

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES**

**DIFFERENTIAL ADAPTATION AND INTER-ETHNIC
INTERACTION:
THE RESETTLEMENT OF KONSO FARMERS IN THE
LAND OF THE BODI AGRO-PASTORALISTS,
SOUTHWEST ETHIOPIA**

AYKE ASFW

JANUARY 2006

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By

Ayke Asfaw

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Abstract

Key Words: Resettlement, Resettlers, Host Communities, Departure, The Bodi, The Konso

The "Salamago Resettlement Scheme" is one of the several state-sponsored resettlement schemes undertaken by the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) since 2003. In government documents, the scheme is also called "Guyo-Dakuba Resettlement," named after one of the six resettlement villages (the administrative center) established by the program. However, I have chosen to call it "Salamago resettlement" after the name of the host *woreda* (district). I preferred to use "Salamago" since it is more official and well-known name in the area.

The study has tried to show that the Salamago Resettlement is underway having some positive features but riddled with a series of setbacks and replete with a host of problems. The existence of a significant number of self-motivated and determined resettlers is an important advantage of the scheme. The resettlers who belong to the hard working community of the Konso ethnic group are also famous for their traditional soil conservation system (terracing). Moreover, the sanction of the free movement of resettlers coupled with the proximity between the resettlement area and their area of origin enabled them to maintain their contact with their area of origin. This is, of course, one of the distinct features of the present resettlement program (from Salamago resettlement perspectives) from the past (military regime) resettlement experience. The suitability of the area for human habitation is also another important advantage of the area.

The above positive aspects of Salamago Resettlement shows that the scheme could have a better prospects if it would have been supported by proper feasibility study, practically observed criteria for selection of resettlers, sound planning and adequate inputs. In actual fact, however, similar to past resettlement experience in the country, the scheme has suffered from rushed out feasibility study, poorly observed selection criteria, unsound planning and inadequate inputs. As a result, deadly conflicts between resettlers and host communities are occurred. Moreover, large number of resettlers, 756 heads households out of a total of 2897 heads of households, which is about 26 percent, abandoned the resettlement area in the last 20 months following their arrival in January 2004.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1. Statement of the problem

It has become an established fact that things often go wrong in planned resettlement projects. Most resettlement schemes worldwide end up leaving the resettlers and for that matter host communities more vulnerable to economic, social and psychological problems. The Ethiopian experiences of such state-organized population relocations have not been different, and may even be worse than many. In spite of the fact that the overwhelming majority of cases of resettlement programs failed, the current EPRDF led government of Ethiopia initiated a new resettlement program since 2003, hoping that it would solve the old problem of food insecurity. The objectives are relocating people to attain food security and improve their living conditions as in the past.

Accordingly, the SNNPRS has planned to resettle 100,000 food insecure households in three years time. Salamago *woreda*, in SNNPRS is one of the resettlement sites in the Region where nearly 3000 heads of households from Konso special *woreda* have been resettled. This research examined the design and implementation strategies of the program in the site. It assessed whether past mistakes and problems have been repeated, averted or managed.

Moreover, one of the distinguishing features of the current resettlement from its predecessors is that it has been undertaken intra- regionally. The resettlers are relocated from one zone /special *woreda* and resettled in another zone/ special *woreda* within the same Regional State. The intention, among others, was said to be to minimize the potential inter-ethnic conflicts between resettlers and the host communities. In this regard, the feasibility of intra-regional resettlement schemes in meeting its stated objectives is another area of interest that has been evaluated with the research in detail.

Moreover, in the case of past resettlement initiatives in Ethiopia, the dominant livelihood strategies of both the sending and receiving communities was mainly based on crop production. However, in the case of Salamago resettlement, the resettlers are agriculturalists, whereas the major¹ host community is agro-pastoralist. Thus, the question is whether the condition would result in complementarity (e.g. exchange of livestock for grain), or competition (for resources such as land) between the croppers (newcomers) and their agro-pastoralist host. How do the host communities, mainly of the Bodi agro-pastoralists conceive of the resettlers? Do they conceive of them as a model for improving their livelihood or as a threat to their transhumant way of life, endangering their natural resources? This research also investigated the existing condition from perspectives of the host communities and their views.

1.2. Objectives

1.2.1. General

The overall objective of this research is to shade light on the various aspects of resettling the agriculturalist Konso in the area of agro-pastoralist host community in Salamago. It tries to reflect how it was designed, implemented, early challenges, the mechanism of adjustment and interactions between resettlers and the hosts.

1.2.2. Specific

1. To assess the strengths and weaknesses of the program in Salamago in the light of past resettlement experiences in Ethiopia.
2. To indicate the actual and potential areas of cooperation and conflict between the resettlers and hosts
3. To evaluate the role of intra-regional resettlement in meeting its initial goals i.e. minimizing the cultural differences and the potential inter-ethnic conflicts between the resettlers and hosts, and
4. To look into the factors of differential adaptation among resettlers

¹ There are three indigenous ethnic-groups in the resettlement area. However, the major host is the Bodi, since the resettlement is exclusively undertaken in the land of the Bodi.

1.3. Methods

This research was carried out by employing a combination of various techniques of qualitative research methods over the course of a month and a half fieldwork in two round trips (The first field trip was conducted in February and March 2005 and the second in September 2005). These include, direct observation, in depth interviews with key informants, household visits and a sample survey were administered for randomly selected households.

Direct Observation- This method was employed to assess and observe about the physical environment of the area and gather data on the daily activities of the resettlers in the site. The method was helpful in enabling me to learn the interaction between the resettlers and the hosts as well as within the resettlers themselves. Moreover, the economic aspects of interactions (who sells what and who buys what) in the marketplaces have been observed. The existence of social relationships, such as the visit of hosts to the resettlers and vice versa has been identified through this method.

In depth- interviews – In depth interviews were conducted with selected key informants who are knowledgeable, articulate speakers, willing and cooperative from both resettlers and hosts. A total of 13 key informants, 7 from resettlers, 4 from the host (Bodi agro-pastoralists) and 2 from resettlement administrators were asked a range questions pertinent to the research objectives. The questions for resettlers include, concerning the consultation meetings, factors of motivation, manner of displacement, promises of the government, initial adjustments, provision of inputs, departure, intentions to stay, relations with hosts, etc. On the other hand, the questions for key informants from host side include concerning pre-resettlement consultation with the government officials, preparations to receive resettlers, impact of the program on them (advantage and disadvantages) and relations with resettlers. In addition to key informants, more than 50 people from various groups, resettlers, hosts (from Bodi and Dime side), missionaries living in the area, Development Agents, teachers, health workers and the resettlement officials at *woreda* level were also asked related questions.

Focus group discussions- Before the end of a field visit, the 13 key informants were formed into a group to discuss some vital issues. This method helped the researcher to understand how individuals differently or similarly explained a certain point when they are in a group. Moreover, this method enabled to check the validity of data informed by a single informant during the interview session. Data acquired through observations was counter-checked through this method.

Survey questionnaire- 15 structured questions was administered to 90 (which is about 3 percent of total resettlers) resettler household heads from the six villages. Fifteen household heads were selected from each village. The selection was made through systematic random sampling method. At each village, the list of resettlers was collected (which is available in the office of Development Agents) and given numbers, and 15 household heads were selected through systematic random sampling method. The sample survey helped to make a comparison among the resettlers about their views and practices regarding major areas of the program.

Secondary Sources: - various secondary materials in relation to population resettlement, displacement, migration, food insecurity, etc. have been assessed and used. These include books, thesis, dissertation, periodicals, web sites, etc. Secondary sources are used as theoretical and practical guidelines for the study.

1.4. Opportunities and Limitations

Having the knowledge of the area, seemingly I was in the advantageous position in relation to a researcher who never had an acquaintance to the area. Being born and grew up in Jinka town (the zone capital located 120 km from the resettlement site) helped me to get the necessary support from the concerned line departments and resettlement officials.

However, there were certain limitations. Time- space limitations are the major variables that influenced the process of this research. The allocated time to collect primary data limited the detailed observation of some key issues such as conflict resolution mechanisms and other

socio-economic dynamics in the area. The location of resettlement site in the remote and hardly accessible part of the country also influenced the research. The problem of transportation facilities to and from the field delayed to catch up with schedule.

Finally, the amount of financial resources at disposal limited the research. The expectation of resettlers who wanted payment or some sort of material help was related to the financial resource that was scarce. In spite of all these, I have devoted my time, money, labor and other inputs to come out with reliable data and write up the research.

1.5. The Significance of Study

The findings of this research can have multifaceted importance as in other academic works. This research can give new insights to policy makers, planners, aid agencies and environmentalists to design development projects in the area of the study or elsewhere in similar conditions. The planners may look at the findings and realize how resettlement schemes such as that of Salamago can cause disturbances on socio-economic and natural environment that used to exist more or less in balance. When they plan resettlement as a viable option the findings may indicate, how it is risk embedded.

Moreover, the findings of this study can serve as an input to design and implement development projects in environmentally friendly way. It can also indicate how resource competitions among various groups of people may lead to tension and inter-ethnic conflicts. By pointing out the origins of conflicts, it may help to design alternative ways of dispute resolution.

As part of an anthropological research employing an anthropological method to resettlement, the findings can also contribute to the broadening of the existing knowledge and literature. In addition, being the first research work about Salamago resettlement, the findings of the research can be used as a tool for future researchers in the area to see the socio-economic and political dynamics of resettlement from different angles. By doing so, it can promote anthropological approach to the study of resettlement in the way of chain reaction.

1.6. Profile of Host Communities and the Resettlers


1.6.1. The Study Area (South-Omo Zone)

The present day South-Omo zone used to be called Galebena-Hamar-Backo Awraja (Province) in the then Gamo-Gofa Administrative Region. At present, South-Omo is one of the 13 Zones and 8 special *woredas* in Southern Nations, Nationalities and People Regional State (SNNPRS). The zone is located at $4^{\circ} 27' - 6^{\circ} 26'$ North and $34^{\circ} 57' - 37^{\circ} 49'$ East. It borders with Gamo-Gofa and Kaffa zones and Konta and Basketo special *woredas* in the North, Konso and Derashe special *woredas* in the East, Borena zone in the Southeast, Kenya in the South, Sudan in the Southwest, and Bench-Maji zone in the West. The total landmass of the zone is 22,360.79 square kilometers and lies between 380 to 3,330 meters above sea level.

The mean annual rainfall and temperature of South-Omo zone ranges from 450mm – 1,500mm and $22 - 30^{\circ}\text{C}$ respectively (South-Omo zone, 2003). The capital of South-Omo zone is Jinka, located 750 km South-West of Addis Ababa. South-Omo zone is a typical example of the multi-ethnic and cultural complexity of the country in which there are more than a dozen of ethnic groups. These includes Ari, Malle, Dassanech (Galeb), Nyangatom (Bume), Hamar, Hana, Karo, Tsemay, Mursi, Bodi, Dime and Marrele (Arbore). There are of course other very small groups such as the Brahe, who are said to be less than 100 (one hundred) people. The most populous ethnic group in the zone is the Ari followed by Malle and Dassanech respectively.

This zone is divided into 6 *woredas* of which only two, Bako-Gazer and Gelila consists of predominantly agricultural communities (the Ari, Gelila and Malle) while the remaining 4 *woredas*, Kuraz, Salamago, Hamar and Bana-Tsemay comprise of pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities.

Map 1: Ethnic Groups in the lower Omo Valley, Ethiopia.



Source: Katsuyoshi Fukui and J. Mrkakis eds. 1994:14

1.6.2. Host Communities


The receiving *woreda* is known as Salamago located in the Northwestern part of South-Omo zone. It is bordered with Kaffa zone and Basketo special *woreda* in the North, Gamo-Gofa zone in the Northeast, Bench-Maji zone in the West, Bako-Gazer *woreda* in the East and Kuraz *woreda* in the South. The total area of the *woreda* is 419.25 square kilometers. Its total population is 18,023 (South-Omo Zone Population office 2004 projection). Salamago *woreda* generally belongs to the lowland and semi-arid parts of South-Omo zone. Hana, the capital of the *woreda*, is a small flat village situated at 680 meters above sea level. There are three major ethnic groups in Salamago: the Bodi, Dime and Mursi.

Map 2. The Distribution of the Bodi



Source: Katsuyoshi Fukui and J. Mrkakis eds. 1994:32

Map 3 :- Salamago Woreda And Resettlement Villages



Source: CSA, 1994

The resettlement site, however, is exclusively located within the land of the Bodi. Therefore, the major host of the resettlement scheme is the Bodi ethnic group. The Bodi call themselves Me'en (sing. Me'enit). They are called "Bodi" by outsiders and the local administration. Linguistically they belong to the Surma (Bender, 1971:192) or Didinga-Murle (Ibid.) group of Nilo-Saharan languages. The Mursi and the Bodi are pre-dominantly pastoralist communities who also practice agriculture on a limited scale.

The traditional political system of the Bodi ethnic group may be characterized by chieftainship. In this respect, the Bodi land is divided into three localities and three chiefs rule over their own part of Bodi land. Resettlement villages and villages of the host communities are situated close to each other but not intermingled. In the outskirts of each of the six-resettlement villages, there are scattered small Bodi villages.

The Dime, who occupies the high land parts of the *woreda* are, settled agriculturalists. The Dime inhabit a mountain range and, to its Northeast, an area of lowland which extends as far as the River Mago. The language, Dimaph is classified as a member of the southern branch of the Omotic language families (Todd, 1979:211). Their main agricultural products include cereals (maize and *teff*), root crops, banana, *enset* (false banana) and coffee. The Dime ethnic community is close neighbors of the resettlers.

1.6.3. The Resettlers

All Salamago resettlers came from Konso special *woreda* of Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State. The Konso special *woreda* is bordered with Derashe special *woreda* in the North, Burji special *woreda* in the Northeast, Borana zone of Oromia Region in the South and Southeast, and South-Omo zone, the receiving zone of the resettlers in the West. The resettlement site is located about 300km west of Karati town, the capital of Konso special *woreda*. The place is named after the indigenous inhabitants of the area; known as the Konso. The Konso are a group of Eastern Cushitic people who live in Konso highlands, a range of mountains, which rise out of the Rift valley to the height of 2000m (Watson, 1998:7). Their

language, known as Afa-xonso or Konsina is classified as part of the East Cushitic language group (Bender, 1976, in Watson, 1998). The Konso believe that they were descended from the Borana in the distant past, and they also have some close cultural and linguistic similarities to the Gidole. The relationship between the Konso and the Oromo peoples is most obviously displayed in the linguistic evidence (Hallpike, 1972). The Konso territory and its relative (geographic) location is best described by Hallpike (1972:1) as follows.

In the far south-west of Ethiopia among the barren mountain ranges of that region can be found the minute territory of the Konso. A watcher in the Konso highlands, looking north, along the floor of the riftvalley sees spread below him the great plain of Gomidia, dominated by the Gidole mountains on the left. Beyond the plain the distant gleam of Lake Shamo [Chamo] will catch his eye, and, remoter still, the towering mass of the Chenchu mountains, sixty miles away, will terminate his view. About thirty miles to the east are the precipitous and rain-scarred heights of the Amarro Mountains, the home of the Burji people, and also used for grazing by the Guji division of the Galla [Oromo]. Over the Sagan River, to the South, are the lands of the Borana Galla [Oromo] ... that runs down to Moyale and Kenya. ...the Hummer range can be glimpsed forty miles to the west, across the humid depths and haze of Woito valley, through which the Woito River runs down to Lake Stephanie,...

The Konso are hard working community; and are most well known for their stonework, called terracing. Also citing Hallpike, Watson (2001:246) wrote about their strong work ethic, "The Konso take intense pride in their agriculture, and have a strong work ethic. Visitors to the region have remarked that the Konso go to work in the fields with such vigour and passion that it looks as though they were going to battle. Their agriculture is inseparable from their identity...." Moreover, they also practice different kinds soil and water conservation techniques. These include, mulching, ridging, the construction of trash bunds, and irrigation (mainly through the opportunistic use of spring water and redirection of run-off) but most impressively the construction of stonewalled terraces which covers the mountains terrain (Watson, 1998).

Despite the above facts, the Konso frequently experience food shortages. The Region's Disaster Prevention Preparedness Bureau monthly assessment reports concerning the agricultural activities of the *woreda* in the last one year before the resettlement (SNNPRS,

yesefera afetsatsem meseretawi tinat, in Amharic 1994, E.C) revealed that the *woreda* is highly vulnerable to drought and consequently to famine. Drought, the complete degradation of the soil fertility and shortage of farmland have been the major problems of the people. As a result, the people have been affected by famine each year since 1998 (Ibid.). As Watson (1998) also wrote, the limiting factors on production are poor soils and land scarcity; but most of all, lack of rainfall. The mean annual rainfall was 551mm, but this varied dramatically from 282mm to 881mm.

The resettlers originate from several different peasant association of Konso special *woreda*. In terms of ethnic composition, there are two groups, the Konso (the overwhelming majority of resettlers) and some households from the Gawwada community. Back home the majority of the Gawwada community is found within the administrative structure of Derashe special *woreda* located North of Konso. However, the Gawwada resettlers came from the small groups of Gawwada community living in Konso special *woreda*. The languages of both groups belong to the Cushitic language family and they share many more cultural traits.

