



Addis Ababa University
College of Social Sciences
Centre for African and Asian studies

**Challenges of Building Developmental States in Africa: The case of Rwanda and
Ethiopia**

By

Mulugeta Abie

Advisor: Dechassa Abebe (PhD)

*A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in
Partial Fulfilment for the Requirements of Master of Arts in African and Oriental
Studies Specialization in Human and Economic Development*

June, 2021

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Challenges of Building Developmental State of Africa: The case of Rwanda and Ethiopia

**A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in Partial
Fulfilment for the Requirements of Master of Arts in African and Oriental Studies
Specialization in Human and Economic Development**

By: Mulugeta Abie

ID: GSE/1953/11

Advisor:

Dechassa Abebe (PhD)

June, 2021

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

ADISS ABABA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
CENTRE FOR AFRICAN AND ASIAN STUDIES
MA IN HUMAN AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

**Challenges of Building Developmental State of Africa: The case of Rwanda and
Ethiopia**

By:

Mulugeta Abie

Approved By the Board of Examiners

1. _____
Dean, Graduate studies Signature Date

2. _____
Advisor Signature Date

3. _____
4. _____
Examiner Signature Date

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	iv
List of Acronyms	v
Abstract	vi
CHAPTER ONE	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Background	1
1.2 Framing Research issue and problems	4
1.3) Research Questions	5
1.4) Objectives of the study	6
1.5) Scope of the study	7
1.7) Relevance and Justification	6
1.8) Organization of the paper	7
CHAPTER TWO	8
REVIEW OF RELATED LITRATURE	8
2.1 The Concept and Evolution of Developmental State	8
2.2 General features of the Developmental State	9
2.3 Defining Features of the Developmental State	11
2.3.1 Development-Oriented Political Leadership	11
2.3.2 Autonomous and Effective Bureaucracy	13
2.3.3 Production-Oriented Private Sector	14
2.3.4 Performance-Oriented Governance	15
2.4 The Developmental State and Africa	16
2.5 Recent trends and discourses on Developmental State in Africa	18
2.6 Failed attempts at state-led development in Africa	23
CHAPTER THREE	26
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	26
3.1 Description of study Area	26
3.3 Types and Sources of data	30
3.3.1 Secondary data	30
3.4 Data Collection Methods	30
3 .5 Methods of Data analysis	31
CHAPTER FOUR	32
Developmental State of Ethiopia and Rwanda	32
4.1 The Emergence of Developmental State in Ethiopia	32
4.1.1 Characteristics of a Developmental State in Ethiopian context	36
4.2. The Making of Democratic Developmental State in Ethiopia	38
4.3 The contemporary Rwandan model	43

4.4. Shortcomings of the developmental state model in the cases of Ethiopia and Rwanda	45
CHAPTER FIVE	48
5.1 Conclusion	48
5.2. Recommendations	50
References:	52

Acknowledgements

Throughout the long period of preparation of this thesis, I have been greatly assisted by many wonderful and excellent people. It is with the utmost appreciation that I thank all those who contributed time, resources and thought to the success of this research thesis. First, I thank the Almighty and Creator God for being my guide and provider and for giving me strength, good health and wisdom to accomplish this study. I am grateful to my respected supervisor Dr. Dechassa Abebe for the advice, directions and precious guidance he constantly gave to me when I needed. I owe special thanks to my friends, colleagues, classmates and relatives for the inspiring and supportive activities they performed.

List of Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CODESRIA	Development of Social Science Research in Africa
CPS	Centre for Policy Studies
Ds	Developmental state
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
HEP	Higher Education Program
HSRC	South Africa's Human Sciences Research Council
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MITI	Ministry of Trade and Industry
MSE	Micro and Small Enterprises
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
PID	Partners in Development for Research, Consulting and Training
SACP	South African Communist Party
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities and peoples
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front

Abstract

This paper examines Challenges of Building Developmental State of Africa: The case of Rwanda and Ethiopia. The political setting is tightly constrained, ethnic based and the state has not allowed the private sector freedom of action to generate the required levels of production. The prevalence of party allegiance at the expense of meritocracy in recruitment and promotion coupled with corruption and rampant rent-seeking political economy became threat to the country's existence and development. Ultimate success will depend on the capacity to transform a state as it has been central to the development process. Rwanda has made achievements in building developmental state as part of its priority means of poverty reduction. It also backed its economy in the spirit of f nationalism and by structuring its political structure through some restrictions including the 2003 ban on political parties based on ethnicity, religion, or sex. Major parties include the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Social Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party. Further, it has also performed well in other aspects towards building a developmental state. The subject matter of the study i.e. the developmental state has not been researched adequately. Particularly in the case of Ethiopia little research is available on the issue. Hence, this research is intended to provide preliminary understanding on the factors, instigating specific questions in this line of inquiry. Therefore, the exploratory research design is most suited to the purpose sought – exploring factors affecting the developmental state perspective. In order to analyze the problem, secondary data was collected.

Keywords

Developmental state, Democratic Developmental State, feature of Developmental state, Ethiopia & Rwanda

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

The history of the post-independent African state is that of monumental democratic and developmental failures in the majority of countries in the continent. Most countries on the continent have been characterised by underdevelopment four decades after independence. Various sources attest to this notion of underdevelopment taking any social and economic indicators into considerations. At the economic level, Africa has been marked by the dominance of the primary sector – agriculture, oil and minerals--partly as a result of the inability of the African state to foster an environment for high value-added economic activities, low domestic capital formation and declining direct foreign investment, foreign aid dependence, heavy indebtedness, high unemployment and the in formalisation of the economies where the majority of its people live in poverty. Consequently, at the beginning of the 21st century, Africa is unable to compete in the global economy. In fact, its marginalisation has been reinforced, particularly since the 1980s (Edigheji, 2005:8).

In their evolution, context, trajectory, and manifestations developmental states have differed. There existed cultural and conjectural peculiarities in the emergence and nature of developmental states around the world, and so “one size fits all” cannot apply to the structure and modelling of developmental states in Africa, as elsewhere in the world. Developmental states have emerged largely through trial and error and learning by doing, which have no formally designed templates that aspiring countries can copy (ERA, 2011:13).

As to Fritz (2006), developmental state is defined as a state that puts economic development as the top priority of government policy, and is able to design effective instruments to promote such a goal. Researches on developmental states mainly identified two major features in a developmentalist ideology and a structure that pertains to the requisite institutions, norms and standards that can support development processes (ERA, 2011:13).

By the same token, the majority of African countries lack basic social and physical infrastructure. Owing to this, most people on the continent have no access to basic services such as potable water, electricity, good sanitation, roads and healthcare. The state of

underdevelopment has been reinforced by authoritarianism, political instability, ethnic and religious conflicts and civil wars. Since attaining their independence, most African countries have been plagued by some form of political conflict (Edigheji, 2005:18).

In the Ethiopian case, the federal structure of the country which was adopted in 1995 aimed at addressing the problem of a failed nation-building project through assimilation and centralization that had been pronounced under the previous regimes. With the adoption of the present constitution the ethnic-federal experiment attempted devolving public power to ethnic groups against the centralized nation-building project of the previous regimes. The previous regimes gave much emphasis to Ethiopian nationalism as a unifying concept and promoted centralization rather than regional or ethnic autonomy (Asnake, 2006:74-78).

During the reign of emperor Haile Selassie (1931-1974), the major orientation of the state was to use the state power for voracious appropriation of resources mainly from the peasantry in order to reward the few ruling nobilities and their clienteles that maintain the survival of the highly centralised state (Messay, 1995).

The Derg military regime which took control of power in 1974, repeatedly stressed that it preferred a 'socialist' solution to the nationalities question but promoted militaristic nationalism by means of an authoritarian and strongly centralized political system. The ethno-nationalist movements that took centre stage of opposition after the 1974 revolution were vocal about their unqualified right to exercise self-determination up to and including secession. The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), for example, in its formative years 'claimed that it was fighting for self-determination... which could result in anything from autonomy, federation, confederation, up to and including independence' (Markakis, 1987:217-37).

The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power by overthrowing the military regime in May 1991. The July 1991 Peace and Democracy conference that led to the establishment of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) adopted a Transitional charter that recognised Eritrea's secession (TGE, 1992).

As early as the 2000s, the EPRDF began to portray poverty as an existential threat to the country. The government had shown its disregard for the other theories, stressed on adherence to the developmental state economic paradigm. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi advocated the use of this model not only in Ethiopia but also across Africa (EPRDF, 1995). With the agricultural

sector at the forefront of the development agenda, the government continuously championed the idea of strong presence of the state in most parts of the economy. Meles had made a compelling case for a strong government presence in the economy to correct the pervasive market inefficiencies citing the experience of Asian countries like Taiwan and Korea with the same growth strategy that they implemented (*Ibid.*).

Rwanda, landlocked republic lying south of the Equator in east-central Africa, is a geographically small country with one of the highest population densities in sub-Saharan Africa. It also shares with Burundi a long history of monarchical rule. Unlike what happened in Burundi, however, the demise of the Rwandan kingship came about through a grassroots Hutu-led upheaval that occurred before the country became independent in 1962. Ethnic strife between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi factions peaked in 1994. Civil war and genocide at that time left Rwanda's economy and social fabric in shambles (See Rwanda genocide of 1994.) The years that followed have been characterized by reconstruction and ethnic reconciliation.

The constitution promulgated in 1978 established a presidential form of government. The president at the time, Juvénal Habyarimana, combined the roles of head of state and head of government with that of president of what was then the single ruling party. In 1994, however, after Habyarimana's death, the country slipped into chaos before elections. A new constitution adopted in 2003 employed strong language decrying the ethnic strife of the past, listing the resolutions to "fight against the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations" and "the eradication of ethnic, regional and other divisions and the promotion of national unity" among its fundamental principles, Rwanda is a multiparty republic. (See Rwanda genocide of 1994.)

The 2003 constitution stipulated that the president, who serves as head of state, was directly elected to a seven-year term, renewable once. However, in 2015 the constitution was amended to allow the president at the time, Paul Kagame, to run for a third consecutive seven-year term in 2017 and, after that, for presidents to serve a five-year term renewable once. The president selects a prime minister, who serves as the head of government. Under the constitution, all citizens at least 18 years of age are eligible to vote. Women play an active role in Rwandan politics, aided in part by the constitutional requirement that at least 30 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies be reserved for women. In addition, women have successfully contested the unreserved seats as well. Rwanda has the distinction of having the world's first female-majority legislative body; after the 2008 elections, 55 percent of the deputies were women.

Rwanda has a multiparty political system with some restrictions, including the 2003 ban on political parties based on ethnicity, religion, or sex. Major parties include the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Social Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party (Biedermann, 2016:27).

Cognizant of the aforementioned issues, this research wants to conceptualise federalism & building developmental state in Africa. It will incorporate the concept and review of ethnic federalism structure and building developmental state trajectories of Ethiopia since the adoption of the 1995 Constitution. It will also deal with the key features on the impact of ethnic federalism form of Government in building a developmental state. Predicating on this, it will highlight issues for research on the impact ethnic federalism on building of developmental state in Ethiopia on one hand and the restriction of political parties based on ethnicity as a solution to move forward towards building of developmental state in Rwanda on the other. (See Rwanda genocide of 1994)

1.2 Problem Statement

As can be deduced from the literature on the subject, a developmental state is characterized by, but not limited to, the following basic features. Firstly, the overriding objective of a developmental state is achieving a fast socioeconomic development via the process of industrialization (Bolesta, 2007:105-111). In so doing, a shift from import-substituting industrialization to export-oriented industrialization is necessary (Kim, 2009:518).

East Asian states achieved a rapid economic development since technocratic bureaucrats have made economic development their top priority and long term goal (Boyd and Ngo, 2005). Secondly, developmental state needs a competent meritocratic autonomous bureaucracy. In a developmental state, bureaucrats are powerful professionals who are protected from the influence of elected politicians (Asayehgn, 2012:34). They facilitate the socioeconomic transformation of a state by enjoying a high degree of political autonomy. Relating to this, it is stated that the politicians —reign while the bureaucrats —rule (Haggard, 2018:1-21). This indicates the real power of bureaucrats in the development endeavour of a state. This meritocratic recruitment of such autonomous, capable bureaucrats takes the centre stage in the East Asian states 'miraculous, skyrocketing economic performance (Edigheji, 2010). Thirdly, a developmental state is an interventionist state in nature. The state actively involves in the economy by regulating, guiding

and controlling it. Its intervention is single-mindedly aimed at promoting industrial growth and economic development (Heywood, 2013). Fourthly, it has a capitalist economic environment, as private sectors are partners in the development of a state (Bolesta, 2007:105-111). In other words, there is a public-private partnership. However, the partnership is not open to all private sectors; rather, it is for selected strong enterprises that enjoy government subsidies. Besides, such a public-private cooperation/partnership doesn't result from voluntary compliance by the private business elites; rather, it is due to the coercive influence of bureaucrats (Onis, 1991:109).

This model is now spreading, beyond East Asia, across various countries of the world. Many countries are rushing to adopt the East Asian model of development, albeit in some countries with necessary alterations. Ethiopia, which is what this paper mainly grapples with, is no exception in this move. Concerns regarding whether a developmental state model is applicable in Ethiopia have taken centre stage in the recent literature (i.e. Ayenachew, 2014; Mesgna, 2015:83-95).

Despite, the ethnic federalism is granted regional states to administer themselves and promote their language and culture (FDRE, 1995), the ethnicization and politicization of staffing the bureaucracy is still problematic. First of all, economic development requires a state which can create and regulate appropriate conditions for development. Successful conditions require a state which has the necessary tools to deal with burden, and it is not merely the guardian of certain freedoms. Hence, this paper examines factors affecting in building of Developmental state in terms basic feature of Developmental state Building in Ethiopia and Rwanda.

1.3) Research Questions

To achieve this objective four main research question and two other related sub-questions were posed:

1. How do features of Developmental state affect the building of a successful developmental state in Ethiopia and Rwanda?
2. How does ethnic federalism affect the building of a successful developmental state in Ethiopia and Rwanda?

3. To what extent do the state bureaucrats staffed in meritocratic principle? How is their political neutrality? How is their capacity and effectiveness to implement the policy?
4. To what extent do the features of Developmental state affect the process of Building developmental state?

