



ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES

**ANALYZING INTELLIGENCE SERVICES REFORMS IN ETHIOPIA:
THE CASE OF ETHIOPIAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND
SECURITY SERVICES (NISS) (1991-2018)**

BY

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ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

Addis Ababa University
School of Graduate Studies
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OF ETHIOPIAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
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Declaration

I, undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and all the references used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ii
LIST OF DIAGRAMS.....	v
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.....	vi
ABSTRACT.....	vii
CHAPTER ONE.....	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Background of the Study	1
1.2. Statement of the Problem.....	2
1.3. Research Objectives.....	3
1.4. Research Questions.....	4
1.5. Scope of the Study	4
1.6. Significance of the Study	4
1.7. Thesis Organization	4
1.8. Operationalization of Key Concepts.....	5
CHAPTER TWO	6
LITERATURE REVIEW: CONCEPTUALIZING INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND PROFESSIONALISM	6
2.1. Introduction.....	6
2.2. Conceptualizing security, Security Sectors, Professionalism and Intelligence	6
2.2.1. Security	6
2.2.2. Security Sectors	9
2.2.3. Professionalism.....	10
2.2.4. Intelligence.....	11
2.3. Conceptual Framework of Security Sector Reform.....	19
2.3.1. Intelligence Services Reform.....	21

CHAPTER THREE	29
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	29
3.1. Introduction.....	29
3.2. Research Approach.....	29
3.3. Research Design.....	29
3.4. Method of Data Collection.....	30
3.4.1. Primary Data	30
3.4.2. Secondary Data	30
3.5. Sampling Method and Techniques.....	31
3.6. Method of Data Analysis	31
3.7. Trustworthiness of the Research.....	32
3.8. Ethical Consideration.....	32
CHAPTER FOUR.....	34
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS: ANALYSIS OF THE ETHIOPIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES REFORMS FROM 1991- 2018.....	34
4.1. Introduction.....	34
4.2. Organization of Ethiopian Intelligence Services	34
4.2.1. The Establishment of Modern Intelligence Services (1944-1974)	34
4.2.2. Organization of Intelligence Services During the Derg Regime (1974-1991)	36
4.2.3. Organization of Intelligence Services During the EPRDF Regime (1974-1991).....	39
4.3. The Ethiopian Intelligence Service Reform from 1991-2018.....	43
4.3.1. The Ethiopian Intelligence Service Reform (1991-1995).....	43
4.3.2. The Ethiopian Intelligence Service Reform (BPR) (2008-2013)	52
4.3.3. The success of the Institution Under this Reform.....	53
4.3.4. The Shortcomings of the Institution Under this Reform	53
4.4. Summary	54

CHAPTER FIVE	56
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION	56
5.1. Introduction.....	56
5.2. Conclusion	56
5.3. Recommendation	57
REFERENCES	59
APPENDICES	70

LIST OF DIAGRAMS

Diagram 1: Intelligence Services organizational structure (1944-1974)	35
Diagram 2: Intelligence Services organizational structure (1974-1991)	38
Diagram 3: Intelligence Services organizational structure (1991-2018)	42

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIAI	Al-Itihad Al-Islamia
ANDM	Amhara National Democratic Movement
EPRDF	Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
IC	Intelligence Community
NIC	National Intelligence Center
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPDO	Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization
PCRD	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
SEPDM	Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TPLF	Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
USA	United States of America

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study examines how a series of Ethiopian national Intelligence and Security Service reforms implemented from 1991 to 2018 contributed to its professionalization. To attain this objective, the study employed a qualitative research methodology. In-depth interviews and public document reviews were used to collect primary data. Moreover, for secondary data, appropriate literature is consulted. The findings of the study revealed that the intelligence institution has made two reforms from 1991-2018 being forced by the revolution and professionalization of the institution; the first one was made from 1991-1995 and the second one was made from 2008-2013 which was made in the form of BPR. It also shows that Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service have faced numerous challenges. The first and foremost important factor that hampered the effectiveness of the institution was the lukewarm proclivity to build a politically independent, strong, and people-oriented institution. The study indicated that despite a series of reforms made to improve the effectiveness of the institution particularly from 1991 to 2018, no significant improvement was made in relation to the independence of the institution. In line with this, it asserted that the intention of EPRDF was not to improve the effectiveness of the institution in ensuring the fundamental rights and security of citizens, rather making sure to serve as a guardian of the party's lust for the perpetuation of power. Moreover, the recruitment criteria prioritized the candidate's loyalty to be hired in the institution than considering merit-based criteria. Thereby, it is partisanship, not merit that had been entertained in the institution. Concerning the institution's problems, the institution did not hesitate to violate citizens' fundamental rights if citizens were critical of the ruling party. Despite its terrible problems, the intelligence institution had success in tackling international terrorist organizations. To overcome the challenges, the country should establish a politically independent institution that is more concerned with the welfare of the people than with the interests of the ruling party.

Keywords: *National intelligence, security, Intelligence service reform, and national intelligence and security service.*

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

It is plausible to assert that every state face threats although it varies from state to state. Strong and weak states would face varying levels of threats. The strong state's threat was previously external, whereas the latter is also internal (Buzan, 1991). There was a revolutionary shift in security thinking immediately following the end of the cold war. As Abdus (2003) identified the current security threat that the globe is facing are related to internal and external. Besides, the dynamic nature of the world has quickly posed a serious threat to the national security of states (Vitkauskas, 1999).

In order to counter the aforementioned multifaceted national security threats it is required to have a strong intelligence agency. This is necessary because to preserve their security, states need to keep track of internal and external threats (Dalton, 2002). The first and foremost function of intelligence service is providing credible information about the potential threat that is posed on the state and its population. The information gathered by the intelligence service would help policy makers to define national interests; develop coherent national security and military strategies; determine the mission doctrine and strategies of the armed force and other security institutions, and prevent threats being posed on the state and its population (Jackson & Scott, 2004).

In Ethiopia, the evolution of intelligence services dates to ancient time in the form of spying, started as modern intelligence services in the time of Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1944, and further developed in the 1970's under the communist regimes of the Derg which overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie I on 12 September 1974 (Mesfin, 2010). In response to the national security threats that faced the country from Sudan, Somalia and internal insurgent and dissident groups tied to the Eritrean independence movement, the regime started to expand its intelligence networks having been supported by its military power and the intelligence networks had more attachment with the military. This Intelligence Institution was established as, a public security institution, with the support of the East German State Security Service in 1978 (Mesfin, 2010).

Right after the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Fronts (EPRDF) came to power by overthrowing the Derg regime in 1991, the regime reformed the intelligence services and established the FDRE National Security, Immigration, and Refugee Affairs Authority and later renamed as the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) in 2013 (Shimels, 2018).

The study scrutinizes whether the reform intended to improve the safety and security of the citizens through maintaining the fundamental freedom and rights of citizens and the state from the internal and external threat. This was ended up with being the guardian of the EPRDF's interest in the lust for the perpetuation of power. Furthermore, the study analyzes whether the reform consider professionalism or ended up being partisanship. Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service have passed through different series of reforms as one of the security sectors of Ethiopia since 1991. In light of this, the study examines efforts exerted by the government to reform the national intelligence and security service from 1991 to 2018.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Security sectors need to be professional to serve the public by providing security. The intelligence institution, which is one of the security sectors, is responsible for safeguarding the national interest of a country by providing intelligence reports gathered by different means, for decision-makers. But, in Ethiopia, even after EPRDF came to power in 1991, the intelligence institution was continued to serve the interest of the ruling party and to this end the institution continued to harass and persuade individuals and groups deemed to be threat for the power of the ruling party by unlawfully arresting and investigating them (Shimels, 2018). This implies that the continuation of the security institutions, specifically the intelligence, is associated with the continuation of the regime though reform was made to solve this problem. This challenged the professionalization of the institution in all aspects especially, the independence aspect of the institution. This is because; the institutions have not been operating independently and professionally, like the Derg regime intelligence agency regardless of the reforms. After EPRDF came to power by ousting the Derg regime in 1991, it changed the previous intelligence institution in structure and hired new intelligence officers by firing most employees whom the regime thought would pose a threat to its power.

Although many researches has been conducted on SSR of other security sectors like police and national defense forces in Ethiopia, researches on intelligence reform were scanty. For instance, Shimels (2018) came up with article focusing on intelligence services approach in countering terrorism, which does not cover the issue of reforms. Berouk (2010) provides article on the structure and role of Ethiopia's intelligence services from 1974-1991 but did not cover intelligence reform. Van veen (2016) provides articles on political settlements and its implications, consequences and risks with regard to the organization and provision of security by state forces, and still it did not deals with intelligence reforms. On the other hand, starting from its reestablishment in 1991, NISS have passed through series of reforms though the reforms could not brought radical change to the efficiency and effectiveness of the institution. This problem needs deep study by academician of the subject. However, the problem of this intelligence reform in Ethiopia has not been researched, which can be considered as a research gap. Therefore, this study accentuates on scrutinizing the efforts made by the government to enhance the maintenance of the state's security through reforming the intelligence service and the resultant effect of the reforms from 1991 to 2018, and call for further research to be conducted. With this aim, the proclivity to shy away from reforming the intelligence service to independently exercise its power would make the attempt to reform the institution futile.

1.3. Research Objectives

The general objective of the study is to assess the efforts made by the government to reform the national intelligence and security service and the effect of the reforms from 1991 to 2018. To achieve this general objective, the study has also the following specific objectives:

1. Identifying the driving factors of Ethiopian National Intelligence Service reform in a manner whether it is intended to improve citizens' security or ended up being the guardian of EPRDF's interest.
2. Assessing the success and shortcomings of the reform.
3. Examining the contributions of the reforms that were undertaken to achieve professionalism.

1.4. Research Questions

The research questions are drawn from the specific objectives and are the following.

1. Why did NISS conduct a series of reforms?
2. What are the success and shortcomings of the reforms?
3. How did the reforms contribute to the professionalization of the institution?

1.5. Scope of the Study

The scope of the study is limited to an appraisal of a series of reforms made at the National Intelligence and Security Service from 1991 to 2018, the driving forces for the reforms, the reforms success and failure, and its contribution in professionalizing the institution. It does not cover the ongoing reform that started right after Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed came to power in April 2018. This is because of the prematurity of the reform and even the proclamation aimed at reforming the intelligence service is not yet come into effect.

1.6. Significance of the Study

Since there has not been studies previously conducted on the subject, it is believed that the output of this study would be helpful for policy makers and concerned public bodies to understand the contribution of the series of reforms in making the intelligence service professionalized. Moreover, it would be important for policy makers to figure out the myriads of problems that the intelligence institution is engulfed with despite its reforms. It also plays a greater role in adding values with regard to creating deep knowledge about the intelligence institution's reform. Furthermore, this report can serve as a basis for those who are interested in conducting further research on intelligence reform in Ethiopia and beyond.

1.7. Thesis Organization

This study is comprised of five chapters. Chapter one deals with an introductory part of the study, which includes a background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research question, scope of the study, significance of the study, key concepts, and organization of the study. Chapter two reviews related literature. This chapter accentuated on the conceptual discussion of relevant concepts such as security, intelligence, professionalism and the

chapter goes through security sector reform and intelligence service reform in Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular. Chapter three deal with the research methodology. Chapter four focuses on data analysis and interpretation of series of reforms made on Ethiopian national intelligence institutions from 1991 to 2018. And the Final Chapter provides the conclusion and recommendations.

1.8. Operationalization of Key Concepts

Security- Security can be best understood as the feeling of being saved from harm, intimidation, fear, anxiety, operations, danger, and threat to core values (Bodunde, 2014).

Intelligence- intelligence can be defined as the collection, analysis, production and use of information that pose a severe threat to the security of the states, groups, individuals, or potentially dangerous activities that pose a severe threat (Lowenthal, 2002). Intelligence institutions are expected to follow this intelligence process in tackling their national security threats though it is not as such applicable in developing countries intelligence institutions.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW: CONCEPTUALIZING INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND PROFESSIONALISM

2.1. Introduction

This chapter reviews the existing literature related to the research question stated in the first chapter. In the first section, it gives due emphasis to the conceptual discussion on security, national security, Security Sectors, Professionalism and Intelligence. The second section highlights the conceptual framework of SSR under which intelligence services reform has discussed with specific attention to Africa and Ethiopia.

