The Socio-Economic Status of Afar under Federal Ethiopia: The Gap between Constitutional Theory of Self-Rule and Political Practice

By Demillie Mollaw Kebede

A Dissertation Submitted to the Center for Federal and Governance Studies, College of Law and Governance Studies, Addis Ababa University, in Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Federal and Governance Studies

Supervisor: Dr. Dereje Feyisa (Associate Professor)

Federal and Governance Studies, College of Law and Governance Studies,
Addis Ababa University

June 2023
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Addis Ababa University

College of Law and Governance

Center of Federalism and Governance Studies

This is to certify that the dissertation prepared by Demillie Mollaw Kebede entitled "The Socio-Economic Status of Afar under Federal Ethiopia: The Gap between Constitutional Theory of Self-Rule and Political Practice", which is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Federalism and Governance Studies, complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

Demillie Mollaw	Signature	Date
	_____	June 18, 2023

Approval by Board of Examiners:

1. External Examiner

Name	Signature	Date
Prof. Yonatan Fessha	_____	July 10, 2023

2. Internal Examiner

Name	Signature	Date
Dr. Mohammed Dejen	_____	July 3, 2023

3. Internal Examiner

Name	Signature	Date
Dr. Fana Gebresenbet	_____	July 7, 2023

4. Chairman Director of the Center for Federalism and Governance Studies(CFGS)

Name	Signature	Date
Dr. Ketema Wakjira	_____	July 17, 2023

Declaration

I, the undersigned hereby declare that this PhD dissertation entitled "The Socio-Economic Status of Afar under Federal Ethiopia: The Gap between Constitutional Theory of Self-Rule and Political Practice" is my original work. It has not been submitted to any university or college for any other academic awards or qualifications. I then would like to certify all sources and materials used in the thesis are dully acknowledged.

Declared By:

Name	Signature	Date
Demillie Mollaw	_____	June 18, 2023

Confirmed by Advisor:

Name	Signature	Date
Dr. Dereje Feyissa		June 23, 2023

Abstract

Federalism evolved and become an alternative system of governance in many countries. As a political arrangement federalism is appropriate to countries having multicultural societies as a means of accommodating the growing desire of people to preserve or revive the intimacy of small societies, and the growing necessity for larger combinations to mobilize the utilization of common resource better. Ethiopia witnessed a major turning point in the arena of national politics since 1991 by adopting ethnic federalism and restructuring its constituent units along ethnic lines. This political arrangement has enabled the Afar people to have their own regional state. By doing the system addressed the territorial quest of Afars for which they were politically mobilized long before the introduction of federalism in Ethiopia. When the federal system was introduced into the Ethiopian political system the peripheral areas mostly inhabited by pastoralists were categorized as Developing Regional States (Afar, SOmali, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz) lagged behind others. To promote the shared interests and common destiny of all Ethiopians, the federal government designed a special support project with the intension of accelerating the socio-economic development of these states. This study examines the socio-economic status of Afar under federal Ethiopia by analyzing the gap between the constitutional theory of self-rule and political practice. The study employed both descriptive and explanatory research designs. Data for this study were collected through qualitative and quantitative methods with a qualitative priority complemented by the quantitative methods. The instruments used in this study include key informant interviews, observation, focus group discussions, survey questionnaire and document analysis. Both the qualitative and quantitative datasets were collected and analyzed concurrently or side-by-side. The central argument of this study is that the socio-economic transformation of Afar Regional State in the three-decade experiment is still low unable to address the problems of the Afar people. The Contributing factors which this study investigate include federal intervention contrary to the rhetorical political empowerment of Afar, capacity limitation on the part of the regional leadership, less effective implementation of the provision of the special support and insignificant contribution of investments and development projects, adverse effects of inter-clan and enter-ethnic conflicts and the socio-economic and environmental impacts of the spread of Prosopis-Juliflora.

Keywords: Afar Regional State, Conflict, Development Programme and Projects Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations, Self-rule, Special support, Socio-economic development

Acknowledgements

Many institutions and individuals were helpful and supportive in the process and completion of this dissertation. First and foremost, I am very grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Dereje Feyissa not only for his intellectual guidance but also for his painstaking corrections, comments and suggestions. I benefitted enormously from the wisdom and long years of experiences of Dr. Dereje Feyissa. His contribution in shaping the focus of my dissertation in general and chapters in particular was immeasurable. His support and guidance was undeterred by the physical distance created between us during the last years of my study. I also appreciated his understanding of my difficulties and the patience he showed to the delays of submitting chapters during the course of my study.

I am grateful to the FDRE Ministry of Defence for giving me the opportunity to pursue my PhD study. I am also grateful to Addis Ababa University for providing me financial support to my PhD study. I also extend my gratitude to the the academic staff of the department of Governance and Federal Studies for their hospitality during the course of my study and for their being considerate to my difficulties. Deserves

There are many people to whom I feel indebted. My special thanks go to my friend Dr. Siraw Demas with whom I shared all the ups and downs during the course of my study. He deserves thanks for his valuable advices and comments on the first draft of the last four chapters. I'd also like to extend my gratitude to Prof. Ann Fitz-Gerald for her unreserved moral and financial support. I also wish to thank Dr. Paula Macphee for her reading and commenting on one of my chapters. My thanks also go to Dr. Muluneh Kassa for his support in preparing two of my chapters for publication. I am also indebted to Mr. Yimer Gobena who made me feel at home whenever I visited Semera during my field Work. I am also thankful to my friends Yonatal Girma, Tesfaye Wondimagegn, Awoke Hailu, Alemayehu Regassa, Mekasha Tadesse and Gebre Wolde for their educational dialogue in our college compound out of which I have benefited a lot.

I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to all my informants, federal and regional government agencies that provided me with information and make available relevant official documents. I would like to express my indebtedness to Dr.Adem Bure, president of Semera University for his hospitality during interview with him and receiving my calls for months even after my field work.

Finally, my PhD study could not be realized without the patience and unreserved support of my wife and children. Therefore, I would like to express my indebtedness to my wife W/ro Tadelu Yimer who have always supported me in realizing my wishes, and who patiently took care of our children and shouldered all the extended family responsibilities to give me the freedom for my studies. I am also grateful to my children Eyob Demillie, Abreham Demillie and Yabsira Demillie for their love, patience and compromising their interest to enjoy my care during my study

Table of Content

Acknowledgements ---- **v**
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ---- **v**
List of Figures ---- **ix**
Part I: The Problem and Literature Review ---- **1**
Chapter One ---- **1**
1. Introduction ---- **1**
1.1. Background and Highlight ---- *1*
1.2. Statement of the Problem ---- *2*
1.3. Key Research Questions ---- *6*
1.4. Research Objectives ---- *7*
1.5. Ethical Considerations ---- *7*
1.6. Significance of the Study ---- *8*
1.7. Scope and Limitation of the Study ---- *8*
1.7.1. Scope of the Study ---- 8
1.7.2. Limitations of the Study ---- 9
1.8. Research Design and Methodology ---- *11*
1.8.1. Research Design ---- 11
1.8.2. Sources of Data ---- 12
1.8.3. Methods of Data Collection ---- 17
1.9. Description of the Study Area ---- *19*
1.10. Organization of the Dissertation ---- *22*
Chapter Two ---- **24**
Literature Review ---- **24**
2. Introduction ---- **24**
2.1 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework ---- *24*
2.1.1 The Concept of Federalism and Federation ---- 24
2.1.2. Importance of Federalism in Multiethnic Societies ---- 25
2.1.3. Federalism, Decentralization and Development ---- 27
2.1.4. Federalism, Conflict and Development ---- 32
2.1.5. Ethiopia's Ethno-Federal Political System ---- 35
2.1.6. Self-Rule and Shared-Rule in the Ethiopian Federation ---- 37
2.2. The Socio-Economic and Political History of the Afar ---- *40*
2.2.1. Socioal Organization of Pastoral Afar ---- 40
2.2.2. Political History of Afar: The Emergence of the Afar Sultanate ---- 43
2.2.3. The Incorporation of the Afar Region into the Ethiopian State ---- 46
Part II: Afar under Federal Ethiopia: Achievements ---- **57**
Chapter Three ---- **57**
The Federal Restructuring of the Ethiopian State ---- **57**
3. Introduction ---- **57**
3.1. Ethno-federal Political Arrangement and the Creation of the Afar Regional State ---- *57*
3.2. The Achievement of Afar Regional State under Federal Ethiopia ---- *60*

3.2.1. Political Gains/ Achievements ---- 60
3.2.2. Socio- economic Achievements of the Afar People in Federal Ethiopia ---- 64
3.2.2.1. Education Service ---- 64
3.2.2.2. Health Service ---- 74
3.2.2.3. Water Service ---- 78
3.2.2.4. Agro-pastoral Economic Development ---- 81
3.2.2.5. Development of Human Capital in Afar Region ---- 86
3.2.2.6. Transport, Infrastructure, Power Service ---- 88
3.2.2.7. The Use of Afar Language (Afar-af) ---- 90

3.3. Conclusion ---- *93*

Part III: Afar under Federal Ethiopia: Political Challenges ---- 94
Chapter Four ---- 94
Power Relations between the Afar Regional State and the Federal Government ---- 94
4. Introduction ---- 94

4.1. The Concept and Importance of Intergovernmental Relations in Federations ---- *95*

4.2. Intergovernmental Relations in Ethiopia ---- *97*

4.3. Mode of Relation between Afar Regional State and the Federal Government ---- *101*
4.3.1. Party Channel as Mechanism of Relation ---- 101
4.3.2. Legislative Bodies as Mechanism of Relation ---- 111
4.3.3. Executive Institutions as Mechanism of Relation ---- 114

4.4. Horizontal Relation between Afar and Tigray Regional States ---- *117*

4.5. Conclusion ---- *123*
Chapter Five ---- 124
Power Relations between within the Afar Regional State ---- 124
5. Introduction ---- 124

5.1. State Structure and Division of Power in Afar Region ---- *125*

5.2. Relations among Levels of Government in Afar Regional State ---- *126*
5.2.1. The Regional State Council vs Regional Executive Branches ---- 126
5.2.2. Zone Administration vs Woreda Executive Branches ---- 130
5.2.3. Woreda Council vs Woreda Executive Branches ---- 133

5.3. Leadership Challenges among Levels of Governments ---- *137*
5.3.1. Leadership Capacity Gaps and Lack of Good Governance ---- 137
5.3.1.1. Leadership Capacity Gaps ---- 137
5.3.1.2. Lack of Good Governance ---- 140
5.3.2. Decline of the Role of the Traditional Leadership ---- 146
5.3.3. Non-Inclusion of the Educated, Youth and Women ---- 150
5.3.3.1. Non-Inclusion of Educated Afar ---- 150
5.3.3.2. Non-Inclusion of Youth ---- 153
5.3.3.3. Non-Inclusion of Women ---- 158

5.4. Conclusion ---- *164*
Chapter Six ---- 165
Conflicts as explanatory variable for underdevelopment ---- 165
6. Introduction ---- 165

6.1. Inter-Clan Conflicts in Afar Regional State ---- *166*
6.1.1. Causes and Consequences of Inter-Clan Conflicts in Afar ---- 166

6.2. Inter-ethnic Conflict-The Protracted Afar-Issa Conflicts ---- *173*
6.2.1. The Afar and Somali Regions in Ethiopia ---- 173
6.2.2. Afar -Issa Conflicts Prior 1991 Federal Ethiopia ---- 175
6.2.3. Efforts of Resolving Afar-Issa Conflicts Prior 1991 ---- 176
6.2.3.1. During the Imperial Regime ---- 176
6.2.3.2. During the Military Regime ---- 178
6.2.4. Afar-Issa Conflicts in post 1991 Federal Ethiopia ---- 180
6.2.4.1. Causes and Consequences of Afar –Issa Conflict ---- 180
6.2.4.2. Efforts of Resolving Afar-Issa Conflict ---- 183
6.2.4.3. Recent Situation of Afar-Issa Conflict ---- 188
6.2.4.4. The Impact of Afar-Issa Conflict on the Development of Afar Regional State ---- 194

6.3. Afar-Amhara Conflict in Post 1991 Federal Ethiopia: An Overviw ---- *196*
6.3.1. Causes and Consequences of Afar- Amhara Conflict ---- 197
6.3.2. Recent Efforts of Resolving Amhara-Afar Conflict ---- 202

6.4. Conclusion ---- *210*
Part IV: Afar under Federal Ethiopia: Economic Challenges ---- 212
Chapter Seven ---- 212
The Political Economy of the Special Support ---- 212
7. Introduction ---- 212

7.1. The Special Support for the Developing Regional States: The Rationale ---- *213*

7.2. Institutional Arrangement for the Special Support ---- *216*

7.3. The Provision of Special Support in Afar Regional State ---- *221*
7.3.1. The Implementation of the Special Support in Afar Region ---- 221

7.4. Challenges in the Provision of Special Support in Afar National Regional State ---- *227*
7.4.1. Challenges Related Federal Projects in Afar Regional State ---- 227
7.4.2. Challenges Related to the Special Support Board and Its Member Institutions (Ministries) ---- 230
7.4.3. Challenges Related to the Ministry of Federal Affairs ---- 234
7.4.4. Challenges Related to Neighboring Regional States (Twinning Arrangement) ---- 239
7.4.5. Challenges Related to Afar Regional State Administration (Special Support Recipients) ---- 243
7.5. Conclusion ---- 251
Chapter Eight ---- 252
Development by Dispossession: The Mega Projects ---- 252
8. Introduction ---- 252

8.1. The Investment Potential of the Afar Regional State ---- *253*

8.2. The Tendaho Sugar Factory ---- *263*
8.2.1. The Establishment of the Sugar Factory ---- 263
8.2.2. Accomplishments of the Sugar Factory ---- 264
8.2.3. The Benefits of the Sugar Factory ---- 268
8.2.3.1. Source of Income and Employment Opportunity ---- 268
8.2.3.2. Social Benefits of the Factory ---- 272
8.2.4. Challenges of the Sugar Factory ---- 273
8.2.4.1. Internal Challenges ---- 273
8.2.4.2. External Challenges ---- 277

8.3. The Extraction of Salt in Afar Region ---- *284*
8.3.1. The Case of Afdera Salt Production ---- 284
8.3.2. Kadaba Salt Suppliers Shareholders Association ---- 286

8.3.3. Business Partnership between Kadaba Salt Suppliers Shareholders Association and SVS Salt Producer PLC ---- 289
8.3.4. The Benefits of the Salt Business to the Local Community, Salt Producers, Kadaba Shareholders Association and SVS PLC ---- 290

8.4. Conclusion ---- *299*

Chapter Nine ---- **300**
Seeing like the State: Villagization back-in ---- **300**
9. Introduction ---- **300**

9.1. A Brief Overview of Resettlement/ Villagization Programme in Ethiopia ---- *301*
9.1.1. Resettlement Programme during the Derg Regime ---- 301
9.1.2. Villagization Program under the EPRDF Government ---- 305

9.2. The Political Economy of Villagization Programme in Pastoral Areas: the Rational ---- *310*

9.3. Villagization Programme in the Afar Region: Practices, Challenges and Prospects ---- *316*
9.3.1. The Implementation of Villagization Programme in Afar Regional State ---- 319
9.3.1.1. Villagization Programme in Assaita Woreda ---- 322
9.3.1.2. Villagization Programme in Amibara Woreda ---- 325
9.3.1.3. Villagization Programme in Teru Woreda ---- 329
9.3.2. Challenges in the Implementation of Villagization Program in Afar Regional State ---- 332
9.3.2.1. Peoples' Perception towards the Villagization Programme ---- 332
9.3.2.2. Lack of Leadership Commitment ---- 334
9.3.2.3. Lack of Appropriate Institutional Structure ---- 339
9.3.2.4. Lack of Inputs, Services and Infrastructures ---- 341

9.4. Conclusion ---- *347*

Chapter Ten ---- **348**
Environmental Challenges ---- **348**
10. Introduction ---- **348**

10.1. The Invasion of ProsopisJuliflora in Afar Region ---- *348*

10.2. Socio-Economic and Environmental Impact of ProsopisJuliflora in Afar Region ---- *351*
10.2.1. Social Consequences/Impacts ---- 352
10.2.2. Economic Consequences/ Impacts ---- 357
10.2.3. Environmental Consequences/ Impacts ---- 360
10.2.4. Control and Management of the Invasion of Prosopis ---- 364

10.3. Conclusion ---- *375*

Chapter Eleven ---- **376**
11. Conclusion and Recommendations ---- **376**

11.1. Conclusion ---- *376*

11.2. Recommendations ---- *378*

References ---- **382**
Appendices ---- **1**

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AEB	Afar Education Bureau
ADLI	Agricultural, Development Lead Industrialization
AKA	Afar Koborih Angoyya (Afar Mobilization Movement)
ALF	Afar Liberation Front
ALRDC	Afar Language Research and Settlement village
ANDP	Afar National Democratic Party
ANLM	Afar National Liberation Movement
ANRF	Afar National Revolutionary Front
ANRS	Afar National Regional State
APDA	Afar Pastoralist Development Association
APDO	Afar People's Democratic Organization
ANDP	Afar People's Democratic Party
ARBPAD	Afar Regional Bureau of Pastoral and Agriculture Development
ARDUF	Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union Front
ASA	Afar Students Association
BGRS	Benishangul Gumuz Regional State
CAP	Community Action Plans
CDCs	Community Development Committees
CDF	Community Development Funds
COBDVP	Coordination Office for Basin Development and Villagization Programme
CRGE	Climate Resilient and Green Economy
CSA	Central StatisticsAgency
CSO	Civic Society Organization
DFID	Department for International Development
DLDP	District Level Development Programme
EBC	Ethiopian Broadcast Corporation

EPD	Ethiopian Pastoralist Day
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESAT	Ethiopian Satellite Television
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GAIN	Global Agricultural Information Network
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHGs	Green House Gases
GoE	Government of Ethiopia
GTP	Growth and Transformation Programme
HoF	House of Federation
HPR	House of Peoples Representatives
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGR	Intergovernmental Relations
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
JPC	Joint Afar-Issa Peace Committee
MEFCC	Reduced Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation Program
MoFA	Ministry of Federal Affairs
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MYSC	Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture
NCFSE	New Coalition for Food Security in Ethiopia
NDRP	National Democratic Revolution Programme
NGOs	Non Governmental Organizations
OIA	Overseas Infrastructure Alliance
PADB	Pastoralist and Agriculture Development Bureau
PASDEP	Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty

PCDP	Pastoralist Community Development Program
PFE	Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia
PLC	Private Limited Company
PRCDO	Public Relations and Communication Directorate Office
PRUP	ParticipatoryResource Use Plans
RPF	Resettlement Policy Framework
RAP	Resettlement Action Plan
REDD	Reduced Emission of from Deforestation and forest Degradation
RLUAPS	Rural Land Use and Administration Policy and Strategies
RPLRP	Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project
RSDP	Road Sector Development Program
SDPRP	Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program
SNNP	Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples
SNNPRS	Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State
TPLF	Tigray Peoples Liberation Front
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
USAID	United States of America
WFP	World Food Program

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Total Interview participants of the study 15
Table 2.1 Total participants in filling the questionnaire of the research study 17
Table 3.3: Gross and Net Participation Rate of Primary Education in Ethiopia (2017) 69
Table 4.3: Gross Participation of regions in General Secondary education (2017) 70
Table 5.3: Net Participation of Regional States in General Secondary Education (2017) 70
Table 6.3 Assignment of Qualified Teachers by Level of Education 71
Table 7.3: Health Professionals in Afar Region 76
Table 8.3: The Contribution of pastoral and agro-pastoral research institution 86
Table 9.4:The Political Right of Afar in Electing Top Level Regional Leaders 106
Table 10.4: Participation of Afar Regional State in the National Policy Making Process 108
Table 11.4: Policy and Strategy Making and Execution Experience of Afar Regional State 110
Table 12.4: Federal Executive Support to Afar Regional State Executive Branches 116
Table 13.4: The Role of Federal Government in the relation between Afar and Tigray Regional States 119
Table 14.5: Capacity of Afar Regional State Leadership 139
Table 15.5 Manifestations of Leadership Capacity Limitations in Afar Regional State 140
Table 16.5: Resource Utilization in Afar Regional State 141
Table 17.5: Problems of Clannism and Favoring ones local area 145
Table 18.5: The Status of Traditional Leaders in the Regional State 149
Table 19.5: Exclusion of Educated Afar in the political Leadership 152
Table 20.5: The Youth in Afar Regional State 157
Table 21.5: The Position of Women in Afar Regional State 162
Table 22.6: Inter-clan and Inter-ethnic Conflicts in Afar Region 209
Table 23.7: The Contribution of Special Support to Afar Regional State .. **Error! Bookmark not defined.**
Table 24.7: Problems in the Provision of Special Support in Afar Regional State 249
Table 25.8: Investors, Investment Sectors with Significant Initial Capital 255
Table 26.8: Participation of Afars in the Investment Sector 259
Table 27.8: Justification for the Low Participation of Afars in the Investment Sector 260
Table 28.8: Participation of Afar Diasporas in the Investment Sector 261
Table 29.8: Justification for the less Participation of Afar Diasporas in the Investment Sector 262
Table 30.8: Land Use by Tendaho Sugar Factory 267
Table 31.8: Pastoralists Right over their Land 283
Table 32.8: Income Collected from Salt Business for Five consecutive Years 296
Table 33.8: Overall Benefit of Afars from Investment being undertaken in their region 297
Table 34.8: Justification why Afars have not been benefited from Investment Sector 297
Table 35.9: Villagization Programme Implemented in Amibara Woreda 326
Table 36.9: Benefits the Villagization Programme 344
Table 37.9: Justification for the less benefit obtained from the Villagization Programme 345
Table 38.10: The benefits of AnimalResources forPastoralists? 372
Table 39.10: Justification why pastoralists are unable to benefit from their animals 373

List of Figures

Figure 1.1: Semera and Selected Woredas (Sample Woredas)..... 14
Figure 2.6: Contested Areas between Afar and Somali Regional State 181
Figure 3.6: Neighboring Woredas in Conflict along the borders of Afar and Amhara Regional States..... 198

Part I: The Problem and Literature Review

Chapter One

1. Introduction

1.1. Background and Highlight

Ethiopia was ruled by the military regime (Derg) between 1974 and 1991 which was challenged by different ethno-nationalist movements soon after it came to power (Gebrehiwet, 2015). The military government was overthrown by a coalition of ethnic rebel groups, called Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1991. The EPRDF adopted ethnic federalism and restructured the country into nine (now eleven) regions along ethnic lines and two-self-administrative cities (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa) (Article 47 of the 1995 FDRE-Constitution).

Federal system was introduced as an alternative political arrangement to make the country a place where citizens receive equal treatment (Hashim, 2010). This isa radical departure in the history of the country because it ended the centralized state system and heralded the rebuilding of the state in a federal model (Markakis, 2011). According to Alem (2003), the system created largely ethnic-based territorial units to provide recognition to ethno-cultural communities.Similarly, Markakis (2003) asserted that the Ethiopian ethnic federalism is designed to address the 'national question'. In cognizant of the long awaited national questions which remained unaddressed by former regimes, the 1995 Constitution recognized Ethiopia as a "nation of Nations" (Fasil, 1997). The new federal state arrangement is believed to ensure the rights of nations, nationalities and peoples to self-determination, including the right to secession (Article 39 of the FDRE Constitution).

The Afar people had no their own separate administrative province before Ethiopia adopted ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia in 1991. Rather theywere partitionedinto different provinces like Tigray, Wollo, Shewa, and Harar (Tadesse andYonas, 2007). The Ethiopian federal political system enabled the Afar to have separate regional state of their own within the Ethiopian federation. The new federal arrangementguaranteed the Afar people a constitutionally entrenched political power, and opened a window of opportunity for development. However, evidences have been showing the gap between the constitutional promises of self-rule, socio-economic development particularly to the developing regional states and the political realiy on

the ground. This study therefore, seeks to examine the self-rule experience of Afar Regional State and the variousfactors adersely affecting the socio-economic development of the region.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Following the overthrow of the military government, the traditional authorities of Afar led by Sultan Ali-Mirah together with his sons, Hanfare and Ahmed Ali-Mirah attended the National Conference held in the capital from 1-5 July 1991 in Addis Ababa representing the Afar Liberation Front (ALF). The ALF administered the newly constituted Afar Regional State during the transitional period (1991-1994). In 1994, TPLF succeeded in creating division between the two sons of Ali Mirah, Hanfare and Omar which in turn created split in the ALF led by the two brothers (Yasin, 2008). A section of the ALF was absorbed into the Afar People's Democratic Organization (APDO) and in the election held in August 1995, APDO won the majority seats where Hanfare Ali-Mirah was elected as the regional president for a brief period (1995-1996). He has also served as an Ethiopian ambassador in Kuwait between 1998 and 2000 (Ibid).

The 1995 FDRE Constitution under Article 51 and 52 of the FDRE Constitution clearly stipulated the powers and functions of the federal government and regional states respectively. Due to the existence of variations in the relative socio-economic development among the constituent units that formed the Ethiopian federation, four of the nine regional states namely, Afar, Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz and Somali were designated as "Emerging Regions" (Haileyesus, 2014), later renamed as "Developing Regional States". Such kind of naming is abandoned following the 2018 reform taking place in the country. These regional states had shown capacity gaps in budget utilization, planning, budgeting and implementation of development activities. The asymmetry in capacity has prompted the horizontal inter-regional cooperation. One example of such relationship is the cooperation between Tigray and Afar as well as between Amhara and Afar regions (Lee, 2015).

The federal government in cooperation with the regional states has also been working on special support program to Developing Regional States. In this regard, one of the main responsibilities of the Ministry of Federal Affairs is providing and coordinating the supports provided for the "Developing Regional States" to bring about equitable development (Haileyesus, 2014). According to Tegegne Gebre Egziabher (1998), the policy of the government is that grants are

used to reduce inter-regional inequalities which would enable them to catch up with others by accelerating their socio-economic development.

The Afar Regional State is one of the peripheral states whose inhabitants predominantly pursue pastoralist way of life (Getachew, 2001). Afar region is one of the poorest and least developed regions of Ethiopia, neglected by national development efforts (Rettberg, 2010). In cognizant of the past injustice and marginalization of the pastoralist communities, the FDRE constitution gave recognition to pastoral production systems. This recognition is reflected in the various provisions of the constitution and the efforts undertaken to provide infrastructures such as road accessibility as well as education and health services for each of the Woredas (Guinand, 2000). Howver, the recognition provided to the sector and the subsequent supports given did not help to bring the intended socio-economic transformation in the regional state due to lack of commitment among the various stakeholders.

The Afar Pastoral Community Development Project founded by World Bank and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) had been assisting pastoralists through various means such as diversifying their means of livelihood, minimizing drought vulnerability and capacity building (Nicol and Otulana, 2014). Similarly, the Afar Pastoral Development Association has been working to solve the problems that the Afar people have been facing. Since its first commemoration on 25th Jan 1999, the Ethiopian Pastoralist Day (EPD) has been celebrated every year using different venues in pastoralist regions. In almost all the celebration days, representatives of the Afar people have got the opportunity to discuss with the Prime Minister and other higher officials to deal with the specific problems of the Afar people. For instance, the 15th EPD was celebrated in Semera, the capital of Afar National Regional State from 23rd-25th January 2015. In his statement Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn asserted that "Marking Pastoralist Day has been playing asignificant role in creating a forum for discussion andConsultation among stakeholders could help to address the challenges facing pastoralists" (EPD, 2015:5). When explaining the 2015 drought situation in Ethiopia, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn asserted that the drought was the first of its kind which has never occurred in the last fifty years history of the country. He further explained that the devastating effect of the drought was high in areas having less underground water like Afar.

However, public views underscored that arranging such platforms where pastoralists' discussoion on their grievances did not help to solve their basic problems because tangible measures have not been taken after the celebration of pastoralist days which as a result similar issues have been points of discussion year after year.

The provision of different financial and technical support to the Afar region has not yet enabled the Afars to transform their socio-economic life in particular and the development of the regional state in general. Although the federal system put in place since 1991 has opened a window of opportunities for the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia, there are people who argue that the Afar region is yet relegated to the waiting room of development. For instance, according to Cerritelli et al., 2008; GTZ, 2015), the Afar Region is one of the least developed of the nine regions within Ethiopia. Ali (2008) contended that even though the federal political system guaranteed the Afar the right to self-administration, change that could benefit the majority of the Afar is not yet achieved. Moreover, Yasin (2008, p.3) asserted that "*the nomadic Afar population is suffering from a high level of poverty and an extreme deterioration of living conditions*." Similarly, Hamad Issa (2012) posited that many Afars are still dying due to preventive diseases or diseases that have been eradicated in many countries in the world. Abubeker et al., (2014) also asserted that the food insecurity and acute child malnutrition problems are increasing from time to time. Yussuf Yassin, **(**n.d.)revealed that in addition to their marginalization and underdevelopment, the Afar are on the brink of extinction as a result of the recurrent droughts that hit their areas and forced them to fight for mere survival. Moreover, he underscored that "in terms of infrastructure and skilled manpower, the Afar Region is the lowest of the four underdeveloped regional states (n.d, p.1)*".* Similarly, Selamawit (2018) asserted that the Afar Region has the highest prevalence of poverty and has not registered as rapid change as the remaining regions of Ethiopia.

The development gap analysis conducted in 2014 by the Afar Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (by organizing study team consisting of 23 members from different institutions) attested the services which have been provided in regional state remained to be poor. In his speech made at the 2016 Afar Forum Conference held in Belgium, Abdulkader Mohamed, underscored that "*the Afar people lag behind in all development sectors*". Similarly, Yasin (2008, p.61) asserted that even though "*the federal system in Ethiopia enabled the Afar to*

establish their own regional administration, the past 15 years of practical experience did not alter the Afar position on the waiting list of development."

The Afars have been organizing forums in which representatives from all the Afar people of the Horn of Africa have been participating. From 2-4 September 2016 the Afar Forum conference was conducted in Brussels, Belgium. The topic of the conference's discussion was "Managing Vulnerability to Recurrent Drought and Building a Resilient Community: The case of *Afar* People in the Horn of Africa". In this conference, Sultan Hanfare Ali-Mirah had participated. As stated above, the sultan was playing an important role in the Afar politics. He is the current sultan of Afar succeeding his father Sultan Ali-Mirah in November 2011. In his interview with the German radio Amharic Voice on 02/09/2016, Sultan Hanfare Ali-Mirah revealed the Ethiopian current situation in general and that of the Afar Region in particular. He stated that "in the past, a very poor Afar had hundred cows and similar number of camel and goats but currently a poor Afar has two goats. This time, the Afar people are not only suffering but also at the verge of extinction". The statements of scholars who conducted research in the Afar Regional State, the speeches of activists and Sultan Ali-Mirah are contradictory to the windows of development opportunity opened to the Afar Regional State by the federal political system, self-rule. Notwithstanding the figures indicated in the above quotation, the Sultan's speech has pointed out something about the existing problem in the livelihood of the Afar pastoralists.

Sultan Hanfare Ali-Mirah made tough talk during his coronation, criticizing the current policy referring to the implementation of an extensive state irrigation and monopolization of natural resources which he considered as a big threat to the nomadic Afar. To show how the Afar value land and opposing the displacement of Afars from their ancestral lands, Sultan Ali-Mirah asserted that their ancestors "had died and killed for the land" (Khaled, 2011). Moreover, as sited in Ibrahim (2011, p.1), sultan Hanfare contend that he has found "*the Afar people living in a very difficult conditions and he further added that if the situation continues like this, it may lead to a total extinction of the Afar community*." Moreover, in his speech made on his coronation day, Sultan Hanfare explained that "As far as I remember, Afar has never been lowered like its current situation." Although this statement is contradictory with the development endeavors made so far, it indicates something about the magnitude of the problems that the Afar has been facing under the Ethiopian federal system. Moreover, according to the report of MoFED

(2012), the regional poverty headcount indices of the 2010/2011 fiscal year showed that the poverty rate of the Afar Regional State was the highest (36.1%) when compared with other Developing Regional States.

The above discussions portrayed that the self-administration experience of Afar under federal Ethiopia has been still unable to transform the development of the regional state. This dissertation seeks to examine the various factors adversely affecting the socio-economic transformation of Afar Regional State under the Ethiopian federal system and to examine why the regional state remained to be conflict prone at a time when the region's self-administration right is constitutionally enterenched and despite the 'special support' program by the federal government and solidarity acts with the neighboring regional states. In so doing, it refers to the comparative literature on the response of local communities to Ethiopia's federal political order and their varied experiences.

1.3. Key Research Questions

In the light of the above problem statement and grand question (why the Afar Regional state is relagated to the waiting room of underdevelopment and remained to be conflict prone ?) this research will focus on the following interrelated specific questions: yet relegated to the waiting room of development

1. What are the achievements of the Afar Regional State in post 1991 Federal Ethiopia?
2. How has the Afar Regional State been exercising its powers and functions prescribed in the federal and regional constitutions?
3. How have intra-clan and inter-ethnic conflics affected the socio-economic development of Afar National Regional State?
4. To what extent the provisions of special support help to transform the socio-economic development of Afar National Regional State?
5. How have development programmes being undertaken and projects established in Afar Regional State support in accelerating the socio-economic development of the regional state?
6. What is the main environmental factor adversely affecting the socio-economic development of Afar National Regional State?

1.4. Research Objectives

The main objective of this study is to examine the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State under federal Ethiopia in line with constitutional promises and political reality. Based on this main objective, the specific objectives are:

1. To assess the major changes that the Afar Regional State has achieved under the Ethiopian federal system?
2. To analize the implementation of the constitutionally entrenched powers and functions across levels of governments and its impact on the socio-economic transformation of Afar National Regional State
3. To examine the effects of intra-clan and inter-ethnic conflics on the socio-economic development of Afar National Regional State?
4. To investigate the role the special support in transforming the development of Afar Regional State?
5. To examine the role of development programmes and projects in accelerating the socio-economic development of of Afar National Regional State?
6. To identify and analyze the main environmental factor adversely affecting the socio-economic development of Afar National Regional State?

1.5. Ethical Considerations

The researcher has taken an important ethical consideration in to account to the best possible degree. In order to meet the validity and reliability of the data gathred, the researcher has tried to control, direct and lead participants gently to the main focus of the study. The researcher also carefully observed and cross-check the truthfulness of data through methods of triangulation.

Moreover, the researcher made sure that the participants get verbal and written information about the aims of the research to make them feel comfortable while giving information. Participants were given an opportunity to ask clarification and to raise any issue of concern with the research prior to conducting interview. The right of participants not to say anything on certain issues on which they have no interest to explain and their freedom of withdrawal at ant time during interview and focus group discussion secessions was respected to ensure their full and informed consent. In order to create conducive environment for the participants, places where interviews and discussions have to be made, the time and conditions were arranged based on their full consent. In short, the researcher has taken care to respect norms of the community and the

research was based upon the informed consent of participants involved. All the research participants voluntarily consented to participate and names of all participants are not mentioned to guarantee personal safety of participants.

1.6. Significance of the Study

The introduction of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia since 1991 has been considered as a land mark in the Ethiopian political system. In principle, the 1995 FDRE Constitution has ensured political empowerment for the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia, allowing each ethnic group to exercise 'self-rule'. Most scholarshave gone to Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz and Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples to see how the Ethiopian federation operates and Afar Region has not been the focus of major works. Therefore, this dissertation attempts to address that gap. Since the research is conducted on the Afar Regional State, which is dominantly pastoralist area, the study will give some highlight on the relationship between Ethiopia's ethnic federal political arrangement and pastoralist way of life. Moreover, the findings of the research and the conclusions drawn from the study will serve as an important input for the various stakeholders aspiring to work on improving the lives of the Afar Pastoralists.

1.7. Scope and Limitation of the Study

1.7.1. Scope of the Study

Although the research tried to shade light on the political history of Afar under different regimes, the main thrust and focus of the dissertation is the period between 1991- March 2020. Obviously, the year 1991 is selected because it was in this year that of federal political system wasintroduced in Ethiopia.The years until few months of 2020 were selected just to entertain few changes observed during the few years after the coming into power of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in March 2018. In the introduction of this dissertation it was explained that the Afar people had no separate administrative region prior to 1991 which as a result they were divided and forced to live in different administrative regions such as in Eritrea today, Tigray, Wollo, Shewa and Hararghe. Hence, specifically the year marked the beginning of Afar's integration into modern political system and the emergence of a self-governing Afar people with their own territory and distinctiveness.

The introduction of federal political system in Ethiopia was expected to open a new window of development opportunities for self-governing ethnic groups. Moreover, the federal government has created mechanisms of supporting the development endeavors of the developing regional states due to historical marginalization. Available evidences indicated that the development of Afar Regional State is still relatively slow. This dissertation has tried to examine the self-rule experience of Afar Regional State, major achievements and challenges adversely affecting the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State under federal Ethiopia. The study is focused on focused on sectors identified by the regional state as "*development sectors*" such as water, education, health, pastoralist and agriculture development and capacity building, as well as on few selected development projects.

In terms of geographical scope, the study is confined to three selected Woredas assumed to reflect conditions of different areas in the region, the regional capital and few development projects. More or less adequate representatives of different categories of people from each category were accessed and participated in the questionnaire survey, in the in-depth interview and focus group discussions. The three Woredas were purposefully considered to reflect areas inhabited by pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and areas where mechanized agriculture has been practiced.

1.7.2. Limitations of the Study

This study is intended to examinethe socio-economic status of Afar under federal Ethiopia by investigating the gap between the constitutional promise and political reality. Therefore, it is clear from the very ouset that the research project would probably yield better results, since it draws data from sample Woredas and sectors in the region. However, due to financial limitations and time constraints, the researcher is forced to draw data from few selected Woredas, Regional Sector Bureaus/Offices and development projects.

The other challenge faced in the course of the study was the difficulty to get sufficient secondary data from local sources particularly at Woreda level. It was very difficult to get complete data from record systems at Woreda level in all sectors, which stems from insufficiency of space for archives and poor data management systems. The other problem was that existing government documents are biased mostly exaggerating the positive achievements whereas disregarding other

negative consequences. This has required very careful triangulation of the information through other data gathering instruments to relate facts on the ground.

The interview process itself was affected by the above and other factors as well. Political discussions, especially in the regional and Woredas, are viewed as very risky dealings; people fear that revealing out some important information could compromise their security and livelihood. In some cases, individuals give official statements that are contrary to what they claim in non-official conversations. This problem was tolerated through convincing the participants about the objective of the study and ensuring absolute confidentiality of their responses. The trust built after tiresome efforts of convincing has changed the situation of most of the participants from no appetite to get involved in the study to be video recorded. The other limitation of the study is related to some of the interviewees who could not speak Amharic and the researcher's inability to be sure whether the translator put facts in exactly what the interviewees want to express.

The research throws light on the major achievements of Afar Regional State since the introduction of federal political system in the country. However, there is a serious gap between constitutional promises of self-rule, socio-economic development and the social and political reality on the ground. Therefore, the study has attempted toexamine several factors adversely affecting the socio-economic development of Afar regional State. In this case the focus was to show how the various factors hindered the development of the regional state rather than investigating each factor in depth. To conduct an empirical study on each of these factors in one go was found to be a very difficult task. Each of them is broad subject worthy of independent study. Hence, the broadness of the topic was a limiting factor.

More importantly, the research did not adequately entertain the rapid pace of political reforms that Ethiopia has experienced since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed tookover power from Hailemariam Desalegn in April 2018. The reshuffling of the top leadership both at the federal and regional level has been regarded as a watershed moment in the country's political development. PM Abiy's brief tenure thus far has been marked by a dramatic shift in the country's rhetoric, an increased tolerance for political dissidents. Obviously, events have been unfolding following the reform that brought political and economic liberalization in the country.

The researcher had already gathered data and writing chapters when these major changes were taking place. Therefore, this study tried to give highlight about some changes taking place in the region until March 2020.

1.8. Research Design and Methodology

1.8.1. Research Design

Research Design is the conceptual structure within which research is conducted (Kothari, 2004). Gray (2009, p.131) defined research design as "*the overarching plan for the collection, measurement and analysis of data*." This study seeks to explain the socio-economic development of the Afar Regional State within the context of the Ethiopian ethnic federal political order. Thus, the study employed descriptive and explanatory research designs in order to understand what is going on (descriptive) and the why is it going on (analytical) aspect of the research.

Descriptive type of research is chosen because of its particular importance to describe and interpret the problem, what relationships exist among different factors, the prevailing practices and point of view, effects that are being felt, processes that are going on and trends that are developing (Best, 1970). When stating the importance of descriptive research method, Burns and Grove (2003, p. 201), asserted that descriptive research *"*is designed to provide a picture of a situation as it naturally happens". Therefore, the researcher applied this research design to describe the self-rule experience of Afar regional state and the various factors adversely affecting the socio-economic development of the regional state.

Explanatory research design focuses on why questions. We may encounter something occurred with its description. In such a case, we might wonder why it occurred. In this regard explanatory research design is used to examine the reasons "why" something occurs (Lee, 2008). It builds on exploratory and descriptive research and goes on to identify the reasons for something that occurs. Similarly according to Gray, explanatory research looks for causes and reasons and hence it seeks to ask 'why' and 'how' questions (Gray, 2009). Despite of constitutional promises of self-rule and equitable development Afar regional state lag behind others in terms of socio-economic transformation. Moreover, the region is still conflict ridden. Since the main purpose of this study is to examine the factors adversely affecting the socio-economic

transformation of Afar Regional State, explanatory research method was appropriate to explain why this is the case.

1.8.2. Sources of Data

For the purpose of data triangulation, this study employed a mixed research approach which combines the qualitative and quantitative approaches. This mixed approach was used with a qualitative priority and the quantitative approach was used just to complement the qualitative one. Among the different mixed methods research designs suggested by Creswell (2009), this study employed the concurrent triangualtion design to guide the selection of research methods and the subsequent procedures of data collection and analysis. In this design, both the qualitative and quantitative datasets were collected and analyzed concurrently or side-by-side. According to Creswell (2009, p.213) applying the integration of qualitative data and quantitative data as research design helps to "*offset the weaknesses inherent within one method with the strengths of the other*". It is important to note that this study was dominantly based on qualitative data and its findings were supported with quantitative data.

Qualitative research can provide rich and detailed descriptions of human behavior in the real-world contexts in which it occurs. Moody (2005) asserted that qualitative approach is appropriate in revealing out real world settings and dynamics. Qualitative research approach was designed to find out what the Afars feel about their achievements under federal Ethiopia or what they think about thefactors hindering the socio-economic transformation of Afar Regional State. Literatures Such as Cresswell (2005) and Bailey (2007) suggest that in qualitative research data gathering and data analysis go side by side. Thus, the data analysis process started from the time of the first interview, the first observation, the first focus group discussion and the first document record.

Population in research refers to all subjects that the researcher wants to study (Hamed, 2016). Therefore, the study population for this research included members of the Afar people. Since it was difficult to collect data from all Woredas of the region, data for this research was collected from Semera, the capital of the regional state and from three sample Woredas which were assumed to reflect the condition of the people of the regional state. The selected Woredas were Assaita from Zone one, Teru from Zone four and Amibara from Zone three.

Before selecting these Woredas discussions were made with people who have better knowledge about the regional state. According to the discussions made, based on the economic livelihood of the peoples of the region, the Woredas in the regional state can be classified in to three categories: predominantly pastoralist, agro-pastoralists, Woredas having better infrastructure, investment projects and modern mechanized agriculture. Accordingly, Semera was selected because it is the administrative capital and political centerof the regional state. Assaita Woreda reflects agro-pastoralists. It is also the historical center of the traditional authority (Sultan) of the Afar people. Teru Woreda refelects the Afar people who predominantly lead pastoralist way of life. Moreover, it is the most populous Woreda in Zone four. Amibara Woreda refelects Woredas having better infrastructure, investment projects and modern mechanized agriculture. It is also the most populous Woreda in Zone three.

Figure 1.1: Semera and Selected Woredas (Sample Woredas)



Participants of in-depth interview consisted of members of the House of Federations, Ministry of Federal Affairs, House of Peoples Representatives Pastoralist Standing Committee, advisors of the regional state assigned by the federal government, members of the ruling parties, EPRDF, members of the states' councils, members of Afar Peoples Democratic Party, members of the national armed forces, members of the regional development sector Bureaus and Woreda Offices (pastoral and agricultural development, civil service and capacity building, water, health, and education), investment projects functioning in the region, members of Afar diasporas, regional police force and local militia and at the sub- regional levels, local officials, clan leaders, community members, young people and women were purposely selected.

In general, for the qualitative data gathering participants were selected mainly based on purposive sampling in order to draw respondents with the desired knowledge and expertise. The researcher also used snowballing sampling technique which enabled him to get respondents who are able and willing to discuss issues in-depth (Naderifar, etal., 2017).Thus, for some important issues, the researcher asked respondents to refer otherindividuals whom they knew were knowledgeable about issues treated in this study.

As mentioned above, to complement and validate the information gathered through the qualitative means, quantitative data was collected through questionnaire. The questionnaire was prepared in Amharic and distributed to the civil servants working in the regional capital and in the selected three Woredas of the regional state. The researcher used the support of a translator for participants who were not able to understandthe items in the questionnaire. Therefore participants for the questionnaire were selected using a certain formula to reflect the studypopulation.

Table 1.1: Total Interview participants of the study

Categories	Number of participants	Percentage (%)
Federa and Regional Government institutions		
House of Peoples Representatives	2	2.1
House of Federation	2	2.1
EPRDF Office	2	2.1
Ministry of Federal Affairs	3	3.1
Afar Regional Bureaaus and Offices	18	18.7
Afar Woreda Administration and Offices	21	21.9
Pastoralistes from Sample Woredas	12	12.5
Other Categories of People Interviewed in Afar Region		
Women and Young (Semera and Woredas) and educated Afars	18	18.7
Tendaho Sugar Factory , Kadaba and SVS salt producers	7	7.3
Investors, former regional officials and opposition party members	5	5.2
MoFA advisors in the region and other knowledgeable people	6	6.3
Total	96	100
Education Level		
Illiterate	9	9.4
Literate	7	7.3
12th Complete and below	15	15.6
College and above	65	67.7
Total	96	100
Gender Male	75	78.1
Female	21	21.9
Total	96	100

According to the (CSA, 2017 population projection values of 2017), the total population of the Afar Regional State is 1, 812,002. The total number of civil servants in the Afar Regional State is 35,211. The number of civil servants in the regional capital, Semera and Logia is 1664. The total number of civil servants working in the selected Woredas, Amibara, Assaita and Teru is 3,563 out of which 1081,1486 and 996 were working in Assaita, Amibra and Teru respectively. Therefore, the total number of civil servants working in the regional capital and the selected Woredas is 5,527. An attempt was made to stratify them in their Woredas and respective institutions where they were working in and to use an appropriate sampling technique to get proportional representation of participants. The researcher used Yamane's (1967) formula to determine the required sample size for the survey questionnaire at 95% confidence level:

Formula: $n=\frac{N}{1+N(e2)}$ **n= 5527/ (1+5527 *0.05^2)**

n= is the sample size
e= is precision
N= is the total population

n=5527/(1+5527*0.0025)
n= 5527/(1+13.8175)
n=5527/14.8175
n= 373

Therefore, 373 questionnaires were distributed to collect quantitative data from the civil servants in the regional capital and the selected Woredas. However, the total number of questionnaires accurately filled and reported was 350. Therefore, frequencies and percentages were computed by voiding missouts and incomplete questionnaires.

Table 2.1 Total participants in filling the questionnaire of the research study

Categories	Number of participants	Percentage (%)
Age of the Respondents		
18-27	105	30
28-37	167	47.7
38-47	69	19.7
48-57	6	1.7
58-67	3	0.86
Total	350	100
Sex of the Respondents		
Male	265	75.7
Female	85	24.3
Total	350	100
Educationa Background of Respondents		
< = 12th Grade	9	2.6
Certificate	12	3.4
Diploma 81 23.1		
Degree	221	63.1
Masters	27	7.7
Total	350	100

1.8.3. Methods of Data Collection

The researcher used a variety of data gathering tools in order to collect a wide range of information which enabled him to investigate the situation of Afar Regional State under federal Ethiopia and the challenges adversely affecting the region's socio-economic transformation. In this regard, first, an attempt was made to collect secondary data from various publications such as government legal documents, reports, copies of minutes of important meetings conducted by government officials at regional, Zonal and local levels; proclamations and regulations enacted by the regional government; letters exchanged between the federal and the regional governments as well as among different offices in the regional state and pamphlets distributed in the regional state and the sub-regional state for different purposes.

The second data gathering instrument was in-depth key informant interviews. The main criterion for the selection of the interviewees was their rich knowledge, not representativeness. Structured and semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions was used because it allowed the respondents to talk at length about their experiences, views and events, so that it created better opportunity for the respondents to express their opinion and to respond freely. Generally, the researcher interviewed 96 people from federal institutions, regional, Zonal and Woreda levels administration, community members as well as people working in development projects:

During interviewing respondents were given better room to explain what they might feel and the researcher took notes on any non-verbal actions or expressions in order to better understand the views of respondents and to conceptualize their argument with the way they express the issue they are requested to describe.

It is also helpful for the researcher to closely understand the interviewee's subjective understanding and interpretations of the self-rule experience of the Afar National Regional State, achievements and challenges. The researcher's close interaction with the participants gave him good opportunity to understand how they build the logic of their arguments regarding the experiences of the Afar within the Ethiopian Federal political order. Face-to-face interview and discussion in non-stressful settings was used as an alternative to obtain detail information regarding the subject of the study.

The third data collection method was participant and non-participant personal observation on the actual practices such as Regional Bureaus, Woreda Offices, economic activities, investment projects and resettlement areas in the regional state. Both McMillan and Schumacher (2001) and Bell (1987) agree that observations reveal characteristics and elicit data that is nearly impossible with other means or approaches.Since the design of this study is based on qualitative approach, the researchers' observation and reflection was an important source of primary data.

The Fourth data gathering instrument was focus group discussion. Accordingly, focus group discussions were conducted with selected Woreda Office heads, educated Afars, pastoralists, civil servants, youth, women, factory workers, and salt producers. The researcher conducted a total of twenty focus group discussions. Four FGDs were conducted with pastoralists and sugarcane out growers, six FGDs were conducted with selected Woreda Office heads and Woreda civil servants, four FGDs were conducted with the young and Women in the three Woredas and the regional capital, four FGDs were conducted with educated Afars in the three Woredas and the regional capital. Two focus group discussions were conducted with Tendaho Sugar Factory workers and salt producers. The researcher conducted focus group discussion with a group of 6- 8 purposefully selected participants in each focus group discussions both in the regional capital and in each selected Woredas.

Administration of survey questionnaire was the fifth data collection method used in this study to gather quantitative data. Quantitative data was collected to complement the information collected through the qualitative means or to ascertain the strength of qualitative information regarding the situation of Afar Regiona under federal Ethiopia (major achievements and development challenges in post 1991 federal Ethiopia). Participants who filled the questionnaire were civil servants working in the regional capital and in the three selected Woredas of the regional state. This is because, it is from this category of people that the researcher can select members who could read and understand the questionnaire prepared in Amharic languge for the purpose of making the questionnaire easily understandable.

1.9. Description of the Study Area

The Afar Regional State is one of the nine regional states (now eleven) legally constituted based on the 1995 FDRE constitution. Geographically, the Afar Regional State is located in the northeastern part of Ethiopia. The total geographical area of the regional state is about 270,000 km^2 (CSA, 2008). It shares common international boundaries with the State of Eritrea in the north-east and Djibouti in the east, as well as regional boundaries with the Regional States of Tigray in the north-west, Amhara in the south-west, Oromia in the south and Somali in the south-east (Art (2) of the 2002 Revised Constitution of ANRS).

Administratively, the Afar National Regional State consists of 5 administrative Zones (sub-regions), 32 Woredas (administrative districts), 28 towns, and 401 rural and urban kebeles. Afar is the origin of human race, where a 4.4 million years old humanoid is recently discovered. The Afar Depression, also known as the Danakil depression, is a part of Great East African Rift Valley, and it is the lowest point in Ethiopia. It is also one of the lowest elevations in Africa and is located in the north of the Afar Region. The southern part consists of the valley of the Awash River, which empties into a string of lakes along the Ethiopian-Djibouti border (Ibid).

The Afar people belonged to Cushitic ethnic group like their Oromo and Somali neighbors, predominantly nomadic in origin and the majorities are still practicing “transhumant pastoralism” for subsistence (Guinand, 2000). According to (CSA, 2007), the total number of the Afar population was 1,411,092 of which 786,338 (55.73%) were males and 624,754 (44.27%) are females. In terms of residence, 188,973(13.40%) were urban dwellers while the remaining

1,222,119 (86.60%) were living in rural areas. In terms of Ethnic composition, the majority (over 90%) was Afar. The Argoba territorial minority in the region comprises 1.55% of the population of the region. There are also members of other ethnic groups living in the region which include Amhara, 5.22%; Tigrayans, 1.15%; Oromo, 0.61%; Welayta, 0.59%; and Hadya, 0.18%). In terms of religion 95.3% of the population was Muslim and 4.7% was Christian (3.9% Orthodox Christian, 0.7% protestant, and 0.1% Catholics). The Afar region has an estimated density of 14.36 people per square kilometer (Ibid).

Afar region is characterized by an arid and semi-arid climate with low and erratic rainfall. Rainfall is bi-modal throughout the region with a mean annual rainfall below 500 mm in the semi-arid western escarpments decreasing to 150 mm in the arid Zones to the east. The Afar region is increasingly drought prone and it receives three rainy seasons. The main rain, karma accounts for 60% of annual rainfall and occurs from mid June to mid September (ANRS, 2010). The region's temperature is usually high which ranges between from 12^0C and 48^0C (CSA, 2007).

The Afar people inhabited the most arid, rocky and environmentally hostile territory of the Horn of Africa (Ayele, 1994; Piguet, 2007) where rainfall is erratic and scarce which make it unsuitable for agriculture (Aynalem, 2014). According to Ayele (1994,p.137), " *the Afar country is the driest, and one of the hottest areas of East Africa, and one of the harshest, most fragile and inhospitable environments for human occupation in the world*". The land inhabited by the Afar is well known as the cradle of mankind and for its abundance of natural resources (Yasin, 2008)

The Afar pastoralist society survived for centuries by adapting and perfecting a life style of nomadic pastoralism, more or less constantly moving with their livestock from one locality to the other depending on the availability of grazing areas and water points (Yasin, 2010). Historically, the Afar pastoralists largely depend on multi-species livestock production for their livelihood. The ecological disaster which caused increased drought and famine situation among the Afar pastoralists forced them to depend mainly on camel and goat pastoralism. Today, there are some Afar agro-pastoralists who combined animal husbandry with marginal agriculture (Kelemework, 2011).

Traditionally, the Afar are given different names by their neighboring people. The Ahmara, Oromo, Somali, Tigre and Arabs named the Afar Adal, Adali, Oda'ali, Taltal and Danakil respectively. The first three names sound the same as the ancestor of the dynasty and the son of Hadal Mahis, Ado'ali (Afar: white Ali). Adal first appeared in historical record at the end of the 13th century when the Walasma ruler of Ifat conquered the Shewan Mahzumi dynasty together with other smaller Muslim principalities such as Adal in 1288 (Yasin,2010). The Tigrigna highlanders used the derogatory name, Teltal to describe the hanging-down of the breasts of Afar women as uncivilized since they did not cover their bodies from the waist up. Because of the commercial contacts that the Arab sailors had with the Dankali clan who ruled the kingdom of Dankali between the 15th and17th century, Arabs gave the name Danakil to all Afar across the Red Sea coast. Despite of the various names given to the Afar by different groups, they have a distinct cultural identity and they invariably call themselves 'Afar' which has no meaning in Afar language (Yasin, 2008).

According to Yasin (2008), the Afar claim to be descendants of Ham, son of Noah. They are classified into two distinct descent sub-groups: the Asahimara (red) and Adohimara (white). The former are the more prestigious and powerful nobility group living along the coast; and the latter are the class of the commoners living in the mountains and the Danakil Desert (Trimingham, 1952; Markakis, 2004). Several hypotheses are provided regarding the distinction between these sub-groups. For instance, one of the hypotheses described that the color dichotomy is derived from the color of the soil of the places where the two groups were living. Thus, the nameAsahimara, the red people, seems to be derived from the red color of soil of the Awsa region and of the Awash Valley and the name Adohimara seems to be derived from the cream-colored sand of the coastal regions of the Red Sea and Gulf of Tadjoura (Getachew, 2001a). However, this distinction between the two groups does not exist today as the two groups intermingled and their cleavage is increasingly disappearing in favor of Afar unity (Ali, 2008). The proverbial ferocity and the inhospitable terrain where they lived had enabled the Afar sultanates to safeguard their independence for a long time (Bahru, 2002).

1.10. Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized into four parts comprising of eleven chapters. Chapter one and chapter two are categorized under the first part that deals with the problem and literature revirew respectively. The first chapter is an introductory section that describes background and high light, statement of the research problem, research questions, research objectives, ethical considerations, significance of the study, scope and limitation of the study, research methodology including study population and sample size, methods of data collection, description of the study area and the structure of the dissertation. Chapter two gives conceptual framework regarding the concept of federalism and federation, importance of federalism in multiethnic societies, federalism,decentralization and development, federalism, conflict and development, Ethiopia's ethno-federal political system and self-rule and shared-rule in the Ethiopian federation. It also gives historical overview about the socio-economic and political history of Afar within the context of state formation in Ethiopia until the introduction of federal system in the country.

The remaining three parts (Part II, III and IV) are dealing with the empirical findings of the research. The chapters are categorized into these parts based on the common theme that they are examining. Accordingly, chapter three which deals with the creation of Afar Regional State and its socio-economic and political achievements under federal Ethiopia is categorized under part two of the dissertation. Part three of the dissertation is focused on the political challenges adversely affecting the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State and part four of the dissertation gave emphasis to the economic challenges adversely affecting the development of Afar Regional State.

Accordingly, Part three of the dissertation comprises of chapter four, chapter five and chapter six which examine power relation between the federal government and the Afar Regional State, power relation within the Afar Regional State and conflict as an explanatory variable for the underdevelopment of Afar Regional State respectively. Chapter four focuses on the mechanisms of relations between Afar Regional State and the federal government such as relation through party channel, through federal executive organs and regional executive institutions. It throws light how these relations contribute for the underdevelopment of the regional state. Chapter five discusses state structure and division of power in Afar region, the mode of relation among levels

of government within the region and leadership gaps adversely affecting the development of the regional state. Chapter six aims at examing the inter-clan and inter-ethnic conflicts which have been adversely affecting the development of the regional state. It discusses the causes and consequences of inter-clan conflicts among Afars, inter-ethnic conflict between Afar and Issa as well as conflict between Afar and Amhara ethnic groups.

Part IV of the dissertation consisted of chapter seven, chapter eight, chapter nine and chapter ten. Chapter seven, deals with the Special Support provided by the federal government to Afar Regional State. It describes the support provided so far and explains the reasons why the support did not help to speed up the development of Afar regional state. Chapter eight, deals with megadevelopment projects taking the case of Tendaho Sugar Factory and Afdera Salt production as an example. It examines the contribution of these projects in supporting the development efforts in the regional state and the challenges adversely affecting their contribution. Chapter nine describes the villagization programme being undertaken in Afar Regional State. It explains the miss-match between the intent, enabling pastoralists get ease access to a variety of services, changing their living conditions and the actual achievements scored. Chapter ten aims at examining the environmental challenge which has been adversely affecting the development of Afar Regional State taking the invasion of ProsopisJuliflora as an example. The final chapter, chapter eleven is the conclusion and recommendation part of the study. The main conclusions drawn from the analysis of the study and the important recommendations developed through the findings of the study are presented in this chapter.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

2. Introduction

This chapter presents brief review of literatures. Accordingly, this chapter is organized into two main parts. The first part provides an overview on the concept of federalism and federation, the importance of federalism in multiethnic societies, the relationship among federalism, decentralization and development, federalism, conflict and development, Ethiopia's ethno-federal political system and self-rule and shared-rule in the Ethiopiian federation. The second part deals with the socio-economic and political history of Afar region visa-vis the process of state formation in Ethiopia. The socio-economic and political history of Afar tracing back to the emergence of Afar Sultanate and the incorporation of Afar Region into the Ethiopian state. It throws light about the Afar pastoralists before their gradual integration into the Ethiopian empire and how they have been treated under successive regimes in Ethiopia.

2.1 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

2.1.1 The Concept of Federalism and Federation

Federalism remained to be a contested concept with no single definition up on which scholars in the field could agree (Burgess, 2006). Because of its polymorphous nature and the different concerns, it reflects, it is difficult to come up with a universally acknowledged definition of federalism (Ibid). Similarly, Law (2013) argued that the efforts of scholars in creating a consensus on the exact meaning of federalism have remained unsuccessfulbecause the concept of federalism has evolved through time.

Nevertheless, students in the subject have tried to define the concept of federalism in their own ways. For instance, according to Riker(1964, p.11), federalism is a state in which "(1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee (even though merely a statement in the constitution)of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere".This definition demonstrates that federalism is a system of government in which a written constitution divides powers between a central government and constituent units and where both tiers of governments have supreme powers in their areas of jurisdiction (Tesfaye, 2010). According to Watts (2008, p.8):

> *The term Federal political systems refer to a broad category of political systems in which, by contrast to the single central source of political and legal authority in unitary systems, there are two (or more) levels of government thus combining elements of shared-rule (collaborative partnership) through a common government and regional self-rule (constituent unit autonomy) for the governments of the constituent units.*

According to Elazar (1987), federalism is a constitutional mechanism for dividing power between different levels of government so that federated units can enjoy substantial, constitutionally guaranteed autonomy over certain policy areas while sharing power in accordance with agreed rules over other areas.

Federation is descriptive concept referring to the actual system of governments or a particular type of institutional relationship. It is used to describe actual systems of governments or tangible institutional facts (Assefa, 2006). Burgess (2006) also defined federation as a distinctive organizational form or institutional fact the main purpose of which is to accommodate the constituent units of a union in the decision-making procedure of the central government by means of constitutional entrenchment. He opines that federation is a constitutionally well-established institution including structures, institutions, procedures, and techniques that recognizes diversity in the state.

2.1.2. Importance of Federalism in Multiethnic Societies

As cited in Akindele and Olaopa Schmitt (2003, p.169), stated that *"federalism has emerged as a means of accommodating the growing desire of people to preserve or revive the intimacy of small societies, and the growing necessity for larger combinations to mobilize the utilization of common resource better*".

Decentralized governance system through the use of federalism as an organizing principle has been used by states with a multi-ethnic population as a mechanism to accommodate the demands of their ethnic groups as well as to protect their territorial integrity (USAID, 2009). Federalism as an organizing principle advocates a 'multi-tiered' government combining elements of 'shared-rule' through common institutions for some purposes and regional 'self-rule' for constituent units for some other purposes, thereby accommodating unity and diversity within a larger political union (Assefa, 2006).

Federalism evolved and become an alternative system of governance in many countries (Anderson, 2008). Scholars in the field agree that despite of its variant, federalism as a political arrangement is appropriate to countries having multicultural societies (Muhammed, 2011). Similarly, Anderson asserted that "*Federalism seems particularly suited to democracies with very large populations or territories with highly diverse populations that are regionally concentrated*" (Anderson, 2008, p.12). In line of this argument, scholars in the fieldasserted that "in contemporary world federalism as a political idea has become increasingly important. This has arisen from the potential of federal idea as a way of peacefully reconciling unity and diversity within a political system*" (*Blindenbacher and Watts, 2011, p.14*).* They further explained that the contributing factors for this trend include modern developments in transportation, social communications, technology, industrial organizations, globalization and knowledge-based (learning) societies.

Papagianni (2006) argued that federalism helps multiethnic and multilingual societies to sustain democracy in the long-term. In line with this argument, Alfred explained the association between federalism, multinationalism and democracy in which he underscored that those countries with high levels of diversity will never become stable democracies "without workable federal systems" (Alfred, 1999, p.19). According to Lijphart (2004), power sharing and group autonomy are the two key elements for the successful establishment of democratic governments in divided societies. For Lijphart, power sharing is the only democratic model which needs to be adopted in divided societies.

Federal reforms are seen as a viable instrument by stakeholders in nations with high levels of racial, religious, social, and/or cultural diversity to preserve national unity while simultaneously accommodating minority desires. The ability of federalism to reconcile conflicting interests, movements for autonomy, and territorial disputes is highlighted in this setting (Buhler, et al., 2017).Since Ethiopia is a country having multi-cultural societies, the introduction of federal political system seems appropriate. It has ensured political empowerment of the various nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia at least constitutionally. Some literatures and public opinion suggest that the federal system has little impact on the socio-economic transformation of the Afar region. This study therefore, investigates the socio-economic status of Afar Regional State within

the Ethiopian Federal political system, its achievements and the challenges adversely affecting the economic transformation of the regional state.

2.1.3. Federalism, Decentralization and Development

Debates of federalism and decentralization are frequentlyoverlapping because both concepts signify transfer of power from the center to territorial units. Neverthless there clear distinction between the two.Federalism, as normative and philosophical principle, refers to the advocacy of multi-tiered government combining elements of shared-rule and regional self-rule (Watts, 1999). Thus, federalism is the distribution of authority, accountability, and responsibility that aims to enhance good governance by concentrating political and administrative authority closer to the people (Bulmer, 2017). Under a federal system, fully constituted governments at the regional or provincial levels are given responsibility and authority. The provinces are frequently represented in central government institutions, such as an upper house of the legislature.Federal nations usually have two things: (1) at least two levels of constitution-guaranteed authority; and (2) representation for regional governments in the national legislature (International IDEA and UNDP, 2014).

Decentralization is the process through which control and accountability for public activities are transferred from the central government to inferior or essentially independent governmental entities or the private sector. This idea, which in the traditional meaning refers to the transfer of power, responsibility, and resources from the federal government to local governments, is crucial to the relationship between the two (Ozmen, 2014).

Decentralized systems may include the allocation of legislative, executive, and judicial power between various levels of government, or a mixture of one or more of them;the allocation of duties among several levels of government for certain government services and responsibilities. Examples include water, immigration, health, the environment, water quality, and policing;the division of responsibility for fiscal issues (fees, taxes, borrowing) among several levels of government; allowing subnational levels of government to manage their own institutional structures, for which they are responsible to their own citizens, with minimal or no interference from the central government and the development of central institutions that include decision-making at the subnational levels of government(Hofmeister and Tayao, 2016).

Decentralization encompasses three separate but linked dimensions which make it making it a multidimensional concept namely political, administrative and fiscal. Each country's decentralized system of government may exhibit a unique combination of the three dimensions.The central government transfers political power to local governments through political decentralization. The transmission of public services from the central government to locally based administrative units or local governments is known as administrative decentralization and The distribution of funds and accountability for specific services to local governments refers to fiscal decentralization (OECD, 2019).

Decentralization aims to establish accountability between local and national governments as well as between citizens, service providers, and subnational governments (Ozmen, 2014). The principle of decentralization and local autonomy grants the local government the mission to identify and implement the most effective solutions for resolving specific local administrative problems on behalf of the local interests they represent. This is done by recognizing the legal personality of the administrative-territorial units and their right to self administration in order to satisfy their own needs. Decentralization, which is based on the concept of local autonomy, is the only situation in which the principle of local autonomy may be put into practice (Zaharia and Bilouseac, 2014).

Power decentralization is the foundation of federalism (Bulmer, 2017). It implies that the state's executive authority will be transferred to the smallest administrative division under the federal government. Decentralization also entails the transfer of duties and power from higher to lower levels of government to the lower administrative units (Ozmen, 2014). Although federalism and decentralization advocate the transfer of power and responsibility from the center to subnational units, there is clear distinction between the two. Federalism is a kind of decentralization where fully constituted governments at the regional or provincial levels are given responsibility and authority and the provinces are frequently represented in central government institutions. On the other hand, decentralization is less concerned with granting regional autonomy demands. Decentralization, which typically occurs at the local or municipal level, is more focused on improving the efficiency with which services are delivered.This is merely to point out that the goal of decentralization is frequently no more than improved service delivery and political accountability at the local level, rather than the more general socio-political objectives that

justify federal systems (International IDEA and UNDP, 2014). This implies that federations are a result of constitutional decision-making, whereas decentralization is a result of policy decision-making (Blume, and Voigt, 2008)

Federalism and decentralization are increasingly recommended by international agencies like the World Bank and the United NationsDevelopment Programme as the most effective means of promoting accountability, democratization and economic progress(Buhler, et al.,2017).For many years federalism has been regarded as a system that provides a workable way to reconcile the objectives of larger political bodies, capable of fostering economic development and preserving security, vs smaller political units, which typically have a responsibility to their own voters and local interests (Watts, 1994). The system does this by creating a government with a division of power between local and central authorities as well as the lines of constitutionally outlined roles and responsibilities for each tiers of the government (Erk, and Anderson, 2009).

For many years federalism has been regarded as a system that provides a workable way to reconcile the objectives of larger political bodies, capable of fostering economic development and preserving security, vs smaller political units, which typically have a responsibility to their own voters and local interests (Watts, 1994). Nowadays, emphasis has been given to a different aspect of fiscal competition. Sub-federal jurisdictions can experiment with new economic policies under a competitive federalism framework. While ineffective policies are rejected by the competing jurisdictions, effective solutions will be imitated. Therefore, competition across jurisdictions leads to a discovery process, which finally advances the public sector (Callander and Harstad, 2015).

According to Qian, and Weingast (1997), federal institutions can promote economic expansion and development. The "market preserving federalism" thesis outlines a number of requirements for a federal government to successfully sustain markets and offer incentives for economic growth and development.Similarly, Bulmer (2017) contended that federalism may promote a favorable atmosphere for identifying needs at the grassroots level. If the problems are adequately evaluated and the right measures are taken, development could advance significantly. According to Wibbels (2006), due to the competitive pressures that decentralized governments place on national governments and each other, fiscal federalism literature contends that decentralized and shared governance ensures more effective delivery of public goods, limits government

intervention in the economy, brings decision-making closer to citizens, and promotes the emergence and maintenance of efficient markets. The analysis of the benefits of decentralization such us enhancing efficiency in service delivery, addressing the interests of political and economic neglected rural and less developed areas, promoting democratic citizenship, increasing accountability and broadening citizen's participation(International IDEA and UNDP, 2014)may help to suggest the positive contribution of decentralization and development.

On the other hand, there are others who argued that it is uncertain how federalism affects the economy. Although some studies find federalism's positive effects on a variety of economically significant variables, others find negative effects. Federations differ from one another. Some are characterized as competitive, while others are cooperative. So, it could be helpful to be more particular and to identify the precise institution that will have an impact on economic variables if one is interested in the economic effects of federalism (Blume, and Voigt, 2008).Those who argued that federalism has a negative effect on development asserted that federalism is a complex, mostly legalistic style of government that can be expensive which can hinder development and make it difficult to establish and implement policies in a coherent manner. (International IDEA, 2017).

Decentralization has been also considereda typical element of development strategies and public finance reform among developing countries over the past few decades (Smoke, 2001). The main justification for decentralization is that doing so can increase efficiency, improve governance, and increase accountability for the distribution of public goods to its consumers (Faguet, 2009).The local government can better develop public services to meet local demands, which are frequently distinct from those in other regions, because it has better information about the preferences of its inhabitants (Von Braun and Grote, 2002).Emprical researches and the experiences of different countries showed that decentralization can promote public sector effectiveness, democratization, and political stability (OECD, 2019).According to Callander and Harstad (2015),feederalismand decentralization increase the political system's ability for innovation which could help to promote economic development.

The principle of decentralization and local autonomy grants the local government the mission to identify and implement the most effective solutions for resolving specific local administrative problems on behalf of the local interests they represent. This is done by recognizing the legal

personality of the administrative-territorial units and their right to self administration in order to satisfy their own needs. Decentralization, which is based on the concept of local autonomy, is the only situation in which the principle of local autonomy may be put into practice (Zaharia and Bilouseac, 2014).The enhancement of service delivery is one of decentralization's primary objectives. Decentralization can enhance service provision by enabling local governments to better adapt their offerings to regional demands. When it comes to the specific service needs of their constituents, local governments are likely to be more knowledgeable than the central government (International IDEA and UNDP, 2014).

Decentralization and local governance are two crucial elements that together significantly increase the effectiveness of local development efforts, according to research on the topic. Decentralization offers local authorities additional power and discretion to act independently of centralized organizations. Improved local government makes it possible to develop plans that more effectively address local needs, lowers opposition and corruption, and fosters cooperation among local actors (Wafaaand Myriam, 2012).

However, decentralization in itself will not be a guarantee for the attainment of development. Insufficient central political and bureaucratic backing due to political and administrative officials' deeply ingrained centrist attitudes and behaviours and when decentralization policies and initiatives have occasionally been created, arranged, and implemented in ways that are not acceptable, decentralization will not have positive effect on development. The outcomes have been found to be mixed. Decentralization has led to increased development activity participation, better local and rural development program administration, and increased administrative capacity outside of the national capital in some countries.But, practically everywhere governments have attempted to decentralize, they have encountered significant implementation problems (Rondinelli, et al., 1983).

Fiscal independence or the capacity of local governments to generate their own revenue without relying on transfers from the federal government, and revenue decentralization are the decentralization types that are most positively associated with development results. However, decentralization’s ability to promote development is hindered, especially in poor nations, by local governments' inability to raise money for the expenditure duties that have been devolved to them (Canare, 2021).

2.1.4. Federalism, Conflict and Development

Federalism has long been advocated as a solution for resolving ethnic strife and secession in nations where ethnic groups are geographically concentrated (Martinez, 2008). Yet, the contribution of federalism for peace and conflict resolution has been found to be mixed. One line of argument is thatfederalism can create national cohesion and stop the dissolution of a state by recognizing and tolerating political differences (International IDEA and UNDP, 2014). This is because one of the main issues in federal systems is the legal relationship between the tiers of government (i.e., the federal government and provincial governments), as well as the division of responsibilities or authority between the two (Ibid).

The ability of federalism to reconcile conflicting interests, movements for autonomy, and territorial disputes has been appreciated. Nonetheless, it must be noted that achieving peaceful coexistence through federalism is not a certainty. Several crucial variables must be taken into account for federal reforms to successfully aid in conflict resolution. For instance, the interaction between various institutions and governmental levels is of paramount importance for the control of disputes inside a nation (Buhler, etal, 2017).

There are differentarguments in discussions on multiethnic federalism. On the one hand, many academics support the use of federalism as a means of stabilizing countries with several ethnic groups (Young 1994). On the other side, other academics contend that federalism makes conflicts worse (Cornell 2002). Similarly, according to Martinez (2008), several academics have warned that federalism may actually make the issues it purports to solve worse.

In general, social scientists and political practitioners have been discussing two significant competing ideas for decades. While some academics have argued that meeting a significant portion of self-government aspirations lessens hostility to the larger political system, others have argued that the most likely result of federalism is an aggravation of secessionist demands (because embedded self-governing institutions allegedly induce distinctive perceptions of collective interests and of self worse (Martinez, 2008).While federalism has helped certain nations in resolving disputes or enhancing governance, it can also intensify already-existing differences, which can sometimes result in even more serious disputes or state failure. In their discussion of this contradictory propensity of federalism, Jan Erk and Lawrence Anderson

acknowledged that "federalism has both secession provoking and secession preventing characteristics" (Erk and Anderson, 2009).

The other concern of this section is the link between conflict and development. Etiologically the term conflict is derived from the Latin word 'Confligere', referring to a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their interests or concerns (Mayer, 1990). Searching for a single all-encompassing definition is difficult, which as a result, there are various definitions of the concept of conflict. For instance, Kreitner and Kinicki (2004) defined conflict as "*a process in which one party perceives that its interests are being opposed or negatively affected by another party*." Madalina (2016), presented conflict as some form of friction, disagreement, or discord arising between individuals or within a group when the beliefs or actions of one or more members of the group are either resisted by or unacceptable to one or more members of another group. According to Dar (2011), conflict remains an important part of human society since the beginning of civilization on this global world.

The interface between conflict and underdevelopment is one of the issues drawing the focus of scholars in the field of social science. Reseaeches showed that that low economic growth increases the risk of conflict and conflict reduces economic growth. However, this is not the case everywhere because the characteristics of economic growth and conflict vary widely across contexts (McIntosh and Buckley, 2015).Conflict can interact with the economy through multiple, complex pathways. Insecurity can disrupt economic activity through a number of channels, and the effects can be large and long-lasting. Fear resulting from violence and destruction can hinder economic activity and can cause the breakdown of political institutions and public services such as health and education. In the context of weak institutions, countries can become trapped in repeated cycles of violence that prevent economic development **(**Mueller and Tobias, 2016**).**

Sub-Saharan Africa has been marred by conflicts during the past several decades. Although the intensity of conflicts has decreased in recent years when compared to the 1990s, the region remains prone to conflict, with approximately 30% of countries affected in 2019 **(**Fang et al., 2020**).** Conflicts in the region have resulted in incalculable human suffering and high economic costs. Furthermore, conflicts pose significant strains on countries' public finances, lowering revenue, raising military spending, and shifting resources away from development and social spending (Ibid). Similarly, Kothari etal., (2019), asserted that controlling other determinants of

growth, conflicts have a significant negative effect on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa.

Some of the key channels through which conflict impedes economic growth are decreased investment, trade, and productivity, along with human and physical capital destruction through forced displacement and devastating effects on education and health care. A major consequence of conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as elsewhere, is the displacement of populations. This carries significant economic, fiscal, and social costs for the region involved in the conflict (Ibid). In this context, Stavenhagen (1996) contends that the economies of many countries ravaged by civil war and other kinds of political strife have been set back by years, if not decades.

Empirical studies conducted in different countries revealed the adverse effects of conflict on development. For instance, according to Onono (2016) ethnic conflicts among Turkana and Pokot communities in the northern principalities of Kenya have been manifested in competition and control over the use of scarce natural resources, raids, and cattle rustling. These conflicts create a strong and constant perception of insecurity and resulted in ineffective resource utilization, reduced mobility, and food insecurity, the closure of markets and schools, and widespread disruption of agricultural production activities. He further asserted that persistent conflict undermines local economies as well as the entire country's economic performance.

The experience in Ghana showed similar effects of conflict on development. Like in Kenya, the causes of ethnic conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana are varied. Mbowura (2014) mentioned that Kpandai District in Northern Ghana was enmeshed in an inter-ethnic conflict between the Gonja and the Nawuri over land rights. Apart from the loss of human lives and property, the war disrupted economic and socio-cultural activities and caused internal displacement of people, with attendant social and economic repercussions. He further argued that conflicts create the opportunity for 'ethnic entrepreneurs' to provide the leadership for the mobilization of ethnic groups into collective actors (Ibid). Similarly, a study conducted in Nigeria revealed that conflict has a significant impact on the economic development of Nigeria (Ijeoma, 2014). This is because conflicts often disrupt economic activities and thereby reduce the per capita taxable capacity of the economy.

Countries in the Horn of Africa have faced many inter-communal armed conflicts. The economic costs of the various wars and conflicts are also likely to be huge given the massive destruction of property and profound socio-economic disruptions. Some view conflict as the single greatest barrier to the region's socio-economic development (Kidane, 2011). Similarly, Yigzaw etal., (2019) argued that conflict and population displacement are among the most significant contemporary problems facing the Horn of Africa. He added that political instability, economic deprivation, changing population dynamics, and resource scarcity are considered as the natural features of the Horn of Africa.

The impact of conflict on development in Ethiopia cannot be exceptional. The new political and administrative arrangements made following the introduction of ethnic-based federalism gave the existing conflicts a new dimension (Asnake, 2004; Bamlaku et al., 2015). In this regard, Abbink, (2006) argued that the most observable impact of federalism in Ethiopia has been the decentralization of ethnic conflicts at regional and local levels. In the same fashion, Lubo (2013, p.66) asserted that "*In spite of the creation of ethnic federalism as an endeavor to address inter-ethnic conflictual problems in Ethiopia, many ethnic conflicts have occurred after 199*1". In the same vein, (Bamlaku, etal., 2015) also noted that ethnic federalism entwined with the existence of ethnic-based political parties is one of the key causes of ethnic conflicts in post-1991 Ethiopia. This study under chapter six examines how conflict could be an explanatory factor for the underdevelopment of Afar Regional State.

2.1.5. Ethiopia's Ethno-Federal Political System

Ethnic federalism is "*a federal political system in which component territorial governance units are intentionally associated with specific ethnic categories*" (Hale, 2004, p.165). Similarly, as cited in Yonas Girma (2015, p.30), Bargin, defined Ethnic Federalism as a "*political system consisting of ethnic based territorial units overlapping with political administrative units*". Therefore, the concept of ethnic federalism in general refers to the correspondence between ethnic groups and the area inhabited by them.

Some scholars criticized the institutionalization of ethnic federalism as an organizing principle of states. For instance, Papagianni (2006, p.51) argued that "*ethnic federations are least likely to survive*". She goes on to state that defining constituent units on ethnic grounds is risky because

such sub-state entities are often unwilling to share power with the central government. Moreover, she argued that when devolution increases the strength of identity-based, regional parties, it will lead to ethnic conflicts.

Ethiopia adopted ethnic-federalism as soon as EPRDF assumed political power in 1991. Neverthless, there are theoretical arguments in favor of and against the institutionalization of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. One line of argument is that, "*Multicultural Federalism was a necessity and a positive innovation for Ethiopia creating the basis for sustained peace and social and economic development*" (Alem, 2010, p.11). Similarly, Seyoum (2014) argued that Ethiopian ethnic federalism was introduced as a response to cultural diversity and self-determination. In a parallel with Seyoum's argument, Hashim (2010) contend that ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is a viable constitutive means to democracy because it institutionalizes 'self-rule' and 'shared-rule' for the territorial ethnic communities which would in turn provide a guarantee for their representation and participation in the governance process. Alemante's explanation seems to support the idea of restructuring society on the basis of ethnicity because he posited that "*membership in an ethnic community is important as it provides individuals with a cultural context which would enable them to make meaningful choices about how to lead their lives, set their goals and establish relationships"(*Alemante, 2003, p.71).

On the other side of the argument, the detractors held sharp contrast positions against the adoption of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. For instance, according to Frank (2009) the adoption of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia did not result in the creation of stability rather it led to growing tensions, instability and might ultimately lead to the disintegration of the state by enhancing ethnic consciousness and contradiction. Another scholar considered the adoption of multination Federalism in Ethiopia as a "*fragile experiment*" (Kymlika, 2006, p.6).

Not only the adoption of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia but also its implementation has been a subject of scholarly debate. There are two opposing perspectives regarding the practice of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. Those who positively viewed it argue that the implementation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has provided the opportunity for the constituent units to develop, promote, and preserve their language and culture and thereby created stability in the country (Asayehgn, 2015). In this regard, Alem (2010) asserted that the current federal arrangement has maintained

the unity of the peoples of Ethiopian and its territorial integrity, while providing full recognition to the principle of ethnic equality. Similarly, according to Asnake (2009) the federal restructuring of Ethiopia can be considered as a response to the legacy of unequal relations among the various ethnic groups despite of the problems observed in the actual practices. Moreover, as cited in David Turton, (Clapham, 2002), asserted that the adoption of federal state structure in Ethiopia has radically changed the former highly centralized and unitary state structure by introducing the principle of self-determination for the constituent units forming the Ethiopian federation using ethnicity as its fundamental organizing principle.

Other group of scholars criticized the implementation of the federal principles in Ethiopia. For instance, Mehari (2015, P.139) asserted that"there are serious disparities between de jure constitutional power granted to regional states, and the de facto power exercised by regional states". In parallel with Mehari's assertion, (Asnake, 2009, p.272), argued that "*Ethnic federalism has not realized its promises of self-administration and autonomy to the regions*".The above ideas are substantiated by Fiseha's *(*2014, P.57) statement in which he contends that the "*Centralizedpolitical practice in Ethiopia is contradictory not only to the constitutional provisions and principles but also to the reality on the ground*."

2.1.6. Self-Rule and Shared-Rule in the Ethiopian Federation

The powers and functions of the federal and regional governments of Ethiopia are constitutionally entrenched. In this regard, Article 51 and 52 explicitly stated the powers and functions of the federal and regional state respectively. Accordingly, Article 52 stated that regional states have the power to formulate and execute economic, social and development policies, strategies and plans of theState;administer land and other natural resources inaccordance with Federal laws; levy and collect taxes and duties on revenuesources reserved to the States and to draw up andadminister the State budget; enact and enforce laws on the State civil serviceand their condition of work; in the implementation of this responsibility it shall ensure that educational;training and experience requirements for any job,title or position approximate national standards and so on.

Article 50(2) of the FDRE constitution stipulated that the Federal Government and the states shall have legislative, executive and judicial powers. Moreover, the Ethiopian federal system allows regional states to adopt their own constitutions subject to the supremacy of the federal constitution (Muhammad, 2011). Article 50(4) of the 1995 constitution allows each regional state to decide on their own local government structure so that the local governance of each regional state could root in their socio-economic circumstances.

Shared rule refers to shared competencies as well as shared institutions through which sub-national units are accorded special participation and input in the national decision-making process. Assefa Fisha (2012) asserted that federal system was introduced in Ethiopia to decentralize power and resources and to address the nationality questions by accommodating the interests of the various nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. Similarly, Balcha (2007) explained that the Ethiopian government advocated ethnic-federalism with the belief that it could empower and equalize the diverse ethnic communities and reduce conflicts.

The institution of the second chamber in the Ethiopian context is the House of Federation. In many federations, second chambers are an integral part of legislatures. After describing the shared competencies particularly law-making powers of second chambers in certain countries like, the US, Germany, Switzerland, and India, Assefa *(*2006, P.126) argued that "*The1995 Ethiopian Constitution stands in sharp contrast in this regard. It fulfills the minimum requirement of having a second chamber but with a totally different function".* It is clearly stipulated under Art 62 (1) of the FDRE Constitution that the most important responsibility of the House of Federation is interpreting the constitution. Moreover, Abbink (1998) posited that the actual division of power between the two levels of governments in Ethiopia is not federal in its strict sense since states have no role in debating the policies and legislations formulated by the federal government. This signifies that the second chamber in Ethiopia has no competence in making the laws of the country. Art.83 (1) of the FDRE Constitution, gave to this house a unique power, interpreting the constitution of the country. From the discussions above, one can understand that the constituent units that formed the Ethiopian federation have little role in decision-making particularly in legislating the laws of the country.

Legislating national laws and policies is exclusively given to the House of Peoples Representatives Art 55(2) (FDRE Constitution, 1995). Thus, the states in Ethiopia have not been sharing power in this area. Scholars argue that the principles of 'shared-rule' and 'self-rule' under the Ethiopian federal system have not been came into effect due to the dominance of the federal government over its constituent units. As a result, regional states have not been freely performing their day-to-day activities due to federal executive interventions (Aalen, 2002; Asnake, 2009). According to Yakob (2010), one of the justifications for the existence of weak intergovernmental relations in Ethiopia is the dominance of the federal government through its party channel. Abbink also underscored that the ruling party retained all real power which gives little room to the competencies of sub-national units on national policies (Abbink, 2011). According to Ghebrehiwet (2015), one of the contributing factors for the dominance of the federal government is the states' heavily dependency on federal transfer due to their weak revenue raising capacity.

The dominance of the federal government is more observable in the relation between the federal government and Developing Regional States (Afar, Somali, Gambela and Benishangul-Gumuz). For instance, researchers such as Asnake (2004) and Abbink (2011) asserted that although the FDRE-Constitution under Art. 47(4) confirmed that all the constituent units of the Ethiopian federation have equal rights and powers; however, the Developing Regional States have not yet been able to score significant socio-economic development even after two decades of federal experience. In line of this argument, Abdi Ismael (2004) asserted that the keenness of federal authorities to intervene in local affairs is an indicator which makes regional autonomy in Ethiopia questionable. According to Assefa (2006), the rationale for federal interference in the affairs of Developing Regional States is lack of skilled man power and resources due to their historical marginalization before the introduction of the federal system in Ethiopia. When explaining the influence of the central government on the Afar Regional State, (Nicol and Otulana, 2014, PP. 9-10) asserted that *"In theory Afar political autonomy exists. In practice, however, autonomy in structure is not translated in to autonomy of political function as so much of ANRS development thinking and practice remains still influenced from the (national) centre."* One of the main reasons to this problem is lack of indigenous capacity to design, plan and implement good programs at all levels of government in the regional state to generate its own development thinking (Ibid). Therefore, this study under chapter four and chapter five tried to

examine how the Afar Regional State and its sub-regional units have been practically implementing their constitutionally entrenched powers and functions as well as the various factors impacting the development of the regional state.

2.2. The Socio-Economic and Political History of the Afar

2.2.1. Socioal Organization of Pastoral Afar

The Afar people are one of the Cushitic speaking Islamic people of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. They called themselves Cafara-Umata, the Afar people, their language, Cafara-af, the Afar language and they also call their homeland Cafar-barro, which literally means the Afar land (Getachew, 2001). Clan organization is dominant in the Afar society (Fekadu et al., 1984; Getachew, 2001). Ali (2008) stated that the entity of the clan is stronger and more significant in social, economic and political life of the Afar society. According to Markakis (2011) the founding principle of the Afar society is blood kinship, and the building block of its social structure is the patrilineal descent group, or clan. There are more than hundred clan families in the Afar region (Piguet, 2001, Markakis, 2011). Each clan has its own territories and leaders (Getachew, 2001). In the Afar society, land is divided among clans (Getachew, 2001; Piguet, 2008) and each clan land is named after a clan whose members have inhabited it for generations (Getachew, 2001). The Afar lands are divided into various tribe regions (Dinto) that are separated by boundaries (Dikka) that follow natural features like rivers, hills, and rocks. (Yasin, 2010).However, Afar settlements are composed of a mixture of clans although each locality is identified with a major clan and affines (Kelemework, 2011).

The Afar have a patrilineal system of ancestry that determines who belongs to which clan (Kedo). Afar villages are made up of a variety of clans, although each locale is recognized by a dominant clan and its affines. Members of the clan are supposed to pool their resources and aid one another in times of need (Ali, 2008). Similarly, Yasin (2010) mentioned that the foundation of social structures among the pastoral nomads of Afar is kinship. Getachew (2001) noted that the Afar make an effort to preserve unity by cultivating strong clan identities. There are a number of clans in northern Afar, but Seka, Damohita, Dahimella, and Hadarmo are the most prevalent. There are various lineages and sub-clans within each clan. According to Ali (2008), Clans are represented by clan heads, who are granted leadership positions based on their

maturity, decisiveness, and general reputation in the community. Sometimes people who hold positions of authority come by inheritance.

Based on accepted norms, each tribe controls its resources jointly. Herd management thus adheres to rotational grazing patterns. Clan members are forbidden from using designated pasture areas when rainfall is typical for the succeeding seasons. Only after all other places have been fully utilized are these regions made available to the members. Although each clan member has an unalienable use right over the resources, these rights are governed by intra-clan customary laws or operational rules (Bekele, 2008).

According to Yasin (2010), every decision and matter involving resources shared by multiple Afar groups must take into account the kinship links of tribe, clan, sub-clan, lineage, and family. The largest recognized kinship group is the tribe. Within the Afar, there are more than 150 different tribes, and each one view its leader as having the same status as other clan heads, regardless of the size of the tribe. The greatest political and social unit in terms of collaboration and sense of belonging is the clans (Kedo) that make up a tribe. Clan members can identify a common progenitor.

The dahla or sub-clan is a smaller social unit than the clan, which is the lowest and de facto administrative level in traditional Afar society. Getachew (2001), stated that each clan is made up of "a group of people linked to each other by descent, living on a common region, and sharing common rites and political leadership," according to each clan has a well-established gerontocracy, in which the clan council, which consists of the clan chief, elders, the feima, and local wise men, has the authority to make decisions on land and other natural resources.

When a clan leader passes away, his sons will be given consideration for the job, but if they don't have the appropriate leadership skills, an election may be held. Clan leaders are charged with the duty of policing clan members' behaviour. They should also encourage clan members to work together on domestic projects and raise funds to cover any financial losses incurred as a result of any bodily or psychological harm given to others during violent conflict. They provide the social, economic, and political safety of each clan member (Ali, 2008).

There are two categories of resource consumers permitted by the Afar's traditional institutions. Clan members who occupy the rangeland on a long-term basis fall under the first group. They are principal right-holders (waamo), with the power to exclude others from using the resources on the rangeland and to pass those rights on to their heirs. The second category of resource users consists of communities of nearby pastoralists, especially during drought years, whose needs for pastoral resources exceed their own resources. These organizations enjoy second-class rights. They can be referred to as "right-holders" since they frequently have access to resources belonging to the clan that are acknowledged and accepted by other clan members and traditional authorities. Secondary right holders must, however, comply with specific requirements in order to use the resources (Bekele, 2008).

Marriage and the division of property rights are also governed by kinship (Ayele, 1986). The Afar engaged in endogamous unions. Polygamy is often utilized due to sororal marriage and religion (such as Islam) (Fekadu et al., 1984). Cross-cousin (Absuma) marriage, intermarriage with unrelated clans, levirate partnerships, and intermarriage with non-Afars are some of the different marriage types (Yayneshet and Kelemework, 2004).Prescriptive patrilateral cross-cousin marriage is the optimal type. Men are allowed to wed their father's sister's daughters (Getachew, 2001a; Yayneshet and Kelemework, 2004). Most families are created through inter-cousin unions. As partners, it is desired that the closest cousins. Girls in this group (Absuma) are seen as a man's future spouses and are seen as his reserves to the point that any guy who touches them will face punishment under customary law. A man has unrestricted access to the daughter of his father's sister (Getachew, 2001a). Fekadu et al. (1984:24) stated that "the two most important things that a person should defend are Absuma and land" in this regard.

The Afar's traditional Absuma marriage laws are also upheld by a person's family history. Such a marriage is preferred, and the Afar normally abide by the prescribed laws. An individual has no freedom to choose a mate of his or her own liking because the principles oblige one to wed a real cousin. If a man only possesses one Absuma, even if she is disabled, unattractive, or has poor manners, he will be compelled to marry her, and vice versa (Getachew, 2001a). Many justifications have been offered in empirical studies for the Afar people's practice of cross-cousin marriage. It is asserted that this kind of endogamous union has the capacity to strengthen the

social structure of the lineage. Cross-cousin marriage gives two intermarrying families and lineages access to production resources and mutual assistance (Ayele, 1986).

Cross-cousin marriages are stronger than marriages between unrelated people since no substantial harm is done to one's own blood and flesh during times of conjugal dispute, according to certain authors (Yayneshet and Kelemework, 2004). Marriage between unrelated people is stable, divorce is less likely, and disagreements can be resolved through dialogue (Getachew, 2001a). Inter-clan marriage, according to Getachew, strengthens ties and fosters relationships between clan members, gives them access to resources and distribution from other clans, fosters defence cooperation, and makes it possible to settle disputes without resorting to violence (Ibid).

2.2.2. Political History of Afar: The Emergence of the Afar Sultanate

Before the conquest of their homeland by the central government, the Afars were loosely grouped in to several sultanates occupying territories encompassing the Red Sea in the east, the foothills of the eastern escarpments in the west, Dire Dawa region in the south and Massawa in the north (Markakis, 2003). EachSultanate is divided into several clans, sub-clans and lineages (Affa). The clan system constitutes almost everything in Afar social and political reality (Mu'uz, 2015).

The Horn of Africa where the Afar people have lived for many centuries has been an area where a number of big and small Sultanates evolved and declined (Getachew, 2001a). Sultanate is a traditional leadership system which persists to this day as the main organizing force (Aynalem, 2014). There are about five sultanates in the Afar land of North-East Africa which occupied the different territories of the area. The Tajurah sultanate (the Berhanto Derder sultan) centered in Djibouti; Rahayto sultanate (the Danki Derder sultan) along the border of Ethiopia and Djibouti; Awsa sultanate (the fiefdom of sultan Ali Mrah) centered at Assaita; Grifo sultanate centred at Bilu along the border of Ethiopia and Eritrea; and Gobaad sultanate in zone three (Gewane) of the Afar Region (Ali, 2008; Aynalem 2014).

The largest of the four sultanates within the Afar Triangle was the sultanate of Awsa (sultanate of Afar) which emerged in the Awash River Delta (Nicol and Otulana, 2014). It was also the most important sultanate by the virtue of its considerable wealth and strategic location and it was

stronger than any other previous Sultanates (Ali, 2008). The emergence of the Sultanate of Awsa was part of the historical evolvement of Muslim Sultanates in Ethiopia. The center of the hegemony of the sultanates had shifted to different places across historical periods. The first Sultanate to take the hegemonic power was the Sultanate of Shewa which adopted Islam as state religion in 897A.D (Kassaye, 2009; Nicol and Otulana, 2014).The leadership of this dynasty had strong relations with the Makhzumite dynasty of Meccan origin. The hegemony of the Sultanate of Shewa lasted up to 1285A.D. The Sultanate of Shewa collapsed due to internal power struggle and the restoration of Solomonic Dynasty of Abyssinians. Following the collapse of the Sultanate of Shewa, a new powerful sultanate emerged in Ifat, north east of Shewa. It established a dynasty known as the Walasma dynasty named after the name of the founder Umar Walasma. It dominated the trade routes towards Zeila and successive leaders of Ifat made repeated wars against the Christian Kingdom until it lost its dominance in 1332A.D. The Sultanate of Ifat was subjected to successive assaults by Christian Abyssinia under the leadership of the newly restored Solomonic Dynasty. Due to this reason, a branch of the Walasma Dynasty moved to the southeast lowlands and established a new sultanate known as the sultanate of Adal of which the Sultanate of Harar was a part. Its center was at Dakar east of Harar and later moved to Harar (Wehib, 2015).

During the 16th century Christian-Muslim conflict, Afar made-up substantial component of the Imam Ahmed's armies. The eventual defeat of the forces of Adal by the highland Christian army was followed by persistent Oromo attack and raids as well as internal strife (Harbeson, 1978; Yasin, 2008). Thus, the sultanate of Adal was further weakened and was even nearly to be destroyed. Harar ruling families transferred the seat of this sultanate from Harar to the fertile valley of Awsa and established the new sultanate of Awsa (Harbeson, 1978; Marcus, 1994; Piguet, 2002; Abdulmalik, 2017). The sultanate of Awsa flourished during the 18th century when the highland Ethiopian empire was nearly wrecked by the Oromo migration and its later disintegration into princely civil wars that hampered the effective control of the central government (Harbeson, 1978). For many years, the Sultan of Awsa managed to retain a greater degree of independence and it remained to be the wealthiest of all the other sultanates in the region (Dahilon, 1985). However, the traditional livelihood systems of the Afar gradually declined with the disturbance of their traditional mobility patterns (FAO, 2019).

