

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

Developmentalism and its Depoliticizing Function

By: Robel Fantu

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ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES
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Abstract

Developmentalism has been introduced and used for the first time in history by East Asian nations. Accordingly, the concept of developmentalism got prized and adopted as a better ideology to bring rapid economic growth.

Consequently, it began to be implemented by other developing nations like countries in Africa. Despite the anti democratic practice of the developmental state ideology by Asian nations, the contemporary notion aspires in democratizing the ideology both in theory and practice. Particularly, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) claimed the practice of developmentalism along with revolutionary democracy, subsequently characterized its self as 'developmental democratic state'. However, the narratives of democratized developmentalism both in theory and practice portray contradiction. By taking what has been stated above as a background, this thesis analyzes the depoliticizing function of developmentalism based on the experiences of East Asian and African nations in general and Ethiopian practice of the ideology in particular. Methodologically, the thesis uses information gathered from official documents, books and others.

Key Words:

Inclusive Development, Developmentalism, Revolutionary Democracy, Depoliticizing function, Hegemony.

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Introduction

After the end of world war two Asian nations turned their faces toward advancing their socio-economic conditions. In order to do so, they come up with state- led political system which is developmental state ideology. And this experience of Asian countries portrayed the effectiveness of developmentalism in bringing rapid economic growth, as a result of this it becomes prominent and preferable ideology by other nations. Tacking the mentioned experience as a benchmark various nations adopted and implemented the ideology having the ambition to achieve fast economic advancement; among these post colonial African countries are the main once. Here the focus of the paper is to show the depoliticizing function of developmentalism based on the Ethiopian experience of the ideology.

This paper contains four major chapters and a conclusion. Chapter one is a conceptual framework of ideology, propaganda and developmentalism as an ideology. The first section of the chapter provides a preparatory view of ideology in connection with the interrelation between the society and a ruling power in the political arena. The second part will explore propaganda and its features along with the role of propaganda in projecting a certain ideology as unquestionable one. The last section discusses the emergence and expressions of developmentalism as an ideology. Chapter two is devoted to the discussion of the main features of developmental state ideology. Furthermore it will explore the East Asian experience of the ideology. It also discusses the debates on the African experience of the ideology. The debate incorporates two major issues, namely the impossibility syndrome and the aspiration of democratizing the ideology. The third chapter deals with the Ethiopian practice of developmental state ideology. And the final chapter will analyze the Ethiopian experience of the ideology and discuss the depoliticizing function of developmentalism.

Chapter one

Theoretical Frameworks of Ideology, Propaganda and

Developmentalism

1.1. An Overview on Ideology

It has been said that the creation of the term *ideology* and its first systematic analysis goes to the credit of Antoine Destutt de Tracy in 1796. The analysis of the term by Tracy is profoundly related to his notion of science or study of ideas at the time of French revolution. Accordingly, Tracy's discussion of the idea of ideology is inextricably related to his notion of science. However, after French revolution, ideology become highly controversial term and has been the issue to be dealt by philosophy and other disciplines (Rolf. S). In relation to philosophy, among various thinkers, this part will explore Marxist, Althusserian and Antonio Gramsci's conception of ideology.

To begin with, Karl Marx is one of the great philosophers who tried to theorize the term ideology with respect to the relation between state and society, and representation of the existing material phenomenon. For him, the state is a 'Machine', which functions through 'repressive structure', and dominates the external which is the social group. Accordingly, Carver defined ideology as:

[a] set of ideas and beliefs that serve to legitimize and justify the arrangements and institutions of that society. These ideas characteristically take a number of forms- political, theological, legal, economic but their function, in the final analysis, is the same: to explain, justify, and

legitimize the division of labor, class differences, and differences of wealth, status and power that exist in a particular society (Carver, 1991:130).

Moreover, Marx portrays ideology as a tool for the ruling class in order to subjugate and keep doing things in fulfilling their own desires at the expenses of the society. Though ideology corresponds to ideas that represent the existing reality of the society, the ruling class uses ideology for justifying and legalizing the rightness of exploiting and casting the mass. In addition to this, it creates an illusion by projecting unjust and unfair situations appear just and fair by misrepresenting the reality of the relation between the ruling class and the society.

However, with respect to the mentioned point, Marx depicts the other face of the term ideology in the following way ‘....but we should not think of ideology as conscious lie or propaganda, for among other reasons, it seems that the ruling class believes its ideas. Rather ideology is a reflection in ideal and idealized terms of the society’s material condition’ (Marx quoted in Carver, 1991:159).

The concept of ideology is here meant to disclose that ideology does not necessarily stand for misrepresented material condition of the society. Rather ideology in proper sense portrays the real representation of the material condition of the society. In relation to this point Slavoj Zizek also argues that:

[i]deology is not simply a 'false consciousness', an illusory representation of reality, it is rather this reality itself which is already to be conceived as 'ideological'- 'ideological' is a social reality whose very existence

implies the non-knowledge of its participants as to its essence (Zizek, 1989:15).

At this juncture the Marxist thinker Louis Althusser starts theorizing the term ideology by agreeing with Marxist conception of ideology in its proper sense. For him, in general sense ideology has no history of its own; rather ideologies have. Accordingly, he asserts that ideology exposes the imaginary relation of individual people with their exact material condition. Here Zizek agreed and states that, ‘the fundamental level of ideology, however, is not that of an illusion masking the real state of things but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself’ (ibid. 30).

For Althusser the representation of the imaginary connection between individuals and the existing situation is exposed to distortion (misrepresentation). In this case, individuals idealize distorted reality which is alien from the existing material condition. Zizek, standing at the other end of the spectrum, contends that ideology ‘is not a dreamlike illusion that we build to escape insupportable reality; in its basic dimension it is a fantasy-construction which serves as a support for our 'reality' itself’ (ibid. 45). So it cannot be exposed for such distortion.

For Althusser, ‘ideology has a material existence; arguing that ‘ideology’ or ‘representations’, etc do not have an ideal or spiritual existence but a material existence’ (Althusser in Rolf.S .5). In connection to this Althusser states that, as practices are based up on firm ideology; ideology is counted as apparatus which demonstrates the imaginary relation of individuals with the existing real material condition. Furthermore, the other function is regulating the relation of societal groups with their place and tasks.

In line with Marx's idea, Althusser on his part believes that ideology is the tool for the ruling class (a state apparatus) which justifies and portrays the exploitation and domination of the social group as perfectly good by projecting the totality of its structure.

According to Antonio Gramsci, ideology is directly related with 'hegemony' and his theorization of hegemony is best explanation of Marxist and Althusserian conception of ideology. To elaborate this, Marx and Althusser depict ideology as apparatus of the ruling class to cast and exploit the society for the profit of the governing power at the expense of the mass society in dominant way and in connection to this point, for Gramsci ideology is a bond of formal ideas which contains 'common sense'. This common sense serves the proponent of a certain ideology (Gündoğan, 2008).

For Gramsci, 'In the case of the proletariat, hegemony was seen as a social base of the proletarian dictatorship requiring class alliance. Such an alliance meant "succeeding in obtaining the consent of the broad peasant masses." This was not something new; any alliance needs to obtain consent' (Gündoğan, 2008: 46).

In this case ideological hegemony stands not only for the ruling class (bourgeois) rather for the working class too. Therefore, the working class can attain hegemonic status by the bridge of 'consent'. In capitalist system the ruling class is in hegemonic status to repress and shape the working class in a way to serve their own benefit and for Gramsci this hegemonic status is not exclusive for ruling class rather the working class can attain hegemonic status.

The working class attains the hegemonic status as the result of the pressure of the ruling class; as the ruling power pressure increases the working class strengthens their unity to

overthrow the ruling class by revolution in order to attain their freedom and end the exploitation. Then the proletariat will hold the dominant power over the ruling class as the result of the revolution (Gündoğan, 2008).

Thus, after achieving the unity and hegemonic status, revolution against the hegemonic ruling class (bourgeois) will take place. Here it is clear that the working class pursue hegemonic status for the quest of liberation from the dominant ruling class, on the other hand, the ruling class implements its hegemonic ideology in order to preserve its ideological leadership over the working class. In connection to this, the ideological struggle between the two classes (the ruling class and the working class) is aimed at transformation to socialism and then communism which is characterized as fair and free from repressive domination. For Gramsci, hegemony does not represent only ideological, political and cultural leadership of a class rather it incorporates economical dominance as well.

Hence, Gramsci used the term hegemony for the consent of the working class for overthrowing the ruling class and for the casting system of the ruling class on the ruled one.

Before proceeding to the next part, it is important to discuss about political ideology in particular. As indicated in the above, ideology is a bond of ideas which set forth certain explanation about the relation between individuals and existing material condition. In relation to this point, 'both Marxist and non Marxist account of ideology recognize that ideologies have a role in shaping political activity, often in unconscious way' (Eccleshall, et al 2003:12).

Therefore, ideology provides a certain framework to social, economic and political activities, and at the same time controls the relation of the ruling power and the society in the political space.

Most importantly, ideology is the base and structure of the relationship of governing power and the social group. So it is visible that any political system is backed by a certain ideology which directs every move and relation between the governing and the governed one.

Moreover, with the nature and function of ideology, the thesis will explore and analyze developmental state ideology in respect to the relation between the ruling party and the society in the arena of politics to show the depoliticizing function of developmentalism.

1.2. Propaganda and its features

For any type of ideology, the followers use various ways to pose their ideology as the indubitable truth and make others accept it as a simple truth and reality. Among these ways, propaganda is the main one. Propaganda in its simple expression is disseminating or promoting a certain ideology to the mass.

Propaganda use persuasive and evocative words in order to convince and persuade the mass, and hence, it is manipulative in its nature. Propaganda is also a means for exploitation and most importantly it distorts individuals' understanding of their relation with the existing condition and reality along with the ruling regime on power.

In connection to this point, Adolf Hitler describes propaganda as follows:

....the art of propaganda consists in putting a matter so clearly and forcibly before the minds of the people as to create a general conviction regarding the reality of a certain fact, the necessity of certain things and the just character of something that is essential. But as this art is not an end in itself and because its purpose must be exactly that of the advertisement poster, to attract the attention of the masses and not by any means to dispense individual instructions to those who already have an educated opinion on things or who wish to form such an opinion on grounds of objective study because that is not the purpose of propaganda, it must appeal to the feelings of the public rather than to their reasoning powers. All propaganda must be presented in a popular form and must fix its intellectual level so as not to be above the heads of the least intellectual of those to whom it is directed. Thus its purely intellectual level will have to be that of the lowest mental common denominator among the public it is desired to reach (Hitler, 1939:116).

Hence, propaganda is a crucial tool to apply any type of ideology through psychological affection on the society in accordance to the intellectual status of individuals. And propaganda by itself is nothing rather it gets meaning and functions with a certain ideology at the back. Here discussing the unique properties which propaganda incorporates is important.