1.7. Organization of the Thesis

The data collected through the various techniques of qualitative methodology are organized into patterns and categories in relations to the general and specific objectives of the paper. Accordingly, the thesis is divided into six chapters. **The First Chapter** is intended to providing an introductory explanation about the study, which includes The Problem Statement, The objectives, The Methodology used and The Profile of the host communities and the resettlers. **Chapter Two** is devoted to a Review of Literature on the issue of population relocations in general and resettlement in particular, used as a conceptual and theoretical guiding tool to this research. The main body of the thesis begins with **Chapter Three**, which deals with the Preparation, Recruitment and Implementation of the Salamago Resettlement. **The Fourth Chapter** examines the aspects of Differential Adaptation among the resettlers. **Chapter Five** is devoted to look into the Relations between Resettlers and Host communities; followed by the final part, the Summary of Findings and Conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

Review of Literature and Theoretical Approach

2.1. Resettlement; Definition, Concept and Practices

It may be difficult to give a generally agreed and accepted definition to a socio economic phenomenon called resettlement. This is partly due to different scholars try to understand and explain the dynamics of population relocations from different angles with different approaches. However, as conventionally accepted, the term resettlement can refer to different migration forms and settlement types in the environment other than the home places. It also can be defined as a phenomenon of population redistribution, either planned or spontaneous. The former most of the time is carried out by the involvement of governments or other agencies whereas the latter takes place by individual initiatives. The indication is moving people or people moving to the new relocations from their own settlements in places of origin (Dessalegn, 1986).

Historically, human life is characterized by migration. As Du Toit (in Du Toit and Safa, eds., 1975:1) has cleverly put it, one of the distinguishing characteristics of *Homo sapiens* is his tendency to migrate, and the frequency and distance of these movements mark him alone. This feature is due in part to cultural adaptability, which allows man to adjust to the major environmental changes by employing his mental abilities and technological skills. Du Toit further mentioned two major factors, "a combination of his animal tendency for self preservation" and "his culturally defined tendency for self improvement" (ibid.) that has resulted in the distribution of *Homo sapiens* to every part of the earth. In this case, the term resettlement covers a wide range of issues regarding human socio-economic life. The dynamics of resettlement can best be understood through different approaches and experiences as a catchall term of descriptive rather than analytical value. As Pankhurst (1992:20) pointed out,

The term resettlement has been used mainly to convey the idea of people returning to an area they had, or were supposed to have lived previously. From the eighteenth century, the term was used to describe the exodus of Jews from Egypt to Judaea. After WWI it was applied to demobilized servicemen returning. Since World War II it has frequently been applied to forced transfer of urban black South Africans to their putative rural home land.

In spite of its long existence as a socio- economic event in human history, the conceptual understandings of resettlement began in the last three or four decades (Ibid) as an academic and scholarly discourse in the literature of migration. For analytical and practical purposes, the literatures on the subject of population movement and resettlement have begun to conceptualize it in different categories based on the nature and cause of the flight i.e. forced or voluntary. In this regard, two types of migrations are commonly recognized and understood, the 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' migrations. These conventional categories are distinguished based on the decision-making power of migrants, which indicate their willingness to leave their original residences, the presence of push/pull factors, and the age make up of the relocates (Gebre, 2002b). Moreover, Hansen and Oliver Smith, as cited in Gebre (2002b:269) stated that "forced migration is distinguished from voluntary migration by a diminished power of decision in the former... and the original absence on the part of the forced migrants of the desire or motivation to leave their place of residence".

On the other hand, Cernea and Guggenheim differentiated forced resettlement from the voluntary movement based on push/pull factors, in which "involuntary resettlement stands apart from most voluntary movements...because it is nearly all push and no pull", and age-based make of the displaced population where "voluntary settlement program usually attract younger families,... by contrast involuntary resettlement programs are indiscriminate" (Ibid). Besides, Dessalegn seems to take an extreme side in conceptualizing involuntary resettlement. As he pointed out (2003:2),

large scale relocation that takes place following natural or man made calamity must be considered involuntary resettlement since the settlers involved were either too powerless to refuse participation in the program, too shocked to use their judgment properly or unaware of the prospects ahead.

On the other hand, Gebre (2002b) went further than the conventional conceptual understanding of resettlement, which was based on voluntary-involuntary classification and was unable to show the hidden dimension of the process. He argued and suggested an alternative model, to conceptualize the manner of resettlement especially in the Ethiopian context. According to him, the 'voluntary' versus 'involuntary' approach overlooks certain dimensions of migration and fails to capture resettlements that occur when people embrace forced removal out of desperation. The classification of voluntary resettlers who have no right to leave the resettlement is unclear. Acts of inducement remain largely subsumed and invisible when it comes to conceptualizations. Because of such ambiguity, he identified four major types of migrations: 'voluntary', 'induced voluntary', 'involuntary' and 'compulsory-voluntary'.

According to Gebre (2002b:271), voluntary migration, implies the power to be informed and make free migration decisions and the willingness of migrants to leave their original place whereas, induced voluntarism occurs when people leave their places to resettle elsewhere, due to deliberate acts of inducement by outside agencies. In the later case, although the migrants retain the decision-making power, the facts on which their decisions are based are analyzed and provided by other agencies. Involuntary migration, as its name signifies, refers to forcible uprooting of people from their original place of residence; whereas compulsory voluntarism occurs when people embrace forced removal out of desperation such as chronic famine and when voluntarily resettled people are denied the right to leave the resettlement. Gebre suggested this alternative model based on his findings from the Metekel resettlement, which was carried out by the Ethiopian government in the 1980s as an immediate solution to the prevailed socio-economic problems in the period.

2.2. Theories

It can be questioned, why the social science researchers interested in the issue of resettlement and formulate and deal with theoretical models and conceptual frameworks. This can be suggested that a better theoretical understanding of the issue of resettlement in one way or

another has an effect on the success or failure of resettlement projects. Theories are tools, which enable the understanding of resettlement dynamics not only after the program implementation, but also provide insights in the stage of inception and planning by indicating the risks and unpredictability of the outcomes. For instance, Cernea (in Gebre, 2002b:19) theorized and pointed out the risks embedded in the resettlement programs as, "all forced displacements are prone to major socio-economic risks, but not fatally condemned to succumb to them".

Despite the significance of the theoretical understanding of resettlement dynamics, to plan, implement and evaluate the outcomes of the program, theoretical aspects in the resettlement literature are insufficiently addressed, controversial and sometimes confusing. This is mainly related to the complex and unpredictable nature of the outcomes of resettlement projects. The difficulty to comprehend migration behaviors results basically from the manner of displacement and the decision to migrate. As pointed out by Pankhurst (in Pankhurst and Piguet eds., 2004), the migration decisions can be embedded on economic, social and political factors and even the involvement of media in the process of propagation which make the clear understanding of resettlement processes difficult and problematic.

By trying to understand the complex nature of resettlement from the new dimension Gebre, (2002b:45) in his study of the Metekel resettlement (North-West Ethiopia) proved his hypothesis that "if voluntary and involuntary settlers were involved in one resettlement program, the voluntary settlers would have readjusted or adapted better and sooner than involuntary settlers". Of course, he did not characterize all voluntary settlers as unsuccessful or poor. Rather he stressed the ramification of resettlement program for both categories of settlers (Ibid.).

However, the assumption can be differed based on time and space and the situation of resettlers. In spite of the deficiency in resettlement theories which overshadow the clear understanding of the multi-dimensional problems, this research based on some of theoretical approaches and models as a guiding device to gather the primary data, organize, interpret,

analyze, reach in conclusion and write up the thesis. The theoretical approaches fundamentally used in this research are, "Inadequate inputs and Inherent Complexity", approach of De Wet and the "Social Geometry" analysis of resettlement by Theodore Downing which is based on the IRR model of Michael Cernea (2005), which indicates the risks of resettlement and other relevant theories to see resettlement problems from different angles.

2.2.1. "Inadequate Inputs" and "Inherent Complexity" Approach

In this approach, De Wet (in Pankhurst and Piguet eds., 2004:51), began by asking, why do resettlements so often go wrong, and end up leaving the settled people (and others as well) worse off than before? As a number of research activities undertaken in the areas of resettlement revealed that resettlement programs have multi-dimensional problems, which could not be easily managed by fulfilling important inputs. He sensitized his approach by criticizing the IRR model of Cernea, which is based on the assumption that the resettlement risks can be averted into reconstruction by fulfilling the necessary inputs so that the program has a high degree of success in achieving its intended objectives. He tried to argue and show how resettlement is more complex than fulfilling the necessary inputs, which are economic in nature.

De Wet (2004:52) criticized the IRR model as basically optimistic, broadly economic and technical in character. In the model he says, the main problems facing resettlement are seen as fundamentally operational and can be dealt with serious policy reforms and procedures and the provision of resources. By challenging the IRR model, De Wet suggested two broad approaches to answer the question, why resettlements so often fail. In his "Inadequate inputs" and "Inherent complexity" approaches, he argued that a complex nature of involuntary resettlement gives rise to various problems that are more difficult to deal with. According to him, it involves more than providing inputs, proper policy, political will and provision of funding (Ibid) and adds that getting these inputs, right cannot sufficiently overcome the complexities in the resettlement.

Indicating such complex nature of resettlement, De Wet (2004) suggested that dealing with complexity requires starting from bounded-ness of framework and procedure that policy prefers. In addition to this, he also stresses the significance of "respect" which is for the people who are supposed to put through resettlement programs for the 'greater good' and 'respect' for the complexity of what resettlement involves. With such understanding, this research tried to look into the complex nature of resettlement and the problems emanated from the complexity and the efforts made to pacify the condition by different agencies in Salamago resettlement of South-West Ethiopia.

2.2.2. Mitigating Social Impoverishment When People are Involuntarily Displaced (Social Geometry)

Downing (2004) proposed a theory of "social geometry" to show that how involuntary resettlement disrupts peoples social fabrics. His assumption is based on one of Cernea's eight elements (forms) of impoverishment risks in the IRR model that embedded in involuntary resettlement, i.e. "social impoverishment". The argument based on the rationale that the social impacts of resettlement is a severe condition to the settlers even more than the immediate economic problems. However, according to Downing, they have not been given much emphasis and treated well as other aspects of the resettlement conditions.

According to Downing, involuntary population displacement may lead to irreversible social and cultural impoverishment. Resettlement disrupts the routine "social time" and "social space" which are critical aspects of human life but often ignored dimensions of culture. He argues that involuntary displacement forces people to reexamine primary cultural questions, which in normal conditions need not be considered. The most important among these is "where are we"? (ibid). The 'social geometry' of a people comprised of infinite links of socially constructed time, space and personages. In many cultures the geometry defines also "who are we"? Mitigating social impoverishment begins by reconstructing in culturally acceptable manner of behavior, which is the social geometry of the displaced. People act in socially constructed space, time and use social linkages to overcome the physical and social problems.

Basing his emphasis on the social dimension of resettlement, Downing raises some interesting questions regarding why disaster victims sometimes refuse to move into shelters preferring to camp at the location of their former homes? Why do not resettlers want to occupy the houses that architects have carefully modeled after their original houses? In addition, why do resettlers and disaster victims often describe their experience like a "dream"? By trying to answer such questions, he referred to and emphasized the social dimensions of resettlement as crucial element in mitigating the social impoverishment and perhaps facilitates political and economic restoration. He added that, reconstruction of the lives of the displaced requires carefully coordinated economic and social action even though more attention has been given to the former. He advocated a theory of "Social geometry" to find answers to the primary questions and capable of explaining how displacement leads to social impoverishment. From the dimension of "Social Geometry", this research observed the social condition of the resettlers in the Salamago resettlement and tried to contribute the understanding regarding resettlement theories in the literature.

2.3. Planned versus Self-Initiated (Spontaneous) Resettlement

Conventionally types of resettlement are classified as planned (organized) or sponsored and self-initiated (spontaneous) undertakings. The major domains for such classification are the presence of push factors in the place of origin and supposed opportunities in place of destination (pull factors), which influence the decision-making processes of resettlers (Kassahun, 2003:1). These factors are believed to encourage the movement of people, in either cases despite the type and procedure of resettlement.

Depending on such categorization, the advocates of "self-initiated" or "spontaneous" resettlement argue that people prefer to migrate on their own initiative and choice to resettle rather than imposed by sponsoring agencies as in the case of planned resettlement schemes. The advocates tend to reflect that the condition of official control adversely affects resettlers from retaining their autonomy in planned resettlement. The other proponents of self-initiated

resettlement argue that in planned resettlement the resettlers may develop a mentality of dependency ignoring the possibilities for self-management and self-reliance. This may lead to conflicts between the resettlers themselves and the host communities partly due to competition over resources and the support provided by sponsoring agencies.

Moreover, the advocates of self-initiated resettlement indicate that self-initiated resettlers can be more productive and self-sufficient in comparison with resettlers in planned resettlement. Similarly (Dessalegn, 1986) indicated that self organized resettlement leave a room for individual initiative and decision-making. It is also less likely to cause tensions between resettlers and the hosts. This is because the spontaneous or self-organized settlers seek to establish social relations with influential people among the local people (ibid). The locals became the patrons of self-initiated resettlers in socio-economic activities as in sharecropping, lease, rental or other kinds of arrangements (Pankhurst, 2004:123). Moreover, the socio-economic ties created between the hosts and self-initiated settlers, can lead to locals' protection to the resettlers and mitigate the dangers of escalation of conflict, which may otherwise lead to loss of property, life or even expulsion of self-initiated resettlers from the area. Due to such merits, some scholars suggest the importance of spontaneous or self-organized resettlements and the possibility of success in relations to the other form of resettlement.

On the other hand, the supporters of planned resettlement begin their argument, by indicating the unrealistic aspect of self-initiated resettlement, given that, the current socio-economic and political conditions in the countries like Ethiopia. According to the proponents of planned resettlement, there is no land vacant to be used by self-initiated resettlers for agriculture or for other economic activities. The existing land is owned by individuals, private firms, or by governments controlled through controlling mechanisms such as constitutional rights. In such cases, it is difficult to self-initiated resettlers to occupy land for either agriculture or other economic activities. On this understanding, participation in planned resettlement is more advantageous and practical in securing tenure and obtaining benefits from the programs (Kassahun, 2003). In addition to this, the planned resettlement is believed to have the

potential, to overcome weakness through coordination and cooperation of the stakeholders (Oberai, 1988 cited in Kassahun, 2003)

Planned resettlements in the Third World are undertaken dominantly in the form of land settlement inaugurated by governments rather than by non-state actors. However, it can be supported by aid agencies as a development strategy if the donors believe in its practicality. State sponsored resettlement schemes had been popular in many African countries since independence in countries like Nigeria, Tanzania, Somalia, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Sudan. Planned resettlements usually based on various justification, which are dominantly economic in nature and can be backed by some political agendas. Among the major socio-economic justifications to carryout planned resettlements is landlessness, increasing agricultural production, exploiting economic potentials of the border areas, creating employment opportunities to the urban poor and securing territorial integrity of nation states (Kassahun, 2003, Dessalegn, 2003, and Pankhurst, 2004).

The objectives include the official statements stated explicitly by policy makers and planners on the project documents, and there may be implicit reasons (often not mentioned in policy and project documents), which policy makers and planners have intended to under go underhandedly. The possible and fundamental objectives of different resettlement schemes, as mentioned by Oberai (in Dieci Paolo and Claudio V., 2001:71) include,

- for population redistribution: refers to resettlement projects mainly concerned with the movement of excess population from one part of the country to other sparsely populated parts,
- for the provision of land for the landless and the unemployed,
- to promote of regional development: some resettlement projects are also mainly aimed at the promotion of infrastructure development and the exploitation of natural resources so as to integrate remote regions more effectively into the national economy,
- to increase agricultural output by introducing new inputs to the sector,

- to reduce urban unemployment,
- to reduce poverty and provide improved standard of living for the resettlers, and
- there is also development –included resettlements, which refers to the moving of people to undertake development projects like the construction of dams, roads, to establish game reserves, etc.

Apart from the above objectives, there could also be implicit motives of governments, such as to control guerilla movements, and ideologically motivated resettlement projects like for the promotion of collectivization and cooperatives within the peasantry for the socialist transformation of agriculture. As Oberai (2001:109) put:

Notwithstanding their limited success, land settlement programs are popular in most developing countries, mainly because they are politically more desirable, more expedient, and relatively easier to execute than other agrarian reform measures. However, the evidences suggest that land settlement programs alone cannot be expected to solve agrarian problems. At best they are palliatives that buy time so that other policies can operate fully.

A large-scale planned resettlement in Ethiopia was initiated after the 1974 Revolution as an emergency condition and implemented in a hasty manner with inadequate preparation (Kassahun, 2003). In the pre-revolution periods, the resettlement schemes were fundamentally undertaken in the form of separated local actions of voluntary and governmental agencies. This was related to the stagnation of the Ethiopian economy, availability of land and expected opportunities in the areas with unutilized or underutilized potentials (ibid).

Planned resettlements uprooting hundreds of thousands drought and famine affected people was carried out after the devastating Ethiopian famine of 1984/85. In spite of the government's expectation to obtain aids from donors, the program has become controversial issue and politically sensitive and it caused opposition by the western governments, which were the expected donors by the government (Kassahun, 2003). However, the program ended in failure without achieving the intended objectives and causing enormous loss in human life.

After assuming the political power and establishing its leadership the current EPRDF-led Ethiopian government, except in the few cases seemed to suspend resettlement program as part of its economic agenda at the beginning of its power. However, in the recent time the government reassumed a resettlement program as part of the solutions for the usual socio-economic problems that had been declared by the former governments to implement resettlement program in the country. To this end, the EPRDF-led Ethiopian government implemented the program in 2003, in four Regional States (Oromia, Amhara, Tigray and SNNPR). The government indicated in its policy document that the program was to be implemented intra-regionally which was thought to be different from the predecessors.

2.4. Effects of Resettlement on the Host (Local) Communities

As research findings indicate, in most planned and government sponsored resettlement programs, the hosts were less likely to get the attention of policy makers, planners, implementers, aid agencies and stakeholders involved in the resettlement processes. In the contrary, their counter-parts (resettlers) benefited from the program and got protection and support by the government and other institutions (Gebre, 2003). Accordingly, the disadvantageous condition of hosts is partly related to the misunderstanding of resettlement authorities (policy makers and planners) who always tend to consider the land in the peripheral areas as unoccupied and unutilized so that should be brought to the economic development. However, in actual fact, currently hunter-gatherers, shifting cultivators or pastoralists could use the land in the peripheries (Wolde-Selassie, 2004). As Gebre (2003) pointed it out, the process of displacement does not necessarily involve geographical mobility and that the livelihoods of the host communities are likely to be disrupted by an influx of newcomers.

