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COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION ON FOUCAULT'S PHILOSOPHY:

DISCOURSE AND POWER

BY: SEMAGN AMSAL

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DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

A Critical Exposition on Foucault's Philosophy:

Discourse and Power

**A Thesis Submitted to the Department of Philosophy in Partial Fulfillments of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy**

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April 2024

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Approval

This is to certify that the thesis prepared by Semagn Amsal Ayaliw, entitled: A Critical Exposition on Foucault's Philosophy: Discourse and Power which is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy fulfils with the regulations of the university and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

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I, Semagn Amsal Ayaliw, the undersigned, declare that this thesis entitled: “A Critical Exposition on Foucault’s Philosophy: Discourse and Power”, is my original work and has not been presented for any academic purpose in any other university or institution prior to this time, and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been appropriately acknowledged.

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Dagnachew Assefa (PhD.)

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ABSTRACT

Philosophers have presented various arguments about the impact of discourse and power in shaping human behavior and conduct. The purpose of this study is to explain Michel Foucault's conceptions of discourse and power in relation to the subject. Foucault argued that no one can escape from power relations, and the subject is a production of power relations. The collusion of power and knowledge through discourse forms a new mode of domination that takes human beings as the object and the subject. This phenomenon discards the assurance of enlightenment thinkers in knowledge. The Enlightenment thinkers are assured in the emancipation of human beings through knowledge. Foucault thought that freedom is an ethical practice in any circumstance. Nevertheless, he argued that liberation is not essential for the practice of freedom; since one cannot liberate him from power relations which is exercised everywhere. Foucault articulates archaeology and genealogy as a method of analysis according to the analyzing concepts and events. Foucault, in his later works he focuses on power. Because of this he shifts his methods of analysis from archaeology to genealogy and argued that power, resistance, and freedom are interconnected. This reveals that, for him, power without resistance and freedom is impossible and the vice versa. Bearing in mind his emphasis on the productive nature of power and the prerequisites of the existence of freedom and resistance in any power relations, I argue that individuals are not determined by power relations forever, but they are free and capable of transcending the existing power relations to pursue new power relations that can compromise all attitudes.

Keywords: *Archaeology, Genealogy, Discourse, Power/Knowledge, Freedom, the Subject*

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a critical exposition on Michel Foucault's accounts of discourse and power. His works, *Discipline and Punish*, *The History of Sexuality*, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and *The Order of Things* are structured to address the deterministic relations of discourse and power/knowledge and their effects on history of thought as a central theme. According to him, discourse shapes the overall nature of power relations because it is through discourse that power is produced, transmitted and implemented, and it is possible to hinder and crash power from what it needs to produce. Therefore, for him, power is the producer of all values, including the subject and knowledge, and no one escapes from power relations. Within this fact, according to him, liberation is not a necessary condition for the practice of freedom. He argued that it is possible to practice freedom within the existing power relation in any circumstances. Nevertheless, through emphasis in his analysis of the nature of power as inalienable from resistance and freedom, unlike him, I argued that the subject is the architect of power relations, and liberation is a necessary condition to transfer into a new power relation that must have space for all group and individual attitudes and practices of freedom.

Foucault is known for his sharp criticism of modernity and humanism. Enlightenment thinkers like Immanuel Kant, Montesquieu, Voltaire, and others strongly believed that because of the advancement of science and technology, progress is possible, and individuals are rational, autonomous, and the creators of their fate.

Though, according to Foucault, the projects of enlightenment are collapse due to the emergence of a new mode of domination. As Foucault argued, this domination happened because of “the interface of modern forms of power and knowledge” (Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 34). Rudi Visker states that Foucault wares the problem of the integration of power and knowledge (Vthe

isker, 1995). He undermines the humanity and showed its paradoxical progress as “humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violence’s in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination” (Foucault, 1977, P. 151). He says that in modernity, the coalitions of power and knowledge create a new epistemic regime that “constituted Man as both an object of this regime and as its subject” (Fraser, 1985, p. 169) According to Roger Paden (1987), by 'Man,' Foucault does not mean the human race, rather a certain understanding of human cognition that embraces them to be amenable to an experimental inquiry that is used as a principal source for knowledge and an explanation of human conduct. Foucault contends "humanism," since for him (1970, P. xxv), “it was the effect of a change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge... Man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nears its end”. Foucault views humanism as a recent development resulting from the modern episteme. Therefore, according to him, this conception of Man is coming to an end as soon as the episteme changes.

According to Wolin (2016, p. 283), “no writer of the last half of the twentieth century has done more in illuminating the nature of power than Michel Foucault”. As he exposes, Foucault’s analysis of power makes a substantial contribution to the transition of the conception of power “from the modern or state centered to postmodern or decentered version”. “Traditionally” power was conceived as it works from top to bottom, and it is repressive. However, as Foucault put in *The History of Sexuality VI*, power is everywhere, and it is exercised from bottom up. According to him, power is not repressive; rather, it is productive. Unlike the humanist, he argues that knowledge and the subject (self) are productions of power relation. He proclaimed that we must abandon recognizing “the effects of power in negative terms... It produces reality; it produces

domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Foucault, 1995, p. 194). According to him, knowledge and the individual are the results of power. Here, by individual he means the subject or the identities of once. Therefore, according to him, knowledge is not neutral from power, and conversely power could never be realized without implementations of knowledge. He states this as “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault, 1995, p.27). This shows that every use of power produces knowledge, and it uses knowledge as a means of operating. As a result, knowledge and power are inconceivable without one another.

However, power and knowledge, according to Foucault, are not ultimately the same; rather, they should be viewed as existing "on an equal footing as specific, similar, related, but ultimately always distinct things" (Kelly, 2014, p. 88). According to him, it is through discourse that power and knowledge join together.

According to Heracleous (2006), Foucault comprehends discourse as both a group of statements and practice which can determine subject position. As group of statements and practice, Foucault (1970) states, discourse is “made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined” (Foucault, 1970, p.117), and on the other hand, it is also rule-based practices of knowledge. According to Foucault, statement is the atom of discourse. The appearance and transformations of the statement is governed by what he called archive. For him, archive is the "law of what can be said," and it is a system of relationships and establishments that "govern the appearance of statements as unique events" (1970, p. 129-130). He therefore defines an archive as a collection of relationships and conditions that make it possible for the constructions of discourse and statement. This implies

that discourse is a historically rooted group of statements and practice. According to him, its unity depends by its virtue of positivity which is critical to define once fields of “formal identities, thematic continuities, translations of concepts, and polemical interchanges” (Foucault, 1970, p. 127).

Friedrich Nietzsche is one of the influential philosophers who argue that the will to power is the creator of all values. For Nietzsche (1968), like Foucault’s power, the will to power is exercised against resistance. And, like Nietzsche, Foucault argued power is productive. Therefore, using these two premises, it is true that Foucault’s account of power is an extension of Nietzsche’s conceptions of the will to power. Foucault, Himself confirmed that he is “simply Nietzschean.” (Gutting, 2005, p. 43)

As Webb (2013), Kelly (2014), (2009), David Macey (2019), and Heracleous (2006) argued, for Foucault, knowledge, the subject, and discourse—creations of meaning and value—are a production of power that exists in every relation. I agree with those interpretations of Foucault’s accounts of power.

The objectives of this thesis are to critically expose Foucault’s analysis of discourse and power and to evaluate the validity and soundness of his philosophy on the subject. To address the task, I would like to expose what he meant by discourse, power, the subject, and then how he addressed the relation between them. Finally, I showed my critique and positions on his philosophical views of discourse, power, and the subject. In doing so, the thesis is organized into four chapters.

The first chapter of this thesis focuses on the illuminations of the general “character” of postmodernism and Foucault’s advancements of his methods of analysis, from archaeology to genealogy, and his critique of modernity and enlightenment. In the history of philosophy, the

subject (self) and knowledge are addressed in different perspectives. Thus, in this chapter, I critically discuss the postmodern views of the subject and knowledge in general.

The second chapter of this thesis sheds lights on Foucault's notion of discourse. In this chapter, I discuss Foucault's theoretical frameworks of discourse. In *the Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault argues that a discourse is not only a group of statements but also a ruled-bound practice of knowledge. In this chapter, I will also address Foucault's conceptions of power/knowledge and their relation to discourse. According to him, without discourse, power and knowledge could never join. For Foucault, truth is subjected to the interaction of discourse and power/knowledge. In this part of the thesis, I intensively discuss Foucault's view of truth as a result of discourse. According to him, every truth has its own "regime of truth," which legitimizes it in specific circumstances.

The third chapter of this thesis exposes Foucault's account of power. According to him, power is everywhere, and it is inseparable from knowledge. He argued that resistance is a precondition for the existence of power. Hence, in this part of this thesis, I deeply elucidate Foucault's accounts of power, knowledge, governmentality, resistance, and freedom.

The fourth chapter is organized to address my critique of Foucault's views of power as impersonal and that resistance is inevitable in all power relations. In this chapter, I argue that the subject is ontologically free being that is capable of transcending power relations. Finally, I conclude the thesis by clarifying my position through exposing the nature of human beings' capability and freedom in transforming power relations.

CHAPTER ONE

UNDERSTANDING POSTMODERNISM AND FOUCAULT

In twentieth century philosophy, debates are raised about whether enlightenment is confident in reason that assures answer for man's basic predicaments. According to the main pioneers of enlightenment, reason is the only means of human emancipation; however, their promise could not succeed as much as they anticipated. Following the failures of enlightenment projects, many philosophers, such as Derrida, Rorty, Lyotard, and Foucault, have raised their harsh reproach against modern projects. This new approach is known as postmodernism. Postmodernism is a rejection of the Meta narratives of the Enlightenment initiatives. Foucault, in his works like *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, *Discipline and Punish*, *The History of Sexuality*, focuses on the how the nixes of discourse an power produces the subject, and the conception of the subject and knowledge are the pillar concerns of postmodern philosophy. Thus, the focus of this chapter is to provide an overview of the nature and major characteristics of postmodernism in referring to Foucault's works.

1.1 The Rise of Postmodernism and the End of Grand Narrative

The intellectual works of postmodernists are deeply influenced by the works of Nietzsche and Heidegger. The term postmodernism is used in many discourses. Nevertheless, for the first time, it is clearly defined and technically used to indicate a new intellectual era in the work of Lyotard (1979), *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. He defines postmodernism as the rejection of the modern principles of philosophical methods. According to him, meta-narratives which are proclaimed by enlightenment thinkers, are in crisis and eventually lost their credibility. As he directs, because of the modern narratives lost their credibility, societies that live in the postmodern era will have to live by recognizing multiculturalism.

Like Lyotard, Christopher Butler also thought that enlightenment narratives are established by excluding the non-western tradition, and they used such narratives as the ultimate principles for evaluating which action is right or wrong and good or bad. He persists that “Such imposing political grand narratives are at best masticatory attempts to keep some social groups in power and others out of it” (Butler, 2002, p. 16).

Since the staking of enlightenment projects on western thoughts, Lyotard shows that postmodernism is non-centrism and favors cultural diversity. He insisted that "the society of the future falls less within the province of a Newtonian anthropology (such as structuralism or systems theory) than a pragmatics of language particles” (Lyotard, 1979, p. xxiv).

Like with Lyotard, Michel Foucault also believed that the only thing modernity asserts that progress is impossible. For Foucault, the major ideas of enlightenment could never give us emancipation; rather, they lead us into disaster (war), thus never counted as achievement. He addresses this ironically as “Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its acts of violence in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination (Foucault, 1977, p. 151).

Rorty also highly criticizes modernity. According to him, modernity within its hypothesis is already a failed project. He says, “the age of faith and enlightenment seems beyond recovery” (Rorty 1982, P. 175). He therefore alleged that postmodernity would have replaced modernity as a result of the failure of programs that were promised.