1.4) Objectives of the study

The general objective of the study is to assess challenges of building developmental state of Africa in Ethiopia and Rwanda by looking at the various aspects, investigate related problems, and then forward appropriate recommendations.

As such the main objectives are:

- To assess the building process of Building of Developmental state in Ethiopia and Rwanda
- To assess the success of Building of Developmental state in Ethiopia and Rwanda
- To find out the major challenges encountered in the implementation of Building of Developmental state in Ethiopia and Rwanda
- To make recommendations to make Building of Developmental state in Ethiopia and Rwanda more effective.

1.5) Relevance and Justification

The discourse about the nature of development is still important for Africa where myriads of developmental models experimented. One of the development models which are being promoted as a panacea for Africa is the ‘developmental state’. The Ethiopian government has explicitly committed itself to build a developmental state. As a result, the country achieved consecutively double-digit GDP growth. Despite the continued economic growth, there is growing discontent with the government ethnically defined state in fear of continued ethnic tension and conflict as a consequence of ethnic-based politics.

Development is more of a political process; according to Leftwich (1996), development in human societies always involves the organization, mobilization, combination, use and distribution of resources in new ways, where the resources take the form of capital, land, human beings or their combination. And because resource are to be used and distributed in new ways,

there will inevitably be disputes among individuals and groups about how such resources are to be used as they calculate who will win and who will lose as a result of different configuration. As such, when the political system is based on ethnicity, partition and federalism forms a challenge for sustainable developmental state.

Furthermore, the empirical findings of Evans (1995) and Leftwich (1996) about the common features of the developmental states in the history of many countries include: highly competent economic bureaucracy that is well insulated from patronage and rent seeking networks; highly competent bureaucracy that enjoys embodied autonomy in the surrounding social structure and developmental elites and nationalism. Thus, the lack of capacity and effectiveness of the bureaucracy is detrimental to implement the developmental policy. The establishment of such competent bureaucrat is badly affected by the ethnic federal policy. Hence, the relevance of this study lies in making a contribution for further researcher to understanding of factors affecting in Buildings of developmental state in Ethiopia and Rwanda.

1.6) Scope of the study

Since the objective of the study is focused on Factors Affecting Building of Developmental State in Ethiopia & Rwanda, data that has been collected and analyzed reflects only from 1991 & Genocide of Rwanda onwards. Due to financial and time limitations, sampling other African Countries that adopted Developmental State system of government was unattainable. Hence, this study is only targeted on Ethiopia and Rwanda.

1.7) Organization of the paper

The study paper would be organized into five chapters. The first chapter presents background, the problem statement, the research questions, scope and significance of the study as well as organization of the paper. The second chapter is dedicated to Review of Related Literature focusing on the study topic. Chapter three discusses methodology and geographical information about Ethiopia and Rwanda whereas chapter four deals with examining the construction of developmental state in Ethiopia and Rwanda and factors affecting the sustainable development in the country perspective. Needless to mention, the last chapter gives a conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITRATURE

2.1 The Concept and Evolution of Developmental State

In the post–World War II era the developmental state came into existence with the leading role played by governments in promoting industrialization in Japan and East Asia. Governments in those countries pursued a series of policies, including tariff protection, subsidies, and other types of control aimed at developing selected productive sectors of economic activity. The creation of an alliance between politics and the economy was instrumental in designing the developmental state for these countries thereby materializing the establishment of a specialized bureaucratic apparatus that had ample powers and coordinated the developmental efforts, at least in their initial stages (Caldentey, 2008:27).

The policies and ideologies of the developmental state are not unique to Japan or East Asia. A similar type of model, albeit a more restrictive one, was also followed in Latin America during the period that lasted from the end of World War II to the beginning of the 1960s and, in some cases, the 1970s. During this time, the state intervened in a number of areas and indeed made use of fiscal, exchange rate, monetary, and sectorial policies to promote the industrialization of Latin America. Neither are developmental state policies a feature limited to the twentieth century. European countries used the same policies throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the United States during the nineteenth century (Kasahara, 2013:297).

On top of the above models, in the second half of the nineteenth century other regions such as Latin America did very much the same thing. The available historical record suggests in fact that the developmental state and its associated policies are a recurrent feature of government policy during different historical times, under different circumstances, and in different geographical locations. Notwithstanding, the recognized successes of the developmental state, the Latin America debt crisis of the 1980s, the spread of globalization, and the East Asian financial crisis in 1997, jointly with the overarching ideological powers of the Washington Consensus, have severely called into question its usefulness. As things stand, the developmental state has been overtaken by a state preoccupied with macroeconomic stability, property rights, and contract

enforcement and partial intervention in education, health, and pensions (Singh & Ovadia, 2017:1033).

2.2 General features of the Developmental State

According to (Caldentey, 2008), the term developmental state refers to a state that encompasses and guides the direction and pace of economic development. The developmental state is chiefly associated with the type of economic policies followed by East Asian governments in the second half of the twentieth century and, in particular, with the post-World War II Japanese economic model. Central to the developmental effort in the case of Japan was the creation of the Ministry of Trade and Industry in 1949. Initially, it coordinated the “Policy Concerning Industrial Rationalization,” which sought to counteract the deflationary regulations of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. The Ministry was also given the power to negotiate the price and conditions for the import of technology through the approval of the Foreign Capital Law (Beeson, 2003).

, The Ministry of Trade and Industry gained further preponderance in 1952 as it took effective control of the rights to import merchandise and of the foreign exchange budget. The tight control of imports led the government to adopt a system of import control for the protection of domestic industry. For its part, the control of the foreign exchange budget allowed it to stimulate and foster export growth (Wade, 1990:13). The Ministry also opened up and eased access to credit facilities through the establishment of the Japan Development Bank which pursued a credit policy to develop key domestic industries (energy and metal production). And that policy was backed by a very generous lending policy involving both the Bank of Japan and commercial banks. This fostered vertical and horizontal concentration of firms producing the keiretsu, an industrial conglomerate reminiscent of the earlier zaibatsu (Coates, 2000:877-880).

The model of the Ministry of Trade and Industry was followed by other “late industrializing” countries such as South Korea. After the end of the Korean War (1950–53), the South Korean government pursued a government-led, export-oriented policy. Modelling upon the example of Japan’s Ministry, it created the Ministry of Commerce and Industry through the adoption of the first five-year plan (1962–66). Through the ministry of commerce and, in particular, the recently created Economic Planning Board, the elected government adopted an exchange rate policy that

combined periodic devaluations and export subsidies to make the exchange rate competitive for local producers (Aseniero, 1994:275).

In the case of Japan, the adoption of developmental policies fostered the concentration of industry. Developmental state policies were not conceived as rigid ones. Rather they adapted over time to fit changing circumstances. Between 1950 and 1960, the states intervened to engineer and monitor the industrial catch-up process of Japan. In the 1960s and 1970s, the developmental guidance became more indicative and turned to the creation of export industries, the production of consumer durables, and the creation of technologically sophisticated consumer products. Finally, in the 1980s, the Ministry turned its attention to the development of high-growth technology industries. At this developmental stage, the Ministry turned to tax incentives and public-private sector collaboration. At the same time it had to deal with industries that were “structurally depressed” such as textiles, sugar refining, cardboard, chemicals, steel, and others (Coates, 2000:877).

In the case of South Korea, the first two five-year Economic Development Plans centred on the establishment, identification, and perfecting of state instruments and on self-reliance. The third plan (1971–75) focused on the “dynamic development of the rural economy, a dramatic and sustained increase in exports and the establishment of heavy and chemical industries” (Lie, 1998:499). At this stage, the focus of the Korean developmental state turned to corporate growth through the establishment of chaebols (family-owned conglomerates) that ended up controlling a significant share of the economy of South Korea.

Later on during the 1990s, the development of a high technological industry captured the attention of the government. A bird’s eye view of government intervention in two source cases - Japan and South Korea-- highlights some of the key features underpinning the notion of the developmental state. From the very start, the developmental state was conceived as an interventionist state. Next, this did not imply that it made heavy use of public ownership. Rather, the developmental state tried to achieve its goals through a set of instruments such as tax credits, breaks, subsidies, import control, export promotion, and targeted and direct financial and credit policies instruments that belong to the realm of industrial, trade, and financial policy. Third, the degree and type of government intervention varies over time in scope and content. It can depend

on different factors, including external/internal circumstances, and on the life cycle of the industry the state is trying to develop Okimoto (1989). For example, in the 1960s Japan adopted a more open economy stance; it reduced its tariff and looked towards administrative guidance instruments to pursue its developmental policies.

He further argued for a time pattern state intervention and that state intervention in Japan was much more pronounced at the early and later stages in the life cycle of the products. State intervention was needed at the early stages to develop the product and the later stages to scrap the declining industries.

In the fourth part, the developmental state requires the existence of a bureaucratic apparatus to implement the planned process of development. More to the point, as in the case of Japan's Ministry of Trade and Industry or South Korea's Economic Planning Board, the developmental state requires a pilot agency to oversee and guide the developmental process. In turn, the existence of such a bureaucratic apparatus requires a "meritocratic bureaucracy" capable of formulating policy and possessing the required freedom and lack of interference to apply it; or, the developmental state requires that the "politicians reign and that the bureaucrats rule" (Johnson, 1982).

Finally, the developmental state requires the active participation and response of the private sector to state intervention.

2.3 Defining Features of the Developmental State

Though not exclusively on the experiences of East Asian developmental states the developmental state notion chiefly predicated upon development-oriented political leadership, autonomous and effective bureaucracy, production-oriented private sector, and performance-oriented governance.

2.3.1 Development-Oriented Political Leadership

Various experts highlighted the indispensability of development-orientated political leadership bound together by a powerful economic and political ideology focused on development (Woo-Cumings, 1999:1-31). In the case of the East Asian developmental states it has been observed that the political elites in these countries were able to devise development (Waldner, 1999:131).

These elites gave the bureaucracy sufficient scope to take initiatives and act authoritatively in pursuit of the desired development goals (Wade, 1990:13). Deyo observes that the unique capacity of the East Asian states was rooted in the political alliances, domestic authoritarian rule, and effective economic institutions – resulting in the effectiveness of state intervention in the market place (Deyo 1987). As appropriately put by Wade:

“While the bureaucrats ‘rule’, politicians ‘reign’. Their function is not to make policy but to create space for the bureaucracy to maneuver in while also acting as a ‘safety valve’ by forcing the bureaucracies to respond to the needs of the groups upon which the stability of the system rests: that is, to maintain the relative autonomy of the state while preserving political stability” (Wade 1990: 26).

Conditions which gave rise to a development-oriented political leadership can be quite diverse. Based on the initial experiences of East Asian countries Johnson and other analysts link the origin of such political leadership to circumstances of “systemic vulnerability “comprising three major elements, namely a broad combined commitment, scarce resource endowment and severe security threats (Doner *et al.*, 2005:327).

As to Waldner, the aforesaid leadership grows out of a political context characterized by the virtual absence of pressure to incorporate popular classes and engage in state-based side payments (populist side payments), thereby giving these leaders scope to provide institutions conducive to economic development. He argued that in developmental states state-building and institutional arrangements precede incorporation of the lower classes (Waldner, 1999:131). Other analysts suggest that a development-oriented leadership evolves from of a clear consensus within the governing elites, both administrative and political, over the scope and direction of development (Weiss, 2000:795).

Amsden and Wade argue that interests of political survival and legitimacy propelled political elites towards a developmental orientation (Wade, 1990:26). It is also claimed that these leaders were either relatively uncorrupted, non-predatory or had limited personal gains, and thus did not impede investments but rather facilitated the expansion of national productivity (Menocal, 2006). On the basis of these observations, Weiss and Thurbon conclude that state-directed development under the developmental state approach is not just about policy but, more importantly, it is about

sustained political will to govern the market in accordance with development aspirations (Weiss & Thurbon, 2004).

2.3.2 Autonomous and Effective Bureaucracy

When compared to other developing regions of the world autonomy, capability and effectiveness of bureaucracy in the East Asian developmental states is outstanding (Wong, 2004). This is traced back to the presence of bureaucracy in the Weberian tradition which prioritizes meritocratic recruitment, provides promotion incentives, shows rationality and guarantees high levels of prestige and legitimacy to bureaucratic officials (Evans 1997). Onis supports this observation as:

Rigorous standards of entry not only ensured a high degree of bureaucratic capability, but also generated a sense of unity and common identity on the part of the bureaucratic elite. Hence, the bureaucrats were imbued with a sense of mission and identified themselves with national goals which derived from a position of leadership in society (Onis, 1991:109).

Business activities that are carried out for extended period reward created commitment and a sense of “corporate coherence” that gave the bureaucratic apparatus a certain kind of autonomy (Evans, 1995). Furthermore, the bureaucracy was able to exhibit such uncommon levels of autonomy and effectiveness when they were effectively insulated by the political elites from unproductive interference (Pempel, 1999:139). As a result, decision makers and technocrats were able to effectively formulate economic policy, forge business alliances and direct state interventions in the economy (Nissanke, 2003:287).

More importantly, the bureaucracy was not only able to protect itself from particularistic private sector interests but it was also strong enough to cooperate with the same in a productive manner (Beeson, 2004). These bureaucracies were also able to construct markets as well as promote actors to operate in these markets. They also set the performance criteria and disciplined the private sector firms that did not measure up to the set standards of performance (Booth, 1999). By using “carrots” and “sticks”, in other words, the bureaucracy was able to influence the industries’ decision-making (Leftwich, 1995:400). More crucial, the state itself was disciplined in a manner that prevented predatory, disruptive rent-seeking behavior or the abuse of power (Amdsen, 1989:14).

With the objective of maintaining the role of the controller, these bureaucracies exhibited a rare form of well- developed administrative capacity which rested upon two major elements-- a powerful set of policy instruments and a specific form of state organization (Kim 2008). In this context, the bureaucracy went well beyond the Anglo-Saxon model, most clearly in the manner with which the state was effectively able to harness “market- conforming”, “market guiding”, “governed market”, “governed interdependence” and even deliberately “market distorting” interventions (Amsden,1992:14). These administrative capabilities are attributed largely to the enormous power that the state bureaucracy wielded over corporations through their control over banks and other financial sources (Chang, 2006:1).

