rank of *Däjjac* but also he was the great grand-son of Emperor Yohannes IV and the son-in-law of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, therefore, presumably a figure of the first importance.⁹⁵ The policy of making direct contact with those *Rases* and notables who bore some grudge against the Emperor, like

Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé, was, therefore, intensified by the Italians on the eve of their invasion of Ethiopia.⁹⁶

Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa came several times to Addis Ababa between 1933 and 1935 to ask the Emperor for an increase of his territory. The Emperor, however, refused on the ground that he had not yet shown capacity to govern what he had.⁹⁷ *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé found it more convenient and comfortable to make the journey northwards by way of Eritrea rather than southwards over Ethiopian territory. From the Eritrean frontier the Italian consul in Mäqällä arranged for him to be sent by car to Asmara, where he was being treated as an honoured guest.⁹⁸ The treatment he received in the hands of the Italians and his imagined slight at the Emperor's court made *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé an easy prey to the Italian promises of high reward for his cooperation.⁹⁹ Although how much the Italians paid for *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa's defection was not known the Italians hoped to manipulate him as an Italian puppet for propaganda purposes, with in and out of Ethiopia.¹⁰⁰

Shortly after his arrival at Asmara to take over the fascist command, De Bono also began receiving letters from *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa complaining of his lowly position in the Ethiopian ranks and asking him for instruction as to his mode of conduct.¹⁰¹ Until the attack against Ethiopia actually began De Bono discouraged, according to his words quoted in Mosley, "...any impulsive act, any premature move, which would have broken the eggs before we [the Italians] were ready to make the Omelette".¹⁰² De Bono recommended *Däjjac* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa to keep quite; to show himself apparently obedient and reconciled; until the day, which was to come soon, when he would give him categorical instructions.¹⁰³

Ras Seyum with his wife *Le'elt Aṣädä* Asfaw, arrived at Asmara on his way from Addis Ababa to Adwa, by February 1928, and expressed his interest of having cordial relations with the Italians and his animosity with *Ras* Gugsä.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, *Ras* Seyum's attitude towards the Italians had never been constant. The undecided character of *Ras* Seyum in his loyalty to the Emperor and in his need for establishing relations with the Italians¹⁰⁵ could be seen in the letter he wrote to Riccardo Astuto on 23 *Meyazya* 1925 E.C. [about the beginning of the month of May 1933].¹⁰⁶ P. Franca wrote about the attitude of *Ras* Seyum, on 16 August 1934, as follows:

*...Il suo [Ras Seyum's] atteggiamento verso di noi allora é stato come attualmente, cordiale senza sincerita, pauroso e sostenzialmente ostile per quanto desideroso di evitare ogni conflitto diplomatico.*¹⁰⁷

His behaviour towards us was, and is still, cordial without sincerity, fearful and basically hostile, although desirous to avoid any diplomatic conflict.

The Italians had also tried to counter-balance *Leul Ras* Seyum by supporting *Ras* Gugsä first, and his son *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä, after the death of *Ras* Gugsä.¹⁰⁸ With regard to *Ras* Seyum, as quoted by Greenfield, de Bono writes:

*... [Ras Seyum] declared his loyalty to the Emperor but he was not really sincere, and was always undecided in his ideas. In his character he was a precise reflection of his father [Ras Mängäša]. Unknown to the central government, we were still exchanging greetings in February and March [1935] and he had accepted a present which I had to his little boy.*¹⁰⁹

The letters which *Ras* Seyum wrote to Orazio Luigi Vinci, on 7 April 1934, asking for a debt of about 5,000 *Birr*, and, on 7 May 1934, expressing his happiness for being appointed over Aksum, Bora, Seläwa, etc, show the type of relation existed between the Italians and *Ras* Seyum on the eve of the Italian invasion on Ethiopia.¹¹⁰ (For the letters refer to Appendices XIV and

XV). *Ras Seyum* who was nibbling at the political Bureau was also promised by the Italians, according to Greenfield, to offer him the Ethiopian throne if he would fight against the central government in support of the Italians.¹¹¹ This offer if done, could, however be, aimed not more than creating their own puppet.¹¹²

6.4 *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa's Defection to the Italians

Two weeks before the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, *Nägadras Wädajo Ali* visited *Mäqällä*, and from there he had flown to Addis Ababa. He reported to the Emperor that *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa was in the pay of the Italians and was concerting revolt with the Italian consulate at *Mäqällä*.¹¹³ Emperor Haylä-Sellassé asked him for a proof and *Nägadras Wädajo Ali* produced bank receipts for deposits made by the Italians into the account of *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa.¹¹⁴ Still the Emperor did not believe that one of his chiefs was planning treachery. "Most of my *rases* take money from the Italians", the Emperor said, "It is bribery without corruption. They pocketed Italian money and remain steadfast to Ethiopia".¹¹⁵ Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, therefore, refused to believe the story and considered the King's man (*Wädajo Ali*) jealous of *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa. The Emperor as a result did not act against *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa.¹¹⁶ The Emperor who had once decided that *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé was good enough to be made a *Däjjazmač* and his son-in-law and being the descendant of Emperor Yohannes IV, who was the enemy of the Italians, could not possibly be a traitor though there were rumours of his correspondence with the Italians and his feeling of being discontented.¹¹⁷ In relation to *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa, Emperor Haylä-Sellassé in his autobiography wrote as follows:

which *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa and his army of about 10,000 men would hold Mäqällä while the army of *Ras* Seyum, further north, would gradually fall back and join them, so that they could fight together against the Italians.¹²¹

Däjjäč Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa, on the other hand, had been waiting for an opportunity when he could secure the governorship of all Tigray.¹²² He also wanted to lead his army against his rival in Tigray, *Ras* Seyum Mängäša, should that wily chief actually take the field.¹²³ He hoped to obtain feudal precedence but at the hands of the Italians. The Italian invasion was, therefore, an opportunity he did not want to miss. Believing that he would be able to gain the diminished traditional rights and prerogatives of his family, *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa, therefore, became the first Ethiopian to defect to the Italians in 1935.¹²⁴ Although he did not defect to the Italians, one of my *informants*, *Fitawrari* Iyasu, had been one of the followers of *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa with his father, *Šum-Seläwa* Tässäma, when he defected to the Italians. *Fitawrari* Iyasu and *Haläqa* Bärhé informed me that *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa told his followers that he had decide to defect to the Italians and fight against the Shewan *supermacy*. Hence, he called on all his loyal followers to follow him to the Italian side,¹²⁵ and made one of his followers, named Haylu Tämbén, to make the following poem to incite hatred against the central government and attract many followers.¹²⁶

ḂSÄ Ḃ=Ḃ<U ḂÇ= ÄÍ ÉUí<'
 SnwḂḂ<U gª }H>í<'
 Mœf<'UuÄ ḂḂÄ M'í<'
 ÄÑ>U ḂḂKÄ äTḂf ḂḂí<'
 ÄÑ>U ḂḂKÄ U ḂḂf uíwi<'
 MÑwḂ<'UuÄ ḂḂÄ M'í<:..¹²⁷

Ultimately, on the afternoon of 11 October 1935 *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä with only about 1,200 men and eight machine guns reached the Italian out post at Idaga Hamus¹³² and joined the Italians there.¹³³ Many of his followers did not accept the idea of defecting to the Italians and fought against the Italians as patriots during the war.¹³⁴

The original plan for his defection had been that he would be seen loyal to the Emperor and make no move and stay in Mäqällä until the actual battle for the town began, by which time he could have been joined by *Ras* Seyum's army and his betrayal would have spread chaos, collapses and dismay along the whole of the Ethiopian front. But *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä had learned of Wädajo Ali's visit to the Emperor and believed that his fate was sealed. He waited until the Italians had begun their attack and then marched northwards and joined them.¹³⁵

The effect of *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä's defection was to leave a vacuum behind *Ras* Seyum into which he was sucked. This gave Mussolini a big propaganda victory for which he was waiting. Adwa was occupied, on 6 October 1935,¹³⁶ and the shames of 1896 revenged.¹³⁷ Next come Aksum, occupied on 15 October 1935. From the Italian military point of view *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä's defection opened the road to Mäqällä that it was occupied by the Italians on 8 November 1935.¹³⁸ Italian entry into Ethiopia was, therefore, greatly facilitated by the defection of *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé.¹³⁹ *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä's action gave Mussolini a virtually bloodless propaganda victory, and its moral effect, though less than had been hoped for, was to cause several of the minor chiefs in Tigray to submit without a fight.¹⁴⁰ *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä was later made, by the Italians, *Ras*.¹⁴¹ The defection of *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä probably had negatively affected the morale of some Ethiopians who wanted to fight and

produced an adverse effect in the military situation.¹⁴² *Däjjazmač* Käbädä Tässämmä wrote about *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä's defection and its effect as follows:

. . . ufÓ_U ÁÍTᵣ ḂÄKYLc? Ḃ<Ód ḂSĚSJÁ"< u` LĀ " < }wKA ḂU'f }ØKAuf dK ¾fÓ_ ÖpLĀ Ó³f uS<K< ḂM)cÖ~U uTKf }kÁT> J• ĀG<" "ĀU uK?L Uᵣ"Áf ĀG<" ḂÄḂ"pU ŸÜ\ Ó"v` LĀ Ÿ"ḂÄa‡ ḂĚ,, KÖLf ḂS"" u\ " ;ōf ḂÉ`Ô ÖLf" ḂeḂv"<.:¹⁴³

. . . While it was thought, and believed on, that *Däjjazemač* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä was in the forefront [of the battle] in Tigray [against the Italians], either because of having some grudges for not being given to him the administration of the whole Tigray, or because of another unknown reason, he defected to the side of the enemy [Italians] with his soldiers and opened the way, for them, in to the interior and allowed the enemy to penetrate deep into the interior [part of the country].

General De Bono notified Rome of *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä's defection to the Italians,¹⁴⁴ and his defection was hailed, in Rome, as an event of great significance, auguring the dissolution of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé's empire.¹⁴⁵ But it was greatly exaggerated so that *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä's men became 10,000 in number.¹⁴⁶ Later it became to be recognized that the military significance of the defection was comparatively slight. The number of men said to have deserted with him dwindled even in the Italian versions to about one thousand, while it was estimated on the Ethiopian side as roughly two hundred.¹⁴⁷ But, even though *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä had only succeeded in persuading a few of his men to desert, this was even undoubtedly important to the Italians because he was the Emperor's son-in-law.¹⁴⁸ European opinion was, however, that the defection which was clearly pre-arranged, probably represented the beginning of an attempt on the part of the Italians to push the claims of a rival dynasty and eventually to set a puppet king in Tigray.¹⁴⁹ *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsä was rewarded and

appointed as Governor of the whole Tigray by the Italians.¹⁵⁰ He was also given the title of *Ras*.¹⁵¹

Ras Seyum led the army from Tigray in person during the war and as a loyal supporter of the Emperor fought resolutely against the Italians before submitting to their rule.¹⁵² It was clear, at that time, that if *Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé was to be on the Italian side *Ras* Seyum would fight against them to the last drop of his blood.¹⁵³ In September 1935, when the Italians crossed the Märäb River *Ras* Seyum fought them at a place known as Da'iro Täkli, near the Märäb, where he had stationed his men. *Ras* Seyum was helped by *Däjjäč* Maru of Tämbén and *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Mädhin of Šerä at the fighting with his about 16,000 men.¹⁵⁴ The determination which *Ras* Seyum and his followers showed at the fighting and their final defeat, mainly due to the lack of logistics and ammunitions was expressed, at that time, by the following poem:

ÁÍ'Ṭṛ Ñ/ŠÉI" ṽμU "Ç= i[
 Ā°Ó>'K"< Ue aw"M::
 Ñ/ŠÉI" i[ÁÍ'Ṭṛ XIK'
 ØĀf c>'<'Uu` S[w UcÑf:..¹⁵⁵

Däjjazmač Gäbrä-Madhen of Šerä,
 Is fighting against [the war] plane,
 Gäbrä-Madhen of Šerä and *Däjjazmač* Sahlä,
 Had it not been for lack of bullets he [they] might have crossed [the River] Märäb.

After the Italo-Ethiopian war the only available survivor was *Ras* Seyum.¹⁵⁶ Since the restoration, the Emperor has kept him at Addis Ababa, presumably because he did not feel able to trust him to return to Tigray, though it was understood that he was the titular governor general of Tigray.¹⁵⁷ After an abortive effort to put in a Shewan governor, he was duly confirmed as the

governor of the whole province and remained as such until his death. It is relevant to notice that he was succeeded by his son, *Leul Ras Mängäša Seyum*, who remained governor until mid 1974.¹⁵⁸

CONCLUSION

In the period under discussion one can easily find out that the socio-political conditions of Tigray were unchanged from the last quarter of the 19th C. Rivalries between the same families still continued. The main chiefs who were quarrelling one against the other were *Ras Sebhat*, *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé*, *Ras Gugsä* and *Ras Seyum*, which their number was, later on, reduced to only potential and principal families that were equally influential and mutually hostile: *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsä*. The continuous efforts to gain the title of *negus* of Tigray, and the rivalries among the ambitious rival Tigrean chiefs became a major factor affecting the courses of events and relation with the central government in the period under discussion.