2.2. Conceptualizing security, Security Sectors, Professionalism and Intelligence

2.2.1. Security

The concept of security is controversial among different scholars, and practitioners and professionals deliver different meanings. Nowadays, security is inextricably resonated with a political value that is subjected to several meanings. Wolfers (1962) elucidated the concept of security from two angles, namely objective and subjective security. The former posited that security as the absence of threats in a given value. Objective insecurity is realized if danger posed by myriads of challenges, threats, vulnerabilities, and risks are obliterated by various players such as individuals, groups, states, regional and international organizations. On the other hand, the latter denotes the absence of fear in which the acquired value will not be attacked. Compiling the two sides of security, Wolfers (1962) defined security in a manner that an absence of objective dangers related to threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks, and absence of potential threat on values. Moller (2003) challenged the subjective definition of Wolfers by raising questions such as whose values, which values and from whom? Subjective factors influence security perceptions if the objective factors in security perception are not sufficient in elucidating and putting some sort of influence on security.

Security is being used in various areas such as politics, psychology, finance, information access, public safety, defense, and military matters. The meaning of security is ambiguous in the sense that its scope continues to expand every day. The concept of security started to garner international attention right after the culmination of the cold war. In the aftermath of the cold war, the concept was referred to as a turning point for the different schools of thought in the realm of security. Security implies a state's capability in ensuring its territorial integrity and fundamental rights of citizens against internal and external encroachments (Bodunde, 2014). In light of this, security can be best understood as the feeling of being saved from harm, intimidation, fear, anxiety, operation, danger and threat to core values.

As far as the dimension of security is concerned, there are two major schools of thought namely, traditional, and non-traditional security. The former school of thought accentuated the maintenance of the Cold War conception of security. This school of thought defines security in a manner that safety from danger and external attack or infiltration. This is the stand of a realist school of security that intended to centralize the state as a referent object (Abolurin, 2010). As far as this is concerned, security is resonated with entertaining peace and preventing the eruption of conflict through the military tool. That is why the definition provided by Walt is related to the study of threat, war, peace, and control of military force (Walt, 1991). It scrutinizes the ways the use of military power puts detrimental effects on individuals, states, societies. Moreover, security refers to policies that the state employs to prevent the eruption of war or waging war against its enemies. This strategy is called reductionism where security is conjured up with building military strength through adopting advanced technology that would be used in the realization of the state's survival and security (Nwolise, 2008).

The other school on the security is a non-traditional school which are challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, resources scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crime (Caballero, 2016). They are often transnational in scope, defying unilateral remedies and requiring comprehensive – political, economic, social responses, as well as humanitarian use of military force. Nwolise (2008) argues that other issues other than military threats, like the environment, political, economic, and social threats endanger the lives and properties of individual and centralizing a

state's security threats as only military issues ignores other broad issues that should be inculcated in the security matter (Nwolise, 2008).

2.2.1.1. National Security

The concept, which is inextricably resonated with security, is national security. Lippmann (1943) argues that national security implies absence of scarification of legitimate interest of a nation to avoid war and if challenged regaining of security by war (Lippmann, 1943). This argument has limited the meaning of national security to war against a nation which has highly narrowed the meaning of security. This definition is not sufficient to represent national security. National security is defined as freedom from foreign dictation (Lasswell, 1950). Similar to Lippmann (1943) this definition also concentrated on foreign invasion against a state by ignoring other national security issues. Wolfers (1962) defined national security from its objective and subjective perspective and objectively as absence of threats to acquired values, and subjectively, as the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. This definition is general and it tried to inculcate different issues of security but it couldn't explicitly include national security issues beyond external threat. From these definitions, national security can be defined as the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory militarily, economically, diplomatically, politically, and environmentally.

On the other hand, scholars like Maier (1990) tried to include other issues than territorial integrity to the definition of national security by defining it as a capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions, of the community and the state (Charles Maier, 1990). Here Maier (1990) tried to deal with human security which is a recent development. Similarly, the National Defense College of India (1996) elaborated national security as all issues of human and state's political, economic, technological and military might (National Defense College of India, 1996) which is highly suited with the current definition of national security. Paleri (2008) also states national security as a state's capacity of overcoming national security threats against its people in all aspects whether it is internal or external (Paleri, 2008). This definition also follows the non-traditional definition of national security and best defined the idea. Ammerdown Group (2016) also agree with the all aspects of security as national security issue by stating it as shared freedom from fear and want, and the freedom to live in dignity (Ammerdown Group, 2016).

Generally, before 21st century, the idea of national security was almost intertwined with military security and was state-centric. However, from the non-traditional school of thought standpoint, national security in the twenty-first century goes beyond military material and threat. In this regard, Kim (2015) mentioned some of the 21st century national security in its broader sense as political security, economic security, energy and natural resources security, homeland security, human security and environmental security. By this view the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service deals with national security threats against the country's national interests and the institution has reformed at different times to discharge its responsibility in a proper manner.

2.2.2. Security Sectors

Security sectors are those organs responsible for the provision, management, and oversight of security at all levels of a country that can be expressed structurally, individually, or institutionally. In good security sector governance, the security sector renders state security and human security simultaneously, which are broad (African Union, 2013).

These security sectors includes, **State security providers** - armed force and supporting services, police, specialized law enforcement agencies, gendarmeries, presidential guards, close protection forces, national guards, civil defense, intelligence, and secret services, border, and customs services, etc. (African Union, 2013). **State justice providers**- courts, judges, and state legal practitioners, defense and prosecution services, Prisons, corrections and detention authorities, military justice systems, state-sponsored alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, etc. **Oversight** - legislatures/parliaments and their specialized committees, judicial authorities, ombudsman institutions, human rights commissions, anti-corruption commissions, independent complaints authorities, audit offices, etc. **Non-state security providers**- unofficial armed groups (militias, armed factions), self-defense groups, commercial security providers, such as private security companies, private military companies, neighborhood watches, women's groups, customary security providers, etc. **Non-state justice providers** - lawyers and paralegals, bar associations, legal aid bodies and public representation programs, victim support groups, prisoner assistance groups, Customary justice providers, community dispute resolution mechanisms, etc.; human rights advocates, Media, victim's groups, women's associations, academic institutions, independent research institutes and think tanks, unions and trade associations, political parties, the interested public, etc. (African Union, 2013).

This shows that intelligence services are one part of the security sector that includes requirements for the intelligence, planning & direction to get the intelligence; a collection of information; processing; analysis & production of the intelligence, dissemination for the responsible authority; and feedback from this authority. This implies that the mere gathering of information could not amount to intelligence unless it is processed in the above-mentioned manner and the issue of intelligence gathering is highly related to the issue of securing national interest which needs due process and serious attention than any other subject areas.

2.2.3. Professionalism

Literally, professionalism refers to the higher competence of an individual on certain profession that can be expressed by specialized knowledge, skill, good academic preparation, trained to do a job well, polite behavior, good decision making, honesty and integrity, respect, accountability, self-regulation and image (Whitty, 2000). The intelligence service needs special professionalism beyond the technical meaning of the term which can be expressed by being abided by the rule of law, independence of the intelligence institutions, accountability, effectiveness, efficiency and oversight by concerned body (Naylor, 2001). To better understand specific issues regarding intelligence professionalism, four key requirements must be fulfilled.

Intelligence mandates- the intelligence agency or intelligence community that is being legislated for, must be given a clearly-defined mandate for its activities; legislation also can be used to establish distinct agency boundaries between domestic, foreign and military intelligence activity, as well as the types of activities undertaken (Wechsler, 1944).

Accountability- serves to assure the public that all capabilities and agencies are being watched over by one body, ensuring against duplication and that gaps are being filled. It provides clear lines of accountability, while subordinating intelligence services to the control of democratically elected leaders. The inherent secrecy that surrounds the activities of intelligence services makes it vital that both the executive and other oversight actors scrutinize the actions of these agencies (Lauren, 2009).

Judicial oversight - in most of the cases above, the judicial system plays a role in regulating the activities of intelligence services in the domestic sphere. Judicial oversight is required to set

limits to achieve the proper balance between the protection of individual rights and the collection of necessary information (Gardner, 2006).

Parliamentary Oversight- Legislative involvement in the oversight of intelligence services enhances legitimacy and democratic accountability, while ensuring that security and intelligence agencies are serving the state as a whole rather than narrow political or other interest. There are many models of parliamentary oversight, with some being more robust than others (Humphreys, 1979).

2.2.4. Intelligence

The other important concept that needs to be discussed in this section is intelligence. It is far more difficult to get a single universally acceptable definition of intelligence since intelligence is a broad concept than the whole aspect of human lives. Common usage of the term produces two definitions. For many people intelligence is “information for decision-makers.” This is broad in scope, and it includes all manner of decision-makers, from businesspeople to sports coaches. Secret state activities designed to understand or influence foreign entities can be taken as intelligence for others (Treverton, 2006).

Binet (1916) defined intelligence as being accustomed to circumstances which is practical sense of auto-critique (Binet, 1916). Sternberg & Salter (1982) states also that intelligence is goal-directed adaptive behavior (Robert Sternberg & William Salter, 1982). These two definitions failed to deal with the mental capacity of individual explicitly as part of the definitions. Humphreys (1979) said that intelligence is the mental processing and using of information and conceptual skills (Humphreys, 1979). Gardner (2006) defined intelligence from problem solving perspective as a human intellectual competence (Gardner, 2006). Feuerstein (1979; 2002) described intelligence as cognitive modifiability (Feuerstein, 1979; 2002). These three definitions concentrated on the mental activities of human being which can implicitly include one’s adaption to environment.

It can be said that world intelligence is divided into Tactical and Strategic Intelligence. **Tactical Intelligence** is translated as Tactical Information and is used in information from human sources, information from open source, Information from images and information from direct observation (Gaitan, 2017). These private sources are needed by soldiers from the theatres of operations

where terrorism has become routine, to identify the simplest behavioral changes and avoid potential unwanted conflicts with insurgents. **Strategic intelligence**- includes secret information necessary to the battlefield and highly related to national issues such as foreign invasion.

Counterintelligence prevents espionage by foreign intelligence services and foreign-controlled political groups against the national interest of a state especially, causing harm to a state or its interest. Here, counterintelligence protects intelligence sources and methods at home and abroad. Counterintelligence can be defensive which relies on inquiries, vetting, and surveillance, or offensive which relies on operations to penetrate, deceive, disrupt, and manipulate other organizations (Johnson, 2010).

Some people use the terms information and intelligence interchangeably, however, they are must the two different terms. Intelligence is made through the process of analyzing and elucidating information (Odom, 2008). Gathering information can be made through different methods. On the one hand, information is produced openly through the review of published materials such as newspapers, radio, periodicals, trade, political, economic, and military journals, as well as internet sources. On the other hand, information is collected through the secrecy and privacy of others. In line with these two methods, human spies, defense attack and diplomatic reporting, intercepted communication and satellite imagery can be used as information-gathering methods. The aforementioned methods are used to steal information that would generate potential threats for the given state from hostile states or transnational terrorist groups (Russel, 2007). Intelligence is not only accentuated on gathering information; more so it emphasized on critically scrutinizing the gathered information. There is no intelligence without a critical analysis about the collected information. In line with this, there are certain steps in which the professionals need to go through while probing a given phenomenon. To be information accurate and reliable, it should be converted to intelligence which must go through planning, collection and gathering information, processing, analysis production, dissemination (Lowenthal, 2002). To this thesis, the term intelligence can be defined as the collection, analysis, production and use of information that pose a severe threat to the security of the states, groups, individuals, or potentially dangerous activities that pose a severe threat.

2.2.4.1. Functions of Intelligence Services

The other relevant topic that needs to be discussed in this section is the functions of intelligence services. The first and foremost function of intelligence services is providing credible information about the potential threat that is posed on the state and its population. The information gathered by the intelligence service would help policy makers to define national interests; develop coherent national security and military strategies; determine the mission doctrine and strategies of the armed force and other security institutions, and prevent threats being posed on the state and its population (Jackson & Scott, 2004).

