ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPERS IN DARFUR (SUDAN) IN PROTECTING WOMEN FROM CONFLICT RELATED GENDER BASED VIOLENCE SINCE 2004

BY
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AU	African Union
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FPUs	Formed Police Units
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GoS	Government of Sudan
HCFA	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICSS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFPT	Integrated Field Protection Team
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IPOs	Individual Police Officers
IR	International Relations
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
MILOBs	Military Observers
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders)
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN
SLM/A	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

Abstract

This research examines the role of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the subsequent UNAMID (African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur) in protecting women from gender-based violence during Darfur conflict. Primary and Secondary data were collected in conducting the research. The secondary data sources include books, journal articles, online newspaper, and magazine articles as well as research reports. Primary data was collected through key informant interviews. The study used qualitative methodology to analyze these data. The major finding of the study is that the AU mission had taken various protection initiatives to combat gender-based violence in Darfur conflict and was partly successful. The peacekeepers provided protection on certain days that they had an agreement and in localities where they maintained presence. However, how well the individual peacekeepers performed within their mandate and capabilities still needs further research. When UNAMID peacekeepers were latter deployed, they did not improve the security of women despite they were higher in numbers than AMIS and was able to cover large areas, because of government restrictions put on the operational activities of the mission following the ICC's arrest warrant for the then President, Omar al-Bashir. However, activities aimed at producing impact on the behaviour of combatants not to engage in attacking civilians and women in particular were important tasks performed by the mission, yet to what extent such activities brought behaviour change on the part of violators need further research.

Keywords: AMIS, UNAMID, Darfur conflict, ceasefire agreement, civilian protection mandate, Janjaweed, women, gender-based violence

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1. Background

According to the Global status report on violence prevention 2014, Gender Based Violence affects one in three women in their lifetime. That is, 35% of women worldwide experience either physical or sexual violence or both by their intimate partner or non-partner in their lifetime (World Health Organization, 2015).

Gender based violence in conflict and post-conflict area is a major problem in modern warfare. Women in conflict affected zones suffer from rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, miscarriage, kidnapping, trafficking, forced nudity and other forms of sexual abuse (Rehn & Sirleaf, 2002). They experience violence at the hands of state and non-state armed actors, and even, tragically, the peacekeeping forces that are sent to protect them and restore order (Manjoo & McRaith, 2011).

Darfur is the western most province of Sudan predominated by the Zaghawa, Fur, Masalit, and various African and Arab tribes (Sikainga, 2009).During the British rule and in its aftermath, land was in the hands of Fur and Masalit and they were the dominant groups in the region(de Waal, 2005). However, after Omar al-Bashir came to power in 1989, such ownership rights were taken away from these groups. The central government also appointed eight Arab emirs in West Darfur in the land of Masalit (Reyna, 2010, p.1299). As a consequence, the marginalized and neglected African peoples in Darfur organized their own militias and formed an armed rebel groups (the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), who sparked the current conflict in Feb 2003 (Bassil, 2004).

One of the dominant characteristics of Darfur conflict is the extensive use of rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls to intimidate and threaten the civilian population (Nielsen, 2008). Instead of providing protection for women and girls, the government forces and their proxy militia, the Janjaweed, committed brutal attack against women and girls. The Janjaweed, sweeping into villages, raped women, killed their husbands, and forced them to flee their home separated from their children. Many of the women miscarried or died while

traveling to find a safe place in camps or in the urban centers (Martin, 2007). For Darfur women there is no safe place to take shelter; the attack even continues in the IDP [internally displaced person] camps. The heavily armed Janjaweed militias, who often surround the camps, attack women when they left the camps to collect firewood or for some other purpose (Cohen & O'Neill, 2006).

The degeneration of the crisis to a humanitarian catastrophe necessitated the intervention of African Union peacekeepers to monitor the ceasefire agreement and prevent attacks on civilians on limited basis (Pan, 2010).In an effort to prevent attacks against women, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)started to provide security during firewood patrols (International Crisis Group, 2005). AMIS soldiers patrol while women collect firewood outside camps in each of the three Darfur states. In some camps, the local police also participate in the joint patrol, even though the IDPs refused their presence and were suspicious of them (O'Neill & Cassis, 2005). Moreover, the AU troops provide patrols only on certain days and in limited areas. Women were attacked even more fiercely on the days the AU was not present, in retaliation for the patrols (Martin, 2007).

Therefore, the intention of the researcher in this paper is to investigate the role of AMIS and the subsequent UNAMID [United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur] peacekeepers in protecting women in Darfur conflict. It examines positive initiatives taken by peacekeepers to prevent attacks against civilians and women in particular. It analyzes the challenges and weaknesses of the AU and UN peacekeepers while combatting sexual and gender-based violence in Darfur conflict.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

The development of the new international security and human rights norm—the responsibility to protect on the one hand and the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda on the other, made conflict-related sexual violence a matter of international concern (Johansson and Hultman, 2019).

Under Darfur peace agreement, parties (the Government of Sudan and rebel groups) agreed to refrain from all acts of gender-based violence (Darfur Peace Agreement, 2006, Art 24). The AU and UN peacekeepers are entrusted to monitor and observe compliance with the cease fire agreement including provisions on gender-based violence (UN Secretary-General Report, 2007, para 54 & 55). However, the government repeatedly violated the peace agreement and failed to cooperate with peacekeepers. The terms and conditions under which it operates have largely negotiated with the Sudanese government, thereby hampering the cardinal principle of peacekeeping—impartiality (Tharoor, 1993).

In this regard, J. Udombana (2007) claim that Darfur does not fit into a classic peacekeeping situation; it is a case of 'responsibility to protect', which do not require state consent where that state is complicit in gross violations of human rights (p. 108).

The AU peacekeepers are authorized to protect civilians on limited basis, but with no power to disband and disarm the Janjaweed monsters—who ruthlessly attack the displaced women (Udombana, 2007). The UN peacekeepers have a Chapter VII mandate and are authorized to use force where civilians are under attack (UNSC Resolution 1769, 2007, para 15).In the same manner, they have no authority to disarm the Janjaweed like the AU forces.

Peacekeepers role in reducing gender-based violence in Darfur conflict was found in different NGO reports and publications. Martin (2007), O'Neill & Cassis (2005), International Crisis Group (2005) and Human Rights Watch (2006) were the major reports and publications. However, peacekeepers role was not documented in a detailed and comprehensive manner in these literatures. They did not make use of theories of wartime sexual violence as conceptual frameworks for analysis. Therefore, the study fills this gap and uses theories of wartime sexual violence to explain the motives behind such crimes for effective intervention by peacekeeping forces and evaluates the case of AMIS and UNAMID peacekeepers from these perspectives.

1.3. Core Argument

The African Union Mission in Sudan and the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur peacekeepers protected women from rape and other sexual abuses by armed militias.

1.4. Objectives of the Study

1.4.1. General Objective

The general objective of the study is to examine the attempts of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeepers in Darfur to prevent violence against women.

1.4.2. Specific Objective

The research has the following specific objectives:

1. To investigate the positive initiatives taken by AMIS to protect women from attacks.
2. To examine the challenges faced by AMIS while protecting women in Darfur conflict.
3. To investigate UNAMID peacekeepers attempt to protect women in conflict in Darfur.
4. To examine the challenges and weaknesses of UNAMID in respect of its protection activities.
5. To investigate mission-wide protection strategies taken by peacekeepers as alternatives to the use of force, with a view to either eliminate a threat or mitigating the risk to women.

1.5. Research Questions

The core research question of this study is that what was the role of AMIS and UNAMID peacekeepers in protecting women in Darfur conflict. The study also tries to provide answers to the following specific research questions.

1. What were the positive initiatives taken by AMIS peacekeepers to protect women from GBV (Gender based violence) in Darfur conflict?
2. What were the challenges that AMIS faced while combatting GBV in Darfur conflict?
3. What were the attempts taken by UNAMID peacekeepers to protect women in Darfur conflict?
4. What are the challenges and weaknesses of UNAMID in respect of its protection activities?
5. What other efforts were taken by peacekeepers as alternatives to the use of force to prevent or reduce violence against women?

1.6. Significance of the Study

The research discusses the role of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeepers in protecting women in Darfur conflict. The topic encompasses multiple issues which directly or indirectly affect peacekeepers' role. First, peacekeeping is one form of external intervention, thus, issues of state sovereignty, on the one hand, and civilian protection, on the other hand, arise. Second, peacekeeping is based on the principle of consent and cooperation, but should consent and cooperation extend to those whose actions are largely condemned as unacceptable by the international community, the government of Sudan in this case. As the study investigates these issues, thus, it will have contribution to these areas of debate. It may also inform current and prospective peacekeeping missions to improve their intervention in terms of preventing gender-based violence. Moreover, as the study will bring theories of wartime sexual violence as conceptual frameworks for analysis, which is the gap in the literature as presented in the statement of the problem, thus, it makes contribution to the existing literature.

1.7. Research Methods and Methodology

1.7.1. Methodology

The study employs a qualitative approach. Qualitative approach relies on using quotations, comments, or anecdotes to provide evidence and support for arguments (Johnson *et al.*, 2008). It generates descriptive information through the use of methods such as interviews or focus group discussion (Colton & Covert, 2007). It is an important approach in the study of political science and social science in general. In qualitative research, the goal is to understand the situation under investigation primarily from the participants' perspective rather than to generalize the findings to the whole research population (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006). In this regard, as the research investigates the role of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeepers in combatting gender-based violence in Darfur conflict, this approach would allow to provide convincing explanations for the issue under investigation.

1.7.2. Methods of data collection

The study utilized both primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data was collected through Key Informant Interview conducted in-person and via WhatsApp. In-person interview is conducted with Boitshoko Mogatlhe, Acting Head of Conflict Management, Post-Conflict

Reconstruction and Development Division of the African Union, on 27th of July 2020, from 10:00 a.m. - 10:42 a.m. First, I wrote an introductory email to the AU Peace and Security Department. Then, the secretary of the office, Yonas Amare, replied to my email while requesting to attach a letter addressed to the Director of AU Peace and Security Department. I then attached the letter and interview questions. Then, the Director referred my questions to Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, after which I went to the African Union office and meet Woinshet Getachew, who is Mogatlhe's secretary, and arranged interview. WhatsApp interview is conducted with Midya Gaddo, the UNFPA [United Nations Population Fund] Gender Based Violence Program Support Specialist in North Darfur, on 16th of April 2020, from 8:30 p.m. - 9:15 p.m. I wrote an email to the UNFPA Country Office in Sudan and it was forwarded to the UNFPA Field Office in North Darfur after which Gaddo directly responded and arranged time for interview. She also helped me in getting contact with Jane Some, UNAMID Women Protection Adviser, and Ashraf Eissa, the spokesperson of UNAMID, with whom I conducted Interview, on 8th of June 2020. These informants are selected purposely: they are well-versed personnel on the study topic (purposive sampling). The first key informant, for instance, is a Senior Official of the African Union and has been working in conflict areas including Darfur since 2003. The UNFPA is selected; because, it is the leading agency among all the UN agencies, programs and plans in terms of dealing with GBV and providing services for survivors of sexual violence.

Books, journal articles, online newspaper and magazine articles as well as research reports were the secondary sources utilized for the study. The UN Security Council resolutions, report of the UN Secretary-General on Darfur, report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, and other international and regional legal documents were also used to analyze issues of state sovereignty, the responsibility to protect and peacekeeping.

1.8. Scope of the Study

The study deals with the role of African Union and United Nations peacekeepers in Darfur in protecting women from gender-based violence and covers the period from 2004 to 2020. It only intends to investigate what peacekeepers have done to protect women from gender-based violence and what legal and political limitations hindered them from providing adequate protection for women in conflict in Darfur suffering from gender-based violence.

1.9. Limitations of the Study

The occurrence of COVID-19 was a challenge during this study. As the University library was closed during these periods, limited access to the internet and other library facilities has been the greatest challenge.

1.10. Organization of the Study

The thesis has five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction part as provided above. Chapter two begins with definition of key terms. It then discusses theories of wartime sexual violence for understanding the motivations for effective intervention by peacekeeping forces.

Chapter three begins with a brief overview of Darfur crisis. It then discusses sexual violence in Darfur: its nature, forms, the roots of violence, the rationale behind and the perpetrators. It also presents failure of the government to protect its citizens.