The gravity of the conflict and the situation in Tigray had an effect on the rest part of the country. The cooperation and unity of the hereditary chiefs of Tigray were, however, desired neither by the central government nor by the Italians since both wanted to secure their rule without any opposition in the area. When the ambitious Tigrean rival chiefs compete one against the other the central government did what it could to achieve an internal balance of power among the leading chiefs, and devised various checks and balance mechanisms in order to integrate Tigray in to the evolving empire, although their bickering were sources of great anxiety to the central government. Hence the central government succeeded in preventing any one of Yohannes IV's descendants from becoming *negus* of Tigray, although the Tigrean chiefs saw the central government's centralization and modernization process as a plan devised to deprive them of their traditional rights. The emperor, therefore, undermined the Tigrean chiefs' ambition to become *negus* of Tigray by dividing authority in the province between the two rival descendants of Yohannes IV: *Ras Seyum* and *Ras Gugsä*. He appointed the two cousins each governor of one

half of the province of Tigray. He also broke the power of the nobility as an independent political force by suggesting that paid officials appointed by the central government administer the province. The central government, therefore, reduced Tigray to a semi-autonomous buffer region but it has never been able to fully control it or deprive its leading families of their centuries old supremacy. As a result the central government had to depend on local leaders and continued the ancient practice of building political loyalty through marriage ties with the rival Tigrean chiefs. In some cases the nobility was also bought off by titles or assignments to diplomatic posts. In other cases the nobles were raised to the powerless rank of senator and compelled to remain in Addis Ababa under the watchful vigilance of the central government and far from their regional backers.

A more significant aspect of the history of Tigray was also the strategic location of the region and the Italian interest in promoting Tigrean autonomy from Ethiopia, and the Tigrean rival chief's desire to maintain their hereditary position and strengthen their hold and influence over their followers through cooperation with the Italian authorities in Eritrea. Almost all the rival Tigrean chiefs at one stage or another, attempted to join hands with the Italians by seeking alliance or aid against the central government or against their local Tigrean rivals as a means to fulfill their old aim of becoming undisputed ruler of the region to be legitimized by obtaining the title of *negus* from the emperor. The attempts of the Tigrean rival chiefs to join hands with the Italians by seeking alliance or aid against the central government was not however aimed at the separation of Tigray from Ethiopian or was not a modern sense of Tigrean nationalism or regionalism. It was rather a means of obtaining promotion at home within the framework of the

Ethiopian political power game. This political game in Tigray had, therefore, contributed much to the Italian aggressive policies in the 1930s.

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

- ¹ Zewde Gabre Sellassie, Yohannes IV of Ethiopia: A Political Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 284.
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- ³ Tsegay Berhe, *A History of Agame: 1822-1914* (M.A. Thesis in History, A.A.U., 1996), pp. 151-152.
- ⁴ Zewde, pp. 284-285.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁶ Mekonnen, p. VII.
- ⁷ H.G. Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia 1844-1913 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 215-217.
- ⁸ Mekonnen, p. 4.
- ⁹ Gäbrä-Hiwot Baykădañ (*Năgadras*), *Aşé Menelikna Etyopya*, pp. 6-8; Mekonnen, p. 5.
- ¹⁰ Gäbrä-Hiwot, pp. 5-6.
- ¹¹ Mekonnen, pp. 7-13; Tsegaye, p. 154.
- ¹² Haggai Erlich, Ras Alula and the Scramble for Africa, A Political Biography: Ethiopia and Eritrea 1875-1897 (Asmara: The Red Sea Press, 1996), p. 144; Bairu Tafla, *The Political Crisis in Tigray: 1889-99* Africa, V. 34, No. 1-2, 1979, p. 114.
- ¹³ Mekonnen, pp. 7-13; Tsegay, p. 154.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 18.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 75.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*

- ¹⁷ Marcus, The Life . . . , pp. 215-217; Märs'e-Hazän, p. 40.
- ¹⁸ Tsegay, p. 165.
- ¹⁹ Täklä-Şadiq Mäkurya, YäEtyopya Tarik Kä Asé Téwodros Iskä Qädamawi Haylä-Sellassé (Addis Ababa: Täsfa Printing Press, 1952 E.C.), p. 135.
- ²⁰ Marcus, The Life . . . p. 216.
- ²¹ Mekonnen, p. 94; Täklä-Şadiq, p. 135.
- ²² Tsehay Haile, *A Short Biography of Dajjazmach Gabre Sellassie Barya Gabir (Abba Kibad): 1873-1930* (B.A. Thesis in History, A.A.U. 1972), p. 13.
- ²³ Ferdinando Martini, Il Diario Eritreo. Volume I (Firenze: 1946), p. 333; Mekonnen, p. 104; Tsehay, p. 7.
- ²⁴ Martini, Il Diario . . . V.I, p. 435.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*
- ²⁷ *Ibid*, volume II, p. 381;
- ²⁸ Täsfayohannes Berhanä (*Däjjazmač*) *Tenš YäHiwät Tarik Mastawäša*, (NALE: M.S. No 20/01/1), p.2.
- ²⁹ Tsehay, p. 16
- ³⁰ Hadera Tesfay, *Ras Seyum Mangesha: 1887-1960* (B.A. Thesis in History, A.A.U., 1976), p.2; Mekonnen, p. 98.
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- ³² Mekonnen, p. 98.
- ³³ *Ibid.*, p.99.
- ³⁴ Täklä-Şadiq, p.135.

- ³⁵ Gäbrä-Sellassé Wäldä-Arägay, Tarik Zämänä ZäDagmawi Menelik Negusä-Nägäst ZäEtyopya (Addis Ababa: Artistic Printing Press, 1959 E.C), p. 301.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*; Hadera, p. 3; Mekonnen, p. 106; Tsehay, p. 18.
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- ³⁸ Mekonnen, p. 107.
- ³⁹ Hadera, p. 3; Mekonnen, p. 108.
- ⁴⁰ Mekonnen, p. 108.
- ⁴¹ Arnaldo Cipolla, Nell' Impero Di Menelik (Milano: Dicembre, 1910), p. 134.
- ⁴² Hadera, p. 4.
- ⁴³ Cipolla, p. 134.
- ⁴⁴ Mekonnen, pp. 108-109.
- ⁴⁵ Cipolla, p. 134.
- ⁴⁶ Tsehay, p. 26.
- ⁴⁷ Hadera, p. 5; Mekonnen, pp. 109-110.
- ⁴⁸ Mekonnen, pp. 109-110.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*; Tsehay, pp. 28-29.
- ⁵⁰ Carlo Annaratone, In Abissinia (Roma: 1914), pp. 74-75.
- ⁵¹ Mekonnen, pp. 110-111.
- ⁵² Tsehay, p. 27.
- ⁵³ Mekonnen, pp. 110-111.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁵ Marcus, The Life . . ., pp. 215-217.
- ⁵⁶ Martini, Il Diario . . . , V. III, p. 227.

- ⁵⁷ Tsehay, p. 27.
- ⁵⁸ Annaratone, p. 71; Marcus, The Life . . ., p. 217.
- ⁵⁹ From Emperor Menelik to *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé, 29 *Teqemt* 1899 E.C. (Letter of appointment) Available at the NALE, No.20-06-4.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁶¹ Hadera, p. 5; Mekonnen, p. 111.
- ⁶² Mekonnen, p. 111.
- ⁶³ *Yätelqu Ras Araya Açer YaHiwät Tarik*, A.A.U., IES Ms. 876.
- ⁶⁴ Zewde, p. 277; Bairu, *The Political. . .*, p. 109.
- ⁶⁵ Mekonnen, p. 114.
- ⁶⁶ *Informant: Ato Kehešän.*
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*; Mekonnen, pp. 114-115.
- ⁷⁰ Mekonnen, pp. 115-116.
- ⁷¹ *Informant: Ato Kehešän*
- ⁷² *Ibid.*
- ⁷³ Täklä-Sadiq, p. 146; Märs'e-Hazän, pp. 58-59
- ⁷⁴ Nega Ayele, *Centralization Versus Regionalism: The Case of Gojjam 1932 – 1969* (H.S.I.U., B.A Thesis in Political Science, 1970), p. 16.
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- ⁷⁷ Asnake, p. 49.
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- ⁸⁰ Mekonnen, p. 118; Tsegay, p. 168.
- ⁸¹ Tsegay, P. 168.
- ⁸² Cipolla, P. 36; Täklä-Šadiq, pp. 146-147.
- ⁸³ Mekonnen, p. 118.
- ⁸⁴ *Ibid.*; *Informant: Ato Kehešan*.
- ⁸⁵ *Informant: Ato Kehešan*; Mekonnen, p. 119; Coppet, p. 621; Täklä-Šadiq, pp. 146-147.
- ⁸⁶ Cipolla, p. 36.
- ⁸⁷ *Informant: Ato Kehešan*; Mekonnen, p. 119; Coppet, p. 621; Täklä-Šadiq, pp. 146-147; Mars'e-Häzän, p. 71.
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Grafiche, 1935), pp. 85-86.
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- ⁹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 121; Tsehaye, p. 37.
- ⁹² Mekonnen, p. 121.
- ⁹³ Patrick Gilkes, The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia (London: Julian Friendmann, 1975), p. 462.

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- ⁹⁶ Hadera, pp. 6-7; Mekonnen, pp. 121-125; Tsegay, p. 168.
- ⁹⁷ Marcus, *The Life . . .*, p. 240.
- ⁹⁸ Mekonnen, p. 123.
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid.*; Tsegay, p. 168; *Informant: Ato Kehešan*.
- ¹⁰⁰ Annaratone, pp. 107-108.
- ¹⁰¹ Zoli, p. 86.
- ¹⁰² Mekonnen, p. 125.
- ¹⁰³ *Informant: Ato Kehešan*.
- ¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*; Mekonnen, p. 128; Kenfä (*Aläqa*).
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- ¹⁰⁶ *ASMAI*: 54/36/145, Colli to MAE, Roma, 17 May 1918.
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- ¹⁰⁸ Cipolla, p. 46.
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- ¹¹⁰ Hadera, p. 7.
- ¹¹¹ *Ibid.*
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- ¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 127; Täklä-Şadiq, p. 147.
- ¹¹⁵ Täsfayohannes, p. 10.
- ¹¹⁶ Mekonnen, p. 118.

- ¹¹⁷ Mekonnen, p. 127.
- ¹¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 127-128.
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- ¹²⁴ Täsfayohannes, p. 10; Tsehay, p. 38.
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- ¹²⁷ Ibid.
- ¹²⁸ Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1991 (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 2002), pp. 117.
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- ¹³⁴ Mekonnen, p. 129.
- ¹³⁵ Steffanson V.I, p. 9; *Informant: Däjjazmač Zewde*.

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¹³⁷ *ASMAI*: 37/4/27-29, "Alcuni Osservazione Per Bulletino No. 16."; Märš'e-Häzän, pp. 44,86.

¹³⁸ Kenfä (*Aläqa*).

¹³⁹ *ASMAI*: 37/4/27-29, "Situazione Politica in Tigray"

¹⁴⁰ FO: 371/3494, Thesiger to Balfour, 26 December 1918.

¹⁴¹ Steffanson, V.I, p. 93.

¹⁴² FO: 371/A 1878, Lewis to Buller, June 1914.

CHAPTER TWO

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- ² *Informant: Däjjazmač Zewde.*
- ³ *Ibid.*
- ⁴ *ASMAI: 54/37/149: "Degiac Gabreselassie Bariagaber"; FO: 371/11574: Bentinck to Chamberlain, 15 May 1926; Tsehay, p. 4; Zoli, p. 88, Informant: Däjjazmač Zewde.*
- ⁵ Annaratone, p. 72.
- ⁶ Cipolla, p. 136.
- ⁷ *ASMAI: 54/37/149: "Degiac Gabreselassie Bariagaber"; Informant: Däjjazmač Zewde.*
- ⁸ Erlich, *Ras Alula....*, p. 140.
- ⁹ Tsehay, p. 169; *Informant: Däjjazmač Zewde.*
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- ¹¹ Tsehay, p 32.
- ¹² Cipolla, p. 134.
- ¹³ *Informants: Haläqa Abay, Däjjazmač Zewde; Gobäzé,P.56.*
- ¹⁴ Tsehay, p. 35.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 41; *Informant: Däjjazmač Zewde.*
- ¹⁶ Tsehay, p. 168; *Informant: Däjjazmač Zewde.*
- ¹⁷ Tsehay, p. 168.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*; *Informant: Däjjaxmač Zewde.*
- ¹⁹ *Informant: Gerazmač Dästa: Ato Kehešän, Qänazmač Gäbrä-Egezyabehér.*
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- ²¹ ASMAI: 54/37/149: "Degiac Gabreselassie".
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- ²³ Hadera, p. 7.
- ²⁴ *Informant: Balambaras Estifanos.*
- ²⁵ *Informants: Ato Kehešan; Gerazmač Dästa; Qäñazmač Gäbrä- Egezyabehér; Däjjazmač Zewdé.*
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- ²⁹ *Informant: Däjjazmač Zewde.*
- ³⁰ FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 1 March 1914.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*; O'Mahony, p. 183; *Informant: Šäqa Bärhé.*
- ³² FO: 371/A 1878: Dodds to Grey, 1 March 1914.
- ³³ Täsfayohannes, p. 11.
- ³⁴ Tsehay, p. 42.
- ³⁵ ASMAI: 37/7/63: "Situazione Politica e Militare Della Colonia Eritrea", 3 March 1914.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*; FO: 371/A 1878: Dodds to Grey, 8 March 1914; *Informants: Ato Gäbrä-Šadiq; Hälqa Bärhé; Gerazmač Dästa; Ato Dästa.*
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- ³⁸ FO: 371/A1878: Doughty Wylie to Grey, 2 May 1914.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Lincoln, p. 539; Tsehay, p. 41.

