



**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY**  
**COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
**DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY**

**POLITICAL POWER, MORALITY AND JUSTICE: CRITIQUE**  
**OF THOMAS HOBBS' POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY**

**BY**

**EYASU DECHA**

**JULY, 2022**

**ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA**

**POLITICAL POWER, MORALITY AND JUSTICE: CRITIQUE OF  
THOMAS HOBBS' POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY**

**BY**

**EYASU DECHA**

**ADVISOR**

**KebaduMekonnen (PhD)**

**FasilMerawi (PhD)**

**A Thesis Submitted to the Department of Philosophy  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for  
the Degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy**

**July, 2022**

**Addis Ababa, Ethiopia**

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY**

**POLITICAL POWER, MORALITY AND JUSTICE: CRITIQUE OF  
THOMAS HOBBS' POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY**

**BY**

**EYASU DECHA**

**Approved by Board of Examiners**

_____	_____	_____
<b>Advisor</b>	<b>Signature</b>	<b>Date</b>
_____	_____	_____
<b>Examiner</b>	<b>Signature</b>	<b>Date</b>
_____	_____	_____
<b>Examiner</b>	<b>Signature</b>	<b>Date</b>

## **Acknowledgements**

First and foremost, would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my thesis advisors, Keadu Mekonnen (PhD) and Fasil Merawi (PhD) for their comments and useful suggestions. Secondly, I extend my tanks to Addis Ababa University philosophy department staff members. Especially, I would like to give my thanks to Biniyam Mekonen for his advices and encouragements. Lastly, I would like to thank my family and my peers; Mekasha Habtewold, Abdu Yimer, Eyob Amha, for their moral and intellectual support.

## Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .....	i
Table of Contents .....	ii
Abstract .....	1
Introduction.....	2
CHAPTER ONE .....	7
INTRODUCTION.....	7
1.1 Thomas Hobbes.....	7
1.2 Moral cognitivism .....	9
1.3 Non-cognitivism .....	11
CHAPTER TWO: HOBBS' MORAL PRESCRIPTIVISM AND LOCKE'S MORAL COGNITIVISM .....	14
INTRODUCTION.....	14
2.1 Hobbes' and Moral Prescriptivism .....	15
2.1.1 Moral Prescriptivism .....	19
2.2 Locke and Moral Cognitivism .....	22
2.2.1 Moral Cognitivism .....	24
CHAPTER THREE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS.....	31
INTRODUCTION.....	31
Conclusion .....	45
Reference .....	48

## **Abstract**

The purpose of this thesis is to present critiques of Thomas Hobbes' political philosophy, with a particular emphasis on the theoretical analysis of meta-ethical beliefs. He observed that morality and justice are the commands that a political power holder or a sovereign issue to the people of a commonwealth. These are the questions that I addressed in my thesis: what are the critical concepts that Hobbes discussed how they can serve as the foundation for his moral beliefs, and what the weaknesses of his arguments are. The thesis introduces the concepts of moral cognitivism and non-moral cognitivism. Furthermore, it necessitates a critical examination of Hobbes' and moral prescriptivism, as well as Locke's and moral cognitivism.

In the thesis, I conclude that Hobbes' belief in morality appears to be invalid because his assumptions about the state of nature, humans, natural law, the social contract, and the commonwealth are disconnected from some relevant grounds. The thesis contends that the natural origin of moral truth is. It also emphasizes that morality is a matter of the human conscience. As a result, it contends that morality is independent of the formation of a government. The thesis also recommends the agreement's necessity; that is, it is required for the establishment of a legitimate government as well as for a specific individual or social purpose. Regardless, no agreement should violate human rights or freedoms or contradict natural law.

**Key words:** Thomas Hobbes, Morality, Political Power, Justice, Moral Prescriptivism, Meta-ethics, Cognitivism, Non-cognitivism, State of Nature, Social Contract, Commonwealth, Sovereign, Natural Law.

## Introduction

The concepts Political power, morality, and justice are central issues in political and social and political philosophy. For example, political power is the primary factor in the identification, survival, and development of the establishment for society.<sup>1</sup>The necessity of political power is to promote stability and justice among society and individuals. However, what is its origin, how it should be exercised, and in what perspective does it promote justice and stability, answered in a different way. This is due to some people's assertion that God is the source of political authority. God designates a few chosen people to serve as kings or queens and rule the populace. Others claim that the popular convention is where political power first emerged.

The concept of justice, which directly affects how political authority is handled; it is another fundamental virtue of morality and political society. Its meaning in the history of political philosophy is contested because different philosophers have varied views on what constitutes justice. On the other hand, justice basically means treating people or groups of people impartially without infringing on their inalienable rights to freedom, identity, or individuality. Nonetheless, political power, justice, and morality are fundamental to political philosophy, and some philosophers may understand these concepts in similar ways.

We can bring Thomas Hobbes here. Hobbes' in his political philosophy had studied political power morality and justice in similar form. What is justice, political, and morality for him is the will of the sovereign.<sup>2</sup>As a result, I focus my analysis to Hobbes' philosophy's meta-ethical outlook. It may aid us in comprehending his ideas from the ground up. His moral concepts are compatible with a meta-ethical perspective. This means that his moral understanding is related to both moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism.

In this regard, his theory of empirical observation of natural law and materialistic moral comprehension, as well as geometric or scientific study of political philosophy, clearly places him on the path of moral cognitivism. As Hobbes' points out:

---

<sup>1</sup> Mehdi Shokri, "*A theory of political power and rights: A secret exchange for legitimacy*" ( PhD diss., University of Berlin, 2018), 10 &12.

<sup>2</sup> Grcic, J, " Hobbes and Rawls on political power" *Etica&Politica / Ethics & Politics*, IX, 2007, 2, pp. 371-392. [https://www2.units.it/etica/2007\\_2/GRCIC.pdf](https://www2.units.it/etica/2007_2/GRCIC.pdf).

And therefore so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war, private appetite is the measure of good and evil: and consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way or means of peace, which are justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of nature, are good; that is to say, moral virtues; and their contrary vices, evil. Now the science of virtue and vice is moral philosophy.<sup>3</sup>

Hobbes' moral theory is also classified as a type of non-cognitivism. At this point, the first logic is psychological egoism, which explains why humans are self-centered creatures. As a result, the very concept of morality is determined by individual emotions. The second reason is convention. Commentators who interpret Hobbes from a non-cognitivism perspective argue that Hobbes' clarified morality as a result of convention. To quote:

Hobbesian morality is conventional in the sense that it arises only after we consent to lay down a portion of our unlimited right of nature. In so consenting, we take on obligations and duties not to interfere with those to whom we relinquish our rights, thus moving from the moral state of nature into society and a common moral standard.<sup>4</sup>

The third reason is the prescription of moral standards by the sovereign. Warrender notes that “morality is created in a fundamental way by the sovereign and by the civil law enforced by his sanctions. In civil society, Hobbes’ gives to sovereign the right to determine. Through the civil, a system of morality is and to prescribe the religious doctrines which the citizens in to take as authentic”.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Thomas Hobbes. *Leviathan or Matter, Form, and Power of Commonwealth Ecclesiastical, and Civil*: (London, 1651), 98.

<sup>4</sup> Alex John London, “Virtue and Consequences: Hobbes on the Value of the Moral Virtues: *Social Theory and Practice*, spring 1998, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 1-23. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23559062>

<sup>5</sup> Howard Warrender. “Hobbes’s Conception of Morality: *Rivista Critica Di Storia Della Filosofia*, Ottobre Dicembre 1962, Vol. 17, No. 4, Pp. 434-449. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44021575>.

Hobbes' moral viewpoint can be classified as moral prescriptivism. It is a non-cognitive theory that regards moral sentences as commands issued by a sovereign power.

Civil law is to every subject those rules which the Commonwealth has commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of for the distinction of right and wrong; that is to say, of that is contrary and what is not contrary to the rule.<sup>6</sup>

For Hobbes' morality comes after the formation of social contract and the absolute power of the sovereign over the social contract. So, morality is the command that the sovereign recommend to the subjects in the commonwealth. As Hobbes' points out that "it is annexed to the sovereignty to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withal in speaking to multitudes of people".<sup>7</sup>

This Hobbes' view of morality encompasses different problem as various commentators point of view. Charles D. Tarlton in the article 'rehabilitating Hobbes: obligation, anti-fascism and the myth of a 'Taylor theses' provided an objection of Hobbes's analysis of morality and political power. He remarked that "Hobbes come to represent a moral, philosophical standard that had shifted from obligation to right and from law to power".<sup>8</sup> Here the point that Tarlton refuted Hobbes's view of morality is that why Hobbes' admits only obligation and power to declare morality and how he forgot natural undeniable liberty of individuals'. Tarlton suggested that without considering natural law it is impossible to do morality.

Jean Hampton also develops arguments against Hobbes' claim about absolute sovereignty. She argues that "Hobbes fails because he cannot prevent the success on his own premises of that other version of contract theory which follows Locke in regarding government as the

---

<sup>6</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 162.

<sup>7</sup> Hobbes', *Leveathan*, p. 109 & 110

<sup>8</sup> Charles D. Tarlton, "Rehabilitating Hobbes: Obligation, Anti-Fascism and the Myth of a 'Taylor Thesis': *History of Political Thought*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 407-438. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26217490>

accountable agent of those who "lend" it their power".<sup>9</sup> She argued that, Hobbes' denied rationality of human being that Aristotle and Locke recognize. Furthermore, she suggested that Hobbes failed to see division of power. Hampton finally claimed that "the institution and empowerment of the sovereign entails no "one-time social contract" but the resolution of "problems of co-ordination" through a series of self- interested agreements of individuals".<sup>10</sup>

Bailey Villarreal confronts Hobbes's theory of morality by denying his hypothesis of nature of human being. The way that Hobbes defined the nature of human being is provide great contribution to his moral belief. If his view of the nature of human being wrong, then Hobbes' could not come to his moral claim. Villarreal did this in the article 'critique of Hobbes' a state of nature'. He notes that:

Hobbes' never intended to prove a presumption of human nature, but to provide a counterfactual justification for the state apparatus and a stable existence within political society... And he compares human organs to basic mechanical components, is a literary device that does just that.<sup>11</sup>

If the nature of human being is opposite to what Hobbes' had defined, then there is no war of all against all, no one can will to surrender his right to the sovereign. Finally, the sovereign cannot recommend moral standards.

Similarly according to J. A. Thomas remarked that Hobbes' presupposition of the law of nature, the state of nature and human nature is false. Thomas argued that society has existed before the state, and the necessity of state is not to draw moral law. As he noted:

Society is older than the State; yet the State is necessary not so much to secure law and order as to provide an impartial definition of the individual's rights. For

---

<sup>9</sup>Uday Singh Mehta, *The Anxiety of Freedom: Imagination and Individuality in Locke's Political Thought*, (Cornell University press, 1992) 335.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 336

<sup>11</sup> Bailey D. Villarreal, "A Critique of Hobbes's State of Nature", *Philologia* 12, no. 1 (2020): pp. 20–24. <https://doi.org/10.21061/ph.229>

the pre-political, state is deficient in this respect that it makes no provision for an arbitrator to decide points of dispute as they arise within society.<sup>12</sup>

In the following chapters, I attempt to discuss meta-ethical account of Hobbes' moral philosophy, and validity in contrast to Locke's moral cognitivism and I try to demonstrate the critical responses to Hobbes' view. The focus of the thesis is to be on the meta-ethical underpinning Hobbes' philosophy and the objective is to provide critiques of Hobbes' claim of morality. This thesis is organized in three chapters. The first chapter introduces underlying philosophical issues and frames the debate. It offers detailed discussion of Hobbes' moral and political philosophy using the frame work of moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism. In the discussion I distinguish Hobbes' view of morality by identifying in which meta-ethical view his idea is situated.

The second chapter contrasts Hobbessian Moral Prescriptivism with Lockean Moral cognitivism. Firstly it deals with the critical discussion of Hobbes' ideas in relation to moral prescriptivism. Here I will try to give an overview of the central ideas of Hobbes' theoretical frame work; state of nature, the nature of human being, natural law, social contract and sovereign. Then I discuss moral prescriptivism. On top of that I also discuss Hobbes' meaning and presumption of morality related with moral prescriptivism. Secondly, the chapter deals with Locke and moral cognitivism. In this section Locke's idea of political philosophy and epistemology are precisely and shortly discussed, since they are indispensable for understanding Locke's morality. I will also critically discuss moral cognitivism and how Locke's moral view is matched with it.