Chapter four has five sections. Section one begins with a discussion of AU's right to intervene in member states in times of crisis. The second section analyzes the principle of the responsibility to protect and its application to Darfur Conflict. The third explores AU's intervention in Darfur conflict in the form of peacekeeping mission. Section four investigates positive initiatives taken by AU peacekeepers to protect women from gender-based violence. This is followed by critical analysis of challenges faced by the AU mission while combatting gender-based violence in Darfur conflict.

Chapter five has four sections. Section one has an introductory purpose with a brief overview of the hybrid operation. The competing interests, constraints and compromises that ensued UN's intervention in Darfur are examined. The second section analyzes the core mandate of the mission ─ protection of civilians─ based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 which established UNAMID. The third explores the attempts of UNAMID peacekeepers to protect women from attacks. This is followed by critical analysis of challenges and weaknesses of the hybrid operation while combatting sexual violence. Finally, the paper ends with conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

Definition of Key Terms

2.1. Gender Based Violence

Gender based violence is a term often used to refer to violence committed against women and girls. Art 1 of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women defines it as:

> Any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivations of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life (United Nations General Assembly, 1993).

In line with this definition, any conduct directed against women by men and intended to cause injury or damage constitutes gender-based violence.

2.2. Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is a concept not mentioned in the United Nations Charter. Neither Chapter Six, which talks about the pacific settlement of disputes, nor Chapter Seven, which provides for enforcement measures in case of threats to international peace & security, mentioned peacekeeping as a mechanism for addressing threats to international peace and security. It is a technique emerged in response to the cold war deadlock that paralyzed the Security Council from taking enforcement measures. And, a concept in between Chapter Six and Chapter Seven, as described by the former Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, 'Chapter Six- and- a Half' (Tshiband, 2010, p. 1).

Peacekeeping can be defined as the dispatch of UN military and police personnel to conflict zones to assist conflicting parties in the implementation of ceasefire agreements (Barnett, 1995). In traditional peacekeeping, United Nations military observers are deployed between or among hostile parties in order to monitor and observe compliance of parties with the ceasefires, seeking to create favorable conditions for the negotiators, diplomats and for the peacemakers to reach political solution (Tharoor, 1993). In modern peace operations, peacekeepers are entrusted with the daunting task of civilian protection in the ongoing conflicts and peacebuilding activities

which includes disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, among others (Brahimi, 2000).

Peacekeeping operates under broad set of principles. The first principle was, the "United Nations-ness" of peacekeeping. That is, peacekeeping operations are established by the decision of United Nations Security Council. They are directed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who gave the orders to the force commander. In other words, all the personnel, military and civilian involved in the peacekeeping operations are under the operational command of the United Nations Secretary-General (Tshiband, 2010). The second principle was the principle of consent: that is, peace-keepers and the operation itself must have the consent of the host governments, and it was accepted that their cooperation was, as a practical matter, essential (United Nations, 2008). Thus, to deploy peacekeepers in a particular country, that country's agreement is a prerequisite. The third principle was the principle of impartiality ─ peacekeeping operation should not favor one party against another. The idea is that peacekeepers are not there to win a war but to end one, or to prevent one from recurring (Brahimi, 2000). But impartiality doesn't mean 'equal treatment of all parties, in all cases, for all time' (Mackinlay, 2000, p.10). In some cases, peacekeepers are allowed to use force against blatant aggressors.

However, in recent years, these doctrinal principles are being called into question. For instance, the 'United Nations-ness' of peacekeeping has been challenged by the proliferation of non-UN peace operations (Bellamy &Williams, 2005). A variety of regional actors have conducted peace operations, often without the Security Council's authorization. Not only regional organizations, individual states & coalitions of the willing have also conducted and authorized operations (Udombana, 2007). These developments have reinvigorated the older debate of which actors and institutions can authorize and conduct peace operations most effectively (Bellamy &Williams, 2005).

The principle of consent and cooperation is also being challenged and has revealed fundamental problems. Should consent and cooperation extend to those whose actions are largely condemn as unacceptable by the international community is questionable (Tharoor, 1993). Even though there were instances in recent peacekeeping trends in which the United Nations deployed peacekeepers without the explicit consent of the host government as in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq, the practice was not consistent. Darfur was a perfect example for this in which the AU as well as the

UN sought for the consent of Sudanese government despite the fact that the government itself was the main violator of human rights. Ultimately, 'is peacekeeping the right tool to apply in such humanitarian emergencies?' is also a question beyond the scope of this research.

2.3 Theories of Wartime Sexual Violence: Understanding the Motivations for Effective Intervention by Peacekeeping Forces

Post-cold war conflicts often referred to as the 'new wars' are no longer characterized by ideological contestations of the superpowers (Leatherman, 2007, p.54). Rather, they are internal; centered on ethnicity, religion and resource conflicts. These intra-state conflicts are marked by the existence of multiple warring factions; no sides can any longer depend on superpowers support to finance the war (Thompson, 2006). Therefore, the perpetrators of the new wars employ violence against civilian populations to loot and control the local resources or for some other specific purposes. As pointed out under paragraph 135 of the Beijing platform for action, 'while the entire communities suffer from the consequences of armed conflict, women and girls are highly affected because of their status in society and their sex' (Beijing declaration & platform for action, 1995, para 135). They are the prime targets of violence because of their reproductive abilities and life-giving capacity in order to achieve the policy of genocide and ethnic cleansing (Leiby, 2009). Thus, women in contemporary armed conflict are victims of murder, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, sexually transmitted diseases and other forms of violence (Annan, 2002).

For peacekeepers, who are called into in such humanitarian emergencies, it is crucial to understand the motives behind such crimes to effectively counter the problem (Office of the UN for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], 2008). For this purpose, I identified three theories that can explain the cause of conflict related sexual violence. I, then, discuss specific strategies that could be taken by peacekeepers in each scenario.

2.3.1. Feminist Theory

Leatherman classify the causes of sexual violence in armed conflict into two: systemic or permissive factors, and proximate causes. She argues that the international system itself is the permissive condition for the commission of violence (Leatherman, 2007). Historically, peace and conflict resolution is the role of the state which is dominated by male. For her, the exclusion of

women from formal negotiations and peace agreements and their implementation hampered successful long-term conflict resolution, and perpetuated the exclusionist and violent institutions which contribute to conflict in the first place.

Gender as a perspective has been nearly totally absent until the late 1980s not only in peace and conflict studies but also in theories of international relations and nation-state system (Brock-Utne, 1989). Feminist international relations scholars criticize mainstream international relations theories as androcentric that are geared towards male interests and criteria (Finke, 2014). They argue that state and foreign policy decisions are influenced by behaviors associated with masculinity which are conflict prone and aimed at power maximization through militaries. For feminist, militaries are threats to individual security particularly to the security of women and other vulnerable groups (Tickner, 2002). Moreover, they claim that state sovereignty which is the cardinal principle of modern international law protects governments from external scrutiny regarding human rights (Leatherman, 2007). Thus, according to this view, the international system itself systemically excluded women from international politics and contributed for their insecurity.

Building a policy consensus on sexual violence as an international security issue is important. In this regard, attempts are made at the UN Security Council level by adopting resolutions to integrate gender into peace and security agenda. Resolution 1820 places sexual violence with in the security paradigm of the council. It states that sexual violence, when used as a tactic of war, can exacerbate armed conflict and impede the restoration of international peace and security (UN Security Council Resolution 1820, 2008, para 1). Resolution 1325 is another path-breaking work which calls for the inclusion of women in conflict resolution and peace-building activities. It calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender based violence (UN Security Council Resolution 1325, 2000, para 10). As a result of these resolutions, peacekeeping missions are increasingly being specifically mandated to address sexual violence (Anderson, 2010). But there is much to be done to translate these commitments into action. Security actors including the UN and regional peacekeepers must respond to sexual violence with much determination as they do for other atrocities (Anderson, 2010).

On the other hand, women inferior social status, the breakdown of law enforcement institutions in wartime, revenge and militarized hyper masculinity are all proximate or situational factors that

open the gate for increased violence against women (Leatherman, 2007). Gottschall (2004) maintains the same view. He claims that, 'men in patriarchal societies are conditioned to distrust, despise and dominate women' (p. 130). Thus, for him, war is a favorable condition in which men vent their contempt for women while enforcing and perpetuating patriarchal gender arrangements (Gottschall, 2004).

Seifert (1992) elaborated the above views from broader perspective. She claims that conflict related sexual violence is not rooted in human nature. Rather, it is an act highly dependent on the social and cultural context. Based on this assumption, she lists down five functions of violence against women during and after war: (1) war is a ritualized game with its own firmly established rules and regulations. That is, there are structured armies, identifiable enemy and front lines, with distinct command structure. One of the rules of the game, the right to exert violence against women is primarily granted to the victor; (2) rape of women has communicative function. It tells the male enemy that they are incapable of protecting their women, thereby hurting their manly pride (Seifert, 1992). What matters here is not the suffering of the women, but the effect it has on men; (3) rape is also a result of the construction of masculinity that armies offer their soldiers. The military profession by itself involves confirmation and strengthening of characteristics associated with masculinity such as power, dominance, eroticism and sexuality. The ideal of manhood cultivated in the military and interlinked with heterosexuality and violence is at least a latent potential for sexual violence (Marlowe, 1983); (4) rapes aim at destroying the adversary's culture. Women have special significance in the existence of a community due to their central role as the mainstay of the family, through which continuity in the culture and the society is ensured. Thus, by attacking women the attacking side destroys its opponent; (5) rape originates in a culturally rooted hatred of women that is acted out in times of crisis. Women are raped in war not only because they belong to the enemy group, but because they are women and by themselves enemies (Brownmiller, 2005).

Peacekeepers can exert a profound impact on social practices. If they treat women with respect, the community and even combatants may follow them. They must empower local women's group and women leaders to represent women's views and engage in public decision-making. In this regard, peacekeepers can serve as 'trend-setters' for how the community views and values women (Goetz& Anderson, 2008, p. 6). Moreover, gender balance in peacekeeping can help the

UN to 'lead by example' (Anderson, 2010, p. 17). The presence of women peacekeepers can shape communities' attitude, sending a message that women are credible interlocutors and vital partners in peace (Anderson, 2010). In light of this, the study will evaluate gender balance in the AMIS and UNAMID peace operations in the finding section.

2.3.2. The Psycho-Social Theory

Munoz-Rojas and Fresard of the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] identify four factors that influence the behavior of combatants to commit atrocious crimes in conflict.

Group conformity: The combatants are no longer totally autonomous individuals (Bandura, 1999). They are motivated more by group pressure than by one's thoughts and feelings. What counts is esteem for their comrades, defense of their collective reputation and desire to contribute to the success of the group (Munoz-Rojas & Fresard, 2005). For these reasons, they commit acts they as individuals would perceive as immoral and wrong.

Obedience to authority: combatants are also subject to their superiors order in the chain of command (Milgram, 1974). Violence may stem from explicit orders given by such an authority or lack of any specific orders not to violate the law (implicit authorization). In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for instance, combatants have given days off to rape and pillage (OCHA, 2008).

The spiral of violence: combatants who have used violence and have been directly affected by violence are inclined to perpetrate violence (Munoz-Rojas & Fresard, 2005).

Moral disengagement: a combatant who commits atrocious act often sees himself not a torturer but as a victim. He feels himself to be a victim, believes himself to be a victim, all of which gives him the right to kill and commit atrocities or justifications for his criminal acts (Staub, 1999).

In this aspect, peacekeepers should at least have preliminary knowledge of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and are required to raise awareness of the IHL whether through dissemination or through specific activities to produce impact on the behavior of the combatants. Training of combatants, strict orders and effective sanctions are the most effective levers in keeping combatants out of the spiral of violence (Walzer, 1977). IHL rules should be included in

the military policies, taught to officers and to the rank and file. Thus, peacekeepers in collaboration with other humanitarian agencies such as the ICRC must strive for the incorporation of rules of IHL into military policies, orders and instructions. They should persuade military leaders to take sanction in the case of failure to comply with IHL, so as to ensure the discipline of their troops and avoid entering a spiral of violence in which violations may become not only more and more serious but also more acceptable in the eyes of those who commit them. For the peacekeepers and other humanitarian organization, to persuade combatants that they must behave in a different way, or to win them over personally is not enough. It is also equally important to influence the people who have ascendency over them including instigators of any excessive violence and those who prepare the political, ideological and moral ground so as to dehumanize the enemy (Munoz-Rajas & Fresard, 2005).