⁴⁴ FO: 371/11574: Bentinck to Chamberlain, 15 May 1926.

⁴⁵ FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 8 March 1914.

⁴⁶ FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 16 February 1914.

⁴⁷ *ASMAI*: 37/7/62: Count Colli to the Governor of Asmara, 7/11/1914.

⁴⁸ FO: 371/A1878: Kitchener to Grey, 20 February 1914.

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⁵⁰ Zoli, p.88.

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⁵² *ASMAI*: 54/37/149: "Degiac Gabresellassié Bariagaber".

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⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Tsehay, p. 43; *Informants*: *Ato Täka*; *Liqä Liqawent Yaréd*; *Mämher Abay*; *Abba Haylä-Maryam*.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Informant*: *Abba Haylä-Maryam*.

⁵⁹ *Informant*: *Ato Dästa*.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*; *Ato Gäbru*.

⁶¹ Tsehay, p 43; *Informants*: *Abba Haylä-Maryam*, *Haläqa Abbay*.

⁶² Tsehay, p. 43.

⁶³ *Informants*: *Ato Haylä*; *Gerazmač Dästa*.

- ⁶⁴ *Informants: Abba Haylä-Maryam: Haläqa Abay; Balambaras Estifanos; Ato Täka, Liqä Liqawent Yaréd.*
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- ⁷¹ ASMAI: 37/7/64: "Promemoria Riservato", 18 March 1914.
- ⁷² Täsfayohannes, pp. 11-12.
- ⁷³ *Informant: Däjjazmač Zewde.*
- ⁷⁴ ASMAI: 37/7/63: "Situazione Politica e Militare Della Colonia Eritrea", 3 March 1914; Lincoln, p. 540.
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- ⁷⁹ *Informant: Däjjazmač Zewde.*
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- ⁸¹ Täklä-Sadiq, pp. 154-155.
- ⁸² FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 16 February 1914.
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- ⁸⁶ Zoli, p. 88.
- ⁸⁷ *ASMAI*: 37/7/63: "Situazione Politica e Militare Della Colonia Eritrea", 3 March 1914; *ASMAI*: 37/7/64: "Promemoria Riservato", 18 March 1914.
- ⁸⁸ *ASMAI*: 37/7/62: Salvago to MdC, 22/2/1914.
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 26/2/1914.
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- ⁹¹ *ASMAI*: 37/7/62: "Situazione in Etiopia", 23 February 1914; *ASMAI*: 37/7/62: Count Colli to the Governor of Asmara, 7/11/1914.
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- ⁹⁷ *Ibid*.
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- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 16 February 1914.
- ¹⁰² FO: 371/A1878: Kitchener to Grey, 20 February 1914.
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- ¹⁰⁶ *ASMAI*: 37/7/63: "Situazione Politica e Militare Della Colonia Eritrea", 3 March 1914.
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- ¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1 March 1914.
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- ¹¹⁷ *ASMAI*: 37/7/63: Salvago to MdC, 28/2/1914.
- ¹¹⁸ *Ibid*; *ASMAI*: 37/7/64: "Promemoria Riservato", 18 March 1914.

- ¹¹⁹ *ASMAI*: 37/7/64: "Promemoria Riservato", 18 March 1914; FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 28 February 1914.
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- ¹²² *Ibid.*
- ¹²³ Täsfayohannes, p. 13.
- ¹²⁴ Tsehay, p. 45.
- ¹²⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹²⁶ O'Mahony, p. 183; "Seyum Mängäša...", p.1; Täsfayohannes, p. 13; Gobäzë,P.56.
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- ¹²⁸ Tsegay, p. 170.
- ¹²⁹ Tsehay, p. 45.
- ¹³⁰ Täsfayohannes, p. 13; FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 8 March 1914; *ASMAI*: 37/7/63: "Situazione Politica e Militare Della Colonia Eritrea", 3 March 1914.
- ¹³¹ *ASMAI*: 37/7/62: Salvago to MdC, 27/2/1914; *ASMAI*: 37/7/63: Salvago to MdC, 28/2/1914; "Situazione Politica e Militare Della Colonia Eritrea", 3 March 1914.
- ¹³² *Ibid.*; O'Mahony, p. 183; Gobäzë,P.56; Yaqob, pp. 152-153; *Informants*: Ato Gäbrä-Šadiq, *Gerazmač* Dästa; *Fitäwrari* Iyasu.
- ¹³³ Tsehay, p. 45.
- ¹³⁴ *Informants*: Abba Haylä-Maryam; *Balambaras* Estifanos; *Haläqa* Bärhé.
- ¹³⁵ Tsehay, p. 46.
- ¹³⁶ *Informants*: Ato Gäbrä-Šadiq; Ato Haylä; *Balambaras* Estifanos
- ¹³⁷ *Informants*: Ato Gäbrä-Šadiq; *Balambaras* Estifanos.

- ¹³⁸ *Informants: Haläqa Bärhé; Qäñazmač Gäbrä-Egezyabehér.*
- ¹³⁹ Täsfayohannes, p. 13; Tsehay, p. 46.
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- ¹⁴⁷ *ASMAI: 37/7/63: Salvago to MdC, 2/3/1914.*
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- ¹⁵⁵ Hadera, p.8; *Informants: Ato Täka; Gerazmač Dästa; Fitawrari Iyasu; Däjjäč Zewde.*
- ¹⁵⁶ *ASMAI: 37/13/130: "Avvenimenti nell' Etiopia settentrionale dal Mascal, 1916 al Marzo 1917"; " Seyum Mängäša ...", P.1.*

- ¹⁵⁷ *ASMAI*: 37/13/130: "Avvenimenti nell' Etiopia settentrionale dal Mascal, 1916 al Marzo 1917".
- ¹⁵⁸ Tsehay.p.47.
- ¹⁵⁹ Täsfayohannes, p.14; *Informants*: *Haläqa Bärhé*; *Haläqa Abay*; *Qäñazmač Gäbrä-Egezyabehér*.
- ¹⁶⁰ *Informants*: *Haläqa Abay*; *Fitäwrari Iyasu*.
- ¹⁶¹ *Ibid*.
- ¹⁶² Täsfayohannes, pp.14-15; *ASMAI* 37/7/64: "Promemoria Riservato", 18 March 1914; *Informant*: *Haläqa Abay*.
- ¹⁶³ *ASMAI*: 37/7/64: "Promemoria Riservato", 18 March 1914.
- ¹⁶⁴ FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 5 March 1914 and 8 March 1914; *ASMAI*: 37/13/130: " Avvenimenti nell' Etiopia Settentrionale dal *Mascal* 1916 al Marzo 1917"; *Informant*: *Haläqa Abay*.
- ¹⁶⁵ Täsfayohannes, p.15; *Informants*: *Ato Täka*; *Gerazmač Dästa*; *Balambaras Estifanos*; *Däjjazmač Zewde*.
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- ¹⁶⁷ Tsehay, p.46: *Infromants*: *Haläqa Bärhé*; *Haläqa Abay*; *Qäñazmač Gäbrä-Egezyabehér*.
- ¹⁶⁸ Tsehay, p.47.
- ¹⁶⁹ FO: 371/A1878: Doughty Wylie to Grey, 16 May 1914.
- ¹⁷⁰ Tsehay,pp. 48-49; *Informant*: *Haläqa Abay*; *Kebäd* was the name of *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellasse's horse.
- ¹⁷¹ Tsehay, p.50; *Informant*: *Haläqa Abay*.
- ¹⁷² Lincoln, P.541; Gobäzé, P.56; *Informant* *Däjjazmač Zewde*.

- ¹⁷³ Lincoln, p.541; Gobäzé, P.56; FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 8 March 1914.
- ¹⁷⁴ Tsehay, p.50; Gobäzé , P.56.
- ¹⁷⁵ FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 13 March 1914.
- ¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 8 March 1914.
- ¹⁷⁷ Hadera, P.9; Täklä-Sadiq, p.155; Gobäzé, P.56-57.
- ¹⁷⁸ FO: 371/A 1878: Dodds to Grey, 8 March 1914.
- ¹⁷⁹ Lincoln, P.541; Gobäzé, p.57.
- ¹⁸⁰ Täklä-Sadiq, p.155.
- ¹⁸¹ FO: 371/4394: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 2 December 1920; *Informants: Ato Täka; Balambaras Estifanos; Däjjazmač Dästa.*
- ¹⁸² Tsehay, p.50.
- ¹⁸³ FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 16 February 1914.
- ¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 8 March 1914.
- ¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*,
- ¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 13 March 1914.
- ¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 8 March 1914.
- ¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 13 March 1914.
- ¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 8 March 1914.
- ¹⁹¹ FO: 371/A1878: Lewis to Clayton, March 1914,
- ¹⁹² *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹³ FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 13 March 1914.
- ¹⁹⁴ Bairu, " Marriage ... ", P.16.

- ¹⁹⁵ FO: 371/A 1878: Doughty Wylie to Grey, 2 May 1914; Täklä-Şadiq, P.138.
- ¹⁹⁶ Martini, Il Diareo... V III, P. 227.
- ¹⁹⁷ FO: 371/A 1878: Dodds to Grey, 13 March 1914.
- ¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 16 February 1914.
- ¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 13 March 1914.
- ²⁰¹ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰² *Ibid.*, 30 March 1914.
- ²⁰³ FO: 371/A 1878: Lewis to Clayton, March 1914.
- ²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰⁵ FO: 371/A 1878: Dodds to Grey, 28 March 1914.
- ²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰⁷ *ASMAI*: 37/7/63 From Bertolini to Ministero Della Guerra, 10 March 1914.
- ²⁰⁸ Martini, Relazionep.6
- ²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*
- ²¹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹¹ FO: 371/A 1878: Dodds to Grey, 28 March 1914.
- ²¹² *Ibid.*, 14 March 1914.
- ²¹³ *Ibid.*
- ²¹⁴ *ASMAI*: 54/37/149: " Degiac Gabresellassie Bariagaber."
- ²¹⁵ *Ibid.*
- ²¹⁶ FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 28 March 1914.
- ²¹⁷ Tsehay,P. 51.

- ²¹⁸ FO: 371/A1878: Doughty Wylie to Grey, 2 May 1914.
- ²¹⁹ *ASMAI*: 37/7/64: "Promemoria Riservato" 18 March 1914.
- ²²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²²¹ FO: 371/A1878: Lewis to Clayton, May 1914.
- ²²² *Ibid.*, April 1914; Addis Hiwot, PP.58-59; Kenefe Regebe, P.1.
- ²²³ FO: 371/A 1878: Lewis to Clayton, April 1914.
- ²²⁴ Asnake, p.52; FO; 371/A 1878: Lewis to Buller, June 1914.
- ²²⁵ Hadera, p.9: *Informant: Šäqa Bärhé.*
- ²²⁶ Hadera, p.9.
- ²²⁷ Tsegay,p.165.
- ²²⁸ Täsfayohannes, pp.15-17; Tsehay. P.51.
- ²²⁹ Täsfayohannes, p.18.
- ²³⁰ Tsehay, p.52.
- ²³¹ *Informant: Däjjazmač Zewde.*
- ²³² Tsehay, p.53.
- ²³³ *Ibid*, pp. 53-54.
- ²³⁴ Täsfayohannes,p.23; Tsehay ,pp.54-55.
- ²³⁵ *ASMAI*: 37/12/119: De Camillis to MdC, 15/10/1917.
- ²³⁶ *Ibid*, 19/10/1917.
- ²³⁷ Tsehay,pp.54-55.
- ²³⁸ *ASMAI*: 37/12/119: De Camillis to MdC, 15/10/1917 and 19/10/1917.
- ²³⁹ Pankhurst, pp.326-327; Tsehay, p.55; *ASMAI*: 54/37/149: " Degiac Gabreselassie Bariagaber."
- ²⁴⁰ Pankhurst, p.327.