Since the 17th century the Afar people abandoned several areas due to the constant westward expansion of the Issa-Somalis. The Afar have been driven out of many places and pushed to remote areas even after the era of colonization and the creation of modern states with international boundaries that divided Afar and forced them to live in different neighboring states (Piguet, 2002).

The Afar had resisted the extensive intrusion of highlanders particularly the Amharas and Tigreans into their lands. The Afar traditional authorities (Amoytas) were relatively semi-independent leaders and representatives of people who successively resisted several attempts of the neighboring highlanders to intervene in the Afar affairs. This semi-autonomous status of the Afar sultanate could be deduced from its relation with the Ethiopian Emperors. The establishment of modern centralized state started during the region of Emperor Tewodros (1855-1868) who ended up the era of princes which was characterized by crises, conflict and continuous war (Ghelawdewos, 2006;Bahru, 1991). During the reign of Tewodros, Kassa Mircha of Tigray rebelled and lived in exile in the northern Afar land where he was assured protection from any threat from the highlanders by the then leader, Yakumi Sere' Ali (Yasin, 2008). Until the reign of Emperor Menelik II, the Awsa sultanate was relatively free from raids of the highlanders and the domination of the Abyssinian power (Trimingham, 1976).

However, the semi-independent status of the Sultanate of Afar did not signify that the Afar territory was totally cut-off from the politics of the Ethiopian Emperors. For instance, the salt bar (Amole) produced in the Afar region was widely used as a medium of exchange up to the mid of the twentieth Century (Dereje, 2011). Although, salt was produced in various places in Ethiopia, it was the Afar Amole which historically widely circulated more than any other salt items in Ethiopia. According to Tsegay, the tax record of Emperor Tewodros proved that the Amole had served as an important medium of exchange among northern Ethiopians. He also asserted that "*Governments and chiefs used to collect tributes and taxation in the form of salt and dispense this salt as salaries for services*" (Tsegay, 2009, p.186). Records also showed that Amole was used for payments at customs posts (Ibid).

The territoral expansion also continued during the reign of Emperor Yohannes IV (1872-1889). During his reign, the Egyptian invasion challenged the independence of Ethiopia (Bahru, 1991). In 1875 the Egyptian army attempted to invade Ethiopia from three directions: in the north through Massawa, in the east through the direction of Tajura and in the southeast through Zeila (Marcus, 1994). The then Sultan of Awsa, Mohammed Hanfare (‘Illelta) fought the forces of Egyptians that wanted to use the Afar land as a gateway to the highlands of Ethiopia. The Sultan inflicted a heavy damage on the Egyptian army at a place called ‘Odumi or Lake Gemeri (Yasin, 2008). The Afar destroyed the Egyptian army that came through Tajura on the coast to the direction of Shewa where the commander, Munzinger himself was killed (Bahru, 1991; Marcus, 1994). In fact, Afar have been resisting any kind of invasion of their land for a long time. Their resistance can be traced back to the era of the Ottoman Turks (Yasin, 2008). The success of the Afar people in defeating the Egyptian invading force in 1875 has contributed for the nation building efforts of Emperor Yohannes.

2.2.3. The Incorporation of the Afar Region into the Ethiopian State

Emperor Menelik (1889-1913) who ascend to the throne following the death of Yohannes pursued the twin imperial policies of modernization and centralization. Before Emperor Menelik completed the territorial expansion and the process of modern state formation, Awsa was left autonomous and was required to pay a fixed annual tribute to the center (Paulos, 1994). In fact, the Shewan kings were in good terms with the Sultanate of Awsa in order to ensure the safety of their caravans to the coast (Trimingham, 1976).

During Menelik’s contestations with the European powers that controlled areas adjacent to Ethiopia, the Awsa sultanate, being part of a wider Islamic polity was not only a competing political entity but also contradicting with the Christian Highland Kingdom (Nicol and Otulana, 2014). When the socio-economic conditions changed for better after the crises caused by the Great Ethiopian Famine (1888-1892) also known as the Kifu Qen, Emperor Menelik II started to give attention to the political incorporation, particularly to northeastern Ethiopia (Ahmed, 2002). Menelik’s contact with the Italians after the Italian Shipping Company, Rubattino purchased the port of Assab from the local sultan in 1869 and its subsequent seizure by the Italian government in 1882 (Bahru, 1991) must have made him aware of the strategic importance of the Afar region

before he became the king of Ethiopia. The port of Assab was an important link between Shewa and the Italians (Marcus, 1994).

The Afar region was one of the areas incorporated into the Ethiopian empire just before the battle of Adwa. The secret alliance between the Sultan of Awsa, Mohammed Hanfare (1860-1902) and the Italians drew the attention of the emperor towards the area and hence he sent military expeditions into Awsa led by his notable officials such as Azaz Welde Tsadiq Giorgis and Ras Tessema Nadew (Ahmed, 2002). Thus, in 1895 the Afar territory was invaded by the Shewan army and forced to pay tribute (Trimingham, 1976; Ali, 2008). Therefore, the Afar region was incorporated into the Ethiopian empire at the end of the 19th century during Emperor Menelik's expansion (Getachew, 2001). However, the policies followed by successive Ethiopian regimes focused on political control and extracting the resources of the region (Getachew, 2001; Tadesse and Yonas, 2007). It was in 1898 for the first time in the history of Awsa that the rulers of Shewa were invited to involve in the internal affairs of Awsa due to power struggle among the family of sultan Mohammed Hanfare (Yasin, 2008). However, the Afar had enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy during the reign of Emperor Menelik in terms of their culture and religion since the main interest of the center in the Afar land was mainly economic (Ali, 1998).

After the death of Emperor Menelik in 1913, the centralization drive continued under his grandson, Lij Iyassu (1913-1916) (International Crisis Group, 2009). However, he stayed in power only for few years. His internal policies which gave recognition to Ethiopian Muslims and his decisions which affected the honor of the Shewan aristocracy many of whom were replaced by his own appointees stood against him (Marcus, 1994). Moreover, his foreign policy:- rapprochement with Turkey that sided with Germany during the First World War as well as his anti-colonial stand and his support to Muhammad Abdulle Hassan who was fighting against the British in northern Somalia made the colonial powers to stand on the side of the Shewan aristocracy (Soule, 2012). Lij Iyassu was overthrown from power by a coup organized by the Shewan aristocracy in 1916 (Yasin, 2008). The only region that supported Lij Iyassu during his fight against the Shewan aristocracy was Awsa. After he was deposed from power, Lij Iyassu went to Afar where the then Sulatn of Awsa, Yayyo Mohammed received him with honor. To that end, forces were sent from the center to Awsa to punish the Sultan and to capture the fugitive king (Bahru, 2002; Soule, 2012). Despite of the conquests against Awsa by Emperor

Menelik's forces and later by the Shewan aristocracy, Awsa had maintained its semi-autonomous status (Marcus, 1994).

The concentration of power towards the center reached at its climax during the reign of Haile Selassie I (1930-1974). In this regard, one scholar asserted that "*the emperor had implemented perhaps the most ambitious centralization agenda than any of his predecessors*" (Ghebrehiwet, 2015, p.25). He restructured the country in to thirty-two administrative divisions and appointed regional governors from the center (Asmelash, 1987).

Emperor Haile Selassie issued the first written constitution of the country in1931 through which he formally stripped the traditional privileges of regional and local lords (Abera, 2000). Bahru (2002) explained that the emperor used this constitution as the legal framework for the subordination of the powerful traditional nobility to the emperor. However, the centralization process was interrupted in 1935 due to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the subsequent occupation which lasted until 1941(Keller, 2005). One of the historical events which brought a disastrous effect on the territorial control of the Afar pastoralists was the Italian occupation after the second Italo-Ethiopian war (1935-1941). During this war, the Issa-Somalis were in support of the Italians and this helped them to expand and occupy many areas in the Afar territory (Markakis, 2011; Asnake, 2013).

Following the restoration of the independence of Ethiopia in 1941, the emperor restructured the administrative division of the country through which he removed the traditional regional lords. Hence, positions at all levels of administration were filled by governors appointed from the center (Ghebrehiwet, 2015). It was after the withdrawal of the Italians that Emperor Haile Selassie I decided to control the lowland Afar. In 1944 the central government sent a force against the unfriendly sultan of Awsa, Mohammed Yayyo. Until this date, the central government was unable to penetrate to the territories of the Sultanate of Awsa (Ali, 2008; Markakis, 2011). Ali-Mirah was appointed as Sultan of Awsa to replace the defeated sultan. Ali (2008) posited that the central governments' attempt of directly controlling the Afar region through centrally appointed governor was challenged by Sultan Ali-Mirah himselfand his supporters. This forced the emperor to resort to indirect rule through local chiefs.

After what was known as the Boha revolt by Sultan Ali-Mirah, against Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1949, an agreement was reached between the two. The emperor knew the importance of the Sultan to influence the political conditions in that area. The Sultan also knew the power of the emperor in determining who should take power in the region when opportunity comes. Therefore, they needed to have smooth relations with each other (Kebede, 1994). Sultan Ali-Mirah was mostly in good terms with Emperor Haile Selassie I. Because of the strategic importance of the Afar Region under the Sultan's control and his influence on the politics of Awsa, Emperor Haile Selassie I bestowed Sultan Ali-Mirah the coveted honorary title of Bitwadded (Kassim, 1985). This promotion to the position of Bitwadded ushered the era of indirect rule over the Sultan's domain (Ali, 2008; Yasin, 2008).

For many years, the Sultan of Awsa managed to retain a greater degree of independence and it remained to be the wealthiest of all the other sultanates in the region (Dahilon, 1985). However, after the central government made its presence into the Afar territory, the traditional autonomous status of the region deteriorated from time to time. For instance, according to (Tadesse and Yonas, 2007; Markakis, 2011), during the reign of Emperor Haileselassie I, the Afar region in Ethiopia was partitioned +in to five different provinces, namely, Eritrea, Harar, Shoa, Tigray and Wollo. They also asserted that the Afar people who constituted a smaller minority within the provinces mentioned above were deprived of any political participation.

This division of the Afar people was a historical event that challenged the political and economic independence of the Afar. Consequently, the Afar tribal chieftains held consecutive conferences to discuss on the fate of their region. In 1961, the Ti'o Conference was held where representatives made consensus regarding the urgent quest for the formation of an Afar autonomous governorate-general. This was followed by the 1963 Assab Conference where it was decided to present a petition to the emperor. Although the elders, tribal chiefs and religious leaders came to Addis Ababa in 1964 to appeal for the restoration of the Afar unity, they returned without achieving their mission (Yasin, 2008).

The isolation and virtual autonomy of the Afar region came to an end with the introduction of commercial agriculture in the Awash Valley. The area was chosen because it offered optimum condition for enterprise which made the valley the site of the first ever development scheme in Ethiopia (Markakis, 2011). Therefore, change in the government policies in the 1960s which

emphasized on import and export substitute products had reshaped the relationship between the central government and the Afar region (Kloos, 1982).

The Imperial government had no proper pastoral policy and absence of legal instruments which could give recognition to the traditional land ownership rights of the Afar had denied them access to pasture and water resources. Art. 130 (d) of the 1955 Revised Constitution of Emperor Haile Selassie I has transferred the pastoralists' grazing land into government property which put the Afars' claim to their traditional right over pasture lands in danger:

> *All property not held and possessed in the name of any person, natural or juridical, including all land in escheat, and all abandonedproperties, whether real or personal, as well as all products of the sub-soil, all forests and all grazing lands, water-courses, lakes and territorial waters, is State Domain.*

The above constitutional provision depicts that the unsettled land was conceived as no-man's land. It was with this conception that most of the state farms and national parks were established in the pastoral lands of Ethiopia. The forceful evacuation of pastoralists from their ancestral lands and the use of their lands by the imperial government for investment had a devastating impact on the pastoral livelihoods (Solomon, 2006). Since the Awash Valley is good for both pasture and irrigation farming, it has always become a point of contention between the central government and the Afar pastoralists (Yasin, 2004).

The intrusion of commercial agriculture was an unmitigated disaster for Afar Pastoralism. Serious damage to livestock production was caused by the loss of vast areas of fertile grazing land of the eastern side of the Awash River. Displaced herders moved into the territories of kindred clans, others were pushed southwards closer to Issa and the rest struggled to survive in much reduced circumstances. Since there was no compensation for the loss, it caused overload in the remaining grazing areas, with overstocking and over grazing which ultimately resulted in the devastation of the Afar pastoral livelihood (Markakis, 2011**).**

The state centered development projects had adversely affected the lives of the Afar people. The resource bases of the Afar shrank because such projects converted the vast grazing areas of the Afar region in to commercial farming, Game Park, and urban settlement. The rhetoric government policy and development interventions in the region were intended to reduce the pressure on arid areas and to bring food security as well as to create employment opportunities (Getachew, 2001). However, government interventions were unable to fulfill the intended

purpose since state sponsored projects led to the reduction of crucial dry-season pastures and displacement of several Afar instead of improving the conditions of their life (Ibid). The agricultural investment which made the Afarland to be exploited for free failed to bring socio-economic benefits for the Afar (Yasin, 2004). Instead, the expansion of farming, the imposition of alien land tenure system and the increasing individualization of clan lands have cumulatively led to the marginalization and impoverishment of the majority of pastoral households (Getachew, 2001).

Since the Imperial government had a strong desire to expand commercial agriculture in the Awash Valley, it established the Awash Valley Authority in 1962 in order to plan the agricultural development on the fertile river basin (Kassim, 1985). Thus, contestation between the central government and the Afar increased after the institutionalization of this Authority over their land (Nicol and Otulana, 2014).

Yasin underscored the impact of commercialization of the Afar land as follows:

> *The pastoralists along the Awash Valley became victims of 'development' schemes which alienated them from their ancestral land, limited their mobility, decreasing of grazing land areas, spreading of livestock diseases as the result of agro-chemicals used in irrigation schemes, cutting of long aged plants species that have prevailing value for pastoral livelihood and degradation of lands led to a man-made famine* (Yasin, 2010, p. 240).

The introduction of large-scale commercial farming into Awsa also shifted the Sultan's economic base and changed the class structure and relations in the region. Sultan Ali-Mirah and small number of clan chiefs were benefitted from the new commercial farming. The new economic wealth and his traditional authority made Sultan Ali-Mirah stronger than his predecessors (Yasin, 2004). Therefore, it was only the politically, geographically and economically better positioned groups who benefitted from the commercialization activities than the poor Afar (Nicol and Otulana, 2014).

Kassim (1985) contend that the central government showed little interest to the welfare of the local communities. Similarly, Bryden (1996, P.2) asserted that *"development schemes in the Afar region have historically reflected the priorities of central government or select commercial and political interests, while the needs and aspirations of the Afar people have been chiefly disregarded."*As a result, the Afar perceived governmental interventions into their grazing lands as unjust since it causes further marginalization of pastoral livelihoods instead of supporting

them (Rettberg, 2010). The Afars were not passive onlookers of the state appropriation of their grazing land which endangered their tenure security. Rather they had resisted the state intrusion into their grazing land by bargaining with farm managers and when refused they frequently led their cattle on to the valuable cotton fields (Nicol and Otulana, 2014).

Sultan Ali-Mirah was a revered figure and one of the leading players in the national and regional politics for several decades (1944-2011). He had resisted the expansion of large-scale commercial agriculture which alienated the Afar pastoralists from their grazing land. For instance, as a means of restricting the further expansion of the Tendaho Plantation, he competed against the project by directly involving in agriculture. Thus, he engaged in farming lands around the existing boundaries of the plantation. Moreover, he encouraged his relatives to follow his step and he also encouraged Afar herdsmen to unleash their cattle onto the farm. The Sultan had struggled against the Imperial Regime and the Derg to maintain the semi-autonomous status of his region. Because of the strategic importance of the Afar Region under the Sultan's control and his influence on the politics of Awsa, Emperor Haile Salessie's approach to the Sultan was cautious (Kassim, 1985).

The system of the Imperial government was severe not only to the Afar. The mass of the Ethiopian people also suffered from the exploitative economic relations of the feudal system. The dissatisfaction of the masses increased from year to year. The three categories of resistance in the decade before the Ethiopian Great Revolution were the radical student movement, the Eritrean insurgency for separation and peasant uprisings to avoid the severe feudal exploitation. The aborted coup d'état of the 1960 was a historical event that inspired the generation and catalyzed the Ethiopian Revolution (Gebru, 2009; Bahru, 2014). After the coup d'état dissent became endemic at the university. Thus, since the beginning of the 1960s, the imperial government faced strong opposition from the Ethiopian student movement who rallied behind 'land to the tiller,' and 'the nationalities question' (Bahru, 2014).

The Afar people were also parts of the struggle against the Imperial Regime. Towards the mid - 1960s Afar students who came to Addis Ababa from various places for university education organized themselves into Afar Students Association (ASA). This was an important step forward in nurturing a sense of belongingness among Afar students and in raising the morale in support of their national identity. In 1972 few members of the ASA who went to Cairo for further

education formed what was known as the "Afar Koborih Angoyya (AKA) meaning the Afar Mobilization Movement or the Movement for the Rallying of the Afar" (Yasin, 2008, P.46). Moreover, members of the AKA who went to Europe joined the Ethiopian Students Union in Europe and participatedactively in the revolutionary struggle (Ibid).

The centralized and exploitativesystem of the Imperial Regime which created widespread popular discontent eventually led to the outbreak of the Great Ethiopian Revolution in 1974, which resulted in the deposition of Emperor Haile Selassie I (Clapham, 1988; Bahru, 2014). Despite of the popular uprising that brought the end of the monarchial system, it was the military (Derg) that assumed power in 1974 and it restructured the political and economic systems in line with socialist ideology (Ghebrehiwet, 2015). Thus, the military that formed a Council known as the Derg (1974-1991) assumed power in 1974 by usurping power from the true revolutionaries (Andargachew, 1990). However, the military government was unable to address ethnic and national questions. The quest for democratic governance and opposition against military rule caused gross Human Rights violation and mass summary execution (Amnesty International, 1978).

A month before the fall of Haile Selassie I, in mid-1974 the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) was established by a meeting held in Berlin. The front was headed by Hanfare Ali-Mirah and his brother Ahmed Ali-Mirah was chosen to lead the ALF's military wing (Markakis, 2011). Following the military seizure of power, the Derg representatives approached traditional leaders among the Afars. Afar delegates visitied the capital, Addis Ababa. They were informed about the land policies of the new revolutionary government which aimed at ending feudal rule and ensuring public land ownership (Yasin, 2008). The "Public Ownership of Rural Lands Proclamation No. 31/1975 issued by the Derg seems to guarantee the land ownership rights of the pastoralist communities because Article 24 of the proclamation stated that:

> *As of the effective date of this proclamation, nomadic people shall have possessory rights over the lands they customarily use for grazing or other purpose related to agriculture.*

However, in practice the interest of the Derg in Afar region particularly along the Awash valley was not different from its predecessor. On 31 May 1975, the new land reform of the Derg and its philosophy of "*Ethiopia First*" were addressed by the Derg members in the presence of Sultan

Ali-Mirah (Yasin, 2008). The introduction of Derg's land reform in 1975 and the subsequent nationalization of communal lands further excluded the Afar from their economic base and it also directly affected the economic and commercial interests of Sultan, Ali-Mirah. Thus, the land reform that nationalized all land in Ethiopia did not bring back communal land to the pastoralists, instead the nationalized cotton plantations became state farms and even new land was brought under cotton and sugar cultivation. The government launched a settlement program to compensate the dispossessed pastoralists (Markakis, 2011).

Even though, the resettlement programmes designed during the Derg regime were believed to transform Afar pastoralists to agriculturalists, it failed to transform pastoral livelihood (Yasin, 2010). The decree which nationalized all rural lands affected the economic and commercial interests of the Sultan (Sansculotte-Greenidge and Demessie, 2012). Moreover, the farms of Ali-Mirah's family and that of the Afar chiefs were partitioned among their clansmen in plots (Markakis, 2011). In fact, during the Derg rule, the Sultanate of Awsa was officially abolished (Ali, 2008), which actually weakened the political strength of the Afar (Helland, 2006).

The Afar struggled against the military regime to liberate them because the system failed to guarantee their landownership right (Ali, 1998). The socio-economic and political marginalization of the Afar helped the Afar elites to mobilize the Afar on ethnic line against the military government. The alliance created among leaders of the ALF and AKA members fall apart when the younger Afar generation (participants in the AKA) with their radical notions denounced the pastoral aristocrats and landed tribal chiefs which were the traditional establishment led by Ali-Mirah (Markakis, 2011). In June 1975, Sultan Ali-Mirah flew to Saudi Arabia and this event marked the end of the relationship between the military government and the Afar (Yasin, 2008). In the following weeks, a group of armed Afars interrupted the Addis Ababa-Assab highway which caused a serious fuel shortage throughout the country (Markakis, 2011). Immediately, armed dispute erupted between the Afar and the Derg forces and the Derg soon reacted harshly by sending troops to forcefully quell the movement of the Afar (Yasin, 2008).

The Derg made use of the Awsa dynastic feud between Habib Mohammed Yayo and Sultan Ali-Mirah as the former offered his service to the Derg for which he was appointed head of local militia to fight against the ALF/AKA rebels (Markakis, 2011).To that end, in 1976 the military force of the Derg led by Habib Mohammed Yayo fought against the Afar fighters (Yasin, 2008). The Derg negotiated with leaders of the AKA group and convinced them that it would give answer to the question of nationalities (Yasin, 2008). In doing so, the Derg succeeded in detaching members of the AKA from ALF and they formed ethnically based political organization known as Afar National Liberation Movement (ANLM) which was the only ethnic organization tolerated by the military regime (Markakis, 2011).

The leadership of the ANLM considered the NDRP (National Democratic Revolution Programme) as an important step towards addressing the nationality question in Ethiopia. It terminated armed struggle and joined the revolution (Yasin, 2008). The Movement held its conference in Munich in August 1976 and expressed its support to the programme as:

> *Now that the program of the Ethiopian National Democratic Revolution has recognized the inalienable right of all Ethiopians, the Afar people have resolutely joined the mainstream of the struggle of the oppressed masses and are determined to make all the sacrifices necessary in order to make the on-going revolution [a] total success (ANLM Guideline Aug. 1976).*

The ANLM became the only ethnic-based political organization that joined the revolution (Yasin, 2008). Because of the important role they played in Ethio-Somalia relations, as they fought on the Ethiopian side, the Derg gave attention to the Afar (Kassim, 1980). In April 1977, the Derg called an Afar congress at the town of Gewane which was attended by Afar elders from all the five provinces where Afar lived. The Afar had an interest to gather the fragmented nation in to one autonomous administrative region in Ethiopia (Kassim, 1980; Markakiss, 2011). Lieutenant Negussie Negassa, the chairman of the Derg's Political Affairs Committee who initiated the meeting was killed on his way back to Addis Ababa and this incidence made the hopes of the meeting remained unfulfilled for the time being (Markakis, 2011).

In 1988 a plan was designed to rearrange the administrative map of Ethiopia and the Afar asked an arrangement in which all the Afar could be included in one administrative region but their question was rejected. The reason given was that a territory which will include all the Afar would be too large to administer and impossible to develop (Ibid). However, the short-lived Afar

self-administration under the Assab autonomous region was established in 1988 which consisted of around 60% of the Afar land (Markakis, 1989). The Derg further disappointed the Afar by failing to stop further expansion of the Issa Somali who continued to push into the Afar territory (Markakis, 2011). Following the fall of the Derg regime in May 1991, the Assab autonomous administration of the Afar was dissolved (Yasin, 2008). In general, Afar nationalist sentiment grew as a response to the lack of fair treatment and neglect by governments that incorporated the Afar region into the central administration (Tadesse and Yonas, 2007) The military government was overthrown from power in 1991 and ethnic federal political system was introduced which reconstituted the country on ethnic lines. The situation of the Afar in the new Ethiopia's ethnic federal system is discussed in a detailed in the subsequent chapters.

Part II: Afar under Federal Ethiopia: Achievements

Chapter Three

The Federal Restructuring of the Ethiopian State

3. Introduction

The federal restructuring of the Ethiopian state has created ethno-territorial units for the nations and nationalities and at least a constitutional promise to administer them and to decide their own Affairs. This chapter discusses how Afar Regional State wascreated and its major achievements under the Ethiopan federal political system. Thus, the chapter is organized into two main sections. The first section tries to shade light on the post 1991 ethno-federal political settlement and the creation of Afar Regional State(the decision how the people of Afar under one subnational unit was made).Section two examines what Afar have achieved under the Ethiopian federal political system. Accordingly, the sub-topics under these sections describe the political gains/achievements and the socio-economic achievements like education, health, water, transport services, agro-pastoral economic development, development of human capital and the use of Afar language.

3.1. Ethno-federal Political Arrangement and the Creation of the Afar Regional State

The institutionalization of ethnicity and the restructuring of the Ethiopian state along ethnic lines was described in the introduction and problem statement sections of chapter one as well as in the literature review of chapter two. The decision of changing the state structure from unitary to federal as well as the creation of ethno-territorial constituent units came to happen following the overthrow of the military government that ruled the country for seventeen years. In principle Ethopia adopted ethnic federalism as a means of avoiding past injustices and bringing stability in the country when EPRDF came to power in 1991.

There were different politically moblized ethn-nationalist movements in the country such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) which aimed at the creation of an independent state for the Oromo (Asnake, 2009), the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) engaged in insurgent activites in Somali region today struggled for the secession of the Ogaden area(Kigen, 2002), the Tigray Peoples LibrationFront (TPLF) struggled for the creation of independent state of

Tigray (Young, 1994) and the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) struggled to maintain the semi-autonomous status of Afar (Yasin, 2008).

There was cooperation between ALF and TPLF during the armed struggle of the later aggainst the military regime. Research participants mentioned that the Afar young fought against the military regime in cooperation with TPLF and Megale (a place in northern Afar) had served as center of TPLF's training and mobility starting from 1982. Megale has also served as center of training for Afar militia. The book prepared by the Coordination Office of the 12th Nation, Nationalities and Peoples Day substantiate the above idea. It mentioned that 74,200, 300 and 158 Afar youth were trained in 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1987 respectively. The Afar militia combined with Tigray militia in their adjacent locality fought against the military regime in places like Moheni, Cher-Cher and Bala (ANRS, 2018).

In late 1989 TPLF formed a coalition party, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front comprising of TPLF, the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM) (Lubo, 2013). These groups collaborated their forces and defeated the military regime in 1991 and TPLF controlled Ethiopia through its cover organization, EPRDF (Semahegn 2012).The front introduced new ethno-federal political settlement and Afar Afar Regional State was established of following the reconstitution of the political and administrative landscape of the country by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia.

The July 1991 Peace and Democracy Conference that led to the establishment of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and adopted a Transitional Charter that recognized the rights of 'nations and nationalities' to self-determination up to and including secession. Based on the charter, the country's internal administration was restructured and in 1992 14 regional administrations were formed along ethno-linguistic lines(TGE, 1992).The Afar people were represented by the ALF in the July 1991 Conference with three seats occupied by Sultan Ali-Mirah and two of his sons Hanfare and Ahmed Ali-Mirah. The Afar leaders were grateful to the EPRDF since the new arrangement united them for the first time in the regional state of their own with a measure of self-government (Markakis, 2011).

The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was ratified by the Constituent Assembly on 8th December 1994, but came into force in 21st August 1995. Ethiopia was restructured into nine (now eleven) constituent units and two-self-administrative cities (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa) with full recognition of the right to self-determination up to secession. The nine ethno-regional states are Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, the State of the Southern, Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, Gambella and Harari. It was through this process that Afar National Regional State was created constituting all areas in Ethiopia inhabited by Afar ethnic groups.

The Afar already had a politically moblized identity before the adpotion of ethnic federalism in Ethiopioa. They were aspiring to unite all the territories inhabited by Afars including Afars in Eritrea and Djbouti. Therefore, the insitutionalization of ethnicity fit into their political program and this political settlementhas addressed the territorial quset of the Afar for the first time in history. The creation of Afar Regional State is not an imposed agenda because the Afar were already moblized as an Afar before identity based political arrangement was made in the country.

In 1991, Habib Ali-Mirah was elected as regional president and later the ALF won the 1992 regional election. However, the relation between ALF and EPRDF deteriorated soon. The federal intervention in the regional affairs was the main cause that made the alliance between to two short lived. The EPRDF cadres were successful in splitting the ALF between the sons of Ali-Mirah, ALF1 headed by Hanfare Ali-Mirah and ALF2 by Omar Ali-Mirah (Yasin, 2008).This split helped the TPLF cadres to bring their handmade political organization, the APDO into the political scene in the region and this party won the 1995 election. But Hanfare Ali-Mirah was elected as the president of the regional government who held the presidency only for few months (August 1995-March 1996). Soon in 1996 the APDO chairman Ismail Ali Siro who was the former TPLF militia succeeded Hanfare Ali-Mirah and held the position of the regional presidency (Ibid).

3.2. The Achievement of Afar Regional State under Federal Ethiopia

3.2.1. Political Gains/ Achievements

In all kinds of data gathering instruments (questionnaire, interviews and focus group discussions questions) participants were asked what the Afar National Regional State has achieved since the introduction of federal system in Ethiopia. Accordingly, most of bthe participants steadfastly described that the unity of the Afar people is the most important political achievement of Afar under federal Ethiopia. Most of them explained that the Afar people have benefited more than any other nations, nationalities and peoples in terms of achieving political unity within federal Ethiopia. This was because the Afar people were divided communities living in different provinces before the establishment of federal system in Ethiopia.

The regional state's document (ANRS, 2018) mentioned that the Afar people were partitioned in seven administrative units, Eritrea, Tigray, Harar, Shewa, and Wollo provinces as well as in Assab and Dire Dawa autonomous districts. As a result, the Afar people who constituted a smaller minority within the provinces mentioned above were deprived of any political participation.The Afar are now have their own regional state which implies that the establishment federal system in Ethiopia has enabled the Afar to achieve unity within the Ethiopian polities.

Most of the participants of the interview consistently expressed that the Afar are happy by the federal political arrangement. They asserted that identity recognition should precede other development initiatives for the region. Thus, they argued that the establishment of a separate regional state for the Afar people signaled the recognition given to Afar identity. Like the other nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia, the federal system has enabled the Afar to have their own separate regional state and to establish their own government structure from region to Kebele level and created the opportunity to administer themselves. The Afar had never administered themselves during the past regimes as one entity. Rather, they were forced to be administered by people delegated from central governments. As a testimony of this reality one exprt in the region's Capacity Build and Human Resource Bureau interviewed at Semera in March 2018 stated that there was Afar'ssaying "*Awash River and Governors of the Afar People came from above*". This analogy between the Awash River which flows downward and

governors sent from the central government to the region is an indication that the Afar people were denied of the right to administer themselvesbefore the introduction of federal system in Ethiopia.He further elaborated that the Afar region has never been administered by Afar officials. Administers from other ethnic groups were sent to Afar by the central government. This time, despite of federal intervention, the new ethno-federal political settlement created an opportunity for Afar sons and daughters to administer their own people.Their intereset is to deepen the federal political system to make it transformational in their regional state.

As enshrined in the federal constitution under Art. 50 (2), Regional States have the right to establish their own legislative, executive and judicial organs of the state. Moreover, based on the provision of the federal constitution stated under Art (52), the federal political system has enabled the Afar to come to the leadership position to decide on matters affecting their own regional state. At least in principle, it provided the regional state the power to enact and execute the provisions stated in the regional state constitution which reflect the social reality on the ground, to formulate and execute economic, social and development policies, strategies and plans of the state and so on. This constitutionalpolitical empowerment of Afar has to be viewed with the institutionalization of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia which makes ethnic identity the basis of politics and constitutional recognition of previously non-dominant groups (Abbink, 2011).

Before the establishment of one political party which has been administering Afar regional state since 1999, the Afar had established five different political organizations that struggled against the oppressive rule of the military regime. These were the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) established in 1974 and the Afar People's Democratic Organization (APDO) established in 1992; Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union Front (ARDUF) founded in 1993 and Afar National Democratic Movement (ANDM) established in 1980; and Afar National Liberation Front (ANDF) established in 1983. Most of these parties believe in armed struggle to achieve the union of Afar people and to ensure the right to self-administration (ANRS, 2017).

Although ALF got the opportunity to administer Afar regional state during the transitional period, the relationship between TPLF (the leftist) and ALF (royalist) deteriorated in the coming years and in 1994 TPLF was successful in creating divisions between the sons of Ali Mirah and

facilitate conditions for the seizure of power by Afar Peoples Democratic Organization (APDO), regional party created in the image of TPLF (Yasin, 2008).

APDO won the 1995 election and continued to administer the regional state. Although APDO dominated the regional politics, the five parties mentioned above were activating in the region. Although these political organizations had differences, all of them had one common broad political agenda, which is the union of all the Afar people under one political administration. Thus, through long process of dialogues and discussions the various Afar political organizations united and established the Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), the ruling regional political party in November 1999 (ANRS, 2017). Following this historical event, "*One people, One Party for the Afar People*" became the guiding principle of the Afar people and their leaders. The Establishment of the ANDP has brought several positive outcomes such as serving as a guarantee for the existence of peace and trust among the Afar people, strengthening the implementation capacity of the regional state, enhancing the national participation of the Afar people and strengthening the unity of the Afar people with neighboring peoples. Therefore, the establishment of one political party, Afar National Democratic Partyis the other important political achievement of the Afar which brought all the Afar people under one umbrella (ANRS, 2017).

Although participants of the interview and the document prepared by the regional state presented the establishment of a single political party in the region as positive, some educated elites particularly lecturers at Semera University and Afaractivists interviwed in April 2018 at Smera argued that the existence of one political party in the regional state has narrowed the political space. They contend thatthe system did not allow Afars to establish another political party in the region. They further elaborated that absence of other competing parties in the region has created the opportunity for the ANDP to control everything in the region. They concluded that such experience is against the principle of multi-party system which adversely affects the democratization process in the region.

An interviwe expert membersof the HPR Legaland Justice Affairs Standing Commitee interviewed in January 2018, Addis Ababa, contended that the federal system guaranteed the Afar people not only the right to self-administration, but it also ensured their representation in the federal houses, House of Federation (the second house) and House of Peoples

Representatives (the lower house) disregard of the existence of serious gaps between the constitutional theory and political practices. Such constitutional arrangement was important to exercise the principles of shared rule which could create favorable condition in which the Afar could influence the national policy making process at least in principle. However, as it will be discussed in chapter four in detail, the Afar were not able to exercise their constitutionally guaranteed rights. He further argued that both Houses have constitutionally entrenched powers and functions. The FDRE constitution made clear that the Second House of the Ethiopian Parliament has the power to interpret the constitution… and decide on issues relating to the rights of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples. And the Lower House has the power to legislate national laws… to call and to question the prime minister and other federal officials… Although both houses lacked strength at the hand of the strong executive organ of the state to properly practice the powers given to them by the constitution, the Afar people have two and eight representatives in the Second House and Lower House respectively.

The above political gains are not, however, without limitations. For instance, according to participants of the interview and focus group discussants the above representation of Afar in the federal houses didn't necessarily signify the role of Afar in decision making on national matters. In this regard, a university lecturer who participated in the FGD conducted at Semera University explained that there has been wide gap between the constitutional theory and political practice. According to him, most of the laws enacted by the federal legislative organ have been initiated by the Council of Ministers, EPRDF. On the other hand, the ruling party administering the Afar Regional State, ANDP is not a member of EPRDF. This implies that the participation of the leaders of the Afar Regional State in decision making on national matters is insignificant. Instead, their role is implementing what has been decided by member parties of EPRDF (FGD. 16 Feburary 2018, Semera University).This sentiment has been voiced by a senior expert in the regional Security and Administration Bureauas:

> *There is a serious gap between the rhetoric political empowerment of Afar and the practice on the ground. What matters is not holding key positions in the regional state government. Rather to what extent the regional state officials make decisions without the intervention of the federal government is that matters. Although the Afar gained recognition and separate regional state of their own, the federal system did not let the Afar free to decide on matters of their own. There is no pastoralist specific policy in the country which as a result, the Afar*

have been forced to implement policies and strategies which do not reflect regional reality (Interview. 12 March 2018, Semera).

Studies seem to support the above views of the interviewees and focus group discussants. According to Adegehe (2009) the federal executive routinely intervenes in the day-to-day activities of the regions due to the asymmetrical relationship prevailing between the federal government and peripheral regions in terms of policy making and finance. The central government maintained direct control over the regions through advisors deployed to the regions.

Another senior expert in the Zone one Administration Office interviewed in May 2018 at Assaita Town further strengthened the above position in which he asserted that until recent times key positions in the regional state were held by Afar politicians who participated during TPLF's armed struggle against the military regime. He further elaborated that such leaders have never been defending the interests of the Afar people. Rather, they accept everything coming from the federal government instead of using national platforms to make the voices of Afar to be heard.The following part presents the socio-economic achievements of the Afar people under federal Ethiopia and the existing limitations in the various services provided in the region.

3.2.2. Socio- economic Achievements of the Afar People in Federal Ethiopia

3.2.2.1. Education Service

The provision of education to all citizens has become a national, regional and international agenda linked to humanity. That is why the right to education is underscored in the national, regional and international documents like constitutions, regional and international human right treaties. Education is one of the crucial factors of development and countries cannot achieve sustainable economic development without significant investment in human capital.More than hundred years has passed since modern education started in Ethiopia. The establishment of a Central State Authority and a permanent urban seat of power have contributed for the introduction of modern education in Ethiopia towards the end of the nineteenth century.

Modern education officially started in Ethiopia in1908 with the opening of Menelik II School in Addis Ababa, which marked a significant step in the history of education in the country. However, the school system was not inclusive of all citizens because the school first opened its

door to children of the aristocracy, so as to set a good example for the general community (Seyoum, 2005).

The expansion of modern education in the country was slow until the opening of the second school in the country's history in 1925, Teferi Makonnen School. However, following the opening of this second school, other schools were opened in many towns of the country (Ibid). It was discussed in chapter two that the Afar region was incorporated into the Ethiopian state in the last quarter of the 19th century during Emperor Menelik's expansion. Despite of Afar's long history of integration into modern Ethiopia, the sons and daughters of Afar were denied of the right to have access to education. This was because the policies of past governments gave little concern to the interests of the Afar people since they focused on political control and extracting the resources of the region (Getachew, 2001).

In 1941 "Seble-Wongel School", today called 'Awash Primary School', the first of its kind, was established in the Afar region. However, the school was not accessible to the sons and daughters of the Afar community. Three other schools were opened in the 1950s and the first education office of the region called- 'Awssa Area Schools Office' was established in 1967 in Assaita town (Nuru, 2014). In a parallel with Nuru's assertation, the majority of the participants of the interview and focus group discussions argued that the Afar people were one of the marginalized groups whose children were denied of the right to have access to modern education.

Schools in the region were opened not to provide educational opportunity for the sons and daughters of the Afar community. Rather, they were primarily aimed at creating the right to have access to education to children of workers of state farms and traders who settled in towns established along the Addis Abada-Assab Road (HoF, 2017). Very few primary schools (1-4) were established in northern Afar region with the support of the Swedish government. However, these were ruined by the air bombardment of the Military regime before they started to provide services (Ibid).

According to a seniorexpert, in the regional Education Bureau, interviewed in Feburary 2018, at Semera, there were only 14 primary schools before the establishment of federal system in Ethiopia and the creation of Afar Regional State. He further explained that only 6 of these

schools were functional. These schools were established along the main road to children of commercial farm workers.

The report of the region's Education Bureau educational statistics annual abstract for the fiscal year (2015/2016) showed that the number of schools opened in the region has been increasing after the introduction of federal system in 1991(ANRS, 2017). It further elaborated that during the transitional government, there were only 30 primary schools in the region. These schools were established along the asphalt road where there are state farms and hence most parts of the region in Zone 2, Zone 4 and Zone 5 as well as the rural Woredas in Zone 1 and Zone 3 had no access to school.

One senior expert in the Regional Civil Service and Capacity Building Bureau interviewed in June 2018, at Semera, mentioned that before the introduction of federal system in the country, the number of Afars who got their diploma and degree were not exceeding five. He further elaborated that in the 2017/ 2018 academic year there are 1164 primary schools, 38 secondary and preparatory schools, 5 colleges and one university in the region. This shows the expansion of education service in the regional state following the establishment of federal system in Ethiopia.

In order to make discussions regarding enrollment rates clear, it seems to define some of the basic concepts like access, gross and net enrolment rate. Accordingly, access measures the proportion of children who have access to schooling with respect to the total population of official school admission age. Gross enrollment in primary school is calculated by dividing the number of students enrolled in primary education regardless of age by the populaion of the age group which officially corresponds to primary education multiplying by hundred. Net enrollment rate is the ratio of children of official school age who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official school age.

The annual educational statistical abstract of the Afar Education Bureau (AEB) published in December 2016 showed the progress in the education sector of the region from 2010 to 2017. It examined access to education, equity, quality and internal efficiency of schools in the region. Access to education refers to (Apparent Intake Rate, Net Enrolment Rate, Net Intake Rate, and Gross Enrolment Rate) of Pre-primary Education, Alternative Basic Education and Primary School as well as the enrolment rate of secondary education. Under equity, the Bureau studied

the Gender Parity Index of both primary and secondary education as well as the enrolment of children with special educational needs in primary education. To assess quality of education in the region, the Bureau looked at the quality indicators like pupil teacher ratio in primary, general secondary and preparatory education, percentage of qualified teachers in primary and secondary education, pupil-text book ratio in primary and secondary schools, and school facilities of primary and secondary schools. To investigate the internal efficiency of schools in the region, the Bureau used promotion, repetition and dropout rates as indicators of internal efficiency.

Access to education in the Afar region showed an increasing trend from 2010 to 2016 and slight decline in 2017 due to the severe drought affecting the region in that year. Despite of expanding access to primary-education in the region, the gross enrollment rate was below 10% and it didn't show growth in 2017. The number of Alternative Basic Education Centers and Enrollment rate has increased over the years mentioned above. The number of primary schools grew to 637 in 2017 from what it was 365 in 2010, which means 272 schools were built within these years, on average about 45 new schools were made functional in the region. Although the Net Enrollment Rate of primary education increased by 9.4 % within these years, the overall position of the region with regard to ensuring access to basic education to eligible children is still low as 34.2 % of children of age 7-10 have been out of school until 2017. Similarly, the enrollment rate of secondary and preparatory education showed increment but still it is low when compared to the corresponding population within the age range of these levels of education.

According to (AEB, 2017), equity in education sector was one of the issues given due consideration by the regional state. The data showed that the Gender Parity Index of primary and secondary education between the years 2010 and 2017 has changed from year to year which implies that the participation of girls in education has been changing as more girls joined schools.

The provision of quality education has been the concern of the federal and regional states. The quality indicators used in the annual educational abstract were pupil teacher ratio, pupil section ratio, qualification or training of teachers, availability of text books and school facilities. The MoE has developed minimum quality national standards for these educational inputs (quality indicators). The data showed that despite of fluctuations from year to year and variations

between schools found around Woreda centers and the major highways, pupil teacher ratio and pupil section ratio have an increasing trend in both primary and secondary education in the years that the annual educational statistical abstract took into consideration (2010-2017). Generally, the rate is higher nowadays as most rural schools are facing shortage of teachers. The data also depicted shortage of qualified teachers for primary school with only 55% of them fulfilling the required qualification. Qualified teachers for general secondary school (9-10) reached 98% in the 2015 academic year while there was shortage of qualified teachers for the preparatory school (11-12) with only 11.7% of teachers fulfilled the requirement. The pupil text book ratio of the years, 2016 and 2017 showed scarcity of books for primary and preparatory schools while secondary schools had sufficient books for all subjects except for physical education. The school facilities considered by the annual educational statistics of the regional education Bureau are availability of water, latrine, plasma TV, library, teaching laboratory and electricity. The data showed shortage of school facilities in both primary and secondary schools.

Data obtained from the Afar National Regional State Education Bureau archives showed that the education sector in the region has shown high progress since 1992. Currently there are 1423 primary schools, 37 secondary schools and in the 2017 academic year 195,000 students have attended their education which makes the general educational coverage of the regional state 65%. Regarding higher education service, there was no single institution in the region. This time there are 5 technical and vocational colleges, 1 teacher training college, 1 health training college, 1 agriculture college and 1 university which has been training and educating 7000 students in different departments. Several sons and daughters of pastoralists have joined and graduated from these higher institutions. Lack of educated manpower in the region has been resolved as graduates have been joining the work force.

According to the information obtained during the field visit, the majority of the participants in the interview and focus group discussion explained that there were no Afar who have diploma and degree before few years but now there are thousands who graduated in different fields of study like medical, engineering, agriculture and other professions.

The Table blow (Table 3.3) depicts the education and training road map prepared by the ad-hoc secretariat office of the education strategy center.

Table 3.3: Gross and Net Participation Rate of Primary Education in Ethiopia (2017)

Region	Gross Participation			Net Participation		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Tigray	120.2	113	116.7	110.9	108.4	109.7
Afar	69.2	62.4	66	51.6	48.4	50.1
Amhara	114.3	109.7	112.1	104.9	102.5	103.7
Oromia	113.3	98.9	106.2	102.9	91	97
Ethio-Somali	102	79.5	91.3	80.6	63.2	72.3
Benishangul G	127.9	107.4	117.8	101.4	90.5	96.1
SNNP	131	116.8	123.9	114.6	103.5	109.1
Gambella	156.5	143.5	150.3	118.3	108.8	113.8
Harari	119.4	101.5	110.7	104.1	90.8	97.6
Addis Ababa	127.1	150.2	138.8	100.9	110.5	105.8
Dire-Dawa	113.9	103.2	108.6	91.1	83.2	87.2
National	117	105.7	111.4	104.1	95.5	99.9

The data showed that the gross and net participation rate of primary education (1^{st}-8^{th} grade) of the Afar Regional State in the 2017 academic was the lowest of all regions. This implies that although there has been an improvement in school participation in Afar regional State, the existence of lower rate of enrollment is an indication of the low level socio-economuiic development in the regional state.

As shown in the table below, the draft document illustrated the gross participation rate of General Secondary education (9^{th} -10^{th} grades) of regions in the 2017 academic year.

Table 4.3: Gross Participation of regions in General Secondary education (2017)

	Regional States											
	Tigray	Afar	Amhara	Oromia	Ethio-Somali	SNNP	Benisha Gumuz	Gambella	Harari	Addis Ababa	Dire-Dawa	National
Male	71.4	18.3	50.3	41.3	17.3	58.8	61.2	114.8	57.9	107.7	55.4	48.9
Female	76.1	12.9	56.4	33.6	11.4	47.8	46.4	96.0	51.4	122.9	47.3	45.2
Total	73.7	15.9	53.3	37.5	14.7	53.4	53.9	105.9	54.7	115.6	51.3	47.1

The data showed that the participation of Afar Regional State in the Gross-Secondary Education in 2017 was lower than other regional states except Ethio-Somali region.

The document also indicated that the net participation rate of General Secondary education (9^{th} - 10^{th} grades) of the Afar Regional State in the 2017 academic was the lowest of all regional states.

Table 5.3: Net Participation of Regional States in General Secondary Education (2017)

	Regional States											
	Tigray	Afar	Amhara	Oromia	Ethio-Somali	SNNP	Benisha Gumuz	Gambella	Harari	Addi Ababa	Dire-Dawa	National
Male	38.61	7.91	25.16	21.02	8.34	30.86	23.29	36.73	31.36	60.23	26.03	24.93
Female	41.44	6.30	29.69	18.37	5.86	26.20	23.36	30.48	29.69	66.14	25.35	24.36
Total	40.01	7.20	27.40	19.70	7.25	28.54	23.33	33.76	30.52	63.38	25.69	24.65

The information gained from primary sources substantiates the above statistical data. According to participants of the interviews, the progress in the education sector has not been as intended

despite of the increment of the number of schools and students. For instance, Woreda expert with long experience in Amibara Woreda Education asserted that the use of Afar-af as medium of instruction and preparation of text books in Afar-af is a great achievement. However, serious lack of teachers who could teach in Afar-af is one of the factors adversely affecting the success of the sector. As a result, Afar young have been assigned as teacher for the very reason that they have attended a two month Afar-af language training. Even there are cases where Grade seven and eight youth assigned to teach up to grade four students (Interviewed 20 January, 2018, Andido).The same idea was reiterated by a senior expert in the Regional Education Bureau as:

> *The expansion as well as the provision of quality education in Afar Regional State has been challenged by different factors such as lack of qualified teachers, accessibility of water (only 20% of schools in the regional state have access to water) strong storm removing the roofs of schools and the prevalence of wrong perception among other sectors. Success in the education sector requires the cooperation among teachers, families and other sectors. Contrary to this, other Regional Bureaus and Woreda Offices left educational matters only to the education sector (Interviewon 21June, 2018, Semera) .*

The data obtained through the administration of questionnaire support the above idea. For instance, one of the responsibilities of the regional state is to ensure educational trainings and experience requirements for any job meet national standards. The problem of assigning qualified teachers presented and described above was further substantiated by quantitative data. Table 6.3 below shows respondents' idea regarding the problem of assigning teachers by levels of education.

Table 6.3 Assignment of Qualified Teachers by Level of Education

The Afar Regional State has been assigning qualified teachers according to national standards by level of education in Ethiopia			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	68	19.4
	Disagree	187	53.4
	Undecided	5	1.4
	Agree	65	18.6
	Strongly Agree	25	7.1
	Total	350	100.0

As we deduce from Table 6.3, above, the percentage of respondents who believe that teachers in Afar Regional State have not been assigned according to the national standard is greater 255(72.9%) than others who expressed the opposite 90(25. 7%). Only few of the respondents, 5(1.4%) were unable to decide. Therefore, both the qualitative and quantitative data indicate that assignment of unqualified teachers is one of the factors challenging quality of education in Afar Regional State.

The information obtained from the participants of the interview made clear that there were few educated Afar both inside the country and abroad when the regional state was established. However, the regional state didn't try to make use of the capacity of theseeducated Afar for the development of the regional state. An expert in the regional Education Bureau interviewed during the field work explained the situation as follows:

> *The regional state politics was dominated by uneducated Afars who won the support of TPLF leaders. It didn't call educated Afar living abroad to come and support the development efforts in their region. But, there were very few educated Afar who came to the region by their own initiative. Initially, the regional state government gave them positions in the government. However, they were gradually pushed out of the system when they started questioning malpractices in the regional state government (Interview on 14 May 2018, Semera).*

Right after the establishment of Afar Regional State educated Afars who were given positions in the regional state government had expected that they would support their government and contribute something to the development of modern government system. However, the uneducated officials who dominated the regional state government failed to accept the ideas raised by the educated. Officialas of the regional state government began to push out the educated who who challenged the traditional system which as a result the youth and the educated began to oppose the exclusion of the educated. One educated Afar elite who represented the youth and the educated during their opposition against the uneducated regional leaders interviewed during the field work in May 2018 explained:

> *The regional state government started to marginalize educated Afar from the very beginning. There were TPLF cadres assigned in the region who played significant role in the regional state politics behind the curtain. Even the Afar named one of the TPLF cadres participated in making major decisions behind the regional state leaders as the "president of the dark/night". This was because this person sat together with regional state leaders during the nights, advised them what to do and in the next day the regional state government expel educated Afar in the name of performance evaluation. Even educated Afars abroad who came to the region*

with the spirit of supporting the development of their regionwere removed from the positions they held and pushed to return back to countries where they came from (intervieed on 16 May 2018, Semera).

Still another interviewee who was member of the ARDUF during the establishment of the regional stateunderscored that the regional state leaders had no interest to integrate those Afars who attended high school level education let alone diploma and degree holders. According to him, even now, educated Afars who are given positions in the regional state government are those who remainedsileny to question the wrong practices committeed by senior officials. Such individuals are concerned with only to satisfy their own interest. He further explained that educated Afars who tolerated malpractices and continued working in the regional state have been serving as a wrong model to the youth. Now if someone asked an Afar young what he want to be after completing his education, he will reply that he want to be member of the regional state cabinet. This is because, the youth have been observed that occupying positions have helped members of the cabinet to amass wealth (intervieed on 12 March 2018, Semera).

The Afar have been given educational affirmative action by the federal government with the intension of fulfilling the human resource need in the region. In this regard, participants of the FGD mentioned that Afar youth were made to join boarding schools and Civil Service University. However, the regional state has not been properly using this generation of educated Afar for different reasons. First, the provision of educational opportunity was based on political loyalty rather than merit (political cadres were recruited and sent to Civil Service University). Several Afar were unable to complete the training and education. Second, the instruction given to the university was just 'enable them' rather than focusing on real capacity building. Third, those who joined the regional state bureaucracy were not able to create influence the tradition in the working practices. This was because; they had to respect the interests of the uneducated leaders if they have to have positions in the government *(FGD, 19 Feburary 2018, Semera University)*

Like other federal higher academic institutions, Semera University has been undertaking the regular teaching-learning activities since its foundation in 2008. According to one of the senior academic staff member of the university interiewed on 15 Feburary2018, the university has opened summer, extension, weekend programmes and it also engaged in long-term and short-term trainings to help the regional state fulfill its human resource need. He further mentioned that

the various units of the university have been providing capacity building trainings. For instance, to enhance the quality of education, the university in collaboration with the regional state Education Burea, have been providing trainings to representatives of high-schools, colleges and offices. For instance, the university provided short-term training to several (400-600) school teachers at a time at different times.

Another academic staff member of law department of the university interviewed on 14 Feburary 2018,further explained that the law school of the university has been providing law related trainings to judges, prosecutors and police men. Moreover, the university has been providing free legal services to community members who do not have sufficient means to pay for it; by appointing prosecutors, providing consultancy services, writing accusation letters and answers as well as by assigning attorneys in the courts(providing legal representation on free basis) to help the poor.

Still another academic staffand department of environmental scienceof the university interviewed on 21 Feburary 2018, at Semera Universityfurther elaborated that one of the missions of the university is to provide community service. In this regard, the university has been supporting the community in the areas agro-pastoralism, education and law. He further mentioned that the university has been supporting the community by providing selected seeds and advice and introducing new kinds of farming system as well as livestock production focusing on animal health. He also pointed out that there are problems on the part of regional state government at different levels have failed to put the trainings provided into practice.

3.2.2.2. Health Service

Participants of the interciewconducted with seniormembers of the Regional HealthBureau in December 2018 at Andido, the capital of Amibara Woreda, contend that the health service provided in the region before 1991 was very low. According to them, there were two hospitals and four clinics in the Afar region before 1991. Like schools, these health institutions were providing services to state farm workers and their children. Therefore, the available health institutions in the region were not intentionally established to provide health service to the Afar.

Afar National Regional State has been trying to implement the health extension package in order to achieve the millennium development goals by providing special emphasis on protecting mothers and children from diseases. The health extension programme started in the region in 2006 by 64 health extension workers. With the aim of expanding the health service in the region, the regional state has been training and deploying health extension workers and their number has reached 772 in 2017. The health extension package showed little improvement from the time it started in 2006 until 2010. However, the performance was improving from time to time with the ever-increasing community mobilization. One of the strategies used by the regional state to improve the health service is training heads of family households. In this regard, 112,596 heads of family households were trained on health package until 2017 which in turn has been contributing a lot for the expansion of health service in the region (HoF, 2017).

The improvement of the health service in the region can be observed from family planning, contraceptive acceptance rate, medical care given to mothers by health professionals and number of children vaccinated. Accordingly, the contraceptive acceptance rate reached 45% in 2017 from what it was 8% in 2005. The prenatal care (follow up by health professionals) grew to 100% in 2017 from what it was 15% in 2005. The number of women who gave birth with the support of midwife reached 32% in 2017 from what it was 2.4% in 2005. Similarly, the postnatal medical care given to mothers in the region grew to 40% in 2017 from what it was only 0.3% in 2005. The number of children below the age of one year who got penta-va-lent vaccination reached 90% in 2017 from what it was only 35% in 2005. The number of children who got vaccination for measles grew to 85% in 2017 from what it was only 23.5% in 2005. And the number of children who got all kinds of vaccinations reached 76% in 2017 from what it was only 26.7% in 2005 (Ibid).

The Data obtained from Afar National Regional State Health Bureau indicated the emphasis given to the health sector since the establishment of the regional state. As a result, access to health service in the region has been expanding from time to time and reached 96% in 2017 from what it was only 6% before the introduction of federal system in the country. Currently, there are 386 health posts, 96 health centers, 6 government hospitals, 2 defense and 2 private hospitals in the region.

According to the Regional State Health Bureau, the regional state gave special emphasis on the development of trained health professionals. To that end, Semera Health College was opened in 2007 and started its mission by training 31 clinical nurses. More than 500 health professionals have graduated from the college and joined the regional work force in the past few years. The college has been enhancing its admission capacity from time to time and in the 2017 academic year 419 students were attending their training in different health sectors. In general, the regional state has been providing training in the regional state and neighboring states' health institutions and has produced several health professionals in health officer, clinical nurse, midwife, pharmacy technician and laboratory technician. As a result, the number of health professionals grew to1734 in 2017 from what it was 27 in 1994. The following table depicts the gradual increase of health professionals in the region:

Table 7.3: Health Professionals in Afar Region

No	**Type of Profession**	**Year**						
		1994	2000	2005	2007	2010	2014	2017
1	Doctors	0	17	12	7	13	23	32
2	Health Officers	0	7		15	51	71	78
3	Laboratory Technicians	5		39	36	52	89	110
4	Pharmacy Technicians	2	15	31	32	42	63	118
5	Different Nurses	20	155	153	184	532	667	678
6	Health Extension Workers	0	0	0	64	772	796	718
	Total	27	194	235	338	1462	1709	1734

The document obtained from the Regional Health Bureau indicated that the regional state government has been trying to make health institutions fairly distributed to enhance the provision of health service in the regional state. Accordingly, there is one hospital in each Zone, at least three health centers in each Woreda and one health post in each Kebele. Moreover, since the mobile way of life of the pastoralists required some kind of adjustment on the provision of health

services, the Regional Health Bureau has been deploying mobile medical team in 20 Woredas comprising of 5 health professionals three males and two females in most Woredas and the vice versa in some Woredas. The Regional Health Bureau assigned one vehicle for each team to support their regular movement so that each team can facilitate the relationship among health centers, health extension worker and the people.

However, the data obtained from primary sources is contradictory to the success report mentioned in the official document of the regional Health Bureau. Participants of the FGD explained that various factors have been challenging the provision of health services in the regional state. For instance, during the discussion a health professional in Teru Woreda Health Office mentioned that the health service which has been provided in the Woreda is not satisfactory. One of the problems challenging the provision of health service is lack of permanent roads connecting the Woreda with Kebeles. During the summer seasons half of the 12 Kebeles in the Woreda have been disconnected with the Woreda Health Office at least three four months. Teru Woreda is the second populous Woreda in the regional state. But only one ambulance is assigned to the Woreda Health Office. Moreover, the fuel consumption allocated to the Woreda Health Service is equal to the fuel assigned to the car of the speaker of the Woreda Council. But the distance travelled by the two cares is totally incomparable (FGD on 8 December 2018, Alelu) another health professional working in the same Woreda health office who participated in the interview further explained the problem in the sector as:

> *Budget allocation to offices has not been based on what offices have planned to work in the fiscal year and the actual tasks perfomed by offices. The turnover rate of health professionals is very high. Several professionals have been leaving and looking for a job in other regional states due to the hardship of the working environment (desert) and lack of incentives. Because of the low budget allocated to the Office, the annual duty payment of health professionals of this year is finished in six months. The annual overtime payment of experienced and newly employed health professionals is 300,000 and 164,000 Birr respectively. On the other hand, the total annual budget allocated for the three health stations in the Woreda is 310, 000 Birr. Therefore, many professionals have been leaving their job and went to other Regional States. For instance, twelve health professionals have left the Woreda between the years 2017 and 2018(Interview on 10 December 2018, Allu).*

The explanation provided by a health professional in Assaita Woreda Health Office interviewed in November 2018 indicated the presence of similar problems in Assaita Woreda. He asserted that even though the number of mothers who give birth with the support of health professionals

has been increasing from time to time, the Woreda Health Office has been unable to provide adequate health service due to lack of necessary facilities, budget and turnover of health professionals.

Generally, the data obtained through interviews and focus group discussions above showed that absence of facilities, the provision of poor quality health service, turnover of health professionals and lack budget have been challenging the development in the health sector. And the actual health service provided has been by far very less compared to the official reports of the Regional Health Bureau.

3.2.2.3. Water Service

Human activities and water have diverse interactions and hence there are close relations between socio-economic development processes and water resource. Water is both an important source for all natural life and a natural resource that is at the core of sustainable development. It is significant for socio-economic development, healthy ecosystems and for human survival itself. Water is a finite and irreplaceable resource in time and space and its availability depends on how we managed it (Yildiz, 2017). Water resource is central to the production and preservation of multiple benefits and services for people. Its nature of availability determines the situation of growth and development in that it enhances economic opportunities when it is adequately available and works against growth when it is unreliable (Ibid).

The speech of the former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, on the 13th Annual Pastoralist Day Celebrations seems to fit to the general situations of pastoralists. He asserted that even though poverty and backwardness are the concern of all Ethiopians, it is worse for thepastoralists. According to him, this backwardness of pastoralists is attributed to absence of appropriate plan and meaningful work done for the pastoralist areas during the past regimes. He further pointed out that the FDRE government has started to work on big infrastructural developments such as roads, electricity and telecommunication. He also underscored that most of Ethiopian pastoralists live with a shortage of water and hence the important thing that we have to do to improve the pastoralists' lives is to solve the water shortage. Solving the water problem will be helpful to make cattle rising productive and modern. In solving the water problem, depending on the interests of pastoralists, they could have irrigation systems to improve cattle

grazing or they could even be involved in farming to improve their lives (PM Meles' Speech, 2011).

Regarding the significance of water to the life of Afar pastoralists, an interview expert in Teru Woreda Water Office interviewed on 13 January 2018, at Alelu, contended that water is the question of life and death to the Afar people even though it is categorized as one of the basic things to all societies. He further explained that in the light of the hot climate and lowland geographical feature of the area, water is one of the priority needs of Afar pastoralists and their animals.

Although researches (Getachew, 2001; Solomon, 2006; Minyahel, et'al., 2016) pointed out that pastoral mode of production and way of livelihood has sustained itself for centuries because of its flexible natural resource management systems, which enabled pastoralists to lead a meaningful life in a disequilibrium environment (economic and environmental rationality in pastoral mobility), the data obtained from Water Bureau of Afar National Regional State (2017) mentioned that the Afar pastoralists were following their cattle in search of water, devoting unnecessary time and energy by wandering from place to place and use poor quality water for centuries due to absence of water infrastructural development. The data also indicated that 22,628 people in rural Afar and 68,068 people in urban areas totally 90,696 Afar or only 6 % had access to clean water before the establishment of the Afar National Regional State while the remaining 94% of the people in the region was using small ponds and rivers. However, after the establishment of Afar National Regional State following the introduction of federal system in the country, the regional state has been performed wide range of activities to address the peoples' quest for of water, to prevent the pastoralists from water borne diseases, to save the time of pastoralists wasted in search of water and thereby to enhance their productivity.

The data obtained from Water Bureau of Afar National Regional State showed the activities performed between 1996 and 2017. Accordingly, in rural Afar civil works and research and design were conducted in 170 places. Within these years several construction works were performed in the region. In 46 places modern water wells with different depths, in 16 places community hand dug wells, in 60 places water wells having medium depths and fixed with hand pumps, in 35 water holes having medium depths and fixed with water pump motors, in 168

places deep water wells, in 67 places construction of motorized drinking water wells, in 4 places construction of multi-village drinking water wells , in 3 places maintenance of streams, in 138 places the construction of water Birka, in 71 places digging and construction of ponds, in 18 places on spot of pumps and motors for water wells and in 8 places planting water filtering machine (EM, Wat, Kit) were constructed. These efforts in the development of water resource have enabled the region to supply clean drinking water for 853,344 constituting 34 % of the people living in rural Afar (ANRS, 2017).

Similarly, the same data indicated that several works were performed in relation to water resource development in urban areas of the region within the period mentioned above. Accordingly, 146,643 people in urban areas of the region have got access to clean drinking water. The provision of drinking water in urban areas of the regional state reached 39% as the result of water sources survey in 38 places, civil works, research and design in 34 places, digging deep drinking water wells in 36 places, and expanding and improving existing water wells in 9 places. The total number of people having access to clean drinking water reached 1,088,517 which constitute 36% of the peoples of the regional state (Ibid).

Water resource development in Afar National Regional State was also targeting at improving the provision of drinking water for animals. Accordingly, in the years between 1996 and 2017 several works were performed. Through the cooperation between the Coordinated Drainage Development Program and different NGOs the design and construction works of cattle troughs were performed in 91 places which enabled 350, 000 animals to have access to drinking water.

Several works have been done in the irrigation development sector too. In order to ensure the food security of the peoples of the regional state, 32 small scale irrigation development research and design works, 32 medium scale irrigation development research and design works and 1 large scale irrigation development research and design totally 65 irrigation development research and design works were performed. Moreover, 4 new institutions for irrigation water management were constructed and improvement research and design for 5 existing small scale irrigation institutions were conducted and the construction of 21 medium scale irrigation institutions was performed.

The above data obtained from the official document of Water Bureau of Afar Regional State failed to reflect the reality on the ground. As explained above under the section discussing on education service, it was stated that 80% of the schools in Afar Regional State have no access to water. FGDs conducted in March 2018 with expers in Woreda Water Offices in Amibara, Assaita and Teru Woreda sasserted that Water Offices have no vehicles to move to the Kebeles to follow up and support the provision of water services in their respective Woredas. Whenever, Woreda officials want to move to their Kebeles, they have to borrow vehicles from the Woreda Administrator or other Offices by covering the fuel cost of the vehicle they borrowed. This implies that Woreda Officers could not exert their maximum effort to enhance the residents' access to water.

A healh professional in Assaita Woreda Health Office who participated in the FGD explained problems related to water development in the Woreda as:

> *Although there are improvements, the provision of water supply services still has several constraints. Pastoralists desert their settlement villages mainly because of lack of access to water. Absence of adequate water supply in the oldest town of Assaita indicates the extent of the problem related to water supply. Shortage of water is still a serious problem in towns let alone to far distant Kebeles. Therefore, success in the development of water supply is not yet achieved. Let alone distant Kebeles, there are residents of the Woreda Capital who have no adequate access to water like Alelu Town, the capital of Teru Woreda (Interview, on 15 December 2018, Alelu).*

3.2.2.4. Agro-pastoral Economic Development

The pastoral life-style had enabled the majority of the Afar people to survive in arid and sparsely vegetated land. However, climate change and instability due to inter clan conflicts and conflicts with neighbor's communities, has been posing challenges on livelihoods and community survival (UNDP, 2010). The Afar Region faced drought conditions inducing an emergency situation characterized by numerous animal deaths since May 2002 and hence governmental bodies and several agencies provided relief and rehabilitation supports (Piguet, 2003).

The overall livelihood conditions of the Afar people have been worsened by several years of drought and the peoples' drought resilience capacity has been diminishing from time to time. Moreover, the exclusion of many Afars from traditional dry season grazing grounds due to the establishment of commercial farms coupled with underdeveloped socio-economic services and

infrastructures have been worsening the life of Afar pastoralists (UNDP, 2010). According to Afar Pastoralist Development Association (APDA , 2017), the winter rains of December 2017 have not eventuated in the entire region leaving most communitiesfacing the long dry season from the time when the main rains completed in early September until late March/ April, which affected the entire livelihood but first access to water.

Bringing socio-economic transformation in the Afar region cannot be materialized without improving the agro-pastoral economic sector upon which the lives of the people in the region has been based. The information gained from the archives of Afar National Regional State Pastoral and Agriculture Development Bureau (2017) showed that the main mission of the Bureau is to bring development in the agro-pastoral sector and ensuring food security in the region. The sources also described that there was no modern way of animal fattening, rearing and using animal products before 1991.

Although scholarly debates indicate that mobile pastoralism offers greater value for money in arid and semi arid lands like in the Afar region, the regional state seem to support the federal government's prioritization of crop production to ensure food security and to enhance development in Afar region. For instance, the view of the regional state government is to use livestock development as a transition to agricultural production. The speech of the regional state president, Haji Seyoum Awol could portray what the regional state has planned regarding the future fate of pastoralism:

> *Villagization to pastoralist communities like us, is not a matter of choice, rather it is basic necessity to avoid mobile way of life. Settling pastoralist communities in selected areas will enable them to get the necessary social services (electricity, education, road, water, health, etc). Settling pastoralists is also helpful to move out pastoralists from the unreliable animal husbandry and transform them to modern agricultural production (ANRS, 2017: 184-185).*

The official report of the regional Bureau also revealed that several efforts have been made in animal resource development following the introduction of federal system in the country and the establishment of the regional state. The regional state has been producing animal feed in large hectares of land and in the gardens of pastoralists to solve the problems of pastoralists arising from the deterioration of natural pasture. For instance, in 2017, more than seven thousand tons of grass feed was produced on 692 hectare of State Land and 232 hectares of land in the gardens of pastoralists.

There are similarities and differences between the development plans of the federal and regional the governments. Development policy and programmes of the federal government and the various documents of Afar regional state made clear that settling pastoralist in the lowlands is the only option to transform their living conditions. The regional state wanted pastoralists to continue the rearing of quality animals in the areas where they settled until they gradually adapt agriculture. On the other hand, the federal government prefers pastoralists to engage in commercial farming within a relatively short period of time (ANRS, 2017).

The regional state has been trying to enhance the awareness of the pastoral communities regarding improving the quality of their animals through hybridization. Moreover, several activities have been done to ensure the quality of skins and hides which as a result, on average more than 200,000 skins and hides found their way into the market every year. In the past regimes there were no modern animal market centers and Afar were exchanging their animals through traditional way in very limited market centers. In this regard, the Regional State made great efforts to enable the pastoralists benefited from their animal resources by facilitating the market system and ensuring the accessibility of institutions. Currently 28 modern animal market centers are established in the region and market centers have been helping the pastoralists not only providing them the opportunity to have access to markets but also they reduce the animals' fatigue due to long caravan and avoid selling at lower price. In the 2017 fiscal year more than 170, 000 cattle and 170, 384 sheep and goat were presented in these market centers (Ibid).

The data secured from the Afar National Regional State Pastoralist and Agriculture Development Bureau (ANRS-PADB, 2017) revealed that the Regional State has been working hard to improve the animal health services to maintain the animal resource and to ensure the peoples' sustainable benefit from the sector. Before 1991, there were only 12 animal health institutions established around state farms. Currently, the number of such institutions has reached 26 and efforts have been made to enhance the material and human resource in the sector. Before the establishment of the regional state, access to animal health service was only 2% in 2005 and in 2017, the region's access to animal health service has reached 65%. The fact that the climate of the regional state is conducive for the prevalence of animal diseases, the region has established animal health research laboratory in the region's capital, Semera and satellite animal Health Laboratories in all of the five Zones.

The impact of climate change on animal health and pasture has been becoming severe in the region. In this regard, efforts have been made to change the life style of the pastoralists, changing from pastoralist to agro-pastoralist way of life. The regional state has distributed lands to pastoralists which were under state farms and capacity building trainings has been given in agriculture and development. Before 1991 less than 5000 hectares of land were cultivated by agro-pastoralists. This time the situation has been changed which as a result 61, 000 households are benefited by cultivating more than 65,000 hectares of land (Ibid).

The document prepared for the symposium of the 12th Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Day by the House of Federation Public Relations and Communication Directorate Office, (there in after HoF-PRCDO, 2017) entitled, "The *Fruits of the Constitution: the Ethiopian federal system and the Benefits of the Afar People*" revealed that 21,405 agro-pastoralists have produced 1,359,330 quintal of crops in the 2017 by cultivating 55,026.65 hectares of land in 26 Woredas through rain fed agriculture and irrigation. One plant clinic is established to prevent crop diseases, weeds and desert locust. Moreover, the regional state has established agricultural extension system and assigned extension workers to enhance the knowledge and skills of the pastoralists to enable them to use new technologies and agricultural in puts.

Research centers are established in all of the five Zones of the regional state to enhance the production and productivity of the pastoralists through the use of new technologies and research results. The research centers have been playing important roles in improving the productivity of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists by producing, adopting and domesticating rural technology equipment, animal, crop and natural resource development research results which fit the geographical landscape of the region.

The year book published Afar Regional State Bureau of Pastoral and Agricultural Development in July 2019 presented success report in the sector. In this year, several hectares of lands were covered by different crops and vegetables in 17 Woredas. Accordingly, cereal crops (maize, sorghum, wheat, barley and teff) covered 13,527.25 hectare, pulses and oilseeds (chickpea, lentil) 1,528.25 hectare, cotton 4318 hectare, vegetables and fruits (onion, tomato, pepper, Sugar beet, watermelon, banana, mango, papaya) 4,931.85 hectare and was expected to produce 1,380,117 Quintal of crops and vegetables from the total covered (46,003.90) hectare of land.

However, participants of the interview in the regional Bureau of Pastoraland Agriculture Development interviewed in 2018contended that the regional state government's reports tempt a rosy picture of the state of affairs.They asserted that there is great difference between official reports and actual life conditions of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists on the ground. They further elaborated that the attempts made regarding the animal resource development for the last 26 years did not bring significant improvement. Animal health professional in the regional state Bureau of PastoralandAgriculture Development stated:

> *The rangeland in Afar region has been deteriorated in an unprecedented manner due to recurrent drought and the invasion of Prosopis which as a result mobility is highly restricted. The traditional way of animal husbandry in limited areas had adversely affected the carrying capacity of pasture lands and the productivity of animals. The inadequate support provided to the pastoralists so far didn't enable them to start modern way of rearing animals. Several animals died whenever animal disease encountered. The Regional animal disease laboratory center has not been working with its full capacity because of serious shortage of annual budget, only 400, 000 Birr which could cover only activities to be performed in three Woredas. The efforts made so far have not enable pastoralists either to strengthening local sources of resilience or to lead better way of life in areas where they are made to settle, because unlike its promises, the government has been unable to supply the necessary services and fulfill infrastructures(Interview, 24 Feburary 2018, Semera).*

The weakness of the Research Institution in supporting the development of agro-pastoral communities presented and described above was further corroborated by the quantitative data. Table 8.3 below portrays the respondents' levels of agreement/ disagreement regarding the benefit of agro-pastoral research institution for the local community.

Table 8.3: The Contribution of pastoral and agro-pastoral research institution

The research works conducted by the pastoral and agro-pastoral research institution of the regional state has been playing an important role in solving the problem of the society.			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	139	39.7
	Disagree	112	32
	Undecided	11	3.1
	Agree	67	19.1
	Strongly Agree	21	6
	Total	350	100.0

As we infer from Table 8.3 above, the percentage of respondents who disagreed regarding the role of pastoral and agro-pastoral research institution in solving the problems of the society is greater, 251(71.7%) than others who agreed, 88 (25.1%) and only few, 11(3.1%) were unable to decide. This implies that the research works in the regional state have not been adequately supporting the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in the region. This implies that the Pastoral and Agro-pastoral Research Instituion has not been performing its responsibilities in a way that could help the pastoral communitiesbenefited from their animal resources.

3.2.2.5. Development of Human Capital in Afar Region

According to the archival source of the Afar Regional State Public Service and Human Resource Development Bureau (2017), human resource development has been given top priority of all other development endeavors. This Bureau was called in different names before it acquired its current name and structure. It was established in 1994 under the name of Civil Servant Administration Bureau and its objective was to fulfill the human resource need with the necessary competence having the capacity to speed up the democratization process and development efforts and to create and organize civil service structure which could enhance effectiveness.

In 2003 the Regional State Capacity Building Bureau and Civil Service Reform Program Office were established and the main aim of their establishment was to put into practice the implementation of the region's capacity building strategy and civil service reform program which was part of the national policies, strategies and programs. In 2005, the Regional State Civil Service Administration Bureau was renamed as Regional Civil Service Commission. In 2009, the region's Civil Service Commission, Civil Service Reform Program Office and Capacity Building Cooperation Office conducted research and based on the result of the research findings, the three institutions were united together and named as the Regional Civil Service and Capacity Building Bureau. In 2017 the Regional State's Public Service and Human Resource Development Bureau was established.

According to a senior expert in the regional president Office interviewed in October 2018, the main purpose of the regional Bureau and Woreda Offices of Civil Service and Capacity is to enable civil servants serve the community in an improved and efficient manner. He also further explained that the Bureau has been organizing capacity building trainings for civil servants to improve service delivery in the region. However, the capacity created so far has not been able to improve service delivery in almost all regional Bureaus and Woreda Offices.

This sentiment has been voiced bysenior official in the regional Bureau of Finance and Economic Development. According to him, the plans and principles by which Civil Service and Capacity Building Bureau Offices have been guided by have only paper values. The trainings provided to civil servants have no consistency which as a result institutions have been unable to respect principles of civil servants' conduct such as legality, loyalty and impartiality. Absenteeism has become the norm everywhere in the regional state. Customers have to visit offices and Bureaus several times to get the service they need. Moreover, the principle of placing the right person on the right place is still far from reach (Interview, 26 October 2018, Semera).

The member of Assaita Woreda Civil Service and Capacity Building Office interviewed in November 2018 at Assaita further strengthened the above idea. He mentioned that the Office has no vehicle to move to Kebeles. Workers of the office have to adjust their plan of going to Kebeles with other Offices that have their own vehicles. This implies that workers of the Civil Service and Capacity Building Office cannot perform their duties according to their own plan.

Therefore, the support provided by the Office to Kebeles cannot help to bring significant improvement in service delivery.

3.2.2.6. Transport, Infrastructure, Power Service

Development of road and transport facility plays a significant role in changing the socio-economic conditions of the people of a region through dynamic externalities, which it generates. It is an important element of both direct and indirect intervention for socio-economic and regional development (Kumar and Sen, 2014). Some historical writings mentioned that the idea of road construction in Ethiopia started during the reign of Emperor Tewodros II. However, Menelik holds a cardinal place in relation to modern transportation in the Ethiopian context (Temesgen, 2006). According to Keller (1991) considerable efforts were undertaken in road construction during the Italian occupation (1936-41). However, the development of transportation infrastructure in Ethiopia was slow because it has been neglected for decades (Ibid). Recognizing that limited road network coverage and poor condition of the existing road network which has been impeding the economic development of the country, the incumbent government has launched the Road Sector Development Program (RSDP) in 1997 to address the problems in the road sector (Ethiopian Roads Authority, 2016).

Participants of the interviews and focus group discussions conducted in Feburary and March 2018 in the three sample Woredas (Amibara, Assaita and Teru) during the field work asserted that the Afar National Regional State is one of the regions with least transport network coverage. The information gained from the archives of Afar National Regional State Rural Road Authority (2016) illustrated that road construction is given significant consideration by the regional state The main responsibility of the region's Rural Road Authority is to construct standard roads which could connect the regional capital, Semera with Zone centers and Zones with Woreda centers. Moreover, the authority has the responsibility to connect the development corridors (mining places, large scale agricultural projects/ farms and village centers where pastoralists settle) through road network. Roads that connect Woreda centers with Kebeles have been constructed by the people coordinated by their respective Woredas.

The document of the Authority described that the asphalt roads in Afar Regional Sate have been constructed by the Ethiopian Roads Authority. The data obtained from the Regional State Rural Road Authority (2017) depicted that the total length of asphalt roads constructed in Afar National Regional State is 1,739 km. The length of standard but not yet asphalt roads constructed by the federal government is 1,293 km. The seasonal access roads having the length of 618 km are also constructed by the Rural Road Authority. A road 50 km long is opened to connect the mountainous Woredas with difficult geographical terrain (Dalol and Kuneba Woredas) with Tigray region. Roads connecting Woredas to Kebeles and Kebeles to Kebeles have been constructed by productive Safety Net Programme and Pastoralist Community Development Programme.

There are also roads constructed by the support of the Pastoralist Community Development Programme (PCDP). Before three years, the total length of roads constructed by PCDP in Woredas was 3000kms. The report revealed that the Regional State Rural Road Authority has been maintaining 4,500 km of road every year. The regional state used the federal government maintenance fund which is released every year at different time intervals and up to 10 million Birr is allocated for the maintenance purpose. However, the achievements mentioned above in the official report documents didn't reflect the actual benefits that the communities have been gaining from the transport service. In chapter nine and elsewhere in this dissertation the socio-economic impact of absence of roads is sufficiently explained.

The shared agreement among participants of the interview and focus group discussants in the three sample Woredas was that, absence of roads and lack of transportation services have been adversely affecting the living conditions of pastoralist and agro-pastoralists in Afar Regional State. For instance, about six out of the twelve Kebeles in Teru Woreda have been cut off from the Woreda Offices during the summer season. This implies that the Woreda executive branches cannot follow up and give support to their respective Kebeles.

For instance, a pastoralist, resident of Berga Kebele in Assaita Woreda interviwed at the Woreda capital, Assaita, explained the extent of the problem as:

> *We were very happy when we started to produce crops. We had a great hope that the agricultural products will diversify our sources of income. However, the tomatoes we produced have been left rotten on the farm due to lack of transportation. Even there are no seasonal roads connecting Kebeles to the main road. We have been unable to get appropriate support from agriculture professionals since they have been unable to frequently visit us (Interview, 6 Feburary 2018, Assaita).*

Photo Taken from a farm in Assaita Woreda, Berga Kebele

3.2.2.7. The Use of Afar Language (Afar-af)

The federal system has enabled the Afar people to use their own language which they were denied during the past regimes (HoF-PRCDO, 2017). The Afar were denied of the right to speak their language, to learn in it, to use it for research and in the courts as well as for administration. This violation was expressed by assigning administrators, judges and police men from the center. Due to this violation of their right, the Afar were forced to use interpreters in matters related to the provision of different services. Moreover, they had difficulties in transferring their culture from generation to generation and to get recognition for their language as well as to proud of their history and culture. The federal political system which reversed the situation has been enabling the Afar people to develop their language, promote and maintain their own cultural values and historical heritages (Ibid).

Data obtained from the Afar Language Research and Settlement village (ALRDC, 2017) archives showed that the Afar language has never been written and served as teaching language. This center was established to make the Afar language written and teaching language. The center has been working in cooperation with Addis Ababa University and has direct relation with Language Studies Department and the cultural center. Since the time of its establishment the center has accomplished several tasks starting from selection of letters up to preparation of teaching materials for different grade levels. In 2017, the center prepared text books for grades 1-4 and recently it prepared teaching materials of science, language and mathematics for grade five, social science, environmental science and mathematics for grade six. Moreover, the center has been preparing the regional exam for grade eight in Afar-af (Ibid).

At the university level, Afar language department was established and the center has prepared more than ten modules. The fourth-round students of the department graduated in the 2017/2018 academic year. In addition to preparing teaching materials, the center has performed several tasks. For instance, it prepared dictionary (Afar-af- Amharic- English), dictionary (Amharic-Afar-af equivalent words). It also prepared a 28 page format consisting of different forms of letters. The center has been providing a translation service. For instance, it has translated the federal and the regional constitutions, education and cultural policies and it is in preparation to translate the criminal and civil laws, as all sectors are working in Afar-af except the court which is still using Amharic language (Ibid).

The achievement of the center mentioned above is not an end by itself. According to an expert in the the center interviewed on 10 May 2018 at Semera; several factors have been challenging the performance of the center. He explained that due to absence of printing press in the regional state, tasks completed cannot be reached as fast as possible. The center has been sending tasks completed to Addis Ababa for publication. He further asserted that the center has not been given concern by the regional state government. This was because of the limited awareness of regional state leaders regarding the roles that the center could play in supporting the development efforts of the regional state. This is reflected by the small budget allocated to the center and the appointment of limited staff members (the tasks performed by the center are many but only four workers have been carrying the burden). As mentioned above in this chapter absence of Afar-af language teachers has been adversely affecting the quality of education in the regional state. The

provision of Afar-af language training and education would contribute for the future success of ALRDC. However, this issue has not been given appropriate concern by the various stakeholders.

The data obtained from some of the participants of the interview and focus group discussions revealled that the official reports of the various bureaus and offices regarding achievments in various sectoral activities are significantly different from the reality on the grouond. They argued that had the statistical reports been true, the living conditions of the Afar people would have been significantly imporoved. The situation of the Afar explained in the rest of the chapters is different from the achievents reported in this chapter.

In the literature it was explained that federalism is an appropriate political arrangement to decentralize power and decentralization has been considered as a typical element of development strategies and public finance reform among developing countries. The importance of decentralization in increasing efficiency and accountability for the distribution of public goodsas well as improving governance was explained in detail.

Moreovwer, decentralization was presented as an important means of empowering local governments and local governments can better develop public services to meet local demands, which are frequently distinct from those in other regions, because it has better information about the preferences of its inhabitants. It was also mentioned that decentralization can promote public sector effectiveness, democratization, and political stability. However, it is possible to argue that the system of governance in Afar Regional State has not been able to maximize the benefits of decentralization. Interviewees have explained that the experience of local governments in trying to understand local demands and trying to solve has not been encouraging. They asserted that waiting orders and decisions to come from above is one of the funadmental problems related to the regional leadership at all levels. For instance, according to one Afar former member of the House of Federation interviewd on 17 March 2019, Semera, explained that let alone zones, Woredas and Kebeles, the regional state government has not been freely deciding on matters under its own jurisdiction. Since the political system prevailing in the country is a top-down approach there is nothing that local governments make decisions by their own decisions. Leaders at Woreda level have been waiting decisions to come from the regional government and Kebeles

from their respective Woredas. The mere existence of structural decentralization did not enable levels of governments to make decisions witrhin their jurisdiction to address local demands.

3.3. Conclusion

The Afar people have gained some achievements in the political and socio-economic sectorsfollowing the institutionalization of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia in 1991. The creation of ethno-territorial unit for the Afar people is one of the political achievents that the Afarethnic groups have achieved.Unlike the experience of the past, Afar sons and daughters controlled the regional politics despite of federal intervention. This was the political agenda that the Afar set long before the adoption of ethnic-federalism in Ethiopia. The new political arrangement has enabled the Afar people to use their own language, Afar-af, as the working and teaching language which isalso a major achievement.

Regional official reports regarding achievements in various sectors are contradictory to the social, political and economic reality on the ground. Although there are changes in the education, water, health and transportation servicesas well as in the agro-pastoral sector the efforts made so far did not bring significantimprovement in the living conditions of Afar pastoral and agro-pastoral communities.Several factors have contributed for the underdevelopment of Afar Regional State such as failure of the federal government to respect the constitutional promises regional self-rule, the domination of the regional politics by the uneducated Afars at the exclusion of the educated ones, absence of proper budget allocation to various sectors in the region, misappropriation of resources as well as high level turnover of profesionals who could support the development efforts in the regional state.

Part III: Afar under Federal Ethiopia: Political Challenges

Chapter Four

Power Relations between the Afar Regional State and the Federal Government

4. Introduction

Intergovernmental relations have become a notable feature of federal political systems. Federations create various structures and arrangements to facilitate interaction between the central government and constituent units. This chapter examines the power relation between Afar National Regional State and the federal government. Accordingly, the chapter is organized into five sections including this introductory part. Section two shades light on the concept and importance of intergovernmental relations in federations. The third section provides highlight on the intergovernmental relations in the Ethiopian federation. It depicted that absence of independent institution in charge of consolidating IGR has its own impact on the effectiveness of IGR cooperation in Ethiopia.

The fourth section assesses the mode of relations between Afar Regional State and the Federal government. It throws light how the party channel which served as mechanism of relation and the impact of categorizing political parties as member of EPRDF and affiliated parties on the relation between Afar Regional State and the federal government and the role of Afar National Democratic Party in co-determining national policy issues with the federal government. It also describes the relationship between the legislative branches of the two levels of governments as well as the relation among federal executive institutions and Bureaus of various sectors in Afar Regional State. This section also explains the practices in the IGR and the challenges encountered.

The fifth section provides an overview on the horizontal relations between Afar and Tigray Regional States. It explains about the forums organized among the executive branches of Tigray and Afar Regional State as well as the capacity building trainings provided to Afar Regional State officials. It concludes that the horizontal relation and the support provided didn't bring the

intended socio-economic transformation due to lack of genuine concern and consistency in the support provided to Afar Regional state.

4.1. The Concept and Importance of Intergovernmental Relations in Federations

Federations are composed of two (or more) orders of government which combine elements of shared-rule through common institutions and regional self-rule for governments of the constituent units (Watts, 1996, p.7). This signifies that federalism divides the sovereignty of the state between the central and regional governments which requires some sort of interaction to work in cooperation for the mutual benefits of the two levels of governments (Cameron, 2001).

Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) can be broadly defined as as "*Interactions between government units of all types and levels within a political system*" (Watts, 2003, p.23). According to Kandel (2020), IGR refers to the interaction among the various levels of government or understanding the roles and responsibilities of each levels of government and developing effective relationships to improve their ability to meet their expectations. The term IGR captures *'the working connections that tied central governments and the constituent units that enjoy measures of independent and interdependentPolitical power, governmental control and decision-making'* (Agranoff, 2004, p.26). In short, IGR focuses on how different orders of government in federal political systems communicate and collaborate with each other encompassing the complex and interdependent relations among various spheres of government in legal, financial and administrative matters and policy coordination (Nigussie, 2015).

IGR is a ubiquitous dimension of federal systems despite differences between federations. The system of IGR has vertical and horizontal dimensions. The vertical dimension refers to the relations between the federal government and the constituent units on issues of common interest and the horizontal dimension has to do with the relations among the constituent units of a federation (Cameron, 2001; Assefa, 2009; Poirier and Saunders, 2015). Although both kinds of relations have profound role in shaping the way in which a particular federation functions, the relations between the central government and the constituent units of a federation have primary importance (Cameron, 2001).

Through IGR the levels of governments "*share information, pool power and resources, and negotiate and implement cooperative arrangements that determine who do--or should--do what*" (Poirier and Saunders, 2015, P.2). Several institutions and processes involve in this interaction through which federal partners enter into relations with each other (Ibid). But the institutions and processes that federations developed to manage the intergovernmental relationship vary widely in several dimensions. They vary from federation to federation and within federations between different time periods and between different policies areas (Simeon, 2001). To put it in plain words, different federations exhibit different structures and features of intergovernmental relations, because the mechanisms of IGR are the results of the bounded rational preference of the political actors and the issues they need to address through the intergovernmental relations (Haileyesus, 2014). The mechanisms and structures of IGR in federations are not static, rather they are dynamic and change depending on shifting political, social and economic circumstances (Ibid).

There is no single federal model that is applicable everywhere (Watts, 2003) which as a result each federation has followed a distinctive path, based on its own particular circumstances and conditions (Cameron, 2001). According to Watts (2003) federations vary in their institutional design, the character of the diversity within their societies, their degree of economic development, and their policy agendas. Similarly, as Cameron (2001) elaborated, the size of the country, the size of the population and the distribution of the population on the territory may all affect the structures and processes of intergovernmental relations. Therefore, as Watts(1996) put it, in order to understand the factors that have shaped the distribution of powers in each federation requires an examination of the historical and cultural context that has led to its original creation, that influenced the drafting of its constitution, and that continued to influence the subsequent operation of the federation.

Although there are variations among federations, IGR are an integral and significant part of every federal system (Poirier and Saunders, 2015). One of the common features of federations is the simultaneous existence of two sets of powerful motives: *(1*) those seeking united action for certain purposes and (2) those seeking the autonomy of the distinctive constituent units of government for other purposes (Watts, 1996, p.2*).* The other common feature among federations has been the need for effective internal intergovernmental arrangements or all federations are

responding to the same functional requirement, namely to find ways of managing the interface among governments (Cameron, 2001 and Watts, 2003).

Federations create various structures and arrangements to facilitate interaction between the central governments and constituent units (Cameron, 2001). Various authors have explained the importance of IGR in many ways. For instance, according to Assefa (2009) IGR refers to the relations (formal or informal) between the federal government and the states units as well as among the constituent units, concerning the coordination of policies on shared programs. McEwen (2015) mentioned that IGR are essential to all political systems with multi-level government. Similarly, Kandel (2020) explained that IGR coordination mechanism in federal system is crucial for development delivery from sub- national governments in a coherent way based on the concurrent functions. He further elaborated that the prime goal of intergovernmental relation is bringing effectiveness and efficiency in the public service delivery. According to Sharma (2011), the aim of IGR mechanisms is to achieve 'policy coordination' by facilitating interactions among the executives of the two orders of government.

IGR power-sharing facilitates intergovernmental cooperation or federal-regional and inter-regional cooperation and co-ordination (Watts, 2003 and Bolleyer, 2006). In this regard, Nigussie (2015) mentioned that IGR forums facilitate negotiation, non-hierarchical exchange of information and cooperation between the institutions of the two levels of government. He further, explained that IGR regulates and enhances communication between the institutions of the two levels of government that have defined jurisdictions and are supreme within their respective powers.

4.2. Intergovernmental Relations in Ethiopia

The adopton of federal political system gave recognition to ethno-territorial communities andgave them the right to self-determination, creating primarily ethnic-based territorial units and providing for an option of ethnic "secession" (Alem, 2004 and Hashim, 2010). The change of government paved the way and created the opportunity to undertake political and constitutional transformation and to devolve state power along ethno-linguistic lines (Hashim, 2010). The idea of federalism presupposes the existence of levels of government with defined competence and dominion of jurisdiction on the same land (Solomon, 2008).

In a federal system, powers and functions of each government are outlined as part of the division of power and maintenance of their sovereignty (Balcha, 2007). In this regard, the 1995 FDRE Constitution clearly establishes two levels of government, and obliges each level to respect the other's constitutional powers (Art.50 (8)). Both the federal government and regional states have legislative, executive and judicial powers within their respective jurisdictional limits (Art. 50(2)). As stated in chapter three, Article 51 and 52 of the constitution lists the exclusive powers of the federal government and regional states respectively. The constitution also establishes a symmetrical federal system in that the powers, functions and prerogatives given to the member states of the Ethiopian federation are uniform (Art. 49(4)).

IGR are the responses that have been developed to facilitate cooperative policy making among divided governments within a federal system. They are supposed to play a 'bridge-building' role to bring a degree of coordination and cooperation to divided powers, and the mechanism by which different levels and branches of government interact with one another in the process of meeting the needs and interests of the public (Dessalegn, 2014). The cooperation effort among the different levels of government needs to be backed by well-designed and institutionalized intergovernmental relations. The very existence of a federal structure and the constitutional entrenchment of different levels of governments working in the same territory and serving the same people by itself necessitate conducting of relations between the different levels of governments (Haileyesus, 2017). According to Assefa (2009), IGR could achieve the desired objectives only when its structures and processes are guided by important principles. IGR regulates and enhances communication between the institutions of the two levels of government that have defined jurisdictions and are supreme within their respective powers (Nigussie, 2015).

The economic, political, socio-cultural and environmental objectives stipulated in the FDRE Constitution (Art. 88-92) make intergovernmental cooperation inevitable between the federal government and regional states. However, the Ethiopian Constitution is silent when it comes to the principles that guide the system of IGR and the necessary institutions that make it work (Assefa, 2009). Absence of formal vertical and horizontal mechanisms of IGR calls for some level of institutionalizing IGR in Ethiopia (Assefa, 2009; Nigussie, 2015 and Ketema, 2018).

Academics and practitioners agree that IGR in the Ethiopian federation are in need of some level of formal institutionalization and the implementation of coherent IGR principles and practices is required for the realization of genuine federalism. The argument for the institutionalization of IGR generally aims to ensure that regional states participate and make their voices heard in federal legislation and policies, since IGR is a mechanism for consultation with and inclusion of regional interests in federal legislation and policy formulation prior to their implementation (Ketema, 2018).

In Ethiopia, there is lack of an independent institution in charge of consolidating IGR and this in turn has created gaps in the regularity, continuity and effectiveness of vertical and horizontal interactions (Nigussie, 2015). Absence of institutionalized IGR is one of the factors that weakened devolution of power and the ability of regional states to actively participate in setting national objectives (Tesfaye, 2002). Rather patron-client type of relationship was established between the federal government and regional states through which the central leadership dominated political power and resources throughout the country by placing local clients at sub-national levels (Ibid).

The system of IGR put in place in Ethiopia for the last two decades is one in which the federal government is predominant and relationships between levels of government are largely informal. The federation has lacked coherent principles, guidelines and institutional systems for governing IGR schemes (Assefa, 2009). Federal institutions with mandates related to IGR, such as the House of Federation (HoF) and Ministry of Federal Affairs, have underlined the need for formal institutionalization and policy frameworks (Assefa, 2009; Ketema, 2018).

The formal vertical and horizontal structures of IGR in Ethiopia are characterized by a few and un-institutionalized structures such as the Special Support Board, ministers and Bureau Heads, forums of different offices of line ministers and regional Bureaus as well as the regional bilateral and multilateral forums between regional governments. Moreover, the Ethiopian IGR are characterized by the dominance of the federal government in formulating national policies in the light of the ethos “developmental state” that is envisioned by the incumbent party for the country (Haileyesus, 2017).

The practice on the ground is different from the constitutional rhetoric regarding the powers of regional state governments because they remain dependent on the federal government to be able to carry out their duties (Aalen, 2002). Regional state governments followed all policies adopted by the EPRDF without questioning (Turton, 2006). TPLF cadres were assigned as advisors to monitor the locally elected administrators who had to ensure their accountability to TPLF unit to remain in their position (Abbink 2006; Aalen 2002).

There is a need for a central/focal institution responsible to design policies on IGR and to coordinate and guide the entire IGR system in Ethiopia. Absence of such institution has been the concern of the Ethiopian government. The Proclamation 471/2006 issued to re-determine the duties and responsibilities of the executive organs in Ethiopia gave the MoFA the power to strengthen IGR. According to Art.21 (6) of the proclamation, MoFA was decreed to be the focal institution to establish good relation and cooperation between the federal government and regional states. Similarly, the Proclamation 691/2011 issued to re-determine the duties and responsibilities of the executive organs has reapproved the previous powers of MoFA (MoFA, 2013).

One of the institutions competing to assume the role of IGR in the Ethiopian Federation is the Ministry of Federal Affairs. The establishment of Intergovernmental Relation Directorate General under MoFA may signify the government's interest to formalize the IGR system in Ethiopia. For instance, two of the duties and responsibilities of the IGR Directorate General of MoFA were undertaking studies on the establishment of transparent and detail systems of relations between the federal and regional governments, the gaps, weaknesses and problems of government relations, and preparing policy and strategy proposals which would create firm ground for IGR (MoFA, 2011). The role of this Ministry in coordinating the special support provided by different federal institutions and neighboring regional states to the Developing Regional States is discussed in detail under chapter seven of this dissertation. Therefore, this chapter is devoted to the other mechanisms of relations which are discussed in the following topics and sub-topics.