The third and last chapter presents my critical analyses. It discusses two issues. First, strength and weakness of Hobbes moral philosophy, and second my ideas to overcome them. Concerning the solution, I will outline Kant's claim of morality. Kant's morality considers absolute law and the laws which purposely used in different circumstances.

---

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 191

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with Hobbes' moral and political philosophy in terms of moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism to find in which meta-ethical view does Hobbes ideas situated. Moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism are two fundamental meta-ethical theories, and they look at the source and soundness of moral judgments.

### 1.1 Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes' (1588-1679) was an influential modern empiricist English philosopher. He was materialist, which he gives credit to only material entities. For this reason he does not accept entities that are not subject to experience. Besides he was an atheist thinker. Hobbes' political views were expressed in 'Leviathan'. For him Leviathan is intended as a metaphor which takes a place of God. It's assumed to form powerful government, which governs all issues of humans in its totality as God governs the universe. He suggested that the cause of political and social damage is citizens' act of particular opinions and absence of powerful government.<sup>13</sup>

Many commentators of Hobbes' agree that the primary aim of the social contract for Hobbes' is securing peace. To do this, Hobbes' has used four essential hypotheses. Firstly, he stipulated the life of human being without commonwealth. He claimed that without commonwealth there is no morality, knowledge, industry and peace. Hence the state of nature identified with a state of constant war. Secondly, Hobbes' rejected of all norms and dogmas before the formation of commonwealth, and he claimed that there is no natural or moral law that obliges individuals. Individuals are at full liberty to do what they desire commensurate with their power. Hobbes' has claimed this as a natural liberty. Thirdly, because of the existence of constant war, life in the state of nature is brutal and horrible. In order to escape from this life everyone seeks peace for mutual preservation and benefit. This is possible only when everyone agrees based on their will. Fourthly, Hobbes' postulated the necessity of absolute power in order to protect the

---

<sup>13</sup> William R. Lund, "Hobbes on Opinion, Private Judgment and Civil War", *History of Political Thought*, Spring 1992, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 51-72, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26214189>.

commonwealth. According to his claim everyone is subject to that power and it is a primary duty and responsibility for everyone is to keep the promise. Then, what is morality, justice and other concepts has meaning in this case. For Hobbes' the concept morality has necessarily relation with formation of social contract.<sup>14</sup>

In Hobbes' philosophy, there is no distinction between morality and politics; or morality and law, because for him convention is a ground of both moral and political law. However his view of morality constitutes contradictory claims. The first claim is that his theory of morality is related with moral realist view, which means he believed in practical absolute legal and moral rule founded by the agreement of peoples".<sup>15</sup> In similar vein he is regarded as:

father of legal positivism –it is belief that whatever the legislator posit as law, no more and no less is law; one cannot go behind the command of legislator to question its reasonableness legislator expressed will is. ... It is a notion of the arbitrary; an institution of the will as opposed to something natural, discovered only intellect".<sup>16</sup>

Inversely, the second claim states that Hobbes' is a morally non-cognitivist-it is a view that stresses "moral judgments have non-cognitive aspects, and these aspects are fundamental to explaining the nature of moral agreement and disagreement".<sup>17</sup> The attitudes of peoples about moral values and the agreement of people's up on moral standards are the qualities of non-cognitivism. According to him to accept what is right and wrong moral standard, there must be an agreement and an authority which speaks the moral standard.

---

<sup>14</sup> George Duke, "Hobbes on Political Authority, Practical Reason and Truth": *Law and Philosophy*, September 2014, Vol. 33, No. 5 (September 2014), pp. 605-627. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24572399>

<sup>15</sup> J. A. Thomas, "Some Contemporary Critics of Thomas Hobbes", *Jun.*, 1929, No. 26 (Jun., 1929), pp. 185-191. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/254820>

<sup>16</sup> Quoted in Mark R. MacGuigan, "Law, Morals, and Positivism," *The University of Toronto Law Journal*, 1961, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1961), pp. 1-28. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/825383>

<sup>17</sup> Quoted in Gunnar Björnsson, "Disagreement, correctness, and the evidence for meta-ethical absolutism," <https://philarchive.org/archive/BJRDCAv3>

Law is a command, and a command consisteth in declaration or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth, by voice, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may understand that the command of the Commonwealth is law only to those that have means to take notice of it.<sup>18</sup>

These two distinct claims of Hobbes' about morality take us to discuss moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Now let me discuss the essence of moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism in the Hobbesian understanding of such claims.

## 1.2 Moral cognitivism

Moral cognitivism is a meta-ethical view, which emphasizes the existence of moral truth. It "holds that there is an appropriate cognitive mode—the counterpart of perception with respect to perceptual knowledge—with regard to knowledge of moral matters, and the concession that we know how to distinguish right from wrong requires a theory of our sources of moral cognition".<sup>19</sup> Moral cognitivism can be divided as naturalism and intuitionism.

Naturalism is a variant of cognitivism based on a belief that focuses only on practical truth. This approach holds abstract and ideal subjectas meaningless. According to this belief, moral knowledge is expressed empirically. Furthermore naturalism insists that moral judgments are the same with natural properties, and can be the result of cognitive access to the facts that make them true due to the natural state of things. What is true and acceptable according to naturalism is the principle of the natural sciences.

Some naturalists like John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, and Sidney Hook claim that there can be practical verification for moral truth. According to Dewey, "moral judgments are statements of fact, whether true or false, and which can be empirically verified in much the same way as scientific statements".<sup>20</sup> Similarly, Sidney Hook, an American naturalistic thinker and pragmatist, states that "all human knowledge's scientific knowledge, and again he states that scientific knowledge consists of knowledge of politics, science, morality, and others.

---

<sup>18</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 166

<sup>19</sup> Joseph Margolis, "Moral Cognitivism": *Ethics*, Jan., 1975, Vol. 85, No. 2 (Jan., 1975), pp. 136-141. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2379928>.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*

In similar account, the Hobbesian idea of morality is situated in the naturalist variant of cognitivism, which means Hobbes' considers his view of morality and politics on a par with an empirical point of view.<sup>21</sup> For Hobbes' the only real things are things that existed materially and are subject to experience. He applied mechanistic method in his philosophy, a method that describes everything in terms of a causal connection with a material object. This mechanism is determined by motion, and he claims that everything man, beast, plant, mineral-is essentially motion; sensation, imagination, and understanding are all to be explained terms of motion.<sup>22</sup>

For Hobbes' everything-man, beast, plant, mineral-is essentially motion; sensation, imagination, and understanding are all to be explained terms of motion.' Even reason is nothing but computation, that is, subtracting, and thus all reasoning is reducible to the operations arithmetic. In such a universe happiness in man consists not in repose continually progresses of the desire, from one object from one object to another. Most basic inclinations in man is a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceased only in death.<sup>23</sup>

Another trace of naturalistic cognitivism in Hobbes' ideas is that just as like mainstream naturalist, Hobbes' denied abstract and supernatural or non-natural entities.<sup>24</sup> So, he rejects entities that are not reducible to material form or things that do not submit to ordinary human experience.

The second variant of moral cognitivism is intuitionism. It is a belief that morality is absolute or objective and can be apperceived innately.<sup>25</sup> Intuitionist underlines that there are actions and

---

<sup>21</sup> Howard Warrender, "Hobbes's Conception of Morality: *Rivista Critica Di Storia Della Filosofia*, Ottobre Dicembre 1962, Vol. 17, No. 4, Pp. 434-449. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44021575>.

<sup>22</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 51

<sup>23</sup> Mark R. MacGuigan, "Law, Morals, and Positivism: *The University of Toronto Law Journal*, 1961, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1961), pp. 1-28. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/825383>.

<sup>24</sup> Benjamin Milner, "Hobbes: On Religion," *Political Theory*, Aug., 1988, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Aug., 1988), pp. 400-425. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/191579>.

<sup>25</sup> Joshua Koloski, "Ethical Intuitionism: The Meaning of Meaning," (Senior thesis. Brandeis University, 2016), 4.

behaviors that are right or wrong in and itself. Furthermore, moral intuitionists “maintains that we have a distinct faculty (a so-called non-natural, because no sense or no sentient, faculty) adjusted to the no propositional "I-ing" of the relevant valuation attribute”<sup>26</sup>. Intuitionist view of moral judgments accepts the view that moral judgments depend on ideal judgments. This means that moral judgments are true or false in it; but it didn't require any convention or external influence, and analysis.

For instance, we can take G.E. Moore's definition of good. For Moore the concept good is not reducible to natural properties and it is not analyzable. It is defined as it is. Because the concept better has simple quality, it is self-evident. Similarly, moral standards are self-evident and have simple qualities. Therefore moral standards and judgments are non-natural.<sup>27</sup> Hobbes' conception of morality does not draw from the intuitionist interpretation of moral cognitivism, because he denies the existence of non-corporeal entities.

### **1.3 Non-cognitivism**

Non-cognitivism is a meta-ethical view that stipulates truth value of the statement based on personal opinion or emotion, and it denies cognitivists claim of objective moral judgment. According to the non-cognitivist, moral knowledge is impossible, because there is no independent judgment on it. “When one states, for example, that the ‘King of Mars is good’, this is either true or false, and the truth or falsity is independent of our opinions and emotions as such”.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, non-cognitivist moral values can be interpreted based on the belief of certain norm.<sup>29</sup> And also the agreement of people in a certain moral issue determines non-cognitivist moral theory. In short, according to non-cognitivism, moral judgment depends on personal feeling, relative to certain norms and conventions.

---

<sup>26</sup> Ibid

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p .5.

<sup>28</sup> Angelo Nicolaidis, “Bertrand Russell Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism and Ethical Critical Thinking,” *Phronimon* Volume 18 | 2017 | pp. 114. <http://doi.org/10.17159/24133086/2017/1953>.

<sup>29</sup> Wolfgang Ertl, “Cognitivism and Non Cognitivism in Contemporary Meta ethics. An Outline”, <http://www.flet.keio.ac.jp/~w.ertl/files/Cognitivism%20and%20Non%20Cog.doc>.

Non-cognitivism incorporates two distinct views in interpreting moral judgments.<sup>30</sup>The first view is emotivism- “it sees a normative sentence as one which expresses a writer’s emotion, such as Whew”<sup>31</sup> and it also denies common existence of moral truth. For instance; emotivism holds “that the primary function of ‘x is good’ is to express a positive emotion or attitude (not a belief) that the speaker has about x. Thus, ‘x is good’ is like, ‘Hooray for x!’ When one says, ‘Pleasure is good’, one is not asserting that one has this feeling; one is just “expressing the feeling”<sup>32</sup>. In this case, Hobbes’ stipulation of the state of nature seems right. Because according to him in state nature everyone has his own desires and feeling, and there is no acceptable true.

State of nature has no moral value. It is defined as the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself. For the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything, which in his own judgment and reason.<sup>33</sup>

For Hobbes’ the state of nature (individualistic life) causes a disorder in life, because of everyone has directed by his own emotion. To accept something as good or evil, there is a necessity of general standard. He remarks that “general standards come into being governing universal preferences in addition to the totally personal judgments of good and evil”.<sup>34</sup>Governing general standard rests on the formation of social contract.

Social contract is the act of giving up certain natural rights and transferring them to someone else, on the condition that everyone else involved in making the contract also simultaneously gives up their rights. People agreed to the contract to retain only those rights over others that they are content for everyone else to retain over them.<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup>Ibid

<sup>31</sup> Ibid

<sup>32</sup>Michael Huemer, *Ethical Intuitionism*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 17.

<sup>33</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 78.

<sup>34</sup> C. W. Maris, *Critique of the Empiricist Explanation of Morality*, (Springer Science Business Media Dordrecht, 1981) 127.