These intelligence powers could also be directed against a state's population if not managed properly. Therefore, the intelligence service needs to have a strong controlling and monitoring mechanism to make sure that the realization of rule of law and fundamental rights of citizens. In a democratic system, measures that limit human rights must be based on law and simple violations of human rights are strictly forbidden which is consistent with other national and international human rights obligations. Here intelligence institution's control should be carefully vetted for purpose, necessity, proportionality, and consistency. The system should allow for individuals to address grievances to an independent democratic institution and seek an effective remedy. Therefore, intelligence powers should be specified by law of a country to make the intelligence institution abide by law and different countries have rendered intelligence power in different ways based on their national security threats.

The first USA's intelligence organization called COI was established in 1941 being responsible to disseminate intelligence directly to the president as its core function (Aldrich, 2011). Since, the military and naval intelligence services were not proving sufficient the intelligence organization need expansion and in response to this, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was created (Best, 2014). After WWII of minimalist peacetime, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was come into being in 1946 including some of the old OSS and COI elements and staff which later became Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Best, 2008). Heads of intelligence services named Interagency Advisory Committee (IAC) was created to serve in an advisory capacity to the DCI having one of the first real avenues for coordination (Stuart, 2003). The US Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) was created, solely for SIGINT coordination purposes (Cardillo, 2010). After all these evolution, the Intelligence community (IC) of the USA

was established by Harry Truman's National Security Act in 1947. At the end of 1947, the intelligence services functions were developed to the internal and external services under different intelligence agencies and the IC consisted of the CIA, FBI, State Department Office of Intelligence Research, Army and Naval Intelligence Offices, the Directorate of Intelligence, and the military signals intelligence offices (Hunter, 1978). This establishment of professional intelligence community was rooted in the protection of USA's national interest against its national security threats especially in response to the Pearl Harbor attack.

After the establishment of USA's IC in 1947, changes were made at different times in the intelligence services to improve the intelligence functions but, significant reform was made after the attacks on September 11, 2001 and the Iraqi WMD crisis (Betts, 2007) which challenged the intelligence functions. In 2004, these intelligence failures led to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). Lack of IC information sharing, poor imagination from analysts, ambivalence toward the prescient warnings on Bin Laden, flaws in the FBI's intelligence capabilities, and broad communitywide structural limitations were reported to be the main causes of the attack (Harknett, 2011). By the reform, as the structural barriers prevented joint intelligence operations, limited structural reform has been made to the IC since it was similar to its structure at the time of its establishment in 1947 (Goodman, 2008). Lack of common standards and practices between the foreign and domestic intelligence agencies hindered timely information sharing that resulted in divided management of national intelligence and efforts was made for centralization. National security threats priorities were made to pay attention to the critical national security threats. Division of labor was made to minimize workload on the certain intelligence agency and limited transparency in IC was initiated. Challenges in civilian-military coordination are revised, increased collection is strengthened, nature of analysis and congressional oversight is changed, and cultural shifts were made in the IC (Gutjahr, 2005).

When we see the overall reforms of the USA's intelligence services to improve the intelligence functions after 9/11, it was highly attached to the more professionalization of the services so as to ensure effective collection and management of intelligence that fit the current dynamic world since it is difficult to manage the temporary national security threats by the 1947's structure and systems.

The reforms of Kenyan intelligence services were made following its independence in 1963 to replace the expatriate officers with senior Africans, and the reform amended again in 1964 (Boinett, 2009) to guarantee the intelligence functions of protecting national interests against national security threats. In 1963 with independence approaching Special Branch was made independent from the police and in 1969 it was given a new charter. It wasn't until 1986 that it was transformed into the Directorate of Security Intelligence (DSI). Following the Kenyan reforms that continued up to the late 1990s National Security and Intelligence Services (NSIS) was established for various reasons (Africa, 2009). The main reason for the reform of the intelligence services of Kenya in 1998 was its unlimited functions and powers, to prevent the intelligence services from undertaking intimidation and torture, and to make it effective to face the increased threats to security, especially in light of the failure to prevent the 1998 U.S. embassy bombing in Nairobi (Betts, 2009).

These intelligence services reform is further necessitated because, it was performing out of its functions and it had developed a notoriously bad name, and an internal struggle between the commissioner of Police and the director of intelligence (Munene, 2010). In 1998, a new act of Parliament in Kenya established the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) to replace the former Directorate of Security Intelligence which at the time was still colloquially known as "Special Branch". There were failures of NSIS to perform as it could, pertain to threat. NSIS lacks appropriate level of professionalism, loss of capacity to monitor & interdict foreign & local terrorists; and lack of technical expertise and equipment. Though there was no evidence to suggest that the NSIS took part in orchestrating the 2007 post-election violence, the intelligence reform was necessitated after the post-election violence (Omondi, 2010).

The issue of intelligence services was raised during the Kenyan constitutional review of 2010 and the final report of the constitution of Kenya Review Commission notes that the essence of the reform was required for the Kenyan intelligence services for the establishment of civilian control to lessen the authority of the executive branch as the core function of the intelligence services (KNA, 2008). The new constitution has changed the name of the institution to National Intelligence Services (NIS) and empowered the institution for security intelligence and counter intelligence to enhance national security by its article 242 and also perform other functions prescribed by the national legislation.

Generally, the Kenyan intelligence services reforms that made at different time were necessitated by poor professional aspect rendering intelligence services out of its function which can be expressed by being engulfed with the police activities, the violation of human rights, ineffective and inefficient performance of the institution, absence of effective information sharing that leads to failure of the intelligence institution. But, after the 2010 reform, the intelligence institution's function has limited to internal and external intelligence services under different intelligence agencies of the country and brought radical change in the professionalization of the institution.

2.2.4.2. Success and Shortcomings of Intelligence Services

2.2.4.2.1. Success of Intelligence Services

As far as the success story of intelligence service is concerned, transparency and accountability play an important role in making the work of intelligence service meaningful. Since intelligence works are confidential, their main tasks cannot be completely transparent as other government sectors services, and therefore, the citizens must create an alternative mechanism to control the behavior of intelligence services on behalf of constituents, but the accountability and transparency of intelligence services are strictly controlled. Here, commonly, the most known controlling and monitoring mechanisms are parliamentary committees and expert oversight organized by parliament in fulfilling its obligation to ensure the existence of checks and balances to control all government agencies following legal procedure (Born, 2012).

However, substantive ethical analysis of intelligence is missed in the process of appraisal. It has been suggested that the unique nature of intelligence services needs the knowledge and expertise of extraordinary or specialized morality as Central Intelligence Agency (Perry, 1995). Dulles (2007) states that the CIA is not an illegal intelligence agency, but a completely legal institution and to know the detail of the institution, one can read the law. Here, the CIA is not the only government institution, where secrecy has great values rather other institutions have main tasks confidential though not as such strong. In a country where genuine democracy is exercised, intelligence institutions rely on public cooperation than coercion and terror, for them to be successful. The intelligence service is not the source of fears induced by secrecy and thereby boosts its effectiveness. Hence, effective intelligence institution can successfully safeguard a state's national security and its success can be:

- Giving early warning of impending crises against national security threats;
- In relation to potential opponents, it serve national and international crisis management by providing accurate intelligence;
- Inform national defense planning and military operations of national security threats;
- Follow the principle of intelligence compartmentation to protect sensitive information secrets, both of their own sources and activities, and those of other state agencies;
- Influencing international security by covertly influencing the outcome of events in favor of national interests; and
- Strengthening counter-intelligence to tackle the efforts of other national intelligence agencies.

2.2.4.2.2. Shortcomings of Intelligence Services

Undemocratic governments or authoritarian regimes often provide intelligence services with extensive law enforcement authority to strengthen capacities for political repression (Dalton, 2002). States draw ethical and legal distinctions between the function of intelligence and law enforcement. Law determines the functions, structures, and mission of the given intelligence institution. The need to separate the two bodies is intended to obliterate abuse of power. The intelligence services serve the ruling party and engage in political repression and human rights violations in authoritarian governments. In a country where genuine democracy is exercised, intelligence institution is people oriented than being the guardian of the political party. Other government agencies or private individuals are not given intelligence services' special powers and if these intelligence services do not use their power properly, they highly violate democratic values which in turn resulted in intelligence failure. Thus, the principles other public institutions must follow are often applied to a different degree to intelligence services (Dalton, 2002).

Intelligence services are expected to do their professional main tasks in line with the intelligence institution's core values and not deemed to do police or military work like arresting people or launching assaults on military opponents that make them lack acceptance from the public. They should not harass, threaten, or injure people that make them liable and intelligence officers should respect the laws to guarantee and respect the human rights of the society (Mellon, 2006). The sources and methods of espionage are typically hidden from the public. However, this is

subject to debate among the public and scholars. Oversight of intelligence agencies is decisive in the professionalization of intelligence institutions which attracts the attention of recent academic studies of intelligence sciences bearing on ethics or political philosophy that have largely focused on procedural questions surrounding their proper performance. Apart from these, the shortcomings of intelligence services are generally:

- Unavailability of information, as already mentioned, hinder the proper application of intelligence;
- Underestimation of the enemy's intention resulted in disastrous effect on the national security;
- Overestimation of the intention of the enemy add workload on the intelligence institutions;
- Lack of communication among the intelligence agencies, and between them and the executive or operations resulted in intelligence failure as has been seen in the case of 9/11 attack;
- Opinions accepted without reinvestigation or failure to see the relationship between pieces of information may result in fatal mistake of misusing intelligence,;
- The tendency to predict enemy actions by own actions in similar conditions- sometimes called mirror imaging may result in fallacy of intelligence work;
- Poor tradecraft (poor training of intelligence personnel): a lack of professional analysts and intelligence practitioners who know the work or an abundance of information without the means to handle it, often a shortage of analysts may cause intelligence failure;
- Competition between agencies and a resultant lack of cooperation disseminate the intelligence and ignore the intelligence without application;
- Subordination of intelligence to policy, supplying intelligence to suit policy, or when aspects of intelligence which do not support policy are ignored which may result in non-acceptance of intelligence.

2.3. Conceptual Framework of Security Sector Reform

The conceptual framework is that technical and institutional professionalization of the security sector by reform to ensure their efficiency and effectiveness. SSR is rooted in the idea that the public has security sectors as an asset rather than a hindrance to peace, security, development, and stability (Born, 2011). These are the professional standards of security sectors and intend to create a security sector that is independent, accountable efficient, effective, and run following good governance principles. Some countries especially, the developed ones in most of the cases comply with this and others especially, developing countries in most of the cases need to be reformed to conform to those principles (Gordon, 2014). The national security sector need to be reformed to hold it accountable for problems related to human right violations and others such as financial, human, and political goodwill and resources required (Sedra, 2017). It can be said that transition or post-conflict needs full scale SSR to satisfy the security need of the society, but post-conflict situation is not ready for immediate, full scale application of SSR which imply that SSR takes a longer time to achieve its goal (Ball, 2004). The difficulty of conceptual, technical, and political idea of SSR comes from the definition of institutions and actors that amounts to security sectors with the specific tasks and activities that characterize the process of reforming it.

The bases for SSR are twofold that can be expressed in the designation of reforms to develop a professional: effective, affordable, and efficient security sector (Born, 2011). SSR has a political, economic, and social contribution to the societies and its political contribution to civil control over security institutions, its economic contribution to the wise use of resources for the security institutions, its social contribution is the population's physical security is guaranteed (Born, 2011). Security sector improvements are made through increased professionalization of all actors in the security sectors to enhance the satisfaction of society (Stanley, 2008). The SSR is guided by the basic principles such as democratic, people centered, locally owned, human rights and rule of law. It is a response to security challenges states and their populations facing, it should build multi-sectorial peace building approaches, it should be developed in accordance with good governance principles, such as transparency, accountability, and others, it should be implemented through transparent and efficient way to secure the professional independence of security sectors (UNSC, 2014).