4.3. Mode of Relation between Afar Regional State and the Federal Government

4.3.1. Party Channel as Mechanism of Relation

The international community and political groups in Ethiopia received the federalization of the country with both hope and skepticism (Aalen, 2002). The institutionalization of ethnic federalism as an organizing principle encourages political parties to organize along ethnic lines and the party channels function as the main vehicles of IGR (Alem, 2005). According to Haileyesus (2014), the mechanisms of IGR in the Ethiopian federation have been shaped predominantly by the party system and the de facto asymmetry among constituent units of the federation.

Ethnic political parties administer the regional states following the new federal restructuring of the country through which EPRDF has undermined regional and local autonomy through its centralized party system (Aalen, 2006). The party organization has created different kinds of relations among political parties. The parties administering the four major regional states (Amhara, Oromia, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples and Tigray) were members the ruling EPRDF coalition Front. On the other hand, the ethnic political parties administering the peripheral regions (Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Somali) were not members of the coalition. Even though these affiliated parties were not members of the ruling coalition front, EPRDF, they vote with it on important issues that come before the federal government (Alem, 2004). The vertical and horizontal IGR has been relatively smooth because the multiethnic ruling coalition and its affiliated ethnic parties have enjoyed a monopoly of power at all levels of government in their respective regional states (Alem, 2010). However, the affiliated parties have not been allowed to be member of EPRDF because these parties were not considered as mature/not reliable to join the coalition (Alem, 2004).

Participants of the study interviewed during the field work in December 2018 in Addis Ababamentioned that the affiliation relation has no constitutional ground. According to a senior member of the House of Peoples Representatives Legal Service and Administration Standing Committee, affiliation indicates the level of relation created between EPRDF and the political parties administering the Developing Regional States. He asserted that the justification behind the creation of this kind of relation between EPRDF and the affiliated parties originated from the

socio-economic analysis of the nations, nationalities and peoples when federalism was introduced in Ethiopia. He further explained that when EPRDF came to power in 1991, it understood that the various regions in the country were at different levels of development. The socio-economic development of the peoples living in Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella and Somali regions were found to be incompatible with the ideology and the socio-economic and political programs of EPRDF. According to his explanation, the programs of EPRDF wish modern and developed production relation, having clear division of labor which is appropriate to the development of capitalist system. Contrary to this, the production relation of the pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities was based on clan. The livelihood of pastoralist communities has been based on animal production and mobile way of life. He also asserted that absence of permanent settlement is the hallmark of backwardness and hence the development of these communities had to be accelerated with the provision of special support before being made member of the ruling coalition, EPRDF. Thus, the affiliation relation was intended to stay until these communities reached the level of socio-economic development compatible to capitalist production relation, which the federal government aspires to establish (Interview, on 21 December 2018, Addis Ababa).Senior federal official in the EPRDF's Foreign Relation Office further strengthened the above idea when he stated:

> *Political parties have to set their social, economic and political programs they aspire to achieve. Moreover, they need to have ideologies which could guide their activities. In this regard, EPRDF has been guided by the ideology of Revolutionary Democracy. On the other hand, clan is the social base of the pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities in Afar Region which is not well-suited to the revolutionary thinking. For instance, leadership in clan-based societies has been transferred from fathers to sons across generations. Thus, in such societies, to be a leader, being born to a family of a certain clan leader is enough and no need to plan to achieve certain political objectives and programs. Knowledge, capacity, experience, commitment and other requirements have not been given due consideration when someone is empowered to a certain positionin clan base societies. Therefore, the living conditions and political thinking of pastoralists have to be significantly changed to enable them to move out of clan mentality and adopt the culture and working procedures of political parties before being accepted as member of EPRDF (Interview, on 24 December 2018, Addis Ababa).*

Moreover, one of the members of Foreign Relation and Peace Affairs standing committee of the HPR interviewed in December 2018explained that class is the social base of Revolutionary Democracy by which EPRDF has been guided. He further elaborated that class-based societies like peasants, proletariat, city bourgeoisie and the educated have relatively better ground to establish capitalist system which EPRDF set as its destination than clan-based societies. He further elaborated that it is in this context that EPRDF came up with the idea of categorizing political parties as member and affiliated. The intension was to accelerate the socio-economic development of clan-based societies living in the periperial regional states and transform them into class-based society.

The ideological prior concern given to agriculturalists and exclusion of pastoralists explained by the interviewees above is also reflected in the program of EPRDF. Accordingly, the program of the front clearly stated that EPRDF is the organization of agriculturalists. It further elaborated that agriculturalists are the main force and supporter of the aims of revolutionary democracy. Therefore, the organization has to gather agriculturalists around its aims above all and before others (EPRDF, 2001). It seems with this ideological ground that the political parties administering the agriculturalists (class-based) were categorized as member of the coalition front, EPRDF and the parties administering pastoralist areas (clan-based societies) as affiliated/ partner parties. Moreover, the 2016 report of EPRDF to the House of Peoples Representatives mentioned that the issue of ensuring the practical implementation and continuity of revolutionary democracy as well as its excellence fell on the shoulder of members of EPRDF who have strong belief and endurance in the line of revolutionary democracy. The report also underscored that accelerating the development of regional states administered by affiliated parties is mandatory to change the social base of the community to develop their capacity of shouldering the principles of revolutionary democracy and to shorten the time of becoming member of EPRDF (EPRDF, 2016: 62).

One senior member of TPLF interviewed in December 2018, in Addis Ababa explained the other justification for categorizing parties administering Developing Regional States as affiliated parties. According to him, pastoralist communities are lagging behind both economically and ideologically to be compatible to the ideology of Revolutionary Democracy. He further explained that if these regional states are allowed to be member EPRDF given their present

socio-economic and political level of development, they will be dominated and will remain voiceless and permanent minorities. To avoid this problem EPRDF designed a solution, working together and try to bring them up to the speed until their level of socio-economic and political development fits to revolutionary mobilization.

The federal government believed that the provision of all-round support to Developing Regional States could accelerate the socio-economic development of the people. However, several years passed without bringing the intended social transformation in the Developing Regional States.
One senior expert member of the Democratic Affairs Standing Committee of the HPR emade an elaboration regarding the mismatch between the rhetoric social transformation in Developing Regional States and the political practice. According to him, political trainings have been provided to leaders of the affiliated parties to help the people living in Developing Regional States to move out of clan thinking and uphold revolutionary thinking in its place. However, the efforts made so far did not bring significant change in this regard. The leadership in regional states administered by the affiliated parties from region to Woreda level have been still elected in a manner to accommodate clan representation. He further asserted that the culture of electing leaders based on their merit and political commitment is not yet put into practice. The efforts made so far to accelerate the socio-economic development of these regional states is not up to expectation because of absence of clear boundary between clan leadership and modern administration (Interview, on 27 December 2018, Addis Ababa).

As stated in the literature (chapter two) there were different political parties in Afar region. The Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP) won the 2005 regional election and and begain to play dominant role in the regional politics. This party administered the regional state until it became regional branch of the newly established, Prosperity Party in December 2019. According educated elites interviewed in May 2018, in the regional capital, Semera, the Regional State President, the Vice President and Head of the Regional State Peace and Security Bureau were playing key role both in the party politics and the regional state government. These regional leaders were given the nick name, '*the trinity'*.

> *The categorization of political parties as member of EPRDF or affiliated parties is a deliberate marginalization of Afar and other regional states administered by affiliated parties in many ways. First, the national policies and strategies have been designed by the coalition member of the ruling party, EPRDF which as a result, such policies and strategies reflect the interests of the agrarian societies in the four regional states but failed to address the affairs of pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities. Secondly, leaders of the four regional states decide on the national development policies and strategies without considering the voice of the people ruled by the affiliated Party. Thirdly, the Afarregional state party, ANDP, was made mere recipient of the orders coming from the federal government which undermined the prerogative of the party. Fourth, the federal government has continued indirectly ruling the Afar region through the cadres it assigned in the region as advisors in the name of capacity building which is in practice violating the self-rule right of the regional state (Interview, on 24 Januaryr 2018, Semera).*

The same idea was reiterated by another expert in the regional Bureau of Public Service and Human Resource Development interviewed in January 2018 as:

> *Key positions in the regional state government were given to loyal leaders committed to enhance the interests of the national ruling party. For instance, the former president of Afar Regional has stayed in power/office for more than fifteen years because he administered the region in a manner that respects the interests of the federal government at the expense of interests of the people in the region. In performance evaluation conducted in 2010, the vice president and the head of the president office reported that the regional state president has not been working to address the problems and interests of the people in the region. They claimed that the president was elected to administer the regional state and to serve the interests of the people in principle but he was working for the federal government in practice. This accusation was shared by many members of the Regional State Council. However, two officials of the federal government who were leading the evaluation strongly defended the position of the regional president. Moreover, one key personnel of EPRDF warned that if the regional council discharged the president, EPRDF will not work in cooperation with ANDP. Later, the above regional officials who initiated the idea of replacing the regional state president by a competent and committed party member were removed from their position through federal intervention and the president sustained his position for several years (Interview, on 27 January 2018, Semera).*

A senior expert in the regional Bureau Finance and Economic Development interviewed in September 2018 asserted that federal intervention in the mandates of the regional state is contradictory to the powers and responsibilities of the regional state enshrined in the national constitution. For instance, Art 52(2) of the FDRE Constitution stated that regional states have the power to establish a "state administration that best advances self-government, a democratic order

based on the rule of law…." Moreover, Art.37 (2) of the 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State revealed that the Afar region has the right to self-determination, self-administration in its own region as well as to have appropriate and fair representation and to make effective participation in the federal government. He further underscored that federal intervention has been threatening the power of Afar regional state when viewed in the light of the contradiction between the constitutional promises and the actual practices.

According to one Afar elite woking in the regional Bureau of Youth and Sport interviewed in October 2018, at Semera, ANDP as a regional party has never challenged the federal intervention because it was dominated by few individuals who have been allies to those who held key positions in the federal government. He further explained that there were few regional officials who have been questioning the federal government's dominance over regional affairs. However, they have been unable to create pressure due to absence of forums where they could make their voices heard and their activities were stifled by the regional cadres. The involvement of the federal government in regional politics presented and described above was further corroborated by the quantitative data. Table 9.4 below depicts the role of the federal government in placing regional leaders who could satisfy the interests of the federal government.

Table 9.4The Political Right of Afar in Electing Top Level Regional Leaders

The Afar have been empowered in electing their top level leaders without the involvement of the federal government			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	89	25.4
	Disagree	167	47.7
	Undecided	9	2.6
	Agree	61	17.4
	Strongly Agree	24	6.9
	Total	350	100.0

As we can see from Table 9.4 above, the percentage of respondents (civil servants who filled the questionnaire) who believed that key positions in Afar Regional State have been held based on the good will of the federal government is greater, 256(73.1.6%) than others who think the other way, 85(24.3 %) and very few, 9(2.6%) respondents were unable to decide. This indicates that

the federal government has been stretching its hands in the decision who should hold key positions in the Afar Regional State.

During the field work in Zone three of Afar Region in November 2018, the researcher observed one expert in the Zone administration distributing the newsletter of EPRDF, *Addis Ra'e* which literally mean "*New Vision*. According to this official, the Zone administrations receive this newsletter from the regional state administration and distribute it to each Woreda on Quota basis. The newsletter provides information on various issues of the national party and it is one of the instruments through which the party indoctrinate its ideology, Revolutionary Democracy and the principle of democratic centralism. .

According to an expert in the regional Bureau of Agriculture and Pastoralist Development interviewed in October 2018, ANDP has been committed to implement orders and policies of the federal government. He further contened that there were no policies, strategies and packages which could address the problems of the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. Now the Pastoralists Development Policy is formulated but not yet adopted. This shows how the interests of the pastoralist communities have been marginalized at policy level. Afar Regional State government has to implement the programs of the regional party. This in turn has its own adverse impact on the pace of socio-economic development in Afar region.

Through examination of the working relation between EPRDF and ANDP is helpful to understand the role of affiliated parties in discussions on national policies and the political support provided by EPRDF. According to a senior expert in federal EPRDF office interviewed in December2018, few representatives of Afar Regional State have been participating in EPRDF Council meetings that discussed on national policy agendas. However, Afar participants attend council meetings as observers with no right to vote on issues discussed in meetings because ANDP is not member of EPRDF. This participation therefore helps the leaders of Afar Regional State only to know what is going on at the national level. According to him, few regional officials have been participating in the meetings of EPRDF Council and EPRDF Executive Committee. They also attend quarterly and annual evaluation meetings. However, they have no right to debate and to be part of the decisions passed in such meetings. Moreover, in such meetings, participants of the developing regional state have no opportunity to reflect on the problems and interests of their people in the EPRDF meetings. He further asserted that in

several occasions' leaders of ANDP were complaining that member parties of EPRDF alone should not decide on national issues. As Ethiopians, the affiliated parties representing the Developing Regional States need to have their say on national agendas which one way or another affects the lives of the people in their respective regions. On the other hand, the limited capacity of the officials of the regional state to contextualize the issues discussed in the EPRDF meetings to the reality on the ground, has been adversely affecting the limited benefit which could be obtained from the participation (Interview, 26 December 2018).

The role of Afar Regional State in determining national policy issues presented and described above was further complemented by the quantitative data. Table 10.4 below portrays the respondents' opinion regarding the position of Afar Regional State government in co-determining national policy issues with the federal government.

Table 10.4: Participation of Afar Regional State in the National Policy Making Process

The Afar Regional State Government co-determined national policy issues with the federal government			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	67	19.1
	Disagree	174	49.7
	Undecided	9	2.6
	Agree	46	13.1
	Strongly Agree	54	15.4
	Total	350	100.0

As we infer from Table 10.4 above, the percentage of respondents who argued that the government of Afar Regional State have not been determining national policy issues with the federal government,241(68.9%) is greater than others who believed the other way100(28.6%). Few respondents 9(2.6%) were unable to decide. Therefore, this quantitative data strengthened the qualitative one. As a justification for their affirmation respondents mentioned that national policies have been initiated by the executive council of EPRDF and the Afar have not been members of this council. This is because the party administering the regional state, ANDP is not member of EPRDF. Therefore, like other developing regional states, the responsibility of the leaders of Afar Regional State has been limited to implement policies adopted by the federal

government which signifies how the existing power relation has undermined the role of developing regional states in national policy making.

According to a regional expert with long experience in ANDP Office asserted that the Provision of training was the other mechanism of relationship between EPRDF and ANDP. He explained that quota was given to affiliated parties to participate in training where few members of ANDP were participating in trainings organized by EPRDF. He further pointed out that the focus areas of trainings provided were on issues related to the experiences of the four regional parties which form the ruling party, EPRDF. He also questioned, as to whether the federal government has real interest to bring social transformation in the Developing Regional States. He further mentioned that stated had the federal government genuine concern to raise the political consciousness and to induce party politics among regional leaders of Developing Regional States, it would have provided continuous training to members of ANDP on issues which have direct bearing on the livelihood of pastoralists (Interview, on 18 Feburary, 2018, Semera). Another expert former member of the the regional state council intervied in Feburary 2018 has similar sentiment as stated:

> *The member parties of EPRDF and affiliated parties have different political culture and experience in the areas of party politics. The constitutional objective of building one political and economic community in Ethiopia cannot be achieved without transforming the people administered by affiliated parties. The ANDP cannot embrace the ideology of Revolutionary Democracy unless the regional state leaders are adequately supported to move out of clan thinking. Therefore, continuous trainings have to be given to members of ANDP on party politics which would help them to accelerate the development of their region to catch up the relatively developed regional states (Interview, on 20 Feburary, 2018, Semera).*

As discussed in chapter seven in detail, the provision of special support to Developing Regional States is one IGR mechanism between EPRDF and ANDP. Several federal institutions were providing capacity building support to similar sector Bureaus and Offices in Afar region. The EPRDF is one of the federal institutions which have been supporting Afar Regional State by sending professionals. One of the federal officials in the EPRDF Office interviewed in January 2018, mentioned that political support has been given to Afar region based on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between EPRDF and ANDP. Accordingly, four cadres representing the relatively developed regional states (member parties of EPRDF) have been sent

to Afar region. Office of EPRDF has been paying the salaries and other incentives to these cadres. He further elaborated that the main activities of these cadres were coordinating members of EPRDF living in the region and motivate them to support the regional state, performing party capacity building activities to indoctrinate EPRDF's ideology, Revolutionary Democracy, supporting the officials of ANDP by consulting on how to planning the activities of the party, preparing discussion documents and brochures of the party, introducing the culture of EPRDF and democratic ways of evaluating tasks performed.

The dominance of the federal government in formulating policies presented and described above was further corroborated by measuring the extent of respondents' agreement or disagreement regarding the role of Afar Regional State in formulating policies. Table 11.4 below portrays to what extent Afar Regional State formulate and execute policies and strategies reflecting the region's specific condition.

Table 11.4: Policy and Strategy Making and Execution Experience of Afar Regional State

The regional state formulate and properly execute economic, social and development policies, strategies and plans which are suitable to regional specific contexts			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	29	8.3
	Disagree	236	67.4
	Undecided	15	4.3
	Agree	29	8.3
	Strongly Agree	41	11.7
	Total	350	100.0

As we infer from Table 11.4 above, the relative percentage of respondents who expressed their disagreement regarding the role of Afar Regional State in formulating and executing policies which are suitable to the regional specific context is greater than 265(75.7 %) than those who expressed their agreement 70(20 %) and the remaining 15(4.3 %) of the respondents were unable to decide. As discussed in the qualitative data, policies have been initiated by member parties of EPRDF (parties ruling mostly agriculturalist communities) which as a result they failed to reflect

the condition of pastoralists. Members of affiliated parties simply accept such policies without contextualizing them with the reality of the regional states.This implies that the party channel relation between the national and regional parties has little impact in accelerating the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State.

4.3.2. Legislative Bodies as Mechanism of Relation

The 1995 FDRE Constitution made clear that the House of Peoples Representatives and Regional State Councils are responsible to the Ethiopian people and the peoples of the regional states respectively. Both organs have the highest authorities and power of legislation on matters falling under their jurisdiction. Common discussion forum among the legislative bodies of the two levels of government is important to create conformity between the federal constitution and the laws enacted by regional states. However, according to senior expert in the regional president office interviewed in January 2018, at Semera, there was no discussion forum between the legislative bodies of the federal government and regional states for more than a decade.

Senior expert in the HPR Legal Service and Administration Standing Committee mentioned that IGR was given due consideration in Ethiopia by taking the experience of other federations. He further explained that the importance of organizing forums where the legislative organs of the two levels of governments discuss on various activities in the country like sharing experiences, making decisions and giving directions on common affairs began to be point of discussions among leaders before the start of common discussion forum between the HPR and Regional State Councils (Interview, 12 December, 2018, Addis Ababa).

The above information was supported by thedata obtained from available federal institutional documents. For instance, according to MoFA (2013) the legislative branches of the two levels of governments started their relation by organizing the first discussion forum between the speakers of HPR and Regional State Councils in 2004. The document made clear that the first forum did not perform tangible tasks beyond conducting inaugural meeting and adopting rules of procedure.

The speakers of the federal and Regional State Councils conducted their second conference in 2006. In this conference, the rules of procedure were improved by incorporating new inputs to strengthen the objective and practices of the forum. The participants of the conference were the

speakers and deputy speakers of the House of People's Representatives and Regional State Councils, selected members of the HPR Standing Committee, chairman of the Regional State Council standing committees and few professionals of the regional state organizing the forum. The rules of procedure indicated that the discussion forums of councils have been conducted twice a year. Article 50(8) of the FDRE Constitution is the legal base for the organization of common discussion forum between the councils of the federal government and regional states (Ibid).

According to the regulation number 1/2007 adopted by the common discussion forum, the objectives of forums include working for the existence of procedures which could reflect public representation in each council, enacting related laws in conformity with one another, discharging its responsibility in the effort of creating one economic community and enhancement of rule of law and good governance by discussing on tasks to be performed by member councils, discharging its responsibility to strengthen the parliamentary system through experience sharing, support and capacity building practices in a coordinated manner.

According to the objective and regulation of its establishment, the reforms and capacity building activities performed by the common forum include accomplish reforms on the organization and procedures of each council which would enable them achieve their mission successfully, making improvements made by the councils consistent and standardized, performing capacity building through wide experience sharing, providing training to members of the councils and professionals on legislative and control procedures as well as reform tasks and supporting in creating conducive work environment by solving lack of equipment and facilities of the councils.

The regulation mentioned that the required budget for the forum is obtained from member councils and donors. The report of the third five-year term of the councils confirmed that the councils have conducted eight regular and two special meetings during the period. The common forum has played an important role in strengthening the IGR, enacting laws helpful to build one economic community, establishing standardized parliamentary procedures, and sharing experience in controlling the executive bodies by properly reflecting the voice of the people.

According to a senior expert in MoFA's IGR Office interviewed in Feburary 2018, Addis Ababa, the common discussion forum has been organized every six months in the nine regional states and the two city administrations on round basis. He further mentioned that the common discussion forums of the legislative organs of the two levels of governments have been led by the speaker of the federal parliament and the speaker of the regional state council organizing the forum. According to him, discussions were focusing on improving the legislating practice and proper implementation of oversight over the activities of the executive branches of federal and regional state governments.

One of the members of Afar Regional State Council interviewed during the field visit explained the procedural approach of forums. He mentioned that in between the forums the speaker of the Regional State Council which will organize the next forum has to make all the necessary preparations in consultation with the speaker of the federal house. In the conference, speakers of the nine Regional State Councils and the city administrations present their working performances. Then the strength and weaknesses of the works of each council have been discussed in detail. The council which performed best has been held as a model and others are encouraged to share the experience of that regional council. Regional State Councils which showed less performance are advised how to correct their weakness (Interview, on 12 May 2018, Semera).

Despite of such practices, the forum had several limitations and has failed to strictly perform its activities in accordance with the rules of procedures. Former member of HPR interviewed in January 2018, in Addis Ababa explained that, one of the problems in the relation between the two legislative organs was lack of motivation on the part of speakers of Regional State Councils to use the comments provided during discussions as an important input to improve the working performance in their respective regional states. According to him, the other problem has been inability of the federal and Regional State Councils standing committees to conduct proper oversight over the performance of the executive branches in the areas of their jurisdiction.

According to the official document of MoFA (2013), the House of Federation started common consultation with regional states in 2006. The objectives of the common consultation forum include strengthening the economic, social and political relations among regions, facilitating conditions for building unity based on equality of the nations, nationalities and peoples, creating

common understanding on the handling and organization of information which served as inputs for the preparation of subsidy for regions and to ensure that citizens have been getting equitable services, creating supportive relation through the forum and to find common solutions for problems encountered and enhancing the culture of experience sharing among regional states.

An expert in the House of Federation interviewed in Feburary 2018 in Addis Ababa explained that consultation forums were largely focusing on experience sharing. He further elaborated that the forum failed to implement the above objectives because such forums had less impact on the executive bodies which as a result the executives were unable to put into practice the issues on which participants created common understanding through experience sharing.

4.3.3. Executive Institutions as Mechanism of Relation

There have been multidimensional relations among the executive organs of the federal government and regional states. Such vertical relations have been made between sector offices of the federal ministries and their counterpart Bureau and offices in regional states. According to the report on IGR practice in Ethiopia, some of the federal executive organs have signed memorandum of understanding with sector Bureaus of regional states like agriculture, finance, health, education, water and energy, federal affairs, justice, Civil Service and capacity building. This vertical relation has created organizations and set up councils to facilitate the relation in each sector. It also clearly stipulated the main functions and responsibilities of the consultation forums of each sector (MoFA, 2013). The relation between two Ministries and their counter Regional Bureaus namely Health and Education are discussed below just to show how executive institutions have been serving as a mechanism of relation between the federal government and Afar Regional State.

According toan expert in Health Bureau of Afar Regional State interviewed in January,2018 Semera, the focus areas that the Ministry of Health agreed to work in coordination with the Afar Regional State Health Bureau, Zonal health departments and Woreda health offices are increasing the number of mothers giving birth in health institutions with the support of health professionals; identify pregnant women in each Kebele with the support of development team leaders and make them visit health posts every month to consult health professionals; prepare experience sharing forums among development teams and working in coordination with leaders

of health sectors from Region to Woreda levels in order to conduct forums with religious fathers, traditional midwives and community elders on quarterly basis.

Another interviewee in the Ministry of Health interviewed feburary 2018, Addis Ababa stated that the Ministry of Healthhas been working in coordination with the Regional Health Bureau in constructing health stations and health posts as well as in fulfilling medical equipment for health stations and expanding health extension programmes. He also mentioned that the Regional Health Bureau conduct implementation evaluation with the Ministry of Health twice a year.

According to the explanation of a health professional in the regional Health Bureau interviewed in May 2018, Semera, reduction of maternal death in the region is one of the positive outcomes of the coordination efforts between the Ministry of Health and the regional Health Bureau. However, the report on the IGR Practice in Ethiopia, revealed that factors like capacity limitation in the Regional Bureau, inability to present implementation reports timely, problem of completing tasks as planned and absence of systems of accountability on those who failed to implement their plans in accordance with the agreement reached have been adversely affecting the relation between the ministry and the regional Health Bureau (MoFA, 2013).

The Ministry of Education has been working in cooperation with Education Bureau of Afar Regional State. The Ministry has been coordinating consultation forums on the education and training sector. One of the Directorates of Afar Regional State Education Bureau interviewed in June 2018, Semera, reported that consultation forums have been organized irregularly although the plan was to conduct on quarterly basis. He explained that participants of forums are heads of all Regional Education Bureaus and educational professionals. He further mentioned that the main focuses of the discussion/consultation forums include implementing national education standards; providing professional, material and capacity building supports; contextualizing and integrating national educational and training plans to the regional reality; designing and implementing common programmes; sharing good practices and experiences; and finding solutions to the problems encountered in the education sector through discussion etc...

Discussion forums have been organized alternatively in different regions where the Regional Education Bureaus evaluate plan implementations on quarterly basis. Although such forums are important in creating common understanding and sharing of experiences, there are problems

adversely affecting the relation between the Ministry and regional Education Bureau such as inability to implement some of the common affairs agreed in the discussion forums; failure to implement the federal rules and regulations; inability to complete activities/tasks according to plans scheduled; and above all absence legal institutional framework which could guide the relation between the federal and regional executive institutions(Interview, 25 June, 2018).

According to one of the directorates of Afar Regional Education Bureau, interviewed in June 2018, Semera, the Ministry of Education has been sending team of professionals who have been supporting the Regional Bureau and Woreda Education Offices by providing training on capacity building, planning and evaluation of implementations. Yet, such support could not help us to bring about significant improvement in the education sector.

The contribution of the cooperation between the federal and regional executive branches in improving the social and economic services in Afar Regional State presented and described above was further corroborated by measuring the extent of respondents' agreement or disagreement. Table 12.4 below portrays the respondents' agreement/disagreement as to whether the cooperation between the federal and regional executive branches has helped to improve the services provided in the regional state.

Table 12.4: Federal Executive Support to Afar Regional State Executive Branches

The cooperation between the federal and Afar Regional state executive branches has enabled the Afar people to get improved social and economic services			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	69	19.7
	Disagree	175	50.0
	Undecided	8	2.3
	Agree	52	14.9
	Strongly Agree	46	13.1
	Total	350	100.0

As Table 12.4 depicts above, the proportion of respondents who believe that the cooperation between the federal and regional state executive branches didn't help to improve the delivery of social and economic services is greater 244(69.7 %) than others who believe the opposite

98(28%) and the remained 8(2.3%) undecided. Therefore, from the data indicated that the supports provided by the federal executives (ministries) could not enable the Afar people to get improved social and economic services. This implies that the vertical relation between the executive organs of the two levels of government did not bring significant improvement in the socio-economic denevelopment of Afar Regional State.

4.4. Horizontal Relation between Afar and Tigray Regional States

Horizontal relation refers to the relation between two or more constituent units of a federation. As discussed in chapter one of this dissertation, due to differences in the socio-economic development among regional states, the government of EPRDF created twinning arrangement between neighboring relatively developed and developing regional states(Afar with Tigay, Amhara with Benishangul Gumuz, Oromia with Somali, SNNPs with Gambella). According to (MoFA, 2013), this relation was necessitated to provide capacity building and technical supports to regional states that require special support, in terms of resolving conflicts caused by claims of regional border areas as well as to organize forums to discuss on current common issues. This section provides an overview of the inter-regional relations between Afar and Tigray Regional States.

Senior expert in the regional president office interviewed in March 2018, Semera,mentioned that the executive branches of Afar and Tigray Regional States have been organizing forums since 1996 despite of irregularities. According to him, the focus of the relation between the executives was on capacity building and the provision of technical support. He further noted that the support provided by Tigary Regional State to Afars lacked continuity because the government of Tigray regional state was responding only when the leaders of Afar Regional State call for support.

Senior expert with long experience king in the Regional Bureau of Peace and Security Administration interviewed in May 2018, Semera, stated that the purpose of the inter-regional relation was to enhance the implementation capacity of the executive branches in order to transform the development of Afar Regional state. He argued that for a decade, the common discussion forums of the executive branches were focusing mainly on resolving the sporadic conflicts among the communities living along the boundary between the two regional states.

The neighbouring Woredas participating in the forums were Berhale, Dalol, Kuneba, Ab'ala, Erebti, Megale and Yalo on the Afar side and Kilete-Awulalo, Sa'esa Tseada Amba, Atsibi-wombera, Enderta, Hintal-Wojerat, vs Raya-Azebo and vs Zobil-Alemata on the side of Tigray.He further elaborated that the irregular meetings didn't help to bring lasting solutions to the conflicts around border areas which as a result higher officials of the two regional states decided to conduct forums on regular basis.

According to senior expert in the regional Bureau of Agriculture and Pastoral Development Affairs interviewed in Aprial 2018 explained that authorities of the two regional states decided to organize forums in which the State Councils of the two regional states together with the councils of neighboring Woredas and Kebeles with some form of permanency. The objectives of such forums were to strengthen the implementation of planned and procedural people to people relations and to support the steady socio-economic development of Afar Regional State. He further explained that the forums have played constructive roles at least during the initial phases. However, the forum lacked permanency / regularity/ where the councils at different levels of the two regional states gathered like a fire-brigade without plan and clear procedure.

The shared agreement among participants of the interview and focus group discussants was that the support that Afar Regional State gained from Tigray was less of the rhetoric twinning arrangement between the developing regional states with relatively developed neighbouring regional State. An instructor in Law School of Semera University explained the patron-client type of relationship between the two neighboring regiona states reflected:

> *Even though the Afar have constitutionally entrenched self-administration right, TPLF has been indirectly ruling Afar Regional State by placing leaders who have been working to satisfy the interests of TPLF cadres who also dominated the politics of the federal government. This has opened an opportunity for Tigrayan investors to dominate the various sectors. Sometimes, I wonder whether Semera, the regional capital is an Afar town or that of Tigrayans (Interview, 17 April, Semera).*

Former member of ARDUF interviewed in June 2018 further elaborated the control of the federal government over the horizontal relation between Tigray and Afar Regional States as:

> *The intension of creating twinning arrangement was to accelerate the development of regional states that lagged behind others. Discussion forums and other cooperation among regional states have not been done without the knowledge of the federal government. The centralized system established in the country didn't allow independent dealing among regional states.Top leaders of Afar regional state were fighters who cooperated with TPLF's campaign against the military regime.Thus, the relationship between Tigray and Afar was dictated by the federal government. Even after the reform there were Afar elites who still support the interests of TPLF in Afar Regional State (Interview, on 29 June, 2018, Semera).*

The involvement of the federal government in the horizontal relation among regional states presented and described above was further corroborated by the quantitative data. Table 13.4 below portrays the respondents' level of agreement or disagreement regarding the intervention of the federal government in the relation among regional states.

Table 13.4: The Role of Federal Government in the relation between Afar and Tigray Regional States

The Afar regional state government has been cooperating with other regional states at the exclusion of the federal government			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	76	21.7
	Disagree	177	50.6
	Undecided	12	3.4
	Agree	47	13.4
	Strongly Agree	38	10.9
	Total	350	100.0

As we infer from table 13.4 above, the relative percentage of respondents who believe that regional states have to deal with each other with the knowledge of the federal government is greater 253 (72.3%) than those who believe that Afar regional states can have relation with other regional states at the exclusion of the federal government 85(24.3%).

Trainings have been provided to Afar middle and lower-level leaders at Mekele Leadership Institution. However, according to former member of the regional state council interviewed in May 2018, Semera explained that trainings provided to Afar elites lacked consistency. He stated that trainings were organized in an unplanned manner. What to train, who will be trained,howand for how long the capacity building training will be provided have not been preplanned which as result trainees have not been satisfiedby the capacity building trainings provided. In the words of one regional.He also underscored that trainings were organized based on the interest andgood will of TPLF cadres.

The explanation provided by a senior Semera University lecturer supported the above idea. He argued thathad TPLF leaders had genuine concern to build the capacity of the leaders of Afar regional state, they would have planned trainings in cooperation with the concerned bodies of Afar regional state. Instead, trainings were organized without assessing and identifying leadership capacitygaps.Moreover, the provision of training was like a campaign work. TPLF leaders may think of providing training anytime and the role of top leaders of Afar regional state was to inform regional Bureau heads and Woreda administrators to select leaders who have to attend trainings organized in Mekele. Moreover, the trainings provided have not been considering the existing reality in the region (Interview, on 5 May, 2018, Semera).

A retired former member the regional state council participated in the interview explained the less contribution ofthe twinning arrangement between Afar and Tigray regional states in the transformation of the development of Afar Regional State as:

> *Afar regional state has been used as a garden for TPLF leaders and Tigrayans investors in the region. I think Afar region has never been benefited from the rhetoric support provided by Tigray regional state. Many Tigrayans have been engaged in almost all investment sectors in Afar region. Moreover, employment opportunities have been opened in Afar regional state to many Tigrayans. Therefore, the benefit that Afar regional state gained from Tigray regional state is insignificant when compared to the resources that Tigray has been obtaining from Afar. In my view, it is better to say that Tigrayans have benefited from the twinning arrangement than the reverse (Interview, 6 May, 2018, Semera).*

The literature review section (chapter two) discussed that the introduction of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia was to decentralize power and resources and to address the nationality questions by accommodating the interests of the various nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia as well

as toempower and equalize the diverse ethnic communities and reduce conflicts. However, the federal government dominated dominated the affairs of the regional state through its party channel.

Although the Ethiopian federal system was believed to decentralize power, it became highly centralized controlling all powers of the state. The ruling party, EPRDF, retained all real power giving little room to the competencies of sub-national units on national policies. The categorization of parties into member of EPRDF and Coalition parties (party administering developing regional state) has significantly affected the competencies of Developing Regional States in deciding on national matters. The federal government dominatesnational matters but also it interfered in the jurisdiction of Afar Regional State. As it is discussed in chapter seven (the political economy of the provision of the special supprt), the federal government used this arrangement as a means of stretching its hands into the affairs of the regional state.

The power relation between the Federal Government and Afar Regional State is contradictory to the federal principle of shared-rule and self-rule. As explained explained in this chapter, leaders of the developing regional states have no say on national policies and strategies. The regional state leaders have been recipient of orders and decisions of the federal government. The federal government had to support the development of the regional state through its intergovernmental relations. The federal government constitution promised to accelerate the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State to enable it catch up the relatively developed refional states. Yet the regional state has been relegated to the waiting list of development. Yet, the supports provided to the regional state have not been significantly improving the development of the regional state.

Some of the participants of the study even argued that the federal government has been concerned to the safety of the Addis Ababa-Djbouti aspalt road that crossed the regional state than the internal situation of Afar Regional State. This can be deduced from the government's effot to involve itself in the regional matters when conflict erupted and disrupt movements along the high way. This, the federal government has been failing to balance the interests of the federal and regional interests.

As discussed above due to absence of an independent institution in charge of coordinating IGR has been adversely affecting the effectiveness of vertical and horizontal relation in federal Ethiopia. In order to solve this problem, in Feburary 2016 the House of Federation in cooperation with MoFA organized a national technical committee prepared a draft the Ethiopian Federalism IGR Policy/Regulation Framework and presented it to the top federal and regional state governments for discussion. This draft document had to be presented and endorsed by the House of Peoples Representatives. However, this was delayed until 2021 and in this year this draft was adopted Proclamation No. 1231/2021 as "The System of Inter-Governmental Relations in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia's Determination Proclamation".

According to thisproclamation the importance of IGR are to realize the national objective of building one political and economic community; to resolve disagreements and conflicts; to effectively discharge common responsibilities; to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of plan accomplishments and service delivery and to share the implementation model experiences, to ensure the efficiency of the IGR. The proclamation also discussed the constitutional basis of the IGR and its objectives. The general objective of the the IGR package is to ensure lasting peace and fast rapid development. The basic principles of the IGR package are the respect of the supremacy of the constitution, equality and participatory, partnership and brotherly relations, mutual respect and trust, consultation and negotiation, cooperation, accountability and transparency, effectiveness, enhancing national missions and values.

The new IGR package also discusses about institutional structures and procedures, IGR common forums, like national forums of the legislative organs, national forums of the executives, national forums of the the judiciary,national forums of sectoral executive branches, forums of the House of Federation regional states, forums of the horizontal relation among regional states. The proclamation also made clear members of forums and issues discussed in each forum; the establishment of national IGR secretary, regional IGR offices, procedures of meetings, desigining of discussion points, decision making, resolving diisagreements and conflicts, procedures of accountability and transparency and budgitory issue.

The researcher has interviewed one member of the standing committee of the House of Peoples Representatives on January 2022 Addis Ababa, about the new IGR forum. According to his explanation, the institutional structure will solve the problems of the IGR but it has not been properly put into practice

because of the political instability created in the country. Establishing smooth relationship among some of the regional states has been becoming difficult. The federal government has been devoting itscapacity by working like a fire extinguisher brigade.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter shades light on the power relation between Afar Regional State and the federal government. The ideology followed by the ruling political party (EPRDF) has influenced the IGR system in the Ethiopian federations. In this regard Tefera (2019) asserted that in the ideology of Revolutionary Democracy, the party leadership and the party's cadres should direct all aspects of society. Therefore, the federal domination overAfar regional state's affairs has emanated from the above ideological reason. EPRDF has maintained its power through a highly centralized party channel which adversely affected the IGR and the autonomous status of Afar regional state.

The relationship between the federal government and Afar Regional state through the legislative and executive branches of the two levels of governments have been facilitating conditions for the domination of the federal government over regional matters. Lack of consistency in organizing common discussion forums and inability of the regional state to participate in the policy making process implies that the IGR between the two levels of governments has not been implemented in a manner which could give meaningful support to enhance the socio-economic development of Afar regional state.Moreover, the twinning arrangment between Tigray and Afar regional states did not bring the intended socio-economic transformation in Sfar region.

Chapter Five

Power Relations between within the Afar Regional State

5. Introduction

The constitution of Afar National Regional State adopted by the proclamation No.1/1998 and the 2002 Revised Constitution of the regional state have listed out the powers and responsibilities of the various branches of the regional state from regional to Kebele levels. According to the preamble of the 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State, one of the main reasons for constitutional revision was the need to clearly stipulate the division of power and systems of accountability among the regional state organs to improve the system of fast service delivery in the region.

In order to investigate the various leadership challenges among levels of government in the Afar Regional State and their impact on the socio-economic development of the region, this chapter attempts to examine the working relations among levels of government in the region. Accordingly, the chapter is organized into four topics and sub-topics including this introductory part. Section two provides information about state structure and division of power in the region. It tries to give highlight on the legislative and executive organs of the regional state as well as the structures of Zone, Woreda and Kebele levels of administrations.

Section three describes power relations among levels of government in the region. In doing so, it attempts to shade light on the relationship between the Regional State Council and the Executive Branches; the relation between the regional state government and Zone administration; the relation between the regional executive branches with their Woreda counterparts; the relation between Zone administration and Woreda executive branches, and the relation between Woreda council and Woreda Executive Offices. The fourth section provides an overview of the leadership challenges among levels of government in Afar Regional State. This section tries to assess leadership capacity gaps, lack of good governance, decline of the role of traditional leadership, prevalence of locality, clannism and corruption and non-inclusion of the educated, youth and women. Finally, section five presents conclusion based on the major arguments and findings of the chapter.

5.1. State Structure and Division of Power in Afar Region

In chapter one it is mentioned that the Afar National Regional State was structured into five administrative Zone, thirty-two Woredas (districts), twenty-eight towns, and four hundred one rural and urban Kebeles. The researcher selected Amibara, Assaita and Teru Woredas from Zone three, Zone one and Zone four respectively with the assumption that the data collected from these Woredas could reflect the people living in the regional state. Based on the livelihood of residents Woredas in Afar regional state can be categorized as predominantly pastoralist, agro-pastoralist and Woredas with relatively better infrastructure and where modern mechanized agriculture has been practiced. Teru, Assaita and Amibara represent the above categorization of economic livelihood respectively. Teru Woreda has twelve Kebeles, Assaita thirteen and Amibara Woreda nineteen.

Article 43(1) of the 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State revealed that the regional state is structured into town, Kebele, Woreda and Regional Councils. This article also made clear that the Regional State Council has the power to create other administrative levels and to decide their powers and responsibilities. The constitution of the regional state mentioned that each council has the power to exercise the highest authority in the areas of their jurisdiction.

The Regional State Council has ninety-six members constituting three members from the thirty-two Woredas in the regional state. The number of Woreda Council members varies from Woreda to Woreda depending upon the number of Kebeles that Woredas are comprised of. Woreda Councils constitute five members from each Kebeles in the Woreda. Accordingly, the numbers regional state council members of Teru, Assaita and Amibara Woreda are sixty, sixty-five and ninety-five respectively.

Article, 44 of the 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State describes the three organs of the regional state, namely, the legislative, executive and the judiciary. Accordingly, the Regional State Council is the legislative organ and the highest authority of the regional state government responsible to the People of the Regional State. The regional Administrative Council is the highest executive organ of the regional state and it is responsible to the president and the Regional State Council. The Judicial Power of the regional state is vested in the courts in the region.

Article 46 of the 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State declared that members of the Regional State Council are elected by the People for a term of five years on the basis of universal suffrage and by direct, free and fair elections held by secret ballot. Members of the state council have been elected from candidates in each electoral district by a plurality of the votes cast. Members of the state council are representatives of the People of the regional state as a whole. And they are governed by the Constitution, the will of the people and their Conscience.

According to Article 45 of the 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State, the powers and functions of the government of Afar Regional State include, formulate the region's economic, social and development policies , strategies and plans; administer the land and other national resources in accordance with federal laws; ensure that educational training and experience requirements for any job title or position approximate to national standard; establish and administer its own police force and maintained the peace and security of the region; establish state administration that best advance self-government, democratic order based on the rule of law and protect the federal constitution; enact and implement the regional constitution and other laws; levy and collect taxes and duties on revenue source reserved to the state and draw up and administer the state budget; levy and collect agricultural income taxes; levy and collect taxes on incomes obtained from privately owned houses and other properties; collect taxes from houses and other properties owned by the regional administration; levy and collect taxes from employees of the regional administration and organizations; levy and collect commercial profit, employment taxes ,sales and excise taxes from business institutions in the region; and give special emphasis to animal resource and pastoral development; administer state land by respecting the right of pastoralist not to be displaced from their own lands.

5.2. Relations among Levels of Government in Afar Regional State

5.2.1. The Regional State Council vs Regional Executive Branches

The powers and functions of the Regional State Council include power of legislation in all matters assigned by this Constitution to the regional state jurisdiction; exercise the highest political authority in the internal affairs of the regional state; ratify agreements signed by the regional executive organ with neighboring regional states; elect the speaker and deputy speaker of the state council, and nominate the standing committee of the state council; nominate the regional state president from among members of the Regional State Council; ratify the

nomination of the deputy regional state president and members of the regional state administration council presented by the regional state president; ratify the appointment of the president and deputy president of the regional state supreme court presented by the regional state president; nominate the auditor general and deputy auditor general of the regional state; establish the judiciary organs of the region, Zone and Woreda administrations; set rules necessary to maintain peace and security of the regional state; establish the regional security and police forces; adopt the social and economic programs of the regional state; enact laws on the revenue sources of the regional state and ratify the regional budget and so on.

As stipulated under Article 56 of the 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State, the powers and functions of the Administrative Council include, ensure the implementation of laws and decisions adopted by the Regional State Council and the federal government; decide on the organizational structures of executive branches and other organs, coordinate their activities, control and provide leadership; draw up the annual regional budget and, implement it when approved by the Regional State Council; ensure the observance of law and order in the region, grant pardon as established by law; enact rules and regulations pursuant to the powers vested in it by the state council; prepare draft state of emergency and submit it to the Regional State Council; prepare conditions for the improvement of the living standards of pastoralists and carry out responsibilities that may be entrusted to it by the Regional State Council.

As mentioned above, the Regional State Council is the highest authority in the regional state and has the power of legislation on matters falling under state jurisdiction. The Regional State Council has five standing committees: Legal Administration Standing Committee, Budget Affairs Standing Committee, Capacity Building and Social Affairs Standing Committee, Pastoral Affairs Standing Committee and Women and Children Affairs Standing Committee.

There is some kind of mix-up in terms of power relation among the Regional State Council, the Regional President and the Administrative Council. This is because, the Revised Constitution of the regional state under Article 54 (2), stated that the Regional President and Administrative Council (heads of the state executive branches (Bureaus) are responsible to the Regional State Council. On the other hand, this constitution under Article 55 mentioned that the Administrative Council are responsible to the Regional State President. Although this kind of set up is not

unique to the Afar Regional State, participants of the interview asserted that the executive council's double accountability to the president and to the Regional State Council has undermined the power of the regional state president to take measures on regional state Bureau heads for whatever weaknesses or misconduct they exhibited. Such kind of power relation has its own impact on work performance and accountability of the executive branches which in turn adversely affect development endeavours in the region.

As a legislative organ of the regional state, the state council make laws on all matters in the region. According to a member of Legal Administration Standing Committee of the regional State Council interviewed during the field work in May 2018, Semera, laws are first initiated by the regional cabinet and send it to the speakers of the state council who send it back to the Legal Administration Standing Committee. This body together with law professionals evaluate the draft laws and check whether the contents are contradicting or comforming with the national and regional constitutions and other laws. Then, the draft is sent back to the speaker of the State Council. Finally, the draft laws are sent to the Regional State Council for approval.

Approving the regional budget is one of the powers and functions of the Regional State Council. As a procedure, the regional cabinet approve the draft budget and send it to the Budget Affairs Standing Committee. Then this organ of the Regional State Council evaluates the draft together with the regional Finance Bureau. Then the draft budget will be sent to the speaker of the state council. Then after the draft budget is sent to the Regional State Council for approval. Administrators and speakers of Woreda Councils of the 32 Woredas participate when the State Council discuss and approve the regional annual budget. This is because the budget of each Woreda is approved by the Regional State Council meeting. This gives Woreda administrators the opportunity to present ideas and ask questions. However, they have no power to vote.

The Regional State Council has been following up, controlling and supervising the performances of the executive branches. The council has been supervising what Regional Bureaus planned to perform in Woredas such as construction of health stations, health posts, schools, and roads, distribution of books and medicine, water infrastructural development like drilling of water holes. Participants of the interview mentioned that the regional sector Bureaus first send their plans and then progress reports on their plan accomplishment to the regional council.

Senior expert in Budget Afairs standing Committee of the Regional State Council explained that projects in each Woreda which require relatively big capital have been carried out by regional sector Bureaus. Sector Bureaus send reports on their plan accomplishments to the regional council on quarterly basis. Therefore, the State Council first evaluate the report and then standing committees to conduct field observation at least twice a year to check the match between reports and the actual works done on the ground. After looking at the gaps between plans and actual performances, the standing committee will provide feedback and tell to the concerned bodies that the Bureau has to accomplish delayed projects within specified time (Interview, 13 May, 2018, Semera).

The shared agreement among most participants of the interview and focus group discussions were that most projects have not been completed within the time that sector Bureaus have planned. In line with this, one of the directorate directors in the Regional Bureau of Finance and Economic Development reflected: "projects which regional Bureaus planned to accomplish in a year have been completed in three/four years because of capacity limitations and prevailing weak work performances". He further explained the problem:

> *Successful plan accomplishment among the various sector Bureaus is rare in the region. One of the reasons for the prevalence of weak work performance is absence of accountability. Although heads of sector Bureaus are responsible to the regional president in principle, the president cannot directly take measure on officials who do not properly discharge their responsibilities in practice because of two reasons. First, members of the administrative councils (Bureau heads) are also responsible to the Regional State Council. Secondly, they are nominated by the Regional State president and their appointment is approved by the Regional State Council. Therefore, to take measures on Bureau heads, first they have to be commented twice by the respective standing committee. Then the standing committee will take their cases to the president if they are unable to discharge their responsibilities as per the comments provided. Finally, the president will present it to the state council for decision. Therefore, any serious measure can be taken on heads of sector Bureaus only after their cases are presented to the Regional State Council. Even I have no information about any measure taken through this procedural approach so far (Interview, on 10 May, 2028, Semera).*

Another factor adversely affecting the power relation between the Regional State Council and the executive branches is absence of separation between party and government. In this Regard, member of Legal Administration Affairs of the Regional State Council interviewed in April, 2018, Semera asserted that most of the regional Bureau heads are members of the regional ruling

party. Even some of the heads occupy positions in the regional party, ANDP, and therefore taking measures on Bureau heads who failed to discharge their responsibilities is difficult. Although this experience is not someting unique to Afar Regional State and its impact may vary from one regional state to another, this reserch find out that the fusion of party and government at regional level has been seriously affecting the check and balance between the Regional State Council and the executive branches. This has been contributing for the prevalence of the problem of accountability and thesustenance of weak work performance which in turn adversely affects\ed the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State.

5.2.2. Zone Administration vs Woreda Executive Branches

Zone administration in Afar region serves as a bridge between the regional state executive organs and Woredas. Participants of the interviewsin the three sample Woredas mentioned that Zonal administrators are agents of the regional state president. According to an expert in zone four administration office interviewed in January 2018, Alelu,Zone Administrators are responsible to support, coordinate and control the activities of sector Woreda Offices in their respective Zones.He further mentioned that development and good governance issues are first communicated between the regional executive organs and Zonal administrators before moved down to Woreda executive branches. Structurally, Zone administrators and their deputies are members of the Regional State Council. This implies that Zone administrators have been participating in the process of making regional laws, policies and strategies. Zone administrators have working relations upward with the regional executive organs and downward with Woredas.

According to an expert in Zone one administration office interviewed in January 2018, Assaita, the structure of Zone administration in Afar Regional State is different from the experience of other regional states like Amhara and Oromia. He explained that Zones in Amhara and Oromia Regional States have development sector offices such as education, agriculture, health, water and finance. He further elaborated that Zone structures in Afar region have only administrative justice organs like Zone Administration Office, Zone ANDP Office, Zone Women and Youth League, Zone Police Department, Zone Justice, Zone Sheria, Zone Court, Zone Militia and Zone Prison. Article 56(2) of the 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State mentioned that the Regional State Council has the power to decide on the structures of the executive organs and other institutions. An expert in Zone three Administration Office interviewed in Feburary 2018,

Werer, mentioned thatbefore 2004, the structures of Zones in Afar Regional State were similar with other regional states. Later, based on the decision of the Afar Regional State Council, development sector offices were made to be only part of Woreda executive offices. The existence of development sectors at both Zonal and Woreda levels had enabled Woredas to get support from their respective Zones. Therefore, the new structural adjustment weakened the capacity of Zones both to support and coordinate the activities of executive branches in Woredas under their administrative jurisdiction which in turn impacted thedevelopment endavors in the Zone in particular and the regional state in particular.

According to Article 47 (1) of the 2002 Revised Constitution, the judicial organ of the regional state is structured into Regional Supreme Court, Zone Higher Courts and Woreda Courts. The Woreda Court is the lowest (first instance judicial organ of the regional state). The Regional State Supreme Court has the power of causation over any final court decision on state matters which contains a basic error of law. There have been vertical relations among levels of courts in the region. Accordingly, decisions rendered by lower courts are appealable to the Zone Higher Courts and then to the Regional State Supreme Court. In this regard, Zone Sheria and Zone courts have been deciding on cases appealed to them.

One of the experts in Zone four administration office, interviewed in January 2018, Kalwan town, stated that the Zone Administration plan its responsibilities of following up, supporting, controlling and supervising the activities of Woreda Executive Organs based on the plans of the regional state and the plans Woreda administrations. He further elaborated that the Zone administration support and push on Woredas to accomplish their tasks according to their plan andthe Zone administrator conduct meetings with Woredas on quarterly basis. Performance evaluations have been conducted every three months. Therefore, Woredas present their plan accomplishment report, tasks completed as per their plan, tasks not yet accomplished and the challenges encountered in the process. Then, the Zone administration send reports to the Regional Administration regarding the overall activities of Woredas based on reports it received from each Woreda and the supervisions it carried out. This process depicts the power relations among tiers of governments in Afar Regional State.

One of the experties of Zone One administration of the Afar Regional State explained the problems of the Zone administration to properly discharging its responsibilities as:

> *There are eight Woredas in the Zone and each Woreda has several sector offices. On the other hand, the Zone administration office has very limited human resource. As a result, the Zone has been unable to implement its plan of supporting, coordinating and controlling the activities of all sector offices in the Woreda under its jurisdiction. It has been difficult for the Zone administration even to properly evaluate the activities of the various sectors in the Woredas let alone providing adequate support. Had the Zone Administration been well structured and staffed with capable professionals like in other regional states such as Amhara/Tigray, the support it has been providing to Woredas under its jurisdiction would have been fruitful in enhancing the implementation capacity of Woreda executives. Therefore, the Zone administration has been performing what it can perform not what it has to perform mainly due to problem of Zonal structure and lack of human resources (Interview, 19 September, 2018, Assaita).*

Former regional state expert, currenly working in an international NGO interviewed in October 2018 at Awash 7 Kilo contend that zones in Afar region have no clearly defined responsibilities. He further elaborated that the powers and functions of Zonal administration are not mentioned in 2002 Revised Constitution of the Regional state. Zones have no constitutionally entrenched power to follow up and control activities of Woredas.But Zone administrators have been acting as agents of the regional state president discharging the responsibility of collecting reports from Woredas and sendingto the region administration.

The explanation provided by an expert in the Regional Bureau of Lragal Administration further strengthened the above idea. He mentioned that the constitution of Afar Regional State clearly stipulated that Woreda administrators are responsible to Woreda Councils and to the president of the regional state. On the other hand, Zones in the region have the mandate to follow up and control the activities of Woredas within their jurisdiction. However, Woredas in Zones have been supervised by and present reports to Zones without legal basis which support this relationship (Interview, 9 May, 2018, Semera).

Zones in Afar Regional State have no constitutionally entrenched power to discharge the responsibilities assigned to them. Because, Art.73 of the 2002 Revised Constitution mentioned that Woreda Administration is a government structure below the Afar National Regional State government. This implies that Zones in Afar Regional State have no constitutionally recognized powers and functions.

There is also overlap between the roles of Zone and Woreda administration. Zones have been supporting, following up and controlling activities in the Woredas. On the other hand, Woreda administrators have constitutionally entrenched power to follow up and control the activities of sector offices in the Woredas. Therefore, Zones in Afar Regional State need to have constitutionally recognized powers and functions and staffed with qualified professionals if they have to properly discharge their responsibilities.

5.2.3. Woreda Council vs Woreda Executive Branches

The Woreda Council is the highest authority at Woreda levels of government. In this regard, Art. 74(2) of the 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State mentioned that notwithstanding the rights and powers of each Woreda to administer itself, develop its area and decide on all matters that fall under its jurisdiction, the Woreda Council is the highest authority below the Regional State Council.

According to Art 76 of the 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State, the powers and functions of Woreda Council include investigate and ratify the draft economic development, social services and administrative work plans and programs in the Woreda; Follow up the implementation of basic animal resource development and pasture development, agricultural development in general, and natural resource conservation in the Woreda; Create conducive environment to motivate and mobilize the peoples in the Woreda for development; Elect and nominate the speaker and deputy speaker as well as the Woreda administrators from among members of the Woreda council; Approve the appointment of Woreda deputy administrator and members of the Woreda Administrative Council presented by the Woreda administrator; Enact its internal working procedures and rules; Ensure that agricultural income tax and other taxes are collected, use other service taxes and payments; Investigate and ratify its own budget, use the revenue sources of the Woreda outside the budget allocated and administered by the regional state; Pursuant to the federal and regional state constitutions, the Woreda Council could enact and implement rules which could enable to ensure peace and security in the Woreda; the right to call and question the Woreda authorities, and investigate the Woreda executive's conduct and discharge of responsibilities.

The 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State under Art 73 (1) made clear that the Woreda Council is comprised of representatives from each Kebele in the Woreda. Woreda officials in the sample Woredas interviewed during the field work in May and June, 2018 at Andodo, Assaita and Alelu, mentioned that the number of Woreda Council members depends on the number of Kebeles in a Woreda and each Kebele is represented by equal (five) number of elected representatives. For instance, the Woredas from which the data for this study collected have different number of Kebeles, Teru (12) Aminara Woreda (19) and Assaita Woreda (13) and hence the three Woredas have 60, 95 and 65 council members respectively.

Development activities have been carried out by Woreda and Kebele executive organs. The Regional State Constitution under Art 82 (1) mentioned that the Woreda Administration Council is the highest executive organ in a Woreda where it is established and it is responsible to the Woreda main administrator and Woreda Council. The Woreda Administration Council is comprised of the Woreda Main Administrator, Woreda Deputy Administrator and heads of the main sector offices established in the Woreda.

Some of the powers and functions of the Woreda Administrative Council include implement policies, laws, regulations, rules, plans and programmes of the federal and regional state governments; follow up and lead the activities of executive organs in the Woreda; maintain the peace and security of the Woreda, coordinate and lead the activities of police and security organs of the Woreda; Prepare and present the economic, social and administration plans to the Woreda Council for approval and implement when it get approved; conserve, care and develop the natural resources and motivate the people for develop work; Closely follow up and make appropriate conservation and care to every heritage found in the Woreda; Follow up the economic activities of pastoralists in the Woreda, work on animal resources, pasture development and similar issues in cooperation with the concerned bodies; Collect rural land use tax and other revenue in accordance with the law, study additional revenue sources and present it to the Woreda Council for approval and perform other activities given to it by the Woreda Council and the Regional State Council (Art (83) the 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State).

Art 85 (1) of the 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State mentioned that Woreda administrator is responsible to the Woreda Council and to the President of the Regional State. Some of the powers and functions of the Woreda administrators include represent the Woreda administration; chairs the meetings of the Woreda Council; Ensure that policies, laws, regulations, rules and programs of the federal and regional state governments are properly implemented in the Woreda; Coordinate, lead and control the activities of Kebeles and different institutions in the Woreda; Control the social services, economic development programmes and plans are timely prepared and follow up their implementation; Present continuous reports to Woreda Councils, Woreda Administrative Council and Higher Administrative Organs; and perform other activities given by the Woreda Council and the Regional State President.

The above power relation among the different organs in the Woredas is helpful to understand the pattern of their relation. The Woreda Council has the power to follow up and control the activities of the executive organs in the Woredas. The various sector offices in Woredas constitute the executive organs of Woredas. This organ of the Woreda administration is responsible to implement policies, laws, rules and development programmes. The Woreda council has the power to follow up, control and supervise the activities of the executive organs of the Woreda.

Expers in the three Woredas interviewed during the field work in January and Feburary, 2018, reported that the various Woreda sector offices send their working reports to the Woreda administrator every month. The Woreda council conduct meetings on quarterly basis (every three months) and undertake supervision (field observation) to check the match/mismatch between what Woreda sector offices have reported and what they have actually done on the ground. However, the interviewees argued that plan accomplishment of most of the sector offices have always been low. Moreover, supervisions and control conducted by Woreda Council Standing Committee on the activities of the executive organs (Woreda sector offices) have been unable to achieve their intended purposes, enhancing the productivity of the various sectors and bringing significant improvement in the livelihood of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in each Woreda.

An expert in Teru Woreda interviewed during the field work further elaborated the extent of the above problem as he stated hereunder:

> *The Woreda Council Standing Committee has been conducting field observations every three months for formality. The Committee has no power to take actions on office heads or their workers who failed to properly discharge their responsibilities beyond reporting the gaps observed to the Woreda administrator. We haven't seen any action taken on Woreda officials or workers who have been frequently absent from their workplace or those who exhibited clear disciplinary problems.For what purpose each sector offices did use the allocated capital budget has not been critically evaluated and there is no accountability based omevaluation of poor plan accomplishment. Many have been questioning the importance of conducting field observations and discussions in the council meetings due to its less contribution in improving the work performance of the executive organs (Interview, 12 January, 2018, Alelu).*

In line with this view, participants of FGDs reflected that budget allocation to the various sector offices has nothing to do with their annual plan for two main reasons. Firstly, since there is no accountability for failure to perform their duties, offices have been submitting unattainable annual plan only to get more budget. Budget has been allocated to sector offices without considering what offices have planned to accomplish in the fiscal year. Secondly, the capital budget allocated to each sector is small when compared to the recurrent budget (salary plus hardship allowance). Moreover, there is no strict follow up and control how sector offices have appropriated the capital budget. Even some office heads have been considering the capital budget as their own pocket money.

An expert in the Regional Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission further underscored that most of the heads of sector offices in Woredas have been at the same time member of the Woreda Council. Therefore, it is not easy to take measures on office heads when they failed to discharge their responsibilities or exhibit disciplinary problems. Although this experience is not unique to Afar Regional State, the support, supervision, follow up and control conducted by the Woreda Council and standing committee have little impact on enhancing the performance of sector offices due to absence of accountability (Interview, 4 May, 2018, Semera).The above explanations depicted the existing complexities to undertake proper check and balance between Woreda Council and executive organs (Woreda Offices). This in turn has its own adverse effects on the development efforts in Woredas in particular and the region in general.

5.3. Leadership Challenges among Levels of Governments

5.3.1. Leadership Capacity Gaps and Lack of Good Governance

5.3.1.1. Leadership Capacity Gaps

Similarly, (Amofa, et al., 2016), asserted that leadership is an important ingredient for high performance. They also added that leadership will continue to be an important tool in enhancing employees' competencies and relations, help increase employees output and making them efficient and effective. In this section, an attempt is made to examine the various leadership challenges at different levels of the Afar Regional State. FGD conducted with Semera University Instructors revealled the relationship between the leadership capacity gaps in Afar Regional State and institutionalization of ethnicity in the country. As one of the participants reflected:

> *Disregard of merits/capacity, ethnic representation in various positions of the legislative and executive organs has become the order of the day in the country due to the institutionalization of ethnicity in the Ethiopian federal system. Clan representation in Afar Regional State as version of ethnic representation (giving less concern to merit/capacity) has been adversely affecting the quality of leadership in the region. Absence of the culture of Assigning the right person on the right place has been one of the serious challenges in the region because clan representation has been serving as subjective criteria (whose clan has to be assigned on which position) while placing leaders at different levels of the regional state. This depicts that clientelism has remained to be a governance challenge in the regional state (FGD, 19 Feburary, 2018, Semera).*

He further explained that the prevailing clan politics in the region has enabled several individuals to occupy leadership positions in various regional Bureaus and Woreda Offices without having the required capacity which could enable them to properly lead, motivate, support, coordinate and control the various activities in the areas of their responsibilities. According to him this problem is by far serious in Woredas where leadership positions are held by individuals who do not pass-through modern education system. Such leaders failed to understand how the modern Bureaucracy works and how to lead activities in line with the development plans of the country in general and the regional state in particular.

Interviews and FGDs with members of the local community in the selected Woredas conducted in Janary, Feburary and March, 2018 pointedout thatkey positions at the different levels of government in the regional state have still been occupied by uneducated leaders. They contend that contextualizing federal policies and strategies into the regional reality is still a problem due

to the existing capacity limitation. They also underscored that there is a wide gap between the rhetoric empowering of the educated and the political reality on the ground. Only few young educated Afar who could tolerate the weaknesses and malpractices of the leadership have been given some key positions. As explained in chapter four, the involvement of the federal government particularly TPLF leaders in the regional affairs has paved the way for the empowerment of uneducated Afar elites.

Former member of the Legak Administration Standing Comittee of the regional state council interviewed in March, 2018 underscored that soon after they controlled the federal political power, TPLF leaders empowered uneducated Afars who collaborate with them during the armed struggle against the military regime. According to him, uneducated three key regional leaders (president, vice presedant and head of regional security administration bureau) were given the nickname; 'the trinity' had dominated the regional state politics for several years were. This has been deliberately done to secure the interests of the federal government in general and that of Tigray regional state in Afar in particular.This problem has been posing serious challenges on the development endeavors of the regional state.

According to an expert in the regional Bureau of Education interviewed in May 2018, Semera, position in the regional state have been occupied by the uneducated. Employment opportunities for educated Afars are gained through nepotism on condition that they will not challenge the working tradition of regional Bureaus and Woreda office practices. Individuals who got employment opportunity through this way are expected to remain silent even perform immoral practices if they had to sustain their job. Therefore, what matters is not whether Bachelor Degree/ Master's Degree holders are employed rather how the system created favorable conditions to apply what they have learned for the benefit of the Afar people and the development of the regional state.

The information gained from an expert in the Regional Bureau of Civil Service and Capacity further strengthened the above idea when he said/stated that leadership capacity gaps coupled with capacity limitation among civil servants has been adversely affecting the development of the regional state. According to the assessment conducted in May 2018 the number of civil servants in the regional state was 35, 211 out of which about 24,000 are below 12^{th} grade complete. This implies that most of the occupational positions in the region are still held by

individuals who do not have the required competency. The number of civil servants in the region is large but small proportions of workers have the capacity that their position requires (Interview 7 January, 2018, Semera).

In general, the information obtained through qualitative data gathering instruments depicted that capacity problems in the Afar National Regional State have seriously affected the development efforts of the region. Although some training activities were carried out, they were not planned and need based, and ill-implemented. The capacity limitation of Afar Regional State leadership presented and discussed above was further corroborated by the survey results gathered through the administration of survey questionaire. Table 14.5 below depicts the level of respondents' agreement and disagreement.

Table 14.5: Capacity of Afar Regional State Leadership

Do you believe that the regional leadership at all levels have capacity limitations?			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Yes	311	88.9
	No	39	11.1
	Total	350	100.0

As we deduce from Table 14.5 above, the percentage of respondents who believed that the leadership of Afar Regional State has capacity limitation is 311 (88.9%) which is greater than others who believed the opposite, 39(11.1%). As shown in Table 15.5 below, respondents were asked about the manifestations of leadership capacity limitations in Afar Regional State.

Table 25.5 Manifestations of Leadership Capacity Limitations in Afar Regional State

If your answer to question (Table14.5) is Yes, what are the manifestations of leadership problem in the region?

		Responses	
		N	Percent
Yes Count	Capacity limitation to discharge the responsibilities that the positions they held requires	279	24.3%
	Prevalence of corruption and bad governance as well as working for self-interest	298	26%
	Inability to move out of clan mentality and making of bias decisions to one's clan	293	25.6%
	Change resistance and inability to move out of traditional practices	276	24.1%
Total		1146	100.0%

As we infer from table 15.5 above, the manifestations of capacity limitations among the leadership of Afar Regional State are inability to discharge responsibilities that the position they held requires, prevalence of corruption and bad governance in the regional state, inability to be fee of clan biasedness and change resistance and being stick to the traditional practices. The table also depicts that the relative percentage of respondents who believe that the prevalence of corruption and bad governance are the manifestations of leadership capacity limitation in Afar Regional State is relatively higher than others, followed by problems related to clannism.Therefore, the data obtained through both qualitrative and qualitative sources indicated that leadership capacilty limitation at different levels of government in the region is one the challenges contributing for the less socio-economic development in Afar Regional State.

5.3.1.2. Lack of Good Governance

Ggovernance refers to "*the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development*" (IFAD, 1999, p.1).In chapter four, it was discussed that absence of accountability is a seriousproblem in Afar region. Therefore, the researcher has tried to examine the practice of governance in Afar Regional State. Interviews and

FGDs with the local community conducted in January, Fedurary and March in the selected Woredas and the regional state capital, Semera, pointed out that that lack of good governance has been challenging the development endeavors in the region.This problem has been manifested in different ways and ithas been echoed in every speech of the public. Absence of accountability characterized the regional state government at all levels. In this Regard an expert in the regional Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission interviewed at the begining Janyary, 2018, Semeraasserted:

> *Absence of accountability has created favorable condition for the prevalence of corruption in the region. Corruption has been manifested in different forms like misappropriation of public resources for private gain, development of rent seeking attitude, bribe and nepotism. The budget allocated for the various sectors has not been properly used for the intended purpose. Those who have the power to manage government budget and resources used this opportunity to benefit themselves, their relatives and to produce partners. The existing gap in budget utilization is well known but higher officials in the region do not have the moral to control the middle and lower-level leaders because many of them are also corrupted. The problem sustained until today due to absence of accountability (Interview, 2 January, 2016, Semera).*

The problem of misuse of available resources by Afar Regional State presented and discussed above was further substantiated by the quantitative data. Table 16.5 below portrays the respondents' agreement or disagreement regarding proper utilization of resources by Afar Regional Stat

Table 6.5: Resource Utilization in Afar Regional State

The regional state government properly used the conditional grant, and the revenues it collected from all income sources for the development of the regional state			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	72	20.6
	Disagree	178	50.9
	Undecided	13	3.7
	Agree	61	17.4
	Strongly Agree	26	7.4
	Total	350	100.0

As we see from table 16.5 above, the percentage 250 (71.4%) of respondents who expressed absence of proper utilization resources in Afar Regional State is greater than others 87 (24.9%) and the remaining 13 (3.7 %) of the respondents were unable to decide. Therefore, both the qualitative and quantitative data showed that misuse of available resources is still a problem in Afar Regional State. Resources which had to be used for the improvment of the lives of the community have been appropriated by leaders at different levels of government in the region.

One incidence witnessed by an expert in Zone three Administration Office could clearly show the prevalance of absence of accountability and misuse use of public money. According to him, the concern of many Afar empowered to a certain position is not primarily to work hard for the development of the regional state. Rather they exerted much effort to benefit themselves and to fill the pockets of their relatives. For instance, in the 2018 fiscal year, the deputy administrator of Zone three helped his own brother (contractor) to win the bid by lobbing cabinet members of Gewane Woreda. The contractor won a project worth of 400,000 Birr. However, the contractor was unable to finish the project within the fiscal year. Then the deputy administrator reported to the Woreda Cabinet that the budget allocated to the project found to be too small. Motreover, he asked the Cabinet to approve additional 850,000 Birr from the next year annual budget for the same project. Some of the members of the Woreda Cabinet opposed the new proposal arguing that even the 400,000 Birr capital was more than enough for the project and this misunderstanding created chaos. Finally, the issue was presented to the Woreda Council and the Council cancelled the new budget request for the project. Later, the deputy Zone administrator using his position arrested those who bitterly opposed his corrupt proposal were imprisoned for about five months without being accused. They suffered a lot although the families and relatives of the arrested presented the case to the concerned bodies. This case shows absence of accountability has been enabling those in power to do whatever they want to do and how corrupt actions have been adversely affecting the development efforts in the region(Interview, 11 Feburary,2018, Awash 7 Kilo*).*

The statement of an expert in the bureau of Agriculture and Pastoralist Affairs reiterated by another official:

> *Per-diem payment has been served as a meansof supporting individuals instead of appropriating budgets for the intended purpose. This payment has been made to individuals who are not sent by their institution for government work. The amount of money paid to those who actually go to Woreda, Zone or Region is not fair. If someone left his Office/ Bureau for three days work, he will be paid for twenty days. Therefore, such a worker will stay at his home for the next twenty days and come back as if he/she has stayed in the field, town or city until the due date for which he received the par-diem payment (Interview,2 March,2018, Semera).*

Interview and FGDs with the local community in the three selected interviewed during the field work in Feburary and March, 2018 ascertained that officials and workers in the region have been committed to maximize their own benefits by misusing the budget allocated to them which as a result they failed to be responsive to the needs and interests of the community as well as the development of the regional state.They described that their leaders have been prioritizing their own interest at the expense of the needs and problems of the community. They added that leaders do not move down to the community for the purpose of listening their voice; understand their problems and try to address based on their priority. Furthermore, they explained that leaders have been doing things in a campaign form than performing their duties in a planned manner. It is difficult to think about effectiveness and efficiency in such working environment because resources have not been used for the intended purposes which as a result working outputs cannot meet the interests of the community.

According to the views of an expert in the regional Education Bureau interviewed in December 2017, Semera, regional state officials who prosper themselves have become wrong role model to the young generation. Nowadays, the wish of educated youth is to be the head of a certain Bureau and to become rich instead of serving their community. He asserted that before few years most educatedAfar were fighting the wrong practices of regional officials. However, these days many young people stopped criticizing the government at different levelsand started approaching officials in search of promotion which would enable them fulfill their own interest.

According to an expert in the Afar Language Research and Settlement village interviewed in Feburary 2018, Semera,the Afar proverb regarding relationship is that “You have to establish close relationship with someone who is good to you and not because he/she is your blood

relative". He contended that contrary to this kind of thinking, clannism/tribalism and locality have become serious problems challenging the development endeavours in Afar region. These problems have been manifested in different ways such as in the process of hiring employees and in the provision of social services. Interviews and FGDs with members of the local community in the selected Woredas and the regional capital attested that the prevalence of tribalism and thinking locally have been adversely affecting the internal cohesion among Afar and the development of the regional state.For instance, an expert in Assaia Woreda Education Office who participated in the FGD reflected:

> *When a parson from a certain clan is empowered to a key position, members of the clan to which he is born will be guaranteed to get employment opportunity. This is because providing priority to one's clan member has become a common practice in the region. The existing system has been compromising capacity to blood relationship in the process of hiring employees. Once a clan member is hired to a certain position, he will serve the interest of the official who helped him to get his job. Moreover, someone hired in this way will keep/ hide the secrets and malpractices of the one who helped him to get employment opportunity (FGD, on 23 June 2018, Assaita).*

In chapter six it is discussed that clannism has its own contribution in intensifying clan conflict which adversely affect the internal cohesion among Afar. When someone belonging to a certain clan is removed from power, due to certain reason, he usulally tells to his clan members that he lost that position because he belonged to clan x. He also tells to members of his clan that a person from clan y is the one who conspire against him. This situation might cause conflict between members of clan X and clan Y.

Interviews conducted in the selected Woredas in March 2018, ascertained that thinking locally among officials has become the order of the day in Afar region. Unequal treatment of different areas has been creating local cleavage in the regional state. University instructors who participated in the FGDreported that Council and Cabinet members have been favouring Kebeles/Woredas from which they came from.In this Regard one of the the participants of FGD asserted that the development of local mentality (favoring ones villagize) has been adversely affecting thefair redistribution of available resources in Afar region. Bureau or Office heads wants to give better social services to their own birth place at the expense of other local areas. For instance, someone working in the regional education Bureau wants to increase the delivery of education service to the areas where he came from by constructing more schools. Heads of

other sector Bureaus and Offices have been doing the same. Such practices have been violating the development right of the community living in certain areas while enabling other areas disproportionately get access to different social services(FGD, on 19 Feburary, 2018, Semera University).

The problem related to favoring one's clan and the local areas from where leaders came from at the expense of others presented and described above was further complemented by the data obtained through the administration of questionnaire. Table 17.5 below depicts the level of agreement and disagreement regarding clannism and favoring ones local area.

Table 17.5: Problems of Clannism and Favoring ones local area

The leaders of Afar Regional State have been equally serving free of clannism and Favoring ones local area (not giving special favor to one's clan or the local area to which they belong			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	126	36.0
	Disagree	137	39.1
	Undecided	14	4.0
	Agree	47	13.4
	Strongly Agree	26	7.4
	Total	350	100.0

As we infer from Table 16.5 above, the percentage 263(75.1%) of respondents who believed that clannism and favoring ones local area are problems challenging the development of Afar Regional state is greater than those who believed the opposite, 73(20.9%) and the remaining 14(4.0%) were unable to decide. Therefore, both the qualitative and quantitative data ensured that clannism and favoring one's own local area are problems in the regional state.Such experience has been adversely affecting the internal cohesion and the development of the regional State.

5.3.2. Decline of the Role of the Traditional Leadership

Prah (2007), contend that democracy succeeds best when it wears and acknowledges the specific historical and cultural realities of the society in question. However, the existence of incoherent institutional systems is undermining the democratization process in the continent of African (Kidane, 2011).The FDER Constitution under Art 34 (5) and the Revised Constitution of Afar National Regional State under Art 33(5) stipulated that citizens can resort to religious or customary laws in cases of personal and marital disputes. Under Article 63, the Constitution of ANRS also allows for the establishment of councils of elders to be associated with each tier of the regional administration. Moreover, the Constitution of ANRS under Article 65 formally recognizes religious and customary courts which existed and functioning prior to the formal issuance of the constitution. In this case, the federal and the regional constitutions gave recognition to religious and customary laws in relation to specific issues related to dispute. However, the role and functions of traditional leadership in the politico-governance of the federal government is not clearly stated in the respected constitutions.Therefore, this section tried to shade light how the Afar Regional State has integrated the traditional leadership with the modern governance system so as to make use of the positive contribution of former.

As per Article 63 of the Revised Constitution of Afar National Regional State advisory institution was established at all levels of the regional administration. Usually, members of Advisory Council are the traditional community leaders. Accordingly, three selected community leaders constitute the Kebele Advisory Council. The Woreda Advisory Committee is composed of one representative from each Kebele. Therefore, the number of Woreda Advisory Committee varies depending up on the number of Kebeles that a particular Woreda has. Similarly, each Woreda Advisory Council selects three representatives to sit on a Zonal Advisory Council and each Zonal Advisory Council selects three of its members for Regional Advisory Council.

The shared agreement among regional and Zonal officials was that the Advisory Councils at all levels of regional state administration have been served as a bridge between government administrations and the community. Members of the regional, Zonal and Woreda Advisory Councils have the responsibility of providing feedback on government plans; performance reports and communicates the concern of their communities to the administration so that it will be considered in government plans and actions.

Regional, Zonal and Woreda (in Zone One, three and Four) officials interviewed during the field work in January, Feburary and March, 2018, mentioned that senior members of the advisory councils have been paid honorarium from the levels of government they have been providing advisory support. They reported that fifteen (three from each Zone) advisors to the regional government have been paid about 7000 Ethiopian Birr which is equal to the salary paid to the members of the Regional State Council. Members of the advisory council to the Zonal administration have been paid about 6000 Birr. However, the honorarium being paid tomembers of the Woreda Advisory Council is not uniform. For instance, in Teru Woreda out of the six advisors, the two senior advisors have been paid 5,270 Birr as honorarium which is equal to the salary of members of the Woreda Council, one advisor has been paid 4000 Birr, and still the other 3000 Birr and the remaining two have been paid 1967 Birr.

According to participants of the interviews in the selected Woredas and the regional state capital, interviewed in March, 2018, there is an overlap between the formal state apparatus and traditional institutions in the Afar Regional State. Several traditional leaders were incorporated in to the modern administration system. Ttraditional leaders who were not incorporated into the new system initially opposed the establishment of modern government structures in the region. This was because they began to lose their traditional roles and powers following the introduction of the modern administration system. The regional state administrators at all levels cannot push clan leaders out of the governance system because of two reasons. First, clan leaders have wide social acceptance and influence among the community. Second, it has been difficult to perform government activities without the cooperation of clan leaders. Thus, there have been attempts to convince such clan leaders through discussions and trainings to make the relation between the two systems of administration smooth. Payment of honorarium is one of the mechanisms of handling clan leaders.

The shared agreement among participants of the interview and focus group discussions was that clan leaders have been serving as an important bridge between the administration and the community. Regional, Zonal and Woreda officials interviewed during the field work in Feburary and March 2028mentioned that governments at all levels of the regional state have been working in cooperation with the traditional leaders. The traditional leaders participate in council meetings and served as an advisory body to the formal administration at all levels of government. They

further mentioned that the traditional leaders have far-reaching political, social and economic functions. They move down to motivate the community whenever the administrations want the community to do something. Particularly, they have been playing crucial roles in maintaining peace and order and in the process of resolving disputes. In this regard, an expert in the regional Justice Bureau reflected:

> *Traditional leaders still have been playing an important role in resolving conflicts. Almost all civil cases have been judged by the traditional court system. Courts encouraged the involvement of the traditional court system because it reduced the burden on the litigation process in regular courts. Only few cases found their way to the modern court system. Conflicting parties who wanted their case to be judged by the modern court system will not have the opportunity to take their case back to the traditional judges. Thus, whenever conflicts arise between two parties, traditional judges announce courts or police that such cases will be decided by them. Most of the conflicting parties in the community prefer their case to be decided by the traditional judges (Interview, on 25 January, 2018, Semera).*

Senior expert in the Regional Education interviewed in Feburary 2018, Semera explained that the role of traditional leaders in social affairs is still very important. They support the government in motivating members of the community to send their children to school and in getting the return of dropout students. According to him, traditional leaders communicate the plans of the government to the community and motivate members to participate in development activities. He further explained the weakness of the administration at different levels to maximize the role of traditional leaders in a manner not contradicting with the modern governance system.

In chapter two, literatures revealled that power is decentralized to make government close to the people, understand their problems and interests and to find out possible solutions. As mentioned above traditional leaders have been serving as a bridge between the administration and the local community. However, the systems of governance in Afar Region failed to address the problems of the community even though both the traditional and modern leadership are working in cooperation. According to interviews and FGDs with members of the community conducted during the field work in in March 2018, in the past traditional leaders were creating pressure on the government to defend the interests of their community but currently they failed to do the same because of the incentives that they have been getting from the government. This depicts that the co-option of traditional elites by the political elites undermined the possibility of the

former emerging as moral authorities. Regarding this issue, former member of the regional state council underlined:

> *Members of the community are not happy because government bodies and traditional leaders have been trying to hear the voice of the community in a campaign form instead of discharging their responsibilities in a consistent manner. In the past, traditional leaders had strong commitment in defending the interests of the community. However, they become reluctant after the government started paying honorarium to the influential clan leaders. As a result, they have been playing the role of silencing the voice of the community instead of expressing the grievances of the community to the government at different levels. Even some times, we are asking the question "do the traditional leader stood for the government at the expense of the interests and problems of the community they have been representing for several years?"(Interview, on 5 March, 2018, Semera).*

The decline of the powers of the traditional leaders presented and described above was further corroborated by the quantitative data. Table 18.5 below shows the respondents' agreement and disagreement about the status of traditional leaders in Afar Regional State.

Table 18.5: The Status of Traditional Leaders in the Regional State

Traditional leaders have been playing significant roles in defending the interests of the community they are representing			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	83	23.7
	Disagree	170	48.6
	Undecided	15	4.3
	Agree	57	16.3
	Strongly Agree	25	7.1
	Total	350	100.0

As we infer from Table 18.5 above, the percentage of respondents who believed that traditional leaders have not been defending the interests of the community, 253(72.3%) is greater than others, 82(23.4%) and the remaining 15 (4.3 %) of the respondents are unable to decide. Therefore, both the qualitative and quantitative data revealed out that unlike their past experience, nowadays, the role traditional leaders in defending the interests of the community has declined. This implies that the chance of the people to create pressure on the government

through their tradional leaders has been weakening from time to time which as a result the efforts the regional state to address the problems of the people has remained to be insignificant.

5.3.3. Non-Inclusion of the Educated, Youth and Women

5.3.3.1. Non-Inclusion of Educated Afar

Education is an important component of social and economic development. Despite of this reality, data obtained from both qualitative and quantitative sources indicated that Afar regional State government has not been properly using the contribution of educated Afars to the socio-economic transformation of the regional state in general and improvment of the living conditions of the pastoral and agro-pastoral communities.

Interviews conducted with regional, Zonal and Woreda leaders, members of the regional state council, retired workers, former members of parties in the region interviewed in Feburary and March, 2018, asserted that there were no educated Afars when the regional state was established following the introduction of federal restructuringin the country. As a result, leadership positions in the region at all levels of government were held by uneducated leaders. They furtherexplained that the expansion of education opportunity has enabled several young Afar to get their first and second degree.However, participants of the FGD at Semera University asserted that educated Afars were not allowed to join the regional state Bureaucracy; rather the existing system has excluded them. The various regional Bureau headswhom the researcher asked to explain the role and or the participation of educated Afars in the regional politics and administration mentioned that educated Afarshavebeen excludeduntil recent time. They mentioned that it was in the last two/three years that the regional state government started to incorporate educated Afar in to regional administration. An expert in the regional ruling party, ANDP, reported that currently almost all deputy heads of Regional State Bureaus are educated Afar. He further elaborated that:

> *In the past the participation of educated Afars in the regional party and in the leadership of regional administration was low because first they were very few in number and Secondly the political climate opened no room for the participation of educated Afar. Efforts have been made to enhance the participation of educated Afars in the regional politics due to the increasing number of educated Afar in recent years. The ruling party in the region started to bring educated Afar to leadership position particularly after the 2015 regional election. These days few educated Afar have been actively participating in the regional party.*

> *However, only those educated Afar who could tolerate malpractices committed by uneducatedleaders have been allowed to participate. This implies that the system has been still pushing educated Afar who have better experience and academic preparation and who could contribute to the development endeavors in the region (Interview, on 14 Feburary, 2018, Semera).*

The information gained from other experts in some way contradictory to the above idea. For an expert in the regional Justice Bureau mentioned that the political system in the region did not allow educated Afar to actively participate in the regional politics. Since the fall of the military regime the regional politics has been dominated by members of the Tigray Afar Liberation Front which was organized by TPLF in order to enhance the interests of TPLF in Afar Region. Therefore, key positions in the party and the leadership in the regionaladministration have been held by those who participated during the armed struggle against the military regime. These officials deliberately pushed educated Afar out of the regional politics because they wanted to maintain their position. They believe that they will lose their power and influence in the regional politics and administration if significant numbers of educated Afar are absorbed into the system (Interview, on 5 Feburary 2018 Semera).

The above idea was reiterated by senior expert in Zone four administrations Office when he described that the former regional president who ruled the regional state for more than tfifteeen years had no modern education background. Most of the leadership positions in the regional state have been held by uneducated individuals. Almost all Woreda Office heads, members of the Woreda Administrative Council and Woreda Council are still held by uneducated Afars. Hence, the regional state has not been benefitted from its educated sons and daughters. The system of administration has made educated Afar strange in the affairs of their own region. The regional ruling party and government did not try to make use of the knowledge and skills of educated Afar for the development of the regional state. They knew that the educated will challenge the traditional practices instead of accepting whatever orders come from those who have been influencing the regional politics (Interview, on 17 January, 2018, Kalwan).

FGD conducted with members of the local community in Amibara Woreda also attested thart most of the leadership positions at all levels of government in the regional state has been still occupied by the uneducated. For instance, an expert in Amibara Woreda Civil Service and Capacity Building Office who participated in the focus group discussion contendsthat political

commitment and loyalty have remained to be the requirement for the assignment of individuals on key positions at all levels of the regional state government. Knowledge and capacity gaps have been forgone for the sake of placing those who will remain loyal to corrupted senior regional, Zonal and Woreda administrators (FGD, on 4 March, 2018, Andido).

Loyalty and clannism have been used as important criteria for the appointment of civil servants in the regional state. Bureau heads and their deputies have never been competed based on meritocracy. Rather, individuals have been placed in such positions based on the loyalty they exhibited to the regional leadership. Sometimes capable Afar youth were appointed but they have been discharged from their positions when they try to challenge the statuesque. *To hold key* positions in the regional state government, educated Afar should show absolute loyalty to the regional leadership, blindly accept whatever comes from the leadership and should not try to fight against corruption, challenge and question the decisions of the leadership (Interview, Participants, March, 2018, Andido, Assaita, Alelu, Semera).

The exclusion of educated Afar presented and described above was further corroborated by the quantitative data. Table 19.5 below portrays the respondents' agreement of disagreement regarding the place of educated Afar in their regional politics.

Table 19.5: Exclusion of Educated Afar in the political Leadership

Educated Afar have been drawn into the leadership position at different levels of government in Afar Regional State			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	23	6.6
	Disagree	47	13.4
	Undecided	7	2.0
	Agree	186	53.1
	Strongly Agree	87	24.9
	Total	350	100.0

As we deduce from Table 19.5 above, the percentage of respondents who expressed that educated Afar have been pushed out of the regional politics, 273(78%) is greater than others who disagreed, 70(20%) and only few of the respondents chose undecided. In general, the ideas

discussed above showed that the participation of educated Afar in the social, economic, and political affairs of their own regional state is still less. Had they been allowed to invest their knowledge and skills their contribution would have brought changes in various sectors. Therefore, exclusion of educated Afar in the regional political and development efforts is one of the factors contributing for the underdevelopment of the regional state.

5.3.3.2. Non-Inclusion of Youth

Youth are now more widely seen as key players in country development and global stability. The youth are not only the leaders of tomorrow but are the drivers of change today. The voice of the youth in catalyzing positive change is very important particularly in developing countries where there are daunting challenges like poverty, lack of employment and limited access to education (USAID, 2014). The UN has long recognized that young people are a major human resource for development and key agents for social change, economic growth and technological innovation (DFID–CSO Youth Working Group, 2010). The speeches of the UN Secretary General further strengthened the above explanations:

> *"We must fulfill our obligations to youth. The World Programme of Action for Youth asks Governments to consider the contributions of the young people on all policies affecting them. Governments must honor this commitment. They must also increase the financial, education and technical support made available to young people…It is high time that we stopped viewing our young people as part of the problem and started cultivating their promise and potential."*
> *(Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary General, and International Youth Day 2007)*

The Ethiopian Youth Policy endorsed at the 100th FDRE Council of Ministers regular meeting held on 12 March 2004, that the federal government has undertaken measures that could enable the youth to be citizens with democratic outlook, professional competence, skill and ethics, so that they can actively, efficiently and widely participate in and benefit from the country's ongoing activities that are aimed at attaining a democratic system and accelerated development. In order to realize this mission, the government has tried to solve the existing institutional and policy gaps. To this effect, the Ministry of Youth, Sports and culture was established to follow up, direct and coordinate youth affairs at federal level. Similarly, Youth Bureaus have also been organized in regional states (FDRE-NYP, 2004). This policy document described that the policy aims at enabling the youth to participate in an organized manner in the process of building a

democratic system, good governance, and development endeavors and benefit fairly from the outcomes (Ibid).

In the light of the roles and contributions of the young for socio-economic development and democratization process, this section has tried to examine how the Afar regional state government has been trying to maximize the contribution of the youth. In terms of government structure, there was the Youth and Women Affairs Bureau which was later restructured as the Youth and Sport Commission. This structural arrangement seems to show the focusof the regional state administration to the interests of the youth at least in principle. However, the information obtained from various sources indicated that the Afar Youth have been excluded and have not been benefitted from the development endeavors in the region.

The shared agreement among the youth living in the three sample Woredas interviewed during the field work was that the regional state administration at all level have not been trying to facilitate recreational services to the youth. These ideas are substantiated by the researcher's personal observation. For instance, in the capital of Teru Woreda, Alelu, there was no power supply and very few individuals have generators they used it for different purposes. In this town, the researcher observed a certain Cafeteria where the youth served only chat, Cigarette, water and soft drinks. Many young usually pass the very hot time of the day (12:00 A.M to 3:00 P.M) in that Cafeteria by chewing Chat and chatting each other. Because of lack of power, the television in that cafeteria provides service starting only at 2:00 P.M to transmit news broadcasted in Afar language. The researcher observed that customers of the Cafteria were requested to pay three Ethiopian Birr to watch whatever was transmitted for an hour between 2:00 and 3:00 P.M (Personal observation, January, 2018, Alelu)

The capital of Amibara Woreda, Andido which was established in 2006 on the main Addis Ababa- Djibouti road has no cafeteria or any other recreational places for the youth. Similarly, the youth in the old town of Assaita also mentioned that the Woreda administration has no concern about the provision of recreational services for the youth. From the interviews with young people in the Woredas and the regional capital, the overriding consensus was that the administration at all levels of the regional state have failed when it comes to giving due consideration to the affairs of the youth. For instance, accoding to one young, the affairs of the Afar youth have been forgotten. The regional state has huge resources but the administration had

no plan to facilitate conditions for the benefit of the youth. He further elaborated that, absence of micro-finance institutions particularly in the Woredas from which the young could get loans is one of the factors exacerbating the problems of the youth. Very few young have got employment opportunities in the various projects such as Tendaho and Kesem sugar factories, SVS Salt Processing PLC. Some organized young are engaged in filling and sewing salt sacks at Afdera Salt Production because they have no money to directly engage in the salt business. Had the Regional State administrators been concerned about problems of the youth in the region, they would have created mechanisms of organizing the youth, provide loans and support us in many ways to make us productive (Interview, on 3 May, 2018, Assaita).This sentiment was voiced by the youth participating in the FGD as:

> *In the past many people coming from other regional states were employed in the various institutions. But this time, many young Afar have become jobless even after graduating from higher institutions. The salt business at Asale was controlled by one military officer until the 2018 reform. The voice of the Afar youth was stifled and many young who tried to openly criticize and oppose the unjust practices found their way to a prison at Abala Woreda which the Afar called it "**the Second Guantanamo**" and will imprisoned for months even without being accused. Following the reform in 2018 the youth from all Woredas revolted and expressed their dissatisfaction and the regional state was forced to take the Asale salt land from the officer and promised to distribute the land to organized youth. This shows that the resources in the region have been appropriated by few individuals and the youth were made observers. This in turn tells us that the administration in the region have been providing less due consideration to the interests and problems of the youth (FGD, on 15 June, 2018, Semera).*

Furthermore, Afar youth argued that many young from other regional states particularly Tigray and Amhara came to their region and engaged in many business activities because they have the opportunity to get loans from their respective regional states. According to them, most of the owners and drivers of Bajaj Car in almost all towns in Afar region are Tigrayans and Amhara's. Employment opportunities in urban investments like hotel services are incompatible with the Afar Culture. Therefore, the efforts of the regional state administration at all levels in organizing the youth and creating jobs to enable the youth benefit from the development endeavors in the region were weak (Interview Participant, June, 2018, Logia).

The above ideas are substantiated by the information gained from different officials in the region. For instance, senior expert in the Regional Bureaue of Finance and Economic Development interviewed in March 2018 explained that absence of micro-finance institutions in the Woredas is a setback for micro and small enterprise development strategy. The shared agreement among experts in the finance and economic development Offices in the three Woredas was that Woredas in Afar region had no micro-finance institutions. They underscored that there was no attempt even to identify the number of unemployed youths in each Woreda before 2016. Following the 2016 youth unrests and uprisings in Oromia and Amhara regional states, the the Federal Government of Ethiopia enacted the Ethiopian Youth Revolving Fund under the proclamation No.995/2017 and allocated 10 billion Birr budget for job creation and development of the youth. They explained that the Afar share from this revolving fund was 206 million Birr. Registration of the unemployed youth and training started after the federal government announced its plan of releasing this fund (Interview Participant, June, 2018, Andido, Assaita, Alelu and Semera).

Taking the experience of Assaita Woreda will be helpful to understand the extent of the problem. An expert in the Woreda Civil Service and Capoacity Building Office mentioned:

> *Assaita Woreda is one of the Woredas which has many jobless young. 8761 young were registered but 350 of them were organized into 25 associations. Each association was planned to comprise only 5 members but practically between 6-20 members were organized in each association. Moreover, out of the 25 associations only 6 associations organized in businesses like fuel distribution, Bajaj transport, environmental protection, Car washing, waste disposal and urban cleaning and hairdressing were allowed to use the revolving fund in the first phase. The plan was to start with these associations and to extend the experience gained to other associations (Interview, on 27 March, 2018, Assaita).*

The revolving fund was released in 2016 following the unrest among the youth in different parts of the country. However, after a year, the researcher heard radio news broadcasted by FM Addis 97.1 on 13 August 2017 that Benishangul-Gumuz and Afar Regional States have never used the revolving fund sent for job creation to the youth. According to the news, out of the 10 billion Birr, the federal government released 4 billion Birr to all regional states in the first phase. The news made clear that the remaining 6 billion Birr will be released based on the performance report of each regional state. The delay in organizing the youth and providing training will have its own impact on the amount of fund to be released in the next phase. Therefore, it is possible to

conclude that inability to use the available fund is one of the manifestations of the regional state's weakness in making the youth benefited from the national resources. This in turn will have a significant impact on the participation of the youth and the socio-economic transformation of the regional state.

The exclusion of the youth presented and described above was further substantiated by the quantitative data. Table 20.5 below depicts the respondents' agreement of disagreement regarding the attention given to Afar youth by the regional state government.

Table 3.5: The Youth in Afar Regional State

The regional state has been giving special attention to the youth in creating employment opportunities and fulfilling other facilities			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	98	28.0
	Disagree	153	43.7
	Undecided	9	2.6
	Agree	67	19.1
	Strongly Agree	23	6.6
	Total	350	100.0

As we deduce from Table 20.5 above, the percentage of respondents who expressed that the Afar Regional State government has marginalized Afar youth , 251(71.7 %) is greater than others who disagreed, 90(25.7 %) and only few of the respondents, 9(2.6%) chose undecided. Therefore, the data obtained through qualitative and quantitative sources attested that theperformance of the regional state in making the youth benefited from the avaliable reaources is weak. Inability to ensure the benefits of the youth and their active involvment in the development endavors in is one of the factors contributing for the less socio-economic developmen of Afar Regional State.

5.3.3.3. *Non-Inclusion of Women*

Women produce half the food in some parts of the developing world, bear most of the responsibility for household food security, and make up a quarter of the work force in industry and a third in service and therefore, improving women's productivity can contribute to growth, efficiency, and poverty reduction (World Bank, 1994). Thus, development strategies have to give due consideration to the role of women in society because it leads to higher productivity and more efficient use of resources and contributes to environmentally sustainable development.

Nowadays, development projects began to view women as active participants rather than passive recipients of development aid. Policy initiatives emphasized women's access to training, credit and employment in order to improve women's contribution to and their capacity to benefit from development (UN, 1999).Therefore, Gender equality is both a requirement for effective, responsive and accountable democratic societies, and a means of increasing the credibility and legitimacy of elected institutions (UNDP, 2016).

The Ethiopian National Policy on Women formulated in 1993, aimed to create appropriate structures within government offices and institutions to establish equitable and gender-sensitive public policies (World Bank, 1998).Ethiopia is one of Africa's fastest growing economies, and recent political and economic reforms recognize the importance of empowering women and increasing their labor force participation. Interventions for women in Ethiopia largely consist of ad hoc and unconnected self-standing projects, which, if continued, will remain gender neutral and ineffective in delivering benefits to women (Ibid).