- ²⁴¹ *ASMAI*: 54/37/149: " Degiac Gabreselassie Bariagaber."
- ²⁴² *Ibid.*; Coppet, p. 627 (Foot Note); Greenfield, p.166; Heruy, p.92; Tsehay, p.56.
- ²⁴³ *ASMAI*: 54/36/146: Gäbrä-Sellassé to Tädla Sahlu, 5 *Genbot* 1914 E.C;
- ²⁴⁴ *ASMAI*: 54/36/146: Piacentini to the Governor of Asmara, 16 May 1922.
- ²⁴⁵ *ASMAI*: 54/36/146: "Tigre", 14 May 1922.
- ²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, *Informants: Ato Haylä; Ato Kehešan; Balambaras Mulaw: Däjjazmač Zewde.*
- ²⁴⁷ *ASMAI*: 54/38/154: Gäbrä-Sellassé, 1 July 1922; *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to *Däjjac* Haylu, 1 *Säne* 1914 E.C, NALE, No, 20-01-03h; *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to *Fitawrari* Tädla Sahlu and *Däjjac* Haylu, 10 *Säne* 1914 E.C., NALE , No.20-01-03K; *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to *Däjjac* Haylu, 9 August 1922,NALE, No.20-01-03K.
- ²⁴⁸ Tsehay,p.57.
- ²⁴⁹ Täsfayohannes, p.23; *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to *Däjjac* Haylu, 1 *Säne* 1914 E.C, NALE, No.20-01-03K; *Aläqa* Kenfä, P.103: Infomants; *Qañazmač* Gäbrä-Egezyabeher; *Däjjazmač* Zewde.
- ²⁵⁰ *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to *Fitawrari* Tädla Sahlu and *Däjjac* Haylu, 10 *Säne* 1914 E.C, NALE, No. 20-01-03K; *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to *Däjjac* Gässässä, 10 *Säne* 1914 E.C., NALE, No. 20-01-03K.
- ²⁵¹ *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to *Fitawrari* Tädla Sahlu and *Däjjac* Haylu, 10 *Säne* 1914 E.C, NALE, No. 20-01-03K.
- ²⁵² *ASMAI*: 54/38/154: From *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé, 1 July 1922.
- ²⁵³ *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to *Fitawrari* Tädla Sahlu and *Däjjac* Haylu, 10 *Säne* 1914 E.C., NALE, No.20-01-03K; *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to *Fitawrari* Tädla Sahlu, 3 July 1922, NALE, No.20-01-03K; *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to *Fitawrari* Tädla Sahlu, 19 August 1922, NALE, No. 20-01-03 K.
- ²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

- ²⁵⁵ Steffanson, V.II, p. 17.
- ²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*
- ²⁵⁷ *Informant: Haläqa Abay.*
- ²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*
- ²⁵⁹ *ASMAI: 54/36/146: "Tigre", 1 August 1922; Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé to Fitawrari Tädla Sahlu, 19 August 1922, NALE, No. 20-01-03K.*
- ²⁶⁰ *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé to Däjjac̣ Haylu and Fitawrari Tädla, 10 Säné 1914 E.C, NALE, No. 20-01-03K.*
- ²⁶¹ *Ibid; ASMAI: 54/36/146: "Tigre", 1 August 1922; Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé to Fitawrari Tädla Sahlu, 19 August 1922, NALE, No. 20-01-03K.*
- ²⁶² *ASMAI: 54/36/146: "Tigre", 1 August 1922.*
- ²⁶³ *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé to Fitawrari Tädla Sahlu, 19 August 1922, NALE, No. 20-01-03K.*
- ²⁶⁴ *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé to Fitawrari Tädla Sahlu and Däjjac̣ Haylu, 10 Säné 1914 E.C, NALE, No. 20-01-03K; Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé to Fitawrari Tädla Sahlu, 3 July 1922, NALE, No. 20-01-03K.*
- ²⁶⁵ *Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellassé to Fitawrari Tädla Sahlu, 3 July 1922, NALE, No. 20-01-03K.*
- ²⁶⁶ Tsehay, pp. 58-59.
- ²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*
- ²⁶⁸ *ASMAI: 54/36/146: "Tigre", 2 July 1922.*
- ²⁶⁹ *Lej Täklä-Haymanot to Däjjac̣ Gäbrä-Sellasse, 10 Yäkatit 1915 E.C., NALE, No. 20-01-3G.*
- ²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²⁷¹ Tsehay, p. 59.
- ²⁷² *ASMAI: 54/36/146: "Tigre", 18 May 1922.*

- ²⁷³ *ASMAI*: 37/7/63: "Situazione Politica e Militare Della Colonia Eritrea", 3 March 1914;
ASMAI: 54/36/146: "Tigre", 7 July 1922.
- ²⁷⁴ *ASMAI*: 37/7/63: "Situazione Politica e Militare Della Colonia Eritrea", 3 March 1914.
- ²⁷⁵ FO: 371/A1878: Doughty Wylie to Grey, 2 May 1914.
- ²⁷⁶ *Aläqa Kenfä*, p. 103.
- ²⁷⁷ Tsehay, p. 59.
- ²⁷⁸ *ASMAI*: 54/38/156: "Malattia del Degiac Taclahaimanot", 4 July 1925.
- ²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Tsehay, p. 64
- ²⁸⁰ *ASMAI*: 54/38/156: Count Colli to the Eritrean Colonial Governor, 3 July 1925.
- ²⁸¹ Hadera, p. 9.
- ²⁸² *Ibid.*, *Informants*: Ato Kehešän; Ato Haylä, *Balambaras* Mulaw.
- ²⁸³ *Ibid.*; *Informant*: *Däjjazmač* Zewde.
- ²⁸⁴ Tsehay, pp. 64-65.
- ²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.
- ²⁸⁶ Täsfayohannes, p. 24.
- ²⁸⁷ Tsehay, p. 57.
- ²⁸⁸ Täsfayohannes, p. 24; *Informants*: *Balambaras Estifanos*; *Däjjazmač* Zewde.
- ²⁸⁹ *Qäñazmač* Rädä Baykädän to Ičägé Gäbrämänfäsqedus, 3 *Tahsas* 1919, NALE, No. 7-02-12; *Qäñazmač* Rädä to Ras Täfäri, 3 *Tahsas* 1919, NALE, No. 7-02-19, *Qäñazmač* Rädä to *Däjjazmač* Mulugéta, 5 *Tahsas* 1919, NALE, No.7-02-12.
- ²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²⁹¹ Täsfayohannes, p. 24; Tsehay, pp. 65-66; *Informant*: *Abba Haylämariam*; *Däjjazmač* Zewde.
- ²⁹² Täsfayohannes, p. 24; Tsehay, p. 66.

²⁹³ Tsehay, p. 67.

²⁹⁴ Zoli, p. 193.

CHAPTER THREE

- ¹ Charles F. Rey, The Real Abyssinia (London: 1935), p. 218; Täklä-Şadiq, p. 159; Bahru, A Short History..., p. 176.
- ² FO: 371/16102: S.Barton to John Simon, June 1932.
- ³ Asnake Ali, "Aspects of the Political History of Wollo: 1872-1916." (M.A. Thesis in History, A.A.U., 1983), p. 27.
- ⁴ Täklä-Şadiq, p. 165.
- ⁵ *Ibid*; Täkläyäsus, p. 47; FO: 371/16102: S. Barton to John Simon, June 1932.
- ⁶ Täklä-Şadiq, p. 166; Täkläyäsus, p. 47.
- ⁷ Kåbådå, p. 48.
- ⁸ FO: 371/16102: S. Barton to John Simon, June 1932.
- ⁹ FO: 371/A, 1878: R.P.Lewis to G.F. Clayton, March 1914; R.P. Lewis to S.S.Buller, June 1914; Asnake, p. 75.
- ¹⁰ FO: 371/16102: S.Barton to John Simon, June 1932; Täklä-Şadiq, p. 166; Täkläyäsus, p. 47.
- ¹¹ Mosley, p. 101.
- ¹² *Ibid*.
- ¹³ Letter from *Ras Täfåri* to *Ras Seyum*, 3 *Teqmet* 1909 E.C. (13 October 1916).
- ¹⁴ *Ibid*.
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- ¹⁶ *Ibid*.
- ¹⁷ Täkläyäsus, p. 47.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 149; Asnake, p. 77.
- ¹⁹ Tsehay, p. 51.

- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ Steffanson, V.I, p. 164.
- ²² Tsehay, p. 54.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, 52.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*
- ²⁵ Asnake, p. 77; Haylä-Sellassé, p. 39.
- ²⁶ Asnake, p. 82.
- ²⁷ Täkläyäsus, p. 149.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*
- ²⁹ Asnake, p. 82; *Berhanena Sälam, Säné* 9, 1924 E.C.
- ³⁰ *Berhanena Sälam, Säné*, 9, 1924 E.C.; Käbädä, pp. 48-53; FO: 371/16102: S. Barton to John Simon, June, 9, 1932 ; *Informants: Ato Kehešan, Balambaras Estifanos; Haläqa Abay.*
- ³¹ FO: 371/4395: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 8 June 1920; *Berhanena Sälam, Säné* 9, 1924 E.C.; Käbädä pp. 48-53; Täklä-Şadiq, p. 166.
- ³² FO: 371/16102: S. Barton to John Simon, June 1932.
- ³³ Hadera, p. 15, *Informants: Ato Kehešan; Balambaras Mulaw.*
- ³⁴ *Informant: Balambaras Mulaw.*
- ³⁵ *Ibid; Fitawrari Iyasu: Haläqa Bärhé.*
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*
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- ³⁹ FO: 371/4395: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 8 June 1920.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ FO: 371/3497: Allenby (Cairo) to Foreign Office, 22 December 1919; Dodds to Earl Curzon 28 December 1919.

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⁴³ FO: 371/4394: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 20 August 1920.

⁴⁴ FO: 371/3497: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 28 December 1919.

⁴⁵ FO: 371/3497: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, December 22, 1919.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ FO: 371/3497: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 28 December 1919.

⁴⁸ FO: 371/4395: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 8 June 1919.

⁴⁹ FO: 371/4394: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 20 July 1920.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Aläqa Kenfä*, pp. 86-87.

⁵² FO: 371/4394: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 20 July 1920.

⁵³ FO: 371/4395: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 8 June 1920.

⁵⁴ *Informants: Ato Kehešän; Haläqa Bärhé.*

⁵⁵ FO: 371/4394: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 20 August 1920.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *ASMAI*: 37/13/129: De Martino to MdC (Roma), 27/3/1917.

⁵⁹ FO: 371/4394: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 20 July 1920.

⁶⁰ *Ras Täfäri* to *Ras Seyum*, 22 *Tahesas* 1912 E.C (January 1, 1920).

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*

- ⁶³ *Ibid*; Marcus, Haile-Sellassie..., p. 47.
- ⁶⁴ Marcus, Haile-Sellassie..., p. 47.
- ⁶⁵ FO: 371/4394: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 25 August 1920.
- ⁶⁶ FO: 371/4394: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 20 August 1920.
- ⁶⁷ FO: 371/4394: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 6 September 1920.
- ⁶⁸ FO: 371/4394: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 2 December 1920.
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁷² *Ibid.*
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁵ FO: 371/5505: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 20 December 1920.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁸ Hadera, p. 15; *Informants: Fitawrari Iyasu; Liqä Liqawent Yaréd: Ato Kehešan.*
- ⁷⁹ Haylä-Sellassé, p. 41.
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁸¹ FO: 371/5505: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 20 December 1920.
- ⁸² FO: 371/5505: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 21 January 1920.
- ⁸³ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁴ *Ibid.*; *ASMAI: 54/37/150: A. Pollera to the Eritrean Governor, 8/2/1921.*
- ⁸⁵ Kābādä, pp. 48-53.