The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2007) has seen Security Sector Reform (SSR) as the establishment of effective governance, oversight, and accountability in the security system; improved delivery of security and justice; development of local leadership of the reform process; and sustainability of justice and security delivery. This implies that SSR plays a greater role in professionalizing security sectors given what many scholars and organizations have seen at different times and almost in a similar perspective.

SSR plays a pivotal role in conflict prevention and peace building if the security sectors discharge their duty professionally by being independent, accountable, transparent, effective and efficient. Hanlon (2016) argues that security decides the development of a country in many aspects and gives a special opportunity for the poor. In countries at risk of conflict or in post-conflict contexts, SSR can be of central importance for stability or conflict prevention. Similarly, Dehéz (2010) said that SSR can help as the means of conflict prevention to ensure long-lasting peace by strengthening oversight and executive control of all security services from the army to border control and the intelligence services while trying to enhance their operational capabilities. But SSR is not necessarily needed in the case of conflicts only; rather there are circumstances when it is needed, to reshape the security sectors. This idea of reforming the security sector to ensure effective security services of Dustin Dehéz is supported by Andrzej Karkoszka who elaborated the concept of SSR and its relevance for conflict prevention, peace building, and development (Karkoszka, 2004). Leboeuf (2017) has also supported the idea of SSR in rendering effective security by conceptualizing it as a crucial device for crisis recovery and reconstructing weak and failed states following the provision of security for the society to assist development. Leboeuf also ignores that SSR may be needed in the absence of conflicts. Schnabel and Ehrhart (2005) argued that local and external actors have a great share in meeting the challenge of sustainable post-conflict SSR and unless security sectors are well reformed political, economic, and cultural rebuilding are impossible in the society (Ehrhart, 2005). In this case, higher concentration has been made on post-conflict issues by ignoring normal circumstances that necessitate SSR. Adam (2015) also supports that SSR is the basic task to prevent conflict, to build peace and it is vital for overall socio-economic and political developments of the states.

Professional security sectors are decisive for the development of a state. SSR is an indispensable element of state-building processes and democratic transitions and development. It has been facing different challenges in its implementation concerning its sequencing, coordination, local ownership, engaging civil society, capacity deficit, spoilers, durable funding & official development assistance (ODA) eligibility, monitoring and evaluation, regional dimensions, fiscal sustainability (CIGI, 2010). Sedra has dealt with SSR with its challenges and implementation problems but has not suggested the solutions for the problems. Agreeing with the view Abrahamsen and Williams (2019) added a new idea that bringing the private in the SSR is essential and SSR is the central part of development since one cannot think development without an effective security sector that can be achieved by SSR. Here they did not suggest the problems that may face in bringing the private in the SSR. Bendix and Stanley (2008) also stipulated that SSR is an essential precondition for sustainable development though could not become efficient enough as needed. Sedra (2017) added that SSR is a special mechanism for countries sustained from conflict or making transitions from authoritarianism, fragility, or collapse to ensure the wellbeing of the society, and it plays a pivotal role in peace building and state-building.

All these ideas directly or indirectly show that security sector reform is needed for a country to ensure the provision of effective security for the public in line with the principles of good governance and democracy which in turn strengthen the security sector's independence to be professional without playing pendulum as the government changed. One can deduct from the authors' idea that SSR leads the good development of democratic security sector that can serve the public effectively in accordance with professionalism. But the authors failed to explicitly give greater attention to the challenges of reforming security sectors, an influence made on security sectors by different political parties, scarcity of resources for the reform, the difficulty of implementation, the difficulty of bringing the intended result. This implies that the mere making of SSR cannot amount to reform unless the intended result of professionalizing security sectors has achieved.

2.3.1. Intelligence Services Reform

When we see reforms in the intelligence institutions it resembles reforms made in other security sectors. Intelligence reform is the reform of intelligence institutions to the professional standards of intelligence service that critically measured by the principles of good governance and

democracy, such as the rule of law, independence, accountability, effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence institutions. In the formal sense, intelligence reform was initiated in the late 1990's as part of SSR and developed after the late 2001 (Ronald, 2002). Regardless of reforms made in the institutions recurrently, it is difficult to achieve the intended result though intelligence institutions reform encourages the professionalism aspect of the institutions.

Lonsdale (2012) argues that intelligence reforms support the security policies of states in that it strengthens the effective performance and governance of the institutions. But the challenges of making the reform in the intelligence institution does not stipulated in the argument. Bruneau (2011) states that in democratic reform of intelligence agencies one cannot expect "total" successes or "total" failures with few exceptions since reforming intelligence institutions have full of challenges and the implementation of the reform is difficult. By the same view Jones (2007) added that intelligence reform is decisive to adapt intelligence institutions to contemporary security challenges in line with the principles of democracy and good governance. But this may not be always successful in being attached to the nature of the government. Similarly, Givens (2012) added that intelligence reform should be systems-based to enhance effectiveness and reduce the risk of unintended consequences. The mere fact that an intelligence institution is reformed cannot bring the intended change in the institution unless it is done systematically. This argument is convincing, but the system needed to reform the intelligence institution may vary based on the nature of the government. Neary (2010) supports that when national intelligence failure has caused intelligence reform; real change in the institution can be achieved if the reform is made properly in line with democracy. Here, it seems that intelligence reform is necessitated by intelligence failure which may not always be the case.

Failure of intelligence institutions to comply with these professional standards necessitates reform in the institutions (Arthur, 2004). The main purpose of intelligence reform is to guarantee the security of the nation and the state. This implies that intelligence reform is basically rooted in intelligence failure, but this may not be the case in some circumstances. Initially, intelligence services are targeted to secure national interests against national security threats and failure of intelligence agencies to achieve this primary objective can be the driving force of intelligence services reform. This failure may be resulted from poor intelligence profession that can be expressed by adequate planning, collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence on the one

hand and absence of rule of law, independence, accountability, effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence institutions on the other hand (Betts, 2009). This has seen in different countries among which the USA intelligence failure experience can be cited as good example.

The terrorist attack on USA which was committed in the wake of the 11 September 2001 has undoubtedly exposed an array of American intelligence failures. The study of the 9/11 commission (2003) revealed the failure surrounding the terrorist attack on the U.S.A. Absence of information sharing among USA's internal and external intelligence agencies, and domestic law-enforcement bodies in relation to potential terrorist suspects and acts have provided as crucial problem. In response to this the USA Patriot Act (USPA) of 2001, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2002 was enacted as laws (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2003). As part of intelligence reform the statutes envisaged integrated intelligence capacity, giving critical attention to analysis, strengthening collection capacity, creating result-based intelligence-community (IC) workforce, ensuring intelligence accessibility to decision makers, strengthening foreign-intelligence net-works, establishing security practices and rules, using the success and failure experience (Arthur, 2006).

Similarly, the review of the Silberman-Robb Commission of the failed analysis relating to the issue of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq in the lead up to the 2003 conflict was also another intelligence failure of USA (Silberman, 2005). The USA cited the IC's assessment of Saddam Hussein's reconstitution of Iraq's nuclear program, and possession of biological and chemical weapons, but failed to find the nuclear program after the end of the conflict (Helen, 2005). The collections and analysis problem of the intelligence resulted in the intelligence failure as a result of which the commission recommends the reform of IC. The intelligence reform has made according to the recommendation by critically centralizing on the IC's organizational structure and culture. It can be concluded that the integration of the collectors and the analysts, and improving information sharing plays a crucial role in intelligence services (Arthur, 2006).

On the other hand, there are circumstances when intelligence reform can be made without the occasion of intelligence failure. If we see the small Eastern European formerly communist states of Lithuania the activities of intelligence services were misunderstood, politicized, and a source of endless conspiracy. The intelligence agency of Lithuania, Valstybe's Saugumo Departamento (State Security Department-VSD) was a tool for the impeachment procedure of the country's

president, two detention centers for use by the U.S. CIA and the death of a VSD officer forced the reform of the intelligence agency Lithuania (Hulnick, 2006). The intelligence institution is better directed and subject to more control after the reform which separated intelligence agencies from law enforcement institutions; threat assessments and pre-trial investigation, elimination of legal flaws, intelligence institutions to be governed by democratic principles, intelligence collection means authorized, and center of governmental communications subordinated (Stéphane, 2012). The intelligence agency was perceived as unwatched watcher, but after the reform it assumed clear intelligence profession being abided by the rule of law, accountable, independent, effective and efficient (Jack D., 2006).

Intelligence service reform took place in the absence of intelligence failure, as Kuperwasser (2007) argued also in the case of Israel. The Israeli's intelligence services reform has concentrated on the professionalization of the institutions by intelligent human power, specialization of core intelligence work and logistics. Kuperwasser (2007) states that though there was no major intelligence failure in Israel, there were factors that necessitate intelligence reforms. Among these geo-strategic changes and some new understandings such as changes in nature of war and enemies war doctrine, information age impact of the 1990s, the relationship between analysts and collectors, and intelligence personnel and decision-makers. And also the coming into being of systemic thinking as an analytical tool, change in structure, revising the intelligence products and goals, applying new tools for dissemination, providing operation-level intelligence, collaborating with foreign intelligence agencies, emphases for human factor are central for the reform (Kuperwasser, 2007). It can be said that intelligence institutions' reform has a great potential in professionalizing the institution, but in most cases, the party-affiliated nature of the institution hinders the achievement of the intended goal of professionalizing the sector. This has been seen in the case of Ethiopia especially, in the National Intelligence and Security Service that has been reshaped recurrently as the government changed starting from its establishment.

2.3.1.1. Intelligence Services Reform in Africa

The origin of African intelligence service is rooted in their respective colonizers intelligence institutions though they were transformed after these countries gained independence being responsible for their safeguarding the ruling regime and characterized as regime security (Africa,

2009). The intelligence services of Anglophone countries were come out from the police as special branch and quickly politicized and militarized for the sole purpose of protecting the regime, as the region were known by repeated coups d'état. This dependency of intelligence services has continued currently in most African countries which downgrade the intelligence service professionalism. This issue of dependency makes the intelligence institutions ignores their main objective of gathering intelligence on their respective national security threats against their national interests (Stanley, 2008). It is obvious that most of African countries are tied with different national security threats like terrorism and religious fundamentalism, boarder security issues, inter and intra-regional conflicts, they need strong intelligence institution to tackle the national security threats.

Intelligence services should be apart from politicians and decision makers to carry out their routine works and the African intelligence institutions need to be reformed not only to realize the effective gathering of intelligence but also the means to significantly alter its ends. The main problem of intelligence services in Africa is that it lacks the requirement of professionalism by being regime security and hence, mostly they are not: abide by the rule of law, independent, accountable, effective, efficient, and over sight by concerned organ. Therefore to be professional intelligence institutions they need to be reformed (Sedra, 2017). To achieve these very objective different African countries intelligence institutions have reformed at different times though could not bring the intended fruit mostly. The experience of some of these African counties intelligence institutions reform has presented as follows.

The reforms of Kenyan intelligence systems were made following its independence in 1963 to replace the expatriate officers with senior Africans, and the reform amended again in 1964 under Special Branch (SB) (Boinett, 2009). Following the Kenyan reforms that continued up to the late 1990s NSIS was created in 1998 for various purposes: such as detect & identify any threat, advising the post holders for any threat of the countries security etc.; however, the changes have brought some challenges. NSIS failed to perform as well as it could pertain to threat. NSIS lacks appropriate level of professionalism, loss of capacity to monitor & interdict foreign & local terrorists; and lack of technical expertise and equipment (Africa, 2009). This NSIS was later changed to National Intelligence Service (NIS) by reform which intends to professionalize the intelligence services in 2010 and working on intelligence gathering against Kenya's national

security threats. After this reform the Kenyan intelligence service brought radical change in professionalization of the institution. South African intelligence service reform has also started from the time of white minority rule to the present day post-apartheid rule. The intention of the reform has many reasons among them some are to check whether the intelligence services oversighted and controlled, and to ensure accountability of the sector (Africa, 2009). The reform also addresses the post-apartheid period which is bounded by duty to defend and uphold the Country's constitution. South Africa's intelligence service reform has done phase by phase which includes the years from 1910-1969, 1969-1990, 1990-1994 and from 1994 to the present day. With the reform the professionalization of the institution is still going on. The Kenyan and South African reform were highly concentrated on technical professionalization of the reforms.

