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College of Social Sciences
Center for African and Asian Studies

*South Sudanese women's involvement in armed conflict and
their influence during the reconciliation processes between
Government and the oppositions*

By
Biruktayet Bihon

June 28, 2021

**SOUTH SUDANESE WOMEN’S INVOLVEMENT IN ARMED
CONFLICTS AND THEIR INFLUENCE DURING THE
RECONCILIATION PROCESS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT
AND OPPOSITIONS**

By

Biruktayet Bihon

A THESIS

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COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
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Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been fully acknowledged.

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ABSTRACT

South Sudan becomes independent from the Republic of Sudan in 2011. The world's new nation entered into a civil war within three years of gaining its independence. Struggle for political power between the President of South Sudan Salva Kiir and the vice president Riek Machar resulted in severe casualties. Since the outbreak of the civil war in 2013 until the signing of R-ARCSS (2018 peace agreement), Millions have fled, killed, and become vulnerable. However, the role of women during the conflict in South Sudan has evolved in different ways. Women during the South Sudan civil war had been a combatant (for all warring sides), supporter to fighter spouse, a stimulator to the fight and reconciler to the peace. The two peace agreements even include women during the agreement and in the post-power-sharing framework. Thus, this research opts to explore the severity of the conflict and the involvement of women during the peace agreement, and the impact of their involvement post-agreements. To conduct the research, primary and secondary sources were employed that gave the study a detailed explanation quantitatively and qualitatively.

Key Terms: *South Sudan, Intra-state conflict, Power struggle, Rebellion, Ethnic violence, External Actors.*

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
ARCSS	Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
AU	African Union
AUCISS	African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CTSAMM	Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
DOP	Declaration of Principles
EU	European Union
ECOWAS	Economic Community of Western Africa
FDP	Federal Democratic Party
FDs	Former Detainees
GPS	Global Peace Index
GRSS	Government of the Republic of South Sudan
HLLRF	High-Level Revitalization Forum
IO	International Organization
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
NAS	National Salvation Front
NDM	National Democratic Movement
NGOs	Non –Governmental Organizations
NIF	National Islamic Front
NPAF	National People’s Alliance Forces
NRM	National Resistance Movement
PDM	People’s Democratic Movement
PoC	Protection of Civilians

R-ARCSS	Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
REMNASA	Revolutionary Movement for National Salvation
R-TGONU	Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity
SPLM	Sudanese People Liberation Movement
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
SSAF	South Sudan Armed Forces
SSDF	South Sudan Defense Forces
SSDF	South Sudan Democratic Front
SSLM	South Sudan Liberation Movement
SSNLM	South Sudan National Liberation Movement
SSNMC	South Sudan National Movement for Change
SSPM	South Sudan Patriotic Movement
SSPPF	South Sudan People's Patriotic Front
SSUF	South Sudan United Front
SSUM	South Sudan United Movement
TGONU	Transitional Government of National Unity
UDRA	United Democratic Republic Alliance
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
WPP	Women Peace Party
SIPRI	The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background to the Study

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross definition of ‘Armed Conflict,’ it is the use of armed force between two or more organized armed groups, governmental or non-governmental alike (ICRC, 2008). This same definition is applied by various International Organizations (IOs) actively working in the area of conflict and other situations of violence as well as in a few researcher's publications including Schindler’s 1976 work on the definition of international and non-international armed conflict.

Africa being the center of various armed conflicts, reports have been issued on the subject across the five regions namely; the African Transition Zone, West Africa (ECOWAS), Equatorial Africa, East Africa (IGAD), and Southern Africa region (Alabi, 2006). Among these is the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) region actively engaged in peace resolution agendas more than any of the blocks from the continent (IGAD,2020). The war in South Sudan, the collapse of the State in Somalia, and the conflicts in Ethiopia, as well as the situation in Sudan, are significant examples of IGAD centered agendas. These states are vulnerable to emerging violent ideologies and armed conflict over several differences.

During a situation of armed conflict, millions of people are forcibly displaced in the region, a tremendous number of actors have played a role in escalating these conflicts meanwhile revolutionary leaders have stepped up at the front line to bring peace and stability to their nation. Among these actors include thousands of women either embracing conflicts, revolutions, war, and independence or advocating for peace and stability over the region (Barth and Fredrikke, 2002).

In the process of the armed conflict, those women who embrace stability might find themselves as peace negotiators, who later be called heroic if a peace agreement is achieved and has the potential to shape the future for their respective nation (Darden and Steflja, 2020).

Researches showed that the inclusivity of women in peace negotiations improves the chances of reaching sustainable peace (ibid).

Despite the importance of inclusivity, the world especially the continent of Africa has witnessed peace talks with minimal women's engagement during the negotiations. The lack of Women's engagement in peace efforts has been a major challenge in conflict-hit nations in some parts of Africa. For Example, women represented only 20 percent of negotiators in Libya's political discussions and 0 percent of negotiators in Libya's military talks. One current peace process is led by a woman chief mediator (Stephanie Williams, acting head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya) marking the first time in six years that a woman holds this role (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020).

The restrictive laws, cultural practices, institutional barriers, as well as disproportionate access to quality education, healthcare, and resources in the region made the accumulated factors for underestimating the role of women. In all armed conflicts, the adverse effects fall disproportionately on women and girls (Yahia, 2014). Despite being the main victim in armed conflicts and other situations of violence, women throughout the year struggled to occupy roles within the situations while deciding fates impacting their surroundings (Krausea and Krauseb, 2018).

The same explanation applies to the world's youngest nation, South Sudan, which continues to struggle despite two peace agreements in 2015 and 2018. The armed conflict between the government of South Sudan and the opposition wings will be covered in this particular research. In doing so, the researcher will make an in-depth assessment of South Sudanese women's influence in armed conflict and their role during reconciliations and the peace process.

1.2. Statement of the problem

South Sudan gained its independence from Sudan in July 2011. Unfortunately, sovereignty has not brought peace to the nation, and violence is a significant ongoing challenge in South Sudan. This was perhaps no more apparent than when the world's newest state descended into civil war on 15 December 2013. The fighting has fractured the state's leadership and has resulted in the internal

displacement of one million people, with an additional 367,000 seeking refuge in neighboring countries (South Sudan peace promotion, 2020).

Following the outbreak of war, various international organizations including The UN Plugom for Action (1995) released reports much on women's vulnerabilities stressing that women were exposed to conflict and thousands of them are forced to flee while there were many of them unwillingly engaged in the war of the Men or make affect-full coincidental decisions regarding their fates.

The South Sudanese Bill of Rights affirms equality and the preservation of human rights (National Gender Policy, 2012). The National Gender Policy acknowledges the progress that women have made, in contributing to South Sudan's struggle for independence, However, the reality at the grass-root level is very different from the ratified bill of rights.

In reality, this war-torn nation gives very little space for women's engagement in major agendas concerning the nation, and they are excluded from political decision-making processes. However, the role of women during the conflict in South Sudan has evolved in different ways. Despite there were millions of women who were victimized following the conflict, the intensified violence shaped women to act in different ways. Despite the involvement, women's position in various constructive duties is still low. (IGAD, 2015).

This study focused on women's engagement equally in armed conflicts that occurred in the Republic of South Sudanese and their role as either negotiators or mediators in the peace efforts. Despite the availability of researches conducted on this topic, only a handful of researches have been conducted still leaving a gap to be filled. The Sudd Institute (2015) emphasizes more about the under-representation of women in the peace process of South Sudan at the general level and gives little space to women's involvement during the 2018 peace agreement or R-ARCSS.

Women's informal peace efforts and the grassroots activism in South Sudan' (Nwoha and Were, 2018) is another research focusing on women's role in the peace process. The research again gives strong emphasis on what women can do in the nation-building process. This study will identify the women's engagement in the conflict and peace efforts while providing an analysis of where to go about. Hence, it would be appropriate to study, in a broader way, what positive or negative roles South Sudanese women can play in national stability.

1.3. Rationale of the Research

The armed conflict in South Sudan has turned many vulnerable most particularly Women and Children. Women were used as a war weapon by the armed groups since the outbreak of the conflict. However, this doesn't mean that women are just vulnerable during the conflict in South Sudan (Bushra and Lopez, 1994).

Despite there were thousands and millions of women victimized by the conflict, there were women actors highly involved in the fighting. Despite lack of data about the number of women fighters, reports, and regional institutions agreed with the fact there are thousands of women on the ground as a combatant (for all warring sides), spouse to the fighter, a stimulator to the fight and mediators to the peace efforts. South Sudan women leaders in warring groups and the existence of women network groups to push for peace efforts proves that women can act as powerful catalysts to both war and peace.