In contrast to postmodern thinkers, Habermas argues that, given the nature of its project, modernity should not be evaluated within the project of enlightenment. According to him, as pointed out by d'Entreves and Benhabib (1997), Modernity is closely associated with the

development of European art; however, its project is articulated and becomes familiar with the advancements of European modern arts. Thus, for him, the project of modernity is a new "gift of enlightenment. Thus, this project could never be achieved in a fixed timetable; rather, they need a long time. He chose to make this argument by stating that "modernity is an unfinished project." However, most scholars believe that the era of modernity has vanished and is replaced by postmodernity, which is opened to any circumstances by Lyotard's so-called "Newtonian anthropology" (Lyotard 1979, p. xxiv).

1.2 Characteristics of postmodernism

As I have discussed in the previous section, postmodernism is a counter criticism of the modern philosophical scheme. The modern philosophical system primarily uses reason as the root of all discourse. Yet, postmodernism highly criticizes the ultimate functions of reason in any argument. Thus, postmodernism discards the very idea of modernism that a foundation of knowledge and objective reality is possible, which was declared by René Descartes. In general, in a diversified world, postmodernists argue that searching for objective standpoints about all dimensions of truth and knowledge is inconvincible. Thus, postmodernists express new kinds of approach that prioritize subjectivism over objectivism (Best & Kellner, 1991). The role of the subject in knowledge production, power relations, and the search for truth is a major issue that postmodernists have preoccupied.

1.2.1 The Subject

The subject is the central issue of philosophy. The subject is analyzed differently in different philosophical schemes. According to Foucault (1970), the concept of man is a very "recent invention," and it is "not yet two centuries old" (P. xxv). On the other hand, in modern philosophy, the subject is considered autonomous, rational, and the makers of history.

The Cartesian analysis of the subject mind and objective body marked the beginnings of modern philosophy. As Descartes says, doubting is a method of discovering a form of thinking, and via this method, he develops a new proposition that he could never doubt- *cogito ergo sum* – I think, therefore I am. According to him, the proposition “I think, therefore I am” is the “archimedes” of knowledge (Descartes, 2008, p.17). Then, all modern philosophers use this Cartesian analysis as a reference point for their philosophy. According to Farrell Fox, following the articulation of the subject by Descartes, all modern thinkers considered the subject "rational, unified, foundational and autonomous" (Fox 2003, p. 25). Similarly with Fox's argument, Sartre's existentialism holds that “I am condemned to exist forever beyond my essence, beyond the motives and reasons for my action: I am condemned to be free. In other words, we cannot find any limits to my freedom other than itself or, alternatively, that we are not free to cease to be free” (Sartre, 2018, P. 577). Sartre insists that the nature of human beings is beyond his participation in the world. Human beings are, by nature, free from any pre-established system. According to him, the only thing that we cannot escape is our freedom.

In contrast to Sartre, Claude Levi Strauss argued that individuals are not free and autonomous from social bondage. According to him, the Sartrean view of the subject is predominantly ‘the prisoner of the Cogito’ (Strauss, 1966, p. 249). He argued that, unlike Sartre, it is impossible to create an independent identity that is free from the effects of our language and social structure. In his later period, Sartre changed his modern views of the subject to a Marxist perspective. In this stage, he comes to believe that the subject is detected and determined by the then existing force of history and family conditions. Like Strauss, Stumph also argued that "we cannot view ourselves as free, independent agents stripped of our social context. We must always use other people as a basis for understanding ourselves” (Stumph, 2012, p. 466). As Fox states, the

structuralism view of the subject is different from what modernists think. But their difference is alleged to be in the degree of prioritizing the structure over the subject. He maintains that “structuralism embarked upon a concerted critique of humanism and anthropocentrism, inverting humanist premises by prioritizing structure over the subject, the unconscious over the conscious, and the objective analyses of scientific laws over ego-based epistemologies (Fox, 2003, p. 25). According to him, like post structuralism, structuralism decenters the subject by believing that the subject is a constructed entity “where cultural and linguistic meanings intersect” (Fox, 2003, p. 25). As he indicates, the self is not, as Descartes believed, autonomous, rational and unified; in contrast, it is un-autonomous, irrational, and fragmented, and it is a cultural and linguistic construction. Jonathan Culler also explained that “the self comes to appear more and more as a construct, the result of systems of convention. The discourse of a culture sets limits to the self; the idea of personal identity appears in social contexts; the 'I' is not given but comes to exist” (Culler, 2022, P.32)

In postmodernism, the subject (self) is not a constant entity that allows for different discourses; instead, it is something that changes according to power relations. Foucault effectively describes this as:

All the chimeras of the new humanisms, all the facile solutions of an ‘anthropology’ understood as a universal reflection on man, half empirical, half-philosophical. It is comforting, however, and a source of profound relief to think that man is only a recent invention, a figure not yet two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge, and that he will disappear again as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form. (Foucault, 1970, P. xxv)

According to him, unlike the modernist, the subject is not a natural and independent entity; rather, it is a recent past (may be starting from Descartes' meditation) of human creation. As he explained, the subject is dependent on existing human knowledge, and that knowledge has also changed through time. Therefore, he argued, this false consciousness of the subject is inevitable to change once a new paradigm of knowledge is developed. Therefore, in postmodernism, the subject is more decentered, fragmented, and multiple.

According to Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault argued that the previous notion of subjectivity (more off-Cartesian, Kantian, and Sartrean) is one of the grand narratives of modernity. Thus, by deconstructing the modern thoughts of the subject, a postmodernist argued that subjectivity is a contingent product of language, culture, and power relations.

For Foucault, the nature of subjectivity could not be escaped from power and knowledge relations. According to him, every individual is enclosed within the culture and power structures. Hence, he argued that individuals' views are directly or indirectly determined by power and knowledge structures. He writes:

The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the vis-à-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects. The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. (Foucault, 1980, P. 98)

Foucault argued that “we have to promote new forms of subjectivity while refusing the type of individuality that has been imposed on us for several centuries” (Foucault 1983, p. 216). For Foucault, as Nick Mansfield notices, “The subject does not exist as a naturally occurring thing but is contrived by the double work of power and knowledge to maximize the operation of both” (Mansfield, 2000, P.59). But, according to Foucault (1985), by rejecting the imposed identity, we are always the creators of ourselves as works of art, and it is nowadays duty of our self. He states that “maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are. We must promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries” (Foucault, 1983, p. 216). Therefore, for him, unlike the modern philosopher, the subject is not given or even authentic; rather, it is a continuous product and inauthentic.

1.2.3 Knowledge

The second main critique of postmodernism extends to modernism's adherent views of knowledge, claiming that knowledge has a secret unity and that it is important for humans to liberate themselves. In this point of view, the discovery of independent and objective knowledge is possible, and this objective knowledge enables us to emancipate ourselves. Nonetheless, Lyotard (1979) argued that since the outbreak of the Second World War, knowledge shows its inability to emancipate human beings.

According to Lyotard, knowledge is always subjected to circumstances in the sense that knowledge is not universal and objective; rather it is particular and subjective. He explained the subjectivity of knowledge as “Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities, it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable” (Lyotard, 1979, P. xxv).

Perhaps Lyotard's most famous and influential work is *The Postmodern Condition* (1979). In this work, he argues that knowledge cannot claim to provide truth in any absolute sense, for it depends on 'language games,' which are always related to specific contexts. According to him, the Enlightenment's objectives of human liberation and the widespread use of reason led us into a form of scientific hubris. For him, knowledge cannot be independently understood without the postmodern notions of power. He argued that "Knowledge and power are simply two sides of the same question: who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided?" (Lyotard, 1979, pp.8-9).

Foucault, like Lyotard, argues that knowledge is immensely derived from an understanding of reality. According to him, reality is not something natural but rather a means of intervention, and "every interpretation of reality is an assertion of power" (Grenz, 1996, P.6). Accordingly, just like Lyotard, Foucault argued that knowledge and power are the two sides of a coin meaning that knowledge without power is unimaginable and vice versa. He writes:

...power produces knowledge... that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. These 'power-knowledge relations' are to be analyzed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations. (Foucault, 1977, PP. 27-28)

As he declares, knowledge is contingent to power structure. Thus, in contrast to enlightenment thinkers, he argued, knowledge is not objective that is accepted forever rather its legitimacy or acceptance depends on the historical horizon. As Grenz (1996) briefs Foucault's idea, he believed that western scholars were wrongly striving for centuries to formulate what they called the objective, neutral, emancipatory knowledge. Relating all of his arguments to one another, Knowledge could be viewed as unprogressive. McHoul and Grace Comment on this matter in some detail as follows:

Foucault's counter-history also had to conceive of bodies of knowledge (discourses) as potentially discontinuous across history rather than necessarily progressive and cumulative... Foucault's analysis of scientific change as discontinuous shows that it is not seamless and rational; that it does not progress from stage to stage, getting closer and closer to the truth; that it is not guided by any underlying principle which remains essential and fixed while all around it changes. (McHoul & Grace, 1993, P.4)

Like Foucault and Lyotard, Derrida also argued searching objective knowledge through finding meaning in our discourse is ridiculous. Because, according to him, our thoughts are entirely connected to language, and the meaning that is derived from the existing language is not constant. He argued that "the textual location in which a signifier is embedded constantly changes; its meaning can never be fully determined...the meaning is never static, never given once for all" (Grenz, 1996, P.144)." This shows that meaning of one's word depends on the contexts of the whole discourses that it incorporates. Therefore, according to him, meanings of the signs and words are changed continuously, and it is dependent on the contexts.

Rorty who is a postmodern pragmatist proposes an alternative postmodern outlook of knowledge. Likewise with Foucault and Derrida, Rorty also discards the enlightenment discourses of their quests to attain absolute and objective knowledge by means of theoretical frameworks.

According to Rorty, we human beings are incapable of directly accessing the world as it is. Because he argues that our access and level of understanding of the things are influenced by language. Therefore, for him, language is the only mediator of the interactions between human beings and the world. Precisely He mentions:

To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human Languages are human creations. Truth cannot be out there - cannot exist independently of the human mind - because sentences cannot so exist or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own - unaided by the describing activities of human beings – cannot. (Rorty, 1989, P.5)

For him, what we think about the world is expressed through statements, and the ultimate source of these statements is human beings. Therefore, the existence of human being is essential for statements to exist and have meanings. He argued that this causal analysis leads us to the conclusion that language is a means for the real interaction between human beings and nature. Coherency, according to him, is the most important to evaluate one's statement either it is true or false. For him, "statements are true insofar as they cohere with the entire system of beliefs-the vocabulary-that we hold" (Grenzy, 1996, P.154).

As Grenzy explains, Rorty goes against traditional theories of knowledge like correspondence theory, which assumes the statement's truth value independently corresponds with the reality, and the metaphysical difference between truths is inevitable. Instead of this, Rorty believed an epistemological difference worthless as far as the statements are confirmed within the existing linguistic system. Grenzy illustrates his central thoughts of epistemology as follows:

Rorty's postmodern pragmatism finds no epistemological difference between truths about what ought to be and truth about what is. Nor will he admit any metaphysical difference between morality and science. He views ethics and physics as equally objective, and he refuses to accede to the modern tendency to evaluate scientists as more objective, logical, and methodological, or devoted to truth than anyone else. He finds only one reason to elevate science among the scholarly disciplines: scientific institutions are models to the rest of cultures of tolerance (or unforced agreement) and human solidarity. (Grenzy, 1996, p. 155)

1.3 Understanding Foucault

Foucault's intellectual critique against enlightenment and modernity are clearly viewed in his works. A new perspective on discourses, power/ knowledge, and ethics are the main thematic concerns of his works. Foucault, in his intellectual development, articulates archaeology and genealogy as a method of analysis.

1.3.1 His Critiques against Enlightenment and Modernity

According to Foucault, the question of what enlightenment is not truly addressed by Kant. In this regard Foucault believes that Kant's definition of enlightenment is very exclusive and authoritarian.

Kant defines enlightenment as “enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority. Minority is inability to use of one's own understanding without direction from another”. (Kant, 1999, p.17) According to Kant, using one's own understanding for any interpretation or action is the first mark of enlightenment. As Kant shows, being enlightened is not a simple project. For him, by nature, a human being is bounded by dogma. So, once to think out of the existing common belief /dogma, cultivating his brain is obligatory.