<sup>35</sup> Hobbes 1651, p. 69

The social contract was governed by one person and the will and emotions of many individuals are generalized by the rules of the social contract. Thus, what is good or evil, what is justice and injustice are interpreted universally. That is keeping promise or covenant in commonwealth.<sup>36</sup> Having this in mind about emotivism, it is time to see the second trace of non-cognitivism. This trace is moral prescriptivism and it is bearing with Hobbes idea of morality and politics. Moral prescriptivism asserts that moral judgments have logical imperatives, and “for the prescriptivist a normative sentence is used for unreserved principle prescriptions which may be universalized. “Thou shalt not kill” would be an example of this notion”.<sup>37</sup> You shall not break promises or you shall keep promises would be also an example in case of Hobbes’.

In short, this chapter aimed to discuss Hobbes’ idea based on cognitivism and non-cognitivism, and it attempted to show that in which view do Hobbes argument situated. Although, different scholars interpret Hobbes’s ideas in different perspectives, the idea of Hobbes’ must be situated in prescriptivism view. The reasons to this are Hobbes’ Psychological egoistic account of human nature, convention and the necessity of power of the sovereign to prescribe standards. But there is something puzzling in Hobbes view of morality. That is, as discussed above, Hobbes’ theory of morality draw with both naturalistic cognitive view and draw with prescriptivist non-cognitivism. Again the related confusions of Hobbes idea can be also discussed in Locke’s philosophy. The next chapter of the thesis focuses on Locke’s view.

---

<sup>36</sup> Barbara Herman, *“Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, ed., (Harvard University Press, 2000) 96*

<sup>37</sup> Angelo Nicolaidis, “Bertrand Russell Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism and Ethical Critical Thinking,” *Phronimon* Volume 18 | 2017 pp. 114. <http://doi.org/10.17159/24133086/2017/193>

# **CHAPTER TWO: HOBBS' MORAL PRESCRIPTIVISM AND LOCKE'S MORAL COGNITIVISM**

## **INTRODUCTION**

The philosophical ideas of Hobbes' and Locke differ on many issues. Even if both accepted the essentiality of social contract for the formation of the state, their ground is strictly different. Hobbes' begins his discussion from a materialist view, whereas the premises of Locke's argument drafted from idealistic view. He rejected non-corporeal entities, while Locke recognized the validity of abstract things.

What is more, in case of political philosophy also their arguments differ from one other. For instance, Hobbes' in his political philosophy hypothesized that man lived pre-social and pre-political life before the formation of government, and this life is a life of cruelty and constant war; because of competition for property, desire for glory and honor. In contrast, Locke stated that before the formation of government, human beings live a recognizable social life and the law of nature has authority to control and govern man's behavior which permits the operation of natural rights including the right to property. For Locke, a man can own labor of his body and a work of his hand as private property. In the case of natural resources and land, all individuals have an equal right to use. This right is granted equally to all human beings. Additionally, life before the formation of government was decent.

Concerning morality, Hobbes' idea's was situated in moral prescriptivism-which holds that moral judgments are right or wrong, or good or bad as a result of the convention and based on the standard that the sovereign prescribes to the subjects through coercion. This view is quite different from Locke's cognitive view, because the Lockean understanding denies the legitimacy of the absolute prescription of moral principles by one single person or government.

In this chapter I continue my discussion by narrating the conflicting views held by Hobbes' and Locke. Firstly, I try to discuss Hobbes' and moral prescriptivism, and then I proceed to discuss Locke and moral cognitivism.

## 2.1 Hobbes' and Moral Prescriptivism

As I tried to show in the introduction of the first chapter; for Hobbes' any knowledge, including moral truths are the results of social contract. I discuss the basic tenets of Hobbes' moral and political theory ranging from how the social contract is formed, and what motivates individuals to enter in to social pact, how social contract is governed and how convention could be the foundation of morality and what is life before social contract.

Various commentators have taken Hobbes' as contractarianist; it is the act by which individual's surrender their will, freedom, and right to sovereign to create common wealth.<sup>38</sup> According to him individuals do agree with government by transferring all their liberties to the sovereign.<sup>39</sup> Once the individuals had surrendered all their rights to sovereign, they have no right and opportunity to regain, because every action and law are determined by the will of the sovereign, and the sovereign does not allow any activities which cause problems in the power of the sovereign.

... if he that attempteth to depose his sovereign be killed or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being, by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall do; and because it is injustice for a man to do anything for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title unjust.<sup>40</sup>

Hobbes' hypothesized that before the formation of the social contract human beings live in individualistic life. Everything determined by individuals' desire and emotions. According to Hobbes' claim, by nature, human beings are selfish/ egoistic. He developed the nature of human beings based on psychological egoism. It is a view which emphasizes that everybody is ultimately motivated by one's own exclusive self-interest or human action principally motivated

---

<sup>38</sup>Da Rosa Ribeiro, André Gustavo, "A Hobbes Theory of Justice" (PhD diss., University of Konstanz, 2019), 8.

<sup>39</sup> Charles D. Tarlton, "Rehabilitating Hobbes: Obligation, Anti-Fascism and the Myth of a 'Taylor Thesis': *History of Political Thought*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 407-438. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26217490>

<sup>40</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 107.

by self-interest. Because of this reason no one cares about the feeling of others, and their actions and behavior are governed not by reason, but by emotions and desires.

Moreover, Hobbes' stated human beings always focus on his own interest, and live solitary life; because he discounted the importance of family and personal attachments within the confines of the individual's self-interested ends). Nothing in the postulation of the state of nature says that individuals can't have family ties or forge valuable alliances. These can be analyzed within the remit of morality. Since everyone is rational; everybody is capable of reasoning, using personal ability and power to attack or kill enemies and to achieve his ends. Here Hobbes' recognizes the rationality of man. By rationality here it means goal oriented, having the ability to discern one's ends and follow the means to achieve them. The rationality of man here is not justified by a logical decision of issues; rather expressed by using power. So, in this condition nothing can be evaluated as good or bad and right or wrong.

For Hobbes' this human behavior is active in the state of nature. As I discussed above, it is hypothetical position that a human being lives without any civil law or government or society. Man is naturally not a social animal, because there is no common value and common rules. If there is no common value and common principle, it is impossible to say that human being is naturally social animal.<sup>41</sup>

Hobbes' recognized the equality and liberty of individuals in the stipulation of the state of nature. Everybody has equal competition for the property, the equal desire of power and honor of all individuals, and these are the cause of quarrel.<sup>42</sup>For Hobbes' "in a state of nature power is used as an instrument that each individual uses to do what he want and to preserve his life. For this reason all individuals have power and wants to influence... power in human level could be regarded an effective cause of the apparent good one seek".<sup>43</sup> By using the power, everyone can do everything, because in a state of nature or in natural condition man has unlimited liberty.

---

<sup>41</sup> Leo Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy and Other Studies*: (university of Chicago press, London, 1959), 407

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 77

<sup>43</sup>James H. Read, "Thomas Hobbes: Power in state of nature, power in civil society," *Polity*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (summer, 1991), pp. 505-525. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3235060>

According to Hobbes' this unlimited liberty of human beings leads to conflict, because there is high competition for private property and the pursuit of honor.

Whatsoever, therefore, is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.<sup>44</sup>

For Hobbes' the concept morality is related to the formation of the social contract. The primary purpose of social contract, according to him is to impose or to create obligations for human beings. This obligation limits an individual's desire. So, according to him morality is interpreted as prescribing common obligation or general standard for the people by the sovereign.

Now, let me proceed to discuss what the social contract is according to Hobbes' and how contract could be the foundation of morality.

The concept of social contract for Hobbes' is the base of his claim of morality and legal theory. According to him social contract is formed voluntarily transferring or surrendering all freedom and rights to one authority by agreement.<sup>45</sup> It is the act of giving up certain natural rights and transferring them to sovereign power. This transferring or surrendering freedom to the sovereign forbids people from any questions and oppositions of state. As Hobbes' stated "people agreed to the contract to retain only those rights over others that they are content for everyone else to retain them".<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 78

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 81

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 69

Through this agreement people make Commonwealth. It is a multitude of people who together consent to a sovereign authority, surrendered all rights to sovereign. Commonwealth could be used broadly to refer to any civil state or to refer only to representative government. He describes commonwealth as an ‘artificial person’ and as a body of politic that mimics (copies) the natural human body. For him artificial man is more structured and strengthened than a natural man, because the natural man is isolated from society by nature, whereas artificial man is related to society by covenant.

According to Hobbes’ sovereign is the master of the commonwealth, and the “Sovereign is the person, endowed with sovereignty by the social contract; and is the head of the Leviathan, the maker of laws, the judge of first principles, the foundation of all knowledge, and the defender of civil peace”.<sup>47</sup> This sovereign is despotic because within the covenant, everyone must confer power on one man or assembly.<sup>48</sup> Since everyone surrenders all of his or her freedom and desire to the sovereign, there is no more demonstration, rebellion, criticism and the right to political revolution, because as Russell noted “criticizing the government and demonstration of government is the cause of social disorder and quarrel”<sup>49</sup>, moreover opposition to the sovereign causes destruction of universal truth.

According to Hobbes' the sole judge and jury of individual’s action in the commonwealth is the sovereign. Of course for Hobbes, morality is emanating from the will of the sovereign. As Grcic stressed that the sovereign is the only foundation of civil law; and what is good for bad for Hobbes’ is the will of the sovereign.<sup>50</sup> The sovereign evaluates the actions of the human based on the agreement that the person’s made. Again Gauthier remarked “the sovereign makes morality, understood as a constraint on each person's endeavor to maximize his own utility and ... the sovereign is the perfect instrument of his subjects, acting only in their interests, yet each would expect to do better if all would adhere voluntarily to their agreements”.<sup>51</sup> The sovereign

---

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 165 & 167

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 556

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 560

<sup>50</sup> Joseph Grcic, “Hobbes and Rawls on Political Power,” *Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics*, IX, 2007, 2, pp. 371-392, [https://www.openstarts.units.it/bitstream/10077/5284/1/Grcic\\_E%26P\\_IX\\_2007\\_2.pdf](https://www.openstarts.units.it/bitstream/10077/5284/1/Grcic_E%26P_IX_2007_2.pdf)

<sup>51</sup> David P. Gauthier, *Moral by Agreement*, (Oxford University Press, UK, 1986), 164.

has an absolute power as well as responsibility “to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another's, what's just, what unjust, what honest, what dis- honest, what good, what evil”.<sup>52</sup>

If I express this much about Hobbes' idea concerning the nature of human beings, state of nature, the social contract and commonwealth, now I directly proceed to discuss moral prescriptivism, which is an important topic and has direct relation with Hobbes moral claim according to various thinkers. So I discuss how Hobbes' claims matched with moral prescriptivism after present's brief introduction of moral prescriptivism.

### **2.1.1 Moral Prescriptivism**

As I have tried to discuss in chapter one, moral prescriptivism is a non-cognitive meta-ethical belief. Its claim concerning morality is distanced from emotivism, quasi realism and all (naturalism, realism, relativism and intuitionism) theories of moral cognitivism. Prescriptivism defends the notion that a moral judgment entails imperatives or obligation and emphasizes the consistency use moral language to guide behavior by telling what ought to do.<sup>53</sup> At this segment, for Hobbes language is a fundamental thing to make decision through using speech. As he stated:

But the most noble and profitable invention of all other was that of speech, consisting of names or appellations, and their connexion; whereby men register their thoughts, recall them when they are past, and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation; without which there had been amongst men neither Commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves.<sup>54</sup>

Furthermore, Hobbes' outlined that speech helps us to express our thought, feeling and gives order for others.

---

<sup>52</sup> Hobbes De Cive VI.9

<sup>53</sup> Ratib Jubair Deeb. “Meta ethics: Descriptivism, Emotivism & Prescriptivism.” [https://journals.seagullpublications.com/ijeer/assets/paper/IJ0520192866/f\\_IJ0520192866.pdf](https://journals.seagullpublications.com/ijeer/assets/paper/IJ0520192866/f_IJ0520192866.pdf)

<sup>54</sup> Hobbes 1651., p. 19

The general use of speech is to transfer our mental discourse into verbal, or the train of our thoughts into a train of words, and that for two commodities; whereof one is the registering of the consequences of our thoughts, which being apt to slip out of our memory and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names is to serve for marks or notes of remembrance. Another is when many use the same words to signify, by their connexion and order one to another, what they conceive or think of each matter; and also what they desire, fear, or have any other passion for.<sup>55</sup>

So for Hobbes' "speech is important for the eventual movement out of the state of nature, and the foundations for how man finds himself entering the commonwealth".<sup>56</sup>This means that moral rule and other legal principles formed because of the prescription or speech of the sovereign.