Writing on why the study of South Sudanese women involvements in armed conflict and their influence in reconciliation processes between the government and the oppositions, it would be apt to divide the rationale into different parts and give reasons separately.

1.3.1. Why study the South Sudanese peace effort?

In July 2011, South Sudan achieved independence following a long-awaited referendum on self-determination. Just two years later, a political crisis within its ruling party boiled over, exposing weak institutions and deep historical divisions among South Sudanese communities. Though it began as an elite political spat, the conflict quickly assumed an ethnic character.

With the outbreak of civil war in 2013, different armed groups were formed with the birth of grievances among community groups that further escalated the problem leading to severe casualties. It is important to study all the facts and answer the WH questions to developments the world's youngest nation had to deal with. The study will provide a lesson for many nations about the structural manners they should follow in the process of state formation, understand the nature of conflicts, and have a paved way to plan in dealing with conflicts. An additional reason for wanting to study South Sudan is due to the researcher's closer contact with the people of South

Sudan and an understanding of the situation of violence and developments in the Republic of South Sudan.

There is an urgent need for stability in South Sudan. The country is already under a humanitarian crisis as a result of multiple and interlocking threats, including armed conflict and inter-communal violence, economic decline, disease, and climatic shocks (Relief web, 2016). According to UNICEF (2016) 1.69 million people have been internally displaced since 15 December 2013, including more than 900,000 children under 18 years of age. The report estimated that the six Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites in South Sudan are sheltering more than 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the impact of the ongoing refugee crisis is being felt across the region.

Addressing the root causes and drivers of conflict is a long-term and complex task especially for those living with conflict first and foremost, but also for those supporting people working for peace. Conflicts have multiple drivers and operate as systems therefore, responses should also require the influence, resources, and commitment of the government, different people, institutions, and researchers at different times (McKay, 1998). In the meantime, Peace studies would entail an understanding of the concept of a country's political structure that can forward remedies for reconciliation. By studying the whole situation in the country, it is important to cover the peace process the country passed two times.

1.3.2. Why study South Sudanese Women's involvement?

This study was conceptualized based on a gap analysis of previous work done on women's participation in peace negotiations in South Sudan. Whereas other studies explored specific issues about women's role to realize peace in South Sudan, this study aims to provide an in-depth explanation about the WHAT-AND-HOW questions on women's involvement in the national agendas and peace process that particularly led to the signature of the peace agreements. One of the agreements is followed by the formation of a Transitional Government.

1.4. Research Objective

This research has two objectives; General and Specific.

1.4.1. General Objective

This research will examine some of the practices concerning both the analysis of South Sudanese women's involvement in the recently signed peace agreement, the afterward political decisions, and their inclusion in the peacebuilding process while examining how their existence impact reverting the conflict situations in South Sudan. Furthermore, the research assesses the challenges that hinder the effective participation of women in peace-building while proposing recommendations that may help address this persistent underutilization of women's vast skills to support durable peace in South Sudan.

1.4.2. Specific Objective

The present research has the following three specific objectives;

- Examine the role of women in armed conflicts in South Sudan;
- Review the place of women during the 2015 and 2018 Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan;
- Assess opinions of stakeholders on the sustainability of the peace agreement?

CHAPTER TWO

2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents key themes in Peace and conflict studies, including conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and security. The Chapter further emphasizes the influence of women in both peace and conflict situations by introducing empirical and theoretical concepts. The chosen theoretical framework combines for this study is theories about peace and conflict theory combined with the concept of agency and feminism and empirical studies on the subject.

2.2. Conceptualizing conflict and peace

There is no one universally agreed-upon definition and understanding of conflict and there are several definitions about the concept. The definitions are derived from a different point of view among scholars and writers. Conflict, which derives from the Latin word, as Miller (2005) indicates refers to a clash or engage in the fight, or it is a confrontation between one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible goals.

This definition is further amplified in many wordings by many other scholars. According to these two scholars, conflict is a situation in which at least two actors, or their representatives, try to pursue their perceptions of incompatible goals by physically damaging or destroying the property and high-value symbols of one confrontation between one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible goals (Sandole and Merwe, 1993).

conflict is an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values, and beliefs that arise as a new form of action generated by a social change. The definitions of conflict defined above reflect the negativity of conflict (Ramsbotham, 2005).

The British Political Scientist John Burton believes conflict as an inevitable, intrinsic, and constructive process of social life. Conflict is an essential creative element in human relationships. It is the means to, how our social values of warfare, security, justice, and opportunities for personal

development can be achieved. The existence of a flow of conflict is the only that the aspiration of society will be attained. Indeed, conflict is to be enjoyed (Burton, 1972).

Therefore, from the aforementioned information, we can frame that conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social life that humans face daily. It arises due to incompatibility or a clash of interests, values, needs, wants, and goals between individuals and groups.

The Concept of Peace on the other hand defines a state of mind felt as a consequence of the actualization of certain stated human desires. That is, it is a feeling of internal serenity as a result of external stability that also describes peace as touching the concept of law and order. That is, an anticipated social order achievable through the instrumentality of force and the threat of it (Galtung, 1967).

This concept, however, does not ignore violence; rather it erects regulations and outlines punishments to produce and maintain a state of tranquility. Also, there is the idea of peace as an absence of any mutually agreed hostility, otherwise known as “negative peace”. It is important to note that this only rules out the existence of deliberate violence between groups or states, but considers the need for occasional revolts, protests, demonstrations, et cetera.

On the other hand, a condition of order conjured by respect for human socio-cultural diversity is called “positive peace”. It is a social condition where multi-culture is respected; multi-ethnic is loved; multi-idea is welcomed; multiregional is embraced; minorities are protected; equality of rights, equity, justice, guided liberty, and freedom is guaranteed. Therefore, the characteristics of peace in International Relations could be cooperation and integration (Scherrer, 2007).

There have been numerous attempts to define what peace is and can be, in a more or less systematic manner. First, the concept of peace has been closely connected to other societal phenomena presumably causing peace. Examples of such definitions are democratic peace, liberal peace, institutional peace, constitutional peace, capitalist peace, and republican peace. The starting point of all these definitions is that peace occurs in contexts where people are free to make their own choices and able to settle their differences in a non-violent manner (Johansson and Saati, 2019).

Second, several concepts are aiming to define different ideal types of peace focusing either on the character or on the quality of peace. Most take their starting point in Galtung’s definitions of

negative and positive peace, meaning an absence of direct violence or absence of structural violence, and aim to further specify what a “good peace” or “less than good peace” might mean. Thus, we have quality peace, just peace, elusive peace, conditional peace, cold peace, precarious peace, victor’s peace, imposed peace, and many more (Galtung, 1996).

Most of these conceptualizations can be sorted as either variations of positive or variations of negative conceptualization of peace. Furthermore, there have been attempts to structure peace with adjectives definitions on a positive-negative peace scale (Umoh and Udoh, 2011).

While they all contribute to our understanding of what peace is and might be in a particular case or even a group of cases, they are standalone concepts that do not relate to one another in a way that would enable a coherent and systematic study of variety. At best, these concepts can have an either/or dichotomous relationship, but still cannot capture the nuances in observed differences across space and time, making them useful for studies of particular cases, but not for comprehensive comparative studies of peace (Klein, 2008).

Third, researchers have tried to re-conceptualize peace in attempts to critique the notions of liberal peace and liberal peacebuilding by including local aspects and cultural diversity in studies of post-war peace. Most notably, the concept of hybrid peace was introduced to juxtapose international and local/indigenous perceptions of peace (Richmond and Mitchell, 2012).

Agonistic peace can also be considered a part of this school of thinking (Shinko, 2008), as well as Dietrich’s typology of understandings of peace as either energetic, moral, modern, post-modern, or trans-rational, arguing for a culturally pluralistic understanding of peace. All these conceptualizations point to the need to broaden the understanding of peace as something complex, cultural, and context-dependent. Yet, once again, systematic comparative studies of peace are not much helped by these definitions. They are useful as they deepen the understanding of what peace is and might be in some cases, yet less suitable for efforts at capturing variety (Dietrich and Sutzl, 2006).

2.3. Theories of conflict

The magnificent number of available platforms to disseminate information and the globalized nature of our world has led Governments to think tanks, and some International Non-Governmental Organizations to track monitor, and report on all the recent developments that happened in our world. Among the diverse agendas, the issue of conflict gains strong attention among these actors due to the greater interest to engage with one another (Rudolph, 2003).