Moreover, based on his findings of the Metekel resettlement, Gebre (2003) argues that large-scale resettlement schemes could dismantle the livelihoods of the indigenous population similarly in the way that dams, parks, urban expansion, and other development projects do to the displacees. Eventually the resource competition between the hosts and the newcomers led to

bloody conflicts, disintegration of livelihoods, restructuring of inter-ethnic alliances and administrative anomalies (ibid.).

Similarly, cases from most of resettlement experiences indicate the socio-economic and cultural differences between the resettlers and hosts create conflicts (Gebre, 2004). Involuntary resettlements impose adverse effects on the host population by alienating them from their vital livelihoods resources (land, forest, water, pasture etc.) and the hosts are sensitive to such impacts of resettlements on their livelihoods. The fear and suspicion of the hosts towards the newcomers is basically due to the possible natural resource competition, i.e. the pressure on land, water sources and the environment at large that affect not only the current survival strategies of the host communities but also the preservation of natural resources to their coming generations.

In addition, in many cases, the hosts are not only deprived of their rights over the natural resources but also they are not beneficiaries of infrastructures and social services that provided to the resettlers either by government or by the aid agencies (Gebre, 2001). These combined effects of resettlements on the host communities can lead to disillusionment and negative attitude towards the resettlement program and animosity to the resettlers that makes the program problematic to achieve its intended goals.

As mentioned above, large-scale resettlement schemes have multi-faceted impacts on the hosts. Moreover, the negative impact on environment and the disruption to the eco-system is so enormous, though usually not well perceived in the stage of planning. The resettlement scheme and encroachment of large resettlement population disturbs not only the natural environment, but also causes changes to the system of natural resources management, which was based on the indigenous knowledge of the local people. This is partly due to the policy and plan, which tends to neglect the ways of life of the local people (Wolde Silassie, 2002:109). The socio-economic changes that occur due to the resettlement on the hosts are mainly related to technological differences and a sudden demographic change in the area of resettlement. On the other hand, the increased demographic features also increase the

competition over the natural resources involving different interest groups and the consequent conflicts between the hosts and the resettlers. Such competition over the natural resources like land causes stress on the indigenous knowledge and traditional institutional arrangements for natural resource management.

The impact of resettlement on the local people regarding the natural resource management system was pointed out by Wolde-Selassie (2002) in the case of the Gumuz in Metekel. Accordingly, the most critical problem that the Gumuz faced due to resettlement and other development projects in the area was their land resource rights and tenure issues. They have been the most vulnerable groups under threat and dispossession of land resource rights due to development projects. The impacts can be explained in relation to political and economic conditions, which undermine the security of the land rights of the indigenous people. The imagination of different governments to expand into the lands of indigenous peoples, aimed at relocating the landless and the unemployed from densely populated highlands and drought affected areas to misconceived "un/underutilized" vacant lands proved to be futile from different resettlement cases (ibid).

Moreover, Dessalegn (2003) indicated that the official policy of the government has often assumed the lands in the peripheral areas as underutilized and therefore can be employed for resettlements or other purpose of development projects. He added that despite the existence of the local populations in the project areas has been recognized, their interests are ignored in most cases. Due to this resettlement has unjustly accumulated the resources of the indigenous population whose economy and habitat is threatened by the long lasting problems.

In the peripheral areas of Western and South-Western Ethiopia, the indigenous populations are engaged in the economic activities like shifting agriculture or hunting-gathering, fishing and other supplementary economic activities. They use their rudimentary and simple technology to produce, which are an advantageous in keeping resources like soil from exhaustion and other resources from depletion. They all maintain an agricultural system adapted to a marginal

ecology, which have been able to maintain a balance between the needs of their economy and those of the environment (Dessalegn, 2003).

The difference in the economic activities between the resettlers and local people create pressure on environment and the eventual depletion of natural resources. Resettlement also exposes the indigenous marginalized people to a threat through alienation of resources, which are basic to their livelihood. This can include the endangering of their customary tenure system, which is based on group or clan ownership of a certain area and individual rights over plots for cultivation. Under communal ownership of the land, the first claimants of land and other two or more families may engage in cultivation on the plot for successive intervals (ibid.)

Other than the impact of resettlement on the Socio-economic life of the hosts (local communities) resettlement has enormous impacts on the natural environment. The issue of environmental impact is related to environmental management, which involves taking necessary measures to protect the migrant population from engaging in the destructive activities to the environment (ibid). Environmental changes can occur due to deforestation and land clearance, which accelerate soil and water erosion and loss of wild life. Environmental pollution due to concentration of large population can affect open fields, market areas, and water and drainage systems. On the other hand, this can endanger the existence of indigenous population by exacerbating health hazards.

The state policies of the successive governments in Ethiopia regarding resettlement program led to an ecological imbalance and environmental degradation. However, in the recent case the EPRDF led Ethiopian government reestablished an authority responsible for the protection of the environment and to carryout environmentally friendly development activities (Wolde-Selassie, 2002). The overall objective of the authority among others is to protect the environment and to ensure its sustainability to the future generation. In spite of this, the practical aspects of the objective seem to be stand far from the reality on the ground. This is partly because of the impacts of resettlement and other development projects on the

environment that continued in a larger scale. The data gathered from the resettlement site in the Southwestern Ethiopia (Salamago), indicate the impact of resettlement on the natural environment and its potential danger of disruption to the livelihood of the Bodi pastoralists.

2.5. Review of Resettlement in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, starting from the imperial period, for a decade from the mid-1960s, governments, missions and aid agencies promoted various resettlement initiatives. Resettlement became part of the government planning from 1966, with the establishment of the Ministry of Land reform and Administration and the Third Five Year development plan published in 1968, as a means of redistributing population and developing less populated areas (Pankhurst and Piguet eds., 2004). However, the sad fact is that the overwhelming majority of cases of resettlement in the country have been unsuccessful (Dessalegn, 1988, Pankhurst, 1992; Gebre, 2001).

Despite the failure of the past state organized large scale resettlement programs in the country, the EPRDF-led government of Ethiopia has also envisaged intra-regional resettlement program as part of the strategy for addressing the food insecurity of the country. The program has been implemented in four regional states. Among these, the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State planned to resettle 100,000 food insecure heads of households in three years time (Wolde-Selassie, 2004:1). The program is underway and 14,844 heads of households have been relocated since the commencement of the program in December 2003 up to January 2004.

The resettlers were predominantly recruited from the Eastern and Northern zones and special *woredas*, and relocated in the Western and Southern parts of the Region. The sending zones and special *woredas* are Walayita, Kambata-Tambaro, Hadiya, Gurage, Sidama and Gedeo zones and Komo and Derashe special *woredas*. On the other hand, the receiving zones and special *woredas* are Dawro, Shekka, Kaffa, Bench-Majji and South-Omo zones, and Basketo and Konta special *woredas*. Moreover, Gamo-Goffa and Silte zones and, Alaba, Amaro, Burji and Yem special *woredas* have undertaken internal transfer within them (Ibid: 3).

Although, the basic assumptions behind the resettlement program at present remain similar to those made during the previous period, the present program is different from the preceding ones in some respects. Kassahun (2003:5) summarized the following important points that distinguish the present resettlement program from the preceding ones: a) it would be based on the free consent and willingness of resettlers; b) it would be implemented at intra-regional level thereby ruling out possibilities of massive movement from one region to another, c) resettlers would retain their land use rights and other immovable property in the original home villages for up to three years after being relocated and d) resettlers can return to their original home villages for good whenever they have a change of mind.

Nevertheless, implementing state-sponsored resettlement is inherently complex. Experiences in Ethiopia, elsewhere in Africa and the world over show the fact that things often go wrong in resettlement programs. In addition, most resettlements worldwide have ended up leaving the resettled peoples (and often other as well) economically, socially and psychologically worse off than before. Similarly to the objectives of past resettlement programs in Ethiopia, the overall aim of the current resettlement program was also to make available the underutilized land existing in receiving areas for underutilized labor coming from the sending areas. The availability of enough land, adequate rainfall and the willingness of the hosts to accept newcomers were stated as the criteria for the selection of receiving areas. However, resettlement scholars (Dessalegn, 1986, Pankhurst 1992, Gebre, 2002b) have questioned the availability of abundant and unutilized arable land in the country. Rather, recently research works on land and related issues invalidated the hitherto existing understandings about the availability of abundant and unutilized arable land in the country (Tefaye 2003: 27).

CHAPTER THREE

Preparations, Recruitment and Implementation

3.1. Preparations and Recruitment

The EPRDF, the current ruling party of Ethiopia, has been an outspoken critic of the resettlement program undertaken by its predecessor (the military regime). However, the EPRDF itself has envisaged a new resettlement initiative. After 11 years since its seizure of power, in its Rural Development Policies, Strategies, and Ways (*yegeter limat policiwoch, stratejiwoch, ena siltoch*, 1994, E.C.), the government officially showed its strategy to undertake state-sponsored resettlement program. This decision by the EPRDF-led government is an irony for many spectators. As one commentator strongly commented on it (Tonbridge Wells, 2005, www.fisethiopia.org.et),

It is unclear how a government that came to power riding on the sympathy of forced resettlement and Villagization would now choose to inflict the same campaign on its peoples. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the same Marxist Malthusians theories that spawned the first resettlement campaign are being read and implemented this time by civilian regime determined to sacrifice its human resources for a failed policy

The question of whether planned or self-initiated resettlement is better has been subject for argument in resettlement literature. For that matter, especially for Ethiopia, scholars and research recommendations have been in favor of self-initiated resettlement. The strong and more or less convincing argument supporting self-organized resettlement is that, self-organized resettlers seek to establish social relations with influential people among the locals; and the socio-economic ties created between the hosts and self-initiated resettlers can lead to locals' protection to the resettlers that mitigate the dangers of escalation of conflict between them (Panahurst 2004, Desalegn, 2003). However, the EPRDF led government argued in favor of planned resettlement without substantiating its position with citation or research outputs. As it is stated in its rural development strategic document, (*yegeter limat policiwoch stratejiwoch, ena siltoch*, 1994 E.C- translation is mine)

It is a fact that in the history of the country people have been leading its life moving from densely populated areas to less densely populated areas and from highlands to low lands. These self-organized movements of people have been taken place with in the same regions; and there were cases that people move and resettle far from their area of origin. Such self-organized movements of people have existed for so long and still continued. When self-organized movements happen in a larger number they can result in the destruction of natural resources and cause for the creation of animosity between peoples. Nowadays, if the disadvantage of resettlement should not weight its advantage, resettlement should be planned and implemented with the support of the government. Individual and self-organized resettlements nowadays would create very high economic political and social chaos. It can be said that self-organized resettlement as an option, is in the finish.

In early 2003, the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State, which planned to undertake resettlement as part of its rural development strategy, sent a letter to South-Omo zone Administration and its respective Rural Development Coordination Department to identify suitable areas for resettlement. The Rural Development Coordination Department on its part requested the six *woredas* (districts) in the zone to identify suitable resettlement sites if any. Consequently, Salamago *woreda* administration responded in the positive to host resettlers. It is reported that the district administration was attracted to host resettlers because of the government promise that the program would involve the establishment of infrastructures (e.g. roads, water points, schools, health posts,) in the receiving *woredas*.

The positive response from Salamago *woreda* was followed by a pre-resettlement (feasibility) study undertaken in June 2003. The study was conducted by a team of eight experts from concerned Regional Bureaus and Zone Departments. The team included, a Veterinary Doctor from the Region Agricultural Research Center (the team leader), another veterinary doctor from South-Omo zone Agriculture and Natural Resource Desk, Crops Development Expert from zone Agriculture and Natural Resource Desk, an Agricultural Engineer and a Forestry Expert both from Ilako-Gazer *woreda* Agriculture and Natural Resource Desk, an Irrigation Engineer, Surveyor and a Geologist, all from the Region's Irrigation Authority.

The preparation for the resettlement in both the receiving and sending areas, however, started before the completion of the study report. In addition, the first batch of the resettlers arrived in

the resettlement area in the first week of January 2004. According to one informant, the feasibility study team was also responsible for designating and determining residential areas (villages) and farm fields as well, which the team accomplished during the study period. From this, it is obvious that the decision to resettle people in Salamago preceded the feasibility study report. The report produced by the team may have been used during the implementation process. For sure, it was not used to decide whether the area is suitable for resettlement or not. This shows that Salamago resettlement, similarly to past resettlement experiences in Ethiopia was implemented with haste, and hence there was insufficient time for adequate planning, adequate preparation and proper consultation with the settlers and the host communities.

With regard to the selection of resettlers, there were no as such strictly observed criteria. However, government guidelines stated that the landless, the chronically food insecure, healthy and hard working smallholder farmers are eligible for recruitment in the program. It is also reported that those individuals who have debt from micro-finance institutions and those having criminal records such as theft were prohibited from the resettlement programs. Nevertheless, it is hardly possible to say that the above criteria were observed since, according to my informants there were individuals who joined the resettlers just on the road while they were on their way to the resettlement area. This shows that there was no proper communication between the sending and receiving areas about the identification of resettlers.

Interviews with resettlers and Development Agents who participated in the recruitment process revealed that the number of resettlers to be selected from a given peasant association was not determined by quota system. For that matter, all my informants unanimously agreed that there was no direct use of force or intimidation during the selection process. However, the plan to resettle 3000 heads of households was made without proper pre-assessment study about the number of persons potentially willing to resettle. As a result, it is reported that lower level authorities in charge of the selection of resettlers used various means to mobilize the people to meet the planned figure. For instance, it is reported by some informants among the resettlers that in some peasant associations a film was shown with developed irrigation schemes and wild coffee in the proposed resettlement site, which are actually non-existent in

the area. Hence, the recruitment authorities may have overlooked the selection criteria to meet the target and the deadline.

In this respect, many resettlers and resettlement authorities in the receiving area emphasized that the poor recruitment process was one of the major factors for the various problems arising in the resettlement area. According to informants from among resettlers themselves, there are resettlers who came to the resettlement only targeting the support packages of the government. They have no interest to cultivate the land given to them. Informants also added that those resettlers are the ones who are involved in illegal activities such as charcoal and lumber production.

3.2. Resources Allocation

The availability and allocation of adequate financial and material resources is one of the vital domains for the undertaking of resettlement schemes. If resources are poor and inadequate, preparations and the actual implementation will be more likely poor and the attainment of resettlement objectives can be unlikely. As De Wet (2004) emphasized, it is partly because of the lack of proper inputs such as funding that resettlement often goes wrong. Cernea (2005) also indicated that the fulfillment of material conditions in the resettlements at least minimizes the impoverishment risks and increase the possibility of the success of resettlements. However, contrary to the above facts, the current government of Ethiopia envisaged to undertake a large-scale resettlement program without adequate financial and material resources. As seen in the Region's resettlement manual, (*SNNPRS, Rural Development Bureau, የፍትሕ አስተዳደር የፍትሕ ሰነድ, Gimbet, 1995 E. C. in Amharic*)

When we mean the resettlement is planned and state-sponsored, it should be known that there is no as much a lot of fund allocated for its execution. It should be noted that it is part of our struggle against poverty being we are under poverty.... (Translation and underline are mine)

The above statement clearly indicates that the government has determined to execute the resettlement program without adequate funding. The question must be, is it possible to

undertake such a huge resettlement program with inadequate funding? Experiences and research works in the area of resettlement do not support the above ambitious idea. Rather, the undertaking of a resettlement program for such a huge number of relocatees requires adequate inputs. In this respect, Salamago resettlement scheme is also suffering from inadequate funding to execute essential components of the program.

3.2.1. The Establishment of Basic Infrastructures

The establishments of basic infrastructures such as roads, health institutions, water points and schools are among the essential factors that require as adequate funding as possible. However, the government was over ambitious in undertaking the resettlement program with minimum funding. As a result, the scheme has multifaceted problems.

Before the relocation, Salamago *woreda* had been hardly accessible by car. It had been only during the dry season of a year that four-wheel drive land cruisers usually drove with foreign tourists were reaching the area in a difficult condition. For undertaking this resettlement, 115 km from Jinka to Hana (the *woreda capital*), and 21 km from Hana to the resettlement villages, a total of 136 km were cleared (most parts unpaved) and roads opened. All the six-resettlement villages are situated close (0 to 4km) to the new access road that stretches from Hana to the distant village (Village 1). As a result, medium and small trucks transporting both people and goods have begun to reach Hana and resettlements villages, and this mode of transportation represents a new development to the area.

However, it is not an all-weather road. Even during the dry season, it is a tough and difficult road. Hence, transportation cost between Jinka and Hana is expensive. Moreover, since vehicles usually break their parts due to the rough road, car owners and drivers are often not interested and willing to drive to Salamago. This poor transportation accessibility and its expensiveness obviously have a negative impact on residents of the area in general and resettlers in particular. Resettlers do not feel comfortable since they have no easy and fair price transportation access. For instance, they complain that in cases of serious illness or emergency cases they may have not got transportation to reach the nearest hospital in Jinka as

soon as possible. Moreover, the price of basic consumable goods such as soap and salt is expensive. For instance, the price of a piece of soap in Hana is Birr 3 to 3.50, where as it is Birr 2.00 for the same type of soap in Jinka town, found only 120km from Hana.