For its aim, any propaganda involves unique features; among others propaganda uses emotively charged terminologies and statements exposed in repeated rate, portrays one side of the idea, it criticizes a certain thing or ideology as a special enemy and so on. So any social communication which contains such features is certainly propaganda. In most cases, individuals are not able to identify the apparent fact from effective propaganda, and because of this reason, the public understanding become distorted and as a result misinterprets the factual relationship between the governing power and the society itself.

Here Hitler further argues that the mass society in a nation have limited understanding on the political matters, so using effective propaganda is the ultimate way to disseminate a certain ideology. To clarify this point let's look at the following text:

[t]he receptive powers of the masses are very restricted, and their understanding is feeble. On the other hand, they quickly forget. Such being the case, all effective propaganda must be confined to a few bare essentials and those must be expressed as far as possible in stereotyped formulas. These slogans should be persistently repeated until the very last individual has come to grasp the idea that has been put forward. If this principle be forgotten and if an attempt be made to be abstract and general, the propaganda will turn out ineffective; for the public will not be able to digest or retain what is offered to them in this way (Hitler, 1939:116).

Thus, as the function of propaganda is to deceive and mislead individuals, to be aware of the properties of propaganda and to employ critical evaluation on various social communications is important. Additionally, the social consciousness have to be free from

distortions which are caused by effective propaganda because, misconception of the factual political practices will result in a society which doesn't have a worldview.

In doing so, all political ideologies use effective propaganda for the mentioned reasons. And the next chapters of the paper will discuss how developmentalism employs propaganda for its depoliticizing function based on Ethiopian experience of developmentalism.

1.3. Developmentalism as an Ideology

Developmental state ideology has been introduced and used for the first time in history by Asian nations. Especially, the concept of developmental state get prized and adopted as a better ideology to bring rapid economic growth by a few nations in Africa, Chalmers Johnson's exposition of north Asian countries experiences and achievements was instrumental in this; his documentation of Japan's successful experience of miraculous economic advancement after Second World War.

According to Johnson 'Japanese state chose economic development as a way to ensure national survival: for most of the twentieth century, economic development was a means for 'overcoming depression, war preparations, war fighting, post-war reconstruction, and independence from U.S.aid' (Boyd and Ngo, 2005: 7). So the intention of Japan's economic nationalism was to cope up with the Western economic hegemony. As a result of this, developmentalism becomes a means for radical change in political economy of most Asian countries like china, South Korea and Taiwan.

In the ideology of developmentalism the state has autonomous political power over every economic aspect and the bureaucratic system is the cardinal element to promote industrialization and investment. And it cannot be categorized as capitalist or socialist in its nature.

At this juncture, various writers like Chalmers Johnson, Boyd and Ngo conceptualize purpose of developmentalist ideology in different ways. Among these, the main one is to overcome external Western economic hegemony and the existing poverty in the nations: Here Chalmers Johnson elaborates developmental state ideology as a get- way to overcome and cope up from the influence of Western nations like Europe and USA as such nations dominate other countries by using various ways like providing financial aid and military support.

He further theorizes the concept of developmental state ideology as best system which brings rapid economic growth for a nation. In the same case Haley in (Boyd and Ngo, 2005: 10-11) discussed the above issues as follows, 'It is the place where bureaucrats are (said to be) stronger than politicians, where the state has known how to identify and to pursue developmental projects that created world-beating industries. It is the place where the state is strong and its agency is highly developed' (ibid: 10).

However, developmental state has two expressions in practice - democratic and undemocratic. Despite the economic advancement made by the ideology, most Asian countries with developmental state ideology are undemocratic. Practices of developmental state ideology in Asian countries like China, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan do not incorporate democratic values and experience. As developmentalist

ideology gives priority to economic advancement the individual's civil and political rights are considered as secondary matters. In such developmentalist nations, the role of individuals in the political and economic arena is limited and controlled by the governing power. In addition to this, there is no political development along with the economic change. And the developmentalist ideology in these countries practiced through an authoritarian system. For instance:

[i]n Taiwan, Thailand, Korea, and Singapore, the conservatism of post independence governments was buttressed by authoritarian rule that actively sought to weaken and/or control social forces such as labor that might have supported more extensive social protections (ibid:149).

As indicated in the preceding quote, developmental state ideology aligns the individual and societal rights in socio economic sphere. Taking Singapore's case in relation to the above point, Robison and Rodan contended that:

....state paternalism, political authoritarianism, and an institutionalized ideology of elitism—all of which were meant to blunt political opposition and reproduce PAP hegemony—were integral features of the broader relationships within which the developmental state operated.(ibid:178)

Unlike the above practice, nations like Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa come up with the new expression of developmentalism which is developmental democratic state ideology. Nations in this category are characterized as 'developmental democratic states' and they believe on the possibility of consolidating values of developmental state ideology along with democratic values. Accordingly, such nations advocate that developmental democratic state ideology as more effective than the undemocratic

developmental state ideology in advancing social, economic and political status of a nation.

On behalf of the mentioned point, the late prime minister of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi argued the possibility and efficiency of democratized developmentalism as follows:

[t]here is every reason to suggest that if a developmental state were to also be democratic the "hegemonic" nature of its development project would be achieved faster and held more deeply because it would emerge from free debate and dialogue. A democratic developmental state is thus likely to be even more effective as a developmental state than an undemocratic one (Meles, 2006: 14)

And in connection to this, Fritz and Rocha contended that, all developmentalist regimes cannot be symbolized as authoritarian or in order to be developmental state one must not necessarily be authoritarian even though the nations who introduced the ideology were authoritarian.

The idea is that, democratizing developmental state ideology is a crucial progress for the process of building social, economic and political strength for developing countries. Furthermore, Mkandawire argues that, '[in the historical development of developmental state ideology,]...few examples of developmental states were authoritarian. The new ones will have to be democratic and it is encouraging that the two most cited examples of such 'democratic developmental state' are both African- Botswana and Mauritius' (Mkandawire, 2001:310). In addition to this, Bollesta analyzed the democratization process of developmentalism and argued as follows:

[w]e may think about democracy as a pervasive system in which we defend the right of the society to choose their leaders and be governed by them, at the same time realizing fully that in order to maintain a developmental path one needs to curb aspirations of the democratic leadership (Bollesta, 2007:107).

In fact the concept of developmental democratic state is in a grass root level and the preliminary practice of the ideology is prized and aspired mostly by developing countries in Africa like Ethiopia. In relation to this point, on the next chapters the paper will explore the practices of developmental democratic state ideology in Ethiopia (as Ethiopia claims to be a developmental democratic state) with relation to the depoliticizing function of the ideology.

Before proceeding to chapter two of the thesis, exploring Mkandawire's and Andrzej Bollesta's conception of developmental state ideology is important.

Mkandawire is one of several scholars who tried to conceptualize developmental state ideology. For him, 'the definition of developmental state runs the risk of being tautological, since evidence that the state is developmental is often drawn deductively from the performance of the economy' (Mkandawire, 2001:290).

At this point, advanced economic status is the implication of state's strength. So developmentalist ideology prioritizes policies aimed at attaining rapid economic change of a nation. Here, for him, taking the outcome which is advanced economic status as justification for state strength as developmentalist may not succeed in attaining the

expected outcome without strong interrelation between the state and the society for the national project in the political arena.

Accordingly,

[i]t is essential to stress these ideological underpinnings of state policies for it is this that provide the rational for some of the ‘policies’ and give legitimacy to otherwise unpalatable ‘sacrifice’, not only because they serve as the ‘opium of the mass’, but also because they knit together the ruling class. The centrality of ideology also points to naiveté of the depoliticised quest for technocratic ‘governance’, now pushed by international financial institutions (IFIs), in which a technocracy is supposed to carry out policies that are good for the nation for no apparent reason, not even self-serving ones (ibid:291).

For Mkandawire the theory of developmental state contains two components which are ideological and structural one. Accordingly, he portrays the ideological aspect of developmentalism:

[i]t is this ideology-structure nexus that distinguish developmental state from other form of states. In terms of ideology, developmental state is essentially one whose ideological underpinning is ‘developmentalist’ in that it conceives its ‘mission’ as that of ensuring economic development (Mkandawire, 2001:290).

At this juncture, the ruling party controls and casts every directions in respect to the intended developmental project. And he further argues that, ‘...the elite must be able to

establish an ‘ideological hegemony’, so that it’s developmental project becomes, in a Gramscian sense, a ‘hegemonic’ project to which key actors adhere voluntarily’ (ibid.).

As developmental state ideology prioritizes economic development, each effective way which endorses such aim is dominantly shaped and applied by the leaders; in this case, the mass society is burdened to act in the given framework.

Here Mkandawire puts the Structural aspect of developmentalism as:

[t]he capacity to implement economic policy sagaciously and effectively.

Such capacity is determined by various factors—institutional, technical, administrative and political. Undergirding all these is the *autonomy* of the state from social forces so that it can use these capacities to devise long-term economic policy unencumbered by the claims of myopic private interest (Mkandawire, 2001:290).

Therefore in developmental state ideology the state applies every effective policies and strategies to achieve rapid economic growth which is backed by hegemonic aspect of the ideology. In connection to this, the interrelation between the ideological aspect and structural part is highly tied to bring the aimed economic advancement.

Moreover, the driving force of developmentalist ideology is nationalism, suggesting countries to level up and advance their economic status having the vision to get food security, and military capacity to coup up with developed ones. However, leaders in various nations use developmentalist ideology to secure their political power by using the hegemonic aspect of the ideology to enforce their ill will on the mass. And Mkandawire discussed it as follows, ‘The ideology of development was exploited as a means of

reproducing political hegemony; it got limited attention and served hardly any purpose as a framework for economic transformation' (ibid: 295).

According to Mkandawire, reason for this is *lack of ideology* (ideological vacuum). And he relates this point with, '...petty bourgeois commitment to their class interests and their fear of 'revolutionary pressures', to the obscurantism of imperialists powers and to mass illiteracy 'which imposes a culture of silence and passivity and inhibits popular demand for ideological discourse' (ibid.).

At this point, elites misuse developmentalism in opposite to the nexuses of the ideological and structural aspect and mission of developmental state ideology. Thus, for him, democratizing the ideology will overcome the *ideological vacuum*.

Andrzej Bollesta on the other hand defines developmental state ideology as a system which incorporates liberal's economic structure along with strategies planned by the state. Thuse, for Bollesta developmentalism cannot be recognized as capitalist or socialist. And in relation to this point, Loriaux argued that, 'the developmental state is an embodiment of a normative or moral ambition to use the interventionist power of the state to guide investment in a way that promotes a certain solidaristic vision of national economy' (Loriaux in Bollesta 2007:106). This implies that developmental state ideology is interventionist in its nature. It also shows us that the ruling power is in charge of creating the rules of the game along with enforcing the rules on the society to attain the aimed progress.