Strong narrations and write-ups, encyclopedic compilations, and analyses on recent civil wars and ethnic conflicts are given, and in-depth monographs on particular countries testing theories of conflict. Because states are the actors in world affairs when sub-state identities and loyalties undermine the legitimacy and stability of states and insurgencies spillover from weak states to neighbors, international conflict management of the state system is at risk. Foremost among these destabilizing sub-state entities are ethnopolitical, ethnonational, and ethnoreligious movements. (Oberschall,2010)

There are five theories about contemporary wars. These theories are not mutually exclusive; all assume that in the post-World War Two eras of anti-colonial, self-determination, and human rights discourse, ethnonational groups enjoy legitimacy for pressing claims to cultural and territorial autonomy and group rights and that these claims inevitably clash with the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty in international relations. These theories also recognize that under some infrequent conditions, demographic shifts, weak state institutions, the threat of external attack, the disintegration of multinational states, and a domino effect of self-determination claims, conflict management between regimes, minorities, and other adversaries is vulnerable to breakdown and high risk of armed conflict (Balancie and Grange, 2005). These theories are;

2.3.1. Ancient Hatreds

Assumes ethnic group membership, boundaries, and identities are rigid, long-standing, and primordial – they resist assimilation and erosion from education, secularization, and modernization (Kaplan, 1994). Contentious issues and grievances are endemic in ethnic group relations because they are burdened with culturally transmitted memory of past violent conflicts, myths, fears, and

hostile emotions. Even after long periods of accommodation and ethnic peace, ethnic incidents can rapidly escalate to destructive violence.

The theory is pessimistic about preventing, stopping, and managing these conflicts through policies and reforms. Secession, territorial separation, and separate institutions are more likely to make for ethnic peace (Kaufmann, 1996).

2.3.2. Identity Politics

This component is additionally known as Symbolic Politics holds that in multiethnic societies, the root cause of ethnic conflict is a threatened change in the prevailing ethnic hierarchy of dominance and subordination. Skeptical of primordial ethnic identities, Identity Politics holds that the social construction of group identities is explained by the social psychology of intergroup relations. There is a cultural tendency toward ethnocentrism and group self-defense that is evolutionarily favored, i.e., it is a normal, not a pathological aspect of group relations (Huntington, 1997).

Leaders create national and ethnic identities with powerful symbols and myths that have emotional appeal. Violence breaks out during ethnic rivalry over control of territory and governance amid exaggerated fears of extinction. Unless ethnic relations are properly managed, divisive ethnic myths, symbols, stereotypes, suspicions, and fears resonate in the population and get activated in ethnic cleansing, massacres, and atrocities (Kaufman, 2001).

2.3.3. Contention for Power

Contention for power develops tools for answering some fundamental questions about group relations. The core idea is contentious politics, i.e., a collective political claim that has an impact on the interests of rivals and adversaries. Groups excluded from the polity, the challengers, contend for power, equality, dignity, religious freedom, workers' rights, and oppose their cause (Tilly, 2003).

Restoring civil politics in multiethnic states shattered by war is not possible because the war itself destroys the possibilities for ethnic cooperation. Whether or not Ancient Hatred is a root cause, whether or not manipulative leaders instigate conflict, whether or not poverty and a failed state are causes, whether or not divisive myths, symbols, and identities fuel violence, protracted violent conflict generates hatred, manipulative extremist leaders gain power, the economic and political

underpinnings for stable life are destroyed, identity politics flowers at the expense of shared identities, and conflict management weakness (Oberschall, 2010).

2.3.4. Manipulative Elites

Assumes fragility in ethnic group relations and social construction of identities, as identity politics does, but highlights top-down more than bottom-up mobilization. Elites contend for power by manipulating social divisions and blowing them out of proportion with threat, fear, and hate discourse and propaganda, and with no-compromise, aggressive, crisis politics (Gagnon, 1994/95).

Manipulative Elites are an opportunity-centered conflict theory in as much as elites create opportunities with issues and crises to advance their interests and goals. Conciliation is difficult when rival leaders demonize their adversaries as opponents who can never be trusted and must, therefore, sometimes be eliminated, dominated, or ethnically cleansed. (Oberschall, 2010)

2.3.5. Economic Roots

Locates root causes in a failed economy and a weak state, typically a poor country with an unequal distribution of incomes run by an authoritarian regime. Warlords and violent entrepreneurs organize unemployed youths into armed groups. They may initially be motivated by political goals, but over time they tend to resort to criminal activities for financing rebellion, which becomes entrenched as a way of life. Facilitators of rebellion are mountains and rainforests and a weak and corrupt government (Collier, 2003).

2.4. Theories of peace

Peace theories can be classified into two categories, one in the name of theory and one according to an individual 's view.

Democratic Peace: The first is the democratic peace theory reflects the idea that representative liberal governments can diminish the occurrence of war is one of the most appealing, influential, and at the same time, controversial ideas of our time. The notion of this theory is that democracies are enormously complicated and require significant time. One cannot just set up ballot boxes, hold elections, and create moderate Democrats and Republicans. Issues like rule of law, civic culture, a stable and committed middle class, and legitimacy of a democratic system may take years, if not

decades, to build. Furthermore, in *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder point out that transitional states or semi-democratic regimes may be extremely dangerous and more likely to start wars. There is no guarantee that the introduction of democratic institutions will be smooth, permanent, or accepted by either the political elites in a country or by the masses. Some scholars point out that in most cases of newly created democracies (the third-wave democracies) the political institutions are weak, frail, and easily reversible. One thing remains clear: the ideas and debate on Democratic Peace Theory will persist in both academic and policy circles.

Johan Galtung's peace theory: another theory revolving on peace is the absence of violence. In this sense, Galtung's is as much a theory that defines violence as it is a theory about peace. This peace/violence dualism tends to simplify the continuous nature of social conditions to opposites and so lacks sensitivity to the rather more dialectical character of social change. So, a theory of peace may be based not on the contradistinction to violence, but on a statement of what peace is (as opposed to what it is not).

Galtung's theory of peace, therefore, hinges on his definition of violence. Violence, he says, is the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is. This is appropriate for crude violence that creates, say, physical harm to people's bodies or mental harm to children, yet it ultimately requires some measures of what is possible to determine the extent to which violence occurs.

2.5. Feminist theories of conflict and peace

Feminist theories play an important role in producing alternative views using the multifaceted prism of gender to tell ensuing narratives. These alternative views go beyond the conceptions of traditional military configurations in international politics by providing ideas about co-operative security arrangements and non-state-centric security perspectives (Laukka, 2018).

Feminist Peace and Conflict Theory reflects on the need for visibility of women in conflicts and has led to a broader understanding of security issues. The early twenty-first-century historic reference to pacifist movements and gender aspects claimed by feminists relate mainly to the two

world wars. Yet feminists questioned earlier the gender dynamics of the French Revolution and the exclusion of women from the acclaimed new status of citizenship (Wollstonecraft, 1792).

Pacifists such as Bertha von Suttner or Revolutionaries, like Luxemburg or Goldman (ND), made explicit reference to the plight of women in war and the continuity of private and public tyranny; men's domination in the family and the public domain.

The suffragist movement at the beginning of the twentieth century such as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), its forerunner the Woman's Peace Party (WPP) was founded in 1915 was divided on the line of argument that still prevails in feminist peace and conflict theory in the early twenty-first century: The split between patriotism and pacifism.

For the patriotic faction, the argument was based on participation and decision-making, similar to the position taken by liberal feminists on the question of women in the army. For feminist pacifists, women had a vital contribution to make for peace. In both camps women, rather than gender, became the decisive category for both analysis as well as offering a possible solution.

For essentialist feminists who argue based on the inherent peacefulness of women enacted by motherhood and caring, war is not only affecting women disproportionately, it is the ultimate attack on 'feminine' non-violent ideals. The concern for liberal and equality feminists is based on the restriction of public space by war. Reardon (1985) and Pateman (1988) describe the conditioning of men towards aggression and women to submission as the patriarchal contract that the legitimization of violence and war is based on.

In a similar framework, current feminist peace and conflict theorists argue that war is excluded from decision-making; which particularly affects women. If women are not allowed in the military they are implicitly barred from a primary institution that helps codify and constitute citizenship (Amico, 1996). However, both frameworks agree that women make a vital contribution to maintaining peace. For essentialist feminists, male aggression is the main cause of war. Essentialist feminists see a potential for change by stressing the non-violent potential of 'feminine virtues' to create a peaceful world (Daly, 1978).

For structuralist feminists, the militarized masculinity, inscribed as the founding myth of nation-states, needs as well as perpetuates the construction of a gender dichotomy. Ruddick (1989) coined

the notion of maternal thinking by arguing that care and ‘relation-based thinking is the main pre-condition for a more peaceful society.