On the other hand, it would have a negative impact on the price of agricultural products. This problem was revealed during the last 'Belg' (spring, 2005) harvest. It was a time that resettlers got a relatively good harvest for the first time following the resettlement. However, to the disadvantage of them, the price of their major produces decreased very significantly. For instance, in Salamago, the price of maize decreased from birr 200 per quintal (100kg) before the 'Belg' harvest to Birr 40 for the same amount immediately after the harvest. They could not sell their products in competitive price in Jinka due to high transportation cost. They have to pay Birr 20 per quintal of grain for transportation from the resettlement area to Jinka. The high transportation cost in the area is the result of the poor condition of the road. We may compare and contrast this transportation cost with the transportation cost on an asphalt road. For instance, the transportation cost for equal amount (100kg) of goods from Addis Ababa to Arbaminch, 500 kilo meter distance (which is about four fold of the distance from Jinka to Hana), is less than Birr 20.

In terms of healthcare intervention, there are two newly established (following the resettlement) health posts. One is located at Guyo-Dakuba (village 3), where the resettlers and the host communities of Villages 1, 2, and 3 receive free medical services. The other health post is found in Tsitsima (Village 6) and it renders free medical services to the resettlers of Villages 4, 5, 6, and the surrounding host communities. Among the locals, the free medical service is given only to the Bodi people, not to the Mursi and the Dime. In terms of human resources, there are two senior clinical nurses and one laboratory technician at Guyo-Dakuba and only one senior clinical nurse at the Tsitsima health post. Due to inadequate human resources, inadequate medical equipments (lack of refrigerator, lack of delivery coach, examination bed,), and logistical problems (both health posts have no vehicle, not even a single motorcycle), the health intervention has been limited to providing curative services on limited scale. Fortunately, the area has not much health hazards. So far, there have been very

few cases of infant mortality and morbidity. All key informants indicated that the resettlement area seems to be a convenient place for children to live. In this regard, the Salamago resettlement site seems to be different from the predominant health problem cases in many resettlement sites. Until the time of the research, there have been few cases of adult mortality.

The available water resources in the area are small rivers and hand-pumped underground supplies. The small rivers include Guyo in Village 3, Harum in Village 1, and two other small seasonal rivers near Villages 4 and 6. In addition to these surface water sources, there are three old shallow wells (constructed before the resettlement) and more than six newly constructed hand pumps. The resettlers use both the small rivers and the wells for domestic purpose including drinking. The residents of Village 1, however, totally depended on Harum River for drinking and all other domestic needs due to the poor quality of the water from the newly constructed wells. The Wells in all other villages are potable. However, due to the malfunctioning of some of the wells, long queues of people are observed on water sites and women and girls were fetching water starting from 4 a.m. The settlers use hard plastic cans (with 20 to 25 liter capacity) to fetch and store water. On the average, the settlers travel 5 to 20 minutes to water sites.

In the resettlement implementation manual prepared by the Regional State, education is considered as something not as urgent as water and health (*yeteshashale yesfera Afetsatsem manual* (Jinbot, 1995 E.C). As a result, it is stated in the document that the issue of education shall be seen in the next consecutive years after the resettlers well establish themselves. However, underestimating the necessity of education for children is a very simplistic approach. Moreover, the Konso resettlers are very much concerned about the educational situation of their children.

It was due to their higher demand from the part of the resettlers that since September 2004 two formal schools were opened under grass-covered shades. The one is in village 3 serving for children from village 1, 2, 3 itself and village 4 partly. In this school, two grade levels, grade 1 and grade 2 were opened in September 2005. Grade1 has three sections while grade two has

only one section. The other school is opened in village 6 serving for children coming from village 5 and 6, and partly from village 4. Here, only grade 1 with two sections is opened to be increased by one grade every other year. However, both schools suffer from the following major problems. In both schools, students attend classes seating on stones and locally made benches. Textbooks are either short or not available. There are no teaching aid materials. Generally, the teaching learning process is underway very unsatisfactorily. There has been no meaningful support given to the schools from the government except assigning teachers. However, UNICEF provided exercise books and pens for the students.

There are also other problems created in relation to education. On the one hand, it caused for the separation of children and parents. Because, due to the lack of grades above grade 2, many resettlers are forced to leave their children back home with relatives not to detach them from their education. On the other hand, those children who have no option to live apart from their parents (and who are at grade 3 and above) have come but are forced to be school dropouts. Some children who previously were at grade 3 level are joined Grade 2 (in village 3 school) not to be away from school. Similarly, some children (from Village 5 and 6) who previously were grade 2, joined grade 1 in Tsitsima school (Village 6). There are also cases in which the husband is forced to live alone while his wife remained back home due to their children education.

Table 1. Number of Students and teachers in the resettlements area (Feb. 2005)

Schools	Grade	No Students Registered			Currently Attending			No. Teachers		
		M	F	Both	M	F	Both	M	F	Both
V3	1	166	82	248	160	80	240	4	2	6
	2	39	9	48	33	9	42			
V6	1	76	69	145	69	69	138	2	2	4

3.2.2. Land allocation and Agriculture

Land was allocated on household basis. Each household was provided with 0.125 hectare of backyard and 2 hectare of farmland regardless of the size of the household. However, in polygamous families, second wives disguised themselves as household heads, got independent household status, and received land accordingly. It appears this is a public secret never challenged and questioned by the community members, local officials, and the development agents. Agricultural inputs distributed to the resettlers included tools such as, a ploughshare, a sickle, machete, an axe, and three different types of hoe per household. Moreover, some seeds/plants (maize and the vegetative part of sweet potato), and an ox for two households. The resettlers have the following complaints regarding the distribution of inputs:

- 1) Some of the farm tools especially, the ploughshare and the machete are poor in quality and hence do not function properly.
- 2) Some households have yet not been given sickle, hoe, and the machete
- 3) Some households have not been paired and given oxen until 14 months after the resettlement

There is no reliable information about the amount of rainfall in the area for lack of metrological data. Based on their observation in the last one year, some resettlers stated that the amount of the rainfall is sufficient while others seem to have doubts about the reliability and sufficiency of rainfall in the area. Each village has two to four development agents, whose duties have largely been limited to keeping records of newcomers, returnees, and the size of cultivated land. Moreover, they are responsible for the monthly distribution of food ration. A veterinary post has been set up and the services have been extended to the Bodi agro-pastoralists. The resettles have only limited number of oxen distributed by the government.

In terms of credit facilities, the *Woreda* Cooperative Office organized resettlers in saving and credit association in Village 3. The association opened a shop and started to sell soap, salt, dry cells, lamps, and other basic essentials. The association obtained the initial capital from the

Woreda Cooperative Office as loan. Until the research period, the association did not provide any credit to its members.

There are two market days in and around the resettlement area: the old Saturday market in Hana and the new Thursday market in Village 3. The *Hana* market is far from Villages 1, 2, 3 and 4. The residents of these villages largely use the local market at Village 3, while Village 5 and Village 6 go to the *Hana* market. Since the establishment of the resettlement, the prices of grain and livestock are reported to have increased significantly. For instance, the price of a big ox is reported to have increased from Birr 500 to 600 to Birr 1000 to 1200 in one year. This has been viewed as good news for the Dime agriculturalists and the Bodi pastoralists.

3.2.3 Food and Non-Food Provisions

The provision of food ration for resettlers (for some period) has always been among the essential components of planned resettlement programs. However, this task itself is not as simple as purchasing some foodstuff and distributing it for the resettlers. Rather, it requires a careful assessment about the feeding habit of the resettlers and the amount of food required to support them for specified period. Hence, questions such as what type of food, how much food and for how long are to be answered before hand.

In this respect, Salamaqo resettlement scheme is not free from problems. Initially, resettlers were receiving 15 kg of wheat flour per person per month. Moreover, they were given Birr 17 per household per month for the purchase of additional food and for other related expenses. However, it was reported that the resettlers had the following complaints concerning food ration. First, the resettlers who found it difficult to prepare their traditional meal did not like the wheat flour. As a result, they were forced to trade the wheat flour for sorghum or maize with the Bodi agro-pastoralists. Secondly, the resettlers also complained about the amount of the monthly food ration and argued that the financial assistance as inadequate. Especially those households who did not bring their family finish the food ration some ten days before the end of the month.

Based on settlers' complaint, resettlement authorities made adjustments on the type and the amount of food ration five months after the resettlement. Accordingly, the amount of food rations increased to 20 kg per person per month. The wheat flour has also been changed by maize. Since June 2004, the financial assistance for the purchase of additional food has increased to Birr 22 per month per household. The resettlers also commented the distribution of equal amounts of food ration for each member of a household, regardless of their age differences. According to informants, those households having larger family members with more children have better chance to collect surplus food than those households having smaller family members do. The resettlers were also critical of the problem of mono-diet, which is uninvolved to fat.

Resettlers have also expressed confusion regarding the duration of the food ration. They argued that during the orientation time (before the recruitment process), the authorities told them that the food ration would last for three consecutive years. However, the resettlement authorities in the receiving area explained them differently. According to officials, three years time is only a grace period given to them to see the advantage and disadvantage of the resettlement area and decide either to stay in the resettlement or otherwise. However, as it is stated in the resettlement implantation manual and as resettlement authorities here it in the receiving area said, resettlers were expected to be food self-sufficient within eight months time.

3.4. The Scale of the Relocation

The Regional government had planned to resettle 3000 heads of households from Konso special woreda to the proposed Salamago resettlement scheme. Accordingly, close to the initial plan of the government, 2,897 heads of households were transported to the resettlement site in two phases, of which 2,820 are male and the rest 77 are female household heads. Of course, it was mentioned earlier that many of the female-headed households are second wives disguising themselves as household heads to secure additional land. The first batch of resettlers arrived in January 2004 followed by the second batch of resettlers a month after

them. The approach adapted by the regional state was to move heads of households first and then to move other family members after household heads have established basic needs especially individual shelters.

It is noted by resettlement scholars that the larger the scale of the resettlement is the higher the probability of failure. Thus, they suggest modest sized, cost effective and manageable scheme (Gebre, 2005:377). In this regard, I can say that Salamago resettlement is large-scale resettlement in terms of three basic measures. The major problems the scheme encountering are arising from the scale of the relocation. First and for most, the resettlement resulted in a big demographic change in the area. Taking five family members as an average family size for a peasant household, the total numbers of resettlers can reach 14,485 (i.e., 2897 heads of households multiplied by 5, assuming that all household heads bring their family). This much number of resettlers would be more than twice of the total population of the host ethnic group (the Bodi agro-pastoralists) and nearly about the total population of Salamago *woreda* in general, i.e. including the Bodi, the Dime and the Mursi.

This sudden demographic change in favor of the resettlers has created a threat of marginalization among the Bodi agro-pastoralists. One Bodi informant said, "We feared that we would be pushed away from our ancestral land in a short period of time". Hence, this sudden demographic change and the probable shift in the power balance of the area in favor of the newcomers is a major source of tension created between resettlers and the host community (the Bodi).

Table 2. Demographic data of host communities

Kebule	Ethnic group	Male	Female	Both
1. Ganchere	Dime	566	596	1162
2. Gancha	Dime	245	237	482
3. Dime Gero	Dime	1146	1266	2412
4. Dime Utra	Dime	874	898	1772

5. Earka Ducha	Dime	311	323	634
6. Deme Garfa	Dime	483	560	1043
Subtotal		3625	3880	7505
7. Ono Hana	Ibodi	1359	1482	2841
8. Naama Shetti	Ibodi	420	422	842
9. Gura	Ibodi	903	559	1462
10. Gicofatuba	Ibodi	207	276	483
11. Hana	Mixed (non indigenous civil servant)	429	225	654
Subtotal		3318	2964	6282
12. Hailwuba	Mursi	447	490	937
13. Dongoso	Mursi	789	771	1560
14. Dura	Mursi	878	861	1739
Subtotal		2114	2122	4236
Total		9057	8966	18023

Source: South Omo zone population department; 2004 projection
based on 1994 National Census.

The scale of the relocation has also created a negative impact on the pastoral livelihood of the Ibodi agro-pastoralists. The resettlement program did not give due consideration to the resource base of the area in relation to pastoral lifestyle. This is so, "...because the pastoral occupation is not generally viewed as productive form of land use when compared with the practice of agriculture" (Ayalew, 2001:61). The ideological justification is the assumption that pastoral land is vacant and unoccupied. Pastoralists are said to have disproportionately more land than they actually need (Ibid: 188). In this respect, demographers are always concerned with the crude density of a population, which refers to the number of persons per square kilometers of a given geographic area. There is of course another term called "Agricultural Density" or "Rural Density", which refers to the ratio between the rural population and cultivated land (in a particular locality). However, both ways are not concerned or do not

consider the livestock population of pastoralist communities in relation to size of the grazing land available.

Planners concluded the Konso special *woreda*, the origin of resettlers as densely populated whereas Salamago *woreda*, the host area, was said to be less densely populated based on mere crude density calculation. The livelihood of pastoralists and their livestock population did not get proper consideration. Such neglect towards pastoral livelihood in Ethiopia, for that matter the world over, has existed for so long. For instance, as Ayalew disclosed it, "no natural livestock census, which would have produced a reliable estimate, has in fact been taken in the country so far" (Ibid: 66). However, research works pointed out that the Bodi agro-pastoralists have a large livestock population. According to the survey conducted by Fukui on 21 compounds (1979: 150), the average herd composition only for cattle (excluding goat) is twenty in each compound.

Moreover, the resettlement site is in the wet part of the Bodi territory and their last resort during the dry season. According to informants from the locals, they have large grazing lands to the central grassland; however, they lack water both for the animals and for herders during the dry season. As a result, they often are forced to retreat to the edge of the Dime Mountains to the Northeast for both grazing and watering, which is now occupied by the resettlement villages. This shows that the scale of the resettlement has significantly affected the transhumant way of life of the Bodi agro-pastoralists. The negative impact of the program on the resource base of the area not only cause new conflicts between the resettlers and the hosts, but it could also aggravate the long existing inter-ethnic warfare in the region as a result of competition over the declining grazing, watering and cropping land.

On the other hand, several resettlement researchers (e.g. Gebre, 2003) emphasized the adverse political, economic and psychological impact of resettlement on host communities. Similarly, the negative political and psychological impacts of Salamago Resettlement on the Bodi agro-pastoralist have begun to be seen as early as the inception of the program. The large the scale of the relocation coupled with the political pressure (from higher-level officials), the local

administration including almost all sector offices were forced to give the highest attention to the program, often at the expense of their regular activities. Especially the *woreda* Rural [Development] Coordination Office has devoted more than 75 percent (according to the words of the head office) of its time to issues related with the resettlement. Before the resettlement, however, the major areas of government intervention in the area were towards the Bodi agro-pastoralists. This has been changed since the resettlement. One informant from the Bodi community said,

"It is not clear for us as to why the government has given much care only for the Komo people. Before their arrival, we were meant to prepare the so-called communal shelters to them. Not only us, but the Amharas (to mean government workers) also suffered a lot working day and night. With their coming, a new road opened, many new water points established, etc. Everything done following the resettlement in Salamago is for their sake. We are forgotten."

The negative environmental impact of the resettlement also cannot be underestimated. In this regard, Salamago *woreda*, similarly to most peripheral parts of the country, is characterized by fragile ecology, uneven rainfall and intensifying temperature. Thus, the scale of resettlements would definitely create a significant pressure on the carrying capacity of the ecology. According to the study team report, the total area of the land demarcated for resettlement is 26,185 hectare. Of which 10,000 hectare for farm fields (38 percent), 8,761 hectare for grazing (11.46 percent), 4,424 hectare for protected forestland (16.87 percent), and 3,000 hectare for residence villages and infrastructures (11.46 percent) are allocated. Locals who live in the resettlement area shared only 400 hectare (1.59 percent) for residence and farm fields.

Therefore, the inevitable clearing of forest for farming fields, resettlement villages, infrastructures and fuel wood will seriously affect the ecology sooner or latter. Moreover, it is reported that settlers have begun producing charcoal and lumber for market, which was totally unknown in the area. Asked on the issue, the Head of the *Woreda* Rural Development Coordination Office accepted the problem and said, "By now the resettlers themselves have set rules which seriously punish those persons who involve in the production of charcoal and

lumber." It is reported that the punishment is up to and including dismissing from the resettlement area. However, it is hardly possible that such measures would achieve the intended goal.

In actual fact, the problem is largely associated with the land tenure system of the country. The traditional land holding system of the Bodi agro-pastoralists combined individual (household) use rights with communal control. However, the land policy of the country does not acknowledge their traditional land holding system. Rather the 1975 proclamation of the public ownership of rural land (No. 31/75) has effectively abandoned the various indigenous tenure arrangements and organized under a generalized uniform state-managed tenure system (Teufaye, 2003: 1). Accordingly, ownership of land was vested in the state abrogating the 1955 constitution that recognized private ownership of land. Consequently, the change to state ownership was enshrined in the 1987 (No.1/87) as well as the 1995 (No.1/95) constitution (ibid.). Ayalew (2001:61) indicated the ideological justification of the government for taking such measures.

Based on the justification that nomadic pastoralists were not attached to any particular land, and in the absence of such attachment land taxes could not be levied, all land worked by pastoralists was declared 'State Land'. The principle was: no land tax, no land ownership. It is this thinking about 'unoccupied', 'unowned' or 'abandoned' land of the pastoralists to revoke communal and tribal ownership and expropriate their land

In practice, however, this land policy is found ineffective to control, protect and develop the natural forest resources in the remote, wide and inaccessible parts of the country. As a result, any measure (punishment) against those who cut trees (among the resettlers) may not be effective enough to protect the forest resources of the area.

Similarly, one of the central arguments of government authorities justifying large-scale resettlement is based on the assumption that there is abundant unutilized land suitable for peasant agriculture to support a large-scale population within each regional state. However, resettlement scholars (Desalegn, 1986, Parkhurst, 1992, Gebre, 2001) have questioned the availability of abundant unutilized arable land in the country. Rather, recent research output on

land and related issues invalidated the hitherto existing ambitious understanding in this regard. As Tesfaye (2003:27), revealed it,

About 55 percent of the total land area in Ethiopia constitutes moisture-stressed arid and semi-arid areas with less than a four-month crop-growing period. The land is not suitable or marginally suitable for rain-fed cultivation because of severe moisture stress. No crops are grown in most of these areas or are grown with a high-risk of crop failure. Areas with a longer and dependable period with at least 120 crop-growing days are found in the remaining 45 percent of the total land area, particularly in the highlands, which accounts for 22 percent of the total land area.