Women and Children Affairs Standing Committee is one of the five standing committees of Afar Regional State Council. Bureau of Women and Children Affairs and Office of Women and Children Affairs were established at Regional and Woreda level respectively as organs of governments of the Afar Regional State Administration. Structurally, the regional Bureau of Women and Children Affairs is organized into three Core Processes namely, Women's Inclusiveness and Beneficiary Core Process, Child Right and Welfare Core Process and Women's Movement Core Process. Participants in the interview mentioned that the main objective of the regional Bureau and Woreda Offices of Women's Affairs include bringing attitudinal change regarding the roles and statuses of women in the society, enhancing the

participation of women in the social, economic and political affairs in the region, avoiding their challenges and ensuring their benefit.

According to experts in the regional Bureau of Women and Children Affairs, in order to achieve the above objectives, the Bureau has been providing awareness creation trainings on the adverse effects of child marriage on the future lives of women, rape, female genital mutilation, penetration of virginity by sticks or knives and other violations of women's rights. They further mentioned that religious fathers, clan leaders, members of the police and community representatives have been participating in some of the trainings to make the dissemination of information among the community easier and faster (Interview participants, Feburary, 2018, Semera).

Interviewees also explained that the capacity building and awareness creation trainings were focusing on enabling women to be self-reliant and stand for the respect of their rights. Women's Affairs Bureau has been working in cooperation with Police, Justice Bureau, Sharia and Regular Courts in protecting the violation of women's rights. Women's development committee was established in each Kebele as an organ which follow up the situation of women in their own respective Kebeles and report assaults and other violation of women's rights to the regional Bureau of Women and Children Affairs. However, the shared agreement among the interviewees and focus group discussants was that the efforts made so far did not bring the intended result. Senior expert in the regional Bureau of Women and Children Affairs contend that Afar women have been carrying heavy burdens because of the surviving gender-based division of household labor. Fetching water, grinding grains, preparing food, collecting firewood, selling small stock animals and constructing huts are still responsibilities that women have been shouldering. The trainings provided did not bring the required attitudinal change among members of the community. Afar women have been still victims of harmful traditional practices. Due to the influence of culture female genital mutilation and other assaults on women have been still practiced and have not been properly reported to the concerned bodies (Interview, on 9 Feburary, 2018, Semera).

Participants of FGDs conducted with members of the local community in the three selected Woredas argued that there is wide gap between the rhetoric efforts of ensuring women's equality rights and the practical treatment of women in Afar region. They also asserted that the political

participation and empowerment of women in the region is very low. The awareness creation trainings provided did not help to avoid the misconception that women cannot be political leaders. The number of women holding leadership positions in the Regional Bureaus and Woreda Offices witnessed the prevailing misconception regarding women. Two Bureaus namely Women and Children Affairs and Pastoral and Agricultural Development at the regional level and only Offices of Women and Children Affairs at Woreda level are held by female leaders (FGDS, January, 2018, Andido, Assaita and Teru).

Participants of the interviews reported that the problem is not only limited to the number of women occupying leadership positions. But also, several factors have been adversely affecting the performance of the Regional Bureau and Woreda Offices of Women and Children Affairs. In line with this view, the head of one of the Core Processes under the Bureau of Women and Children Affairs reflected:

> *The focus given to women's affairs in our region is low. This is manifested in the existing gaps between what the Bureau has been planning and the budget allocated to it. The Bureau has no professionals having adequate capacity on gender issues. The Bureau has not been getting support from other institutions easily. The Bureau has no its own building rather it has been using rooms from the building constructed for the regional court. The Bureau has no its own vehicles to provide transportation service for its workers as well as to go to the Woredas to coordinate the activities of Offices of Woreda Women and Children Affairs. The regional state government has not been taking correction measures based on the information gathered by members of the Regional Women and Children Affairs Standing Committee who have been conducting field observation at least twice a year(Interview, on 11 March 2018, Semera).*

The federal constitution under Article 35(3) and the Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State under Article 34(3) mentioned that as a remedy of the historical legacy of inequality and discrimination, women are entitled to affirmative measures and special attention has to be given to women to enable them compete and participate on the basis of equality with men in political, social and economic life as well as in public and private institutions. However, participants of the interview asserted that there is serious gap between the constitutionally entrenched rights of women and the practice on the ground. In this regard senior expert in the Regional Women and Children Affairs Bureau asserted that many officials have been heard speaking about the importance of gender mainstreaming as a solution to build the capacity of women and to enhance their participation in various affairs in the region. However, the regional state administration has

been still unable to organize the Regional Bureau and Woreda Offices of Women and Children Affairs let alone creating mechanisms through which other institutions could give proper attention to the affairs of women. She added that the Committee established at Kebele levels have not been reporting the challenges that women have been facing because they do not bring attitudinal change yet (Interview, on 13 Feburary, 2018, Semera).

Following the 6th regular conference of the Afar National Democratic Party, Regional Bureaus and Woredas have conducted meetings in the second week of January 2018 that discussed on problems of good governance. The voice of a certain women from Dalifage Woreda of Zone five televised on 30 January 2018 could indicate the under performance of the regional administration in general and the regional Bureau and Woreda Offices of Women and Children Affairs in particular in enhancing the participation of women. She explained:

> W*e hear that in other regional states women have been actively participating in the socio-economic and political matters of their respective regions. In our Zone, as well as in the region, the issue of empowering women and respecting women's rights has existed in name only. Still, we are discharging our traditional responsibilities. There is serious gap between the rhetoric participation of women in the region and the political reality. We have to share the experiences of other regional states and our Regional State government has to be committed to put women's rights on paper into practice (ETV, on 30 January, 2018, Addis Ababa).*

Awareness creation trainings have been provided to small number of women in a campaign form. Governments at different levels gave less due consideration to the issue of enhancing the capacity of women, empowering and supporting them. Gender mainstreaming has been point of discussions in various meetings. However, women's affairs have been left to the regional Bureau and Woreda Offices of Women and Children Affairs (Interview participants, Feburary 2018, Semera).

Schools are places where tomorrow's capable female leaders are produced. However, according to senior expert in the regional Education Bureau, the educational participation of female students in the region has been very less when compared to their counterparts empowerment of women could not be achieved without providing appropriate support to female students at schools. Leaders at all levels of the regional state government believe that the government has to provide continuous awareness creation trainings to members of the community about the

importance educating women and to encourage families to send their daughters to school. However, the enrollment rate of female students is still low (Interview, 5 January 2018, Semera).

The exclusion of the women presented and described above was further substantiated by the quantitative data. Table 20.5below depicts the respondents' agreement of disagreement regarding the role of women in the regional politics.

Table 21.5: The Position of Women in Afar Regional State

The system established in the Afar Regional State has been enabling the Afar Women to play active roles in the political affairs of their regional state			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	115	32.9
	Disagree	149	42.6
	Undecided	13	3.7
	Agree	47	13.4
	Strongly Agree	26	7.4
	Total	350	100.0

As we infer from Table 21.5 above, the percentage of respondents who expressed that Afar women have been marginalized from the politics of their own regional state, 264(75.4 %) is greater than others who disagreed, 73(20.9 %) and only few of the respondents, 13(3.7 %) chose undecided. The inclusion of women in the socio-economic and political activities in the region would help in increasing the contribution of women for the regional development. However, the less focus given to women's affairs in Afar region has been adversely affecting women's participation in the various activities and this in turn adversely affects the socio-economic development of the regional state.

The achievements indicated in the various reports of the regional state discussed in chapter three did not show the socio-economic reality on the ground. The regional state leadership has been unable to bring about significant change in the development sectors in a manner that could address the interests of the local community. As discussed above this problem is attributed to the federal intervention and the regional leadership'scommitment to the interests of the federal

government at the expense of the regional state. The federal government was removing other regional state presidents whether they were performing well or not.It was for this reason that the federal government tolerated the regional state president to administer the regional state for more than fifteen years without delibering to the regional state.

Article 45 of the 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State declaredthat the government of Afar Regional State has the power toformulate the region's economic, social and development policies, strategies and plans. However, due to lack of capacity, vision, and commitment on the part of the regional leadership, they were unable to bring significant improvement in the the development sectors. Had the regional leadershiphad capacity and vision, it would have delivered something better to bring about significant improvement in the regional state by withstanding the pressure that came from the federal government.

As discussed above, leadership problem is one of the reasons contributing for the underdevelopment of the regional state. The leadership lacked not only capacity but also commitment to provide the necessary services. Marginalization of the educated, women and the young coupled with misappropriation of available resources have all adverse effect on the socio-economic development of the regional state.Therefore, it seems appropriate to blame the regional leadership for not bringing significant improvement in the region because the sector bureaus and offices were under its jurisdiction. Thus, had the leadership been committed, it would have tried to provide appropriate support whatever the interventions from the federal government.

5.4. Conclusion

The chapter examined the relations among levels of governments in Afar Regional State as well as the powers and functions of levels og governments in the region. The check and balance relationship among regional state government organs has not been helping the executive organs to improve their day yo day activities. Absence of accountability for weak performance and misappropriation of government resources are the main factors why the executive organs didn't bring significant improvement in discharging their responsibilities.

Structurally, Zones in Afar Region have no constitutionally entrenched power. Moreover, Zones have no development sectors and they lacked qualified personnel's which implies that they could not properly supervise, support and control Woreda Executive Branches. Woreda offices cannot be accountable to the Zone administrators. Moreover, the research revealed out that lack of budget has been hindering the activities of Zone Administrators.

Leadership challenges among levels of government in the region like capacity gaps, lack of good governance, decline of the role of traditional leadership and non-inclusion of the educated, youth and women have been adversely affecting the socio-economic development of the regional state. The occupation of keyleadership positions by the uneducated who lacked the capacity that positions require and the exclusion of educated Afars has been negatively affecting development efforts in the region. Lack of good governance which is manifested in clannism/ tribalism, nepotism, favoring ones local area, and misappropriation of resources are problems hindering the development of the regional state. Decling in the role of traditional leaders adversely affected the development of the regional state. Moreover, the provision of less due consideration to the contribution of the educated, youth and women for the development of the regional state as well as their exclusion in their own regional state affairs has significantly reduced their contribution to the socio-economic development of the regional state.

Chapter Six

Conflicts as explanatory variable for underdevelopment

6. Introduction

Focusing on the theme of this study, the principal thrust of this chapter is to expound the contribution of conflicts for the underdevelopment of Afar Regional State. Accordingly, the chapter is organized into five sections including this introductory part. Section two shades light on the inter-clan conflicts among Afar by looking at conflicts which have been taking place in the selected Woredas. It tries to show the causes of these conflicts and their adverse effects on the socio-economic development of the selected Woredas in particular and the Regional State in general.

Section three describes the Afar-Issa inter ethnic conflict. It tries to portray the deriving factors behind conflicts between the two ethnic groups which have continued until the present time, forces involved in the conflict, attempts undertaken by various stakeholders to resolve these conflicts, the current situations of the conflict and its implication for the underdevelopment of Afar Regional State.

Section four provides general overview of the Afar-Amhara conflicts, their causes, and consequences, peace conferences undertaken by various stakeholders who aimed at managing and resolving conflicts among communities of the two ethnic groups living along bordering Woredas. In doing so, the chapter sought to partially address the second specific question. Finally, section five concludes the chapter recapitulating the major arguments and findings.

6.1. Inter-Clan Conflicts in Afar Regional State

In chapter two, literature review, the interface between conflict and development is well described. Emperical research results showed that conflict adversely affects the socio-economic development countries in general and subnational units where conflicts occured in particular. Therefore, this chapter tries to examine the impact of inter-clan and inter-ethnic conflicts on the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State.

Research findings indicated an increasing trend in inter-clan conflicts among the Afar pastoralist communities over the past four-five decades **(**Kelemework, 2013**)**. According to Bekele (2006), these inter-clan conflicts usually happened due to the intrusion into one's perceived territory without pre-negotiation and agreement. This type of conflict is observed whenever a clan moves into territories which traditionally belong to another clan. Clan territorialism became more intense close to the Awash River bank (Ali, 1994). Similarly (Piguet, 2001, p.8) asserted that *clan consciousness of territory becomes more intense closer to the Awash River bank; the further away from the river the less important become these exclusive territorial rights"* In this regard, Getachew's research findings indicated that internal conflict among the Afar became more intense since the recent return of state farms because the returned land is held by the new elite in the administration and clan leadership. He concluded that the expansion of farming, the imposition of alien land tenure system and the rules as to their uses, and the increasing individualization of clan lands in Afar land, have cumulatively led to the marginalization and impoverishment of the majority of pastoral households (Getachew, 2001).

6.1.1. Causes and Consequences of Inter-Clan Conflicts in Afar

According to Bekele (2015), state driven development projects have been changing the customary resource rights of the Afar clans. He goes on to state that such an approach has been causing conflicts among clan members by creating disparity in the level of resource use by excluding some clan members while including other members. Inter-clan conflicts among the Afar were commonly observed when different clans try to use crop residues from the surrounding State farms. Similarly, (Markakis,2011, p.52), asserted that "conflict *among Afar clans for natural resources and control of trade routes is a constant theme of their oral history"* He also underscored that land tenure has become the cause of frequent conflict among Afar

clans. The Afar saying "*we love each other, but we will quarrel with each other if it comes to land* (Ibid)" is an indication of the role of land resource in shaping the relationship among the Afar clans. The following sub-topics dealt with the various causes and consequences of inter-clan conflicts in Afar region by taking some inter-clan conflicts as case studies.

One of the factors contributing forthe persistent inter-clan conflicts in Afar region is access to a wide range of resources. For instance, the Debne and Weima clans who lived in Amibara Woreda have always been in conflict. The conflict between the two clans can be traced back to the previous regimes. In this regard, Lode and Getachew (2001) stated that the Issa Somali's encroachment into Afar lands which continued until to this day is one of the causes of conflicts between Debne and Weima clans. They further elaborated that many Afar clans belonging to Weima clan have been displaced from their clan lands in Mulu, Errer, Hurso, Afdem, Mieso, Dire-Dawa. These clans have been forced to move into areas occupied by members of Weima clan (Ibid). This sentiment has been voiced by a pastoralist, resident of *Halai-Debi,* Kebele in Amibara Woreda in the following way:

> *In the early days, our ancestors (Weima Clan) were living in many areas which are now inhabited by the Issa Somalis. The unceasing conflict between the two ethnic groups (Issa and Weima) forced the later to leave vast areas behind. Our community elders list down a number of places which were once occupied by our ancestors. Now we are living in Amibara Woreda. Even today we found ourselves between two sharp swords. The Issa are still pushing and forced us to move into the territories inhabited by the Debne clan. Because of this condition, we confront the Issa pressure on one hand and we are competing with the Debne clan for both territory and access to resources, pasture land and water points on the other hand(Interview, on 7 March, 2028, Andido)*

Debne and Weima clans were also in conflict during the Imperial Regime. In this regard, Bekele (2006) mentioned that the Debne clan claimed to have exclusive rights to use the cotton stalk on the fields cultivated by the Middle Awash Agricultural Development Enterprise. The Weima also want to use the same animal feeds. Therefore, members of the Weima clan living in Dudub area were in frequent clash when they move into the field. The Weima were also in conflict with another group of the Debne clan around Awara Malka State farm near Sabure (Ibid).

Following the fall of the Derg regime and the coming into power of EPRDF in 1991, much of state farms in the Middle Awash Valley were returned to the community (Kelemework, 2014). However, the re-allocation of the returned land in Amibara Woreda became source of conflict between Debne and Weima clans. This was because all returned state farms were given to Debneclan while members of the Weima clan have got nothing (Yasin, 2004).

Given the above historical context this research examines the situation of inter-clan conflicts in Afar region since the institutionalization of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. Participants of the study interviewed during the field work in February 2017, March 2018, and January 2019 mentioned that inter-clan conflicts have still adversely affecting the socio-economic life of manyAfar pastoral and agro-pastoral communities. For instance, anotheragro-pastoralist, resident of Halai-Debi Kebele in Amibara Woreda underlined that members of the Weima clan have been living in Halai-Debi Kebele. He further elaborated that *c*onflicts have been arising betweenWeima and the Debne clan at different times. According to him, competition for controlling grazing land increases whenever they encountered scarcity of pasture. Sometimes, the Debne clan declares that the lands belong to them and not to members of the Weima clan. This became the source of conflict between members of the two clams. When one of thetwo tried to deny access to resources, the other tried to use the nearby pasture by any means instead of waiting and see the death of their animals which as a result the two clans entered into serious conflict (Interview, on 6 March, 2028, Werer).

Sometimes the conflict between Debne and Weima clans gets severe, causing the death of members from both sides. Mostly such kinds of conflicts have been resolved by clan leaders and community elders. The process is procedural and, peace settlement through this process is economically devastating because people involved in resolving conflicts have to be free from engaging in other activities, temporary houses have to be constructed where the elderly conduct a meeting for eight days and an ox has to be scarified (FGD, Participants, March 2018, Andido).

The Afar believed that all disputes within their ethnic group should be settled peacefully and according to the long-standing customary laws (*Mad'aa). Mad'aa* consists of specified guidelines and rules on how to handle dispute cases. Inter-clan conflicts in Afar society are mostly resolved outside courts. Once a conflict case is in the hands of elders, there can be very little room for an individual to further his interests by force (Kelemework, 2011). However, managing conflicts

through the long-established traditional conflict resolution mechanisms is not an easy task. In this regard, Yayneshet and Kelemework (2004) asserted that customary laws that were effective means of ensuring sound use of grazing reserves are weakened by the creation of incompatible administration system and recurrent drought.

Afar clans entered into conflict due to competition for scarce natural resources like pasture and water. Thus, the deriving factor behind the conflict among Afar pastoralist communities is the need to sustain the lives of their animals. Contrary to the causes of conflicts (searching resources for their animals), the feasts prepared to resolve conflicts have adverse effects on the economic life of the community in two ways. First, members of clans who entered into conflict have to sit idle before the conflict is resolved in order to avoid further death and destruction which might come as a result of revenge. Secondly, the feast prepared in the process of resolving conflicts affects the economy of households (Interview Participants, 2018, Werer).

During the field visit in Teru Woreda in January 2017, February 2018, and March 2019 participants of the interview explained that the main causes of conflict among pastoralist communities is the need to control scarce natural resources like pasture and water. They further elaborated that the various clans living in the Woreda seasonally move with their animals in search of water and pasture as well as to escape damages that could happen during heavy summer seasons. In line with this a senior expert in Teru Woreda Pastoral and Agricultural Development Office reflected:

> *During summer seasons some of the Kebeles found in the lowlands of the Woreda have been overwhelmed by floods coming from the highlands of Amhara and Tigray Regional States. During such occasions Afar pastoralists leave their residences and move to Kebeles which are relatively located at higher altitude. This seasonal movement sometimes lead to conflict between those clans displaced from their residences and hosting clans living in Kebeles less affected by summer flooding.For instance, during rainy seasons Kara and Reyika clans who live in Barentu Kebele and Ada'ali clan living in Debahu Kebele move to Digdiga Kebele (territory belonging to Bukri clan).But when there is no enough pasture the Bukri clan members prevent the other clans from having access to pasture. On the other hand, other clans want to use the resources in the area by force which as a result they entered into conflict with the Bukri clan (Interview, 7 December, 2018, Alelu).*

When the summer season ends the *Kara and Reyika* clans return back to their residence areas. Sometimes, conflict arises between these clans due to competition for pasture. A pastoralist resident Debahu Kebele explained thatKara clan of Berentu Kebele and Ada'ali clan of Debahu Kebele who usually entered into conflict with the Bukri clan of Digdiga Kebele during the summer season also fight each other after they return back to their residence areas at the end of summer seasons. When they come back to their home following the end of the summer season, they usually got grasses grew well. But they entered into conflict because either Kara or Ada'ali clan wants to use the pasture alone (Interview, 9 December, 2018, Alelu).

An expert in the Civil Service and Capacity Building Office interviewed in December 2018, Alelu, contended that clan conflict in Teru Woreda between different clans has been adversely affecting the socio-economic life of the community. He mentioned that the conflict between *Modaytu* and *Hamedisreta* clans which took place in 1992 was very devastative. It was caused by competition between the two clans for the control of territory. Many people lost their lives and properties were destructed by this conflict. Although clan leaders and community elders attempted to manage this conflict, it continued to be uncontrolled for more than ten years.

Competition for scarce resources and control of clan territory are not the only causes of conflict among Afar clans. Some of the other causes of conflict between Afar clans include the cross-cousin marriage practice known as *Absuma*, *revenge* (what Afar call it *Bilu) and clannism, (*clan sentiment*).*There are several marriage patterns in Afar region bbut the most common one is *Absuma*: Marriage practice between two cousins (girls are expected to marry their paternal cousins and boys marry their maternal cousins). Cross-cousin marriages are stronger than marriages between blood unrelated persons because no serious harm is inflicted on one's own blood and flesh in times of conjugal conflict. However, in some areas particularly in the south fierce inter-clan fighting may arise as a result of failure to adhere to such a norm. Marriage will be a source of conflict if a woman wants to marry a person other than her mother's brother's sons, *Absuma*. In such cases, conflict will arise between members of the groups of her *Absuma* and members of the clan to which the new partner belongs to. In such conflicts lives have been lost and properties have been destructed (Interview Participants, 2018, Alelu). The prevalence of conflict caused by different factors has been destabilizing the area and the socio-economic life of pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities.

Bilu (revenge) caused by inter-clan homicide is the other problem destabilizing the security of many Afar clans. Killing action committed by one member of a clan will disrupt the security of members of his clan. Fear of revenge from members of the victim all male members of the murderer have to gather and find host in another clan. The judges (Mekabon) are usually drawn from clans other than those clans involved in the conflict. The reconciliation process is lengthy and uneconomical. Cow or camel has to be sacrificed as a pre-condition for the commencement of the conflict resolution procedures. The investigation process of the murder/ murderers' case usually will last for more than forty days. Clan and family members of the deceased remain under oath that they will not attempt to retaliate. Once the offender is forgiven, compensation or blood money has to be paid within specified time. Usually about 40 heads of camel are transferred to the family and clan members of the deceased, which is contributed by the clan members of the murderer. In addition to the sacrifices made during the whole process of conflict resolution, the sitting idle of all the male clan members of the murderer until forgiveness is ensured has significant impact on the socio-economic development of the area(Interview with Community Elder, 2018, Assaita).

According to s senior expert in Zone Four Court interviewed in March 2018, at Kalwan, politicized clan sentiment is the source of conflict among Afar clans. He further elaborated that favouring one's clan at the expense of members of the other clan has been adversely affecting the unity of Afar. He asserted that "*if someone has a close relative occupying important position in the government, he/she is guaranteed to be employed in government works disregard of his/ her capacity and academic qualification".*

According to the information gained from an expert memberof LegalAffairs Standing Committee of the regional state council, the same idea was reiterated by members of the Afar National Democratic Party during the 6th Regular Conference of the party held in January 2018. Members underscored that the regional state governments at all levels have to fight against clannism, rent seeking and corruption to ensure sustainable development in the region. The motto of the conference was "*We have to be reformed while working and working while reformed.*"

Clan conflict in relation to clannism also occurs when someone is removed from a certain position due to his own problems. According to an expert in the regional Justice Bureau, a certain official may be discharged from his position for different reasons. In such an occasion, the one discharged usually inform his fellow clan members that he is discharged because he belongs to X- clan. He also labelled someone responsible for hisbeing discharged. This will anger members of the clan to which the discharged official belongs and entered into conflict with members of the clan who is labelled as the cause for the discharging action. As the result of this kind of conflict members from both sides loss their lives and properties are destructed (Interview, 11 March, 2018, Semera).

The experiences in Amibara and Teru Woredas explained above showed that Inter-clan conflicts involving reprisal killing, destruction of properties, raiding and counter-raiding of herds, the time wasted as well as the sacrifices made in the process of the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are all have an adverse effect on the socio-economic development of the communities entered into conflict in particular and the regional state in general.

As clearly explained in chapter two, clan organization is dominant in the Afar society and it has significant role in the social, economic and political life of the Afar. Each clan has its own territories (land) and clan identity matters in the utilizationof resources over the land named after each clan. For instance, use of pasture by members of a certain clan requires the will of the clan on whose land the pasture grows. Such clans may inter into conflict if they are unable to agree on the utilization of pasture particularly during the time serious shortage.

Examining clan organization is important to have clear understanding aboutinter-clan conflicts among Afars. In chapter five it was mentioned that clannism has become one of the serious challenges adversely affecting the day-to-day activities of the Afar. Internal harmony among the Afar has been eroded by the prevalence of clannism. Clannism has been interfering in the appointment of civil-servants in Regional Bureaus and Woreda Offices. Placement of individuals on a certain position depends on whether one has a clan member who occupied key positions in the regional state government. There is unnecessary competition among leaders on the distribution of infrastructures since each leader wants to favor members of his clan. Quarrel between individual members belonging to different clans has been converted into clan conflict.

Generally, inter-clan conflict has been one of the factors adversely affecting the socio-economic development of the Afar regional state.

6.2. Inter-ethnic Conflict-The Protracted Afar-Issa Conflicts

6.2.1. The Afar and Somali Regions in Ethiopia

The Afar region share boundary with four regional states in Ethiopia: Amhara, Oromia, Tigray and Somali and further sharing international boundary with Djibouti and Eritrea. Similarly, the Somali region of Ethiopia borders Djibouti, Somali, Kenya and Ethiopian regions of Oromia, Afar and the chartered city of Dire Dawa. According to the current map of federal Ethiopia, Afar and Somali regions have a common border stretching from the Middle Awash all the way towards the border of Djibouti (Yasin, 2010).

Afar and Issa belong to the Eastern Cushitic linguistic category of the Afar and Somali speaking groups in the Horn of Africa respectively. They relate to each other in terms of language and culture. Socially they are all organized in patriarchal clan structures. Both the Afar and the Issã practice Islam almost exclusively and are predominantly engaged in nomadic pastoralism. Both the Issa and the Afar remained at both the geographic and political periphery of the Ethiopian state for much of the 20th century (Biniyam, 2016)

The Afar people have a distinct cultural and linguistic identity of their own and inhabit a well-defined territory in the Horn of African; an area commonly referred to as the Afar Triangle which is divided between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. The land inhabited by the Afar in the Horn region is well known as the cradle for early human origin and for its abundance of natural resources as well (Dagnachew, 2013).

The Afar people have adapted pastoral nomadic lifestyle for many centuries, which greatly rely on environmental resources whose accessibility is determined by temporal and spatial variables. The Afar has increasingly been affected by commercial farm development and wildlife protection schemes since the second half of the 20th century (Ayelew, 2009). The Awash River which flows to eastward is the life line of the people of Afar who live in the southern portion of the ANRS, supplying them with their only permanent source of water and important dry season pastureland (Piguet, 2002). In the current federal political arrangement in Ethiopia, the Afar

people exist in the Afar National Regional State (ANRS). The total area where the Afar people live is 72,053 km^2, positioned between 39^0 34' East Longitude and 8^0 49' and 14^0 30' North Latitude

The Issa are one of the nine Somali clans residing in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somaliland (Abraham, 2002). The Issa ethnic groups are the second largest Somali clan in Ethiopia after the Ogaden clan. Now the Issa Somalis occupy Siti Zone, northwest part of the Somali National Regional State (SNRS) and it covers an area of 279,252 km^2 (Yasin, 2010). Siti Zone is inhabited by different ethnic groups, however, the majority (95%) are the Issa Somali, 2.03% are Gadabursi and Gurgura subgroups of the Somali Dir,1.42% are Amhara and all other ethnic groups comprise 1.55% of the population (Biniyam, 2016).

Siti Zone, shares border with two Zonal administrations of the Afar region, Zone one (Awsi Rasu) in the north and Zone three (Gabi Rasu) in the south. Siti Zone shares boundary with Djibouti and Somaliland in the north and east respectively; Jijiga Zone in the southeast, and Oromia and Afar regions in the south and west respectively (Yasin, 2010). Siti Zone which lay at the base of the Great Rift Valley is progressively lower, hotter, and drier, especially near the border with Djibouti. The average annual rainfall in the Zone is 557mm and the average temperature ranges around 27^0C to 43^0 C (Catley and Alula, 2010). The total population size of the Issa in Ethiopia was estimated at 457,086 (CSA, 2007). The Zone is named after its largest town, Siti, has six Woredas out of which five towns are located along the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway line (Yasin, 2010).

In the old days economically the Issas predominantly depended on animal husbandry while some members of the group gradually shifted from herding to running diverse sorts of urban trade. Because of the harsh environment the Issa pastoralists seasonally move from place to place to get pasture and water for their livestock. Generally, in the dry period the people and their animals are forced to concentrate closer to water wells and are deployed after the rains when the grazing is fresh and green (Herrie, 2008).

6.2.2. Afar -Issa Conflicts Prior 1991 Federal Ethiopia

Historical overview of internal and external factors contributing for the perpetuation the Afar-Issa conflict which continued across generations is helpful to examine the nature of the current conflicts between the two ethnic groups. The conflict between the Christian Highland Kingdom and the lowland Muslim sultanates in the 16th century witnessed the period when the Afar and the Issa lived together without conflict. However, there are no oral and written sources as evidence regarding the relation between the two ethnic groups before the time of Imam Ahmed Ibin Ibrahim Al-Ghazi War against the Christian Highland Kingdom (Biniyam, 2016).

Before the conquest of their homeland by the Christian Highland Kingdom at the end of the 19th century, the Afar were loosely grouped into several sultanates whose combined territory ran from the shore of the Red Sea in the east to the foothills of the escarpment in the west, the Dire Dawa region in the south and the vicinity of Massawa in the north (Yasin, 2010). During the imperialist scramble, Afar land was divided between Ethiopia, Italy (Eritrea) and France (Djibouti). The Afar sultanates were dismantled, with the partial exception of Awssa in Ethiopia that retained a modicum of autonomy until the demise of the Imperial Regime in 1974 (Biniyam, 2016).

The Afar-Issa conflict was long standing and continued through generations. The internal factors contributing for for the perpetuation of the Afar-Issa conflict include: the defeat of the Muslim forces at the hands of the Christian Highland Kingdom(Biniyam, 2016),the Oromo population movement which occurred after the Christian-Muslim conflict (Abir,1980),the westward expansion of the Issa Somalis into the traditional home land of the Afar in the past seven to eight decades (Bekele, 2010), climate change and resource competition between the two ethnic groups (Mu‟uz,2009),the traditional practice of animal raiding and counter raiding and a culture of rewarding warriors in both communities(Bekele, 2010; Biniyam, 2016), Issas' involvement in smuggling different goods (Bekele, 2010) and State sponcered projects and individual investment projects along the Awash Valley which created pressure on Afar(Getachew, 2001; Bekele, 2010; Fratkin, 2014).

The external factors which contributed for the long perpetuation of Afar-Issa conflict include the invasion of Ethiopia by the fascist Italian forces in 1935, which favored the Issa Somalis (Yasin, 2010; Asnake, 2013; Biniyam, 2016)andthe independence of Somalia republic in 1960 and the birth of the idea of creating Greater Somalia encompassing all the territories inhabited by the Somalis (Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, French Somaliland, Ogaden and the Northern District of Kenya) (Bahru, 1991; Yasin, 2010). Both the internal and external forces were in favor of the Issa Somalis which in one way or another facilitated the west-ward expansion of the Issa Somalis in to the ancesteral lands of the Afar.

6.2.3. Efforts of Resolving Afar-Issa Conflicts Prior 1991

6.2.3.1. During the Imperial Regime

Several conflict resolution efforts were attempted to end the Afar-Issa conflict during the Imperial Regime. One of the mechanisms used was the implementation of new administrative divisions. Accordingly, in 1945 the Imperial government tried to curb the frequent inter-ethnic conflicts between the Issa and Afar by bringing the boundary of Issa and Afar under one legal authority. The Issa and Afar boundary delineated into three Woredas namely, the Adal-Issa-Karayu Woreda, the Adal-Issa-Gugrgura Woreda, and Dire Dawa, Adal and Issa Woreda, and were put under the General Governorate of Harar. This was done to make both groups accountable and responsible to the law and to control the conflict between the two through a single administrative body (Biniyam, 2016).

However, the above administrative reshufflings strategy was not successful to bring lasting peace and stability between Afar and Issa. The researcher got two documents from an educated Afar who was a manager of one of the offices in the regional administration for few years in the 2000s. The documents comprise of different letters exchanged among the various stakeholders and minutes). The first one is binding No. 2.2. Entitled "*Efforts made to resolveAfar-Issa conflicts and measures taken to delineate boundar*y" consisting of 145 pages covering the period from 1945-1987. The second is binding No.4 entitled "*Damages inflicted by the invading Issa Somalis on Afar, other neighboring ethnic groups and security forces; and the counter forceful measures taken on the invaders* " consisting of 139 pages covering the period from 1948-1977.

A letter from Lt. Colonel Abebe Degefu, Governor of Karayu, Adal and Issa Woreda addressed to the Minister of Interior in Addis Ababa and to Harar Governorate General written on 6/2/1946 Ref.no.1317/6 stated that 'in order to mitigate the frequent conflict between Adal and Issa people, the following provisional solution is given from our office. From now on, Issas are restricted from crossing *Bulga*, *Aydora*, *Erer*, *Fa'o* while Adals are prohibited to traverse from *Ayroli*, *Asbuli*, *Biya'ad*, *Merihan* and *Andido.*'

Letters exchanged between the Awraja administrators revealed that the new administrative restructuring of the areas did not bring lasting solution to the Afa-Issa conflict. The Issa Somalis continued to occupy more and more territories despite of the restrictions imposed on them. Raiding and counter raiding of herds continued.

In May 1961, the Harar Governorate General delineated a grazing reserve at Erer River for each of them where Afar should settle to the West of Erer River and Issa to the East of Erer, though, the latter may use range land at time of shortage (Biniyam, 2016). But it did not the expansion of the Issa Somalis. For instance, a letter from the police commander of Adal, Issa and Garaguracha Awraja written on 30 November 1962 Ref.No.xx2/284 to Kegna-azmach Sahlu Gebrehiwot, Governorate General of Harar stated that the Issa crossed west of the Erer River disregard of the order given by their Ugazs and the police office. It also mentioned that less than 15 km distance is left between the two ethnic groups and it requested an order from Governorate General if the Awraja police could force stop their advance before they entered into conflict with the Issa.

Different sources indicated that peace conferences were conducted in 1962 and 1966 in which Sultan of the Afar and Ugaz of the Issa, clan leaders and community elders from both sides participated. However, such peace negotiations and punishments didn't help to bring peace between the two ethnic groups since the Issa continued their expansion into Afar lands disregard of territorial restrictions and punishments. Thus, the conflict between Afar and Issa accompanied by killing, raiding and counter raiding continued. This has a great impact on the implementation of development works in conflict-prone areas inhabited by them where frequent violent armed conflicts hampered socio-economic matters (Yasin, 2010; Biniyam, 2016).

6.2.3.2. During the Military Regime

The Afar –Issa conflict continued during the military regime, even though the 1975 Land Reform of the Derg in principle granted pastoralists rights to grazing lands. The regime aggressivelypursued the expansion of state farms, with specialsupport provided for agricultural development which as a result Afar pastoralists were still excluded from some of the most important resources of the Awash Valley. Areas set aside for state irrigation projectsoften lay in key pastoral dry season grazing areaswhich were essential for livestock survival in times ofdrought (Helland, 2006).

In contrast to the 1975 Land Reform Proclamation, the traditional grazing land of Afar pastoralist had been significantly reduced by the expansion of the government irrigated agricultural development schemes. Furthermore, in 1979 the military government established new plantations particularly in the Middle Awash Valley and huge expansion project was implemented in Amibara that displaced thousands of Afar pastoralists (Biniyam, 2016). The loss of grazing lands to state projects exacerbated the resource-based conflict between Afar and Issa. The Derg regime, which was entirely tied up with internal political turmoil as well as armedstruggles that stretched from the north to the eastern border, could not deal much on theAfar-Issa conflict (Yasin, 2010). Therefore, the coming to power of the Derg could not give final solution to the conflict rather it fell prey tothe popular prejudice of trivializing Afar-Issa conflict asmere nomadic conflict over pasture and water (Asnake, 2013).The Issa requested for redefinition of the boundary between Afar and Issa pastoralists and hence in 1977 joint conference was held in Erer in which Lake Mero was identified as dry season boundary between them. It was decided that Afar cattle to occupy the west side while Issa to limit itself to the east side of the lake. However, the Issa break the agreement and began to encroach into the Afar pasture land (Ibid).

The war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977/78 intensified Afar-Issa conflict. This war was caused by the rapid Somali nationalism and irredentism followed by the invasion of Ethiopia by the republic of Somalia (Bahru, 1991; Yasin, 2010). In order to achieve its objective, Somalia provided moral and political as well as military support to Issa Somalis and instigated war against disobedient clans like Afar. This gave the Issa superior arms power making the former victims and enabling the latter control vast areas, ancestral lands of Afar (Bahru, 1991; Yasin,

2010; Asnake, 2013). In the same fashion, Markakis (2003) explained that the Issa were well armed and trainedwhen the invasion of Ethiopia came in 1977 and this enabled them to presstheir advantage to push further into Afar territory.

Like its predecessor, the Derg had the attitude of oversimplifying the Afar-Issa conflict in which the regime reduced the main cause of the conflict between the two ethnic groups to "traditional and backward" nomadic livelihood of both societies (Yasin, 2010). Later, however, President, Mengistu affirmed that the conflict between Afar and Issa became complicated due to the involvement of anti-people forces, members of the administration, the party, the army as well as manipulation by the elites of both ethnic groups. As part of stabilizing the security of the area, the government passed an order to the administrators of Wollo and Hararge Provinces that they would be held accountable in the event of conflict between Afar and Issa respectively. Moreover, the responsibility of controlling the stability in the Afar and the Issa side was given to the Eastern Command and the First Revolutionary respectively (Ibid).

The Derg made no negotiations and peace deal processes to find lasting solution to the Afar- Issa conflict. However, for the purpose of securing the rail way and the Addis Ababa-Assab main road, the military regime forcefully imposed disarming and faring both groups from these vital infrastructures and the state farms and agricultural schemes introduced during the past regime and further expanded by it. According to this restriction Afar pastoralists were allowed to graze 10 kms east of the main asphalt road and the Issa Somalis 30 kms far to the east of the Addis Ababa-Assab Road creating 20 kms buffer Zone between the two ethnic groups. Thus, the Derg left Afar-Issa to their violent discretion provided that they would not be threats to its security and military concerns (Biniyan, 2016).

In the late 1980s, the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) established Nationalities Reconciliation Committee comprised of members from both Afar and Issa. However, the attempt remained far from bringing solutions like negotiations made during the Imperial Regime (Biniyam, 2016). Failure to take proper intervention enabled the Issa to expand unabatedly through Afar homeland. This is a euphemism for Ethiopian government failure to take military measures against the Issa to restore Afar land. Failure of the state to govern effectively contributed for the sustenance of the problem. The other factor was that the policies they followed resulted in

alienation of the Afar pastoral land which exacerbated the competition over pastoral resources providing the Issa with a pretext for invasion (Getachew, 2001; Kasim, 1985).

The ever-increasing intensity of the conflict between the two ethnic groups is evident of the state negligence. For instance, between 1981/82 to 1991/92 around 4,000 Afar pastoralists migrated to Djibouti, 86 Afar were killed and about 1788 animals were raided by the Issa and 71 state farm workers were killed and 47 wounded by the Afar (Biniyam,2016).

6.2.4. Afar-Issa Conflicts in post 1991 Federal Ethiopia

6.2.4.1. Causes and Consequences of Afar –Issa Conflict

Following the fall of the Derg regime and the coming into power of EPRDF in 1991, ethnic federalism was introduced and the country was restructured into self-administering ethnic constituent units which gave the Afar the right to have their own regional state like other ethnic groups. However, the Issa took the brief transitional period (1991-1994) as good opportunity to trespass the 20 kilometers, a buffer Zone created by the Derg regime and the Afar territory along the Addis Ababa-Djibouti highway where they occupied Adaytu, Gedamaitu and Unduffo (Biniyam, 2016). In the same vein, Yasin (2010) mentioned that the transitional period became a grace periods for Issa's intrusion deep into the Afar land, strengthen their new settlements along the road. Similarly, Asnake (2013) described that during the transitional period, the Issa controlled contraband towns which are now posing state security and law enforcement challenges. In effect, in the first five years after the downfall of the Derg, the Issa controlled more territories than they had in thirty years (Mu'uz, 2010). Senior expert in the regional Security Administration Bureau interviewed in Feburary 2018, Semera, supported the above idea. He explained that the Issa used the short period of instability and disorder following the fall of the Derg regime as a good opportunity to control more Afar territories by crossing the Awash River and settlingalong the highway.

Following the new federal restructuring of the Ethiopian state in 1995, the three contested areas, Adaytu, Gedamaytu and Unduffo were embedded into Mille, Amibara and Gewane Woredas of Afar Regional State respectively. However, the Issa Somalis refused to accept the decision of the federal government (Biniyam, 2016).The Afar-Issa conflict became more intensified after EPRDF took state power. Unlike their past experience, the Issa began overtly promoting

territorial claims. They also hoisted the flag of Somali Regional State in and appointed Kebele administrators for Adaytu, Gedamaytu and Undufo towns and issued seal bearing Adaytu and Gedamaytu Kebele offices of Siti Zonal administration, under the jurisdiction of the Somali National Regional State (SNRS) (Asnake, 2013).

Figure 2.6: Contested Areas between Afar and Somali Regional State



EPRDF has inherited Issa-Afar violent conflict with great intensity due to the ever growing and changing issues debilitating the challenge of solving the old with the rise of new issues accompanying the outbreak of every violent incident (Mu'uz, 2015). According to Biniyam (2016) lack of knowledge on the part of the EPRDF fighters regarding to whom the contraband towns belong to, has enabled the Issa to take root in Afar lands. Hr further noted that:

> *The EPRDF force particularly the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) fighters who controlled Adaytu and its surroundings first met the recently arrived Issa. They had no knowledge about the area and the Afar-Issa conflicts. Hence, they considered the Issa as the native inhabitants of Adaytu because they met them there before Afar groups. They preached for the peaceful coexistence of the*

> *two groups at Adaytu instead of giving room to the claims of Afar's ownership rights (Biniyam, 2018,* p.51*).*

In the past the the causes of conflict between Afar and Issa were comprtition over the control of scarce resources, cattle raiding and revenge. However, following the coming imto power of EPRDF, the Issa controlled areas by displacing the Afar and established Issa settlement areas deep in the territory. This has changed the nature of conflict between the two ethnic groups changed from a resource-based conflict in to a political-territorial conflict.The control of Afar territories by Issa-Somalis has exacerbated the conflict between the two ethnic groups. In this regard Biniyam (2016) asserted that ethnic federalism has aggravated and transformed the age old Afar-Issa conflict from resource-based conflict into a boundary conflict.

According to an expert in the regional Capacity Building and Social Affairs Standing Committee interviewed in March 2018, Semera, the change in the nature of Afar-Issa conflict from resource-based to boundary conflict is related to the restructuring of the country's administrative units along ethnic lines following the introduction of ethnic federalism. Conflict between the two ethnic groups Prior 1991 was resource based because the politics was not based on identity. The Afars were not politically organized as an Afar in a territory named after them and the Somalis too. Regional states are named by the ethnic group thatconstitute the majority in post 1991 federal Ethiopia. Thus, the majority ethnic groups considered themselves as owners of the regional state named after them. The federal structure even allowed minirity groups to have their own special Zones and Woredas administration. Such arrangements could not happen during the imperial or the Derg regime because the politics was not based on identity.

Conflicts between the two ethnic groups resulted in loss of human life and livestock, loss of animals in raids, depletion of financial asset, destruction of infrastructures and degradation of natural resource (Rettberg, 2010). However, loss of land plays a prominent role because of its economic and symbolic function, places that symbolize their social identity. Due to this reason, it is easier for pastoralist Afarto name lost territories than lost family members in the conflict (Ibid). In the same fashion, Muauz (2018) mentioned that the issue of boundary is one of the basic problems which became the bone of contention between Afar and Issa in the post-1991 period. For instance, in 1993 well-equipped Afar men opened fire against the Issa at Ell-Wuha,

35 kilometers from Adaytu in order to get back Adaytu where about 130-150 Issas were killed by the Afar (Yasin, 2010).

Although the Issa control of Afar lands has intensified the conflict between the two ethnic groups, the various causes of conflicts discussed under past regimes have been still playing the role of triggering conflicts between Afar-Issa. In this regard, a resident of Halai-Debi Kebele in Amibara Woreda interviewed in March 2018, at Andido,explained that although loss of territory has become a burning issue today, competitions over scarce natural resources such as pasture and water, as well as animal raiding (cattle, camel and goats) are still the causes of conflicts between Afar and Issa pastoralist communities. Referring the period after Afar and Issa leaders signed the December 2014 peace agreement, another pastoralist, resident of the same Kebele reinstated the above idea: *These days we are peace with the Issa-Somalis but we never trusted each other. They often steal our livestock and we reacted by stealing theirs.*

6.2.4.2. Efforts of Resolving Afar-Issa Conflict

Various evidences showed that conflict between Afar and Issa became the day-to-day experiences in post 1991 federal Ethiopia. For instance, Herrie (2008, p.26) asserted that "*the current conflict between Afar and Issa-Somalis persists in a more violent and politicized way in the new federal era*". He further explained that due to the intensification of conflicts between Afar and Issa, the federal government started to respond to the conflict in 1994 by sending representatives of the government to the area where the first meeting between officials and representatives of the conflicting communities was held at Awash 7 Kilo town on 17 July 1994. In the meeting representatives from both sides informed the federal officials about the scale of the conflict and aggravating factors such as territorial claim, cattle raiding, killing and looting. At the end of the meeting, a document was prepared which contained detailed proposals like options of common resource use arrangements, establishment of Joint Peace Committees and to work together on conflict management at a joint meeting (Biniyam, 2016). However, no response was given on the part of the government. As a result, conflicts continued to escalate in the following years (Ibid).

In 1996, the presidents of the two regional states gathered at Duftir (Afar region) and discussed on the conflict between the two ethnic groups where they decided to convene a large Peace Conference in the following year in Awash to thoroughly examine the problems and find out solutions (Michaclson, 2000). Accordingly, the first and the second JPC conferences were held in Awash and Dire Dawa towns between 31/10/98-4/11/98 and on 14/12/98 respectively (Yasin, 2010). The Awash Conference brought officials from Afar Zones one, three, five and Siti Zone of the Somali Regional State along with regional authorities, local elders and a federal government representative. In this meeting, participants agreed to establish Joint Afar-Issa Peace Committee (JPC) at regional, Zonal and Woreda levels of administration (Michaclson, 2000). The Awash Conference symbolized a turning point in Afar-Issa relations and in the Dire Dawa Conference; the broad commitments of the Awash Conference were consolidated. Six hundred elders and government officials participated in the Dire Dawa Peace Conference and important agreements were reached on matters of peace. The Awash Conference would also function as the cutoff date for accountability where all killings, lootings and other violations that occurred before the Awash Conference would be forgiven and all criminal acts since Awash Conference would be investigated and punished (Ibid).

The federal government showed its concern to the conflict between Afar and Issa following the outbreak of Ethio-Eritrean war in 1998. Accordingly, the two conflicting parties were requested to delay their quest for boundary demarcation and were urged to keep peace and stability in the area that could sustain at least until the government pushed the Eritrean invading force out of the Ethiopian territory. The delegate of the federal government promised to bring lasting solution to the Afar-Issa conflict after defeating the Eritrean force. This was to secure the high way to the port of Djibouti and the need of the government to fully focus on the war with Eritrea (Biniyam, 2016).

The party-crisis (disagreement among top leaders of the TPLF after the end of Ethio-Eritrean war) has adversely affected the Afar-Issa peace efforts and violence began escalating once again (Muauz, 2018). In fact, several peace negotiations were undertaken between Afar and Issa. Commissioner of Regional Affairs in the Prime Minister's office, BitewBelay led several meetings of the JPC held at Awash 7 Kilo. The JPC arranged football matches between Afar and Issa youth as well as a new project of marriage relations between the two ethnic groups was

recommended to inter-link between the two hostile groups. However, none of the meetings tried to touch the root causes of conflict (Yasin, 2010).

The JPC also held consecutive meetings after the Ethio-Eritrean war. However, the federal government failed to fulfill its promise, dealing with the main cause of conflicts and addressing the boundary issue between the two ethnic groups. Public reports regarding the performance of the JPC showed that it was unable to stop death and lootings on both sides and government's intervention was not serious (Interview participants, Martch, 2018, Alelu).

As mentioned above, Adaytu, Gedamaytu and Undufo were territories in Afar where there were few scattered Afar settlements before the change of government in 1991. As explained above, the Issa crossed the border and occupied these Kebeles using the instability created during the transitional period as a good opportunity. Finding a lasting solution to the Afar-Issa Conflict became complicated because the proposals presented by the two parties cannot be reconciled. The Afar continued claiming their historicalownership right over these Kebeles inhabited by Issa. On the other hand, the Issa-Somalis claimed constitutional right to live in these Kebeles. They further argued that in a democracy, people have the right to live in territories in the country and the right to determine their self-administration. On the other hand, the Issa disregard settlement history and presented pastoral commons argument (pastoral production system based on a communal ownership of land and other resources) and open access resouces to justify their right to live in the areas where they have settled after 1991 (Interview Participants, March, 2018, Alelu, Gedamaytu).The federal government faced the dilemma of having to choose between the contrary solutions demanded by the rival parties. Because, decisions in favour of the historical rights of Afar would alienate the Somali, while a referendum desired by the Somali would upset the Afar (Markakis, 2003).

Successive committee meetings could not avoid conflicts between Afar and Issa. For instance, the two ethnic groups entered into serious conflict due to the 2002 severe drought which increased the competition between the two ethnic groups, for grazing and water. According to the interview conducted with pastoralists during field observations to Andido, and Gedamaytu, the March 2002 conflict was the worst one when compared with other conflicts occurred in the 1990s (Piguet, 2002). Markakis (2003) also mentioned that in this conflict about 13 Issa- Somalis were killed and 10 others wounded. This conflict affected truck drivers along the main road

which created fuel shortage in Addis Ababa and hence the severity of the conflict forced the federal government to give due consideration to start peace talks between the two ethnic groups. He further elaborated that following the outbreak of violence in March 2002 successive meetings were held in Awash and Dire Dawa under the chairmanship of the Minister of Federal Affairs and in Addis Ababa under the Prime Minister. However, these meetings could not bring tangible solutions due to the conflicting claims of the parties in the conflict (Ibid).

Conflicts between Afar and Issa continued because the JPC meetings never tried to deal with the root causes of conflicts. Moreover, according to a senior expert in the regional Burweau of Justice interviewed in January 2018, at Semera, the federal government has been playing a kind of fire brigade role only to ensure the safety of the main road instead of searching lasting solutions to conflicts. In this regard, Yasin (2010) asserted that the fruitless chain of meetings held by the JPC at Awash 7 Kilo wind up its mission in 2004.

Sporadic conflicts continued due to the irreconcilable interests of Afar and Issa-Somalis over the ownership right of the three Kebeles inhabited by ethnic Issa Somalis, Adaytu, Gedamaytu and Undufo located within the territory of Afar Regional State. According to (Yasin, 2010, p.192) *"the joint administration of the contested hamlets has demolished around forty-sevenhouses in Gedmaytu and a number of illegal settlements in Unduffo*.Moreover, due to the increasing pressure from the Afar side, in 2008 the major contraband town, Gedamaytu wasbanned illegal Issa settlement and huge stock of contraband commodity was confiscated after fierce battle against Federal and Regional law enforcement forces. However, within few months the Isssa re-inhabit and began to use Gedamaytu as hot spot of contraband trade than before (Asnake, 2013).

The federal government has been involved in the process of resolving the conflict between Afar and Issa. However, it lacked consistency in presenting points of agreements. The Government's stand vacillates like a pendulum to either of the sides depending upon the situation. For instance, in 2008, as mentioned above, the federal government considered Gedamaytu as illegal Issa settlement. However, the federal government changed its approach over the years. Regarding this, Muauz (2017) pointed out that in a meeting held at Awash 7 Kilo in June 2011, the Ministry of Federal Affairs chaired by the ex-minister Abay Thsehaye proposed a recommendation of providing legal recognition of the Issa inhabited territories to be part of the Siti Zone self-governing units under Somali region to bring lasting solution to the Afar-Issa conflict. This

enraged the Afar and participants of the meeting walked out of the meeting hall. The Afar expressed their discontent against the federal government by violently attacking federal government truck drivers and Trucks of TPLF-affiliated endowment enterprise, Trans-Ethiopia. Subsequent outbreak of violent conflicts following this proposal brought nothing except causing several causalities on both sides (Ibid).

According to Afar young university student intervied in Feburary, 2018, at Semera, the federal government gave less attention to the perpetual violent conflict between Afar and Issa. He added that the federal government usually gives concern to peace talks when the conflict disrupts the main road which is the lifeline of the country. He further explained that one of the causes for the failure of the federal government to give lasting solution is the irreconcilable claims of the parties to the conflict, Afar and Issa.

The clashes between Afar and Issa ethnic groups continue along the boundary of the three contested Kebeles which have strategic importance due to their locations along the highway between Addis Ababa, Djibouti, and the Assab port in Eritrea, Adaytu, Gedamaytu and Undufo. These areas are predominantly inhabited by Issa-Somali ethnic groups. Data obtained from the reports of the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Afar Peace and Security Administration Bureau showed that Afar and Somali Regional States signed memorandum of understanding on 17 December 2014, which recognized a '*Special Kebele Status'* for the three contested areas under the administration of Afar Regional State. Afar and Issa elders interviewed at Andido and Gedamaytu on 11 and 13 February 2018 respectively expressed that the presidents of the two regional states signed the agreement at Awash 7 Kilo in the presence of representatives of the Ministry of Federal Affairs and the Deputy Prime Minister.

Based on the Memorandum of understanding a committee was set up to demarcate the boundaries of the three Kebeles: Adaytu, Gedamaytu and Undufo and the Sub-Kebeles as well as villages these kebeles constituted. The committee had nine members which comprised of two higher authorities representing the regional states, two consultants assigned by the Ministry of Federal Affairs, two higher officers assigned by the Ministry of Defense and one senior officer assigned by the Federal Police. The committee accomplished the task of demarcating the administrative boundaries in January 2016. Then the federal government presented the report to the regional state governments requesting them to forward their feedback. The regional state

governments in turn forwarded their feedback to the committee that carried out the administrative boundaries. The committee made minor corrections on Gedamaytu demarcation points and presented the final report (Afar Regional State Peace and Security Administration Bureau, February, 2016).

The Afar-Issa violent conflict came to a rapid halt in 2014 following the two regional states signed the memorandum of understanding with the intension of bringing lasting peace, development and good governance among the peoples of the two regional states. Participants of the interview explained that relative peace prevailed for at least four years. The Ministry of Federal Affairs prepared agreement document comprised of six articles. It was expected that the governments of the two regional states would sign the final agreement in June 2017. According to Article II of the agreement document the aim of the agreement was to find out lasting solution to the conflict along the boundary and to integrate the neighboring communities through development and good governance as well as to ensure reliable and sustainable peace in the area (MoFA, 2017).

6.2.4.3. Recent Situation of Afar-Issa Conflict

The short-lived relative peace between Afar and Issa began to deteriorate in 2018 because clashes erupted among neighbouring communities. The researcher has attended Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's public consultation with representatives of the Afar people on 28 June 2018 in Semera. Regional leaders at different levels, community elders and clan leaders who participated in that conference raised several questions regarding various issues. A participant from Amibara Woreda raised problems related to conflict in which the Afar people have been involved as:

> *Conflicts have still continued eroding the brotherhood relationship among neighboring communities and the situation has become threatening. Unlike the past, neighboring communities began to see each other as enemies. Particularly the conflict between Afar and Issa has become worse than ever before. These days it became clear that the expansion of Issa communities in to Afar territories have political motivation beyond the traditional search for pasture and water. The government of EPRDF has made several efforts to resolve the conflict between the two ethnic groups. Boundary demarcation between Afar and Somali regional state was considered as a lasting solution. But it has not been drawn for reasons which are not yet clear.That decision has to come into effect to stop the displacement of many Afar and the gradual expansion of the Issa-Somalis into Afar territories. We expect that your government would come up a quick response*

and give lasting solution to the problem (Interviewe, 13 November, 1918, Andido).

In this regard, one educated Afar mentioned that the relative peace situation lasted for about four years after the leaders of the two regional states signed memorandum of understanding in December 2014. However, conflict between Afar and Issa neighbouring communities started in vigour in the last quarter of 2018 which became the norm in the subsequent years. For instance, according to the data obtained from Peace and Security Administration Bureau of Afar Regional State, conflict suddenly erupted in Undufo Kebele in the night of 24 December 2018. The Special Force of Afar Regional State moved to the Keble to pacify the area but it clashed with equipped individuals. The Issa Somalis conducted demonstration in the Kebele a week before requesting for the fulfillment of infrastructures. By this conflict four people were killed and thirteen others were wounded. Moreover, the movement of vehicles trucking loads and passengers along the Addis Ababa-Djibouti high way was interrupteduntil the middle of the next day. Moreover, on 26 December 2018 armed men (militants) equipped with machine gun coming from the direction of Djibouti killed eighteen Afar and thirty-six including old men, children and women were wounded. During this attack several domestic animals were also killed and properties vandalized.

From the beginning of 2019 the conflict situation became worse than the previous ones. According to a senior expert in the regional President Office interviewed in Feburary 2019, Semera, the Issa Somalis living in the three special Kebeles were enjoying self-administration for the last four years under Afar Regional administration. He further elaborated that the conflict between Afar and Issa relapsed in January 2019. According to him, the current conflict was caused by the Issa's rejection of their integration into Afar Region and their desire to be part of the Somali Region. In order to loosen the conflict, the federal government decided the withdrawal of Afar Special Forces from Gedamaytu which enraged the Afar. The statements forwarded by Issa-Somali interviewed by the researcher in March 2019 at Gedamaytu substantiate the above idea. He underscored that if every Issa living in the three special Kebeles of Afar Regional State are asked regarding their choice, they would express their interest to be incorporated into the Somali Region.

The Afar protested against the decision of the federal government and soon conflict broke out in January 2019. During this conflict the Addis Ababa-Djibouti main road through which 90% of the country's import-export trade passed was blocked. This historical event was televised by the EBC on 13 January 2019. Although this was condemned by the Issa Somalis, senior Afarin the regional Justice Bureau who supported the action taken by the Afar underscored that forced withdrawal of the Afar special force from the three Kebeles is denying the ownership right of Afar Regional State over its own territory. He further explained that members of the Afar Regional State police force were living in these Kebeles with the Issa Somalis to ensure peace in the area. But conflict aroused because the Issas burnt the flag of Afar Regional State. Hence, total withdrawal of Afar special force from Gedamaytu is unlawful loss of Afars' territory. He stated that like other Ethiopians the Issas can live in the designated special Kebeles, own property, engage in different activities but the land belongs to Afar Regional State (Interview, on 14 January, 2018, Semera).

Federal and regional state governments, community elders and religious fathers have been conducting peace discussions after every conflict. However, they failed to bring lasting solutions to the conflict between the two regional states. An expert and former member of regional administration council currently working in an international non-governmental organization interviewed in March 2019, considered the successive peace initiatives as fire-brigade task because the concerned bodies rushed for a meeting only after a conflict break out and inflict heavy damage on human life and material properties. For instance, the Ministry of Peace discussed with community elders and religious fathers on 25 January 2019 following the start of conflict in the second week of January. This meeting was televised by Fana Television on the same date. Participants of the meeting expressed their agreement and they underscored that blood shade among brotherhood communities (Afar and Issa) has to be stopped from that day on. One of the Issa elders who participated in the meeting passed the following message: "we *the Issa and Afarpeoples are Muslims and conflict among Muslim communities is immoral. It is contrary to the rules of Alah. From today on, we have to call upon to members of our community and try to convince them to stop shading the blood of even a single individual" (Fana, TV, January 2019, Addis Ababa).*

An expert in the Ministry of Peace asserted that contrabandists and other forces engaged in illegal practices have been playing significant role in provoking conflicts between Afar and Issa. He also underscored that the federal government will be committed to identify problems and to find out lasting solutions to the conflict with the participation of the community. He further mentioned that the conflict between Afar and Issa will be resolved step by step by working hand in hand with the local community. First peace will be restored, next law will be respected and then the focus of the government will be to eradicate poverty which is the long aspiration of the community. To that end joint committee was established comprising of members from both sides to investigate the causes of the conflict and to avoid the possible occurrence of conflict in the future (Interview, on 21 Feburary, 2019, Addis Ababa).

Peaceful way of life among the bordering communities of Afar and Issa has not been materialized despite of peace resolution efforts. The three Kebeles in Afar Region inhabited by the Issa remained to be sources of conflict between Afar and Somali Regional States. According to one Issa community elder interviewed on 2 May 2019 at Gedamaytu mentioned that on twelve people were killed and three others wounded by Afar Regional State special force. Following the current conflict thatclaims the lives of Issa-Somalis, the new government of Somali Regional State expressed its opposition of the integration of the three Kebeles inhabited by the Issa Somali under the administration of Afar Regional State. Demonstrators in Woredas of Siti Zone and Dire Dawa supported the decision of the Somali Regional State cabinet regarding the fate of the Issa Somalis living in Afar Regional State. The same idea was reiterated by former expert in Siti Zone administration but now left politics and engaged in business:

> *The three Kebeles (Adayitu, Gedamayitu and Endifo) were illegally decided to be administrated under Afar Regional State. These Kebeles were made part of Afar Regional State following the decision of corrupted leaders and contrabandists who worked only to satisfy their personal interest. The Somali Regional State Cabinet decided to legally incorporate these Kebeles under the Somali Regional State administration. The cabinet denounced the agreement reached by the former presidents of the two regional states in December 2014. The incorporation of the three Kebeles into Afar Region had no constitutional base (Intervieed on 24 December 2019, Addis Ababa).*

Conflict became the day-to-day experience of Afar and Issa neighbouring communities. According to an Afar senior official in the regions Peace and Security Administration Bureau, the Somalis inflicted a heavy damage on Afar on 12 October 2019. Both sides accused each

other regarding who took the initiative for the conflict. Following this conflict, a meeting was organized under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on 18 October 2019. Representatives of the Ministry of Peace, security forces and the presidents of the two regional states participated in the meeting. The presidents expressed their sorrow for the deaths that accompanied the current conflict. This agreement was televised by Fana TV on the above day. The president of Somali Regional state explained that the leaders of the two regional states have to work in cooperation with the federal government and the demands of the people and questions related the territorial ownership rights have to be resolved based on constitutional principles. He also underscored that they have to stop referring to past differences and producing unnecessary narrations whenever newconflicts arise. Rather the leaders of the two regional states at all levels should work hard to bring lasting peace among Afar and Issa neighbouring communities. On the other hand, the president of Afar Regional State asserted that they have to strengthen the relation between Afar and the Issa Somalis living in Afar region in order to resolve the conflict sustained for years. Although the purpose of this meeting was to find out lasting solution to the conflict many feared that this is just another example of nominal peace-making without any substance which does not address the root causes of the conflict between the two ethnic groups.

Successive peace negotiations mentioned above have not been able to create peace between the two ethnic groups. Rather clashes became the day-to-day experience along the boundary of the two regional states. A three-day peace conference was conducted at Adaytu Kebele in Mille Woreda, where participants discussed on peace and reconciliation between Afar and Issa communities. The unswerving interests of community elders, religious fathers, federal and regional state leaders eventually resulted in the organization of this conference. This conference was televised by Fana TV on 1 November 2019. Participants of the conference discussed that political entrepreneurs have been causing conflicts between Afar and Issa communities in the cover of the need for pasture land and water.

The president of Afar Regional State, Ato Awol Arba, mentioned that the conference was historical and was conducted based on the initiative of the people:

> *This is a historical conference because it was conducted based on the initiative of the people themselves. Conflicts in these areas have not been caused by the people rather it has been sponsored by individuals who want to destabilize the area. Conflicts have been motivated by contrabandists for political gain. In this conference participants mentioned that they didn't want to be in conflict and condemned the involvement of external forces. The question of the Issa residents in the designated towns is education for their children, supply of water service and good governance. Therefore, the two regional states should work in cooperation for the prevalence peace and stability in the area which in turn would help to address the demands of the people (Fana TV 1 November 2019).*

The same idea was reiterated by the head of Afar Regional State Peace and Security Administration Bureau. He recognized the existence of problems related to good governance and development questions in the three Kebeles where the Issa Somalis have been living. He asserted that the prevalence of peace and stability has to be given prior concern to respond to the above questions because it is very difficult to address public problems in the absence of peace.

Three weeks after the Adaytu conference, similar conference was conducted at Undufo Kebele in Gewane Woreda. Participants of the interview mentioned that contrabandists and other anti-peace forces have been initiating conflict to endanger the peace and unity of Afar and Issa communities in the name of pasture and water just to satisfy their own self-interest. Conflicts occurring every week and every month have been claiming the lives of several people and caused material destruction. Participants of the conference underscored that communities of the two ethnic groups will work together to bring about good governance and development following the agreement reached in this conference. At the end of the conference, the president of Afar Regional State, Ato Awol Arba put keystone in Adaytu Kebele to construct boarding school to the Issa Somalis living in Afar Region (*Televised on 21 November 2019, Fana TV*).

Despite of successive peace conferences mentioned above conflict between Afar and Issa communities broke after a month. The experience showed that Afar and Issa Somalis repeatedly entered into conflict after several peace negotiations. The shared agreement among many respondents is that community elders, religious fathers and regional leaders at different levels have to think one step ahead of the people to find out lasting solution to conflicts and to ensure

peace and stability in the area. This is because these categories of people deliberately provoked conflicts for political consumption (Interview, Participant, November, 2018, Semera).

6.2.4.4.The Impact of Afar-Issa Conflict on the Development of Afar Regional State

The above sections describe Afar-Issa conflict during the past regimes giving emphasis on the conflict between Afar and Issa under the government of EPRDF, causes and the efforts made to resolve conflicts. The efforts made so far did not help to avoid the ongoing conflict between Afar and Issa. The agreement made between the two regional states in December 2014 failed to resolve the conflict, which has been adversely affect the development of Afar Regional State in various ways. One of theacademic staff membersof Semera University mentioned that the 2014 agreement between Afar and Issa stabilized the conflict for few years but violent conflicts erupted over the ownership rights of the contested areas since 2018. These conflicts resulted inlose of human life on both sides (pastoralists, civil servants and police officers have been killed and get wounded). Because of the tension, free movement of people hasbeen halted. The Afar lost its control over Gedamaytu, which became the center for illegal trade (Interviewed on 14 November 2018, Semera).According to an expert in the regional Budget Affairs Standing Committee not only death but getting wounded as a result of conflict also has immense economic implications:

> *Physical impairment after getting wounded significantly affects individual's active involvement in various economic activities. Moreover, someone who gets wounded by bullet may seek orthopedic doctors (health professional specialized in musculoskeletal system). Such treatment is too expensive to ordinary people. The expense needed for the treatment affects not only the asset of the individual but also the clan to which he/she belongs. Clan members are not only sharing resources but also sharing expenses. The big money needed for the treatment would have been used for other purposes which could support the development endeavor (Interviewed on 16 March 2018, Semera). .*

In an attempt to explain the economic impact of the conflict between the two ethnic groups an expert in Amibara Woreda Finance and Economic Development Office asserted that due to Issa's control of dry season grazing areas Afar pastoralists have been forced to feed their large number of animals over small area of grazing lands, which resulted in overgrazing and land degradation. This in turn affects the productivity of their animals. Moreover, pastoralists lost their animals due to death that comes as the result of transmitted animal diseases (because animals feed on grazing

lands in an overcrowded manner). Therefore, the economic life of Afar has been significantly affected due to their conflict with the Issa (Interviewed on 11 February 2019, Andido).

According to the views of an expert in Zone three Administration Office of Afar regional state, the buffer zone created along the boundary between Afar and Issa for security purpose has its own contribution for the shrinking of Afar's pastoral resource base. He further elaborated that Prosopis expanded and controlled vast territories in the dry season grazing areas. As, explained above in this chapter, managing and controlling Prosopis is very challenging ones it is well-established over certain areas. The number of animals that individual households possess reduced from time to time and the plant also controlled farm lands and this in turn has serious impact on the livelihood of Afar pastoralists in particular and the development of the regional state in particular(Interviewed on 13 February, 2019, Andido).

Former member of ARDUF currently working in one of the regional Bureaus mentioned that failure of the leaders of the two regional states to respect and abide by the agreement they reached in 2014 was the cause for the perpetuation of the conflict between the two ethnic groups. Their respective forces entered into clash around contested areas at different times. The Somalis wanted to integrate the three Kebeles inhabited by the Issa Somalis to Siti Zone. On the other hand, the Afar wanted the Issa only to have a special Kebele self-administration status under Afar Regional State administration. This polarized interest sustained the conflict between the two and violent conflict erupted since the beginning of 2019 which resulted in the control of Adaytu and Gedamaytu by Afar security forces after great loss of human life.Fighters on both sides also indiscriminately killed animals too. Loss of human resource and prevalence of instability has still been severely affecting the livelihood of Afar pastoralists in particular and the development of the regional state in general (Interviewed on 24 February 2019, Semera). The other economic impact of the Afar-Issa conflict was explained by an expert in Ministry of Peace as:

> *While the Afar controlled Adaytu and Gedamaytu, the Issa controlled Undufo, which is on the main Addis Ababa-Djbouti road. The Issa blocked the movement of Afar who want to travel crossing Undufo. They established posts at the gate of the town, stopped every vehicle and checked whether the Afar are travelling. Due to this problem, the Afar are travelling to Addis Ababa through Dessie. This incurs additional transportation cost due to the long distance through Dessie to Addis-Ababa. Moreover, travelling through Dessie requires a two day trip which increases cost of accommodation* (Interviewed on 2 March 2019, Addis Ababa).

Generally, the situations explained above could show the impact of inter-clan and the Afar-Issa conflicts on the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State. The researcher has observed that Afar Regional State is endowed with different natural resources which could be good potential for enhancing its development. However, contlicts in which the Afar involved have been adversely affecting their development. Inter-clan conflict among the Afar has been affecting their internal harmony which in turn affects their day-to-day activities and conflict reconciliation process is uneconomical (many people sit idle for several days and the sacfification of animals). Similarly the Afar-Issa conflict has been affecting the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State not only by causing loss of human life and destruction of material resources but also by diverting the budget of the regional state to the security sector. As a result, the services and facilitis which are being provided and the infrastructures established are are very limited. The pastoralist communities have been leading difficult living conditons. They are higly dependant on the provision of aid on monthly basis which implies that both the prevalence of conflictand administrative weaknesses mentioned in chapter five have been adversely affecting the development of Afar Regional State.

6.3. Afar-Amhara Conflict in Post 1991 Federal Ethiopia: An Overviw

The FDRE Constitution under article 39 restructured the administrative regions in Ethiopia. The Afar had no their own separate autonomous administrative region before the federal restructuring of Ethiopia. Rather the Afar land was part of administrative units of Eritrea, Tigray, Wollo, Shewa and Hararghe provinces (Tadesse and Yonas, 2007). The Afar united together under one administrative region following the introduction of ethno-regional administrative structure in Ethiopia since 1991.

Afar and Amhara agro-pastoralists lived together in peace with traditional sporadic disputes caused by customary practices and competition over resources (pasture and water). Conflicts between Afar and Amhara can be traced back to the historical movement and settlement patterns of people in the 16th century (Yasin, 2010). During this time the population movement and pressure from Oromo and Somalis forced the Afar to move westward and to occupy the Amhara homelands. Evidences showed that the Afar in Dawe waged war against the Amharas in Majete in the 17th century which ended with the death of the leader of Afar of Dawe, Ali Mussa Ahmed in the battle (Ibid).

6.3.1. Causes and Consequences of Afar- Amhara Conflict

The data obtained from Afar Peace and Security Administration Bureau showed that the current Afar region share more than 400-kilometer boundary with Amhara National Regional State from Kobo Woreda of North Wollo Administrative Zone in the north to Ankober Woreda of North Shewa Administrative Zone in the south. According to Yasin (2010) the four out of ten Zones of Amhara region share boundary with three out of five Zonal administrations of the Afar region. More than 130 Kebeles in 26 Woredas of both regional states share borders between Afar and Amhara Regional States. The 65 Kebeles of Afar Regional State share borders with 66 Kebeles of Amhara Regional State. The Amharas living in Kebeles sharing border with Afar are pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities.

An expert in Afar Regional State Peace and Security Administration Bureau explained that cross-border ethnic killings as a cultural practice among the Afar and Amhara bordering communities for the sake of pride and fame was one of the causes of conflicts between the two ethnic groups beyond competition over access to resources. In this regard, a person kills another person belonging to another ethnic group to get fame among his ethnic group. This in turn maintains the cycle of revenge which adversely affect the relationship among neighboring communities (Interviewed on 12 December 2019, Semera). According to Yasin(2010), interest to be regarded as a hero within one's own society, competition to show ethnic supremacy, revenge for lost lives and properties and wealth accumulation were factors aggravating the conflict between Afar and Amhara neighboring communities. The conflict between Afar and Amhara after the introduction of federal system in Ethiopia will be treated under the following sub-topics.

Figure 3.6: Neighboring Woredas in Conflict along the borders of Afar and Amhara Regional States



Woredas of Afar Regional State sharing borders with Woredas of Amhara Regional State are Chifra and Mille Woredas (Zone 1), Gulina, Awra and Ewa Woredas (Zone 4), Dawe Woreda (Zone 5). Woredas of Amhara Regional State sharing borders with Woredas of Afar Regional State are Kobo and Habru Woredas (North Wollo), Worebabo Woreda (South Wollo Zone),Jille Timuga, Bati and Kewet Woredas (Oromia Zone of Amhara Region).

The people living along the border areas of the two regional states have long historical, economic and social interaction. For instance, Afar entered with their cattle and camels into Raya Kobo (North Wollo) and the local people welcomed them. Interviewees mentioned that market exchange, lending and borrowing relationship among communities living along border areas have never been interrupted even during the time of misunderstanding between local leaders. Similarly, the neighboring communities of Sodoma Kebele of Habru Woreda in North Wollo Administrative Zone of Amhara Region and Chifra Woreda in Zone one of Afar Region have lived together for years and their residents have marriage relations (Interview, Afar and Amhara community elders, Mersa and Semera, 12 November, 2018; 23 December 2018, respectively).

The shared agreement among participants of the interview was that cross-border resource sharing has become difficult following the restructuring of the Ethiopian State and change of government in 1991. After the creation of ethnic-based regional states and boundary demarcation, trying to move into the neighboring grazing sites during shortage of pasture in their respective areas would automatically lead to deadliest fighting. The frequency, magnitude and characteristics of conflict between communities along border areas of Afar and Amhara Regional States seems escalating as a result of frequent armed disputes due to territorial claims following the introduction of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia (Yasin, 2010). According to Habru Woreda official interviewed in November 2018, conflict became the day-to-day experience in three out of the 13 Woredas of Amhara Regional State sharing boundary with Woredas of Afar Regional State. These are Habru, Bati and Kewet Woredas of Amhara Region and Chifra, Mille and Simurobi Gelealo Woredas of Afar region.

An interviewee from Afar Regional State Peace and Security Administration Bureau further explained Woredasin conflictr are far away from the administration centers of the two regional states which might be difficult to extend effective political control over border areas. The Amharas entered into Afar territory attracted by the availability of vast arable land and the Afar tried to protect their land. This uncompromised interest has been the source of conflict between these communities. He further elaborated that conflicts among the neighboring Woredas have been erupting every day, every week and every month.Repeated conflicts between neighboring communities have several consequences like loss of human life and injury, destruction of resources, robbery of property and recycling of revenge (Interview, on 5 January 2019, Semera).

Woreda officials in the Peace and Security Offices ofHabru andChiffra Woredas interviewed in December 2018 and January 2019 respectively asserted that the contested areas among Afar and Amhara border communities are pieces of agricultural lands and residential areas. For instance, Mille Woreda (in Zone one of Afar region) entered into conflict with Bati Woreda (Oromia Zone of Amhara region) over ownership right of one Kebele called by Afar as Jeldu and Chachatu by the Oromo in the Amhara regional state. Moreover, community elders of both sides interviewed in the above months mentioned that the clash between the two ethnic groups in the area was severe in the first two-three years after the new federal restructuring of the country. According to one Afar elder, women had never been target of cross-border traditional conflicts. Unlike this experience, in 2002 about thirty-two Afar women were killed by Amhara militia on their way home after attending a daily market near the town of Shewarobit in Amhara region. This shows the changing nature of conflict in post federal Ethiopia.

Community elders in Habru Woreda interviewed in December 2018, at Mersa, mentioned that most of the areas of western Afar Regional State today were under the administration of the former Wollo Province during the military regime. Following the adoption of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, territories inhabited by Afar were integrated into the newly established Afar Regional State. Due to this reason, nowadays, more than the traditional resource-based conflict, territorial claim became the main source of conflict between Afar and Amhara neighboring communities.They explained that sporadic conflicts have been erupting which disrupt the relationship between neighboring local communities of the two regional states living along the regional boundary. Such conflicts have been resulted in loss of human life, animal raiding, displacement of people, and interruption of social interaction and problem of ensuring rule of law in the area.

Conflicts between Afar and Amhara neighboring communities became intense since the beginning of 2017. According to a pastoralist, resident of Chifra Woreda interviewed in December 2017, the July 2017 conflict between Sodoma Kebele in Habru Woreda of Amhara Region and Chifra Woreda of Afar Region was severe. He further elaborated that the clash lasted for about three days and 12 people were killed from both sides which as a result the federal police force intervened to ensure peace and security in the area. He added that loss of human life

and displacement of people has been increasing from time to time due to absence of government organ which could bring killers before the court and finding lasting solution to the conflict.

In the words of one community elder from Sodoma Kebele who put the extent of the problem:

> *The peace committee of Chifra Woreda and Sodoma Kebele has negotiated for several times. But neighboring communities soon entered into conflict again. In my view the main cause behind the current conflict is the question of ownership right of a place called Jara. Both sides have been claiming that Jara belongs to them. When the Amharas raised questions related to it, they have been told that the land belongs to them. Similar responses have been given to the Afar when they presented their claimed over the same territory. The concerned bodies had to give clear decision regarding the ownership right of this place with the help of political map as part of finding out lasting solution to the conflict between the two ethnic groups. Inability to do that will contribute for the sustenance of the problem (Interview, 12 January, 2018, Meressa).*

Since local administrators and community elders were unable to resolve the July conflict a new conflict erupted in September 2017 and the security situation around Jara became very tense. This conflict started on 12 September 2017and lasted for three consecutive days (Interview, Participants, and Feburary 2018). According to the explanation of interviewees two farmers residents of Habru Woreda, Kebele 23 and another farmer resident of Direluka village in Kebele 24 were killed by Afar gunmen on the 12th and 14th of September 2017 respectively. As revenge, Amhara farmers moved into Afar villages where four Afar were wounded in a fire exchange but how many Afar were killed is not known (Interview, February 2018, Sodoma).

A regional official in Afra Regional State Peace and Security Administration Bureau inteviewed in January 2018, Semera, stated that territorial claim has become the main cause of conflict between Afar and Amhara neighboring communities. He further explained that the current Chifra Woreda of Afar region was part of Habru Woreda during the military regime. Chifra became part of Afar Regional State following administrative restructuring of the country by the government of EPRDF in 1991. The Amharas along the border area still feel that Chifra belongs to them. This territorial claim has been the source of repeated conflicts between the two ethnic groups. He underscored that conflict has been significantly affecting the relationship between neighboring Afar and Afar communities. For instance, unlike the experience of the past, fearing of revenge, Amharas have stopped attending the market in Chifra town of Afar region. Similarly, the movement of Afar into Amhara Woredas and Kebeles has been restricted.

6.3.2. Recent Efforts of Resolving Amhara-Afar Conflict

Public conferences and discussions have been conducted between Afar and Amhara regional state administrators at different levels with the intent of resolving and /or avoiding conflicts along border areas. For instance, according to Amhara Mass Media, Afar and Amhara regions' Regional Councils and neighboring Woredas People to People Peace Conference was held in Woldia town (North Wollo) on 14 March 2019. In this conference more than 800 people have participated including regional state presidents, members of Regional State Councils, representatives of neighboring Woredas' administrators, security forces, community elders, religious fathers and representatives of local communities (Amhara Mass Media Agency on line, March 2019).

In this conference a paper entitled "*The Relation among Amhara and Afar Peoples, Value as well as Directions on Possible Solutions to Conflicts*" was presented. Participants of the conference identified the following five main causes behind conflicts between Afar and Amhara neighboring communities: *First*, cross boundary use of arable and grazing land due to natural calamities such as draught. Shortage of arable and pasture land on the part of Amhara Woredas and the interest of Amhara pastoralists and agro-pastoralists to use the vast arable and pasture land of Afar Woredas and Kebeles have been causing conflicts along border areas. The Afar also used to send their animals to Amhara Woredas like Raya Kobo and Habru during the time of natural disaster like draught. The two ethnic groups entered into conflict when one group crossed the boundary of the other; *Second*, territorial claim which arise from administrative restructuring of Woredas. For instance, Chifra Woreda was part of Wollo province during the past regimes but now it is part of Afar region. The Amhara did not stop claiming territories in the current Afar Regional State which were under Wollo administrative province in the past; *Third*, culture of killing and revenge as well as labeling clashes between individuals as ethnic conflict. If an Afar kills a person belonging to Amhara ethnic group, the families and relatives of the deceased will revenge by killing the murderer or his families and relatives. Moreover, conflicts between individuals belonging to the two ethnic groups have been converted into ethnic conflict. This vicious circle of conflict has been adversely affecting the relationship between these neighboring communities; *Fourth*, ethnic conflict entrepreneurs (individuals who have been deliberately disrupting the long historical brotherhood relations and blood ties among neighboring Afar and Amhara

communities); and *Fifth*, lack of commitment on the part of leaders (administrators) at different levels, illegal human traffickers, contraband traders and individuals engaged in illegal arms trafficking.

Participants of this conference mentioned that discussing on the causes of conflicts could not help to solve the problem unless all the concerned bodies make tangible measures. In this regard, one, participant from Afar region asserted:

> *Discussing on the problem without taking measures on those who have been causing conflicts between the two ethnic groups along border areas will not help us to find out appropriate solution to the problem. Who is guilty has to be made clear (either Afar or Amharas) and regional governments need to have a firm stand to take measures on ethnic entrepreneurs. Moreover, we have to give our ear to elderly people, community leaders and fathers of peace if we don't want to see people die of conflicts sustained among neighboring communities (Conference Participant's speech 14 March 2019, Woldia).*

Another Afar-Amhara Security forum was organized in Kombolcha Town (South Wollo Zone) on 19 September 2019. Commanders of the North-Eastern Command have participated in this forum in addition to regional state presidents, community elders and representatives of local administrators. The shared agreement among participants of the conference was that conflicts have been causing loss of human life despite of the possibility of resolving conflicts through traditional and administrative means. According to the evaluation made by participants, South Wollo and North Shewa Zonal administrations have shown improvement in terms resolving conflicts. But Habru Woreda of North Wollo Zone has weakness in resolving its conflict with Chifra Woreda of Afar region. They also asserted that Woreda and Kebele administrations have to work in cooperation with the security organs to ensure peace and security along the border areas of the two Woredas. Moreover, both regional state governments have to handover criminals, presenting them before the law in order to ensure the respect of law (Amhara Mass Media Agency on line, September 2019).

The various conferences and discussions made so far did not help to avoid the conflict among the neighboring communities of Afar and Amhara regional states. As part of finding lasting solution to conflicts, which have been causing loss of life, destruction of properties and displacement of people, peace conference was organized at Woldia Town on 12 November 2019. The researcher has participated in this conference and had the opportunity to hear who said what during the

discussion. In the opening statement of the conference, the Head of the Office of Woldia Town Amhara Democratic Party underscored that frequent conflicts have been disrupting the peaceful way of life and free movement of people between neighboring Woredas and Kebeles of Afar and Amhara regional states. He asserted that unlike the past, in recent years, Afar have not been entering into the towns in North Wollo Administrative Zone like Woldia, Kobo and Mersa. He expressed his wish that the conference will help to find out lasting solution to conflicts and to create favorable conditions for the peaceful co-existence among neighboring communities. This sentiment was voiced by an Afar Participant of the conference as:

> *Woldia was our second town and we knew it as our home town. Afar were free not only to enter into the town but also to live in it. Offices of Zone Four of Afar Regional State were in Woldia for few years after the establishment of Afar Regional State following the federal restructuring of the country. Our Parents have attended their education in Woldia. We have attended our education in Woldia and we have sent our children to school in Woldia. There are boys and daughters born from Amhara mothers and Afar fathers which indicate the existence of a healthy relationship between the two ethnic groups. But, these days, particularly after the establishment of federal system in Ethiopia, situations have been completely changed. I never thought that conflicts could change the marriage relation, blood ties and economic interaction among neighboring communities of the two regional states to this extent. I hope today's discussion will enable us to identify the political entrepreneurs who have been exacerbating conflicts out of which they have been trying to maximize their own self-interest(Conference Participant's speech 12 November2019, Woldia).*

The North Wollo Zone Administrator argued recurrent conflicts have been disrupting the long-established brotherly relationship among neighbouring communities. Nowadays, Afar do not feel free to visit Woldia. He underscored that leadership problem was one of the main causes behind the conflict among Afar and Amhara communities living along border areas. He further elaborated that Woreda and Kebele officials have been exacerbating conflicts instead of being part of the solution. He urged that administrators have to be vanguard in creating stability in their respective areas, working hard for the prevalence of peace and ensure the security of all lines (roads) connecting the various towns of the North Wollo Zone with Afar region.

The shared agreement among participant of the conference the main factor contributing for the perpetuation of conflicts among people living along bordering areas of the two Regional Stateswas lack of commitment and integrity on the part of Zonal, Woreda and Kebele leaders of both sides. One of the Afar participant underscored that community members would have not

been involved in conflicts had they been properly led by administrators at different levels of regional state governments. He further mentioned that leaders had to organize public discussion forums and create awareness among the people on the effects of conflict which would have saved the lives of many people. He concluded that Woreda leaders of the two neighboring communities have to settle their differences first if we want to find lasting solutions to the conflicts between neighboring communities. This sentiment was voiced by a senior Military Officer, Northern Command who attended the conference as:

> *You have big capacity. It is miserable to experience recurrent conflicts and damages in the presence of government leaders, government structures, security forces and community elders who can create peace for others let alone for your own community. Unnecessary scarifies were paid due to lack of commitment and absence of proper follow up on the part of the leadership at different levels. There are model Woredas in terms ensuring peace and stability but you have failed to create favorable conditions for experience sharing among Woredas. Particularly the leadership of Chifra, Worebabo and Habru Woredas should work hard to mitigate or at least minimize the effects of conflicts occurring in your respective areas. You have to stop mocking in human life and even you have to feel regret for the mistakes you committed so far. Nothing can be gained from killing each other. The community can profit only when we ensure our security and cooperate against our common enemies, poverty and backwardness (Conference Participant's speech 12 November2019, Woldia).*

The other main cause exacerbating conflicts between neighboring Afar and Amhara communities was the weakening of traditional methods of conflict resolution. Many of the participants of the conference who made speech underscored that the intervention of the political leadership at different levels of government has been undermining the role of community elders and religious fathers in resolving conflicts. For instance, Head of the Office of Habru Woreda Amhara Democratic Party mentioned that communities have encountered problem of sustaining the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms which were effective for centuries. As a result, recurrent conflicts which were considered as small in the past are now get harsher causing loss of human life and destruction of material properties. He suggested that the role of the political leadership has to be creating favorable conditions which could enable community elders solve problems through their traditional mechanism. An elderly Afar further strengthened the above idea when he stated:

> *Nowadays conflict resolution mechanisms are becoming ineffective. In the past community elders were creating peace and enabling the community living together in peace. When cattle were taken by the other group, community elders were able to get them back within 3-4 days through discussion. When a person was killed from one side, community elders were able to stop further killing through reconciliation, forcing the killer pay blood money to the families of the deceased and stop cycle of revenge. But today killing has increased than ever before. The involvement of the political leadership has been exacerbating instead of reducing the occurrence of conflicts (Conference Participant's speech 12 November2019, Woldia).*

Discussants of the conference call for the practical implementation of the agreements reached. For instance, in the words of an elderly Afar participant:

> *Now we are discussing in a comfortable environment (hall) but people are dying there. We might get people killed when we return back to home. Therefore, what matters is not the issue we have discussed in this conference hall. It is rather our commitment to put what we have agreed here into practice and make use of it for development and prosperity by bringing lasting peace among people living along border areas (Conference Participant's speech 12 November2019, Woldia).*

The attorney of North Wollo Administrative Zone underscored that conflict is unavoidable social phenomenon. Conflict between individuals or groups may happen in the future but members of the community have to stop labelling individual clashes as ethnic conflict in order to deny playing ground for ethnic entrepreneurs. He further explained that the cooperative efforts of administrators at different levels and members of the community is very important to bring criminals before the law and to avoid the escalation of conflicts.

In the same fashion, an Afar participant of the conference mentioned that they have to focus on their future peace and forget their memories of past conflicts and associated damages. Leaders of the two regional states have to strengthen people to people relationship. Ethnic-conflict entrepreneurs have to be identified and brought before the court if the regional states have the commitment to find lasting solutions to the problems.

As a concluding remark, the North Wollo Administrator underscored on the following solutions: the leadership at different levels need to have a firm stand not to interfere rather to create favourable conditions for the community elders to resolve conflicts through their tested traditional conflict resolution mechanisms; and stop labelling criminals to the ethnic group to which they belong. Rather Zonal, Woreda and Kebele administrators and security forces need to

have the commitment to control and handover criminals instead of giving cover up to their criminal acts; peace can be ensured only when we discuss on the causes of conflict and take pre-emptive action instead of rushing after conflict erupted. We need to have regular forums where we discuss on various issues of the community but unlike this conference the number of community elders has to be significantly increased; and Kebele security committees engage in tasks related to peace and security have to sufficiently use as the main tool of peace making. To that end, what they have to perform have to be counted and given and they have to be let them to count and receive their responsibilities.

Seven months after the Woldia Conference another Peace Conference was conducted in Dessie Town on 26 June 2020 where higher leaders of Afar and Amhara regional states discussed on conflicts sustained along border areas. Participants of the discussion mentioned that weakness of the leadership at different levels to bring individuals who have been disrupting the healthy relationship among people before the law and problem of not taking measure before escalation of the problems were the other factors exacerbating conflicts. Discussants asserted that governments of the two regional states have to follow up and stop the actions of those political entrepreneurs who have been trying to instigate conflicts which have been causing loss of human life and destruction of properties. Participants also underlined that neighboring communities have to use traditional conflict resolving mechanisms to avoid revenge and to enable residents to focus on development endeavors (Amhara Mass Media, 26 June 2020).

Conflict resolving efforts made so far and consecutive peace conferences conducted in various towns have not been able to bring lasting solutions. For instance, Afar gunmen burned villages in places called Humnanu and Borena, in Oromia Zone of Amhara Region on 12 December 2020. According to the head of Peace and Security Office of Amhara Region Oromia Zone Administration, this conflict has caused serious damage on human life and property. He also asserted that the current conflict is severe than the previous conflicts. This conflict is different from past conflicts because *first*, heavy weapons were used in the fighting, and *second*, the fighting was conducted in a tactful manner. The Director General of Pre-warning and Sustainable Resolution of the Ministry of Peace further underscored that the current conflict is quite unusual and the government is aggressively working to stop this conflict. (EBC, 14 December, 2020). In general, the discussions above showed that the prevalence of inter-clan and inter-ethnic conflicts

is one of the factors contributing for the less socio-economic development of Afar Regional State.

As mentioned above, demarcation of administrative regions along ethnic lines has exacerbated the conflict between Amhara and Afar communities living along boundary areas. Moreover, conferences organized at different times did not help to stop the ongoing conflict. According to participants of the interview, conferences which failed to create stability have their own adverse impact on the socio-economic development of Afar regional state. Official of Afar Regionaal State who participated in the conference organized at Woldia explained the economic implication of futile conferences as:

> *Conferences organized in different towns where leaders from Woreda to regional level participate have never met their intended purpose, avoiding conflicts between the two regional states. On the other hand, the budget allocated to cover the accommodation cost (food, drink, hotel services) for the participants of consecutive conferences is too expensive. Moreover, the transportation cost and per-diem payments for the participants of conferences have been uneconomical. The big amount of money appropriated for such futile conferences would otherwise be used for development purpose (Conference Participant's speech 12 November2019, Woldia).*

Absence of leaders from Woreda to regional level from their workplace to attend conferences has its own impact on the activities of Bureaus and offices. Such absence of leaders implies that they cannot perform their follow up and control activities. This, in turn has its own impact on the work performance of Bureaus and offices in particular and the development of the regional state in general.

The inter-ethnic conflict between Afar and Amhara has been causing devastation of properties, loss of human life and instability among members of the community living along border areas of the two regional states. This has its own impact on the productivity of members of the local community and the regional state at large.Constant cattle raiding among people living along bordering Woredas has been discouraging the pastoralists. Due to absence of security guarantee, pastoralists have not been encouraged to rear more animals due to restrictions on the use of pasturelands. In general, buffer areas remained unused for cultivation or grazing due to the conflict between neighboring communities. Such problems have their own impact on the socio-economic development of Afar regional state.

The inter-clan and inter-ethnic conflicts presented and described above, was further corroborated by the quantitative data obtained through the administration of questionnaire. Table 22.6 below depicts the respondents' idea regarding the impact of inter-clan and inter-ethnic conflict.

Table 22.6: Inter-clan and Inter-ethnic Conflicts in Afar Region

Do you believe that the inter clan and inter-ethnic conflicts have contributed for the underdevelopment of Afar Regional State?			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Yes I believe	277	79.1
	I do not believe	73	20.9
	Total	350	100.0

As we infer from Table 22.6 above, the percentage of respondents who believe that inter-clan and inter-ethnic conflicts are contributing factors for the underdevelopment of Afar Regional State, 277 (79.1%) is greater than those who do not believe in that way 73(20.9%).The respndents explained that conflict in the region has been affecting the development efforts in the region by distablizing the political environment as well as by disrupting the utilization of resources for the benefit of the people.

Literatures showed mixed results regarding the link between federalism and conflict. In this regard, there are scholars who argued that federalism is a political arrangement appropriate to resolve conflicts and to create national cohesion and hence it serve as a means of stabilizing countries. On the other hand, other scholars argued that federalism can intensify already existing differences, which can sometimes result in even more serious disputes. The Ethiopian experience seems to fit into the second line of argument. This is because the data used in this study revealed out that conflicting situation is exacerbated since the introduction of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia.

Literatures regarding the relation between conflict and development indicated that violence creates insecurity which disrupts economic activities. Conflict could decrease investment, trade and productivityand in doing so it impades economic development. Imperical researches presented in the literature also showed that conflicts in Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria have

significantly affected the economic development of these countries. The experience in Ethiopia fits to this link between conflict and development. This study also showed that the prevalence of conflict in Ethiopia has severely affected the development of Afar Regional State in particular and the country in general.

6.4.Conclusion

Inter-clan conflicts among Afarclans have been eroding the internal unity and harmony of Afars. Competition over scarce natural resources, inter-clan homicide, clannism, localism, cross-cousin marriages and raiding and counter-raiding of herds are still causes of inter-clan conflits. The competition among different clans for the seizure of positions in the various levels of the regional state government, make clan representation a requirement at the expense of merit/capacity. Inter-clan conflicts have been adversely affecting the socio-economic development of Afar region in many ways such as loss of human life and material destruction, disruption of the stability of the clans involved in the conflict as well as the resources consumed during the process of ritual peacemaking (resolving conflicts) including the scarification of oxen, all in one way or another have been adversely affecting the socio-economic development of clans in particular and that of the regional state in general.

The long standing resource-based conflict between Afar and Issa Somalisis transformed intoboundary conflict after the restructuring of thecountry's subnational units along ethnic lines in post 1991 federal Ethiopia. The main cause behind the current conflict between Afar and Issa is the establishment of Issa settlements in three Kebeles (Adaytu, Gedamaytu and Undufo) in Afar land and the accompanied territorial claim of Afar over these areas and the interest of IssaSomalis living in these kebeles to be structurally part of Siti Zone of Somali Regional State. The recurrent Afar-Issa conflicts had caused the loss of human life on both sides, displacement of many thousands of pastoralists and disruption of the day-to-day activities of people living in the conflict-redden areas. The conflict has significantly affected the traditional mobility of pastoralists denying them access to alternative grazing lands. The efforts made so far to resolve the conflict between Afar and Issa remained to be fruitless due to the polarized interests presented by the conflicting parties and lack of committment on the part of the federal government in wholeheartdly supporting the peace making process. All these have their own

impact on the livelihood of the community and the socio-economic develoment of Afar Regional State.

Cross boundary use of arable and grazing land, culture of killing and revenge were sources of conflict among Amhara and Afar pastoral and agro-pastoral neighbouring communities. Like in the case of Afar and Issa Conflict, the conflict between Amhara and Afar neighboring communities became more intense following federal restructuring of the country in1991. Beyond competition for resources, nowadays boundary claiming has been causing severe conflict between the two ethnic groups. The conflict has disrupted the economic exchange between the two ethnic groups. Unlike the past, recently the Afar have not been attending markets in Amhara towns and the Amhara too. The stoppage of cross boundary use of grazing lands has been adversely affecting animal production upon which the livelihood of pastoralist communities of both sides depends on. Moreover, the preparation of fruitless discussion forums is also uneconomical. In general, both the inter-clan and inter-ethnic conflicts have been adversely affecting the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State.

Part IV: Afar under Federal Ethiopia: Economic Challenges

Chapter Seven

The Political Economy of the Special Support

7. Introduction

All regions of the country were not at similar level of political and socio-economic development when Ethiopia was restructured following the introduction of ethnic federalism in 1991. Cognizant of the regional disparities the preamble of the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia stipulated the need to rectify the existing imbalance and to work hard to promote the interests of the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia with the intent of building one political and economic community, the common destiny of Ethiopians.

Within the context of promoting the shared interests and common destiny of all Ethiopians, this chapter attempts to examine the provision of special support which has been provided to the Afar Regional State. Accordingly, the chapter is organized into six sections including this introductory part. Section two shades light on the rationale for the provision of special support to the Developing Regional States. It tries to give highlight why the Ethiopian pastoralist communities lagged behind others and what the federal system brought to them at least in principle.