Depending upon the above institutional arrangement, the state employed overall command and authority to direct both domestic and international forces and, more importantly, was not under pressure to “buyout” rent- seekers (Haggard, 1989). In conclusion, the responsibilities assumed by the bureaucracy, as Amsden argues, “provide supporting evidence for the proposition that economic expansion depends on state intervention to Create price distortions that direct economic activity toward greater investment” (Amsden,1992).

2.3.3 Production-Oriented Private Sector

At the center of the rapid progress of industrialization and modernization that occurred in the East Asian developmental states there has been production-oriented private sector (Booth, 1999:379). Delivering high economic performance with necessary speed and flexibility was set as the overarching development goal by these states (Westphal, 2002:397). As pointed out by Amsden, state intervention in the East Asian developmental states marked a different type of capitalism, in which the primary purpose of intervention was to promote the interests of the business sector, create conditions for capital accumulation and productivity improvement (Amsden, 1989:14).

Towards achieving this goal, the state utilized a wide range of institutional instruments to poke and prod domestic firms to meet domestic and international business standards, productivity levels, and organizational and technical capacities. These instruments included selective and strategic use of protectionism, provision of industrial subsidies and programs tied to performance

standards and targets, and the creation of business coalitions amongst industrial capital and financial capital and the state (Wong, 2004:187).

On the basis of extended institutionalized alliances amongst political power, financial and industrial capital, these state-private sector partnerships were crafted on the principle of reciprocity, such as connecting subsidies to performance, and acted as an incentive for productivity (Wade, 2000). For instance, the use of exports as a criterion for allocating credit and the provision of subsidies encouraged the adoption of international standards, and accelerated the diffusion of technology (Amsden, 1989:14). The state was not only able to secure the survival and the ability of the private sector to compete at any level but, more crucially, was able to “create” and “reward” in addition to “picking” good performers as well as “punishing” bad ones (Wade, 1990). In such method, the state was able to promote long-term investments among the industrial elites that resulted in sustained industrial development in East Asian countries (Low, 2004).

2.3.4 Performance-Oriented Governance

As they are associated with promoting rapid economic growth and providing economic benefits to both the ruling elites and the general citizenry developmental states enjoyed the support of their constituencies (Chang 2003). This approach to development has commonly been referred to as “growth with equity”. As noted by Chang:

The achievements of the region’s economies did not stop at income growth. Their records in terms of improvements in infant mortality, life expectancy, educational achievements and other indicators of ‘human development’ have also been very impressive, even considering their income growth (Chang, 2006:1).

With respect to the governance orientation of the developmental state there are two major issues that need to be considered seriously. In the first place, the ruling elites in these countries demonstrated high levels of commitment to poverty reduction. They began to address equity concerns from the early stages of the transformation process (Hort & Kuhlne, 2000:162). Consequently, the rapid industrial growth in East Asia was paralleled by a favorable pattern of income equality, low unemployment and the near elimination of grinding poverty (Deyo, 1987). Additionally, successful economic performance was the primary source of political legitimacy.

Political elites largely depended on delivering growth with equity as a means of strengthening their legitimacy and support base (Kim, 2007:518).

Haggard underscored that fast economic development generated a broader “growth coalition” and supportive policies which sustained an institutional and political framework, and this success became the survival basis and legitimacy of the regimes in East Asia (Haggard, 1990:1-21). As aptly stated by Johnson:

The source of authority in the developmental state is not one of Weber’s ‘holy trinity’ of traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic sources of authority. It is, rather, revolutionary authority: the authority of a people committed to the transformation of their social, political, or economic order. Legitimacy occurs from the state’s achievements, not from the way it came to power” (Johnson 1999).

Cognizant of this notion Castells contended that a state is developmental when it sticks as its principle of legitimacy to its ability to promote and sustain development which is understood as the combination of steady and high rates of economic growth and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship with the international economy (Castells,1992). On top of this, Berger noted that the experience of East Asian developmental states is “a case of successful industrialization that combines growth with equity from the beginning of the modernization process” (Berger, 1987:163).

2.4 The Developmental State and Africa

Is the East Asian economic development model applicable in other states? In 1999 Johnson declared that the Japanese development model “would be hard to emulate.”(Johnson, 1999). This is not to say, however, that Japanese history is not “generalizable”; it simply requires a state with a similar commitment “to the mobilization of industry.” He recognized successful emulations of the Japanese development model in other countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and (much later) China. Johnson “had no doubt that other Asian, African and Latin American countries would try to emulate Japan.”

While deliberating on Africa’s economic development prospect various scholars have expressed pessimism s and have debated whether the East Asian economic model is duplicable in the African context. The pessimism, which is expressed in the impossibility-of-a-developmental-state-in-Africa Theory, is informed mainly by the internal conditions of many African states:

unending civil wars, pervasive corruption, dependence syndrome, and lack of autonomy, rent-seeking behavior, neo-patrimonialism, lack of democratic institutions, unaccountable governments, and lack of adequate educational opportunities for the continent's teeming youth population, among others.

Only four African states—Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa, and Uganda—are regarded in the scholarship as “potential developmental states,” based on the “‘activist’ role” they play in their economic development. The word “potential” is very telling and contrasts with the impossibility theory because it implies the presence of the capacity to develop, whereas the play in their economic development. The word “potential” is very telling and contrasts with the impossibility theory because it implies the presence of the capacity to develop, whereas the impossibility theory implies the absence of such capacity (Leftwich, 2002:270).

The impossibility theory has, however, been deconstructed by some scholars as a misinterpretation of Africa's economic history, and for failing to consider the continent's economic growth in the past decade. Also, the idea that the lack of democratic institutions in Africa makes the developmental state impossible flies in the face of the East Asian experience. However, the impossibility theory has already done significant damage to Africa's development. It has influenced the actions of many African states, leading to policy measures that have so seriously undermined their “economic and political capacity” that the states appear compelled to exhibit proof of the impossibility of becoming developmental states(Kim, 2007:222-225).

Nevertheless, Johnson(1982) highlighted optimism for a better economic future for Africa can be observed; it is stimulated by the success of East Asian states, most of which found themselves in conditions much worse than those faced by most African states today. For instance, South Korea started with a lower per capita GDP than that of most African states currently, it lacked natural resources essential for growing the manufacturing sector, it had no prior successful industrialization experience, and it faced a constant military threat from North Korea. Yet it was able to achieve economic development and it successfully lifted itself out of life-threatening poverty to become an industrialized state with a high per capita GDP. The silver bullet was an aggressive pursuit of state-led export promotion policies which, as the economy advanced, loosened up to increase the role of the private sector (Johnson, 1982)

A growing number of scholars now acknowledge that African states are not only capable of becoming developmental, but have in fact already exhibited evidence thereof, despite leadership failures in many parts of the continent. While some scholars believe that African leaders' propensity for power consolidation using state power overwhelmed their declared development" under postcolonial leaders, even as neoliberalism gained ground in the 1980s (Johnson, 1999). Applying Mkandawire's definition of the developmental state, however, it is not enough that the "ideological underpinning" of the leaders was developmental; they must also be shown to have "seriously attempted" to utilize their state's resources for the purpose of development, even if they failed to achieve it. Capitalizing on the aforesaid points, it is worth looking at the extent of manifestation of the developmental state within the extractive resource sector in Africa, focusing specifically on Kenya, Rwanda, and Tanzania.

2.5 Recent trends and discourses on Developmental State in Africa

When reference is made to the "developmental state" one might think of East and South East Asian countries and not usually about Africa. For the past few years, however, there has been a noticeable interest in academic as well as development cooperation circles in the usefulness of the concept for political economic conditions in Africa. This debate is closely related to, and an extension of, the achievements of East Asian economies since the 1960s and the concept of the "developmental state", which has become the theoretical underpinning of their success. The question for fledgling African economies is whether they can learn from the East Asian experiences and perhaps even emulate their achievements to overcome their persistent development problems.

It is not, of course, as if African countries had not embarked on development endeavors of their own since gaining political independence in the 1960s and '70s. On the contrary, the early years of independence were characterized by state-led developmentalism in many African countries, which did lead to economic growth and the improvement of social infrastructure in the short-run, but ultimately failed to provide sustainable progress. Partly due to the fluctuations of world markets but more prominently to the predatory nature of the state in many cases, statist developmentalism by the 1980s had led to economic demise and a seemingly enduring poverty

crisis. These post-colonial experiences, therefore, are nowadays regarded as developmental failures (Johnson, 1999).

As a result of their economic demise many African countries also faced a debt crisis and had to embark on structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in order to access new credits from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank as well as bilateral donors. These programs involved a complete turnaround of economic policies from the statist approaches of the post-colonial period to the market-oriented reforms of the 1980s and '90s. The expected outcome, however, did not materialize. The SAP-inspired decades in Africa are today frequently referred to as the “lost decades”, and the persistence of the poverty crisis has led international donors to refocus their aid programs on debt relief-funded poverty reduction strategies (Johnson, 1999).

The widespread failure of SAPs reopened the search for viable development strategies and, towards the end of the 1990s, led to the current developmental state debate in Africa. It was widely agreed that there could be no question of simply returning to post-colonial developmentalism. There was little purpose in re-enacting the failed experiences of that period. Attention now was directed to the successful development experiences of East Asian countries, some of which had been, around 1960, at comparable levels of development with African countries and were now marching far ahead. Reference to those experiences was, therefore, the starting point for the new debate. The significance of this Point of departure is – to paraphrase Chalmers Johnson who coined the developmental state concept in his study on industrial policy in Japan – which the East Asian countries’ achievements were, based neither on Soviet-type command economies nor on laissez-faire free-market economies, but on “market-conforming methods of state intervention”, i.e. a “capitalist developmental state” (Johnson, 1999).

Early references to the developmental state in the African context were country-based. Two countries in sub-Saharan Africa embarked on development trajectories soon after they gained independence in the 1960s which avoided the pitfalls of overbearing statist intervention. Both Botswana (Edge 1998; see also the country study on Botswana in this INEF-Report) and Mauritius (Meisenhelder, 1997:(35/2) have been described as developmental states. They were

held to be exceptions to the rule, while the bulk of sub-Saharan African countries were seen to lack the determined focus on development needed to establish a developmental state.

In these countries, the post-colonial state rather than representing the solution to development challenges came to be seen as the problem hindering development as it came under the control of patronage oriented political rulers. Various epithets, such as “the predatory state”, “the weak state”, “the neo-patrimonial state” to name just a few, were introduced to characterize the lack of development leadership in many African countries. This undifferentiated juxtaposition has been challenged more recently, notably by contributors to the debate in Africa investigating the potential for development in countries also characterized by corruption and patronage. The volume entitled “The Potentiality of ‘Developmental States’ in Africa. Botswana and Uganda Compared” (Mbabazi & Taylor 2005:1-15), one of the first book length studies on the topic in the African context, is a case in point here.

A different recent focus of the developmental state debate in Africa has been South Africa. The theme emerged in the political arena in the run-up to the national elections in 2004 when the ruling African National Congress (ANC), anxious to instill new purpose into its “tripartite alliance” with the more radical Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) and to retain the vote of their supporters, introduced the concept to its campaign programme and subsequent party documents. The short-term aim of serving “as an ideological glue to hold the alliance together” was achieved (Southall, 2006:201-206). But since then there has been a lively debate on the problems and prospects of applying the concept to South Africa. In his introduction to the 2005-2006 edition of the South African Yearbook “State of the Nation” Southall identifies divergent positions in the country with regard to the developmental state, expresses some doubts as to whether the conditions for the establishment of a developmental state, such as adequate state capacity, are in place in South Africa, but asserts that important lessons can be learnt from the East Asian experiences of developmental states (Southall, 2006:201-206).

Amongst the three positions he refers to, the economic liberals, the Jacobins and the developmentalists, the latter represents the left wing of the ANC and strongly advocates a

developmental state perspective for South Africa. At a national conference on the developmental state held in Pretoria in 2007 it was concluded that “in the absence of a comprehensive development strategy, South Africa could not presently be characterized as a developmental state”, but that given the persistence of unemployment, poverty and inequality in the country a developmental state was needed to address these problems and that South Africa had taken several steps in that direction (Turok, 2008:149-166).

The developmentalists’ case was argued in greater detail in the conference volume entitled “Wealth Doesn’t Trickle Down. The Case for a Developmental State in South Africa” (Turok, 2008:149-166). Besides the few works mentioned above the debate on the Developmental state in Africa has led to a still rather limited number of publications. Notable among these is the book entitled “The State They’re In: An Agenda for International Action on Poverty in Africa” by Matthew Lockwood. Written from a practitioner’s viewpoint it is a highly informative and critical review of sub-Saharan Africa’s development experiences and prospects of pursuing a developmental state approach, insisting principally on the creation of the necessary political conditions to curb clientelism (Lockwood, 2006:30(1)).

The doctoral dissertation by Daniel Kunzler takes a more traditional analytical approach discussing development issues against the background of modernization and dependency theories without referring to the more recent debate initiated by the East Asian experiences (Kunzler, 2004:689). In this respect, a publication by Stefan Andreasson published under the title “Africa’s Development Impasse: Towards a Political Economy of Transformation” (Andreasson, 2010:174-188) is an earlier contribution which expressed a degree of scepticism regarding the prospects for developmental states in Africa and raised a question as to whether the ‘special case’ of a few developmental states in East Asia can be applied to the ‘general case’ of persistent underdevelopment elsewhere”(Andreasson 2007:81(8)).

There have been two quite dissimilar positions that recap the debate on the developmental state in Africa. One viewpoint is that the conditions which facilitated the successful East Asian developmental state experiences do not exist in Africa, and the other argues that following the failure of post-colonial state developmentalism and subsequent market-oriented structural adjustment what Africa needs is a “democratic, developmental and socially inclusive” strategy

perspective (Mkandawire,2005). For most African analysts who defend the latter view is Thandika Mkandawire, a former executive director of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) who was teaching at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His influential article “Thinking about developmental states in Africa” insists on a differentiated analysis of African countries and argues that developmental states “are not totally alien” to Africa (Mkandawire, 2001:289).