The scale of the resettlement is also incompatible with the material, financial and human resources needed to implement the program. It seems to me that government may have planned the program with the hope that the international community would extend its generous support to the program. However, it is seen that the donor community declined to render any meaningful support. As a result, the government alone failed to support the program adequately in terms of the provision of agricultural inputs, kitchen utensils, logistics, technical expertise, food and non-food items, infrastructures, etc.

The agricultural inputs distributed included tools such as plowshare, sickle, machete, axe, and hoe (three different types), each only one per household. Until my first field trip in March 2001 (about a year and three months after the resettlement), only one ox was given to two households. Resettlers have serious complaints about the quality and quantity of agricultural inputs. According to informants, some of the tools especially the plowshare and machete are poor in quality and do not function properly. In addition, more than a year after the resettlement, some settlers were not yet given a sickle, and machete. Similarly, some resettlers were not yet paired and given ox.

Their problem was more serious in the case of oxen since it is the most important agricultural input to them. As one ox is given to two households, four households should form a group to have a pair of oxen. This has created dual problems. First, they could not cultivate their land on time. The one who got the first chance in the group would be forced to cultivate earlier than the plowing season. Whereas others in the third and fourth turn would be forced to lag behind

the season. Secondly, many oxen either plow poorly or are dying of overload. It is reported (up to September 2005) that 85 out of 1898 oxen died so far (it is to be noted that more than half of the total were distributed between March and September 2005).

Only limited kitchen utensils such as plates, cups, jugs and casseroles, one each per household were distributed. Here again, informants revealed that except the casserole, the rest are of poor quality and became out of use very rapidly. There has been also a serious logistical problem at both *woreda* and site level. For instance, there is no single motorcycle or vehicle assigned to the resettlement program either at *woreda* or at site level. As a result, development agents, health workers and supervisors cannot easily move from village to village to fulfill their duties and responsibilities properly.

3.5. Resettlement Administration

The setting up of efficient resettlement agency staffed primarily with a personnel specialized and/or practical experience in planning and operating resettlement schemes (Dessalegn, 2003: 61) is an essential condition in the undertaking of state sponsored resettlement programs. In the current resettlement program, based on the federal structure of the country, Regional governments are supposed to be the highest responsible organs for planning, execution and management of the resettlement program undertaken under their domain. In this respect, the NNPRP did not establish an independent agency responsible for the program. Rather, at regional level, a committee comprising of representatives of sector bureaus (often delegated by the heads of each bureau) including the region's president is established. Almost all regional sector bureaus are represented in the committee. The Region's President is the chairperson while the Region's Rural Development Coordination Bureau is the Vice-chairperson of the committee. It is a broad and complex administrative structure.

Table 3. The Regional Resettlement Program Main committee

No	Members	Roles
1	President of the Region	Chairperson
2	Region's Rural Development Bureau Head	Vice Chairperson
3	Region's Food Security Office Head	Secretary
4	Region's Agricultural and Natural Resources Bureau Head	Member
5	Region's Finance and Economic Dev't Bureau Head	Member
6	Region's Health Bureau Head	Member
7	Region's Water, Mines and Energy Bureau Head	Member
8	Region's DPFC Head	Member
9	Region's Information Bureau Head	Member
10	Region's Population Office Head	Member
11	Region's Capacity Building Coordination Bureau head	Member
12	Region's Justice and Administration coordination Bureau head	Member
13	Onso Macro Finance head	Member
14	Region's Rural Road Authority head	Member
15	Region's Cooperative Office head	Member
16	Region's Education Bureau head	Member

Source: SNNPRS, Rural Development Bureau, "yeteshashale yesefera afetsatssem memaria", 1995 E.C., in Amharic.

Major duties and responsibilities of the Regional resettlement program main committee'
as stipulated in the manual are the following.

- Authorize the selection of resettlement sites based on research,
- Determines the sending and receiving areas,
- Controls the implementation of the program based on the principle of volunteerism from the part of the sending areas,
- Set rules and directions that support the proper implementation of the program
- Makes final decisions on requests and issues coming from various bodies concerning the resettlement program.

- Controls all member institutions to function as per their duties and responsibilities,
- Identifies the required support from the regions government, and
- Authorizes the human and material resources necessary for the implementation of the program

Almost similar committees are established in both the sending and receiving areas from zonal level down to *kebedes*, the latter being the lowest governmental administrative unit. It is not an easy task for such committees to efficiently handle the "inherently complex" (De Wet, 2004) nature of resettlement. Handling resettlement program shall not be left subordinate to sector departments who are established with their own specific tasks. In this regard, experiences often show that a committee of all often ends up as a committee of none.

A similar committee was established in Salamago comprising of almost all sector offices. However, in actual fact, the execution and management of the program seems to be left to the *Woreda* Rural Development Coordination Office. In terms of technical expertise, resettlement authorities at *woreda* level and the site staff have no adequate expertise knowledge, experience to understand, and manage the dynamics of resettlement. For instance, Development Agents having 1 month to 1 year training as multi-purpose agricultural worker are staffed in all the six villages. The *Woreda* Rural Development Coordination Office Head devotes more than 75 percent of his working time in relation to the resettlement program. He is the first person at *woreda* level in charge of the resettlement program. He is also a Development Agent by profession. They may handle technical issues. However, as resettlement is not a mere physical project, they cannot look into and deal with the human elements of resettlement. When asked whether they have any similar experience in relation to population displacement and migration in the past, to all of them Salamago is their first experience when working in resettlement program.

CHAPTER FOUR

Differential Adaptation among Resettlers

4.1. The Manner of Resettlement and Factors of Motivation

The Federal Democratic Government of Ethiopia, while opting for resettlement program as a remedy for the food insecurity problem of the country, blamed the past resettlement program (accomplished during the military regime) mainly for its involuntary approach. In its Rural Development Policies, Strategies and Ways (in Amharic 1994 E.C), the government criticized the past resettlement program as follows.

The basic defect of the resettlement program during the military regime was that it was not based on the willingness and interest of the resettlers. Since nothing accomplished by force of action can bear fruit, the program was basically failed causing a heavy loss on the resettlers. (Translation is mine)

In this respect, policy makers and planners of the current resettlement program, both at Federal and Regional level, at least in policy documents have emphasized the principle of "voluntarism" as the major tenet of the new resettlement initiative. It seems that the undertaking of the so-called "Voluntarily Resettlement" by itself alone was understood as making a radical departure from the past resettlement program, which actually was suffered from a host of problems. Hence, the effect of the manner of resettlement was over-emphasized to the level that diminishes or attributes all past mistakes and problems only to the "involuntary" nature of the *Derg* resettlements program. This understanding had two major problems. First, the manner of displacement is only one factor, among many, that could positively or negatively affect a given resettlement program. Secondly, their explanations about the manner of displacement were exclusively based on the traditional 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' dichotomization of resettlement. As a result, the motivating factors behind resettlers' decision in favor of resettlement were not properly analyzed. As Pankhurst and Piguat (2004:671) explained,

However the question of voluntariness is not straightforward, and individuals' decision-making is embedded in social, economic and political factors. Even where an individual volunteers to be resettled, this may go against the wishes of other family members. Parents, spouses or children of the decision-maker may find themselves pushed into resettlement. Women often face tough choices of whether to remain with parents or leave with husbands or vice versa. ...peer and kin pressure, as well as the influence of influential leaders, members of social and religious organizations, and local tradition of community pressure in which the wishes and choices of individuals are overridden leading to social coercion.

Nonetheless, the 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' dichotomization of resettlement program has become a controversial issue among scholars of resettlement. Traditionally, a resettlement program was believed to be voluntary when resettlers are not coerced by outside agencies to leave their area of origin and resettle somewhere else. On the other hand, a resettlement program was said to be involuntary when resettlers are coerced by outside agencies (Governments and Aid agencies) or natural calamities to leave their area of origin. However, these days, the traditional 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' dichotomy is subject to argument. Rather, it has become recognized that the distinction is more theoretical than practical. As Guggenheim (in Gebre, 2002b:269) put it, "Nevertheless, the boundary between voluntary and involuntary resettlement is often blurred. There is a pronoun of distinction.... involuntary resettlement is often easier to isolate from other forms of human movements in theory than in fact." Seemingly synonymous to Guggenheim's idea, Dessalegn (2003:2) also referred "large scale relocation that takes place following natural or man-made calamity...." as involuntary resettlement.

Coming back to Salomago resettlement, all my informants said without difference that there was no use of force or intimidation during the recruitment process. However, the recruitment process was made in haste. The resettlers had no sufficient time even to think twice over it. In the words of my informants, they decided and prepared for relocation within two to four weeks time. As one informant explained it,

"About two to three months before the resettlement, there were widely spread talks in our community concerning the plan of the government to resettle people from Konso special woreda to South-Omo zone. Later on, about two weeks before the displacement,

our PA leader and Dks called us for a public meeting, and they officially announced about the plan and objectives of the resettlement program. It was on that meeting that I officially learn about the details of the program. I consulted my wife over the issue. Then we agreed to resettle and see things

Different factors, with different degree, motivated the resettlers to decide in favor of the resettlement. The lack /shortage of land, repeated drought and subsequent famine, degradation of soil fertility and government promises were the four major factors behind settlers' decision in favor of the resettlement. According to the sample survey conducted on 90 resettlers (heads of households), 19 of them (21.11 percent) have no farmland at all, 26 (28.88 percent) have only half hectare or less, 24 (26.66 percent) have between half and one ha, and 21 (23.33 percent) have more than one ha farmland in their area of origin. Based on the above data, 45 out of 90 (50 percent) settlers had either no or less than half hectare of farmland before the relocation. In terms of drought, all the available sources indicate that Konso special *woreda* is among the drought prone areas of the country. Moreover, in spite of the traditional soil conservation practice of Konso farmers (through terracing work), farming as their main livelihood has suffered from severe degradation of soil fertility due to long years of cultivation and the effect of erosion which is the result of the slope nature of the terrain in most parts of the *woreda*.

The promise of the government had also significantly affected resettlers' decision in favor of the resettlement. First of all similar experiences here in Ethiopia and elsewhere have showed that state (or donor) sponsored population relocations often create higher expectations on the refugees. Secondly, informants revealed that authorities promised several attractive benefits packages. During the public meetings in their area of origin, resettlers were not given complete and genuine information. The destination area was also explained to them in exaggerated manner, as an area with abundant and virgin land having adequate rainfall. In some *kebeles*, informants disclosed that they were shown a film that presents the proposed resettlement area having developed irrigation scheme and wild coffee, which are actually non-existent in the area. As mentioned before, each household was promised the provision of

adequate inputs, such as farm tools including a pair of oxen, complete household utensils, access to two hectares of land, three years relief, the establishments of infrastructures and social services. However, most of these promises could not be delivered on arrival.

While asked to compare the initial promise of authorities with the actual reality in the resettlement area in terms of benefit packages they are getting, the overwhelming majority of informants responded that it is far below what they were promised and what they expected. According to the sample survey, only 3 resettlers out of 90 (3.33 percent) responded the benefit packages of the government as something good enough while the rest answered for the question in quite opposite manner.

The following was partly taken from an interview and/or discussions made with one of my key informants.

Q. Your compound is looking good?

A. Yes. I have worked hard to make my compound looking interesting to me and to my family. I have well fenced it, built two good dwellings and planted vegetables.

Q. How are things here in the resettlement? The land, the climate, cropping, social services, etc.

A. Some are good, some are not.

Q. Very good! Let us begin with the good ones?

A. Although the area is a bit hot, as compared to my area of origin; it is harmless to human habitation. We are healthy, our children are healthy. We have got enough size of farmland.

Q. What about things which are not good?

- A Many things. The government has not kept its words. It is hard to us to cope up with the situation in the absence the promised support of the government. You saw our farmland. It is full of trees. When we cut tress, the roots remain in the soil. Hence, you cannot dig it with hoe. We are so far given only an ox for two households. I think you have heard many things. In short the government is not up to its words; that is the main problem.*
- Q. What else?**
- A The other major problem is the security situation. The Bodi are not happy with our coming. Everybody is uncertain about the security situation.*
- Q. What size of farmland do you have in your area of origin?**
- A less than half hectare*
- Q. What about other properties, like ox, cow, goat and house,**
- A I had one dwelling and three goats. That is it.*
- Q. What did you do about your properties when you came here?**
- A I sold the goats. I left the farmland and the house to my wife's father.*
- Q. Did the promises of the government influence your decision to decide in favor of the resettlement?**
- A Yes. I was very much delighted.*
- Q. Do you think you would have not decided to resettle if authorities had not promised you all those attractive things?**
- A Whatever the promise, my coming was must. Because, I had no better chance there. Had it not been for the sake of my children, I would have left my village earlier than this resettlement.*
- Q. Have you brought all your family here?**

A *My eldest son, who is about 15, is there. Together with my wife's family, he looks after my house and farmland there. Here we are five; three children, my wife and I.*

Q. **How much size of land have you so far cultivated?**

A *about 1 ha*

Q. **Have you determined to live here?**

A *Definitely. Whatever the worst comes (possibly in terms of conflicts with the flood), I may send my children and my wife back home. I will die here.*

Based on the discussion above, the man argues that it will be challenging to him to cope with the situation with existing minimal government support. According to him, although he was delighted by the promises of authorities, he had decided to resettle even in the absence of the promises. Moreover, he has a high determination to stay regardless of whatever problems he encounters. A significant number of resettlers share his views. However, regardless of their unmet expectations in terms of government supports as well as the conditions of the resettlement area, again the great majority of the resettlers did not regret with their decision to resettle. According to the sample survey, 82 out of 90 interviewees (91.11 percent) did not regret with their decision in favor of the resettlement. The above facts may reveal three essential points that could serve as premises for my later conclusion. The points are,

- 1 A significant number of resettlers' decision in favor of the resettlement was influenced by the attractive promises of authorities
- 2 However, the reality in the resettlement area is much below from what they were promised and what they expected (for 96.67 percent of the resettlers based on the sample survey)
- 3 Still, however, the overwhelming majority of the resettlers (91.66 percent according to the sample survey) did not regret with their decision to resettle.

Therefore, I wish to conclude that, although resettlers' decision was partly (for the great majority) and mainly (for some groups of resettlers) affected by the attractive promises of resettlement authorities (which can be seen as pull factors), for the great majority of resettlers, the decision in favor of the resettlement, however, was more influenced by the 'push' than 'pull' factors. This is because, despite the fact that their expectations are left unmet, the overwhelming majority of the resettlers do not regret with their decision to resettle. Hence, according to Cernea and Guggenheim's conceptualization of the 'voluntary' and 'Involuntary' resettlement in terms of 'push' and 'pull' factors (in Gebre,2002b:269), for the majority of Salamingo resettlers it is nearly involuntary since their decision to resettle was highly affected by 'push' factors. Or else, according to Gebre's (ibid.) conceptualization of the manner of resettlement, this group of resettlers belongs to compulsory-voluntary type of resettlers, since their decision to resettle was mainly out of a desperate measure.

On the other hand, it is mentioned that resettlement authorities of the sending area exercised acts of inducement. In this regard, some groups of resettlers decided in favor of the resettlement mainly due to these deliberate acts of inducement. According to the sample survey, 19 out of the 90 (21.11 percent) interviewees, responded that they were still undetermined to stay or otherwise in the resettlement scheme.

The following is a conversation made with one of my key informants, who is intelligent and articulate speaker,

Q. When and how did you hear about the resettlement?

A. Of course, there were talks everywhere about the resettlement since some two to three months before the relocation. But I officially learnt about the program at a public meeting only two weeks before our displacement. The meeting was chaired by our Kebele chairperson. Explanations about the program were given by two men whom I do not know before.

Q. what were the issues explained to you on the meeting?

A They told us many things. They started by explaining about the problems of our home area which we know it well: about the shortage of land, soil degradation and the drought. Then they explained to us about the existence of abundant, fertile, and virgin land in the proposed resettlement area. They also promised us that the government would support the resettlers with, among others, food ration, agricultural tools, a pair of oxen for one household, cloth, and kitchen utensils, for three consecutive years.

Q. **Do you meet your expectations?**

A Not at all. In actual fact, the government cheated us. For instance, they gave one ox for two households instead of two oxen for one household as we were promised. We are yet not given any cloth except a blanket that we are given before our displacement. The farm tools distributed are inadequate and some of which are poor in quality.

Q. **Did government promises influence your decision to resettle?**

A Exactly! Otherwise how come a poor man like me can have courage to come and settle in such a forest land with empty hands?

Q. **Some settlers told me that they had been showed film having developed irrigation schemes and wild coffee in the resettlement area?**

A In my locality, we didn't see the said film. But I heard the same information from others.

Q. **Now do you regret with your decision to resettle?**

A I do not regret (he laughed)

Q. **How do you find the resettlement area as compared to your previous information?**

A The resettlement area is good in some ways. We have got enough size of backyard and farmland. To our knowledge, the soil also looks good. The environment is also suitable to our health.