According to Hobbes' stipulation the moral standard that the sovereign prescribe is absolute and that is possible merely by the agreement of the people. But that would be impossible in the state of nature, because prior to the creation of the commonwealth individuals retain their own rights and feelings. As Hobbes' stated:

Differences of opinion, which prevent cooperation or a natural union of men, seem inevitable: men's passions and inclinations are diverse, stemming from their different "constitutions," and "good and evil are names given to things to signify the inclination or aversion of them, by whom they were given". Differences of opinion, moreover, quite apart from competition over material goods, produce conflicts as a consequence of certain psychological mechanisms connected with the pleasure attached to honor.<sup>57</sup>

So in order to prescribe universal truth; two things are necessary according to Hobbes'. The first one is convention. For Hobbes' convention is a foundation of every man made truth. It is a voluntarily surrendering as well as submitting of personal rights to the sovereign for mutual protection. Since the individuals make covenant based on their will, they are not inclined to

---

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p.20

<sup>56</sup> Ibid

<sup>57</sup> Thomas Hobbes, De Cive XVII.27

violate the common principle. Rather everybody obliged to keep the promise. Here in this case, there is general standard or obligation that all peoples accept the standard out of personal desire. According to Hobbes' this general standard come into being governing universal preferences in addition to the totally personal judgments of good and evil.<sup>58</sup>

The second one is the power of the sovereign- Hobbes' argued that the sovereign has an absolute power in the commonwealth, and it frames and governs universal preferences and total personal judgments.

Talk of just and unjust, right and wrong, duty and obligation, natural right and natural law, good and bad, merit and due, flows freely from his pen. He carefully distinguishes between just men and just actions, insists that "the laws of nature are immutable and eternal, and discourses at length on the duties and obligations of sovereigns'.<sup>59</sup>

Here the sovereign power is an essential thing to prescribe into law. Because according to Hobbes' political power is proceeds to morality. Hence, what is moral is the standard that the power holder commands.

Hobbes's view of moral prescriptivism distanced from Hare's view of prescriptivism. Hare was a contemporary English moral philosopher and an introducer of moral prescriptivism. His claim of prescriptivism attempts to demonstrate the rationality of moral thought, which the exoticism had virtually ignored. Hare figures prescriptivism in two means, namely; imperative and value judgment. Imperative meaning refers that morality is simply a command that tell what to do.<sup>60</sup> Consider, for instance; 'do not harm innocent people'. We accept this command as it is. Value judgment refers, offering some guidance and advice to the people for future good. Consider, for example; you ought to do this, but you ought not to do that. Hare denies Hobbes's view of using power to recommend moral truth. As Hare remarked:

---

<sup>58</sup> C. A. Maris, *Critique of the Empiricist Explanation of Morality*, (Springer Science Business Media Dordrecht, 1931), 27

<sup>59</sup> Don Herzog, "Hobbes's Prescriptive Arguments," *Without Foundation*, (Cornell University Press, 1986), 31. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt207g6t3.5>

<sup>60</sup> H. M. Hare, *Languages of Morals*: (Oxford University Press, 1952), 3

And there is no more reason for saying that commands are attempts to persuade or get someone to do something; here, too, we first tell someone what he is to do, and then, if he is not disposed to do what we say, we may start on the wholly different process of trying to get him to do it.<sup>61</sup>

Hare recognizes the universality of moral commands and values, unlike Hobbes' view of the universality of morality; it is not framed in absolute political power, instead on logical consistency of reason.

## 2.2 Locke and Moral Cognitivism

John Locke (1632-1704) was another influential modern political philosopher. He developed “arguments about freedom of conscience and belief, the relations between religion and politics, the nature of property, the family, consent, majority rule, resistance, and the foundations of political legitimacy”.<sup>62</sup> Locke's argument concerning politics and morality could be taken as the anti- thesis of Thomas Hobbes' moral and political thought. Before directly discussing Locke's view of morality, I want to give a brief overview of Locke's political philosophy and epistemology.

Like Hobbes', Locke is a proponent social contract theorist in history of political philosophy. Conversely Locke's view differs fundamentally from that of Hobbes'. Locke's political view basically expressed in his book “Two treatises of the government”. In the first treatises Locke “criticizes the doctrine of hereditary political power”.<sup>63</sup> Whereas in the Second *Treatise of the Government* Locke “gives his own account of the state of nature, the social contract and system of government”.<sup>64</sup> In the two treatise of the government Locke developed a “doctrine that all

---

<sup>61</sup> Ibid

<sup>62</sup> John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration*, Rethinking the Western Tradition, ed. Locke Ian Shapiro, (New Haven and London: Yale University, 2003), ix

<sup>63</sup> Bertrand Russell, *The History of Western Philosophy* (Manufactured in the United States of America by American book Stratford Press, 1945 ), 623

<sup>64</sup> Anthony Kenny, *An illustrated brief history of western philosophy*, (3<sup>rd</sup> volume) (BlackWell Publishing Ltd, 1998), 226

legitimate political authority is rooted in the consent of the governed”.<sup>65</sup>His doctrine of legitimate political authority opposes political absolutism.

Unlike Hobbes, Locke claims that the state of nature characterized by “men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them”.<sup>66</sup>According to Locke, in the state of nature all humans are equal and governed by natural law. In Kenny’s reading of Locke’s view in the state of nature “humans are aware of natural law which teaches that all men are equal and independent, that no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possession”.<sup>67</sup>

Contrary to Hobbes’, Locke maintains that the law of nature is a declaration of God's will and a standard of moral judgments. And it “consists of divine commands and it is not imposed by any human legislator”.<sup>68</sup>Moreover the law of nature is the foundation of all other laws such as political, religious, moral laws. It existed before any civil laws and limits the amount of private property that individuals can rightfully possess.<sup>69</sup>When someone violates someone’s freedom, then natural law has sufficient power to punish violators.<sup>70</sup>Because there is the law of nature to govern it and which obliged everyone.

In addition, unlike Hobbes’ for Locke the law of nature consists both rights and obligations. Since it governs the state of nature, it guarantees rights like; the right to life, liberty, and the right to possess one’s individual property. The obligation of natural laws is such that no one ought to harm others and that each individual has an obligation to preserve her own life. These rights and duties of natural law are similar everywhere in and across time.

In contrast to Hobbes’ for Locke the essentiality of social contract is not to deny and replace natural law by artificial principle, but instead to protect and guarantee the natural rights possessed

---

<sup>65</sup> Ibid

<sup>66</sup> Russell Ibid 625

<sup>67</sup> Ibid

<sup>68</sup> Ibid

<sup>69</sup> E. Clinton Gardner, “John Locke: Justice and the Social Compact,” *Journal of Law and Religion* , 1992, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1992), pp. 347-371, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1051205>

<sup>70</sup> Ibid

by all human beings. With regard to this the contract is not between the ruler and the ruled but between free and equal individuals who do not surrender or transfer their natural freedom to other person or sovereign by agreement. According to Locke the social contract preserves the individuals' equal right and freedom, including the rulers.

Unlike Hobbes,' Locke argued that whoever attempts to gain absolute power over others puts himself at war with others, because according to Locke exercising absolute power over others violates the law of nature and no one has authority to prescribe and impose obligation up on subjects what they ought and ought not to do.

Locke's study of epistemology also offers a crucial perspective to understand his view of morality. Locke subscribes to empiricism, an epistemic conception which asserts that knowledge is acquired through experience and experiments. Even though Locke admits the source of knowledge is experience, the fundamental notion of knowledge is 'idea'. It is an immaterial element which cannot be perceived practically.<sup>71</sup> In this juncture also Locke contrasted with Hobbes' outlook of knowledge, because Hobbes' denies immaterial notion of knowledge. Whereas Locke had recognizes the immaterial notion of ideas as the foundation of moral knowledge.

### **2.2.1 Moral Cognitivism**

Locke's moral persuasion is situated in moral cognitivism. It is a view that "holds that there is an appropriate cognitive mode—the counterpart of perception with respect to perceptual knowledge—with regard to knowledge of moral matters".<sup>72</sup> The concern that we know how to distinguish good from bad and right from wrong requires a theory of our sources of moral cognition. Moral cognitivism figures either as naturalism or non-naturalism (or intuitionism). These two contrasting moral cognitivist theories employ distinct approaches at the truth value of the moral judgments.

---

<sup>71</sup>Refat-E-Rubaia, "Locke's Theory of Ideas: A Critical Exposition", *Philosophy and Progress: Vols. LXI-LXII*, January-June, July-December, 2017. <https://doi.org/10.3329/pp.v61i1-2.44206>

<sup>72</sup> Joseph Margolis "Moral Cognitivism", 136.

Moral naturalism has it that moral judgment has objective value and it is studied empirically as like as natural science. It is “a project explaining all that moral values can be in terms of sensibility and showing how that is sufficient for full-ordered morality”.<sup>73</sup> Similarly, David Coop remarked:

Moral naturalism holds that in thinking of things as morally right or wrong, good or bad; we ascribe moral properties to these things – properties such as moral rightness and wrongness, goodness and evil. It holds that there are such properties, and it adds that these properties are ordinary garden-variety natural properties – properties that have the same basic metaphysical and epistemological status as the properties a tree can have of being deciduous.<sup>74</sup>

According to the naturalist view moral truth should be existed in empirical form, in order to judge good or evil and right or wrong. Naturalists also argue that moral properties are identical with natural properties.<sup>75</sup> How could moral properties be identical with natural properties? Moral naturalists defend this question by using three theories.

The first theory that naturalist posit is non-eliminative reductionism; it is a theory of moral naturalism states that the internal perspective (features of the mind, such as perception, thinking, judgments, language) is reducible to a physical state.

The second theory that naturalists use to justify the oneness of moral principles and natural properties are analytical functionalism; it supports a claim that an object is determined by its function. Phelan and Buckwalter remark functionalism as following.

According to functionalism, a belief, intention, emotion, pain, or any other mental state is a mental state because it has a certain function or plays a certain role within a cognitive system. Functionalist theories typically define mental states in

---

<sup>73</sup>Jon Jacobs, “*naturalism*”, <https://iep.utm.edu/naturali/#SH3a>.

<sup>74</sup>David Coop, “*Varieties of Moral Naturalism*,” 13 (2-supplement):280-295, oct 2012, 10.4013/fsu.2012.132(suppl).05

<sup>75</sup> David Coop, “*Varieties of Moral Naturalism*,” 13 (2-supplement):280-295, oct 2012, 10.4013/fsu.2012.132(suppl).05

terms of the relations they bear to sensory impingements upon the body, other mental states, and behavioral out.<sup>76</sup>

The third theory that moral naturalist used to proof the similarity of moral and natural properties is Cornell realism; it is a non-reductionist cognitive view which holdsthat ethical properties are themselves natural. It claims that “ethical statements are semantically meaningful and have ontological commitments of their own”.<sup>77</sup> Cornell realism theory critically discussed by Nicholas Sturgeon in the book ‘Moral Explanations.’ Again Oliveira and Perrine quoted Sturgeon’s view in the article ‘Cornell Realism, Explanation, and Natural Properties’.

Naturalism is in one clear sense a ‘reductionist’ doctrine of course, for it holds that moral facts are nothing but natural facts. What I deny, however, is that from this metaphysical doctrine about what sorts of facts moral facts are, anything follows about the possibility of reduction in another sense... more familiar from the philosophical literature: that is, about whether moral expressions can be given reductive definitions in some distinctive non-moral vocabulary, in which any moral explanations could then be recast.<sup>78</sup>

According to Cornell realist, even though moral facts cannot be reduced to natural properties; but they have natural qualities in themselves. This is because” ethical properties are natural properties since they play roles in what we will call legitimate and valuable explanations.”<sup>79</sup> For example, we take a moral property like rightness; it cannot be reducible to natural properties, and yet it becomes natural properties by a successful role in the explanation.