- ⁸⁶ Haylä-Sellassé, p. 41.
- ⁸⁷ *Ibid.*; Marcus, Haile-Sellassie...., p. 47.
- ⁸⁸ Haylä-Sellassé, p. 41.
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.* Marcus, Haile-Sellassie...., p. 47.
- ⁹⁰ *Informant: Fitawrari Iyasu.*
- ⁹¹ Hadera, p. 16; Gobäzé, pp. 121-122; *ASMAI: 54/37/150: A. Pollera to the Eritrean Governor, 31/01/1921; Informants: Balambaras Estifanos; Fitawrari Iyasu; Balambaras Mulaw.*
- ⁹² *ASMAI: 54/37/150: A. Pollera to the Eritrean Governor, 31/01/1921; Gobäzé, p. 121.*
- ⁹³ *Ibid.*; Marcus, Haile-Sellassie...., p. 47.
- ⁹⁴ *ASMAI: 54/37/150: "Ligg Iyasu Cattura"; ASMAI: 54/37/150: A. Pollera to the Eritrean Governor, 1/2/1921 and 8/2/1921; Gobäzé, pp. 121-122.*
- ⁹⁵ *Aläqa Kenfä, p. 92; Haylä-Sellassé, p. 41; Gobäzé, pp. 121-122; Informants: Fitawrari Iyasu; Balambaras Mulaw: Liqä Liqawent Yaréd.*
- ⁹⁶ Gobäzé, pp. 122; *ASMAI: 54/37/150: A. Pollera to the Eritrean Governor, 1/2/1921; and 8/2/1921. Informant: Balambaras Mulaw.*
- ⁹⁷ *ASMAI: 54/37/150: A. Pollera to the Eritrean Governor, 2/02/1921.*
- ⁹⁸ *Ibid.*; Gobäzé, pp. 122; Marcus, Haile-Sellasse...., pp. 47-48; *Informant: Balambaras Mulaw.*
- ⁹⁹ Marcus, Haile-Sellasse...., p. 48.
- ¹⁰⁰ *ASMAI: 54/37/150: A. Pollera to the Eritrean Governor, 12/2/1921.*
- ¹⁰¹ *ASMAI: 54/37/150: A. Pollera to the Eritrean Governor, 1/2/1921; Gobäzé, pp. 122.*
- ¹⁰² FO: 371/5505: Russel (Addis Ababa) to Foreign Office (Cairo), 3/2/1921.
- ¹⁰³ *Aläqa Kenfä.*
- ¹⁰⁴ *ASMAI: 54/37/150: A Pollera to the Eritrean Governor, 26/02/1921.*

- ¹⁰⁵ FO: 371/5505: Russel to Curzon, 12 April 1921.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁷ FO: 371/5505: Russel to Curzon, 14 May 1921.
- ¹⁰⁸ Steffanson, V. II, p. 12.
- ¹⁰⁹ Marcus, Haile-Sellasse...., p. 48; Gobäzé, pp. 122.
- ¹¹⁰ Käbädä, pp. 48-53.
- ¹¹¹ FO: 371/5505: Russel to Curzon, 4 August 1921.
- ¹¹² Marcus, Haile-Sellasse...., p. 48; Gobäzé, pp. 122.
- ¹¹³ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹⁴ FO: 371/5505: Mr. Cane, Addis Ababa, 25 July 1921; Gobäzé, pp. 122.
- ¹¹⁵ Polson Newman, Ethiopian Realities (London: 1936), p. 67; Gobäzé, pp. 122.
- ¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*; Haylasellassé, p. 42; Rey, p. 50; Heruy, p. 24; *Informants: Fitawrari Iyasu; Balambaras Mulaw; Haläqa Bärhé.*
- ¹¹⁷ FO: 371/5505: Russel to Curzon, 4 August 1921; *Informants: Fitawrari Iyasu; Balambaras Mulaw: Haläqa Bärhé.*
- ¹¹⁸ Haylä-Sellassé, p. 42.
- ¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*; Hadera, p. 16; *Informant: Fitawrari Iyasu.*
- ¹²⁰ FO: 371/16102: S.Barton to John Simon, June 1932; Haylasellassé, p. 42.
- ¹²¹ FO: 371/16102: S. Barton to John Simon, June 1932.
- ¹²² FO: 371/4395: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 8 June 1920.

CHAPTER FOUR

¹ Greenfield, p. 145; Gobäzé, p. 127.

² Hadera, pp. 9-10.

³ *Ibid.*, Heruy, p. 24.

⁴ Hadera, p. 12.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10; Heruy, p. 24; *Abba Yelaq* was the horse name of *Däjjac̣ Kassa Seyum*.

⁶ *Informants: Ato Dästa; Qäñazmač Gäbrä Egezyabehér; Fitäwrari Iyasu; Däjjazmač Zewdé*

⁷ *Informant: Däjjazmač Zewde; Gerazmač Dästa; ASMAI: 54/36/146: De Martino, "Politica", 25/9/1918.*

⁸ *Informants: Ato Dästa; Fitäwrari Iyasu; Ato Haylä, Balambaras Mulaw.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Informant: Fitawrari Iyasu.*

¹² *Informant: Qäñazmač Gäbrä-Egezyabehér; Däjjazmač Zewde.*

¹³ *Informant: Gerazmač Dästa.*

¹⁴ Greenfield, p. 145; Gobäzé, p. 127.

¹⁵ FO: 371/3496: Allenbey to R. Winget, 27 April 1919.

¹⁶ FO: 371/16102: Barton to Simon, June 1932; Käbädä, pp. 48-53.

¹⁷ *Informants; Gerazmač Dästa; Fitawrari Iyasu, Balambaras Mulaw; Ato Haylä.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Hadera, p. 12; Greenfield, p. 145.

²¹ Greenfield, p. 145.

- ²² *ASMAI*: 37/13/139: De Camillis to MdC, 10/5/1918.
- ²³ *ASMAI*: 37/13/139: "Informazione Dall' Etiopia", February 1918; Heruy, p. 94.
- ²⁴ *ASMAI*: 37/13/139: "Informazione Dall' Etiopia", February 1918.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*
- ²⁶ Hadera, p. 13.
- ²⁷ *ASMAI*: 54/36/145: De Camillis, "Tigre", 5 January 1918.
- ²⁸ *ASMAI*: 54/36/145: De Camillis, "Tigre", 3 January 1918.
- ²⁹ *Informants*: Ato Dästa; *Aläqa* Abay, *Qäñazmač* Gäbrä-Egezyabehér; Ato Täka.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*
- ³¹ *Ibid.*; Hadera, p. 13.
- ³² *Ibid.*
- ³³ *Informants*: Ato Dästa; *Haläqa* Abay; Ato Täka, *Fitawrari* Iyasu; *Däjjazmač* Zewde.
- ³⁴ *ASMAI*: 54/36/145: De Camillis, "Tigre", 5 January 1918.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*
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CHAPTER FIVE

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CHAPTER SIX

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- ¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

- ¹¹⁶ Steer, P.144.
- ¹¹⁷ Haylä-Sellassé, P.205.
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- ¹¹⁹ Täklä-Şadiq, PP.249-251.
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III. List of Informants

No	Name	Title	Age	Place of Interview	Date of Interview	Remark
1.	Abay Bärhé Wäldä-Täklä	<i>Haläqa</i>	65	Adigrat Qäbällé 07	21/01/95 E.C.	- A very well versed informant about the Battle of <i>Āk̄hora</i> and the rebellion of <i>Däjjäč</i> Kassa. He recalls most of the poems, which he learned from his elders.
2.	Abay Gäbrä-Hiwät Gäbray	<i>Mämher</i>	61	Mäqällä Qäbällé 18	13/01/1995 E.C.	- A retired person who served in different posts in the Ministry of Education, in Tigray. He is one of the most outstanding informants with wider interest and exposure to read historical materials. He also claims to be the relative of <i>Däjjäč</i> Gäbrä-Sellassé.
3.	Bärhé Hagos Gäbrä-Täklä	<i>Šäqa</i>	95	Adigrat Qäbällé 05	20/01/95 E.C.	-A very old man but with good memory of what he saw and informed. He was a tax collector in the region before and after the Italian Invasion.
4.	Bärhé Häylä- Maryam Kahsay	<i>Haläqa</i>	72	Adigrat Qäbällé 05	20/01/95 E.C.	-Former courtier but now in pension. Has a very detailed and vivid knowledge about the relation of the Tigrean chiefs in the period under discussion.
5.	Dästa Haylu Araya	<i>Gerazmač</i>	81	Adigrat Qäbällé 05	19/01/95 E.C.	-The grand-son of <i>Ras Sebhät</i> (son of <i>Wäyzäro</i> Haräya <i>Sebhät</i>) with long years of service in government offices (about 35 years) during the Imperial period. Now he is in pension.
6.	Dästa Haylu Mäzgäbä	<i>Ato</i>	86	Adwa Qäbällé 06	22/01/95 E.C.	- A very knowledgeable informant. Participated in the fighting against the Italian invasion of 1935. Know about the pre-1935 history of Tigray.
7.	Eštifanos Näga Mädhanyä	<i>Balambaras</i>	79	Adwa (<u>A</u> di Abun)	22/01/95 E.C.	- He claims to be a relative of <i>Däjjäč</i> Gäbrä-Sellassé. He served <i>Ras</i> Seyum in different offices. Has a valuable knowledge about the history of the region.

No	Name	Title	Age	Place of Interview	Date of Interview	Remark
8.	Gäbrä-Egezyabhér Abreha Tälla	<i>Qäñazmač</i>	72	Adwa (<u>Adi-Abun</u>)	23/01/95 E.C	- A relative of <i>Däjjäč</i> Gäbrä-Sellassé. He served in different government offices. He had once been member of the parliament. Now in pension. He is very well versed informant.
9.	Gäbrä- <u>Sadiq</u> Gäbru Hawki	<i>Ato</i>	76	Adigrat (<u>Nehbi</u>)	18/01/95 E.C	-Claims to be a relative of <i>Ras Sebhät</i> and is well informed about the Battle of <u>Äkhora</u> .
10.	Gäbru Lätwä Haylu	<i>Ato</i>	78	Mayčaw (<u>Qäbällé 01</u>)	29/01/95 E.C	- A knowledgeable merchant who is the native of <u>Ägamä</u> . He is well informed about the Battle of <u>Äkhora</u> . He recalls most of the poems, which he learned from his elders.
11.	Haylä <u>Kahsay</u>	<i>Ato</i>	78	Adigrat (<u>Läqay</u>)	19/01/95 E.C.	- He is a farmer who knows much about the local tradition. A very knowledgeable informant particularly in genealogy.
12.	Haylä-Maryam Araya	<i>Haläqa</i>	89	Mayčaw <u>Qäbällé 01</u>	01/02/95 E.C.	- A retired teacher. He mostly served in church affairs. He had a sound knowledge on how <i>Lej Iyasu</i> was captured in Tigray.
13.	Haylä-Maryam Täklä-Haymanot Wäldä-Maryam	<i>Abba</i>	88	Mäqällä (<u>Qäbällé 16</u>)	14/10/95 E.C.	- A monk who lived in different monasteries. He also served and lived in the Ethiopian monasteries, in Jerusalem, for about eleven years. He had a good knowledge of the history of the region.
14.	Iyasu <u>Asebha</u>	<i>Fitawrari</i>	84	Mäqällä (<u>Qäbällé 08</u>)	12/01/95 E.C.	- Although old enough, he still appears to be a well-versed and informed person on the history of the relation of the Tigrean chiefs. He served as district governor in different times.
15.	Kehešan 'Enday <u>Hayälom</u>	<i>Ato</i>	120	Mayčaw (<u>Qäbällé 01</u>)	30/01/95 E.C	- Although aging his reminiscence on the history of Tigray under discussion remains very clear. Participated at the fighting against <i>Dajjač</i> Gäbrä-Sellassé.
16	Mulaw Wäräs <u>Sähayu</u>	<i>Balambaras</i>	90	<u>Kuyha</u>	14/01/95 E.C	- He served as a courtier and governor at different times during the Imperial period. Has an interesting memory of the history of the rivalry among the Tigrean chiefs.

No	Name	Title	Age	Place of Interview	Date of Interview	Remark
17.	Segab Hagos Täsfay	<i>Ato</i>	51	Adigrat Qäbällé 05	20/01/95 E.C.	- He is a merchant who claims to be the relative of <i>Ras Sebhät</i> . He is well informed about the history of the relation between <i>Ras Sebhät</i> and <i>Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé</i> .
18.	Täka Gäbrä-Egezyabhér Walda-Rufael	<i>Ato</i>	82	Adwa Qäbälé 06	23/01/95 E.C.	- He served in the administrative offices during the Imperial period, for about 30 years. He is now in pension. He is well acquainted with the history of the region.
19.	Yaréd Kassa Täka	<i>Liqä-Liqawent</i>	59	Mäqällä	14/01/95 E.C	- A monk in the Däbrä-Sälam St. Mikael Cathedral in Mäqällä. Teaches theology in the Theology College of Qidus Firaminatos <i>Abba Säläma Käsaté Berhan</i> .
20.	Zewde Gäbrä-Sellassé	<i>Däjjazmač (Dr)</i>	76	Addis Ababa	8/7/95 E.C	Is son of <i>Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé Barya-Gaber</i> . Is a noted historian and had a very critical and detailed knowledge of the history of Tigray in general. He is also the author of a book on the biography of Emperor Yohannes IV.

APPENDIX:I

[Translation]

[Emperor Menelik's Letter of *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé's Appointment]

I, Menelik II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, because he served me, I gave the following areas to the son of *Däjjäč* Barya-Gaber, *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé: from Hahylä, Zeban Haylä, Äddi Zämaru, Agura; from Imba-Sänäyti Suhän, Mäzäl, Äddi Hayam, Hegur; from Darha, Mayqäyehat, Ägamido; from Inkečäw [Intečo] Addi Hedur and Henta-Hamus which was muslim's land; from Igäla Säyaba. I made these *restä-gult* both to his sons and to his daughters. No one should be appointed over them. I shall write this [appointment] at the *Kebrä-Nägast* in Aksum. 29 *Teqemt* 1899 E.C. Addis Ababa.