- Q. You told me that the authorities cheated you with false promises. What do you think would happen if you had the actual information? Do you think you would have not decided to resettle?
- A. *I am not sure. But I doubt.*
- Q. But you told me that now you do not regret with your decision?
- A. *Yes, I do not regret. First the area is not bad. Secondly, I want to see things here for sometime.*
- Q. Have you determined to stay here?
- A. *Government gave us three years grace period. That time I will decide.*
- Q. What size of land do you have in your home area?
- A. *About 2 ha*
- Q. What about other properties?
- A. *Two Oxen, 2 cows, some five goats, two houses and some chicken*
- Q. Have you brought all your family here?
- A. *I am here with my second wife. I have 4 children to her. We are 6 here.*
- Q. What did you do about your properties back home?
- A. *My eldest son and two younger ones (male and female respectively) are there. They are from my first wife. She died. I left my properties with them. I am here with my 2nd wife. I have four children to her. All of them are here*
- Q. You did not sell any from your livestock while you came here?
- A. *I sold some sacks of maize and 3goats (out of 8 I had). Nothing else*
- Q. You look young. How old are you?
- A. *I do not know my age. Maybe I am about 45 years old.*

Q. How old is your eldest son?

A. He is at marrying age; may be about 20.

Q. What was the major factor that motivated you to decide in favor of the resettlement?

A. Government promised many things to us. I already told you all the promises. So how could I hesitate to decide in favor of the resettlement hearing all those promises?

The above interview gives a good picture about the factors of motivation and the manner of resettlement behind the man's decision in favor of the resettlement. In his area of origin, he has had a very good size (2 hectare) of farmland in comparison with the average land holding size of the Ethiopian peasantry, which is currently about half hectare. Moreover, at the time of the displacement, he had some surplus production that he managed to sell while preparing for the resettlement. Hence, his decision to resettle was not out of desperate action. He also mentioned that sooner than later, he has to share some portion of land to his eldest son. Thus, mainly motivated by the promises of the government, he may have considered the resettlement as an opportunity to secure additional land for him and his growing family members.

Moreover, resettlement authorities (also site level documents) revealed that hundreds of resettlers returned home in the first two months after the resettlement. The reason for these early returnees, according to key informants both from resettlers and administrators side, was mainly associated with the unmet expectations. This fact indicates that those early returnees decided to resettle mainly motivated by the promises of resettlement authorities. Later on, as they did not find the promises on arrival, they soon returned to their area of origin. Therefore, the manner of the resettlement can also be characterized as "induced voluntarism"; which refers to the manner of displacement that, although the migrants retain the decision-making power, the facts on which their decisions are based are analyzed and provided by other agencies (Gebree, 2002b).

To conclude, the manner of displacement of Salamago resettlement could be characterized as compulsory-voluntary, which accounts for the majority of resettlers; and induced-voluntary for the rest of the resettlers. This categorization is based on the factors of motivation and self-expressed explanation concerning resettlers' decision in favor of the resettlement. Among the factors of motivation, the landless resettlers and resettlers who have had less than half hectare of farmland in their area of origin, those who were repeatedly hit by drought and those resettlers who came from areas where farming has suffered from severe soil degradation mainly decided in favor of the resettlement out of desperate measure. In other words, their decision to resettle was mainly affected by their desperate living conditions in their area of origin than government promises. Therefore, the manner of resettlement for this group of resettlers is compulsory-voluntarily.

On the other hand, there are also resettlers who were relatively well off in the community. Some in this group joined the Salamago resettlement scheme with a kind of pioneering spirit. For some others, it is a way of securing land for growing up families, which might not be available in Komsa. The manner of resettlement for these groups of resettlers is also characterized as induced voluntarism since their decision to resettle was not backed by genuine information and adequate time to make decision. Rather, according to informants, the resettlers in these groups mainly decided in favor of resettlement due to the attractive promises of the government and/or just to see and decide on the spot.

Generally, despite the strong claim of the government about the "voluntary" nature of the program, in actual fact, however, it is hardly possible to characterize the manner of the resettlement as voluntary in the absence of free and informed decision on the part of the resettlers.

4.2. Intentions to Stay

After a year stay in the resettlement area, the great majority of the resettlers showed higher determination to stay there. The sample survey that I conducted for the purpose of this research in February 2005 revealed that 71 out of 90 (78.88 percent) of the respondents said

they were determined to stay. The existence of large number of resettlers highly determined to stay points to the situation of hope but also irony. The irony stems from the fact that many of those who determined to stay are not in a position to cope with the challenges of the struggle for reestablishment. Their determination to stay, therefore, largely emanates from their former desperate living condition back home. As long as the government has nothing to offer for these destitute resettlers, their mere determination to stay may not enable them to reestablish.

The remaining 19 (21.11 percent) resettler households had not yet decided whether they would stay or not. The same survey, however, showed that 100 percent of the respondents worried about the security situation (this survey was conducted before the July 2005 conflict) above anything else. Those who have not yet decided mentioned two basic factors that would determine their future desire to stay or not to stay. First, they want to see and wait for some more time whether or not their relations with the hosts will improve over time. At the same time, they also want to evaluate whether or not the government is strong enough to control the security situation if conflict arises. Secondly, there are also resettlers who have doubts about the dependability of the Rainfall. These two basic factors are only connected with the future conditions in the resettlement area. Here, it is expected that some resettlers may be unlikely to answer these questions truthfully. Nevertheless, I think it is necessary to mention it here that, I have found that the Konso community (may be unlike the tradition of many of the Ethiopian peasantry), in many cases, are bold enough to speak on matters affecting their life.

There is also another important factor (regardless of the conditions in the resettlement area) which would affect the final decision of many resettlers to stay or otherwise. This is associated with the right of the resettlers to use their land in their area of origin. According to the approach adopted by the regional state, resettlers are entitled to retain their land usufruct right in their home areas for three consecutive years. Except for selling or mortgaging, they can either sharecrop or cultivate the land by using either part of the family labor left behind or making institutional arrangements through social networks (Wolde-Selassie, 2004). That means that after three years, resettlers should decide to both stay in the resettlement area and leave their land in their area of origin or leave the resettlement area for good and maintain

their land in their area of origin. To a significant number of resettlers, it was difficult to forecast their future decision on the issue based on their current conditions. However, most resettlers so far stayed in the resettlement area since it is an advantage for them to use their land back home as well as benefiting from the support packages of the resettlement (new farm fields, food rations, agricultural inputs, free medication).

To mention some of the characteristics of those who have determined to stay are,

1. Those with in the age limit of 30-45: many in this group, who have lost hope in their area of origin (due to landlessness and/or drought), have no other better option than to stay and see things here in the resettlement. To migrate to towns to engage in non-farm activities is not their likely option.
2. Those who already moved their family: the most important labor force for a peasant household is its family. Hence, those with their family are relatively in a better condition in terms of their housing condition, in terms of planting vegetables in their backyard, etc. Moreover, they also get some surplus ration since ration is distributed per person. As a result, these groups of households are found in a relatively better condition than those who do not move their family and they want to remain. These groups of households built some two and in few cases, three huts in their premises. Of course, there are no other signs of investment with the exception that a few resettlers have bought an ox.
3. Resettlers who do not have farmland in their area of origin: there are two groups of settlers among the landless. The first group of landless settlers is those who were based on contracted land. That means resettlers who were cropping by contracting land with the agreement to share part of their harvest to the owner of the land. As these resettlers were severely exploited by landowners, they show higher determination to stay in the resettlement. (The second group of landless resettlers is those who came from non-farm activities, from towns working as daily laborer. The majority of these resettlers are undetermined to stay or otherwise)

Those who have undecided are,

- 1 Young men who are still single (unmarried): these groups are not stable to remain in the resettlement area. They want to see the conditions for some more time so long as the government food ration is available. They hold other options such as to go home and engage in non-farm activities like petty trading and/or migrate to neighborhood towns and lead their life as a daily laborer.
- 2 Men and women above 50 years of age: these groups mainly came to the resettlement area mainly to secure additional land for their sons and/or grand sons (who are both here in the resettlement or who are still back home) if things go good in the future. Their future therefore, depends on the success or failure of their sons.
- 3 Those that have not moved their families: this group of households so far has not moved their family due to two reasons. One thing some of them have no financial capacity to transport their family. The free transportation support for families of resettlers by the government ceased only after one trip may be because of budget constraints. Secondly, there are also some single headed households whose families (wives, sons and daughters) have refused to come to the resettlement area. Thus, these groups of households are in dilemma about their future. Here it should be clear that, when I mean those who did not move their family, I am referring to single headed households. Otherwise, those who moved part of their family (second wives, elderly daughters or sons) may have used family splitting as a strategy to have foot in both places.
- 4 Those that were in a relatively good economic condition: there are a few resettlers who back home have relatively a good size farmland and were relatively in good living conditions. They came to resettlement just to see if there is any good heaven. Obviously, this group has yet not decided to stay or otherwise.

- 5 Resettlers who came from non-farm activities: these resettlers, as they were away from agricultural activity for longer period, they are not in a position to cope with the existing minimal support of the government. As a result, they are largely undetermined to stay or otherwise.

4.3. Abandoning the Resettlement Scheme

There have been departures from the resettlement scheme since the first month of their arrival. Other than individual cases of returnees, which still have continued, three major departure cases were seen during the first year and half following the resettlement. The first of these departures happened in the first two months after the resettlement. Based on site level information gathered from each village, more than one hundred heads of households deserted from the resettlement area during this early case of departure. Unmet expectations were the major factor that accounted for the first departure. Some individuals came back again after two to three months stay in their area of origin. Asked about the reason for his early departure, an informant among those who came back again explained,

Initially, many of us were shocked and uncomfortable by what we were watching and observing immediately in the aftermath of the resettlement. In the first place, the communal shelters we were provided to live in were poorly constructed. Furthermore, many resettlers were assigned in one shelter in a congested way. More importantly, there were signs of serious follow up on our movements by resettlement authorities. Some resettlers were put in prison as they tried to escape from the resettlement area. This action was against what we were promised. We were told before the relocation that we are free to decide to stay in the resettlement area or otherwise. When authorities put restrictions on our free movement, we became suspicious of everything. Some of us began to doubt about other hidden motives behind the resettlement. These were more or less the reasons why we escaped from the resettlement area within the first two months after the resettlement. Later on, I came back again to the resettlement area since I got the information that the free movement of resettlers is fully respected."

Some of the returnees managed to escape on foot all the way to Jinka, South-Omo zone capital and then by different means of transportation (by bus, trucks,) from Jinka to their area of origin. Some others bypassed Hana, the *woreda* capital on foot and caught trucks on the road to Jinka. Later on, movement between the resettlement area and their area of origin has become free. It is reported that the regional president on his visit to the scheme ordered resettlement authorities not to take any action against the returnees.

Thereafter, resettlers were only expected to inform to site level officials when they want to go back to their area of origin. Those who decided to return for good would be asked to return the materials they are provided (farm tools, kitchen utensils, ox). However, in many cases it is reported that returnees (for good) do not give notice to the authorities. Some sell the materials and leave without informing the authorities. Some other returnees left the materials with their neighbors (later on neighbors return the materials to the authorities) and left without noticing to the officials. It is only in a few cases that returnees leave informing authorities. If they move for other purposes (to visit relatives, bring family,.) they will get a letter of permit stating their reasons.

Table 4. Comparison of Total Resettlers and Returnees (HHH)

Name of village	Number of Households at arrival			Number Households in Feb.2005			Number of Total households in Sep.2005			Total Number of Returnees so far		
	MHH	FHH	Both	MHH	FHH	Both	MHH	FHH	Both	MHH	FHH	Both
Village 1)	191	4	195	446	2	448	387	3	390	204	3	207
Village 2)	226	16	242	318	13	331	307	12	319	29	4	33
Village 3)	521	5	526	511	13	524	493	13	506	28	-	28
Village 4)	497	9	506	324	9	333	293	9	302	204	-	204
Village 5)	313	8	321	297	5	304	256	5	261	57	-	57
Village 6)	542	33	575	440	35	475	352	18	370	210	17	227
Total	2820	77	2897	2340	77	2399	2088	60	2148	732	24	756

Source: Field Data gathered from each village

The second major cause of departure was following the killing of a settler by a Bodi man in June 2004, about six months after the resettlement (see cooperation and conflict part.) After the incident, once again, hundreds of resettlers mainly from village 5 and village 6 (the killed man was from village 6) returned to their area of origin. Hence, the immediate factor behind

the second major departure case was the security tension that escalated following the June 2004 incident.

The third major case of departure was following the July 2005 conflict between the resettlers and the host community. This conflict was the first major conflict between them, which caused the death of six persons from both sides, five from among resettlers and one from the host within two days. The conflict broke out in village 6 and all the five resettlers were killed from the same village. Hence, once again, in the third major case of departure, hundreds of resettlers of whom 96 heads of households from only village 6 abandoned the resettlement area. Overall, 756 heads of households, which are 26 percent of the total arrivals, have abandoned the resettlement scheme in the last twenty months following the resettlement.

4.4. Why Differential Reestablishments?

In state-sponsored resettlement projects, it is often the case that some groups of resettlers reestablish themselves sooner and better than others do. In other words, some settlers become better off (in terms of their living condition, such as housing, cropping, asset building and self-expressed satisfaction) while some other settlers fail to reestablish themselves. Since recently, preferential adaptability and reestablishment among resettlers has become the subject of research interest. (Differential adaptability and/or advantageousness within the host communities are also the case)

Dealing with the issue of preferential adaptation among resettlers is important since it provides us with practical and empirical lesson for improving the understanding of the dynamics of resettlement. In this regard, a combination of questions must be raised; why some settlers adapt and reestablish sooner? Why some other settlers fail to reestablish themselves in the new setting? What are the factors for the preferential adaptability among settlers?

Different factors may account for the preferential adaptability among resettlers. Gebre (2002a), in his research findings in the Metekel resettlement of North-West Ethiopia, revealed that the manner of resettlement (the voluntary versus involuntary nature of the resettlement)

could determine the success and failure of settlers in the new environment. Accordingly, he concluded "...voluntary settlers appeared relatively better reestablished than forced migrants" (ibid.). Oetee used some concrete indicators, such as cattle ownership, capital production, resilience to periodic food security, self reported satisfaction, to compare and contrast success and failure between voluntary and involuntary settlers as he conducted the research fifteen years after the establishment of the resettlement scheme.

In the case of this research (Salamago resettlement scheme), less than a year and half (during the time of the research), it was too early to look into the preferential adaptability of resettlers in terms of concrete socio-economic measures. However, based on the discussions with key informants both from among resettlers and settlement authorities, there are differences among resettlers in terms of their emotional feelings and perceptions about the resettlement scheme. For instance, some resettlers showed higher determination to stay. On the other hand, some others did not hesitate to tell me that they are undetermined to stay or otherwise. Moreover, in terms of housing condition and the size of cultivated land, some households are in better condition than others are. For instance, there are households who built two and in some cases three dwellings having well (wooden) fenced compound. At the same time, some households cultivated more than 1.5 ha while some other households cultivated less than half hectare

The major question, therefore, is what categories of resettlers are determined to stay and why? At the same time, what categories of resettlers are undetermined to stay and why? Why has some resettlers reestablished better than others do? I began my assessment from the perceptions of resettlement authorities and resettlers themselves concerning the characteristics of "successful" and "unsuccessful" resettlers. In this respect, the discussions gave me a vivid picture of their view that settlement authorities often raise specific issues resulted from other factors. On the other hand, resettlers mention a wider set of factors of success and failure. In some cases, of course, the views of resettlement authorities directly or indirectly coincided with that of resettlers.

Resettlement authorities compare and contrast between better-reestablished resettlers and failed resettlers as follows. According to them, resettlers confined to agricultural activities rather than those mainly or partly engaged in extra-farm activities, who did not frequently move back and forth (between the resettlement scheme and their area of origin) rather than who do so, the middle aged households rather than the elderly, those interested to work rather than those who were less interested, and those who were satisfied with the support packages of the government rather than those who complained, were determined to stay; and hence, better reestablished. Administrators hardly responded to the "why" questions. For instance, they were not clear enough as to why some settlers were interested to work while some others were less interested. Generally, the administrators' observation was much focused on effects than causes.

On the other hand, resettlers mentioned a wider set of factors of differential reestablishment among resettlers. They compared and contrasted successful and unsuccessful resettlers as follows. According to them, resettlers who came from agricultural livelihoods rather than those who came from non-agricultural economic activities, the middle aged households (roughly between 30 and 45) rather than the youth and the elderly, those who came to live rather than those to see, those who brought their family, rather than who did not, and those who came with some amount of money rather than those who came with little or no money, were better reestablished. According to the views of resettlers, therefore, the issue of differential reestablishment among resettlers is more of the matter of pre-resettlement conditions of an individual resettler (household) than post-resettlement events.

As shown above, the assessment was first made at the general level, by which data from key informants was used to assess the conditions of resettlers who have been relatively in better condition on the one hand and those resettlers who have not been in good condition on the other hand. The differences, according to informants were believed to be the causes for the differential reestablishment among resettlers. Following the above general assessment, I made specific comparison between different categories of resettlers (based on the data collected from the 90 randomly selected households). Accordingly, the adaptation experiences of

different categories of resettlers were compared and contrasted based on self-expressed determination to stay or otherwise, housing condition and the size of cultivated land. In this respect, the study revealed that the differential reestablishment experiences were mainly associated with differences among resettlers in terms of the following factors: A) The manner of resettlement B) Family situation and, and C) Previous wealth status

A. The Manner of Resettlement

It was already discussed above that the manner of resettlement of Salamago resettlement is characterized as compulsory-voluntary and induced-voluntary. In this regard, the research revealed that compulsory-voluntary resettlers reestablished better than induced-voluntary resettlers did. The specific comparison was made on sample groups of 10 compulsory-voluntary resettlers (household heads) and equally 10 induced-voluntary resettlers based on self-expressed determination to stay or otherwise, housing condition and the size of land they have cultivated. The result of the comparison showed that eight of the 10 compulsory-voluntary reported their determination to stay while 7 of the 10 induced-voluntary resettlers did not determine to stay or otherwise, as they reported.

In terms of housing conditions, five of the 10 compulsory-voluntary resettlers built more than two dwellings in a well-fenced compound. Whereas four of the 10 induced-voluntary resettlers built more than one dwellings and with wooden-fenced compound. Moreover the average size of cultivated land for compulsory-voluntary resettlers (still based on the 10 sample groups) was 0.9 hectare whereas it was 0.6 for induced voluntary resettlers.