However, Foucault argued that Kant’s definition is very totalitarian and universal. According to him, Kant’s conception of enlightenment is constructed by the scope and dimensions of western cultures. However, as Foucault shows, Kant’s views of enlightenment are nothing more than his reflection on his understudying of history. Foucault says that when we try to use Kant’s ways of reflecting on the notions of today, we get that the attitude of modernity is our benchmark of enlightenment today. Hence, Foucault argued that modernity is more of an attitude than a historical period. He writes

And by "attitude," I mean a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an *ethos*. And consequently, rather than seeking to distinguish the "modern era" from the "premodern" or "postmodern". (Foucault, 2007, p. 105)

Foucault further explains modernity as “modernity is the attitude that makes it possible to grasp the "heroic" aspect of the present moment. Modernity is not a phenomenon of sensitivity to the fleeting present; it is the will to "heroize" the present” (Foucault, 2007, p. 105). According to him, being modern is the mentality that enables one to understand the magnificence of the

present. So, for him, modernity is a tendency to glorify the present rather than a phenomenon of compassion for temporary activities. For more consciousness, the position of Foucault about modernity as an attitude referring to Baudelaire views of modernity is very determinate. According to Baudelaire, modernity is an exercise of freedom in the process of searching for what is real.

According to Foucault, in the question of what enlightenment is, one must address the issue of “man's relation to the present, man's historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject” (Foucault, 2007, p. 105). Since, these are central themes in discourses of enlightenment, and they are once again not settled. According to him, on the horizon of time, they need a new explanation. Therefore, the defection of enlightenment must include these natures of relation; however, Kant's definition missed these elements, and he didn't consider them as the most determinate elements of defining what enlightenment is. Foucault argues that the definition of enlightenment must not be restricted to existing facts; rather, it must be flexible and include everything in its subsets. For this reason, Foucault defines enlightenment as “Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude—that is, of a philosophical ethos—that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era” (Foucault, 2007, p. 105). This means, according to him, enlightenment is not a fixed principle; rather, it is a reactivation of an attitude in the given philosophical ethos.

Therefore, in this postmodern world, Kant's view of enlightenment much different from the existing reality since it is constructed based on the fixed historical activities- the western.

Hence, Best and Kellner (1991) argued that Foucault's works are concerned with the necessity of rejecting the enlightenment's singular views like emancipation, reason, and progress. In this regard, Foucault (1977), in his work *Discipline and Punish*, argued that knowledge and

power in modernity are highly intertwined and lead us into new forms of domination and hostility. As he clearly indicates, in the name of enlightenment and modernism, a set of disciplines, practices, and discourses are established that facilitate and legitimize the new modes of domination and operation. In this regard, he urges scholars to oppose this new mode of domination and operation. As a result, he stands completely against modernity and enlightenment.

1.3.2 His Methodology Development: Archaeology and Genealogy

According to Karim (2021), discourse, power, and ethics are the bold thematic concerns of Foucault's scholastic journey. According to him, to effectively address these broad themes, Foucault develops archaeology and genealogy as a method of analysis according to the analyzing concepts and events. Thus, Foucault uses these methodologies in different phases of his works. In his earlier works such as *Madness and Civilization*, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Science*, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and others uses archaeology, while in his latter works that he essentially analyses power such as *Discipline and Punish*, *The History of Sexuality: The will to Knowledge Vol. 1*, and Ethics like *The History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure Vol. 2*, and *The History of Sexuality: The Care of the Self uses Vol. 3* shifts his method from Archaeology to genealogy.

Foucault (2024) argues that archaeology is a theoretical frame work of his analysis. This means all concepts that he raised in his scholastic works are governed under the outlines of archaeology. He says “by “archaeology”— it is the methodological framework of my analysis”, while “By “genealogy” I mean the reason for, and the goal of, analyzing these discourses as events” (Foucault, 2024, p.95). Thus, Foucault's methodological shift is determined on his thematic concerns. And, as his methodology, these themes are developed and discussed in different phases

of Foucault's works, lectures and interviews, and they are much interconnected. He argued that genealogy is the goals of analyzing discourses as events that can shape our ways of behaving and acting. He says, "genealogy is the goal of the analysis, and archaeology is the material and methodological framework" (Foucault, 2024, p. 96). This confirms that archaeology and genealogy are interconnected in Foucault's methods of analysis of the "system of thoughts". In the strict sense, genealogy without archaeology is incapable of showing the nature of power and ethics, and, without archaeology, archaeology is insufficient to analyze the relationships of discourse with power and ethics, but many debates are raised about his methodological turn from archaeology to genealogy.

Some thinkers, including Dreyfus and Rabinow, believe that Foucault makes an absolute methodological turn from archaeology to gemology, while others, such as Gutting (1989), Howard (2018), Koopman (2008), and Karim, argue that it is not an absolute turn, rather it is a methodological development or "historiographical expansion" (Koopman, 2008, p. 339), and these methods are interdependent.

Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) claimed that Foucault, in his earlier time, used archaeology, but eventually he understood that archaeology cannot address his latter project, which is exploring the nature of power and subjectivity. Because of this, according to them, he turns his methods to genealogy and this turn is an absolute because of the faille of archaeology as a method of analysis. In contrast to this, Gutting (1989), Howard (2018), Koopman (2008), and Karim (2021) argued that Foucault does not absolutely leave archaeology; rather, throughout his works, archaeology and genealogy function in harmony. Thus, according to Gutting, Foucault's turn to genealogy is a tactical one, and in Foucault's work, archaeology and genealogy have their

independent functions. He explains the reason why Foucault uses genealogy alongside archaeology as follows:

It seems, then, that Foucault's development of a genealogical approach to history is a matter of (1) returning archaeology to its role of describing both discursive and non-discursive practices, (2) thereby exhibiting an essential tie between knowledge and power, and (3) exploiting this tie to provide a causal explanation of changes in discursive formations and epistemes. Accordingly, genealogy does not replace or even seriously revise Foucault's archaeological method. It rather combines it with a complementary technique of causal analysis. (Gutting, 1989, p.271)

Howard (2018) argues that Foucault's methodological shift from archaeology to genealogy is not a result of archaeology's failure rather it is a development as result of his turning themes from discourse to power and ethics. This the reason that Koopman (2008, p. 339) insist us to understood Foucault's methodological shifts not as an absolute break but as a "historiographical expansion".

And according to Gutting, for Foucault, archaeology and genealogy are re complementary methods of analyzing history and systems of thought. As he claimed, even archaeology is still relevant means of analyzing Foucault latter works which Foucault is forced to change his methods to genealogy as a major method of analysis.

CHAPTER TWO

FOUCAULT'S NOTIONS OF DISCOURSE

In the previous chapter, I presented the essential characteristics of postmodernism in relation with Foucault's quest towards defining modernity as "an attitude" rather than as "a historical period" (Foucault, 2007, P.105). In this chapter, I try to address Foucault's notions of discourse as a deterministic factor of the natures of power. According to him, it is through discourse that power is able to produce knowledge and knowledge is used for a systematic operation of power.

2.1 Foucault's Theoretical Frameworks of Discourse

According to Foucault the history of human being is full of discontinuous thoughts. This means that according to him, there is no discourse that is articulated from the smooth and the continuous interactions of a specific society. Hence, he argued that each discourse is the instant irruptions of thoughts. In *The Archaeology of knowledge*, he argues that human knowledge is subjective on specific periods of time. Therefore, according to him, the idea of discontinuity in knowledge has been recognized as the variations of rocks discovered during excavation. Foucault asserts that the unity of discourses is examined based on a set of rules that define its specificity in practice. Statement is a minimum unit of discourse. He argued "We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation" (Foucault, 1972, p.21). On the other hand, according to him, discourse is also a rule-based practice of knowledge. He says, it is only "archaeology" as a method of analysis that can reveal the practical nature of discourse and treats statements as an event. The combination of all

systems of statements at a specific time creates the archive which is a set of rules that can govern the formations and transformations of statements.

2.1.1 Discourse as Belonging to a Discursive Formation

According to Webb (2013), Foucault, in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, argued that historical analysis was and is still conceived concepts, ideas, thoughts, science, knowledge, and objects as a result of continuous progress, and they have their unity. However, Foucault challenges that in the ground, there are no visible configurations that signify its continuity from the previous systems of thought, “but they have a very precise function” (Foucault, 1972, p. 21). Taking a phenomenon as continuous, something previous leads us into an infinite search for its origin since each part of the phenomenon has its own endless beginning. He takes tradition as a section and argues as follows:

Take the notion of tradition: it is intended to give a special temporal status to a group of phenomena that are both successive and identical; it makes it possible to rethink the dispersion of history in the form of the same; it allows a reduction of the difference proper to every beginning, in order to pursue without discontinuity, the endless search for the origin. (Foucault, 1972, p. 21)

According to Foucault, the causal linkages between texts are inevitable due to the “inner thoughts and intentions of an author.” Nonetheless, as Webb clarified, this connection is not based on the real meaning of the works. Foucault claimed, “...there is the notion of influence ...the phenomena of resemblance or repetition, which links, at a distance and through time—as if through the mediation of a medium of propagation—such defined unities as individuals, Oeuvre, notions, or theories” (Foucault, 1972, p. 21).

For Foucault, nothing is constant, not even coherence, which spontaneously develops as the subject imagines. According to him, taking history “as the unfolding of a single idea” in which the universe is governed by the rules of change is totally unconvincible. As he argued, in nature, events do not exist in the manner of entire unity. Nevertheless scholars, in the name of development and evolution, tried to make a fictional line to connect each event and count it as a single or group, and through the reality of what they made, they tried to search for the event origin, which is in the entire change from the beginning. For him, formulating an adherent principle that proposes future unity is counted as “mastering time through a perpetually reversible relation between an origin and terms that are never given but are always at work” (Foucault, 1972, p. 21–22).

According to Foucault, in the 19th century, discourse was formulated by different disciplines. These disciplines were quite different with the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries since in these centuries disciplines were not categorized, yet they worked “only by a retrospective hypothesis and by an interplay of formal analogies or semantic resemblances” (Foucault, 1972, p. 22). Thus, this reveals that there is a relationship between each discipline; nevertheless, this relation is not laid on universally acceptable characters. He insists that this temporal relation can never serve as the foundation for searching for the origins of a discourse. Rather, according to him, each movement of discourse is a “sudden irruption” and it is the origin of else (Foucault, 1972, p. 25). In his words, he writes:

We shall recognize the unexpected occurrence of discourse. It is the ultimate sources of all reality. It is the reason that we must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its sudden irruption; in that punctuality in which it appears, and in that temporal dispersion that enables it to be repeated, reused and recognized, advanced concepts that are far from the researchers and analysis.

Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin but treated as *the origin at the moments it appears*. (Foucault, 1972, p.25 emphasis mine)

In referring to medicine, economics, and grammar, Foucault argued that the discursive unities are not actually laid on the networks between concepts, themes, objects, and statements, “but a group of rules that are immanent in a practice and define it in its specificity (Foucault, 1972, p. 21). According to him, in the analysis of these, we find multiplicity instead of unity.

Unlike the others (historians of science and philosophy who tried to address things via the chine of inference and linguists who tried to address things via the table of differences), Foucault thought that the only thing capable of addressing this is “systems of dispersion.” He writes,

Hence the idea of describing these dispersions themselves. . . . Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functioning, transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive formation... The conditions to which the elements of this division (objects, mode of statement, concepts, and thematic choices) are subjected we shall call the rules of formation. The rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance) in a given discursive division. (Foucault, 1972, p. 37-38)

He argued that through time, discourses are inevitable to merge according to issue they refers and the strategy they employed. “We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation; it does not form a rhetorical or formal unity, endlessly repeatable; it is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of

existence can be defined” (Foucault, 1972, p 117.) According to him, the combination of discourses makes discursive formation, and it is subjected to the rule of formation as he lists “objects, enunciative modalities, concepts, and strategies” (Foucault, 1972, p 119.). As an example, he takes a group of statements belonging to psychopathology as evidence that all assertions refer to madness.