The idea that the debate in Africa focuses upon strongly is the need for a democratic developmental state. This is an issue because the developmental state in the East Asian experiences is generally seen as having been autocratic rather than democratic. While not described as a necessary condition, autocratic rule was deemed to have facilitated the strong political leadership and the autonomy of state bureaucracy, both seen as essential features of developmental states in East Asia. What counted was the developmental performance of a state, while the nature of its political regime was regarded as secondary. As regards conditions in sub-Saharan Africa Omano Edigheji, research director at South Africa’s Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), challenged this view. In a research outline entitled “A Democratic Developmental State in Africa? A concept paper” he argued, referring to Africa’s ‘failed’ post-colonial statist experiences, that if there was a positive correlation between autocratic regimes and development, “then African countries would have been among the most developed countries in the world” (Edigheji, 2005). Looking particularly at the South African case, Edigheji and other analysts have pursued this line of argument in more detail in a recent edited volume entitled “Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa: Potentials and Challenges” (Edigheji, 2010:9).

Mkandawire who considers “a developmental state as one whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development” provided a working definition. (Mkandawire, 2001) Our approach encompasses the broader context of the developmental state debate and discusses its relevance for sub-Saharan African conditions. In her contribution, which draws on a more comprehensive study (Musamba,2009), Charity Musamba on the whole reviews key theoretical works on the developmental state based largely on East Asian - and also to some extent Latin

American - experiences, from which she then synthesizes four defining features of the developmental state.

Further she analyses the relevance of the developmental state for Africa discussing the arguments of the so-called “impossibility theorem” as well as their limitations and concluding with the case for a democratic developmental state in Africa. To exemplify the developmental experience of an African country which is generally referred to as a developmental state Peter Meyns in his contribution looks at the case of Botswana, highlighting strengths as well as weaknesses of its trajectory since independence.

By and large, the defining features of the developmental state are principally based, as the preceding analysis has shown, on the experiences of East Asian countries. There can be no doubt that their experiences are invaluable for developing countries elsewhere seeking ways and means to advance their own economic and social development. Some critical comments, however, have been made on the developmental state concept. As cautioned by Woo-Cumings, the developmental state can be “good” in terms of its effectiveness but “it can also be Ugly – undemocratic and authoritarian, explicitly or implicitly” (Woo-Cumings, 1999:1-31). Two points are especially noteworthy in this context. First, developmental states are said to have a close affinity with authoritarian politics and are based on an understanding of the state as both autonomous and imposed on society (Randall, 2007). The postulate of an autonomous and insulated bureaucracy fits in with these characteristics. Indeed, most East Asian developmental states were governed by dictatorial leaders and even those considered democratic tend to have systems that intertwine democratic ideals with authoritarian politics (Kim, 2007:121).

2.6 Failed attempts at state-led development in Africa

Many African countries experienced some sort of big push for development during the early independence years. However, subsequently governance deteriorated due to clientelistic and/or neo-patrimonial social structures strangled the potential of promising economic sectors and undermined attempts at state-led industrialisation. Efforts to spread education stalled, inter alia when increasingly authoritarian leaders found that those with some education, but lacking good employment opportunities (due to the clientelistic throttling of the economy), become politically

dangerous. National armies discredited themselves through bloody coups and internal divisions along ethnic lines. The project of national integration failed (Menocal, 2007).

In many countries of Africa, benefits generated by state-led development were turned in to rents for small elites and clientelistic networks that captured the state- making investments successively less productive (Van de Walle, 2001). Hence, the difference between successful and failed attempts at state-led development does not appear to be primarily attributable to corruption-which was generally present in both- but rather to the problem of ‘state capture’ (Khan, 2005).

A key ingredient in avoiding state capture and other forms of predatory behaviour is a competent, meritocratic and ‘result-oriented’ core bureaucratic system. In a majority of African countries, a committed and competent civil service failed to emerge or was eroded (often despite repeated attempts to develop it) (Menocal, 2004). Civil service structures and other benefits generated by state-led development were frequently manipulated by the government apparatus and ruling elites as a source of patronage. The state was captured by narrow interests more concerned with building clientelistic networks than with fostering a transformation of the country’s economy (Bayart, 1993:291).

Political leadership is crucial because of the way it affect the quality and autonomy of the bureaucracy in developmental states. Importantly, political leadership in Africa has not been uniformly poor since independence. However, even development-oriented post-independence leaders failed to build a sustained ‘embedded autonomy’ of the state (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007:531). The tendencies militating against successful state-led development- leadership which lacks a motivation to prioritise development and the dearth of a competent and efficient civil service- are perhaps most evident and perverse in sub-Saharan African states.

While unfavorable geographical and economic factors have certainly had a detrimental impact on development prospects (Sachs, 2005), the dynamics embedded in a political system rooted in neopatrimonialism have played a central role in engendering and reproducing underdevelopment. No African country- with South Africa, Botswana and Mauritius- has truly achieved an encompassing and sustained developmental orientation; the underlying reason increasingly

identified by academic scholars and other observers is the neopatrimonial character of many African states (Van de Walle, 2001).

One argument often advanced, sometimes by Africans themselves, relates to the lack of an ideology of development anchored in some form of nationalist projects. Fanon's (1967) tirades against the ideological numbness of the emergent ruling classes in Africa remain among the most sustained statements of this position. Many other political leaders and analysts have elaborated on this lacuna.

Onimode (1988) talks of the 'ideological vacuum' that he attributes to petty bourgeois commitment to their class interests and their fear of 'revolutionary pressures'. For some, the lack of ideology is inherent in personal rule under which loyalty is not to some overriding societal goals but to individuals, often holding highly idiosyncratic ideologies that they themselves flout with impunity and with no moral qualms (Sandbrook, 1986:319).

Consequently, such leaders are said to have no moral basis on which they could demand enthusiastic and internalized compliance to whatever 'national project' they launched. As Mkandawire explained that the quest for an ideology to guide the development process inspired African leaders to propound their own idiosyncratic and often incoherent 'ideologies' to 'rally the masses' for national unity and development. The centrality of 'development' was such that it acquired the status of an ideology ('developmentalism') that provided the ideological scaffolding of development plans (Mkandawire, 2001:289).

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents description of the study area, research design, data types and source of data, data collection method and method of data analysis.

3.1 Description of study Area

Africa, the second-largest continent, is bounded by the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic Ocean. It is divided in half almost equally by the Equator. Africa's physical geography, environment and resources, and human geography can be considered separately.

Ethiopia, a country in the Horn of Africa, lies completely within the tropical latitudes and is relatively compact, with similar north-south and east-west dimensions. The capital is Addis Ababa, located almost at the centre of the country. Ethiopia is the largest and most populated country in the Horn of Africa. With the 1993 secession of Eritrea, its former province along the Red Sea, Ethiopia became landlocked (Ullendorff, 1973, reprinted 1990).



Source: *Ethiopia map-worlometer*

Ethiopia is one of the world's oldest countries, its territorial extent having varied over the millennia of its existence. In ancient times it remained centred on Aksum, an imperial capital located in the northern part of the modern state, about 100 miles (160 km) from the Red Sea coast. The present territory was consolidated during the 19th and 20th centuries as European powers encroached into Ethiopia's historical domain. Ethiopia became prominent in modern world affairs first in 1896, when it defeated colonial Italy in the Battle of Adwa, and again in 1935–36, when it was invaded and occupied by fascist Italy. Liberation during World War II by the Allied powers set the stage for Ethiopia to play a more prominent role in world affairs. Ethiopia was among the first independent nations to sign the Charter of the United Nations, and it gave moral and material support to the decolonization of Africa and to the growth of Pan-African cooperation. These efforts culminated in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (since 2002, the African Union) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, both of which have their headquarters in Addis Ababa.



Source: Ethiopia map-woreldometer

Ethiopia is bounded by Eritrea to the north, Djibouti to the northeast, Somalia to the east, Kenya to the south, and South Sudan and Sudan to the west.

Ethiopia's topography, one of the most rugged in Africa, is built on four geologic formations. Rocks of Precambrian origin (more than 540 million years in age) form the oldest basal complex of Ethiopia, as they do in most of Africa. The Precambrian layer is buried under more recent

geologic formations—except in parts of northern, western, and southern Ethiopia, where there are exposed rock layers of granite and schist. Geologic processes of the Mesozoic Era (about 250 to 65 million years ago) contributed sedimentary layers of limestone and sandstone, most of which have been either eroded or covered by volcanic rocks. Younger sedimentary layers are found in northern Ethiopia and on the floors of the Rift Valley. Lava flows from the Cenozoic Era (i.e., the past 65 million years) have formed basaltic layers that now cover two-thirds of Ethiopia's land surface with a thickness ranging from about 1,000 feet (300 meters) to almost 10,000 feet (3,000 meters). The Rift Valley forms a spectacular graben (a massive tectonic trough) running right down the middle of the country from the northern frontier with Eritrea to the southern border with Kenya.

Although Ethiopia's complex relief defies easy classification, five topographic features are discernible. These are the Western Highlands, the Western Lowlands, the Eastern Highlands, the Eastern Lowlands, and the Rift Valley. The Western Highlands are the most extensive and rugged topographic component of Ethiopia. The most spectacular portion is the North Central massifs; these form the roof of Ethiopia, with elevations ranging from 14,872 feet (4,533 metres) for Mount Ras Dejen (or Dashen), the highest point in Ethiopia, to the Blue Nile and Tekeze river channels 10,000 feet below. Lake Tana—Ethiopia's largest inland lake and the main reservoir for the Blue Nile River—is located in this region, at an elevation of about 6,000 feet (1,800 metres)(Ullendorff, 1973, reprinted 1990).

Rwanda, a landlocked republic lying south of the Equator in east-central Africa is known for its breath-taking scenery. Rwanda is often referred to as *le pays des mille collines* (French: "land of a thousand hills"). Its capital is Kigali located in the centre of the country on the Rugezi River about 6,000 feet (1,800 meters) (J. Gotanegre, Prioul, and Sirven, 1974).



Source: Rwanda map-Nations online project

Like Burundi, its neighbour to the south, Rwanda is a geographically small country with one of the highest population densities in sub-Saharan Africa. Rwanda also shares with Burundi a long history of monarchical rule. Unlike what happened in Burundi, however, the demise of the Rwandan kingship came about through a grassroots Hutu-led upheaval that occurred before the country became independent in 1962. Ethnic strife between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi factions peaked in 1994. Civil war and genocide at that time left Rwanda's economy and social fabric in shambles (*See Rwanda genocide of 1994*). The years that followed have been characterized by reconstruction and ethnic reconciliation.

Rwanda is bounded to the north by Uganda, to the east by Tanzania, to the south by Burundi, and to the west by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa) and Lake Kivu. The landscape is reminiscent of a tropical Switzerland. Its dominant feature is a chain of mountains of rugged beauty that runs on a north-south axis and forms part of the Congo-Nile divide. From the volcanoes of the Virunga (Birunga) Mountains in the northwest—where the Karisimbi reaches 14,787 feet (4,507 metres)—the elevation drops to 4,000 feet (1,220 metres) in the swampy Kagera (Akagera) River valley in the east. The interior highlands consist of rolling hills and valleys, yielding to a low-lying depression west of the Congo-Nile divide along the shores of Lake Kivu (Gotanegre, Prioul and Sirven, 1974).

3.2 Research design

Following Babbie's (2006) categorization of social research on the basis of purpose as exploratory, descriptive and explanatory, this qualitative research employed an exploratory research design, with certain characteristics of descriptive research. In social science an exploratory research design is most suited to a research problem/topic where there are few or no earlier studies to refer to. In such a case the exploratory research focuses on gaining insights into and creating familiarity to a subject for later investigation (Cuthill, 2002:79-89).

The goal of exploratory research, therefore, is not to produce a conclusive result that can be used for decision making, but rather to create more understanding of an issue for further research. An exploratory research design also provides maximum flexibility since it can be used to address questions of all types (what, why, how) and can use various methods of data generation (Labaree, 2014:1-14).

The subject matter of the study i.e. the developmental state has not been researched adequately. Particularly in the case of Ethiopia little research is available on the issue. Hence, this research is intended to provide preliminary understanding on the factors, instigating specific questions in this line of inquiry. Therefore, the exploratory research design is most suited to the purpose sought – exploring factors affecting the developmental state perspective.

3.3 Types and Sources of data

In order to analyze the problem, secondary data was collected. The methods of collecting secondary data, while in case of secondary data the nature of data collection work is merely that of compilation (Kothari, 2003).

3.3.1 Secondary data

The research is conducted by studying a wide array of Secondary data documentary sources using both published and unpublished materials. These include government and non-governmental reports, books, journals, party documents (particularly the EPRDF & Rwanda's Patriot Party), newspapers, magazine and internet sources.

3 .4 Methods of Data analysis

Following the completion of data collection, the data have been edited and structured for analysis and interpretation purposes. In the end, interpretation of data was conducted using a combination of interpretivism and constructivism to guide the qualitative method of research.

CHAPTER FOUR

DEVELOPMENTAL STATE OF ETHIOPIA AND RWANDA

4.1 THE EMERGENCE OF DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN ETHIOPIA

Deliberations and discourses about the nature of development are still important in Africa where varieties of developmental models have been tested and failed. Recently, one of the development models, which promoted as a panacea for African development problem is the developmental state approach. The role of the state in socioeconomic development cannot be doubtful (UNECA, 2011). A lesson that was learnt from the 20th century developmental states was that state has to be one of the “institutional keystones” needed to bring economic success. The evidence spawned from the recent global economic crisis suggests that unregulated markets are “unworkable and unsustainable in the long run” and increased role of the state is essential (Evans, 2010:11-16).

In the present global situation, the conventionally accepted wisdom of free market-led development as a necessary condition for transforming backward economies to high level can no longer be taken at face value. Particularly, the 2007/08 global financial crisis left even many western economies in shambles, which disproved the insight of neoliberalism (UN-Habitat, 2014). Due to this, western governments themselves were forced to introduce bailout packages and fiscal stimulus programs to correct the widespread market failures followed the financial crisis (UNECA, 2011).