---

<sup>76</sup> Mark Phelan and Wesley Buckwalter, “Analytic Functionalism and Mental State Attribution,” *Philosophical Topics*, fall 2012, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 129-154. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43932977>

<sup>77</sup> Luis R.G. Oliveira and Timothy Perrine, “Cornell Realism, Explanation, and Natural Properties,” *European Journal of Philosophy*, 25:4ISSN0966 8373pp.1021 1038, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ejop.12282>

<sup>78</sup> Ibid

<sup>79</sup> Ibid

Here the major point in discussing naturalism is that it is indispensable for interpreting Locke's moral theory. Now I try to show what Locke's moral claim looks like based on moral naturalism. In order to do this, let me discuss what knowledge is for Locke in a nutshell, because for him morality is one part of knowledge.

As I have tried to discuss above for Locke knowledge is a perceived 'idea' in the mind. He distinguished moral knowledge from other empirical science. Hence, moral knowledge is immaterial and cannot be perceived physically.<sup>80</sup> They are perceived immediately in mind and they didn't require any proof and inference, because they are closed questions and they are self-evident.<sup>81</sup> On account of this, we can conclude that Locke's moral view is not considering the view of moral naturalism.

Rather, Locke's moral claim grounded on moral intuitionism or non-naturalism. It is a view that we arrive at moral knowledge immediately, without adding or requiring any further proof. In case of Locke, intuitionism could be knowledge "when the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement ideas immediately, without any intermediate evidences".<sup>82</sup> The following statements can be taken as an example of intuitive knowledge and their truth value is evaluated intrinsically.  $4+1=5$ ,  $5>2$ , white is not black, triangle is not circle, killing innocent person is wrong, telling truth is right, etc.

From Locke's claim of morality, we can identify four critiques against Hobbes' moral claim. Firstly, intuitionism moral claim. Intuitionist claim of morality contrasted with Hobbes' moral prescriptivism. One, moral knowledge of intuitionist is non-inferential, which means that one can understand morality without inferring others. In this sense there is no need of a sovereign authority to prescribe moral standard to others. Two, intuitionist view of morality denies conventional account of truth.

---

<sup>80</sup>Peter P. Cvek, "John Locke on the Relationship between God and Morality," *Ultimate Reality and Meaning* September-December 2012, Vol. 35, No. 3-4, pp. 260-285. <https://utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/uram.35.3-4.260>

<sup>81</sup> S. Jeff, *Moore on the simplicity and Indefinability of Goodness*, (The University of Indiana Press, 2007) 23

<sup>82</sup> John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, (Prometheus Books, 1995), 389

Secondly contrary to Hobbes' for Locke natural law is a foundation of moral obligation. Locke infers that the real origin of every moral and natural law is God.<sup>83</sup> Moral principles and obligation cannot be declared by anyone, and acting moralis not always dictated by the fear of punishment, because in the first place no one has power to draft moral standard whether in government or without government. Cvek states:

No one can oblige or bind us to anything, unless he has right and power over us, so that when he commands us, "he only makes use of his right" (Essays 181–83). In order to connect the ideas of being commanded by God and being obliged to obey, we must begin with the idea of authority.<sup>84</sup>

And secondly morality is used as rational appreciation of what is right and wrong. Mehta remarked that all obligations binds conscience and lays a bond on the mind itself. Hence, that a rational apprehension of what is right, puts us under an obligation, but not fear of punishment.<sup>85</sup> Thirdly, contrary to Hobbes', Locke claim of political principles, epistemology and morality are grounded on the command of God. As Colman notes:

Locke never wavered from his belief that a world without God is both rationally unintelligible and morally vacuous, for as Locke observes, "I assume there will be no one to deny the existence of God, provided he recognize either the necessity for some rational account of our life, or that there is a thing that deserves to be called virtue or vice. This commitment to God as the genuine source of meaning and value animates Locke's philosophical life; and it is the identification of morality with that which is obligatory, and what is obligatory with what is willed by God."<sup>86</sup>

---

<sup>83</sup> Ibid p. 266

<sup>84</sup> Peter P. Cvek, "John Locke on the Relationship between God and Morality," 269.

<sup>85</sup> S. Mehta, *The Anxiety of Freedom: Imagination and Individuality in Locke's Political Thought*. (Cornell University press, 1992), 335

<sup>86</sup> John Colman, *John Locke's Moral Philosophy*, Edinburgh University Press, 1983. viii + 282 pp. 20.00

Finally, unlike Hobbes' Locke recognizes pure liberty of human being and deny slavery of human being to political laws.

The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of Nature for his rule. The liberty of man in society is to be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth, nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact according to the trust put in it.<sup>87</sup>

When comparing the moral view of Hobbes' and Locke, Locke's theory is more plausible than Hobbes's theory, for the following reasons. First, Locke considers the necessity of natural law in his moral perspective. His moral theory developed from his understanding of natural law. He understood the law of nature as a statement of the will of God and a standard of good and evil, and is the foundation for all other laws. Second, since morality is a concern of the rational being, morality from Locke's point of view considers natural freedom undeniable and states that human nature has guided by reason and tolerance. Third, Locke's moral view recognizes that moral actions are a concern of individuals. But it is not about cooperation, because moral activities are universal, not limited in certain groups. While cooperation is not universal, it is limited in some cultures and communities. Finally, Locke's moral values differed from legal principle, as legal principles could be the result of agreements, while moral values were the result of natural law.

In my overall analysis and discussion in the chapter, Locke's ideas and suggestions on morality are more valid than that of Hobbes' hypothesis. As have seen, for Hobbes' making a political community is a priority and fundamental for all activity of human life. There was lack of exercising social life; there is no notion of culture, religion, morality and justice or injustice. In addition, there is no concept of business, development, industry, and there is no life at all. This is due to the absence of a powerful man made law formed by the peoples' convention. According to Locke's approach Hobbes' view of the state of nature can be seen as problematic. Locke argued that everything is under the control of natural law. This natural law defines the boundary for everything, including the wishes and desires of human beings. There are rights in nature that

---

<sup>87</sup> John Locke, *the Works of John Locke Volume1* (London, Printed for Thomas Tegg, 1823), 114

human beings will enjoy (the right to life, liberty and possession); and there is obligation (refraining from harming others and wanting or practicing to control others). This view of Locke implies that there is social life, morality and development before political community. Thus, the formation of communities or political conventions could not be at the origin of our moral standard and other beliefs.

As a second point, I take Hobbes' absolutism and Locke's critiques. Hobbes' in the formation of the Commonwealth argued that everyone should cede all their rights to the Sovereign in the settlement process, and that the Sovereign should exercise absolute power. And he has the right to prescribe general standards for his subjects. This view is contrasted with Locke's idea.

Hobbes' believes that absolute power purifies the blood of men and corrects the baseness of the needs of human nature. Locke's idea here is that there is no practical justification for accepting the idea that absolute power regulates or edifies human behavior, other than failing to create peace and stability in the community.<sup>88</sup>

Locke provides anti-theses to Hobbes' argument and expressed human being in optimistic view. This means that naturally human beings are hopeful; expect good things, protect themselves from harming other and belief in one common principle. According to Locke this common belief is natural law. As stated by Oyekan "The Law of Nature is the basis of morality, and given to us by God, and it commands that we do no harm to others with regards to their "life, health, liberty, or possessions".<sup>89</sup>In my view, I suggest that Locke's argument concerning morality seems valid than that of Hobbes'. I recognize the argument that Locke provided against Hobbes' moral prescriptivism. I also have additional related arguments against Hobbes claim of moral prescriptivism and have researcher claim.

---

<sup>88</sup>Nauta 2020, p. 33

<sup>89</sup>Adeolu Oluwaseyi Oyekan, "Human Nature and Social Order: A Comparative Critique of Hobbes and Locke, Thought and Practice", *A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya (PAK) New Series*, Vol.2 No.1, June 2010, pp.59-71 2010, p. 64 <http://ajol.info/index.php/tp/index>.

## CHAPTER THREE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

### INTRODUCTION

As have looked earlier in Chapter Two, Hobbes' moral philosophy has a direct bearing with his political thinking. His moral idea is situated on moral non-cognitivism-Moral prescriptivism. It entails that telling or prescribing an imperative to others. Hobbes' believes that an imperative is morally universal because everyone obeys the king's orders. In the same chapter I tried to show how John Locke criticized Hobbes' idea.

In this chapter, I critically analyze Hobbes' arguments and I outline my ideas to overcome them. At this juncture, I try to point out some critics mainly on Hobbes' state of nature, social contract and absolute monarchy; because these concepts are the origin of Hobbes' belief of moral prescriptivism.

The critical analysis includes political philosophy of Hobbes', because he had not separated morality, justice and political power in his discussion. His moral and political claims depend on the assumptions that he provided for the state of nature, the social contract and political power or absolute monarchism. Thus, the critical analysis focuses on these issues because they are the foundation of Hobbes' moral prescriptivism.

Before demonstrating the weakness of Hobbes' political view, let's see the strength of his political opinions. The first strength of Hobbes' political thought is his aspiration and aim to eliminate anarchism and instability from society. As understand that Hobbes' political philosophy aimed how to stop anarchism. Richard Ashcraft states that "Hobbes began to write *Leviathan* sometime in 1647-1648, when, according to him, sovereignty was "contended for," there being neither established "sovereign power" nor peace in the state".<sup>90</sup> In 'leviathan' he stated that in contending of sovereign power there is an anarchy and multitude of men of lawless men as well as there is centralization of private interest without obligation. According to Hobbes' these qualities are the causes of an anarchy and political turmoil. He framed that creating powerful sovereign as a solution to avoid these crises. Here the point is that Hobbes'

---

<sup>90</sup> Richard Ashcraft, "Ideology and Class in Hobbes' Political Theory", *Political Theory* , Feb., 1978, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Feb., 1978), pp. 27-62, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/190884>.

“introduced temporal and informational dimensions which undermine the debilitating consequences of the idea of anarchy”.<sup>91</sup>

Additionally, Hobbes’ aim for the necessity powerful central government to prevent commonwealth from any violence could be seen as the strength of his political thought. He insisted that individuals should renounce their rights in order to be under one sovereign. This could be taken as strong side, because the unity of the civil association has more value to development and security, and preventing commonwealth from any abuse is central issues in political thought.

The other strength of Hobbes’ political theory is that he was counted as building block or foundation for political thinkers after him, especially John Locke, J.J. Rousseau and Emmanuel Kant. Even if they have a contrasted view with Hobbes’, they are influenced by his notions like law of nature, social contract, sovereign authority and individual liberty as well as universality of moral laws. Indeed, Locke’s or Rousseau’s as well as Kant’s political ideas opposed with that of Hobbes’. For instance; unlike Hobbes’ they underline natural freedom of individuals, which is undeniable in any conditions. Plus, even they accept the essentiality of commonwealth, in contrast to Hobbes’ they denied coercive power. However, according David Artimagesuggestion Hobbes’ regarded as a basis of modern western philosophy.<sup>92</sup>

Related to this, some readers of Hobbes’ view him as foundational thinker of international relation. Grewal notes that “the beginning of the international relation is confirmed by the fact that his exposition of early modern international thought does not so far as to make a case for Hobbes...”<sup>93</sup> Here the scholars argued that Hobbes’ notion of the state of nature continues as a metaphor for relations among sovereign states. Thus, without international sovereign states

---

<sup>91</sup>Guilio Gallarotti, “The Enduring Importance of Hobbes in the Study of IR”, Jan 10 2013, <https://www.e-ir.info/2013/01/10/hobbes-is-still-extremely-relevant-for-the-study-of-irespecially-the-cosmopolitan-hobbes/>.

<sup>92</sup> David Artimage, “*Hobbes and the Foundations of Modern International Thought*”, *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, ed. Annabel Brett and James Tully, (2006) 219-235.

<sup>93</sup> David Singh Grewal, “The Domestic Analogy Revisited: Hobbes on International Order”, *The Yale Law Journal*, (2016), 618-680.

are depicted as in state of war based on the metaphor of the state of nature. In this respect Stanlink states that civil war is identical to international war.<sup>94</sup> So as Heller remarked “the Hobbesian solution—common authority—continues to appeal as an escape from the insecurity or the socioeconomic deficiencies of the international state of nature”.<sup>95</sup>

Now, discuss the weakness of Hobbes’ assumption of state of nature. Here various commentators suggest that Hobbes’s hypothesis of state of nature is crucial premises for his conclusion about morality. Because what Hobbes’ said about the state of nature will make a good condition for what he claimed about social contract and power of the sovereign.