[Source: Original at the NALE, No. 20-06-04]

Appendix III

[Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé's Awaj, Genbot 5, 1914 E.C. to be proclaimed in Adwa]

ÄÉ[e Yö] <^] }L XIK< YSM>Yw`H`f Nw[YLc? YvLUv^e >Lvi Nw[iÇ=p:: Èf c`w|k%EM:: È@ ÁI" ~ ueLc? †`f:: Ái nM
 êôL‡HKG<" YÑuÁ >Éa ÈÇ=Ñ`:: %G<K< f|³' Ó" uS`Ñw }ïö ò| <^] > >Á Äe| Äµf ÄS×M::
 Ó"xf 5 k" 1914 /U >Ç=e >uv

[%Ák Nw[eLc? ò`T" T|}U >Kuf]

Ái nM

eT eT eT
 %fÓ_ c`< u|Ó²=>wH@` ðnÉ uS"Óef †`f K>, >Ñ` unG<:: Äe wKA—M Äe ÄuMI:: >Ñ_ È}ÓÇ| cU%oKG<:: >Äµ|
 >KTHKG<:: >^g= u|`hl 'ÒÈ u"ÓÉI e^| Y^:: 'ÒÈ k[Ö<"U ÈÁ Ø"~ >Á'ÓMHKG< u%S"ÑÆ >fk[ØU Ý"É x| uk`:: %|K< k[ØU K²"Éa
 U_HKG< È%ÑÉ; Ywf Ñ`| >Ñ_" >MTM`:: ÉH %uÁMI 'ÒÈ %kTI w`~ pxf |k×HKG<:: >MU`IU::
 1914 /U Ó"xf 5 k" >Ç=e >uv ÝT }ið::

[%Ák Nw[YLc? T|}U]

[%Ák Nw[YLc? ò`T]

[Source: ASMAI: 54/36/146, Gäbrä-Sellassé to Tädla Sahlu, 5 Genbot 1914 E.C.]

APPENDIX:III

[Translation]

[*Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé's Awaj, Genbot 5, 1914 E.C. to be proclaimed in Adwa*]

May it reach *Fitawrari* Tädla Sahlu, *Mälakä-Berhanat* Gäbrä-Sellassé and *Balambaras* Gäbrä-Şadiq. How are you? I am well, praise be to God. I sent you a decree and made it be read (announced) at the market place in Adwa. All my other orders will arrive soon [at Adwa] with the arrival of *Fitawrari* Araya Dästa. 5 *Genbot* 1914 E. C. Addis Ababa.

Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé's signature.

Decree

Listen

Listen

Listen

The people of Tigray, due to the wishes of God and the benevolence of the government I am re-appointed to my father's domain. I am, therefore, happy and let you be happy. I listen all that you, my countrymen, have suffered a lot. Do not worry I shall let you be developed. You, the agriculturalist, go on in your agricultural activities, and you, the merchant go on in your trade. To you, the merchant, I shall restore the taxation to its previous state. You will not be taxed everywhere (at every way). Except at one post I made you, the merchant, be relieved from tax on grains. Let you trade and buy cattle and let you made my country be developed. He who mistreat the poor and he who rob the merchants will deserve sever punishment from me. You, who mistreat the poor and rob the merchants will never spare from my punishment. 5 *Genbot* 1914 E.C. Addis Ababa.

Signature and Seal of *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé

[Source: *ASMAI*: 54/36/146, Gäbrä-Sellassé to Tädla Sahlu, 5 *Genbot* 1914 E.C.]

Appendix IV

[Terms for Reconciliation between *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé and *Šum Āgamä Kassa Sebhat*]

¾øØ'f ¾,K?Ó^U nM

ÄÉ[e YÁÍ'Ṭ Ṽw[YLc?

Y'e- Ò` ueMj Y'ÖÑ" u%EL we^f Sx:: uÓ^Ṭ Ṽ"MA¾e òf" u)Ç=e uuv u?)i'e+A" Y²=I kØKA ÁK"<" nM c=UK< g<U
òT@ "X U"U Ṽ"²w ṼMðMÓU ṼK<::

SËSb [SËS]Á] - Ṽ"ÓÇ=I Ṽ"e- g<U ṼòT@ "X" Ṽ"Á Mĭ- ÁÁK< Ṽ"dt"<U Ṽ"e-" Ṽ"Á Ṽ"vṼṼ"< Ṽ"Á ^e ewHf ÁÁK<::

G<K) - ¾òT@ c-< "Á Ṽ" K"Ṽ"Á'f u=SÖ< Ṽ"kuMU Ṽ"dt"< ÁÓV ul' c< "Ṽ" ¾fÓ_ " c< [É^a Ṽ)c<U' i_] Ṽ"ÁkuK<U:: ÁÓV Y²=I kÁU
¾òT@ c-< Y- Ò` G<"< u"Ṽ"Á'f "Á ṼòT@ Ṽ"SKXK" u=K< Ṽ"YKjMU Ṽ)c<U Ṽ"Á²=G< Ṽ"YKjK<U:: ¾'c< "Ṽ"Á' ¾J<
¾K?L Ṽ" c-< "Á- c=SÖ< ¾g<U ṼòT@ "X" Sdb" [SX]Á" Ṽ" Ṽ"Ṽ"K": Ṽ)c<U Ṽ"Á²=G< ÁÁ`ÒK<::

Ze) - Ṽ"e-U ¾g<U ṼòT@ "X Ṽ"v f ¾J< Ṽ"ÁJ' Ṽ"²w U"U Ṽ"ÁeðMÓU ¾- g<TU"Ṽ" u²=I 'Ṽ" ¾T>Ác"jM Ṽ"ÇÄ ¾KU 5 k" Ṽ"ÇÄ[U
w"TTM Ṽ"hLM wK"< ¾_ ¾"+f Ṽ"Y' k" }TTM": Ṽ"e-" Ṽ)Ç=e uuv ÁK< S"D"Ṽ"Ṽ"U Ṽ"Á²=I Ṽ"Ç=ÁÁ'Ṽ"Ṽ" Ṽ"KU"K": ¾"+f Ṽ"Y' k"
1915 Ṽ"U

Mĭ }iKHÄT•f

[Source: Telegram Message from *Lej Täklä-Haymanot Gäbrä-Sellassé* to *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé, 10 *Yäkatit* 1915 E.C., NALE, No. 20-01-3/G]

APPENDIX:IV

[Translation]

[Terms for Reconciliation between *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* and *Šum Āgamä Kassa Sebhat*]

An Emergency Telegram Message.

May it reach *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé*

After I have just ended the telephone conversation with you, a message of congratulation arrived. In the presence of *Gerazmač Wäldä-yäs* and in front of a church in Addis Ababa, *Šum Āgamä Kassa* demanded no money [compensation] and agreed on the following conditions [for reconciliation].

First, you [*Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé*] will consider (treat) *Šum Āgamä Kassa* as your son and *Šum Āgamä Kassa* will consider (treat) you as his father, *Ras Sebhat*.

Second, if people from *Āgamä* want to join us, as soldiers, we shall not accept them and they will not also accept people who would go to them from Tigray (Adwa, Aksum, *Šerä*); and if those *Āgamä* people who had been with us but wanted to return to *Āgamä* as soldiers requested us for their return to *Āgamä* we shall not prevent them to do so, and they will also do the same to the people of Tigray [Aksum, Adwa, *Šerä*]; and if people from areas other than *Āgamä* who had been serving *Šum Āgamä Kassa* as soldiers want to join us we shall accept them but we should return the rifles and other materials given to them from *Šum Āgamä Kassa*. They will also do the same.

Third, if you accept that you would treat *Šum Āgamä Kassa* as a father, there will no need for money [compensation]. There will no one who could be an obstacle from the elders (mediators) in our side. Because the elders (mediators) recognized the necessity of having an oath for the reconciliation within five days that we have concluded an oath for accepting the reconciliation today, 10 *Yakatit* [1915] E.C. We are, therefore, begging you and the other chiefs in Addis Ababa to do so. 10 *Yakatit* 1915 E.C.

Lej Täklä-Haymanot.

[Source: Telegram Message from *Lej Täklä-Haymanot Gäbrä-Sellassé* to *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé*, 10 *Yakatit* 1915 E.C., NALE, No. 20-01-3/G]

Appendix V

[¾k—Tκ [Ç vÄÿÇ~ je ÓMvB]

¾= fÄÄÁ S"Óef M@<M ›MÓ "Ái JÄ [Ó²=›wH@` ÁdÄ-: ÁíTκ Nw[YLc? HÖ=›]T" <["] SĚSjÁ uS²² uTI}Tκ uò`Tκ
["SKjK": SĚSjÁ Mĭ Nw[YLc? c=vK< K›=xMÁ ŸUØª "Á ›YS^ S] G<" < ›SÖ<f:: G<K) — K^e S"Ñh K›=xMÁ S] J" < Áw[PÄL LÄ
"ÖT" <... ›) — ÁÉÁx S_f K›=xMÁ q`Ö" < ¾cÖ<f 28 ›Ñ:: ›Ue) — Ÿj;c<U ¾Ø" f ¾'u[]j; Ÿð["I ›"Ø]" < UeÖ=|"]Ÿ< "KH" <Mf uÉ"ÖÄ
¾}ið" <" ilðf ÁK" < [U'u[É ›^f j"É IS~ G<Kf j"É }e" " "Æ u|w^ÄeØ" uHuh ilðf ÁK" < Kð["Đκ cØ}ªM:: ... cv) — Í"JÄ [›i@ U"K=j] uV~
Ñ>²? ›=fÄÄÁ }Ú"n iHÄª ÚMVvf XK; Í"JÄ V~ wK" < K›=xK=Á T>eÖ= `´Ó[" < Ÿ›=xMÁ ›Ñ" ¾Ù' Í=›"aκ ›=fÄÄÁ" KSÁ' "Á ›eS^ "Ö<
|d†" < K›=fÄÄÁ S"D" f Í"JÄ VjªM" ØÄf" w[f]@ [κxKG< Kgª w["]" <Ö wK" < LŸ<: eU)" — Ÿ›=xMÁ w[f" ØÄf ›" <Ø}" < ' < }wK" <
"Ç=I u=Ö ["Á ›Ç=e ›uv] ¾= fÄÄÁ S"Óef KTØó f Ÿ›=xMÁ }h"Ÿ" < 11 g=I Ÿcvf S, I'w Ú[c<f I'w Ä" ÁIM SV~ ð["Đκ uÍ@ªK?
›'c<f:: ²Ö' — ÉM J" < Ÿ" u=H@Æ ›=xMÁ }kwKA [UuK<f [UÖÖ<f ØÄf w[f]¾cÖ u›=xMÁ öp` ›ekSx†" <: ›e[— Ñ@[" Mĭ Ác<
HTc?" Ÿ›=xK=Á K=ÁeKpl ÁSxK< }wKA XK 12g= w[f 7 SÉö 12 Sf[¾e K=kuk< ¾fÓ_ I'w ›ð`c" < K›=xMÁ S] ð[" <^] J" < K=Ñ<
" <M ›Á[Ñ<: ŸTHŸK< ›MÓ "Á Ó`T@f "ÓYf K›=fÄÄÁ S"Óef [²<Ç=~]]³[: Ó`T@f "ÓYf Ÿ"Ñc<U [u%EL] ›L[ñU: ›e^ ›)Á—
¾HTc?" I'w ¾= xMÁ S"Óef ÖM}" < "Á ›=fÄÄÁ S"Óef öMÓ u=Sx [Äcl cxD†" <: Ÿ›=xMÁ "I> [e[" < V~: ›e^ G<K) — KTÉ ›"ud
K›=xMÁ S)ÁÁ cÖ<: ›e^ Ze) — G<K) — ›Éª Ÿj)S< uò f ŸS"Óef ðnÉ "Ø}" < ¾Ú[c<f" I'w u=Á"X†" < G<K) — ¾f[u=f ›ªÍ†" < ÁMÑÁK<
ÁMuÁK< [ScK" <] U_HKG< wK" < ›ªí "Ñ\:: [L Ó" ›"jU "Öª" ›"jU ŸÇª [ÁK< I'w- "Á"cc< ›Sf G<Kf ›Sf [Äcl ð]f:: ›e^ ›) — ð[" <^]
S"Ñh "Á ^e Ñ<ÓX ŸS"Óef }MŸ" < u=H@Æ [ªÁ ›É "uÁ" 'U wK" < }kuLD†" <: Ÿ²=Á u%EL ›É ›=xMÁ u=Sx KHÄKYLc? Mĭ KSç"™
K›=MT Mĭ uSj[Ó w[f ÁKI ð[e ÁKI wK" < u| ucMö ÁM}kuK<f Ÿ›=xMÁ KSx ucMö" u|vu? }kuK<f:: É"K? [¾]d cMñ [eŸ Zef k" [¾::
›e^ ›Ue) — ¾}kv "Ñ<c 'Ñef U"K=j; LÑ"ª Kc^Äf u| ÄJ"ªM" gª " < fÓ_ " < ð["I " < dfM pu[" < wK" < Áekulf" ³_ Ó" ¾= fÄÄÁ ›Ø" f "Á aT
›hÑ\ f [ÇÇ=e 'Ñ" J-v†" < ð["Đκ w²< Mpf J': Ú" Öw ›cu<: ›e^ eÉe) — ›=xMÁκ [eŸ — Ö[ö ¾V, Su=M" ¾vu<` S"ÑÉ ›cÖ[Ñ< ÁíTκ
ÁÓV Ÿ›=xMÁ ›^f SH"Ç=e }kwK" < [eŸ ›Éª ›eÖ[Ñ<f NÑ" [¾]²² ¾k[SkŸ [¾]vK:: ›e^ cv) — ÁíTκ ¾^e e¿U Mĭ ¾}Çl Ñ>²? çT"Ç,]
}KAU" + vKS<K< eMx" ¾HTc?" UeK'@ feª ^c< eMx" ÁL†" < U²? ›É"Ñ" < uö, Óªö [¾]c< }Çl:: ›e^ eU)" — Ç"Çf ¾T>vM }ªª KSÉö"
KSf[¾e ¾T>S< ^e Ñ<Ód Kgöf' f }kUÖ" <uf ¾'u[]É SH"Ç=e ›UØ}" < [ª^c=Á†" < ÚU[" < "H" <™ x[" < ›d¿f:: ›e^ ²Ö' — Ó^Tκ
›KT@ ¾T>vM ›Ÿ^†" < "Á ›=xMÁ HÑ" H@É ›^f " }kuU [c< [²=Á XK K›=fÄÄÁ eMŸ™κ ŸMjK" < u›=xMÁ IØ' ›^f " [¾]ÖÑl c'u~:
Ÿ²=Á u%EL ¾SÉö" ¾Sf[¾e }Djκ Ÿ›=xMÁ HÑ" ›UØ}" < "Á ›Éª ›ÑvD†" <... HÁ ›)Á — ¾fÓ_ I'w "Ç=I [ÇÄSx² u — ›Ñ" < [Äcl SKc<f
"Á HTc?" ¾T>H@É Ó" ›ÄŸKjK<fU:: HÁ G<K) — Ÿ²=I "Ç=I uÑK? Ñ>²? }q[q[¾TÄvM }ªª q[q\... 3 [de 1919 ~U