According to Bollesta the basic features of developmental state ideology are:

[f]irstly, a developmental state is a state in which the authorities' objectives are to achieve fast socioeconomic development. Secondly, these objectives are achieved via the process of industrialisation. Thirdly, although the strategy and goals might be drafted by the ruling elite, the state transformation is facilitated by competent bureaucracy, a state administration, which is a structure largely independent from possible democratic choices of the society (Bollesta, 2007:109).

Accordingly, Bollesta argued on the understanding of developmentalism as an ideology which can be considered as a possible way to bring economic development in a nation. To further elaborate this point let's see the following analyses which he gave:

[t]he developmental state theory is not a recipe for successful civilization advancements of a nation. It is, however, a state philosophy which can create an adequate ground for developmental efforts. This ideology puts development in the forefront agenda. We shall not, however, accept this theory as dogma (ibid:110).

Though developmental state ideology is controlling and interventionist in its nature, he suggested democratizing the ideology as the best alternative to achieve the development goal based on the idea that it is not necessary to be authoritarian in implementing developmentalism.

The next part of the paper will discuss the essential features of developmental state ideology, East Asian experiences and debates on African experiences of the ideology.

Chapter two

Features of Developmental State ideology, East Asia experiences and debates on African experience of the ideology

2.1. Features of Developmental State Ideology

The witnessed dramatic economic growth in East Asia after WWII projects developmental state ideology as the best theory of political economy. And because of this reason it has been adopted and implemented by a few Asian nations and other developing countries. Despite the economic progress which can be made by developmental state ideology, this part of the thesis will explore political experiences of East Asian and African countries following developmental state ideology.

Before proceeding to the political experiences and debates, it is important to look at the basic attributes of developmental state ideology; (Boyed and Nego, 2005), after analyzing the experience of Asian developmental states, tried to identify some basic features of developmental state ideology. Accordingly, to their observation, the first characteristic of the ideology is having an authoritarian state. Thus, such kind of an authoritarian state tries its best to protect itself from any political or social pressures. The state also stretches a bureaucratic accompanied by *meritocratic technocrats* that help it to be a single decision making apparatus. Secondly, economic development is propagated as a key issue of the state. And in relation to this point, the technocrats work a lot to inculcate the idea that considers economic development as the last and absolute goal of the state to the public. Moreover, any activity that is related with development such as industrialization, rapid economic growth, competitiveness, and economic strategies are facilitated by these technocrats. The third feature is the argument that promotes the state to play a crucial role

to bring the expected economic advancement. That means, the state should intervene on selected factors of the economy for the sake of implementing its economic strategies that is dispensed by the technocrats.

As stated, the experience of East Asian countries showed that the state is in charge of creating and implementing the policies and also the long term vision and mission of the country is determined by the ruling power. In doing so, the vision and mission is to achieve rapid economic growth as it is believed to be the basic foundation for other aspects of development. Hence, to attain the intended advancement, the ideology takes industrialization and competitive market as important pillars of the development process.

In order to undergo the development process the state uses large bureaucratic system. At this point (Kohli, 2004), states that, the repressive and authoritarian nature of developmentalist ideology is the result of competent bureaucracy which is created to overcome the loose alliance between the state and capital. This implies that bureaucracy is the tool for the state to implement policies and strategies for the prioritized economic development. Additionally, bureaucratic system helps the ruling elites to preserve their power for long as a result of the procedural process dictated by the ideology.

Having the preceding general characterization of the ideology, recent literature on developmental state ideology indicates *embedded autonomy and nationalism* as additional crucial features of developmental state. Evans discussed embedded autonomy as follows:

[t]he developmental state is autonomous insofar as it has a rationalized bureaucracy characterized by meritocracy and long-term career prospects,

traits that make civil servants more professional and detached from powerful rent seeking groups. On the other hand, the state cannot be too insulated or isolated from society without running the risk of becoming excessively detached, unable to appreciate and act upon societal needs. Thus, it must also be embedded in society, that is, '[connected to] a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies (Evans in Fritz and Menocal, 2007: 535).

This point implies the importance of state interference in creating and implementing various strategies in order to endure the developmental process. The mentioned interference engages not mere elite's involvement, rather trained civil servants have crucial role in implementing policies designed by the state without any reservation. Since the developmental state ideology primarily requires national consensus among individuals on the developmentalist goal and fighting rent seeking for its effective implementation, molding the civil servants consciousness toward the ideology is important.

Here, Evans underlined on the relation between the state and the society by prescribing strengthened collaboration and interconnection between the ruling power and the society. In addition to this, the whole process must be for and from the society which Evans says *embeddedness*. Consequently, 'the *autonomy* of the state comes from social forces so that it can use these capacities to devise long-term economic policy unencumbered by the claims of myopic private interest' (Mkandawire, 2001:290).

Accordingly, Evans argued that the autonomy of the state in involving to the process of development have to be provided a fundamental structural basis from its *embeddedness*. At this juncture, the society in a nation has to be the initial actors and providers of basic inputs which are useful to the development procedures. Moreover, ‘it is usually necessary for the elite to expound a vision that connects the state and society in a mutually binding way, through some form of shared national project’ (Fritz and Menocal, 2007: 535). In relation to this point, the interrelation between the state and the society has to be founded based on common project in which both sides agreed upon and has to be shared by the public as national project.

Having the above major characteristics of developmental state ideology, creating *nation-wide* agenda ‘[must not] be rooted in a unified sense of ‘nation’ based on cultural and linguistic unity, but may well take the form of a more civic identity’ (ibid). Therefore, the nationalist sense is not based on a single nationality in a particular nation rather the vision and mission of the ideology has to be founded up on the nation in general or (has to be based on civic identity). And developmentalism requires the engagement of both the ruling power and the society, subsequently it is important to create public consensus on the mission.

In connection to this point, Mkandawire states that effective implementation of developmental state ideology is processed due to an overall national agenda. The moral is that the enrolment of each member of a nation is required for the actualization of the ideology.

Additionally, maintaining the hegemonic aspect of the ideology enables it to attain consensus on the project by catching the attention of the large part of the society through

various and effective ways. This helps the state to execute all strategies which are said to be the ways to the intended development by the ideology. And this nationalism is based on the aspiration of securing food, health and military needs of the nations who currently are following the ideology.

At this juncture, Ashraf Ghani states two major qualities which developmental state has to acquire in the development journey as follows: ‘First, the state must have the capacity to control a vast majority of its territory and possess a set of core capacity that will enable it to design and deliver policies. Secondly, the project must involve some degree of reach and inclusion (Ghani in Solomon, 2011: 19-20). This implies that the state has to monopolize fundamental institutions which are the basic foundations for the remaining aspects of the nation to monitor every social and political activities and uphold the inherent hegemonic nature of developmentalism.

2.2. East Asian experience of developmental state ideology

The East Asian experience of developmental state ideology is taken as a benchmark for the contemporary conceptions and experiences of the ideology and it has become the bases for the motivation to democratize the ideology. Even if there are some disagreements among scholars about the detailed activities taken by East Asian countries to achieve immense economic development, still there are basic principles of developmental state ideology that all East Asian countries experienced during the heydays of their booming economy. Fritz and Rocha explained the case well as:

[t]here is some disagreement in the literature regarding the core set of policies that enabled the original Asian tigers and others to achieve high

levels of development and economic growth; there is general consensus about the essential features that characterized these successful developmental states. Most of all, a strong core of state institutions with the capacity to promote economic growth without being ‘captured’ by particularist interests is regarded as having been essential. This is what Peter Evans (1995) has called ‘embedded autonomy’. (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2006:8).

Besides the principle of ‘embedded autonomy’ there are also other agreed ways and attributes of developmental state ideology based on the past East Asian experiences. Among these agreed concepts the major one is the consensus of the public in making the developmentalist project national agenda is undeniably important. And, the mission manifested by the ideology cannot be realized with the absence of the participation employed by each member of the society in addition to the implementation of large bureaucracy.

[i]n Asia, political leadership committed to development was often motivated by regional competition, nationalism and the desire to ‘catch up’ with the West. As a result, development was regarded as a ‘national project’ of the first priority. Such determined political elites were either relatively uncorrupted or limited personal gains to non-predatory corruption which did not impede investments and the expansion of national productivity (ibid, 8-9).

The above quoted projects, the national achievements by developmental state ideology are founded on regional competitions. But these competitions have something in

common, that is, all are looking forward to the nationally agreed development. Having this fact, the political elites are characterized as uncorrupted and accountable for the system. And these elites formulate determined ways in which the society take and move toward the planned economic growth. Besides, these elites use the bureaucratic system by being loyal to the aimed goal which is the national project of developmentalism.

Therefore, based on the nationalistic aspirations, the state designs and employs various policies and frameworks which targets at the aimed economic change with each member of the society. In undertaking development through developmentalism, political elites are taken as free from personal advancement at the expense of the society's economic progress.

Here Boyd and Ngo further argued that with some of its unique features the political experience of East Asian can be categorized as one of the theoretical discourse among many of the political science theories. These writers claimed that:

[t]he political experience of East Asia [projected].....the “plan-rational” state [in developmentalism] that is to say, a state led by technocrats who enjoy a high degree of political autonomy, insulation from societal demands, and yet who are simultaneously embedded in that society can engineer economic growth (Boyd and Ngo, 2005: 1).

East Asian experiences of developmental state ideology portray the state's role as highly intervenes in every social, political and economic activities. In fact this situation was highly exposed to various types of corruption by the political elites and as a result, rent seeking becomes major problem in impeding the development process.

Moreover state power was centralized by few political elites accompanied by technocrats. And these actors were in charge of declaring a mission and vision which is considered as nationwide project.

Though the national mission to be achieved is said to be a composition which incorporates demands of the society in relation with the state, the society was alienated from participating in molding and advancing the national vision and mission as a result of elites domination. Hence, East Asian developmental states autonomy was not embedded in the society, rather East Asian developmental states were authoritarian.

Regarding the role of the state in the economic growth of East Asian countries and the imitation of such experience by other nations is well explained by Mkandawire as:

[Having the drawbacks of East Asian experience of the ideology with regard to political development] ...Mounting evidence showed that the state had been the key agent behind the spectacular success of the East Asian 'Four Tigers'. This has led not only to a re-reading of the role of the state in the development process, but it has also raised the question of the explicability of their policies and experiences in other developing countries (Mkandawire, 2001:292).

The perceptible outcomes made by developmental state ideology in East Asian nations justified the capability of developmentalism in bringing rapid economic advancement, but due to some determining factors which will be explored in the next part of this chapter, scholars propound the impossibility of implementing developmental state ideology in effective way to attain the witnessed achievements made by East Asian nations in developing nations specifically African states.