Therefore, depending on the so-called free market-led development approach could not address all market failures in developing countries; in contrast, it needs an integration of the role of state and market. No nation without an efficient state intervention attained successful economic development. State acting as a vanguard of development has its own advantage in terms of accelerating economic development via addressing market failures and supporting indigenous private sector. In effect, the developmental state model has reemerged as an alternative development model, which promotes the role of state and market integration. Ethiopia, as one of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries committed itself to practice the developmental state model via customized ideology to its unique context. The choice of the developmental state paradigm for Ethiopia is the result of a long process of searching alternative development paths. The model

aims to bring structural change through prioritizing and modernizing agriculture and moving towards industrialization (UNDP, 2015).

The core idea of the developmental state model is that the state should make development agenda its top priority and intervene in the economy to facilitate growth and economic transformation. “In terms of ideology developmental state is essentially one whose ideological underpinning is developmentalist in that it conceives its mission to ensuring economic development” (Mkandawire, 2001). In this aspect, the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy document indicates that “lack of democratization, poverty, and backwardness are threats to the national survival of Ethiopian statehood system. There can be no doubt that the attainment of speedy economic development, democratization, and peace is fundamental to the survival of the country, which finds itself in a state of abject poverty and backwardness” (Ministry of Information, 2002).

More specifically, the recent five-year medium-term Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) also crafted the country’s vision as “to become a country where democratic rule, good governance and social justice reign, upon the involvement and free will of its people, and once extricating itself from poverty to reach the level of a middle-income economy as of 2025” (MoFED, 2010).

The vision for the economic sector in particular set as: “Building an economy, which has a modern and productive agricultural sector with enhanced technology and an industrial sector that plays a leading role in the economy, sustaining economic development, securing social justice and increasing per-capita income of the citizens”. Boosting agricultural productivity and strengthening the industrial base will be essential to transform the economy in a significant manner. Hence, based on the developmental state paradigm, the government has been able to design and implement a pragmatic developmental policies and strategies (*Ibid*).

This indicates the developmental state gives top priority to the agenda of poverty eradication and sustainable economy building, which improving the well-being and the living standards of the nation. Then, the developmental state has declared poverty as its enemy number one and its

strategy focused on to reduce and eventually eradicate it from the nation. Accordingly, a country has registered double-digit GDP growth over the last decade (Negash, 2011:195).

Owing to this, the level of poverty reduced to about less than 30% in 2011 from where it was as high as 58% in 1995. Such reduction was achieved through broad-based economic growth that enabled agriculture making a major contribution, increased and more equitable public spending, and via promoting labor-intensive manufacturing (Africa Progress Report, 2014). This indicates the political leadership and the society almost reach in consensus on the common enemy of the country; poverty and backwardness, and then they are committed to override it under the motto of our enemy is poverty and we will make poverty history.

The introduction of the developmental state paradigm in Ethiopia was viewed into two broad contexts --the country's successive attempt to emulate the developmental paths of the East Asian countries and the large-scale global reaction on the failure of neoliberal paradigm in developing world, particularly in Africa (Fantini, 2013:31). The developmental state model in Ethiopia has two unique features which included both developmental and democratic behaviors. Therefore, the goal of the democratic developmental state in Ethiopia is to create a modern nation and this can be achieved through building rapid and sustain economic development. To materialize this, the country followed a green development path, for instance, it targeted that most of the power generated in the country should emanate from renewable sources, mainly hydropower. In this regard, the democratic developmental state in Ethiopia contributed to achieving rapid economic growth and paved the way to transform the economy towards industrialization (Addisale Balema, 2014).

Though the Ethiopian version of developmental state shares many of the common features of a developmental state from East Asian countries mainly South Korea and Taiwan); the unique features of the country (for instance, the fact that it is a multi-ethnic nation should have been taken into consideration (Fantini, 2013& Balema, 2014). The state pays due attention to the good practices of success stories and tries to adapt according to the unique context of the country. In addition, the state has also given proper attention to design and development of far-reaching institutions, which are crucial to accelerate the socioeconomic structural transformations. Building an increasingly capable, credible, and committed developmental state with democratic

credentials is indispensable to accelerate the development and democratization process (Daddi, 2013). Hence, the democratic developmental state model already in place started to achieve its primary goals enhance economic growth and transformation, and reducing poverty (Addisalem Balema, 2014), though the pace of democratization is not as fast as economic growth. This difference resulted due to the institutional requirements needed to build democracy and achieve economic growth.

After the nation adopted the democratic developmental state paradigm, the state is able to design and articulate its long-term socioeconomic development strategies and programmes. The development policies and strategies have geared towards the priority agenda of reducing multidimensional poverty. Under this priority development agenda, the state has employed several socioeconomic policy instruments to tackle productivity and production challenges in the agricultural sector. Particularly, the agricultural-led development strategy further helps to boost the infrastructure and social services of the rural population consider as cornerstone for structural transformation (Melke, 2013:38(11)).

As the infrastructure expansion takes place successfully, integrations or linkages created among the sectors of the economy or between rural and urban economy. For instance, in the urban areas the developmental state considers Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs) development to address directly unemployment problems in urban areas. Such efforts of the state enhanced the well-being of the nation by attaining rapid economic growth, promoting social development, freeing millions of poor Ethiopian from the intergenerational cycle of poverty, and improving life expectancy of the nation. This indicates the nation's economy proceeding into broad-based and sustainable economic development by the provision massive infrastructural and social development through extensive public investment (Daddi, 2013).

On the whole, besides designing coherent development policies and strategies and inspiring achievements in the economy, the democratic system needs further institutionalization and practices. In Ethiopia, poverty is the most challenging factor that heavily affects the transition towards democracy. People, who live under difficult situations such as poverty and backwardness, lack the capability and time to practice their rights and responsibilities (Rahmato *et al.*, 2008). However, whatever challenges are there, the process of strengthening democracy

has to go hand in hand with poverty eradication or development endeavors. The current economic development practice needs to push further until where it will eliminate major development obstacles in the economy and until realize a dynamic and viable economic environment. Only through significant economic growth, can democracy and economic development be further enhanced and consolidated, and their interrelation and interdependence can be sustained and strengthened. Democracy in Ethiopia is not an option rather it is the only means of survival as a united country (AdisAlem, 2014).

4.1.1 Characteristics of a Developmental State in Ethiopian context

Given the relatively polarized politics and the heterogenous nature (multi-ethnic, multilingual, and multicultural) of Ethiopia, where the quest for the rights of nations, nationalities, and people is the centre of political discourse, engendering a development-oriented political leadership with lesser pressures is quite difficult. The experience of East Asian countries also suggests the importance of clear consensus and shared vision between different elites as an instrument to build a development-oriented leadership (Pempel, 1999). However, at least as far as the reviewer is concerned, the Ethiopian state lacks this virtue. Worse, part of the political leadership has been accused of rent-seeking and predatory bandit behaviour, which is a clear obstacle for the creation of development-oriented elite (Waldner, 1999:131-144). Compared to other developing regions, the autonomy, capability, and effectiveness of the permanent executive in the East Asian developmental states are quite impressive. This may be traced back to the presence of a bureaucracy in the Weberian tradition, which prioritizes meritocratic recruitment, provides promotion incentives, shows rationality, and guarantees high levels of prestige and legitimacy to bureaucratic officials (Meyns and Musamba, 2010).

Onis states his argument: “Rigorous standards of entry not only ensured a high degree of bureaucratic capability, but also generated a sense of unity and common identity on the part of the bureaucratic elite. Hence the bureaucrats were imbued with a sense of mission and identified themselves with national goals which derived from a position of leadership in society” (Onis, 1991:109). Such a bureaucracy exhibits uncommon levels of autonomy and effectiveness when it is obviously free from unproductive interference from the political leadership. In consequence,

decision- makers and technocrats were able to effectively formulate economic policy and employ innovation in public service delivery (ECA and AUC, 2011; Pempel, 1999).

Notwithstanding, the Ethiopian public sector lacks these key manifestations of a developmental bureaucracy. There is also evidence of recruitment and promotion based on political patronage in some key public agencies. In the words of Mebratu (2015):

The civil service in Ethiopia today is actually being re-politicized. Thus, understanding of Ethiopian efforts to adopt reforms—in the context of developmental paradigm—provides key perspectives and experiences to end hiding behind development if there is actual need to transform civil service institutions and save them from being simple cogwheels that conclusively carry out the wishes of politicians.

A production- oriented private sector working closely with an interventionist government has been at the centre of the rapid building of a successful developmental state. Based on extended institutionalized alliances among political power, the financial sector, and industrial capital, these state-private sector partnerships were crafted on the principle of reciprocity such as connecting subsidies to performance, and acted as an incentive for productivity (Wade, 2010:1-7). Nonetheless, the reality on the ground demonstrates that the majority of Ethiopian business is characterized by short-term investments that are seeking for short-term returns and “hot money”. This makes profit, particularly short-term profit, a significant factor in the investment decision-making process.

The other characteristic of the developmental state is the existence of performance-oriented governance. Developmental states are found to enjoy support because they are associated with promoting rapid economic growth and providing economic benefits to both the ruling elites and the general public. Hence due attention is given to performance orientation and the delivery of services (performance legitimacy) to citizens rather than to the ballot (electoral legitimacy) (Johnson as cited by Musamba, 2010).

In Ethiopia, state legitimacy is achieved through the ballot; however, the main short-coming is that society has, arguably, not reached an equilibrium stage where the feedback mechanism between voting patterns and the delivery of services reinforce each other. Moreover, there is emerging criticism of the Ethiopian government related to election frauds and suppressive laws

that “has narrowed the political arena”. Critics often also accuse the regime of having room only for weak, fragile, and puppet political oppositions.

To conclusion, developmental states tend to manifest the following traits: economic nationalism (skepticism about neo-liberalism), strong government bureaucracy, and production oriented private sector, prioritization of economic growth over political reform, performance legitimacy, and focus on technical education. Successful developmental states have used the aforementioned traits to transform their economies and be globally competitive, to reduce poverty and inequality in their societies and by and large to enhance quality of life. In this regard, Ethiopia, a self-declared democratic developmental state, lacks most of the manifestations of successful developmental states.

4.2. The Making of Democratic Developmental State in Ethiopia

Democracy and federalism have been adopted as equally important values of the FDRE constitution with a view to curing the national political ills of the state. Constitutionalism and rule of law demand the implementation of these two equally important values as a top priority before any political economy including DS. However, the normative aspiration of democracy and ethnic federalism shows wider pitfall and anomalies in its practical implementation.

The other important national challenge is poverty and the country needs to achieve fast economic growth to survive. One of the TPLF confidantes AddisAlem Balema (2013) stressed on the importance of development saying that “people lives under poverty and backwardness lack the time and capabilities to exercise their rights and responsibilities”. But as Rodrik (2006) rightly pointed out “we do not need to delay democratization just so that we can actually have growth or that we have democracy only when we can afford it”.

According to the constitution, democracy and federalism are the irreplaceable choices for Ethiopia and there is no alternative path. However, developmental state is not the only way to achieve development. Therefore, in case of inevitable normative contradiction, theoretically, the government has no choice than compromising the political economy of the developmental state. In other words, under Ethiopian normative framework, DS doctrine needs to be altered so as to make it consistent with the federalism and the democratic tenets, not otherwise.

The EPRDF government, since it has come in power, tries to find a suitable political economic model for the country. The TPLF before came into power in 1991 strongly adhere to the Marxism and Leninism doctrine, Albania as a model. After 1991 due to the change of global system towards liberalism, EPRDF announced the liberal policies in the transitional period (1991-1995) while keeping the revolutionary democratic ideation (Bach 2011:50(5)).

The EPRDF revolutionary democracy; is a bricolage operating out of Leninism, Marxism, Maoism, and also liberalism” (Bach 2011). It is not a mere antithesis of neoliberalism rather it is a hotchpotch doctrine without clarity “aims at legitimizing a political and economic structure which de facto implies the resilience of authoritarianism (Bach, 2011).

The need to emulate the developmental state model is not a new phenomenon for Ethiopia. The EPRDF started to articulate the idea of DS first by the rejection of the neo-liberal model. In this regard, Meles Zenawi in 2012 pointed out that “the neoliberal paradigm led Africa to unstable democracy and economic dead end and it also hindered the development of an alternative path of democracy which over time could be stable and mature”.

Despite early developmental tendencies of the EPRDF, the 2000/1 TPLF internal party crises forced the prominent party elites to rearticulate the party policy and since 2002 the party officially declared DS as its political economy doctrine (Zenawi 2006; Simon 2011:173).

The EPRDF based on the developmental state experience of South Korean and Taiwan and the party political doctrine of revolutionary democracy decided to adopt DS (OGCA 2000; EPRDF 2010; ANDM 2013). Theoretically, EPRDF is right at least when it stresses the values of democracy by stating that, “the homogenous nature of the East Asian population helps them to compromise democracy and this is not the case in diversified Ethiopia” (EPRDF, 2010).

The developmental state of Ethiopia is different from the South East Asian model of DS. The Ethiopian government has been trying to build developmental state in a norm of democratic and fully ethnic federal state structure while the South East Asian successful DS model was implemented in a homogeneous unitary state structure under soft authoritarian government. In Ethiopia, the adoption of developmental state as a model, unlike East Asian, comes from the domestic threat of poverty than external pressure (Clapham, 2017). Unlike the Ethiopian weak

bureaucracy, the East Asian was in an advantageous position of strong and meritocratic bureaucracy.

The Ethiopian DS adopted in a fully ethnic federal state and it has its own norm contradictions and serious challenges. The ethnic federal structure provides autonomy and decentralized many aspects of legislative, executive, judicial and fiscal powers while the DS require centralized planning and resources mobilization. The bureaucracy in developmental state needs to be meritocratic, depoliticized, efficient, and effective, while the ethnic federal Ethiopian bureaucracy is politicized and ethnic oriented (Jebena, 2015:1-9). In ethnically diverse and deeply divided society it is hard to create a national consensus which is a requirement for effective DS. Theoretically, central planning, central mobilization of national resources and uniform implementation of the national development plan in genuine ethnic federal states is difficult. Any development coalition and partnership in ethnic federal states is not goal oriented rather it is ethnic oriented (Tiruneh, 2015:551).