As I have tried to discuss in the previous chapters; for Hobbes’ state of nature is a hypothetical thought that experiment on human being prior to any social and political order. It is also a place that lacks truth, justice, knowledge and business. In order to preserve his life everyone takes his own action. The law of nature allows this right for everyone. There is no morality at all; instead there is war of all against all.

Here can take Rawls view of original position to criticize Hobbes’ presumption of the state of nature. For Rawls original position is hypothetical place as like as Hobbes’ and Rawls holds the original position as initial situation of rational and equal individuals. To quote: original position “a simplified situation is described in which rational individuals with certain ends and related to each other in certain ways are to choose among various courses of action in view of their knowledge of the circumstances”.<sup>96</sup> Besides, Rawls’ noted that “original position is a state of affairs in which the parties are equally represented as moral persons and the outcome is not conditioned by arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of social forces”.<sup>97</sup>

---

<sup>94</sup> Nancy A. Stanlink, “a Hobbesian view of international sovereignty”, *Journal of social philosophy*, Volume 37, Issue 4, 14 November 2006. p. 552-565, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2006.00357.x>

<sup>95</sup> Mark A. Heller, “*The Use & Abuse of Hobbes: The State of Nature in International Relations*”, *Polity*, Autumn, 1980, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn, 1980), pp. 21-32, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3234689>.

<sup>96</sup> John Rawls, *a Theory of Justice*, (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), 119.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p.120.

Having said this, Rawls' defends the existence of morality in the initial place. As he stressed that "If the original position is to yield agreements that are just, the parties must be fairly situated and treated equally as moral persons".<sup>98</sup> In this sense Hobbes's presumption of state of nature can be seen as problematic, because Hobbes' connoted state of nature as pre-social that lacks morality, and war of all against all. Instead, for Rawls original position is group of rational, equality, and self-interested people who want to devise mutually beneficial moral guidelines for reforming our social system".<sup>99</sup>

The second critique is on Hobbes' theory of the law of nature. He described the law nature as "general rule found out by reason, by which a person is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or takes away the means of preserving his life, and required to do what which he believes best preserves his life".<sup>100</sup> In short the law of nature for Hobbes' is the right use of power for self-preservation.

Some commentaries contended that Hobbes' claim of the law of nature. As David Undersrud stated that Hobbes' view the law of nature cannot be taken as law, but as precepts. Undersrud underlines the reason as follows:

'Precept' is a general term, according to Hobbes something by which a man is guided and directed whatsoever. A law and an act of counsel are two different kinds. Whereas a law is an obligatory precept, a counsel is a non-obligatory. If a law of nature is nothing but a precept, then the definition should have terminated at that point. But it continues, in order to identify the specific differences between this kind of precept and others: 'found out by reason, a man is forbidden.'<sup>101</sup>

---

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p. 140.

<sup>99</sup> John Fieser, "Government," Accessed 6/1/2021, [www.utm.edu/staff/jfieser/120](http://www.utm.edu/staff/jfieser/120). <https://www.utm.edu/staff/jfieser/class/120/8-government.htm>

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., p. 80

<sup>101</sup> David Undersrud, "On Natural Law and Civil Law in the Political Philosophy of Hobbes", *History of Political Thought*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter 2014), pp. 683-716, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26226782>.

Here according to Undersrud analyses Hobbes failed to distinguish the law of nature from counsel. Natural law by definition consists an obligation that the humans must follow, whereas counsel is an advice that maintains the interests of the persons counseled. So accepting the law of nature as counsel can be seen as problematic.

Furthermore, Hobbes' fails to recognize that the law of nature as a ground of moral principles that governs the world. Various philosophers admit that the law of nature is a will of God and that governs the world, as well as it is a basis of moral rules. For instance, take Aristotle's view of natural law. For Aristotle natural law is eternal and immutable and has the same force everywhere; and because this natural law is supposed to be as governing natural phenomena. He refers natural law as ground of moral law.<sup>102</sup>

In addition, there is contradiction of ideas in Hobbes' view of the law of nature. This is as underlined by Springborg.

Contradictions (Hobbes' claims all things are controlled by physical or empirical laws and this empirical law is connected with natural law by causal connection, and on the other he claimed natural law has no power to govern human desire) if natural law has causal connection with empirical law and empirical law governs all things, then natural law has power to govern human desire, but Hobbes does not considers this.<sup>103</sup>

The third critique is related with Hobbes' understanding of human nature. In this segment, Hobbes' considers human beings as selfish. Here, he failed to consider the rationality of human being. Consider, for instance; Aristotle argued for rationality of human being. He insisted that being virtuous is a moral action. "Human virtue then, for Aristotle, is this state of the human soul, that is, the state of the human soul such that the person in this state chooses the correct

---

<sup>102</sup> W. von Leyden, "John Locke and Natural Law", *Philosophy*, Jan., 1956, Vol. 31, No. 116 (Jan., 1956), pp. 23-35, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3749204>.

<sup>103</sup> Patricia Springborg, "The Paradoxical Hobbes: A Critical Response to the Hobbes", *Symposium, Political Theory*, Vol. 36, 2008, *Political Theory*, October 2009, Vol. 37, No. 5 (October 2009), pp. 676-688, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25655509>.

actions, at the correct times, for the correct reasons".<sup>104</sup> So for Aristotle the nature of human being is not concluded simply as selfish or altruistic, rather the nature of human being is evaluated on moral virtues. Thomas Aquinas had stressed the needed relationship of morality and human nature. For him morality is about a good for human being and this good is happiness. It consists the fulfillment of our distinctive nature, such as personal development, friendship, social cooperation and suit for justice.

But Hobbes comes with a vague explanation of human nature. Because Hobbes' does not considers an interaction between morality and the nature of human being. Morality is founded through law of nature, and it is intuited intrinsically in human thought, because human being has ideal quality. Therefore, a selfish and altruist character of human being is related to the adherence and fulfillment of these laws.

Thus, the above ideas of Hobbes' seem problematic. Firstly, Hobbes' committed hasty generalization fallacy. Of course, there are egoistic peoples, but all humans are not selfish. The premises that he used are so weak to conclude that all human are selfish. So all human being are not selfish.<sup>105</sup> This is also because being egoistic is not a necessary thing to human being. If it is not necessary thing it is impossible to characterize all humans selfish. Secondly the aiming humans of common life express unselfishness of human being. If all humans are selfish, they didn't need a common or social law. Instead they may create law for their own, which support their selfishness. Thirdly, it is impossible to understand man only through material perspective, because man has material, intellectual and spiritual values. These three values of man existed three in ones. The physical perspective deals the activities and fulfillment of material requirement of human being. Intellectual perspective deals with consciousness and imagination of human being and spiritual perspective deals the spiritual activities (such as worship, pray and the relation of human being with God or super natural) of the human being. In short Hobbes' failed to recognize psychological and spiritual qualities of human being.

---

<sup>104</sup>John Alison," Human Virtue in Plato and Aristotle," <http://www.hep.upenn.edu/~johnda/Papers/Virtue.pdf>

<sup>105</sup>Muktar Ahmed, "*The Moral Dimension of Thomas Hobbes Political Philosophy*", ( MA thesis., Addis Ababa university, 2014) , 46.

The fourth critique of Hobbes is that of his argument about social contract. For Hobbes' Social contract is mutual transferring of right to the sovereign. The sovereign has absolute power. Through this power the sovereign prescribe moral and legal standards. Morality is necessarily related to social contract and the power of the sovereign. However, it has some absurdity. The first one is that agreement of the people is changeable, grows and disappears. This means that the government will change and disappear. If that is the case, then morality will change and disappear. This idea is far from the notion of morality.

The second reason is that there is contradicting idea of the Hobbes'. He believes that there is universal truth based on agreement on the one hand, and universal truth that works irrespective of time and place. As I mentioned above, the agreements that people make with each other change from time to time and are different. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is a static universal truth in this regard.

The third reason is that Hobbes' failed to consider prior elements of agreement. These prior elements of agreement are culture; language, common location, and common history. I acknowledge that these elements must be the base for social contract. Unlike Hobbes' without these entities no one come to agreement. So that it is impossible for all people to agree voluntarily for the common good without these common values.

The last reason is, although Hobbes believes that there is morality in the agreement, which is to keep the agreement or promise itself, what he calls morality, is not related to ethical principles. Indeed, obedience to governments is a moral obligation. Unlike Hobbes I believe it is not only obedience that matters, instead the right to overthrow governments (when they degenerate) is a moral or natural right. Essentially, morality is obedience to our conscience.

The fourth critique of Hobbes' is his view of absolute power of the sovereign. As have seen; for Hobbes absolute monarchy is the special government system to keep commonwealth. It is formed by agreement of individuals. It has unlimited and unclassified power; and ruled by sovereign. According to Hobbes the sovereign has authority to construct legal and moral standards. Coercion and punishment is the feature of Hobbes' absolute monarchism. What is justice or injustice and good or bad is determined by the obedience and disobedience to the sovereign. Hobbes' absolute monarchism concerns both activities of politics and morality.

This absolute power seems void because, on one hand as Warrender suggested that “Hobbes never allows that superior power as such establishes a right of obedience. All he says about sovereignty by conquest bears out this view”.<sup>106</sup> On the second hand “Hobbes never considers the possible effect of periodical elections in curbing the tendency of assemblies to sacrifice the public interest to in the private interest of their members.”<sup>107</sup> On the third hand, coercive power cannot secure the stability of a commonwealth rather it leads to another conflict and chaos. Additionally, he demolishes the free will of individuals. And there is an exploitation of resources by power owners. Since every individual surrender or transfer his or her freedom, there is an alienation of humanity. Even though Hobbes’ stated that man is naturally selfish; the purpose of the formation of government is not to stop egoistic character of human being. Rather it is to put demarcation that someone prevents himself from hurting other’s desire. To this marking absolute and coercive power is not necessary. Because it is possible to lead a stable life by obeying and respecting natural law, applying cultural values, following religious principles and additionally forming legitimate political power.

Lastly political power must be separated and limited, because it is a relevant to check and balance power and to avoid anarchism, and it is beneficial to update government policies and combat despotism, but Hobbes rejects division and limitation of power.

In general, Hobbes’ philosophical approaches like state of nature, the nature of human being, the law of nature, social contract and power of the sovereign seems problematic. If this is so, it is impossible to claim morality by a code that the sovereign prescribe.

Since morality is a matter of humanity and regulation of natural law, it is something impossible to think agreement as the basis of morality and afford peace. In the first place ‘nature’ had afforded unchanging rules and regulations for all human beings. In the second place there are social chaos and crisis even in the agreement.

---

<sup>106</sup> Howard Warrender, “Hobbes’s Conception of Morality: *Rivista Critica Di Storia Della Filosofia*, Ottobre Dicembre 1962, Vol. 17, No. 4, Pp. 434-449. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44021575>

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 552

Related to this, I am interested to discuss Kant's political and moral theory. Because his ideas are based on natural law and natural human values and his notions include the religious, rational and other dimensions. So now let me briefly outline his idea.

Emanuel Kant was an influential idealist German philosopher. He lived from (1724–1804). He was considered as one of the enlightenment thinkers. He argued that there is existence of universal moral law, and this law stems from reason. This refers that moral knowledge can be comprehended transcendently and freely.<sup>108</sup> The other interesting point in Kant's philosophy is that he underlined that freedom as a fundamental requirement to understand and practice morality. As Frederick Rauscher stated "freedom is required for morality in order to supply to the will a priori practical principles given by our reason. Here Kant mentions "the freedom of the will, which bears a complicated relationship to the freedom of practical reason".<sup>109</sup> Furthermore, like Hobbes' Kant argued for the essentiality of social contract to create public law in order to maintain common benefit, everyone's freedom, equality and independence. And Kant insisted that everyone must respect the public. But, unlike Hobbes' it is not founded because of the fearing of political power, instead based on freedom and reason.