In the late nineteen-nineties, post-modernist or deconstructivist feminists such as Butler (1990), argued further, that gender as well as any other identity is created through discursive practice. Since then, a broad variety of liberal, post-structural, and anti-essentialist feminists Linda (1995) argued on the assumption that, if gender is constructed, it can be de-constructed and has no prior relation to the sex of a person. Earlier on, in the mid-nineteen-eighties African-American women as well as Non-Western Feminists criticized the women’s movement as well as feminist peace theory and activism in two substantial ways. For example, Hooks (1984), Mohanty (1991), Moghadam (1994), and others argued that ‘White feminism’ creates a homogenous, monolithic image of ‘third world women’ as victims. In doing so, white middle-class western feminism was criticized as simply replicating the normative setting of the Anglo Christian male by silencing anybody conceived as the ‘Other’.

In addition to this essential criticism, questioning the homogenous identity of women as victims and naming western, white women as perpetrators, another groundbreaking influence challenged the discourse of feminist peace and conflict theory: the narration and accounts of women who participated or fought in liberation movements and claimed their position as liberating.

The experience of female fighters in Nicaragua (Randall, 1994), Africa (Urdang, 1989), Vietnam (Bennett, 1995) made a deep impact on the feminist peace discourse. In the wake of acknowledging women’s experiences in war, both as active fighters as well as victims, the question of inherent peacefulness and maternal thinking, were shattered. Aggression and submission as gendered adjectives conditioning men and women have reflected anew.

Bloodthirsty deities (Ehrenreich, 1997) and warrior queens (Mernissi, 1993) questioned the selective history of female peacemakers. However, the tendency even in feminist peace and conflict theory is to portray female warriors as individual exemptions, as temporary transgressors.

2.6. Empirical literature on peace and conflict

In his 1996 comprehensive work, Galtung highlights the notion of peace studies as an applied science similar to medical studies or health science, informed by an underlying D, P, T paradigm

(diagnosis, prognosis, therapy). In peace studies, diagnosis refers to states of violence, prognosis to processes of violence (increase, same, decrease), and therapy to processes of violence reduction (negative peace) and processes of life enhancement (positive peace).

Galtung's detailed systematization of peace and conflict studies, and the place of structural violence in that system. As pointed out earlier, structural violence is seen as one of three violence that must be addressed if we are to better understand social reality and if we are committed to reducing violence at all levels.

In his recent collaboration, Galtung has formed transcend, a peace and development network for conflict transformation by peaceful means, which builds on his work and that of others to advance peace research with the explicit goal of 'searching for peace' that includes explicit attention to the violence triangle, that is, direct, structural and cultural violence. Peace studies are generally regarded as covering research and teaching on the causes of violence, including war, and the conditions of peace (Stephenson,2008).

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) publishes an annual volume with estimates of each country's military spending. The institute has analyzed the economic impact of the country's military spending and the situation of peace. The volume reflects that during the period of the height of the Cold War, world military spending reached nearly \$1 trillion per year. From 1989 to 1998 it declined, mainly in the former Soviet Union, but since then, world military spending has increased again. This spending has a direct impact on the conflict and war that happened across the world.

Leontief and Duchin (2008) also used an input/output model of the world economy to analyze the economic implications of various levels of reductions in military spending. Their work has concluded that 'All countries would enjoy higher rates of economic growth with lower military spending because they could afford to invest more in their civilian economy'.

In the work *Structural Violence in Peace Research and Peace Action* Weigert (2008) made a research on the concept of structural violence, at least two issues arise. First, how useful is the concept for those doing peace research? Second, how useful is it for those involved in action for peace?

In Donohue's (2000) work on interpersonal conflict, he examined one area of interpersonal conflict research with a broad range of applications that examines crisis bargaining. In a series of studies, Donohue and his colleagues have sought to understand how police negotiators develop relationships with hostage takers and how that relationship affects outcomes in hostage-taking incidents.

A theoretical framework for conceptualizing these relationships functions across two dimensions: affiliation (e.g., trust, liking, and acceptance) and interdependence (e.g., the mutual acceptance of rights and obligations). To track the relationships over the course of each incident, a coding system for verbal immediacy was used to track each relationship as it moved through different phases. The research found that negotiations that demonstrate more relational stability were more likely to yield cooperative agreements.

Braun and Hentschel (2015) publish the research on Intragroup Conflicts. In the early stages of theory and research, conflicts in groups have been described as detrimental to organizational functioning. Yet, within the last decades, the field of intragroup conflict has developed considerably, such that it is now providing more comprehensive insights into the different types of conflict and their consequences.

The underlying goal of this string of research is to identify conditions under which intragroup conflict is destructive or productive and to derive recommendations for improved organizational functioning. While relationship conflict in groups generally decreases satisfaction and performance, task conflict holds advantages for performance on nonroutine tasks. As this finding indicates, not only the type of conflict but also the type of task at hand is crucial for the impact of intragroup conflict.

2.7. Women in conflict and peacebuilding: the gender perspective

The issue of women in peacebuilding has received a lot of attention in different researches. Women have hardly participated in peace negotiations and peacebuilding since then, people usually think that women as victims and therefore ignore the interests of women. The authors also discuss the sociological theory about sex and gender that we are not born into men and women but masculinity

and femininity are socially constructed and taught during childhood and throughout life, a theory that will be developed in the section below and used in this research (Schirch and Sewak, 2005).

Schirch and Sewak also underline the need to adapt to an intersectional perspective where more than just being a woman or a man determines how you are going to act. They argue that the importance of women in peacebuilding should not consist of women being seen the subject of women in peacebuilding has received much attention in research.

Jordan (2003) studied a phenomenon in which women participating in peacebuilding rarely receive the same recognition as men present. She said that women exist to a large extent, but they are not so conspicuous. Jordan believes that women engaged in peacebuilding work often use their knowledge and strength to help other women and increase their influence.

Manchanda (2005) also discusses that since women are the subordinate gender and thus disempowered and are not recognized in the same way as men.

Pankhurst (2003) highlighted a problem. In recent years, more women have been included in the process of achieving peace. Unfortunately, this has not brought a better life for women after the conflict. She discussed the broad assumption that women advocate peace and natural peace. She emphasized that it is assumed that male and female roles are relative. Based on this, the author concludes that women's jobs are generally regarded as feminine jobs, empowering women to work to enhance and expand existing female jobs.

Laura Shepherd (2016) discusses women as agents of change rather than victims of violence. she argues that only letting women be represented as victims of violence undermines their agency and thus the development of peacebuilding activities, in which women can participate and all their experiences of conflict are addressed is undermined.

2.8. Brief summary about the conflict in South Sudan

The South Sudanese civil war was a multisided civil war between forces of the government and the opposition. In December 2013, the President of the Republic of South Sudan accused the then vice president Dr. Riek Machar and ten other higher government officials of attempting coup d'état. Despite the accused officials including Machar denied trying to start a coup, they fled to lead the SPLM – in opposition (Global Conflict Tracker, 2018).

With the creation of SPLM-IO, an intensified fight broke out with the government forces led by the president igniting the civil war. Leaders of the two parties were at the time accused of the death of thousands of civilians and failure to reach an agreement. In January 2014 the first ceasefire agreement was reached, however, the ceasefire agreement didn't stop the war. Fighting continued in the youngest nation that led to the involvement of external actors to intervene in both positive and negative ways (ibid).

The fight in South Sudan was followed by several more failed ceasefire agreements. Negotiations mediated by IGAD as well as the African Union, United Nations, China, the EU, USA, UK, and Norway. A peace agreement is known as the "Compromise Peace Agreement" was signed in August 2015.

The peace agreement was followed by Machar returning to Juba in 2016 and appointed as a vice president. Following a second breakout of fighting within Juba, the SPLM-IO fled to the surrounding and previously peaceful Equatorial region. Kiir replaced Machar as First Vice President with Taban Deng Gai that split the SPLM-IO.

Following the Failure of the 2015 peace agreement, the conflict in South Sudan gives birth to different internal warring actors on the ground. The factions (warring groups) have resulted in three different ways. This includes;

-The splitting of the opposition (SPLM-IO) into divisions.

-Splitting of the government: this happened with the rise of few individuals who opposed the president and set to form another warring party. For Instance; rivalry among the Dinka factions led by the President and Paul Malong Awan also led to fighting.

-The rising of new armed groups of political formations that opposed both the stances of the Government and SPLM-IO.

CHAPTER THREE

3. METHOD

3.1. Research Design

This chapter discusses the method employed for the present research. A mixed research method consisting of a combination of the qualitative and quantitative methods was used for the study. Its specific objective is addressed by corresponding a research approach. Specific objective one is achieved by employing quantitative method whereas specific objective two uses document review and specific objective three applies key informant interview.