In connection to this point, ‘as in the East Asian cases, autonomy also grows out of the social origins of the bureaucrats themselves. Local recruits into the bureaucracy are likely to be ideologically committed to the state’s redistributive project, given the long-standing ideological hegemony of left-wing ideas among the local university population, but they are less likely to be of peasant origin themselves’ (Evans, 1995:238).

Therefore the elites of developmental states are highly concerned in keeping the hegemonic essence of the ideology having the ambition to attain the expected outcome of the process which is advanced economic growth. In order to do so, the state incorporates various members of the society for the underpinning aspect of the ideology. Accordingly, the recruiting process engages both literate and illiterate individuals from both urban and rural areas.

The above East Asian experience of developmental state ideology shows how the miraculous economic change was attained and the next section of the paper will explore the debates on African experience of the developmental state ideology having the aspiration of democratizing it.

2.3. Debates on African experience of developmental state ideology, aspiring in democratizing the ideology

The beginning of developmental state ideology in Africa is a debatable issue between scholars up to now; some scholars argued that the concept of developmental state ideology is totally new for African nations up to this time, but others state that:

[a] discussion of the relevance of the developmental state concept for Africa must necessarily begin by referring back to the initial post-colonial

experiences of African countries in the 1960s and '70s because these were characterized by state-led interventions and have been seen to be an expression of developmentalism' (Shivji in Meyns and Musamba, 2010:28).

As indicated in the preceding quote, the idea of developmental state ideology is not a new phenomenon for African nations. Based on the experiences of few African countries after the end of colonialism some political analysts believe that these African countries turned their faces toward economic development which has been weakened by the colonial regime through centralized state power.

Furthermore, Mkandawire argues that African states around mid-70's can be categorized as developmental states as far as they pursued the developmentalist ways and goals. Based on this he discarded the notions which alien the ideology from African countries.

Having the above debate, the other controversial issue is with regard to the intention of African leaders in post colonial time in choosing developmental state ideology over other ideologies for the purpose of healing Africa from the damage caused by colonization. On the other hand Claude Ake argued that the ideology of developmental state serves African leaders to maintain their power. To illuminate his argument let us quote his statement:

[t]he politics that rendered development improbable has made the adoption of an ideology of development inevitable. For the political elites struggling to maintain their power and to reproduce their domination amid the problems of the postcolonial era, the ideology of development has

been an effective strategy of power that addresses the objective necessity for development (Ake, 1996: 16-17).

Here, Ake illustrates the intention of post colonial African leaders as the deep desire and will to stay on power for long period of time. Subsequently, he accused these leaders for assigning abused instrumental value for the concept development by using it as a way to sustain on power.

Additionally, in post colonial Africa the struggle for power was enormous and consequently, leaders who were able to catch the power used various methods to maintain their power. Here, the political context of developmentalism is directly related with such African experience of the ideology.

However, Peter Meyns and Charity Musamba in *INEF-Report* on 2010 document portrayed Mkandawire's argument as a good response to Ake's statements on the intention of post colonial African leaders. This comparison perceives and projects Ake as the accuser of post colonial African leaders for adopting and implementing the ideology based on the desire of power, and put Mkandawire as a defender for the leader's intention which is ambitious for development per se.

Here in the other end of the spectrum Mkandawire asserts that 'for most of the first generation of African leaders, 'development' was certainly a central preoccupation' (Mkandawire, 2001). Furthermore, he argued that the post colonial African leaders preferred developmentalist ideology with the motive to create a significant social, political and economic advancement. Therefore, it is wrong to lay blame on these leaders of using the developmental state ideology for their power survival. Thus referring to

some African nations experiences, he justified that the post colonial African leaders adopted developmentalism with the intention of bringing positive change for the nations after the horrible damage caused by colonization.

But still Ake argued as when they employed such ideology, ‘economic transformation’ has a secondary status for those African leaders. According to him ‘developmental state ideology’:

[a]s an ideology,... [of] development served a dual function. It represented the interests of the African political elites and their patrons. At the same time, it was an ideology of economic transformation. But the latter was secondary. As a basis for economic change, the ideology was shaped decisively by the essentially political interests of its proponents (Ake, 1996:17).

Moreover, he states that developmental state ideology is a tool for African leaders in which they use to shape African people in order to secure their position and employ a system which fits and satiate their desires.

Though few African nations claimed in practicing developmental state ideology, Peter Meyns and Charity Musamba argued as follows:

[d]evelopmentalism in Africa in the 1960s and ‘70s was characterized by weak state capacity and ineffective statist intervention in the national economy [...]. The political and economic crises which resulted from post-colonial statist experiences in Africa must, in conclusion, be seen as

the outcome of states which lacked essential features of a developmental state (Meyns and Musamba 2010:30).

The above text tried to expose the other side of the issue which is not assessed by Ake and Mkandawire. Meyns and Msuamba, rather than arguing on the exploitation of the ideology by African leaders, they illustrated the weak understanding and application of developementalism by African nations in the 1960's and '70s. Actually these African nations were practicing centralized and hegemonic system and this can be considered as one of the major attributes of developmentalism. Hence, by considering this fact it is indisputable to say African nations in 1960's and '70's cannot be mentioned as developmental states in strict sense of the ideology.

The other burning case in African experience of developmental state ideology is the possibility and impossibility of developmentalism in relation to effective implementation of it in African nations. Scholars in the first category like Mkandawire tried to defend and show the possibility of implementing developmental state ideology by referring to the perceptible experiences of African developmental states based on Asian practices of the ideology and he praised the aspiration of democratizing the ideology by mentioning few African countries which are said to be developmental democratic states (Mkandawire, 2001: 310).

Literature from 80s and 90s stands at the other end of the spectrum, and contend the impossibility of implementing developmental state ideology in Africa for some reasons like, 'the practice of developmental states cannot be replicated mainly because the institutions associated with the East Asian developmental states are both highly

contextual and time-specific, the problem of transferability of developmental state institutions is linked to East Asian societal traditions and culture, [developmental state ideology is] determined by a particular geo-political and historical context' (Meyns and Musamba, 2010:31-32). According to this literature, the aforementioned factors justify the impossibility syndrome in implementing developmental state ideology in effective manner and attain the expected outcome in African scenario.

At this juncture, Kelsal states six African nations; Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. And from these nations he regarded Ethiopia and Rwanda as patrimonial developmental states. Moreover, he characterized them as:

[a] system to centralize the management of economic rents and orient rent generation to the long term. In other words, there was a structure in place that allowed a person or group at the apex of the state to determine the major rents created and to distribute them at will. In addition, leaders had a vision that inspired them to create rents and discipline rent-seeking to expand income through productive investment over the long term. The mechanisms for doing this differed from country to country, but they always involved a combination of: a strong, visionary leader (often an independence or war-time hero), a single or dominant party system, a competent and confident economic technocracy, a strategy to include, at least partially, the most important political groups in some of the benefits of growth and a sound policy framework, defined here as having a broadly pro-capitalist, pro-rural bias (Kelsall, 2011. 2).

Having the witnessed situation in developmental states particularly the mentioned once in the above quote, are authoritarian regimes with single dominant party and ethnic group ruling in a certain way.

As indicated in the above quote, the ruling power which is the dominant party is formulated by one ethnic group. And this dominant ethnic group will be benefited in advance from the achieved economic growth rather than accommodating the remaining part of the society. Referring to history, every ideology and implementation of it has a creator and proponent which usually counted as a hero. When we look at it in Ethiopian case, the hero is deliberately recruited from the ruling party which is formulated by one ethnic group. Following this, the hero will be taken as a symbol of the revolution and change.

However, scholars like Maphunye, contends that ‘given the challenges of the Asian developmental states, especially in terms of democratic participation, it would be desirable for African countries to consider adopting and implementing developmental states that are also democratic, particularly in terms of allowing a space for civil society and public participation’ (J. Maphunye, 2009:14). So, Maphunye discarded the impossibility syndrome via supporting the idea of democratizing developmentalism. Accordingly, by aspiring these, few African nations like Botswana, South Africa, Mauritius, and Ethiopia are characterized as developmental democratic states.

Recent literature with regard to developmental state ideology discussed the possibility of patrimonial mode of governance as a core essence in developmentalism. And in connection to this point, ‘a patrimonial mode of governance can take different forms,

some developmental and some not. [.....] case studies of states whose forms of patrimonialism can be seen to have had positive developmental impacts' (Kelsall and Booth in Routley, 2012: 33). Here scholars argue contrary by taking developmentalist African nation's experiences in particular, patrimonialism is found to be the main obstacle not to achieve the developmental aspirations.

Based on the above quotes, it is visible that developmentalism incorporates patrimonial approach in governing process and few developmentalist countries are said to be patrimonial namely Japan, Korea and Taiwan. And from African continent, some nations are categorized as neo-patrimonial states, for instance, Botswana and Ethiopia. As indicated, scholars like Kelsall and Booth asserted that patrimonial mode has played a positive role in realizing the expected outcome. Nonetheless other scholars contended the opposite which means, they portrayed patrimonialism as an obstacle in developmentalism.

Here When we look at patrimonial ruling system itself, it prioritize political elite's benefits at the expense of basic societal gains, it also creates a conducive environment for corruption (rent seeking), and one part of the society or a particular ethnic group hegemonies the remaining ethnic groups in the society.

Accordingly, characteristics of patrimonial mode are highly interrelated with the nature of developmental state ideology which means, 'The separation of the developmental patrimonial state from the developmental state is perhaps not as such a clear cut. Additionally, whilst developmental gains have been made by those states highlighted by the Africa power and politics program as examples of the model, these successes

have not amounted to the miraculous growth of the East Asian economic miracle' (ibid: 35). As explored in the previous part of the paper, developmental state ideology incorporates effective and large bureaucratic system as a core essence and this system interconnects the state and the society particularly business persons, and as a result, the whole governing system and the market situation will be exposed to rent seeking and corruption. And this scenario shows how patrimonial system of governance negatively impacts the ideology.

Having the above facts,

[p]oliticians can consolidate their personal power base differently... For example, if politicians seek to build a professional network of loyal clients in the bureaucracy, this network helps them but not the state they run. Instead, if they consolidate their power base by building effective coercive state apparatuses, these may stay with the state long after they have left the scene (Vu in Routley, 2012: 35).

Though such system is antidemocratic and conquering, developmentalist countries which applied a regime tuned with patrimonial mode like South Korea and Malaysia achieved rapid economic growth. When we come to the African case, the mentioned countries as patrimonial developmental states are witnessing fast economic advancement. However, the social and political development in these nations in fact is infant and fragile. And at the same time, some patrimonial developmental states in Africa are not able to realize the expected result which is rapid economic growth. Such case makes exception for patrimonial developmental states in relation to the outcome which have to be attained.

Additionally, the lack of good governance which is rooted in the ideology in such nations triggered various social, political and economical crises and this situation highly impedes the development process.