Its function specifies that we behave socially and politically as if we have signed a contract in which we merely obey our own reason rather than any authority, and by which we constrain ourselves voluntarily.<sup>110</sup>

With regard to knowledge, Kant argued that genuine knowledge came from the combination form of our understanding and sense. For him knowledge is not only originated from either reason or experience. He distinguished two forms of knowledge. The first one is a posteriori knowledge; it is knowledge after experience. For Kant posterior knowledge connected with analytic judgments. Analytic judgment is one in which "the predicate 'B' belongs to the Subject

---

<sup>108</sup> Frederick Rauscher, "Pure Reason and the Moral Law: A Source of Kant's Critical Philosophy", *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, Vol.13, No.2 (Apr., 1996), pp.255-271, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27744703>.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid

<sup>110</sup> Chun-Yip Lowe, "Kant's Social Contract: A New Transcendental Principle in Political Philosophy," *Kant Yearbook* 4, no. 1 (2012).

‘A’, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept<sup>111</sup>, but according to Kant judgment cannot be both analytic and posterior; because analytic statements are not experienced. For this reason there is no sufficient knowledge in experience. The second one is knowledge of a priori-knowledge comes before experience. According to Kant it is transcendental idea and it determines the use of the understanding according to principles in the whole of an entire experience”.<sup>112</sup> It has synthetic judgments, which means the predicate of the statements conveys the subject of the statement. A claim of morality, mathematics and arithmetic are situated in this form of knowledge. Here for Kant synthetic a priori knowledge is Knowledge of both understanding and sense. Kenny expressed Kant’s claim of knowledge as follows.

The basis of human knowledge is sense and understanding. Through the senses, objects are given to us; through understanding, they are made thinkable. The structure of our senses determines the content of our experience; the constitution of our understanding determines its structure.<sup>113</sup>

Kant comprehends moral knowledge as like as mathematical and geometrical knowledge. So what is morality, how it is founded, and what its nature, for Kant is answered based on his claim of knowledge, as like as geometrical and arithmetic truth, moral truth existed alone without any qualification. For him what is good is good in itself, what is right is right in itself and what is wrong is wrong in itself. We should not require further information and reasoning to make true judgment true.

Kant declares morality as acting from duty or in other statement it is a matter of obligation.<sup>114</sup> That means “to act out of reverence for the moral law; and the way to test whether one is so acting is to seek the maxim, or principle, on which one acts, that is to say, the

---

<sup>111</sup> Richard Swinburne, “Analytic/Synthetic: *American Philosophical Quarterly*”, Jan., 1984, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan., 1984), pp. 31-42. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20014027>

<sup>112</sup> Emmanuel Kant, *Critique Of Pure Reason*, Edited by Paul, Guyer And Allen W. Wood, (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 399.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid p.278

<sup>114</sup> E. D. Miller and Jon Jensen, *Question that Matter: an Invitation to Philosophy* (1937), 398.

imperative to which one's act conforms".<sup>115</sup> He distinguished two imperatives. These are categorical and hypothetical imperatives.

Categorical imperative refers to a command that are declared by nature and existed in every rational mind. It stands from our general will or maxim. For this reason it isn't determined by emotions, cultures, people's conventions and others. So categorical imperative is unconditioned, and it is universal. As Kant states:

...there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This imperative is categorical. It concerns not the matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is itself a result; and what is essentially good it consists in the mental disposition, let the consequence be what I may. This imperative may be called that of morality.<sup>116</sup>

The second imperative of Kant is hypothetical. According to Kant expression hypothetical imperatives are conditioned moral obligations and are valid only in pursuit of predetermined ends. For instance, you have to work hard to be rich; you have to study hard to get good grades. The results we get here depend on the work we do. It is the action that one takes to achieve one's goal. This imperative is subjective, because there are different ends that peoples' pursuit to achieve.

There are three basic things to take from Kant's point of view. The first one is that there is moral knowledge, which comes naturally to a rational being. It means there was morality before the formation of the Commonwealth; and there was morality before powerful government. Therefore Morality does not mean surrendering all right and freedom to one person or group of person for Kant; instead it is an exercise of natural freedom accordance with law and order.

The second point is categorical imperative, as I mentioned above, this command is always the same and universal. For example, trampling on another person's freedom is wrong in

---

<sup>115</sup> Kenney, *An illustrated brief history of western philosophy*, 296

<sup>116</sup> Immanuel Kant, in other words, trans. *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*. (Library Liberal Arts, Indianapolis, 1949) 19.  
1949, p. 19

everywhere, with everyone. Since moral law is a duty to do right thing in any circumstances, For Kant fundamentally morally right behavior consists respecting and obeying moral law without any hesitation. It includes recognizing freedom and dignity of other persons. Here the crucial issue in Kant's categorical imperative is that it universalizes moral laws and orders human beings to live together.

The third point is related to the ideas of Kant's is hypothetical imperative. As we have seen above hypothetical imperative is conditioned. It is subjective to the end that individuals targeted. It is not fixed and similar always, because of this it is changeable and it allowed that people can make rules and regulations for their own benefit. At this point it does not need a universal commitment of moral principle. But its application is specific goals and wants. For example; hypothetical imperative means just like when different peoples pay different amount of value for similar goods or services.

Since morality is a natural law of human conscience and spirit, we cannot create it in any way. But we obey it, we act according to it. Morality has nothing to do with the consensus of the people and the existence of the government. Instead, governments need to be morally inclusive. In this sense we cannot consider agreement as a basis of morality.

Even though, the agreement of the people is an important thing, it does not mean that agreement is necessary to establish absolute power, but to establish a constitutional government. The other is that when the people make an agreement, they should not loss their rights and freedom as well as people should consider and respect natural and cultural differences when they come to an agreement.

Generally, in this chapter I have mentioned critical analysis of Hobbes' moral beliefs. As I have stated that in the earlier sections, Hobbes' idea of morality is situated in moral prescriptivism. According to Hobbes' it is interpreted like the command of absolute sovereign power. This means what is morality is the activity and the decisions that the sovereign prescribe to the subjects. I have indicated that the assumptions of the state of nature, the nature of the human being, the social contract and absolute monarchical power are the pre-conditions of Hobbes belief of moral prescriptivism. In this chapter I have tried to offer critique of Hobbes' hypothesis of the law of nature, the state of nature, social contract, and the power of the sovereign.

In this chapter firstly I have attempted to mention the strengths of Hobbes' political thought. At that point, I have tried to point that Hobbes' objective of political thought aims to overcome anarchism and political turmoil from society. Because political turmoil and anarchism are fundamental problems in politics, how to overcome them was the aim of his political study. The other strength of Hobbes' political thought that I have discussed is his way to form powerful central government. The existence of powerful central government in a certain country or commonwealth is fundamental to protect the sovereignty of a country from any abuses. What is more, according to various readers' suggestion Hobbes' regarded as building block of modern political thought as well as Hobbes' notions could be considered as a metaphorical foundation of international political view.

In this chapter I also tried to mention the problems of Hobbes' assumption of the state of nature. A state of nature is not pre-social, brutish and evil. Rather, it is social and it is a state of equality and liberty. The existence of equality and liberty can't cause war of all against all.

Secondly I have tried to point out some mistaken ideas' of Hobbes' in the law of nature. I have tried criticizing Hobbes' claim of law of nature by two reasons. One, Hobbes does not consider the law of nature as a ground of morality. Two, there is contradictions in Hobbes claim of the law of nature. This contradiction stated by Springborg and I have mentioned it.

Thirdly I have tried to critique of Hobbes in his idea of the nature of the human being. The first reason that I oppose Hobbes' claim of the nature of the human being is that Hobbes' denied the necessary relationship of the human being and morality. I have discussed the natural relationship of morality and the nature of human being by referring the ideas of Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas. The second reason is that Hobbes' does not consider spiritual and psychological features of the human being. He merely focused on material or physical features of the nature of the human being.

Fourthly, I have discussed Hobbes's idea of social contract. Here I have presented three reasons to show the inconsistency of his idea of social contract. One, any agreement that peoples make is updatable, changeable and will disappear. In this case there is no universal moral truth, if agreement is the foundation of morality. So Hobbes' idea of universal morality is wrong. Two, agreement is the result pre-existing values of the human beings such as; language, religion,

culture, etc. Without these values, there is no agreement. Hobbes in his analysis rejects these issues. Hence, the claim of Hobbes is that the existence of an agreement and absolute monarchy are the solution to all problems is wrong. Three, even if Hobbes argued that there is morality and justice in agreement. To accept this Hobbes view, it should consist overthrowing and opposing the sovereign, but not only to be obedience to the sovereign.

Next to this, I have tried to offer some of the critiques on Hobbes' idea of absolute sovereign power. Lack of periodic and fair election and his alienation of individual liberty are the first reason. The second reason is lack of division of political power and deficiency of appreciation and acceptance of the ideas of diversity.

In general, in this chapter I tried to indicate Hobbes' philosophy in general and his moral understanding in particular. In this regard, I also tried to point out some critics on Hobbes' analysis of morality, justice and political power. In the segment, I used Kant's ethical and political philosophies in order to problematize Hobbes' claim of morality.

## Conclusion

The task of this thesis concerned on Hobbes' political theory, particularly his meta-ethical view of morality. According to him morality is expressed in the perspective of moral non-cognitivism. Here morality cannot be defined naturally, because of culture, personal emotions and the will of certain community. Specifically Hobbes' has a prescriptivist moral view, because he recognized that morality is a command declared by the sovereign in the commonwealth. Moral prescriptivism is a non-cognitive theory that demands entailing commands. This approach underlines persuade subjects by using force and power of the sovereign, instead of a rational use of language to express and transfer thoughts. Hobbes' proposed that convention and absolute power of the sovereign are the two essentials of morality.

The other issue that I delivered in this thesis is Locke's moral cognitivism. Moral cognitivism is a meta-ethical view which claims the existence of moral truth without determination of pact of certain community and personal emotions. I also tried to compare Hobbes's moral prescriptivism theory with Locke's moral cognitivism. According to Locke's theory, Hobbes' theory of moral prescriptivism is wrong by following reasons.

In the first place, there is the argument from natural law; it defends that all laws including moral standards are the authority command of God. Again argument from natural law maintains moral standards are not the result of convention of peoples, rather it is perceived intrinsically. Locke argued that natural law is the basis for every political and moral principle. Accordingly Locke the truth of morality is directly perceived in mind. Hence, they are not founded by convention, rather they are naturally existed.

Secondly, argument from individualism; it is a view defends personal liberties. Locke claims "all individuals are created equal in the eyes of the creator, so no one individual has the right to take it from another. These rights are granted by the ownership of the creator and unless one wishes to go against the wishes of this creator, one must recognize the rights of other individuals as

well”.<sup>117</sup> Here according to Locke morality refers moral action that individual act according to their natural right and obligation.

In the thesis I have attempted to point out some critics on Hobbes’ understandings of human nature, the state of nature, social contract, and absolute political power. These concepts are hallmarks in the philosophy of Hobbes moral prescriptivism. As I mentioned above Hobbes state of nature fails to recognize human beings natural goodness, freedom, and morality. In doing so, I tried to use Rawls claim of original position. In contrary to Hobbes, Rawls argued that before the formation of social contract; human beings are equal, freedom, and moral; and there is social structure.

I have tried to mention arguments against Hobbes’ state of nature. Law of nature and the nature of human being covers the wide space in his stipulation of the state of nature. Since everything is in the control of natural law, the desire of human being is also limited by the principle of law. There are also contradictions in Hobbes’ claim of natural law. I have mentioned Springborg statements.

The other point that I have argued, is the nature of human beings. I claimed that naturally; human beings are not selfish wholly, and all are not altruistic. If so, it is wrong that to conclude by saying human beings are selfish naturally. Besides this, human beings can be defined through material, intellectual and spiritual perspective. Therefore, when we consider these above discussed things; state of nature fail to give us Hobbes’ results.

If we believe that convention is a foundation of moral and other standards, then it contradicts universality and absolute existence of moral truth; because there is no constant agreement. Lack of agreement in society is not a cause of the problem; and presence of agreement is not solution to every problem in the society. The agreement itself needs prior essential things; like common culture, religion and others. The other point that I discussed is, morality is that not a question of convention as Hobbes claim, but it is about humanity and rationality as well as conscience.

---

<sup>117</sup>Philip Schuyler, *“Three Theories of Individualism.”* (PhD diss., University of South Florida, 2007), 21.