Generally speaking, the FDRE government effectively adopted the DS in an ethnic federal state structure. However, the practical implementation resulted in a mixed outcome. With its own challenges, the government achieved convincing overall development, however, the tenets of democracy and administrative and political autonomy of states deliberately neglected. In contradiction with the normative requirement, practically the agenda of development takes primacy over democracy and administrative and political autonomy of states. Despite its compelling development success, the EPRDF governments are challenged by a number of factors. The weak bureaucracy, leadership crises, internal security threat, the neurosis of ethnic nationalism, the inability of fast economic transformation to manufacturing, legitimacy crises, and weak private sector are some of them.

The building of strong institution and meritocratic bureaucracy is a requirement for the effectiveness of DS. The Ethiopian civil service despite the implementation of various reform programs is constrained by lack of committed meritocratic bureaucracy. Lack of accountability and transparency and inadequate moral and material support for the employees crippled the implementation capacity of the civil service (Markos, 2013:61). The over politicization of the

civil services, poor salary system, and lack of merit based promotion of employees do not attract capable and committed human resources. The civil service position assigned not based on merit, it is based on ethnic quotas and political allegiance for EPRDF. This political patronage and ethnic quota system of the civil service seriously affected the autonomy of the civil service (Jebena, 2015:1-9). The undue delay and overrun of many projects is one of the Indicators for the lack of capacity and commitment in the bureaucracy (Tilahun, 2016:551).

The lack of accountability is manifested by the massive corruption and illicit financial flow from the country. According to Transparency International corruption survey index 2016, Ethiopia ranked 108 out of 176 states (TI 2017). Corruption, bribery, and kickbacks were on the rise, according to Global Financial Integrity report Ethiopia “lost US\$11.7 billion to illicit financial outflows between 2000 and 2009” (Gascoigne, 2011:9(8)).

The late Premier of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi was exceptionally capable of articulating the East Asian model and adapting to the Ethiopian circumstances (Clapham, 2017). Arguably, he was a “super smart pragmatic leader with authoritarian streak” (Clapham and Mills, 2015:7(08)). After his death, the office was transferred peacefully to his successor Hailemariam Desalegn Boshe, the soft spoken and humble Protestant from Wolayit ethnic group. But he failed to lead the country as his predecessor under one voice, and ‘many elites became reluctant to his humble ruling strategy’ (Bonda, 2011:267). This leadership gap significantly affected the uniform effective implementation of projects across the country.

The implementation of DS without widespread consensus and consented hegemonic developmental dogma is difficult (Bonda, 2011:267). The varying historical narrative and conception about the future create a strong mistrust among political elites in Ethiopia (Fiseha, 2012) and with this deeply divided society building effective DS is another challenge. The government tendencies of excluding and marginalizing rival elites (Bonda, 2011) make it hardly possible to build grand elite coalition and consensus. Further division of the elites is aggravated by the ethnic based federalism and it makes dialogue among elites hardly possible. Due to the widespread Oromo protest, for example, the government was unable to discuss let alone implement the Addis Ababa integrated master plan.

The Ethiopian developmental state despite its effectiveness to achieve development, it has not yet managed to transform the agriculture based economy to manufacturing. According to World Bank, still half of the national GDP and 85% the work forces are dependent on agriculture. The Ethiopian DS are also unable to attract and create productive private sector (Clapham and Mills, 2015: 7(08)).

Development and security have been the potential sources of EPRDF domestic legitimacy. However, due to the growing authoritarian tendency and neglect of regional autonomy, all in the name of development, this source of legitimacy are almost lost. The massive protests in the state of Oromia and Amhara states, in the aftermath of 100% election victory, and the declaration of a state of emergency for 10 months in 2016/17 were some of the indicators (BBC, 2015; VOA, 2017).

Generally, in ethnic-based federalism from the available literature the following issues are concluded:

- ✓ Since the civil service position assigned not based on merit, it is based on ethnic quotas and political allegiance for EPRDF has discouraged the building of strong institution and meritocratic bureaucracy is a requirement for the effectiveness of DS.
- ✓ The varying historical narrative and conception about the future create a strong mistrust among political elites in Ethiopia (Fiseha, 2012:435) and with this deeply divided society building effective Developmental state is another challenge.
- ✓ Power sharing in reality, the arrangement is criticized for its fictitious ethnic coalition organizations which have formed EPRDF. In simple and clear manner, it is a system stretched to assure the TPLF's hegemonic project by using ethnic rights discourse. Thus, unless these political elites do not come to power through the full consent of the people, it was totally impossible to say there is a legitimate power sharing among ethnic groups. This again implies that unless ethnic groups are not involved in power sharing, they mistrust the governing body, and they assumed that it is the government of other ethnic groups. This finally leads to inter-ethnic conflicts in the one hand and government and the underrepresented peoples on the other.

- ✓ One of the major problems refers to the impossibility of making ethnic and administrative boundaries congruent. This tends to engender tensions and conflicts in the relationship between local/regional majorities and minorities.
- ✓ In the same vein, ethnic federalism is criticized for frustrating countrywide free mobility of citizens and turning every constitutional conflict into ethnic conflicts (Fleiner, 2000:97).
- ✓ Moreover, ethnic-based federalism might exacerbate the plight of local minorities

4.3 The contemporary Rwandan model

Scholars broadly agree that the country is run by a small and resolute group of leaders, constituting visionary and developmentally committed elite (Hasselskog, 2015:36(5)). President Kagame's personal leadership style has been deemed determined "to the point of ruthlessness" (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2011:379) and Jones (2012) analyzes how policy is driven by a closely linked inner circle around the president (Hasselskog, Mugume, Ndushabandi & Schierenbeck, 2017: 36(5)). "Vision 2020" provides an explicit state-owned vision and top-down developmentalist agenda, stating the necessity to "clearly define the future of the country" and envisaging that radical modernization will transform Rwanda into a middle-income country (RoR, 2000). Driven by political will and long-term vision rather than short-term personal gains, leaders have not gained or remained in power by distributing benefits. Rather, though there are sources of primary accumulation that could have led to corruption, corruption is uncommon and vigorously sanctioned (Beswick, 2011: 32(10)).

The Rwandan government also strives to achieve a meritocratic ideal.³ the post-genocide Regime added technocratic and bureaucratic strength (Samset, 2011), highly educated Rwandans continue to return, and recruitment policies include headhunting among the diaspora (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012:379). "Vision 2020" states the need for a small, effective and flexible public sector (RoR, 2000), and a firmly results-based management, through a comprehensive system of performance contracts, serves to instill a spirit of hard work and competitiveness.

Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2011) dealt with a disciplined technocracy with strong vertical coordination, but weak technocratic integrity, implying that officials are unlikely to object to misguided political schemes. This combination of strong political leadership and efficient

bureaucracy provides for firm action, with the operationality of the development strategy and effective implementation of reforms found to distinguish Rwanda from other developing countries (Beswick, 2011; OECD, 2011:32(10)).

Furthermore, the Rwandan government expects to steer the economy, reflected for example in the intent to radically transform the agricultural sector, which is to provide a specialized engine of growth, later to be replaced by the industry and service sectors (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2014a). Specific sectors are identified for development and “party-statal” are allowed to accrue rents and jump-start growth (Mann & Berry, 2016). State-led development and control are, however, combined with a liberal market approach, and the key role of the private sector is emphasized, for example in generating growth, creating jobs and providing services (RoR, 2013a).

State ability to steer the economy is increased by large flows of aid and resources from government supporters, not least in the diaspora. There is also a notable lack of challenges to the government, with no large landowners or politically effective economic interests, and with state officials largely insulated from pressure by interest groups or parliamentarians. According to Beswick (2011), a consensus-based model serves to disguise the heavy dominance of the president and the ruling party. Elections are reported as being manipulated, opposition politicians’ silenced, civil society eliminated as an autonomous force and the media controlled (Reyntjens, 2011:1-34).

Despite undisputed authoritarianism, the legitimacy of the Rwandan government and president is high. Unlike the 20th-century developmental state, however, legitimacy does not derive mainly from development performance. Rather, the ruling party’s role in defeating the genocidal forces in 1994 allowed it considerable autonomy in reconstituting the state (Beswick, 2011) and, depicting itself as the only option to maintain stability, the government continues to use its moral authority and “genocide credit” (Hayman, 2009).

Socioeconomic development, meanwhile, is seen as a way to create security, overcome ethnic divisions and promote political stabilization, and thus a means towards the predominant goals of unity and reconciliation (Samset, 2011). As noted, there are also divergent views on development

achievements. While international donors are largely favorable, commending Rwanda for the use of aid resources and the results achieved (World Bank, 2013), numerous scholars warn that deteriorating rural living conditions and extreme inequality will lead to polarization (Desrosiers & Thomson, 2011: 49(3)).

Despite the debate surrounding development results and distribution, the above shows that the current Rwandan model of governance and development in many aspects reflects the 20th-century developmental state—with power concentrated in a small, development-oriented and determined political leadership, a disciplined and hard-working Bureaucracy, low levels of corruption, state capacity to manage economic interests, relative absence of political challenges and high government legitimacy (Hintjens, 2013).

4.4. Shortcomings of the developmental state model in the cases of Ethiopia and Rwanda

Building of the developmental state has two cardinal shortcomings in Ethnic Based federalism: first, state hegemony instead of democratic plurality; and second – a result of the first – weak accountability of a government that is heavily dependent on personality and party oversight, instead of democratic institutional accountability. In both Ethiopia and Rwanda, developmental states have been effective in their delivery of public services and economic development (although less so in the spheres of politics and democracy). As a result, their governments have generally enjoyed performance legitimacy. Both countries have been led by dominant parties, which are critical for developmental states.

At the center of the transformation of the Rwandan economy and the country's security are the governing RPF and President Paul Kagame, while in Ethiopia it was the EPRDF and its leader, Meles Zenawi. The World Bank called this model “The Ethiopian Way.” For developmental service delivery, perhaps aptly, the EPRDF and the RPF looked to the east for inspiration. While Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and China are most often considered the premier developmental states, China and South Korea provided the inspirational blueprint on which the EPRDF based its economic model, with some adjustments in

the light of Ethiopia's historical, cultural and other national particularities (Maru, Mehari Tadele,). The developmental states in Ethiopia and Rwanda became viscerally hostile to accountability and the rule of law. While democracy, as generally understood, is designed more to handle differences than similarities and assumes that all officials and parties, including presidents and ruling parties, are replaceable, in a developmental state there is a monopolistic exercise of power.

Each developmental state has had an authoritarian or Marxist-leaning dominant party at some time in its history. Hence the developmental state can lead to a political party 'imperium' which exercises state power as a monopolistic hegemony. Like Ethiopia and Meles Zenawi, Rwanda is known for its rapid economic growth and its long-serving president, Paul Kagame. Labelled by many media outlets as one-horse races, elections in both countries have been led by dominant ruling parties: Ethiopia under Zenawi and Rwanda under Kagame offered participatory but uncompetitive space. The ruling parties in both countries and their leadership have been accused by opposition parties both at home and abroad of violating human rights and stifling critical power contenders ("Rwanda Events of 2019," Human Rights Watch, 2020). International media, human rights organizations and intergovernmental bodies such as the UN and the EU have expressed their opposition to the governance style in Ethiopia and Rwanda (" Human Rights Watch, 2 June 2017 :).

Dynamism and pragmatism are two essential pillars of the developmental state. With a growing middle class and the strength of popular demands, the Ethiopian developmental state failed to reflect demographic trends. Protests that followed the death of Zenawi, the architect of the Ethiopian developmental state, led to a change of leadership that favored a neo-liberal ideology, which caused a schism within the ruling party. The Ethiopian constitutional system failed to manage differences within the ruling party, leading to civil war in the country. While its progress is commendable, ("Ethiopia's Great Run: The Growth Acceleration and How to Pace It," op. cit). Ethiopia's developmental state lagged behind in democratization, a deficit that caused continual protests and now a civil war. The fate of Rwanda may be no different unless its politics are rapidly democratized. This is in addition to geopolitical competition from great powers in Africa that could affect its fate (Tadele, 2018: 3(2).

Ethiopia's recent civil war might offer lessons for Libya as an aspiring developmental state. It shows the need for robust and reliable democratic constitutionalism guided by the rule of law. Neither a dominant political party nor a strong leader can substitute a vibrant constitutional democracy in which power is exercised with legitimacy, the majority of the citizenry have the right to rule nor are the rights of minorities fully respected. Like socio-economic development, democratic accountability increases tolerance of diversity and plurality. An empowered democratic citizenry is central to increasing the accountability of officials through constitutional democratic institutions. On the contrary, a fixation on stability at any cost can jeopardize future social developments and even the state's viability. Similarly, Libya's post-war generation will increasingly require leadership that thrives on freedom, not fear.

In the Ethiopian situation, ethnicity was associated with narrow-nationalism, tribalism or conspirators' agenda by the previous regimes, whereas the new ruling elites as the emancipator and valuable asset to be protected and promoted. As Markakis states that 'over-night, ethnicity became a legitimate and preferred principle of political organization, and provides the foundation for a reconstructed Ethiopian state' (Markakis, 1994:217). The most relevant situation for Ethiopia is the position that takes it as an ideology of mobilized collectivises that may be used both as a weapon of resistance by the marginalized ethnic groups and as a political instrument for elites (Merera, 2003:155-160).

CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 CONCLUSION

This study has made a modest attempt to indicate factors that have been affecting the developmental state model in Ethiopia and Rwanda. It gave attention to identify the dynamics that influenced the sustainable and successful state-led model of development. After considering the various facts exhaustively discussed in the previous chapters, the following conclusions are drawn:

Since TPLF did not empower ethnic communities, but it is promoting surrogate elites and ethnic entrepreneurs from various ethnic communities that have facilitated the expansion of its influence and rule in their respective areas. The implication is that ethnic federal arrangement has been employed by TPLF in order to extend its authority beyond its own territory in order to make the Tigrayan elite a dominant political and economic force in the Ethiopian state. But numerous analysts highlight the essentiality of development orientated political leadership bound together by a powerful economic and political ideology focused on development (Beeson, 2003: 100(22)).

In the case of the East Asian developmental states it has been observed that the political elites in these countries were able to devise development (Waldner, 1999:131). These elites gave the bureaucracy sufficient scope to take initiatives and act authoritatively in pursuit of the desired development goals (Weiss 2003). As a result, as TPLF was not interested to create a genuine ethnic coalition government and a genuine ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia it was not possible to create environment conducive for Building of Developmental state and its sustainability.