According to Foucault, the concept of madness is subjected to several discourses that name it. Thus, it is the intersection of different groups of discourses like medicine, law, and others that are leveled as psychopathology. Regarding madness, Foucault (2006) argued that the concept of madness has been evolved according to the discourses and power relations of the epoch. Due to this, the concepts of madness in the Western renaissance, Middle Ages, and modern times are different and changed according to the discourse of the eras. Therefore, as he (1972, 2006) states that the discourses that formulate discursive are not ideal and timeless; they are temporal and inescapable from discontinuity. Thus, discursive formation is the space of disagreements and contradictions.

Foucault argued that discourse is analyzed through the rules of discursive formation. As he indicates these rules of formation, objects, enunciative modalities, concepts, and strategies are studied according to their specific rules of formation and regularity. He argued that the rules of formations are the reason behind the existence, co-existence, and even disappearance of a given discourse.

According to Foucault, the formation of objects indicates where the object of discourse appears. Thus, it is related to the formation of phenomena that discourses create. It is analyzed based on what he articulates as “the surface of emergence, authority of delamination, and grades of specification” (Foucault, 1972, p. 41-42). The surfaces of emergence are different for the

existing object. So, the object at first may revile according to a specific condition, but gradually it rises to a complex scale. He argued that these ways of manifestation of the object are the driving causes of the field of differentiation. According to Webb, “the relations supported by the surfaces of emergence are local, with this locality giving rise to a complex space when viewed across a larger scale”. (Webb, 2013, p. 65)

Nerveless, the appearance of an object might not have the real consequence that follows from action. To do so, authority for delamination is needed to “identify and name an object, establishing its existence as an object of study” (Webb, 2013, p. 65). Foucault (1972, p. 42) says, “In the nineteenth century, medicine became the major authority in society that delimited, designated, named, and established madness as an object.”

The grade of specifications is the third one for which he analyzed the formation of objects. He said that it is “the systems according to which the different 'kinds of madness' are divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, and derived from one another as objects of psychiatric discourse” (Foucault, 1972, p. 42). Accordingly, this element is essential to articulating different divisions of the objects.

While the enunciative modalities show the positions that individuals take within a given discourse, Foucault articulates three integrations that indicate the linkages of a given discourse with its specific authority, intuition, and subject of inquiry. Every discourse has its experts. He says, ‘Medical statements cannot come from anybody’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 51). It is the doctor who has the right to write medical statements. The second emphasis of Foucault is the site where a given discourse is articulated. According to him, in the case of medical statements, hospitals and private clinics are accepted sites. But the roles of these sites have changed according to the changing medical discourse.

The subjects' positions in discourse are subjected to the various domains of objects, Webb writes (2013, p. 71), in reference to medicine; the subject "may be a 'questioning subject', a 'listening subject', a 'seeing subject' and so on. The subject may use instruments or not and may take up one perspective or another in relation to the object."

Concepts and strategies are produced by specific discourses. According to Dreyfus & Rabinow (1983, p. 70), the unity of a certain discourse depends on its use of concepts. Nevertheless concepts are "subject to conceptual revolutions" (Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow, 1983, p. 70). Foucault (1972, p. 60) argued that due to this conceptual revolution, instead of concepts making paradigm shifts, they co-exist or disappear. However, within a certain discourse, a single set of concepts may be analyzed by different strategies, and according to Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983, p. 71), a single theme may be analyzed by different discourses. He takes the theory of evolution from the eighth and nineteenth centuries. In the eighth century, it was analyzed as the continuum of species that were subjected to natural selection. While in the nineteenth century, it depends on the descriptions of discontinuous groups. Thus, according to Foucault, the rule of concepts and strategies indicates the concepts that they produce and the themes and approaches that they employ, respectively.

2.1.2 Discourse as Discursive Practice

Foucault argues that discourse is not simply a collection of statements and assertions. More importantly, discourse is rule-based practices of knowledge. He states that the *Archaeology of Knowledge* aims to characterize discourses as practices that are governed to specific rules. Bacchi and Bonham (2014) assert, Foucault terms discursive practice is to indicate the practical implementation of the discourse. Therefore, according to him (1972, P.117), discursive practice refers to a set of historical laws determined by time and place, defining the parameters of the

enunciative function in a particular social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area. It is not the operation of desires.

Foucault argued that discourse should be understood as a monument, and it is possible when we avoid metaphoric methods of explaining it and emphasize the discourse's inherent volume.

According to Foucault, discursive practice is not only a way of producing discourse but also has enormous impacts on reality. He states that “discursive practices are not purely and simply ways of producing discourse. They are embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behavior, in forms for transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms that at once, impose and maintain them” (Foucault, 1977, p. 200). In this sense, discursive practice is one means of producing discourse. According to him, it manifests in technological processes, institutions, behavior patterns, transmission methods, and instructional forms. And, in explaining how statements and archives are interpreted in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, he highlights the connection between discourses and archives. In this analysis, he (1972, p. 131) comprehends discourses as practices that are specified by the characteristics of the archives. So, here, before discussing his thoughts regarding the relationships between discourse and archive, I must show a clue about his unique perspective of statements

According to Webb (2013, p. 85), Statements are the inseparable parts of discourse, and discourse is not an expression of reality. According to Foucault, its rules of formation, as Webb puts it, are not based in the speaking subject and are not consistent with "a deeper ontological truth." Webb insists that all elements of discourses are the construction results of historical process. According to him, the rules that can dictate the next regulations of discourses are even the outcome of historical processes that do not exist in discourses; rather, they are the very conditions of discourses. In constructing this argument, Foucault has taken the statement as a

benchmark. According to Foucault, a statement is a fundamental aspect of discourse and symbolically defines it as “a point without a surface, but a point that can be located in planes of division and specific forms of groupings” (Foucault, 1972, p. 80). This character is only manifested in chemist conceptions of the atom. Therefore, according to him, just as atoms are the smaller parts of compositions, statements are also the minimum parts of discourses. However, even if an atom is the smallest indivisible part, it has its parts, and this metaphorical expression works about the nature of the statement in discourses.

Nevertheless, Foucault believed, this definition wasn't able to express the ultimate nature of the statement. As he states a statement can be formed by any series of signs, figures, marks, or traces, and it is analysis, logic, and grammar that can determine its speech act, propositional form, and sentence parts of the statement. This implies that “a statement is formed when several signs are juxtaposed or even, perhaps - when there is a single sign”. He claimed that the existence of a sign is a sufficient requirement for the existence of a statement.

Hence, according to him, the existence of a defined propositional structure cannot be the primary condition for existence of a statement. Thus, he emphasizes that a statement has not a distinct character that could be used to define it and “it is not the same kind of unit as the sentence, the proposition, or the speech act” (Foucault, 1972, p. 86). rather, he added, it should be viewed “as a function that operates vertically in relation to these various units”. He says it is a function that can be used to say whether a set of signs is present.

The statement, unlike the sentences, propositions, and others, is not a structure that allows perfect models. As he indicates, it is a function of existence that belongs to signs. Whether they are written or spoken, they need analysis or intuition to determine their rules, symbolism, meaning, and the act that is performed. As he states, the statement is not directed by the

structural criteria of unity since it is a function that crosses a domain of structures and potential unities. Thus, the statement does not belong to sentences, propositions, or speech acts that language specifically uses, nor does it belong to language in general. Though, it is very important to evaluate them. As Webb writes, for Foucault, “It is by virtue of statements that one can tell whether a proposition, sentence, or speech act contains a series of signs or not” (Webb, 2013, p. 89).

As Webb shows, this relation of statements with sentences, propositions, and speech acts is interconnected, and Foucault termed this "function." According to him, the ideas of function express the internal characteristics of the statement. According to him, from the beginning a statement is a composition of words and things; therefore, at the first label, a discourse is a composition of groups of statements, and the statement is a composition of words, things, and concepts. Thus, the statement is a functional relation, and it is an atom of discourse. According to him (Webb, 2013, p. 90), here, Foucault uses the concept of atomism to signify the "external" nature of the statement alongside other discourse elements; in contrast, he uses the term function to state the "internal" nature of the statement.

According to Foucault (1972, pp. 129-130), the archive is the "law of what can be said," and it is a system of relationships and establishments that "govern the appearance of statements as unique events." He claimed that it is “the general system of the formation and transformation of statements”. He therefore defines an archive as a collection of relationships and conditions that make it possible for the constructions of discourse and statement.

Foucault stressed that discourse is a group of statements that belong to a discursive formation. Then, as he indicates, throughout time, the unity of a discourse is enabled by the virtue of its positivity. As he identified that this unity “defines a limited space of communication” that

enables us to customize whether or not different texts and authors target the same objects by employing the same concepts that “belong to a single discursive formation” (Foucault, 1972, p. 126). This limited space, after this, which I shall call discursive, is different from the space that shows the explicit debate realm or the succession of influences that have flowed from one writer to another. Its connectivity is not solely based on the logic or concepts advanced by different authors; rather, he claimed that the positivity of discourse is essential for its unity. He said, "this form of positivity defines a field in which formal identities, thematic continuities, translations of concepts, and polemical interchanges may be deployed," and, as he exposed, the positivity of discourse plays an indispensable role for "what might be called a historical a priori" (Foucault, 1972, p. 127).

As Rik Peter (2021) discussed that there is no scientific field of study that is entirely harmonious and constituted by absolute agreements among scientists; rather, the level of unity is different from one to another. Because of this, according to him, Foucault uses the technical phrase "historical a priori" “to serve as the principle of unity underlying a field of knowledge, even when there is disagreement and battle within this field” (Peter, 2021, p. 114). According to Foucault, the co-existence of statements makes a “complex volume” governed by various “regions with incompatible rules and practice”, and it is characterized by various types of positivity (Webb 2013, p. 117). But, For Foucault, instead of analyzing “a great mystical book of history," in which it is a piece of paragraph concepts and ideas are established within a limited circumstance, we shall refer to “the density of discursive practices and systems that establish statements as events and things" (Foucault,1972, p. 128). He suggests that when all systems of statements, whether they are about things or events, are combined at a specific time, they form what he calls the 'archive'.

By 'archive', Foucault does not mean a collection of texts that elucidate the history of human interaction across time. Rather it is about the reason behind the statements made by many individuals over a long period of time. He claimed that rather than being the result of linguistic performances, these things arose from a special set of relations at the discursive level. According to him (1972, p. 130), it "emerges in fragments, regions, and levels". In doing so, as Webb writes (2013, p. 117), it is the archive that "gives discourse structure, differentiating discursive formations from one another.

2.2 Discourse and Power/Knowledge: Towards a Unified Scheme

According to Foucault, as Kelly points out, power and knowledge are not ultimately identical; they should be understood as being "on an equal footing as specific, similar, related, but ultimately always distinct things" (Kelly,2014, p. 88). Though discourse makes that power and knowledge are joined together. Thus, they are not explained by others. This means power and knowledge are inseparable "two sides of single processes" (Pitsoe & Letseka 2013, p.24). According to them, they are an immense one by others. Foucault states that the production of new knowledge depends on the exercise of knowledge, and conversely it is impossible to exercise power without knowledge. According to him, the intermingled nature of power and knowledge has two implications. The first one and most important is showing how mechanisms of disciplinary power are simultaneously instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge. Second, according to Foucault, it shows the positive nature of power which is more productive than as commonly perceived as repressive. Due to this, he clearly exposes that "Every point in the exercise of power is a site where knowledge is formed. Conversely every established piece of knowledge permits and assures the exercise of power" (Foucault, 1979 p. 62)

For Foucault (1978), discourse is a sequence of discontinuous segments with a variable function. According to him, this indicates that dividing discourse along the lines of accepted and excluded, or the dominant and the dominated, is incompatible. Instead, he argues that discourse is a variety of discursive elements that have the capacity to dynamically shape human interaction. He maintained that the whole interaction of power over the society and individuals are assisted with discourse. As he states, it is discourse that produces, transmit and even fragile power. He writes, "Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it" (Foucault, 1978, p. 101). Foucault states that "Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations" (Foucault, 1978, p. 94). Power is not concentrated in the hands of individuals or groups, according to him, it emanates from everyone. He argued that power relation could not be seen as an exterior position of other relation since all relations are its manifestation.