3.2. Sampling and Data

The analysis applies the availability sampling technic where all the 15 political parties (including one umbrella party representing nine political parties). All 15 observations were used in the analysis. qualitative and quantitative data were collected through various approaches by using primary and secondary sources.

3.2.1. Qualitative Data

The qualitative study uses both primary and secondary sources. Primary data is collected through snowball chains and key informant interviews (face-to-face and on the telephone) with respondents. As far as interviewed stakeholders are concerned, the study is limited in the sense that it covers a limited number of organizations and individuals who participated during the peace process.

The limit on the stakeholders is because IGAD has selected very few regional and international actors to participate in the peace effort. The study includes all involved actors. For the secondary sources, document review and analysis are used. The purpose of carrying out the qualitative part of the research is to gain a detailed understanding of the role of women in conflict and peace building as well as the sustainability of the peace process by addressing the whys and hows of the phenomenon in question.

Objective two and three of this study employed qualitative methods composed of document reviews and interviews with actors and stakeholders.

3.2.2. Quantitative Data

Quantitative data which is used for addressing specific objective one was obtained from secondary sources. Data for all the variables are obtained from the Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

3.3. Analysis

3.3.1. Qualitative Analysis

A symphesis of qualitative contents analysis and document analysis is used for the analysis of the open-ended questions from the interviewees and reviewed documents.

3.3.2. Statistical tests

A statistical test provides a mechanism for making quantitative decisions about a process. Tobit regression model assumes normal distribution and homoscedastic error. Thus, the test of normality and Heteroscedasticity is conducted.

i) Test of Normality

If the data are not normally distributed, the result and mean is not a representative value of our data. A wrong selection of the representative value of a data set and further calculated significance level using this representative value might give a wrong interpretation. Therefore, a test of the normality of the data is conducted to decide whether the mean is applicable as a representative value of the data or not (Altman and Bland, 1995).

Test for normality is conducted by using Shaapiro wilk and Shapiro-francise having a null hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed and an alternative hypothesis that the residuals are non-normal.

ii) Test for Heteroscedasticity

Heteroscedasticity refers to data with unequal variability across a set of second, predictor variables. Thus, heteroscedasticity is the absence of homoscedasticity.

The existence of heteroscedasticity is a major concern in regression analysis, as it invalidates statistical tests of significance that assume that the modeling errors all have the same variance. Therefore, a heteroscedasticity test is conducted to find whether the variance in the error term is constant or homoscedastic (Frost, ND). Test for homoscedasticity is conducted by using White and Breusch-Pagan Tests for homoscedasticity. The null hypothesis is that the residuals are homoscedastic whereas the alternative hypothesis is that the residuals are heteroscedastic.

3.3.2. Estimated Model

3.3.2.1. Tobit model

The quantitative method applies Tobit regression analysis for attaining a specific objective. The Tobit regression model analyzes the relationship of the dependent variable with the list of independent variables.

The Tobit model is employed because the data consists of a combination of censored and truncated data. The general Tobit regression model is specified as;

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i + \beta_2 x_i^2 + \beta_3 x_i + \beta_4 x_i + \beta_5 x_i + \beta_5 x_i + \varepsilon_i$$

y denotes the dependent variable that is related to a set of independent (or explanatory) variables given by x . The parameters β_1, β_2 are the regression coefficients associated with x and ε is the random error term (McDonald and Moffitt, 1980).

3.3.2.1.1. Variables included in the Model

A. Dependent Variable

i) The number of armed conflicts

Since the outbreak of the South Sudan civil war in 2013 between SPLM and SPLM-IO, other political parties with an armed group have established their respective wings in certain areas. During this time, the Government of South Sudan has made several operations on different bases against armed groups actively that fights from an area. This dependent variable has the probability to be influenced by the independent variables given below and is measured by the number of incidents of armed conflicts since 2013 as indicated in Table 1.

B. Explanatory Variables

i) Duration of formation of the political parties

Although most political actors engaged in the South Sudan armed conflicts are established following the outbreak of the 2013 conflict, few actors were established even before the outbreak of the conflict. This variable is measured in the number of months since the establishment of the Party. It is expected that political parties with old establishments may have high military capacity than those formed recently. This may lead to incidents of conflicts.

ii) The military capacity of the political actors

Each political actor with an armed group has several fighters who are committed to giving their lives for the cause. The number of fighters depends on the support the party gains from the community or the ethnicity it represents. This variable is measured by political parties with the number of fighters(troops). A high military capacity may lead to an increase in the number of armed conflicts than the one with limited troops.

iii) Gender composition of executive committee members

The involvement and impact of South Sudanese women during the conflict and peace process being the centric concept of this study, it is important to see the effect of women's involvement in the leadership within each political party. This variable is measured as the proportion of females within the parties' executive committees. The proportion of females within the parties' executive committee may or may not impact the intensification of an armed conflict.

iv) The ethnic composition of the political parties

Political parties which are composed of the different ethnicities within South Sudan are considered as ‘Diverse’ political parties while those established under the root of a single ethnic background are considered as ‘ethnic affiliated political parties. The variable takes a value of 1 for diverse ethnic affiliated political parties and 0 for single ethnic affiliated political parties. A political party composed of a single ethnicity may intensify the armed conflict as compared to a diverse one.

v) Education of leadership

The education variable represents the number of years the leadership of the political party spent in schooling. The data for the educational years of the leadership are retrieved from biographies of the leaders as well as credible sources. This variable is measured by years of completed schooling. Education of leaders is expected to have a negative effect on the number of conflicts because more educated leaders are expected to prefer resolving conflicts through negotiations rather than armed fightings.

vi) Age of Leadership

The age of leadership is expected to contribute to the escalation or de-escalation of conflicts. Younger leaders may generate and welcome innovative ideas for reconciliations. On the other hand, younger leaders may be more aggressive especially when they are less educated. This variable is measure by the number of years.

Table 1: Variables included in the model

Variables	Abbreviation	Number	Description
Dependent Variable			
Number of Armed Conflicts	Nac	Number of conflicts since 2013	The number of armed conflicts the actor has been involved in since the outbreak of the civil war in 2013.
Explanatory Variables			
Duration of formation	DoF	Months	The duration since the formation of political parties.
Military capacity	Mc	No. of troops	The number of combatants the political actor has.
Gender composition of the executive committee	Exf	% of females executive members	The proportion of female executives the political party has.
Ethnic composition	Ethn	Diverse = 1 Single ethnic group = 0	The diversity of ethnic groups the political party represents
Age of leadership	Age	Years	The age of the political party leader
Number of years of completed schoolings of leadership	Edu	Years of completed schooling	The education level of political party leaders.

3.3.3. Empirical Tobit model

The first specific objective employed the Tobit regression model to analyze the relationship of the dependent variable with the list of explanatory variables. The dependent variable in this study is the number of Armed Conflicts (Nac) while the explanatory variables include duration of formations of Political Parties (DoF), Military Capacity (Mc), Gender compositions of Executive Committee (Exf), ethnic compositions (Ethn), Age of leadership (Age), and educational of leadership (Edu) are specified below.

$$Nac = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DoF_i + \beta_2 Mc_i + \beta_3 Exf_i + \beta_4 Ethn_i + \beta_5 Age_i + \beta_5 Edu_i + \varepsilon_i$$

CHAPTER FOUR

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Chapter presents the descriptions of political actors and analysis and findings of the role of women and other factors contributing to armed conflict and sustainability of peace efforts. It also discusses the place of women in the 2015 and 2018 peace agreements.

4.1. Description of the political actors in South Sudan

Upon the signing of the 2018 peace agreement, there were a total of fifteen (15) political actors. Among them, SPLM had the power to rule the Republic of South Sudan since its independence. Below are brief descriptions of the political actors engaged in the South Sudan conflict (based on ISS, 2018).

Federal Democratic Party: Formed in August 2015, have an average military capacity of 17 thousand fighters, led by Mr. Peter Gadet, part of the South Sudan Opposition Alliance, which operates mainly around the Fangak area.

National Democratic Movement: Formed in September 2016, have an average military capacity of 8500 fighters, led by Mr. Lam Akol, part of the South Sudan Opposition Alliance, operate mainly around the Fashoda area. National Democratic Movement is among the armed political parties with the lowest military capacity.

National Salvation Front: Formed in March 2017, has an average military capacity of 125 thousand fighters, led by Mr. Thomas Cirillo, part of South Sudan Opposition Alliance, operate mainly around the Kapoeta, Imatong, and Yei River.