PKn }jK< [Ç vÄÿÇ::
PKn ²Ñ¾ dç`

[Source: *YäQäñazmač Räda Baykädañ Kes Gelbač*: NALE, No. 7-02-12]

APPENDIX: V

[Translation]

[A Copy of *Qäñazmač Rāda Baykädañ's Charges (against Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé)*]

The Crown Prince of the Ethiopian Empire, *Ras Täfäri*, let God show you the mis-deeds of *Däjjäč Gäbrä Sellassé*. We are appealing to you against the mis-deeds of *Däjjäč Gäbrä Sellassé* by listing down his charges and having our signatures and our seals. First, from the start he brought and led the Italians from Massawa to Asmara. Second, he fought against *Ras Mängäša*, leading the Italians, at *Däbrä-Häyla*. . . Fourth, he gave parts of *Adeyabo* to the Italians (about 28 villages). Fifth, he gave to the foreigners [Italians] an engraved marble-stone on which an ancient history was inscribed in Hebrew and Ethiopian languages, from *Aksum* . . . Seventh, At the time when the Emperor [Menelik II] died and at the time when the Ethiopians were highly worried [due to the death of Emperor Menelik] he told the secret of the death of Emperor Menelik to the Italians. As a result, Italian war generals came from Italy to Asmara to occupy Ethiopia. He also sent a message to the Ethiopian nobles by stating that the Emperor is already dead, I will give you rifles and bullets and let us fight together against the Shewans. Eighth, after he received rifles and bullets from the Italians, he demurred the call to come [to Addis Ababa] and he destroyed (killed) about 11,700 people in cooperation with the Italians. It was the Italians who picked the dead up. Ninth, after his defeat he retreated to the bush and the Italians were supplying him with food, drink and with rifles and bullets, based on their friendship. Tenth, at the time when it was said that *Lej Iyasu* will come to force the Italians leave *Hämasén*, *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* had made an agreement with the Italians to receive about 12,000 rifles, 7 cannons, 12 machine-guns and to fight against *Lej Iyasu* by leading the people of Tigray. In the meantime the throne was, however, transferred to the Empress [*Zäwditu*] of Ethiopia. He did not, however, refrain from his activities even after the coming to power of the Empress. Eleventh, when the people of *Hämasén* came to Ethiopia by hating the Italians he made them be detained and forced their return to Eritrea. They, therefore, died in prison. Twelfth, he gave a domesticated lion to the Italians as a gift. Thirteenth, unregretted to the loses which the people suffered due to his refusal to obey the orders from the government and pretending as if he did not kill and as if he did not mis-treat the people, he announced pardon to the people after he was re-

appointed over Adwa. However, he later on accused some people of betrayal some others of fighting against him and made them be suffer one or two years of imprisonment. Fourteenth, when *Fitawrari* Mängäša was sent to *Ras* Gugsä Araya by the government he [*Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé] received him as an ordinary soldier. But, later on, when an Italian [general] come to him [*Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé] he received him with high ceremonial reception by having a huge parade which he did not do to the son of Haylä- Sellassé, Makonnen, and to the son of Yelma. The Italian general visited the parade for about three days. Fifteenth, he picked out from its burial place and sent to Rome the skeleton of the Italians [died at Adwa] who Emperor Menelik ordered to be buried unidentified whether it was a Shewan, a Tigrean or a foreigner, fearing that it might cause disease. When the foreigners [the Italians] saw the skeleton of the dead they cried out, as it was a recent event. By recalling the past events the Italians, therefore, started to think for revenge. Sixteenth, when the Italians constructed roads and railways up to our border, *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé also cleared the road up to Adwa after having received four engineers [from Italy]. He forced people to work on the construction of the road and punished those who were absent. Seventeenth, when [*Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé] married the daughter of *Ras* Seyum [Wälätä-Israel] he made Talamonti and other two people his responsible friends (*mezzés*) at the wedding and married by having fotografhes. Eighteenth, he brought an Italian engineer and showed him Da'dat and its water sources. Da'dat was an important strategic place to use cannons and machine-guns and was also a place where *Ras* Gugsä had been living in during his days of rebellion. Nineteenth, after having sent his servant named Alämé to Italy he was in constant telephone communications with him for about four months, by using the Italian code and by preventing the Ethiopian telephone operators to use the telephone. Later on, [due to this communication], he brought cannon and machine-gun shooters from Italy to Adwa. . . . Twenty-first, while preventing by the use of guards, those Tigrean people from entering into Ethiopia from Eritrea by forcing their return to Eritrea chained, he did not prevent those who want to go to Hämásén. Twenty-second, he built a fortress, which was so far unthinkable to be built by any one... 3 *Tahsas* 1919 E.C. Addis Ababa.

Täklü (*Häläqa*)

Zägäyā Sakor (*Häläqa*)

Räda Baykädañ

[Source: *YäQäñazmač Räda Baykädañ Kes Gelbač*: NALE, No. 7-02-12]

Appendix VI

[Letter of accusation against *Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé* from *Qännazmač Rāda Baykādañ* to *Eččagé Gäbrä-Mānfäsqedus*, 3 *Tahsas* 1919 E.C.]

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ÚÑ@ Ñw[S"ðe pÆe ²S"Óe} >fĀĀĀ Ñw["Nª ÁG< K>=³/c<e j`e,e "MÆ KpÆe T`qe ""Ñ@L© ²u[uS"u[}iKHĀT•f::
Ó²=>wH@` ÁdĀ- Ó²=>wH@` KðØ[- "Ñ<Y KW^@~ `ll >³ " <: ÁÍ`T< Ñw[eLc? K>fĀĀĀ KHÑ^<G< KI`v<G< ¾uĀMªf" uĀM
"SK;K": "Ñ\U "Ç=I " <: K>fĀĀĀ KHÑ^<G< ¾w`H" Seçf J<G< >Ā"E" >w`}" >Ñ\` ²Ó}" "cKØ"K" wL<G< ÁcKÖ"<%Ef" >Ñ` w`H'
Seç~` Yð)" < ÁÍ`T< Ñw[eLc? K>fĀĀĀ ÚKT J"" < S"Óe}" "KTØóf }e}ªM:: u=^u=a ^eª" dĪÉ" Sw^f KTØóf f'dK< Yw`H'< S<kf LĪMð::
MĪ Ñw[YLc? c=vK< ĒUa ĩeY ³ _ É[e dĀJ"L†"< ĩ¼k[" < ĩ"= K>fĀĀĀ K>Ñ^<G< vĀcS<f vĀĵf " < ĩ"= u>×MĀ ĩĪ KTÉ[Ó >L[ñU:: ĩ—
Ó" KS"Óe}" òp`ª KHÑ^<" p`f eKĀ²" " < ĩ"= u;w[†"< Ñ@k" ueÒ ""ÉT" "†"< Ó" j; >Sÿ?L G<ªM" HĀ >É HÖ=>f >L†"<" eKS"Óef
wK"< KÓ`T<f "Óef" KM@<M >MÒ "ªi >SM;}" < GÖ=>†"<" uÓMĭ M" ĩ uU"K=i " <nu? u>vf- u>u' }iKHĀT•f >TØ-@-ĩKG< XĀnÖM
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[Source: NALE, No. 7-02-12]

APPENDIX: VI

[Translation]

Your Excellency, our Lord, *Eččagé* Gäbrä-Mänfäsqedus. . . let God made you see [our problems]. It is known that God to his creatures and King to his soldiers are benevolent (charitable). We, however, appeal to you against *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé by charging him against the mis-deeds he committed against your country, Ethiopia, and against your people. In the country where you have done a lot to make it developed *Däjač* Gäbrä-Sellassé became an obstacle and stood up for its destruction. As a butterfly which set off to made the light off, although it could not spare itself from the heat of the light, *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé, from the start until now did not stop his endeavors to hand Ethiopia over to the Italians though you did not see and listen his deeds and inspite of his unsuccessfulness. In spite of the fact that he is our master (lord) and our brother we accuse him of the crimes due to the fact that we have love for our government and our country. Because he became a thorn to the country and because he is accused of about twenty-one charges, please, for the sake of Menelik and for the sake of your father, *Abunä* Täklä-Haymanot, tell these charges against *Däjjac* Gäbrä-Sellassé to the Empress and to the crown prince so that we can win. 3 *Tahsas* 1919 E.C. Addis Ababa.

Täklu Mäšäša

Täklä-Haymanot Gedäy

Balambaras Gäbru

Šäqa Dästa

Qäñazmač Rāda Baykādañ

[Source: NALE, No. 7-02-12]

Appendix VII

[Translation]

Ras Täfäri the Crown Prince of the Ethiopian Empire.

May it reach *Ras Seyum*, how have you passed the rainy season? Praise be to God, am well. When, by the will of God, the notables, the people, the *Abun* and the *Iččégé* discussed and made Empress Zäwditu to assend to her father's throne, they also made me the Crown Prince. Thus, I am delighted and I would like you to share my happiness. This was done because *Lej Iyasu* neglected the throne and the religion entrusted to him, decided to strengthen the Islamic faith and weaken the government.

Ever since the Gospel was preached in Ethiopia, the people have been stead fast in Christianity. They will not embrace Islam and they cannot live under it. It is also the right time, for you, when you should think more about your religion and your government that you should be strong at your domain. As God, it being his will, has elevated us so timely and [given us] such resolution, it is clear that He will help us in all our undertakings if every one of us, where ever we may be, watches after our state and faith. May God, in his mercy, help us meet in life and enable us to exchange friendly greetings. 3 *Teqemt* 1909 E.C [13 October 1916], Addis Ababa.

[Source: Hadera Tesfay, *Ras Seyum Mengesha: 1887-1960* (B.A. Thesis in History, A.A.U 1976), p.46 (Appendix VIII)].

Appendix VIII

[Translation]

[From *Ras Täfäri* to *Ras Seyum*]

Ras Täfäri Crown Prince of the Ethiopian Empire.

May it reach *Ras Seyum*, how are you. Praise be to God, am well. Though you and I have discussed on the telephone, this week about *Lej Iyasu*, it is impossible to conclude the matter in this manner. We have, therefore, sent our loyal officials with *Däjjazmač Dästa* to give you the letter and to explain the case fully. Ever since you have sent to me concerning this case, I have been very much worried since I thought it to be dangerous to me and trouble some to you as you will learn from the messengers. However, your loyalty and support to our government is unquestionable and known to God and all men. You know that after the deposition of *Lej Iyasu* there have been too much bloodshed all over Ethiopia. Furthermore many people lost their lives on account of his deceitful oaths for reconciliation two or three times. Find out if he has the same intention for the future. You will get the rest of the details from the delegates we have sent. Do not forget our discussion, which we had in the presence of *Ičégé Wäldä Gyorgis*; though he is dead and we are alive. I shall not retract my word until I die. May God help us to meet in life so as to exchange words. 22 *Tahsas* 1912 E.C. [1 January 1920].

[Source: Hadera Tesfay, *Ras Seyum Mengesha: 1887-1960* (B.A. Thesis in History, A.A.U 1976), p.48 (Appendix IX)].

APPENDIX:IX

[Translation]

[From Empress Zäwditu to *Däjjac* Kassa]

Queen of Kings Zäwditu of Ethiopia, daughter of Menelik II, King of Kings.