2.3.3 Strategic Rape Theory

According to this theory, sexual violence in war serves a strategic function and an integral tool for achieving particular military objectives (Horwood, 2007). It may be used to intimidate or punish individual women and social groups, to destabilize and demoralize communities or to drive unwanted people from their land.

Last identifies three broad aims of sexual violence in armed conflict. (1) To ensure the compliance of the population with the demands of a particular military faction. (2) To instill terror among the victim group to such an extent that the group is driven from its land (3) as a means of destroying the population of a certain area or a particular ethnic group within that population (Last, 2003). The AU and UN peacekeepers in Darfur will be evaluated whether they tried to understand such manifestations of sexual violence and devised strategies to tackle the problem or not in the finding section of this paper. Raped women may become pregnant by the enemy, they may suffer severe physical and psychological injuries, they may die or they may be rejected by their husband. Thus, by diminishing the reproductive capacity of women, it results in the severe destruction of the family and community. For these reasons, advocates of strategic rape theory often refer to it as ‘genocidal rape’—rape designed to exterminate a people and a culture (Gottschall, 2004, p. 132). The mass rape of women and girls during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda is a good example for this. Tutsi women were killed and raped by Hutu militia; its purpose was the destruction of those categorized as being ethnic Tutsis (Hynes *et al.*, 2004).

State officials when they face pressure from international community regarding the incidence of mass sexual violence, they claim that it is not employed strategically and occurs without their knowledge. They argue that 'sexual violence is the unfortunate result of the transgression of a few bad apples' (Leiby, 2009, p. 448). In this regard, examining principal-agent relationship is important. There are two dilemmas in principal-agent relationships: goal variance and information asymmetry (Neil, 2004). The former one occurs when motives or interests of leaders and agents diverge. Thus, ordinary troops may commit violent acts without their commanders' knowledge for personal revenge or gratification. The second problem occurs when leader's lack information on subordinates' behavior. As a result, agents can exploit such information gap to pursue their private interest. At the same time, principal may intentionally keep silent or do not want to intervene for their own strategic benefit. Such implied consent provides a morale-boosting for soldiers to commit further atrocities. It may further serve the interests of the commanding officers by weakening opposition groups without directly engaging in official fight, thereby allowing principals to deny any knowledge or participation in the violence (Butler *et al.,* 2007).

Peacekeeping missions are mandated to protect civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence. However, this may not be enough to encompass sexual violence due to the unconventional spaces and times at which it occurs and the fact that sexual violence is shrouded in silence and shame (Goetz & Anderson, 2008). Survivors tend not to report sexual violence for fear of social stigma, re-victimization or due to built-in bias in the legal system. Thus, as agreed by members of United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and other UN personnel at Wilton Park Conference on May 2008, a paradigm shift is needed because business as usual has not equipped peacekeepers to detect, predict, prevent and respond effectively to attacks (Goetz & Anderson, 2008). Troop contributing countries need to internalize this issue to the national defense policies to inform their respective peacekeepers. Participants also stressed that ad hock tactical responses need to be codified as doctrine and included in pre-deployment as well as in-mission training. Willingness to patrol and operate in unconventional space (in proximity to villages, compounds, camps, forests and fields) is also required from peacekeepers (Anderson, 2012). The study will evaluate the case of AMIS and UNAMID peacekeepers from these perspectives. When sexual violence has been employed as a method of warfare, it can become a habit seamlessly carried even after the conflict is over. As mentioned by war

correspondents and reporters from the frontlines, for women ‘war is not over when it’s over’ (Anderson, 2010, p. 16). However, sexual violence is rarely mentioned in ceasefire agreements. Thus, ceasefire monitors should be mandated to follow-up the activities of ex-combatants to ensure raping does not continue. In other words, what they monitor should include the cessation of sexual violence.

Effective response to sexual violence also requires political will and leadership. This must be manifested in strong and specific mandates, timely delivery, with adequate human and material resource. Clear guidance to peacekeeping missions on how to operationalize the protection of civilians mandate including the protection of women and girls from sexual violence is crucial (Goetz & Anderson, 2008).

CHAPTER THREE

Women and Armed Conflict in Darfur

3.1. Darfur conflict: A brief Overview

Darfur is far western region of Sudan bordering Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic (Salih, 2008). Dar Fur refers, strictly speaking, to 'Land of the Fur' (de Waal, 2005, p, 118). Nonetheless, the region is also a home for many non-Arab ethnic groups such as Zaghawa, Masalit, Berti, Bergid, Tunjar and Daju as well as Arab groups such as Rizeigat, Misiriya, Ta'aisha, Beni Halba and Beni Hussein, just to mention a few. There are also the Hausa and Fulani peoples who migrated from West Africa and occupied substantial territories in Darfur. Majority of the region's non-Arab population practice sedentary farming. Most of Darfur's Arab tribes are pastoralists (Sikainga, 2009). Those Arab tribes who resided in the southern part are cattle herders and they are known collectively as the Baggara or 'cattle-men', whereas northern nomadic groups are camel herders and grouped under the name 'Abbala' (Gruley & Duvall, 2012). 'The Baggara awarded a territorial jurisdiction (hakura) by the Fur Sultan, but the northern Abbala clans continued a primarily nomadic existence on the desert edge, without a hakura' (de Waal, 2005, p. 188).

When sections settle as many did, they were subjected to the administrative authority of provincial governors. Thus, the northern Bedouins were integrated into the sultanate more as subjects than as quasi- autonomous tribal units. As de Waal claims, these historic legacies have implication to the current conflict. Most of the Arab groups involved in current militia activities including land grabbing are Abbala remnants, with weak historic claims to tribally defined territories (de Waal, 2005).

Since 2003, the Darfur region has been the site of terrible violence, death and displacement (Sikainga, 2009). The United Nations has described it as 'the world worst humanitarian crisis'. The war was labeled as 'genocide' by the International Criminal Court which issued three arrest warrants for the now-ousted President Omar al-Bashir. The current conflict in Darfur has long and complex genealogy. But, a handful of central factors are presented as follows.

First, Darfur has been economically and politically marginalized within Sudan, both under British colonial rule and after independence (Gruley & Duvall, 2010). The British had no economic interests in Darfur, thus, they made no project for social change or modernization (De Waal, 2005). They pursued educational and development policies that favored the northern part (Ateem, 2007). Following independence of the country the northern elites, who were better educated and above all controlled the national economy, took the political control by replacing the colonial officials. As Ateem notes, "out of the eight hundred administrative posts that have been Sudanised by 1954 only six were filled by people from marginalized areas" (Ateem, 2007, p. 17). Thus, the exclusion of Darfurians from power sharing began immediately after independence of the country with the process of exporting electoral candidates to stand for elections in Darfur.

High representation of the northern region in the central government remained the same irrespective of changes in the political environment (Bassil, 2004). When Al Bashir government took power in 1989, he maintained the established patter of injustice by appointing those of northern origin politicians in other regions including Darfur. Higher positions at the ministerial level were filled by people with northern origin. As the group calling itself "the Seekers of Truth and Justice" claim, the Ministry of Economy and Finance has always been dominated by the Northern region (Anonymous, 2004). This led to the excessive allocation of government budget to the northern regions. Substantial expenditures were spent for the construction of infrastructures and development projects in the northern region. Major financial institutions and banks are also headed by personnel from the north, which in turn contributed for the concentration of wealth and economic activities in the center and north (El-Tom, 2006). As a result, Darfur region deprived even basic infrastructures and facilities that are vital to sustain life. They lived trapped in poverty and underdevelopment, which triggered them to organize themselves and revolt against government in 2003.

Environmental degradation and drought was also another source of Darfur conflict. During the 1980's because of the severe drought occurred in the northern Darfur, the northern people, many of whom were Arabs migrated towards southern regions of Darfur (Reyna, 2010). 'The mingling of large numbers of northerners in southerners' lands put extreme pressure on the land tenure system' (Reyna, 2010, p. 1299). This created tribal conflicts between Arab pastoralists and Fur

cultivators (Nielson, 2008). What made these local conflicts to escalate was the intervention of the central government on the side of Arabs (Ateem, 2007). Foreign military presence in Darfur was also another augmenting factor. During the Chadian civil wars of the 1980s, Darfur has been a rear base for belligerents in proxy and direct wars (Gruley & Duvall, 2012). The Chadian opposition groups, who were supported by the then Libyan president Muammar al-Gaddafi, used Darfur to launch attack against their government (Danielova, 2014). This led to the high prevalence of modern arms and military equipment as well as armed and trained groups in Darfur (Bassil, 2004). By taking advantage of such militarized environment, the aggrieved farmers−represented mainly by the Fur tribe−established their own militias to protect their land (Salih, 2008). This was a turning point which led to the formation of the two anti-government military groups (the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), who sparked the current conflict.

In March 2003, these rebel insurgents downed a government helicopter and attacked the central government's airbase at El Fasher (Straus, 2005). In response, the Sudanese government mobilized Arab militias known as 'Janjaweed' and launched counter insurgency against the rebels (Ateem, 2007). 'The Sudanese air force bombed and strafed villages. Then Janjaweed entered to butcher, loot and rape to finish the job' (Reyna, 2010, p. 1300). So, by this time Darfur had become a place of war. According to the United Nations estimation, 300,000 were killed and around 2.7 million forced to flee their homes (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], 2017).

Although overall security situation in Darfur exhibited significant improvements over the past years, there are still irregular clashes between government forces and rebel factions as well as within the rebel groups, especially in the Jebel Marra area (UN Secretary-General Report, 2019 p. 1). According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Situation Report issued on 13 Feb 2020, 54 people were killed and around 40,000 newly displaced because of inter-communal clashes in west Darfur, occurred in earlier months (OCHA, 2020, p. 1). Thus, Darfurians are still suffering from the effects of the conflict even after seventeen years.

3.2. Sexual Violence in Darfur Conflict

One of the perverse manifestations of Darfur Conflict is the extensive use of rape and other forms of violence against women (Nielsen, 2008) When the conflict broke out in 2003, the Janjaweed along with government troops killed men and raped women and then burnt their houses and looted their property (Amnesty international, 2004). The rape was accompanied by severe physical violence. Women were beaten with sticks, whips or axes before, during or after the act of rape (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2005).

Sexual violence in Darfur has not only been perpetrated by men in the Janjaweed militias but also assisted by 'their women', the Hakkama (Nielsen, 2008). The 'Hakkama' were involved in conflict by being communicators of the attack for the Janjaweed. They accompany 'their men' and harass the women that their men rape (Amnesty international, 2004). With the splinting of the rebel groups, at the later stage of war, there were also individuals and opportunistic bandits who inflict attacks on women (Martin, 2007). Members of rebel groups attacked women who perceived to be supporting opposing factions of the rebel movement (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], 2006).

Untold numbers of women were raped in Darfur. The humanitarian Organization, Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders), reported that it treated almost 500 rape victims between October 2004 & February 2005 in South Darfur. Given the great sense of shame, humiliation and fear felt by victims of sexual violence, a sense which discourages them from going to a health facility to receive treatment, MSF acknowledged that these numbers represent only a fraction of the real number of victims (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2005). No women were safe: even old and pregnant women were targeted and assaulted (Martin, 2007).

Majority of the attacks occur in and around displaced camps (Human Rights Watch, 2008).Women were raped when they leave the IDP camp to carry out activities essential to the survival of their family, such as searching for firewood or water (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2005).

> A common pattern is small groups of Janjaweed militia intercept women in isolated areas, insult them by calling them 'slaves' or 'Torabora' and beat them with whips, sticks, gun butts, or their hands, and then rape them (Human Rights Watch, 2008, p. 12).

Rape incidences also occurred inside the IDP camps, which have become increasingly politicized with the infiltration of armed men and weapons (Human Rights Watch, 2008, p.12).

3.2.1. The Motives behind Sexual Violence

Like in many other conflicts, sexual violence in Darfur has been used as a military tactic. The Janjaweed and Government forces used rape to accomplish military and political aims in the region (Abdullahi, 2016).

First, in many cases, the Janjaweed have raped women in public, in the open air, in front of their husbands, relatives or the wider community (Amnesty international, 2004). This is done deliberately to instill fear and terror among the civilian population, so as the victim group will not want to stay in the area. Thus, the Janjaweed can easily capture land throughout Darfur (Singh, 2009). As areas occupied by Fur and other non- Arab tribes are suitable for animal husbandry, the Janjaweed resettled their families and related Arab tribes in these areas after forcefully expelling the villagers (Human Rights Watch, 2004). As Nielsen notes, 'the expulsion, dispersion and expropriation of the other ethnic groups were the primary aim of the government and Janjaweed, and mass rape has been very effective at accomplishing this' (Nielsen, 2008, p. 453).