Marrone (2015) added that the Sudan intelligence service were highly working to preserve the Sudanese ruling party which is out of the security sector profession and needs reform until the recent coup d'état. They were party-affiliated and accused of suppressing oppositions from the public against the system as a result of which the government has failed after ruling for a long period. After the coup, the transitional government has made intelligence service reform and creating stability (Marrone, 2015). But here the non-professionalism of intelligence service in Sudan is still creating problems in the country and intelligence service ought to have solved these problems. Adeba also supports this idea that the intelligence service of South Sudan is also party-affiliated and works to make the ruling party long-lasting rather than serving the whole public equally because of which it is the contributory factor for the country's conflict which has been in progress for a long period and still in question (Adeba, 2020). But here also the non-professionalism of intelligence service in Sudan is still creating problems in the country and intelligence service reform ought to have solved these problems and what we can see is that it is difficult to audit and inspect the performance of the security sector in the absence of professionalism. This can be corrected by intelligence service reform in conforming to the principles of good governance, but in most of the cases, the mere making of intelligence service reform cannot bring changes to the sectors unless its implementation is strictly followed by the concerned bodies which did not be seen by most authors.

2.3.1.2. Intelligence Services Reform in the Post-1991 Ethiopia

The Ethiopian state gets into a gross change in the early 1990s, after the fall of the Derg regime which has a highly centralized state structure and replaced with the federal system, adopting a democratic constitution, the transfer of power through elections, and the recognition of the rights associated with freedom of expression (Berhe, 2017). Following the change, the Ethiopian security sector was transformed from 1991 onwards. The defense, police, and intelligence review were developed in the context of this wider security sector transformation. This change resulted in a new idea of threats and security needs, which necessitated the institutional arrangements of the country's intelligence service in alignment with the new federal arrangements (Tadesse, 2009). The reform reorganized the intelligence institution in conformity with the newly established government in structure, human power, system and effective usage of resources.

The Ethiopian intelligence service reform experience was shaped by the insightful analysis of its political and security threats, which guided the intelligence transformation. The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) entrenched the supremacy of political leadership over its intelligence service leadership contrary to the then previous regime and this was recognized by the ratification of the new Ethiopian Constitution on the 21st August 1995 (FDRE Constitution, 1995). The Constitution established the intelligence institution. Immediately after the coming into effect of the Constitution, the National Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority was established on 24th August 1995 representing the former Ministry of Internal Affairs on most of the matters that were covered by the Ministry (Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority, 1995). The main objective of the Authority was to execute policies and laws on state and public security, immigration, nationality, and refugees.

After organizing professional intelligence institutions, the major foreseeable threats to national security were identified (Berhe, 2017) and intelligence gathering was concentrated on these national security threats throughout the EPDRF regime. The institution continues to professionalize itself by BBR starting from 2008 and started to deal with the issues of terrorism, gross economic sabotage, and good governance issues as security threats to national interest after the re-establishment of the institution by proclamation number 824/2013 as Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Services.

The intelligence reform was made to ensure the technical and institutional professionalization of the intelligence services as the EPRDF government reorganized the intelligence institution by firing and imprisoning the leaders and operational intelligence officers of the Derg regime by alleging that they were party affiliated and serving the sole interest of the Derg (Berhe, 2017). The EPRDF government also claims that “the intelligence leaders and officers were not professionally capable of gathering intelligence in the dynamic world as the national security threats changes recurrently and they were unfit”. (Mesfin, 2010)

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

This section presents the methods and design used in the study. Hence, the first section deals with research methodology, the second section deals with research design, the third section presents a method of data collection, the fourth presents sampling method and techniques, the fifth section presents method of data analysis, the sixth section presents trustworthiness of the research and the last section presents ethical consideration of the research.

3.2. Research Approach

Research methodology discusses how the study is made, and it is the system in which the researcher designs a study to ensure valid and reliable results that address the research aims and objectives (Paradis, 2017). Qualitative research focuses on collecting and analyzing written or spoken words and textual data, and it can also focus on body language or visual elements (Symeou, 2008). Moreover, the data obtained from qualitative research is very “rich”; it provides insightful accounts and complex details and can show the full extent of the subject’s experiences (Bryman, 1988). It is used when the research aims, and objectives are exploratory.

This study employed a qualitative approach for exploring the problem at hand because; the research gives emphases for an understanding of underlying reasons, opinions, and motivations and gives insights into the problem or tries to develop ideas from the data gathered. It collects data at the sight where the participants have experiences on the issues; it gathers multiple forms of data through interview questions, observations, and documents.

3.3. Research Design

A qualitative research study is best suited for research that is exploratory to identify variables that can be used as a ladder for quantitative studies through objective measure of variables (Creswell , 2013).

The design employed in the study is an exploratory research design. An exploratory study is employed since little information exists related to the topic of this thesis. A general lack of knowledge about the topic prompted the given study to go through an exploratory research design to understand the subjective viewpoints of the participants (Swedberg, 2018). Therefore, this approach fits this study so long as the study is engulfed with challenges regarding obtaining data. This is because there is little information available on the area of the study given the nature of the intelligence institution, most of whose activities are secret.

3.4. Method of Data Collection

Data collection methods are explanations it can generate that determined by the methodology and analytical approach applied by the researcher (Bismah Jameel, 2018). There are two types of data collection tools namely, primary data and secondary data.

3.4.1. Primary Data

For this research, primary and secondary sources were used. For analyzing and buttressing what has been gathered through different means and to make it valid and reliable, reviews of relevant books, journals, legal documents, articles, magazines, websites, and posters have been conducted.

Primary data collection is one way of getting first-hand information about a situation, person, and problem or phenomenon (Mohajan, 2018). Regarding collecting data, the interview technique was conducted especially since there are scanty written sources related to the Ethiopian National intelligence and security reform since 1991. The researcher uses primary data to collect information from the people who participated in different intelligence services. Interview questions were used to collect information about series of reforms made on Ethiopian national intelligence and security service since 1991. This tool was applied in the information-gathering process. It allows the researcher to see the experience on the ground.

3.4.2. Secondary Data

Secondary data collection is the outcome of the people works that are preserved in the form of publications like, journal articles, books, and reports. In most cases, secondary data help us to get

information about the previous activities, and provide information about other experiences (Kothari, 2004). Here, the researcher has used government reports, manuals, booklets, books, journals, etc. in the study by reviewing as them to support the argument of the study under different sub titles.

3.5. Sampling Method and Techniques

Sampling implies selecting from a large to come up with the conclusion (Mohajan, 2018). The researcher used snowball and purposive sampling techniques in selecting the interviewees since some of the subjects are difficult to be found. Therefore, there are three patterns of snowball sampling, namely linear snowball, exponential non-discriminative, and exponential discriminative snowball sampling. But the researcher chose exponential non-discriminative sampling where the first subject recruits to the sample groups provide multiple referrals and each new referral is explored until the primary data are collected (Kumar, 2019).

The Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Services is one of the institutions in charge of gathering intelligence and analysing both the internal and external national security threats. The total sample of interviewees was eleven, including a former intelligence officer who left the NISS and former student at Addis Ababa University. The participants were selected purposefully from the experts in the field who have better knowledge or understanding and experience in the intelligence community. Interview questions were prepared for in-depth interviews with experts and government officials from the Ethiopian national intelligence and security service.

3.6. Method of Data Analysis

Based on the research approach and objectives of the research, the thematic content analysis technique was used. Data gathered were transcribed and reduced into themes and analyzed accordingly. The data analysis begins in categorizing and putting data into a theme. Thematic analysis will be used, if the research is inductive, the themes emerge from the data and are not imposed upon it by the researcher. Data from multiple sources are then converged into the analysis process (Leavy, 2017). Data arrangement and writing were made in concurrent with the data collection process to reduce data emission and missing important information. Each data source in interview questions was treated as one piece of the “puzzle,” with each piece

contributing to the researcher's understanding of the whole phenomenon and promotes a greater understanding of the case. The data gathered through interview questions were analyzed based on the participants' experience that they figure out the problem and the rationale of reform of the intelligence service from 1991 to 2018. Finally, the researcher analytically wrote the experience he gained during personal observation.

3.7. Trustworthiness of the Research

In research, there are at least three ways of verifying a particular event, description, or fact being reported by a study. Triangulation of data collection techniques, peer review of data collection instruments, and getting approval of the data collection tools by an adviser. Researcher's commitment to empirical research helps the research only depend on the actual life of the research participant and following scientific probing. Moreover, the ethical standard of the research helped to keep the research valid. Interview questions were used to triangulate the ideas the researcher got from reviewing different literature and get holistic information from different sources like officials, experts, and the hosting community. In addition, the data collection tool was reviewed by peers and approved by the immediate advisor confirming the fact that the tool address to answer the objective of the research. Furthermore, following scientific as well as the ethical standards of the research was considered for the validity of the research. Scientific procedures starting from getting a support letter from the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) preparing informed consent were contributing factors to get empirical data from the intended research subjects.

3.8. Ethical Consideration

So far as the thesis probes into some sensitive issues such as covert policy matters, the confidentiality, and anonymity of the respondents are strictly maintained starting from interview questions. It is unethical to overlook to protect the confidentiality and anonymity of the information gathered from one's respondents (Kumar: 2019).

In line with this, in the study and related issues first, I reaffirmed that their identity would not be public because they did not offer their consent. Second, As far as this research is concerned, all the respondents wanted their identities to be confidential and thus, their identity had been kept

anonymous in the thesis. Third, the respondents should not be harmed because of the interview and I assure that no harm would be caused on them after the interview question because of their response. Lastly, it is also important to make sure that the selected interviewees are relevant to the objective of the thesis (Kumar: 2019). Prior to requesting the consent of the respective respondents, therefore, I was able to make sure that the respondents are relevant to the objective of the Study. So, in order to be ethical, a researcher first explained aptly and briefly the objective of the thesis to make sure the respondents have adequate knowledge to provide when asked.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS: ANALYSIS OF THE ETHIOPIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES REFORMS FROM 1991- 2018

4.1. Introduction

This chapter analyzes the data gathered based on the series of intelligence reforms conducted at the Ethiopian National Intelligence Services, driving forces of the reforms, successes and failures of the institution and the reforms contribution in professionalizing the intelligence services as well as protecting the state and its population.

4.2. Organization of Ethiopian Intelligence Services

4.2.1. The Establishment of Modern Intelligence Services (1944-1974)

The historical foundation of the Ethiopian state got back at least three thousand years (Marcus, 1994). In spite of Ethiopia's recognition as a polity for three thousand years, the current geographical boundary is of recent phenomenon. The polity is rather known for its fluid territorial boarder which is later shaped by the extent of conquest made by the Ethiopian Emperors of the 19th and 20th century (Prouty, 1986). It is important to note that despite the long history of people and state, Ethiopia has little experience with the establishment of outstanding and strong intelligence institution. Starting from ancient time, espionage was used to gather information to tackle security threats against the ruling class and the society, and the modern intelligence services were a recent phenomenon (Mesfin, 2010).

The Ethiopian intelligence service was established as one section of Public Security Protection Office under Ministry of State in 1944, by regulation that came in to effect to determine the power of the ministry. The regulation established the intelligence section, the police section, the prison section and the laissez-passer section to protect the public security. The intelligence services was strengthened in 1952 by revising the 1944 regulation and special attention was given to intelligence and surveillance work. But the modern organizational structure of the intelligence services was first studied and presented by regulation in 1967 (Derese, 1967). Accordingly, under Public Security Protection Office; Internal Intelligence Section, External

Intelligence Section, Laissez-Passer Section, Research Section and Protection Section were organized to safeguard the Ethiopian national security. One of the interviewee said that “it was structurally sound and strong though it promoted the Emperor’s interest” (I2, personal communication, February 15, 2021). As far as its structure is concerned, the current intelligence service is more or less resembles the structure of Emperor Haile Selassie’s intelligence services.