May it reach *Däjjazmac* Kassa Seyum; how are you? Praise be to God, am well. Because *Ras Täfäri* was already set on his way to Wällo, to stabilize the area, he made *Ras Seyum* to stay a while in order they could leave [Addis Ababa] together. They will set on their way in this week. We also heard of the fact that you fought against *Däjjac* Germay. What was the cause for the fighting? Inform us about the security of the area and the well- being of the harvest regularly, through the telephone via Asmara. 17 *Tir* 1910 E.C.

[Source: *ASMAI*: 54/36/145: From Wäldämaryam to Musse Vartollané, 17 *Tirr* 1910 E.C, A.A.U, IES, Micro Film]

APPENDIX: X

[Translation]

[From *Ras Täfäri* to *Däjjäč Kassa*]

Ras Täfäri, the Crown Prince of the Ethiopian Empire.

May it reach *Däjazmač Kassa Seyum*, how are you? Because of the fact that I should go to Wällo to stabilize the area, I let *Ras Seyum* to stay for a while [in Addis Ababa] after he had already started his journey from Addis Ababa. We shall go together up to Dässé. Are not the area and the people well? 17 *Tirr* 1910 E.C.

[Source: *ASMAI*: 54/36/145: From Wäldämaryam to Musse Vartollané, 17 *Tirr* 1910 E.C, A.A.U, IES, Micro Film]

Appendix XI
[Translation]

[From Empress Zäwditu to Ras Seyum]

Queen of Kings Zäwditu of Ethiopia Lion of Judah, elect of God Empress Zäwditu daughter of Menelik King of Kings.

May it reaches *Ras Seyum*, how are you? Praise be to God, am well. Though you arrested and sent to us *Däjjäč* Kassa because of your loyalty to our government, we refrained from sending him to the place of his detention and kept him at his sister's house with *Däjjäč* Gétačäw so that he might be advised, as he is your son. As we have informed you on the telephone he broke out and escaped on *Yäkatit* 3rd and travelled on an unknown path between Säälalé, Gendä-Bärät through Adabärga and Muger lowlands, on foot and with a few followers, where he encountered countrymen who ordered him to stop. But he refused, killed three people, wounded two others and he was finally killed in the fighting along with his six followers. Our intention was to settle the case peacefully when you come, since your action was out of good will to us. Unfortunately God did not wish it and our wishes cannot be fulfilled. What can be done? the wishes of God and men are different. May God condole you. Further more, we have sent our storekeeper, *Gerazmač* Gäbré to visit you. 29 *Mägabit* 1913 E.C. [7 April 1921], Addis Ababa.

[Source: Hadera Tesfay, *Ras Seyum Mengesha: 1887-1960* (B.A. Thesis in History, A.A.U 1976), p.44 (Appendix V)].

Appendix XII

[From Riccardo Astuto to *Ras Gugsu Araya*]

Governo Dell' Eritrea

Da Asmara a Macalle

[From Riccardo Astuto to *Ras Gugsu Araya*]

u27 Ø 1924 ¼Lÿ<M" ,K?Ó^U Á[cM": Marchese Della Stufa Ý²=I kÁU M@<M "Á)eS^ K=SÖ< ÁS—K< wK"<)e"Í":
"U M@<M Ý²=I u=SÖ< Áe¼" "< wK"< "Ç=Áe" <p-f 'Ó_Á+" < 'u":)G<"U M@<M'f- u=SÖ<)? f^ uÁe" "ÉfkuM-)[ÒÓØM-]KG<:
"Á)? f^ SU×f- Ö?" uT×f U|"Áf uSJ'< Ó" Ád"—M:: eKJ'U Ó" ÁeS^ ,¼" ¼Hÿ=V‡ SÉH>f u,KA "Ç=ÁÉ•f U'n¼" "ÑMØM-]KG<:
Dottor Alemagna)w[-f "Ç=SÖ< nM)XMôÁKG<:

Riccardo Astuto

Governo Dell' Eritrea

[Source: *ASMAI*: 54/38/159: Riccardo Astuto to *Ras Gugsu Araya*, 9 February 1932, A.A.U., IES, Micro Film]

APPENDIX: XII

[Translation]

[From Riccardo Astuto to *Ras Gugsa Araya*]

The Government of Eritrea

[From: Asmara to Mäqällä]

I received the telegram message you sent me dated 27 *Tirr* 1924 [6/2/1932]. *Marcese Della Stufa* had informed me earlier that you were hoping for a visit to Asmara. I also replied to him to inform you that I will receive (accept) your coming with pleasure, and I can also confirm to you that Eritrea will wel-come your coming with pleasure. I am, however, sad due to the fact that your coming to Eritrea is due to health problem. However, it is my hope that the weather condition and the medical treatment that you will get in Eritrea will immediately cure you from your disease. I have also sent a message to Doctor Alemagna to accompany you in your journey to Asmara.

Riccardo Astuto

The Governor of Eritrea.

[Source: *ASMAI*: 54/38/159: Riccardo Astuto to *Ras Gugsa Araya*, 9, February 1932, A.A.U., IES, Micro Film]

Appendix XIII

[Letter From *Ras Gugsu Araya* to *Riccardo Astuto*, 18 *Meyazya* 1925 E.C]

Ÿ^e Ñ<ÓX ››Á YLc? T>Á'Á 18 k" 1925 ¯/U

Kju<` Ôy`" „_]" É ›e~„

ÁÉ[e Kju<` Ôy`" „_ ›e~„ %›?` f]Á Ñ»:: cLU“ Ö?“ K`e- ÁG<“:: KÉj} ` K?ç [“@” KTYÜ [eY ³_ É[e Y’@ Ò` eK]“<M` w²< ›ScÓ“KG<:: [dt]“< uT>K<f ‘Ñ’ G<K< uw²< fÒf [“@” KTÇ” [Ö }x\M“:: ‘Ñ’ Ó” [Ó²=>wH@` vÁðpÁ“< dÁJ”L†“< eKk[“Á ›?` f]Á ÁSKXK<:: T>Á'Á 18 k" 1925 ¯/U }ið::

^e Ñ<ÓX ››Á YLc?

[Source: *ASMAI*: 54/38/159: *Ras Gugsu* to *Riccardo Astuto*, 18 *Meyazya* 1925 E.C., A.A.U, IES, Micro Film]

APPENDIX: XIII

[Translation]

[Letter from *Ras Gugsa Araya* to *Riccardo Astuto*, 18 *Meyazya* 1925 E.C]

From *Ras Gugsa Araya-Sellassé*, 18 *Meyazya* 1925 E.C.

To *Riccardo Astuto*, Governor.

May it reach to his excellency, *Astuto*, the Eritrean governor, may peace and health be for you. I thank you for letting Doctor [*Leco*] to treat me till now. He tried his best to treat and cure me. However, because it was out of the will of God that he could not cure me. He will, therefore, return to Eritrea. 18 *Meyazya* 1925 E.C.

Ras Gugsa Araya-Sellassé

[Source: *ASMAI*: 54/38/159: *Ras Gugsa* to *Riccardo Astuto*, 18 *Meyazya*_1925 E.C., A.A.U, IES, Micro Film]

Appendix XIV

[Letter from *Ras Seyum* to *Orazio Luigi Vinci*, 29 *Mägabit* 1926 E.C. (7 April 1934)]

ÄÉ[e Kju<` ÇÎ *^c=Ä K<`<Í= u=" [Orazio Luigi Vinci] ¼)=xMÁ S"Óef vKS<K< YM×" T>'>e,` cLU" Ö?" K` e- ÄG<":
Äã"<" >Éª >?Î" c=Á uÓw` ¾T>Ñv< Ñ"²w ¾T>Á'c<f" u²=l u>`<Á >Sf U,`Áf eK†Ñ[" "< eK'@ "ÇĪ- wK"< uwÉ` U,`Áf u=J" >Uef g=
w` >K²=Á ¾}‰M-f" ÁIM ju<` ðnÉ- J• Ýw`H' ""ÉU ["Ç=Mÿ<M~ w¾ uTju` "KU"-KG<: eK Ñ"²u< 'Ñ`U ¾T>K"Ö"<" KwL," Ñ@ " IÄ
>el"<mÁKG<: SÒu=f 29 k" 1926 /U [7 April 1934]

[¾^e Y¿U S"Ñh TI}U >Kuf]

[Source: *ASMAI* 54/37/151: *Ras Seyum* to *Orazio Luigi Vinci*, 29 *Mägabit* 1926 E.C. (7 April 1934)]

APPENDIX: XIV

[Translation]

[Letter from *Ras Seyum* to *Orazio Luigi Vinci*, 29 *Mägabit* 1926 E.C. (7 April 1934)]

From *Ras Seyum*

To *Orazio Luigi Vinci*.

May it reach my friend *Orazio Luigi Vinci*, the Italian government's viceroy. I wish you be happy and in peace. Please, for the sake of me, your friend, send me even in the form of debt about 5,000 *birr* or any amount to your ability, which you would deduct from the amount to be taxed from the Italian Agency in Adwa. I requested you to send me the amount of money I specified above, because I suffer from shortage of money to the feast [probably of Easter]. Send me the money with *Berhanä Wändem*. For the exchange of the money I have already informed *Blatén-Géta Heruy*. 29 *Mägabit* 1926 E.C. [7 April 1934].

Ras Seyum's seal

[Source: *ASMAI* 54/37/151: *Ras Seyum* to *Orazio Luigi Vinci*, 29 *Mägabit* 1926 E.C. (7 April 1934)]

Appendix: XV

[Letter from *Ras Seyum* to *Orazio Luigi Vinci*, 29 *Meyazya* 1926 E.C (7 May 1934)]

ÄÉ[e Kju<` ÇÎ *^eÄ K<`<|= u="^ [Orazio Luigi Vinci] ¾)=xMÁ S"Óef vKS<K< YM×" T>>e,`:: cLU" Ö?" K`e- ÄG<":
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}"óÄ eKJ'< uTju` >e!"<o-!KG<:: T>Á²=Á 29 k" 1926 ¯/U [7 May 1934] ::

[¾^e e¿U S"Ñh TI}U >Kuf]

[Source: *ASMAI*: 54/37/151: *Ras Seyum* to *Orazio Luigi Vinci*, 29 *Meyazya* 1926 E.C. (7 May 1934)]

APPENDIX: XV

[Translation]

[Letter from Ras Seyum to Orazio Luigi Vinci, 29 Meyazya 1926 E.C (7 May 1934)]

From *Ras Seyum*

To Orazio Luigi Vinci

May it reach my friend Orazio Luigi Vinci, the Italian government's viceroy, I wish you to be health and in peace. The Emperor [of Ethiopia], by a decree, gave me Aksum and Bora-Seläwa as *madärya*, Häramat and Gär'alta as its overlord (*qorač'enät*, and Tigrä-Tigriñi as *čekalnät* in addition to what I already had, that I am happy and because, knowing that you will be happy, I want to inform you about the appointment with excellence. 29 *Meyazya* 1926 E.C. [7 May 1934].

Ras Seyum's seal

[Source: *ASMAI*: 54/37/151: *Ras Seyum to Orazio Luigi Vinci, 29 Meyazya 1926 E.C. (7 May 1934)*]

APPENDIX XVI

[*Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa to Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, 16 *Mäskäräm* 1928 E.C.]

V› ›"ud ²U'ÑÁ ĀG<Ç kÇT© HĀKYLc? e¿S ūÓ²=›wH@' "Ñ<W 'ÑYf ²=fĀĀÁ::
Ó'T@'f- ›ex ¼LYM' ¼U''f Mwe Ā[c~:: eK²=I ›Y' Ñ>²? S_f ūeTKG<:: ū"ĀS×M"U "Ç=Ā"< KwhKG<:: ¼v''@x"<"U SKĀ
SØ,,M" K"ĀòfU ū"Ā²=G< ¼Ó'T@'f-" fū³' KSðIU ¼4)²ÖĒG< "':

SeŸ[U 16 k" 1928 ū.U

v'Ā- ĀÍ'T< ūĀKYLc? Ñ<ÓX.

[Source: Täklä-Sadiq Mäkurya. *YäEtiopya Tarik KäAsé Téwodros Iskä Qädamawi Haylä-Sellassé*. Addis Ababa: Täsa Printing press, 1952 E.C.]

APPENDIX: XVI

[Translation]

[*Däjjäč* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa to Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, 16 *Mäskäräm* 1928 E.C.]

King of Kings Haylä-Sellassé I of Ethiopia, Lion of Judah, elect of God.

I received the military uniform, which your Emperorship sent to me. I, therefore, bow and kiss the ground [thanks] ten times. I wear it as soon as it arrived. Hoping that the military cap (uniform) would come I am also ready to obey the orders of your emperorship for the future. 16 *Mäskäräm* 1928 E.C.

Your servant *Däjjazemač* Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa.

[Source: Täklä-Sadiq Mäkurya. YäEtiopya Tarik KäAsé Téwodros Iskä Qädamawi Haylä-Sellassé. Addis Ababa: Täsfa Printing press, 1952 E.C.]