Section three describes the institutional arrangement created for the provision of special support to the Developing Regional States. In doing so, it attempts to shade light on the Federal Board and member institutions of the Federal Support Board. The fourth section provides an overview of the implementation of the provision of the special support to the Developing Regional States. The fifth section describes the provision of the special support to Afar Regional State focusing on the practical implementation of the special support provided to the regional state. The sixth section is about the various challenges encountered in the provision of the special support to the Afar Regional State. This section tries to assess the different challenges of the stakeholders involved in the provision of special support to Afar Region such as the federal government, the Special Support Board and its member institutions (ministries), the Ministry of Federal Affairs and neighbouring regional state (Tigray) and Afar Regional State itself. Finally, section six summarizes the major arguments and findings thereof and thereby partly address the fourth

specific research question of this study: *To what extent the provision of special supports to the Afar Regional State helped to transform the economic development of the regional state?*

7.1. The Special Support for the Developing Regional States: The Rationale

The peripheral areas of Ethiopia (Afar, Somali, Gambela and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states) are victims of marginalization, the process which started since the time of modern state formation in Ethiopia. Successive Ethiopian governments were largely focusing on the appropriation of the resources of pastoral communities while at the same time neglecting their socio-economic development. Due to their past experience of socio-political marginalization, pastoralists mistrust governmental interventions and even considered themselves as 'forgotten people' (Rettberg, 2010). When EPRDF took power in 1991 and restructured the country through federal arrangement, it became obvious that the peripheral areas of the country mostly inhabited by pastoralists lagged behind others.

The 1995 FDRE Constitution moved the country out of its century's old experiences of unitary state structure which had little recognition to the ethno-cultural communities and introduced ethnic federalism as an alternative political arrangement to make the country a place where citizens receive equal treatment (Hashim, 2010). It was believed that accelerating the development of Developing Regional States is the only option to enable them to catch up other regional states. Participants of the interview asserted that there are capacity limitation gaps even though the number of educated elites has been increasing from time to time. Moreover, they explained that absence of proper utilization of resources in the developing regional states has adversely affected their socio-economic development as it was intended to be.

In cognizant of the past injustice the FDRE government has followed a radical shift at least in principle from its predecessors regarding pastoral production systems. This historical departure is reflected in the various provisions of the Constitution and the subsequent development policy and strategy documents. As part of giving recognition to the pastoral life, the 1995 FDRE Constitution has ensured the land ownership rights and tenure security of pastoralists. To that end, Article 40 (5) of the FDRE Constitution has guaranteed the land ownership right of pastoralists. It stated that "*Ethiopian pastoralists have the right to free land for grazing and*

cultivation as well as the right not to be displaced from their own lands... " Moreover, Article 41 (8) of the FDRE Constitution clearly stipulated that Ethiopian farmers and pastoralists have the right to "*...receive fair price for their products that would lead to improvement in their conditions of life and to enable them to obtain an equitable share of the national wealth*…"

Ethiopian pastoralists are one of the groups who lag behind others in terms of their socio-economic and political development because of negligence and marginalization by past governments (Yohannes and Mahmmud, 2015). It seems with this understanding that the government of EPRDF gave due consideration to the historically disadvantaged societies of the country at least in principle. To that end, Article 89 (4) of the FDRE Constitution stated that *"Government shall provide special assistance to Nations, Nationalities and Peoples least advantaged in economic and social development."* This is the position of the government which aimed at providing affirmative action to people living in the Developing Regional States to rectify past discrimination and to enable them catch up with others by accelerating their socio-economic development.

According to MoFA (2016), the main objectives of the special support package include bringing democratic unity and building one political and economic community by ensuring equitable development in the four special support seeking Developing Regional States; ensuring food security in the four special support seeking Developing Regional States and improving the living conditions of their people as well as building a democratic system which could ensure popular participation and building the national and regional capacity to maintain sustainable and equitable development.

The rationale for the provision of special support to the Developing Regional States is presented in some detail by the Ministry of Federal Affairs. Accordingly, the support is based on the following grounds: First, the federal government has constitutional responsibility (Art.89/4) to support nations, nationalities and peoples that are least advantaged in their socio-economic development. Second, the existing capacity and development gaps among regional states necessitate positive intervention for the realization of the long-term plan of the country, building one political community (ensuring the common destiny of nations, nationalities and peoples).

Third, the interest of developing regional states to get support from the federal government and from the relatively developed neighboring regional states is the other rationale for the provision of the special support. Fourth, the District Level Development Programme (DLDP) started during the Transitional period (1991-1995). The DLDP was one of the strategies set by the government of the FDRE in 2000, to realize the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP). The 1991 change of government in Ethiopia has introduced federalism and decentralized government administration structure which in turn is believed to transfer the political, administrative and fiscal powers to regional state governments and to their lower-level administrations and thereby improving the provision of social services to the local communities. Fifth, practical implementation capacity building strategy and programmes designed to eradicate poverty. Building the implementation capacity is one of the key issues to solve capacity limitations and to implement national policies and strategies by contextualizing them to their existing realities. Sixth, Equitable Development Assurance Strategy designed by the Ministry of Federal and Pastoral Areas Development Affairs to ensure equitable development among regional states by narrowing the existing capacity and development gaps. This strategy was aimed at building the implementation capacity of Developing Regional States and to enable them to catch up the relatively developed regional states and the national average. Seventh, Rural Woreda and Kebele Good Governance Package prepared by the FDRE Ministry of Capacity Building which focused on identifying the causes of the problems of good governance among rural Woredas and Kebeles and to forward possible solutions to the problems. Woredas and Kebeles in Special support Regional States and pastoralist areas have to contextualize the package to the social reality on the ground to make the community both participant and beneficiary of the package by ensuring fast and sustainable development (MoFA, 2017).

Generally, the aim of providing special support to the Developing Regional States was to narrow the gaps in capacity, development and good governance among regional states by building the implementation capacity of Developing Regional States step by step and to enable them to implement activities by their own (MoFA, December, 2017). The document also mentioned that member ministries engaged in the Provision of Special Support should focus on building the institutional capacity of the Developing Regional States and provide their support in a responsible and accountable manner.

7.2. Institutional Arrangement for the Special Support

The Provision of Special Support to the four Developing Regional States started after the adoption of the 1995 FDRE Constitution. The federal government organized an office called "*Office of Regional Affairs*" within the Prime Minister's office which provided support to the four Developing Regional States. Until 2001 this sector supported the establishment of government structures in the regional states and its support was focusing on the construction of offices, elementary schools, hospitals and health stations as well as improving the implementation capacity of the Developing Regional States by providing trainings and practical experience sharing (MoFA, 2016).

The Office of the Regional Affairs since its establishment and its successor, MoFA has facilitated situations in which leaders at different levels and members of executives in the Developing Regional States share best practices and experiences from other regional states and to adopt it into their day-to-day activities (Ibid). The Office of Regional Affairs was supporting the various activities in the four Developing Regional States. However, the supports provided so far could not bring substantial changes in terms of building the implementation capacity of the regional states.

In line with the above view one of the directorates of theMoFAunderscored thatthere was an obvious gap between the efforts made so far and the changes brought in building the implementation capacity of the Developing Regional States. He further mentioned that in 2002 the ruling party (EPRDF) thoroughly examined the support provided and sort out the reasons for the limited achievements. According to him, it was found that the technical advisors and professionals deployed to the Developing Regional States were performing tasks on behalf of the respective sector offices and administrators where they were assigned rather than focusing on building the capacity of workers and administrators. This had its own adverse effect on the purpose of the provision of the special support to the Developing Regional States. The government decided to make structural adjustment for the provision of special support which as a result the Office of Regional Affairs was replaced by the Ministry of Federal Affairs which was believed to foster the development efforts in the Developing Regional States (Interview, 24 December, 2018).

The Ministry of Federal Affairs is in charge of coordinating the special supports provided by members of the Special Support Board. It was first established under proclamation N0.256/2001 that defined the powers and duties of the reorganized executive organs of the FDRE.Again on Proc.No.641/2009 and 691/2010 additional role & responsibility given to the Ministry of Federal Affairs to oversee & ensure common understanding among Religions and Faithsto prevent any form of conflict. It was mainly tuned to the Growth and Transformation Plan of the country. Hence the core processes ought to bring equitable development in the Developing Regional States, prevent and resolve conflicts, strengthen the federal system, uphold federal-regional relations in the country, and maintain good relations, peace and tolerance among different religions and beliefs (MoFA, 2016).

The MoFA is headed by a Minister and a State Minister. It is organized into five Core and five Support processes to undertake the powers and duties given to it. The core processes are headed by Directorate Generals. The core and support processes are accountable to the State Minister and the Minister. The structural setup of the ministry include Equitable Development Core Process; Conflict Prevention and Resolution Core Process; Intergovernmental Relations Core Process; Religion and Faith Affairs Core Process; and Policy Analysis, Plan, Finance and Procurement Core Process; Audit and Inspection Support Process; Women's Affairs Support Process, Change Management Support Process; Public Relation Support Process; Human Resource Development and Property Management Support Process (MoFA, 2016).

In order to understand what was intended as a result of the special support given to Developing Regional States and the achievements obtained, it seems worth mentioning some of the duties and responsibilities of the Directorate Generals heading the first core process because its duties and responsibilities have relevance to the issues to be discussed in this chapter. Accordingly, some of the duties and responsibilities of Equitable Development Directorate General include direct and coordinate Case Team to collect, organize and analyze data of capacity building, good governance, social, gender and environmental development based on projection and progression rate between relatively developed and developing of the regions to create working documents; delegate a team to undertake package program on capacity building, good governance, economic, social, gender and environmental development; initiate, coordinate and direct evaluation on plan implementation periodically; direct and coordinate common forum to evaluate

the regions, Woredas on their periodic performance; provide adequate human resource; improve the practice achieved so far and studies based or customer's needs and expectations, monitor the mission accomplishment of the work process…monitor teams undertaking their task end-to-end (Ibid).

MoFA has also a Regional Equitable Development Directorates in Developing Regional States. Some of its duties and responsibilities are direct, coordinate and monitor the technical advisors from federal institutions and neighboring regions to accomplish their given tasks; direct, coordinate and collect data for the work process studies from the regions, Woredas and Kebeles; direct, coordinate and monitor that the project led program should be incorporated in the regions and Woreda strategic plan respectively; direct, coordinate and monitor the task carried out by UNDP, PCDP and other NGOs in the regions; monitor and resolve with regional bodies the short coming found across implementing the program; create conducive condition processional support in terms of finance, logistics and provision of offices, direct and coordinate evaluation of implementation together with regional and Woreda executive bodies (MoFA, 2010).

In order to further strengthen the support which has been provided to the Developing Regional States, the Special Support Board was established in 2004 to coordinate the efforts of the federal government in providing special support to the Developing Regional States (Haileyesus, 2014).The Board was established by the Council of Ministers Regulation No. 103/2004 to provide affirmative support for "less developed regions". This regulation was amended by the regulation No.128/2006 and the latest regulation of the Council of Ministers No. 24/2011 repealed the 2006 regulation. According to the regulation "less developed regions", refers to the regional states of Afar, Somali, Gambela and Benshangul Gumuz as well as pastoral areas in Oromia and Southern Region Nations, Nationalities and Peoples. The regulation makes clear that "affirmative support" means sustainable and coordinated support given to the regions mainly with regard to plan preparation and implementation based on their interests (Haileyesus, 2014).

The Federal Board is the main organ established to coordinate the Special Support given to the Developing Regional States. The Board is accountable to the Prime Minister and its objectives are to direct, coordinate and ensure the effectiveness of affirmative support provided to Developing Regional States by institutions of the federal government, provide the necessary support for the regions in their effort to carryout democratization, sustainable development and

capacity building based on the vision and plan and encourage close cooperation between the regions eligible for affirmative support and neighboring Developing Regional States. The responsibilities and duties of the Board include initiating planning ideas to ensure rapid and sustainable growth in the Developing Regional States; giving coordinated and sustainable support with respect to plan preparation, implementation and follow up; providing sustainable implementation capacity building support to the Developing Regional States to make them self-reliant; direct and coordinate the federal affirmative support provided for the Developing Regional States with respect to development and good governance, and ensure its effectiveness; coordinate the federal affirmative support provided for the Developing Regional States and the cooperation of neighboring regions and to establish federal affirmative support technical committee composed of members having the required profession and experience(MoFA, 2010).

Ministries which established the Special Support Board are the Ministry of Federal Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electricity, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resource, Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries, Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development. According to the regulation, high official members of the Special Support Board include an official designated by the FDRE Prime Minister chairs the Board and the Ministry of Federal Affairs is the deputy chairperson. The other members of the Board include the Ministers of the Ministries mentioned above and other officials designated by the Prime Minister (Ibid). According to the Directive issued by the Board No. 1/2011, higher officials such as the National Security, River Basin Issues and Public Organization and Participation Issues, advisors of the Prime Minister are members of the Board with the status of Minister.

According to the workers of the various regional Bureaus interviewed during the field work, there are also other federal institutions outside of the Special Support Board which have been providing support to the Developing Regional States such as the Ministry of Finance and Economics, Ministry of Urban Development and Housing, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Ministry of Mines, Petroleum and Natural Gas, FDRE Federal Attorney General, Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority, Ethiopian Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Management Institute, Federal Police Commission, Office of the Federal Auditor General and Ethiopian Road Authority(Interview, 14-16 March,2018, Semera).

Initially when MoFA was established in 2001, the focuses of the Special Support provided to the four Developing Regional States were ensuring peace and security, capacity building and prevalence of good governance. Moreover, starting from 2005 MoFA widened its focus of support to include other sectors like agriculture and rural development, water, health care and education. Starting from 2011 supports were given in connection with the Villagization Programme. Moreover, middle and higher leaders and technical advisors were assigned to support the day-to-day activities of the sectors mentioned above (MoFA, 2016).

Starting from 2011 the MoFA revealed that its objective is to ensure equitable development in the country. According to the bulletin published in June 2011 by its Public Relation Office, the vision of MoFA is to "*realize lasting peace, strong intergovernmental relations and equitable development in Ethiopia by 2020*". However, one of the technical advisors working in the head office, Addis Ababa, asserted that this vision could not be attained given the inadequate support which have been provided and the existing capacity limitations in the Developing Regional States. Further building on this assertion, one of the directorates of the MoFA reflected:

> *The vision of MoFA was not set based on the common agreement among support providing and support recipient organs. It was set without considering the commitment of member institutions of the Special Support Board and the existing tangible implementation capacity limitations in the Developing Regional States. Later based on the experiences gained, the time required for the realization of the vision was extended to 2025 to make it compatible to the vision of the country, achieving middle income status by 2025 … to a more open, inclusive, equitable and democratic society(Interview 21 December, 2018).*

Building the implementation capacity of regions, Zones, Woredas and Kebeles would enable institutions to realize their mission by performing various activities through their own efforts and it will make the Woreda graduation plan effective. Woredas are the main development implementation centers and hence they are the focus areas of graduation. The plan is to graduate Woredas within two years by strengthening the special support and enhancing the coordinated efforts of all stakeholders (MoFA, 2017). Therefore, according to the plan, the special support given to Developing Regional States will enable them to implement activities and stand by their own in 2025 and all the technical advisors deployed by the federal government to these regions will withdraw.

Pastoralist Community Development Project (PCDP) has been implemented in Somali and Afar Regional States and pastoralist communities in Oromia and SNNP since 2005. The project has been implemented in three phases and it has provided several benefits to the pastoralist communities in the aforementioned areas. The total amount of budget allocated for this project was 408 million dollar, 60 million dollar for the first phase (2005-2009), 138 million dollar for the second phase (2010-2015) and 210 million dollar for the third phase (2016-2020). This budget included the contribution of the community in kind (labor) and cash (MoFA, 2016).

The other support is related to sustainable draught resistance which started in 2011 and will last for 17 years. In this support 192 million dollar obtained from international lending institutions was allocated in 58 pastoralist areas to benefit more than 1.6 million people. MoFA has been playing a significant role for the successful accomplishment of the above programmes by coordinating the support capacities and by assigning manpower in pastoralist areas (Ibid).

7.3. The Provision of Special Support in Afar Regional State

7.3.1. The Implementation of the Special Support in Afar Region

In chapter three it was described that the Afar Regional State is structured into five administrative Zones, 2 city administrations, 32 Woredas and 401 Kedeles. According to participants of the interview, the technical advisors deployed from the federal institutions have been assigned in the Regional Bureaus and Offices, Zones and Woredas. Since Zone two, north Afar, is relatively developed when compared with the other Zones, technical advisors have been assigned in the remaining four Zones. Participants of the interview mentioned that northern Afar was an area long known by TPLF fighters before the fall of the military government. Several Afar from norh Afar had joined the armed struggle on the TPLF side. They believed that the leaders on North Afar have relatively better capacity when compared with the rest of Afar. Even the leadership in the whole of Afar has been dominated by Afar from the north. Until 2016 the special support was given only for two Zones, Zone three and Zone four. They also mentioned that, the special support began to be given for the other two Zones, Zone one and five in 2017. All member ministries of the Special Support Board have assigned their own technical advisors to provide support to Afar Regional State. The technical advisors of the MoFA have been coordinating the activities of the other technical advisors at regional, Zonal and Woreda levels.

The technical advisors of MoFA assigned at Zonal and Woreda level are known as cluster coordinators.

The official document of the Ministry of Federal Affairs showed that in 2018 fiscal year the total number of federal technical advisors deployed in Afar Regional State was *54* out of which 51 were from the seven ministries forming the Special Support Board and the remain 3 were from EPRDF office. Therefore, two kinds of advices have been given for the Regional State. According to the regional coordinator of MoFA, the technical advisors supporting the regional state are known as '*development team'*. Professionals deployed by member ministries of the federal board provide technical advisory support to the various sector Bureaus and Offices in the region, Zones and Woredas. Processionals of the ruling party, EPRDF provide political advice to the regional state government. Participants of the interview asserted that the manpower resource deployed in Afar region is too small compared to the support needed to bring about meaningful change in the region.As it will be discussed in detail under the sub-title entitled " "Challenges Related to the Special Support Board and Its Member Institutions (Ministries)", below, capacity limitation on the part of technical advisors was one of the factors adversely affecting the provision of Special Support in the region. Member Ministers of the Special Support Board also deployed 19 vehicles to Afar Regional State (MoFA, 2018).

Respondents from Federal, Regional, Zonal and Woreda levels of government asserted that the supports given by the development team to regional Bureaus, Zonal and Woreda offices are general. They provide support to their respective Bureaus and offices in plan preparation, evaluation of plan implementation, economic and social development, good governance, security, capacity building, gender, environmental protection and villagization.

One of the regional leaders mentioned that the regional party, government and the public have been working in cooperation for the development of the region. Structures such as the Party Wing, Government Wing and Public Wing are created to mobilize the community for development activities. According to ANRS (2017), manual of the structure and procedure of the public wing in the pastoral and agro-pastoral areas, the objective of the creation of the public wing is to organize the people, create wide mobility; ensure the participation of the people in development and good governance to make them benefitiary. The missions of the creation of the public wing are creating common understanding on development and good governance; to

accomplish planned activities, solve problems encountered in the process, build strong development army and to ensure sustainable beneficiary of the people. There are also other structures like development team and one to five teams established for the purpose of enhancing the participation of the people and to accelerate the development endeavors in the region. The one to five teams was structured ubder the development team. This structure was created on voluntionary basis by taking the neighborhood, nature of economic activities, dwelling areas in to consideration. The missions of the one to five teams are to make the people organized army, create mutual cooperation based on common understanding; to make the people participants in the preparation,implementation and evaluation of development activities with the aim of ensuring sustainable benefit of the people; to createinquisitive society and enhancing the ownership feeling of the people on the development activities being undertaking in their areas and to make the people as an important capacity for implementing government policy, strategy and development programmes.

The regional coordinator of MoFA explained that these structures are important to facilitate the provision of special support in the region. However, he asserted that lack of commitment on the part of the leadership at different levels, capacity limitations particularly at Woreda level and limited awareness of the community remained to be surviving challenges to maximize the positive contribution of these structures.

The shared agreement among regional and cluster coordinators of MoFA, was that the deployment of technical advisors in Afar region has its own contribution in the developments that the regional state has scored. They asserted that technical advisors have been playing an important role in areas identified as development sectors (Education, Water, Health, Agriculture and Natural Resource and Civil Service and Capacity Building). Therefore, it is worth mentioning the contribution of the technical advisors for the limited changes brought in these sectors.

Each technical advisor provides support to their respective sector Bureaus or Offices where they are assigned. For instance, technical advisors deployed by the Ministry of Education provide support to the Regional Education Bureau and to the Woreda Education Office. The Technical Advisors prepare plans and checklists to facilitate their support. They work in cooperation with

their respective Bureaus and Offices. They also attend the management meeting of their respective sector Bureaus and Offices to discuss on activities done and evaluate gaps.

The technical advisors supporting the various Bureaus in the regional capital, Semera, conduct meeting every Thursday chaired by the Regional MoFA Coordinator. Every week each advisor brings the tasks done in their sector, strengths and weaknesses raised during evaluations in their respective sector management meetings. Then members of the development team discuss on the reports of each sector, identify the gaps, the direction of the next focus and prepare common plan. The Zone and Woreda development team also do the same and even their meeting day is the same, Thursday.

Supporting and following up of the development efforts in the region is not left only to the development team in the region coordinated by MoFA. Members of the HPR Standing Committee, the Technique Committee of the Special Support Board, authorities and professionals of the various sector ministries also conduct field observation and provide feed-back. Although there are irregularities (twice a year if not once), different forums have been organized where the federal and regional authorities discuss about the development efforts in the region. For instance, in the 2018 fiscal year a forum was organized in Semera, to create common understanding on plan preparation. Representatives of the federal government and the regional authorities identified the gaps observed and gave directions on how to solve problems observed. However, there have been irregularities in conducting field observations and organization of discussion forums. Participants of the interview explained that field observations and discussion forums have not been conducted on regular and scheduled manner. Sometimes these activities have been done in short time intervals like every three month, six months interval in the other year. Therefore, absecnce of clearly defined time when to conduct observation and discussion forums has its own impact on the coordinated efforts of the various stakeholders.

There are also forums where the development team in the region present and cross-check its plans in which the Minister of MoFA, Directorate Generals, the Regional State higher authorities, and all Woreda and Zone administrators participate. In such meetings, tasks accomplished and/ not yet accomplished are identified and directions are given for the next activities to be done. The following sections will shade light on how the supports have been provided in the region and the problems encountered in the process.

The seven member Ministries of the Federal Support Board have been deploying different number of technical advisors to Afar Regional State. For instance, in the 2018 fiscal year, the Ministry of Federal Affairs assigned (two regional coordinators, four cluster coordinators and eleven Woreda coordinators), Ministry of Health (five regional and fourteen Woreda technical advisors), Ministry of Education (one regional and three Woreda technical advisors) , Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electricity (three regional and two Woreda technical advisors), Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resource (one regional and four Woreda technical advisors), Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries(two regional technical advisors) and Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development (one regional and two Woreda technical advisors) (MoFA, 2018).

According to the regional coordinator of MoFA the number of technical advisors deployed in all developing regional states is not enough to provide adequate support to therespective regions. He further pointed out that the number of technical advisors deployed to Afar Regional State were small when compared with others. He added that technical advisors had no interest to be deployed to Afar Region. This was because, it was propagated that the leaders of Afar Regional State do not want to be supported. There are twenty-five Woredas in the four Zones of the Afar Region where the Federal Board technical advisors were deployed in the 2018 fiscal year (eight Woredas in Zone one, seven Woredas in Zone three, five Woredas in Zone four and five Woredas in Zone Five). He explained that the intent of deploying technical advisors from the center was to build and enhance the implementation capacity of the regional leadership at different levels and to support the development efforts in the region, Zones and Woredas where they are assigned. However, the number of technical advisors deployed to the region was small when compared with the existing gaps (Interview, 8 February 2019, Semera).

Examining the deployment of federal technical advisors in the region, Zones and Woredas is helpful to show the in adequacy of the support provided to the region. According to the statement of Zone three cluster coordinator, there are seven Woredas in the Zone and in 2019 the numbers of technical advisors providing support in the Zone was eleven. The Ministry of Federal Affairs, three technical advisors (one Zone and two cluster coordinators), Ministry of Education, two technical advisors (one Zone and one Woreda), Ministry of Health, two technical advisors (one Zone and one Woreda), Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electricity, Ministry of

Agriculture and Natural Resource, Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries and Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development each have assigned one consultant(worked as both Zone and Woreda consultant) (Interview, 13 February 2019, Worer).

In Zone one, the Ministry of Federal Affairs has assigned only three coordinators, one at Zone level and two at Woreda level. Six Federal Board technical advisors from other ministries were assigned in this Zone. However, the federal technical advisors were not able to provide the required support to the respective sector offices where they are assigned. In line with this, the Zone coordinator of MoFA explained thatZone one has eight Woredas and yet the number of members of technical advisors assigned by the Federal Special Board ministries is too small compared to the support needed to be provided. For instance, technical advisors of the MoFA cannot effectively coordinate the activities of the other Special Support Board technical advisors assigned in the six of the eight Woredas in Zone one. The two Woreda coordinators are assigned in Chifra and Adaar Woredas. The Zone cluster Coordinator has been coordinating activities in Assaita, Dubti and Elidar Woredas in addition to providing advisory support to the Zone administrator. Such extra burdens have adverse impacts on the effectiveness of the support. MoFA, advisors have been coordinating activities in other Woredas in anon and off basis. The MoFA has to assign additional coordinators in all Woredas if sufficient support has to be provided to bring about equitable development in the regional state (Interview, 12 February, 2020, Aysaita).

The regional coordinator of the MoFA also explained that the efforts of member Ministries of the Special Support Board in enhancing the implementation capacity of Woredas in Afar region have been constrained by lack of adequate manpower (technical advisors). For instance, the MoFA has assigned only one cluster and one Woreda coordinator in Zone five. Therefore, they cannot effectively coordinate the activities of other technical advisors who have been supporting sector offices in the five Woredas of the Zone. The cluster coordinator encountered car accident in 2018 but the MoFAdidn't send his replacement. This indicates the presence of serious problem in coordinating the provision of the special support provided in that year. Thus, building the implementation capacity of leaders will be extended which in turn will cause delay in the graduation of Woredas in the Zone (Interview, 8 February 2020, Semera).

As mentioned above, special support has been provided in four of the five Zones in Afar region. Despite of the various supports provided to the Regional State, several challenges have been constraining the effectiveness of the support provided. The challenges of the stakeholders involved in the provision of support to Afar regional state is discussed in the following topics and sub-topics.

7.4. Challenges in the Provision of Special Support in Afar National Regional State

7.4.1. Challenges Related Federal Projects in Afar Regional State

The federal government established different development projects and infrastructural networks in the Developing Regional States with the rhetoric intent of accelerating the socio-economic development of these regions although its prior concern was to enhance the national economic growth by using available resources in these regions. In this regard, the federal government has established mega projects worth of billions to facilitate and expand the development opportunities in the Developing Regional States. For instance, the federal government established Tendaho Sugar Factory in Afar Region, Gode Irrigation Project in Somali Region, Omo Kuraz Sugar Factory in Southern pastoralist areas, and the Great Renaissance Dam in Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State. The federal government has also constructed Asphalt and gravel roads providing services from one corner to the other in the Developing Regional States. Moreover, the four Developing Regional States are made to be benefited from telecom and rural electrification programmes. Universities and airports are constructed and have been giving services in the four Developing Regional States (MoFA, 2016).

According of an expert in MoFA's Equitable Development Directorate interviewed in January 2019, Addis Ababa almost all federal projects established in the Developing Regional States were not completed withintheir planned schedule. Had the federal government completed its projects without extreme delay, the special support provided to Developing Regional States would have brought rapid socio-economic development. The following cases could show how the delay in the completion of government projects in Afar Region adversely affected the special support provided by the Federal Board institutions.

As explained by the Federal Board technical advisors working in Zone three of the Afar Region, the Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electric started the construction of Kesem Sugar Factory. They further mentioned that the pastoralists in Awash Fentale Woreda within the range of the factory were given enormous hopes by the ministry such as supply of water, electricity and irrigation services. It was also planned to construct houses and settle the pastoralists in selected settlement villages and to supply the services mentioned above. However, there was unfair delay in the construction of the factory which as a result the Federal Sugar Corporation takes away the responsibility and gave it to the ministry which carried out the construction works. Therefore, the delay in the construction of the sugar factory and the late start of settling pastoralists in settlement villages has created difficulties for the provision of special support.

The Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electric also delayed in its water works. One of the technical advisors of MoFA working in Amibara Woreda mentioned that the Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electric dug out water in 38 water holes in Halay Deghe Kebele of Amibara Woreda. But these holes still remained closed without giving water to the pastoralist communities. Had this water project been finished timely, favorable condition would have been created for the provision of the special support? The supply of water would help pastoralists to settle permanently in certain areas and to produce crops and rear animals. This in turn, would enable the support provided by the technical advisors deployed to Afar region effective (Interview, 18 March, 2019, Andido).

The statement of the regional MoFA coordinator further strengthened the above idea. He explained that the Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electric started to construct two bridges in Mille and Dubti Woredas in 2016 but not yet finished until 2018. Similarly, the Amhara Design and Control Enterprise conducted site selection works for Irrigation development in Zone 4 in Ewa and Awura Woredas. The Amhara Water Works Construction Enterprise started the construction of Sunuta Irregation Project in Ewa Woreda in 2015. This project can irrigate 2000 hectares of land and it was planned to settle 4000 households. However, the construction work is not yet completed due to power shortage. Several efforts were made among MoFA, Zone 4 Administrator, Amhara regional state authorities and the Ethiopian Light Power Authority. Now the problem is solved (power supply ensured). Participants of the interviews explained that, the delay in the construction of such government projects has been creating grievances among

members of the community. The delay also constrained the provision of special support to Afar Regional State (Interview, June, 2018, Semera).

Tendaho Sugar Factory was the other federal project constructed in Aysaita Woreda. Participants of the interview from different categories of people mentioned that the factory was expected to motivate the economic development of Afar Regional State. However, according to the technical advisors of the Federal Special Support Board Ministries working in Zone One of Afar Region, the delay in the construction of the factory as well as its inability to start producing sugar for years has its own impact on the provision of the special support. Contrary to the various promises given, pastoralists felt that they lost their land for nothing. Pastoralists and leaders at different level failed to accept the supports provided wholeheartedly due to the negative attitude they had developed towards the factory. According to the MoFA Zone three cluster coordinator:

> *Although it showed some progress starting from 2016 on, the failure of federal projects in the region has eroded the public trust on supports provided by federal institutions.* Pastoralists *didn't openly oppose the support and yet they were not seen practically doing things as per advises provided by technical advisors. Regional Leaders at different levels also gave cold reception to technical advisors deployed to the region. They considered technical advisors as government spies who are deliberately assigned to expose the corrupt practices and wrong doings of officials in the region rather than looking them as development agents (Interview, 16 February, 2018, Worer).*

In the same fashion, Zone one cluster coordinator of MoFA mentioned that not only members of the community but also the regional leadership at different levels had grievances in the delay of the sugar Factory. Pastoralists were promised to be paid compensation between 5,000 and 12,000 Birr per hectare of land depending on what pastoralists were producing over their land. For instance, those who used it to produce crops which could be cultivated in short time will be paid the lowest payment. Others who were producing crops which need relatively long time to ripe like cotton will be paid the highest one. However, the factory failed to pay what it promises because it has not been properly functioning since the time of its establishment. According to the regional coordinator of MoFA, in the conference held in January 2018, the regional state president has openly asserted that the Afar people are not benefiting from the factory because it is not yet functional although several years have passed since the commencement of the project. The factory failed to fulfill its promise to support pastoralists by supplying different social

services and inputs. This has eroded their trust on the federal government which as a result they failed to develop positive attitude towards the support provided by various federal institutions until the last three years *(Interview, 12 June 2018, Assaita).*The reasons for the delay in the construction, why the federal government tolerated the delay and how the prevalent of corruption affects the effectiveness of the factory is explained in detail under chapter eight entitled "development by Dispossession".

Generally, the delay in the completion of federal projects has significant impact on the provision of special support in the regional state. Completion of government projects in the region within reasonable time could enable the community get access to different social services. This in turn would gradually shape their understanding about problems related to mobility and the importance of leading sedentary way of life. Permanent settlement creates favorable conditions for the provision of special support. This implies that success or failure in the completion of government projects has negative or positive impacts on the provision of special support respectively.

7.4.2. Challenges Related to the Special Support Board and Its Member Institutions (Ministries)

As mentioned above, the Special Support Board was established in 2004 to coordinate the provision of support to the Developing Regional States. The Board has made different efforts to bring progress in the Developing Regional States. One of the mechanisms of following up and supporting the development efforts of these regional states is organizing forums and conducting field observations. In this regard, the Federal Support Board has two committees (the Main and Technical). Members of the Main Committee (at Board level) consisted of the ministers of the institutions forming the Federal Board chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister (MoFA, 2017).

The main committee has been organizing quarterly meetings in the Developing Regional States in alternation and conducting field observation in three/four Kebeles of the Developing Regional States where forum is organized. The Equitable Development Directorate General of MoFA explained that Regional Presidents and all Bureau Heads of the Developing Regional States have been participating in such field observations. For instance, in 2016, the quarterly meeting was held in Kebri-Dehar, Somali Regional State and participants conducted field observation on the

Gode Irrigation Dam Construction. In 2017, the Committee meeting was organized in Asosa Town, Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State and four Kebeles in the region were observed. Such observations have been creating opportunity of experience sharing among representatives of different Regional States.

The second (Technical) Committee consisted of the Directorate Generals of Sectors of the seven Ministries forming the Federal Support Board chaired by the State Ministers. The coordinator of the Directorate Generals of sectors is the Equitable Development Directorate General of MoFA. The Technical Committee has been organizing meetings every month and conduct field observation three times a year. As mentioned above, member institutions of the Special Support Board deployed their Technical Advisors to support the various sectors Bureaus and Offices in the Developing States. Participants of the Interview explained that the technical committee has been trying to look at what supports have been given, what tasks have been performed and what changes have been brought.

Although the Board made several efforts to achieve the objectives for which it was established, different problems have constrained its success. One of the problems of the Board was its inability to coordinate and lead all support capacities to make the Special Support effective (MoFA, 2016). It was intended that the Board would be able to effectively coordinate the supports provided by member institutions (ministries) and to enable support receiving regional states to maximize the benefits of the special support. However, respondents contend that the Board was unable to coordinate all efforts in a manner it was expected. The coordination has not been led by strict discipline to create proper understanding among stakeholders on the main developments sectors. The Weakness observed in the implementation of the villagization programme in Afar region until 2017 is one of the manifestations of the existing coordination problem.

Absence of established systems of accountability is the other challenge of the Board. Article 13 of the proclamation that established the Board clearly stipulated that member institutions of the Board will be accountable by a competent law for failure to discharge their responsibilities. The proclamation also made clear that the Board will issue regulations which could clarify mechanisms of accountability and their implementation. Rcperts in the Core Processes of MoFA (at headquarter in Addis Ababa) and *regional coordinators (at Semera) in Afar region asserted*

*that there are no rules/ mechanisms of making membersof the Federal Board institutions accountable when they failed to practice the agreements reached and the directions provided by the Special Support Board (*Interview, December, 2018, Addis Ababa and March 2016, Semera Respectively*).*

As discussed above the main and technical committees of the Special Support Board have regular meetings and field observations at least four times a year in principle. However, Experts in MoFA interviewed during the field work in December 2018, asserted that there are times when meetings/or field observations were not conducted as per the schedule (quarterly). There are also absentees during such committee meetings and field observations. Members who didn't participate have not been held responsible due to absence of established systems of accountability. This situation has been adversely affecting the role of the Board in the provision of the Special Support to the Developing Regional States.

According to the proclamation that established the Special Support Board, member institutions have common and individual functions and responsibilities. However, member institutions have several problems in discharging their individual responsibilities. The main problem of member institutions of the board is failure to give proper concern to their responsibility related to the provision of Special Support. This problem is emanated from inability to see the purpose of providing support to the Developing Regional States from wider perspective (MoFA, 2016). In this regard an expert under the Intergovernmental Relations Directorate General of MoFA asserted that member institutions failed to understand that the trust of the Developing Regional States on the federal system will deteriorate from time to time unless their participation and fair beneficiary right is not ensured. The constitutional objective of building one political and economic community will not be achieved without narrowing the development gaps among all regional states. However, member institutions of the federal board failed to understand the impact of delay in the Developing Regional States on the national development (Ibid).

The explanation provided by another expert in Equitable Development Directorate General of MoFA further strengthened the above idea when he stated:

> *Member institutions of the Special Support Board showed weakness in conducting thorough evaluation of the gaps observed and to take corrective measures which would make the provision of Special Support effective. Moreover, they lacked sense of ownership on political tasks of disproving wrong propagandas opened against the villagization programme being undertaken in the Developing Regional States. The delay in the commencement of the programme in Afar Region depicts the existing weakness in this regard (Interview, 1 Januaray, 2018, Addis Ababa).*

The other problem is related to the capacity of technical advisors providing support to the Developing Regional States. It was important to recruit and assign capable technical advisors who could thoroughly examine the existing situation in the region, the capacity gap of the regional leadership and professionals in the region to improve the development of the regional state. However, some of the technical advisors deployed to the region had no experience of working on leadership positions or they lacked the required Woreda leadership skills through training. Therefore, lack of experience and limited capacities on the part of technical advisors deployed to the region has its own adverse impact on the effectiveness of the support provided (Interview Participants, March, 2018, Andido, Assaita, Teru, Semera).

The other problem related to the provision special suppot is the Woreda graduation Strategy. According to the Woreda Graduation Strategy document prepared by MoFA in December 2018 to the regions and Pastoralist areas that require the provision of special support, the support provided by various stakeholders shall build the capacity and enable Woredas to lead the development activities by their own efforts in their respective Woredas. The Ministry has set criteria to measure the capacity built in Woredas. To that end, the Ministry has to check to what extent the Woreda has fulfilled in terms of structures and procdures which helped to bring improvements in capacity building and good governance, agriculture and proper utilization of natural resources, animal and fish resources, water, irrigation and electricity , provision of health and education services as well as expansion of infrastructures. In general, the concept of Woreda Graduation has to do with enabling Woredas reach the level of undertaking government activities without support. However,according to an expert in MoFA interviewed in December 2018, Addis Ababa, member institutions of the Special Support Board have no common understanding

about the concept of Woreda Graduation and the requirements to be fulfilled by Woredas to graduate. There have been efforts to set criteria for Woreda graduation in the process. However, there were gaps in putting criteria up on which support giving and support receiving organs could agree and perform their activities as per the criteria they set.He asserted that the federal institutions providing support considered the mission of supporting the Developing Regional States as something additional or failed to give appropriate weight like other missions of their own respective sectors. This has an adverse impact on the supportprovided and the followup undertakenon the Developing Regional States.

7.4.3. Challenges Related to the Ministry of Federal Affairs

The MoFA is the institution discharging the responsibility of coordinating supports provided by the member institutions of the Special Support Board to the Developing Regional States (MoFA, 2016). As mentioned above Professionals of MoFA have been coordinating members of the development team at regional, Zone and Woreda levels.The development team has been conducting meetings every week to evaluate the activities of sector Bureaus and Offices where the federal board technical advisors are assigned. The technical advisors have to discuss things in the management meetings of their respective sectors before they bring reports to the weekly meeting of the development team. The regional coordinator and technical Advisors in Semerainterviewed during the field visit underscored that it is difficult to get information from sector Bureaus and Offices regularly. There are times when technical advisors have been unable to get leaders of Bureaus and Offices due to repeated urgent management meetings and other engagements. This makes the weekly evaluation of the development team incomplete (Interview, on 17 January. 2018, Semera).

Technical Advisors have been consulting the various regional leaders and experts of the sector Bureaus and Offices where they are assigned to give advisory service. They also provide training for different regional professionals working in different sector Bureaus like Education, Health, Water, Capacity Building, Pastoral and Agriculture Development. According to MoFA cluster coordinator in Zone three attempts have not been made to understand the impact of trainings provided. However, the development team did not set mechanisms of checking what changes have been brought as a result of the trainings provided (Interview, 9 December, 2018, Werer).One expert in the region's Civil Service Capacity and Building Bureau made analogy

between a trainer who didn't try to know the impact of the training he gave with a farmer who cultivate crops but never try to go back to his farmland to check and harvest.

FGD conducted with members of the local community pointed out that lack of serious concern on the part of the regional leadership to the support provided by the development team is the other problem. Some of the leaders at different levels have not been participating in the quarterly evaluation of the implementation performance of the support provided. This practice has its own negative impact on the provision of the special support particularly to sector Bureaus and Offices whose leadership lacked concern about it (FGD, 10 December, 2018, Alelu).

According to Woreda Experts who participated in the FGD, the other problem of MoFA in the provision of special support is related to the behavior and capacity limitation of the technical advisors deployed to the regional state. Some of the technical advisors have attitudinal (belief that it is impossible to improve the living conditions of postoralists through the provision of special support). Others lacked the required knowledge, skills and commitment which as a result they have been unable to identify and try to solve the problems encountered in the process of providing support. Some of them failed to struggle and enable regional leaders avoid their weaknesses. Instead, they accustomed to live with the weaknesses observed among leaders instead of struggling to change conditions (FGD, on 11 November, 2018, Andido).

Experts working in different sector Bureaus interviewed during the field visit also underlined that the technical advisors deployed to Afar region have different capacities. Some of them have the required knowledge, skills and attitude and their support is highly demanded by the sector Bureaus and Offices where they are assigned. On the other hand, there are also technical advisors whose capacity is even less than the capacity of professionals working in the Bureaus and Offices where they are assigned to support. *Senior expert in the regional Eduction Bureau*echoed the above idea as stated:

> *Some sectors accept and work with technical advisors without questioning their capacity simply because they are sent from the federal government. Advisors need to have the necessary knowledge and skills about activities being performed by the sectors where they are assigned to support. There are professionals who considered discussing with technical advisors who lacked the required knowledge as wastage of time. There are educated Afars who have better knowledge than the Technical Advisors sent to the region. It is better to provide training to such indigenous professionals and assigning them as technical advisors based on their*

area of study than relying on technical advisors who have capacity limitations (Interview, 21 October, 2018, Semera).

One federal official in the Office of the ruling party, EPRDF asserted that, there isstill a wide gap in the changes scored in Afar Regional State despite the special support provided so far. The change after several years of support is not as such significant. The role of advisors sent from the center in bringing the anticipated rapid change and development is still very slow. There is a doubt whether these professionals have been carefully selected and the confidence of the regional state in their capacity (Interview, 8 January, 2019, Addis Ababa).

The information obtained from the official document of MoFA substantiates the above ideas. The document mentioned that MoFA has been trying to give training and education to its professionals but still it has limitations in building the capacity of technical advisors on sustainable basis. The trainings were largely focusing on planning and on how advisors have to approach the regional government at different levels as well as the respect of the culture of the community in the process of providing support. As enshrined in the FDRE Constiotion under article 89 (4) the federal government has to support the developing regional states to accelerate development in these regional states. However, the training provided so far lacked consistency. Technical advisors had to be given on job training appropriate to the support they have been giving to the region. However, the efforts made in this regard are not adequate *(*MoFA, 2016*).*

Turnover of technical advisors is the other problem challenging the provision of special support in Afar Regional State. The shared agreement among cluster and regional coordinators of MoFA was that harsh-working environment (climate), lack of incentives and facilities as well as the need to search other better paid jobs are the main factors which have been increasing the rate of turnover among technical advisors deployed to Afar region. They suggested that it was better to sustain experienced advisors than employing new professionals who are alien to both the environment and the work (Interview, January, 2018, Semera).

The 2016 report of MoFA revealled that lack of coordination among members of the Federal Board institutions is one of the main problems in the provision of special support. Although efforts were made to incorporate the responsibilities to be discharged by members of the Federal Support Board institutions at the plan level, the support provided failed to be effective because the coordination has not been led by strict discipline. Deployment of technical advisors by the

Federal Special Support Board institutions at different times and absenceof similar staying time in the region havechallenged the effectiveness of the support provided. Moreover, the implementation evaluation of the support has not been properly conducted to ensure the participation of all members of the Special Support Board institutions (MoFA, 2016, p. 24).

The other challenge of MoFA is problem of coordinating the deployment of manpower and supply of inputs. The federal institutions have been deploying technical advisors in Afar Regional State. However, according to the regional coordinator of MoFA, problem of deploying their manpower at different times, inability to provide coordinated support and different staying duration of technical advisors deployed to the region have been adversely affecting the provision of the special support.

The federal technical advisors have been deployed to support the development efforts in Afar Regional State. However, the ministries deploying their expers have not been creating conducive working environment in order to maximize the technical support provided to the regional state. According to Zone three cluster coordinator of MoFA, the conditions in which the technical advisors have been living and working has its own adverse impact on their motivation and commitment. He further explained that the Federal Board institutions have wide gaps in providing incentives and in fulfilling the necessary facilitiesfor for the technical advisors deployed in the region. For instance, technical advisors particularly at Zone and Woreda levels, have no their own offices which as a result, they have been forced to share offices of Zonal and Woreda workers. Such working environment has been significantly affecting their privacy and comfort to work freely. He also mentioned that technical advisors have been using their own personal laptop to keep the required data. Absence of offices and the necessary office equipment has been adversely affecting their motivation for work. Had the respective Federal Board ministries provided different incentives and facilitiesfor the technical advisors they deployed to the region, they would have fully engaged in building the capacity of the regional leadership at different levels (Interview, 22 January, 2019, Awash 7 Kilo).

The other factor adversely affecting the provision of special support in Afar Regional State is lack of transportation service for the technial advisors. Woreda technical advisors had to regularly travel to Woredas to supervise development areas and to discuss with members of the communities. However, the existence of limited vehicles makes the provision of the necessary

support difficult. Most of the time Woreda technical advisors use the vehicles of Woreda offices to go to their respective Woredas but such an arrangement is difficult to do things according to our own plan (Interview, 23 January2019, and Andido).

According to Zone three cluster coordinator, the total number of the Federal Board technical advisors in Afar Region was 54 in 2018. Yet, the number of vehicles contributed by each ministry are very few or none. Ministry of Federal and Pastoralist Affairs has assigned one vehicle, Ministry of Health two vehicles (one for Zone and the other for Woreda) and the other ministries didn't assigned vehicles in Zone three of Afar region. Most of the technical advisors move to the Woredas by adjusting times to use the vehicles of Zone and Woreda offices (Interview, 13 February 2019, Worer). This implies that technical advisors cannot perform their day-to-day activities unless they schedule their time to make use of the vehicles of other offices. Therefore, lack of transportation services has been hampering the provision of appropriate support to Woredas. The problem related to transportation is not only limited to the number of vehicles assigned for the Federal Board technical advisors but there are also quality and maintenance problems. In line with this one of the regional MoFA coordinator reflected:

> *The Federal Board ministries have not been providing support to Afar Regional State in a similar manner. The assignment of technical advisors and vehicles in the region could reflect the existing difference. Almost all the vehicles deployed to Afar Region by federal board ministries have quality problems. Moreover, ministries failed to assign vehicles appropriate for field work with due consideration of the climatic and topographic conditions of the area. Most of the vehicles encountered repeated technical problems and there has been too much delay in the maintenance process which as a result the vehicles remain out of work for an extended time. Due to this, the Federal Board technical advisors have been unable to provide the required support to the Woredas where they are assigned (Interview, 11 February 2020, Addis Ababa).*

The shared agreement among the participants of the interview was that due to lack of transportation service technical advisors have been unable to regularly move to Woredas and settlement villages. This in turn adversely affected the plan accomplishment and role of the Federal Board technical advisors in building the capacity of the leadership at different levels. Moreover, inability to provide adequate transportation service has been significantly affecting the day-to-day activities of federal Technical Advisors such as visiting development areas and discussing with members of the community.

7.4.4. Challenges Related to Neighboring Regional States (Twinning Arrangement)

As discussed in chapter one, the four lowland regional states namely (Afar, Somali, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz referred as Developing Regional States) had a historical experience of isolation and marginalization. According to Zemelak (2014), the regional states which form the Ethiopian federation exhibit wide variation in territorial and population size, degree of social and economic development as well as in the livelihood of their inhabitants. He further asserted that the Developing Regional States are characterized by extremely poor economic and infrastructural development. Tsegaye (2004) mentioned that the states constituting the Ethiopian federation have equal power and rights irrespective of the glaring numerical and economic disparity among them. This is the constitutional expression of the *de-jure* symmetry among the Ethiopian Regional States. However, the existing *de-facto* asymmetry (disparities) among regional states requires accelerating the socio-economic and political development of the Developing Regional States to ensure equitable development in the country.

The federal government sought to redress the disproportionate regional development, and startling inequality throughout Ethiopia through the provision of special support for the four 'Developing Regional States', channeled through the Ministry of Federal Affairs (Tsegaye, 2004). The other mechanism of supporting the socio-economic development of the Developing Regional States is the twinning arrangement through which the relatively developed regional states provide technical, personnel, financial and material supports to the Developing Regional States since they could not narrow the development gaps by themselves. According to this arrangement, the Afar region is twinned with Tigray Regional State while Somali Region to Oromia, Gambella to SNNPs and Benishangul-Gumuz to Amhara (Ephrem, 2010).

Regional leaders at different levels mentioned that Tigray Regional State has been providing two kinds of capacity building supports to Afar Region like the support of the federal board institutions. Political professionals support to the ruling regional party, Afar National Democratic Party. Other professionals provide support to the development sectors Bureaus and Offices. According to the explanation of one of the authorities of Afar ruling party, speakers of councils of the two regional states organized forums twice a year together with leaders of neighboring

Woredas. Moreover, the two regional states conduct people to people conferences for the purpose of experience sharing.

According to an expert in Afar regional state Justice Bureau, Tigray region has been providing capacity building trainings for Afar political leaders in Tigray Leadership Training Institute. For instance, in the 2017 fiscal year, training was provided for more than 700 middle level Afar Regional State leaders in Mekelle. Moreover, Tigray region has been providing education opportunity to Afar Youth.As mentioned above, the residents of northAfar has long relation with TPLF fighters during the armed struggle and many Afar fron Zone two had joined the struggle. Many of those who struggled against the military regme on the side of TPLF were empowered in the regional state when TPLF/ EDRDF controlled the national politics. This has created political division between 'North'' and 'South'' Afar - throughout EPRDF's rule because power had been dominated by the northern Afar elites. This division has affected the quality of the regional political leadership, which is also playing out in the ongoing war - now regional power is dominated by the Southern elites and the northern elites feel abandoned in the war against the Tigray Defense Force (Interview, 19 January, 2019, Semera).

There were times where Afar and Tigray regional states prepare their plan in the presence the Regional State Presidents and Bureau Heads of each sector. There are also forums where the regional presidents evaluate the cooperation between the two regional states. Woredas in northern Afar sharing common boundary with the seven Woredas of Tigray Regional State have been working in cooperation. Forums have been organized between sector Offices of adjacent Woredas of the two regional States where representatives of sectors (sector-to-sector) discuss on security and development issues. Representatives of sector Offices present what they have done, tasks not been done, the reasons why tasks were not done and what will be done next. In such a way, neighboring Woredas prepare common plans and evaluation forums from which Afar Regional leaders at different levels share experiences which in one way or another assist the development of Woredas in particular and the region in general(Interview, 12 January, 2019, Semera).

The shared agreement among regional, Zone and Woreda leaders of Afar Region was that the support provided by Tigray Region lacked consistency. They further elaborated that the way support was provided within the first ten years since the commencement of the provision of support was appreciable. However, the human and material resources deployed to Afar region significantly decreased with the passage of time. There are contending views regarding the reduction of the support provided by Tigray Regional State. Leaders of Afar region asserted that Tigray began to give priority to get resources from Afar Region than providing genuine support to the region. On the other hand, professionals working in the Equitable Development Directorate of MoFA argued the feature of cooperation changed when the Afars came with the idea that they have built their capacity and no need of fully depending on the support of neighbors and the support should focus on selective areas where they have gaps.

Tigray Regional State has been supporting Afar Regional State by deploying human resources, providing capacity building training, other inputs and technical supports. However, according to the views of the interviewees and focus group discussants, there is serious gap between the rhetoric support provided and the expected development on the ground. Regarding this issue, an expert in the regional Investment Commission underlined:

> *The various supports provided by Tigray Regional State failed to bring significant development in Afar Region. Several factors contributed for the inability of the support provided to bring meaningful change in the region such as lack of consistency in the provision of support (sometimes serious and not at another time), failure to incorporate the support plan into its regular annual plan, inability to create appropriate structure which could make the support provided effective, lack of follow up through strict discipline on the implementation of the support and its effect, inability to assign capable technical advisors to provide genuine support which could foster the development endeavor in the region, and failure to evaluate implementation problems and to provide feed-back to the region as well as absence forums for common evaluation of the whole supports provided(Interview, 16 April, 2018, Semera).*

Senior expert in Assaita Woreda Civil Service and Capacity Building Office has also similar sentiment. He explained that Tigray Regional State has been providing support to Afar Region for several years. However, the development scored in the region is not yet satisfactory. This was because, on the one hand, lack of understanding on the part of Tigray Regional state on the consequence of inadequate support provision to Afar Regional State. Support providers lacked the ability to understand that failure to bring equitable development among regional states would

adversely affect the national development. On the other hand, leaders of Afar regional styate have been giving less concern to the support provided and failed to use it as something important to accelerate the socio-economic development of the regional state (Interview, 18 March, 2018, Aysaita).

According to the participants of the focus group discussion, lack of coordination of the efforts of Tigray and Afar Regional State was the other cause for the inability of the support provided to bring the intended development better than the change scored so far. Discussants underscored that equitable development can only be realized when support providers and support recipients have common understanding, commitment and hold strong stand to exert maximum effort. This sentiment has been voiced by one of the professional working at the Head Quarter of MoFA as:

> *The Vision of the MoFA is to realize equitable development in Ethiopia by 2025. Therefore, the Developing Regional States and other organs providing support to them have to set similar vision if genuine development has to be achieved in the Developing Regional States within the time planned by the MoFA. This implies that, the development of Afar Regional State cannot be accelerated unless Afar and Tigray Regional States hold this vision as their shared vision and work hard with strong sense of unity. The provision of support by Tigray Regional State to Afar Regional State should be based on clear understanding about the ultimate goal of providing support (Interview, 16 January 2019, Addis Ababa).*

The other project which was intended but not put into practice was development interrelationship (Development inter-linkage) between relatively developed and Developing Regional States based on the twinning arrangement. The intension in this form of cooperation was to create linkage between institutions of Tigray and Afar Regional States like school to school, health station to health station linkage and exchange of development workers. It was believed that Afar Regional State would benefit through such kind of experience sharing. But this form of cooperation stopped only at its plan phase. According to one professional working in Afar Agriculture and Pastoral Development Bureau, had this cooperation been implemented, it would have brought changes better than what has been scored so far (Interview, 15 February, 2019, Semera).

7.4.5. Challenges Related to Afar Regional State Administration (Special Support Recipients)

According to MoFA, to bring about sustainable development enhancing the participation and creating sense of ownership among community members and gathering pastoralists in carefully selected settlement villages is vital. The document prepared by the ministry mentioned thatscattered settlement is difficult to make the people benefit from social and economic infrastructures and good governance (MoFA, 2013). This signifies that the federal government has considered villagization and the sedenarisation as a right policy choice to bring development among pastoralists in the region.

The role of leaders in mobilizing the community for better change is crucial. Although Afar Regional State showed improvements from time to time, the region has several problems in terms of using the support for better result. One of the problems is lack of clear understanding about development. The leaders of Afar Regional States knew that their region has wide limitations in terms of implementation capacity and socio-economic problems when compared with other regional states. They also knew the importance of special support but they failed to make use of the resources at their disposal and the supports provided to enhance the development of their region (MoFA, 2019).

The shared agreement among technical advisors interviewed during the field visit in 2017, 2018 and 2019 was that Afar Regional State leaders at different levels lacked commitment and initially they did not wholeheartedly accept the importance of the special support given to the regional state. For instance, one of the core activities which the Special Support Board gave due consideration was the villagization programme. However, villagization programme started late in Afar Regional State than in other Developing Regional States. They underscored that the delay in the commencement of the villagization programme in Afar Region is partly related to lack of support and commitment on the part of the leadership.

Zone three coordinator of MoFA asserted that scatteredsettlement and mobile way of life is difficult to provide the necessary social and economic services to residents. The Federal Support Board and the leadership of Afar Regional State have been working in close cooperation to enable the pastoralist communities get access to different services such as health, education,

market, electricity, telecommunication etc and to ensure food security by bringing sustainable development in the region. However, initially, members of Zonal and Woreda administrators stood against the programme. Their opposition emanated from doubt, that the federal government will take their land after making the pastoralist communities settled in few selected pocket areas. To that end, few members of Zonal and Woreda administrators who were found mobilizing the community for opposition were put into jail by the federal government (Interview, 15 March, 2019, Assaita)

Although there are counter arguments discussed in detail in chapter nine which explained that mobile outreach services in pastoral areas as more effective than sedentarization given the ecological constraints, the government considered villagization as the right policy to enhance development in Afar region.The data obtained from the Ministry of Federal Affairs archives substantiate the above assertion. The data showed that 322,425 households were settled in 562 villages (settlement villages) between the years 2011 and 2015 in the four Developing Regional States. The number of households settled in Afar Regional State within these five years is less when compared to the experience of other Developing Regional States: Somali (177,475), Afar(23,144), Benishangul-Gumuz (81,303) and Gambella (40,503) (MoFA, 2016). Participants of the interview underscored that lack of commitment on the part of the leadership has its own contribution for this less performance in the implementation of the villagization programme (MoFA, 2018). Participants of the interview asserted that the Afar from their past experience knew that development projects in their region have never benefited the people in the region. Therefore, they resisted the villagization program because they suspected that the federal government will use the land in the region to achieve its national economic growth in the name of supporting development efforts in the region.

Focus group discussants also underlined that Problem of leadership is one of the bottlenecks adversely affecting the provision of the special support in Afar region. Leaders at various levels in the region lacked commitment and motivation to fill their capacity limitations. The leaders of the regional state knew the existing capacity limitations but they failed to make use of the federal grant, supports provided by the Special Support Board and Tigray Regional State as well as the human and material resources in their hands for development purpose. The regional state has been obtaining the highest portion of its annual budget from federal subsidy. However, some of the

leaders have been appropriating the resources at their disposal for their own personal benefits and for non-development purpose instead of looking development as a life and death struggle to expand internal income generating sources and tax collecting capacity which could free the regionalstate from its dependency on the federal grant (FGD, January, 2019, Semera University).

Afar Regional State is endowed with different resources such as wide irrigable and arable land, river and underground water as well as minerals. However, leaders at various levels have been unable to make use of the supports provided by different stakeholders to develop their capacity which could enable them to exploit the available resources in the region for the benefit of the community. According to an expert in the regional Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, rent seeking mentality on the part of the leadership is one of the problems which reduced the contribution of the supports provided for the development of Afar Regional State. He further reflectedthat leaders of the regional state have been prioritizing their own self-interest at the expense of the benefits of the community. Some of the leaders give the clan lands to rent seeking investors, own land for themselves or in the name of their families instead of using the support they have been given by the federal government and Tigray Regional State to cultivate lands for the benefit of the community. The prevalence of rent seeking mentality among Afar Regional State leaders at all levels has been hindering development in the region which as a result ensuring the benefit of the community has become difficult (Interview, 14 October, 2018, Semera).

The other problem of leaders of the regional state is absence of sense of accountability. FGD conducted with technical advisors of MoFA indicated that leaders of the regional state do not consider misappropriation of federal subsidies and other supports as something accountable. As one of the cluster coordinator of the MoFA put it: "*some leaders misunderstood the concept of self-administration as the right to demand support from various sources and freedom of utilizing the supports gained for whatever purpose they wish to do. With this misconception, it is very difficult to score the required development*" (FGD, 16 Feburary, 2018, Kalwan). Such an argument failed to show the impact of the federal government for the prevalence of the problems mentioned above. This is because the federal government has been supporting and working in close cooperation with regional states blamed for the misaapropriation of resources while tolerating the regional state's deliberate exclusion of educated elits.

Due to absence of accountability there is wide gap between the special support provided and the status of socio-economic development in Afar region. The shared agreement among participants of the interviews and FGDs was that leaders have not been made accountable when they were found disrupting the development endeavors. In the words of an expert in Zone OneOffice of Justice:

> *The rhetoric accountability in the region have not been put into practice. It is only when there is accountability that one could get leaders in the required place and time to support the development efforts in the region. It is when leaders feel accountable that they could actively involve in development activities and mobilize the community with sense of ownership to maximize the support provided by the Federal Board and Tigray Regional State (Interview, 4 Feburary, 2018, Assaita).*

Zone One cluster coordinator of the MoFA explained that the provision of special support in Afar Regional State has been constrained by several factorss. According to him active involvement of leaders in plan preparation, implementation and evaluation is crucial to make development endeavors effective. However, lack of leadership commitment has still remained to be a bottleneck to the provision of the Special Support to the regional state. The participation of leaders starting from plan preparation has not been encouraging due to lack of motivation and the prevalence poor working culture, leaders have been showing the tendency of wait and see things to be done by technical advisors deployed from federal institutions (Interview, 22 January, 2020, Aysaita).

The purpose of the special support provided to various sector offices in Afar Regional State is to enhance the capacity of planning and executing socio-economic developments, enhancing public participation, ensuring good governance and supplying quality government services to the community. Supports have been provided to build the required capacity with the intent of fostering development and enabling the regional state to stand by its own after certain years. However, inability of the leadership to enhance the implementation capacity comparable to the support provided is remained to be the unresolved problem (MoFA, 2016).

According to participants of the interviews conducted in January 2019 with technical advisors deployed to the selected Woredas and the regional capital, Semera, the overall implementation capacity created in the region is lowwhen compared to the support provided in terms of human resource, training, inputs and finance. They underlined that the supports provided to the region

since 1995 did not create the required capacity. They furter mentioned that lack of commitment on the part of leaders of the regional state at different levels has significant contribution for the imbalance between the supports provided and the socio-economic development achieved so far. One of the cluster coordinators of the MoFA who lived in the region for many years asserted:

> *The regional leaders have been showing interests that supports has to be delivered in cash to make it easier to be appropriated for personal benefits. On the other hand, they do not want to be advised on how to use supports that they have been given. They hate federal technical advisors who tried to advise leaders to correct rent seeking mentality observed in the utilization of the budget granted to the region. They also failed to cooperate with technical advisors who were rising rent seeking as a point of agenda during evaluation stages (Interview, 3 January, 2018, Awash & Kilo)*

The efforts of the MoFA have encountered problems to graduate certain Woredas in Afar Region due to leadership problems. The objective of Woreda graduation was to produce leaders capable of planning and executing the activities of their respective Woredas. It also aimed at making government services close to the community, enhancing the participation of the people and ensuring decentralized administration in the Woreda. This could help to expand the experiences gained from model Woredas to other Woredas (MoFA, 2016). However, according to many of the federal technical advisors deployed to the region, the effort of leaders to graduate Woredas has been low. They were unable to formulate the experiences gained from graduated Woredas and expand it to other Woredas.

The other problem related to the regional leadership was lack of capacity to create organized public participation and mobility. The budget allocated by the federal government, the supports provided by the Special Support Board and from Tigray Regional State could not solve the deep-rooted socio-economic problem in Afar region unless the leaders organize the human and material resources to bring rapid socio-economic development (MoFA, 2016). The shared agreement among interviewees and focus group discussants was that leaders of Afar Regional State lacked the required capacity to mobilize the community and enhance their productivity which would help them to move out of dependency.

Generally, the information gained through interviews, FGDs and available documents indicated that the special support provided to Afar Regional State did not bring the anticipated socio-economic development in the region. The information obtained through questionnaire further

strengthened the above assertion. As shown in the following table, respondents were asked to express their agreement/ disagreement regarding the contribution of the provision of the special support to the socio-economic development of the Afar Regional State.

The special support provided to Afar Regional State by the various stakeholders presented and described above was further corroborated by the quantitative data obtained through the administration of questionnaire. Table 23.7 below depicts the respondents' judgment regarding the role of the special support in the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State.

Table 23.7: The Contribution of Special Support to Afar Regional State

Do you believe that the special support provided to the Afar Regional State has brought significant change in the socio-economic development of the region?

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Yes, I believe	94	26.9
	No, I do not believe	256	73.1
	Total	350	100.0

Survey data collected by the researcher, 2018/19

As we infer from Table 23.7 above, the percentage of respondents who believed that the contribution of the special support for the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State is insignificant, (26.9%) as compared with those who are skeptical (73.1%). Through cross tabulation respondents who contend that the provision special support to Afar Regional State did not bring significant change in the socio-economic development of the region or were asked to explain the reasons behind the failure of the special support to contribute to the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State.

Table 24.7: Problems in the Provision of Special Support in Afar Regional State

If your answer to the above question (Table. 23.7) is no, what are the factors adversely affecting the provision of special support in Afar Regional State?

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		F	Percent	
Not Believe	Limited capacity of the technical advisors (professionals) deployed in the region to support different sectors	187	24.2%	73.0%
	Lack of coordination among professionals supporting the various sectors in the region	172	22.3%	67.2%
	Limited awareness of the community about the purpose of the provision of the special support to the region	196	25.4%	76.6%
	Lack of motivation and commitment among the leaders of the regional state at different levels	217	28.1%	84.8%
Total		772	100.0%	301.6%

Survey data collected by the researcher, 2018/19

As we infer from Table 24.7 above, 187(73.0%) of the respondents argued that limited capacity of the technical advisors deployed in the region to support different sectors has its own impact for the low contribution of the special support to the socio-economic development of the Afar Regional State. Others 172(67.2%) of the respondents argued that the lack of coordination among technical advisors supporting the various sectors in the region is the cause for the low contribution of the special support. Moreover, 196(76.6%) of the respondents asserted that limited awareness of the community about the purpose of the provision of the special support to the region is cause for the low contribution of the special support for the socio-economic development of Afar region. Moreover, 217(84.8%) of the respondents argued that lack of motivation and commitment among the leaders of the regional state at different levels is the main factor why the special support provided to Afar Regional State is not translated into meaningful socio-economic development. Both the qualitative and quantitative data showed that the provision of special support to Afar Regional State has less contribution in accelerating the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State.

In the literature section (chapter two) it is discussed that nations, nationalies and peoples were not at similar level of socio-economic and political development when the contry was restructured along ethno-territorial units in 1991. It was due to this development disparity that the Ethiopian government categorized the peripherial areas of the country as "Developing Regional States". It was with this understanding that the government of EPRDF gave due consideration to the historically disadvantaged societies of the country and planned to accelerate the development of these regional states with the provision of special support.This is the position of the government which aimed at providing affirmative action to people living in the Developing Regional States to rectify past discrimination and to enable them catch up with others by accelerating their socio-economic development.

Although the federal government established a Special Support Board, create structural adjustments for the provision of special support to the Developing Regional States and deploy technical advisors (from different sector institutions) for more than two decades, the support do not bring significant improvement in the lives of the peoples in these regions. Moreover, the federal government created what was called "twinning arrangement", a mechanisim through which relatively developed regional states would support the development endeavors of in the developing regional states. In this case, Tigray Reginal State has supported Afar Regional State.

The provision of special support is part of building one political and economic community national stategy by ensuring equitable development in the four Developing Regional States. However,the socio-economic development of Afar regional state did't show significant improvement despite of the above arrangements for the provision of support. This was partly due to lack of commitment on the part of the regional leadership to maximize the supports provided by the federal government and Tigray Regional State and partly and partly due to the federal government's lack of wholehearted support. Had the federal government seriously concerned to the development of the regional state , it would have exerted more effort to solve problems hindering the development of the regional state.

The researcher made an assessment on the situation of the provision of the special support in Afar Regional State after the 2018 reform in the country.According to the information gained from one expert in the Mnistry of peace in June 2022, the ministry has evaluated the special support provided

to the developing regional states. Based on the evaluation result, the ministry concluded that the federal intervention made so far was not effective. Therefore, the ministry decided to stop handful technical advisors to the developing regional states.The federal government changed its modality of providing support. The new focus became enabling regional states to do perform their rutine tasks by their own without sending technical advisors. To that end, the Ministry of Peace began to send teams at different times which provide support in common plan preparation. Mostly the support focuses on projects being undertaken by allocating huge capital budget.

7.5. Conclusion

The special support provided to Afar Regional State since 1995 could not significantly impact the socio-economic development of the Regional State. Several contributing factors have reduced the role of the special support in accelerating the socio-economic development of the regional state in general and improvement of the lives of the local communities in particular. Factors like lack of coordination and genuine concern among members of the Special Suppot Board institution, capacity limitation and commitment on the part of the regional state government at all levels, lack of capacity among some of the the technical advisors deployed to Afar Regional State by the special Support Board institutions, allocation of inadequate resources and facilities as well as absence of well planned support from Tigray Regional state through the twinning arra. There is a wide gap between the reality and the development hope that was promised when the provision of special support started. Generally, the rhetoric of change achieved in Afar regional is far from the reality and Afar regional state is yet relegated to the waiting room of development.

Chapter Eight

Development by Dispossession: The Mega Projects

8. Introduction

In recent debates public investment has been considered as a potential tool to create jobs and lay the foundation for renewed and sustained growth by fostering socio-economic development of nations. In the coming years public investment, which takes the form of infrastructural expenditures for road and rail networks, ports, bridges, energy-generating plants, telecommunications structures, water and sanitation networks, government buildings can play an important role for the realization of government policy goals for growth, poverty reduction and climate change mitigation as well as for responding to forthcoming demographic trends, particularly the rapid urbanization process (UN, 2009).

According to FAO, IFAD and WFP (2015) well-designed and implemented investments for zero hunger will increase the productivity and incomes of small-scale producers by offering income-enhancing opportunities to the poor and thereby increasing growth and employment opportunities. The Ethiopian Investment Proclamation No.280/2002 underscored that investment objectives of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia are designed to improve the living standards of the peoples of Ethiopia through the realization of sustainable economic and social development.

Ethiopia envisions becoming amiddle-income country and leading manufacturing hub in Africa by 2025. According to National Planning Commission, the major objective of the Second Growth and Transformation Programme (GTP II) was to serve as a spring board towards realizing the national vision through sustaining the rapid, broad based and inclusive economic growth, which accelerates economic transformation and the journey towards the country's Renascence by focusing on economic, social and environmental development (NPC, 2016). Achievements in the investment sector, has its own share in the realization of this national plan. Therefore, this chapter tried to examine the role of investment for the economic development of the Afar Regional State by investigating the extraction of the abundant salt resource and the

sugar plantation project being undertaken in the regional state. Accordingly, this chapter is organized into five sections including the introductory section. Section two throws light the investment potential of Afar Regional State. It describes that the regional state is endowed with variety of natural resources. The third section provides an overview about Tendaho Sugar Factory, its establishment, accomplishments, the benefits of the sugar factory such as source of income and employment opportunity and other social benefits to the local community, the internal and external challenges adversely affecting the success of the factory.

The fourth section describes the salt business by examining the extraction of Salt at Lake Afdera. It investigates the stakeholders in the salt business such as salt producers, Kadaba Salt Suppliers Shareholders Association and SVS Salt Production PLC. It explains the benefit of the salt business to salt producers, the local community, the regional state, Kadaba Salt Suppliers Shareholders Association and SVS Salt Production PLC. The final section draws conclusion.

8.1. The Investment Potential of the Afar Regional State

The objectives of investment in Ethiopia as stipulated in the revised "Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012" are designed to improve the living standards of the peoples of Ethiopia through the realization of sustainable economic and social development. One of the specific objectives of the national investment proclamation is to encourage balanced development and integrated economic activity among the regions and strengthening the inter-sectorial linkage of the economy.

According to the 2004 Revised Investment proclamation of Afar National Regional State, the objectives of investment in the region are to improve the social services and encourage the economic development of the regional state; to facilitate and strengthening the necessary conditions with the concerned body which could ensure food security of the people living in the region; to encourage the peoples of the region to make them benefit from agricultural industry and modern technology; to encourage investors to exploit and develop the immense natural resources of the region; to expand income sources of the region and to create wide employment opportunity for the peoples of the region (ANRS, 2004).

Various literatures indicated that the Afar region is known for its huge natural resources such as water, mineral salt, potash, gypsum, manganese, marble and sulfur (Varet J, et'al., 2012). Similarly, the Afar National Regional StateRural Land Administration and Use Policy Document (2008) mentioned that the regional state has a large size land endowed with natural resources. The policy document also stated that land and other natural resources of the regional state have not been used in a manner that would accommodate the interests of future generation. This idea is substantiated by the information obtained from the participants of the interviews and focus group discussants. They explained that Afar Regional State is rich in natural resources such as vast arable land and animals as well as tourist attractive areas which could encourage investment in the region. However, investment activities have not been properly carried out to make use of the existing abundant resources in the region and in a way that could benefit the pastoralist community.

Although an estimated 90% of the population of Afar is pastoralist, most of the development investment projects in the region have been made in sectors that are marginal to Afar pastoralism like irrigation, transport infrastructure, service provision and minerals (Helland, 2015). There are also several factors for the low contribution of the investment sector to the economic development of Afar Regional State. According to an interviewee, lack of emphasis given to the investment sector by the regional state government is one of the reasons why investment did not play an important role for the economic development of the regional state. He further explained that the less focus given to the sector can be deduced from the organizational structure of the unit coordinating investment activities in Afar region. He pointed out that before 2017 the unit coordinating investment activities in Afar region had the status of Core Process under Trade-Industry and Transport Bureau which implies that the manpower resource and the budget allocated to it were less. In 2017 the investment Core Process was promoted to the status of Investment Office to enable it effectively follows up and coordinate investment activities in the region. And in 2019 following the reform the Afar Regional State Investment Office was promoted to the status of Investment Commission. According to an interviewee, the new organizational structure will enhance the capacity of the region to coordinate and regulate investment activities in a better way. Moreover, the information gained from the documents of the commission revealed that training regarding investment was given to the concerned bodies from region to Woreda levels including community elders for three days in October 2019.

Moreover, promotion works have been made using various Medias in Afar language. These activities have motivated many Afars which as a result 41 new Afar investors are registered and received investment certificate in this year.

The number of investors, investment sectors and the initial investment capital of investors with significant initial capital is shown below.

Table 25.8: Investors, Investment Sectors with Significant Initial Capital

No	Investment Sectors	Number of Investors	Initial Capital In Ethiopian Birr
	Animal resources more specifically in producing fodder, rearing of hen and goat	17	769,612,795
	Agriculture cotton, Production of crops, fruits and vegetables	24	538,270,000
	Manufacturing	18	1,309,725,924
	Salt production	5	1,090,807,210
	Milk and milk products	2	8,343,182
	Candy and ice-cream production	2	5,000,000
	Hotel service	20	315,895,450
	Construction	87	1,258,947,500

Survey data collected by the researcher, 2019

As shown in table 25.8 above, the data dipcted that the manufacturing sector has created employment opportunity for 669 permanent and 945 casual workers; the hotel sector for 628 permanent and 944 casual workers; agriculture development sector for 724 permanent and 1004 casual workers; animal resource for 1114 permanent and 2,120 casual workers. However, according to an expert in Afar Regional State Investment Commission interviewed in Feburary 2019, investment activity in the Regional State is not yet encouraging since only few people are engaged in the sector and job creation for the young and women has not lived up to expectation. He further elaborated that the benefit obtained from the investment sector is very limited when compared with the region's potential for investment. According to an expert in the Regional

Bureau of Finance and Economic Development investment in the Afar region has not been carried out with the intention of benefiting the pastoralist communities. He further elaborated:

> *Although the animal resource of the Afar has been deteriorating from time to time, animal husbandry still remained to be the main life style of the pastoralist communities. Neither government nor private investors have tried to establish milk processing or leather factories which could use animal products as an input. Thus, Afar pastoralists have been unable to benefit from their animal resources. Absence of proper marketing infrastructure and strategy for their livestock still remained to be one of the main constraints challenging the productivity of Afar pastoralists. The Afars have been unable to maximize their benefit from both domestic and international livestock markets.That is why pastoralists have resorted to international black markets to sell their livestock at better prices (Interview, 16 January, 2019, Semera).*

An expert in the regional state's investment commission interviewed in January 2019, Semera, asserted that the participation of Afars in investment is still low. However, the number of Afars who engaged in animal resources, manufacturing, agricultural development particularly in cotton production and construction investment sectors has been increasing these days. He underscored that the regional state did not conduct an organized research regarding investment in the region. He further pointed out that awareness creation and motivation tasks were not done due to the less due consideration given to the investment sector which as a result Afars have been providing less concern to investment.

The data obtained from the Afar Regional State Investment Commission indicated that, in 2018/2019 the commission has allocated 4,185,000 Birr for a research to be conducted on investment potentials of the regional state. One interviewee further elaborated that twelve professionals with good knowledge in the sector have been conducting research on18 Woredas which are believed to have good potential for investment. He further explained that the completion of the research and full operation of investment will motivate the Afars.

There are federal projects and private investment activities aimed at making use of the natural resources in the region. However, participants of the interview contend that the Afars are not active participants in investment activities being undertaken in their own region. Several factors have contributed for the low participation of the Afars in the investment sector such as the culture of the Afar people which encourages resource sharing than saving and accumulation of capital; the involvement of non-Afars in the investment sector with whom the Afars could not

compete; absence of micro-finance institutions from which the Afars can borrow money and the Muslim culture which forbid interest; and inability of the regional state government to implement its investment policy as well as Agricultural Land Use and Administration policy(land is still owned by clan leaders) which could not encourage investment in the region(Interview participants, January, 2019, Semera).

According to the researcher's informaldiscussions with different members of the communities during field observations in the town of Semera-Logia, Assaita, Amibara and Teru Woredas, Afars were and are still marginalized from the investment activities. For instance, an expert in the regional Bureau of Justice explained that Afars have less participation in the investment activities being undertaken in their own region. According to him, the number of Afars who engaged in animal resource development, agriculture, and manufacturing and construction sector is still small. If one considers investment in the regional capital, Semara, more than 95% of the hotel services and almost all shops in Semera and Logia towns are owned by non-Afars. Similarly, Bajaj motorcycle transportation service provided in Semera and Logia towns are predominantly owned by non-Afars. He further rstated that Afars who owned their own Baajaj may constitute less than five percent. These days many Afars are questioning whether Semera, Logia and other towns in the region belong to Afarssince Tigreans and Amharas have been controlling every investment activities in these towns (Interview, 23 January, 2019, Semera).

Participants of the study also asserted that the regional state government did not perform awareness creation among the youth and give financial support which would help them to organize themselves and engage in investment. An Afar could have three wives and fifteen or more children and hence unable to feed his family let alone accumulating wealth and saving money for investment. Moreover, the traditional financial institutions like Equb are not known in Afar culture. The establishment of micro-finance institutions in the region started in the last few years and conducive environment is not yet created to enable Afars get access to financial sources. Moreover, absence of policy and legal framework which centered on transforming pastoralist communities is the main factor which forced Afars to remain poor and watch how members of other ethnic groups prosper in their region (Interview, 9 January, 2019, Semera).

It is obvious that investment has been carried out in Afar region in different sectors including sugar mega projects. Participants in this study were asked to what extent the regional state has benefitted from the investment sector. Focus group discussants and interviewees asserted that investment in the region has been enriching non-Afars and Afar officials who have been directly involved in the investment or gained benefit through networking. They also argued that investment has worsened the poverty of Afars since they are evicted from their land in the process of creating investment opportunities for private and government projects (Interview, 10 January, 2019, Semera).

Article 41 of the 2002 Revised Constitution of the Afar Regional State stipulated that residents of the regional state have the right to improve their living standards and to sustainable development; have the right to participate in national development and, in particular, to be consulted with respect to policies and projects affecting their community and the basic aim of development activities shall be to enhance the development of the residents of the regional state and to meet their basic needs. However, the data obtained through various data gathering instruments showed that actual practices to meet the rights of the peoples of the Afar region mentioned above have not been materialized.

The information transmitted by Walta TV news televised on 17 January 2019 regarding the prevalent of corrupt practices before the 2018 reform further strengthened the above idea:

> *Tigrayan investors imported metals and other construction materials free of tax to construct 55 five-star hotels at Abala town. Residents of the town reported that the intended investment remained dream and no one knows what the investors did with the imported construction materials. How such investors gained the license is questionable but the local people were evicted from their land just to satisfy the interests of corrupted investors. The Mayor of Abala town also reported that many of the investors didn't come although the Office repeatedly requested them to come and report.*

Similarly, according to one worker of the Afar Region Revenue Bureau who gave information to ETV televised on 21 January 2019, in spite of the high money transaction in the region, the amount of revenue that the Afar region has been collecting is very small. He explained that the regional state has been collecting very small amount of revenue because most of the traders who run their business in the region are illegal. He further elaborated that the regional state lacked commitment in collecting revenue. He also contended that the region has been unable to properly

collect the tax imposed on people who engaged in various sectors, and "the amount of tax collected from pastoralists is almost zero".

The participation of Afars in the investment sector presented and described above was further corroborated by the quantitative data obtained through the administration of questionnaire. Table 26.8 below portrays the respondents' agreement or disagreement regarding the participation of Afars in the investment sector.

Table 4.8: Participation of Afars in the Investment Sector

Do you agree that the Afars have been actively participating in the investment activities of their region			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Yes, I believe	72	20.6
	No, I do not believe	278	79.4
	Total	350	100.0

As we infer from Table 26.8 above, the majority of the respondents 278(79.4%) believed that Afars have not been actively participating in the investment activities in their region and the remaining 72(20.6%) believed the opposite. Respondents who contend that Afars have not been actively participating in the investment sector were asked to explain the reasons behind the low participation of the Afars in the sector.

Table 57.8: Justification for the Low Participation of Afars in the Investment Sector

If your answer to the above question (Table.26. 8) is no, what is your justification for the low participation of Afar in the investment being undertaken in the region?		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Not Believe	The culture of the Afar people encourage resources sharing but not saving and capital accumulation	207	25.5%	74.5%
	The involvement of non-Afars in the investment sector which pushed out Afars from competition	249	30.7%	89.6%
	Absence of adequate natural resources which could encourage investment in the region	113	13.9%	40.6%
	Lack of implementation of the investment policy formulated by the regional state government with the aim of encouraging investment	243	29.9%	87.4%
Total		812	100.0%	246.4%

As we deduce from Table 27. 8 above, 278 respondents do not believe the Afar have been actively participating in the investment activities of their region. These respondents could choose more than one factors as a justification for disagreement. Accordingly, out of the 278 respondents who expressed their disagreement, 207(74.5%) believed that the culture of the Afar people encourages resources sharing but not saving and capital accumulation, 249(89.6%) of the respondents expressed that the involvement of non-Afars in the investment sector which pushed out Afars from competition, 113(40.6%) believed that absence adequate natural resources which could not encourage investment in the region and 243(87.4%) chose that lack of implementation of the investment policy formulation by the regional state government with the aim of encouraging investment are among the contributing factor for the Afar haven't been actively participating in the investment activities of their region.

Leaders of the regional state government interviewed explained that the number of Afar refugees in the West is small. They further mentioned that there is no statistical information about the general number of the Afar Diaspora. According to them, the number of the Afar of all age groups living in North America will not exceed one thousand people and in Europe may be double of this figure. They also elaborated that few hundred Afar have been living in New Zealand and Australia.

An attempt was made to know to what extent the regional state government has been encouraging the Diaspora group in participate in the investment activities in the region.

Regional leaderswere asked about the participation of Afar Diaspora in the investment activities being undertaken in Afar Regional State. They contend that not only Afars in the country but also Afar Diasporas have not been actively involved in the investment activities in the regional state. Simiralrly one Afar Diaspora whom the researcher interviewed in Semera town on 19 January 2019 contends that the regional state government officials have not been encouraging the Diaspora community because they suspected that the Diasporas have been sponsoring anti-government group in the region like Ugugumo.The information gained through the questionnaire substantiates this argument. As shown in the following table, respondents were asked to express their agreement/disagreement about the participation of Afar Diasporas in the investment being undertaken in Afar Region. This, argument was further substantiated by the quantitative data gathered through the administration of questionnaire. Table 28.8 below depicts the respondents' idea regarding the participation of Afar Diasporas in the investment being undertaken in Afar Regional State.

Table 68.8: Participation of Afar Diasporas in the Investment Sector

The Afar Diasporas have been actively participating in the investment activities of their region			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Agree	61	17.4
	Disagree	289	82.6
	Total	350	100.0

As can be deduced from Table 28.8 above, the majority of the respondents 289 (82.6%) agreed that Afar Diasporas have not been actively participating in the investment being under taken in the region and the minority 61 (17.4) of the respondent disagreed.Through cross tabulation respondents who contend that Afar Diasporas have not been actively participating in the investment being undertaken in Afar Regional State were asked to explain their justification as shown in the following table.

Table 79.8: Justification for the less Participation of Afar Diasporas in the Investment Sector

If your answer to the above question (Table.28.8.) is disagreement, what is your justification for the low participation of Afar in the investment being undertaken in the region?		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Disagree	The Afar regional state government did not sufficiently motivate the Afar Diaspora to invest their resources in their region	269	25.7%	93.1%
	The Afar Diaspora lacked confidence about their profitability due to the prevalence of corruption in the region	277	26.4%	95.8%
	Absence of infrastructures and different facilities such as roads, power and water	272	26.0%	94.1%
	Unlike other ethnic groups, there are very limited Afar Diaspora	230	21.9%	79.6%
Total		1048	100.0%	229.4%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

As we infer from Table 29.8 above, among the 289 respondents who believed that the Afar Diasporas have not been actively participating in the investment activities of their region, 269 (93.1%) of the respondents believed that the Afar regional State government has not been motivating the Afar Diaspora to invest their resources in their region, 277(95.8%) of the respondents contend that the Afar Diaspora lacked confidence about their profitability due to the prevalence of corruption in the region, 272 (94.1%) of the respondents said that the Afar Diaspora have not been encouraged to invest in the region due to lack of infrastructures and facilities and 230(79.6%) of the respondents argued that the number of Afar Diaspora is limited. The information gained through qualitative and quantitative methods made clear that the participation of Afars in general is insignificant.

The following section of the study has tried to examine the general situation of investment in the Afar Regional State by taking the Tendaho Sugar Factory and Afdera Salt production as an example.

8.2. The Tendaho Sugar Factory

8.2.1. The Establishment of the Sugar Factory

According to the report of the Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN, 2019), Ethiopia has become dependent on imported sugar to meet domestic demand since 1993. The vision of the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation is to become one of the world's top ten sugar producing countries by 2020 through consistent development endeavors. This shows that sugar projects are among the various investment sectors where the government of Ethiopia has invested huge capital.

Tendaho Sugar Factory in Afar Regional State is one of government projects established in the Lower Awash River Basin. The factory was established by the Council of Ministers Regulations No.122/2006 as a public enterprise. According to the regulation, the objectives of the enterprise are to grow sugarcane and other yielding plants; to process and produce sugar, sugar products and sugar by-products; to supply and sell its products in domestic and export markets; and to engage in any other related activities for the attainment of its objectives.

Tendaho sugar factory was established in 2006 following the enactment of the regulation of the Council of Ministers. Its vision is to play a leading role for the national economic development by producing environmentally friendly sugar and sugar-products and ensure its competitiveness at the international level. The missions of the factory are Cultivating sugarcane on 50,000 hectare of land and building sugar and ethanol producing factories; Supplying quality sugar to the beneficiaries and the sources of renewable energy (ethanol and electric power) by producing them through the use of modern technology; ensuring the benefits of the local communities from the development project; Producing competent workers who developed good working culture and who aspire the realization of the vision of the factory and accomplishing the operation of the factory in accordance to the standard and ensuring the future productivity and competitiveness of the factory.

The factory was established in Assaita Woreda on 1.4 kilometer by 1-kilometer-wide land and its head office is in Assaita town. A senior manager, head of one department of the factory explained that Tendaho Sugar Factory was established by 5.5 billion Birr capital obtained from the government of India through loan. Moreover, the information obtained from the documents

of the factory showed that various stakeholders were involved in the establishment of Tendaho Sugar Factory. An Indian company, OIA (Overseas Infrastructure Alliance) is the main contractor for the construction of the sugar factory and the consultant is also an Indian, J. P. Mukherji and Associates Private Limited (JPMA), specialized in Engineering and Consultancy Services in the Production of Sugar and Cogeneration of surplus power for sale to public utilities. The Ethiopian Ministry of Water Resources, Ethiopian Water Works Construction Authority and Ethiopian Water Works Design and Supervision Enterprise carried out the land preparation, dam construction and irrigation structures. The Ethiopian Ministry of Urban Development and Construction accomplished the construction of houses for the leaders and workers of the factory. The pre-secession farm preparation tasks like preparing initial seed cane, sketching lines and planting commercial cane planting were accomplished by the factory itself.

As one of the top managers of the factory interviewed, reflected, unlike the technologies of older sugar factories in Ethiopia which began with analogue system, Tendaho Sugar Factory started with digital system and when the factory reaches its full production capacity, it can crush 13,000 tons of sugarcane per day out of which 1,300 quintal of sugar will be produced per day during the first phase. He further mentioned that during the second phase of its production, the factory will have the capacity of crushing 26, 000 tons of sugarcane. The factory is also expected to produce about 300,000 tons of sugar per year. He further explained that the bulky sugar project with such capacity is the first of its kind in the history of sugar production in the country. It will also generate 60 megawatts of electricity when starting its full operation. It is the hugest plant in the country and it will take the lion's share of the total amount of sugar produced in the country when it started working with its full capacity (Interview, 23 January, 2019, Assaita).

8.2.2. Accomplishments of the Sugar Factory

Tendaho Sugar Factory workers Participated in the focus group discussion asserted that in the beginning, the federal government through the regional leaders made continuous and excessive propaganda regarding the benefits of the sugar factory to the economic development of the regional state in general and the improvement of the life of the local communities in particular. It was told that more than 25 villages will be constructed in Dubti, Detbahiri and Assaita for the residence of workers of the factory and more than 20,000 workers will be employed. So far, the

factory has constructed 12 villages in the aforementioned places where workers coming from the various parts of the country particularly from the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, Amhara and Tigray regional states. There were different perceptions regarding the possible consequences of the construction of residence houses in these sites. While some believed that this would create economic motivation in the region, others perceived that the settlement of such huge number of non-Afar people might endanger the self-rule right, culture and religion of the local communities in particular and the peoples of the regional state in general (FGD, 26 January, 2019, Assaita).

According to one of the department heads of Tendaho Sugar factory interviewed in March 2019 who has been working in the factory starting from the very beginning, Tendaho Dam has the capacity to hold 1.86-billion-meter cube water and it has the capacity to irrigate 60,000 hectare of land. The factory had planned to cover the 50, 000 hectares of land with sugarcane and to use the remaining10, 000 hectare of land for fodder development for the animals of pastoralists. According to the plan half of the land will be developed in Assaita Woreda and the other half in Dubti Woreda. However, the factory was forced to readjust its plan of growing sugarcane according to conditions. Accordingly, the factory grew sugarcane only in Dubti Woreda because the agro-pastoralists in Assaita Woreda decided to cultivate their land by their own instead of giving it to the sugar factory. Therefore, Tendaho Sugar Factory started to grow sugarcane in Dubti Woreda on the land which was owned by the former Tendaho Large-Scale Commercial Cotton Plantation. The size of the land owned by the Cotton Plantation was 7,000 hectare (4,000 hectare in Dubti and 3,000 hectare in Detbahri). Before the start of the Sugar Factory, the former Agricultural Plantation Enterprise was growing cotton on 5,000 hectare of land and the remaining 2,000 hectare of its land was used by the local communities. One interviewee asserted that during the rush for starting the sugar factory, the machines of the former cotton factory were pull out and matured cotton cultivated on the 5,000 hectare of land was cleared by tractors without giving due regard for the resources invested over the land (Interview with workers and managers of the factory, January 2019, Assaita).

According to senior workers of Tendaho Sugar Factory who participated in the FGD, the factory planned to develop the 50,000 hectare of land in two phases using irrigation water from Awash River at Tendaho Dam out of which 25,000 hectare of land to be cultivated in the first phase. In

the second phase the factory planned to develop the remaining 25,000 hectare of land and promised to develop fodder for the animals of the agro-pastoralists on 10,000 hectare of irrigable land. Thus, with the aim of increasing the size of the land, the task of land preparation started in 2008 on 25, 000 hectare of land including the land which was owned by the Tendaho Cotton Plantation Enterprise. They further explained that the local pastoralists whose land is taken by the factory were organized into 16 sugarcane producers' associations (sugarcane out growers) (FGD. 28 January, 2019, Assaita)

According to the agreement between the factory and the sugarcane producers' associations, pastoralists will grow sugarcane and supply it to the factory. The factory will help them by clearing land, preparing farm, plough their land, providing machinery and technical advices. He further noted that some of the pastoralists have started to grow maize on their own land around the factory and this practice will help the Afars to adopt the culture of crop production.It was also believed that different from other sugar factories, the hot climate condition of the area would shorten the maturity time of the sugarcane and could ensure its supply to the factory throughout the year without interruption (FGD, 22 January, 2019, Assaita).

Documents of the factory revealed that the factory accomplished the task of land preparation until 2008 and in the same year it planted the first seed cane. The size of the land covered by sugarcane grew from year to year and the irrigable land reached 21,191.9 hectares in 2015 while construction of the main canal and other canal structures were already built. The first sugarcane matured in 2010 but the factory couldn't produce sugar because of the ripening of the sugarcane on more than 20, 000 hectares of land earlier than the completion of the factory. As one senior manager of the factory put it, a small plant called Jagari was established at Dubti in order to avoid wastage of sugarcane. This plant crushes and squeezes the cane, boil the liquid and produced slice of sugar known as *Jagari sugar*. Then the slice of sugar was packed in a sack and sent to Metehara Sugar Factory where it was milted, refined and converted into real sugar and this process continued until 2012. However, it was not productive and even it was unable to cover only the payment of casual workers employed for cutting the sugarcane. Moreover, the sugarcane was seriously affected by the devastative effect of the 2015 climate change and El Niño. The following table depicts the total area of land developed by the factory for the cultivation of sugarcane and other infrastructures by 2015

Table 30.8: Land Use by Tendaho Sugar Factory

No	Used Land in hectare	Sites										Total
		Dubti				Village-6			Det Bahri			
		PC1	PC2	PC3	Sum	PC4	PC5	Sum	PC6	PC7	Sum	
1	land covered by sugarcane in each village	1446.85	3181.8	1466.2	**6094.85**	1280	5138	**6418**	2399	6280	**8679**	**21191.9**
2	Land covered by infrastructure of the factory in each village	48.08	534.5	94.3	**676.88**	143.1	573.54	**716.64**	748.9	362	**1110.9**	**2504. 42**
3	Total land developed by the factory in each village	1494.93	3716.30	1560.56	**6771.73**	1424	5711.6	**7135.6**	3148	6642	**9790**	**23697.33**

N.B. PC= Primary Canal

Tendaho sugar factory began trial production in 2015 while the construction work was under way. This was done because it was propagated that the factory will start producing sugar for the political consumption of the May 2015 election. The factory started producing sugar in November 2015 but soon interrupted due to damage on the machinery. After maintenance, the factory restarted to produce sugar in January 2016. However, production was interrupted at different times due to technical problems of the machine. During the trial phase, the factory interrupts its function in every three, four, five days and weeks. Participants in the interview underscored that the factory operates without interruption only for three consecutive months (February-April- 2017). The factory started to produce half of its capacity since the beginning of 2019. However, due to lack of sugarcane supply, the factory totally stopped its function in May 2019.

Sugar production interrupted from that time until the researcher's last visit of the factory on 10 February 2019. The researcher conducted telephone interview with one of the senior managers of the factory on 17 June 2019 to understand the status of the factory. He reported that the pastoralists send their cattle into the farm and the sugarcane is totally ruined. Now the land is almost to be covered by Prosopis. He further explained that the fate of the factory requires government decision. The factory will stop its function nearly to three years because clearing the Prosopis, preparing the land and growing sugarcane requires more time.

The information televised on 22 September 2020 by ESAT television could further strengthen the above idea. It mentioned that the factory had technical problems and it started to produce half of its capacity in 2019. The contractor did not yet handover its task to the factory because its full capacity (crushing 13,000 tons of sugarcane per a day) has to be tested three times. But in this year the sugarcane of the factory which was growing on 19 thousand hectares of land is damaged (consumed by cattle) and the factory is forced to stop its function for unknown time. The journalist of the television mentioned above asked the public communication head of the factory regarding the time when the factory will start its function. He replied "*I do not know when it will start. The federal government, the national sugar corporation, and the Afar Regional State knew the existing problem and I hope they will decide something regarding what to do next".* Wayessa's argument could explain the reason why the concerned bodies delayed in making decisions regarding the fate of the factory. He asserted that of the ever increasing demand for sugar in the country is not the only factor for the expansion of Ethiopian sugar projects, but also because of the global political economy that shapes the nature of development projects in Global South.

8.2.3. The Benefits of the Sugar Factory

8.2.3.1. Source of Income and Employment Opportunity

The researcher visited the factory in March 2018 and in Feburary and March 2019 and interviewed managers and workers of the factory, pastoralists who were growing sugarcane for the factory and other crops around the factory, educated Afars, elders as well as regional leaders at different levels regarding the benefits of the factory. Workers and leaders of the factory who participated in the interview and focus group discussion conducted in the factory contend that the

factory is one source of income for employees working in the factory. They mentioned that the factory has been paying 36,000,000 Birr to its workers every month and the regional state has been collecting around 2 million income taxes from the workers of the factory since regional state governments are responsible for the collection of taxes from income earned in the state. Moreover, the regional state has benefited from the transaction since workers of the factory expend to hotel, food and other services provided in towns (Interview, 6 March, 2018, Tendaho Sugar Factory).

Regional states have the right to collect land use tax form investors establishing projects in their respective regions. Accordingly, Tendaho sugar factory has to pay 11 million Birr land use tax per year. According to one Department Head of the Factory, interviewed in March, 2018, the regional state collected only 5 million Birr land use tax for the 2017 fiscal year. However, the data obtained from the Regional State's Revenue Bureau, the factory did not pay the land use tax, administrative punishment payment and interests which amounted 85,054,211 Birr for the years 2010-2016. An expert in Afar Regional State Revenue Bureau asserted that, the Bureau has requested the factory to pay the land use tax for several times. However, the response on the part of the factory has remained to be unacceptable. It requested our Bureau to lift payments related to punishment and interests and to get time until the factory start to produce sugar. He further explained that the regional Revenue Bureau has no mandate of lifting payments. Currently, the factory is totally stopped functioning and how payments will be made remained to be unresolved problem (Interview, 15 Feburary, 2019, Semera).