South Sudan Liberation Movement: Formed in October 2016, has an average military capacity of 130 thousand fighters, led by Mr. Bapiny Montuil, part of the South Sudan Opposition Alliance, operate mainly around the Northern Liech. The South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) was a resurrection of an armed group that fought against the SPLA in the 22-year war. The dates that are listed for its founding are taken from when B Monytil defected from the government.

South Sudan National Movement for Change: Formed in January 2017, has an average military capacity of 50 thousand fighters, led by Bangasi Joseph Bakosoro, part of South Sudan Opposition Alliance, Operate mainly around the Amadi, Gbudwe, Maridi, Tambura, and Yei River.

South Sudan Patriotic Movement: Formed in April 2017, has an average military capacity of 15 thousand fighters, led by Mr. Costello Garange Ring Lual, part of the South Sudan Opposition Alliance, operate mainly around the Aweil East. South Sudan Patriotic Movement is the youngest political group established.

South Sudan United Movement: Formed in July 2017, has an average military capacity of 8,500 fighters, led by Mr. Peter Gadet, part of South Sudan Opposition Alliance, operate mainly around the Northern Liech. South Sudan United Movement is among the armed political parties with the lowest military capacity. South Sudan United Movement (SSUM) was a resurrection of armed groups that fought against the SPLA in the 22-year war. The dates that are listed for its founding are taken from when Gadet defected from the SPLM-IO.

Sudan People's Liberation Movement-SPLM (Government): Formed in 1983, has an average military capacity of 250 thousand fighters, led by President Salva Kiir, Presence throughout the country. SPLM-IO has the largest Military Capacity and is the oldest in an establishment. SPLM has the highest female Executive member.

Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition: Formed in December 2013, has an average military capacity of 165 thousand fighters, led by Dr. Riek Machar, Presence throughout rural parts of Greater Upper Nile, Greater Equatoria (Yei River, Gbudwe, Maridi, Amadi, Kapoeta, and Imatong) and Greater Bahr-El Ghazal (Wau and Lol).

United Democratic Republic Alliance: Formed in February 2017, has an average military capacity of 8500 fighters, led by Mr. Gathwech Koang Thich, part of South Sudan Opposition Alliance, operation area unknown. United Democratic Movement is among the armed political parties with the lowest military capacity.


National Agenda: Formed in 2013, has no armed group (military formations), led by Joseph Ukel Abango, part of other political parties. National Agenda has the oldest leader.

National Alliance: Formed in 2013, has no armed group (military formation), led by Mr. Kornelio Kon Ngu, part of other political parties.

People’s Democratic Movement: Formed in 2015, has no armed group (military formation), led by Dr. Hakim Dario, part of the South Sudan Opposition Alliance.

SPLM Leaders Former Detainees: Formed in 2015, has no armed group (military formation), led by Mr. Pagan Amum, part of South Sudan Opposition Alliance. SPLM Leaders Former Detainees is officially formed upon the signing of the ARCSS. The Former Detainees were not an organized party until the signature of the first peace agreement.

Umbrella: Formed in 2015, has no armed group (military formation), led by Mr. Peter Mayen Majongdit, part of other political parties. Umbrella has the youngest leader.



Caption: Time line on the formation of political parties since the outbreak of the 2013 civil war.

Source: R-JMEC/Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (2018)

Table 2: descriptive statistics of variables included in the model

Variables	Abbreviation	Measurement Unit	Min	Max	Mean	SD
Dependent Variable						
Number of armed fonflicts	Nac	Number of conflicts since 2013	0	15	2.647	3.779
Independent Variables						
Duration of formation	DoF	Months	50	452	110.88	100.896
MilitarycCapacity	Mc	No. of troops	0	250	60.441	70.001
Gender composition of the executive committee	Exf	No. of females	0	0.227	0.06	0.089
Ethnic composition	Ethn	Diverse = 1 Single thnic roup = 0	0	1	0.5294	0.516
Age of leadership	Age	Years	47	82	62.5296	8.713
Number of years of completed schoolings of Leadership	Edu	Years of completed schooling	12	25	17.8	4.229

On Average 2.65 fightings(operations) have been carried out per political Party within 92 months (7.6 years) with the maximum incidents of conflict being 15. The average duration of formation of the political parties is 110 months (9 years) with minimum and maximum being 50 and 452 months respectively. The average military capacity is 60,441 troops (combatants) with the minimum and maximum being 0 and 250,000 troops respectively.

The average proportion of female executive committee composition is 0.0617, the minimum being 0 and maximum being 0.0227. Of the 15 political parties, 9 have diverse ethnic representation whereas the rest 6 have a single-ethnic affiliation. The average age of the party leader is 62 years the minimum being 47 and the maximum 82 years. The leaders on average spent 17 years in schooling the minimum being 12 years and the maximum 25 years.

4.2 Results of statistical tests

Tests for the violation of assumptions of homoscedasticity and normality are conducted. Results for Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia tests for normality are shown in Table 3 and those of White's test and Breusch-Pagan test for homoscedasticity are shown in Table 4. Both assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity were met as discussed underneath tables.

i) Normality

Tests for the violation of assumptions of normality have been conducted using Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia tests (Shapiro and Francia, 1972).

Table 3: Results of tests of Normality: Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia Tests

Model	Test Name	Observation	W	V	Z	P-value
I	Shapiro-Wilk	15	0.975	0.488	-1.419	0.922
II	Shapiro-Wilk	15	0.979	0.412	-1.753	0.960
I	Shapiro-Francia	15	0.983	0.366	-1.773	0.962
II	Shapiro-Francia	15	0.986	0.304	-2.100	0.982

An important assumption of the Tobit regression model is that the distribution of the error terms shall follow a normal distribution. The reason for undertaking this test is that the non-normality of the distribution may lead to incorrect results for inference making or tests.

The normality test has a null hypothesis stating that the residuals are normally distributed, and the alternative hypothesis that the residuals are non-normal. The P-value is high in the test showing that the assumption of a normal distribution is met (Table 3).

ii) Heteroscedasticity

the Tobit regression model assumes that the variance of the error term is constant or homoscedastic. If heteroscedasticity exists, the results are less efficient and make the statistical inferences less reliable. If the size of the error term differs across values of the independent

variable, or the variance of the residuals is not constant, the series encountered heteroscedasticity (Frost, ND).

White’s test and Breusch-Pagan test for homoscedasticity were used to test the assumption of homoscedasticity of the error terms. The null hypothesis for the test of heteroscedasticity states that the residuals are homoscedastic, whereas the alternative hypothesis says that the residuals are heteroscedastic. As given in Table 4 both test results confirm that the residuals are homoscedastic.

Table 4: Results of tests of homoscedasticity: White and Breusch-Pagan Tests

Model	Test Name	Test Statistic	P-Value
I	White’s Test (Homoscedasticity)	15	0.3782
II	White’s Test (Homoscedasticity)	15	0.3782
I	Breusch-Pagan Test (Homoscedasticity)	2.4764	0.8711
II	Breusch-Pagan Test (Homoscedasticity)	5.6634	0.4619

4.3. The role of women in armed conflicts in South Sudan

To examine the role of women during the armed conflict in South Sudan, a Tobit regression analysis was conducted for a number of armed conflicts on a set of explanatory variables; namely, the duration of formation, the military capacity, gender compositions of the executive committee, ethnic compositions, age of leadership, and education of leadership. Here, the focus is the proportion of female executive committee members within the political actors in South Sudan.

Table 5: Tobit for number of conflicts

Number of Armed Conflicts	Coef. (St. error).
Duration of formation	0.029 (0.005) ***
Military capacity	0.019 (0.006) ***
Gender compositions of the executive committee	-1.061 (4.099)
Ethnic composition	-1.456 (0.705) *
Education of leadership	0.095 (0.077)
Age of leadership	0.017 (0.042)

Constant		-3.896 (3.201)	
Mean dependent var	2.000	SD dependent var	3.780
Pseudo r-squared	0.467	Number of obs	15.000
Chi-square	31.566	Prob > chi2	0.000
Akaike crit. (AIC)	52.013	Bayesian crit. (BIC)	57.677
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$			

The Tobit regression model shows that the proportion of women in the executive committees has no statically significant effect on the number of armed conflicts. This implies that gender does not influence the intensification of armed conflicts.

The results also indicate that the duration of months since the formation of a party and troop size were statistically significant predictors of the number of armed conflicts (each at 1% level of significant). A one-month change in the duration of formation of a party will increase the number of armed conflicts on average by 0.029. That is, in every three years age of a party ($36 \text{ months} \times 0.029 = 1.044$), it is likely for the party to be engaged in at least one-armed conflict.