Internal Intelligence Section was responsible for the protection of national security by safeguarding the country’s political, economic, social and military matters against national security threats in the country before they commit attack. It was mandated to preserve the regime from any kind of internal dissent. External Intelligence Section was responsible for the protection of national security from external national security threats. It was highly attached to the gathering of intelligence to secure the border of the country from external enemies. Foreign invasion and military issues were dealt with this intelligence main department. Laissez-Passer Section was responsible for the gathering of intelligence relating to immigrants, emigrants, refugees and returnees, so as not to open a loop to make attack on the country by the cover of these passengers. Research Section was responsible for collection, processing, analyzing and disseminating to concerned public organ of intelligence relating to national security threats so as to ensure action to be taken before the national security threats committed attack. Protection Section was responsible for airport security, border security and higher officials’ security and gather intelligence on these issues.




Diagram 1: Intelligence Services organizational structure (1944-1974)

4.2.2. Organization of Intelligence Services During the Derg Regime (1974-1991)

Started during the time of Emperor Haile Selassie, the Ethiopian modern intelligence services were developed in 1970's under the communist regimes of the Derg (Mesfin, 2010). The Derg began to organize the structure of the intelligence services in response to the national security threats that faced the country from its border areas and internal insurgent and dissident groups. This Intelligence Institution was the Public Security Organization (PSO) that established with the support of the East German State Security Service in 1978. The public security organization was the primary civilian intelligence gathering, counter-intelligence and surveillance under the aegis of the Ministry of Public Safety and Security, later renamed as, Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Public Security Organization was responsible for internal security and control of inside and outside of government structure capable of posing a threat to the regime and the state, insurgent groups' protection, internal and boarder control from political movements, protecting external security threats against Ethiopian's national security. These functions were distributed among different operational departments of the public security organization. These departments were Office for Internal Security, Central Investigation Organ, Technical Department, Training Department, Foreign Intelligence Department, Economic Intelligence Department and Military Security Main Department to safeguard the Ethiopian national security (Mesfin, 2010).

Office for internal security were responsible for internal security and managed to protect all issues relating to political, economic, social and military aspect in the country. Central Investigation Organ has its own special prison in which it indefinitely detained suspects, whose activities and views were deemed out of line, using torture and even carrying out executions. The military security main department was responsible for controlling the armed forces and was acting as a "secret police" within the armed forces. It was tied with collecting information on the private lives and general activities of the armed forces personnel. It was also responsible to gather intelligence on the activities of foreign intelligence agencies and its networks were also in the ministry of defense and the commission of defense industry. It was hated by the public and the professional officers and even the regime has no full confidence on the military security main department. The Technical Department was responsible to provide assistance in electronic surveillance telephone tap operations and code breaking that may threaten the regime and the

national interests. The Economic intelligence department was responsible for gathering intelligence on organized crime, including financial malfeasance, smuggling and black markets. Training department was responsible for rendering intelligence training for the intelligence officers to build their capacity. The Foreign intelligence department was concerned with the gathering of intelligence relating to national security against foreign states, the activities of foreign intelligence services, and the department was also active abroad and especially, in gathering intelligence on the activities of opposition groups.




Diagram 2: Intelligence Services organizational structure (1974-1991)

4.2.3. Organization of Intelligence Services During the EPRDF Regime (1974-1991)

Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front EPRDF, which adopted ethno linguistic identity as the prescribed basis of politics in the new federal, came to power by ousting the Derg regime in 1991. The ruling coalition of EPRDF was composed of four political parties delineated along ethnic lines: the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization (OPDO), the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM). The ruling coalition had five affiliated political parties (agar) representatives of all other ethnic regions.

Right after EPRDF came to power, it reorganized the structure of the intelligence services and later established the institution by proclamation in 1995 as the Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority and later renamed as National Intelligence and Security Services in 2013. Accordingly, Main Department for Internal Security, Main Department for External Security, Main Department for Technical Intelligence, Main Department for Protection, Main Department for Immigration and Nationality Affairs, Main Department for the Administration of Refugees and Returnees Affairs Authority, Main Department for Finance and Administration and Kinfe Training Center was established to protect the national security against national security threats to preserve national interest. According to one of the interviewee, "the regime changed Derg's intelligence institution so as to make sure that it works for the interest of the party itself" (I6, personal communication, February 15, 2021). Positing that EPRDF fired and imprisoned most of the institution's employees whom the regime considered them as a threat for its survival; he further said, "This was one of the terrible mistakes that had been made by the regime in weakening the intelligence services".

The Main Department for Internal Security was responsible for leading the work of intelligence and surveillance services inside the country in a responsible manner, follow up and investigate terrorism and extremism and collect intelligence and evidence, tackle any internal activity intended to overthrow the constitution and the constitutional order unlawfully, threats against the national economic growth and development activities', serious good governance problems, protect espionage activity against the interest of the country and its people in the country and conspiracies, other serious crimes which are threats to the national interest and security, conduct

surveillance by human intelligence, in accordance with court warrant, on any person suspected of criminal activities and work in collaboration with other relevant organs, and preparing the main department's structure to present it to the appropriate body.

Main Department for External Security was responsible for leading the work of intelligence services outside the country in a responsible manner, follows up terrorism and collects intelligence and evidence, work on any external activity intended to overthrow the constitution and the constitutional order unlawfully, protect espionage activity against the interest of the country and its people at abroad, collect information and undertake counter-espionage activity, other serious crimes at abroad which are threats to the national interest and security, work in collaboration with other relevant organs, and preparing the main department's structure to present it to the appropriate body..

Main Department for Technical Intelligence was responsible for leading the work of intelligence and surveillance services in the country on terrorism, extremism, gross economic sabotage, serious good governance problems and conspiracies, espionage, any internal activity intended to overthrow the constitution and the constitutional order unlawfully and other serious crimes which are threats to the national interest and security through technical manner, by intercepting or conducting surveillance on the telephone, fax, radio, internet, electronic, postal and similar communications of a person suspected of the crimes; enter into any premise in secret to enforce the interception; or install or remove instruments enabling the interception up on getting court warrant and preparing the main department's structure to present it to the appropriate body.

Main Department for Protection was responsible for leading the work of security services in the country with specific concentration on aviation security activities. Provision of aviation security services and coordination of other aviation security stakeholders in accordance with the Ethiopian aviation security proclamation. Provision of security protection to the President and Prime Minister of the country as well as to heads of states and governments of foreign countries, in collaboration with other relevant organs is also its responsibility. Issuance of directive and standard for the security protection of high government officials of the country and high foreign officials and dignitaries, and ensuring the proper provision of security protection to them is also treated here. Furthermore, issuance of directive and standard for the protection of critical institutions, issuance of permits for the production, possession, use, import, sale, repair and

disposal of explosives and control of their movement and issuance of security clearance for key government employees after carrying out security clearance investigations is made by this main department. Determining and controlling the use and the issuance of license for importation, exportation, sale, movement, possession, production and disposal of intelligence and security equipment and devices, and preparing the main department's structure to present it to the appropriate body.

Main Department for Immigration and Nationality Affairs was responsible for leading the provision and control of immigration and nationality service to Ethiopians and foreigners in accordance with the immigration and nationality proclamation; study and submit to the concerned body service charge rates and implement same upon approval; oversee the issuance of passport and national identification card and preparing the main department's structure to present it to the appropriate body.

Main Department for the Administration of Refugees and Returnees Affairs Authority was responsible for leading the provision of the necessary service for refugees in cooperation with other appropriate organs, based on the Refugee Proclamation and preparing the main department's structure to present it to the appropriate body.

Main Department for Finance and Administration was responsible for leading the finance, logistics and human resources of the institution and capacity building at all level including the leading of intelligence and security training at Kinfe Training Center.




Diagram 3: Intelligence Services organizational structure (1991-2018)

Cognizant that the institution has engulfed with several problems, EPRDF decided to reform the institution in 2013. The reform was made under National Intelligence and Security service re-establishment proclamation.

Despite the fact that the coalition was able to manage series of crisis erupted in different times, EPRDF was broken up following the coming of new administration run by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in April, 2018. EPRDF was changed into Prosperity Party late of June 2019. Right after the new administration came to power, it has been going through reforming the security sectors including the intelligence institution. The government is finalizing the proclamation targeting Ethiopian national intelligence and security service right now.

All in all, though the history of intelligence service traced back to ancient time, the pedigree of modern Ethiopian intelligence service got back to the time of Emperor Haile Selassie. Since then the intelligence institution had gone through series of reforms under Emperor's successors. However, this study accentuates on the series of reforms made from the coming of EPRDF to power in 1991 to 2018.

4.3. The Ethiopian Intelligence Service Reform from 1991-2018

The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front EPRDF came to power by ousting the Derg regime in 1991 and adopted ethno linguistic identity as the prescribed basis of politics in the new federal system. The EPRDF government has reformed the security sectors right after its coming to power. In line with this the intelligence institution has reformed starting from 1991 and approved by proclamation in 1995 and again reformed starting from 2008 and approved by proclamation in 2013. These reforms, factors initiated the reforms, success and failure of the reforms and contributions of the reforms for the professionalization of the institution are presented as follows.

4.3.1. The Ethiopian Intelligence Service Reform (1991-1995)

After coming to power, the new EPRDF government started to reform the security sectors by reorganizing the defense forces, the police and the intelligence services, and abolished the revolutionary guards with the decision of the EPRDF's military forces to be the Ethiopian national defense forces by proclamation no.8/1992 of security sectors. As one part of the security

sectors, the government reformed the intelligence institution's structure, human power, and systems and usage of the resources. Most of the intelligence institution's leaders and operational officers were fired from the institution by being alleged that they were working with the previous regime to preserve it and they were unfit. New leaders were replaced and new intelligence officers were recruited from the defense forces and the society by their background of prior engagement of gathering information for EPRDF. But, this was not supported by the elite for the fearing of the creation of regime security that would preserve the EPRDF as the previous regime. According to I9 (personal communication, February 21, 2021), "the regime reformed Derg's intelligence institution to make sure that it works for the interest of the party itself, positing that EPRDF fired and imprisoned most of the institution's employees whom the regime considered a threat to its survival by replacing them with employees who are loyal to the party without taking into account merit". In addition to human power, the institution reformed its structure by organizing six operational main departments and one administrative main department. As I2 (personal communication, February 13, 2021) posited it, "the intelligence institution has organized six operational main departments named as Main Department for Internal Security, Main Department for External Security, Main Department for Protection, Main Department for Technical Intelligence, Main Department for Immigration and Nationality Affairs, Main Department for the Administration of Refugees and Returnees Affairs and one administrative main department named as Finance and Administration Main Department". These structures was later provided by Proclamation No. 6/1995 Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority Establishment Proclamation which also guarantee the effective usage of resources and restructured the intelligence services practices to be conducted professionally with the flow of intelligence cycle. The proclamation has vested the power of execution of policies and laws on state and public security, immigration, nationality and refugees affairs on the intelligence institution.

4.3.1.1. The driving forces of the 1991 Ethiopian Intelligence Service Reform

Even though security sector reform garnered international attention in the 1990s, the Ethiopian government became cognizant of the uppermost important role of undergoing SSR through figuring out the intricate nature of security. As one part of the security sectors the government

started to reform the intelligence institution by reorganizing the Derg's intelligence institution to create favorable environment through which fundamental rights are protected. The main contributing factor for the reform to be conducted is change of government by revolution in 1991. It was concluded that the previous intelligence institution was party affiliated and was working for the sole preservation of the power of Derg's regime. Pursuant to I6, (personal communication, February 15, 2021), "the Derg's intelligence institution was serving for the power preservation of the regime and highly attached to the military and its commanders". This was critical threat for the newly established government and the government decided to reorganize the institution.

The other contributing factor was the intelligence institutions poor professional capacity of gathering intelligence. According to I4 (personal communication, February 14, 2021), "the main objective of the Derg's intelligence institution was protecting the regime, not the national interest of the country as such and they were the decisive authority in the country having all powers of commanding the military and the police especially, in relation to acts against the regime". They were keys at any level of administration in the country and they are loyal to the regime more than any other institution as the interviewee has posited it. The issue of national security threat was not as such critical for them though they have identified the national security threats to some extent. The intelligence institution was also not professional enough in conducting intelligence by the profession of intelligence following the intelligence cycle and has no professionals that can fit the dynamic nature of the then world. Therefore, they were unfit for the intelligence activity. In relation to the problem of professionalism, the problem of organizational structure, practices of the institution and usage of resources have also necessitated the reform.