Second, mass rape in Darfur was used to achieve the policy of ethnic cleansing (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Non-Arab women particularly from Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit were targets of the attacks. The Janjaweed raped high numbers of women from these ethnic groups to cause cultural and familial destruction. "In cultural relations between Black and Arab populations, rape is culturally understood as 'polluting' traditional family blood lines with foreign 'seed"' (Singh, 2009, p. 46). According to the United Nations Children's Fund report issued on 11 February 2005, majority of women who have been raped by the Janjaweed were pregnant (UNICEF, 2005). Thus, the Janjaweed sought to destroy the society of rebel groups through attacking their bloodlines.

Third, the Janjaweed used rape to keep troops happy and agreeably continue the fight, by allowing them sexual access to the enemy's women. However, this strategic use of rape backfired and inspired more men to join the SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Army) to fight against Sudanese government (Abdullahi, 2016).

3.2.2. Failure of the Sudanese Government to Protect Women from Attacks

The government of Sudan has blatantly denied the prevalence of sexual violence in Darfur (Human Rights Watch, 2008). It has not only failed in its duty to protect its citizens, it has also actively involved in violations of human rights (International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 2005).

According to the Amnesty International report, it would appear that violence against women and rape in particular, is mainly committed by the Janjaweed in the presence of government army (Amnesty International, 2004). The Janjaweed have acted with full impunity and full knowledge or acquiescence of the government Army. The police did not want to intervene to stop attacks by Janjaweed. Regrettably, they themselves attacked women on many occasions (Martin, 2007).

For these reasons, victims did not want to report cases that they lack trust and confidence in the authorities (OHCHR, 2006). When rape survivors come forward to report attacks to the police, they have been turned away or intimidated. Some have been charged for the crime of adultery and illegal pregnancy (Human Rights watch, 2008). Relatives of victims who reported sexual violence were subjected to torture. The mass rape incident of Tabit, a village in north Darfur, in October 2014, was a stark example for this in which Sudanese government officials and military commanders threatened, beat, detained and tortured residents of Tabit to prevent them from speaking out about what took place (Human Rights Watch, 2015) The authorities have also repeatedly denied UNAMID and other investigators access to the town (International Refugee Rights Initiative, 2016).

International aid workers have also suffered reprisals for condemning sexual violence in Darfur. For instance, in May 2005, the government arrested and detained Paul Foreman, Head of Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) Holland, after the MSF issued a report on rape in Darfur (Moszynski, 2005).

Even though Special Court was established to deal with cases of gross human rights violations in Darfur with the signing of Doha Peace Document, majority of cases brought to the court were petty crimes rather than substantive war crimes or crimes against humanity (Asylum Research Consultancy, 2015). The court was also rendered non-functional owing to lack of necessary funds (United Nations Security Council, 2015).

According to the UN Secretary-General report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019, sexual and gender-based violence including rape, remains a serious concern for women especially in the greater Jebel Marra area. With reference to sexual violence the report notes that the freedom of movement for women and girls in areas of return and around camps for internally displaced persons continued to be restricted (UN Secretary-General, 2019).

CHAPTER FOUR

African Union's Intervention in Darfur Conflict

This chapter is the beginning of the findings. It has five sections. Section one begins with a discussion of AU's right to intervene in member states in times of crisis. The second section analyzes the principle of the responsibility to protect and its application to Darfur Conflict. The third explores AU's intervention in Darfur conflict in the form of peacekeeping mission. Section four investigates positive initiatives taken by AU peacekeepers to protect women from gender-based violence. This is followed by critical analysis of challenges faced by the AU mission while combatting gender-based violence in Darfur conflict.

The African Union's intervention in Darfur was the first serious test for the organization, which replaced the 39-year-old organization of African Unity (OAU) in 2002 (Cohen& O'Neill, 2006). The OAU was infamous for refusing to interfere in the internal affairs of member states. It insisted on the primacy of Sovereignty taking no action even in extreme situations like Rwandan genocide (O'Neill& Cassis, 2005). In striking contrast to the OAU, the African Union (AU) adopted a different approach and constitutionally structured to be able to intervene in member states in times of crises (Dembinski, 2017).The AU incorporated this emerging norm of protection into its Constitutive Act under Article 4(h). It states that AU has the right to intervene in a member state in respect of grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (African Union, 2002). The AU has created its own African Standby Force (ASF) ─a rapid reaction force ─to be deployed in times of crisis in Africa (Powell &Tieku, 2005).

But, in reality, the AU is more inclined to state sovereignty and regime security than human security (Aboagye, 2012). It has failed on numerous occasions to intervene in a member state to end human rights violations. As many AU heads of state are dictators, they don't have the moral authority to stand against other similar abusive leader. They have never authorized military intervention to protect civilians; because, that may threaten their own grip on power (Sharpe, 2017). Professor Christakis argues that 'the AU has often not intervened, even when not only its own Constitutive Act, but also international law on the use of force more generally, allowed it' (Nouwen, 2013, p. 331). The Libya's crisis is an ideal example for this, in which the Africa

Union opposed the intervention that the UN had authorized. The AU had also been dysfunctional during the Cote d'Ivoire crisis (Aboagye, 2012).

4.1. Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect in Darfur

According to the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,

> *…the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, & the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICSS], 2001: xi).*

Thus, the international community has an obligation to react under such circumstances, which may include coercive measures such as sanctions and international prosecution, and military intervention in extreme cases and as a last resort (ICSS, 2001).

Darfur conflict was the most obvious case for the application of the principle of the responsibility to protect. It meets the criteria for intervention identified by the ICISS (Baldo, 2006). Slim (2004) and Badmus (2015) also maintain that the situation in Darfur is a case for which the R2P was meant to apply. The government of Sudan, who bear the primary responsibility to protect its people, deliberately violated its obligation. It has been the prime mover behind the campaign of ethnic cleansing and has unleashed the Janjaweed militias on the people of Darfur (Grono, 2006). The international community, the next bearer of the responsibility to protect, has failed to take timely actions to protect the people of Darfur. It was only in March 2005, two years after the conflict started, that the Security Council belatedly moved to establish an International Commission of Inquiry and referred the matter to the International Criminal Court (Ojo & Folarin, 2016). Even though the USA and NATO member states are disturbed by what is happening in Darfur, they were unwilling to commit their troops on the ground in Sudan (de Waal, 2007). The French government, who possesses foreign military bases in the neighboring Chad and Djibouti, was not willing to commit those troops to civilian protection in Darfur (Williams, 2006). Other governments, such as China, have staunchly defended Sudanese sovereignty and their own interest to access Sudanese oil, while the Arab League have denied the Sudanese government's responsibility for war crimes in Darfur and described the situation there as a civil war (Terrie, 2006). As Deegan notes

> *China, India, Malaysia & some European countries are dramatically expanding business ties with Sudan…. Companies from those countries are investing billions of dollars and working closely with the Khartoum government with little concern about its role in mass killings in the Darfur region (Deegan, 2009, p. 178).*

Instead, the international community focused on providing humanitarian assistance ─ thereby addressing the consequences but not the causes.

The African Union was the first international body to react to Darfur. When it became clear that the UN and the major powers were not going to intervene militarily to stop the killing, the African Union stepped in to Darfur conflict in the form of a ceasefire monitoring mission and sent a small number of troops on 28 May 2004 (O'Neill& Cassis, 2005). This marks the deployment of African Union Mission in Sudan. However, the AU troops were too small and underequipped; they didn't have the capability to carry out the daunting task of civilian protection in active conflicts (de Waal, 2007). This generates questions how a continental organization of 55member states, if it had genuine intent to protect Darfur civilians, failed to conduct a large-scale civilian protection operation. The following section tries to provide answers to such questions and others after briefly introducing the mission.

4.2. African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)

Following the signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) between the government of Sudan (GoS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army(SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), on April 8,2004, the AU started its initial deployment by sending 60 Military Observers (MILOBS) to Darfur (Appiah-Mensah, 2005). The first MILOBS arrived in El Fashir, Darfur on June 4 and declared operational on June 19, 2004 (Ekengard, 2008). One month after, 300 protection forces arrived at Darfur to provide security and safeguard for the unarmed observers. AMIS was initially authorized only to monitor the ceasefire and report violations of the HCFA and protect itself (Deegan, 2009). The areas of operations were divided into six sectors (El Fashir, Nyala, El Geneina, Kabkabiya, Tine and Abeche (Eastern Chad), and sector commanders were appointed to each. Each sector had two MILOB group sites. At each group site four teams of MILOBS were deployed; each team consisting of ten MILOBS—six AU observers, one from the government, two each from SLA and JEM, and one from donor nations, usually the US or European union (Powell, 2005).

In an attempt to adapt the composition of AMIS with the situation on the ground, On 20 October 2004, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) authorized the enhancement of the force by about tenfold (Appiah-Mensah, 2005). This enhanced force was known as AMIS II. AMIS II involved an increase in the number of troops to 2341 and the introduction of a civilian police [CIVPOL] component of 815 police. The mandate of the mission was expanded to include protection of civilians on limited basis. Three new Sectors were added, in Kutum, Zalingue, & Al Daien (Boshoff, 2005).

After the introduction of the new sectors, AMIS operational areas look as depicted in the following map:



Fugure1/ Map of African Union in Sudan Administrative Sectors adapted from

Humanitarian information center. African Union Mission in Sudan. (2004, November 17).

The mission has four components: the military component, the Civpol, political and humanitarian affairs and the chief administrative officer (CAO). The military component of AMIS consists of force commander and eight sector commanders. Each sector had two MILOB group sites. Each group sites had four teams of MILOBS; each team consisting of ten MILOBS as depicted in diagram below.



Figure 2/AMIS II Mission Structure adapted from

Boshoff, H. (2005). The African Union Mission in Sudan, *African Security Review*, *14*(3), 57-60. http://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2005. 9627371

Early 2005 saw a continuation of ceasefire violations and human rights abuses in Darfur. As a reaction, the PSC decided on 28 April 2005 to further enlarge the mission to 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police (Williams, 2006). At this stage, there was at least one infantry battalion in each sector. The number of MILOBS Group sites increased from fifteen to twenty-nine. The protection force was largely composed of troops from countries such as Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya and Gambia. The expansion did not significantly change the AMIS function. 'Patrols by MILOB teams with section-to platoon-sized escorts

remained the preferred mode of operations. AMIS also engaged in escorts of AU and humanitarian convoys, and provided protection for the unarmed civilian police' (Ekengard, 2008, p. 21). The CIVPOL was tasked with mentoring the government of Sudan police as well as investigating violations of cease-fire and reporting breaches to the union's political wing (Wax, 2004). To be able to work closely with the Sudanese police, the AMIS CIVPOL adopted its organization to the administrative boundaries of Darfur. It established regional offices in each of Darfur's three states (Human Rights Watch, 2006).

According to the findings of the Joint Implementation Mechanism Mission for Darfur, the presence of AMIS has 'provided a very positive influence' (Monthly Report of the UN Secretary-General, 2005, p. 13). In areas where it established a presence, both the security and humanitarian situations improved. In particular, the number of clashes between the belligerent parties diminished, as did the number of attacks on civilians even though the then UN figure Kofi Annan and Andrew Natsios, the head of the US Agency for International Development, attributed this not to AMIS but to the general decrease in hostilities (William, 2006).Nonetheless, it is also important to take into account the challenges within which the AU troops were actually operated.

4.3. AMIS' Efforts in Combating Violence against Women in Darfur

The heavily armed Janjaweed militias, who often surround the camps, attack women when they left the camps to collect firewood or for some other purpose (Cohen & O'Neill, 2006). According to the UN High Commissioner for Human rights, Louise Arbour, the IDP women were held 'captive in prisons without walls', as they could not move outside the camps' perimeters for fear of attacks. She added:

> *Janjaweed attacks against villagers are still ongoing, but the type of attacks has changed to a new pattern of individual attacks on a massive scale. In all the camps where … women attempted to step out to collect firewood there is very widespread preying on these individual victims (cited in Deegan, 2009, p. 175).*

In an effort to reduce such attacks, AMIS had taken several positive protection initiatives, presented as follow.