While scholars broadly agree that the country is run by a small and resolute group of leaders, constituting visionary and developmentally committed elite (Hasselskog, 2015:36(5)). President Kagame's personal leadership style has been deemed determined "to the point of ruthlessness" (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2011:379) and Jones (2012) analyzes how policy is driven by a closely linked inner circle around the president (Hasselskog, Mugume, Ndushabandi,&

Schierenbeck, 2017:38(8)). “Vision 2020” provides an explicit state-owned vision and top-down developmentalist agenda, stating the necessity to “clearly define the future of the country” and envisaging that radical modernization will transform Rwanda into a middle-income country (RoR, 2000). The other main feature in building of developmental state is autonomous and effective bureaucracy. This is traced back to the presence of bureaucracy in the prioritizes meritocratic recruitment, provides promotion incentives, shows rationality and guarantees high levels of prestige and legitimacy to bureaucratic officials, But in Ethiopia. Many of surrogate ethnic parties, which have not have any legitimacy from their respective ethnic communities, have become an instrument of the TPLF’s hegemonic desire, as they have been easily susceptible to TPLF’s rewarding or/and coercing power not a meritocratic recruitment. In this case, the TPLF has been consistent in its core policy in promoting first and foremost the interests of their Party, but not in promoting of Building of Developmental state in the country, The prevalence of party loyalty at the expense of meritocracy in recruitment and promotion coupled with corruption and rampant rent-seeking political economy would be additional threats to the country’s existence and development, while The Rwandan government strives to achieve a meritocratic ideal. The post-genocide Regime added technocratic and bureaucratic strength (Samset, 2011:38(4)), highly educated Rwandans continue to return, and recruitment policies include headhunting among the diaspora (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012:379).

The primary purpose of intervention in Developmental state was to promote the interests of the business sector, create conditions for capital accumulation and productivity improvement (Amsden, 1989:(4)). But Since the 1990s, Ethiopia has seen the emergence of four such endowment conglomerates, each in one of its federated states and associated with one of the ruling Fronts: the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT) in Tigray Region; *Tiret* or Endeavour in Amhara; *Tumsa* in Oromia; and *Wendo* in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State (SNNPRS), which weaken the private sector and Makes keep going on their Party strong which have a negative impact to the creation of Competent and Supportive citizenship for successful developmental state of Ethiopia. But in Rwanda the public and private sectors are intertwined through the ruling party’s holdings endowment that initiate investments in areas key to further economic development; they provide indirect resources and public goods that feed wider social, political and developmental processes.

They have played a role in financing and facilitating investment in areas of weak private involvement, and by small and new business start-ups, including youth co-operatives. A degree of divestment from the SME sector, in combination with outsourcing business to new actors, has accelerated to the sustainable and successful state-led model of development.

Moreover, Ethnic federalism might exacerbate the plight of local minorities, which Makes the tendency of exacerbating conflicts between local majorities and local minorities. And one of the major problems in ethnically based country Like Ethiopia refers to the impossibility of making ethnic and administrative boundaries congruent. This tends to engender tensions and conflicts in the relationship between local/regional majorities and minorities. In the same vein, Ethnic federalism is criticized for frustrating countrywide free mobility of citizens and turning every constitutional conflict into ethnic conflicts, accordingly if there is Mistrust between citizens common sense of nationalism are lost. The achievement of Rwandan Building of Developmental state as their priority Means of Poverty Reduction and Fostering of Countries Economy stands from Common sense of Nationalism by structuring their Political Structure through some restrictions, including the 2003 ban on political parties based on ethnicity, religion, or sex. Major parties include the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Social Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party.

5.2. Recommendations

Predicating upon the aforementioned issues, it is possible to note that the sustainability of building a developmental state could be assured by creating national consensus through restructuring the political system of the country.

In the Ethiopian situation, ethnicity was associated with narrow-nationalism, tribalism or conspirators' agenda by the previous regimes, whereas the recent ruling elites acted as the emancipator and valuable asset to be protected and promoted. As Markakis states 'over-night ethnicity became a legitimate and preferred principle of political organization, and provides the foundation for a reconstructed Ethiopian state' (Markakis, 1994:154(12)). The most relevant situation for Ethiopia is the position that takes it as an ideology of mobilized collectivise effort that may be used both as a weapon of resistance by the marginalized ethnic groups and as a political instrument for elites (Merera, 2003:4(10)).

If ethnic groups are geographically concentrated, federalism could offer an excellent opportunity for group autonomy. Thus, by accepting the inevitability of drawing federal arrangements based on ethnic boundaries in case of geographically concentrated ethnic groups, the federal framework with relatively many and small constituent units could make the federal dividing lines coincide as much as possible with the ethnic boundaries (Lijphart, 2002:37-54), so as to these reason Common sense of Nationalize embarked between Political Leader, Elites and across the nations.

If there is common sense of nationalism existed the leadership strongly commit to developmental goals, and which places national development ahead of personal enrichment and/or short-term political gains (Ghani et al., 2005), the state is become autonomous in so far as it has a rationalised bureaucracy characterized by meritocracy and long-term career prospects, traits that make civil servants more professional and detached from powerful rent-seeking groups (Evans, 1995:11-16), the intervention of state the state is to promote the interests of the business sector, create conditions for capital accumulation and productivity improvement (Amsden,1989) . Had the steps and ideas put into effect properly, the sustainability of building of developmental state could have been achieved.

References

- Addislem Balema, A. (2014). Democracy and development in Ethiopia.
- Ainscow, M., Booth, T., & Dyson, A. (1999). Inclusion and exclusion in schools: Listening to some hidden voices. *Inclusive education: International voices on disability and justice*, 139-151.
- Alice H. Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Allo, A. (2017). Protests, terrorism, and development: On Ethiopia's perpetual state of emergency. *Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. LJ*, 19, 133.
- Amsden, A. H. (1989). *Asia's next giant: South Korea and late industrialization*. Oxford University Press on Demand.
- Amsden, A. (1992). A theory of government intervention in late industrialization. *State and market in development: Synergy or rivalry*, 14.
- Amsden, A. H. (1994). Why isn't the whole world experimenting with the East Asian model to develop? Review of the East Asian miracle. *World Development*, 22(4), 627-633.
- Aryeetey, E. (2003). Recent developments in African financial markets: Agenda for further research. *Journal of African Economies*, 12(suppl_2), ii111-ii152.
- Asnake, M., Walie, L., & Melkamu, Y. (2006). Improving the range of contraceptive choices in rural Ethiopia. *Ethiopian Journal of Health Development*, 20(2), 74-78.
- Ayenachew, D. (2014). Evolution and Organization of the Čäwa Military Regiments in Medieval Ethiopia. In *Annales d'Ethiopie* (Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 83-95). Persée-Portail des revues scientifiques en SHS.
- Bach, T., & Hehn, J. P. (2011). Photochemical reactions as key steps in natural product synthesis. *Angewandte Chemie International Edition*, 50(5), 1000-1045.
- Bauer, R., Waldner, G., Fallmann, H., Hager, S., Klare, M., Krutzler, T. ... & Maletzky, P. (1999). The photo-fenton reaction and the TiO₂/UV process for waste water treatment— novel developments. *Catalysis today*, 53(1), 131-144.
- Bayart, JF (1993). Religion and political modernity in black Africa: God for all and each for himself.

- Bayart, J. F. (1993). Religion et modernité politique en Afrique noire: Dieu pour tous et chacun pour soi.
- Berger, J. O., & Delampady, M. (1987). Testing precise hypotheses. *Statistical Science*, 163.
- Beswick, D. (2011). Aiding state building and sacrificing peace building? The Rwanda–UK relationship 1994–2011. *Third World Quarterly*, 32(10), 1911-1930.
- Birks, M., & Mills, J. (2015). *Grounded theory: A practical guide*. Sage.
- Booth, A. (1999). Education and economic development in Southeast Asia: Myths and realities. *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, 304.
- Bolesta, A. (2007). China as a developmental state. *Montenegrin Journal of economics*, 3(5), 105-111.
- Bonda, S. (2011). Impact of ethnic federalism in building developmental state of Ethiopia. *Unpublished Master's Thesis*. International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague, the Netherlands.
- Bonda, David J., Hyoun-gon Lee, Jeffrey A. Blair, Xiongwei Zhu, George Perry, and Mark A. Smith. "Role of metal dyshomeostasis in Alzheimer's disease." *Metallomics* 3, no. 3 (2011): 267-270.
- Booth, A. (1999). Education and economic development in Southeast Asia: Myths and realities. *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, 290-306.
- Booth, D., & Golooba-Mutebi, F. (2012). Developmental patrimonialism? The case of Rwanda. *African Affairs*, 111(444), 379-403.
- Booth, D., & Golooba- Mutebi, F. (2014). Policy for agriculture and horticulture in Rwanda: A different political economy?. *Development Policy Review*, 32(s2), s173-s196.
- Boyd, R., & Ngo, T. W. (Eds.). (2005). *Asian states: Beyond the developmental perspective*. Routledge.
- Caldentey, E. P. (2008). The concept and evolution of the developmental state. *International Journal of Political Economy*, 37(3), 27-53.
- Castells, M. (1992). The world has changed: can planning change? *Landscape and Urban Planning*, 22(1),56.

- Clapham, C., & Mills, G. (2015). Ethiopia's compelling rise: Lessons for Africa. *Johannesburg South Africa, the Brenthurst Foundation*. <http://aameg.Org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/Brenthurst-Ethiopia-paper-2015-02.Pdf> Accessed, 7(08), 2017.
- Clapham, C. (2017). *The Horn of Africa: State formation and decay*. Oxford University Press.
- Chabal, P., & Daloz, J. P. (1999). Africa works. *Disorder as political instrument*.
- Chang, H. J. (2006). Understanding the relationship between institutions and economic development. Some key theoretical issues. *Revista de Economía Institucional*, 8(14), 1.
- Chang, H. J. (Ed.). (2003). *Rethinking development economics*. Anthem Press.
- Coats, S., Flanagan, W. M., Nourse, J., & Roberts, J. M. (1996). Requirement of p27Kip1 for restriction point control of the fibroblast cell cycle. *Science*, 272(5263), 877-880.
- Coates, G. W. (2000). Precise control of polyolefin stereochemistry using single-site metal catalysts. *Chemical Reviews*, 100(4), 1223-1252.
- Cuthill, M. (2002). Exploratory research: citizen participation, local government and sustainable development in Australia. *Sustainable development*, 10(2), 79-89.
- Conde, M. (2011). Andreasson, Stefan. 2010: Africa's Development Impasse: Rethinking the Political Economy of Transformation. London: Zed Books. 256 pp. £ 17.99 paperback, £ 65 hardback. ISBN-10: 1842779729 paperback, 1842779710 hardback. *Progress in Development Studies*, 11(3), 251-253.
- Clapham, C. (1996). *Africa and the international system: The politics of state survival* (No. 50). Cambridge University Press.
- Clapham, P. B., Downs, M. J., & King, R. J. (1969). Some applications of thin films to polarization devices. *Applied optics*, 8(10), 1965-1974.
- Clapham, P. R., Weber, J. N., Whitby, D., McIntosh, K., Dalglish, A. G., Maddon, P. J., ... & Weiss, R. A. (1989). Soluble CD4 blocks the infectivity of diverse strains of HIV and SIV for T cells and monocytes but not for brain and muscle cells. *Nature*, 337(6205), 368-370.

- Demilie, T., Beyene, G., Melaku, S., & Tsegaye, W. (2012). Urinary bacterial profile and antibiotic susceptibility pattern among pregnant women in North West Ethiopia. *Ethiopian journal of health sciences*, 22(2).
- Desrosiers, M. E., & Thomson, S. (2011). Rhetorical legacies of leadership: projections of 'benevolent leadership' in pre-and post-genocide Rwanda. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 49(3), 429-453.
- Deyo, F. C. (Ed.). (1987). *the political economy of the new Asian industrialism*. Cornell University Press.
- Dewhirst, F. E., Chen, T., Izard, J., Paster, B. J., Tanner, A. C., Yu, W. H., & Wade, W. G. (2010). The human oral microbiome. *Journal of bacteriology*, 192(19), 5002-5017.
- Deyo, F. C. (Ed.). (1987). *The political economy of the new Asian industrialism*. Cornell University Press.
- Doner, R. F., Ritchie, B. K., & Slater, D. (2005). Systemic vulnerability and the origins of developmental states: Northeast and Southeast Asia in comparative perspective. *International organization*, 59(2), 327-361.
- Economic Report on Africa (ERA) (2011). *Governing Development in Africa-the Role of the State in economic Transformation: Africa's Need for a Developmental State; Opportunities and Challenges*, Chapter 5, Economic Commission for Africa, African Union.
- Edigheji, O. (2010). Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa: potentials and challenges.
- Evans, W. J., & Lexell, J. (1995). Human aging, muscle mass, and fiber type composition. *The Journals of Gerontology Series A: Biological Sciences and Medical Sciences*, 50(Special Issue), 11-16.
- Fiseha, A. (2012). Ethiopia's Experiment in Accommodating Diversity: 20 Years' Balance Sheet. *Regional & Federal Studies*, 22(4), 435-473.
- Fleiner, T. (2002). Recent developments of Swiss federalism. *Publius: the journal of federalism*, 32(2), 97-124.