Hence, according to Foucault, it is a discourse that weaves knowledge and power together. He claims that discourse is the most important for both the formation of knowledge and the maintenance of power. On the other hand, he asserts that discourse is also never exists without the operation of power /knowledge.

CHAPTER THREE

FOUCAULT'S GENEALOGY OF POWER

In the previous chapter two, I presented Foucault's theoretical frame works of discourse. This chapter focuses on explaining Foucault's account of "power," which is the most important theme in his genealogy works. According to him, the modern form of power relates to knowledge, and constituted a new form of domination that "constituted Man as both an object of the regime and as its subject" (Fraser, 1985, p.169). Power, form him, is not controlled by subjects (individuals or groups), rather it is subject less which stems from bottom up. Power and knowledge are logically compatible, and they have interplay relations. He expresses this interplay as knowledge is a product of power and power functions through the complex nature of knowledge.

3.1 The Interplay of Power and Knowledge

Foucault, in his book *Discipline and Punish*, argued that in any historical trajectory like knowledge, power could not be perceived as self-defined. According to him, power and knowledge are interdependent with each other. Here, he argued that in any aspect, knowledge is subjected to power, and the reverse is also true. In this respect, According to Visker, for Foucault, power and knowledge interplay with each other. Nevertheless, for Foucault, it is so difficult to decide which comes first, but he confidently proclaimed that knowledge is not for the sake of knowledge rather it is for production that is different from the existing conditions and the primers cases for the discontinuity of systems of thought. He states that "knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting" Foucault, 1998, p. 380).

For Foucault, unlike the enlightenment thinkers, knowledge is not something that expects human intervention for discovery and intrinsically good. According to him, knowledge is subjected for the existing power relation, and it is critical to the effective excises of power.

Instruct sense, for him, knowledge is an instrument and a production of power. He argued that “Power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault, 1977, p. 27).

According to Foucault, discourse is critical for the relation and implementation of power. For him, the ultimate function of knowledge is discourse formation. Discourse is a weakly interrelated set of thoughts that are only actualized through the interaction of power and knowledge. Therefore, he claimed that the formation of discourse is the most critical cause for the unavoidable relationship between knowledge and power. The function of power in various societies may vary in comparison with others. But all power relations function with the implementations as well as the production of discourse according to the existing social structure. He states that “In any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse” (Foucault, 1980, P.93).

Foucault asserts that power is functioning by using discourse and discourse is also produced in a practice of power. The relationship between truth and power is very deterministic for their practical implementation. This shows that the exercise of power is impossible without the economy of discourses of truth that function based on these relationships. According to him, what we take as true are the results of power; they are manifestations of power relations. Therefore, as he argued, the production of truth is vital for the exercise of power. And, for him, truth is the result of power. He believed we human beings are the producers of our truth,

meaning that truth is neither relative nor objective, rather the perspective of a specific society, institution, or group.

For Foucault, the exercise of power and the formation of knowledge are interdependent phenomena of human history. According to him, one's without others is implausible. He remarks that 'Every point in the exercise of power is a site where knowledge is formed. Conversely, every established piece of knowledge permits and assures the exercise of power' (Foucault, 1979, p. 62). Furthermore, according to him, truth is a source of principle that dictates the overall activity of discourses and power relations. He argued that the continuity of truth is certain by power

As Hubert & et al. (1983) mentioned, Foucault's account of power is not a theory because he assumed that "the question "What is power?" is obviously a theoretical question that would provide an answer to everything, which is just what I don't want to do" (Foucault, 1997, P. 13). However, Foucault himself expresses that his account is an analysis of power. According to Hubert & et al., for him, power is not an abstract that is hidden from history. It is not also a physical thing and a control of institutions. Foucault (1980) claimed that any attempt to articulate a formal theory of power needs to start with a search for the origins of the concepts that should be theorized. According to him, to do so, the theorist must show the exact time and place of the concepts raised for the first time. However, the concept of power does not need such kinds of endless searching of the origins of it because it is not an abstract; rather, it is loosely modes of relations that will be terminated if the actress is not interested in staying in those modes of relations. The possible ways of handling power are therefore an analysis. He asserts that making a "theory of power one will always be obliged to view it as emerging at a given place" But according to him, "power is in reality an open, more-or-less coordinated" (Foucault, 1980, P.199).

Mark Kelly claimed that Foucault's analysis of power is essentially concerned with identifying how power operates. Thus, Kelly argued, "Foucault could still be preparing the way for a theory of power while deliberately refusing to elaborate one" (Kelly, 2009, P.34). According to him, Foucault discarded the orthodox concepts of power which viewed power as negative and hierarchical.

As Foucault points out, "power must be analyzed as something which circulates, or rather as something that only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, and never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth" (Foucault, 1980, p. 98). Unlike Marxists, he argued that power is not in the hands of the master or the rulers. The argument suggests that everyone shares power and that no one has more power than another.

For Foucault (1980), there are Power relations held between a man and a woman, between family members, between a teacher and student, and between every free subject whether they know implication or not. According to him, the source of power is not the state or king. For him, "power comes from the bottom" (Foucault, 1976, P. 94). Nevertheless, as he explains, power operates from bottom to top as well as from top to bottom. In this respect, he argued, "power is exercised from innumerable points in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations" (Foucault, 1976, P. 94). Kelly precisely summarized the decentralized and multidirectional natures of power as follows:

power is de-centered is implied by its impersonality, since any center, whether it be an individual or an elite, would be a subject; since power cannot be possessed, it can only be relational, residing in the interstices between individuals, since if it resided in individuals, they would possess it; if it is relational and decentered, then it must be multidirectional, because, since it does not have a center, yet

clearly must have form (if it is to be anything at all), it must be organized autonomously around its own tendencies and directionality, rather than those that individual subjects might have. (Kelly, 2009, P.38)

As Foucault states, power is not an everlasting control of an institution. Rather, for him, power is the name of an aggregate expression of a “strategic situation in a particular society” (Foucault, 1976, P.73). According to him, the approach of power is different from time to time. It is always changing.

According to him, every exercise of power is moved towards its certain goal; however, it is not directed by the individual's (the subject) determination. He writes “there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. But this does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of an individual subject (Foucault, 1976, P. 95). According to Kelly, Foucault uses the term intention in a technical sense. As he explains, power is not guided by a person's desires Kelly claimed that “Foucault says that power relations are not subjective. This implies on the one hand that power relations are not simply the result of choices by subjects, as well as that power relations do not themselves possess subjectivity” (Kelly, 2009, p. 48).

3.2 Power and Truth

According to Foucault (2008), truth is a production of power relation, and it is varied according to a system of power that regulates the conducts of one's society. On the other hand, truth is a critical element in operating and legitimizing of power relation. He coined “regime of truth” to indicate the validation of statements according to a specific circumstance.

For Foucault, According to Sribas Goswami (2014), the most relevant question of today is not what truth is or how we can discover it; rather it is why we think in this way not in the other ways. According to Goswami, Foucault's intention is not to discover or defend truth like Plato,

Aristotle and some other figurative philosopher; rather he likes to interrogate how truth is formed.

Foucault claimed that “truth isn't outside power or lacking in power” (Foucault, 1980, P.131). It is a production of complex natures of power relation. Thus, according to Foucault; statements have meaning and truth value only within a specific context and discourse narrations. This shows that truth is not absolute, it is contingent to historical periods, and it changes as soon as the system of power changes that gives chance to appear it as truth. According to him, truth is varied across in different society. He says that “Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements” (Foucault, 1980, p.131). This regime of truth, according to him, imports the values of statements that make it true. The regime is a means of evaluating the truths of once society. It outlays the sanction and the probation of values. As he states, the regime is also severed as the ultimate sources and means of identifying the truth values of statements. This proves that, according to him, “nothing has any meaning outside of discourse” (Goswami, 2014, P.10). Foucault asserts that as “truth isn't the reward of free spirits... or the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power” (Foucault, 1980, p. 131).

On the other hand, power relation is continued to certain periods of time using truth. This means that power produces truth as we produce things, then power uses it as means of justification and effective exercise of power. He claimed that “There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and based on this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through power, and we cannot

exercise power except through the production of truth” (Foucault, 1980, P.93). Thus, For Foucault, power and truth are very associated concepts of his works. As he states that without use of discourse, power cannot practice and produces knowledge. For the productive exercises of power truth is very essential. Now days, Government uses political economy as a truth to administer the populations.

According to Foucault (1980), the political economy of truth in societies is characterized by five key characters. Firstly, the truth is articulated in the form of discourses and institutions. Secondly, according to him, this truth is formed according to the demands of the existing political and economic encouragements, then it being circulated through education and information. As he states that at the fourth, the truth is produced and transmitted under the few actors of the sates like university, army, hospital and so on. Finally, this truth becomes a significant political debate and social confrontation.

3.3 Governmentality

According to Foucault Governments employ different modes of controlling the subjects’ actions. Foucault defines governmentality as “the conduct of conducts” (Dean, 2010, P. 10). According to Dean, for Foucault, the concept the conduct of conduct can be illustrated by referring what is the activity of government. He argued that “government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors” (Dean, 1999, P. 11). According to Foucault, governmentality is an elastic version of government. Thus, to understand what he means by governmentality, we should take three circumstances. First, governmentality is the set of institutions which is a means of exercising power. Secondly, it

refers to the tendency to prioritize the power of government over other forms of power, which leads to the development of specific techniques and knowledge. And finally, according to him, he reminds us of the implications of the processes of the “Middle Ages” state of justice that were dramatically transformed into the administrative state that gradually and slowly changed the target population as the objects of exercising powers.

Therefore, according to Foucault, the notion of "governmentality" encompasses a variety of characteristics, such as the gradual changing of government in to governmentalization, the propensity to establish government as the recognized form of power, and the cooperative use of institutions and strategies that allow for the exercise of a specific form of power. Therefore, governmentality is a complex historical process, and primarily it refers to the art of governance, which allows the subjects to rule themselves through the pre-articulation of circumstances. Dean claims that the idea of government in terms of the states is expanded by Foucault's conceptions of governmentality. He asserts that the leaders behind the "conducts of conduct" are the government (Dean, 2010, p. 10).

Nonetheless, according to Dean, the role of government is not merely concerned with controlling each action; rather, it shows the direction in which individuals are able to monitor their actions. Dean states that governmentality makes us “govern others and ourselves according to what we take to be true about who we are, what aspects of our existence should be worked upon, how, with what means and to what ends”(Dean, 2010, p. 18). Furthermore, the nature of governmentality provides a more comprehensive understanding of how society functions and thinks.

Foucault discards the popular understanding of power, which holds that it operates top to bottom. Instead, he claimed that power is exercised from bottom to top, and knowledge and

discourse are the most sophisticated means of governing the action of others. Hence, knowledge and discourse serve as the systematic ways that people are forced to follow the rules and regulations.

For Foucault, governmentality is beyond what governments do within the framework of the state. Hunt and Wickham argued that it “is the dramatic expansion in the scope of government, featuring an increase in the number and size of the governmental calculation mechanisms” (Hunt & Wickham, 1994, p.76). Foucault argues that the state's emergence as a political issue can be viewed as part of a broader history of governmentality. He states, “the emergence of the state as a fundamental political issue can in fact be situated within a more general history of governmentality”; and, according to him, even “the state is an episode in governmentality” (Foucault, 2009, p. 248). Foucault claimed that governmentality is a practice deriving from state institutions that use political economy as means of comprehending and shaping the individuals and population. This indicates that Foucault's governmentality notions underline the economy as a tool for influencing specific populations. According to Dean, it makes a connection between government with other forms of power- sovereign and disciplinary what Foucault called technology of power.