Protecting the national interests of the country from the national security threats were also the main contributing factor for the reform and after organizing professional intelligence institutions, the major foreseeable threats to national security were identified (Berhe, 2017). The first of this was the potential internal dissent that could come from the mismanagement of issues of cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity. Given a long national history of marginalizing certain cultural, ethnic, and religious groups, failure to implement the constitutional provisions of guaranteeing the rights of communal self-determination and establishing a secular state that mandated the equal treatment of all religions, ethnic and cultures could cause havoc. In this view secessionist

movements could be resulted among different nations and failure to implement the constitution concerning diversity management might result in turmoil by which conception secessionism blended with religious radicalism driven by self-centered elites was identified as a major internal threat to the stability of the nation.

The second major national security threats were threats from external powers attempting to interfere in Ethiopia to influence the management of natural resources, particularly water. The issue of Nile water has been highly conceived as a challenging problem in the region, being a source of tension and conflict for the greater part of the 20th and 21st centuries. Diplomatic and material support given by Egypt and sometimes Sudan at different times to insurgents fighting the Ethiopian ruling government can be seen as the implication of intervention against the internal affairs of the country. Therefore, the coming of peace in Ethiopia has not been appreciated by these actors and they would try to destabilize the government either through the provision of arms to proxies or through direct military intervention (Berhe, 2017).

The third threat came from issues relating to Muslim extremism and fundamentalism that were directed against the country from Al-Itihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) extremist organization which was come into being during the last years of the Siyad Barre regime in Somalia to create Islamist caliphate in the Horn of Africa and in 1991, it controlled the Gedo region of Somalia. This extremist organization got support from international jihadists and creates intimacy with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) of Ethiopia and then creates training camps in the Gedo and the Ogaden regions of Ethiopia. This organization started to destabilize the country by making an attack in the country by explosions which resulted in the dismantling of the organization by the work of intelligence and surveillance of Ethiopian intelligence institution (Daniel, 2008).

Though at the initial stage the reform was highly appreciated by being seen as the beginning of the establishment of independent intelligence institution, it lacks acceptance as the time gone, when the elite started to realize that the EPRDF was reforming the intelligence institution for its own interest. According to one of the interviewees, “the regime changed the existing Derg’s intelligence institution to make sure that it works for the interest of the party itself” (I1, personal communication, February 21, 2021).

4.3.1.2. Functions of the Intelligence Institution

As it has been enshrined in the Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority Establishment Proclamation No. 6/1995, the intelligence institution had the following functions. The first function of the institution is formulating policies and strategies concerning state and public security as well as immigration and refugee affairs. In formulating policies and strategies, it has responsibility to investigate whether there are potential threats for the territorial integrity of the state and its economy or endangers its citizens' security. The other function of the intelligence institution is to issue licenses for the possession or use of arms, firearms, and explosives; prescribe conditions under which explosives may be sold. Furthermore, it has responsibility for matters relating to refugees. In cooperation with the appropriate organs, it has a responsibility in a manner to provide for the registration and issuance of entry and exit permits to foreign nationals as well as permits to move within the country, the institution investigates and causes decisions to be taken on the cases of persons who apply for asylum and Ethiopian nationality. Issuing passports to nationals other than diplomatic passports; issuing travel documents (visas) are also the function of the institution that it discharges its task in cooperation with the appropriate organs and international organizations.

From the above functions of the institution, what one can understand is in fact that the responsibility of the institution is not limited to gathering and analyzing information concerning to the security threat and provide to policy-makers but also it goes through the case of immigration and refugees which needs to be done by other separate body. This is of course considered as one of the significant factors that hobbled the institution not to be effective and competent and engulfed with the menace of corruption.

4.3.1.3. The Success of the Ethiopian Intelligence Institution

As it had set the objective of the national security threats protection in the reform agenda, the institution has successfully safeguard the integrity of the country from the international terrorist attack. Even though the Ethiopian intelligence institution, which was established in 1995 as the Security, Immigration, and Refugee Affairs Authority, had been engulfed with myriads of problems, it had an undeniable success story in preserving the territorial integrity of the state and ensuring the security of the citizens. One of the interviewees stressed that it is unquestionable

that the institution would not vacillate to infringe citizens' human rights through intimidation and arrest if it considered them as a threat for its lust for power. "But, it was also able to protect the citizens and the state from the threat posed by internal and external terrorist organizations" (II, personal communication, February 21, 2021)

Located in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia's security is in a state highly affected by the terrible situation in the Horn of Africa. But the spread of Islamic radicalism in the 1990s gave 'terrorism' an indelibly Muslim face in the Horn. Islamism has transformed the Horn into a veritable arena of conflict between jihadists and their enemies. There are several reasons why the Horn of Africa has become a battleground for jihadists and their foes. The first and foremost factor is the fact that the region's geographical proximity and bonds of history with the Middle East facilitated the movements of terrorist agents within and across the two regions (Rotberg, 2005).

Ethiopia has demonstrated its deep and long-standing involvement in opposing terrorist organizations including Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and Al-Ithihad-Al-Islamiya (AIAI) as well as ONLF and OLF. It has shown a persistent effort to flack dawn, disrupt apprehend and ultimately bring to justice to penetrate terrorist activity and to dismantle this organization and its connection with Al Qaeda (Kinfе, 2006).

One of the success stories of the Ethiopian intelligence institution is its capability to foil the assassination attempt that targeted Egypt's president in 1995. In June 1995, The Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak flew to Ethiopia for a meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa. When he arrived in Addis Ababa, there had been an attempt to assassinate him. However, the attempt foiled when the Ethiopian anti-terrorist force killed five of the assassins and captured three more (Kinfе, 2006).

Ethiopian intelligence institutions had also played a paramount role during the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ethiopia sent intelligence personnel to Eritrea. They did a great job there. Somalia, which is the base for a terrorist attack, along with Eritrea posed a potential security threat on Ethiopia. Ethiopia cracked down hard on AIAI across the Somali border and established alliances with several groups inside Somalia. Somalia had a long-standing goal to weaken Ethiopia. It has the ambition to incorporate Somalis who are living in Ethiopia, especially, if a united Somalia results in an unfriendly neighbor (Moller, 2009). On the other

hand, however, many Somalis claim that AIAI is a freedom fighter even though engaged in violent acts against the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. Most Somalis are convinced that Ethiopia wants only to keep Somalia a weak and divided state (Daniel, 2008). This exacerbates Somali hostilities and indicates there would be a new security threat posed on Ethiopia. Owing to this reason, Ethiopian intelligence institutions had been taking the threat posed by Somalia seriously. “This is also considered as another success story of the institution in preserving the territorial integrity of the state and the security of the people” (I3, personal communication, February 14, 2021).

Therefore, the institution had played an uppermost role in hobbling the conspiracy and plan of internal and external terrorist organizations. Thereby, this role can be taken as the achievement of the institution in ensuring the security of the citizens and survival of the state. However, the institution had been engulfed with myriads of problems. Lack of capacity, a workload that comes from its responsibility to deal with immigration and refugee, the strong intervention of ruling party in the works of the institution and other factors affects its effectiveness. This shortcoming will be discussed in the next section in detail.

4.3.1.4. The Shortcomings of the Ethiopian Intelligence Institution

One of the interviewee said that the intelligence institution had suffered from myriads of problems. “First and foremost, as the employees of the institution were the members of the ruling party, it was established based on the interest of the then ruling party to protect it” (I2, personal communication, February15, 2021). The need to obliterating the previous institution (Public Security Organization) was solely driven by some politicians within the party. “From this, one can asserted that the institution accorded primacy to protecting the power of the then regime” (I2, personal communication, February15, 2021).

“Subscribing to the above view, the other interviewee said that the intelligence service must be loyal and resilient to the constitution and constitutional order” (I4, personal communication, February 14, 2021). However, practically speaking, the reality on the ground revealed that the institution was loyal to EPRDF than the constitutional order. In line with this, I9 asserted that “the 1995 intelligence institution was loyal to EPRDF and engaged in political repression to

maintain the regime's lust for the perpetuation of power" (I9, personal communication, February 21, 2021).

Mellon (2006) typically argued that the intelligence institution needs not to harass, threaten, or injure people - these actions are illegal and intelligence officers, as government employees, must respect the laws of their country, the rights, and privacy of fellow men. Against this background, the interviewee posited that "the employees do not discharge their task based on the law and principles enshrined in the 1995 proclamation rather they respect the order given by the party" (I10, personal communication, February 21, 2021).

The other problem that the institution had been engulfed with is in fact that there has been extensive secrecy within the institution that makes it being suspicious and being frightened. "This of course significantly reduces public support" (I7, personal communication, February 16, 2021). In democratic countries, intelligence institutions rely on public cooperation rather than coercion and terror, for them to be successful. The image of the institution is positive since it is not the source of fear rather the source of pride for the citizens because it respects human rights, and thereby boosts their effectiveness (Nathan, 2012). In a democratic country, measures restricting civil and human rights are based on law, carefully vetted for purpose, necessity, proportionality, and consistency with other national and international human rights obligations. "But the intelligence institution would not vacillate to violate civic and human rights if there is a threat to the power of the party" (I6, personal communication, February 15, 2021).

It goes without saying that by far the most predominant factor that imperiled the strength and performance of the intelligence institution was its lukewarm proclivity to recruit professionals or employees based on merit. If the employees have not the ability to analyze the gathered information, how the intelligence institution could be effectively discharge its function? Despite the fact that the employees are loyal to the party, they may not even realize the party's interest so long as their analytical ability is flimsy. "Partisanship was considered while recruiting employees" (I5, personal communication, February 15, 2021). "However, based on the EPRDF's recruitment criteria to hire employees to the institution, if the person wants to be recruited in the intelligence institution, first and foremost he or she should be loyal to EPRDF" (I9, personal communication, February 21, 2021). Prior to join the institution, their loyalty to the party and prior engagement in information gathering and affiliations is highly investigated. As a result,

EPRDF has been seen as an important tool for the employees that makes them more loyal to the party. This brings the lack of support from the society to the institution.

The terrible problem that needs to be discussed is in fact that the intelligence service in addition to its primary task goes through the case of immigration and refugee. Despite the fact that it is important to maliciously investigate and spy on the intention of immigrants and refugees, it is quite problematic to go through all cases of immigration and refugees. The task to deal with immigration and refugees should be separate from the intelligence service. On the one hand, it increases the workload of the institution and on the other hand, it is more likely making corruption rampant in the institution because there are funds donated from international governmental and non-governmental organizations in the name of immigration and refugees. “The intelligence services also use public funds (I3, personal communication, February 14, 2021) and the resources expected to be used properly”. However, the institution is not checked, and no alternative mechanisms were created to oversight and monitor its work.

4.3.1.5. Contribution of the 1991 Intelligence Services Reforms to the Professionalization of the Institution

The intelligence institution has contributed a lot to the organization of modern intelligence institution to run by intelligence sciences. According to I8, “the 1991 reformed intelligence institution has many contributions in professionalization of the institution though its success has shadowed by its shortcomings” (I8, personal communication, February 21, 2021). This can be expressed by the organization of the institution by different main departments as mentioned above and division of intelligence works to different section in a coherent manner; Critical identification of national security threats as mentioned above and was doing intelligence and surveillance work on these threats which resulted in tackling of these threats before they committed attack mostly; creation of conducive working environment including building of standardized head quarter at Addis Ababa before any federal institutions; professional intelligence work were started with the 1991 intelligence institution’s reform which include setting ultimate goal, mission, core values and vision of the institution and specific missions for each main departments. The intelligence gathering has also started to be scientific in line with intelligence cycle.