- Fritz, V., & Menocal, A. R. (2007). Developmental states in the new millennium: Concepts and challenges for a new aid agenda. *Development Policy Review*, 25(5), 531-552.
- Fourie, J., & Santana-Gallego, M. (2011). The impact of mega-sport events on tourist arrivals. *Tourism management*, 32(6), 1364-1370.
- Gascoigne, N. R., Casas, J., Brzostek, J., & Rybakin, V. (2011). Initiation of TCR phosphorylation and signal transduction. *Frontiers in immunology*, 2, 72.
- Gil-da-Costa, R., Martin, A., Lopes, M. A., Munoz, M., Fritz, J. B., & Braun, A. R. (2006). Species-specific calls activate homologs of Broca's and Wernicke's areas in the macaque. *Nature neuroscience*, 9(8), 1064-1070.
- Gökgür, N. (2012). Rwanda's ruling party-owned enterprises: Do they enhance or impede development??. *IOB Discussion Papers*, (2012.03).
- Haggard, S. (1989). Introduction: The International Politics of Industrial Change. *Pacific Dynamics: The Inter-national Politics of Industrial Change (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989)*, 1-21.
- Halabo, T. T. (2016). Ethnic Federal System in Ethiopia: Origin, Ideology and Paradoxes. *Inter. J. Polit. Sci. Develop*, 4, 1-15.
- Hasselskog, M., & Schierenbeck, I. (2015). National policy in local practice: the case of Rwanda. *Third World Quarterly*, 36(5), 950-966.
- Hasselskog, M., Mugume, P. J., Ndushabandi, E., & Schierenbeck, I. (2017). National ownership and donor involvement: an aid paradox illustrated by the case of Rwanda. *Third World Quarterly*, 38(8), 1816-1830.
- Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., & Kaufmann, D. (2000). Seize the state, seize the day: State capture, corruption and influence in transition. *Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition (September 2000)*.
- Heywood, A. (2014). *Global politics*. Macmillan International Higher Education.
- Jebena, B. A. (2015). Ethnic federalism and democratic developmental state in Ethiopia: Some Points of Contradiction. *International Journal of Political Science and Development*, 3(7), 291-300.
- Hintjens, P. (2013). *ZeroMQ: messaging for many applications*. "O'Reilly Media, Inc."

- Jebena, M. G., Taha, M., Nakajima, M., Lemieux, A., Lemessa, F., Hoffman, R., & al'Absi, M. (2015). Household food insecurity and mental distress among pregnant women in Southwestern Ethiopia: a cross sectional study design. *BMC pregnancy and childbirth*, *15*(1), 1-9.
- Johnson, C. (1982). *MITI and the Japanese miracle: the growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975*. Stanford University Press.
- Kear, B. P. (2005). Cranial morphology of *Platypterygius longmani* Wade, 1990 (Reptilia: Ichthyosauria) from the Lower Cretaceous of Australia. *Zoological Journal of the Linnean Society*, *145*(4), 583-622.
- Kebede, M. (2001). The rehabilitation of violence and the violence of rehabilitation: Fanon and colonialism. *Journal of black studies*, *31*(5), 539-562.
- Kebede, A. M., & Demeke, G. W. (2017). The influence of leadership styles on employees' job satisfaction in Ethiopian public universities. *Contemporary Management Research*, *13*(3).
- Kim, Heejung S., David K. Sherman, and Shelley E. Taylor. "Culture and social support." *American psychologist* *63*, no. 6 (2008): 518.
- Kim, J. Y., Lee, K., Coates, N. E., Moses, D., Nguyen, T. Q., Dante, M., & Heeger, A. J. (2007). Efficient tandem polymer solar cells fabricated by all-solution processing. *Science*, *317*(5835), 121.
- Koshe, W., & Jha, K. N. (2016). Investigating causes of construction delay in Ethiopian construction industries. *Journal of Civil, Construction and Environmental Engineering*, *1*(1), 18-29.
- Kothari, C. R. (2004). *Research methodology: Methods and techniques*. New Age International.
- Künzler, D. (2004). *WO dies Elefanten tanzen leidet das Gras* (Doctoral dissertation, Universität Zürich).
- Kuhnle, G., Spencer, J. P., Chowrimootoo, G., Schroeter, H., Debnam, E. S., Srai, S. K. S., ... & Hahn, U. (2000). Resveratrol is absorbed in the small intestine as resveratrol glucuronide. *Biochemical and biophysical research communications*, *272*(1), 212-217.

- Labaree, D. (2014). Let's measure what no one teaches: PISA, NCLB, and the shrinking aims of education. *Teachers College Record*, 116(9), 1-14.
- Leftwich, A. (1995). Bringing politics back in: Towards a model of the developmental state. *The journal of development studies*, 31(3), 400-427.
- Leftwich, A. (2002). Democracy and development. *New Political Economy*, 7(2), 270.
- Ligon, K. L., Alberta, J. A., Kho, A. T., Weiss, J., Kwaan, M. R., Nutt, C. L., ... & Rowitch, D. H. (2004). The oligodendroglial lineage marker OLIG2 is universally expressed in diffuse gliomas. *Journal of neuropathology and experimental neurology*, 63(5), 499-509.
- Low, L. (2004). *Developmental states: Relevancy, redundancy or reconfiguration?* Nova Publishers.
- Lou, Q., Leftwich, M. E., & Lam, K. S. (1996). Identification of GIYWHHY as a novel peptide substrate for human p60c-src protein tyrosine kinase. *Bioorganic & medicinal chemistry*, 4(5), 677-682.
- Lockwood, P. (2006). "Someone like me can be successful": Do college students need same-gender role models? *Psychology of women quarterly*, 30(1),
- Mackie, J. (1998). Development and Democratisation in East and Southeast Asia. *Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform*, 366.
- Mann, L., & Berry, M. (2016). Understanding the political motivations that shape Rwanda's emergent developmental state. *New Political Economy*, 21(1), 119-144.
- Mardon, R. (1990). The state and the effective control of foreign capital: the case of South Korea. *World Politics*, 43(1), 111-138.
- Markoš, A., & Cvrčková, F. (2013). The meaning (s) of information, code... and meaning. *Biosemiotics*, 6(1), 61-75.
- Markakis, J. (1994). Ethnic Conflict and the State in the Horn of Africa. *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, 217-37.
- Maru, M. T. (2021). *The developmental state experience in Ethiopia and Rwanda: lessons for Libya?*. European University Institute.
- Mbabazi, P., & Taylor, I. (2005). Botswana and Uganda as developmental States. *The Potentiality of 'Developmental States' in Africa: Botswana and Uganda Compared*, 1-15.

- Mebratu, A. A. (2015). Internal audit function and its challenges in public sector governance: Empirical evidence from Amhara National Regional State, Ethiopia. *AshEse Journal of Economics*, 1(1), 001-012.
- Meisenhelder, T. (1997). The developmental state in Mauritius. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35(2),
- Menocal, M. R., Scheindlin, R. P., & Sells, M. (Eds.). (2006). *the Literature of Al-Andalus*. Cambridge University Press.
- Menocal, A. R. (2004). And if there was no state?: critical reflections on Bates, Polanyi and Evans on the role of the state in promoting development: Feature Review. *Third World Quarterly*, 25(4),
- Merera, C., Ayana, T., & Gudeta, T. (2013). Effect of feeding *Leucaena pallida* with concentrate and antihelminthic treatment on growth performance and nematode parasite infestation of Horro ewe lambs in Ethiopia. *International Journal of Livestock Production*, 4(10), 155-160.
- Messay, K. (1995). *Survival and Modernization: Ethiopia's Enigmatic present: A philosophical Discourse*. New Jersey and Asmara.
- Mkandawire, T. (2005). Targeting and universalism in poverty reduction.47.
- Mkandawire, T. (2001). Thinking about developmental states in Africa. *Cambridge journal of economics*, 25(3), 289-314.
- Mesgna, G. (2015). *The challenges and prospects of building a Developmental state in Africa: A comparative study of Botswana and Ethiopia* (Doctoral dissertation, Addis Ababa University).
- Meyns, P., & Musamba, C. (2010). The developmental state in Africa. *Institute for Development and Peace (INRF), University of Duisenberg, Essen*.
- Musamba, C. (2009). *The Developmental State and Poverty Reduction in Africa: The Case of Zambia* (Doctoral dissertation).
- Nega, F. (2008). *Poverty, asset accumulation, household livelihood and interaction with local institutions in northern Ethiopia* (Doctoral dissertation, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven).

- Negash, A., Eshete, D., & Jacobus, V. (2011). Assessment of the ecological status and threats of Welala and Shesher wetlands, Lake Tana Sub-Basin (Ethiopia). *Journal of Water Resource and Protection*, 2011.
- Nissanke, M., & Stein, H. (2003). Financial globalization and economic development: toward an institutional foundation. *Eastern Economic Journal*, 29(2), 287-308.
- Okimoto, D. I. (1989). *Between MITI and the market: Japanese industrial policy for high technology*. Stanford University Press.
- Öniş, Z. (1991). The logic of the developmental state.
- Onimode, B. (1988). *A political economy of the African crisis*. Zed Books.
- Ozer, E. J., Best, S. R., Lipsey, T. L., & Weiss, D. S. (2003). Predictors of posttraumatic stress disorder and symptoms in adults: a meta-analysis. *Psychological bulletin*, 129(1), 52.
- Pempel, T. J. (1999). Structural gaiatsu: international finance and political change in Japan. *Comparative Political Studies*, 32(8), 139,144,175
- Rahmato, D. (2008). *The peasant and the state*. Custom books publishing.
- Rodrik, D. (2006). What's so special about China's exports? *China & World Economy*, 14(5), 1-19.
- Sachs, J. (2005). Teacher education and the development of professional identity: Learning to be a teacher. *Connecting policy and practice: Challenges for teaching and learning in schools and universities*, 5-21.
- Samset, I. (2011). Building a repressive peace: The case of post-genocide Rwanda. *Journal of intervention and Statebuilding*, 5(3), 265-283.
- Sandbrook, R. (1986). The state and economic stagnation in tropical Africa. *World Development*, 14(3), 319-332.
- Shaughnessy, K. H., & Booth, R. S. (2001). Sterically demanding, water-soluble alkylphosphines as ligands for high activity Suzuki coupling of aryl bromides in aqueous solvents. *Organic letters*, 3(17), 2757-2759
- So, H. J., & Kim, B. (2009). Learning about problem based learning: Student teachers integrating technology, pedagogy and content knowledge. *Australasian Journal of educational technology*, 25(1).
- Southall, R. (2006). Introduction: can South Africa be a developmental state?

- Spear, B. B., Heath-Chiozzi, M., & Huff, J. (2001). Clinical application of pharmacogenetics. *Trends in molecular medicine*, 7(5), 201-204.
- Taylor, J., Craft, J., Blair, E., Wordsworth, S., Beeson, D., Chandratre, S. ... & Knight, J. C. (2019). Implementation of a genomic medicine multi-disciplinary team approach for rare disease in the clinical setting: a prospective exome sequencing case series. *Genome medicine*, 11(1), 1-12.
- Tilahun, D., Hanlon, C., Fekadu, A., Tekola, B., Baheretibeb, Y., & Hoekstra, R. A. (2016). Stigma, explanatory models and unmet needs of caregivers of children with developmental disorders in a low-income African country: a cross-sectional facility-based survey. *BMC health services research*, 16(1), 1-12
- Turok, I. (2008). A new policy for Britain's cities: choices, challenges, contradictions. *Local Economy*, 23(2), 149-166.
- Van de Walle, N. (2001). *African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge University Press.
- Vandewall, A., Degreve, J., & Baeyens, J. (2001). Attrition and erosion in powder circulation loops. *Powder Handling and Processing*, 13(1), 77-81.
- Wade, J., O'Reilly III, C. A., & Chandratat, I. (1990). Golden parachutes: CEOs and the exercise of social influence. *Administrative science quarterly*, 587-603.
- Wade, R., Haggard, S., Kriekhaus, J., Weiss, L., Thurbon, E., Pempel, T. J. ... & Butler, G. (2004). I&S ISSUE FOCUS. *Issues & Studies*, 40(1), 13-134.
- Wade, R. (1988). Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South.
- Weiss, T. G. (2000). Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual and actual challenges. *Third world quarterly*, 21(5), 795-814.
- Woo-Cumings, M. (1999). Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the politics of nationalism and development. *The developmental state*, 1-31.
- Wong, A. (2004). The role of emotional satisfaction in service encounters. *Managing Service Quality: An International Journal*.
- Westphal, V., Rollins, A. M., Radhakrishnan, S., & Izatt, J. A. (2002). Correction of geometric and refractive image distortions in optical coherence tomography applying Fermat's principle. *Optics expresses*, 10(9), 397-404.
- Wong, P. K., Ho, Y. P., & Autio, E. (2005). Entrepreneurship, innovation and economic growth: Evidence from GEM data. *Small business economics*, 24(3), 350.

- Yang, Y. R., & Lam, S. S. (2000, November). General AIMD congestion control. In *Proceedings 2000 International Conference on Network Protocols* (pp. 187-198). IEEE.
- Zenawi, M. (2006). African development: dead ends and new beginnings. *Preliminary draft*.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX: Time and Budget schedule

Time Schedule

This section will be guiding the researcher to perform the details of the research within the time frame of the university. So, the researcher is presenting below the time schedule as soon as possible.

No.	Activities	Duration in months (M)									Remarks
		Oct.	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jun.	
1.	Proposalwriting	x	x	X	x	X					
2.	Review of related literature	x	x	X	x	X	x				
4.	Collectingdata						X	X			
5.	Data analysis							X	x		
6.	Research report writing							X	X		
	Submission ofdraft reporting								X		
	Editing thereport									X	
	Submission of final researchreport									X	
	Presentationof result (Defense)									X	

Budget schedule

In this section also presented the amount of money or budget that the researcher spent on the entire study.

No.	Material used	Quantity	Unit cost in Birr	Total cost in Birr
1.	Stationary materials			
1.1.	Pen	10	5	50
1.2.	Marker or highlighter	1	20	20
1.3.	Rubber	1	5	5
1.4.	Laptop	1	11580	11580
1.5.	Rough paper	1 packet	400	400
2.	Transportation cost of data collection	12 days	10	120
3.	Internet expense			200
4.	Secretarial service charge	120 pages	5	600
5.	Binding			30
6.	Reserve			500
	Total			13505

Declaration

I, the undersigned, declared that the thesis is my original work equipped under the guidance of Dr. Dechasa Abebe. All resource of materials used for this thesis have been duly acknowledged. I further confirm that the thesis has not been submitted either in part or full to any other higher learning institutions for the purpose of possessing any Degree.

Name

Signature

Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa

June, 2021

Endorsement

This thesis entitled with “Challenges of Building Developmental State of Africa: The case of Rwanda and Ethiopia” has been submitted to Addis Ababa University College of Social Science Centre for African and Asian Studies MA in Human and Economic Development Program with my approval as Addis Ababa university advisor.

Name

Signature

Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa

June, 2021