Thus, governmentality, according to Hunt and Wickham (1994), is an extension of government's scope that results increase in the quality and scope of the institutions which make up the subjects are easier to administer.

3.4 Technologies of Power

According to Foucault, the system of operating power has become more evolved and sophisticated throughout time. Nonetheless, he believes that the nature of power is not changed, but rather the way power is exerted. In this sense, he maintained that the repressive notion of

power, which regards power as unproductive, stems from the outdated technology of power - sovereign power. As Elden (2001) argues that Foucault's argument about technology is more like what Heidegger believes. According to Heidegger, it is “a way of revealing” (Heidegger, 1977 P.12). Therefore, similarly with Heidegger, Foucault believed that technology is not simply conceived as the enhancement of humans on materials like wood, fire and machine. Here, Foucault believed that technology also should be considered as the art of exercising power. Kelly explains this different Foucault's expiration of power with technology as “That they are technologies means that they are, like other technologies, a body of technical knowledge and practices, a raft of techniques, which once developed and understood can be applied to various situations” (Kelly, 2009, P.43-44).

According to Foucault, sovereign power is a pre-modern technology of power, and it functions through violence and physical torch. He claimed that knowledge was not used in the time of pre-modern power technology operates. In the modern time, according to him, sovereign power has been accompanied with two new technologies of power: discipline and bio power. However, as Larsson et al. (2012) situate, these three forms of power are developed in different trajectories of modernity, and they did not substitute each other. Larsson et al. (2012) writes that in his works “Foucault discussed three forms of power relating to the state: sovereign power, disciplinary power and bio- power. These three forms emerged in different historical phases of modernity, but did not replace each other (Larsson et al., 2012, P.9).

3.4.1 Sovereign power

For Foucault, sovereign power is a technology of power that controls the subjects by brutal means. According to him, under this form of power, the king exercises his ultimate power in visible ways, to a degree of “take life and let live” (Foucault, 2008, P.5). According to him, if the

king suspects a threat to his power, he takes the cruel powers over the subjects have to take the life of the suspected man. He argued that “the characteristic privilege of sovereign power was the right to decide life and death... the power of life and death was not an absolute privilege: it was conditioned by the defense of the sovereign, and his own survival (Foucault, 1978, P.136).

Similarly with Foucault, Derrida indicates that in sovereign power the monarch is above any subjects and has the right to do what he wants. He insists, the king “allows at one and the same time for war to be waged at the political condition of possibility without it being for all that, in any respect, the aim, the finality or even the content of the political” (Derrida,2005, P.126). In this respect, Larsson et al. (2012) also claimed that in the first era of modernity where the modern European revived, physical punishment was the way of prevails the state power. As they argued “sovereign power relied on symbolic actions where inflicting pain upon the body played a crucial part, and punishment served as a way of dramatizing state power (Larsson et al., 2012, P.121).

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault explains a historical shift from the barbarian- sovereign power to the most advanced modern power. According to him, it is a dynamic transition from a more brutal and highly visible operating power to a less visible but more systematic and effective management of the subjects. He illustrates the supplementations of sovereign power with bio power: “the old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life” (Foucault, 1978, P.139 140). According to Oksala (2010), these powers are complementary and overlap each other’s; however, he reminded us that they operate in different rationality. As he states these Bio power means “power over bios or life, and lives may be managed on both an individual and a group basis” (“ Taylor, 2011, P.44).

According to Foucault, unlike sovereign power, the modern form of power, such as disciplinary Power and bio power are work in more complex and secret conditions. He argued that Bentham's inventions of panoptic are the means of the advancement of modern forms of exercising power over the subject. As he believed that this sophisticated architect is effectively controls large amounts of criminals by a single person, where he or she stands on the top of the building, and no one can check whether they are monitored or not. Because of this, the prisoners always act as well as possible since they believe that they are under surveillance. According to Foucault, Bentham's did not invent this architectural style for these purposes, but in modern times, as Bentham's panoptic is able to easily administer the prisoners, the individuals in particular and the community in general are under surveillance by governments through employing discipline and bio power in distinct areas of human nature.

Foucault argued that "the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy" (Foucault, 2009, P.1). According to him, the invention of bio power makes a paradigm shift on the classical conceptions of human beings as a political animal, But , elastically he argued that modern man has become an animal which politics regulate even his existence. He states, "For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question" (Foucault, 1978, P.143).

According to Taylor (2011), sometimes Foucault understood discipline and bio power as distinct technologies of power that existed in different times. Since when he introduced discipline as a new technology of power, in *Discipline and Punish*, he never introduced the term Bio power. However, as Taylor argued, in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault introduced the term bio power as technology of power that considers discipline as one of the two

elements of bio power. He stated that taking the individual body as machine and supervising the human species birth and death rate in general are what he called the two poles that discipline power functions. He writes, "The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed" (Foucault, 1978, P. 139).

Therefore, regulating the individual body and the general biological processes of the human species are the goals of exercising power over life. It is essential to balance the population and enhance the individuals as the demands of the system of power relations.

3.4.2 Disciplinary Power

According to Foucault, Disciplinary power is technology of power that operates at individual level. According to his description, sovereign power operates under the direct commands of kings or monarchs and does not specify its objectives unless we consider preserving the king's power at all costs to be its main goal. Whereas, in disciplinary, power is applied by means of instantiations to normalize the individual. As he indicates, in the case of disciplinary power, because of the importance of behavioral modifications of the "criminals," the sovereign means of punishment is replaced by "preventive detention". (Dreyfus & Rabinew, 1983, P.153)

Punishment no longer sought significant public representation and didactic moral insight but rather attempted behavioral modification-both body and of the soul-through the precise application of administrative techniques of knowledge and power. Punishment would have succeeded when it produced " docile bodies. "

The application of punishment was once again inscribed on the body, but its aim was no longer to crush, dismember, and overpower it. Rather, the body was to be trained, exercised, and supervised... the ritual of torture and confession and the

punitive city of the reformers were carried out in public, this new technique of punishment required secrecy. (Dreyfus & Rabinew, 1983, P.153)

This means, unlike sovereign power, disciplinary Power works in more complex and secret conditions. As Foucault exposes, the goal is to “produce subjected and practiced bodies, 'docile' bodies” (Foucault, 2012, P. 138). But this is regulated by the narration which imposed the interests of others not the individuals. However, Butler takes this narration as the best mystification “attempts to keep some social groups in power, and others out of it” (Butler, 2002 P.16).

As Dreyfus and Rabinew (1983) point out, discipline is a sophisticated means of operating power that targets the individuals' body and soul. Foucault also claimed, "discipline' makes' individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise" (Foucault, 1979, P. 170). According to him, the underlying assumption of Discipline power as technology is based on the possibility of producing the subject as the system required via separate control of the body and proper use of institutions such as prison, hospital, school, and so on. Because, as he claimed, “a body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved” (Foucault, 1977, P.136). Therefore, according to him, the docile body is simply a potential object which is possible to be changed according to the system's need.

Though, Foucault argues, the application of human masters over their body to the political domain could not be considered a spontaneous discovery, because it requires procedures. As he argued (1977), to achieve the desired result over the docile body, the art of training has an indispensable impact. As he appealed, “distribution within space; the control of activity –

timetables, rhythms, dressage; the use of exercises; the articulation and combination of forces" are the methods of discipline and power exercise over the body (Elden, 2001, P.139).

According to Foucault, the art of distribution in space with close supervision is crucial to get a positive effect on individuals. As he states, this is plausible in school, military, prison, industry, hospital and so on. For that he argued "discipline organizes an analytical space" (Foucault, 2012, P.143). As he constructed, discipline is nothing beyond the proper use of space on the docile body. According to Foucault, power is understood as negative and repressive must be ceased. He argued that all that we have are a fiction of power relation. For him, it is obvious that the individual is a fabrication of their society's ideology/ common belief. Nevertheless, as he states, the society's ideology is also the fiction of power. Thus, according to him, everything, including our reality, knowledge, and even the individuals are the productions of what he named disciplinary power. This means, for him, nothing escapes from power effects.

3.4.3 Bio power

As I have discussed in the previous section, disciplinary power is one element of Foucault's conception of bio power. As Foucault states that this power is aimed to discipline, molded and subjected the individual in order to be fit to the "system". Therefore, according to him, it functions at the micro level. However, as he states, due to the growth of population, resolving the second half of the 18th century problem with disciplinary power is likely impossible. He argues that "after the anatomo- politics of the human body (Disciplinary power), established over the eighteenth century, we have, at the end of that century, the emergence of something that is no longer an anatomo- politics of the human body, but what I would call a "biopolitics" (Regulatory power) of the human race" (Foucault, 2004, P.243, My Under bracket). Because of this, he argued, the invention of regulatory power technology is necessary and this power "is addressed

to a multiplicity of men” (Foucault, 2004, P. 242-3). Nevertheless, according to him, regulatory power works in combining with disciplinary power. As he states that all technologies of power function by combining with others. These technologies of power function on different scales and employ relatively sophisticated technology according to the conditions in which they appear. Thus, according to him, each technology has a function to change the individuals and the states in general. Therefore, they operate at a different level and on a different scale. This implies, according to him, even if these technologies are inseparable; they employ in different way and scales. As he argued, in contrast with disciplinary power, bio politics executes at macro levels of regulating the systems of the states. He argues, “Bio politics deals with the population, with the population as a political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem” (Foucault 2004, P.245). Thus, according to him, bio politics is focused on managing the size and quality of the population. As he argued, the whole process of life cycle of population is the main concern of bio politics and it operates its power by “intervention in terms of, the birth rate, the mortality rate, various biological disabilities, and the effects of the environment (Foucault, 2004, P.254). According to him, this technique of managing of population is primarily employed by states.

Likewise, Foucault, Thomas Lemke explained, in postmodern discourses of power, population is counted as the main threat of power. Because of this, according to him, bio-politics emerged as a means of controlling all biological activities of the population. He argued, “Bio politics implies regularization of population according to the perceived insistence of norms . . . , bio politics concern itself with the regularization of societies in a large scale, notably through demography” (Lemke, 2011, P.9)

But, For Foucault, regulatory power is interactive and productive. Therefore, according to him, this power could never be conceived as a deduction of power which appears to limit or distract the body. As he insists, in contrast sovereign power, bio power works secretly “working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them” (Foucault,1978, P.136).

3.5 The Subject and Power

Showing the relationship between the subject and power is one of the major stated themes that Foucault analyzes throughout his works. According to him, it is vital to recognize the true nature of power as constructive rather than oppressive to the very instance point for clear notions about the interwoven relationship of the subject and power. Kelly remained that Foucault is misunderstood as anti-subjectivist. As Kelly suggests, this sense of categorization emanated from Foucault’s analysis of power as subject less. Nevertheless, Foucault himself declared that he does not deny the existence of the subject rather he is against the traditional notions of the subject which are expressed by phenomenology and existentialism. He writes:

Perhaps I did not explain myself adequately. What I rejected was the idea of starting out with a theory of the subject-as is done, for example, in phenomenology or existentialism-and, because of this theory, asking how a given form of knowledge [*connaissance*] was possible. What I wanted to try to show was how the subject constituted itself, in one specific form or another, as a mad or a healthy subject, as a delinquent or nondelinquent subject, through certain practices that were also games of truth, practices of power, and so on. I had to reject a priori theories of the subject in order to analyze the relationships that may

exist between the constitution of the subject or different forms of the subject and games of truth, practices of power, and so on. (Foucault, 1997, P.290)

For Foucault, the individual is nothing but what s/he conducts in his/ her day-to-day activity. However, according to him, every individual action is subjected to power relations. According to him, power is conduct of conduct. For this reason, according to Kelly, Foucault denies “the notion that the individual is natural”, instead of this, he argued that those individuals are the products of power relation (Kelly, 2014, P.174). Thus is unnatural and the production of power relations. Nevertheless, he argued that the subject is not an entity rather it is a form that constructs itself through power relations.