The opportunistic and greedy desires of the political elites in patrimonial developmental state ideology directly affect the market, huge projects like infrastructural constructions and generally the development of the continent, and a nation in particular. The debate in connection to patrimonial developmental states in Africa continued up to now but taking the perceptible factual experiences of these countries, it is undeniable that developmental state ideology in most African nations includes patrimonial mode of governance. The next part of the paper will focus on Ethiopian experience of the ideology.

Chapter three

Developmentalism in Ethiopia

3.1. The Paradigm shifts of Political Ideologies from 1974 up to now in Ethiopia

After the end of the imperial regime in the mid 1970s, the Derg regime took the political power and *Marxist-Leninist* ideology was declared. Even though the system has tried to implement fair resource distribution which has been owned by the previous landlords, it failed to recognize the civil and political rights of citizens. Consequently, the role and conciseness of individuals was surpassed by the system. As it was totalitarian in its nature every social, political and economic activities of individuals was controlled and casted by the military regime. Consequently, social, economic and political disorders happened and at the same time, the superstructure which was established with the support of Russians fell and *Marxist-Leninist* ideology came to an end.

Along with this, after 17 years of war, in 1991 the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) captured the state power and came up with new official ideology- *Revolutionary Democracy* which is said to be the mixture of Communist and the shining and dominant thought of the time after cold war which was liberalism. This new ideology propagates democracy on one hand and in the other it absorbs basic socialist beliefs as a central motto and this point will be discussed on the next parts of this chapter. But in early 2000's, the EPRDF projected poverty and rent seeking as an existential threat and adopt *developmental state* ideology from East Asia especially from

Korea and Taiwan as an antidote. Furthermore, as East Asian states are not democratic, EPRDF adopt the concept of developmentalism along with democracy and characterized itself as *developmental democratic state*. Then following the controversial election in 2010, EPRDF declared the five years goal, which is *Growth and Transformation Plan* in order to undergo the development process. The next sections of the paper will discuss these three paradigms.

3.1.1. Marxist Ideology in Ethiopia

In January 1974, the Imperial Regime came to an end and the overthrow of the regime, ‘initially started as an urban phenomenon, students, teachers, civil servants, and soldiers embarked on a rebellion against the imperial representatives of Haile Selassie, its supporters of nobility and feudal aristocracy, and the nascent national bourgeoisies’ (Adejumobi, 2007: 119).

[r]ather than being guided by an elaborate ideology, the coup makers claimed that they were motivated by a sense of patriotism. They adopted as their motto “Ethiopia Tekedem” (Ethiopia First), and they began referring to themselves, the “Derg”- Amharic term meaning “committee”.

Over the next years, the Derg began to define its revolutionary objectives through its policy edicts. (J. Keller, 2005:101).

And the regime declared socialist political ideology accordingly the basic principles of the ideology has been the foundation and framework of the governing system. ‘That is why the Derg is remembered historically as, ideologically shaped prominent Marxist regime of the 20th century Africa. In the early stage of the regime, the one hundred

military personnel who finally become key figures in leading the country pledged to introduce socialism in to Ethiopia' (Bahru, 2002: 243-244). So, the Derg regime has been affected by the ideology of the time which is Marxist Leninist ideology propagated by the Soviet Union. At that time, Soviet Union was powerful and dominant state. As a result of this fact, the socialist ideology was expanding throughout the world. Furthermore, Soviet Union used various ways to expand and actualize socialism. Among these ways, providing financial aid and armamental support for different opposition armies in other nations and continents was the main one. In fact the ideological expansion movement of Soviet Union was successful in making alliance with leaders in other states. In relation to this point, the Derg was one of the state powers which have been aided and supported by the Soviet Union.

In time of power the regime implemented three phases:

[i]n the first phase, which began in December 1974, the Derg declared its commitment to Ethiopian socialism, followed by a declaration of a corollary economic policy. This phase, [John Harbeson] argues, was characterized by pragmatic judgments, general formulations, and moderate tone. The second phase featured the promulgation of sweeping reforms designed to root out the socioeconomic underpinning of the old order and to mobilize masses of rural and urban constituents for the revolutionary struggle. The dominant feature of the third phase was the launching of a new Democratic Revolutionary Program and the strengthening of grassroots management committees, [...] this last step was an attempt to invest the masses with significant political power, leading to the creation

of a People's Democratic Republic at the national level. (Adejumobi, 2007: 120)'.

Though the Derg regime underpinned the above phases in order to employ socialism, the system encountered different opponents with substantial critics and advanced ideas. In connection to this point J. Keller discussed it as follows, Specially the young intellectuals, who were claimed as kindles of the revolution were not convinced by the attempt of the Derg and its accomplishment to construct a new system. Therefore, many opposition groups proliferated on the political scene to resist the new ideology adopted by the Derg. Some of the resistant groups such as Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Democratic Front raised ideological issue as main reason among many other reasons. The remaining ethnic based movements that decided to wage armed struggle against the Derg regime like OLF (Oromo liberation Front) relate their resistance with the neglecting of nationalist questions by the ruling power. For some time the Derg become successful in silencing these resistance groups with firm assistance of Soviet Union, Cuba and Yemen (J. Keller, 2005).

However Derg's forceful replay towards the armed groups did not bring long lasting peace, rather the country was immersed the country in uninterrupted severe civil war forced by reginal and ethnic rebellion movements that are listed above.

Regardless of the above factors, the regime committed fatal mistakes with regard to the oppositions on that time, villagization process and on using aided finances to the intended mission. When we look at the first issue, the Derg destroyed various resources and agricultural productions which are said to be located as areas which the opposition forces.

And this measurement made the oppositions more aggressive and strong. Additionally, it opened a gate for creating alliance between farmers and the opposition forces for common target which was the overthrowing of the ruling power. The second mistake which played a vital role in abolishing the Derg itself was the issue of villagization process implemented by the regime per se. This program moved and relocated various communities to other areas which were not suitable without considering and consulting the members of the communities. Consequently the relocated communities complained and began to oppose the system. The last mistake which has been done by the Derg is directly connected with the aid donated by various humanitarian institutions. At this point, the ruling power diverted the fund aided for advancing its own military power than maintaining the damage caused by the famine. For these reasons the society became anti the Derg system (Adejumobi, 2007:128).

In connection to nongovernmental and civil society organizations:

[n]GO interventions in the mid-70s coincided with the termination of imperial rule in Ethiopia. Notwithstanding the initial support by the socio-political and economic reforms of the new Dergue regime, a period of disillusionment followed the high-handed nature of governance exercised by the nouveau regime. Subsequently, Ethiopian society witnessed the progressive and steady shrinking of socio-political and economic freedoms. At the same time, politically instigated insurgencies escalated in several parts of the country. The State responded to the growing popular discontent by ruthless and arbitrary violations of basic human rights and democratic freedoms in a manner unprecedented in the history of Ethiopia

in the twentieth century (Kassahun in Bahru and Pausewang et al, 2002: 122).

In addition to this, even if the Derg claimed the regime is practicing Marxism; it was not well organized as the soviets in understanding and employing the ideology. And the totalitarian essence of the system created various internal quarrels in the Derg regime. Moreover, the ruling power was not able to fulfill the demands of the society in turning the autonomy of the land to the majority farmers.

At its early times, the regime promised to the public to provide autonomy, local governance and people's participation to the mass population who were organized under the newly emerged peasant and urban dwellers associations. Unfortunately, when time passed these radical socialist policies of the mid 1970s were abused and the associations that were constructed with the aim of promoting and echoing the society's voice by being free from any pressure of the ruling power, were shaped to serve as a channel for the regime to control every activities of citizens. They also served the regime as apparatus to ensure the implementation of its central directives well (Mehret in Bahru and Pausewang et al, 2002: 134).

Despite the damage caused by the Derg, the regime has tried to fairly distribute the nation's resources to the majority which has been owned by few land lords of the past imperial system. And considering this perceptible fact, it is legitimate to credit the Derg. At this juncture, the fall of Soviet Union's socialist structure made the Derg weaker. This external factor led the regime to employ worst actions to sustain its power and these

actions finally contributed a lot for the fall of the regime. In connection to this point Adejumobi argued:

[b]y 1990, Soviet military advisors were withdrawn, and the number of military supplies continued to dwindle until 1991, when the military assistance agreement formally expired. The Ethiopian regime also encountered problems such as a lack of resources, droughts, the social dislocations of rural communities due to resettlement, problems with land tenure, villagization, and the conscription of young farmers to meet military obligations. Mengistu continues to declare policies aimed at ameliorating the condition of the peasants including passing the decree that guaranteed the free movement of goods, removed price controls, and facilitated secured land tenure (Adejumobi, 2007:128).

Internally, the regime was challenged seriously by a prolonged and protracted war with various resistance groups that took arms to overthrow the Derg power. Most of these resistance groups were organized based on ethnic lines. Reasons for the proliferation of armed resistance groups were first, ‘Red Terror’ campaign of the regime that was launched against the educated youths who opposed the regime without the participation of the public. The other reason was the failure of the regime to fulfill the promise of accommodating ‘ethno-linguistic’ diversity of the country and their quest toward up to self- determination (Tronvoll and Vaughan, 2003: 130). National integration coupled with strong centralization policy became the prime’s agenda and any group that advocate ‘nationalist question’ was considered as anti-revolutionary movement. Because of the

above two factors, the country was immersed in uninterrupted civil war waged by regional and ethnic rebellion movements against the Dergue.

Furthermore, history repeated itself on Ethiopians; as time of the fall of the imperial regime, though the majority of Ethiopians were hopeful in gaining autonomy of land and various resources of the nation which have been in the hand of the land lords, the Derg failed to keep and realize the societal demands. In fact, at the expenses of the national interest of the society, ruling power once again centralized and resources were also monopolized by the regime.

[b]oth African socialism and Marxism-Leninism failed to have enduring impact anywhere in Africa. Yet, this is not to say that the concerns and aspirations that led to their temporary appeal and ascendancy are no longer there. Even if we leave aside the internal factors that contributed to that appeal and ascendancy, Africa has still to define its relationship with the global order that controlled its destiny in the past and continues to dominate it today (Bahru in Adejumobi, 2007: 129).

After the fall of the Derg regime in 1991, once again Ethiopians had a chance to pursue a bright future which incorporates equality, civic and political rights of citizens and the autonomy of ethnic groups which have been suppressed. Following the defeat of the Derg power, the EPRDF captured the governing power with new vision and political ideology.