4.3.1. Positive Initiatives: Firewood Patrols

The most well-known example of the efforts of AU mission in Darfur to protect women from attacks was the initiation of firewood patrols (Ferris, 2008). AMIS firewood patrol consist of AMIS police monitors along with their Sudanese counterparts and protection soldiers accompanying women to an identified area, patrolling around them within earshot when they gather their firewood and then accompanying them back to the camps (Martin, 2007).



Figure 3/ AMIS Firewood patrol near Kass in South Darfur adapted from

Darfur crisis: Progress in aid & peace monitoring threatened by ongoing violence & operational challenges. (n.d.). DIANE Publishing.

Women identify the routes, then AMIS together with humanitarian actors, determine the day, time and routes of the patrols (Cohen & O'Neill, 2006). AMIS may recommend the changes to the schedule depending on their security assessments. For this purpose, there are contact people (IDP representatives) who facilitate communication between the Women and AMIS soldiers. In north Darfur, civilian police [CIVPOL] female officers together with female Sudanese police visit the camps to discuss IDP women's concerns, including the firewood patrols (Human Rights Watch, 2006). According to the International Rescue Committee report more than 800 women would go out together to collect firewood on the days of the AU patrols (cited in O'Neill & Cassis, 2005, p. 30). In many camps, especially in West Darfur, women's movement and security improved once the patrols started. According to a key informant from the AU,[1]the firewood and water patrols not only protected women from being killed but also protected them from rape and abuse by the armed militia.

[1]Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, the African Union, Acting Head of Conflict Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, 27 July 2020.

In some camps, the local police also participate in the joint Patrol, even though the IPDs refused their presence and are suspicious of them because of their participation in grave crimes (O'Neill & Cassis, 2005). In an attempt to improve such unhealthy relations between the IDPs and Sudan Police, AMIS has taken confidence building measures. For example, in Nyala, South Darfur, IDPs refused to have local police participation in the patrols. In response,

> *AMIS organized meetings attended by IDP leaders and the police to discuss their concerns, resulting in gradual progress as each side became familiar with the other. In one meeting, the police commander acknowledged the wrong-doing of the police and promised to punish any officer who commits offence (O'Neill & Cassis, 2005, p. 31).*

This led to the resumption of Sudanese police participation in the firewood patrols in September 2005. AMIS limited numbers restricted its ability to provide patrols to large areas. AMIS tried to fill this gap by deploying CIVPOL to patrol outside camps, without protection forces accompanying them (Human Rights Watch, 2006). The CIVPOL also established permanent police posts in the most sensitive camps in order to watch over IDPs in the camps. The CivPol will not live inside the IDP camps but will keep a 24-hour presence stationed adjacent to the camps (International Crisis Group, 2005). As of March 2006, 26 out of 65 identified sensitive villages had permanent CIVPOL presence (Human Rights Watch, 2006). The CIVPOL presence in the IDP camps has reduced the numbers of attacks and intrusions of militias in the IDP camps (O'Neill & Cassis, 2005). This shows the AU police willingness to patrol and operate in unconventional spaces such as in villages, compounds, camps, forests and fields, as discussed in theoretical section of this research.

According to strategic rape theory, as presented in chapter two of this research, sexual violence in war serves strategic military objectives. It may be used to instill fear and terror among the civilian population, to destabilize and demoralize a particular ethnic group or for the purpose of ethnic cleaning. The core question is did the AU peacekeepers in Darfur understand such manifestations of sexual violence in armed conflict? According to a Key Informant Interview with Mokgatlhe,[2] the AU peacekeepers came from different countries and they have gender-based violence related experience. 'They have it in different levels: There are some who would be very good at it; there are some who would be not so good; there are some who would be not

[2] Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, the African Union, Acting Head of Conflict Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, 27 July 2020.

good at all.' Especially, the senior police officers that came from countries that had reputation for community policing such as South Africa and Nigeria were well-trained in community policing and well-experienced in dealing with gender-based violence in conflict. This was not their first posting in terms of having to deal with gender based violence in conflict.[3] Thus, it is safe to say that some of the AU peacekeepers in Darfur were able to understand such manifestations of sexual violence and assisted women in areas where they were deployed.

Enhanced collaboration with humanitarian and human rights actors: AMIS has joined the UNHCR and UN Human rights officers in west Darfur to tackle gender-based violence (UNHCHR, 2005). In March 2005, the UNHCR received allegations that the government was prosecuting and detaining rape survivors for the crime of adultery and illegal pregnancy under the penal code of Sudan. Just days after the reports of arrests and detentions were received; an African Union helicopter transported an investigative team consisting of the UN Human Rights Officers, UNHCR staffs and the female CivPol to Bindisi for several days of investigation (O'Neill & Cassis, 2005). The joint intervention forced Sudanese police to drop the charges and release women (UNHCHR, 2005).

Preventive deployment: AMIS deployed its troops in areas where attacks were anticipated (Refugee International, 2005). For instance, on Dec 17, 2004 government forces and militia had attacked the nearby villages of Labado town, south Darfur state. Thousands of displaced persons from these nearby areas had fled to Labado, making it one of the larger displaced persons sites under SLA control (Human Rights Watch, 2008). In January 2005, the AU sector commander in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur state, heard that government directed forces were about to attack the town in order to drive out rebel forces. He rushed 100 troops to Labado & the nearby town of Muhajira and prevented a second attack that would have directed against the displaced and women in particular (Refugee International, 2005). In the same way, AMIS troops were deployed to Zalingei, a town in west Darfur, to prevent retaliation against IDPs following attacks by SLM/A (Darfur crisis: Progress in aid & peace monitoring threatened by ongoing violence and operational challenges, n.d.).

[3] Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, the African Union, Acting Head of Conflict Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, 27 July 2020.

Temporary accompaniment: In areas where it cannot establish military camps, AMIS provided temporary accompaniment for villagers and women in particular, who were under imminent threat of attack (Cohen & O'Neill, 2006). The incidence of Tawila, a town in North Darfur, was an ideal example for this. On Saturday morning, Nov 28, 2004, a team of nine African union military observers arrived in the town, one week after deadly rebels attack and counter attack by government forces (Sengupta, 2004).The monitors, who are unarmed, risked spending the night in the frigid desert in the out skirts of the town to show people that they were there. During the day, they handed over their rations to starving local women. Until the monitors left—headed back to their base in the state capital El Fashir—their stay offered a short spell of security for villagers and women in particular (Sengupta, 2004).

Mediation and conflict resolution: In some locations, AMIS sector commanders hold regular meeting with traditional leaders (sheiks) to address local peoples' concerns, while striving to forge reconciliation agreements to prevent local conflicts from escalating into large-scale violence (O'Neill & Cassis, 2005). This had positive impact in reducing structural conditions that increase the risk of violence to women. Peacekeepers have negotiated for the release of women taken hostage by armed groups (Human Rights Watch, 2008). The incidence of Adwah was a good example for this. On Nov, 2004 the SLA-held town of Adwah on the west side of the Nyala-Fashir road and the nearby corridors were attacked by government forces (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Even though AMIS team encountered a Sudanese arm blockade, they managed to enter the town later on. When AMIS team entered Adwah, those women and girls who had not managed to escape were reportedly held captive in the town and repeatedly raped. Several wounded women were detained in the town without medical care (Human Rights Watch, 2008). The AMIS team evacuated many of the wounded women and ferried them to hospitals (International Crisis Group, 2005).

4.4. The Challenges of African Union Mission in Sudan

Combatting sexual violence is one of the most challenging tasks for peacekeepers, especially in situations like Darfur. Firstly, for peacekeepers to protect women from gender-based violence, they need to have robust protection mandate with strong command and control structures (Johansson & Hultman, 2018). Secondly, as rape and other forms of sexual violence may be carried out in public spaces in order to terrorize the civilian population or opportunistic rape

committed in private space, thus, peacekeepers need to go beyond the frontline (Anderson, 2012). This requires larger military and police personnel that can patrol women when they venture outside. Thus, a sizable force with a protection mandate to use force can effectively guard women from physical and sexual abuse. Thirdly, while armed actors with a high level of internal control and act as unitary actors may sometimes engage in sexual violence for strategic or instrumental purposes, they are also able to restrict such behavior within their forces when faced with peacekeepers (Baaz & Stern, 2009). Evaluated from these perspectives, none of the above favorable conditions exist in Darfur. AU Presence in terms of troops was less than 7000 by 2005 and the civilian protection was near Zero (Ojo and Folarin, 2016). Its ability to protect civilians is impeded by restrictive mandate, small troop size, lack of willingness and determination to act, government restrictions, and existence of fragmented armed actors, and insufficient resources (Ojo and Folarin, 2016). An in-depth analysis of these issues is presented hereunder.

4.4.1. The mandate of AMIS

For any force to be able to protect Darfuri women from being raped, a clear and strong mandate to protect civilians is essential (Martin, 2007). The mandate of the mission in relation to the protection of civilians simply states that '… protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the Government of Sudan' (Williams, 2006). This mandate is based on the assumption that Government of Sudan would comply with the cease fire agreement and protect its peoples (Ekengard, 2008). But, given the fact that the government of Sudan is the prime perpetuator of violence against Darfuris civilians and women in particular to authorize peacekeepers with such mandate which is based on unrealistic expectations creates confusion. That meant, what are the respective responsibilities of AMIS and of the Government of Sudan or whose responsibility to protect IDPs was not clear (William, 2006). In the language of Brahimi Report, the mandate lacks clarity and insufficient to protect civilians (Brahimi, 2000). Yet it provides a room for interpretation which was left to the AU's Peace and Security Council. Thus, with flexible interpretation and strong Rules of Engagement (ROE), such a mandate can be made right to permit robust actions to protect civilians. However, the AU force even lost this second opportunity. There had been disagreement within member

states on how to interpret the mandate. While Nigerian government agreed with Khartoum's position that AMIS troops were not to use force to protect civilians, Rwanda's government insisted on the use of such force (Williams, 2006). The PSC, thus, failed to put enough pressure on the Government of Sudan to allow peacekeepers with greater freedom of action ─ the result was such weak mandate not even made better with rules of engagement that can guarantee protection for IDP women (Chang, 2007).

According to the Human rights watch,

> *the rules of engagement are ambiguous concerning the use of force to protect civilians, and are not sufficiently developed or detailed to allow for the reactive or proactive protection of civilians at sector and company level, where the patrolling protection forces encounter daily challenges (Human Rights Watch, 2006, p. 27).*

There is no rule explicitly permitting the use of deadly force to protect civilians under imminent threat. With regard to the CivPol, relevant rules governing their actions do not provide them with executive powers of arrest and capacity for criminal investigation. The inability of CivPols to arrest those implicated meant that, even if they gathered sufficient evidence to identify the rapists or attackers, their investigation was disregarded by Sudanese police and it never resulted in arrests or trials (Human Rights Watch, 2006).

The AU troops had also no authority to disarm the Janjaweed forces who were the principal offenders. According to Mokgatlhe, it was not their mandate to disarm the Janjaweed and to collect weapons from them; because, that is the government's responsibility.[4] Nonetheless, when the peacekeepers actually confronted them and they had to shoot-out, they would have to disarm them; because, in that case, they are not just threatening the civilians, but they are also threatening the peacekeepers.[5]

As Mokgatlhe states, there are three types of parties involved in Darfur conflict: the government forces, the armed militias and the farmers, and then, the mission that is supposed to protect civilians under threat. The militias get into a fight with farmers; then you go there, how do you

[4]Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, the African Union, Acting Head of Conflict Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, 27 July 2020.

[5] Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, the African Union, Acting Head of Conflict Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, 27 July 2020.

take away the weapons? Where did you start taking away the guns? He further states:

> *Let's say you have the responsibility to disarm, from whom do you start disarming? What if the Janjaweed says to you this weapon is for protecting me and my family? What criteria did you use in the middle of the conflict to take away arms as a mission? Because, you leave them vulnerable to the farmers.*[6]

The conflict was very blurry in terms of identifying who is the Janjaweed and who is the true farmer. That is why the AU needed the government to actually be active in this. Mokgatlhe further notes:

> *If you start force disarmament, your troops become the target. Because, the Janjaweed would mobilize and say these people are out to destroy us, and remember that you are in a foreign territory. If all those Janjaweed rose up against the peacekeepers, that mission would not be able to stand up against them.*[7]

So, the mission is also cautious not to undertake activities that would endanger itself. To go on a nation-wide campaign to disarm people may actually put the mission in harm's way.