The data obtained from the documents of the factory showed that until 2017 the factory has created employment opportunity for a total of 17,065 workers: 2,751 permanent workers (2,444 males and 305 females), 193 contract workers (140 males and 53 females), and 14,121 casual workers (11,028 males and 3,093 females). However, the number of workers decreased from time to time because the factory has been unable to produce sugar without interruption. In 2018 the number of workers reduced to 15,607 (2,356 permanent and 13, 251 casual). In November 2019, the numbers of workers of the factory decreased to 10,923, of which 2,341 are permanent, 257 contract and 8, 325 are casual workers. By the time the researcher visited the factory for the last time in March 2019 the total number of workers of the factory was 10,434 out of which 2,279 were permanent, 144 contract and 8,022 casual workers. In terms of sex, 7,704 were males

and the remaining 2,730 were females. This shows that out of the total number of workers of the factory 6,272 (60%) were Afars. Many of the workers were either transferred to other sugar factories or left the factory in search of employment opportunities in other institutions. Generally, the rate of turnover is very high and there are cases where workers left the factory even after starting to work for only three-four days. For instance, two senior electricians whom the factory brought from Fincha and Metehara factories with promising salaries left the factory within ten days in March 2018.

Managers of the factory at different levels interviewed im March 2019 mentioned that the factory has a rule which restricted that all positions below level 18 and 19 have to be occupied by Afars. Some of the jobs such as guards, operators, office runners and coordinators of the five sites (villages) are exclusively held by Afars. Because of the academic qualification requirement, only highly qualified semi-professional and professional positions are held by people coming from other regions. It was very recently that the general manager, public relations and facility section (Purchase and supply department) positions are made to be held by Afar nationals. For the purpose of enhancing sense of ownership among Afars for the factory the Regional State Council has assigned an Afar with the status of Deputy Manager for Social Participation and Beneficiary Public Relation Office of the factory.

Employees, whom the researcher interviewed in Feburary and March 2019, asserted that the factory has created employment opportunity for many Afars although production has been interrupted several times. However, many Afars working in the factory have been earning low salary due to the low positions they held in the factory.

With regard to the provision of employment opportunities to the peoples of the region one the senior experts in Tendaho Sugar Factory mentioned in the past, Afars were not worried about employment. It was only the highlanders who came and work in the cotton plantation. As pastoralists they had several animal resources on which their lives solely depended on. However, the number of cattle that Afars had has been declining from time to time due to climate change and the associated deterioration of pasture. Nowadays, the sons and daughters of the Afar people began to think of seeking employment opportunities as an alternative means of getting life sustaining economic resources. As a result, many Afars have been employed in Tendaho

sugar Factory and get their means of livelihood. However, they have been paid without working like retired workers and the situation has been hurting them psychologically. They are not sure for how long they will work in the factory because they have losttheir confidence in it due to continuous interruption of production. They have been paid without working for the last nine months and hence they afraid that sometimes in the future decisions may be reached to stop paying salaries to workers at times when the factory stop producing sugar (Interview on 15 March 2019, Tendaho Sugar Factory).

Despite of the employment opportunities that the factory provided to the members of community various categories of people such as pastoralists, clan leaders, and regional state officials and educated Afars have a different perspective. According to an expert in the regional Bureau of Finance and Economic Development Bureau, the adverse effects of the factory on the life of the community are more than the benefit it has been giving to them. He further explained:

> *The large-scale development project of Tendaho Sugar Factory was established in the Afar region as a federal project primarily to make use of the fertile land to enhance the national economy and not to benefit the Afar people. The government did not conduct serious social and environmental analysis before the establishment of the factory. Pastoralists were evicted from their farm lands where they were producing crops two times a year. The pasture land upon which the lives of animals sustained has been taken by the factory and the living conditions of pastoralists became worse from time to time due to loss of their animal resources (Interview, on 15 March, 2019).*

A senior regional official inthe region's Civil Service and Capacity Building Bureau also reflected that the revenue that regional state gained as an income tax from the sugar factory and the employment opportunity it created is at the expense of the land that pastoralists which used for pasture and cultivation. According to him, the salary obtained by Afar employees cannot be compared with the suffering of agro-pastoralists and the deterioration of animal resources. The regional state did nothing topastoralists evicted from their land with the money it collected from the factory.Pastoralists have been losing their cattle year after year. He further explained that in the past Afar pastoralists were important sources of livestock supply to the highland crop cultivators and now it is a paradox that Afars, are pastoralists in name, but the milk supplyto Semera-Logia towns has been brought from Amhara agriculturalists, Kombelcha (Interview, 9 March, 2019, Logia).

Experts participated in the interview contend that the benefit of the factory for the economic development of the region in general and that of the community in particular is insignificant. They argued that initially, some regional leaders opposed the establishment of the factory in the region. They asserted that there were instances where Woreda leaders were arrested by the regional state president who was committed to fulfill the interest of the federal government without questioning its impact on the interests of the Afar people. For instance, one former senior Afar regional official underlined the idea that:

> *Despite of our opposition, the establishment of the sugar factory in our region became inevitable since the federal government had already decided to do so. It used both lobbing and coercing strategies to change the minds of regional officials. Our discussions with the federal government before the establishment of the factory have also misled us. We displaced the pastoralists from their land because we were convinced that the benefit of the sugar project will be by far more than the land, they lost to it. Later we regretted when we learned the discrepancy between what we thought of and what actually happened on the ground. We expected improvement in the lives of agro-pastoralists who were capable of feeding themselves by producing crops on their farm. Paradoxically, pastoralists who lost their land began to lead impoverished life. The compensation given to the pastoralists was by no means comparable to the farm and pastureland they lost to the factory which does not produce sugar even after more than ten years of its establishment (Interview 24 Feburary, 2019, Semera).*

A young educated Afar lecturer at Semera University supported the above idea because he argued that the eviction of pastoralists from their land just to give land for Tendaho Sugar Factory is unconstitutional. Art 42(2) of the 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional Stated revealed that displaced individuals or people whose life is impacted because of projects undertaken by state have the right to get sufficient support, to be transferred to other places and commensurable payments. Contrary to this constitutionally guaranteed right, Afar pastoralists have been evicted from their land without getting appropriate compensation (Interview 13 January, 2019, Semera University).

8.2.3.2. Social Benefits of the Factory

Some managers of Tendaho Sugar Factory believed that the establishment of the factory in Afar region has numerous advantages to the community. According to them, Afars were forgotten for centuries in terms of investment and therefore the establishment of Tendaho Sugar Factory in the region by itself which had never been thought of shows the recognition given to the Afars under

federal Ethiopia. In addition to growing sugar cane at Tendaho, currently, the factory is also cultivating wheat on 700 hectares of land which can be used as a model to the pastoralists (in order to motivate the pastoralists to engage in agriculture) (Interview, March, 2019, Tendaho Sugar Factory).

The information gained from the middle and lower level managers of the factory attested that the factory has been also discharging different social responsibilities to the local communities. According to them, currently the factory cultivated only 21, 192 hectares of land and hence it distributed the remaining land and the excess water to the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists so that they can use the land until the factory start its second phase of production. Moreover, the factory has been supporting the local community by clearing land, preparing farm, providing machinery and sometimes by ploughing their farm using its tractors and enabling them to produce crops like maize. They further elaborated that the factory has established schools and health institutions (clinics) for the families of the workers of the factory where children of the local communities have been getting services. They further maintained that as part of providing special support, the factory has a plan to sell sugar to the local community only at production cost (Interview, 13 January, 2019, Tendaho Sugar Factory).

8.2.4. Challenges of the Sugar Factory

8.2.4.1. Internal Challenges

The establishment of mega projects like Tendaho Sugar Factory requires through analysis of the internal and external environment. However, according to one middle level manager of the factory, the whole process of the establishment of Tendaho Sugar Factory lacked this important element. He further mentioned that it took several years for the factory (2006-2015) before it started the first trial production. Moreover, he axplainned that the factory has never worked without interruption and from May 2019 on, it totally stopped functioning. Therefore, the factory is not in a position to accomplish its vision and missions (Telephone Interview, June 2019).

In order to understand the challenges that Tendaho Sugar Factory faced, it would be better to see the contribution of the various stakeholders: the federal government, Sugar Corporation, the contractor and the factory itself. The factory encountered several internal and external challenges working against its vision, playing a leading role for the national economic development by

producing environmentally friendly sugar and sugar-products and ensure its competitiveness at the international level.

One of the junior level manager of the factory asserted that the most important internal challenge which threatened the function of the factory is the installation of old machines which have been stopping time and again. He further underscored that a manager transferred from other sugar factory and assigned as the manager of Tendaho Sugar factory frequently travelled to India and strongly debate with the main contractor, OIA, regarding the old machines which have not been properly functioning. However, this manager was removed from his position very soon he returned back from India after attending a meeting which had aimed at solving the problems of the machines. In the same fashion, a technician who has been working in the factory starting from the very beginning mentioned that the main problem adversely affecting the success of the factory are the old machines which are unable to properly function (Interview 24 January 2019, Assaita).

Another internal factor challenging the activities of Tendaho Sugar Factory was absence of stability of the management. According to one senior technican of the factory he never knew a manager who led the factory for more than six months. He further mentioned that managers of the factory were appointed by the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation. However, the turnover rate of professionals and managers has been very high. In line with this a senior worker and head of one department of the factory reported: "*eight managers were appointed since the establishment of the factory and four of them are still in prison due to mismanagement of resources and corruption cases. It is after the factory stopped its function in May 2019 that an Afar national was appointed as manager of the factory*" (Interview, 26 feburary 2019, Semera).

Producing competent workers who developed good working culture who aspire the realization of the vision of the factory is one of the missions of the factory. However, the prevalence of poor working culture in the factory is a paradox which has been adversely affecting its performance. One of the problems related to the working culture is absenteeism. There are also cases where workers remained absent for a month or more without the knowledge of their immediate boss. Such workers can produce letter of support from different institutions regarding their absence even without having any tangible health problem. Not only managers at different levels but also

workers of the factory underlined that poor working culture has been one of the serious problems of the factory. For instance, one technician who has been working in the factory since its establishment stated:

> *It is common that workers disappeared from their workplace for days, weeks or months without permission from the concerned body. It is not difficult for such workers to get letter of support from courts, police stations, Woreda administration offices and hospitals regarding the reasons of their absence. A hospital gives a month sick leave for a worker who took a two day leave from his annual leave and remained absent for a month. The factory could not take measures in accordance with the rules and regulations of the civil service. Managers could not write a discharge letter for workers who frequently disappear from his/her workplace. If he did that, he will be accountable instead of the factory that he represents. There are cases where a manager who wrote a discharge letter to a worker subject to attack and being accused where the court decided that he is guilty (Interview, 27 January, 2019, Assaita).*

Thomas (2018) underscored that the effectiveness and efficiency of an organization is highly dependent on its human resource in which motivation plays great role. He explained that motivation is a drive to perform the job or any task for which one is responsible. In this regard, many workers participated in the interview and focus group discussion elaborated that that unsatisfactory salary, lack of incentives and rewards, absence of encouraging supervision and fear of the continunity of employment are factors affecting workers' motivation of Tendaho Sugar Factory.

Turnover is another internal challenge that Tendaho Sugar factory has been facing. According to focus group discussants, prevalence of poor working culture is one of the contributing factors for the high turnover rate in the factory. In this regard a senior manager of the factory explained that senior electricians transferred to Tendaho Sugar factory from Fincha and Metehara sugar factories with promising salaries left our factory after working only for few days due to the incompatibility of their experience and the new working culture they encountered in the factory. Such workers are highly respected because they are considered as the heart of the factories without whose role machines could not properly function. In the case of Tendaho Sugar Factory workers assigned to support such electricians may stop their work to pray or to go to somewhere for some purpose. Electricians who accustomed to give strict orders to the members of their staff

lacked the patience and leave our factory disregard of attractive salaries that our factory promised to pay (Interview 7 Feburary, 2019 Tendaho Sugar Factory).

The other internal factor challenging the performance of Tendaho Sugar Factory is the distance between the farm where the sugarcane grows and the factory where sugar is produced. According to workers of the factory, the minimum and the maximum distance between the farms and the factory are 7 and 70 kilometers respectively. They further elaborated that in one shift (8 eight hours duration) a tractor can transport sugarcane only twice from the nearest farm and only once from distant farms. Therefore, given the poor transportation facility of the factory, had the machinery of the factory functioned properly, it would have been impossible to transport 13,000 tons of sugarcane from the farm to the factory per a day. When managers began to question the general condition and capacity of the machinery, heads of the contractor were used to say "*bring the 13,000 tons of sugarcane to the factory and let us see whether our machinery could crush it or not.*" One senior technician of the factory asserted that the impact of the distance between the farms and the factory had to be studied before the establishment of the factory. Another worker of the factory further echoed: "*the sugarcane once cut had to reach the factory within 24 hours. But due to lack of transportation service, the sugarcane reached to the factory after three or four days, dried and lost its sucrose*"(Interview, 23 January 2019, Assaita).

Still the other internal challenge adversely affecting the performance of the factory is lack of skilled workers. As one senior technican of the factory put it, "*as a remedy to solve the problem of lack of skilled and experienced workers individuals who studied related fields like forestry were appointed."* According to one instructor of Semera University, cognizant of the existing lack of professional manpower, the university established Sugar Plant Science Department in 2012 with 42 students to produce graduates who could fill professional human resource gaps in Tendaho Sugar Factory and to conduct research in the area of sugar development. Until 2015 four batches with total number of 195 students have graduated from the department. However, since the factory does not start its proper function, it is unable to create employment opportunities for professionals who could be its valuable assets. Owing to the existing situation, the department reviewed its curriculum and changed the nomenclature of the department to Plant Science Department since 2017. In the 2019/20 academic year the number of plant science

students is 109 of whom 65 are second year and 54 are third year students (Interview, 5 January 2019, Semera University).

8.2.4.2. External Challenges

As a stakeholder, one of the external challenges which forced the factory to sustain with its problems is the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation. According to one foreman who has been working in the factory since 2008, the corporation focuses on changing managers instead of trying to solve the fundamental problems like investigating the condition of the machinery and creating friendly working environment by raising awareness among regional leaders and the local communities. Another department head of the factory further strengthened the above position. He tried to associate the ineffectiveness of Tendaho Sugar Factory with the haphazard and hasty decisions of the federal government to launch several mega projects at a time. He further asserted that a thorough look at of the vision of the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation which came into being in October 2010 by the Council of Ministers Regulation No 192/2010, "*Ensuring sustainable growth, becoming one of the ten competitive sugar producing countries of the world in 2023*" would help us to understand the country's rush to establish huge projects without conducting clear feasibility studies (Interview, 19 Feburary 2019, Assaita).

The regional government was consulted when the federal government initially designed the sugar project on the need for and the scope of the intended projects and initially, the regional administration demonstrated its full support for the project (Mulugeta and Firehiwot, 2014). However, the regional leadership came to be the other external challenge affecting the performance of Tendaho Sugar Factory with the passage of time. According to one junior manager of the factory most of the regional leaders have no positive outlook regarding the establishment of the factory in their region because they knew from their experience about the consequences of dispossessing arable and grazing areas for government projects. He further underscored that the establishment of Tendaho Sugar Factory became inevitable because the federal government first convinced very few regional leaders who were dominating the regional politics. Thus, regional leaders at different levels were forced to accept it through lobbing and coercing even though their support was not wholehearted (Interview, 2 Feburary 2019, Assaita).

One of the reflections which could show the perceptions of regional leaders is their intervention in the appointment workers in the factory. Participants of the focus group discussion underlined that the decisions of regional leaders at different level are the causes for the presence of several workers who have been paid without working. They explained that more than 700 workers were appointed at a time before the factory start to work just to fulfill the interests of regional readers. These workers accustomed to sign payroll and receive their salary without working. Later when the factory started operation, it became difficult to make such workers available at their workplace. Writing supporting letters to the factory by regional leaders regarding the appointment of individuals has continued until recent times. As evidence, the researcher got the scanned copy of a supportive letter addressed to Tendaho Sugar Factory requesting the appointment of an individual to a status of coordinator.

The other challenge to the factory is lack of positive attitude and sense of ownership among leaders at various levels.This can be reflected in many ways like opposing discharging measures taken by the factory against workers who violet regulations, even considering the one who wrote the discharging letter accountable(Interview, 25 January, 2019, Semera). Moreover, pastoralists send their cattle onto the farm that consume cane seedlings because small grows are soft than matured and hard sugar cane which could pierce their tongue. According to one of the managers of the sugar factory, when the factory accused pastoralists who deliberately send their cattle, the responses from leaders are usually unfriendly *"What does the factory did to benefit the pastoralists? It is better the cattle consume the cane because punishing cattle owners for a factory which could not produce sugar will be unfair".* Moreover, when the factory requests the regional leadership for a certain support, the usual response has been "*what a support for a factory which could not produce sugar*?"(Interview, 14 January 2019, Tendaho Sugar Afctory).

The bare land around the factory has not been used by pastoralists and the regional state had promised to give it to the factory. But the regional leaders changed their mind when they saw that the factory remained on a trial and error process for the last ten years. The factory had planned to give the already cultivated land in Dubti Woreda in exchange for the land around the factory in Assaita Woreda. However, regional officials expressed their disagreement because they believed that giving land to the factory which did not properly produce sugar will create discontent among the local community and clan leaders. They have been heard saying" *why*

should we give land to a factory which dispossess the farm and pasture land of pastoralists but still unable to produce sugar" (Interview 28 January, 2019, Assaita).

The contradiction between the factory and agro-pastoralists evicted from their farms and pasturelands has become the other external challenge to Tendaho Sugar Factory. Agro-pastoralists who were engaged in crop production had opposed the establishment of the factory from the very beginning. Discussion and consent with the local community whose lives would be affected by the newly established project would give an opportunity to hear their voices and to compromise the interests. However, the process of the establishment of Tendaho Sugar factory lacked this important element. This sentiment was voiced by a pastoralist as: "*they took our land through lobbing and promises which could not be materialized."(Interview January 2019, Assaita).* An expert in Assaita Woreda Finance and Economics Development Officecontend the sugar cane plantation in the Lower Awash Basin has affected the dry season grazing area; pastoralists' access to water for their livestock and household purpose, decrease on their livestock size, created conflict between the pastoralist and the Tendaho Sugar Project (Interview, 27 January, 2019, Assaita).

Another pastoralist further underscored that the factory promised to bring so many good fortunes for the local community like preparing; pasture land for their animals, employment opportunities for their children and to pay compensation for the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists whose land is taken for the factory. According to Mulugeta and Firehiwot (2014) the payment of compensation depends on what kinds of crops had land owners produced in the previous years. Accordingly, the compensation was determined to be 12,000 Birr/ha/year for crops which take long to grow while the compensation for those who were producing subsistence crops like maize was determined to be 5,000 Birr/ha/year. The factory grew sugarcane on the land it took from members of the local community. However, pastoralists evicted from their land asserted that the factory was unable to pay the compensation it agreed. Therefore, the factory has worsened the living conditions of the community instead improving.

Pastoralists were also convinced that they will be benefitted if they grow sugarcane on the remaining land they have and supply it to the factory. Hence, they organized themselves into 16 sugarcane outgrowing cooperative associations with 1,667 members. This was done with the intension of enabling the local community participate in sugar production and benefit from sugar development. However, the factory was not properly function which as a result, agro-pastoralists were unable to supply the cane to the factory. Therefore, the factory threatened the lives of the local community and their animals due to the gradual decline and total stoppage of the factory since May 2019. According to one of the sugarcane out-growers, they have accused the factory but their case has not been yet decided. He further mentioned that they have no hope to be compensated since the factory has already stopped functioning.

During the late Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi's visit of the Tendaho Dam and Irrigation Project in 2010, clan leaders and community elders voiced that the fertile soil of the Awash Valley was suitable for crop production which as a result sixty Quintal of maize per hectare has been produced. In addition to crops, vegetables like onion, papaya and banana have been cultivated in Dubti, Assayita and Afambo Woredas. Despite the practice of crop cultivation, animal husbandry has remained to be the main life style of pastoralist and agro-pastoralist Afars. Thus, participants voiced their dissatisfactions and grievances arising from the establishment of Tendaho Sugar Factory. In the conference participantsexpressed theirfrustration to P.M Meles Zenawi expressing the difference between what they were told and what actually happened on the ground. According to them they were that animal resource development will be carried out along with the federal sugar project with the support of the government to pastoralists. However, nobody did what was promised and their animals have been encountering severe shortage of pasture. No one raised the issue let alone trying to relieve the lives of their animals. Theiranimals missed not only pastureland but their movement is also restricted due to the canals dug for the irrigation which as a result they are exposed to sun stroke. If animals by chance entered into the canal, they will be slaughtered there and their meat will be taken out due to absence of corridors through which animals could came out of the canal alive. For instance, one clan leader participanted in the conference explained the multidimensional challenges faced by the local community in the following manner:

> *We were told that the development project will benefit the peoples of Ethiopia let alone the Afars since the Awash River can irrigate the vast land on both sides of the basin. However, we gained nothing except hope. Drought resistant trees which were used for animal feeding were cut down to make the land free for the sugar project. Since then, our animals lost not only pasture but also a corridor to pass through and to search pasture lands in other areas. The canal blocked our movements. Our women have no ways to go to their home after fetching water. The canal deterred our relation with the town and it made movement of people difficult particularly during the nights. There are cases where some people encountered arm and leg fracture while trying to cross the canals. We hope that the federal government will try to solve the problems of our animal and that of ours (Conference Participant's speech in 2010).*

The Afar agro-pastoralists voiced the same problem after seven years when the current Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed discussed with representatives of the Afar people on 28 June 2018. Participants expressed that the livelihood of Afars depended on their animals. However, the establishment of the sugar factory and the loss of pasture land have been causing animal deaths due to lack of pasture, human death by cholera and other water-borne diseases due to contamination of water and ruining of indigenous trees due to water cover. Participants asked questions like what they could do with their animals left from drought and displacement and what the federal government could do to benefit the local communities and enable them lead settled way of life.

As mentioned above, the factory took the lands of pastoralists in addition to the 7000 hectare of land which was owned by the former Tendaho Cotton Plantation. According to Mulugeta and Firehiwot (2014), the factory provided compensation to agro-pastoralists who had plots of land in the new land development and the compensation was distributed on annual basis to continue up to the point where fully developed and ready for farming replacement land is provided and until the agro-pastoralists produce the first harvest. The compensation was computed based on the amount of profit they received on their last harvest and was determined to be 12,000 Birr/ha/year for crops which take long time to grow and 5, 000 Birr/ha/year for those who were producing subsistence crops like maize.

Members of the local community reported that the agro-pastoralists whose land is taken by the factory were organized into 16 sugarcane outgrowing associations in 2014. These associations made an agreement to grow sugarcane and supply it to the factory. According to one of the sugarcanes out growers, leaders of the regional state told them that they will be benefited if they

produce sugarcane and supply it to the factory than the usual way of using land. He further explained that in 2015, the association supplied the factory sugarcane grown on 60 hectares of their land. However, the factory didn't pay them which as a result their families starved.

Sugarcane out grower further strengthened the above idea when he stated that in 2010, the regional state prepared the land and distributed half hectare of land to each agro-pastoralists which they used it for both cultivation of maize and pasture for our animals. In 2014, they were convinced that if they grow sugarcane and supply it to the factory, they will paid12, 000 Birr per hectare of sugarcane and their life will be improved. Accordingly, they grew and supplied their sugarcane to the factory in 2016 but the factory didn't pay them. The factory stopped functioning since last year. They repeatedly asked the factory to pay them for the land it used forthe last four years and in this year (2019), the factory announced that it wants to interrupt its agreement with 6 of the sugarcane outgrower associations whose lands are very far away from the factory and to continue its partnership with the remaining 10 sugarcane outgrower associations even though the factory didn't properly function. Due to this unfair promise, pastoralists lost everything after they gave their farmlands without critically analyzing the situation with the expectation that we will be benefitted (Interview, Januray, 2019, Dubti).

According to an expert in the regional Investment Commission, the hatred of the local community towards the sugar factory increased with the passage of time due to continued environmental degradation which reduced the size and vegetation intensity, stock size and productivity of animals. This trend is challenging the traditional pastoralist way of life. As the problem further intensified, agro-pastoralists lost their sense of ownership towards the project. In this Regard one of the junior level managers of the factory asserted that when the factory stopped its function in May 2019, the pastoralists send their cattle to the sugarcane and damaged it while taking care of not to affect the sugarcane of private out growers. Further building on this assertion, Assaita Woreda official reflected pastoralist's attitude towards the factory as:

> *Pastoralists had positive attitude towards the former cotton plantation than the sugar factory because their cattle can feed the cotton after the first pick. They wait the maturity season of the cotton, not only the local communities but also pastoralists as far as Zone four, came with their animals. Unlike this story, the animals of pastoralists did not benefit from the byproducts of sugarcane. This is because the leaves and buds of the sugarcane are burnt on the field before it is cut and transported to the factory. This implies that pastoralists value anything that*

support their animals upon which their livelihood depends (Interview, 26 January, 2019, Assaita).

One agro-pastoralist whom the researcher interviewed regarding the benefits of the sugar factory to the local community made analogy between Tendaho Sugar Factory and infertile women who could not give birth while her husband is badly in need of a child. He stated: "A *husband could know and speak about the benefit of his wife when she born a child to him.*" He further explained that before the establishment of Tendaho Sugar Factory they were able to produce up to 100 quintal of maize per hectare on theirfarmland. They had also pasture land where their animals can feed. Their threat was the recurrent drought which they are still unable to resist it. But, contrary to their expectation, the factory exposed them for poverty by taking their irrigable land and the rich grazing areas of theiranimals (Interview 12 January, 2019, Assaita).

The land holding rights of pastoralists presented and described above was further corroborated by the quantitative data collected through the administration of questionnaire. Table 30. 8 below shows the respondents' agreement and disagreement regarding the respect of pastoralists' land right.

Table 8.8: Pastoralists Right over their Land

The regional state administered state land by respecting the right of pastoralist not to be displaced from their own lands			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	75	21.4
	Disagree	174	49.7
	Undecided	10	2.9
	Agree	58	16.6
	Strongly Agree	33	9.4
	Total	350	100.0

As we infer from Table 31.8 above, the percentage of respondents who believed that Afar regional state government did not respect the right of pastoralists not to be displaced from their land 249 (71,1%) is greater than others 91(26%) who think that pastoralists landholding right is respected. Only few 10(2.9%) respondents didn't decide.

Pastoralists interviewed explained that their trust in livestock production has been declined from time to time due to several factors. They asserted that the productivity of animal production which has been their means of livelihood declined from time to time. Due to recurrent droughts the number of animals that each pastoralist possesses has been decreased. Moreover, the drought resistant plant, Prosopis covered much of the grazing areas and other species cannot grow ones the pasture land is invaded by Prosopis. They underscored that both the federal and regional state governments had no clear strategies at least to reduce the impact of drought and mechanism of controlling the spread of Prosopis. Agro-pastoralists around the Awash valley have long experience of cultivating cotton. They have positive attitude to cotton production because the remnant after the first pick cloud also used for animal feeding. Moreover, they engaged in sugarcane production because they were told that producing and supplying sugarcane to the factory will bring significant change in their lives than the traditional livestock production. Based on the above discussions, it is possible to conclude the federal sugar project which was trusted to bring about economic development for the country in general and the Afar Regional State in particular has resulted in failure. Instead of improving the lives of the pastoralists, it changed the life conditions of the local communities from bad to worse.

8.3. The Extraction of Salt in Afar Region

8.3.1. The Case of Afdera Salt Production

In chapter two of this dissertation, it was mentioned that salt production in the Afar region has a long history and it was widely used as medium of exchange until the mid of the 20th century. When Ethiopia lost the Afar salt mines following the independence of Eritrea in 1993, salt was imported from Eritrea until the eruption of the 1998-2000 war between the two countries. Ethiopia was temporarily forced to import salt from neighboring countries particularly from Djibouti and to explore domestic sources of salt because of the interruption of salt supply from Eritrea (Dereje, 2011).

Soon the country explored abundant salt in the Afar Regional State, particularly at Lake Afdera which became the main source of salt supply covering 95% of the total salt requirement of the country. Lake Afdera became source of fierce economic competition following the beginning of salt production at Afdera and the involvement of different interest groups in salt production and distribution. The non-Afars who are named by Afars as Habesha (mainly Amharas and

Tigreans), the federal government, Afar Regional State Officials and individual salt land owners around Lake Afdera tried to maximize their economic interest from the salt business (Ibid).

The researcher visited Lake Afdera from 23-26 March 2018 and in February 2019, observed the production activities and conducted interview with land owners, investors, laborers working for the salt producers and different members of the Afar community in order to get firsthand information regarding the contribution of salt production for the economic development of the regional state. According to the information obtained through interview during the field visit, initially Afar salt land owners around the lake, the Woreda administrators and the Regional State officials had expected that investment in this sector would foster the economic development of the region in general and Afdera Woreda in particular.

According to the participants of the interview, the licensed producers in Afdera are divided into three; higher, medium and traditional (small scale) producers. The large scale (non-Afars) producers are licensed at the federal level while the remaining two are licensed at regional levels.Four producers were licensed by the federal government and more than 2,500 by the regional government to operate in the Afdera Lake. However, this number decreased from time to time since many of the small scale salt producers have been forced to leave the business. The higher producers are given three to five square kilometers of land based on the amount of money they invest for the production. The medium level producers are given 20,000sqm to 80,000sqm of land and they invest between 500,000 Br to 600,000 Br while the traditional producers are given less than 15,000sqm of land. However, the salt business was soon dominated by the non-Afars who gradually pushed the small-scale salt producers (mainly Afars) out of the market by lowering the price of salt.

Former member of ARDUF interviewed in Feburary 2019, at Semeraasserted that the marginalization of Afars from the salt business started from the very beginning. He further explained that when the Ethiopian government decided to start salt mining in the country and to quit importing salt from Djbouti, the Federal Ministry of Mining and Energy provided license to large scale salt producers (mainly highlanders) who had the financial capacity to invest. Later the Afar Regional State Bureau of Mining and Energy took over the responsibility of distributing land to producers.

8.3.2. Kadaba Salt Suppliers Shareholders Association

The official document of Kadaba Salt Suppliers Shareholders Association revealed that business objectives of the association include buying iodized salt and distribute it to whole-sellers in the country and exporting abroad; buying non-iodized salt produced in the country and distribute it to whole-sellers in the country and exporting abroad; providing salt iodizing service; producing industrial and chemical products obtained from salt, establishing a factory that produces sacks and packages; engaging in the provision of dry load transportation service and renting machines; working as trade commission agent; and buying shares from other companies and selling shares to other companies (official Report of Kadaba, June,2014, pp. 1-2).

Dereje in his study entitled "*the political economy of salt in Afar Regional State in Northeast Ethiopia* (2011)" revealed that during the time of his research, the total number of salt producers at Afdera Lake was 750. In January 2014, 350 Afdera salt producers organized themselves and established an association called Kadaba Salt Suppliers Shareholders Association with initial capital 32.5 million Birr. This shows that all salt producers are not members of the association. The number of shareholders has been fluctuated because some members left the association while others join it. One salt producer reported that the reduction in the number of shareholders is attributed to the withdrawal of many small-scale producers from the salt business due to their inability to compete in the market. As of June 2019, the Afar Mining Office issued a total of 815 licenses for salt producers out of which only 450 salt producers have shareholders from Kdaba Salt Suppliers Shareholders Association.

The Kadaba Salt Suppliers Association held its 2nd urgent and 4th regular meeting on 26 January 2018 to hear the audit report for the budget year ended in June 2017. According to the report document, the association was established to enable salt producers get fair profit from the salt business. The audit report for the budget year mentioned above revealed that the total sale of the budget year before profit was 115,335,039.81 Birr. The report also made clear that the amount of income uncollected for long time was 21,120,252.62 Birr and 1,975,033.98 Birr was found in the association's account unmovable for more than a year. This might indicate problem of appropriate financial regulation system prevailing in the performance of the association.

The researcher visited the office of the association at Semera from 21-22 March 2018 and on 10 February 2019, and conducted interview with workers of the association. As one office worker reflected, the criteria to join the salt suppliers' association is to get certificate from the Regional State Bureau of Mining and Industry, own salt land and engage in salt production. The production of salt at Afdera started before 15 years. However, relatively modern way of producing salt began in 2015. The association has been serving as a middleman between producers and the buyer, SVS. In order to facilitate the salt business, the association has been buying (receiving) salt from each producer with prices fixed by the Federal Ministry of Trade and sell it to SVS Salt Production PLC. He further explained that the Afar Regional State has been collecting more than 10 million Birr income tax every month from the association (royalty, income tax, withhold tax and vat). Although there are problems in collection of taxes from the salt business, salt production is profitable than the sugar project which failed to sustain itself let alone gaining profit (interview with finance workers of Kadaba Salt Suppliers Shareholders Association, Semera 22 March 2018 and 12 March 2019).

The Federal Ministry of Mining and Energy had the authority to provide license to large scale salt producers (mainly highlanders) who had the financial capacity to invest on more than 200,000 square meter salt land. As per the existing mining regulation No. 005/2010, Art. 12/3/ the Afar regional government has the authority to issue license for salt land between 20,000 and 80,000 square meter salt land. This implies that the land holding of salt producers vary depending upon their financial capacity. According to interviewees the land holding of some large-scale producers is more than 66-fold of that of the small-scale producers (mostly Afars).

Salt producers who joined Kdaba Salt Suppliers Shareholders Association generate income from two sources. They sell their salt to the association at the spot (Afdera) and generate income from the sale. They also get income (dividend) from the annual profit of the association based on the amount of their initial capital in the stock. The competition between these unequal parties (small scale producers and large-scale producers) has been revealed not only in the disparity of their land holding but also in their success in the salt business. The income generated from the salt business is depending up on the salt land owned by producers and the efforts made in processing the salt product (Interview, 13 January, 2019 Semera). However, according to the arguments of

members of both large-scale and small- scale producers interviewed by the researcher, the lion shares of the benefit obtained from the salt business goes to the distributer.

According to an Afar salt land owner who rented his salt land to a producer (highlander), one of the main cause for the economic marginalization of Afars in relation to the salt business is their limited financial capacity and lack of financial institutions from which they can secure loans. Moreover, he expressed that most salt land owners rent their land to investors due to lack of initial investment capital. Another salt land owner further underscored that the profit share between salt land owners and investors depend on their agreement. The agreement ranged from 80/20 to 55/45 percent. But many Afar salt land owners have been renting their salt land to producers on 70/30 percent agreement, where 70% of the share went to investors and the remaining 30% to salt land owners. When the financial capacity of salt land owners grew, they renew their agreements with investors who rent their land to increase their share. In general, the imbalance in the income generated from the salt business depicts the very limited benefit that the Afars obtained from the abundant resource being mined in their region (Interview, Feburary, 2019, Semera).

An Afar investor further strengthened the above position. He asserted that they have been unable to accumulate capital despite of their long-time engagement in the business due to the very small income they have been gaining from the salt business. Many investors underscored that the chance of being successful in the salt business is rare for salt land owners. Careful analysis of the production process would help to understand the difficulties that small-scale producers have been facing. They cannot sell what they produce because the total amount of salt to be sold by the association in a month is limited by the Ministry of Trade which is 472,000 Quintal. There is also another regulatory restriction which allows each producer to sell only 2.5 % of what he/she produced every month. Moreover, producers are forced to sell their product by a limited price, 2.5795 Birr/kg of salt (which means 257.95 Birr/Quintal). An investor will get around 1.50 Birr/kilo gram of salt after paying all kinds of taxes. But there are also production costs that a producer has to pay which includes payment for the daily laborers which is 25-30 Birr to dig and collect salt from meter square of salt land; payment for the operator of a motor, cost of materials needed for the production like plastic to be stretched over the salt land and

plastic pipe, pick axe, shovel, handcart and fuel. Therefore, the profit obtained from the salt business is a matter of survival particularly for the small-scale producers.

8.3.3. Business Partnership between Kadaba Salt Suppliers Shareholders Association and SVS Salt Producer PLC

Ethiopian and Turkish investors established a plant named SVS with 500 million Birr initial capital and it inaugurated its business (iodizing salt) in 2014 in Semera, the capital of Afar Regional State. About 67% and 33% of the construction cost was covered by Non-Afar Ethiopian business men who set up their own PLC and Turkish investors respectively. The plant has the capacity to produce more than 472,000 quintals of iodized salt per month and is created employment opportunity for 501 permanent and 367 contract workers. The PLC has the capacity to produce 630 quintal of iodized salt per hour (Interview the Human Resource head of the PLC, Semera 13 February, 2019).

According to workers of the SVS Salt Processing, Iodization and Packing Project feasibility report, the project implementation showed that the PLC started implementation in 2014 and from January 2017 onwards it started intensively working especially in the area of organization sessions with stakeholders, updating the feasibility study, machinery selection and so on. The study also revealed that the iodized salt producing plant will be commissioned in April 2017 and start normal production after three months. It further assumed that the utilization capacity will be 75% for the first year, 85% for the second year, 90% for the third year, 95% for the fourth year, 98% for the fifth year and thereafter reached its full operation. However, an interviewee stated that the plant has not been accomplishing activities according to its schedule. He mentioned that although it started production, the plant is still under construction due lack of foreign currency since machineries have been imported from abroad, China.

As mentioned above it is Kadaba Salt Producers Shareholders Association (most of salt land owners and producers who form an association) that buy 472,000 quintal of salt from producers every month and sells it to SVS Salt Producer PLC. Salt producers have agreed to sell their salt to Kadaba Salt Producers shareholders because most of them are members of the shareholders association. Interviewees also explained that the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT) has 20% share from Kadaba Salt Producers Shareholders Association.

According to one investor, Kadaba Salt Producers Shareholders Association has been buying two kinds of salt from producers. The first one is industrial salt (52,000 quintals) which are to be used as an input for different industries and factories. The Association buys this kind of salt from producers by a price of 257.95 Birr per quintal and sells it to the SVS Salt Producer PLC by 267.37 Birr per quintal, which implies that the association makes a profit of 9.42 Birr per quintal of salt. The other type of salt that the association buy from producers is what they call it Regular Salt (Table salt) (420,000 quintals) per month which is used for public consumption. The association buys this kind of salt with the price of 257.95 Birr per quintal and sells it to the SVS with the price of 287.95 Birr per quintal. Thus, the association makes 30 Birr profit per quintal of salt. Although the two types of salt are bought and sold by different prices, both are non-iodized salts. The division only shows the quota allocated for industrial inputs and for public consumption.

One of the salt producers explained that currently the lion share in the salt business is taken by SVS Salt Producer PLC. He further elaborated that the SVS Salt Producer PLC buys one quintal of salt by 287.95 Birr from producers, mix it with iodine and sells one quintal of iodized salt by 529.65 Birr and distribute it everywhere in the country. This shows that the PLC makes a profit of 241.70 Birr per quintal. However, according to one accountant working in the Afar Regional State Revenues Bureau, the PLC is still didn't pay 55 million overdue payments for land use and other appropriate taxes despite of the huge profit it has been amassing from the sale of iodized salt. According to an interviewee, lack of commitment on the part of the regional state government to collect taxes and the prevalence of chained corruption practices are the reasons behind this problem. He further mentioned that Regional State Revenues Bureau has never taking any measure beyond writing payment request letter.

8.3.4. The Benefits of the Salt Business to the Local Community, Salt Producers, Kadaba Shareholders Association and SVS PLC

As mentioned above, Kadaba Salt Producers Shareholders Association has an agreement with salt producers to buy 472,000 quintal of salt every month by a price decided by the Federal Ministry of Trade. The association has been serving as a middleman between Afdera salt producers and the SVS. According to the agreement between the two institutions, SVS uses its own vehicles to transport the salt from Afdera to Semera which is about 180 kilometers. The

association simply buys the salt on the field (at Afdera) and sells it to the SVS on the spot. Thus, the association has been supplying the above amount of salt to the SVS without incurring any transportation coston it.

The SVS usually make payment to the association after it received the above amount of salt. Then the association pays both salt land owners and investors according to their share agreement. According to the financial professional working in the Office of the association, producers were paid directly in cash. Starting from May 2019, the association changed the modality of making payment, depositing payments into the account of producers than paying them directly in cash. One of the investors asserted that the new way of making payment has helped them to develop saving culture. This has also its own importance to financial inclusion at the national level since producers do not withdraw all the money they have in their account.

One of the investors reported that Kadaba Salt Producers Shareholders Association has been buying salt from each producer based on the quota system. Therefore, producers cannot sell what they produced every month. Those producers who have large size salt land sell more salt than the small land owners. For instance, if one investor produces 10,000 quintals of salt every month, he will sell 250 quintals because according to the quota each producer has to sell every month 2.5% of what he/she produced. If on the other hand an investor produces 500 quintal of salt every month, he/she has to sell only 12.5 quintal of salt per month. This shows that the quota system is against the small-scale producers while favoring large scale producers because the profit those small-scale producers gained from the sale is low. This is because the small amount of salt they have been selling will not enable them to sustain in the market in the light of the expenses they have been making for the inputs of production.

As mentioned above the land on which traditional (small scale) producers could possess, 15,000sqm area of land is very small when compared with the land owned by large-scale salt producers, up to five km square, more than 66-fold. Although it is difficult to know the amount of salt that each producers, produce every month from the lake water pumped to saltpans for solar evaporation, given the quota system (selling only 2.5% of the amount produced every month), the lion share of the business goes to the non-Afars. That is why, many asserted that the Afar have been pushed out of the business from time to time.The statement one investor also strengthened the above idea when he stated that:

> *There is huge stock of salt (more than 13 million quintals of excess salt) accumulated at Afdera for the last 7-8years. On the other hand, the amount of salt being sold every month is only 472,000 quintals due to the quota system applied to keep the balance between salt production and national salt consumption. This amount of salt to be sold every month was fixed by the Federal Ministry of Trade before ten years and has never been adjusted in accordance with the population increment and the growing national salt consumption. Moreover, the price of salt has never been adjusted considering the increasing foreign exchange rate and the increase in the cost of production. This has been challenging the capacity of producers because they have been importing some of the production in puts from abroad (Interview 22 Feburary, 2019, Afdera).*

Salt land owners and investors, whom the researcher interviewed during the field, work in March 2018 and February 2019, the association and SVS amassed great profit from the salt business at the expense of producers. They underscored that they have been dissatisfied not only by the low profit they have been obtaining from the salt business but also by the delay of payments. The researcher observed while payment was made during his visit at Afdera in March 20178 Salt producers explained that payment was made in March for the salt they sold in December and January. In line with this a small-scale salt producer reported that the delay in payments has made it difficult to get the money when the need arises which as a result, they have been borrowing money from others to solve their problems in between.

Another salt producer further echoed that investment in the salt business did not improve the lives of producers. He underscored that only few large-scale producers are successful in the salt business. As one senior accountant of the associationput it, "*Kadaba Salt Producers Shareholders Association has become profitable at the expense of producers.*" The same idea was reiterated by an investor who asserted that the association has been increasing its profit from time to time at the expense of producers. Further building on this assertion, still another investor reflected: "*Kadaba remained profitable since it has been buying the salt on the field (Afdera) free of transportation cost. According to the agreement between the producer association (Kadaba) and buyer (SVS), the buyer has to transport the salt from Afdera to Semera using its own vehicles*."(Interview, 24 March 2019, Semera)

One of the investors whom the researcher interviewed during the second field visit in March 2019 reported that had it not been the prevalence of corruption practices Kadaba Salt Producers Shareholders Association would have been more profitable. He also asserted that there is no

appropriate financial management system in the association. According to him, members of the shareholders who are in management position have been prospering themselves. He further further elaborated that the leaders of the association have been imprisoned and the documents of the association are taken by the Federal Revenue Custom Authority and Federal Attorney General for investigation since 1 October 2019.

Similarly, according to one Afar regional leader interviewed in Feburary 2019, at Semera,SVS Salt Producer PLC has been amassing huge profit at the expense of salt producers. As mentioned above, the price of un-iodized table salt that this plant buys from Kadaba is 287.95 Birr per quintal and sells it at a price of 529.65 Birr per quintal after iodization which makes the profit 241.7 Birr from a single quintal of salt. He added that the unhealthy market system in the salt business has become the source of prosperity for few individuals while many of the producers struggled just to survive in the business.

Yet different experts challenged the revenue collection experiences of the regional state. In line with this, a young educated Afar working in the regional Investment Commissioncontends that had the regional state collected revenue from private investors, associations and federal projects properly, the economic development of the regional state would have been encouraging. Taking the practices of SVS Salt Producer PLC, he further underscored that the PLC has been gaining huge profit since the time it started the iodization process. Yet, it has not been paying taxes for the Regional Revenues Bureau for the last three years (interview, 17 March, 2018, Semera).

The above assertion is substantiated by the EBC news televised on 21 Janury2020. The news, referring to the Afar Regional State Revenue Bureau revealed that the Afar Regional State has been collecting small amount of income in spite of the huge money transferred in the region. This is because most of the merchants are illegal traders and the less commitment on the part of the leadership in revenue collection. The revenue that the regional state has been collecting from animal resources is almost zero due to the illegal nature of trade being undertaken in the region. Therefore, inability of the regional state to collect taxes and problem of proper utilization of revenues could be one of the factors for the problem of underdevelopment in Afar Regional State.

One of the contributions of investment projects is the provision of different services for the local communities where investment is carried out. In this regard, the researcher asked different people working in the association what Kadaba Salt Producers Shareholders Association did to the local communities. One of the workers explained that the association had promised to support the development efforts of Afdera Woreda by paying 1 Birr per quintal every month in addition to the royalty payment. However, the association didn't keep its promise instead it has constructed high school at Afdera Town, paying tuition fee for teachers who have been teaching natural science subjects in tutorial classes and covering some of the expenses of first-and secondary-degree students. He further expressed that the association sells fuel from its deposit to the local community with fair price and it also give transport service to the local community in times of emergency and other urgent problems. However, according another worker of the association, the above services were provided for sometimes not on constant bases (Interview, 30 March, 2018, Afdera).

According to one investor interviewed in March 2018, the association has been paying seven million Birr royalty tax to Afdera Woreda. Moreover, he stated that there is a youth association engaged in sewing sacks after being filled by salt. The young have been obtaining one million Birr per round sell (every month). However, the money paid to this association is insignificant because it has been shared among large number of young who joined the association. Moreover, some educated Afars challenged the contribution of salt production to the development of Afdera Woreda. In this regard, one young resident of Afdera town contended that Afdera Woreda is the source of our "*White Gold*", which he refers to the salt produced at Afdera Lake. He further underscored that the lion share of the national salt supply has been extracted from Afdera Lake but its contribution for the improvement of the lives of the peoples of Afdera Woreda, has been insignificant. The involvement of EFFORT and regional state leaders for their own personal interest may have its contribution for the domination of the business by few individuals. One resident of Afdera town further strengthened the above idea when he stated:

> *Several stakeholders have involved in the salt business in Afdera Woreda. The biggest national salt supply has been extracted from Afdera Lake for more than twenty years. Investors who came to the Woreda and engaged in salt business have prospered themselves. Similarly, regional state leaders who owned large size salt land have amassed great wealth. On the other hand, the local communities remained poor because either they remained small scale producers*

> *or hire their land on 70/30 basis or pushed out of the business. Afdera town has no electricity and drinking water supply as well as hotel services while individuals prosper at its expense (Interview, 25 January, 2019, Afdera).*

Although the focus of this study is Afdera Salt production, the experience in other salt producing areas of the Afar region is also similar with the exception of salt extraction at Dobi since 2004. The experience here is different. According to, Gemechu (2019) the salt business at Dobi has been dominated by one Afar investor, 'a Big Man is at the same time a state official, business man and a clan leader'. The social network he stretched with diverse groups including the state has enabled the 'Big Man' to emerge as a new form of power capable of determining access to and ownership of resources related to the salt business at Dobi using the heterogeneous social network woven around him.

According to an educated Afar young, Asahle Salt production was given to a private investor, a retired colonel. He further elaborated that one of the retired TPLF colonel, Zewditu, was prospering herself from the salt business while the youth in Berhale Woreda remained unemployed. The young were repeatedly appealing regarding the unfair salt business in the Woreda but the leadership gave deaf ear to their questions. It was following the 2018, reform and the Afar Youth Movement in the Woreda called Dikohina (End of oppression) occurred in 2019 that the salt land was taken away from the single private investor who accumulated huge wealth from the business. The leadership had promised to redistribute the salt land to unemployed youth. Now the regional state government has started to distribute the salt land to few organized youth although large part of it remained not yet divided (Interview, 13 March, 2020, Semera).

Although the leadership in the region has been less committed in revenue collection, the salt business is one of the sectors contributing for the region's annual income. The following table depicts the amount of excise tax and vat that the regional state collected for five consecutive years.

Table 92.8: Income Collected from Salt Business for Five consecutive Years

Source of Salt and Taxes	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Dobi Salt (Excise Tax)	12,846,190.00	8,899,200.00	17,465,032.36	42,876,183.61	25,055,703.28
Afdera Salt (Excise Tax)	27,449,531.00	36,865,053.37	62,663,921.24	112,094,388.86	93,309,238.81
Asale Salt (Excise Tax)	315,538.00	810,483.40	4,047,065.90	6,688,294.63	2,388,632.00
Total Vat	84,544,008.19	68,879,236.07	72,501,550.32	95,587,554.14	111,162,448.18
Total	**125,155,267.19**	**115,453,972.84**	**156,677,569.82**	**257,246,421.24**	**107,169,917. 27**

Participants of the interview and focus group discussants argued that misappropriation of the revenue obtained from the business has remained to be a serious problem. They asserted that because of the prevalence of corruption in the business, the income generated from the salt business has not been used for the intended purpose, supporting the national economy in general and improving the socio-economic development of Afar region in particular. As it can be seen from the table above, the total amount of income generated from tax income of the year 2019 is less than the previous years. This is an indication of the prevalence of corruption in the business which adversely affecting government's income. The EBC Police Program news televised on 5 July 2019 could further strengthen this idea. According to the program, salt producers have become highly corrupted in general which as a result the government was unable to collect more than 800 million Birr tax income from Afdera salt producers and 20 million Birr from SVS Salt Producer PLC.

The overall benefit of investment being undertaken in Afar Regional State to Afar people presented and described above was further corroborated by the quantitative data. Table 33.8 below portrays the respondents' agreement and disagreement regarding the benefit of investment to Afars.

Table 33.8: Overall Benefit of Afars from Investment being undertaken in their region

The Afar people are beneficiary from the investments being under taken in their region			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Agree	73	20.9
	Disagree	277	79.1
	Total	350	100.0

As we see from Table 33.8 above, the majority of respondents, 277 (79.1%) believed that the Afar people have not been benefitted from the investment activities being undertaken in their region. The minority 73 (20.9%) of the respondents have appreciated the benefit of investment to Afars. Through cross tabulation respondents who contend that the Afar people have not been benefitted from the investment being undertaken in their region were asked to explain their justification as shown in the following table.

Table 104.8: Justification why Afars have not been benefited from Investment Sector

If your answer to the above question (Table.33.8) is disagreement, what is your justification for the low participation of Afar in the investment being undertaken in the region?				
		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Disagree	Since most of the people engaged in investment are non -Afars, the profit gained from the sector has not been used for the development of the region	248	23.9%	89.5%
	The deterioration of the animal resource of pastoralists from time to time	267	25.8%	96.4%
	The living condition of the Afars has not been significantly changed	260	25.1%	93.9%
	The regional state government has not been properly collect revenues from investors and use it for the purpose of improving the lives of Afars	261	25.2%	94.2%
Total		1036	100.0%	374%

As we infer from Table 34.8 above, the justifications that respondents expressed why they contend that the Afar people have not been benefitted from the investments being undertaken in Afar Regional State were listed. Accordingly, 248 (89.5%) of the respondents, contend that non-Afars have been dominantly involved in the investment sector and hence the profit gained from

the sector has not been used for the development of the regional state. 267 (96.4%) of the respondents mentioned that the deterioration of animal resources from time to time and the accompanied impoverishment of pastoralists could justify their judgment. According to 260(93.9%) of the respondents' absence of significant change in the living condition of the Afars is an indication of the less benefit that Afars has been gaining from the investment sector. For 261(94.2%) of the respondents, inability of the regional state government to properly collect revenue from investors and use it for the development of the regional state is on factor which reduced the benefit from the investment sector. Therefore, the qualitative and qualitative data attested that the contribution of investment activities in sugar production and extraction of mineral salt being undertaken in Afar regional state for the improvement of the livelihood of the Afar in particular and the region's socio-economic development is low.

Federations could bring significant socio-economic transformation by ensuring equitable development among the constituents units forming the federation. As discussed in chapter one and chapter two, the ultimate goal of the Ethiopian government is building one political and economic community. This ream requires avoiding the existing disparity among the different regional states. As discussed in chapter seven, the provision of special support to the regions designated as Developing Regional States. Moreover, the federal government establishes development projects in regional states to enhance the national economy while at the same time assisting the development of regional states. Neverthless, as discussed in this chapter, the establishment of Tendaho Sugar factory in Afar regional state has adversely affected the living conditions instead of improving. Moreover, Afar regional state has not get appropriate benefit from the extraction of mineral salt in the region. Thus, the role of federal projects in the region in enhancing the socio-economic development of the regional state is insignificant.

8.4. Conclusion

The establishment of Tendaho Sugar Factory and Afdera Salt Production in Afar regional state examined in this chapter seems to be contradictory tothe Investment objectives of the country which is designed to improve the living standards of the peoples of Ethiopia through the realization of sustainable economic and social development.Although the sugar project remained to be far from success, the federal government was prioritizing its contribution to the national economy than the interests of the local community. Government's less concern to conducting social and environmental impact prior the establishment of the sugar factory on the farm and pastureland of the local community may signify the less concern given to the local community.As a result, the establishment of Tendaho Sugar Factory has changed the life conditions of pastoral and agro-pastoralist communities from bad to worse by evicted from their farm and grazing lands to give land for the factory.More specifically, agro-pastoralists who agreed to grow sugarcane over their remaining farms and to supply the sugarcane to the factory have been forced to lead the poorest way of life. Therefore, the factory has worsened the life of pastoralists instead of improving. Eventually, the factory totally ceases to function in May 2019. The factory has been unable to pay land use tax to the regional state. This all shows that the factory has been adversely affecting the livelihood of the local communities in particular and the development of the regional state in general, which is contrary to the purposes of its establishment.

Afar Regional State has not been benefitted from the extraction of mineral salt although the largest salt has been extracted from Afdera Lake. The contribution of the salt business to the improvement of the lives of the Afar people is low because the business has been dominated by non-Afar investors (large scale salt producers) and the regional state officials. Salt land possession depends on the investment capital that one has and hence the above category of people can own large salt land and most of the Afar have been pushed out of the salt business. The non-Afar who have who engaged in the business have been using the profit they gained from the salt business to invest in other areas. The lion share of the salt business is dominated by non-Afars and the regional state couldn't collect income tax from the salt business due to the prevalence corruption practices, which as a result Afar Regional State remained to be the least developed regional state in Ethiopia.

Chapter Nine

Seeing like the State: Villagization back-in

9. Introduction

This chapter deals with the Villagization program which has been implemented in Afar Regional State with the aim of improving the living condition of the local community in particular and to bring sustainable development in the region in general. In this regard, the 2010 Growth and Transformation Plan outlined the Ethiopian government's development strategy made clear that Ethiopia seeks to reach middle-income status by 2025 through extensive infrastructure construction and large-scale agricultural production. One of the key elements of this development strategy is the relocation of large number of people under the government's "Villagization" program (Fana Gebresenbet, 2014).

The program aims at, helping the relocated people to lead a sedentary way of life in addition to supplying basic rural infrastructures and socio-economic services (HRW, 2011). As part of the accomplishment of this program villagization has been carried out in the Afar Regional State with the aim of changing the pastoralist way of life of the Afar people from mobile into sedentary to improve their living conditions through the provision of different services. Accordingly, this chapter is organized into five sections including the introductory section. The second section provides a brief overview of villagization programme in Ethiopia during the military regime and under the government of EPRDF.

Section three describes the rational for the implementation of villagization programme in pastoral areas in Ethiopia. Section four investigates villagization programme in Afar Regional State focusing on the implementation and challenges in the implementation of the programme such as peoples' perception towards the villagization programme, lack of leadership commitment, lack of appropriate institutional structures and lack of inputs, services and infrastructures for which development in the regional state has not lived up to expectations. and the last section draws the conclusion.

9.1. A Brief Overview of Resettlement/ Villagization Programme in Ethiopia

9.1.1. Resettlement Programme during the Derg Regime

The term villagization frequently confused with 'resettlement' since the two policies often occur at the same time and may overlap. According to Alula (1992), villagization refers to the concentration of people in villages, which usually does not involve moving significant distances while resettlement involves large portion of the population and involves movement of long distances. Villagization is also defined as the process of gathering scattered form of settlements into a predetermined center or site either voluntarily or forcibly (Messay and Bekure, 2011). Villagization involves the relocation of scattered dwellings and settling in mostly similar geographic and administrative units without moving significant distances (Zinabu, 2014). Guyu (2012) contend that villagization involves establishing nucleated villages to deliver social, economic and administrative services intended to be implemented on a voluntary basis in order to meet the interests of the relocated people.

Resettling of people to new locations has become a dominant development practice in many parts of the world in response to natural and manmade factors or for political, economic, and social reasons (Zinabu, 2014). Nations that used to adopt villagization as the dominant development models and approaches with the belief that rural development cannot be materialized without villagization scheme (Mhando, 2011). Policy makers of many developing countries mainly African governments prioritized villagization in order to achieve development in their rural areas (Guyu, 2012).

In Ethiopia, the first organized and centrally sponsored initiative to implement resettlement programme dates back to the 1960s (Alula, 1992). The Imperial Regime settled small number of northern peasants in western and the rift valley areas through its spontaneous and planned resettlement programmes (Dessalegn, 2003). Following the establishment of the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration in 1966, resettlement became an issue of state concern and hence in the third five-year development plan, published in 1968, settlement schemes were considered as vital to relieve population pressure in the northern highlands, and to raise production by exploiting underdeveloped lands in the south (Alula, 1992). The settlement programmes implemented during the Imperial Regime were small-scale in size and ad hoc in nature (Kassahun 2003). However, according to Wood (1985), before the coming into power of

the military regime self- initiated resettlement undertaken by individuals and small groups occurred more frequently than those sponsored by governments and other actors.

Alula also stated that a combination of 'push factors' in the north and 'pull factors' in the south set conditions for the spontaneous migration and settlement of people in the south. The push factors include land degradation and population pressure, a system of land tenure which led to fragmentation of holdings, evictions resulting from the establishment of large mechanized estates and periodic and increasing incidence of famine. While the pull factors included availability of land and opportunities of wage-labor and trade (Ibid).

Although it is difficult to find adequate information regarding the exact number of people settled during the resettlement programmes of the imperial government, Clark (1986) mentioned that some 20,000 families were settled mainly from the drought afflicted and over populated north to the south before the military seizure of power. Nevertheless, the resettlement programmes carried out during the imperial period were not successful due to inadequate planning of programmes, inappropriate settler selection, inadequate budgetary support, and inexperienced staff (Dessalegn, 2003).

Ethiopia has a long and troubled history of famines. According to O Grada (2007) the 1984 famine was the worst one that Ethiopia has ever experienced, and it ranks amongst the worst famines in recent world history. The 1984 famine was not something happened all of a sudden rather it was a slow process that began in the late 1970's with the failure of yearly rains (Gizachew, 2014). An African Watch Report (1991) mentioned that the 1984 famine in Ethiopia was the worst and unprecedented in terms of its magnitude and area coverage and the death toll it caused one million people. The1984 was by all accounts a year of severe drought- almost in all regions the rains failed in the Belg (minor crop) season although the main regions affected were Tigray, Eritrea and Wollo in the North of the country(Ibid).

Following the 1984 devastating famine, the military government embarked on villagization programme, to change the highlands' historic patterns of settlement from scattered hamlets located near water and fields to concentrated dwellings clustered along the main communication lines (Marcus, 1994). The plan was to relocate 1.5 million people from the most severely affected northern parts of the country to areas in west and southwest that had adequate resources

and rainfall (Getachew, 1989; Keller, 1988). In three phases from November 1984 to March 1988, more than 600,000 people were moved. The official rationale for villagization was to promote rational land use; conserve resources; strengthen security; and provide access to clean water, health and education infrastructure. Moreover, the government presented its villagization program to the west and to the people of Ethiopia as a famine relief measure, and tried to justify that the north of the country was stricken by drought and environmental collapse, and the only alternative was to move most of the people elsewhere (HRW, 2012). During this period settlers or their representatives had no the opportunity to visit resettlement sites rather high-level government officials on helicopter tours did it without undertaking proper survey on the development potential, soil, climatic, disease, surface and/or ground water, etc. conditions (Dessalegn 1988; Gebre, 2003).

The proponents of the villagization programme argue that the programme will reduce vulnerability to famine in the highlands by reducing population pressure and improving the environment (Tegegne, 2014). Despite of the government's claim that the villagization programme was done for economic and humanitarian purposes, it has been perceived from different dimensions. Some believed that the programme was instituted through the rural land-reform policy, as part of the government's Ten year development Plan (Keller 1988). Others argue that the programme was implemented to further government's control over the periphery and to use the villages as source of forced labor for government projects like road construction, agricultural production, or other infrastructure development (HRW, 2012). Similarly, others assert that the rural people were organized in villages alongside roads for a more easily exploitable and controlled population (Marcus, 1994). From political perspectives others contend that the main motive was to empty rebel areas of potential recruits by forcibly removing the population in the guise of resettlement. In other words, the program has been criticized as the government's counter insurgency strategy to depopulate the population where the rebels, Tigray People's Liberation Front and Eritrean People's Liberation Front, were active (Gizachew, 2014; Kumar, 1987).

The massive resettlement undertaken by the military government was condemned by many authors due to its involuntary nature and its devastative effects on the settlers. Although the programme was subjected to the above critics, the government considered the resettlement programme as a means of serving the long-term needs of the drought affected peoples of the north. More specifically, Sub-article 2 and 3 of Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution states:

> *The state shall ensure that human settlement patterns correspond to the distribution of natural resources in order to create favorable conditions for development (2)… The state shall encourage the scattered rural population to form consolidated communities in order to free rural life from backwardness and to enable the people to attain a better social life (3).*

At the core of any resettlement programme is the need to undertake a more rigorous analysis of environmental, economic and social factors as well as alternative and promising land use potentials (Shumete, 2013). The resettlement programme undertaken by the military government lacked this important element which as a result failed to achieve its intended purposes. According to Marcus (1994) in 1987 the regime admitted that wiser planning and better use of resources might have improved the program. The rep[ort of HRW (2012)revealled that the resettlement involved massive human rights abuses, poor preparation, lack of resources, and almost certainly led to further impoverishment of Ethiopia's peasants. He further explained that camps were usually ill-prepared for the peasants and many died of malaria and sleeping sickness because of poor sanitation, lack of housing, food, and water, and inadequate health care, as well as the absence of the necessary seeds and tools to support themselves. Similarly, Gizachew (2014) contend that the programme lacked standards of human rights and it played its own part in worsening the famine situation. In the same fashion, another author (Shiferaw, 1986) mentioned that the resettlement programmes have claimed the life and desertion of thousands and was a dark spot in the settlement history of the country killing people at a faster rate than the famine. The same idea was reiterated by another author who underscored that the resettlement programme played its own part in worsening the famine situation (Gizachew, 2014). Many authors such as (Kumar 1987; Getachew 1989; Teketel 1998) asserted that the resettlement programme resulted in widespread suffering due to lack of preparedness and hasty implementation. According to Dessalegn (2003) about 33 000 settlers lost their lives due to disease, hunger and exhaustion in connection with the emergency resettlement process.

Likewise, during the military regime, settlement programmes were considered as a way of transforming Afar pastoralists to agriculturalist and settlement farms were established in both middle and lower Awash Valley. The major settlement areas were Amibara, Gawane, Mille, Logiya, Dubti, and Assaita. However, the government faced challenges in settling pastoralist people due to lack of clear policy on how to settle pastoralists and limited participation of settlers in farm work (Biniyam, 2016).

From the above discussions one can learn that the resettlement programmes implemented during the military regime failed to achieve its intended purpose. The Ethiopian experience in relation to the resettlement programme might not be exceptional in this regard. Literatures made clear that even most planned resettlement schemes in the world, have been reported to be unsuccessful and environmentally devastative (Shami, 1993) and hence, most resettlement schemes have failed to meet targets throughout the world. Similarly, according to Gebre (2004) in Ethiopia most of the resettlement programmes ended in accelerated environmental degradation, site desertion, further impoverishment and increased fatalities. According to Kassa (2004), the military government announced the suspension of the programme in March 1990 following the mounting criticisms and international pressure to halt the emergency resettlement programme.

9.1.2. Villagization Program under the EPRDF Government

As discussed above the military regime's state-sponsored resettlement programme failed to achieve its intended purpose due to poor preparation and execution which ultimately lead to the suffering of settlers. However, the EPRDF government, (hereafter Government of Ethiopia) did not abandon the villagization programme rather it is considered as a major instrument for ensuring food security. This was because resource degradation and decline of production capacity in many densely populated areas of the country threatened the food security of many people (Kassa, 2004).

Although available literatures show conceptual differences between resettlement and villagization, the state-sponsored relocation of people has been explicitly stated as "voluntary Resettlement Program" by various national documents of the EPRDF government like the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program(SDPRP) (MoFED, 2002), Rural Development Policy and Strategies(MoFED, 2003), Plan for Accelerated and Sustained

Development to End Poverty(PASDEP) 2005/06(MoFED,2007),and Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II) (2015/16-2019/20) (NPC, 2016). Therefore, it seems appropriate to use the terms villagization and voluntary resettlement alternatively for the resettlement programme being undertaken by the Government of Ethiopia since national documents attest that villagization should be conducted within regions rather than across regions.

In early 2000s, population relocation schemes were resuscitated and reintegrated into Ethiopia's food security and rural development strategies (Fana, 2014). However, unlike the experiences of the military government, the institutionalization of ethnic federalism and restructuring of the country's administrative regions along ethnic lines by the Government of Ethiopia severely limited inter-regional resettlement or resettlement from the drought-prone areas of one regional state to sparsely populate and with high potential agricultural land in another regional state (Kassa, 2004). Therefore, government policies envisaged intra-regional villagization programme as an important instrument of ensuring food security which at the same time would help to avoid friction and mistrust among various ethnic groups since people are made to settle within their own regions where they will live together with people with the same ethnic, language and cultural backgrounds (Kassa, 2004; MOIPAD, 2001).

According to MoFED (2002), guaranteeing the availability of land for people who are able and willing to make a living out of farming is fundamental and is a step in the right direction for proper use of land resources. Moreover, the Government of Ethiopia considers villagizaion programmeas as a key strategy that would help realize the objectives of food security in the medium and long-term and hence one of its priorities is to settle people from drought prone areas to areas where sufficient land and rainfall are available (Ibid). Thus, the Government of Ethiopia planned to relocate 2.2 million people from drought prone areas to areas of fertile soil during the period 2003–2005 (USAID, 2007).

The official statements of the Government of Ethiopia underscored that villagization programmes will have positive contribution to rural development if relocation of people is conducted based on a well-conceived plan and with government assistance (MoFED, 2003). It also underlined that ensuring the voluntariness of the people and identification of unoccupied land on which to settle these people should precede the resettlement operation. In line with the development policy of the country, Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI),

villagization programme is one way of using the abundant land. In this regard, the National Food Security Strategy document revealed that resettlement program which could change under-utilized land into economic use will have a positive effect on food security, improvement of the welfare of the relocated communities as well as to the economic growth of the country (MoFED, 2002). It seems in the light of this trust that the Government of Ethiopia launched the intra-regional resettlement programme in Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional States in 2003 to relocate people from drought prone and chronically food insecure areas to potentially more productive, fertile and less populated areas with the aim of enabling 2.2 million food insecure people attain food security within three years, between 2003 and 2005 (Kassa, 2004; NCFSE 2003, Shumete, 2013).

Widespread food insecurity in Ethiopia throughout 2003 even in the traditionally known productive areas of South and South west was caused by the 2002, failed belg, or secondary rains from March to May, combined with delayed and sporadic meher, or main rains from July through September, that led to severe drought conditions which as a result Ethiopian government launched a large-scale villagization programme beginning in 2003 (Shumete, 2013). According to (NCFSE, 2003; Gebre, 2005), villagization schemes were suggested to be based on four pillars and 13 principles. The four major pillars are voluntarism, availability of under-utilized land, consultation with host communities, and provision of minimum infrastructure. On the other hand, partnership, community participation, transparency of program design, and development are some of the 13 principles.

The report of the Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) For the Implementation of Reduced Emission from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) Program in Ethiopia (MEFCC, 2017) mentioned that resettlement programme could meet its intended purpose, ensuring food security, if the Resettlement Action Plan(RAP) fulfill required elements like identification of project impacts and affected populations; legal framework for land acquisition and compensation; compensation framework; description of resettlement assistance and restoration of livelihood activities; detailed budget and implementation schedule; description of organizational responsibilities; framework for public consultation, participation, and development planning; description of provisions for complaints and appeals; and framework for monitoring, evaluation, and reporting.

The Country's Rural Development Policy and Strategy document revealed that willingness of settlers and identification of unoccupied land are important in order to implement the villagization programme (MoFED, 2003). It also made clear that the land selection procedure should be carried out in a manner that will not repeat the political crime perpetrated by the Derg. According to the Resettlement Policy Framework document (2017), the procedures in the implementation of the resettlement programme include consultation (a continuation of the process entered into during the site selection, screening and Resettlement Action Plan development process); notification to affected parties; documentation of assets; agreement on compensation; preparation of contracts; and compensation payments and provision of assistance in resettlement.

Various institutions involve in the processes of implementing villagization programme. Federal, regional as well as local level institutions engage in these processes. These institutions play various roles in the fulfillment of the objectives of villagizations without causing serious social, economic, cultural and environmental impacts (MEFCC, 2017). The overall co-ordination of the programme was given to the Department of Food Security at the Federal Ministry of Rural Development. In terms of funding the programme 75% of the cost was to be allocated from the federal budget for food security. Regional funds cover 20% of the fund while the respective host Woreda has to contribute the remaining 5% of the fund (Feleke, 2003).

The plan of the intra-regional villagization programme undertaken by the Government of Ethiopia was to be relatively fairly planned in advance, executed with the involvement of regional governments. The main strategy in connection with villagizaton is thus to build, in advance of actual settlement, infrastructural facilities (clean water, health post, feeder road), and provide basic services based on overall regional development programs in areas where settlement programs are to be conducted (MoFED, 2003). Moreover, settlers were provided food rations and working capital in their resettlement sites until the first harvest, settlers have the right to maintain their land in the areas of their origin for three years and even they have the right to go back to their areas of origin if they wish (Kassa, 2004).

Villagization is considered as one of the key and quickest ways to achieve food security in a short- and medium-terms (Megerssa, 2012). The Government of Ethiopia initially began a pilot resettlement scheme in 2003 that has resulted in intra-regional resettlement of about 45,000

households (180,000 people) in three regions: Amhara, Oromiya, and Tigray (MoFED, 2003). Six months after the pilot phase, the government planned to implement a more intensive and prolonged intra-regional resettlement scheme targeting to resettle about 440,000 households (2.2 million people) within three years (2003-2005) and between 2003 and 2004 over 149,000 households were resettled(MoFED, 2006; IDMC, 2007). However, in 2006/07 there was underperformance in the implementation of the villagization programme despite of regional variations which as a result out of the planned 57,250 households only 28,794 (50.3%) households were resettled in Amhara, Oromia and SNNP regions. In Amhara region, the plan was to settle 15,000 household heads out of which 7,203 (48%) household heads were settled. In Oromia region, 34,650 household heads were planned to be resettled and out of this 14,931(43%) household heads were resettled. The achievement against the target in SNNP region was better in which out of the planned 7,600 household heads, 6,660(88%) household heads were resettled (MoFED, 2007). It was reported that only 198,896 household heads (1,317,054 people) were resettled in the four major crop producing regions, (Amhara, Oromiya, Southern Nations and Nationalities Peoples Regional State /SNNPRS/ and Tigray) as of June 2009 (Messay and Bekure, 2011).

Despite of the different arrangements at all levels; the Government of Ethiopia was not able to materialize its ambitious plan of settling that huge number of people in 2009 let alone at the end of 2005. The performance of the implementation of the villagization programme was found to be low due to the delay in the preparatory works on the newly identified resettlement sites (MoFED, 2003; Kassa, 2004).

According to Megerssa (2012), who conducted research in Metema Woreda in Amhara National Regional stated that the villagization programme was contradictory with those pillars and principles of the implementation process which as a result the programme was not environmentally friendly and millions of people have been facing acute food insecurity year after year. Post resettlement assessment undertaken in Biftu Jalala resettlement site in Oromia Regional State also revealed that the villagization programme has caused huge environmental degradation even though it made the livelihood situation of settlers better than the former one (Shumete, 2013). Similarly, according to Terefe and Melese (2014) who conducted a research on the livelihood of settlers in Essera Woreda in SNNPRS underscored that the human and natural

capitals of livelihood assets are not at pleasing status due to less infrastructure and social service facilities like schools, health services, safe drinking water, veterinary services, and land holdings. Fesseha Haile's research on Idris resettlement site in Kafta Humera Woreda in Tigray Regional State also indicated that the villagization which was conducted to achieve food security and environmental rehabilitation has resulted in diminishing the carrying capacity of the environment due to unsustainable land management in the area (Fesseha, 2007). Therefore, based on the various researches conducted in major crop producing regions (Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPRS and Tigray) it is possible to conclude that most of the villagization programmes implemented by the Government of Ethiopia did not achieved their intended purposes, ensuring food security and creating favorable conditions for sustainable development.

9.2. The Political Economy of Villagization Programme in Pastoral Areas: the Rational

Pastoralism is a method of agricultural exploitation based upon extensive herding where movements of herds and men are the major components of the system. In Ethiopia, the human population of pastoral areas is estimated to be between 12-15% of the country (MoFED, 2002). Food insecurity and poverty are as pervasive and deep in pastoral communities across the country because the rainfall in the areas where they have been living is too scanty and too intermittent to support rain-fed crop production (MoFED, 2003). Pastoralist societies in East Africa have been facing different problems such as population growth, loss of their grazing land for government sponsored projects, drought and famine, commoditization of livestock products, sedentarization, migration, and conflict over resources (Fratkin, 2001, p.1). Considering these multidimensional problems that pastoralists faced, he further asserted that "*pastoralistsface more demands on their way of life than any previous time*".

According to the Ethiopian Resettlement Policy Framework document, development issues faced by pastoralists include weak governance structures with limited public participation in local decision making processes; poor access to social services, especially to quality education and health care; dependence on extensive livestock production with poorly developed support infrastructure and services; environmental degradation, particularly of rangelands; vulnerability to recurring droughts exacerbated by climate change; increasing competition for use of land for intermittent grazing and lack of access to water supply schemes; and conflicts over natural resources(HRW, 2012).

The move towards sedentarization of pastoralists, which is highly propagated by the Pastoral Policy of Ethiopia, is an area of debate among researchers. Different researches conducted on pastoralism suggested that mobile pastoralism has high adaptive capacity to arid and semi-arid areas characterized by harsh climatic conditions. They argue that mobile life is guaranteed for flexible use of temporally and spatially variable resources (Getachew, 2001a; Lemessa, 2015; Piguet, 2007; Endalew, 2015). In this regard, Fekadu (2014) contends that the challenges of pastoral transformation to sedentary farming are multifaceted and hence the preferred pathway is the need to design an intervention that supports livestock production in a way pastoral herders can adapt to the environmental changes affecting livestock production rather than shifting their production systems. However, according to (MoFED, 2002; Temesgen etal., 2014) these days the varying circumstances driven by climate change and its impact on the environment and humans of dry-land regions, where pastorals and agro-pastorals dominantly live has been challenging the viability of mobile way of life due to the deterioration of natural resources in many areas giving no alternative water sources and grazing land to pastoralists.

The various policies, strategies and programmes of the Government of Ethiopia such as the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) and Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) advocate for the sedentarization of pastoralists over the long term (PFE, 2009; Little et al., 2010). For instance, the Ethiopia's 2006, PASDEP made clear that special effort will be made to provide pastoral areas with basic services and to facilitate the slow transition towards settlement on voluntary basis (MoFED, 2006). The Ethiopian government's policy approaches pastoralism as a transitory livelihood strategy rather than a permanent way of life that pastoralists have to stay with (Firehiwot and Yonas, 2015).

Settlement programmes have become part and parcel of the national economic and social development programme. The various policy, strategy and intervention documents of the Government of Ethiopia underscored that development approaches/interventions in pastoral areas should give priority to the resettlement of pastoralists to ensure food security and sustainable development. The Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program paper (MoFED, 2002), stated that the objectives set out to improve food security and enhancing income earning capabilities of pastoral community are improving livestock productivity through

irrigated pasture, environmental rehabilitation and improved animal health services; and exploring market outlets and integrate livestock production into the national economy.

The strategies adopted for pastoral development are sedentarisation of mobile pastoralists on voluntary basis; consolidate and stabilize those who are already settled or semi-settled through improved water supply, pasture, and social services; carefully select viable and reliable river courses for future sedentarisation based on irrigation and link these places through roads and other communication lines; and provide mobile social services including health and education holistically for those that continue to be mobile. Moreover, the government's technical interventions in pastoral development include improving water supply and irrigation development; water harvesting technique such as construction of ponds, birkas; constructing water points adjacent to range resources for dry season utilization; utilizing road-side runoff water for crop and forage production; diverting rivers and streams flooding during rainy season and supporting local and traditional irrigation practices; and supply appropriate crop varieties and pest control techniques(Ibid).

As indicated in Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program paper major socio-economic constraints identified in pastoral development are ecological constraints, poor facilities, weak institutional support and lack of clarity of vision and strategy for pastoral development. Therefore, the means for sustainable development of these areas now is a holistic and integrated development approach. The necessity of grass-root participation in the design and implementation phase of development programs is also emphasized. It is recognized that sustainable development and radical transformation of the livelihood of the pastoral community could be achieved through a step-by-step and voluntary sedentarization of the pastoralists (MoFED, 2003).

The above policy directions, strategies and interventions attest that the Ethiopian government considers settlement as a final strategy to transform the life of pastoralists and thus encourages them to settle on voluntary basis (Yohannes and Mahmmud, 2015). The governments' advocacy for crop production as a best strategy in all climatic Zones, including in the pastoralist areas, seems a deviation from its policy context and the constitutional right of pastoralists not to be displaced from their land. The argument of Hagman and Mulugeta (2010), substantiate the above idea. They asserted that the movement of pastoralists to different localities depending up on

seasonal variations and resource availability is contradictory with the government's plan of establishing permanent territorial settlement for the pastoralist communities. .

Villagization programme among pastoralists is not simply physical process of relocating people rather it is more complicated process which entails change in the modes of villagizers. Its rationale may be social, political, environmental, agricultural, militaristic, administrative, or a mix of several of these. Moreover, the motivations for and methods of villagization vary across countries (Lorgen, 1999). Similarly Helland (2015) asserted that the attempt to sedentarize pastoral families is not as simple as settlement of highland crop cultivators from over-exhausted areas to relatively fertile lands which involves only locational change. He further argue that sedentarization of pastoralist societies involves not only a change in geographical location but, most importantly, a cultural revolution in their ways of life. In the light of the discussions above, it seems possible to argue that settling pastoralists along river valleys is beyond making them crop cultivators since it requires change of culture and ways of life. For instance, if we take their feeding style alone, it might involve a shift from an exclusively culturally distinctive diet, like meat and milk to maize and sorghum (Helland, 1984). In general, the objective of pastoral development is to settle the pastoral population. However, the cultural transformation and the required persuasion work would take several years, perhaps decades (MoFED, 2002).

Pastoralism in Ethiopia has been subjected to both natural and manmade challenges for long. Pastoralists were victims of political marginalization expressed in terms of their absence from policy making and pastoralist spaces are the most deprived areas in terms of access to social services and infrastructures (Firehiwot and Yonas, 2015). The Government of Ethiopia believed that providing the necessary infrastructures for sustained development and radical transformation of the livelihood of pastoralists is a real challenge and long-term agenda. It also believed that development agenda among pastoralists could be wellaccomplished only if the people can be settled (MoFED, 2002). Settlement programs within these areas should be directly linked with the development of irrigation projects. Hence, the selection of areas for sedentarisation in these regions hinges on the availability of surface or underground water which would help to transform pastoralists into sedentary farming(crop farming practices) (NPC, 2016). Moreover, the existing training and extension interventions give special emphasis on crop-farming and this has also produced a bias against pastoralism (Fekadu, 2014).

Poverty in pastoralist areas is generally worse than elsewhere in the country in terms of conventional human development indicators (MoFED, 2006) and villagization programmes have become part and parcel of the national economic and social development programme (MoFED, 2002). It was in the light of this plan that the Government of Ethiopia launched its villagization program in the four Developing Regional States (Gambella, Afar, Somali and Benishangul) in the middle of 2010 (Guru, 2012; HRW, 2012). The state rhetoric behind the villagization among pastoralist/agro-pastoralist communities in these regional states is to provide basic socio-economic infrastructures such as health services, schooling, roads, houses, fertile farmland and water which aimed at ensuring food security, bringing socio-economic and cultural transformation for the relocated people (HRW, 2012; Moti, 2014).

The plan was to villagize about 1.5 million people by 2013 in the four Developing Regional States where 1 million people were to be settled in Afar and Somali regional states (500,000 in each) and 500, 000 people were to be settled in Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states (225,000 in each) (HRW, 2012). The implementation of villagization in Afar and Somali regional states was planned to be carried out in one year, while it was planned to be a three-year program in Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states. As of November 2010, 150,000 Somalis had been moved, with the remainder to be moved throughout the rest of the year. However different researches conducted on the implementation of the villagization programme in the four Developing Regional States contend that the government has provided insufficient services and facilities to sustain people in the new villages (Ibid).

Villagization started in Gambella region in 2010 and according to the plan of the government of Gambella Regional State about 45,000 households are to be moved over the three-year life of the plan (HRW, 2012). Several authors asserted that the villagization programme in Gambella region was primarily motivated by the need to create space for agricultural investors rather than the state rhetoric provision of socio-economic infrastructures, ensuring food security and ultimately bringing socio-economic transformation of the lives of indigenous people. The villagization programme was undertaken without having meaningful consultation with the target communities and the basic services were partially fulfilled in few villages and insufficient in many villages. Generally, the expansion of large-scale agricultural investment in Gambella region not only

evicted the communities from their ancestral lands but also caused environmental degradation (HRW, 2012; Alexander, 2014; Yonas and Ezra, 2014; Zinabu, 2014; Fana, 2016).

The Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State Food Security Strategy Paper underscored that the region is one of the poorest and most food insecure regions in the country despite of the availability of huge natural resources potentials and opportunities. It also revealed that the regional economy depends on agriculture which accounts for 93.2% of the economically active population. Although the region is endowed with potential natural resources that can be tapped for the well-being of the people and its conducive agro-ecology for growing different types of food and cash crops, crop production and productivity is very limited due to use of rudimentary labor-intensive farm tools, prevalence of crop diseases, pests and weeds, declining soil fertility and so on. Moreover, livestock production is constrained by many factors and the return obtained from the sector is very low mainly due to livestock diseases (Tsegaye, 2015).

Key issues affecting food security in Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State are low crop production and productivity, livestock diseases, erratic rainfall, natural resource degradation, limited income and employment opportunities, poor market and infrastructure, poor health and nutrition, cultural practices affecting women, limited emergence response capability and conflict. The Food Security Strategy paper also state that the settlement pattern of the indigenous communities is highly scattered. Given this situation of the region the regional state declared that voluntary villagization programme is one of the regional development priorities which deserve due attention to attain food security in the region (Ibid).

Like the experience in Gambella Region, pastoralist communities in Benishangul-Gumuz Region were resettled in many villages. However, studies indicated that natural resources-bases rural livelihoods of local communities have been under increasing threat due to large-scale land acquisition by private investors, state-sponsored resettlement schemes and state farms. More and more land resources are given out by the state to commercial agricultural investments particularly in the last few years which in turn resulted in land disputes and contestations between local communities, the state and investors (Guyu, 2012; Keeley etal., 2014;).. According to Tsegaye (2015), the Gumuz people held the view that an effort to relocate many of their villages is a strategy of the government to expropriate their land which as a result they reacted in various ways to threats of dispossession and displacement such as destroying field crops and

machineries, and attacking/killings), refusal to comply with villagization, threats not to pay tax, and encroachment onto land already acquired by investors.

Studies conducted on the effects of villagization programme on the sustainable livelihoods of settlers found to be mixed. According to the research conducted by Abdisalan and Mossa (2019), on the social consequences of pastoralist sedenterisation schemes in Beer Caano district, Shabelle Zone of Ethiopian Somali Regional State revealed that the scheme has brought improvements in social and institutional services in terms of education, health, water and sanitation, communication, irrigation usage, use of improved agricultural inputs, extension service, credit and market service. On the other hand, Yohannes (2015), who conducted research in Shinile District, Somali Region, asserted that the government's policy and practices which are by and large skewed towards permanent settlement and expansion of crop farming with transfer of modern technologies has stimulated undesirable outcomes such as risk of vulnerability of farming under arid and semi-arid agro-ecology, conflict in different land uses, rural urban migration, dropouts from pastoralism, high dependence on charcoal making and on safety net supports that triggers the vicious circle of poverty.

9.3. Villagization Programme in the Afar Region: Practices, Challenges and Prospects

The present rural development policies and strategies of Ethiopia advocate sedentarization as the last option to bring development in pastoral areas of the country. For instance, the FDRE Rural Development Policy and Strategies document considered settlement of pastoralists as a viable economic and social development option to bring about meaningful and lasting impacts on the lives of herders. Hence it underscored that the ultimate goal is to settle the entire pastoralist population (MoFED, 2003). The emphasis given to the sedentarization of pastoralist communities can be deduced from the speeches of heads of the government. For instance, at the celebration of the 15th Ethiopian Pastoralists Day in the Semera town in Afar Regional State, Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn heralded that the objective of the Villagization Program is to provide the necessary infrastructure such as schools and health facilities for the communities and to provide food stalk and water for the cattle. In addition to that, pastoralists are induced to practice sedentary farming thus changing their way of life in a gradual manner (WIC, 2015).

In line with the federal policies and strategies regional state governments' policies and strategies also stressed on the importance of villagization programme. In this regard, the Afar Regional State Rural Land Use and Administration Policy and Strategies (ARS-RLAUPS) considered settlement of pastoralists as an important option to transform the life of the Afar:

> *The Afar pastoralists usually roam from place to place in search of grazing and water for their cattle and other animals. This system of livelihood has helped to balance and protect the eco-system from destruction. However, the repetitive and cyclical drought has made the traditional system of roaming in search of water and grazing totally unreliable and is threatening the very existence of the pastoralists. Creating suitable environment to settle pastoralists has therefore become an urgent and important task. This issue and direction have already been given sufficient attention in the Rural Development Policies, Strategies, and Tactics document of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia; and other documents that outline the visions for pastoral areas development and good governance (*ANRS-RLAUPS, 2008, p.13*).*

Another document of the regional state (ANRS, 2017) underscored that the livelihood of the Afar will basically change only through the implementation of the resettlement programme. It further elaborated that Villagization programme in Afar region is not something that will be practiced when it is successful and interrupted when it is not. Rather, the implementation of Villagization programme for the Afar is the priority action with no other alternative.

As discussed above, the federal constitution and the various documents of ANRS considered settlement of pastoralists as the last option to bring about development among pastoralists. However, the literatures reviewed presented contradictory debates regarding the future of mobile pastoralism. For instance, (Little, et al., 2010) contend that mobility is important to maximize the utilization of spatial and seasonal variability in the availability of forage and water and therefore, settlement is not the solution in pastoral areas. Similarly, Helland (2015) mentioned that many people want to remain pastoralist. Moreover, Berihun (2016) underscored that government's plan to bring pastoral development based on agrarian assumption has been adversely affecting the continuous viability of pastoralists and it makes the sustainable pastoral way of life unsustainable.

Contrary to the above arguments, there are also others who do not view pastoralism as a viable pursuance of life. For instance, Mohammed and Abule (2015) underscored thatin the past, the use of indigenous knowledge about livestock and rangeland management practices has enabled

the Afar pastoralists to live friendly with their environment. However, in recent time, the traditional resource management system became shrinking due to modernization, population increment and drought making pastoralism unreliable. In the same fashion, Piguet (2001.p.7) asserted that the *"Afar feel that their way of life has failed in terms of the viability of their pastoral economy"*. Similarly, according to Eriksen and Marin (2011) mobility is becoming more difficult and less viable.Moreover**,** FAO and Tufts University (2019) asserted that multifaceted driving forces such as demographic and policy changes, more extreme climate events which caused loss of livestock to drought and other shocks moved pastoralists out of pastoralism in search of alternative livelihoods.

The views of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists seem to support the arguments of those who questioned the viability of pastoralism. Pastoralists interviewed in the three selected Woredas, mentioned that they were totally opposing the villagization programme. But they had started to change their mind because of the deterioration grazing lands from time to time and government propaganda regarding the importance and reliability of sedentary way of life and . For instance, one of the pastoralists who settled in a settlement village in Galifage Kebele Kebele in Assaita Woreda stated:

> *Ensuring food security, sustaining and improving our lives cannot be materialized through the traditional mobile way of life in an era of climate change which has been causing the deterioration of the resources upon which our livelihood heavily depend on. In the past, we were able to sustain our mobile way of life because it had helped us to use alternative resources available in different areas. However, starting from the past few decades, recurrent drought and the invasion of Prosopis have seriously affected rangelands and water sources. This in turn has undermined the viability of mobility (Interview, 14 March, 2019, Assaita).*

He further explained that pastoralists have been comfortable with seasonal mobility which allows them to use resources in different areas in the region. However, the number of animals that each household had decreased from time to time due to lack of pasture and water in almost in all parts of the region. He also mentioned that pastoralists began to settle in settlement villages with the expectation that the government will ensure the supply of different services and infrastructures as per its promises.

9.3.1. The Implementation of Villagization Programme in Afar Regional State

Leaders of the regional state at all levels interviewed during the field visit in 2018 and 2019 underscored that the regional state government evaluated the low performance in the implementation of the villagization programme conducted between 2012 and 2015. They further explained that unlike the experiences in the preceding years, in 2016, the regional state designed a new villagization programme, which centered on the availability of water and tried to ensure the supply of social and economic service giving institutions like schools, clinics, health centers for human and animals, electricity and roads.

As explained above, the documents of Afar regional state such as ANRS-RLUAPS and Afar (2017) made clear that settling pastoralists in selected settlement villages is the best alternative to improve the living conditions of pastoralists. Moreover, the Afar Regional State Villagization Programme Strategy (2016) underscored that the implementation of basin based villagization programme is the core principle of the regional state party (ANDP). The regional state government considered that in recent years mobility has exposed the movement of pastoralists from place to place to natural and manmade hazards as well as to social, economic and human crisis. Therefore, villagization is considered to be important to move pastoralists and agro-pastoralists out of their backward way of life which forced them to live under absolute poverty and to enable them lead settled and permanent way of life. Such policy directions were against the lifestyle of pastoralists which has existed for many centuries enabling them to adapt the most inhospitable and arid environments. This agrarian biased programmed might indicate the influence of the federal government in policy making. As explained in chapter four, policy making in federal Ethiopia is still top down approach and regional states administered by affiliated parties are recipients of policies designed by the federal government. Moreover, EPRDF's program underscored that the front is the organization of agriculturalists while declaring pastoralism as incompatible to the ideology of Revolutionary Democracy.

Regional leaders interviewed during the field work in 2018 and 2019 mentioned that the leadership at various levels were convinced that settling pastoralists in settlement villages and supplying the necessary facilities will improve the living conditions of pastoralists.The data obtained from the ANRS- Coordination Office for Basin Development and Villagization Programme (ANRS-COBDVP) (2017) showed that the number of households villagized in

2016/17 was beyond the plan for the fiscal year. It was planned to settle 15,000 households in 59 settlement villages in 26 Woredas but the actual number of households settled in 108 settlement villages was 16,321 households which is 108% success in plan accomplishment. However, evaluation of the programme indicated that 2,714 households deserted the settlement villages (ANRS-COBDVP, 2018). The most important thing to be noted is that the opinion of the pastoralist communities seems to deviate from the official report (several pastoralists' desert villages between seasons).

Pasastoralists in the three selected Woredas interviewed during the field visit in December 2018 and March 2019asserted that pastoralists deserted the settlement villages because of the insufficiency of the services and facilities provided. One pastoralist in Teru Woreda reflected that it is difficult for them to live in the developmemt centers/villages permanently. They have not yet fully adapted plough agriculture. But they want to secure the benefits obtained from both mobility and settled way of life. The government cannot fulfill all the necessary facilities and infrastructures. Therefore, they move to other places when they encountered lack of pasture to their animals. They have a good culture of information sharing called, Dagu.Thus, they moved back to their villages when they get information about government's plan of counting pastoralists in the development centres because they don't want to miss the services provided there(Interview 6 March 2019, Alelu).

According to the report of the Equitable Development Directorate General of the Ministry of Federal Affairs for the 6 month of the 2017, the number of households living in old village centers in Somali, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella regional states was 183, 252, 23, 144, 82,968 and 40,437 respectively. From this report, therefore, it can be understood that the implementation of the villagization programme in Afar Regional State is lower than in other Developing Regional States (MoFA, 2017). According to the explanation of an expert in the regional COBVP Office interviewed in Feburary 2019, there are two reasons behind the low performance in the implementation of the villagization programme in this fiscal year. First, the regional state government had no similar motivation and didn't repeat its success of the previous year. Secondly, lack of continuity in the awareness creation campaigns, pastoralists have not been fully convinced although they found that mobility could not help to sustain their livelihood like in the past.

An expert in the Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Pastoralist Development supported the above idea. He explained that both the regional leaders and the community had opposed the villagization programme when it started. This was manifested in the low performance of the regional state in the implementation of the programme for consecutive years. The critics given to the regional state during common forums with the federal government and other regional states on the evaluation of programme implementation influnced the regional state's concern to the programme. The Regional state evaluated its weakness and started to work aggressively. That was why the performance of the regional state in the implementation of the villagization programme was beyond its plan in the 2016 fiscal year (Interview, 12 March 2019 Semera).

The performance in the implementation of the villagization programme in 2018 seems to support the arguments of pastoralists. Data showed that the villagization programme accomplishment of 2018 was by far less than that of the 2017. In this regard, the official report of COBDVP indicated that in 2017/18, the regional state planned to settle 15,328 households in 106 settlement villages in 28 Woredas. However, it was able to settle 8,644 households which is 56.4% success in plan accomplishment (ARS-COBDVP, 2018).

The implementation of the villagization programme in 2018/19 was found to be very low. The regional state planned to settle 5,200 households but only 485 households which is 9.3% plan accomplishment. Participants of the interview and focus group discussants explained that the low performance in the implementation of the programme was attributed to the national and regional reform as well as the Afar-Issa conflict which created instability in the region. The report of the office indicated that the regional state government tried to create common understanding among stakeholders on the plan and strategies of the villagization programme as well as the roles and responsibilities of the government at different levels before starting the 2018 villagization programme. To that end, discussion forum was organized at regional level where the central committee and steering committee as well as Zonal and Woreda leaders participated. Moreover, public conference was organized at Kebele level to mobilize the community. This indicates the policy continuity under the current ruling party, Prosperity Party. However, the plan accomplishment for the fiscal year was not encouraging.

In general, some of the challenges adversely affecting the plan accomplishment of the villagization programme include continuous village desertion of settled pastoralists, government's less work to raise the motivation of the community; inability to ensure pasture and fodder development strategy in accordance with the scheduled time; lack of water supply or interruption of the service due to malfunctions in some of the settlement villages; lack of focus on the economic benefit of the community; lack of coordination among stakeholders and absence of the necessary infrastructures (road network, lack of electric service in most settlement villages). Therefore, plan accomplishment of the villagization programme was far from success even after the regional state designed and implemented the new strategy since 2016.

According to pastoralists in the three selected Woredas interviewed during the field visit in December 2018 and March 2019 there is no settlement village which fulfilled all the necessary facilities. They further explained that had the pastoralists gained different socio-economic services and the necessary in puts, they would have not chosen mobile way of life in a period where natural resources are degraded due to climate change and drought. They also underscored that accessibility to rangelands and watering points is increasingly hampered by expansion of sedentary agricultural settlements along the Awash River and implementation of large-scale agricultural projects like the state-owned Tenaha sugar plantation. The villagization programme implemented in the three sample Woredas discussed below could give us the general picture of the programme practiced in the regional state.

9.3.1.1. Villagization Programme in Assaita Woreda

In Assaita Woreda eleven settlement villages (villages) are established. Water supply is still a problem although all Kebeles are found along the Awash River. According the explanation of an expert inAssaita Woreda Water Development Office interviewed in January, 2019, the government has been trying to excavate underground water in different Kebeles of the Woreda but the water found to have high fluoride content.He further elaborated that purifying the water requires high cost. Similarly, one of the top leaders of the Woreda Water Office underscored that the Woreda government has been stretching pipelines for the purpose of supplying water to Kebeles from Assaita town. So far Kebeles like Berga, Hinele and Karatura have got pure drinking water. He further mentioned that enabling the pastoralists living in Gehertu Kebele get

access to water is still impossible because the area is where the Awash River sinks and the salt and fluoride content is extremely high (Interview, 15 March 2019 Assaita).

Assaita Woreda has been considered as developed area of the Afar region because of its long experience in crop production and expansion of government projects since the imperial period. However, the villagization programme being implemented in the Woreda has still wide gaps. The researcher's personal observation during the field work in January 2018 and March 2019, in two settlement villages in Galifage Kebele namely Aybayito and Galateluberi located on the side of the main road (Assaita to Semera) attest that the villagization program being practiced is still unable to achieve its intended purpose, improving the living conditions of pastoralist communities.

The 2017/18 evaluation of the villagization programmed in the two settlement villages revealed that residents of Aybayito have a school (1-4 grade levels) and health posts for their animals. But the center has no power, mill, pure drinking water and health center for humans. The pastoralists living in this settlement village use water from Awash River and most of their farmland is taken by Tendaho Sugar Factory. During the fiscal year there were 156 household residents in this center and 178 students were registered for the academic year but only 70 students were found at the end of the academic year. This shows how conditions in the center are not still conducive for living and learning. On the other hand, residents of Galateluberi village have school (5-8 grade levels) and health center. The water hole dug at many places in this settlement village found to be fluoride. The pastoralists whom the researcher interviewed asserted that they have no interest to live in this village center. They reported that they have appealed to be transferred to Aybayito settlement village and waiting until decision comes from the government (Personal observation andInterview, 14 March 2019, Assaita).

The statements of Konte Mussie (Dr), Chairman of the Afar Peoples Party during an interview with Ethiopian Satellite Television, televised on 30 July 2018 strengthened the difficulty of searching pure underground water in Woredas along the Awash Valley. He asserted that the Awash River has been contaminated since the 1950s and 1960s. He further pointed out that the chemicals sprayed on state cotton farms have gradually infiltrated into the soil over the years which contaminated the underground water along the Awash River Valley. That is why all of the water holes being dug in village centers established along the river found to be contaminated.