3.1.2. Revolutionary Democracy in Ethiopia

In 1991 the Ethiopian people's revolutionary democratic front takes the ruling power and declared a new ideology which is *abyotawi democracy* or revolutionary democracy. The regime claims that, '[the ideology applies its] democratic project through revolutionary means partly emerged from a Leninist interpretation of Marx's Proletariat Dictatorship thesis. The notion of revolutionary democracy came from an opposition to capitalist liberal ideology, and Lenin's revolutionary project' (Bach, 2011: 641). Here before proceeding to the declaration and implementation of revolutionary democracy in Ethiopia, discussing the term *revolution* is significant.

The concept of *revolution* has been dealt by many scholars. Among these Hannah Arendt discussed the term *revolution* in various perspectives in history. This part of the paper is limited in discussing Arendt's conceptualization of the term. And the importance of exploring her conceptualization of the term *revolution* is to see the different interpretations in history and its place in the modern political matters.

According to Hannah Arendt, on her critique of modern politics in particular on the concept of democracy, she exposed the importance and crucial role of *revolution* in politics and human life. For her, *revolution* is effective way or process which serves as the way to overcome totalitarian, dictatorship and bad governing system in general. After analyzing the 1956 Hungarian revolution in which the Hungarian people upraised on the totalitarian and attained their freedom, De Jongh argued that, Arendt justified the importance of revolution in the modern era. Consequently, she portrayed the validity of revolution in the time of twentieth first century.

For her, revolution is the only possible way for individuals to directly face the corrupted and totalitarian political power. And revolution is effective way for the society to bring actual and total change to the better.

Having this fact, ‘The challenge of modern politics, then, is to keep alive the revolutionary spirit of action without rendering its own achievements futile, without surrendering to the seeming irreconcilability of the conservative and innovative sides of the paradox of politics’ (De Jongh, 2012: 11).

At this point, she portrayed the drawbacks of personal wills and desires of few individuals in revolution; for her the consensus of all members in a society is very important for revolution. However, she condemns reflecting personal motives and passions in the public realm. At the same time, she argued that individuals have to actively engage in the revolution process with common interest. But if individuals keep projecting their own personal outlooks in the political arena, as per her writing it will destruct the politics itself rather than upholding change. Therefore revolution must be a bond of passions and motivations of the society for the common interest.

Arendt tried to project different interpretations and outcomes of revolution in history up to now. For her:

[t]o any understanding of revolutions in the modern age is that the idea of freedom and the experience of a new beginning should coincide. And since the current notion of the Free World is that freedom, and neither justice nor greatness, is the highest criterion for judging the constitutions of political bodies, it is not only our understanding of revolution but our

conception of freedom, clearly revolutionary in origin, on which may hinge the extent to which we are prepared to accept or reject this coincidence (Arendt, 1965:29).

In addition to this, she argued that revolution is the foundation and means to attain the basic rights of individuals. And according to her the inalienable rights possessed by man is the outcome of revolution.

Even though individuals perceive revolution in relation with violence and chaos Arendt contends:

[v]iolence is no more adequate to describe the phenomenon of revolution than change; only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution (ibid, 35).

In her work *On Revolution*, she mentioned three major conceptions of revolution which has been given through history. Revolution has been conceptualized as a path to restoration, then taken as a way to attain freedom and at last a path which individuals pass through in order to attain happiness. And she also glorified the role of revolution in politics, plus she criticized modern politics for abandoning the spirit of revolution particularly, democracy with the absence of revolution. This will lead us to the Leninist interpretation of Marx's Proletariat Dictatorship thesis and the EPRDF's notion of revolutionary democracy.

Having the various roles and interpretations of revolution in history,

[r]evolutionary democracy has been interpreted as a bridge between pre-capitalist and socialist societies. These theories have had a great impact in what was called the “Third World” during the Cold War. The notion of revolutionary democracy was then used by the USSR to designate one tendency of not-capitalist countries or movements which had nevertheless not achieved their revolution yet (Bach, 2011: 641-642).

In contrary, after analyzing Ethiopian case Bach states that, revolutionary democracy was the core doctrine of the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) before it extended its interest to the liberation of Ethiopia and became the EPRDF. Furthermore, he mentioned two leaders of TPLF which are Ababy Tsehay and Melese Zenawi as the influential actors in advocating socialist ideology.

After the fall of the Derg regime, ‘The EPRDF, which assumed state power in May 1991, promised both federalism and multiparty democracy in response to the popular quest for equality and democratic governance’ (Merera, 6). As a result of the cold war the liberal thought of the West was dominating, hence the EPRDF was forced to incorporate the political ideology which is liberalism in its core doctrine. Moreover, there are two major reasons for the regime to mix both the liberal and socialist ideology to form revolutionary democracy which is differently copied from the Leninist interpretation of Marx’s Proletariat Dictatorship thesis discussed on the above quote by Bach and the claimed reasons by the EPRDF for declaring *abyotawi democracy* are, to

gain the acceptance of the Western nations and the other reason is to gain financial aid from these nations to maintain the problems caused by the debit which the nation faces.

But this liberal practice does not capacitate courage for EPRDF to throw Marxist-Leninist ideology and *abyotawi democracy*. Consequently, the ‘EPRDF Program published in 1991 (1983 EC) was entitled *abyotawi democracy* (YeEhadig Abyotawi Democracy Program) and in 1994, Meles Zenawi confirmed the ideological resilience on the occasion of a TPLF cadre conference in Meqele (Tigray), describing revolutionary democracy as an appropriate doctrine that had to be firmly grasped if Ethiopia was to embark on sustainable economic development’ (Bach, 2011: 643). Consequently, to safeguard individual’s rights, freedom, equality, and to serve the public interest the EPRDF take revolutionary democracy as the only way (as omniscient ideology).

Following the immediate fall of the Derg regime,

[t]he EPRDF does not have concrete conception of revolutionary democracy *abyotawi Democracy* which can be a source for various policies. But the government implemented the ideology for two purposes, first to shape every activity toward development by democracy and secondly, to serve the society’s inclination to socialism. In order to do so, EPRDF used basic democratic pillars with a spice of socialism (EPRDF, 2003:34).

And it was perceptible that, during the war between the EPRDF and Derg, the ideology was functional for the EPRDF in organizing local farmers as militant to confront the Derg

regime. In addition to this point, the EPRDF used revolutionary democracy as antidote for problems like corruption in its institution.

Though it is ambiguous to explain the concept of Revolutionary democracy besides to say it is a hybrid of revolution and democracy, some scholars like Jean-Nicolas Bach tried to explain the Ethiopian anomaly as the superimposition of the revolutionary democracy over constitutionally guaranteed liberal concepts such as multi-party system and parliamentary system that are affected through election and the participation of political parties. But, the irony is when the superimposition is done, those liberal concepts are failed to be visible in the political landscape of the country. Rather, the liberal tools are served only as an instrument to the legitimate the EPRDF power and its long age survival in the political scene.

And though the EPRDF negates the Western countries liberal political ideology, it adopted the basic attribute of the ideology which is election. As election is the core essence of democracy the EPRDF appropriated it with in revolutionary process as the ultimate way to bring change. However various scholars tried to interprets the ideology as follows:

[t]he EPRDF is one of a number of political organizations that grew out of the Marxist student movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Its preferred conception of democracy has not been the liberal bourgeois variety, based on individual participation, a diversity of interests and views, and plural representation. Rather ‘revolutionary’ democracy is based on communal collective participation, based on consensus forged

through discussion led by the vanguard organization. The party's long-standing commitments to Leninist and Maoist precepts of mass political mobilisation were confirmed by the TPLF's success in Tigray, where the peasantry was mobilised on an ethnic basis. This, in turn, became the mode of participation and representation in the TGE/FDRE. The extent to which the ideology associated with this history may have been revised by EPRDF during the recent period remains unclear and controversial (Tronvoll and Vaughan, 2003:15).

Additionally, the former member of the TPLF and president of Tigray region Geberu Asrat in his book *Sovereignty and democracy in Ethiopia*, states that, '[the former prime minister Meles Zenawi] gave his own vague interpretation, on one hand he asserts *abyotawi Democracy* as an ideology which gives priority for group rights. On the other hand he argues that the ideology is suitable for a nation with infant capitalist system' (Gebru, 2007: 378).

Likewise scholars like Vaughan and Tronvoll expose the odd interpretations of democracy by the ruling power as follows, 'donors and the EPRDF have not meant the same thing by 'democracy'. The ruling party has its own understanding of democracy, which differs significantly from the type favored, and ascendant, in the west; the institutions it has created accordingly function differently' (Tronvoll and Vaughan, 2003: 116).

As stated above, because of the ambiguous conception of EPRDF, revolutionary democracy can be interpreted in various ways and this quality indicates the very intention

of the EPRDF which this paper will discuss in the next sections. Among other attributes and targets of revolutionary democracy, ‘The state, not distinguished from the ruling party (EPRDF) nor from the government, creates organizations, leaders, and vanguard elites who all spread and impose the party’s ideology. EPRDF’s top-down policy is presented to both domestic and international audiences as democratic and revolutionary [is the main one]’ (Bach, 2011:, 648). The regime used a strong top-down arrangement so as to implement the ideology in effective manner. However, ‘*Abyotawi democracy* seems neither revolutionary nor democratic. EPRDF’s revolutionary discourses have to accommodate pragmatic policies. Then we have to consider *abyotawi democracy* as a symbol, a powerful discursive and political tool, rather than a genuinely revolutionary program’ (ibid, 653).

During the transition time, ‘the Marxist- Leninist ideology was about to end and liberal world view was flourishing. Because of this reason EPRDF take time to come up with alternative ideology to keep the vibe of democracy and development alive in addition to revolutionary democracy. In doing so, the EPRDF planned to adopted developmental state ideology from the experiences of Taiwan and Korea having the aspiration of democratizing it’ (EPRDF, 1999 and 2003: 78-80). But before the implementation of the developmental state ideology Ethio- Eretria war takes place.

After the end of the war, the EPRDF faced major internal crises and this problem is caused by two groups having ideological difference and both sides forwarded various ideas toward the basic cause of the internal problem in the institution. The first group blames some EPRDF leaders for being *adhari* or becoming the supporter of *shabia* and imperialism. So this group accused these leaders. On the other hand, the second group

claims corrupted members as the very cause for the problem. After long debates and meetings, members of the EPRDF once again agreed to come up with renaissance path or *tehadeso mesemer*. On September, 1994 E.C the 4th institutional meeting EPRDF's revolutionary democratic nature get renewed and the desire to adopt developmental state ideology is also strengthened. And this meeting is also taken as the rebirth of the EPRDF with new chapter.

Consequently, based on the document prepared by late prime-minister Meles Zenawi after the end of Ethio-Eritrea war, Gebru Asrat explained the situation as follows, '[Meles Zenawi on his presentation for the central committee argued that], The system lead by the EPRDF has faced bonapartist essence and as a result of this, expansion of antidemocratic thinking and high level of corruption appeared in the regime. Furthermore, [he strongly asserted that] if bonapartism get praised, Ethiopia will get destructed' (Gebru, 2007: 285).