Similarly, military capacity predicted the average number of armed conflicts. For every one-unit increase in troop size, the number of conflicts will rise by 0.019 assuming other factors do not change. A difference of 50,000 troops ($50 \text{ troop size} \times 0.019 = 0.95$) between parties will bring about a difference of nearly one-armed conflict. Also, ethnicity, diverse versus single ethnic composition of a party, has marginally significant (at 10% level), effect on the number of armed conflicts. On the other hand, the educational level and age of the leader did not contribute to the prediction of a number of armed conflicts.

4.4. The place of women during the 2015 and 2018 agreement

4.4.1. The place of women during the 2015 Agreement

They were also actively engaged in the independence movement as combatants and caregivers to wounded soldiers. At the outbreak of the 2013 conflict, women's groups, some of which were


active during the CPA process quickly mobilized to call for a cessation of hostilities and women's participation in the IGAD-led peace talks (Reilly, 2015).

When conflict erupted in South Sudan in December 2013, IGAD immediately called its 23rd Extraordinary Summit, which took place in Nairobi, Kenya, on 27 December 2013, to discuss the South Sudan situation. During the time, three male envoys were appointed to head the South Sudan Process. The three envoys at the time were supported by a technical team composed of 8 women and 24 males (Vertin, 2018).

The assigning of the task force was followed by the holding of the first phase of peace negotiations in 2013. It was a time of the outbreak of the civil war in the Republic of South Sudan. During the first phase of delegation the government of the Republic of South Sudan didn't bring women in its delegation, however, SPLM-IO surprisingly, invited three women together with other 7 negotiators to take part in the reconciliation effort. At the time, women made up 9% of the witnesses to the peace negotiations (JMEC, 2015).

During the second phase, the government added three women to its negotiating team. The action was followed after the push by several women network groups advocating for women's inclusivity in the peace efforts. The second phase was made up of 7% of witnesses to the peace negotiations and 8% of the negotiating teams. During the talks leading up to the 2015 peace deal, 33 women lobbied for 40% representation in all institutions of the Transitional Government of National Unity, including ministerial positions, and they were granted 25% representation within the national assembly. They were also granted ministerial posts and presidential advisers' positions but these were considered to be of cosmetic value, as they could not influence the decision-making process (JMEC, 2015).

The Women's Bloc of South Sudan a network of civil society leaders also served as formal observers and signatories of the 2015 agreement and as members of the JMEC, who monitored the implementation of the agreement. The executive positions in South Sudan according to the 2015 agreement are divided between the Government controlling 53%, SPPLM IO-33%, Former Detainees -7%, and Political formations who attended the 2014 Addis Ababa Symposium to hold the rest 7%. It is from the aforementioned power-sharing percentage that women were given a 25% quota. Table 6 shows how women were represented during the process of the 2015 agreement



Caption: 2015 power-sharing agreement

Source: IGAD, 2018

Table 6: Women representative at the negotiating table

Women representative at the negotiating table		
Status	Description	Sources
Observer	In August 2014, the Women’s Bloc secured observer status in the negotiations. This enabled women representatives to listen but not contribute during the negotiations	Soma, 2020
Direct representatives at the Negotiating table	Women made up six of the 18-person civil society delegation accredited for the June 2014 round of talks. There were two women signatories to the agreement, one specifically representing women	UNMISS and ARCSS 2015
Consultation	The Women’s Monthly Forum on Peace and Political Processes in South Sudan held consultations with women from communities across South Sudan, providing updates and gathering input on women’s perspectives, to inform their public positions and to share with civil society delegates when they were back in the country between rounds of the negotiations	. Nasiwa, 2019

<p>Inclusive Commission</p>	<p>South Sudan’s 2011 Transitional Constitution mandated 25% representation of women in decision-making positions in government, institutions, and commissions. This was upheld in the peace agreement. The ARCSS also explicitly provided for the inclusion of different stakeholder groups (including women’s groups) in the peace process implementation institutions and commissions.</p>	<p>Murungi, 2019</p>
<p>Mass Action</p>	<p>In March 2015, when the peace talks risked collapse, the Women’s Monthly Forum (WMF) organized a procession in Juba with representatives from all 10 states, calling for parties to return to the negotiating table</p>	<p>Soma, 2020</p>

4.4.2. The place of women during the 2018 Revitalized Agreement

A one-to-one interview with Respondent 1 stressed the 2018 Agreement is the most successful Agreement South Sudan Political Actors made to realize a comparatively peaceful period in the youngest nation. There was a commitment seen by all sides of negotiators that finally leads to the signature date on September 12, 2018. Regional leaders have endorsed the creation of a new initiative in South Sudan, and the High-Level Revitalized Forum (HLRF) is intended to revive the stalled 2015 peace agreement. Therefore, different processes and pro-peace agreement consensus were made before the 2018 major peace agreement. In light of this, major Four agreements were reached in various issues of concern among signatories (Respondent 1, 2021).

The four pre-agreements were considered to pave the way to solve major differences among warring actors in South Sudan. Regards to the 2018 R-ARCSS agreement have significant changes in the scope of the Executive and Legislative arms of government. Following the signature, the size of the government has been expanded because the number of actors in the conflict has increased, and almost every party demands adequate representation in the cabinet and parliament. 15 Political parties (armed and non-armed groups) have participated during the peace effort.

Regarding the involvement of women during the peace effort, their participation starts during the four pre-2018 agreements (R-JMEC,2018).

The table below shows women’s presence during the four pre-important agreements that paved a way for the 2018 signature.

Table 7: Gender composition on the Agreement of the cessation of hostilities (First Pre-Agreement)

First Pre-Agreement					
	Date	Actors of Signatories	Men	Women	Total
HLRF Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities	December 21 st 2017	Political Parties	14	0	14
		Faith-Based Leaders	2	0	2
		Eminent Personality	1	0	1
		Youth Representatives	0	1	1
		Women Bloc	0	1	1
		Business Community	1	0	1
		Academia	0	1	1
		CSOs	1	0	1
		Observers from South Sudan	6	2	8

Source: R-JEMEC, 2018

Table 7 shows the gender participation agreement of cessation of hostilities. Accordingly, the Academia, Women bloc, and youth representative have full women representation while the CSOs, Eminent Personalities, Faith-Based Leaders, and the political parties themselves have full women representation. Women have shared space in the observer's seat.

When IGAD convened discussions on the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in Addis Ababa in December 2017, Deng-Yak and Lopidia were invited to the HLRF, representing the Women’s Bloc and Eve Organization, respectively. These talks had a record number of women civil society delegates accredited to the talks.

Table 8: Gender composition on the Agreement of the protection of civilians and humanitarian Access (Second Pre-Agreement)

Addendum to	Date	Actors of Signatories	Men	Women	Total
the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access	17-22 May 2018	Political Parties	17	1	18
		Faith-Based Leaders	2	0	2
		Eminent Personalities	1	0	1
		Women Bloc	0	1	1
		CSOs	4	3	7
		Business Community	1	0	1
		Academia	1	1	2
		Concerned South Sudanese	1	0	1

Source: R-JMEC,2018

Table 8 shows gender participation in the agreement for the protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access. Accordingly, the women bloc has full women participation as the name itself is gender-centric. The Eminent personalities, Faith Baith leaders, and concerned South Sudanese show full participation of men. The rest have a share of sit both by men and women.

The HLRF Taskforce developed a delegate list based on those stakeholders in the original ARCSS agreement, those stakeholders left out of the agreement; and those on the periphery but who had made strong submissions and suggestions on how to resolve the conflict in South Sudan during the pre-forum consultations. The women and the civil society did something differently. The groups were first proactive to come up with insightful position papers and held meetings where they came out with position papers and for many of them, they were good positions that influenced the HLRF.

The women and civil society stakeholders who were signatories to the ARCSS (2015) continued as stakeholders in the R-ARCSS (2018). The Women’s Bloc had retained its network and continued with Amer Deng-Yak as its chairperson and representative to the R-ARCSS negotiations. The Civil Society Alliance remained as a network, with Alokiir Malual as its chairperson and representative to the R-ARCSS negotiations.

Table 9: Gender composition on the Agreement of the security arrangements (Third Pre-Agreement)

Date		Actors of Signatories	Men	Women	Total
Agreement on the Outstanding Issues on Security Arrangements of the Republic of South Sudan	July 6, 2018	Political Parties	9	1	10
		Witnesses	2	0	2

Source: R-JMEC,2018

Table 9 shows gender participation in the agreement for the security arrangements of the Republic of South Sudan. Accordingly, the witnesses were fully represented by a male while a share of sit by both genders in the political parties.