The other thing was that sometimes there is a problem with the government intervening to say that their people have been killed and these were not Janjaweed, then, identifying them became a big problem for AMIS.[8] Because, sometimes when the AU troops fire at somebody and kill them; the government come and say this person was not a militia. The family also argues that this person was not a militia, and then, they file a case in the court of law against the AU forces claiming damages and compensation, but they were actually the Janjaweed.[9]

4.4.2. Small Troop Size

The problem was not only the mandate but AMIS also faced serious deficit in the number of troops. AMIS was so tiny it could cover only a fraction of Darfur and protect only a tiny percentage of the population (Williams, 2006). There are two rules commonly used to calculate

[6] Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, the African Union, Acting Head of Conflict Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, 27 July 2020.
[7] Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, the African Union, Acting Head of Conflict Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, 27 July 2020.
[8] Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, the African Union, Acting Head of Conflict Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, 27 July 2020.
[9] Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, the African Union, Acting Head of Conflict Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, 27 July 2020.

the necessary force size for civilian-protection operations. The first is based on the assumption that 2-10 troops are required for every 1000 inhabitants within the crisis zone (O'Hanlon & Singer, 2004). The UN Refugee Agency reported that Darfur had 1.8 million IDPs as of May 2006 of which the majorities were women (Africa Bureau, 2006, p. 5). Thus, according to the first rule AMIS should have had 3,600 - 18,000 personnel. The second method is based on the assumption that protection force should be equivalent to the size of the national army deployed for the conflict (O'Hanlon & Singer, 2004). The Government of Sudan had officially 200,000 troops, of which estimated 40,000 - 45,000 troops were deployed in Darfur. The Janjaweed forces were an estimated 10,000 - 20,000 strong (Williams, 2006). On this measure AMIS should have had a minimum of 10,000 & potentially 45,000 troops. On either of these measures, AMIS was too small to offer adequate protection for women along with civilians. Lack of sufficient protection forces has been one reason for the inclusion of government police into the firewood patrols which in turn contributed for the frustration of IDP women. IRIN news of 14 March 2007 discloses this fact: 'Women fled the scene upon seeing an AU convoy. When AU troops, CivPol and Government of Sudan police inquired as to why, the women admitted that they were scared of being attacked.' Moreover, parties used their participation in AMIS as a means to block or delay investigations into alleged violations (Appiah-Mensah, 2005).

AMIS limited numbers have restricted its ability to sustain firewood patrols (O'Neill & Cassis, 2005). The AU troops provide patrols only on certain days and in limited areas. Women were attacked even more fiercely on the days the AU was not present, in retaliation for the patrols (Martin, 2010). For these reasons, the firewood patrol had been effective only in limited areas in which the AU maintained presence.

According to Mokgatlhe,[10] the problem with the firewood patrol was that:

> *Women lived in places that sometimes the water and firewood become further and further, and that obviously meant exposing our troops to danger; because, remember this is the terrain that the militias are familiar with and our troops were not familiar with. So, the more the women fetched firewood and water from far, the more exposed our troops became (Mokgatlhe, 2020).*

The AU troops cannot be everywhere, every day and every time. Hence, sometimes they are not

[10] Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, the African Union, Acting Head of Conflict Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, 27 July 2020.

readily available; women would have to organize themselves to make sure that on certain days they are ready to be protected and go; because, AMIS had an understanding and an agreement that on these days it will provide protection.

> *But what happens that you don't have firewood and it is not the day that the AMIS is supposed to be there? So, that one woman might go out and get raped. Do you blame AMIS? Do you blame the government? Do you blame the Janjaweed? You obviously can't have the whole of AMIS or even a battalion or even a section coming to protect one person. Because, you have to match the resources with the responsibility (Mokgatlhe, 2020).*

As Mokgatlhe further explains, AMIS was not a flash with money. It was struggling even to keep its mission continue; because, there was no money. To carry out these patrols is costly. 'We can't have these missions carried out every day. If we had a lot of money, we probably would have been able to do it. But we didn't have that money' says Mokgatlhe.[11] So, it had to be scheduled to make sure that the resources meet the responsibilities in a certain way.

Peacekeepers should have organized and be there to protect women every time. However, they cannot be there every day because of resource limitation not only in terms financial resources but also, in terms of troops and force multiplier.

> *If there is fighting in Jebel Marra, for instance, and then, you need the force multiplier that are based in El Fasher or in El Geneina; you need all forces that you can master to go there. That means, you leave other areas likely vulnerable. And, therefore, collection of firewood may not be in the priority area for that particular period; because, you have got a bigger threat elsewhere that you need to as a mission attempt to. Therefore, on those days, if a woman decided to go out without protection, then, it will become a problem.*[12]

AMIS mission alone was costing more than the AU commission in a year. ''They were costing more', says Mokgatlhe, 'in a month, we were going through a bill of about 10 to 20 million dollars, which is what this commission survives on for all year at a time'" (Mokgatlhe, 2020). The AU member states make limed contribution and most of the money that was used to manage AMIS came from outside. The AU member states deploy troops and expect somebody else to pay for the troops.[13]

[11] Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, the African Union, Acting Head of Conflict Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, 27 July 2020.
[12] Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, the African Union, Acting Head of Conflict Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, 27 July 2020.
[13] Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, the African Union, Acting Head of Conflict Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, 27 July 2020.

Michael R. Gordon, the chief military correspondent for the New York Times, claims that small forces can be a powerful one if aided by advanced command and control systems, improved intelligence technologies, tactics and organization (Gordon, 2006). Thus, it is possible to stop attacks against civilians without defeating the attacker, just by assembling and guarding concentrations on threatened people especially on the IDP women (Bernath & Gompert, 2003). None of these qualities existed with AMIS. The mission was characterized by lack of flexible command and control of distributed forces, standard operation procedures, tactics/techniques and severe logistical shortcomings (O'Neill & Cassis, 2005). Timely, accurate, abundant and usable intelligence is crucial especially in settings like Darfur (Bernath & Gompert, 2003). However, AMIS capacity to gather, analyze and act on information has been weak. The only intelligence collection tools available were MILOBS and limited helicopter reconnaissance (Ekengard, 2008). This made preventive deployment very difficult.

4.4.3. Shortage of Qualified Female AMIS Police Officers and Translators

According to feminist theory, as presented in the theoretical section of this research, gender balance in peacekeeping can help the mission to lead by example. The presence of women peacekeepers can shape patriarchal attitudes and social practices, which is one of the factors for increased sexual violence in war. As of April 2005, of a total of 454 military observers, only two were women. As of August 2005, of a total of 816 CivPol, only 126 were women (O'Neill & Cassis, 2005). That is, about a quarter of the AMIS CivPol were female. Even though this is a much higher percentage than the 4% in UN peacekeeping, it is not a fair number in situations like Darfur in which the conflict is characterized by extensive use of rape and gender-based violence. The IDP women were not willing to talk to the AU soldiers, as they are all men. Therefore, the poor gender balance not only inhibited AMIS from fully understanding the population it was there to protect, but it also made the mission not to act as a role model.

The female police officers often lacked the appropriate background in policing standards and protocols for handling cases of sexual violence (Human Rights Watch, 2006). On a number of occasions, AMIS staff reported the details of the cases, including the names of victims of sexual violence, in public meetings (Human Rights Watch, 2006). As many of AMIS police officers came from Franco-phone African countries such as Mauritania, lack of translators has greatly

hampered AMIS's capacity to either provide additional protection for displaced women in Darfur or to mentor government of Sudan police officers effectively (Martin, 2007).

These problems do not mean that AMIS personnel performed poorly as individuals. The peacekeepers on the ground should not be blamed for factors beyond their control. Rather they deserve credit for individual initiatives they took in order to protect women from attacks. They tried to provide security for the displaced women of Darfur in areas where they were deployed. Many AU soldieries have shown a spirit and commitment that have given confidence to Darfur women. The following picture depicts this fact:

Figure 4/ picture taken from

Cohen, R., & O'Neill, W.G. (2006). Last stand in Sudan. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 62(2), 51-58.

Instead, AMIS leadership took the responsibility for the overall failure of the mission to provide adequate security for all war-affected populations of the province.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Intervention of United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur Conflict

This Chapter has four sections. Section one has an introductory purpose with a brief overview of the hybrid operation. The competing interests, constraints and compromises that ensued UN's intervention in Darfur are examined. The second section analyzes the core mandate of the mission ─ protection of civilians─ based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 which established UNAMID. The third explores the attempts of UNAMID peacekeepers to protect women from attacks. This is followed by critical analysis of challenges and weaknesses of the hybrid operation while combatting sexual violence.

On August 31, 2006 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1706 to deploy large, agile and robust military peacekeepers in Darfur (United Nations Secretary-General, 2006). Resolution 1706 authorizes the expansion of UNMIS [United Nations Mission in Sudan] that had earlier been deployed in South Sudan to support the implementation of the CPA [Comprehensive Peace Agreement] that ended Sudan's North-South war (Badmus, 2015).Initially it was enacted to replace the patently ineffective AMIS with an authorization to use force to prevent attacks against civilians including women and girls (United Nations Security Council [UNSC], 2006, para 12(a)). Under this resolution, UNMIS is also authorized to disband and disarm the Janjaweed. However, the mission was never deployed because of division between the permanent members of the Security Council. The United States, United Kingdom and France supported for intervention while China and Russia opposed to claiming that sending 22,000-strong UN force would amount to violation of Sudanese sovereignty (Kreps, 2007, p. 67). As Udombana states:

> *Both Russia and China continue to oppose sanction against Sudan, largely because of their own economic and political interests. Russia is a major supplier of weapons to Sudan, and China is a major consumer of oil from the country. Such conflicts of interest explain why the modest goal of peacekeeping that Resolution 1706 envisages for Darfur might be heading towards the rocks (Ubombana, 2007, p. 110).*

This had encouraged the Sudanese government to vehemently oppose the expansion of UNMIS into Darfur. As a consequence, a compromising resolution 1769, which established the UNAMID, was adopted on November 17, 2006 (Mickler, 2013).

UNAMID was the first joint initiative established to strengthen the efforts of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), in response to the increasing violence in Darfur (Pan, 2010). AMIS was completely merged into this new force by 31 Dec. 2007 (Kreps, 2007). UNAMID was initially mandated for 12-months period, but this period was extended with subsequent resolutions and the force has still maintained a presence in Darfur despite the conflict was over except sporadic clashes in the Jebel Marra. Even though the UN proposed to deploy 26,000 military and police personnel in Darfur, the real number of troops deployed on ground was far below this figure (Deegan, 2009). For instance: as of July 2008, only about 9,479 uniformed personnel were on the ground in Darfur, most of whom were ex-AMIS forces (Forti, 2019, p. 3).



Figure 5/ Proposed and actual number of uniformed personnel from 2008 - 2019 adapted from

Forti, D. (2019). Navigating Crisis and Opportunity: The Peacekeeping Transition in Darfur. International Peace Institute, 3.

UNAMID reorganized the preceding AMIS eight sectors into three sectors, i.e. Sector North (with headquarters at El Fashir), Sector West (El Geneina) and Sector South (Nyala), as depicted in the following map.



Figure 6/ UN-AU Hybrid Operation for Darfur Administrative Sectors taken from

Aboagye, F. (2007). The hybrid operation for Darfur: A critical review of the concept of the mechanism. *ISS Paper 149*, 15.

By mid-2015 a further two sectors had been established: Sector Central at Zalingei and Sector East at Al Da'ein. Each sector has 35 team sites (Aubyn, 2016, p. 2). The mission has three components: military, police and civilian. The police component is composed of three core elements: formed police units (FPUs), individual police officers (IPOs) and senior leadership group, which provides management and oversight.



Figure 7/ UNAMID Mission Structure adapted from

Aboagye, F. (2007). The hybrid operation for Darfur: A critical review of the concept of the mechanism. *ISS Paper 149*.