Following this, since the beginning of 2000 EPRDF launched Developmental state ideology from the experience of East Asia nations in order to fight poverty and rent seeking (EPRDF, 1999, 2003).

3.2. Developmentalism in Ethiopia

Since the beginning of 2000s EPRDF adopted developmental state ideology by referring to East Asian nations particularly Korean and Taiwan's experience as the best model and strategy. And this model is admired by the EPRDF as it 'provides a suitable environment and situations for poor country like Ethiopia to transform in to developing status in fast and practical way' (EPRDF, 2003: 24). And the other function of the ideology according

to the EPRDF is 'it is the best way to fight against rent seeking political-economy and to abolish the allegations with regard to the market (market failures) which are the major hindrances of the development process' (ibid, 45). In addition to this point, the government adopted the ideology as a result of declaring poverty as existential threat and by the harsh experience of the controversial election in 1997 E.C. Consequently, in practice it is claimed that, the government is practicing Revolutionary Democracy along with Developmental state ideology.

The EPRDF mentioned three distinct features of developmental state ideology which is in practice based on the conception of East Asian countries. The first one is, taking development as unquestionable (as a matter of life and death) mission, secondly freeing the government from the shadow of the political economic ideology of the rich along with large beurecracy and creating national consensus on developmentalist thinking (keep its hegemonic status). Accordingly, the government is implementing on the bases of these three attributes of developmental state ideology. Here let's explore each of them, '[the government], claims we believe that development is a matter of life and death mission because the poverty we are experiencing now may cause bad governance and as a result of this the people will get hopeless and declare war to each other (civil war)' (EPRDF, 2003: 45-46). At this juncture, the government takes this as a first step for the commitment of transforming the country to middle income nations (developing countries) in short period of time. Plus, this big step will enable the regime to stay in power, as it mentions the process of development will take years of experiences in the future.

The second characteristic of the ideology in Ethiopian experience is to liberate the government from the domain of the rich's political economic dominance. In order to do

so the ‘[EPRDF] monopolized key economic institutions by resisting privatization of neo liberalism based on the absorbed attributes of command economic system in order to serve the mass. This enables the government to be free from the dominance of the rich’s political economic thinking and it also provides a conducive environment to fight rent-seeking political economy’ (ibid, 47). And this attribute is very important to implement selective governmental interventions through the developmental structure by using large bureaucracy for the success of the aimed target.

Proceeding to the third major aspect, the government contended that, ‘our regime is effective in keeping the hegemonic status of developmental state ideology by using the social communication. And these social communication and public relation are playing decisive role in indoctrinating developmentalism to the people [in order to create national consensus with regard to the issue]’ (ibid, 48). Subsequently, every governmental and private Medias are expected and obligated to agree in developmentalist ideology and create awareness to the society for the expected national consensus in every possible way and as mass mobilization is a basic requirement for developmentalism, the EPRDF is using the main social Medias for propaganda purposes.

By implying the above situations the EPRDF claimed that, the government fulfilled the basic features of the ideology more than the referred East Asian nations particularly Korean and Taiwan.

3.2.1. “Developmental Democratic State” ideology in Ethiopia

In literature, the EPRDF emphasized in projecting the unique implementation and practices of developmental state ideology in Ethiopia. The uniqueness is with regard to

democratizing the ideology besides East Asian nation's antidemocratic practices; as it considers the regime 'developmental democratic state'. The government admitted that East Asian experience of developmental state ideology is antidemocratic one and for this practice EPRDF mentioned two key reasons and conditions for the ideology to be antidemocratic in Korean and Taiwan's regime, the 'first one is, the peasants were economically poor and have weak political consciousness, and the second one is people in each nation were from one culture, language and foundation' (EPRDF, 2003: 40). Hence, these two reasons are the enabling conditions for those nations to exercise antidemocratic developmental state ideology.

In addition to the above enabling conditions, EPRDF states the enabling environment, 'the first one is the regimes in both nations were antidemocratic in their nature, and the second one is the regimes fear the people (peasants) upraise against the system by formulating opposition parties' (ibid, 41-42). Accordingly, the EPRDF portrayed the above conditions as basic reasons for both Korean and Taiwan's practice of antidemocratic developmental state ideology. By mentioning this, the government of Ethiopia asserts that as it has the majority vote and acceptance of the Ethiopian people specially the peasants and as it has been fighting for democracy for life; the regime discarded antidemocratic practices of developmental state ideology and declared (characterized itself) as democratic one.

As indicated in chapter one, the former leader of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi strongly argued on the possibility of establishing democratic developmental state. And he also states that, though most nations who practiced developmental state ideology are antidemocrat, it doesn't mean that the ideology can't be democratized. In relation to this point, EPRDF

claims that to democratize the ideology, practicing it with *abyotawi democracy* is the ultimate way. Referring to East Asian exercise the government states:

[k]orean and Taiwan's regimes fear the free movement for change as a result of communist revolutionary world view, so they surpassed the society's freedom and liberation by implementing antidemocratic system. But [EPRDF argues], as our developmentalist aspiration is from and for the Ethiopian people we have no fear as the above two regimes. And [having the above thinking the regime claims that] the developmentalist government is working for good governance and freedom of the people by helping the society in formulating and supporting civil society organizations (ibid, 55-56).

In order to undergo the development process through developmental state ideology and moreover Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) states, '[As Ethiopian long term ambition is], to become a country where democratic rule, good-governance and social justice reigns, upon the involvement and free will of its peoples; and once extricating itself from poverty and becomes a middle-income economy' (MoFED, 2010: 7). The EPRDF designed a five year Growth and Transformation plan (GTP). The plan broadly incorporates infrastructural development along with community development.

3.2.2. Growth and transformation plan (GTP)

As a result of the controversial election on (post 2002) the EPRDF launched the five year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) (Gebre, 2007: 371). Accordingly, the EPRDF

claimed that the five year Growth and Transformation Plan is the result of hard work and it has wide national acceptance. The government asserts that the plan contains various effective strategies and policies which can overcome the deprived conditions of Ethiopia and accelerate the development progress more than ever. The GTP widely targets on:

[c]reating sustainable food security in the country, attracting internal and external investors, advancing the industrial and agricultural sector by technology transfer with foreign countries and by capacity building, strengthening the awareness of the developmentalist ideology [or preserving the hegemonic essence of the ideology] in rural and urban areas, and changing from agriculture lead economy in to industry lead economy (EPRDF, 2003).

With regard to the relevance of the plan, the EPRDF states that the development process is not limited in the five years rather it aspires a sustainable development in the mentioned sectors for longer time. And it is not just growth and development; it also takes a great place in our history of renaissance. All these essences of the plan make it unique and desirable. Therefore the government takes the five year Growth and Transformation Plan as a life and death mission nationwide. When we look at the general objectives of the GTP, referring to the document prepared by MOFED in 2010, the first one is ensuring fast economic growth by maintaining the eleven percent GTP growth rate. Secondly, meeting the millennium development goals including assuring of qualities of health and education. The other one is establishing a precondition that assist the effort of creating a stable democratic and developmental state. Finally, guaranteeing sustainable growth through a stable macroeconomic framework.

The general objectives of the GTP will be implemented through the seven pillar strategies that have tight nexus with the above objectives. These pillar strategies are;

[s]ustaining faster and equitable economic growth, Maintaining agriculture as a major source of economic growth, Creating favorable conditions for the industry to play key role in the economy, Enhancing expansion and quality of infrastructure development, Enhancing expansion and quality of social development, Building capacity and deepen good governance, and Promote women and youth empowerment and equitable benefit (MoFED,2010:8).

Here GTP is taken as the major tool and attribute of the characterized ideology of the EPRDF which is ‘developmental democratic state ideology’ and the implementation of the ideology is guaranteed by the GTP. In relation to this point, the government claimed that the democratization process of developmental state ideology is tuned by revolutionary democracy.

The next section of the paper will critically analyze the implementation of *developmental democratic state* ideology in Ethiopia and based on this it will discuss the depoliticizing function of developmentalism.

Chapter Four

Depoliticizing Function of Developmentalism in Ethiopian context

4.1. Critical analysis on “Developmental Democratic State” ideology and its propaganda in Ethiopian context

As we have seen so far, developmentalism as an ideology has played crucial role in miraculous economic advancement to nations who employed it. Accordingly, this ideology underlined the importance of the top down approach and hegemonic character of the state to undertake the development process. And as discussed in the preceding chapters, few leaders of African countries adopted the ideology on post colonial time as their ruling system for various reasons, and among these the Ethiopia government (EPRDF) implemented developmental state ideology having the ambition to make Ethiopia a developing country in short period of time. In doing so, the government claimed that this regime has actualized the basic elements of the ideology better than the referred Asian nations as benchmarks namely Korea and Taiwan.

The basic elements emphasized and claimed to be implemented efficiently by the EPRDF are, Taking the issue of development as life and death mission (popularizing development), liberating the government from the political economic ideology of the rich, building effective bureaucracy, and keeping the hegemonic characteristic of the ideology. Though the government asserted that the developmental state ideology is democratized by revolutionary democracy, in the process of praising and employing the above elements of the ideology the EPRDF has neglected individual's basic roles and

rights of participations in the arena of politics. In fact this happened not out of a blue rather it is directly connected to the ideology which the government practices (developmental state). For instance, individual's freedom of speech and assembly, free movement and participation of civic society organizations, the right for expression and implementation of other best alternative ideologies than the ideology of the regime, the societies role in shaping and advancing policies are taken from the society.

In connection with the above situations, Asnake Kefale in his article contends that:

[i]n the Ethiopian context, while the EPRDF argues that it is following a democratic developmental path, the opposition and critics underscore that political space in the country has been narrowing down. Surprisingly, the popularization of developmentalism somehow coincided with the passing of a set of laws which put limitations on civil society organizations, and the media. In the absence of a democratic space which among other things allows debates and exchanges on the making and implementation of public policies sustaining high level of development would be undoubtedly difficult (Asnake, 12).

In addition to this point, Asnake underlined on un limiting the space of the political arena and the role of the society in order to attain the aimed target which is fast and sustainable development as wide political space and active participation of the society are the basic requirements to bring fast and sustainable development.

Here let's explore how the EPRDF implemented the mentioned basic attributes of developmental state ideology having the aspiration of democratizing it. As discussed in

chapter three, the government characterized the regime as “developmental democratic state”. When we look at the basic pillars of the ideology, they are highly interconnected; and consequently preserving this interconnectedness is crucial in actualizing the ideology.

At this point, elites of the EPRDF processed the first step which is declaring development as unquestionable mission to deal with, in doing so; they portrayed poverty and rent seeking as existential problem of the country. As a result of this step, the government formulated and endorsed the GTP for five consecutive years.