The above comparison made it clear that, if compulsory-voluntary resettlers and induced-voluntary resettlers are found in the same resettlement scheme, compulsory-voluntary resettlers reestablish better than induced-voluntary resettlers do. However, it is also understood from the comparison that, not all compulsory-voluntary resettlers were better off than all induced-voluntary resettlers were. In other words, some compulsory-voluntary resettlers were found to have failed while some induced-voluntary resettlers reestablished better. This shows, although the manner of resettlement is a factor for differential readjustment

among resettlers, the comparison also indicated the existence of other factors too that account for differential success among resettlers.

B. Resettlers Previous Economic Conditions

Concrete and reliable data are lacking regarding the economic condition of individual households before their relocation. Thus, I made the comparison based on the size farmland and the number of cattle an individual household had before the relocation. In this regard, three categories of households were selected. These were 10 landless households who also had not cattle, 10 households who have had between $\frac{1}{2}$ and 1-hectare land and one or 2 cattle, and thirdly, 10 households who have had more than two hectare of land and three and above cattle.

Accordingly, eight of the 10 landless resettlers expressed their determination to stay. However, only three of them were in better housing condition and four of them cultivated more than 1 hectare land. Resettlers who were landless in their area of origin were the most destitute group of the resettlers. Since they have no better opportunity back home, the great majority of them expressed their determination to stay in the resettlement. However, many of these destitute resettler households, despite their determination to stay, were not in a position to cope with the challenges of reestablishment. For instance, they even lack the capacity to prepare feast and call for a work party, which is the most important mechanism for pooling labor.

In the case of households who have had an average size of land and some cattle, eight of the 10 sample households reported their determination to stay in the resettlement scheme. In terms of housing condition, five of them were in better housing condition as well as cultivated more than 1 hectare of land. This group of settlers showed higher determination to stay mainly because of shortage of land coupled with the repeated drought and degradation of soil fertility, and as a result, they seemed to have lost their hope to live in their area of origin. However, unlike the landless households, they came with some money (from their savings and selling part of their properties, cow, goat,) that enabled them to reestablish better. With the money, at

least they can buy or prepare local beer to call for a work party (to build their dwellings and for clearance of their farm field, which was full of trees and grass).

Many of the households in the third group, who have had more than 1.5 hectare of land and some cattle, were well off in their area of origin. Their decision in favor of the resettlement was mainly motivated by the promises of the government. As a result, four of the 10 reported their determination to stay. Many of them complain against the false promises of the government and the security situation as the factors behind their hesitation to determine to stay. However, since many of them came with money, their housing condition is relatively better. On the other hand, only three of the 10 cultivated more than 1-hectare of land. In the resettlement area, their farming activity has been mainly limited in their backyard. Because, many of this group of resettlers did not bring their family and frequently move back and forth (between the resettlement and their area of origin).

Generally, the above comparison showed that resettlers who were in a relatively average economic condition in their community reestablished well than the destitute and the relatively well off resettlers. The landless and the destitute households, although have higher determination to stay, many of them were not in a position to cope with the challenges of reestablishment in the situation that the program has not been supported even with basic essentials, such as adequate and quality farm tools and oxen.

C. Family Situation

As indicated earlier, the discussions with key informants (both from settlement authorities and from resettlers) revealed that those individual households who brought their family were relatively in good living conditions than those single headed households (unmarried ones, divorced or who did not bring their family). The comparison made between these two categories of households is consistent with the data collected from key informants. The two categories were selected from the sample survey conducted on 90 households. Accordingly, 23 of the 90 (25.55 percent) households who were found to be single headed households (either unmarried youth, divorced or many of them have families back home but did not bring them to

resettlement) were compared and contrasted with another group of randomly selected 23 households who brought their families. In this regard, five of the 23 (21.73 percent) single headed households reported that they did not determine to stay or otherwise. This shows that the percentage of undetermined (to stay or not) resettlers among the single headed households is nearly twice of the percentage of undetermined households (which was 12 percent) for 90 randomly selected households. On the other hand, only one of the 23 (4 percent) households who brought their family did not determine to stay or otherwise. This comparison indicated that households who brought their family have more determination to stay in the resettlement than these single headed households do.

In terms of housing condition, only four of the 23 single headed households had a relatively better housing condition, like having more than two huts and well managed compound. Whereas, 10 out of the 23 households who brought their family, had better housing condition. Similarly, only three of the 23 single headed households managed to cultivate more than 1-hectare of land while 10 of the 23 households with family cultivated more than 1 ha of land. Generally, the comparison made between these two categories of households, households without family on the one hand and households with family on the other hand, further substantiated the data obtained from key informants. That means, households with family were generally found in a relatively better living condition to be reestablished.

4.5. Case Studies of 'Successful' and 'Unsuccessful' Resettlers

4.5.1. 'Successful' Resettlers

It is already mentioned earlier that it is too early to identify successful resettlers in terms of concrete socio-economic measures. It may take more than a generation of period to measure successful resettlement in concrete terms. However, as indicated earlier in this chapter, based on some indications, such as, housing condition, size of cultivated land and self-expressed views of resettlers some are found in a relatively good condition than others. The following are case studies from both groups.

5.1.1. 'Successful' Resettler - Kusse¹

He is in late 30s. The major motivating factors to decide in favor of the resettlement, according to him, are shortage of farmland and the repeated drought (and hence famine). In his area of origin, he had less than half ha land, only two cow, and two sheep. He sold all his properties (except the land) before coming to the resettlement area.

He has brought all his family to the resettlement; three children and his wife. His total family size currently is therefore five. He has so far cleared and ploughed 1.5-hectare land (out of his 1-hectare land). His 0.125-hectare backyard is also well cultivated and ready for cropping. In terms of asset building; he has bought an ox, has some chicken and constructed two houses in his compound. Unlike the compound of relatively poorly reestablished resettlers, his compound is well fenced (by local wood); his wife also prepares local beer for sale.

He has organized two work parties in which neighbors and friends participated in clearing and tilling his farmland. Here it is to be noted that one has to prepare feast (*Cheqa*, the Konso traditional beer) to organize work parties. He has good relations with the site level administration and resettlers leadership. So far, he has no involvement in leadership position, and has no any special relation with the local population.

5.1.2. 'Successful' Resettler - Korbaido

He is in his mid 30s. He responded to the resettlement program in the positive mainly because of the repeated drought condition and shortage of land. He has less than 1/2 hectare land, two oxen, and two cows and six goats in his area of origin. He came to the resettlement leaving all his properties with his first wife. Now he lives with his second wife and a child, all together three family members.

So far, he has cleared and cultivated more than one and 1/2 hectare of his farmland and his entire backyard 0.125 hectare). In terms of asset building, he has bought one ox and

¹All the names mentioned about "Success" and "Failure" cases are Pseudo names.

constructed two houses in his compound. His compound is well fenced (by local wood) and he planted some vegetables (Shiferaw, Mango,) in his backyard. Neither he nor his wife has involved in any form income generating activities. He has prepared repeated work parties to clear and plough his farmland.

In terms of his relation with the local administration, he has good relation with resettlers' leadership and he is also member of village (*Kebele*) council. He has no special relation with the local population.

4.5.2. Profile of a 'Failed' Resettler

Generally, individuals who are either single or who have yet not brought any of their family members are not in a good position. This simply proves that a family is the most important labor force of a peasant household.

4.5.2.1. 'Failed' Resettler- Lemeta

He is in his mid 50s. The major motivating factors to decide in favor of resettlement were the repeated drought situation and the degradation of soil fertility. In his area of origin, he has about 1 hectare of land, a cow, 20 goats and 6 sheep. He came to the resettlement area leaving all his properties with his wife and children. He lives here alone. His wife and eight children are still in their area of origin. He did not bring his family since he has not yet decided to stay or otherwise.

Until the time of my first field trip, more than 14 months after the resettlement, he has cleared only 0.1 hectare of his farmland. He has so far no asset with the exception of a small hut. He has never been engaged in any form of non-farm activities and very dependent on government ration. His compound is not fenced. He is not in good terms with the administration. The administration prohibited him from getting the monthly financial support (Birr 22) due to his poor agricultural performance. He has not involved in leadership position.

CHAPTER FIVE

Intra- Regional Resettlement, and Settlers and Hosts Interactions

5.1. Conflict versus Cooperation

Before looking into the relations between the resettlers and the host communities, it is important to assess hitherto existing war and peace relations amongst the various indigenous ethnic groups in the area. This is because the nature, cause and the outcome of conflicts and warfare between groups in the Lower Omo valley, may give us a glimpse picture about the area.

In this regard, the lower Omo valley, for long, has been an area of warfare between different ethnic or as Turton (1994) referred to them, "territorial" groups. These include the seemingly permanent state of warfare between the Mursi and the Hamar, the Hamar and Dassanech, war and peace relations between the Mursi and the Nyangatom, the Mursi and the Bodi, the Bodi and the Dime, the Dassanech and Nyangatom, etc. The competitions over resources, such as for grazing land, water sources, and raiding has often been explained as causes of conflicts among neighboring ethnic communities. Such explanations perhaps relate to the materialist view of warfare which is the most widespread approach found in literature. Brian Ferguson (in Turton, 1994: 21) has described this as focusing on 'war's relation to the practical problems of maintaining life and living standards. David Turton in his article entitled, "Mursi political density and warfare..." (Ibid.) explained Ferguson's recent work on the issue. Accordingly, Ferguson (ibid.) has identified three 'mutually reinforcing premises' of the materialist approach: that 'causal primacy' is given to the infrastructure; that 'there may be competition between and selection among groups'; and that 'wars occur when those who make decision to fight estimate that it is in their material interest to do so'.

however, Turton (ibid:21-22) doubts the above materialist propositions since they "...seem to end down to the single assumption that warfare is the result, in one way or another, of competition between groups for scarce resources". Hence, to Turton (ibid: 22), "the materialist explanation of warfare, in other words, only works if the same assumptions are made about groups as Hobbes about individual." In substantiating his counter argument against the materialist approach, Turton forwarded empirical examples based on his ethnographic account of the Mursi of Southwest Ethiopia (ibid:).

But there are also empirical grounds for doubting the usefulness of treating groups such as the Mursi and their neighbors as Hobbesian individuals writ large. For not only are they, both to themselves and to the outside observer, the products of relatively recent population movements, but they also form today a regional system of economically interdependent contiguous local groups.

Harrison (in Turton, ibid:23) based on his account of warfare at Avatip, in Papua New Guinea, argued that warfare and peaceful exchange are simply two different, but not opposed or mutually incompatible, ways of creating boundaries between groups, of creating groups. This line of reasoning implies that political identity is a product rather than a cause of social action. Similarly, to Harrison, Turton (ibid) suggested that,

For the Mursi and their neighbors, warfare is not a means by which an already constituted political group seeks to defend or extend its territory, but a means by which the very idea of it as an independent political unit, free from the normative claims of outsiders, is created and kept alive.

In his another article entitled "War, Peace and Mursi Identity", Turton (1979:180) treated the institutions of war and peace as something permanent and "...as part of a continuing relationship between two territorial groups". He further explained that (ibid),

If, for example, this relationship alternates between war and peace, then it will not be possible to make sense of periods of war if they are seen merely as momentary aberrations or arbitrary "breakdowns" in "normal" (i.e. peaceful) relations. Both war and peace must be seen as two sides of a single coin. (By peace I do not refer simply to a lack of hostilities but to social contacts and exchanges which, by their very nature, preclude hostilities).

and on his ethnographic accounts of the Bodi, Fukui in his article "Cattle colour Symbolism and Intra-Tribal Homicide among the Bodi" (1979) explained warfare and homicide in the Bodi as part of their belief system. According to Fukui's description, Bodi men perform animal sacrifice or go (often with their age mates) to commit homicide among neighboring Bodi groups when the "Morare", one's favorite animal (usually an ox) get sick in order to help their favorite animal to recover. As the Bodi put it (Ibid.), "when the Morare dies, I am successful and go to kill a Mursi or highlander".

In his strong criticism against Fukui's article, Strecker (1994) suggested that beliefs (like the institution of "Morare" in the Bodi) are not primary factors for actions but rather secondary or derived ones. Seemingly closer to the materialist understanding of war, Strecker rather stressed the implicit reason behind the Bodi's belief in "Morare", as an "... undisguised expression of aggression and expansion (Strecker, 1994:303). When further illustrating his points of argument about the institution of "Morare", Strecker (ibid) put,

A primary factor among the Bodi (as among so many other pastoralists) is the desire to create in the members of their society a strong commitment to their herds. Herding cattle, goats and sheep is often a lonely and extremely trying [out-trying] activity. It involves hardships of various kinds, including the protection of the herds from dangerous animals and their defense against raiders from neighboring groups. One way of strengthening the commitment of the herdsman is the institution of the favorite animal, usually an ox or castrated he-goat.

In this way, the Bodi have not focused on the theoretical interpretation of warfare and peace. The scope of this study launched me from working towards a critical theory of warfare. However, I believe, as Strecker put it interestingly (1994:299), "... engaging in armed conflict and writing about it are inseparable activities because theory and practices influence each other and constitute a causal chain".

Salumaga warred, the Bodi agro-pastoralists have had two front warfare, against its southern neighbor, the Mursi, and northeastern neighbor, the Dime sedentary agriculturalists. To put it, in the case of the warfare between the Bodi and the Mursi agro-pastoralists,

"there are institutionalized methods of announcing and terminating hostilities" and therefore, there are "rules of war" to them. According to Todd, "such rules are, perhaps a necessity, since the two tribes are similar in number and weapons." On the other hand, the warfare between the Bodi and the Dime, often provoked by the former (due to raiding and looting grain) have had a permanent nature due to their territorial proximity and power imbalance (in terms of fire arms) in favor of the Bodi. Moreover, unlike the case between the Bodi and the Mursi, in the case of the warfare between the Bodi and Dime, there are no rules. As Todd explained about it (1979:219),

But between the Bodi and Dime rules do not exist, nor is there any reason why they should, since the Dime are unable to offer successful resistance. This lack of rules is also perhaps evidence of a cultural difference between highlanders (cultivators) and lowlanders, and between representatives of two distinct language groups.

In the same way, David Turton (Turton, 1979:180) stressed on the need to differentiate "... between different kinds and degrees of warfare, governed by different rules and conventions, within the same ethnographic context, and these will need to be distinguished". In this case, therefore, he put (ibid.), "Thus, group A may accept and observe rules for limiting death and destruction in its hostilities with group B, but not with group C. The killing of women and children, for example, may be ruled out in the one case but not in the other". In the case of Mursi and Bodi, Turton showed (Ibid: 181), "During periods of peace these two groups live in close proximity and engage in much mutual visiting and economic co-operation. When at war their hostilities are governed by strictly observed rules, the most important of which is that women and children are not legitimate victims".

In the aftermath of the resettlement in Salamago, the relations between resettlers and the host community (the Bodi agro-pastoralists) are largely characterized by uneasy coexistence worried by constant tensions and sporadic conflicts. The sad fact of these sporadic, often inter-personal conflicts is that they are always prone to turn into inter-ethnic conflict. The expectation that intra-regional resettlement would solve inter-ethnic rivalry has become unrealistic. The linguistic relationship between the resettlers and the host (the Bodi) is the

lowest, for they belong to different language families; their livelihood system also differs considerably: the settlers' livelihood centered on crop production, while the world of the Bodi agro-pastoralists is cattle.

As discussed in chapter two (part 2.4), the fundamental factor for the escalations of tension between the Bodi and the resettlers is the sudden demographic imbalance in favor of the newcomers. Nevertheless, the immediate causes that instigate conflicts between them partly arise from the cultural differences. For instance, resettlers beat cattle when they found them in their farm field. Beating cattle, however, is something sinful in the world of the Bodi agro-pastoralists. One of my key informants said, "The Konso (the resettlers) beat our cattle. It is sinful to beat cattle that have no mouth (language) to respond to them. If cattle damage their crop, they should take the issue to the owner of the cattle. We do not beat cattle. They are the *horma* of our life." While expressing the central value of cattle for the Bodi, Fukui (1979:150) wrote,

Cattle are important not only in subsistence but also as mediations with the supernatural world, while the grain, on the other hand, serves only to satisfy hunger. So interested are the Bodi in cattle that their daily conversation seemed to be about nothing else. Indeed, it was soon evident that in order to understand their society we would first have to grasp their cognitive system for talking and thinking about cattle.

Though the Konso also have the tradition of herding, their valuing for their livestock is different from that of the Bodi agro-pastoralists. For the Konso, their herds are mainly important for their fixed value. As Hallpike (1972:25) wrote about the Konso and their livestock,

There are cattle in plenty, as well as sheep and goats, but they have none of the mystique with which pastoral tribes like the Borana or Nuer endow cattle. While they figure prominently in ritual and a brave man is called 'horma', a bull, their principal function in daily life is to provide manure, and meat, the greatest delicacy for the Konso.

In June 2004, about six months after the resettlement, a Bodi man killed a resettler. In this case, the cause of the incident was not an individual conflict. Rather it was the manifestation

of resentment against resettlement. The incident, by informants from settlers and authorities side, is reported as follows. A group of settlers was coming from a water point around 9:00 o'clock in the evening. A Bodi man lurked them on the road and shot at the group. He killed one of them and escaped.