This shows how the ugre for national economic growth has been adversely affecting the lives of pastoralists under successive regimes.

The explanation of another expert in in Assaita Woreda Water Development Office indicated to that provision of water supply has remained to be a serious problem in Assaita Woreda although the Woreda is rich in underground water. According to him, the office is currently establishing two big water institutions by organizing a team, which works on water civil works. In order to ensure adequate water supply for Assaita town, the office allocated more than one million Birr from its capital budget for civil work research which started in 2016 and completed in February 2017. He further elaborated that digging holes, excavating water and treating fluoride is unthinkable in the light of the Woreda capacity. The problem of water supply in rural Kebeles is still severe. For instance, three Kebeles namely Dalifage, Hinele and Handeg are getting water by directly pumping water from Awash River and filtering it by using sand and this was done with the support of NGOs (Interview, 19 March, 2019, Assaita).

The presence of unresolved problem of water supply for Assaita town which served as the capital of the Afars for several decades until it was replaced by Semera, the current regional capital established in 2005, could signify the inability of the regional state to satisfy the water demand of pastoralists. If the water supply for the old town, Assaita is found at this stage, shortage of water supply in rural Kebeles will not be surprising.

Other problems in the Woreda are absence of road to connect the Woreda capital, Assaita Town with rural Kebeles and lack of market facilities. Analyzing the situation of the pastoralists in Berga Kebele which is around just three kilometers far away from the Woreda capital, Assaita town would be helpful to understand the general conditionof the Woreda in this regard. During the field work in December 2017 and March 2018, the researcher observed pastoralists dumping matured tomatoes on their farm. One agro-pastoralists in Berga Kebele interviewed during the field visit reported that although they exerted great energy starting from clearing forests, land preparation and growing vegetables, they have not been benefited due to lack of access to market. He further mentioned that the role of leaders in terms of awareness creation and mobilizing the pastoralists is insignificant. The researcher checked the price of tomatoes per kilogram. Pastoralists would be happy if someone collects their product by two Ethiopian Birr per kilogram before it rotten on the farm. The price raised as distance from the farm increases. In

the aforementioned months, the price of one kilogram of tomato at Assaita town just three kilometer from the farm was five Birr. Further moving to Semera, the regional capital which is 70 kilometers far away from the farm, the price raised to eight Birr per kilogram and in Addis Ababa, it grew to sixteen Birr per kilogram. This experience could suggest that agro-pastoralists have not been benefitted from their products due to lack of transportation and market services in the Woreda. Therefore, they heve not been encouraged to actively involved in the production of vegetables.This is against the government's ultimate goal, increasing productivity, ensuring food security, improving the living conditions of the local community and changing mobile pastoralists into permanent settlers.

9.3.1.2. Villagization Programme in Amibara Woreda

An expert in Amibara Woreda Pastoral and Agriculture Development Office revealed that villagizaton programme started in the Woreda in 2013. He mentioned that during the first year of the implementation of the programme, significant number of pastoralists were villagized in seven settlement villages (villages) of the Woreda because the community living in the Woreda have long experience in cotton and crop production as well as growing of fruits and vegetables. He further explained that government's promise to fulfill different facilities might have contributed for the initial success. The following table shows the performance of the villagization programme of the Woreda in 2013.

Table 115.9: Villagization Programme Implemented in Amibara Woreda

No	Kebele	Development Center	Plan number of people to be villagized	Plan accomplishment (Number of people settled)	Plan Accomplishment In %
1	Badham	Waydolele	500	323	64.6
2	Bediluale	Bediluale	292	202	69.2
3	Angelele	Yueren	500	445	89
4	Hasoba	Hasoba	250	250	100
5	Buri	Keleatburi	293	450	153.6
6	Halai-Debi	Halai-Debi	250	250	100
7	Bonta	Bonta	250	187	74.8
Total			2,380	2,107	88.5

Organized by the Researcher from the report 2018

The report revealed that villagized pastoralists were given different services like education, health and water as well as other facilities including farm and pasture land, seeds, agricultural tools and anti-pest chemicals. The report mentioned that the performance in the implementation of the villagization programme did not show progress due to several challenges such as the low awareness of pastoralists regarding the importance of the villagization programme, inability to produce crops in some settlement villages due to lack of hand pipe to pull underground water, lack of proper maintenance on the old irrigation canals in all settlement villages; absence of pure drinking water in Waydolale and Yueren settlement villages, inability to supply different inputs timely; absence of tractors to plough virgin lands which are hard to plough by oxen, lack of commitment on the part of the leadership and weak follow up and evaluation system (Interview 21 December, 2018, Andido).

The argument of focus group discussants substantiated the above idea. They asserted that the Woreda administration was not able to accomplish its plan of settling more pastoralists in the following years. They further explained that the pastoralists' interest to be villagized declined because the government failed to provide the necessary infrastructures which could enable them

lead sedentary way of life in the settlement villages. The statement of one pastoralist seems to support the above assertion:

> *Our livelihood was dependent on the rearing of cattle, camel and goat but their number has been reducing at alarming rate. We started irrigation agriculture and produce market crops like onion and tomato to cope with the challenge that we have been facing. We have been buying fuel for our generator to pull water from the ground but our capacity of affording for fuel has become costly. Unless the government helps us by making channels to use the Awash River for irrigation, we cannot benefit from the cultivation of crops, fruits and vegetables (FGD, 26 December, 2018, Andido).*

Like the case of Assaita Woreda, in Amibara Woreda, programme implementationbetween the years 2013 and 2016 remained low. For instance, no new settlement took place in settlement villages like Halai-Debi, Hasoba and Buri. According to discussions the researcher held with pastoralists during field observations in Amibara Woreda, many pastoralists desert the settlement villages and started their mobile way of life due to serious gap between government promises and actual practices in the provision of inputs and infrastructures. In the words of a pastoralist who settled in Keleat-Buri settlement village in 2013 explained that they rushed to the settlement village with the belief that government's promises to furnish them with different inputs, services, facilities and infrastructures will improve our way of life. But they quickly left the settlement village because the government was not able to keep up its promise. Their movement from place to place is not aimless wandering, rather it is to search water and pasture to their animals upon which their livelihood depends. The services and infrastructures did not enable them to stay in the village center. But they use the settlement village as a home base for them to and from movements between seasons (Interview, on 13 March 2019, Andido).

The New villagization programme in the Woreda started in 2017 in three new settlement villages namely Andada, Qurqura and Gelsa. The report of the Woreda Agriculture and Pastoral Development Office showed that the plan was to settle 380 households in the three new sites and the actual performance was 349 households which is 91.8 % success. However, these villages were centered on pond water. Out of the 349 household settlers, 250 households obtained farmlands which indicate 71.6 % of the settlers begin crop cultivation while the remaining 28.4% of the households still depend on animal husbandry. The Woreda prepared 130 hectare of land for these households but the actual cultivated land in the fiscal year was 110 hectare of land.

The voices of an agro-pastoralist settled in Qurqura settlement village in Assaita Woreda interviewed in March 2019 seems to support the situation of pastoralists in the three settlement villages. He underlined that several pastoralists left their newly established villages when the water in the ponds dried during dry seasons. According to nother pastoralist who has been living in Halai-Debi settlement village in Amibara Woreda, government promises were very attractive before they settled but it has been unable to fulfill the necessary services and in puts. They have access to water and education services (1-8 grade levels). Despite of their dream of enjoying improved way of life, they still remained poor. They are living in dark because there is no electricity and there is no telecommunication service. He further explained that the regional state government had promised to facilitate grazing lands around the settlement villages which would help them to sustain livestock production. But it failed to fulfill its promise which as a result, the number of cattle and goats they havedecreased from time to time due to lack of pasture and appropriate treatment. He also asserted that nowadays, they become dependent on government aid. Moreover, they work five days and obtain 15 kilogram of wheat or maize every month under the Productive Safety Net programme (Interview 27 March 2019, Andido).

Another pastoralist who is the resident of the same settlement village also reported that they were encouraged to engage in agriculture but their Kebele administration has been still unable to supply them fertilizers. He further elaborated that the black soil is hard to plough with oxen but they are struggling to bring about change in their life. However, their engagement in agricultural practices still did not enable them to improve their way of life due to lack of access to market. He also explained that they have been cultivating onion, peppercorn, tomato and melon but the products remained rotten on their farm due to absence of road and transportation. What they produced has been washed out by floods during the rainy season due to absence of bridges and they have no communication with others during summer seasons (Ibid).

The information gained through FGD substantiates the above idea.Focus group discussants also underlined that the Woreda administration is still unable to address the pastoralist community's quest for development and good governance. Pastoralists have not been able to get the required services and infrastructures in their settlement villages. A pastoralist who participated in the FGD mentioned that in theirsettlement village (Keleatburi Kebele,in Amibara Woreda), they have a school (1-5 grade level), health post for human, deep hole water and recently mill. But

there is no health post where their animals get treatment, thereis no drinking water because the water obtained from the water hole has changed its test (cannot used for drinking), even there is no trough to enable their animals properly drink the available little water and the houses constructed for school teachers are not yet finished (Interview 23 January, 2019, Andido).

Another pastoralist, resident of Andido Kebele, Etiaso settlement village also strengthened the above assertion as stated *"the efforts made so far did not enable us to get all the necessary services. We have drinking water, school (1-4 grade level) and trough for our animals. But we have no health service (health post is under construction) and health post for our animals*". Still another pastoralist, a resident of Halai-deghe settlement village asserted that the center has no animal health post, trough and mill.

9.3.1.3. Villagization Programme in Teru Woreda

Settled pastoralists living in the settlement villages of Teru Woreda asserted that the services they having been given are less of what the government promised to supply. Even they insisted that their former pastoral life assisted by mobility was much better than the new settled way of life. One pastoralist living in Barentu settlement village in Teru Woreda 20 kilometer far away from the Woreda capital, Alelu, asserted that unlike the previous time, now they want to settle in settlement villages. However, the government failed to provide the necessary infrastructures as per its promises. He further elaborated that there is no difference between the services they were used to have during their old, scattered and mobile way of life and the services they have been providedt after theyare made to settle in settlement villages. According to him, in the past they were able to rescue the lives of their cattle by moving and searching alternative sources of pasture and water. But after settlement, their village gets water supply once or no in a week. An attempt was made to provide school and health services but many of the settlers desert the center and returned back to their place of origin because of lack of sustainability in the provision of these services (Interview 7 March 2018, Alelu).

Despite of the regional state rhetoric success in the Villagization programme, the practice in Teru Woreda indicated wide gaps in the implementation. Expers interviewed in the Woreda Offices attested that due to absence of roads the communication between Woreda and the settlement

villages has been interrupted during rainy seasons. In this Regard, one expert in Teru Woreda's Water Development Office asserted:

> *There are nine settlement villages (villages) in our Woreda, namely Abdi, Asabea, Asabera, Barentu Boyna, Debaho, Dirma, Maramara and Mebay. 288 households have been living in the seven settlement villages far away from the Woreda administration center. These villages have been obtaining water supply from Digdiga Kebele near the Woreda capital, Alelu where the government dugout water, the generator and water tanker are stationed. It is from Digdiga that 94-kilometer pipeline is stretched to enable rural Kebeles get access to water. However, there is irregularity in the provision of water supply. During the summer season (May-August), flood has been interrupting the communication between the Woreda and these villages. During this time, the Woreda Water Office cannot solve when water supply problem encountered in these villages. Although the presence of underground water in three Kebeles is confirmed, still no attempt is made to dig out the water (Interview 8 March 2018 Alelu)*

Further building on the above assertion, another expert in the Woreda Finance and Economic Development Officeassertedthat transportation problem is serious in Teru Woreda which has weakened the communication between the Woreda and Kebeles. For instance, the distance between Alelu, the Woreda capital and Mebay Kebele is only 70 kilometers. However, residents of the Kebele have to travel more than three days to reach the Woreda administration center. On the other hand, when they use vehicles to travel to the Woreda center, first they have to pass through Kori Woreda and reach Semera, the regional capital which covers 180 kilometers and then to Alelu, the capital of Teru Woreda, which covers 130 kilometers. This shows that due to absence of road directly linking the kebele with the Woreda, residences of the Kebele have been forced to travel 620 kilometers round trip to reach the Woreda administration center (Interview11 March 2009, Alelu).

According to an expert in Teru Woreda Education Office, most of the schools in the Woreda were established centering the residence areas of Kebele leaders. He further elaborated that despite of huge budget allocated for the Villagization programme; there is no school, health center, mill and power giving institution established for new settlement villages (villages). The settlement villages themselves were established around the old residence areas and the services have been provided in these areas. Due to the insufficiency of the services provided most settlers left the settlement villages and started their mobile way of life leaving the original residents in the village centers (Interview, 9 March 2019, Alelu). The same idea was reiterated by the

2017/18 report of the COBDVP. For instance, the report revealed that in 2017out of 186 households who settled in Debahu settlement village, 38 households deserted the center and returned to their areas of origin.

Although leaders at all levels of the regional state underlined that the new approach to the villagization program is to establishsettlement villages in areas where water is available, the practice in Teru Woreda is not still encouraging. FGD with members of settlement villages made clear that the government is still unable to ensure the provision of water supply to all of the nine settlement villages in the Woreda. Only two settlement villages namely Dirma and Asabera have their own generator to pull groundwater. The remaining seven villages got the service from Digdiga Kebele which is nearto the Woreda capital, Alelu. The Woreda center, Alelu itself has been getting water supply from the same source. They further elaborated that constant water supply in the Woreda is unthinkable. The supply could be interrupted for indefinite time if shortage of fuel encountered or if the generator stopped due to technical problems. Moreover, the discussion made clear that all the rural Kebeles have no mill. According to them, pastoralists have not been permanently living in their villages rather they are still moving from place to place and returned back to their village when conditions improved around (FGD, 16 March 2019 Alelu).

The situation in Digdiga Kebele (Detademum settlement village) where the water supply to other developmentcenters originates is not different from the rest. One pastoralist underlined that the residents of the settlement village (village) have no sufficient water supply. The school and health post established in the village have not been providing proper functions. Most of the settlers left the settlement village (Interview, 13 March 2019 Alelu). According to the 2017/18 report of the COBDVP, out of the 96 households settled in the center 50 deserted in the fiscal year. The researcher's visit of the area in March 2019 also attested additional number of households deserted and hence few households were living in the village. The report also indicated that pastoralist living in Memehara settlement villagehave no water supply although it is located along the side of the main road on the way to Kalwan Woreda. Residents of the village have been fetching water from river and transporting it using donkey, camel and carts. Their request for water supply has not been resolved. In 2019 health post was established in the village but it did not yet start to provide service. In general, the 2017/18 report underlined that

there were gaps in the areas of water supply, access to health and school, animal health and natural resource utilization in almost all settlement villages in Zone Four.

9.3.2. Challenges in the Implementation of Villagization Program in Afar Regional State

The regional state has been implementing villagization programme since 2012. It was stated above that the performance of the regional state in the implementation of the villagization programme between the years 2012 and 2015 was low. The regional state conducted survey studies on the performance of the implementation of the programme, organized forums where leaders at all levels of the regional state government, regional party members, community elders and clan leaders discussed on the issue. As discussed above, the regional state started new strategy of implementing water centered villagization programme in 2016. However, the implementation of the programme is not still up to expectations. The following sub-topics dealt with the various challenges adversely affecting the implementation of the villagization programme undertaken by Afar Regional State.

9.3.2.1. Peoples' Perception towards the Villagization Programme

Voluntary participation of pastoralist communities is important for the successful plan accomplishment of villagization programme. However, when the programme started in 2012, villagization programme in Afar region was implemented without ensuring the consent of the members of the community. Rather, the leadership forced pastoralists and agro-pastoralists to settle in settlement villages without consulting and convincing them. The involuntary villagization programme implemented in various settlement villages wrongly affected the public perception towards the programme. Pastoralists thought that the government deliberately gathered them in certain centers to use their land for government projects and private investors (Interview 18 March 2019 Assaita).

Not only members of the community but also the leaders of Afar regional state had negative attitude towards the villagization programme. They gave political implication to the villagization programme and hence they did not properly lead the programme for the benefit of the community. Initially, the leadership did not wholeheartedly accept the importance of permanent settlement for the improvement of the lives of the pastoralists. Members of the local community in the three selected Woredas interviewed during the field visit in March 2019asserted that the

role of the leadership in creating common understanding among stakeholders regarding the goals of the programme was insignificant. In the first case no attempt was made to conduct research and to identify the problems of pastoralists before the start of the programme. Failure to provide the necessary socio-economic services and infrastructural assets as well as absence of sense of ownership and commitment on the part of the leadership to correct wrong perceptions of the community regarding the villagization programme and to enable pastoralists benefit from the programme further strengthened the wrong perception of pastoralists towards the programme.

According to an expert in the region's COBDVP Office, plan accomplishment of the villagization programme in Afar region between 2012 and 2015was low when compared with the experience of other regional states. This was due to lack of motivation and less effort on the part of the leadership to change the perception of members of the community towards the programme. The inconsistent efforts to create awareness among the public has its own impact in changing their perception. Moreover, the leadership failed to make socio-economic services and infrastructures available in the settlement villages. It was gradually that the regional state wereconvinced about the importance of the villagization programme which as a result a new strategy was designed and implemented since 2016(Interview 19 March 2019 Semera).

An expert in the regional Bureau of Agriculture and Pastoralist Development asserted that the involuntary villagization programme implemented in various settlement villages wrongly affected the public perception towards the programme. According to him, pastoralists thought that the government deliberately gathered them in certain centers to use their land for government projects and to give the land for private investors. Failure to provide the necessary socio-economic services and infrastructural assets as well as absence of sense of ownership and commitment on the part of the leadership to correct wrong perceptions regarding the villagization programme and to enable pastoralists benefit from the programme further strengthened the wrong perception of pastoralists towards the programme (Interview 14 March 2019, Semera).

In 2016 the regional state evaluated its weaknesses in the implementation of the villagization program and started a new approach, which is to establish villages in areas where water sources are available. When the new strategy started in 2016 leaders at different levels started to mobilize communities in a form of campaign work. Pastoralists had started to change their mind that

development activities being undertaken in the settlement villages are for their own interest and began to score encouraging contribution in supporting the development endeavors through their labour and direct participation in the social, economic and political activities. However, the efforts made so far could not help to enhance the understanding of pastoralists regarding the importance of villagization programme due to lack of continuous awareness creation activities. Today, there are many people who believe that mobile way of life is better than permanent settlement which would enable them to use alternative use of resources, water and pasture. Pastoralists' conception about number of cattle instead of quality is not yet changed. Had settled pastoralists brought significant change in their understanding regarding the ultimate purpose of the villagization programme and the challenges which they would encounter through the process, they would have stopped deserting their settlement villages (Interview 26 Feburary 2019, Semera)

9.3.2.2. Lack of Leadership Commitment

The survey research conducted in 2016 by the Afar National Regional State COBDVP Office revealed that lack of commitment on the part of the leadership at various levels of the regional state was one factor for the weak performance in the implementation of the villagization programme. The villagization programme implemented until 2015 could not ensure the benefits of the community due to the existing gaps between the preparation and implementation of the programme and the growing demand for development on the part of the community, which increased from time to time.

The research also made clear that the performance of the villagization programme in Afar region was low due to several reasons. In the first case no attempt was made to conduct research and to identify the problems of pastoralists before the start of the programme. There was no coordination among sector institutions (stakeholders) during the implementation of the villagization programme. The leadership at various levels had their own role for the weak performance of the villagization programme. The higher-level leaders of the regional state (central committee of the regional party, heads of regional Bureaus and offices, Zonal administrators and Zone party leaders) gave political implication to the villagization programme and hence they did not properly lead the programme for the benefit of the community. According to the views of a member of the House of People's Representatives Pastoralist Standing

Committee interviewed on 9 May 2018, the federal government did not seriously considerthe challenges that could come from the community when forcing the pastoralists to change their long established way of life. They failed to understand that settling pastoralists is not only location change. The government did not try to convince the regional leadership about the intent of the programme in terms of the rhetoric improvement of the living conditions of pastoralists. She further mentioned that, the federal government blamed the regional leadership's failure in changing the attitude of the community regarding the importance of the Villagization programme.

The shared agreement among Semera Unicersity instructors who participated in the FGD asserted that higher regional leadership did not design appropriate strategy and give clear direction to the middle and lower level leaders which would help to effectively implement the programme. TThey further argued that the federal government has already decided that the socio-economic development of pastoralist communities could beachieveonly by enabling pastoralists lead sedentary way of life (FGD 21 December 2018, Semera University). As explained in chapter four, the law making process in Ethiopia is dominated by the federal government and particularly the governments of the developing regional states have no role on national policy issues. The regional leaders had to implement the federal policy directionswithout wholeheartedly accepting the importance of permanent settlement for the improvement of the lives of the pastoralists. They asserted the role of the leadership in creating common understanding among stakeholders regarding the goals of the programme was insignificant. Instead of convincing the pastoralists to construct cost effective permanent new houses, the leadership encouraged them to construct mobile houses which could sustain the culture of mobility. Some of the leadership reported that in some places, the old residence areas are the same as new villagization centers. Moreover, it failed to link animal husbandry with crop production and marketing to enable pastoralists benefit from their animal resources (Ibid).

The research conducted by the regional COBDVP revealed that the middle level leaders (leaders at Woreda level and the executive/ tactical leaders close to the community) and lower-level leaders (Kebele leaders) have their own share for the weak performance of the villagization programme. Misappropriation of the budget allocated to solve problems related to development and good governance which would help to improve the lives of pastoralists; custom of waiting

orders to come from higher level leaders instead of performing tasks by their own initiatives; lack of understanding about accountability for the actions they took and decisions they passed; inability to perform daily routines based on plan and not considering themselves as vanguard in plan preparation, implementation and mobilization of the community for the effective implementation of the villagization programme; providing land to illegal investors in order to get benefit from the investment at the expense of the poor pastoralists and constructing houses in areas where people did not actually live to disguise that they have established settlement villages were some of the malpractices of the middle level leaders which hindered the plan accomplishment of the villagization programme before 2016(ARS-COBDVP, 2016).

According to a senior expert in the Regional Bureau of Civil Service and Capacity Building most of the Kebele leaders were agents who worked for the implemrntstion of the parasitic thinking of the middle level leaders, victims of clannism and locality (favoring the local area and its people from where they came at the expense of others). Moreover, he resisted the villagization programme. He did not try to support government, institutional and public organizations in the Kebele for the benefit of the local community. Leaders did not follow up activities related to development and good governance taking place in their respective Kebeles. They also did not inform to the concerned bodies about problems for the benefit of the communities settled in settlement villages (Interview, 16 Jahuary, and 2019 Semera).

It was with this understanding that the regional state started the new villagization strategy since 2016. The regional state at all levels together with advisors (clan leaders) discussed on how to implement the villagization programme to bring sustainable development in the region. Initially when the new villagization programme started attempts were made to convince pastoralists regarding the importance of settled way of life. In the words of a pastoralist resident of Galifage Kebele in Assaita Woreda mentioned that they were highly motivated when leaders tried to convince them that the government will provide different agricultural in puts, socio-economic services and to establish infrastructures. They imagined that their problems will be resolved overnight. But in practice, they didn’t find life in the settlement villages up to their expectations (Interview5 November 2018).

An expert in Zone One Administration supported the above Idea.Accorrding to him, before 2016, villagization programme in the region was conducted withoutconsidering the availability of infrastructures in the settlement centers which would enable the pastoralists to live relatively better way of life. Moreover, the programme was carried out by forceful means neglecting the interest of the people and no attempt was made to get the consent of pastoralists (Interview 11 November 2018, Assaita).

The 2016 regional state villagization programme strategy document mentioned that the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists started to present questions for development and showed great interest to participate in development and good governance issues in the last two three years. Moreover, pastoralists interviewed in the three sample Woredas underscored that in ideal terms villagization programme could create favorable conditions to supply the necessary services at one center. However, attempts made on the part of the government could not enable them to enjoy the benefits of government promises. The words of a pastoralist resident of Debaho settlement village in Teru Woreda reflected:

> *We knew the hardship we have been facing in mobile way of life. Our movement from place to place should not be considered as simple wandering. Rather it was the best strategy to keep our animals alive upon which our life depends. We had misunderstanding about villagization when the programme started. We had no interest to settle in certain places because we doubt that the government will take our land after gathering us in some places. In the last three years we began to shape our mind because of two things. The first is the recurrent drought and degradation of resources which have been reducing the value of our mobile way of life. The other is government's attempt to convince us regarding the importance of sedentary way of life.(Intervie, 15 December 2018, Alelu)*

Despite of pastoralists' attitudinal change towards villagization programme, still now many pastoralists have been deserting developing centers when they encounter shortage of water and pasture. The report of the COBDVP for consecutive years even after the start of the new villagization programme indicated that significant number of pastoralists have deserted their village each year.

Different leaders both at Regional and Woreda levels were asked about the successes of their respective Bureaus and Offices in the last few years. Villagization programme was mentioned as a common achievement. However, inability of the government to fulfill different agricultural

inputs, facilities and services has been posing challenges which forced settled pastoralists to look for alternative way of solving their problems through their traditional mobility.

When the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi visited the Construction of Tendaho Irrigation Dam in 2010, representatives from different areas reported that their live was endangered due to the establishment of the government project as the expense of their pasture lands. Almost all people who made a speech during that forum reported that their animals were dying because the government failed to respect its promises, preparing pasture land for their animals and to provide different services. They reported that different drought resistant trees and grasses were cleared for the construction of the canal and the land to be covered by water around the dam. They were promised that the federal government will solve their problems in consultation with the regional state officials.

After eight years when the current Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed visited Afar Region and discussed about the new reform on 28 June 2018, participants from different Woredas of the region reported about problems related to villagization programme. They raised issues like the loss of animal resources, absence of rural roads, absence of fair distribution of resources, in sufficiency services to support settled way of life, conflicts and unfulfilled government promises in general. The words of a participant from Awash Fentale Woreda, Sabure Kebele, could show how the problems of the pastoralists remained unresolved over years:

> *There is a serious gap between what we were promised and what the government delivered. Although efforts were made in the last three years, many things are left to ensure the benefits of the community. We were promised that the government will establish schools, health institutions and supply of pure drinking water. Still now we gained none of these services. Let alone getting pure drinking water, the Awash River which has been used for drinking since time immemorial is now contaminated and subject us for different diseases (Conference Participant 28 June,2018, Semera).*

Many of the participants questioned the commitment of the regional state government and asked what the federal government could do in response to their demands to help them lead sedentary way of life in settlement villages where they settled.

9.3.2.3. Lack of Appropriate Institutional Structure

Structurally, the COBDVP is under the Regional Agriculture and Pastoral Development Bureau. The Bureau has work relations with several federal institutions like Ministry of Animal and Fish Resource, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resource, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Forestry and Institute of Biodiversity. However, the structures of regional Bureau of Agriculture and PastoralDevelopment do not fit with federal institutions to properly carry out its relations. According to expertsin this Bureau, this structural problem has created burdens to the Bureau. They asserted that different units of the Bureau have contact with the federal institutions mentioned above like sending plans and reports. This in itself has created questions of focus and priority because each federal institution created pressure to give focus and priorities to activities and tasks related to their own affairs (Interview, 7 October 2018, Semera).

There are several offices under the Regional Agriculture and Pastoral Development Bureau such as Disaster Prevention Office, Pastoral and Agro-pastoral Research Institute, the regional Animal Health Laboratory and the COBDVP. The Bureau has been also following up activities of other development projects like World Bank and Africa Development Bank. On the other hand, the office in charge of coordinating, the big development strategy, villagization program, is structurally under Agriculture and Pastoral Development Bureau which has been shouldering several responsibilities mentioned above.

In the first case, the Afar Regional Bureau of Pastoral and Agriculture Development (ARBPAD) itself has no legally recognized mandate to coordinate the activities of the various stakeholders involved in the implementation of the villagization programme. Secondly, the COBDVP should get the will of the ARBPAD to carry out the villagization programme. Moreover, the responsibilities being discharged by the Office requires big capacity to coordinate the activities undertaken by other stakeholders involved in the villagization programme such as the regional Water Development Bureau, Health Bureau, Education Bureau, capacity building and Human Resource Development Bureau, and many others. The federal Special Support Board technical advisors assigned in the region were providing consultation regarding the implementation of the villagization programme. However, the office has no sufficient human resource to effectively coordinate the various activities related the villagization programme. Moreover, the head of the COBDVP has not been participating in forums organized for the steering committee (regional

Bureau heads) and technical committee (Deputy regional Bureau heads). Regarding this structural problem, one regional official underscored that there is a mismatch between the status of the unit in charge of coordinating the villagization programme and the concern of the regional state, villagization as a core development strategy.

An expert in the regional COBDVP Office interviewed in January 2019 asserted thatbasin development and villagization programme could play decisive roles in settling pastoralists in certain centers and to enable them benefit from development and good governance. For effective implementation of the programme, the office mandated to coordinate these activities should have to be organized with the status of a Bureau and manned with adequate manpower and experts. The head of the office have not been directly participating in the steering committee meetings and discussions because of its lower status, which could be one of the factors adversely affecting its coordinating capacity. It seems with this understanding that the regional state promoted the status of the office into commission in 2019.

Woreda administrations are responsible for the actual implementation of Villagization programme. In practice, the Woreda Agriculture Development Office is in charge of implementing the programme in selected Kebeles. Interviewees and focus group discussants underscored that structural problems of the office and lack of capacity have been adversely affecting the roles of the office in following up and control of activities related to the villagization programme. As one TeruWoreda official reflected:

> *Structurally, the Woreda Agriculture Development Office has different units: Woreda Disaster Prevention, Woreda Natural Resource, Villagization Programme and Pastoralist Community Development Programme are under the Woreda Agriculture Development Office. However, the office has no human resource capacity to properly discharge its responsibilities. The office is in charge of coordinating the villagization programme which its considered as the final strategy to ensure food security and sustainable development to the pastoralist communities. But due to multiple responsibilities it shoulder, absence of capable professionals and lack of focus to the villagization programme have lowered the performance of the office in coordinating the Villagization programme (Interview, 14 December 2018, Alelu).*

9.3.2.4. Lack of Inputs, Services and Infrastructures

Successful implementation of the villagization programme requires the fulfillment of the required inputs, socio-economic services and infrastructures. However, the practical experiences observed in many settlement villages in Afar region showed that lack of proper support on the federal government and inability of the Afar Regional State to supply social services and to construct infrastructures which would help to improve the living conditions of pastoralists has adversely affected the effectiveness of the villagization programme.

The villagization programme has been sponsored by the federal government, donors and the regional state. For instance, one of the projects working to improve the living conditions of pastoralists is Pastoralist Community Development Project (PCDP) and it has been largely sponsored by World Bank and IFAD. In 2003 this project commenced a five year project (2003-2008) having three phases with a planned project budget of 60 million US dollar (IFAD, 2016). The second phase was (2010-2014) and the budget for this phase was 138.7 million UD dollars: US$80 million from the World Bank/IDA (US$23.4 million loan and US$56.6 million grant); US$39 million from IFAD (half loan and half grant); regional Government contribution (US$5 million); and contribution from beneficiary communities (US$14.7 million in cash and in kind). The cost of PCDP III which started in 2017 was approximately US$233.5 million, consisting of:(i) an IFAD loan of US$85 million; (ii) an additional IFAD loan of US$15 million; (iii) co-financing of US$110 million from the World Bank/IDA, (iv) a government contribution of roughly US$18.6 million and; (iv) a contribution from beneficiaries of some US$4.9 million (IFAD, 2017). The Afar pastoralists had their own share from the above budget. PCDP was aimed at improving the livelihoods of Afar pastoralists and in other pastoralist areas.

Other NGOs like UNDP, USAID, and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) were also indirectly sponsoring the villagization programme. These organizations were funding the Production Safety Net Programme (PSNP), food aid and the provision of basic services (PGS). These services were provided in the settlement villages where pastoralists have been settled (Holm, 2015). Similarly, Solomon (2015) mentioned that PCDP is aimed at improving the livelihoods of pastoralists in Afar and other pastoralist areas. The project is designed in such a way to empower pastoralists as well as district and regional governments to better manage developments in pastoral areas.

Ethiopia's international donors were not seemed to oppose the villagization programme undertaken in Ethiopia. Their concern was to avoid violation of rights accompanied by the procedures of settling pastoralists. The 2012 report of Human Rights Watch seems to justify this:

> *Ethiopia's foreign donors have a complicated relationship with Ethiopia's villagization program. On the one hand, they clearly understand the risks associated with relocating large numbers of people and have actively encouraged the Ethiopian government to follow best practice and to refrain from using force. On the other hand, through their ongoing budgetary support to regional and local governments, they are, in part, paying for the construction of schools, health clinics, roads, and water facilities in the new villages. They are also funding agricultural programs directed towards resettled populations and the salaries of the local government officials who are implementing the policy. Encouraging the government to follow best practice and to avoid common abuses associated with resettlement programs such as expropriation, forced displacement, and violations of economic and social rights is positive. However, foreign aid agencies should ensure that their assistance is not contributing to the very same violations by underwriting abusive programs (HMR, 2012, p. 61).*

Membersinstitutions of the Federal Board and several Bureaus of Afar Regional State have been indirectly sponsoring the villagization programme. Federal institutions assigned their technical advisors and resources. The Regional Education Bureau coordinates schools in settlement villages, so did Health, Water, Pastoral-agriculture Bureaus. Moreover, the regional state assigned human and financial resources to the region's Coordination Office for Basin Development and Villagization Programme (COBDVP). However, participants of the interviews underscored that there was no auditing system which as a result, the budget allocated for the implementation of the villagization programme have net been properly used for intended purposes.

Pastoralists and agro-pastoralists living in different settlement villages in the three sample Woredas whom the researcher interviewed during the field visit in 2018 and 2019, underlined that the government promised them to supply agricultural in puts like seeds, fertilizers, axes, shovels, ant-pest chemicals, animal health vaccinations; socio-economic services such as schools, water supplies, clinics and health posts for the communities and their animals, electricity, mills and telecommunication as well as infrastructures like rural roads, bridges, irrigation schemes and markets. They further underscored that there are serious gaps between what the government promised to deliver and actual services provided as well as the

infrastructure assets available in all settlement villages. Based on the information gained through interview and focus group discussion it is possible to argue that it is hard to find a single settlement village which fulfilled all the necessary services and infrastructural assets. An expert in Terru Woreda Agriculture Development Office expressed that *"Government promises are attractive which as a result many pastoralists rushed to settlement villages. However, pastoralists desert the development centers/ villages due to absence of sustainable supply of socio-economic services*" (Interview 13 December, 2018, Alelu).

Absence of rural roads has been exacerbating the problems of pastoralists in various settlement villages.There are several Kebeles cut off from their respective Woreda administration during summer season due to floods. For instance, Romayitu, Mamule, Handeg and Ahayile Kebeles in Assaita Woreda; Keleat buri, Angelele, Halai-Debi and Gelsa Kebeles in Amibara Woreda; and Asabera, Barentu Boyna, Debaho, Dirma, Maramara and Mebay Kebeles in Teru Woreda have been separated from their respected Woredas between May and October. During summer time pastoralists cannot get the necessary professional support from different Woreda Offices because professionals cannot go to the settlement villages. Therefore, this problem has creating challenges in the implementation of the villagization programme and the process of adapting agriculture and modern way of rearing animals among the pastoralist communities. Moreover, regional state and Woreda standing committee members have not been able to conduct field visit to evaluate and comment on various activities being undertaken in settlement villages (Interview, 15 December, 2018, Alelu).

Lack of vehicles is also a serious problem hindering the communication between Woredas and their respective Kebeles. Participants of the interviews and focus group discussions in almost all offices in the three sample Woredas underscored that absence of vehicles has been challenging activities performed by experts of Woreda Offices not only during summer seasons but throughout the year. Some offices have old vehicles which mostly encountered technical and mechanical problems and sent to garage for maintenance where they stay for months. Other offices have no vehicles at all to transport professionals to settlement villages. Such offices borrow cars from other offices and use them by covering fuel cost by themselves. But these offices have to wait the time when vehicles left unused by owner offices. This implies that offices which have no vehicles cannot perform activities according to their own schedule.

Therefore, Woredas fail to provide appropriate support to settlement villages which is in turn reduce the effectiveness of villagization programme (Interview, December 2018, Alelu, Andido).

Access to agricultural markets and agricultural market information is essential for participating in agricultural markets. However, problem of agricultural marketing chain has been a serious problem in Afar region. For instance, Muluken et al., (2019) asserted that access to basic services in southern Afar is low, only 22.2% of the households had access to markets near their villages and the majority of the households (77.8%) usually travel long distances to sell their cattle and camels. Professionals working in the regional Pastoral and Agriculture Development Bureau and Woreda Agriculture Development Offices underscored that poor access to markets by pastoralists is attributed to poor road infrastructure, lack of means of transportation, and lack of agricultural market information. They contend that the Regional Bureau and Woreda Offices have weak performance in creating marketing chain to pastoralists. For instance, agro-pastoralists in Berga settlement village in Assaita Woreda and Halai-Debi settlement village in Amibara Woreda reported that they produce tomatoes, peper and cotton. But these products have been rotten on their farm due to lack of access to market. In practice, agro-pastoralists have not been getting fair share of their produce which as a result they failed to consider agriculture as their main economic activity.

The villagization programme implemented in Afar Regional State and its benefit to pastoralists presented and described above, was further substantiated by the quantitative data. Table 36.9 below, portrays the respondents' evaluation of the benefits villagization to Afar pastoralist

Table 126.9: Benefits the Villagization Programme

The Villagization programme has benefitted Afar pastoralists and agro-pastoralists			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Agree	67	19.1
	Disagree	283	80.9
	Total	350	100.0

As we infer from Table 36.9 above, respondents were asked about the benefit of the villagization programme to Afar pastoralists. Accordingly, the majority 283(80.9%) of the respondents contend that the villagization programme did not benefit the Afar People. And the remaining 67 (19.1) of the respondents have expressed their agreement. Through cross tabulation respondents who contend that the Afars have not been benefitted from the villagization programmes were asked to explain their justification as shown in the following table.

Table 137.9: Justification for the less benefit obtained from the Villagization Programme

If your answer to the above question (Table.36.9) is disagreement, what do you think as to why Afars have not been benefitted from villagization Programme?				
		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Disagree	Pasture and arable lands on which the livelihood of pastoralists depend have been used for investment	265	25.8%	93.6%
	The regional state government has been unable to fulfill socio-economic services in the settlement villages	271	26.4%	95.8%
	Accessibility to range lands and watering points has been increasingly hampered by the invasion of Prosopis	256	25.0%	90.5%
	The regional state government settle pastoralists in areas which are not conducive for living	234	22.8%	82.7%
Total		1026	100.0%	362.6.%

As we infer from Table 37.9 above, the justifications for why respondents contend that the Afar people have not been benefitted from the villagization programme. Accordingly, 265 (93.3%) of the respondents, contend that loss of pasture and arable lands for investors is one of the contributing factors. 271 (95.8%) of the respondents mentioned that the villagization programme did not benefit pastoralists because of absence of socio-economic services in areas where they are made to settle. According to 256(90.5%) of the respondents, the expansion of Prosopis and blocking of range lands and water points has hampered the movement of pastoralists. For 234(82.7%) of the respondents, contend that pastoralists have not been benefitted from the villagization program due to the settlement of pastoralists in areas which are not conducive for living. Therefore, both the qualitative and quantitative data attest that the benefit of villagization

programme to the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in Afar regional state is less when compared with the rhetoric success report of the federal and regional state governments.

In chapter one and chapter two of this paper it was described that decentralizing political and fiscial power, enhancing the implementation capacity of the leadership and accelerating the socio-economic development of the developing regional states was the development strategy of the federal government. It was with this understanding that the federal government considered villagization as a means of ensuring food security and development in pastoral areas. However, absence of preparation to provide the required support on the part of the federal government and inadequency of the awareness creation to the community as well as lack of commitment on the part of the regional leadership at all levels makes the purpose of the implementation programme in Afar Regional State far from success.

9.4. Conclusion

Although governments failed to achieve their rhetoric purpose successive Ethiopian regimes had implemented villagization programme as a development strategy. The government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia continued the Resettlement Programme because it considered the programme as a major instrument of ensuring food security. Unlike the experience of past regimes, the government of EPRDF implemented intra-regional resettlement programme because the institutionalization of ethnic federalism since 1991 has created friction and mistrust among various ethnic groups which make inter-regional resettlement programme difficult. The resettlement programme has been one of the priority areas by the national development policy because it is believed that villagization programme will change under-utilized land into economic use, ensure food security and improve the socio-economic life the relocated communities in particular and the economic growth of the country in general .

Villagization programme has been given special focus in pastoralist areas of Ethiopia because food insecurity and poverty have been considered as pervasive and deep in pastoral communities. The Ethiopian Resettlement Policy Framework document has identified several development challenges faced by pastoralist communities and considered pastoralism as a transitory livelihood strategy rather than a permanent way of life that pastoralists have to stay with. Similarly the Afar Regional State Rural Land Use and Administration Policy and Strategy document underscored that creating suitable environment to settle pastoralists has become an urgent and important task to bring about development and good governance in the region. It was with this intension that villagization programme has been carried out in Afar Regional State.

The villagization programme implemented in Afar Region is far from success because the federal government has failed to give appropriate support to implement the programme, negative attitude among leaders at different levels and local community towards the programme, capacity limitation on the part of regional leaders, misappropriation of resources, absence of properly organized structure to coordinate the implementation of the programme, lack of infrastrucures, facilities and in puts in the settlement villages/villages and failure of the regional state government to put into practicethe rhetoric water-based settlement of pastoralists. Rather, patoralists were made to settle in areas selected by regional leaders which make the settlement of pastoralists simply location change.

Chapter Ten

Environmental Challenges

10. Introduction

The preceding chapters dealt with the various manmade factors adversely affecting the socio-economic development of the Afar Regional State. This chapter describes the environmental challenges affecting the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State by taking the invasion of Prosopis in the region into consideration. Accordingly, this chapter is organized into three sections including the introductory section. Section two shades light on the invasion of ProsopisJuliflora in Afar Regional State, its impacts on the environment and on the socio-economic of development of the Regional State. It also described that Prosopis has been posing health challenges for the pastoralists and their animals. This section also mentioned the difficulties encountered in the control and management of Prosopis. The final section sections draw the conclusion.

10.1. The Invasion of ProsopisJuliflora in Afar Region

ProsopisJuliflora (henceforth referred as Prosopis) is a fast growing, drought resistant and invasive evergreen tree of South America, the Caribbean, and Central American origin which spread to most arid and semi-arid areas of the world. Currently, *Prosopis*has become the worst weed in Pastoral and agro-pastoral communities of Ethiopia, Kenya and generally in the eastern part of Africa (Mwangi, and Swallow, 2008).

Prosopis has several peculiar features which made it grow tremendously and covering large areas within a short period of time than any woody species within its niche such as "*tolerance of arid conditions and saline soils, fast growing, nitrogen-fixing, rooting abilities, coping abilities, ability to stay dormant for longer time in a soil and germinate during favorable conditions, number of seeds/pod, sweetness of pods, made it grow tremendously, covering large areas within a short time than any woody species within its niche"(*FARM Africa, 2008,p.6*).* According to Prasad and Tewari (2016) Prosopis speciesonce they are established and are able to tap groundwater or any other water source during the first years, they have the capacity to adapt areas with low rainfall and long periods of drought.

Existing evidences suggest that *Prosopis*was introduced to Ethiopia in the early 1980s purposely for the sake of tackling the challenge of desertification in over grazed arid and semi-arid areas (Abdulahi et al., 2017). Similarly, Rettberg (2014) mentioned that the intentional introduction of Prosopis to the Ethiopian lowlands during the Derg regime was part of its environmental rehabilitation campaign in which the planting of Prosopis was conceived as an afforestation measure to halt desertification processes in dry land areas. Local administrators were ordered to plant Prosopis seedlings around state farms and in few permanent settlements in the vicinity of these farms for the benefit of governmental agriculture and the settled population (mostly migrant workers from the highlands). Therefore, Ethiopian regimes had no intension of improving the livelihood of mobile Afar pastoralists when they introduced Prosopis into the Afar lowlands. However, in the process the best areas in terms of agro-ecological conditions, the wetlands, large floodplain areas along the Awash River were affected. These were areas where seasonally flooded fertile soils provided abundant grazing opportunities for pastoralists as well as a good potential for irrigation agriculture (Ibid). Therefore, Prosopis was introduced into Afar region without giving due attention to the invasive nature of the plant which as a result it rapidly spread throughout the country and in particular in dry lands and along water courses overtaking critical dry season grazing areas and irrigable land (FDRE, 2017).

In Ethiopia areas most adversely affected by the spread of Prosopis include Afar and Somali Regional States, and around Dire Dawa City. Moderately affected areas also found in Amhara, Oromia, Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) and Tigray Regions. Because of its rapid invasion, wider area coverage and its adverse effects in infected areas, Prosopisbecame a number one priority invasive weed in Ethiopia (DFID, 2005; Abdulahi et al., 2017). According to Admasu (2008), in 2006 about 700,000 hectare of land in the country was invaded by Prosopis out of which more than 70% is located in Afar region mainly within the Middle and Lower Awash Valley.

Prosopis particularly became a huge issue for populations in semi-arid lands, reducing pasture for livestock, blocking access to water, causing physical harm, and creating other negative impacts (ASSAR, 2018). In this regard Tewodros (2015) asserted that Prosopisplant has emerged as a major invader of the arid and semi-arid regions of Ethiopia. In a parallel with Tewodros' assertion, Zeraye (2015) argued that the ecological vulnerability in the fragile

ecosystem where pastoralists and agro-pastoralists have lived for centuries has been exacerbated by the invasion of Prosopis which made livestock rearing extremely difficult.

Research evidences show that Prosopis has been causing, social, economic and environmental harm since its introduction into Ethiopia in general and into the dry land areas in Particular (Abdulahi et al., 2017; Zeraye, 2015). It has inflicted heavy damage on various types of land use such as rangelands, farm lands, flood plains, routes, dwellings and in particular it threatened the livelihoods of pastoral and agro-pastoral communities. It has been also invading parts of wildlife reserves and National Parks threatening biodiversity (FDRE, 2017).

The data obtained from the Afar Regional State Agricultural Pastoral Development Bureau revealed that Prosopis was introduced into the region before thirty years and it was first planted in Dire Dawa and in Amibara Woreda. It was deliberately brought to the area for conservation purpose (Haregeweyn et al., 2013). However, it gradually became an aggressive plant invading all areas especially rangelands and it discouraged the growth of other species in areas where it grew well and it covered 1.2 million hectare of land in Afar Region and it is estimated that the rapidexpansionofProsopishasreachedthealarmingrateof50,000 hectare per year (Beruk, 2014). According to (Haregeweyn,etal., 2013), it wasestimated that the area covered by ProsopisJulifloracould increase to 145.81 km2 (27.62 %) andfurther to 163.06 km2 (30.89 %) by the years 2015 and 2020 respectively in Amibara Woreda.

A research carried out by a team of researchers organized by Addis Ababa University Water and Land Resource Center, in 2019 on the current distribution of Prosopis, land use changes, water use of Prosopis and its impact in the Afar region further strengthened the above idea. It revealed out that Prosopis has invaded an area of about 1.2 million hectare of land over the past 31 years (1986- 2017) which constituted 12.3% of the total regional area. The research further elaborated that the invasion increased much faster after 2000 which as a result 300,000 hectare of grassland changed to bare-land, 450,000 hectare of bush-shrub-woodland changed to bare-land and more than 600,000 hectare of grassland disappeared (more than 50% changed to *Prosopis*invaded land). Regarding water use, this research revealed that, a Prosopis tree use 7 liters of ground water per a day and from invaded area, Prosopis trees use and loss ca.8.321 billion mm/day from through sap flow and ca.9.055 billion mm/day through evapo-transpiration, which is equivalent to 3.3 billion m^3 of water per year which could irrigate 400,000-450,000 hectare of

cottonfarmland (7000 m^3 of water can irrigate 1 hectare for cotton) (Hailu, etal., 2019).As one senior agricultural expertise of the regional Agricultural Pastoral Development Bureau put it, "*Prosopis causes loss of soil moisture and increasingly drier conditions leading to land degradation and desertification as well as loss of biodiversity. In doing so, it eroded the natural resources on which the livelihood of pastoralists depends on"(Interview 14 January, 2018, Semera).*

10.2. Socio-Economic and Environmental Impact of ProsopisJuliflora in Afar Region

The 2018 reports of Afar Regional State Pastoral and Agriculture Development Bureau pointed out that the Afar region has been seriously affected by the invasion of Prosopis. At present 20 Woredas of the region are affected by the adverse effects of Prosopis at different levels. The magnitude of the problem related to the invasion of Prosopis is worse in Woredas found in Zone 1 and Zone 3. The report of the Bureau mentioned that 60% of the land in most affected Woredas like Amibara, Gewane, Awash Fentale and Bure Medayitu has been covered by Prosopis plant.). According to Herrie (2014), the invasion of Prosopis has been rated as the second most important ecological problem next to reduced volume of Awash River.

Rettberg (2014) mentioned that the uncontrolled floodwaters are a major agent for the spread of *Prosopis*seeds to new areas. Similarly, pastoralists interviewed in the three selected Woredas explained that the main mechanisms for the spread of Prosopis in the region include animals (both domestic and wild), rivers and water flow through irrigation channels. Animals eat the pods that contain the seeds. The seeds get released into the land through the animals' dung, where they germinate after rain.

Prosopis invasion is threatening the livelihood of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists due to loss of pasture and indigenous trees and destruction of croplands (Hailu, *et al*., 2004). In general, the impact of the rapid expansion of Prosopis has brought significant social, economic, and environmental risks to people in Afar regionwhich are discussed under the following sub-topics.

10.2.1. Social Consequences/Impacts

The social consequences that come as a result of the invasion of Prosopis in Afar region include animaland human health problems, increased incidences of malaria, displacement of the community from their residence areas as well as exposure to wild animals (Interview, 21 December, 2018, Andido).

The impact of Prosopis on the agricultural economy of the cattle rearing pastoralist communities is critical. Pastoralists and agro-pastoralists whom the researcher interviewed in the selected Woredas in December 2018 and March 2019 witnessed that the number and productivity of animal resources of the region has been decreasing from time to time as a result of the invasion of Prosopis. According to a pastoralist from Assaita Woreda, Galifahge Kebele, the health, quality and productivity of their animals has been increasingly declining since the introduction of Prosopis into their locality. According to him, the toxic thorns of Prosopis have been causing injuries and damage on the eyes and feet of animals. Sometimes they see that the jaws of animals get deformed and their teeth fall out which reduced their grazing ability. The animals become thinner and thinner until their final death due to underfeeding. Moreover, after injuries animals are exposed to serious infections which adversely affect their health condition. When animals consumed high amount of the pods of Prosopis, they encountered indigestion problems. These combined effects of Prosopis have been resulted in death of animals (Interview, 14 December, 2018, Assaita).

Research findings on the impacts of feeding on the pods of Prosopis agree with the above idea of pastoralists. For instance, Inkermann (2014) stated that animals are subjected to problems of digestion as a result of eating too many of the pods of Prosopis. According to him, this animal disease is known as Harmaku which gradually lead to deformation of animal jaws and death. Similarly, Abiyot and Getachew (2006) alsoasserted that ingestion of the pod over long periods of time will result in death of cattle and stomach poisoned by the pod may induce a permanent impairment of the ability to digest cellulose.

In the same fashion, a pastoralist, resident of Amibara Woreda, Halay-Dege Kebele voiced the impact of Prosopis on livestock as:

> *In the past grasses were growing well in our Kebele and the whole land was covered by grasses which grew equal to human height. Our Kebele was known for its high numberof animals.The introduction of Prosopis into our area has changed the situation. No grass has been growing in areas invaded by Prosopis which as a result our animals have been forced to feed on the leaves, pods(seeds) ofProsopis and they become sick, getting thin and thinnerand they keep on dying. We cannot tie calves under the shadow of the Prosopis because if it pierces their body, it is impossible to pluck the thorn (pulling and releasing the thorn). When we want to use the shadow of the plant for us, there is something which causes irritation on our skin. Even though we tried to make use of the plant, its advantage is less when compared with its adverse effects (Interview,23 December, 2018, Andido).*

Another pastoralist resident of Bedula'Ali Kebele in Amibara Woreda also explained that the number of animals that each households had continuously decreased due to recurrent drought which has been claiming the lives of their animals and the death that come as the result of feeding too much of Prosopis pods. He further elaborated that in the past, they had hundreds of cattle, however, the number of animal resources decreased from time to time due to the deterioration pasture lands. Due to the increasing food insecurity caused by the loss of their animal resources, they have been forced to drop out of our traditional lifestyle and try to diversify their livelihood by engaging in other income earning activities (Interview, 22 December, 2018, Andido).

Another pastoralist in Teru Woreda Berentu Kebele explained that the invasion of Prosopis has resulted in the reduction of the number of animals and milk productivity at alarming rate. He further elaborated that their pastoral way of life has been endangered for the last two decades since their cattle have been killed by the invasive Prosopis. According to him,Prosopis has double blades through which it cut their livelihood. It devastated their grazing lands and denied their cattle to have access to pasture. He mentioned that initially they were not aware of its adverse effects and hence they felt happy when they see that their cattle feed on its pods during drought seasons. Few of their animals that survived the devastative drought of 2015 died even after the drought season ended. Later they realized that their cattle became sick, getting weak

and thin until their final death as a result of consuming pods for prolonged time (Interview, 13 December, 2018, Alelu).

The other social consequence of Prosopis is its impact on human health. Various research findings (Herrie, 2014; Inkermann, 2014; Abdulahi et al., 2017) revealed that Prosopis has been severely affecting the health conditions of pastoral communities. For instance, according to Herrie (2014) who conducted a research on the socio-economic and ecological impactsof *ProsopisJulifloral*invasion inGewane and Buremudaytu Woredasof the Afar Region, the impact of Prosopis on human health has complex nature. He elaborated it as follows:

> *The thorns of the plant are inflicting wounds on legs, hands and eyes causing blindness, lameness and even amputation of legs and hands due to infection of wounds. People are becoming disabled and could not perform their day-to-day duties and are exposed for food insecurity. People especially children, women and the elderly are suffering from malnutrition causes by the shortage of milk at household level. Additionally, their immunity level is very poor and thus they easily succumb to diseases. Children feeding on the Prosopis-Juliflorapods are suffering from impaction and constipation (Herrie, 2014, p. 120).*

Participants of FGD supported the above idea. During the discussion, pastoralists living in Amibara Woreda, Sediha-fage Kebele asserted that the encroachment of Prosopis into their farms and settlement areas has been inflicting heavy harm on the health of the local community.For instance, one of the participants of the discussion reflected:

> *Our children like to eat the pods of Prosopis for their test but it leads to constipation. The thorns of Prosopis are very poisonous and people thrust by the thorns of Prosopis have been getting sick or may get permanent disability. Although the thorns of Prosopis inflict harm on all categories of people, it has been causing more health problems on women than men because of their interaction with the environment. Women are in charge of domestic chores such as nourishing the family, collecting water and fire wood, looking after small livestock as well as building traditional houses. Six years ago, the thorn of Prosopis thrust the leg of my wife while she was collecting firewood. We were able to pull out the thorn after few days. But she encountered permanent disability due to the poisoning effect of the thorn (FGD, 26 December, 2018, Andido).*

The other health problem related to the invasion of Prosopis is the increased incidences of malaria. Pastoralists interviewed in the three Woredas mentioned that in spite of the efforts of the regional state government to control malaria disease, it remained to be one of the serious health problems among pastoralist communities. The national strategic document for the control and management of Prosopis substantiate the ideas forwarded by the interviewees. According to the

document the incidence of malaria is said to have increased due to a moister microclimate than before (FDRE, 2017). Some research findings further strengthened this idea. For instance, Herrie reflected "The high humidity and ambient temperature favors the breeding of mosquitoes and hence facilitates the spread of malaria in affected areas*" (Herrie, 2014, p.120).*

The other socio-economic problem caused by the invasion of Prosopis is its effect of deterring mobility. According to Assefa,et al.,(2010)*ProsopisJuliflora* has invaded the critical resource of the Afar rangelands. During the interview community members highlighted that Prosopis trees form dense stands, making it impossible for animals (sheep, goats, cattle and camel) to move through and graze.

The other social effect of Prosopis in infested areas is the extra manpower it requires to care their herds. In line with this idea, a pastoralist from Sideha-faghe Kebele in Amibara Woreda reflected that a herd which was used to be care by one person before the introduction of Prosopis, now demands more people to protect cattle from entering into dense thickets on their way to grazing sites. This is because it is difficult to get cattle out once they get into a dense thicket (Interview 27 December, 2019, Andido)..

The other social problem caused by Prosopis is displacement of pastoralists from their settlement areas. A pastoralist from Assaita Woreda Galigage Kebele underlined that their economic life has been severely affected by the fast encroachment of Prosopis into their rangeland, farms and villages. According to him, the local communities were happy twenty years ago when the new drought resistant tree, prosopis was introduced into their area because it can grew well in the absence of rain. This was because they thought it could provide food for their animals and in regulating the climatic condition of the dry areas. However, they later saw that it grew well even during drought seasons while other types of grasses, shrubs and trees gradually vanished. Grasses and other types of plants cannot grow around Prosopis. It was later that they began to understand that the tree has been adversely affecting the basis of their livelihood. their animals feed its seedpods where the small sized and hard seeds which are able to pass the digestive system of animals (remained undigested) and fall on the soil together with animal dung, which helping the spread of the plant across their grazing lands. It remained dormant for years until it got favorable condition to germinate. Then, it grew faster and spread over vast areas in a short time. Nowadays, it encroached to their villages. Since their individual effort could not enable

them to stop its rapid expansion, they repeatedly reported to the government about the harm it caused on them and their animals. However, the efforts made so far by different stakeholders, could not help to control its spread. They have a threat that the invading tree will force them to leave their residence with no hope of returning back unless some kind of solution is designed ahead of their decision(Interview 17 November,2018, Assaita).

Another agro-pastoralist, a resident of the same Kebele also strengthened the above assertion as stated:

> *Life in the settlement villages has become very challenging for us. The government has taken our grazing land for the construction of dam and dyke for its Sugar Project at Tendaho. Then there is the "Devil Tree" (referring to Prosopis) which covered the floodplains upon which our lives depend. It formed thorny impenetrable thickets which blocked the movement of our animals to places where pasture is available. Now it encroached and even covered our dwellings. Our children have no place to play. We came to this settlement village to get access to water and other infrastructures. This time there is no place to go. The tree has taken over everything of us. We tried to manage it mechanically (uprooting the tree) but unable to reclaim the grass lands, crop farms and routes. Now we are thinking of leaving our residence to find out less affected areas where we can settle (Interview, 18 November, 2018, Assaita).*

The adverse effect of the rapid expansion of Prosopis is similar in other Woredas. An agro-pastoralist and resident of the town of Ellu-wuha inAdaar Woreda along Mille-Bati road whom the researcher met by chance at Semera in November 2018 described the threat posed by the expansion of Prosopis in the town and its surrounding. He reported that indigenous trees and the rangelands ruined giving space to the newcomer and fast invading Prosopis plant. Initially, they were not aware of the nature of the new drought resistant plant, Prosopis. The vegetation cover in their locality gradually vanished due to recurrent drought and Prosopis trees grew well in place. The plantencroached the town from all directions and grew on every available free space in the town and blocked pathways and short cuts. They tried to halt its encroachment but the task became beyond their capacity. According to him, they repeatedly asked the government to help them in clearing the threatening plant. But no action put in place so far and now the town is almost covered by Prosopis which halted their movement within the town and their cattle cannot move to nearby areas where they could getpasture(Interview, 11 November, 2018, Semera).

In an interview conducted with ESAT on 5 October 2017, the chairman of Afar Human Rights Organization explained the suffering of Afar Pastoralists as the result of the invasion of their surrounding by Prosopis. He asserted that Prosopis has invaded all areas along the Awash Valley where it claimed rangelands and hence animals have no grass to eat. On the other hand, Afar pastoralists are prohibited not to appear or move along road sides with their cattle. But it has to be noted that pastoralists who lost their grazing land have to cross the road to search for new livelihood opportunities or move to new grazing areas, which raises the risk of land conflicts with other pastoralists and farmers. This discrepancy between orders of the government and the social reality on the ground, the problems of pastoralists, need to be reconciled. Pastoralists have been struggling with nature to make a living in the harsh climatic conditions. Furthermore, he raised an important question "*who could understand the misery of Afar pastoralists and give them justice?*"

10.2.2. Economic Consequences/ Impacts

Most of the Afar people are pastoralists whose livelihood and income sources are based on the rearing of animals. On the other hand, the sustainability and productivity of animal husbandry is determined mainly by the supply and quality of pasture in the region. The spread of Prosopis has been ever endangering the future fate of the pastoralist community by devastating their economic base (pasture lands). An overview of the impact of Prosopis on the economic life of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in the selected Woredas could reflect the economic situation of Afars reg. A 57 years old pastoralist living in Assaita Woreda, Kede-bura Kebele expressed how the invasion of Prosopis has changed their life from bad to worse. He explained that in the past, one pastoralist could have up to hundred cows or some had fifty. However, people who have had a several number of livestock in the past, have one cow, or might have two cows today. Prosopis has killed their animals directly through its poisoning effect or indirectly by denying them access to have water and pasture. Now pastoralists are leading destitute way of life. They became aid dependent after losing their resources (Interview, 8 November, 2018, Assaita).

In line with this view, an educatedAfar, lecturer at Semera University asserted that the Afar people gone from very well of to be a community who are living in malnutrition, stricken by thirsty and hunger, stricken by herd lost, not being able to get into the market and the whole thing is challenging for them. They need long term support to bring about change and to enable

them move out of the vicious circle of poverty (Interview, 21 Feburary, 2018, Semera University).

According to Halai-deghe Kebele administrator in Amibara Woreda, in the past there were no trees in the Kebele and the whole land was covered by grasses. The grasses which grew over vast areas in the Kebele were comfortable for cattle, sheep, goats and camels as well as to herbaceous wild animals. Pastoralists were competing in the number of cattle they owned. He further elaborated that the introduction of the invasive plant, Prosopis, has drastically changed the situation. Prosopis invades the grazing lands and the rate of its expansion is progressive (expanding very fast). Now more than 80,000 hectare of land of the Kebele is covered by Prosopis plant and the residents of the Kebele have been severely affected. The number of cattle and camels that individual households possess reduced. Pastoralists are forced to live in poverty due to the loss of their animals that resulted from the loss of pastureland (Interview, 27 December, 2018, Andido).

Research findings substantiate the above idea. For instance, Admasu (2008) underscored that livestock production and productivity has been significantly declined due to loss of dry season grazing areas by *Prosopis*plants. The amount of total milk obtained from cattle, sheep, goat and camel in a given lactation period has shown considerable reduction. In the same fashion, an agro-pastoralist from Halai-Debi Kebele in Amibara Woreda stated that their Kebele was identified as "*the land of milk*". He further mentioned that meat, butter and milk were the main food items in their diet. However, this situation is completely changed today due to the invasion of Prosopis and the accompanied loss of grazing lands which in turn caused reduction in the number of animals and their productivity. According to Herrie (2014) the invasion of Prosopis has been also hindering crop production by claiming agricultural lands and serving as a hiding place for crop pests and wild animals.

The situation in Teru Woreda is also similar. Pastoralists who participated in the FGD during the field work underscored that the adverse effect of the invasion of Prosopis is well felt in many of the Kebeles in the Woreda. A pastoralist resident of Awidi Kebele asserted that their pasture lands are highly invaded by Prosopis trees. The number and productivity of their animals declined from time to time due to diseases and malnutrition caused by the invasion ofProsopis. This is because Prosopis formed a dense canopy prohibiting their animals from grazing. They

further mentioned that drought has been challenging their life before the introduction of Prosopis into their living areas. But these days the combined effects of the two has been threatening their livelihood than ever before. Today, there are people who have no cattle at all. Had it not been the aid provided through the safety-net program, many of them would have died probably years ago (FGD, 15 November, 2018, Alelu).

An expert in the Regional Pastoral Agriculture Development Bureau reported that the Afar region is known for its irrigation development next to its animal resources. He pointed out that the region has several medium and large government irrigation projects and private investments along the courses of the Awash River. However, the sustainability and profitability of these sectors have been facing serious challenges as the result of the invasion of Prosopis plant. He further mentioned that government lands are least invaded by Prosopis when compared with private investors and individual agro-pastoralists. This was mainly because these lands are continuously being used (Interview, 12 March, 2018, Semera). In this regard, Yohannes (2014) asserted that irrigated agricultural land can remain useful if it is continuously cultivated. Otherwise, *Prosopis*aggressively invades the land and converts it to dense shrub-land within a short period of time.

Preparation of land for cultivation is a labor-intensive task. Due to its laborious nature, individual agro-pastoral households producing crops through irrigation find it difficult to clear Prosopis which reclaimed their farm after every production cycle. Agro-pastoralists from Berga Kebele of Assaita Woreda who participated in the FGD expressed how producing crops is tiresome while at the same time struggling against the encroachment of Prosopis. They explained that Prosopis covers most of the land which they have been using it for different livelihood activities. They have been producing Tomatoes, Onion, Pepper, cotton and Maize using water from Awash River. The supply of water to the soil both during land preparation and cultivation phases creates favorable conditions for Prosopis. Prosopis has been growing well along irrigation channel which supply water to their farms and in areas where water is available. It tookover farm lands if they are left uncultivated for a short time. Therefore, always they have to be available around their farms to check the invasion of Prosopis.

They asserted that managing and controlling as well as eradicating Prosopis plant is difficult and time consuming (FGD, 14 November, 2018, Assaita). The same Idea was reinstated by (Herrie, 2014, p.120) *"Land cleared for crop production is always reclaimed by ProsopisJulifloraduring fallow period and hence agro-pastoralists are required to clear land every season they want to cultivate crop*".

Tendaho Sugar Project which is expected to support the realization of the country's growth and transformation plan couldnot be free from the adverse impacts of the invasion of Prosopis plant. Although Prosopis has been identified as drought resistant species, its growth and land coverage following the direction of the water drainage system is greater than areas far away from the system. Regarding this issue, one junior manager of the factory reported that the growth and greenness of the Prosopis plant is greater on the right and left side of irrigation channels which supply water to Tendah Sugar Factory. Clearing the channels has been a routine activity to protect Prosopis from invading channels and the farms where sugarcane grows. However, the factory stopped its function since May 2019 due to lack of sugarcane supply and Prosopis has reclaimed the whole farm since it was left uncultivated only for few months (Interview, 10 November, 2018, Tendah Sugar Factory).

10.2.3. Environmental Consequences/ Impacts

Prosopis has been threatening the environment or biodiversity in many ways. Decline of the number and variety of wild animals in pastoral areas is one of its adverse effects. The strong and dangerous thorns of Prosopis plant which has the character of controlling the ground and growing sideways make the invaded areas difficult for the movement and sheltering of wild animals and subject them to death and migration. The spread of Prosopis is also one of the contributing factors for the reduction of domestic animals in Afar region. In this regard, Inkermann (2014) contend that decrease of grazing areas together with animal diseases has been leading to the decline of the livestock herd sizes. He elaborated that the reduction of livestock in the region shifted the situation of food security from periodic food insecurity to chronic. He further noted that the roots and fruits of indigenous trees were used as supplementary food supply. However, such trees disappeared in the region due to the invasion of Prosopis which in turn worsened food security.

Piguet (2002) asserted that ProsopisJuliflorachased away all valuable vegetation and endangers biodiversity. In line with this, one of the senior experts in the field of agriculture mentioned that Prosopis forms thorny impenetrable thickets along water courses, floodplains, road sides and inhabited areas. It has been also encroaching upon paths, irrigation schemes, and crop farms. By so doing, it has been significantly affecting rural livelihood and local biodiversity.

According to asenior expert in Amibara Woreda Civil Service and Capacity Building Office, the Afar people love their environment and they knew every trees and grasses grew in their locality. They never destroy the environment, trees, grasses or whatever around. Instead, they want to preserve it and they have rules and regulations in their tradition which had enabled them to rear large stock size at times where there was no drought. Now the situation is completely changed due to the rapid expansion of Prosopis at the expense of important trees and grasses which in turn threatened the livelihood of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists by further complicating livestock food shortage and hindering crop production (Interview, 23 December, 2018, Andido).

Still another interviewee further elaborated the ecological impact of Prosopis. According to him, there were different varieties of trees and grasses in Afar region. However, they disappeared following the introduction of Prosopis plant in the region. In areas where it spread, Prosopis has destroyed natural grazing lands, displaced indigenous trees, and led to fewer and lower quality rangeland sites available to pastoralists. Prosopis is water consuming species and has very deep root system and this nature has enabled it to take over the lands which once were covered by grasses and various species of trees.

The same idea was reinstated by one pastoralist resident of Berentu Kebele in Teru Woreda stated:

> *The Woyane tree (Prosopis) which covered our pastureland and farms has forced us to change our seasonal mobility. In the past, when our environment get inundated by the flood coming from Amhara Region, we were moving to Digdiga (another Kebele in the same Woreda) with our cattle and pass the rainy season there. Then when winter comes, we move back to our Kebele where we get the grass grew well. But this time, we cannot keep on that traditional mobility within our Woreda because our land is already claimed by Prosopis. Since the pasture in Digdiga Kebele could not serve our cattle beyond the summer season, we migrated up to 150 kilometers to Assaita, Dubti and Chifra Woredas to get pasture and help our cattle survive. (*Interviewed on 15 March 2019, Alelu).

Pastoralists living in Galifage Kebele in Assaita Woreda who participated in FGD asserted that the Woyane tree destroys everything upon which their livelihood depends on. It invaded areas which were covered by grass, herbs, and shrubs, trees, overtaking pasture land and reducing its productivity. The number of animals they had reduced from time to time due to loss of pasture. Prosopis grew well along livestock routes where their animals regularly migrating from one place to another and hence movement in search of grazing lands and water points became difficult at times when it is critical and leaving our residence became a must. This is because the densely growing Prosopis created blockage denying both humans and animals access to roads and water points (FGD, 13 November, 2018, Galifage).

According to an expert in the regional Bureao of Pastoral and Agricultural Development, the Afar called Prosopis '*Woyane Tree'* because they made a kind of analogy between the characteristics of Woyane (which TPLF called itself when it started its struggle) and Prosopis. According to this analogy, Woyane entered into Afar Region without their will, exploit all available resources of their region and prosper itself at the expenses of the Afar People. Similarly, the nature of Prosopis was not clearly understood by the Afar when it was introduced into their area. But it soon became invasive, covered the resource base of pastoralists (Farms, rangelands and water points) and grew well and thereby it worsened the living conditions of the Afar people (Interview, 6 March, 2018, Semera).

Land degradation is the other ecological impact of the invasion of Prosopis in the Afar region. In the past, pastoralists were able to maximize the use of available pasture lands through their traditional mobility. However, participants of the interview and focus group discussants reported that the mobility patterns of men and women have been heavily impacted by the spread of Prosopis. These days the spread of Prosopis has been halting the movement of men to faraway places with their camel and cattle in search of water and grazing. Therefore, unlike the past, today pastoralists have fewer places to go. Because of that they are forced to use the same grazing area for longer time periods and this has been causing environmental degradation. In this regard, Helland (2015) asserted that the encroachment of Prosopis has been further exacerbating the loss of high-quality rangelands. Similarly, according to (Assefa et al., 2010) the rapid expansion of Prosopis is very critical in almost all parts of Afar region since it has invaded the critical resource of the Afar rangelands. In the same way, another researcher mentioned that dry

and wet season grazing lands, agricultural lands, riverbanks and settlement areas of Afar region are increasingly facing the threat of Prosopis invasion (Zeraye, 2008).

Herrie's explanation regarding the impacts of Prosopis seems more comprehensive:

> *The survival of livestock has been also endangered by the high number of wild predators (lions and hyenas) hiding in the thick bushes of ProsopisJuliflora. People have been thus discouraged to continue with livestock production and hence opted for other livelihood systems mainly crop production, charcoal making, petty trade and selling labor to some extent. However, crop production too is being seriously constrained by the negative impacts of ProsopisJuliflora. Land cleared for crop production is always reclaimed by ProsopisJulifloraduring fallow period and hence agro-pastoralists are required to clear land every season they want to cultivate crop. Hence crop production is becoming laborious and discouraging business (Herrie, 2014, p.120)*

The invasion of Prosopis has also adverse effects on the water resource development in Afar region. According to one agricultural expert, the roots of Prosopis grew deep into the soil in search of water. Naturally the Afar region has erratic rainfall and it has been obtaining water sources from the neighboring highland drainages. The growth of dense thickets of Prosopis along the Awash River has been contributing for the reduction of the volume of water. If it continued to expand more without being controlled, it will destroy the whole dry season grazing lands which in turn will exacerbate the suffering of Afar pastoralists. In this regard (Patnaik et al., *2017.p.489*) asserted that the "*Encroachment upon water bodies by Prosopisinterferes with drainage, and exacerbates flooding"*. The increase of the volume of the Awash River which caused unprecedented flooding in the summer of 2020(July-September) and the displacement of more than 143, 000 Afars could confirm the above assertion.

Although Prosopis is identified as drought resistant species, its growth and land coverage of the plant following the direction of the water drainage system is different from faraway places. For instance, the growth and greenness of the Prosopis is greater on the right and left side of the irrigation channel which supply water to Tendaho Sugar Factory. Similarly, the Prosopis coverage on the sides of Mille River which flows near the town of Logia also shows this reality. Here along the banks of the Mille River the quantity, height and greenness of the plant increases very much. If the expansion of this plant which has long roots with the tendency of germinating along the water sources is not halted, it will have a serious impact on the water resources of the region. In general, all the available research findings of different authors and the data obtained

from the participants of this research showed that the rapid expansion of Prosopis has become the major socio-economic and environmental threat to peoples of the Afar region.

10.2.4. Control and Management of the Invasion of Prosopis

The discussions above showed that the spread of Prosopis in Afar region has been threatening the socio-economic life of pastoral and agro-pastoral communities. In extreme cases agro-pastoralists have to leave their farms, change the composition of their herds and that herd productivity has been reduced by as much as 85% (Yibekal, 2012). Although there is an increasing use of Prosopis for firewood and charcoal production, most people in the Afar region consider it as a menace and they have been trying some mechanical controls like cutting and stumping it. Few people value Prosopis for its economic potential and consider it to be a 'black gold' because of its monetary benefits through charcoal production while most pastoralists perceive it as a 'curse from Allah' or a 'wrath from Allah for their wrong doings' and opt for its complete eradication (Herrie,2014; Ilukor, et al., 2014).

The researcher's discussion with pastoralists found while selling the pods of Prosopis during the field visit at Alelu, the capital of Teru Woreda substantiates the above idea. They reported that they earn income from the sale of Prosopis pods during the dry season, 60-70 Ethiopian Birr/sack which has the capacity to contain 50kg of other crops. Pastoralists in the town buy Prosopis pods to feed their cattle, goats, donkeys and camels. However, the perception of pastoralists who generate income from the sale of pods towards Prosopis is still negative. This sentiment has been voiced by a pastoralist as:

> *Although we use Prosopis for firewood, construction of houses and fences as well as for generating income, we don't like it. The process of collecting pods, transporting it and the waiting time before the sale at the market are all very tedious works. Prosopis has taken all the good things we had before it was introduced to our areas. It covered the rangelands and this severely affected our animals. It decreased our herd size because it covered the dry season grazing areas and diseases that come as a result of feeding on it. Meat, Milk and Butter were available in our diet. There were times where we dump milk to the soil. Now everything is changed, no milk and the income we generated from the sale of animals is low because lack of animal feed has reduced their quality. Therefore, we use Prosopis pods as life sustaining strategy and not because we fond of it (Interview, 7 January, 2018, Alelu).*

The rapid expansion of Prosopis has been endangering the livelihood of Afar pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. Some authors contend that most pastoralists perceived Prosopis as a harmful bush or express their hatred to Prosopis and they need for its complete eradication because it began to take over their resource base, formed impenetrable thickets which blocked human and herd mobility, and the strong thorns cause physical injuries to both humans and animals (Hailu, et *al*., 2004; Zeraye, 2015).

Although there were no national and regional policies and strategies which aimed at controlling and managing Prosopis until 2011, there have been piecemeal efforts by government bodies, NGOs and others to control the spread and prevent the impact of Prosopis on the livelihood of the Afar pastoralists and agro-pastoral communities (Herrie, 2014).

A senior expert in the Afar Region Pastoral Agricultural Development Bureau clarify that before the enactment of regulation on Prosopis, the first strategy of the regional state to control and manage the spread of Prosopis was to encourage the people to cut the tree and use it for the production of charcoal. Thus, members of the community were organized into cooperatives for the purpose of coordinating their efforts. This strategy was thought to be helpful for both controlling the spread of Prosopis and creating income generating opportunities for those involved in clearing Prosopis trees(Interview,8 May, 2018, Semera).

One senior Amibara Woreda official stated that initial efforts of eradicating Prosopis was encouraging but soon the regional state government prohibited the activities of cooperatives and individuals who engaged in clearing Prosopis mainly for two reasons: *First*, charcoal production has been used in some cases as a cover to produce charcoal from more easily accessible but protected tree species particularly Acacia spp, an act adversely affecting biodiversity in the region. *Second*, the emergence of conflict of interest associated with the income generated from the sale of charcoal. There is also some concern expressed that if cooperatives make a profit from Prosopis, they may have an incentive to let the tree return to their lands through coppicing, rather than to take the additional effort of removing stumps, which is the recommended action (Interview, 2 December, 2018, Andido).

On the other hand, the regional state government supported the efforts of the British NGO, FARM Africa which worked in Afar Region since 1998. Senior agro-pastoralist professional in the region's Pastoral Agricultural Development Bureau explained that FARM Africa has implemented integrated pastoral development projects which included regular development interventions and livelihood-based emergency services, pastoral extension approach-mobile outreach system. He further pointed out that in 2001 this NGO conducted research on the management of Prosopis in two Prosopis affected Woredas of the Afar Regional State, Gewane and Amibara (Interview, 13 March, 2018, Semera).

Wondimagegne (2014) mentioned that FARM Africa organized a project known as Afar ProsopisJuliflora Management Project and implemented Prosopis management in two phases. The first phase lasted from 2008-2011 and the second phase from 2012 to 2015. The First phase was implemented in four and five Kebeles of Gewane and Amibara Woredas respectively funded by the Norwegian Development Fund. The second phase was implemented in 20 Kebeles of three Woredas, Amibara, Gewane and Burmudaytu. FARM established Community Development Committees (CDCs) on Woreda level in order to prepare and implement Community Action Plans (CAP), Participatory Resource Use Plans (PRUP) and Community Development Funds (CDF). FARM Africa mobilized local communities and providing them hand tools to clear invaded lands and started to use the cleared land for crop and pasture production.

The second phase was originally designed for four years (2012-2015) and it was planned that the Prosopis which covered vast areas could be eradicated by uprooting the tree and making charcoal out of it andreclaiming the cleared land for crop and pasture production. However, the project phased out one year earlierdue to the evaluation made by the funding organization. The evaluation proved that such intervention in limited Kebeles made the successes registered limited while the invasion continued at alarming rate in other Kebeles. In 2014 only seven Kebeles out of the twenty were engaged in clearing Prosopis (Ibid).

The Other NGO which worked on Prosopis management in Afar region was USAID under CARE Ethiopia consortium with its program Pastoral Livelihood Initiatives. According to the report obtained from the Afar Regional State Pastoral Agricultural Development Bureau, CARE Ethiopia worked with the Gewane Woreda Pastoral and Agriculture Development Office where

it organized seven groups to clear land invaded by *Prosopis*and use the land for crop cultivation. To make the management of Prosopis successful CARE made different efforts like providing technical support, capacity building trainings, purchasing water pump and creating links to the central markets. Yet, success remained to be far since the reclaimed land through this mechanism was by far less when compared to the land invaded every day. In line with the above idea, a pastoralist resident of Sideh-Faghe Kebele in Amibara Woreda described the situation as:

> *Prosopis tree covered almost all the available land in our Kebele, farms, pathways, pasture lands, water points and resident areas. With the support of NGOs, we were organized into cooperatives in order to control and manage Prosopis tree in a coordinated manner. Although we were able to clear several hectares of land, we were not able to control the invasion. This was because the pace of the invasion exceeds our capacity of clearing by cutting and uprooting the tree. What makes things worse is that Prosopis reclaimed the already cleared land before we use it either for crop production or for pasture development (Interview, 17 November, 2018, Andido).*

The above ideawas voiced by another pastoralist resident of Serkamo Kebele in the same Woreda interviewed during the field visit in November 2018. He underscored that their capacity of reclaiming Prosopis infested lands is less when compared with the alarming rate of Prosopis invasion. He further mentioned that animals drop their dung on the cleared lands together with Prosopis seeds which remained undigested in their digestive tracts. Then it begins to germinate and grow fast while they were busy in clearing the already invaded lands. Making cleared lands out of the reach of animals is another tiresome task for the pastoralists who used to move freely to places where pasture and water are available.

The same idea was reiterated by an expert in Teru Woreda Office of Civil Service and Capacity Building interviewed in Feburary 2018. He underscored that mechanical way of clearing Prosopis could not help to control and manage Prosopis invasion. Pastoralists in different Kebeles of the Woreda have been facing the challenge of clearing Prosopis which has been overtaking the basis of their livelihood. Cleared lands were very soon reclaimed by Prosopis. The traditional mobility of pastoralists in Berentu, Awidi and Boyna Kebeles to places less affected by flood during the summer season has been obstructed by Prosopis trees which have been blocking passing corridors.

As one pastoralist, resident of Awidi Kebele in Teru Woreda reflected:

> *RemovingProsopis by uprooting the tree is very difficult and time-consuming task because it has deep and vigorous root system. On the other hand, we cannot remove Prosopis by cutting the stem because the stump has quickly coppiced when the Prosopis tree get cut and the root left in the ground. This has been worsening the situation than before. Therefore, the government should come up with some kind of solution before we totally loose our means of livelihood (Interview 4 Feburary, 2018, Alelu).*

Although the challenge of Prosopis started before two decades, both the federal and Afar Regional State governments were late to show their concern about it. On 7th of July 2011 the Afar Regional State issued the Regulation No. 5 to control, manage and eradicate the invasion of *Prosopis in* the Afar Region. The regulation describes the control strategy and the roles and responsibilities of the pertinent regulatory bodies at Regional, Woreda and Kebele levels to implement the strategy designed to prevent, control and eradicate the encroachment of *Prosopis*. In order to accomplished plan-based activities, the Woreda administration council established Prosopis Committee at Woreda and Kebele levels comprising of different stakeholders specifying their roles and responsibilities.

Article 3 of the regulation make clear that the regulation will be implemented only in areas severely affected by Prosopis identified by research and assured by the regional state Pastoral Agricultural Development Bureau. Article 2 (6) of the regulation listed the main types of indigenous trees prohibited not to be cut in the process of clearing Prosopis. Moreover, Article 4(2) of the regulation stated that the land use purpose and use plan has to be presented and get approved before clearing the infested areas.

According to the explanation of regional leaders interviewed guring the field visit in 2018 and 2019, the negative perception of Afar pastoralists concerning the invasion of Prosopis has forced the regional state to give concern about its regulation. Although, the impact of Prosopis on the livelihood and environment of pastoralists was not discussed in the parliamentary section, the regional state has felt the threat posed by Prosopis. The issuance of the regulation may indicate the concern of the regional state government about the problems of the people living in Prosopis infested areas however its implementation on the ground is still pending.

Experts in various regional Bureaus and Woreda Offices interviewed during the field visit in 2018 and 2019 mentioned that regional leaders have been heard expressing about the threat posed by the spread of Prosopis. To that end, they established a task force and tried to mobilize the community and work in cooperation with NGOs like Farm Africa to eradicate Prosopis. But, during the campaign, the community cut all the indigenous trees and used it for charcoal production. The Regional State government decided to stop the campaign to design mechanism which could help to protect indigenous trees. But, the regional state failed to correct the problems and start the campaign against the fast spreading Prosopis. In the mean time, the invading tree got the opportunity to cover vast areas in the region.

As stated by the respondents during the focus group discussion, many efforts have been done to eradicate and control *Prosopis*from its areas of invasion. However, the spread of Prosopis continued to be unresolved problem because efforts have been done in the form of uncoordinated campaign and lack of consistency in discharging stated responsibilities among the various stakeholders. The national strategic document substantiates the above idea. It elaborated that the regulation issued by the Afar region for the control of Prosopis invasion has not been properly implemented due to lack of coordination and commitment among the various stakeholders; insufficient awareness and capacity of the regional government and local communities, lack of human as well as logistics resources within the government system to implement the regulation (FDRE, 2017).

At national level, there was no policy and strategy regarding the control and management of Prosopis until January 2017. The Government of Ethiopia (GoE) has declared Prosopis to be a dangerous plant, which should not be cultivated or planted, and requires containment, control, management and ultimately its removal (FDRE, 2017). It was in this year that the government of Ethiopia recognizes the importance of a strategic approach to control and manage this invasive species particularly in pastoral areas. In this regard the federal government developed a strategic guidance to deal with the problem of Prosopis invasion.

A national Taskforce of experts in pastoralism and the management of Prosopis coordinated the development of the document. This document provides policy and strategic direction for the control of Prosopis invasion, technical guidance and lays out the institutional arrangement and

human and physical resources required for the implementation of the Strategy. The objectives of the Strategy are to i) prevent the expansion of Prosopis to un-invaded areas, ii) to reclaim and restore invaded areas after Prosopis clearance and sustainably manage Prosopis for productive use and increasing biodiversity and iii) to regulate and coordinate Prosopis management initiatives for complimentarily and synergy. This Strategy was produced through a consultative process including federal and regional representatives, academia and researchers, private sector, NGOs and civil society.

The strategy document suggested several arrangements for effective control and management of Prosopis such as setting up of Prosopis Management Councils at national, Regional and Woreda levels; deciding which interventions should be done where and by whom; intervention mechanisms for Prosopis control and management (improve knowledge about Prosopis and build capacity and commitment to address the problem, prevention of new introductions of Prosopis and removal of Prosopis where it is already established); monitoring, institutional arrangements and knowledge management mainstreaming of Prosopis in land use planning and developmentactivities and management structures required, and roles and responsibilities.

The national Prosopis management strategy document mentioned that a National Prosopis Management Council (NPMC) has to be established in order to coordinate the process of Prosopis management. The Council will constitute ministers and executives of agencies including key stakeholder institutions such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MoANR), Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MEFCC), the Ministry of Federal and Pastoralist Development Affairs (MoFPDA),EthiopianInstitute of Agricultural Research (*EIAR*), CSOs and NGOs. However, regional officials and expers in various Bureaus and Offices interviewed during the field Visit in 2018 mentioned that the federal government did anything accept designing Prosopis management strategy and facilitatingstructures for the various stakeholders.

Experts in Teru Woreda Pastoralist and Agriculture Development Office who participated in the FGD during the researcher's field visit in Feburary 2018underscored that the Federal government is too late to act against the threat posed by the invasion of Prosopis at least in terms of designing strategy to control and manage Prosopis in affected areas. They further elaborated that by the time

the federal government designed a strategy on the control and management of Prosopis, Most of the Woredas in Afar region were infested by Prosopis and pastoralists and agro-pastoralists have already lost their water points, rangeland, farms and passing corridors.

The plan of the regulation presented different procedural approaches and mechanisms of controlling the expansion of Prosopis such as identifying areas already invaded, areas started to be invaded and areas which will be invaded soon and create awareness to the various stakeholders. Preparing land use plan with the participation of professionals should precede the start of clearing invaded areas. Creating awareness among pastoralists living in areas not yet invaded by Prosopis about the impact of Prosopis on their livelihood. The controlling mechanisms were uprooting Prosopis three that grew around residence areas and passing corridors either individually or in groups with the support of Kebele and clan leaders; picking the seeds of Prosopis before spreading, cutting immature Prosopis trees and use for firewood, charcoal and other uses; to avoid further germination of Prosopis, it has to be cut 15-30 cm deep inside.

Participants of the interview mentioned that the effort of the various stakeholders to control the invasion of Prosopis was not properly coordinated. The area of land invaded every time was by far greater than the land cleared. Although pastoralists were allowed to use Prosopis for charcoal, it was found that they cut other indigenous trees instead of Prosopis. Due to this reason, the regional state passed a decision which forbid cutting of Prosopis until it will design another strategy of controlling the spread of Prosopis. However, the regional state government did not yet come up with the new strategy and the uncontrolled Prosopis has been expending toWoredas in the regional state (Interview 8 November, 2018, Andido).

Although the proposed development of a National Land Use Plan provides an opportunity to integrate Prosopis and other invasive species into land use management decisions across the country, there is a wide gap between the practical implementations and actual performance on the ground. According to the participants of the interviewees, neither the national strategy nor the regional regulation on the control and management of Prosopis bring significant change in solving problems related to the invasion of Prosopis in Afar region.

In line with this, one regional official in the Regional Bureau of Finance and Economic Development has the following to say:

> *Prosopis invasion creates a significant threat to pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihood system in our region. We use Productive Safety Net Project to coordinate the efforts related to control and manage Prosopis and our communities have invested their time, energy and resources in clearing Prosopis. Development agencies and NGOs have also supported activities to eradicate Prosopis. However, effective control of Prosopis is not yet achievedbecause efforts remained to be fragmented.Due to the aggressive nature of the plant, the proportion of land invaded every time is more than the reclaimed land. Our development goal of improving pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihood and reducing poverty will remain a dream unless serious and coordinated action is taken to mitigate the threat posed by Prosopis (Interview, 26 March, 2018, Semera).*

An expert in Assaita Woreda Pastoral and Agriculture Office interviewed in Feburary 2018 underscored that the invasion of Prosopis has been significantly affecting the benefit of pastoralists from their animals. He further elaborated that, Prosopis has been covering grazing lands and water points and it also restricted the seasonal movement of pastoralists with their animals in search of pasture.

Table 148.10: The benefits of AnimalResources forPastoralists?

Do you believe that the Afar pastoralists have been benefitted from their animal resources			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Yes, I believe	52	14.9
	I do not believe	298	85.1
	Total	350	100.0

As shown in the above table, 38.10, out of the 350 participants, the majority 290(82.9%) of the respondents disagreed regarding the benefits of the pastoralists from their animal resources. Respondents were asked the reasons behind their disagreement regarding the issue under discussion. Accordingly, out of the 290 respondents who disagreed, great majority of the respondents 270(93.1%) expressed that recurrent drought and climate change in the region has been killing animals and this has significantly reduced the benefit that pastoralists could obtained from animal resources.

Table 159.10: Justification why pastoralists are unable to benefit from their animals

If your answer to the above question (Table. 38.10)is no, what is your justification why Afar pastorali Are unable to get adequate benefit from their animal resources?		Responses	
		N	Percent
Yes	Recurrent drought and climate change in the region which have been killing their animals	343	29.9%
	Agriculture and pasture lands have been used by government development projects and investors	214	18.6%
	The veterinary Research institution established by the regional state has been properly discharging its responsibility	305	26.5%
	Expansion of ProsopisJuliflora (the Afar called it Woyane plant) has covered most of the agricultural and pastoral lands	287	25.0%
Total		1149	100.0%

The above table 39.10 shows that, from the total 284 respondents' replies for the question on the reason for the pastoralist of the region unable to develop their animal resource of the region 343(98%)

said recurrent drought and climate change in the region which have been killing their animals, 214(61.1%) said agriculture and pasture lands have been used by government development projects and investors, 305(87.1%) said the veterinary Research institution established by the regional state has been properly discharging its responsibility and 287(82%) said Expansion of ProsopisJuliflora (the Afar called it Woyane plant) has covered most of the agricultural and pastoral lands are among the contributing factor for the region pastoralist not develop the animal resource in the region. Therefore, both the qualitative and quantitative data attested that the expansion of Prosopis is one of the factors for the decrease of the number and productivity of animals in Afar region which in turn it affected the socio-economic development of the regional state.

As discussed in chapter seven the constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia stipulated the need to rectify the existing imbalance and to work hard to promote the interests of the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia with the intent of building one political and economic community, the common destiny of Ethiopians. With the context of promoting the shared interests and common destiny of all Ethiopians, the federal government has designed special support programme in order to accelerate the socio-economic development of the

developing regional states. It was also discussed that the provision of special support to Afar regional state didn't achieved its intended purpose.

In this chapter it was discussed that Prosopis Juliflora has invaded 20 Woredas out of the thirty-two and posed social, economic and environment challenges. Although the invasion of Prosopis has been severely affecting the lives of the Afar people, the problem has not been given due consideration. Solving the multidimensional problems caused by the invasion of Prosopis was not included in the provision of the special support to the regional state. The federal government didn't design a strategy until 2017 on the management and control of Prosopis although the problem has become serious from year to year. Even the government didn't show any commitment after it designed a national Prosopis management and control strategy. Had the federal government a genuine plan of building one economic and political economy, it would have given to serious concern to solve the problem adversely affecting the development of the regional state. Therefore, the above national project cannot be achieved without properly supporting the regional state lagging behind others.

10.3. Conclusion

The invasion of Prosopis has been adversely affecting the socio-economic life of Afar pastoral and agro-pastoral communities by claiming rangelands and water points and thereby causing decline in livestock production and productivity. The Volume of the Awash River has been reduced due to the growth of dense Prosopis thickets along the valley. The plant also cause harm on the health of animals and human beings, as well as environmental degradation. Loss of livestock and inability of agro-pastoralists to further engage in crop production because of the reclaiming of agricultural lands by Prosopis has subjected the people to food insecurity.

The federal and the Afar Regional State governments, NOGs as well as local community members became concerned about the control and management of Prosopis for the last two decades due to the multidimensional adverse effects of the invasion of Prosopis. Federal government designed national strategy on Prosopis Management and the Afar Regional State issued Regulation to control, manage and eradicate Prosopis. Moreover, NGOs like FARM Africa and CARE Ethiopia have tried to support the community's effort of controlling and managing Prosopis in the region. However, the national strategy and the regional state regulation were not practically implemented due to lack of leadership commitment, lack of coordination among the various stakeholders and the fragmented nature of efforts of controlling and managing Prosopis. The invasion of Prosopis continued to be a severe threat to the livelihood of Afar pastoralist and agro-pastoralists. Therefore, the challenge posed by Prosopis remained to be a contributing factor hindering the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State

Chapter Eleven

11. Conclusion and Recommendations

In this concluding chapter, the researcher has summed up the major debates and findings, attempt to draw some conclusions and provide possible recommendations. Therefore, it proceeds in two sections. The first section reiterates the major debates and findings of the research and the second section forwarded recommendations which may help to enhance the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State.

11.1. Conclusion

The government of EPRDF adopted ethnic-based federalism with the intension of providing recognition and to guarantee self-administration rights to the ethnic-based ethno-cultural communities.The adoption of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has enabled the Afar to have their own administrative region. Statistical data from MoFD and public voices indicated that Afar Regional State has been lagging behind other regional states.

Although the federal arrangment gave recognition to Afar identity, established their own separate regional state (Afar unity).and promiseed the rhetoric self-rule, the constitutional empowerment of Afar has not been translated into socio-economic development of the regional state. Politically, Afar regional leaders have not been unable to implement appropriate policies and stratergies to the local needs due to centralization of political power by the ruling party and its unlimitted intervention in the regional affairs. Federal government's prioritization of the agricultural activitieshas marginalized pastoral development. Moreover, capacity limitation on the part of Afar Regional State leaders at all levels, misappropriation of avaliable resources, marginalization of the young, women and educated Afars as well as the declining role of tradional leaders have their own role for the less socio-economic development of Afar regional State.

The rhetoric special support provided to Afar Regional state didn't achieve its intended purpose (accelerating the development of the regional state to enable it catch up relatively developed regional states. This was because member institutions the special support board did'nt play their expected roles, capacity limitation on the part of technical advisors deployed to the region,

regional leaders' lack of capacity and motivation to make use of the support provide for the improvment of the lives of the the pastoralist community.

Inter-clan and inter-ethnic conflicts have been adversely affcting the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State. The institutionalization of ethnic federalism has changed the long lived resourcebased conflict into boundary conflict. The conflict between Afar and Issa Somalis as well as the conflict between Afar and neighbouring Amhara Communities is exacerbated after the country's restructuring of constituent units along ethnic lines. The federal government and the leadership of the parties to the conflict failed to bring lasting solution which would help regional states in conflict to concentrate on development activities.

Investment projects implemented in Afar regional state like Tendaho Sugar Factory and Afdera Salt Production did't help to to improve the living conditions of local communities in particular and the development of the regional state. The establishment of Tendaho Sugar Factory in the region has changed the living conditions of pastoralists from bad to worse by evicting them from their farm and pasture lands. Similarly, Afars are marginalized from the salt business because of lack of initial capital to engage in the salt business, dominance of non-Afars in the business as well as amassing of huge profit from the salt business by private salt processing institutions at the expense of salt produces who have been selling their product at lower prices.

The implementation of villagization programme in Afar did't achieve its intended purpose(changing the style of living, ensuring food securty and bringing sustainable socio-economic development in the regional state. Wrong implementation practices, inability to supply the necessary facilities, services and in puts and prevalence of negative attitude towards the program make the programme far from success.

The invasion of Prosopis Juliflora of vast areas of the regional state has been adversely affecting the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State by ruining the resource-base (pasturelands) or its social, economic and environment impacts and absence of proper management and controlling mechanizm make its negative effects unprecedented. Both the federal and regional state governments have been unable to give appropriate support to the local community to enable them manage, control and eradicate Prosopis in the region.

11.2. Recommendations

The previous sections highlight the major conclusion remarks of this dissertation and it is stated that Afar Regional State has been lagging behind other regional states despite of the constitrutional empowerment of ethnic groups following the institutionalization of ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia since 1991. The development efforts of Afar Regional State have been adversely affected by the various factors discussed in the empirical chapters. In this section, the researcher recommended the following ideas for consideration which could help to enhance the development of Afar Regional State:

Federal Government

- TThe federal government should genuinely decentralize power and respect the principle of regional self-rule and refrain from undermining regional and local autonomy through its centralized party system despite a constitution that generously provides regional autonomy. Therefore, the federal government needs to avoid the practice of tightly controlling the regional political process. Instead of imposing and dictating federal policies on the regional state, it is important to work on capacity building schemes that improves region's capacity to formulate its own policies reflecting local contexts.

- Institutionalized vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relationship has to be put in place with the aim to ensure the participation of all constituent units in the planning, implementation and administration on national policies and strategies. The synergy among the different levels of government needs to be backed by well-designed and institutionalized intergovernmental relations. IGR in the Ethiopian federation has to base on prior stated principles and rules to replace the informal and ad hoc forums. The special support which has been providing support to the developing regional states has to be channeled through institutionalized relationship. The provision of special support has to focus on using the capacity of educated Afars than relying on handful technical advisors deployed from the center.