In declaring development as life and death mission, the elites of the EPRDF used enormous propaganda on how democratized developmentalism is best for Ethiopia and also the elites claim the effective implementation of the ideology to its maximum level. Furthermore, they appropriated the propaganda to fulfill the core attribute of the ideology which is maintaining the hegemonic quality and make the mission a nationwide project. To create the expected awareness and acceptance of the ideology, the regime monopolized all governmental and nongovernmental Medias and presses; hence they are obligated to dedicate their entire programs for the propaganda of the ideology. This process is not limited in dealing the crowd by mass communications rather the government designed additional strategy to perpetuate in individual level which is the one to five grouping in every social structure and institutions; these created groups are accountable to the higher political officials of the government in respective sectors. Hence, the government uses this grouping strategy for the purpose of passing it’s policies for implementation. Accordingly, the given policies are unquestionable as a result, every

member of each one to five group is expected to employ the given policies without any reservation as the mission of development is a life and death one.

In addition to the one to five grouping, the EPRDF uses civil society organizations for the same purpose and here Desta has discussed this point as follows:

[i]s managed by civil servants that have clearly spelled-out functions. The government functionaries and technocrats are by and large recruited on meritocracy and are expected to serve competently. However, the institutions in which the functionaries operate are not autonomous. They are strongly influenced by the ruling elite. The higher positions in many governmental departments are assigned according to an ethnic-based quota system (Desta in Solomon, 2011: 30).

The other way which the government uses for propaganda is posting various guiding slogans, mottos and postures including pamphlets in different places especially on every sub cities in particular and on various governmental and nongovernmental offices in general. The propaganda passed through this posted materials played crucial role in printing the developmental state ideology on the society's consciousness.

Furthermore, the government employed another strategy for the same purpose which is developmentalist individual's capacity building. Under this, different types of short and long term trainings are issued and for these trainings the government prepares its manifesto by incorporating the propaganda on the developmentalist ideology. Accordingly, serious measurement is issued on those who resist the indoctrinations and un attendant individuals in the mentioned programs.

In the same way, this strategy has also played important role in imposing the ideology and shaping the civil servants conciseness in the intended way. Hence, all the above strategies justify the EPRDF will take any possible way to secure the hegemonic character of the developmental state ideology at any expense.

Referring to what we have seen, the government is highly molding and enforcing the mob's mentality and psyche in a certain direction. And this direction is made by the elites of the government. All these imply that policies and strategies are imposed on the society by the ruling party as the result of the adopted ideology. Having the above processes taken by the ruling party, elites of the regime claimed that, developmental state ideology is democratized in theory and practice. When we critically examine the 'developmental democratic state ideology' in fact it is the same as an attempt to mix oil with water which is impossible.

To elaborate the above point, as the nature and experiences of developmentalist ideology discussed in chapter one and two; it is clear that the developmental state ideology is essentially intervenient and hegemonic one. And the tight nexus between the ideological and structural aspects made the ideology authoritarian in its nature. However, few African nations including Ethiopia aspire democratizing the ideology.

When we look at it from the Ethiopian experience, the EPRDF declared 'developmental democratic state ideology' as a result of exercising developmentalist ideology along with revolutionary democracy. Yet, the claimed practice of both ideologies is very ambiguous in its theorization and application, metaphorically speaking; it's like using a knife with both sides sharpened. As discussed in chapter three of the paper, both ideologies are not

clearly apprehended by the elites in the regime; as the consequence of the death of the former prime Minister Meles Zenawi the remaining political elites failed in justifying the above ideologies in deceiving way for the society in their literatures prepared for propaganda purpose. The evidence here is, referring at the materials prepared by the EPRDF elites for various trainings especially after the death of Meles Zenawi; they have weak persuasive power, and there entire interpretation of the ideology is ambiguous.

In the same case, Meles himself was not able to give substantial interpretation of both *abyotawi Democracy and Developmental democratic state* ideology. As a consequence, the EPRDF elites failed in creating strong propagandist materials for the society in different mental capacity and political awareness. However, the government is using various kinds of propagandas in order to justify, shape and create public acceptance of democratized developmental state ideology.

The other strategy which the EPRDF used for propaganda purpose is, the five year *Growth and Transformation plan*. After the endorsement of this plan, the EPRDF contentiously used it for showing the importance and use of the *developmental democratic state* ideology in creating the claimed great renaissance in Ethiopian history. Having this, all media echoed it to keep the vibe of the ideology alive among the society.

In doing such propaganda, the government narrowed individual's quest for another best alternative which is suitable for preserving rights, attaining inclusive and sustainable development and keep democracy alive. Though wide political arena and liberated consciousness of individuals are the sources of fruitful inputs for existing ideology and advanced political economic ideologies, the elites of the EPRDF narrowed the above

basic factors in order to keep the hegemonic and authoritarian essence of developmental state ideology. Thus, it is legitimate to consider developmentalism as dehumanizing ideology.

As explored in chapter two and three, there are two categories in relation with democratizing the developmental state ideology; and the EPRDF is in the category which advocates the possibility of democratizing the ideology. But despite the witnessed infrastructural advancement and the claimed double digit economic growth in Ethiopia, the government failed to keep the promise made back at the transition time which is to flourish democracy in Ethiopia.

Hence, *developmental democratic state* ideology is not there in reality rather in contrary the EPRDF is exercising the kind of developmental state ideology which has been practiced in East Asian nations which is authoritarian and antidemocratic one. So the claimed democracy in developmental state ideology by the government is propaganda per se. Hence, based on the witnessed practice of the ideology in Ethiopia, it is perceptible that the EPRDF portrayed pseudo uniqueness in democratizing the ideology comparing to the referred East Asian countries theorization and practices.

4.2. Critics on depoliticizing function of developmentalism in Ethiopian context

In this section, I will present my critics on the depoliticizing function of developmentalism in the Ethiopian context. As I have tried to discuss in the preceding chapters, the EPRDF used various strategies to undergo developmental state ideology in

Ethiopia. These implemented strategies, in fact, depoliticized the society. Realizing this, I am going to discuss the way how developmental state ideology depoliticized the society. In doing so, my concern however is not to give mere critics on the system of the government; but by exploring the perceptible experiences of the ideology, I will try to indicate the depoliticizing nature of the ideology both at the conceptual and implementation level.

To begin with, the government of Ethiopia has applied enormous Propagandic ways to secure and maintain the existence of developmental state ideology in the country. Among these propagandic ways, monopolizing the media, narrowing individual's right to participate in various political activities, using one to five grouping and using civil society organizations for propaganda, taking the GTP as a tool for manipulation and posting different materials on governmental and nongovernmental institutions for traumatizing the society are the major ones.

At this juncture, in Ethiopian constitution, Article 29 enumerated the various freedoms of individuals and the media in holding and expressing any ideas and opinions. However, as indicated in chapter three and four, the government caste individuals consciousness and every media of communication through extensive propaganda. And based on the inherent essence of the developmental state ideology, the EPRDF narrowed the political space for the quest of possible advanced political economic ideology which is suitable for inclusive and sustainable development.

To further elaborate the above point, free political arena and society's consciousness with unlimited right to participate in political activities are the sources of new ideologies and

long last solutions for the problems on hand. However, the ideology which is adopted by the government must be open for critics and substantial comments of the society. As discussed in chapter two, Evans contends that the autonomy must be embedded in the society in collaboration with government elites which means, the society must be the primary source of major inputs in the political activities along with meritocratic bureaucracy of highly skilled people.

Yet, the government restricted educated individuals from criticizing the ideology. Furthermore, 'the EPRDF launched the Growth and Transformation Plan without consulting intellectuals, and consider the society's outlook. Additionally, the GTP is declared without evaluating the previous policies and strategies which has been employed by the government' (Gebru, 2007: 371). In relation to this point, Gebru Asrat argued that, even though the government tried to incorporate attractive plans to get public acceptance, the plan was not able to solve basic economic problems. As evidence, he raised the inflation and the measures taken by the government elites after the declaration of the GTP.

According to him, the measures taken at the time of inflation were fruitless in addressing the situation, which means, the plan was not able to give sustainable solution rather the measures caused more problems like shortage of supplies and market failure, and as a result it aggravated the inflation. Furthermore, the GTP is not improving the status of the majority poor in a comprehensive manner; rather it provides favorable environment to few riches to get richer. Therefore, all these situations justified how the government is manipulating the mass by using propaganda like the GTP.

As indicated in the previous chapters, developmental state ideology glorified the role of the governing power in designing and applying different policies and strategies which are claimed to be the only path toward development. When we take Ethiopian case, despite the perceptible infrastructural changes and the claimed economic growth by the EPRDF, democratic rights of the society are conquered by the system.

In connection to this, According to Gebru Asrat, after the renaissance path or *tehadeso mesmer* implemented by the government, ‘the system becomes one party vanguard ship (one party dictatorship) than multi party system, society’s freedom become suppressed, democratic and human rights get violated, private medias discouraged, the justices system turned into an instrument of the ruling party and the government controlled activities of civil society organizations’ (ibid: 378- 379). Therefore it is clear that, the developmental state ideology hampered democratic rights by depoliticizing the society in such a way.

Generally, it is visible the fact that, developmentalist ideology overtake basic democratic values which every human being should acquire in the political space in particular and in daily life in general. Nonetheless it is evident that a nation can attain miraculous economic advancement by antidemocratic ideology, but it is undoubtedly true that the attained economical development will not sustain for long. In addition to this, world history shows that the quest for freedom created huge conflicts and wars in the past up to now and the consequences are still affecting the well being of the society. Thus, the value of freedom in human life in general and in Ethiopian society in particular is immeasurable and uncompromising.

In fact there is no social activity which is out of the political domain, so acknowledging political rights of the society is indispensable. At last, even though the attempt to democratize developmental state ideology is a great aspiration, it is infinite quest as the democratizing process essentially ascribes to the depoliticizing function of developmentalism and claiming the existence of developmental democratic state ideology is the same as elevating hope to truth.

Conclusion

Based on the above analyses of the Ethiopian experience of developmentalism, I reached at the following conclusions. First, even though the developmental state ideology claimed to be democratized, it created a contradiction. And the contradiction is founded upon the clash between the core features of developmentalism with basic democratic values. Consequently, this contradiction portrays the depoliticizing function of the ideology. And the depoliticizing function of the ideology is the root cause for the impeding factors in the process of democratizing developmental state ideology. Thus having the basic features the ideology cannot be a democratic one at all.

The second one is the attempt of the EPRDF in democratizing developmentalism has failed to meet its goals which is actualizing the claimed developmental state ideology which is leveled as democratic one.

Lastly, developmentalism as an ideology might bring astonishing economic advancement for nations but such economic growth is not the only condition which a society must get hold of rather the achieved economic development have to be attained along with social and political developments. Hence widening the political arena to slot in new ideologies

which are suitable to bring inclusive and sustainable development is inevitably significant.

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