Finally, I attempted to forward criticisms to Hobbes' claim of absolute monarchy. Hobbes argued that the absolute monarchy as creator of moral standard and political laws; and has unlimited power. This is wrong because; the power of the government should be limited; and government cannot create moral principles and values.

The other critical issue that stated in the thesis is a convention of peoples could not be the foundation of morality and justice, because morality is the result of natural law. But for specific individual and social benefit agreement is the essential thing. This is because of there is lots of cultures, beliefs, and different political views. Connected to this, I suggest that Kant's moral philosophy will provide better understanding concerning morality.

## Reference

- Mehdi Shokri, "A theory of political power and rights: A secret exchange for legitimacy" ( PhDdiss., University of Berlin, 2018).
- Grcic,J, " Hobbes and Rawls on political power" *Etica&Politica / Ethics & Politics*, IX, 2007, 2, pp. 371-392. [https://www2.units.it/etica/2007\\_2/GRCIC.pdf](https://www2.units.it/etica/2007_2/GRCIC.pdf).
- Ahmed,Muktar."The Moral Dimension of Thomas Hobbes Political Philosophy."MA thesis., Addis Ababa University, 2014.
- Artimage, David. "Hobbes and the Foundations of Modern International Thought".*Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, ed. Annabel Brett and James Tully, 2006.
- Ashcraft, Richard. "Ideology and Class in Hobbes' Political Theory".*Political Theory*, Feb., 1978, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Feb., 1978), pp. 27-62, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/190884>.
- Alison, John." Human Virtue in Plato and Aristotle." <http://www.hep.upenn.edu/~johnda/Papers/Virtue.pdf>.
- Björnsson, Gunnar. "Disagreement, correctness, and the evidence for meta-ethical absolutism." <https://philarchive.org/archive/>.
- Colman, John. "*John Locke's Moral Philosophy*."Edinburgh University Press, 1983.viii + 282 pp. 20.00
- Coop, David. "Varieties of Moral Naturalism." 13 (2-supplement):280-295, oct 2012. 10.4013/fsu.2012.132 (suppl).05.
- Cvek, Peter, P. "John Locke on the Relationship between God and Morality." *Ultimate Reality and Meaning*, September December 2012, Vol. 35, No. 3 4, pp. 260 285. <https://utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/uram.35.3-4.260>.
- Deeb, Ratib, Jubair. "Meta ethics: Descriptivism, Emotivism & Prescriptivism." [https://journals.eagullpublications.com/ijeer/assets/paper/IJ0520192866/f\\_IJ0520192866.pdf](https://journals.eagullpublications.com/ijeer/assets/paper/IJ0520192866/f_IJ0520192866.pdf).
- DeSantis, Cara, Rima. "Aristotle on the Moral Virtues." Last modified 2019/10/12. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341041151\\_Aristotle\\_on\\_the\\_Moral\\_Virtues](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341041151_Aristotle_on_the_Moral_Virtues).

- Duke, George. "Hobbes on Political Authority, Practical Reason and Truth." *Law and Philosophy*, September 2014, Vol. 33, No. 5 (September 2014), pp. 605-627. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24572399>.
- Ertl, Wolfgang. "Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism in Contemporary Meta-ethics an Outline." <http://www.flet.keio.ac.jp/~w.ertl/files/Cognitivism%20and%20Non%20Cg.doc>
- Fieser, John. "Government," Accessed 6/1/2021, [www.utm.edu/staff/jfieser/120](http://www.utm.edu/staff/jfieser/120). <https://www.utm.edu/staff/jfieser/class/120/8-government.htm>.
- Gallarotti, Guilio. "The Enduring Importance of Hobbes in the Study of IR". Jan 10 2013, <https://www.eir.info/2013/01/10/hobbes-is-still-extremely-relevant-for-the-study-of-internationally-the-cosmopolitan-hobbes/>.
- Gauthier, David, P. *Moral by Agreement*. Oxford University Press, UK, 1986.
- Gauthier, David. "Thomas Hobbes: Moral theorist." *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 76, No. 10, Seventy-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Oct., 1979), pp. 547-559. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2025550>.
- Grewal, David Singh. "The Domestic Analogy Revisited: Hobbes on International Order". *The Yale Law Journal*, (2016), 618-680.
- Joseph, Grcic, "Hobbes and Rawls on Political Power," *Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics*, IX, 2007, 2, pp. 371-392. [https://www.openstarts.units.it/bitstream/10077/5284/1/Grcic\\_E%26P\\_IX\\_2007\\_2.pdf](https://www.openstarts.units.it/bitstream/10077/5284/1/Grcic_E%26P_IX_2007_2.pdf).
- Gardner, E. Clinton. "John Locke: Justice and the Social Compact." *Journal of Law and Religion*, 1992, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1992), pp. 347-371. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1051205>.
- GustavoDa, Rosa, Ribeiro, André. "A Hobbes Theory of Justice" (PhD diss., University of Konstanz, 2019).
- Heller, Mark A. "The Use & Abuse of Hobbes: The State of Nature in International Relations". *Polity*, Autumn, 1980, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn, 1980), pp. 21-32. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3234689>.
- Hare H. M. *Languages of Morals*: Oxford University Press, 1952.
- Herzog, Don. "Hobbes's Prescriptive Arguments." *Without Foundation*. Cornell University Press, 1986. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt207g6t3.5>.

- Hobbes Thomas. De Cive XVII. 27.
- Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan or Matter, Form, and Power of Commonwealth Ecclesiastical, and Civils*: London, 1952.
- Herman, Barbara. *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy*: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Huemer, Michael. *Ethical Intuitionism*: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Jon, Jacobs. "Naturalism", <https://iep.utm.edu/naturali/#SH3a>.
- Jeff, S. *Moore on the simplicity and Indefinability of Goodness*: The university of Indiana press, 2007.
- Kant, Immanuel. In other words. Translated by Agbbolt, T.K *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*: Library Liberal Arts, Indianapolis, 1949.
- Kant, Emmanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*: Edited by Paul, Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Kenny, Anthony. *An illustrated brief history of western philosophy*. 3<sup>rd</sup> volume, BlackWell Publishing Ltd, 1998.
- Koloski, Joshua. "*Ethical Intuitionism: The Meaning of Meaning.*" Senior Thesis., Brandeis University, 2016.
- Krebs, Dennis, L. *The origin of morality: an evolutionary account*: Oxford University press, 2011.
- Leyden, W. von. "John Locke and Natural Law", *Philosophy*, Jan., 1956, Vol. 31, No. 116 (Jan., 1956), pp. 23-35. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3749204>.
- Locke John. *The Works of John Locke*. Volume 1. London Printed for Thomas Tegg, 1823.
- Locke, John. *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Prometheus Books, 1995.
- John, Locke. *Two Treatises of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration*: Rethinking the Western Tradition, ed. Locke Ian Shapiro, (New Haven and London: Yale University, 2003), ix
- London, Alex, John. "Virtue and Consequences: *Hobbes on the Value of the Moral Virtues.*" *Social Theory and Practice*, spring 1998, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 1-23. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23559062>.
- Lowe, Chun-Yip. "Kant's Social Contract: A New Transcendental Principle in Political Philosophy." *Kant Year book* 4, no. 1 (2012).

- Luis, R.G. Oliveira and Timothy, Perrine. "Cornell Realism, Explanation, and Natural Properties," *European Journal of Philosophy* 25:4 ISSN 09668373 pp.1021-1038. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ejop.1222>.
- Lund, William R. "Hobbes on Opinion, Private Judgment and Civil War". *History of Political Thought*, Spring 1992, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 51-72. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26214189>.
- MacGuigan, Mark, R. "Law, Morals, and Positivism: *The University of Toronto Law Journal*, 1961, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1961), pp. 1-28. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/825383>.
- Margolis, Joseph. "Moral Cognitivism." *Ethics*, Jan., 1975, Vol. 85, No. 2 (Jan., 1975), pp. 136-141. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2379928>.
- Maris, C. W. *Critique of the Empiricist Explanation of Morality*: Springer Science Business Media Dordrecht, 1931.
- Mehta, Uday, Singh. *The Anxiety of Freedom: Imagination and Individuality in Locke's Political Thought*: Cornell University press, 1992.
- Mill, John, Stuart. *Utilitarianism*: 7th Ed. London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1879.
- Miller, E.D. and Jon Jensen. *Question that Matter: an Invitation to Philosophy*: 6<sup>th</sup> ed. University of Colorado: New York, 1937.
- Milner, Benjamin. "Hobbes: On Religion." *Political Theory*, Aug., 1988, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Aug., 1988), pp. 400-425. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/191579>.
- Nicolaides, Angelo. "Bertrand Russell Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism and Ethical Critical Thinking." *Phronimon* Volume, 18, 2017, pp. 114. <http://doi.org/10.17159/24133086/2017/1953>.
- Oliveira, Luis, R.G. and Timothy Perrine. "Cornell Realism, Explanation, and Natural Properties." *European Journal of Philosophy* 25:4 ISSN 09668373 pp.1021-1038. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ejop.1222>.
- Oyekan, Adeolu, Oluwaseyi. "Human Nature and Social Order: A Comparative Critique of Hobbes and Locke, Thought and Practice." *A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya (PAK) New Series*, Vol. 2 No. 1, June 2010, pp. 59-71 2010, p. 64 <http://ajol.info/index.php/tp/index>.

- Phelan, Mark and Wesley, Buckwalter. "Analytic Functionalism and Mental State Attribution." *Philosophical Topics*, fall 2012, Vol. 40, No. 2, Consciousness (fall 2012), pp. 129-154. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43932977>.
- Rauscher, Frederick. "Pure Reason and the Moral Law: A Source of Kant's Critical Philosophy." *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, Vol.13, No.2 (Apr., 1996), pp.255-271, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27744703>.
- Rawls, John. *A Theory of Justice*. London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.
- Read, James, H. "Thomas Hobbes: Power in state of nature, power in civil society." *Polity*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (summer, 1991), pp. 505-525. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3235060>.
- Rubaia, Refat. "Locke's Theory of Ideas: A Critical Exposition." *Philosophy and Progress*: Vols. LXI-LXII, January-June, July-December, 2017. <https://doi.org/10.3329/pp.v61i1-2.44206>.
- Russell, Bertrand. *The History of Western Philosophy: Manufactured in the United States of America by American book Stratford Press*, 1945.
- Schuyler, Philip. "Three Theories of Individualism." PhD diss., University of South Florida, 2007.
- Springborg, Patricia. "The Paradoxical Hobbes: A Critical Response to the Hobbes Symposium", *Political Theory*, Vol. 36, 2008. *Political Theory*, October 2009, Vol. 37, No. 5 (October 2009), pp. 676-688. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25655509>.
- Stanlink, Nancy A. "A Hobbesian view of international sovereignty". *Journal of Social Philosophy*, Volume 37, Issue 4, 14 November 2006. p. 552-565, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2006.00357.x>.
- Strauss, Leo. *What is political philosophy and Other Studies*: university of Chicago press, London, 1959.
- Swinburne, Richard. "Analytic/Synthetic". *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Jan., 1984, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan., 1984), pp. 31-42. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20014027>.
- Tarleton, Charles D. "Rehabilitating Hobbes: Obligation, Anti-Fascism and the Myth of a 'Taylor Thesis.'" *History of Political Thought*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 407-438. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26217490>.

- Thomas, O'Neill. "*Hobbes's Moral Factualism: Reason, Facts, and Intentions.*" PhD diss., Durham University, 2016.<http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11658/>.
- Thomas, J.A. "Some Contemporary Critics of Thomas Hobbes". Jun., 1929, No. 26 (Jun., 1929), pp. 185-191.<https://www.jstor.org/stable/254820>.
- Trainor, Bernard, Thomas. "*The Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes.*" PhD diss., Adelaide University, 1979.
- Undersrud, David. "On Natural Law and Civil Law in the Political Philosophy of Hobbes". *History of Political Thought*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter 2014), pp. 683-716. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26226782>.
- Villarreal, Bailey, D. "A Critique of Hobbes's State of Nature." *Philologia* 12, no. 1 (2020): pp. 20–24. <https://doi.org/10.21061/ph.229>.
- Warrender, Howard. "Hobbes's Conception of Morality." *Rivista Critica Di Storia Della Filosofia*, Ottobre Dicembre 1962, Vol. 17, No. 4, Pp. 434-449. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44021575>.