Later on, it is reported that the host community (the Bodi) itself exposed the alleged killer to the police and consequently he was sentenced to 15 years in prison by the South-Omo Zone High Court. However, it is rumored that the alleged killer was not the actual killer of the man. The rumor rather puts the story as follows. Elders and some influential members of the community perjured against the man since he is a poor man having no livestock. Hence, according to them, it is not a problem for a poor man to stay in prison for so long since he has nothing to leave behind. According to the tradition of the Bodi, it is said that after he has served his sentence he will get compensation (some cows and goats) from the man who actually killed the settler. People also say that the person who actually killed the resettler is a rich man who is from one of the chief's families. I got the chance to talk with Berguy (the alleged killer), a young man may be in his mid twenties, in Jinka prison house. Asked about the incident, he said,

"I didn't kill the man. Like anyone, I heard about the murder of a settler the next morning. Of course, I also heard who killed him. Everybody in our community knows about it. Nevertheless, the third day a policeman came to my house and took me to prison. Police whipped me, tortured me, and forced me to confess. Later, I heard that some men also perjured against me. They did so because I am a poor man. They did not want to expose the actual killer, who is a rich man. I did not kill the man. I have no reason to quarrel with settlers since I have no problem of grazing land; I have only three cattle."

After the June 2004 incident, there were other cases of conflicts. For instance, Bodi men raped two women resettlers, one from village 1 and the other from village 4. To take revenge, a

group of resettlers from village 1 attacked one Bodi man with a cudgel after wresting his gun from him. During the time of my first fieldwork, i.e. in February 2005, the resettlers were fearful about the possible outbreak of inter-ethnic conflict between them and the Bodi. The major source of tension was that the Bodi feared being outnumbered by the resettlers and were worried that they would be pushed away eventually. At the same time, the resettlers were worried since they are unarmed whereas the Bodi are all armed.

On 13 July 2005, a serious conflict broke out between them in village 6. The immediate cause of the conflict is reported as follows. On 14 July 2005, late in the afternoon, two Bodi men were drinking *chupa* (the local beer) in the compound of a resettler. After having drunk a lot, one of them refused to pay for what he drank. Then quarrel started between him and a group of resettlers. During this incident, two men were killed immediately, one resettler and one Bodi man. However, it is reported that the Bodi man was killed outrageously. The following day a group of armed young Bodi men came to village 6 and opened fire. They randomly killed four resettlers, two women and two men. About five others were wounded. In sum six persons, five resettlers and one man from the Bodi died within two days.

The situation forced the intervention of the defense force, higher-level officials from the Regional State and the sending area to stop the conflict and to seek for solutions for the problem. Several days of reconciliation meetings were held between the representatives of both communities. With the conclusion of the reconciliation meetings, it is reported that both sides reached agreement to refrain from actions that provoke conflict between them. It is also reported that five locals and six resettlers who are accused of the murder of five resettlers and one local respectively are now in prison (in Jinka, zonal capital) awaiting trial. Following the incident, more than one hundred resettlers went back to their area of origin for good.

The immediate causes of the conflicts between settlers and the Bodi include,

- inter-personal quarrels at drinking places, usually when the Bodi refuse to pay after drinking *chupa*.

- when the Bodi herders let their cattle enter Konso farm fields,
- quarrels at water points (hand pumps), when the Bodi let cattle to drink or when the Bodi refuse to stand on the queue and fetch water before their turn comes,
- some Bodi men show their erect penis to the settlers women, which is said to be sinful in the eyes of the settlers but normal for the Bodi, and,
- there are also conflicts over farmlands in which the Bodi usually accuse the resettlers of going beyond their given land.

There are nonetheless some encouraging signs of cooperation between resettlers and the hosts. In this respect, the Bodi-agro pastoralists have got a good market for their animals and animal products such as goats, oxen and milk following the resettlement. For instance, the price of a goat has increased from 500-600 Birr before the resettlement to 1000-1200 Birr after the resettlement. Moreover, in some few cases locals share out their farm fields (in the fertile and wet riverbanks, which are left for the host community) in exchange for labor. In terms of the distribution of land, authorities revealed that (which is also confirmed by resettlers and the hosts) riverbank fields with 200m distance from riverbanks are reserved for locals living in the resettlement zone.

There are also a few locals who put their granaries in the compound of their bond-friends among the resettlers (e.g. in village 1). According to informants, it is safe for them to put their granary in the compound of resettlers since they usually move from place to place with their cattle. The famous traditional beer of the resettlers, which is known as *Cheqa* has become very much liked by the Bodi. Many locals usually come to resettlers' house to buy and drink *Cheqa*. The newly started Thursday market in Village 3 has also become the biggest market in the area.

The Dime ethnic group, the close neighbors of the resettlers, is in favor of the resettlement program. This research did not dwell on the relationship between the resettlement program and the Dime community. However, according to my limited discussions with several Dimes, they do not hesitate to express their happiness with the resettlement program. Based on the ideas I got from them and on my own observations, I can put four possible explanations as to why the Dime community are in favor of the resettlement. First and for most, at least for the time being, they lost nothing by the program since the resettlement is undertaken exclusively on the land of the Bodi.

Secondly, for a long time there have been clashes between the Dime and Bodi agro-pastoralists. It is said that it is often the Bodi who provoke conflicts, to loot animals or food crops from the Dime. With the arrival of resettlers occupying a large area between the two traditional contenders, the Dime and the Bodi, would block or at least reduce the possible attack of the latter against the former. Moreover, with the establishment of resettlement villages, the Dime community has also gained a safe way (corridor) in their movement to the woreda capital, Hana, both for market and administrative issues. Thirdly, at this early stage of the resettlement, they have also got a good market for their root crops, fruits and grain. What would happen in the future requires further study about the trend of their relations. Last, but not least, (unlike the Bodi agro-pastoralists), the Dime sedentary agriculturalists appreciate established infrastructures such as the roads and schools in the area. To date, there is no complaint from the Dime attending school in the newly opened schools in resettlement villages, as primary schools are available in their own locality.

Fourthly, the resettlers also have a positive view towards the Dime. Many resettlers said that they could have not easily coped with and adjusted to the new situations in the area in the absence of the Dime. Before resettlers starting cropping, they were getting root crops such as cassava, banana and local beer from the Dime. The other ethnic group in the woreda is the Suri. However, they are far from the scheme and so far, they have no significant relations with the resettlement program and the resettlers.

Highland and Lowland Interaction

As the past resettlement experiences in Ethiopia, the new EPRDF-led resettlement drive has been undertaken intra-regionally whereby settlers are taken from one zone/special *woreda* to another zone/special *woreda* but within the same regional state. The major reason, among others, was said to be reducing the cultural differences and the potential ethnic conflict between the settlers and the host communities. In this respect, at the major resettlement scheme some positive achievements and trends were observed.

First and foremost, the sending area and the resettlement site are situated not far from each other. The distance between Karati, the capital of the sending *woreda* and resettlement site is about 245-300 kilometers. In terms of transportation cost, one-way truck transportation from Hana (the capital of the receiving *woreda*: Salamago) and Jinka (the capital of South-east zone) is 20 *birr* (2.30 USD) per person (excluding payment for other possessions of the settlers). In addition, the cost of transportation between Jinka and Karat (the capital of the sending *woreda*: Komso) is also Birr 20 per person. Passengers also pay 3 to 5 *birr* (to the nearest and the furthest village respectively) per person to travel between Hana and resettlement villages. Therefore, a round trip travel between the sending area and resettlement site would cost Birr 90 per person. Most of the time, settlers go on foot between Hana and resettlement villages.

Due to the proximity between the sending area and resettlement site, most settlers usually travel back and forth. According to the sample survey, only in the first one-year following the resettlement, on average each household head traveled to his/her area of origin 10 times. They go to their area of origin for various reasons, such as in the cases of the announcement of a death of a relative or a friend and/or just to visit their relatives. More importantly, however, many resettlers cultivate and follow up their land back home alongside their new land in the resettlement area.

There are at least two important positive implications of retaining their contact with their area of origin. Primarily, it may create an opportunity for the commencement and promotion of

lowland-highland interaction as suggested by scholars in the area (e.g. Pankhurst, 1992). Secondly, many resettlement researchers have tried to show the negative social impact of resettlement on resettlers. Downing (2004) for instance, referred to the social dimension of resettlement as crucial to mitigating social impoverishment and, perhaps facilitate political and economic restoration. True to Downing, due to the frequent contacts and communications with their area of origin, Salamao resettlers do not suffer from a sense of alienation and loneliness.

5.3. Perception of the Host Communities

For a long time, in planned population relocation programs, the host communities have been either forgotten or, in some instances, they are incorporated as secondary target groups and their inclusion is often considered as an after-thought in project planning and management. Recently, however, thanks to researchers in the area of population relocations, the effect of resettlement on the host communities has become a bone of contention. In this respect, it is reported that a series of (about six rounds) consultation meetings were held between government officials and representatives of the Bodi community, comprising of traditional chiefs, elders and the youth sometime before the coming of the resettlers. These consultation meetings had two major objectives. The first objective was orienting the host communities about the motives and objectives of the resettlement program. Secondly and more importantly, the consultation meetings were aimed at winning their willingness to host resettlers. The Bodi agro-pastoralists have been resistant against the idea of the resettlement program from the very beginning. After repeated hot discussions, key informants both from host's and authorities reported that the chiefs and elders expressed their willingness to host settlers on condition that authorities are responsible not to bring people who may drag in social problems such as theft and evil eyes.

The youth group of the community, the herders, however, strongly opposed the program from the beginning to the end. Asked on the issue, one young Bodi said, "Elders have no power to give our land to others. They have 'finished their age' and their responsibility to our land. Now the land is to the youth and we didn't accept any group to take our land". They have

began taking action against the program even before the coming of the resettlers to the area. According to my informant from resettlement authorities, the youth started uprooting the pegs driven in to demarcate the proposed resettlement area.

During the consultation meetings, it is reported that government officials tried to convince the host community by stating the advantage of the resettlement program to them. They promised them to establish infrastructure such as roads, schools, health posts and water points. In actual fact, however, except for a few elites of the community such as locals in government office, the establishments of infrastructures are not of much interest to the Bodi agro-pastoralists. The establishment of roads and schools are not attractive to them, as they are keen to be distant from the state apparatus. For instance, in the two newly opened formal schools in village 3 and village 6 to far there is no single child from the host communities attending in these schools. The students are exclusively from resettlers.

Many of the elders themselves (also the chiefs) who first accepted the program are not comfortable with the conditions in the aftermath of the resettlement. For example, one of the chiefs (the Bodi have three traditional chiefs) said, "We accepted the program and put pressure on our people to refrain from actions against the scheme since it is difficult to totally reject government request. Now the number of the newcomers is beyond our expectation. Thus, all of us feared that we will be pushed away in the future".

CHAPTER SIX

Summary of Findings and Conclusion

This thesis has tried to show that the Salamago resettlement scheme has been riddled with a series of setbacks and replete with a host of problems. The research has also indicated some positive features of the scheme. As it is indicated in the First Chapter, in the statement of the problem, and in Chapter Two, in the Literature Review part, experiences in Ethiopia, elsewhere in Africa and the world over have shown that planned resettlement programs often end up leaving the resettlers and the hosts as well worse than before. In spite of these facts, the EPRDF led government of Ethiopia, the outspoken critic of resettlement programs undertaken by its predecessor regimes, has envisaged a new resettlement initiative.

The preparation, recruitment and implementation processes were, however, not free from problems. Rather, similarly to the previous programs, the present resettlement program has also suffered from rushed out feasibility study, unsound planning, poorly observed selection criteria and inadequate inputs. In this respect, this thesis in the Third Chapter has revealed that,

1. A feasibility study was undertaken by a team of experts but in haste. It is reported that the decision to resettle people in the area was made before the release of the report of the study team.
2. Criteria were set to select potentially permissible settlers: to focus on the landless, the healthy and self-motivated farmers who are also free from misbehaviors. However, these criteria were not observed during the selection process. The lower level authorities in charge of recruitment operation may have been forced to overlook the criteria in order to meet the planned figure and the deadline. It was reported from informants (both from resettlers side and settlement administrators) that there were

settlers who simply joined resettlers on the road. There was no communication between the sending and the receiving areas about the identifications (name, sex, age, area of origin, etc.) of each settler.

3. The scale of the resettlement was incompatible at least with the following three essential measures.

3.1. The resettlement has brought a significant demographic change in the area. This sudden demographic change and the probable shift in the power balance of the area in favor of the newcomers is the major source of tension created between the resettlers and the Bodi agro-pastoralists.

3.2. The negative impact of settling such a large number of resettlers on the environment, wild life, the livelihoods of the host communities and the ecosystem in general was not properly seen before reaching the decision to resettle people in the area.

3.3. The material, financial and human resources allocated for the program were inadequate, to say the least, to support such a large-scale undertaking.

Chapter Four has tried to show the manner of the resettlement and the factors of motivation. In this respect, one of the major claims of the government about this resettlement was concerning the manner of the resettlement. The government strongly argues that the program has been implemented on fully voluntarily basis. Moreover, the manner of resettlement was over-emphasized to the level that diminishes or attributes all past mistakes and problems to the involuntarily nature of the *Derg* resettlement Program. This understanding had two major problems. First, the manner of resettlement is only one factor, among the many, which positively or negatively affect the outcome of a given resettlement program. Secondly, their explanation about the manner of resettlement was exclusively based on the traditional 'voluntarily' and 'involuntarily' dichotomization of resettlement. The motivating factors

third settlers' decision in favor of resettlement were not properly analyzed. In this respect, based on the factors of motivation and self-expressed explanation concerning resettlers' decision in favor of resettlement, I have rather concluded that Salamago resettlement could be characterized as compulsory-voluntary and induced-voluntary.

As it is seen in Chapter Five, the relations between the resettlers and the Bodi have been largely characterized by uneasy coexistence worried by constant tensions and sporadic conflicts. The conflicts have costed human life both from resettlers and from the host. The reputation that intra-regional resettlement would solve inter-ethnic rivalry has become unrealistic. As Eyo Strecker, in one of his reports (1976) put it, the most powerful factor threatening prosperity of projects in the area has been unquestionably the negative factor of "inter-tribal warfare". Similarly, conflict between resettlers and the Bodi has become a major threat of the scheme. Competition over resources (such as for water and pasture) and killing have been mentioned as causes for the inter-ethnic warfare in the area. In this regard, Eyo Strecker (ibid.) also indicated that the destruction of old institutions of internal social control has also contributed for the escalation of conflicts.

On the other hand, the sanction of the free movement of resettlers coupled with the proximity between the resettlement area and their area of origin enabled them to maintain their contact with their area of origin. This is of course, one of the distinct features of the present resettlement program (from Guyo-Dakuba resettlement perspectives) from the past (military time) resettlement experience. There are at least two important positive implications of maintaining contact between resettlers and their area of origin. Primarily, it may create an opportunity for the commencement and promotion of lowland-highland interaction as reported by scholars in the area (e.g., Panahurst, 1992). Secondly, due to the resettlers' closer contact with their area of origin, the negative social and psychological impact of resettlement on resettlers, which is highly emphasized by resettlement researchers (e.g. Downing, 1996, and Seflanie, 2002), has been decreased if not totally avoided. As a result, many resettlers do not suffer from a sense of alienation and loneliness. Moreover, unlike the experiences of

most resettlement schemes in the past, Guyo-Dakuba resettlers are happy with their health condition in the resettlement area.

To conclude, eleven years after its seizure of power, the current government argued in favor of planned resettlement without substantiating its position with citations or research outputs. Even though the question of whether planned or self-initiated resettlement is better has been a subject for argument, a thoroughly evaluation on the past experiences, a nationwide consultation among resettlement experts and among the common people, and scholarly debates should have preceded the policy formulation and planning stage. However, none of these was addressed. This was the first and may be the fundamental mistake committed by policy makers.

The Regional government resettlement operation manual states that the resettlers are expected to be food self-sufficient within 8 months. Nevertheless, it is very ambitious expectation, if not unrealistic. It is already seen that in almost all resettlement schemes the resettlers have been dependent on food ration for more than a year. Hence, the government should continue its close supervision and adequate budgetary support to the scheme for some time (three to five consecutive years as necessary). The human and logistical capacity of the service sector offices engaged in the operation and management of the scheme should be strengthened.

The problems are not only due to the inadequacy of inputs, but also resettlement operation is inherently complex, as it is not a physical operation but a human project. Therefore, periodical evaluations and studies should be made on the progress of scheme by independent and professional bodies. All assessments should involve human and social (of the resettlers and host communities), technical and environmental factors. The usual evaluation approach by a team of experts from government itself (the implementer) may have not free from bias and may not meet its intended objectives.

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Survey Questionnaire

- 1) General
 - 1.1. Age
 - 1.2. Sex
 - 1.3. Religion
 - 1.4. *Kebele* (Peasant Association)
 - 1.5. Village
- 2) How was your economic condition prior to the resettlement?
 - 2.1 In terms of size of farm land
 - 2.2 Number of livestock
 - 2.3 Other incomes
- 3) What was your major motivating factor to decide in favor of resettlement?
 - A. Lack of land
 - B. Shortage of land
 - C. Government promises
 - D. Drought and soil degradation
 - E. Other Mention
- 4) What did you do about your properties in your area of origin?
- 5) Did you so far go to your area of origin? If yes, how many times? For what purpose?
- 6) What size of your allotted land do you so far cleared and cultivated?
- 7) Have you determined to stay in the resettlement area?
 - A) Yes
 - B) Not yet
- 8) Now do you fill that you made a right decision to resettle?
 - A) Yes
 - B) No

- 9) Do you now regret with your decision to resettle?
- A) Yes
 - B) No
- 10) Have you brought your family?
- A) Yes
 - B) No
 - C) Still single
- 11) What do you think is /will be/ the major problem for resettlers future here in the resettlement?
- 12) Does government support meet its prior promises and your prior expectations?
- A) Yes
 - B) No
- 13) Did government promises influence your decision to resettle?
- A) Yes
 - B) No
- 14) Do you think you would have not decided to resettle in the absence of the attractive promise of the government?
- A. Yes
 - B. No
- 15) Do you fill loneliness and alienation?
- A) If Yes, why?
 - B) If No, why?

Declaration

I, the Under signed, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university, and that all the sources of material used for the thesis have been dully acknowledged

Signature

Confirmation

I confirmed that the advisee could submit this thesis for defense

Advisor's Signature