Foucault, in his essay, *the subject and power*, shows that the term "subject" has two meanings. As he indicates, it means both a self-aware topic of something and something that is controlled or subjugated by someone else. Literally he argued, in relation to subject and power, the meaning of the term subject should be undertaken in two senses: “subject to someone else by control and dependence and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge” (Foucault, 1983, P. 212). These two meanings of the subjects indicate a power relation that submits and makes the subject. This means, in a power relationship, human beings are leveled either as free subjects who make themselves or as subjects who are subjugated to others. He claimed, however, that the subjugated never be a free subject by interacting themselves in “struggle via against domination and exploitation” (Foucault, 1983, P. 212). Since, according to him, this form is struggling to respond to the question who are we? Because of this, according to him, struggle against subjection is more essential in the modern world. He says “nowadays, the struggle against the forms of subjection-against the submission of subjectivity-is becoming more

and more important, even though the struggles against forms of domination and exploitation have not disappeared” (Foucault, 1983, P.212).

Foucault never denies that all forms of subjection are the manifestation of exploitation and domination. However, he believes that combat against subjugation is the proper kind of struggle that the present time needed. The reason for this is that, in his opinion, the contemporary state has exercised a new form of power which “ignores individuals, looking only at the interests of the totality or, I should say, of a class or a group among the citizens” (Foucault, 1983, P.212). However, the state appears to exercise power for its own strength by combining "individualizing and totalizing forms of power" that could never be realized in practice. According to him, this type of combination is so tricky and even it was never undertaken in the premodern era. As a result, he maintained that the modern state is formed by producing new forms of individuality, which he believed that must be banned in order to be the people's free subject.

Foucault (1983) argued that the modern state is a highly sophisticated structure that passes the individual into a new state that is subjected to a set of very deterministic technological patterns. According to him, it is the result of the advancements of the states over the individuals. This advancement gradually degrades humans' freedom.

Likewise, Kant, Foucault understood philosophy is important to tackle human predicaments. But, as he indicates, the way Kant interprets the function, and the importance of philosophy is limited to investigating the present states of us. This means Kant’s analysis limited the philosopher's role only in finding out what we are. Thus, according to him, Kant’s question circulates merely on the interaction between us and the preset conditions which never escape to being the production of previous power interaction. Because, unlike Kant, Foucault argued the goal against subjugation is not to discover what we are, rather to refute it and proclaimed new

form of subjectivity which discards state made individualization. He proclaims that once and for all “We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of political "double bind," which is the simultaneous individualization and tantalization of modern power structures” (Foucault, 1983, P.216). For him, the main goal is not only to emancipate from the state but also “both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to the state (Foucault, 1983, P.216).

Here, Foucault argued that the political, ethical, and philosophical issue of the twenty-first century is not just about emancipating the individual from various forms of institutional domination; but it also aims to free the individual from state itself and new mode of state-made individualization. Therefore, according to him, unlike the enlightenment period, the main project of the twenty-first century is to promote a new form of subjectivity through refusing what we are.

3.6 Resistance

According to Kelly, Foucault held that power and resistance are intertwined, thus comprehending resistance is crucial to understand his accounts of power. Foucault (1978, pp. 95–96) asserted that "where there is power, there is resistance," however “resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power”. In a vacuum of power, he claimed, resistance could not possibly exist. Thus, according to Foucault, resistance cannot exist without power, and vice versa.

Foucault claimed that “a man who is chained up and beaten is subject to force being exerted over him, not power” (Foucault, 2001, p. 324). This implies that exercising force on the slave person is not considered as power since the person living under this condition has no capability to react to what is done to him or her. Thus, as he argued, power is exercised over free subjects.

Power exerted on active agents is therefore not null; a free subject's refusal is expected. According to him, this refutation is a precondition for the existence of power. Due to this, he believed that “there is no power without potential refusal or revolt” (Foucault, 2001, p. 324). However, according to Foucault, it is impossible to indicate the points that all refusals come out, since, according to him, power is never regulated by someone rather it exists in relations. He states, “Points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions” (Foucault, 1978, p.95-96). According to him, as Kelly explains “power can only exist where there is a possibility of refusal, since otherwise we would be mere tools of whomever exercised power over us, rather than being what we are: agents in our own rights, with actions that may be acted upon by others but are not completely controlled” (Kelly, 2009, p. 107). For the interaction of power, people could be enthusiastically aware of what is being done to them. Unless using force against non-reactive agents is merely regarded as imposing one's will on objects, for this reason, it should never be interpreted as power. Therefore, according to Foucault, in every relation of power, resistance is inevitable.

Foucault argued that as power is everywhere, resistance also is everywhere. But resistance begins at local levels. However, he states that it is impossible to indicate the single spot lines of resistance. This shows, according to him, resistance is unpredictable counter reactions of power that changes power relations. He argues as “If there was no resistance, there would be no power relations. So, resistance comes first, and resistance remains superior to the forces of the process; power relations are obliged to change with the resistance” (Foucault, 1996, P. 386).

Thus, according to him, power relations are different according to the degree of resistance manifested in power relation. For him, in a time of power exerted on somebody, either she/he

defends or not she/he tries to resist it. He writes “There are no relations of power without resistance; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised” (Foucault, 1980, p. 142). So, in any relation, resistance comes first, and it is a necessary important condition for the existence of power over the free subject.

3.7 Freedom

According to Minj (2019), Foucault in his latter works vividly states his new alternative versions of freedom. Nerveless, because of his complex analysis of freedom with the omnipresence of power and his denials of an autonomies subject, some thinkers like Oksala, Taylor, Walzer and Rorty argued that he has pessimistic about the existence of freedom. But, in fact Foucault is a “philosopher of freedom” (Rajchman, 1985, p. 50).

According to Foucault, we are the production of power relations, and it is historical. So, the constraint, which shall be rejected, bound us is not resolved by metaphysical and philosophical activities rather by its origin that is political. Foucault because his interests, according to Todd May, Foucault “neither defends nor denies metaphysical Freedom” (May 2011, p. 74). But, as a new perspective, he defines freedom in connection with human history, and as a means of refusing what we are.

According to Foucault (1983), Freedom is an ontological prerequisite for the existence of power relations. He argued that not all relationships are power relations. Power is exerted over a free subject. Thus, he believes that power relation does not exist over a slave subject. So, according to him, any relationship between masters and slaves is merely a physical one. This shows that the existence of power everywhere indicates the existence of freedom everywhere. According to O’Leary (2002), Foucault’s argument about the omnipresence of power supports

the possibility of anything with power relation except slavery. As I showed, for Foucault slavery is not power relation rather it is physical. This way of understanding is emanated from Foucault's conception of power as productive. Nevertheless, others believed the existence of freedom where power is exercised is an illusion, because for them power is not productive like Foucault thinks, rather it is in nature repressive. Foucault responds to such kinds of critique against his conception of power and freedom as:

This being the general form, I refuse to reply to the question I am sometimes asked: "But if power is everywhere, there is no freedom." I answer that if there are relations of power in every social field, this is because there is freedom everywhere. Of course, states of domination do indeed exist. In a great many cases, power relations are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom. (Foucault, 1997, P. 292)

Thus, for Foucault, power relation is possible where freedom is exercised. The existence of freedom shows itself by resisting power relation. Resistance, as he states, is the validation of the existence of power relation. He insists that "in power relations there is necessarily the possibility of resistance because if there were no possibilities of resistance (of violent resistance, flight, deception, strategies capable of reversing the situation), there would be no power relations at all" (Foucault, 1997, P.292). According to Minj (2019), Freedom for Foucault is not an ideal that we are waiting for discovery, rather it is a day to day practice of individuals. By practice, according to him, he means experience of individuals in their conducts. Hence, according to Foucault, freedom is not something that we will realize after overthrow of some kinds of power relation,

but we always exercised in any circumstance, since for Foucault, no one can escape from power relation.

However, according to Taylor (1984), Foucault's conception of freedom within the exercises of power does not make sense. Foucault uses freedom and power as they are not an opposite. As he states that, unlike Foucault, freedom is something that we can actualize after liberating ourselves from some kinds of power relation, because of this, according to Taylor, Foucault's conception power without the idea of liberation is meaningless. Nevertheless, Foucault states that power relation is quite different from domination. In the case of state domination as an example, liberation is crucial and it may be "sometimes the political or historical condition for a practice of freedom" (Foucault, 1997, P.283). But power relation is different from domination. According to him, for power relation liberation is not more important than practice of freedom. He writes:

Practice of liberation is not in itself sufficient to define the practices of freedom...

This is why I emphasize practices of freedom over processes of liberation; again, the latter indeed have their place, but they do not seem to me to be capable by themselves of defining all the practical forms of freedom. (Foucault, 1997, P. 282-283)

Therefore, Foucault claimed the practice of freedom is possible in any circumstances and liberation is not a necessary condition for it.

For Foucault, resistance is possible in any oppressive circumstance. According to him, from the beginning without resistance no power relation exists at all. This means the existence of refusing what is imposing on somebody is the pre-request of power relation. Therefore, for Foucault, liberation is not conceptualized as out of power relation. Here, Foucault emphasizes the nature of resistance as a reference of power and practice of freedom.

For Foucault, the subject is not autonomous. It is the production of power relations. Foucault claimed that the subject is not natural and given, rather it is a product of power. So, according to him, under any condition, the subject cannot escape from power relations. The logical sense of liberation could not be separated from the concepts of resistance. Hence, his level of resistance varies due to the nature of power and the practices of freedom. Freedom is not a state of being that we will live after the revolution; rather it is an art of living once true pleasure in against governmentality. The pleasure of a free man never contradicts the interest of others. As he states the practice of freedom is an ethical practice by itself. Foucault claimed that “Freedom is an ontological condition of ethics” (Foucault, 1997, P. 284). This means ethics is the formation of the practice of freedom and ontologically priors’ freedom.

According to Foucault, the concept of ethics is revolved on the ancient Greek thoughts of the care of the self. In Greek antiquity, the care of the self was the central principle to evaluate ethical conducts. Ancient Greek philosophy indicates that what makes one action whether ethical is not the care of other; rather the care of the self. This mean, the care of the self by itself is an ethical conduct. So, this shows that the care of the self and others have complex relation. Due to this, in so far as freedom is an ethical practice, the care of others is the one of the ethics of freedom. He argued that one who gives care of the self has good relations with others. Every bad relationship with others is emanated from once lack of care of oneself. So, for him, the care of the self is a foundation for care of others. He states that “the problem of relationships with others is present throughout the development of the care of the self” (Foucault, 1997, P. 287). This implies that, first oneself must give care for him to care for others. The reason is that “the care of the self is ethically prior in that the relationship with oneself is ontologically prior” (Foucault, 1997, p.287).

CHAPTER FOUR

CONSCIOUSNESS AND POWER: CRITIQUE AGAINST FOUCAULT

As I clearly discussed in chapters two and three, Foucault argued that the relation between discourse and power over the subject is very deterministic. The subject is not given; rather, it is the result of power relations. Furthermore, he claimed that power relations are impersonal and purposive. By purposive, he means the subject is impossible to be out of power relations because power relations are everywhere where there is freedom. He reflects that power is self-regulated and beyond the control of the subject. His accounts of discourse, power, freedom, and the subject make a paradigm shift in modern philosophical shame. On the other hand, I argued that the way Foucault understood power, freedom, resistance, and the subject is implausible. Regarding theses, in this chapter, I vividly show up my position by referring to Sartre, Levy, May, and Taylor.

For Foucault, power relation is decentered and out of the subject control. Then, I thought that thinking the subject, who knows how power is produced, transmitted, and functions as totally determined and incapable to regulate power relation is absurd. In fact, power has a tremendous impact on what we were, are, and becoming. Nevertheless, we human beings are not passive that fashioned according to the pre-determined systems; rather we are an ontologically free being. As such, in contrast to Foucault, the subject is not “solely” product of power relations. Also, it is an intentional involvement of human beings driven by "consciousness." By intention, I mean that it is the choices of human beings to be what kind of subject. Therefore, the subject has freedom and free project to fashion or transcend the existing power relation.