- The federal government should give serious concern to the Afar-Issa Conflict and committed to find out lasting solution to the conflict in cooperation with the leadership of the two regional states. To that end, the federal government should bring to a halt to the unintentional or deliberate downplaying of the conflict between the two ethnic groups as merely pastoral

competition for grass and water. The federal government should be seriously involved in managing the conflict. It has to help Afar and Somali Regional States reach an agreement og the status of the three Issa inhabited Kebeles in Afar region as well as to demarcate the bounday between the two regional states like finalizing the 2014 memorendum of understaning signed between the two regional states. Moreover, since both communities are predominantly pastoralists, the creation of a buffer zone is important in order to avoid the risk of pastoral confrontation.

- The federal government should decide regarding the fate of Tendaho Sugar Factory, support the regional state to rehabilitate pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. It has to conduct social and environment analysis to enable the factory properly function, benefit the local community and assist the development efforts of the regional state. Similarly, the Afdera salt production being undertaken in Afar Regional State has little contribution in improving the lives of Afars. Therefore, the federal government together with the leadership of Afar Regional State should conduct serious evaluation on the performance of federal projects and find out solutions to enable projects support the development of Afar Regional State. Moreover, the federal government and the leaders of Afar Regional State should work in close-cooperation and design an appropriate strategy which could enable the Afar to be active participants in the investment activities being undertaken in their own regional state.

- The federal government should try to clearly understand the perception of the Afar pastoralists and agro-pastoralists towards the villagization programme instead of considering it as the only viable option to bring about development in Afar region. Settling pastoralists in selected settlement villages is not only change in the location residence areas but it also entails change in culture and way of life. Therefore, the federal government in collaboration with the regional state government should create awareness among members of the community; enable pastoralists to sustain their pastoral way of life by preparing grazing lands in the areas where they settled until certain level of development; fulfill all the necessary facilities and services in the selected areas if it has to bring genuine transformation in the socio-economic life of the people.

Amhara, Afar and Somali Regional States

- The governments of the Regional States should try to make use of the opportunities that the federal system has brought instead of being victims of its drawbacks. The regional states should investigate the cause of their failure for reaching a sustainable conflict resolution and shall jointly work for its success by denying rooms for the conflict entrepreneurs and making use of the role of traditional leaders in conflict resolution. Responsible bodies of the regional governments at any level should cooperate in bringing criminals to justice. Moreover, the regional state governments should focus on development projects along their common borders. Joint development plans should be initiated regarding the enhancement of access to grazing and marketing areas and water resources.

Afar Regional State

- Rural Development Policy and Strategies of the country are focusing on agricultural sector. Therefore, the government of Afar Regional State has to adapt federal development policies and strategies to suit to the specific contexts of the region instead of simply copying and trying to implement it. Since the livelihood of pastoralists in Afar region is depend on animal production, priority has to be given to livestock development until the level of development that requires shift is reached instead of rushing to change the living conditions of pastoralists at this time.

- Like the federal government, the Afar Regional State considered settlement of pastoralists as an important option to ensure food security and to transform the life of Afars. Changing the ways of life which pastoralists lived for centuries is not something easy, rather it requires gradual transformation. The government of Afar Regional State should make structural adjustment to enhance the power and status of the Office in charge of coordinating the villagization programme. The regional state government should conduct voluntary water-based settlement instead of settling pastoralists in areas which are not suitable for living.

- Transforming the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State is unthinkable without concerned efforts and active participation of Afar Regional State Council, the leadership at different levels and the Afar people as a whole. Therefore, Afar Regional State leadership should be committed to avoid the flaws identified in this study such as misappropriation of

resources, exclusion of educated Afars, women and the youth, undermining contribution and role of traditional leaders, waiting orders to come from immediate higher structures instead of discharging one's own responsibility, the prevalence of corruption, clannism, favoring the local area from where one came from as well as prioritizing the interests of the leadership at the expense of the wellbeing of the community.

- The invasion of Prosopis is a severe problem posing serious challenges to the development efforts of Afar Regional State. But the organs working to control and manage the effects of these problems have not been given appropriate status (case teams) under the Regional Bureau of Pastoral and Agriculture Development. Therefore, the regional state government has to make structural arrangements to empower the units in charge of working in these sectors. Moreover, the regional leadership at all levels should be committed to mobilize members of the community and to coordinate the efforts of the different stakeholders engaged in the management and control of the fast spread of Prosopis Juliflora in Afar regional state

References

Aalen, L. (2002). Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000. Bergen: Michelson Institute Development Studies and Human Rights, Vol.2,No.2. pp.1-141.

Aalen, L. (2006). Ethnic Federalism and Self-Determination for Nationalities in a Semi-Authoritarian State: The Case of Ethiopia. International Journal of Minority and Group Rights, 13, PP. 243-261. Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.

Abera, Jembere. (2000). An Introduction to the Legal History of Ethiopia 1434-1970, Leiden: Leiden University.

Abdi, Ismail (2004). 'Ethiopian Federalism: Autonomy vs Control in the Somali Region'. Third Worldly Quarterly, 25(6), pp.1131-1154.

Abdisalam, A., and Mossa, E. (2019).The Social Consequences of Pastoralist Sedenterisation Schemes in Somali Regional State, Ethiopia. Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems- Scientific Journal, Croatian Interdisciplinary Society Provider Homepage: Vol. 17, No.4, pp. 738-752.

Abdulahi et al., (2017) Prosopis Juliflora: Distribution, Impacts and Available Control Methods in Ethiopia. Tropical and Subtropical Agro-ecosystems, pp. 75 - 89https://www.researchgate.net,...,neoptera,prosopis. (Last accessed on 24 October 2018)

Abdulmalik, Abubaker (2017). Taxes, Tax Payers and Collectors-Pre and Post Menelik: Harari Experience. Journal of Accounting and Taxation, 9(3), pp. 23-35.

Abbink, J. (1998). New Configurations of Ethiopian Ethnicity: The Challenge of the South, Northeast. African Studies, 50(1), pp.59–81.

Abbink, J. (2006). Transformations of Violence in Twentieth-century Ethiopia: Cultural Roots, Political Conjunctures. Focaalno, 25, 1995: pp. 57-77

Abbink, J. (2011). Ethnic-based Federalism and Ethnicity in Ethiopia: Reassessing the Experiment after 20 years. Journal Eastern African Studies, Vol.5, No.4, pp.596-618.

Abir, Mordechai (1980). Ethiopia and the Red Sea: The Rise and Decline of the Solomonic Dynasty and, Muslim-European Rivalry in the Region. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.London Cass.

Abiyot, Berhanu, and Getachew, Tesfaye. (2006). The Prosopis Juliflora Dilemma, Impacts on Dry land Biodiversity and Some Controlling Methods. Journal of Dry lands, 1, PP.158–

164.https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267951814. (Last accesed on 12 Feburary 2018).

Abraham, Sewonet (2002). Issa Suffer from Massive Cattle Deaths and Conflict with Afar Over Scarce Resources. Assessment Report of Shinille Zone, Somali Region.UN Emergency Unit for Ethiopia.UN, pp.1-7.

Abubeker, et al., (2014). Options to Reduce Poverty among Agro-pastoral Households of Ethiopia: A Case Study from Aysaita District of Afar National Regional State. Journal of Development and Agricultural Economics.Vol. 6, No.6, pp.257-266.

Adaptation to Scale in Semiarid Eco-system (2014-2018) (ASSAR) (2018). Changing Ecosystem Services are Increasing Peoples Vulnerability in Semi-Arid Regions. An ASSAR Cross-Regional Insight. http://www.assar.uct.ac.za. (Last accessed on 19 October2018).

Adegehe, A. (2009). Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia.A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions. Leiden University, https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13839((Last accessed on21 October 2018).

Admasu, Derese (2008) Invasive Plants and Food Security: the case ofProsopis juliflora in the Afar region of Ethiopia, in FARM-Africa, IUCN report. http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/invasive_plants_and_food_security___final.pdf. (Last accessed on 14 January 2018).

Afar Pastoral Development Association Initiative in Afar Development (APAD, 2015).

Afar National Regional State (ANRS) (2009). Afar National Regional State Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation No. 49/2009.July 2009, Semera.

Afar National Regional State (ANRS) (2017). Afar National Regional State Rural Education Bureau Annual Educational Statistics Abstract (2015/2016). Afar National Regional State Education Bureau, Semera.

Afar National Regional State (ANRS) (2018). Annual Bulletin of the Regional Bureau of Animals, Agriculture and Natural Resources, Form 1, No.9.July 2018, Semera. ,

Agranoff, R. (2004). Autonomy, Devolution and Intergovernmental Relations. Regional and Federal Studies, Vol.14,No.1, pp. 26-65.

Ahmed, Hassen (2002). Emperor Menelik's Attempts Towards Political Integration:Case Study from North-Eastern Shoa (Ethiopia), 1889-1906. Annales d'Ethiopie. Vol. XVIII:231-243.

Akindele, T., and Olaopa, R.(2003). The Theory and Practice of Federalism as a Structural Mechanism of Governance: How Adequate for Gender Struggle and Representation in Nigeria?. Anthropologist, Vol.5,No.3,pp. 169-178.

Alem Habtu (2004). "Ethnic Pluralism as an Organizing Principle of the Ethiopian Federation". Dialectical Anthropology,Vol.28,No.2,pp. 91-123

Alem Habtu (2005). Multiethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: A Study of the Secession Clause in the Constitution. Pulius: the Journal of Federalism, Vol. 35, pp. 313-335.

Alem Habtu (2010). "Ethiopian Federalism: Principle, Process, and Practice" ed. Prepared for the 5th International Conference on Federalism. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.

Alemante Gebreselassie (2003). Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa, Yale Journal of International Law, Vol.28, No.51, pp. 51-107.

Alfred, S. (1999), "Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model," Journal of Democracy in Ugo Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo, eds., Federalism and Territorial Cleavages.

Ali, Hassen (2008) 'Vulnerability to Drought Risk and Famine: Local Responses and External Interventions Among the Afar of Ethiopia, a Study on the Aghini Pastoral Community', PhD thesis, Department of Social Geography, University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth. https://d-nb.info,...,pdf. (Last accessed on 11 October 2018)

Ali, Said (1994). Pastoralism and the State Policies in Middle Awash Valley: the Case of the Afar, Ethiopia: African Arid Lands Working Paper Series. No.1/94. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.pp.1-94

Ali Said (1998). "Afar Ethnicity in Ethiopian Politics" in M.A. Mohammed Salih and John Markakis (eds), Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa, pp.109-115. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab

Alula, Pankhurst (1992) Resettlement and famine in Ethiopia: The villagers' experience. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Amnesty International (1978).Human Rights Violations in Ethiopia. Al Index:AFR 25/10/1978. London WC2E &HF, England.

Amofa, et al., (2016).Leadership Styles and Organizational Productivity: A Case Study of Ghana Cement Limited.European Journal of Business and Management, Vol.8, No.2,pp. 131-143.

An Africa Watch Report (1991). Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia. New York.

Andargachew Tiruneh (1990). The Ethiopian Revolution (1974 To 1987). Unpublished Ph.D.Dissertation, London School of Economics.

Anderson, G. (2008). Federalism: An Introduction. Oxford: University Press.

Afar National Liberation Movement (ANLM)(1976). Afar National Liberation Movement General Guideline. In: Tiglachen Zena, Special publication, Stockholm, pp.4-12.

Afar National Regional State (ANRS) (2004). Afar National Regional State Investment Proclamation No.23/2004. Negarit Gazeta of the Afar National Regional State.:2nd Year No. 4 Samara 6th, 2004

Afar National Regional State (ANRS) (2009). Afar National Regional State Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation No. 49/2009.July 2009, Semera.FAO.https://faolex,fao.org.docs,pdf,eth152566 (Last accessed on8 November 2018)

Afar National Regional State (ANRS) (2014). Afar Development Gap Analysis 2002-2004efy (final draft) 2002 Development Gap Assessment, Samara, May 20, 2014.Unpublished regional report.

Afar National Regional State (ANRS) (2017). Afar National Regional State Rural Education Bureau Annual Educational Statistics Abstract (2015/2016). Afar National Regional State Education Bureau, Semera.

Afar National Regional State (ANRS) (2018). The Guards of the North-East: Achievements and Vision. Unpublished Journal prepared by the Cooperation between Afar National Regional State Finote Tinsae Printing Media.

Asayehgn Desta (2015). Beyond the Usual: Re-thinking Ethiopia's Ethnic Federalism for the 21st Century. https//lawethiopia.com. (Lase accessed on 14 February 2018).

Asmelash Beyene (1987). "Some Notes on the Evolution of Regional Administration in Ethiopia". Ethiopian Journal of Development Research, Vol.9,No.1, pp.21-49. Addis Ababa University.

Asnake, Kefale (2004) 'Federalism: Some Trends of Ethnic Conflicts and their Management in Ethiopia', in A.G. Nhema (ed), The Quest for Peace in Africa, Utrecht: International Books. pp.51-72.

Asnake Kefale (2009). 'Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions'. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Leiden.

Asnake Menbere (2013). Dynamics of Pastoralist Relations at Change: An Exploration into the Causes of Afar-Karrayu Conflict in the Awash Valley. Ethiopian Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol.9, No 1, pp.1-28.

Assefa Fiseha (2006). **Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study**. Netherland, Wolf Legal Publisher.

Assefa Fiseha (2009). The System of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) in Ethiopia: In Search of Institutions and Guidelines.pp.96-131. https://www.researchgate.net,publication,319701818.

Assefa, Fiseha (2012). Ethiopia's Experiment in Accommodating Diversity 20 Years' Balance Sheet.Regional & Federal Studies, Volume 22, Number 4, PP.435-473.Routledge .

Auel, K. (2014). Intergovernmental relations in German federalism: Cooperative federalism, Party Politics and Territorial Conflicts. Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

Ayalew Gebre (2009). When Pastoral Commons are Privatised: Resource Deprivation and Changes in Land Tenure Systems among the Karrayu in the Upper Awash Valley Region of Ethiopia In: Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies. https://www.degruyter.com (Last accessed on 26 October 2018)

Ayele Gebremariam (1986). Economic Adaptation and Competition for Scarce Resources: the Afars in the Northeastern Ethiopia , unpublished MA Thesis, University of Bergen, Norway

Ayele Gebre-mariam (1994). The Alienation of Land Rights among the Afar in Ethiopia.Nomadic Peoples, Vol.4, No.3, pp.137-146.

Aynalem, Adugna (2014). Afar: Demography and Health. http://www.ethiodemographyandhealt.org,afar. (Last accessed on28 October 2018).

Bahiru Zewde (1991). A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-19748. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Bahiru Zewde (2002). A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991 (2nd ed). Oxford: James Currey.

Bailey, C. (2007). A Guide to Qualitative Field Research. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, Sage Publications.

Bagwitz, et al., (2008).Economic Development in conflict-affected countries. Deutsche Gesellschaft für, Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH

Baker, J. (1990). Ethiopia's Road to Perestroika: In search of the end of the rainbow? Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Balcha Berhanu. (2007). Restructuring State and Society: Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia. Spirit PhD Series, No. 8. Aalborg: SPIRIT.

Bamlaku, et al., (2015).The Dynamics of (Agro) Pastoral Conflicts in Eastern Ethiopia.Ethiopian Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities.Vo.11(1). PP. 29-60.

Bekele, Hundie (2006). Explaining Changes of Property Rights among Afar Pastoralists, Ethiopia.ICAR : Discussion Papers, 14).

Bekele Hundie and Padmanabhan, M. (2008). The Transformation of the Afar Commons in Ethiopia: State Coercion, Diversification, and Property Rights Change among Pastoralists.https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5057224

Bekele Hundie (2015). Property Rights among Afar Pastoralists of Northeastern Ethiopia: Forms, Changes and Conflicts. Cornell University.Ithaca, New York.

Bell, J. (1987). Doing your Research project (1st ed.). Buckingham: Open University Press.

Bello, M. (2014) Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria: An Assessment of Its Practice at the Local Government Level.Journal of Poverty, Investment and Development.Vol.4. https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/JPID/article/view/10078

Beruk, Yemane (2014). Prosopis Control and Management: The Ethiopian Experience. In-Exploring Prosopis Management and Policy Options in the Greater Horn of Africa Proceedings of a Regional Conference.Desalegn Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia November 26th to 27th2014.

Berihun, Adugna (2016). Unsustain the Sustainable: An Evaluation of the Legal and Policy Interventions for Pastoral Development in Ethiopia. https://pastoralismjournal.springeropen.com (Last accessed on 4 November 2018)

Best, J. (1970).Research in Education. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Biniyam Aklilu (2016). A Historical Survey of the Issa-Afar Conflict from 1936 to 1994. Unpublished MA Thesis, Haramaya University, Ethiopia

Blindenbacher, R., and Watts, R. (2011).Federalism in a Changing World – A Conceptual Framework for the Conference.Forum of Federations.http://www.forumfed.org (last accessed on19 November 2018).

Blume, L., and Voigt, S. (2008) : Federalism and Decentralization: A Critical Survey of Frequently Used Indicators, MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, No. 2008,21, Philipps-University Marburg, Marburg.

Bolleyer, Nicole (2006). Consociationalism and Intergovernmental Relations-Linking Internal and External Power-Sharing in the Swiss Federal Polity. Swiss Political Science Review Vol.12, No.3,pp.1-34.

Bryden, M. (1996).United Nations Development Programme. Retrieved December 12, 2014, from Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia Situation Report on Region2: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/eue_web/AFAR1A.htm(Last accessed on12 October2018).

Buhler, et al., (2017).Federalism and Conflict Management.International Munich Federalism Days 2017. Hanns Seidel Foundation, Munich

Bulmer, E. (2017). Federalism.International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), Stockholm, Sweden.

Burgess, M. (2006). Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice, London and New York: Routledge.

Burns, N. and Grove, S. (2003). Understanding nursing research (3rd ed). Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company.

Callander, S., and Harstad, B.(2015). Experimentation in Federal Systems. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.130, No. 2., PP.951-1002. Oxford University Press, London. United Kingdom.

Cameron, D.(2001). The Structures of Intergovernmental Relations. International Social Science Journal, Vol. 53,No.167, pp. 121-127.

Canare, T. (2021). Decentralization and Development Outcomes: What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say? Review of Public Economics 237:PP. 111-151. Instituto de Estudios Fiscales.https://dx.doi.org/10.7866/HPE-RPE.21.2.5 (last accessed on25 October 2018).

Catley, A., and Alula, Iyasu (2010). Moving Up or Moving Out? A Rapid Livelihoods and Conflict Analysis in Mieso-Mulu Woreda, Shinile Zone, Somali Region, Ethiopia. Feinstein International Center. https://dl.tuftsedu,concern,pdfs. (Last accessed on 26 October 2018)

Cerritelli,et at., (2008) 'Updated Mapping Study on Non-State Actors Sector in Ethiopia (Final Report)'. Addis Ababa: European Commission Civil Society Fund in Ethiopia. https://www.semanticsscholar.org (Lase accessed on30 October 2018).

Clapham, C. (1988). Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clapham, C. (2002). Afterword.In David, Turton (2006). Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective (ed). James Currey.

Clarke, J. (1986). Resettlement and Rehabilitation: Ethiopia's Campaign against Famine. Harney and Jones: London.

Cornell, S. (2002) Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective, World Politics 54(246). https://www.semanticscholar.org. (last accessed on 22 October 2018).

Creswell, J. (2005). Educational research: Planning, Conducting, and Evaluating Quantitative and Qualitative Research. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education.

Creswell, J. (2009). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches. Third Edition. SAGE Publications, Inc.

CSA (Central Statistical Authority) (2008).Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007.Population and Housing Census. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Dagnachew, Yitbarek (2013). Conflict between Afar and Issa Groups in North-Eastern Ethiopia A Study of Institutional Security Responses and Management. MA Thesis

Dahilon Yasin (1985). "The Rise and Fall of the Sultanate of Aussa", Unpublished B.A Thesis in Political Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa university

Dar, S. (2011). Understanding Conflict, Causes and Consequences: A Conceptual Analysis. Journal of Peace Studies, 18(3 & 4), pp.63-81. New Delhi.

Dereje Feyissa (2011). The political economy of salt in the Afar Regional State in northeast Ethiopia. Review of African Political Economy, 38(127), PP. 7-21.

Dessalegn Rahmato (1988). Settlement and Resettlement in Metekel, Western Ethiopia. Africa, Vol.43,No.1, pp. 14-34.

Dessalegn Rahmato (2003). Resettlement in Ethiopia: The Tragedy of Population Relocation in the 1980s, FSS Discussion Paper No.11. Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies.

Dessalegn Rahmato (2007). Customs in conflict: Land Tenure Issues among Pastoralists in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies

Dessalegn Tigabu (2014). Horizontal Intergovernmental Relations between Ethiopian Federating Units: The Case of Amhara and Benshangul Gumuz Regions. Unpublished MA Thesis, Addis Ababa University.

DFID (2005).Controlling the Spread of Prosopis in Ethiopia by its Utilization.https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk. (last accessed on 21 January 2018)/

DFID-CSO (2010).Youth Participation in Development: A Guide for Development Agencies and Policy Makers. DFID–CSO Youth Working Group. pp.1-120. London.

Elazar, D. (1987) Exploring Federalism, Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.

Endalew Addis (2015). Implementation of Government Development Strategies on Afar Pastoralists in Ethiopia: Challenges and Opportunitie, in the Intricate Road to Development: Government Development Strategies the Pastoral Areas of the Horn of Africa. Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Addis Ababa University.

Environmental Protection Authority of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2010).Afar National Regional State Programme of Plan on Adaptation to Climate Change. Semera

Ephrem Madebo. (2010). Ethnic Federalism and One Party Rule in Ethiopia, URL. http://ecadforum.com/articles/2010/03/15/ethnic-federalism-and-one-party-rule-in-ethiopia/. (Last accessed on 26 March 2018)

Eriksen, S., and Marin, A. (2011). Pastoral pathways Climate change adaptation lessons from Ethiopia. Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric Norwegian University of Life Sciences.

Erk, J., and Anderson, L. (2009). "The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions?" Regional and Federal Studies, Vol.19,No.2,pp. 191-202.

Ethiopian Pastoralist Day Report (EPD, 2015).

Faguet, J. (2009), "Governance from below in Bolivia: A theory of local government with two empirical tests", Latin American Politics and Society, Vol.51, No.4,pp.29-68.

FAO and Tufts University (2019).Examining Alternative Livelihoods for Improved Resilience and Transformation in Afar. FAO: Addis Ababa. https://fic.tufts.edu,wp-content. (Last accessed on 1 December 2018)

Fana Gebresenbet (2014). Governing the Horn of Africa's Lowlands: Land Investments and Villagization in Gambella, Ethiopia. The Southern Voices Network Research Paper: No. 3 Wilson Center.https://www.wilsoncenter.org. (Accessed on 27March 2019).

Fang et'al., (2020). The Economic Consequences of Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.IMF Working Paper, African Department.International Monetary Fund.

FAO, IFAD and WFP (2015).Achieving Zero Hunger-the Critical Role of Investments in Social Protection and Agriculture.Presenting a vision by the Heads of the Rome Food-based Agencies, FAO, IFAD and WFP on the Report that Highlights the Critical Role of Investments in Social Protection and Agriculture.

FARM Africa (2008) Experiences on Prosopis Management Case of Afar Region . [report] FARM Africa. September 2008. https://www.farmafrica.org,resources. (last accessed on 16 November 2018).

Fasil Nahum (1997). Constitution for Nations of Nations: The Ethiopian Prospect. Lawrenceville, New Jersey: The Red Press.

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) (1995) The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) (2001). Program of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Front, adopted on the 4th Organization Conference, September,2001.

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries (FDRE-MoLF) (2017).National Strategy OnProsopis Juliflora Management. January 2017Addis Ababa,Ethiopia.

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia National Youth Policy (FDRE-NYP) (2004). Federal Democratic Republic Ethiopia-National Youth Policy.Ministry of Youth, Sports and culture.Addis Ababa .https://www.youthpolicy.org.(Last accessed3 December 2018).

Fekadu Beyene (2014). The Challenges to Pastoral Transformation to Sedentary Farming: The Case of Karrayyu Pastoralists. In the Intricate Road to Development: Government Development Strategies the Pastoral Areas of the Horn of Africa. Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Addis Ababa University.

Fekadu, et al. (1984).'The Socio-economic Aspects – Anthropology', in The Nomadic Areas of Ethiopia, UNDP/RRC Report ETH/81/001. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Feleke Tadele (2003). The Current Resettlement Program in Ethiopia: A Review of the Design and Implementation Approach. Medrek, Vol.1,No.3, pp. 8-12.

Fesseha Haile (2007). Land Degradation Assessment at Idris Resettlement Scheme, Kafta Humera Woreda, Western Zone of Tigray, Ethiopia. Unpublished MA Thesis.Addis Ababa University.

Firehiwot Sintayehu and Yonas Adaye (2015). "The Ethiopian State and Pastoralism: Appraisal of praxis of pastoralist policies in the Afar National Regional State" in Yohannes Aberra and Mahmmud Abdulahi (eds.) The Intricate Road to Development: Government Development Strategies the Pastoral Areas of the Horn of Africa. Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Addis Ababa University.

Fiseha Haftetsion (Nov. 2014). Coping with Winds of Change: Analyzing the Resilience of the Ethiopian Federal Compact.Journal of Ethiopian of Federal Studies, 1(2).Center for Federal Studies, Addis Ababa University.

Frank, M. (2009). Effects of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: Holding Together or Splitting Apart? Summer Institute Guadalajara. University of Toronto/University of Freiburg.

Fratkin, E. (2014). Ethiopia's Pastoralist Policies: Development, displacement, and resettlement. Nomadic Peoples, Vol.18,No.1, pp. 94–114.

Fratkin, E. (2001). East African Pastoralism in Transition: Maasai, Borana and Rendille cases. African Studies Review, Vol.44, No.3, pp. 1–25.

GAIN (2019). Global Agricultural Information Network Report,https://gain.fas.usda.gov (Last accessed on 11 May 2019)

Gebre Yntiso (2004). The Metekel Resettlement in Ethiopia: Why Did It Fail? In Alula Pankhurst and F. Piguet (Eds), People, Space and the State: Migration, Resettlement and Displacement in Ethiopia, Workshop Proceedings, 28-30 January 2003, pp. 92-111, Addis Ababa University.

Gebre Yntiso (2003). Resettlement and Unnoticed Losers: Impoverishment Disasters among the Gumz in Ethiopia. Human Organisation, 62(1), pp. 50-61.

Gebre Yntiso (2005). Stakeholder Participation in Resettlement Decision-making in Ethiopia. Research Project Workshop presented on Forum for Social Studies, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. http://ejol.aau.edu.et,EJDR. (Last accessed on9 October 2018)

Gebru Tareke (2009). The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa. Addis Ababa: Eclipse Printing Press, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Getachew Kassa (2001a). Resource conflicts among the Afar of North-East Ethiopia. In M. Salih, T. Dietzand G.M. Ahmed (eds.), African Pastoralism: Conflict, Institutions and Government, pp. 145–171. London: Pluto Press

Getachew Kassa (2001). Among the Pastoral Afar n Ethiopia: Tradition, Continuity and Socio-economic Change. International Books, Utrecht.

Getachew Woldemeskel (1989). The Consequences of Resettlement in Ethiopia. African Affairs, Vol.88,No.352, pp. 359-374. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ghebrehiwet Tesfai (2015). The Practice of Fiscal Federalism in Ethiopia: A Critical Assessment 1991-2012.An Institutional Approach. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Faculty of Economics and Social Science at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland).

Ghelawdewos Araia (2006). The Great Unifier: Emperor Tewodros II of Ethiopia. Institute of Development and Education for Africa (IDEA), Inc. https://wwww.africanidea.org. (Last accessed on 11 February 2018).

Gizachew Andargie (2014). Military Rule Responses to the Ethiopian Agony: Famine of 1984-1985. International Journal of Humanities Social Sciences and Education, Vol.1,No.8,pp. 183-192

Gray, D. (2009). Doing Research in the Real World (2nd ed). Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.

GTZ (2015).Capacity Development for Strengthening Drought Resilience of the Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral People in the Lowlands of Ethiopia.https://www.gtz.de,worldwide. (Last accessed on 5 Feburary 2019).

Guinand, Y. (2000). Afar Pastoralists Face Consequences of Poor Rains: Rapid Assessment Mission. UNEUE Field Mission Report, 19 to 24 April, Addis Ababa. https://reliefweb.int,report,afar-pastoralists. (Last accessed on17 February 2018)

Guyu Ferede (2012). Voluntary Villagization Scheme (Vvs) For Transforming Semi-Pastoral Communities in Benishangul-Gumuz Region, Northwestern Ethiopia: Challenges And Local Development Indicators. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 14(5), PP. 162-196.

Habtu, A. (2003) Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: Background, Present Conditions and Future Prospects. Paper Submitted to the Second EAF International Symposium on Contemporary Development Issues in Ethiopia. Ghion Hotel Addis Ababa Ethiopia.

Hagmann,T and Mulugeta Alemayehu (2010). Pastoral Conflicts and State-building in the Ethiopian Lowlands.University of Zurich, Zurich Open Repository and Archive. http://www.zora.uzh.ch. (Last accessed on23 March 2018).

Hale, H. (2004). Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of ethno federal State Survival and Collapse. Published By: None.Vol. 56, No. 2 (Jan., 2004), pp. 165-193.

Haileyesus Taye (2014). De facto Asymmetry and Inter-governmental Relations in the Ethiopian Federation. Journal of Ethiopian of Federal Studies, Vol.1,No.2,Center for Federal Studies, Addis Ababa University.

Haileyesus Taye (2017). Mechanisms of Intergovernmental Relations in the Ethiopian Federation.: Lambert Academic Publishing

Hailu Shiferaw, et al., 2004). Some Biological Characteristics that Foster the Invasion of Prosopis-Juliflora (Sw.) DC.at Middle Awash Rift Valley Area, north-eastern Ethiopia. Journal of Arid Environments, Vol.58,No.2, pp. 135-154.

Hamad Issa (2012). Afar Forum ConferencePaper,https://www.academia.edu › THE_DRAMATIC_SOCI... (Last accessed on 16 June 2019)

Hamed, T.(2016). Sampling Methods in Research Methodology; How to Choose a Sampling Technique for Research. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3205035. (Last accessed on26 March 2018).

Harbeson, J. (1978) 'Territorial and development politics in the Horn of Africa: the Afar of the Awash Valley', Journal of African Affairs Vol. 77, No.309,pp.479–498.

Haregeweyn, Nigussie et al., (2013). Analysis of the Invasion Rate, Impacts and Control Measures of Prosopis Juliflora: A Case Study of Amibara District, Eastern Ethiopia. Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, Vol.5, No.2, pp.7527–7542.

Hashim Tewfik (2010).'Federalism in Ethiopia.' Paper submitted to the International Conference on Dynamics of Constitution Making in Nepal in Post-conflict Scenario, January 15-17, 2010. Nepal Constriction Foundation, Kathmandu, Nepal

Hegre, H. (2013). Civil Conflict and Development.Uppsala University.Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO.

Helland, J. (1984). Pastoralists and the Development of Pastoralism, 2nd ed. Occasional Paper in Social Anthropology,20 Burgen: University of Burgen.

Helland, J. (2006) ‘’Pastoral Land Tenure in Ethiopia, at the frontier of land issues’’, Montpellier. ttp://www.mpl.ird.fr/colloque_foncier /Communications/PDF/Helland.pdf (Last accessed on 17January, 2018)

Helland, J. (2015). Afar Resilience Study. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Working Paper WP 2015:6).https://www.cmi.no › publications › 5560-afar-resilien. (Last accessed on 5 April 2018).

Herrie, Hamedu (2008). Historical Perspectives of the Afar and Issa-Somali Conflict in North-eastern Ethiopia.MSC Thesis. UMB, Norway

Herrie, Hamedu (2014). Socioeconomic and Ecological Impacts of Prosopis-Juliflora Invasion in Gewane and Buremudaytu Woredas of the Afar Region., in GTZManaging Prosopis Juliflora for better (agro-)Pastoral Livelihoods in the Horn of AfricaProceedings of the Regional Conference .pp.118-124.

https://wocatpedia.net,images,proceedings_r…pdf. (Last accessed on 8 January 2019).

Hofmeister,W., and Tayao, E. (2016). Federalism and Decentralization: Perceptions for Political and Institutional Reforms. Local Government Development Foundation, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.https://books.google.com. (Last accessed on8 April 2018).

Holm, M. (2015). Villagization: A Case Study of Ethiopia’s Villagization Programme. Unpublished MA Thesis, Addis Ababa University.

HRW (2011). Ethiopia: Forced Relocations bringing Hunger and Hardship; “Waiting Here for Death”: Forced Displacement and ‘Villagization’ in Ethiopia’s Gambella Region. - http://reliefweb.int/node/470159(Last accessed on 26 April 2018).

HRW (2012), " Waiting Here to Death" Forced Displacement and "Villagization" in Ethiopia's Gambella Region, 16 January,2012. https://www.ecoi.net,document. (Last accessed on 29 Feburary 2018).

Ibrahim Mussa (2011). Proud Afar, Proud Ethiopian Under Past and EPRDF Era.https://mereja.com. (Accessed on 12 December 2028).

IDMC (2007).Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Ethiopia: Addressing the rights and needs of people displaced by conflict. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.Norwegian Refugee Council. Geneva, Switzerland. www.internal-displacement.org

IDRC (2020). Policy mapping: Women’s economic empowerment in Ethiopia. Ottawa, Canada. https://dl-bnc-idrc-dspacedirect.org. (Accessed on 21 March 2019).

IFAD (1999). Good Governance: An Overview. EB 99/67/INF.4,https://webapps.ifad.org › eb › docs › EB-67pdf. (Last accessed on4 April 2018).

IFAD (2016).Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Pastoral Community Development Project II, Project Performance Assessment.https://docplayer.net. (Last accessed on7 May 2018).

IFAD (2017).Proposed Additional Financing to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for the Pastoral Community Development Project III.https://www.gati.de. (Last accessed on 9 November 2018).

Ijeoma N. (2014). Impact of Cost of Conflict on Economic Development in Nigeria.International Journal of Open Scientific Research IJOSR. Vol.2, No. 1, PP. 13-31. Kindi Publications.

Ilukor,J. etal., (2014). Impact Assessment of Prosopis JulifloraInvasion in the Afar Region, Ethiopia- Synthesis and Recommendationsfrom an Interdisciplinary Perspective, in GTZManaging Prosopis Juliflora for better (agro-)Pastoral Livelihoods in the Horn of AfricaProceedings of the Regional Conference .pp.30-39.

https://wocatpedia.net,images,proceedings_r…pdf. (Last accessed on 18 November 2018).

Inkermann, H. (2014). Gender Aspects of Prosopis Juliflora Spread in Baadu area, Afar Regional State, Ethiopia-Perceptions, Impacts and Coping Strategies, in GTZManaging Prosopis Juliflora for better (agro-)Pastoral Livelihoods in the Horn of AfricaProceedings of the Regional Conference.pp.56-64.

https://wocatpedia.net,images,proceedings_r…pdf. (Last accessed on 10 November 2018).

International Crises Group (ICG). 2009. Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents (Crisis Group Africa Report N°153). Nairobi/Brussels.https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-ethnic-federalism-and-its-discontents.(Last accessed on 15 April 2018).

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and UNDP (2014). Decentralization in Unitary States: Constitutional Frameworks for the Middle East and North Africa. https://www.jointpeacefund.org. (Last accessed on29 October 2018)

International Journal of Open Scientific Research IJOSR Vol.2, No. 1, 13-31. Kindi Publications

Kandel, Resham (2020). Inter- Governmental Relations in Federalism: Perspective and Practices in Nepal.https:www.academia.edu.

Kassa Belay (2004). Resettlement of Peasants in Ethiopia. Journal of Rural Development, 27(1071-2019-1791), pp. 223-253.

Kassahun Berhanu (2003). 'Resettlement and the Quest for Food Security in Ethiopia: The Challenge of Resettlement in Ethiopia'. Bulletin of the Forum for social studies, Vol.1, No.3, Addis Ababa, Forum for Social Studies.

Kassaye, Begashaw (2009). "The Archaeology of Islam in North East Shoa".In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies. Trondheim.

Kassim, Shehim (1980). Djibouti and the Question of Afar Nationalism.https://www.africabib.org › rec. (Last accessed on 30 January 2018).

Kassim Shehim (1985). Ethiopia, Revolution, and the Question of Nationalities: The Case of Afar. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 23, Issue 2, PP.331-348.Published online by Cambridge University Press.

Kebede, Yimam (1994). 'Afar Nationalism in the Horn of Africa'.Senior Essay.Department of Political Science and International Relations, College of Social Sciences Addis Ababa University.

Keeley, et al.,(2014) Large-scale land deals in Ethiopia: Scale, trends, features and outcomes to date. International Institute for Environment and Development. London: IDRC

Kelemework Tafere (2004). Indigenous Conflict Management in North Afar, Ethiopia. A Pastoral Forum Organized by the Dry-lands Coordination Group (DCG) in Mekelle, Ethiopia.

Kelemework Tafere (2011) Social Organization and Cultural Institutions of the Afar of Northern Ethiopia. Journal of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 1, No 13: PP. 423-429.

Kelemework Tafere (2013). Peace-making from Within: The Tradition of Conflict Resolution in Northern Afar, Ethiopia. EJOSSAH, IX(1), PP.57-77.Leiden University.

Kelemework, Tafere (2014). Formal and Informal Land Tenure Systems in Afar Region, Ethiopia: Perceptions, Attitudes and Implications for Land Use Disputes.

Keller, E. (1988). Revolutionary Ethiopia - From Empire to People's Republic. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Keller E.(1991). Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University

Keller, E. (2005). "Making and Remaking State and Nation in Ethiopia". In Recardo Rene (ed), Borders, Nationalism, and the African States. Boulder, Co: Lynne Reinner.

Ketema Wakjira (2018). Institutionalization of IGR in the Ethiopian Federation: Towards Cooperative or Coercive Federalism? Ethiopian Journal of Federal Studies (IJFS), Vol. 4, No. 2 (July, 2017), pp. 121-160.

Khaled Ismail (2011). The Afar Have a New Grand Sultan and Party.

Kidane Mengisteab (2011). Critical Factors in the Horn of Africa's Raging Conflicts. Discussion. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala.

Kigen.E (2002)."The Impact of the Cold War on The Ethiopia-Somalia Relations, 1960-1990", Institute Of Diplomacy and International Studies, Reg. No.: R/50/7000/. Nairobi University, Nirobi, 2002.

Kloos, Helmut (1982). Farm labor migrations in the Awash valley of Ethiopia. International Migration Review: Sage Publications. Vol. 16, No. 1PP. 133–168.

Kothari, C. (2004). Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques (2nd ed), New Age International Publishers, New Delhi.

Kothari, et al., (2019).The Economic Consequences of Conflicts.In Regional Economic Outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa: Recovery Amid Elevated Uncertainty. International Monetary Fund, Publication Services.

Kreitner, R. and Kinicki, A. (2004). Organizational behavior (6th ed.). USA: The McGraw-Hill.

Kumar, G. (1987). Ethiopian Famines 1973-1985: A Case Study. Wider Working Papers, WP26.World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University.

Kumar, K., and Sen, A.(2014). Road Transport and Regional Development in Gaya District, Bihar. https://www.researchgate.net, publications,2762666709. (last accessed on22 April 2018).

Kymlicka, W. (2006). "Emerging Western Models of Multination Federalism: Are they Relevant for Africa." In David Turton (ed.), Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: James Currey, Athens: Ohio University Press and Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.

Law, J. (2013). How Can We Define Federalism? Perspectives on Federalism, **Vol. 5, issue 3.** https://edwardwimberley.com. (Last accessed on 24 May 2018).

Lee, J. (2015). The Process of Decentralization in Ethiopia since 1991: Issues and Improving Efficiency. Korea Review of International Studies.

Lee, P. (2008). Social Work Research Supplement: Notes and Worksheets for Research Methods, (2nd ed.). School of Social Work San José State University.

Lemessa, Demie (2015). Ethiopian Pastoralist Policy at the Crossroads: Further Marginalization or Revitalization? In the Intricate Road to Development: Government Development Strategies the Pastoral Areas of the Horn of Africa. Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Addis Ababa University.

Lijphart, A. (2004). 'Constitutional design for divided societies.' Journal of Democracy, 15(2), Johns Hopkins University Press, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 96-109.

Little et'al., (2010). Policy Options for Pastoral Development in Ethiopia Report Number 3 Pastoral Economic Growth and Development Policy Assessment, Ethiopia. https://jomcpeak.expressions.syr.edu. (Last accessed on18 April 2018).

Lorgen, Christy (1999). The Experience of Villagisation: Lessons from Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tanzania. Oxfam-GB.https://mokoro.co.uk. (Last accessed on27December2018).

Lubo Teferi (2013). The post 1991 'inter-ethnic' conflicts in Ethiopia: An investigation. International Journal of law and Conflict Resolution, Vol.1, No.1, pp. 108-115.

Madalina, O. (2016). Conflict Management, a new challenge.3rd Global Conference on Business, Economics, Management and Tourism, 26-28 November 2015, Rome, Italy. Procedia Economics and Finance 39 (2016), pp. 807– 814.

Marcus, H. (1994). A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press

Markakis, J. (1989). Nationalities and the State in Ethiopia: An Interpretation. Working Paper Series, No.63. pp.1-22.

Markakis, J. (2003). Anatomy of a Conflict: Afar and Issa Ethiopia. Review of African Political Economy, Vol.30(97), pp. 445 – 453.

Markakis, J.(2004). Pastoralism on the Margin.Minority Rights Group International.UK.

Markakis, J. (2011). Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers. Oxford: James Currey.

Martínez, E. (2008). Federalism and ethnic conflict management: rival hypotheses, the attitudinal missing link and comparative evidence. Federalism Research London: Routledge.

Mayer, R. (1990). Conflict Management: The Courage to Confront. Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Press.

Mbowura, C. (2014). "Inter-Ethnic Conflicts and their Impacts on National Development, Integration and Social Cohesion: A Study of the Nawuri-Gonja Conflict in Northern Ghana; International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 4, No. 7(1): pp. 108-118.

McEwen, et al., (2015). Intergovernmental Relations and Parliamentary Scrutiny: A comparative overview, Report prepared for the Devolution (Further Powers) Committee, September 2015.https://www.centreconstitutionalchange.ac.uk(Last accessed on 4 January 2018).

McIntosh, K. and Buckley, J. (2015). Economic development in fragile and conflict-affected states: Topic guide. Birmingham: University of Birmingham.

McMillan, J., and Schumacher, S. (2001). Research in Education. A Conceptual Introduction(5th ed.). New York: Longman.

MEFCC (2017). Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) For the Implementation of REDD+ Program in Ethiopia.https://reddplusethiopiafilesworkplace.com. (Last accessed on 2 March 2018).

Megerssa, Tolessa (2012). Contradictions Between Rhetoric And Practice: The Case Of Intra-Regional Resettlement Programme in Northern Ethiopia. .Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol.14, No.2 Unpublished MA Thesis, Wollega University, Ethiopia.

Mehari Taddele (2015). Federalism and Conflicts in Ethiopia. Horn Affairs, Africa Insight,18 June 2015. https://www.researchgate.net › publication › 274117861. (Last accessed on 25 May 2018).

Messay, Mulugeta. and Bekure ,Woldesemait (2011). The Impact of Resettlement Schemes on Land-use/Land-cover Changes in Ethiopia: A Case Study from Non Resettlement Sites, Central Ethiopia. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol.13, No.2, pp. 269-293; PennWest Clarion,Clarion University.USA.

Mhando, L. (2011). Tanzania and the Geopolitics of Rural Development: The Return of Neo-liberalism. Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Vol. 3, No.26,pp. 455-472. An ICA Institute publication, Pennsylvania State University, USA.

Michaelson, M. (2000).Afar-Issa Conflict Management.http://www.icwa.org › 2015/09 › MM-18pdf. (Last accessed on23 April 2019).

Minyahel Tilahun, et al., (2016). Perception and Attitude of Pastoralists on the Use and Conservation of Rangeland Resources in Afar Region, Ethiopia.

https://ecologicalprocesses.springeropen.com. (Last accessed on17 December 2018).

Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA) (2011).Vision, Mission, Powers, Duties and Responsibilities of the Ministry of Federal Affairs.Prepared by Public Relation Office.

Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA) (2013). Intergovernmental Relation Experiences in the Ethiopian Federal System: Survey Report on the Practical Implementation of Intergovernmental in the Ethiopian Federal System Prepared by the Office of Intergovernmental Relations Directorate General of MoFA from Feburary-May 2013.

Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA) (2017).Evaluation of Plan Implementation of Afar Regional State in the 2018 Fiscal year.

Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) (2002). Ethiopia: Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) (2003), Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Rural Development Policy and Strategies, April 2003, Addis Ababa..

Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) (2006) Ethiopia: Building on Progress A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) Volume I, Addis Ababa.

Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) (2007). Ethiopia: building on progress: a plan for accelerated and sustained development to end poverty (PASDEP). Annual progress report 2005/06-2009/10. Addis Ababa.

Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) (2012). Ethiopia's Progress Towards Eradicating Poverty: An Interim report on Poverty Analysis Study.

Ministry of Information Press and Audio-visual Department (MOIPAD) (2001) Rural Development Policies, Strategies and Instruments.Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa.

Mohammed, A., and Abule, E (2015). Assessment of Pastoral Perceptions Towards Range and Livestock Management Practices in Chifra District African Journal of Food Science.

Moody, D. (April 2005). 'Empirical Research in Conceptual Modeling: A Theoretical and Practical Imperative', Wirtschaftsinformatik, Vol.47, No.2, pp. 152-162.

Moti, Mosisa (2014). Politics of Development and Resettlement in Ethiopia: Is it Villagization or Land grabbing? The case of Gambella Regional State. MA Thesis

Muauz, Gidey (2018). A Critical Analysis of Issa-Afar Violence in Ethiopia and the Imperative for Constructive Transformation.PhD. Dissertation.

Mueller, H. and Tobias J. (2016). The cost of violence: Estimating the Economic Impact of conflict. International Growth Centre.https://www.theigc.org,default,files. (Last accessed on 21 October,2018).

Muhammad Habib (2011). The Ethiopian Federal System.The Formative Stage.Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Addis Ababa.https://library.fes.de,bueros. (Last accessed on 7 October 2018).

Mulugeta , G., and Firehiwot, S.,(2014). Land Use, Pastoralism and Transformation Challenges in the Afar Regional State of Ethiopia, in A Delicate Balance Land Use, Minority Rights and Social Stability in the Horn of Africa. pp.92-116. Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University.

Mu‟uz Gidey (2009).″The Issa-Afar Conflict in the Post-1991 Ethiopia.″ Unpublished MA Thesis, Institute of Peace and Security, Addis Ababa University.

Mu'uz, Gidey (2010). The Afar-Issa conflict in post-1991 period: Transformative exploration (Theses for the partial fulfillment of MA in PSS, AAU, UPEACE-Africa). AAU, Addis Ababa.

Mu'uz Giday (2015).The Geopolitics and Human Security of the Afar in the Post-Cold War Period.AJOPSAIR.Vol.9, No.6, pp. 225-253

Mwangi, E, and, Brent, S. (2008). Prosopis Juliflora invasion and rural livelihoods in the Lake Baringo area of Kenya. Conservation and Society, Vol.6, No.2, pp. 130–140.

Naderifar, et al., (2017). Snowball Sampling: A Purposeful Method of Sampling in Qualitative Research. https://www.researchgate.net,..., (Last accessed on 30 December2018).

National Planning Commission (2016). Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II) (2015/16-2019/20). https://plasticsdb.surrey.ac.uk, Ethiopia,Nationa…pdf.(Last accessed 7November 2018.

NCFSE (2003). New Coalition for Food Security in Ethiopia: Voluntary Resettlement Programme, http://ageconsearch.umn.edu (Last accessed 21 November 2018)

Nicol, A and Otulana, M (2014). Contested Margins, Complex Pathways: The Afar Triangle in the Horn of Africa. https://www.future-agricultures.org. (Last accessed on 4 January 2018).

Nicole, B. and Evelyn, B. (2009).Government Congruence and Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems. Regional and Federal Studies, 19(3), pp. 371-397.

Nicole, B. (2006). Consociationalism and Intergovernmental Relations: Linking Internal and External Power-Sharing in the Swiss Federal Polity. Swiss Political Science Review, Vol.12,No3, pp.1-34.

Nigussie Afesha (2015). The Federal-state Intergovernmental Relationship in Ethiopia: Institutional Framework and its Implication on State Autonomy. Mizan Law Review, Vol. 9, No.2,pp.341-368.

Nuru Ahmed (2014). Afar Region and Its Development (Party II). Tigray Online

O Grada, C. (2007). Making Famine History. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.45,No.1, pp. 5–38.

Onono, P. (2016). Economic Effects of Inter-community Conflicts In Kenya: Evidence of the Importance of Peace in the Realization of Sustainable Development. International Journal of Cooperation & Development, Vol.3,No.2, pp. 118-129

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2019). Making Decentralisation Work a Handbook for Policy-Makers. Policy Highlights. https://www.oecd.org/efe/regional. (Last accessed on 4 January 2019).

Ozmen, A. (2014). Notes to the Concept of Decentralization. European Scientific Journal, edition Vol.10, No.10.pp.415-424.

Papagianni, K. (2006). Accommodating Diversity: Federalism, Autonomy and Other Options.Oslo Forum.https://hdcentre.org,insights. (Last accessed on 16 December 2018).

Patnaik, et al.s (2017). Prosopis (Prosopis Juliflora): Blessing and Bane. Tropical Ecology, Vol. 58, No.3, pp.455-483

Paulos, M and Getachew, Metaferia (eds) (2005). The Battle of Adwa: Reflections on Ethiopia's Historic Victory against European Colonialism. New York: Algora Publishing.

PFE (2009).Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia Pastoralist Perspectives of Poverty Reduction Strategy Program Experiences and lessons from Afar Region of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Piguet, F. (2001). Even after Good Rains, Afar Pastoralists Remain Vulnerable. Multi-Agency Assessments Mission Report, 15-23 June and 19-23 August. UNDP, Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia.

Piguet, F. (2002). Afar: Insecurity and Delayed Rains Threaten Livestock and People. UN-Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia.https://uneue.org,Archive,AfarMission. (Last accessed on 10 December2018).

Piguet, F. (2003). Afar Region: Drought Emergency not yet over. UN-Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia.https://apps.who.int,disasters,repopdf.(Last accessed on 24 December2018).

Piguet, F. (2007).Complex Development-Induced Migration in the Afar Pastoral Area (North-East Ethiopia). Paper Prepared for the Migration and Refugee Movements in the Middle East and North Africa.https://documents.aucegypt.edu,FrancoisPiguetpdf . (Last accessed on 13 November 2018).

Poirier, et al., (2015). Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems: Comparative Structures and Dynamics. Oxford University Press, 2015, pp 1-13, Available at SSR https://ssrn.com/abstract=2812341 (Last accessed on 27 November 2018).

Prah, K. (2007). Democracy, Education, Literacy and Development Keynote Address; 10th Year Jubilee Celebrations of the Centre for International Education, University College of Oslo, 28th – 30th August.http://www.sciepub.com.reference. (Last accessed on 6 January2018).

Prasad, M., and Tewari, J.(2016). Prosopis Juliflora (SW) DC: Potential for Bioremediation and Bioeconomy. In: M.N.V.Prasad, editor, Bioremediation and Bioeconomy**,** Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2016, PP. 49-76.

Proclamation No 23/2011, Regulation of the Council of Ministers on the Establishment of the Special Support Board for Regional Governments.https://www.ilo.org,dyn,docs. (Last accessed on 22 January 2018).

Qian, Y., and Barry, W. (1997). Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives, 11 The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No.4,pp. 83-92.

Rettberg, S. (2010).Contested Narratives of Pastoral Vulnerability and Risk in Ethiopia's Afar Region.Practical Action Publishing, Vol.1, No.2, pp.248-273.

Rettberg, S. (2014). The Spread of Prosopis Juliflora in the Wetlands of the Middle Awash Basin, in GTZManaging Prosopis Juliflora for better (agro-)Pastoral Livelihoods in the Horn of AfricaProceedings of the Regional Conference. pp.5-9. https://wocatpedia.net,images,proceedings_r…pdf. Last accessed on 19 November 2018.

Riker, W. (1964). Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Boston: Little, Brown & Co. Vol. 6, No. 10, pp. 187 – 192.

Rondinelli,et al., (1983) Decentralization in Developing Countries. A Review of Recent Experience. World Bank Working Papers No. 581, Washington DC.

Sansculotte, K. and Demessie F. (2012).Traditional authority and modern hegemony: Peacemaking in the Afar region of Ethiopia. In Integrating Traditional andModern Conflict Resolution:Experiences from selectedcases in Eastern and theHorn of Africa.Africa Dialogue Monograph Series No. 2/2012

Selamawit Teklu (2018). The Impact of the Productive Safety Net on Livelihoods and Social Services among the Afar Pastoralist and Agro-Pastoralist Communities in Ethiopia: Lessons and Policy Directions, in SIDA Conference Proceedings Social protection as a Pathway for InclusiveDevelopment among the Pastoral and Agro-pastoral Communities in Africa,pp.14-15.

Semahagn, Gash (2012). The Dilemma of Adopting Ethnic Federal System in Africa in light of the Perspectives from Ethiopian Experience.Journal of African Studies and Development Vol. 4(7), pp. 168-175.

Seyoum Mesfin (2014). The Inter-regional Migration Phenomenon: Response of the Indigenes Majang Nationality Zone in Gambella Region, Ethiopia. Ethiopian Journal of Federal Studies, Vol.1,No.2,

Seyoum Teffera (2005). Education and development in Ethiopia. Vol 8,No 2. Addis Ababa.

Shami, S. (1993). The Social Implications of Population Displacement and Resettlement: An Overview with a Focus on the Arab Middle East. International Migration Review,Vol.27,No.1.pp.4-33.

Sharma, C. (2011). Intergovernmental Coordination Mechanisms in India.South Asian Journal of Socio-Political Studies. Vol.15,No.2, pp..40-28

Shiferaw, Bekele (1986). An Empirical Account of Resettlement in Ethiopia 1975-1985. Paper prepared for the 9th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, pp.127-142 Moscow, August.

Shiferaw Bekele (1988). An empirical account of resettlement in Ethiopia (1975- 1985). In: proceedings of the ninth international congress of Ethiopian studies. pp 127-142, Moscow.

Shumete Gizaw (2013). Resettlement Revisited: The Post-Resettlement Assessment in Biftu Jalala Resettlement Site. Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics, Vol.3,No.1, pp.22-57.

Simeon, R.(2001).Making Federalism Work: Intergovernmental Coordination and Institutional capacity.Forum of Federations.https://forumfed.org › document › making-federalism...
(Last accessed on 4 April 2018).

Smoke, P. (2001), “Fiscal decentralization in developing countries: a review of current concepts and practice”, UN Research Institute for Social Development - Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights Programme Paper 2. Vol.43, pp.34-41.

Smoke, P. (2001), “Fiscal decentralization in developing countries: a review of current concepts and practice”, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development - Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights Programme Paper 2.

Solomon Desta (2006). Pastoralism and Development in Ethiopia. Economic Focus, Vol.9,No.3, https://www.africabib.org › query_a. (Last accessed on 13 March2019).

Solomon Negussie (2008). Fiscal Federalism in the Ethiopian Ethnic-based Federal System, Revised Edition. Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers.

Solomon, Tadesse, etal., (2003). Geology and Mineral Potential of Ethiopia: a note on geology and Mineral map of Etpia. Journal of African Earth Sciences 36(2003),pp. 273-313.

Soule, A. (2012). Lij Iyassu and the Afars (Part II): Impeachment of Lij Iyassu and support of the Afars. http://www.hare.org,Africa. (Last accessed on12 January2018).

Stavenhagen, R. (1996). Ethnic Conflict and Economic Development.In Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State. Palgrave Macmillan, London

Taddese Berha and Yonas Adaye .2007. “Afar: The Impact of Local Conflicts on Regional Security”: In Journal of Institute for Security Studies Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Tahir, B. (2010). Afar Regional State of Ethiopia.Between 14th to 20th April 2010. EPRDF Prepared a Meeting for the Afar and Issa.

Tefera Negash (2019). Ideology and Power in TPLF’s Ethiopia: A Historic Reversal in the Making? Oxford University Press

Tegegne Gebre Egziabher (1998). The Influence of Decentralization on Some Aspects of Local Regional Development Planning in Ethiopia. Institute of Development Research (IDR), Addis Ababa University.

Tegegne Sishaw(2014). Population Dynamics and its Impact on Land Use / Cover in Ethiopia: the Case of Mandura District of Metekel Zone, Benshangul-Gumuz Regional State, Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Geography, University of South Africa, p. 39.

Teketel Abebe (1998). Tenants of the State: The Limitations of Revolutionary Agrarian Transformation in Ethiopia, 1974-1991. Lund Dissertations in Sociology 24, Department of Sociology, Lund University, Sweden.

Temesgen Aklilu (2006). The Role of the Transport Sector in Ethiopia's Economic Development. Economic Focus, Vol.9 No.4.

Terefe Zeleke and Melesse Asfaw (2014).The Contribution of Rural Resettlement to the Livelihoods of Settlers in Ethiopia: A Case of Essera District Resettlement Schemes in SNNPR, Vol.4, No.5

Tesfaye Abreha (2002), Vertical Intergovernmental Relations in the Federal Systems of Ethiopia: the Case of Education Bureau of the Amhara National Regional State and the Ministry of Education. LL.M Thesis.

Tesfaye, Habisso (2010). Multiethnic (Multinational) Federalism in Plural Societies: Does It Make a Difference? Retrieved from http://aigaforum.com/articles/Multiethnic federalism (Last accessed 18 June 2018).

Tewodros Wakie (2015). Distribution and Economic Analysis of Prosopis-Juliflora in Ethiopia. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Colorado State University

The 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.The Red Sea Press.

The 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar National Regional State.

Thomas, Fleiner (2006). Challenges of Devolution and Power Sharing Structures in Federations: Paper for the Conference Comparative Constitutional Traditions in South Asia of the joint conference of SAIS and SOAS.

Thomas, G. (2011). How to Do Your Case Study: A Guide for Students and Researchers. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.

Thomas, H. and Dean, W. (2013).Analysing data in qualitative research. In: Nursing & Midwifery Research: Methods and Appraisal for Evidence-Based Practice. 4th edn.(Schneider Z, Whitehead D, LoBiondo-Wood G & Haber J), Elsevier - Mosby, Marrickville, Sydney. pp. 141-160.

Thomas Haile (2018). The Challenges and Effects of Motivation on Employees Performance in Ethiopia: The Case of Tendaho Sugar Factory. International Journal of Current Advanced Research, Vol.7,No.3,pp. 10863-10869

Trimingham, S.(1952). Islam in Ethiopia.Geoferey Cumberlege Oxford University Press London, New York, Toronto.

Trimingham, S.(1976). Islam in Ethiopia. London: Oxford University Press .Third Impression.

Tsegay, Gebrelibanos (2009).The Ethiopian Salt Trading System in the 20th Century: A View from Mäqäla, Northern Ethiopia In: Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, ed. by Svein Ege, Harald Aspen, Birhanu Teferra and Shiferaw Bekele, Trondheim.

Tsegaye Regassa (2004). State Constitutions in Federal Ethiopia: A Preliminary Observation. A Summary for the Bellagio Conference, March 22-27, 2004.

Tsegaye Moreda (2015) Listening to their silence? The Political Reaction of Affected Communities to Large-scale Land Acquisitions: Insights from Ethiopia, Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol.42: No.3-4, pp. 517-539.

Turton, D. (2006). Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: James Currey

UN (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 22 December 2015. [on the report of the Second Committee (A/70/476/Add.2)]

UN (1999). Sustainable Development and International Economic Cooperation: Women in Development, World Survey on the Role of Women in Development: Globalization, Gender and Work-Report of the Secretary-General. https://www.ucl.ac.uk › urb_society › pdf_gender.pdf.(Last accessed on 17 May 2019).

UNDP (2010). The Afar Integrated Dryland Management Project (AIDMP) under the Integrated Drylands Development Programme. January 2010-December 2012. https://info.undp.org › docs › pdc › Documents pdf. (Last accessed on 7 April2018).

UNDP (2016).Strengthening Women's Political Participation: An Analysis of the Impact of Women's Parliamentary Networks in Europe and Central Asia. https://www.undp.org › belarus › publications › streng... (Last accessed on27 May 2018).

UNICEF (2015). Context Analysis Summary: Ethiopia, https://education4resilience.iiep.unesco.org › 2015 › c... (Last accessed on17 June 2018)

USAID (2007). Ethiopia: Complex Food Security Crisis: Situation Report No 1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2007.Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. https://reliefweb.int,report,ethiopia-complex-food- (Last accessed on15 November 2018).

USAID (2009). Democratic Decentralization Programming Hand book UNDP. General governance Indicators Literature.https://urban-links.org,wp-content. (Last accessed on 24 December 2018).

USAID (2014). Resilience-building in the Afar National Regional State, Ethiopia:Agriculture Knowledge, Learning Documentation and Policy (AKLDP) Project, Ethiopia. https://agri-learning-ethiopia.org,2014/11, (Last accessed on 24 March 2018).

USAID (2018) .Gender and Youth Inclusion Strategy. Agribusiness Competitiveness Activity in Tajikistan(ACAT).https://pdf.usaid.gov,pdf_docs (Last accessed on 21 January 2018).

Varet, et al., (2012). Exploring for Geothermal Sites in Northern and Central Afar (Ethiopia)" Proceedings, 4thAfrican Rift Geothermal Conference. Nairobi, Kenya.

Von Braun, J. and Grote, U. (2002), "Does decentralization Serve the Poor?", in E. Ahmad & V. Tanzi (Eds.), Managing fiscal decentralization, London: Routledge, pp.68-96.

Wafaa, N. and Myriam, D. (2012). Local governance, decentralization and local economic development.Middle Eastern Finance and Economics. Euro Journals Publishing, Inc. pp.125-135.

Watts, R.L. (1994). 'Contemporary views on federalism', in: B. de Villiers (ed), Evaluating Federal Systems, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994) 7.

Watts, Ronald (1996), Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s. Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University and the McGill-Queen's University Press.

Watts, R. (2003). Intergovernmental Councils in Federations: Constructive and Co-operative Federalism? A Series of Commentaries on the Council of the Federation.Institute of Intergovernmental Relations at Queen' University.

Watts, R. (2008). Comparing Federal Systems (3rd ed.) Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Wehib, Ahmed (2015). History of Harar and the Hararis: Harari People Regional State Culture, Heritage and Tourism Bureau,https://everythingharar.com › files › History_of_H...pdf

Wibbels, Erik (2006). MADISON IN BAGHDAD?Decentralization and Federalism in Comparative Politics.Annu.Rev. Polit. Sci. pp.165–88.

Wondimagegne Chekol (20-14). Prosopis Juliflora, Parthenium and beyond, challenges for an integrated strategy of IAS control in the Afar Region, in GTZManaging Prosopis Juliflora for better (agro-)Pastoral Livelihoods in the Horn of AfricaProceedings of the Regional Conference. pp.86-92. https://wocatpedia.net,images,proceedings_r…pdf. (Last accessed on 26 November 2018).

Wood, P. (1985). 'Population redistribution and agricultural settlement schemes in Ethiopia, 1958-80'. in Clarke, I.J., M.Khogali and L.A.Kosinski (eds.), Population and Development Projects in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

World Bank (1994).Enhancing Women's Participation in Economic Development.Volume 41181,Nummer 4 van World Bank E-Library Archive.

World Bank (1998). Gender Issues in Ethiopia: Implementing the National Policy on Women. Africa Region Findings and Good Practice Infobriefs; No. 119. Washington, DC. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9885. (Last accessed on6 February 2018).

World Bank (2010). Gender and Development: An Evaluation of World Bank Support, 2002–08 https://www.semanticscholar.org › paper › Gender-and-d. (Last accessed on13 May2019)

Yigzaw et al., (2019).Causes and Impacts of Internal Displacement in Ethiopia. African Journal of Social Work, Vol.9,No.2, pp.32-41.

Yildiz, Dursun (2017). "The Importance Of Water in Development ", World Water Diplomacy & Science News. Hydropolitics Academy, January 2017 ,Ankara._Turkey

Yakob Bekele (2010). The Party as an Instrument of Intergovernmental Relation IIGR): EPRDF and SPDP.

Yasin Mohammed (2004). Pastoral Land Tenure Issues and Development in the Middle Awash Valley: Case Study on Amibara and Gewane Woredas. Unpublished MA Thesis, Addis Ababa University

Yamane Taro (1967). Statistics: An Introductory Analysis (2nd ed.). New York: Harper and Row

Yasin Mohammed (2008). Political History of the Afar in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Afrika Spectrum, 43(1), pp. 39-65. GIGA Institute of African Affairs, Hamburg.

Yasin Mohammed (2010). Regional Dynamics of Inter-ethnic Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: An Analysis of the Afar-Somali Conflict in Ethiopia and Djibouti. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Hamburg.

Yayneshet, T. and Kelemework, T (2004) .Indigenous Rangeland resources and Conflict Management by the North Afar Pastoral Groups in Ethiopia.A Pastoral Forum Organized by the Drylands Coordination Group (DCG) in Ethiopia, June 27-28, 2003, Mekelle, Ethiopia. DCG Report No. 31 November 2004

Yibekal, Abebe (2012). Ecological and Economic Dimensions of the Paradoxical Invasive Species-Prosopis juliflora and Policy Challenges in Ethiopia. https://scholar.google.com › citations. (Last accessed on 22 May 2018)

Yohannes Aberra and Mahmmud Abdulahi (eds.) (2015). To Development: Government Development Strategies in the Pastoral Areas of the Horn of Africa. Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University.

Yonas Adaye and Ezra Abate(2014).Conflict Dimensions of Large-scale AgriculturalInvestment in Ethiopia: Gambella Case Study, In Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe (Dd) **A Delicate Balance:** Land Use, Minority Rights and Social Stability in the Horn of Africa, IPSS, Addis Ababa University.

Yonas Girma (2015). Federalism Vis a Vis the Right to Freedom of Movement and Residence: Critical Analysis of the Law and the Practice in Ethiopian Perspective. Hamburg: Anchor Academic Publishing.

Yohannes Zergaw (2014). Quantitative Assessment of Invasion of Prosopis Juliflorain Baadu, Afar Regional State of Ethiopia, University of Bayreuth, German.in GTZManaging Prosopis Juliflora for better (agro-)Pastoral Livelihoods in the Horn of AfricaProceedings of the Regional Conference .pp.6-19. https://wocatpedia.net,images,proceedings_r…pdf. Last accessed on 16 November 2018.

Young, C. (1994). Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: An Overview, Occasional Paper, Geneva: UN-Research Institute for Social Development,.https://digitallibrary.un.org › record (Last accessed on10 Feburary 2019)

Yussuf Yassin (n.d.). Afar Perception and Reality after 1991 Reconstitution of Ethiopia by EPRDF

Zaharia, P., and Bilouseac,I. (2014). Decentralization and Local Autonomy-Local Public Management Defining Principles. Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Vol.11, No.2.

Zemelak Ayitenew (2014). The politics of sub-national constitutions and local government in Ethiopia.Perspectives on Federalism, Vol.6, issue 2, 2014.UWCScholar-Publications.

Zeraye, Mehari (2008).Invasion of Prosopis juliflora (SW.) DC and Rural Livelihoods: The Case of Afar Pastoralists at Middle Awash Area of Ethiopia. MA Thesis.

Zeraye Mehari(2015). The Invasion of Prosopis-Juliflora and Afar Pastoral Livelihoods in the Middle Awash Area of Ethiopia. Ecological Process, a Springer Open Journal.Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research.

Zinabu Endalfer (2014). Villagization in contemporary Ethiopia: The experience of Gambella. Unpublished MA Thesis, Addis Ababa University.

Appendices

Annex I: List of Focus Group Discussion Guides

FGD I- With Educated Afars and Civil Servants, Youth and Women

1. To what extent the Afar people have been benefitted under the Ethiopian federal system; What factors are challenging to improve the benefits of the Afar people;
2. Do you believe that the leaders of Afar Regional State perform their duties and make decisions free from the influence of the federal government; If your answer is No, how do you explain the relationship between the leaders of Afar Regional State and the federal government;
3. To what the leaders of Afar Regional State at all levels discharge their responsibilities in a transparent and accountable manner; What are the leadership challenges contributing for the underdevelopment of the regional State;
4. The regional ruling party, Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), is an affiliated party to the national ruling party; EPRDF (is not yet member of EPRDF). What comparative advantages or disadvantages have this form of party relationship;
5. How do you explain the role and or the participation of educated Afars in the regional politics and administration; What actions have been taken by the regional government to make women and the youth actively participate in the development endeavors of the regional state and to enable them benefit from the fruits of regional development;
6. What are the roles of development projects in improving the living conditions of the community in particular and the development of Afar Regional State in particular;

FGD II- With Pastoralists/Agro-pastoralists

1. What are the achievements of Afar Regional State since the establishment of federal system in Ethiopia; To what extent the living conditions of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists has been improved under federal Ethiopia;
2. What are the challenges of pastoral and agro-pastoral economic activities in Afar Regional State; What are the supports given to the community by the regional state government;
3. What benefits do pastoralists and agro-pastoralists gained from development projects like Tendaho Sugar Factory and Salt Production; What is your attitude towards the sugar factory;
4. What is your attitude towards the villagization programme being undertaken in the regional state; How do you compare permanent settlement in settlement villages and the traditional mobile way of life;
5. What is the role of traditional leaders in the community; To what extent they stood for the respect of the rights and protect the interests of the community they represent; Or to what extent they have been voicing the problems of the community;
6. Are there inter-clan conflicts affecting the internal cohesion of Afars; If, yes, how do such conflicts affect the livelihood of the community in particular and the development of the regional state in general; What are the effects of conflicts between Afars and neighboring ethnic groups (such as Issa/Somalis an Amhara)? ;
7. To what extent the Woreda/Kebele Administration is close to the local community and tries to solve their problems; How do you evaluate the service delivery of the local government institutions; To what extent the local government is responsive to the demands of the local community;

Annex II: List of Interview Guides

Interview I- with Authorities of Federal Institutions

1. How do you explain the power relation between Afar Regional State and the Federal Government in co-determining on national policies to make them compatible with regional laws and policies; the party channel, between the legislative and executive branches of the two levels of government; How about the relation between Afar Regional State and Tigray Regional State;
2. How do you explain the categorization of political parties in Ethiopia as member of EPRDF and affiliated parties in relation to the need for devolved power in federal systems;
3. What is the accountability relationship between the federal government and regional state governments when authorities of regional states do not properly perform what is expected of them or when problems encounter which adversely affect the benefits of citizens;
4. How the federal government and the Afar Regional State evaluate the execution of national laws and policies in the Afar Regional State;
5. Do you believe that the Afar National Regional State has achieved significant economic changes under the Ethiopian federal system; If your answer to is "yes ", what are the major changes that the regional state has achieved; To what extent these changes enabled the regional state to address the interests of the Afar people;
6. What special supports have been given to the Afar Regional State; What are the contributions of professionals sent by the federal institutions to Afar Regional State in enhancing the capacity of the political leaders of the regional states; Do you believe that such supports have been significantly supporting the economic development of the regional state; If your answer is "no", why such supports did not result in transforming the economic development of the regional state;
7. How do you explain the contribution of development programmes and projects such as villagization programme, Tendaho Sugar Factory and salt production for the socio-economic transformation of the regional state in general and the life of the pastoralists in particular;What factors have been challenging the success of villagization programme in Afar Regional State;

8. To what extent the Inter-ethnic conflict has affected the development of Afar Regional State; What efforts have been made to find out lasting solutions to conflicts between Afar and its neighboring regional states;

Interview II- with Regional Bureau Officials and Workers

1. How do you explain the power relation between the Federal Government and the Afar Regional State Government in the light of the provisions of the federal and Afar Regional State constitutions; Or how do you explain the power relation between the Federal Government and the Afar Regional State Government in terms of creating conducive environment for regional self-rule;

2. To what extent the Afar Regional State government is free from the influence of the federal government while exercising its power of designing laws, economic and social development policies, strategies and plans which reflect the regional reality;

3. How do you explain the role of the Ministry of Federal Affairs in coordinating the provision of special support to the Afar Regional State;What are the roles played by professionals assigned by the federal government in providing technical support to the Afar Regional State government; To what extent the Afar Regional State is benefitted from the development cooperation with other neighboring regional states;

4. What are the main achievements of the Afar Regional State under the Ethiopian federal political system; How about development challenges; Or what are the challenges deterring the realization of economic transformation of the Afar National Regional State;

5. The regional ruling party, Afar National Democratic Party, is an affiliated party to the national ruling party; EPRDF (is not yet member of EPRDF). What comparative advantages or disadvantages have this form of party relationship;

6. How do you explain the cooperation between the Afar Regional governments with the traditional leadership in leading the Afar people; What mechanisms are put in place to maximize the role of the traditional leadership in motivating the community for development endeavors; If not, why; And what is the impact of the exclusion of the traditional leadership for the economic development of the region;

7. How do you explain the role and or the participation of educated Afars in the regional politics and administration;
8. What actions have been taken by Afar Regional State government to make women and the youth actively participate in the development endeavors of the regional state and to enable them benefit from the fruits of regional development;
9. How do you explain leadership capacity, the human resource strength in relation to the structures and tasks, in all sectors; What actions have been taken for the purpose of building the capacity of the human resource; How do you evaluate the activities of the regional leadership at all levels in properly discharging their responsibilities;
10. Do you believe that investments being undertaken in the Afar Regional State have significant Impact on the socio-economic development of the region; If you answer is "I do not believe" why such investments did not enhance the economic transformation of the regional state;
11. Are there inter-clan and inter-ethnic conflicts between the Afars and their neighboring communities; if your answer is "yes", what are the causes of these conflicts? And how such conflicts affect the economic transformation of the Afar Regional State;
12. How do you explain the follow up and controlrelationship between the Afar Regional State government and the Woreda Administration;And what mechanisms are put in place to make Woreda administrations exercise self-rule in their own jurisdiction;
13. How do you explain the efforts of the Afar Regional State governments at all levels in meeting the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal; To what extent the regional state government appropriately use revenue sources for the development of the regional state;
14. What is the environment challenge adversely affecting the development of Afar Regional State; How do you evaluate the emphasis given by the Afar Regional state to basic animal resource development since the region predominantly inhabited by pastoralist society;

Interview III- With Members of Afar Regional State Council

1. How do you explain the relationship between Afar Regional State Council and the executive branches of the regional state; How many field observations the state council conduct to oversight the activities of the executive branches;
2. What kind of measures have been taken on those who do not properly discharge their responsibilities based on evaluations made by the regional state council;
3. What are the benefits of assigning traditional leaders as advisors at Woreda, Zonal and regional levels of governments as well as their participation in the regional state council conferences;
4. What are the problems challenging the regional state council to discharge its responsibilities up to expectations ;
5. It has been said/written that accelerating the development of Afar Regional State has become difficult although the self-administration right of the regional state is ensured since 1991. If so, What are the factors challenging the socio-economic transformation of the regional state;

Interview IV- With Members of Afar Regional State Bureau of Peace and Security Administration

1. What is the main security threat currently to Afar Regional State;
2. How do you explain conflicts among different clans in the regional state; Which clans have been in frequent conflicts; What are the causes of conflict among Afar clans; What efforts have been made to avoid inter-clan conflicts in the Regional State;
3. How do you explain the relationship between Afar and Issa/ Somalis since the introduction of Federal system in Ethiopia; What are the causes and consequences of conflictsbetween the two ethnic groups; What efforts have been made to resolvethe conflict between the two ethnic groups ;
4. How do you explain the relationship among neighboring Woredas of Afar and Amhara Regional States since the introduction of federal system in Ethiopia; What are the causes of conflict among neighboring Woredas; What are the effects of conflicts among neighboring Woredas; What efforts have been made to avoid conflicts among neighboring Woredas of the two Regional States;

Interview V-With Pastoral and Agriculture Development Bureau Workers

1. How do you explain the animal resource development in Afar Regional State; To what extent the regional state and the community benefited from the animal resource; If not, why;
2. What conditions have been facilitated to help pastoralists improve their animal resources; It has been saidthat themilk has been brought to Afar towns like Semera and Logia from the towns of Amhara Regional State like Dessie and Kombelcha (from agrarian to pastoralists).Would you please explain why it happened as such;
3. Are there institutions or factories in Afar Regional State which have been using animals and animal products as an input;
4. What do suggest about what things have to be done to improve the animal resource of Afar Regional State ;
5. What are the effects of the invasion of Prosopis Juliflora on the lives of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists; What efforts have been made to control and manage the spread of Prosopis;

Interview VI-With Regional Bureau of Revenue

1. What are the sources of revenue to the Afar Regional State; What portion of the annual budget of Afar Regional State has been covered by the revenue it collected from various sources;
2. What amount of revenue that Afar Regional State has been collecting every month from the salt business; Could you please explain the specific amount of money that the regional state has been getting from Afdera, Asalle and Dobi;
3. What amount of revenue that Afar Regional State has been gaining from SVS salt production PLC every year; How about from Tendaho Sugar factory;
4. Do you think that the regional state has been properly collecting its revenue and using it to contribute for the development of the regional state ; What are the challenges related to the proper utilization of the revenue collected for the development of the regional state;

Interview VII- With Regional Investment Commission

1. How do you explain the investment activities being undertaken in the regional state in general; Do you believe that the regional state is benefited from the investment sector; Or what is the contribution of the investment being undertaken in the region for the socio-economic development of the regional state; What are the challenges of the investment being undertaken in the regional state;
2. What are the sectors that investors engaged in the regional state; In which Woredas do investors engaged in agricultural activities; What are the items that investors have been producing;
3. What is the participation of Afars in the various investment sectors being undertaken in the regional state; What are the reasons why Afars have not been actively participating up to expectations;
4. To what extent Afar Diasporas have been participating in the investment being undertaken in the regional state; What are the reasons why the Afar Diasporas have not been actively participate in the investment being undertaken in the regional state;
5. What do you think about what has to be done to make the regional state benefit from the investment sector;

Interview VIII-With Woreda Officials and Workers

1. How do you explain the relationship between the Woreda Offices and the regional bureaus; Or how do you explain the follow up and control relationship between the Afar Regional State government and the Woreda Administration;What are the successes that Woreda Offices have achieved in the past few years;What are the factors hindering Offices to sufficiently implement their responsibilities;
2. What are the main development challenges of Woredas since the introduction of federal political system in the country; Or what are the challenges deterring the economic improvement of Woredas in the regional state;
3. Do you believe that the self-rule experience of the Afar Regional State has enabled it to address the interests of the Afar People; If your answer is “no”, how do you explain the gap between the expectation of the Afar people and operational reality;

4. How do you explain the cooperation between the Afar Regional governments with the traditional leadership in leading the Afar people; What mechanisms are put in place to maximize the role of the traditional leadership in motivating the community for development on the economic development of the region;
5. How do you explain the contribution of development programmes and projects such as villagization, Tendaho Sugar Factory and salt production for the socio-economic transformation of the regional state in general and the life of the pastoralists in particular;
6. Are there intra-clan or local cleavages which have been adversely affecting the internal cohesion of the Afars; If your answer is "yes", what are the causes of these conflicts; What is the role of government institutions in such conflicts; And how these conflicts affect the economic transformation of the Afar Regional State; How about the causes, consequences of inter-ethnic conflicts (conflicts between Afars and their neighboring communities?)
7. What are the major leadership challenges in the Woredas which have been adversely affecting the development efforts in the Woredas;
8. How do you explain the efforts of the Afar Regional State governments at all levels in meeting the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal; Or to what extent the Woreda administrations properly use revenue sources for the development of Woredas;
9. How do you explain the attitude of the pastoralists of the regional state towards villagization programme? What are the problems that came to happen as a result of the villagization programme carried out in the region;
10. What actions have been taken by the regional government/Woreda administration to make the educated, women and the young actively participate in the development endeavors of the regional state; And how do you explain the impact of the exclusion of the educated, the youth, women as well as the existing work place environment and working habit on the economic development of the Afar Regional State;
11. What are the effects of the invasion of Prosopis Juliflora on the lives of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists; What efforts have been made to control and manage the spread of Prosopis;

Interview IX- With Educated Afars and Civil Servants

1. To what extent the Afar people have been benefitted under the Ethiopian federal system; What factors are challenging the efforts of improving the benefits of the Afar people;
2. Do you believe that the leaders of Afar Regional State perform their duties and make decisions free from the influence of the federal government; If your answer is No, how do you explain the relationship between the leaders of Afar Regional State and the federal government;
3. To what the leaders of Afar Regional State at all levels discharge their responsibilities in a transparent and accountable manner; What are the leadership challenges contributing for the underdevelopment of the regional State;
4. The regional ruling party, Afar Nationa Democratic Party, is an affiliated party to the national ruling party; EPRDF (is not yet member of EPRDF). What comparative advantages or disadvantages have this form of party relationship;
5. How do you explain the role and or the participation of educated Afars in the regional politics and administration; What actions have been taken by the regional government to make the educated, women and the youth actively participate in the development endeavors of the regional state and to enable them benefit from the fruits of regional development;
6. What are the roles of development projects in improving the living conditions of the community in particular and the development of Afar Regional State in particular;
7. What are the effects of the invasion of Prosopis Juliflora on the lives of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists; What efforts have been made to control and manage the spread of Prosopis;

Interview X- With Different Members of the Community (Educated, Youth, women and others)

1. To what extent the Afar people are happy with the federal political system; What are the fruits of federal system to the Afar people; To what extent the living condition of the Afar people has been improved under federal Ethiopia; What are the indicators of their improved live conditions;
2. To what extent authorities at different levels of the regional state perform their duties and responsibilities in a transparent and accountable manner; And how do you explain government service delivery in general; What is expected from government of the regional state at all levels to improve service delivery in the regional state;

3. How do you explain the efforts of the Afar Regional State governments at all levels in meeting the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal; To what extent the Regional government/Woreda Administration is close to the local community and tries to solve their problems;
4. To what extent the regional government/Woreda administration have been trying to ensure the benefits and participation of the young and women; Or what activities have been done by the regional government/Woreda administration to improve the economic capacity of the young and women; What are the results achieved so far;
5. What is the contribution of the villagization programme, development projects like Tendaho Sugar Factory and Afdera Salt production for the development of the regional state; To what extent the Afar people have benefitted from investments being undertaken in their regional state; How do you evaluate the participation of Afars in the investment being undertaken in their regional state;
6. What mechanisms have been put in place to evaluate the work performance of leaders at different levels of government and to ensure that the activities of authorities are in line with the interests and problems of the community; What conducive conditions have been created by the Woreda/Kebele administration to enable the local community to participate in decision making on issues regarding their Woreda/Kebele;
7. Are there inter-clan and inter-ethnic conflicts between the Afars and their neighboring communities; If your answer is "yes", what are the causes of these conflicts; And how such conflicts affect the economic transformation of the Afar Regional State;
8. How do you explain the role and or the participation of educated Afars and traditional leaders in the regional politics and administration;
9. What are the environmental factors adversely affecting the socio-economic development of Afar regional state ; What efforts have been made to overcome the adverse effects of these factors;

Interview XI-With Pastoralists and Agro-pastoralists

1. What are the achievements of Afar Regional State since the establishment of federal system in Ethiopia; To what extent the living conditions of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists has been improved since the introduction of federal system in 1991;
2. What are the challenges of pastoral and agro-pastoral economic activities in Afar Regional State; What are the supports provided to the community by the regional state government;
3. What benefits do pastoralists and agro-pastoralists gained from development projects like Tendaho Sugar Factory and Salt Production; What is your attitude towards the sugar factory;
4. To what extent the regional state government at all levels is close to the local community and tries to solve their problem and to address their interests; Or responsive to the interests and needs of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists;
5. How do you explain the benefits of the villagization programme to the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists; What is your general attitude towards the villagization programme;
6. What is the role of traditional leaders in the community; Do you believe that they are still defending the interests of the community; if not, why;
7. How do you explain the productivity of pastoralism (animal husbandry) in the past and its current situation;
8. What are the effects of the invasion of Prosopis Juliflora on the lives of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists; What efforts have been made to control and manage the spread of Prosopis;
9. Are there inter-clan and inter-ethnic conflicts between the Afars and their neighboring communities; If your answer is "yes", what are the causes of their conflict; And how such conflicts affect the economic transformation of the Afar Regional State;
10. To what extent the regional leadership and professionals have been giving awareness creation trainings to pastoralists and afro-pastoralists about various issues;
11. What are the effects of the invasion of Prosopis Juliflora on the lives of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists; What efforts have been made to control and manage the spread of Prosopis;

Interview XII-With Workers of Coordinated Office for Basin Development and Villagization Programme

1. When do Villagization programme started in Afar Regional State; Could you please give information about the number of households settled in the last few years which would help to understand failures/ improvements in the implementation of the Villagization programme over the years;
2. In which Woredas of the Afar Regional State pastoralists have been made to settle; why;
3. Is there a difference between the huts constructed in the settlement villages and those in which the pastoralists were living in their former residence areas; If any, what difference;
4. What are the benefits that the pastoralists gained after being settled in the settlement villages; Are there challenges that the pastoralists encountered as a result of being settled in settlement villages; if any, what are the challenges;
5. What are the challenges encountered in the process of settling pastoralists in settlement villages; what is expected of the regional leadership at levels (Region, Zone and Woreda) to make pastoralist benefit from the villagizaion programme;

Interview XIII- With SVS Salt Production PLC

1. When did SVS salt production PLC commenced processing salt; How many people got employment opportunity in the PLC; What number of the employees constitute the Afars; What is the processing capacity of the PLC per a day;
2. What is the business relationship between SVS salt production PLC and Kadaba Salt Suppliers Shareholders Association; What is the price of one Quintal of salt that the PLC receive from the association; What is the price of one Quintal of salt that the PLC hand in to its costumers after processing;
3. What are the types of taxes that the PLC has been paying; What is the amount of tax that the PLC has been paying to the regional state;
4. What are the benefits and services that the PLC has been delivering to the local communities;
5. What are the challenges adversely affecting the proper functioning of the PLC;

Interview XIV- With Workers of Kadaba Salt Suppliers Shareholders Association

1. When Kadaba Salt Suppliers Shareholders Association was established; What was the number of members of the association during the time of its establishment; What is the number of shareholders now; Who is the responsible organ to give investment license to those who want to engage in salt business in the region; What are the criteria to have a salt land or to engage in salt business; Hoe do you explain the participation of Afars in the salt business;
2. What is the amount of salt presented for sale at Afdera every month; Who decides the amount of salt to be sold every month; What is the amount of salt that each members of the association present for sale every month;
3. What is the price of one Quintal of salt that the association buy at Afdera from members of the association; What is the price of one Quintal of salt that the association sell to the SVS salt producing PLC;
4. What are the benefits that Afdera Woreda gets from the salt produced around Lake Afdera? How about the local communities; The regional state;
5. What are the main problems encountered in the process of producing salt in general;

Interview XV- With Workers of Tendaho Sugar Factory

1. Who was the owner of the land where Tendaho Sugar Factory established its infrastructures of the factory and the lands where it grows sugarcane; for what purpose these lands were used for before the establishment of the Sugar Factory in the area; How the factory gained the land;
2. What is the attitude of the local communities and the regional leadership at all levels towards the sugar factory;
3. When the factory did finish its establishment and commenced producing sugar;It has been said that there has been interruptions in the production of sugar. For how long the factory has worked without interruption. What are the reasons for the interruption of sugar production; What are the challenges adversely affecting the effectiveness of the sugar factory; What is expected,from whom to enhance the effectiveness of the factory and the benefit of the regional state ;

4. What was the number of workers employed when the factory commenced sugar production; What is the current number of workers of the factory; What number Afars constitute out of the total workers of the factory;
5. What are the benefits that the factory has been providing to the local communities and the regional state; How do you explain the relationship between sugarcane out growers and the sugar factory; What are the benefits that the local community has been gaining from the factory;

Annex III: List of Questionnaires Guides

Table.6.3:. Assignment of Qualified Teachers by Level of Education

The Afar Regional State has been assigning qualified teachers according to national standards by level of education in Ethiopia			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	68	19.4
	Disagree	187	53.4
	Undecided	5	1.4
	Agree	65	18.6
	Strongly Agree	25	7.1
	Total	350	100.0

Table. 8. 3: The Contribution of pastoral and agro-pastoral research institution

The research works conducted by the pastoral and agro-pastoral research institution of the regional state has been playing an important role in solving the problem of the society.			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	139	39.7
	Disagree	112	32
	Undecided	11	3.1
	Agree	67	19.1
	Strongly Agree	21	6
	Total	350	100.0

Table.9.4: The Political Right of Afars in Electing Top Level Regional Leaders

The Afars have been empowering (electing) their top level leaders without the envolvement of the federal government			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	89	25.4
	Disagree	167	47.7
	Undecided	9	2.6
	Agree	61	17.4
	Strongly Agree	24	6.9
	Total	350	100.0

Table.10.4: Participation of Afar Regional State in the National Policy Making Process

The Afar Regional State Government co-determined national policy issues with the federal government			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	67	19.1
	Disagree	174	49.7
	Undecided	9	2.6
	Agree	46	13.1
	Strongly Agree	54	15.4
	Total	350	100.0

Table.11. 4: Policy and Strategy Making and Execution Experience of Afar Regional State

The regional state formulate and Properly execute economic, social and development policies , strategies and plans which are suitable the regional specific contexts			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	29	8.3
	Disagree	236	67.4
	Undecided	15	4.3
	Agree	29	8.3
	Strongly Agree	41	11.7
	Total	350	100.0

Table.12.4: Federal Executive Support to Afar Regional State Executive Branches

The cooperation between the federal and Afar Regional state executive branches has enabled the Afar people to get improved social and economic services			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	69	19.7
	Disagree	175	50.0
	Undecided	8	2.3
	Agree	52	14.9
	Strongly Agree	46	13.1
	Total	350	100.0

Table.13.4: The Role of Federal Government in the relation between Afar and Tigray Regional States

The Afar regional state government has been cooperating with other national regional states at the exclusion of the federal government			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	76	21.7
	Disagree	177	50.6
	Undecided	12	3.4
	Agree	47	13.4
	Strongly Agree	38	10.9
	Total	350	100.0

Table.14. 5: Capacity of Afar Regional State Leadership

Do you believe that the regional leadership at all levels have capacity limitations?			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Yes	311	88.9
	No	39	11.1
	Total	350	100.0

Table.15. 5: Manifestations of Leadership Capacity Limitations in Afar Regional State

If your answer to question (Table.14.5.) is Yes, what are the manifestations of leadership problem in the region?			
		Responses	
		N	Percent
Yes Count	Capacity limitation to discharge the responsibilities that the positions they held requires	279	24.3%
	Prevalence of corruption and bad governance as well as working for self-interest	298	26%
	Inability to move out of clan mentality and making of bias decisions to ones clan	293	25.6%
	Change resistance and inability to move out of traditional practices	276	24.1%
Total		1146	100.0%

Table.16.5: Resource Utilization in Afar Regional State

The regional state government properly used the the conditional grant, and the revenues it collected from all income sources for the development of the regional state			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	72	20.6
	Disagree	178	50.9
	Undecided	13	3.7
	Agree	61	17.4
	Strongly Agree	26	7.4
	Total	350	100.0

Table.17.5: Problems of Clannism and favoring ones Local Area

The leaders of Afar Regional State have been equally serving free of clannism and Favoring ones Local Area (giving special fevor to ones clan or the local area to which one belongs)			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	126	36.0
	Disagree	137	39.1
	Undecided	14	4.0
	Agree	47	13.4
	Strongly Agree	26	7.4
	Total	350	100.0

Table.18.5: The Status of Traditional Leaders in the Regional State

Traditional leaders have been playing signifant roles in defending the interests of the community they are representing			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	83	23.7
	Disagree	170	48.6
	Undecided	15	4.3
	Agree	57	16.3
	Strongly Agree	25	7.1
	Total	350	100.0

Table.19.5: Exclusion of Educated Afars in the Political Leadership

Educted Afars have been drawn into the leadership position at different levels of government in Afar Regional State			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	23	6.6
	Disagree	47	13.4
	Undecided	7	2.0
	Agree	186	53.1
	Strongly Agree	87	24.9
	Total	350	100.0

Table.20.5: The Youth in Afar Regional State

The regional state has been giving special attention to the youth in creating employment opportunities and fulfilling other facilities			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	98	28.0
	Disagree	153	43.7
	Undecided	9	2.6
	Agree	67	19.1
	Strongly Agree	23	6.6
	Total	350	100.0

Table.21.5: The Position of Women in Afar Regional State

The system established in the Afar Regional State has been enabling the Afar Women to play active roles in the political affairs of their regional state			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	115	32.9
	Disagree	149	42.6
	Undecided	13	3.7
	Agree	47	13.4
	Strongly Agree	26	7.4
	Total	350	100.0

Table.22.6: Inter-clan and Inter-ethnic Conflicts in Afar Region

Do you believe that the inter clan and inter-ethnic conflicts have contributed for the underdevelopment of Afar Regional State?			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Yes I believe	277	79.1
	I do not believe	73	20.9
	Total	350	100.0

Table 23.7: The Contribution of Special Support to Afar Regional State

Do you believe that the special support provided to the Afar Regional State has brought significant change in the socio-economic development of the region?			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Yes I believe	94	26.9
	No I do not believe	256	73.1
	Total	350	100.0

Table.24.7. Problems in the Provision of Special Support in Afar Regional State

If your anster to the above question (Table. 23.7) is no, what are the factors adversely affecting the provision of special support in Afar Regional State?		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Not Believe	Limited capacity of the technical advisors (professionals) deployed in the region to support different sectors	187	24.2%	73.0%
	Lack of coordination among professionals supporting the various sectors in the region	172	22.3%	67.2%
	Limited awareness of the community about the purpose of the provision of the special support to the region	196	25.4%	76.6%
	Lack of motivation and commitment among the leaders of the regional state at different levels	217	28.1%	84.8%
Total		772	100.0%	301.6%

Table.26.8: Participation of Afars in the Investment Sector

Do you agree that the Afars have been actively participating in the investment activities of their region		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Yes I believe	72	20.6
	No I do not believe	278	79.4
	Total	350	100.0

Table.27. 8: Justification for the Low Participation of Afars in the Investment Sector

If your answer to the above question (Table.26.8) is no, what is your justification for the low participation of Afar in the investment being undertaken in the region?		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Not Believe	The culture of the Afar people encourages resources sharing but not saving and capital accumulation	207	25.5%	74.5%
	The involvement of non-Afars in the investment sector which pushed out Afars from competition	249	30.7%	89.6%
	Absence adequate natural resources which could encourage investment in the region	113	13.9%	40.6%
	Lack of implementation of the investment policy formulated by the regional state government with the aim of encouraging investment	243	29.9%	87.4%
Total		812	100.0%	246.4%

Table.28.8: Participation of Afar Diasporas in the Investment Sector

The Afar Diasporas have been actively participating in the investment activities of their region		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Agree	61	17.4
	Disagree	289	82.6
	Total	350	100.0

Table. 29.8. Justification for the less Participation of Afar Diasporas in the Investment Sector

If your answer to the above question (Table 28.8.) is disagreement, what is your justification for the low participation of Afar in the investment being undertaken in the region?		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Disagree	The Afar regional state government did not sufficiently motivate the Afra Diaspora to invest their resources in their region	269	25.7%	93.1%
	The Afar Diaspora lacked confidence about their profitability due to the prevalence of corruption in the region	277	26.4%	95.8%
	Absence of infrastructures and different facilitirs such as roads, power and water	272	26.0%	94.1%
	Unlike other ethnic groups, there are very limited Afar Diaspora	230	21.9%	79.6%
Total		1048	100.0%	229.4%

Table.31.8: Afar Pastoralists' Right over their Land

The regional state administered state land by respecting the right of pastoralist not to be displaced from their own lands		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	75	21.4
	Disagree	174	49.7
	Undecided	10	2.9
	Agree	58	16.6
	Strongly Agree	33	9.4
	Total	350	100.0

Table.33.8: Overall Benefit of Afars from Investment being undertaken in their region

The Afar people are beneficiary from the investments being under taken in their region			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Agree	73	20.9
	Disagree	277	79.1
	Total	350	100.0

Table. 34.8. Justification why Afars have not been benefited from Investment Sector

If your answer to the above question (Table 33.8.) is disagreement, what is your justification for the low participation of Afar in the investment being undertaken in the region?				
		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Disagree	Since most of the people engaged in investment are non -Afars, the profit gained from the sector has been used for the development of the region	248	23.9%	89.5%
	The deterioration of the animal resource of pastoralists from time to time	267	25.8%	96.4%
	The living condition of the Afars has not been significantly changed	260	25.1%	93.9%
	The regional state government has has not been properly collect revenues from investors and use it for the purpose of improving the lives of Afars	261	25.2%	94.2%
Total		1036	100.0%	374%

Table.36.9: Benefitsof the Villagization Programme

The Villagization programme has benefitted Afar pastoralists and agro-pastoralists			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Agree	67	19.1
	Disagree	283	80.9
	Total	350	100.0

Table.37.9: Justification for the less benefit obtained from the Villagization Programme

If your answer to the above question (Table 36.9) is disagreement,what do you think as to why Afars have not been benefitted from villagization Programme?				
		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Disagree	Pasture and arable lands on which the livelihood of pastoralists depend have been used for investment	265	25.8%	93.6%
	The regional state government has been unable to fulfill socio-economic services in the divelpment centers	271	26.4%	95.8%
	Accessibility to range lands and watering points has been increasingly hampered by the invasion of Prosopis	256	25.0%	90.5%
	The regional state government settle pastoralists in areas which are not conducive for living	234	22.8%	82.7%
Total		1026	100.0%	362.6.%

Table.38.10: The benefits of AnimalResources for Pastoralists ?

Do you believe that the Afar pastoralists have been benefitted from their animal resources			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Yes I believe	52	14.9
	I do not believe	298	85.1
	Total	350	100.0

Table. 39.10: Justification why pastoralists are unableto benefit from their animals

If your answer to the above question (Table. 38.10)is no, what is your justification why Afar pastorali Are unable to get adequate benefit from their animal resources?		Responses	
		N	Percent
Yes	Recurrent drought and climate change in the region which have been killing their animals	343	29.9%
	Agriculture and pasture lands have been used by government development projects and investors	214	18.6%
	The veterinary Research institution established by the regional state has been properly discharging its responsibility	305	26.5%
	Expansion of Prosopis Juliflora (the Afar called it Woyane plant) has covered most of the agricultural and pastoral lands	287	25.0%
Total		1149	100.0%