5.1. UNAMID's Core Mandate: Protection of Civilians (PoC)

As stated under the report of the Secretary-General & the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur, UNAMID is mandated:

> *To contribute to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence and prevent attacks against civilians, within its capability and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan (UN Secretary-General, 2007, para 54(b).*

The mission is authorized to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and to use force to prevent attacks against civilians (UNSC, 2007, para 15). But they have no power to disband and disarm 'the Janjaweed monsters'—who ruthlessly attack the displaced women (Udombana, 2007, p. 99). According to WhatsApp interview with Eissa,[14] UNAMID had no authority to disarm the Janjaweed; because, Sudan has a functional government and, therefore, it's the government's responsibility to disarm the Janjaweed forces and protect its people. UNAMID's role is to assist

[14] Ashraf Eissa, Spokesperson, African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 8 June 2020.

the Government of Sudan in prevention of any form of violations against civilians, women and children being the most vulnerable.[15] It shall only monitor, verify and promote efforts to disarm the Janjaweed and other militias by the government of Sudan (UN Secretary-General, 2007, para 55(b). The police component, UNAMID police, is empowered to support the protection mandate of the mission but with no power to arrest and detain individuals and investigate crimes (UN Secretary-General, 2007, para 81).

As noted in the preamble of the UNSC Resolution 1769, especial emphasis was given to widespread sexual and gender-based violence in Darfur and protection of women from attack is a critical element of UNAMID's PoC mandate. This is in line with the UNSC Resolution 1820 and 1325 (2000) which recognized sexual violence as a threat to international peace and security, if used as a tactic of war, and calls on peacekeepers to respond to all forms of violence against women, as presented in chapter two of this research.

In this regard, UNAMID maintained some of the activities that had been carried out by AMIS peacekeepers including the firewood patrols and has also taken new initiatives to protect women, as presented below.

5.2. New Protection Initiatives

Night Patrols: In an effort to prevent attacks against IDP women occurring during the night, UNAMID police conducted night patrols expanding the duration of its daily patrols from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m., to cover the period from 8 a. m. to midnight (UN Secretary-General, 2008, p. 6). In August 2009, UNAMID started a 24-hour patrolling in selected IDP camps in each of Darfur three states. The Kalma camp (South Darfur), the Zam Zam camp (North Darfur) and the Krinding 1 and 2 (West Darfur) are some of the IDP camps with around-the-clock presence, just to mention a few (Muller & Sauvant, 2011, p. 141).

As one IDP leader from the Krinding IDP camp told Sudan Tribune:

> *We are always hearing shooting and men come in and attack us, but in the few weeks since the hybrid forces began regular night patrols around the camp, there has not been a single live fire incident and U.N.-AU troops do not generally encounter armed men, Janjaweed, along the way (Rahman, 2008, p. 2).*

[15] Ashraf Eissa, Spokesperson, African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 8 June 2020.

It had significantly reduced night crimes including rape despite interruptions by the SAF [Sudan Armed Force] soldiers, who fired at peacekeepers on many occasions (Muller & Sauvant, 2011).

Medium and Long-range patrols: The FPUs [Formed Police Units] conducted medium-range (less than 50 km) patrols in villages, town and market centers (Aubyn, 2016, p. 4). During harvest seasons, UNAMID troops are deployed around farms to deter pillage and molestation of women, as depicted in the following picture (Caparini *et al.*, 2015).

This U.N. soldiers are patrolling the village, while women gathering crops.

Figure 8/ picture taken from

African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur. (2010, July). Protecting civilians UNAMID's top priority. *Voices of Darfur*, p. 15.

The FPUs accompanied women along water supply routes, as armed groups often camp near rivers to secure their own supply (Anderson, 2012). From 24 to 27 July 2009, UNAMID dispatched its first long-range integrated patrol from Tawila to Kabkabiya in North Darfur ("UNAMID's long range patrol visits IDP camps in Tawila," 2015). More long-range patrols have since been conducted to monitor the security situation and build confidence while visiting IDP camps and meeting with the villagers along the route (UNAMID, 2017).

Firewood Patrols: U.N. peacekeepers have restored the firewood patrols at Kalma, South Darfur that the AU soldiers had stopped because of high security risks ("New U.N. force seeks to protect Darfur women from rape," 2008). Every Monday and Thursday, UN police cars, pickups and three APCs [Armored Personnel Carriers] escorted women from Kalma IDP camp into the surrounding hills and waited while women collect woods and fodder for their animals. UNAMID also initiated aerial patrols to watch over women dispersed in the bush to collect firewood (Anderson, 2012).

UNAMID has also enhanced its visibility inside the camps. For example, it conducts daily foot patrols in camps in El Daein, East Darfur, where peacekeepers speak directly with IDPs and make their presence known to the community (The Darfur Consortium an African and International Civil Society Action for Darfur, 2008). Generally, more than 200 patrols were conducted every day throughout Darfur with many of these being within and around IDP camps (UNAMID, 2010, p. 4). According to Eissa, UNAMID deployed mixed teams that included female peacekeepers despite small in number during these patrols for extensive outreach to Darfuri women.[16]

Community-oriented policing in IDP camps: UNAMID police has introduced an initiative called community policing in IDP camps. For this purpose, it recruited community policing volunteers (CPVs), who are individual IDPs residing in camps, and trained them on a range of topics, including handling cases of sexual and gender-based violence (Samson & Halidu, 2015). In 2010, alone, about 2,414 of them underwent training and were integrated into security operative agents who protect civilians in IDP camps and community (UN Secretary-General, 2010, p. 7). These volunteers provided public security, patrol camps and villages, make arrest of criminals and hand the suspect over to government police (Fryer, 2013). They acted as community resource when UNAMID police officers are not present, and played a major role in preventing abuse against women at different team sites (Holt *et al.*, 2009).

The establishment of Women's Desk and Forensic Laboratory: UNAMID's Gender Advisory Unit established women's desk, staffed by female police officers, at government police centers to enhance the reporting of sexual and gender-based violence cases (Human Rights

[16] Ashraf Eissa, Spokesperson, African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 8 June 2020.

Watch, 2008). Four women's desks in Kutum, Mellit, Um Kadada and Kabkabiya in North Darfur have been set-up (Aubyn, 2016).

According to WhatsApp interview with Some,[17] UNAMID has also assisted the Sudan Police in the establishment of 40 Family and Child Protection Units [FCPUs] in police stations in the Greater Jebel Marra area. The FCPUs assist in ensuring the survivors of sexual violence receive medical attention. They also investigate incidents reported to the Sudan Police and act to ensure that suspects and perpetrators are brought to account and that justice is served.[18]

UNAMID have also established a forensic lab in Nyala, South Darfur, in order to avoid the challenges of getting quality evidence in serious crimes such as rape and murder (Caparini *et al.*, 2015). As scientific evidences are critical for effective prosecution of sexual crimes, in this way the mission tried to address impunity.

Collaboration with the UNFPA [United Nations Population Fund]: UNAMID collaborated with the UNFPA, the leading UN agency working on sexual and gender-based violence. According to WhatsApp interview with Gaddo,[19] during the conflict services were not been established to respond to survivors of sexual violence because of the sensitivity of the conflict. But after the large clashes have decreased, the UNFPA started functioning and the UNAMID joined the program. The Human Rights and Women Protection and Empowerment Section of UNAMID reported cases and referred survivors to the UNFPA where they will get a package of services which are mainly the clinical management of rape services, the psycho-social support services, the legal aid services and the security services.[20] She also added that for protection specifically and women protection from sexual violence, UNAMID worked with the UNFPA on strengthening the capacity of the government of Sudan to ensure that the police of Sudan or the police of Darfur will have the knowledge and also the right practices to protect women from sexual violence.

Crisis Mediation and Community Outreach Initiatives: UNAMID peacekeepers have mediated tribal disputes and engaged with community leaders to settle disputes (Office of the

[17] Jane Some, Women Protection Adviser, African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 8 June 2020.
[18] Jane Some, Women Protection Adviser, African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 8 June 2020.
[19] Midya Gaddo, GBV Program Support Specialist, the UNFPA, North Darfur, 16 April 2020.
[20] Midya Gaddo, GBV Program Support Specialist, the UNFPA, North Darfur, 16 April 2020.

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2016). A noteworthy example for this is Gokar village in West Darfur. Gokar is conflict hotspot area with frequent armed fighting occurred between Massalit and Arab tribes, causing injuries to female community members (UNAMID, 2017). Women in these areas have also suffered from persistent harassments by Arab tribes-men. In response to these problems, the UNAMID Integrated Field Protection Team [IFPT] at El Geneina organized reconciliation meetings that brought farmers and Arab herders together. After a series of consultations with the community leaders, the IFPT enabled them to reach an agreement which is followed by cultural event between farmers and herders to unite them as Sudanese (UNAMID, 2017). These initiatives had significantly improved securities of Gokar villagers and women in particular.

UNAMID through its community outreach programs, organized open days, music concerts, cultural festivals and sporting events, among others, to rebuild the social-cohesion of Darfuris that have been broken through years of conflict and displacement (Caparini *et al.,* 2015). Through these activities and events, the mission delivered messages spreading peace, thereby promoting the culture of forgiveness, tolerance and solidarity (International Refugee Rights Initiative, 2016). In mid-2018, UNAMID Community Outreach Team at Golo, Central Darfur, conducted training workshops for women praise singers (Hakamats) to equip them with skills to use their songs to promote peace and peaceful co-existence in the community (Almahady, 2019). As one participant of the workshop told Voices of Darfur, 'I am now a new Hakama. I fully understand my changed role of peace builder through chanting for peace and peaceful co-existence in our society' (Khamis, 2019, p. 11). Hakamas' were once involved in sexual violence by being accomplice to the Janjaweed. Thus, working on these women to see their changed role is really important. This is also how the researcher engaged the psycho-social theory which is presented in the theoretical section of this research. UNAMID peacekeepers instructed all parties who engaged in attacking IDP camps that such acts or threats of violence against the civilian population are prohibited by International Humanitarian law ("Dialogue and reconciliation efforts critical to UNAMID's protection of civilians," 2019). By not being involved in sexual violence and sexual exploitations, UNAMID peacekeepers served as role models for the local

communities in Darfur.[21] These activities are vital to produce impact on the behavior of violators as suggested by psycho-social theorists in the theoretical section of this study.

As explained by Some,[22] UNAMID implemented quick impact projects such as pasta-making, baking, soap-making and braiding to enhance local women economic capacity and improve their sustenance capacity. UNAMID through its Women Protection and Human Rights Section advocated for the repeal of laws which are discriminatory against women, and promoted women's participation in decision-making in coordination with the government to ensure that their concerns are taken into consideration.[23] She added that the mission has also undertaken pubic advocacy, awareness-raising and capacity building training on the protection of women's rights, particularly as they pertain to sexual violence in conflict: the mission undertook an extensive campaign in this regard between 2019 and March 2020, reaching populations in nine locations where UNAMID has a presence in the Greater Jebel Marra area.

5.3. UNAMID's Major Challenges and Weaknesses

5.3.1. Government Obstruction

The government of Sudan imposed numerous restrictions on UNAMID from the outset of the mission. As Neethling notes, The Sudanese government consented to the deployment of UNAMID only 'after much political "arm-twisting"', and has never fully cooperated with it (cited in Mickler, 2013, p. 505). The Sudanese government wanted the mission be entirely African force to ensure the continuation of Sudanese balance of force dominance over the peacekeeping forces (Kreps, 2007). The GoS refused peacekeepers from counties like Sweden and Norway, while it delayed agreement with major troop contributing countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Thailand (Badmus, 2015). This has slowed down deployment. It also contributed for lack of quality resources from the developed world, as many African countries have not had modern and sophisticated equipment for peace operations (Aboagya, 2007). Moreover, the Sudanese government promptly dismissed the possibility of UN-commanded force, or control of the ''blue helmets'' shortly after the Nov 17, 2006 agreement in Addis Ababa on an AU/UN military arrangement for Darfur (Ojo & Folarin, 2016, p. 254).

[21] Ashraf Eissa, Spokesperson, African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 8 June 2020.
[22] Jane Some, Women Protection Adviser, African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 8 June 2020.
[23] Jane Some, Women Protection Adviser, African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 8 June 2020.

Further restrictions were put on the operational activities of UNAMID following the ICC's [International Criminal Court] arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir, in 2008, on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 'The indictment not only proved to be a political dead end but also heightened the suspicion against any UNAMID activities aimed at gathering information on violent incidents against civilians' (Muller & Bashar, 2017, p. 7).