4.1 The Ontology and Paradox of Freedom and Resistance

According to May, Foucault neither rejects nor states the ontological nature of freedom in his argument. He uses the concept freedom in relation with the subject to exercise their right and duty with the given political and economic discourse that produces and executes power relation. But I believed that any analysis of freedom must begin from the fundamental nature of itself. Locke, Kant, Descartes, Husserl, and Sartre philosophically articulate the ontology natures of human freedom in different structure but they have no difference on the nature of human being, i.e., unique features of consciousness that enable him to be aware of what is going on in his surroundings and beyond itself. According to Sartre, this is the unique nature of human being (being-for-itself) from mere objects (being-in-itself).

Sartre (2018) in his master work, *Being and Nothingness*, states two modes of being distinctly, namely being-for-itself or consciousness and being-in-itself or simply objects (Sartre, 2018). Sartre takes being-in-itself to indicate objects that are not aware of its existence and which lacks consciousness. Being-in-itself is what it is (Sartre, 2018). This means that it is with fixed essence. In contrast, being-for-itself is not what it is (Sartre, 2018). This means that it is free in order to transcend from its facticity or historical situation. But my focus here is on Sartre's conception of being-for-itself. According to him, it is only human beings that question his existence. Neil Levy simplified Sartre's technical representation of human being in being-for-itself or freedom as following:

Our ability to question ourselves is defining characteristic of being-for-itself. The for-itself is, precisely, for-itself; that is, it exists at a distance from itself. It is internally fissured, in

such a manner that it can adopt an attitude to itself, of treating itself as an object. Or in other words, the for-itself is a being that is separated from itself. (Levy, 2002, P.32).

According to Sartre (2018), it is hum beings questions himself and the world by being separated from himself and the world. Levy (2002) states that the ability of human being to question is vital evidence of separating from himself and the world. Sartre claimed that for itself (human being) is separated from itself and the world by “nothingness” (Sartre, 2018. P. 145).

According to Levy, For Sartre, consciousness is the reflections of what looking for the world. Therefore, for him, consciousness shall be characterized as nothingness which totally rejects Descartes proposition of “I think therefore I am”. Thus, according to Sartre, the human being in states of absolute inwardness or investigations of consciousness confirm that no room for the ego (I). According to him (1960), the ego (I) is the constitution of consciousness that exist in the world like the others ego. In this regard, he debunks Descartes’ proportion of “I think therefore I am” by saying that “the consciousness that says *I think* is precisely not the consciousness that thinks” (Sartre, 1960, p. 45). Because, according to him, the consciousness that is a potential source of all things does not manifest itself in the form of an object. He clarifies that “a consciousness has no need at all to be a reflecting consciousness in order to be conscious of itself. It simply does not posit itself as an object” (Sartre, 1960, p. 45).

According to Husserl and Sartre, the only approach to this complex fact is phenomenology. Sartre (1960) reminds us that phenomenology is a method of study of consciousness that takes place a dilemma of facts. According to him, dilemma of fact is inevitable in phenomenology because the “ego” (I) does not exist either in form or material in consciousness, but rather it is a production of consciousness. Therefore, Sartre (1960) believed that there is no transcendental ego that can serve as the basis for our intentional action.

Sartre defines “Consciousness by intentionality. By intentionality consciousness transcends itself. It unifies itself by escaping from itself” (Sartre, 1960, p.38). Sartre (2018) claimed that consciousness sets in two modes, what I shall call lyres of consciousness. Whenever consciousness focuses on external things or involves external activity, the “self” does not appear. According to him, the self appears when consciousness is detached from the external world, and it focuses inwards on itself. Thus, he claimed that “consciousness knows itself only as absolute inwardness” (Sartre, 1960, P. 41). Nonetheless, Descartes believes that being aware of a thinking being is the simplest proof of who I am. But for Sartre, the ability to think does not take place in the consciousness that says, “I think,” rather in the reflexive modes of consciousness, which Desecrates does not mention in his proposition. So, for Sartre, uttering “I think” is an “external” activity of consciousness without an awareness of it-self (consciousness) involved in thinking. Or, in simple terms, thinking is processed in Sartre’s conception of reflexive modes of consciousness, which have no room for ego (I). For Sartre, appealing to the self as a thinking substance and a borderline of all activity of a human being is not plausible since, for him, the self never appears unless the consciousness intentionally looks inward itself. So that he argued that being aware of our existence helps us to be aware of ourselves.

Thus, according to Sartre, human beings have consciousness that can make them aware of what is going on in the world and interrogate itself. Once to interrogate him, he must treat himself as object. As he claimed this nature of consciousness is the ultimate source of human freedom and it makes that human beings are the only architects of their history in the concert world. According to Sartre, Foucault’s assertion that the subject is a product of power relation is bad faith. Because of it promotes deterministic theory. In fact, for Sartre, human being or the subject is a creator of himself and his historical situation.

However, can the subject be constituted out of power relations? Never! After all, Foucault and I also thought that power is relational and exists everywhere. By everywhere, he means in all relations. Therefore, it is impossible to say the subject exists in the vacuum of power relations, and therefore freedom could not be conceptualized as an absence of power relations. Rather, it must be taken as something that plays in certain modes of power relations. But, unlike him, I claimed that the subject cannot exercise freedom in line of resistance; rather, a given power relationship that is difficult to practice must be replaced by a laissez-faire power relationship through the resistance of the subject. So, for the practice of freedom, liberation is a necessary condition. However, being liberated does not mean living in an out-of-power relation; rather, it means being in a state of relatively new and “flexible” power relations. Foucault states this scenario as the subject could never escape power relations under any circumstances.

Hence, it is sound to think that only human beings are the subject. And human beings are ontologically free and capable of understanding what is going on. It is also true that human beings are capable of revolt and project power relations if the existing ones do not have enough space to practice freedom. Therefore, it is plausible to think that the subject is the architect of power relations and liberation is necessary condition to transcend into relatively new power relation.

Foucault claimed that resistance and freedom are inseparable and that they are means of validating power relations. However, Taylor (1986, 2011) rejects this proposition. Because, according to him, power and freedom are naturally opposites, and it is through resistance that liberation is redone. According to him, power and freedom are opposite each other. Foucault intentionally refuses the concepts of liberation related to power relations. Taylor claimed that the idea of liberation is very critical to comprehending what power is. According to him,

Foucault over simplified the conceptions of liberation from power. Taylor believed the notion of power does not make sense without the conception of liberation. (Taylor, 1986, P92) So, in mentioning him, I argued that resistance and freedom are paradoxical in the sense that where there is freedom, there is no resistance. But resistance is a vital means of attaining freedom. This means the subject can regain freedom whenever they can consistently resist unjust power relations in the quest for new power relations. Thus, unlike Foucault, I thought that freedom was natural and the opposite of power. However, being liberated does not mean living in an out-of-power relationship; rather, it means the relationship is proper and compromises all interests.

4.2 Concluding Remarks

The effect of discourse, power, and knowledge on shaping human's ways of behaving is the most critical issue in postmodern philosophy. In this thesis, I discussed Foucault's views of Discourse and power/knowledge nexus. In doing so, I relied on his Major works, lectures, interviews, and commentaries which are explicitly addressed what he means discourse and power /knowledge.

Most postmodern philosophers like Lyotard, Rorty, Derrida, Butler, and himself Foucault, just to name a few, have a common understanding about the account of knowledge, truth, and the subject in postmodern world. According to them, postmodernity is a rejection of modern conception of reason and emancipation. In this regard, Lyotard argued that the grand narrative of modernity failed and the society who lived in postmodern world lived in promote multiculturalism. Regarding to the subject and knowledge, without difference, all postmodernist argued that they are not constant. According to Foucault, the subject and knowledge are the results of the interactions of discourse and power relation in human conducts. Thus, unlike the modernist, postmodernist believed that the subject is not rational, autonomous and natural rather

is constricted, fragmented and artificial in a sense that the subject is a logistical, cultural and political constrictions Like the subject, post modernists reject modern views of knowledge as it has ultimate unity and vital for human emancipation. Instead, they argued that knowledge is not neutral and objective that waits for discovery rather it is subjected to circumstance and unlike modernist, in general, the postmodern argued that knowledge is not intrinsically inkling to emancipation, but it is also means of domination that constituted human being as an object and the subject. And they argued that knowledge is not neutral and objective that waits for discovery. It is subjected to circumstance, and it is not intrinsically associated to emancipation.

As I have discussed, Foucault's methodological turn from Archaeology to genealogy. His new methodological shift is depending on his thematic turns from the theoretical discourse analysis to the practical effects of discourse and power in the subject and knowledge. However, for Foucault, this turn is not absolute break, rather it is an interconnected.

For Foucault, discourse is both a group of statements and ruled based practice of knowledge in actual world. Human thought is subjected to limited prides of time meaning that history shows we human beings have been behaving and acting according to the specific episteme. Thoughts are in entire changing what he says discontinues. However, this discontinuous should be conceived as the variations in rocks discovered during excavations. As the rock is settled indifferent levels but we see the unity indifference layers. For Foucault argued that as there is unity in rooks there is also unity of discourse which is examined by a set of rules that define its specificity.

Foucault, in his later works argued power relation is everywhere and works through a systematic implementation of knowledge. He states that in every exercise of power there is knowledge of production, and in the reverse power uses knowledge as means of exercising

power. Therefore, he argued that power and knowledge are inseparable as two sides of the single coin and he prefers to perceive these critical terms as power/knowledge. He asserts that it is discourse that intermingle power and knowledge.

Foucault claimed that power is exercised over free subject, and every exercise of power is intentional and goal oriented. However, because power is played over free subject, resistance is inevitable in every exercise of power relation. Power is decentered, self-regulated and function from boom to top. According to him, this resistance is important to validate power relation. In clear notion, he argued that in every relation of power there is resistance, and this resistance is not “exterior” to power meaning resistance is a counter action of power and any relation that has no resistance is not power relation. Thus, freedom is an ontological prerequisite for the existence of power relations, resistance and ethics. He said that “there are relations of power in every social field, this is because there is freedom everywhere” (Foucault, 1997, P. 292). According to Todd May (2011), Foucault neither defends nor denies metaphysical conceptions of freedom. Foucault uses freedom in relation to history. He argued, the subject is a production power relation and freedom is a connotation that we able to refuses what we are. Thus, Freedom, according to Foucault, is an art of living once true pleasure in against of governmentality.

Finally, let me finish the thesis by addressing the two possible scholastic objections that would be raised in Foucault’s integrated views of power, resistance, and freedom. The first objection is that how power is subject less and decentered? The second objection is how are freedom and resistance conceived in the absence of liberation? According to Foucault, these objections are mainly raised from different rationality. The first objection is coming from the supposition of power will be controlled by few groups and even by individuals while the second objections is originated from both misconceptions of “the inescapable natures of power relation”

and “power is domination and repressive in nature”. In contrast, for him, "Power is not something that is acquired, seized or shared, something one holds on to or allows to slip away" (Foucault, 1978, p. 94). Rather it is productive and its relational meaning there is a production of knowledge and “the subject” in every exercise of power and it held between free subjects. Thus, for him, domination is an imbalance of relation that needs liberation to exercise freedom; He takes the case of colonization as an example. He emphasized that a free subject will never have power relation with the slave one, if it happens, it is not power relation rather physical one because the slave could never resist what is being imposed imposing on him, whereas power relations are relationships between individuals, husband and wife, families, and so on—that have a space for resistance and exercises of freedom. Though, I understand that these power relations are made possible by the goodwill of individuals. This means that at any time and under any conditions, the individual is free either to stay or to free themselves from this power relationship, even if the existing power is non-repressive. Unlike what Foucault argues, this shows that any power relationship is not beyond the comprehension of the subjects. Therefore, I strongly argue that through the exercise of their freedom, humans are naturally capable of resisting not only what Foucault called domination but also power relations and they can construct relatively new power relations that compromise all attitudes. Because, as Foucault argues, freedom is an inalienable nature of human beings and a means of revolting.

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