The main problems that shadowed these contributions are the issue of the intelligence institutions dependency on the ruling party and its being the guardian of the party which created grievances among elites, different politicians, activists, and the societies. As I11 posited it, “the intelligence institution was solely concentrated on the protection of the ruling party’s power and no one can be the member of this institution except the EPRDF members” (I11, personal communication, March 2, 2021). Though the reform was blaming the intelligence institution of the Derg for its being party affiliated, the institution continued to organize itself by EPRDF members at any level. This minimized the acceptance of the intelligence institution before the society. According to I7, (personal communication, February 16, 2021), “out of the intelligence institutions power vested on it by the 1995 proclamation the intelligence institution was arresting and investigating the suspected criminals of crimes against national security which exposes the institution for the violation of human rights that make it responsible at the end of the day”.

4.3.2. The Ethiopian Intelligence Service Reform (BPR) (2008-2013)

The government launched Justice System Reform Program Office under the auspicious of the Ministry of Capacity Building Authority and later named the Comprehensive Justice Sector Reform Program (JSRP) embarked on security service reform in 2002 (Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program, 2005). The intelligence institution has started to make the BPR later after most of the security sectors have started to conduct it. According to I4, (personal communication, February 14, 2021), “the intelligence institution has ignored this BPR at initial stage by believing that it would not bring radical change but, later made for formality requirements”. It has been controversial whether this is BPR or reform but, the institution has tried to see itself from its professionalism perspective and tried its best to come up with professional intelligence institution. The institution has formed special committee and this committee has prepared different intelligence manuals in relation to the routine intelligence works. These manuals are mostly related to the intelligence report manual and no radical change has made by this reform on the organizational structure, rather emphasis has been given to the practices, effective usage of limited resources and routine intelligence works to enhance the gathering of intelligence on national security threats. At the end of this reform the intelligence institution has reestablished the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Services in 2013 by proclamation number 824/2013. But the intelligence manuals prepared by this reform and the

proclamation itself could not brought the intended result as the proclamation do not supported by regulations and directives. The main driving forces for the reform were the government influence of reforming security sectors to bring professional security sectors and technical professionalization of the institution. In relation to the functions of the intelligence institution no significant change has made from the previous proclamation, rather additional power had vested upon the institution under the core functions of the institution in the previous proclamation.

4.3.3. The success of the Institution Under this Reform

The success of the reform is that, since the main objective of the reform was technical professionalization of the institution, professional intelligence work were strengthened which are highly tended to achieve the goal, mission, core values and vision of the institution with measurable results from each main departments, and departments. The intelligence gathering has also got into the scientific line of intelligence cycle and no short cut intelligence work is allowed after the reform.

4.3.4. The Shortcomings of the Institution Under this Reform

The main shortcomings of the intelligence reform is that the manuals prepared by the BPR committee did not formally applicable for gathering intelligence but, the intelligence officers use the manuals if they get it for conducting intelligence. Similarly due to the absence of regulations and directives to apply its content, the proclamation that came into effect following the reform could not fully applicable. After this reform also national security threats could not commit attack on the country, but internal conflicts relating to ethnicity that rose in 2015 forced the government to get in to overall reform starting from April 2018.

The proclamation stated that the national intelligence and security service is established with the ministerial status as an autonomous federal government office having its legal personality ((NISS Re-Establishment Proclamation No.804 (2013), Art 4(1)). It revealed that the institution has equal hierarchical status with other ministries in terms of being accountable to the house of people's representatives. The FDRE Constitution (Proclamation No. 1/1995) under articles 55 (13) and 74 (2) requires parliamentary approval of nominees for ministerial positions and other top officials by the House of Peoples' Representatives. However, the prime mister nominated the directors of NISS and does not send them to the parliament for approval. The Prime Minster

monitors and supervises the activities of the Service while exercising his power of executive oversight (NISS Re-Establishment Proclamation No.804 (2013), Art 23). This succinctly revealed that the intelligence service does not have an institutional base, but personal. That is why almost all interviewees subscribed to the view that the intelligence institution could not be able to be independent of serving as an instrument for the realization of the ruling party's interest.

Despite the efforts that were exerted to conquer the problems and challenges of the 1995 intelligence institution by issuing the new proclamation, the institution resolutely committed to realizing EPRDF's lust for the perpetuation of power (I8, personal communication). This can be expressed in a manner that the newly established proclamation blocking any chance of judicially probing the validity of the source (Belete, 2018). Even though the intelligence institution does not state the source and the method used to gather information, its report is valid without being investigated whether the information is valid or not. The intelligence institution is empowered to intercept and conduct surveillance on the telephone, fax, radio, internet, electronic, postal, and other similar communications of a person suspected of terrorism (Belete, 2018). Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (EATP), which was introduced in 2009 also legally, substantiates national intelligence and security service to stifle Ethiopian citizens and organizations that are critical of the ruling party (Tewodros, 2019).

In relation to the contribution of this reform, it has no significant contribution to the professionalization of the institution except the technical professionalization of intelligence gathering by intelligence cycle principles.

4.4. Summary

The Ethiopian national intelligence and security services had made two reforms starting from 1991 to 2018. The first reform was made when EPRDF came to power by ousting the Derg regime in 1991 and continued up to 1995 when the proclamation for the application of the reform has proclaimed. The main contributing factor of the reform was related to the revolution of 1991. This reform has reorganized the intelligence institutions structure, man power, practices and effective usage of limited resources. Though it was reorganized the Derg's intelligence institutions for its being the servant of the Derg regime, the institution continued to be party

affiliated after its reform which minimized its reputation. The institution was successful in countering terrorism and its failure is related to its dependence on the EPRDF. The reform has contributed to the professionalization of the institution by reorganizing the whole structure of the institution. The second reform was controversial whether it was reform or BPR and made from 2008-2013 for the technical professionalization the intelligence institution but, failed to achieve the intended goal. There was no radical change in the institution except the change in its name.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1. Introduction

This study aimed at examining whether the reform intended to professionalize NISS and improve protection of state and its population through the analysis of collected primary and secondary data. This chapter draws a conclusion based on what the findings of the study revealed and suggests possible recommendations for policy makers.

5.2. Conclusion

The pedigree of the Ethiopian National intelligence service has traced back to ancient times and the modern Ethiopian intelligence institution has started during the reign of emperor Haile Selassie I and developed in the 1970's, during the Derg's regime. After the fall of the Derg and coming in to power of EPRDF the intelligence institution has reformed two times; from 1991-1995 to reorganize the intelligence institution and from 2008-2013 to technically professionalize the institution. The driving force for the first reform was the reorganization of the institution structurally, its human power, its practices and to effective usage of the resources of the institution by firing the Derg's intelligence personnel as they were alleged to be the guardian of the Derg regime. The driving force for the second reform was related to the government influence to reform the security sectors to technically professionalize the institution but, failed totally in the case of the intelligence institution.

It can be said that both reforms could not achieve their intended goal and failed at the end of the reforms. In both of the reforms, the intelligence institution was successful in protecting the country from international terrorist organization attack and its failure was related to the dependent nature of the institution to the ruling political party. Almost all interviewees confirmed that the series of national intelligence service reforms that had been made by EPRDF was not intended to strengthen and enhance the institutional capacity of the service rather making sure that it is the guardian of the party's interest. Though the intention of the first reform was to make the intelligence institution independent from the ruling political party, the dependency of

the institution on the ruling political party continued after the reform and resulted in being the main cause of the institution's failure.

5.3. Recommendation

To professionalize the intelligence institution, the first recommendation is that making reform in the institution is good by setting out the driving forces for the reform, but, it should be strictly followed that the reform has achieved its main goal, otherwise the mere fact that reform has made cannot be taken as a reform. Therefore, the government should create the special mechanism for audit and inspection of the reform by other concerned bodies to realize the application of the reform and at the end of the day the reform's contribution to the professionalization of the institution should be realized.

The second and foremost suggestion that the study would like to provide is the institution should not be dependent on the ruling political parties. It does not only have a pernicious effect on the fundamental rights and security of the citizens; more so it will have a detrimental effect on the survival of the regime in the long run if the institution has a party-oriented objective. It is now evident that the intelligence service was not able to rescue EPRDF's interest, particularly TPLF which had a dominant role in the party even though the institution served as a guardian of EPRDF's interest for almost three decades.

The third suggestion that the study would like to provide of course it is inextricably intertwined with the second recommendation is related to employees' recruitment criterion. The employees of intelligence services should have an extraordinary capacity to analyze information and able to unveil the hidden information that would of course pose a severe threat to the state and the people. EPRDF stepped aside from the uppermost importance of the outstanding ability of a person in analyzing information while hiring employees to the institution, rather accentuated the need to consider the loyalty of the person to the party. This made partisanship the defining characteristic of EPRDF's intelligence institution, which of course hobbled the effectiveness of the institution. Now the country is engulfed with an internal and external threat. Unquestionably, the country requires a strong intelligence service whose employees have an extraordinary capacity to probe the security threat. Therefore, recruitment criteria should accord primacy on professional intelligence personnel or it should be merit-based than being partisanship. To this

end the intelligence institution should cultivate the will be intelligence officers from lower grade before they influenced by any political party' affiliation as they are deemed to be independent from any political party.

The other recommendation is that to professionalize the institution, scholars and practitioners in the field of peace and security should conduct further research on the institution as there is no research relating to the institution. It is obvious that it is difficult to get data relating to intelligence institutions but, devotion of the researcher and voluntariness of the institution decides the successful conduct of further research and this has a great contribution in the professionalization of the institution.

The institution should not be freighted rather respected by the citizens because the intelligence service cannot be effective alone. In a sense, it requires collaboration with ordinary citizens. Therefore, it should be able to develop the habit of working with ordinary people. All in all, it should be people-oriented institution and refrain from violating the fundamental rights of citizens for the sake of realizing the party's lust for the perpetuation of power.

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The Ethiopian State: Ministry of State (1952): Regulation to provide for the powers and duties of
Ministry of State.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

List of Key informants

No	Position	Organization	Date of the Interview
1	Expert Q	NISS	February 21, 2019
2	Expert R	NISS	February 13, 2021
3	Expert S	NISS	February 14, 2021
4	Expert T	NISS	February 14, 2021
5	Expert U	NISS	February 15, 2021
6	Expert V	NISS	February 15, 2021
7	Expert W	NISS	February 16, 2021
8	Expert X	NISS	February 21, 2021
9	Expert Y	NISS	February 21, 2021
10	Expert Z	NISS	February 21, 2021
11	Former AAU student	AAU	March 2, 2021

Appendix 2

Questionnaires

Interview Questions Guide

I. Introduction

As per the regulation of the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University, for the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master, students are obliged to conduct research on their subject area. In line with this, the graduate masters' students of IPSS are expected to research on their selected title of Peace and Security Studies to fulfill the requirements. Here the researcher is going to research "**Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service reform from 1991 to 2018**" for the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Peace and Security Studies.

The purpose of this interview question is to capture information about reform in Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service since 1991. As part of the exercise, you have been selected to fill the interview questions and the information obtained from this interview question will be used only for research purposes and will be kept confidential.

II. General information

Interviewee code:

Name of organization:

Title/Position in office:

Gender:

Address:

Region:

City:

Woreda:

III. Interview Questions

1. What is an intelligence service? Explain your perception towards the concept?
2. How do you think about the development of intelligence service in Ethiopia?
3. Is there any real or perceived national security threat that necessitates intelligence service in the country? What are your views in this regard?
4. Under what reforms did the Ethiopian Intelligence institution passed since its establishment as a modern intelligence institution?
5. Describe the reforms made in the institution since 1991 with their unique feature?
6. Explain the contribution of the reforms in the professionalization of the intelligence service?
7. What was the perception of the employee towards reform and professionalization of the main tasks?
8. What are the achievements gained by the reform process since 1991? Explain them especially in promoting professionalism and its achievement so far?
9. How do you explain the prospects of reform in the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service in the short and long term towards professionalism?
10. What are the dynamics of intelligence service in Ethiopia, as part and parcel of enabling opportunity in the country?
11. Describe the role of government efforts to reform the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service?
12. What are the challenges of the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service to reform the institution?
13. Describe the independence, human rights, and transparency issue of the institution since 1991?