The mass rape incident of Tabit, a village in North Darfur, reflects this general situation. From Friday October 31 to Saturday November 1, 2014 members of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) raped 221 women and girls of Tabit, in retaliation for the unexplained disappearance of the SAF soldier making civilians in Tabit responsible without evidence (Human Rights Watch, 2015, p 8). UNAMID investigative team reached Tabit on Tuesday, Nov 4 at about 5 a.m. Sudan time to interview villagers about the mass rape allegation (Reeves, 2014). But the interview was interrupted by government security officials. On the following day, 5 Nov 2014, UNAMID issued a press release claiming that it '…neither found any evidence nor received any information regarding the media allegations of the mass rape during the period in question,' despite witnesses testified in support of the crime (Reeves, 2014, p. 3). As a consequence, UNAMID was heavily criticized by the villagers, media and international commentators for covering up crimes by government forces, which led the mission to attempt to a second visit to Tabit (Caparini *et al.*, 2015). But the government denied permission and ordered UNAMID to close its human rights office in Khartoum and called on the mission to prepare an exit plan ("Sudan asks UN to shut human rights office in Khartoum over above claims," 2014). The government further declared two senior U.N. officials Ali Al-Za'tari, U.N. resident coordinator at the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], and Yvonne Helle, the UNDP's country director, persona non grata and ordered their exit (The Guardian, 2014).

Also, on many other occasions the government denied peacekeepers access to violent incidents that threatened civilians' life (Muller & Sauvant, 2011). As Eric Reeves notes, 'Khartoum's usual response is simply to deny access, a denial that UNAMID characteristically accepts with a shrug' (Reeves, 2014, p. 6). That is, there is also a failure on the part of the mission to confront the Sudanese government obstructionist behavior.

5.3.2. Lack of Willingness to Act

Not only had UNAMID capitulated to the government forces, but also lack motivation to act. The incident of Tawila, a village in North Darfur mainly inhibited by non-Arab ethnic groups, exemplifies this fact. From August 24-27/2012, government soldiers attacked the villagers of Tawila on the suspicion that they supported rebels (International Refugee Rights Initiative, 2016). The soldiers raped several women, assaulted men and children, looted their properties (Elbasri, 2016). Even though the local population alerted UNAMID on August 26 about the attack, the peacekeepers didn't rush to protect them. 'They waited four days to leave their base to patrol the village which was only about 12 miles away' (Elbasri, 2014, p. 2). According to Aicha Elbasri, who was the spokesperson of UNAMID from August 2012 to April 2013, UNAMID failed to protect the villagers because it suspected them of supporting the rebels (Elbasri, 2016). That is, UNAMID peacekeepers acted in breach of the cardinal principle of peacekeeping ─ impartiality.

Elbasri also revealed the most embarrassing failure of the mission in which UNAMID peacekeepers failed even to attempt to protect civilians under their escort. She specifically pointed to an incident of 24 March 2013 and she argues that, 'UNAMID troops ─contrary to their claims ─did not make any effort to stop hostile and armed insurgents from abducting 31 displaced persons in Central Darfur who were travelling to a refugee conference under UNAMID escort' (Elbasri, 2016, p. 5). She further blames the mission for its failure to investigate an attack committed on its own troops, turning the government perpetrators into 'unidentified assailants' and suppressing all facts that attest government soldier's responsibility for the attack (Elbasri, 2014, p. 5). From the above analysis, I argue that UNAMID was unable to protect civilians and women in particular. It would not be reasonable to expect protection from such a force that even failed to investigate a wrong done on its own peacekeepers.

5.3.3. The Existence of Multiple Armed Actors

Darfur conflict was a set of separate conflicts which involved intergroup conflict, regional strife or a struggle for leadership within Darfur, a clash between the center and the region and other international actors with multiple competing interests (Reyna, 2010). These separate conflicts interacted with each other and, because of their interaction, they turned the region into what

Stephen P Reyna calls 'the Mother of Damnation' (Reyna, 2010, p. 1301). With the signing of the DPA (Darfur Peace Agreement), which was only signed between the SLM/A faction, led by Minni Arku Minnawi, and the GoS, while Abdul Wahid al Nur's and other factions of SLM/A and JEM refused to sign, the SLM/A was disintegrated into several smaller armed factions with multiple leadership (International Crisis Group, 2014). This had further complicated UNAMID's role of protection, in which the mission itself fallen prey to bandits and criminal activities including frequent killings of peacekeepers and carjacking (Holt *et al.*, 2015).

5.3.3. Other Constraints

Language barriers, rudimentary road and communication infrastructures of Darfur, lack of essential equipment including armoured personnel carriers, attack helicopters and night vision googles, just to mention a few, all hindered the mission from providing adequate protection for civilians and women in particular (Muller & Sauvant, 2011). These situations were more explicated by Lydia Polgreen in her New York Times article titled 'Peacekeeping in Darfur Hits More Obstacles,' March 24, 2008 in which she revealed that the old AU forces even had to buy their own paint to turn their green helmets into United Nations blue (Polgreen, 2008, p. 1).

The mission also faced challenges in finding qualified female police offers, especially on higher ranks, from troop contributing countries (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Most troop contributing countries (TCCs) send few female peacekeepers to the Mission while others do not send any at all.[24] As of February 2009, the mission had just over 300 female police officers, which is too small to serve 1,350,000 IDP women [75% of the total 1.8 million IDPs] of Darfur (UNAMID, 2015, p. 20). From this, I can argue that UNAMID was unable to act as a role model by appointing more female peacekeepers to shape the patriarchal culture of Darfur that treats women as lesser beings, which is one of the main factors for increased sexual violence in Darfur.

The UNAMID has withdrawn its troops from the three of the five Darfur states. The Mission's peacekeeping area of operation is currently limited to the Greater Jebel Marra area.[25]

[24] Ashraf Eissa, Spokesperson, African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 8 June 2020.
[25] Ashraf Eissa, Spokesperson, African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 8 June 2020.

Conclusion

The African Union was the first international body to intervene in Darfur conflict. Indeed, this can be taken as a promising step towards implementing the responsibility to protect in the absence of early humanitarian military intervention coming from the wider international community. On the other side, the AU is the largest continental union consisting of 55member states with manpower and some even with emerging economies such as Nigeria and South Africa. Nonetheless, the AU deployed only 60 military observers accompanied by 300 protection forces with no civilian protection mandate, at the beginning of the mission in 2004. The AU troops were just over 7000 by 2007, which is still small number in situations like Darfur in which 10,000 strong military peacekeepers are required at a minimum. AMIS was also deployed with insufficient resources: the number of vehicles, attack helicopters and other equipment were inadequate. Considered from this angle, the AU's intervention seems something merely apparent rather than genuine or actual.

Yet, with all these shortcomings, the AU peacekeepers had taken various initiatives to protect civilians and women in particular. The firewood patrols were one of the positive initiatives and had been effective to some extent. As the region is so arid, women travel for miles to collect firewood and water. Hence, providing security for women while traveling long distance in an unfamiliar terrain in which you encounter hundreds of Janjaweed in your way is undoubtedly challenging and also appreciable.

As presented earlier, the AU peacekeepers have no authority to disarm the Janjaweed forces. In this regard, the justifications provided by the Acting Head of Conflict Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division of the AU Commission are convincing. Firstly, taking away weapons from one side in the middle of the conflict sometimes may not be acceptable. Secondly, it may also lead peacekeepers to engage in conflict with the Janjaweed making them vulnerable to attacks.

Even though the AU peacekeepers were unable to provide protection on a daily bases and in large areas, they provided protection on certain days that they had an agreement and in localities where they maintained presence. However, how well the individual peacekeepers performed within their mandate and capability still needs further research. The organization itself and the

member states took the blame for their failure to make enough contribution and mobilize resources to provide adequate security for all civilians and women in particular.

When UNAMID peacekeepers were latter deployed, they did not improve the security of women despite they were higher in numbers than AMIS and was able to cover large areas, because of government restrictions put on the operational activities of the mission following the ICC's arrest warrant for the then President, Omar al-Bashir. They were forced to operate according to government guidelines. Their movements and activities are highly controlled by government forces. As a result, they even failed to investigate an attack committed on their own troops let alone women. On the other side, activities aimed at producing impact on the behaviour of violators (such as the training workshops provided to Hakamats, who were involved in sexual violence by being accomplice to the Janjaweed, activities aimed at raising awareness of International Humanitarian Law by instructed parties to the conflict not to engage in attacking civilians and women in particular) were important tasks performed by the mission. Yet, to what extent such activities brought behaviour change on the part of violators need further research.

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Appendix

Research step	Time-frame
1. Research topic selection and approval	Oct
2. Background and problem articulation	Nov - Dec
3. Core argument, objectives and research questions	Dec
4. Methodology	Jan
5. Significance, scope and organization	Jan
6. Literature review	Feb – March
7. Theoretical frameworks	March - April
8. Data collection	April - July
9. Analysis of findings	April - Aug
10. Reference	Oct – Aug

Interview questions

Interview questions for African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS)

1. What were the positive initiatives taken by African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to protect the displaced women of Darfur from attacks?

2. For any force to be able to prevent Darfuri women from being raped, a clear and strong mandate to protect civilians is essential. But, African Union peacekeepers have no authority to use force for the purpose of protecting the displaced women of Darfur along with civilians. They also had no authority to disarm the Janjaweed forces who are the principal offenders.

Why the AU Peace and Security Council opted for such restrictive mandate? Why were peacekeepers not deployed with robust (full) civilian protection mandate?

3. What other challenges the AMIS faced while protecting women from GBV in Darfur conflict?

4. the most well-known example of the efforts of AU mission in Darfur to protect women from attacks was the initiation of firewood patrols. How do you evaluate its effectiveness? Given the fact that, the AU troops provide patrols only on certain days and in limited areas, and the local police also participate in the joint Patrol, even though the IDPs refused their presence and were suspicious of them, do you think that was it successful in providing real protection for women?

5. Were AU Military Observers (MILOBs) and Civilian Police (CIVPOL) provided with training on how to respond to Sexual violence? If yes, what type of training they received? Did it help them to properly monitor the investigation?

6. Did AMIS police have the ability to pursue reported abuses with the government police, pressuring them to take appropriate action?

7. As female police officers are better in investigating rape and working with rape survivors, did AMIS had fair number of female police and gender experts?

8. How do you evaluate the overall performance of AMIS in protecting civilian women of Darfur?

Interview questions to the Joint United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

1. What are the positive initiatives taken by UNIAMID peacekeepers to protect Darfur women from physical and sexual violence?

2. What were the weaknesses of UNAMID vis-à-vis protecting the displaced women in Darfur conflict?

3. For any force to be able to prevent Darfuri women from being raped, a clear and strong mandate to protect civilians is essential. UNAMID has a Chapter VII mandate and is authorized to use force where civilians are under attack. But, they have no authority to disband and disarm the Janjaweed who ruthlessly attack the displaced women.

Why the UN Peace and Security Council opted for such inconsistent mandate? Why were peacekeepers not deployed with robust (full) civilian protection mandate?

4. What other challenges that the UNAMID faces while protecting women in Darfur conflict?

5. Are UNAMID troops motivated and willing to help the IDP women from attacks?

6. What government restrictions are put on the activities of the mission vis-à-vis civilian protection?

7. What the mission have done in terms of promoting self-help mechanisms, use of psychological methods to influence the behavior of violators in order to ensure compliance with the law; and in terms of applying other protection techniques such as mediation and conflict resolution, peace building activities and women empowerment as long term goals to tackle structural conditions that increase the risk of violence to women?

8. How do you assess the overall performance of UNAMID in providing security for women?

9. How do you compare UNAMID performance from that of AMIS in relation to combatting gender based violence in Darfur conflict?

Interview questions for United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

1. How do you assess African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) overall performance in combatting gender based violence in Darfur conflict?
2. Do you think that AMIS had been effective in reducing the number of attacks on IDP women?
3. What about the firewood patrols? Was it successful in reducing attacks against women?
4. Did AMIS have formal mechanisms for cooperation with the UN human rights officers and humanitarian agencies working to tackle gender-based violence?
5. Was AMIS willing to share information on incidents of violence perpetuate by the government of Sudan?
6. How do you evaluate the UNAMID peacekeepers role in Darfur in reducing gender based violence?
7. What positive protection initiatives were taken by UNAMID to protect women?
8. What were the weaknesses of UNAMID vis-à-vis protecting the displaced women in Darfur conflict?
9. What government restrictions are put on the activities of the mission vis-à-vis civilian protection?
10. What about the quality of the troops? Did the UNAMID troops possess the courage and motivation to act while taking risks in order to stop or prevent attacks against women?
11. How many camps are currently available in Darfur?
12. If available, please provide the total number of IDP women in camps in Darfur?

Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

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Ayinabeba Tesfaye

November, 2020.