Table 10: Gender composition on the Agreement of governance (Forth Pre-Agreement)

Agreement on the Outstanding Issues on Governance of the Republic of South Sudan	Date	Actors of Signatories	Men	Women	Total
	August 5,2018	Political Parties	5	0	5
		Faith-Based Leaders	1	0	1
		Eminent Personality	1	0	1
		Women Bloc	0	1	1
		CSOs	1	1	2

Source: R-JMEC,2018

Table 10 shows gender participation in the agreement for Governance in the Republic of South Sudan. Accordingly, the women bloc is fully represented by women while the rest three lack women participation.

The 2018 R-ARCSS happened after the four aforementioned pre-agreement that was reached among the warring parties.

4.4.3. Women's share of power: ARCSS versus R-ARCSS

Women's civil society organizations (CSOs) were a powerful weapon to push hard to realize long-standing stability in South Sudan through various advocacy campaigns and awareness building to the international community about the situation in South Sudan. The coalition of women was not just active after the outbreak of the 2013 civil war, but the engagement was equally fruitful and paved the way in mobilizing turnout for the 2011 South Sudanese independence referendum. During the two peace agreements, the involvement of women was among the issue of discussion in the process of establishing a reconciled government (Respondent 2, 2021).

Respondent 3 who is part of the government (SPLM/A) on their part reiterated the political and personal interests sometimes over-road identification with and prioritization of cross-cutting women's issues. The 2015 Agreement saw a little commitment in the assignment of the 25% quota while there were major positive adjustments made during the 2018 peace agreement that gives 35% of the power share to South Sudan women. South Sudan made a very remarkable decision in the inclusivity of women across the major power structures and hierarchies. Women across the globe are largely marginalized and woefully underrepresented in formal peace processes. Many studies have also proved this statement.

South Sudan, women made up only 15% of delegates in negotiations that led to the 2015 peace agreement, and 25% during the 2018 negotiations shows that the country has represented a higher level of women's representation than in many peace processes around the world. The South Sudan government in the process of the two-peace effort was working on women's meaningful inclusion by which every concern was reflected throughout the process institutional mechanism which was set up to facilitate the implementation of both the 2015 and 2015 agreements saw a major involvement by women as peace striver (Respondent 3, 2021). The institutions and mechanisms were framed with the following consensus to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreements through the division of various segments; for example. A segment on peace, security, national matters which the political actors negotiated to work on jointly (IGAD,2018).

Table 11: Women's representation during ARCSS (2015) institutions and mechanisms

Women's representation during ARCSS (2015) institutions and mechanisms				
Institution/Mechanism	Total no. of representatives	Number of women	Number of men	Percentage of women represented
Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC)	32	1	31	3%
Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR)	20	1	19	1.05%
Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM)	21	1	20	1.05%
National Constitutional Amendment Committee	8	0	8	0%
Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission -JMEC	32	4	28	8%
Strategic Defense% and Security Review -SDSR Board	20	4	16	5%
Total	133	11	122	8.27%

Source: IGAD, 2020

Table 11 shows there were a total of six institutions formed during the ARCSS (2015) to facilitate the formation of a transitional government. The Total Representatives from all institutions make up 133 members where 122 of them were males and the rest 11 were females. The Average total proportional representation of women makes 8.27% (IGAD,2020).

Respondent 4 believes South Sudanese women's groups were at the forefront of advocating for the effective implementation of the 2018 agreement even higher than the 2015 agreement. Despite the many achievements, women's engagement in the peace process had to face several challenges including the patriarchal system that pushes women to effectively operate in the male-dominated negotiations, however, the existing women members have contributed a lot to the peace process being the focus of these objectives, stakeholders were asked how the 35% quota was realized. A one-to-one interview with Respondent 4 from SPLM/A that (Respondent 4,2021).

Respondent 5 on his part explained the R-ARCSS process saw the accreditation of more women and civil society activists as delegates with an equal voice in the formal process. The women and civil society stakeholders who were signatories to the ARCSS continued as stakeholders in the R-ARCSS. The Women's Bloc had retained its network and continued with Amer Deng-Yak as its

chairperson and representative to the R-ARCSS negotiations. The Civil Society Alliance remained as a network, with Alokiiir Malual as its chairperson and representative to the R- ARCSS negotiations. Of the 17 stakeholders who signed the R- ARCSS, seven were women. At the time of the reconciliation, IGAD encouraged political parties to include women in their delegations. Every delegation was expected to nominate three members to sit as a negotiator with at least one woman. Despite the start was slow and the number of women in the warring political parties was only 11 out of 90 participants, the ending of the process saw an increase in the number of women participants during the whole reconciliation process. By the end of the Addis Ababa rounds of talks in May 2018, there were 39 women delegates among 120 participants (Respondent 5, 2021).

political parties that signed the peace agreement are obligated to legally uphold women's presentation and participation in the peace agreement implementation by affirmative action of at least 35% for women. Recently, it was observed that the parties' signatories to the R-ARCSS decided to nominate their delegates to the various R-ARCSS implementation mechanisms and institutions of the National Pre-Transitional Committee without enforcing the principles of affirmative action of at least 35% for women. All the peace agreement (R-ARCSS) implementation mechanisms and Institutions failed to meet the threshold of affirmative action of at least 35% for women participation and representation (Respondent 6,2021). This recent practice sent out a strong alert that if efforts are not now deployed by women in political parties for obligating the parties for compliance and enforcement of the agreed-upon affirmative action of at least 35% for women, then less can be done for enforcement of the affirmative action of at least 35% for women at all level of government during the formation of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity as expected. Weak women in political parties influence on their respective party leadership on enforcement of the affirmative action of at least 35% for women, may lead to below expectation execution of the affirmative action of at least 35% for women at all level of the government. Unlike 2015, the 2018 peace agreement is an all-inclusive process leading to its signature. The process allowed all stakeholders to participate and share their concerns and among the stakeholders include estranged groups, women, and young people (Respondent 6,2021).

The 2018 peace agreement was also ended with the establishment of institutions that will pave the way/facilitate the establishment of reconciled and Transitional Government. The table below

shows the number of representatives from the institutions and the proportion of women within the members in coordinating the establishment of Transitional Government.

Table 12: Women’s representation During the R-ARCSS (2018) institutions and mechanisms

Women’s representation During the R-ARCSS (2018) institutions and mechanisms				
Institution/Mechanism	Total no. of representatives	Number of women	Number of men	Percentage of women represented
National Pre-transitional Committee (NPCT)	10	1	9	10%
National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC)	15	2	13	13.3%
Independent Boundaries Committee (IBC)	13	3	10	23%
Technical Boundary Committee (TBC)	8	1	7	12.5%
Joint Defense Board (JDB)	16	-	16	0%
Joint Transitional Security Committee (JTCS)	16	-	16	0%
Joint Military Ceasefire Committee (JMCC)	15	-	15	0%
Strategic Defense and Security Review Board (SDSR-B)	20	3	17	15%
Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring and Verification mechanism Board (CTSAMVM)	22	9	13	41%
Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC)	23	8	15	34.8%
Total	158	27	132	17.09%

Source: R-JMEC, 2020

Table 12 shows there were a total of Ten institutions formed during the R-ARCSS (2018) to facilitate the formation of a transitional government. The Total Representatives from all institutions make up 158 members where 132 of them were males and the rest 27 were females. The Average total proportional representation of women makes 17.09% (R-JMEC,2020).

Table 13: Average of the 2015 and 2018 women representations in institutional mechanisms

Year	Total	Female	Male	Average
2015	133	11	122	8.27
2018	158	27	132	17.09

Source: IGAD and R-JMEC, 2020

Table 13 shows the number of women participating as a member within the institutions has increased in 2018. The increase in the number of participants has direct relations with the average representation.

4.4.4. Review of the 2015 and 2018 peace Agreement: the general provisions

The 2015 Peace agreement contains 75 pages and includes several topics for implementation and the 2018 Peace agreement contains 122 pages and includes several topics for implementation. Both peace agreements were comprised of Table of Contents; Acronyms; Preamble; Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU); Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements; Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction; Resource, Economic and Financial Management; Transitional Justice, Accountability, Transitional Justice Accountability Reconciliation and Healing; Parameters of Permanent Constitution; Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC); Supremacy of the Agreement and Procedures for its Amendment; Signatories; and Appendixes.

Within each content; both of the agreements contain articles that carry the sentiment of inclusivity, diversity, joint-decision making approaches, humanitarianism, reform on the rule of law, transparency, accountability, rule of law, truth, justice, apology, reparation, compensation, healing, harmony, federalism, reconstruction and development. The agreement is also inclusive of religious contents that were acceptable by all signing parties and stressed reconciliation and healing among warring parties and victims of the ongoing armed conflict. Additionally, the humanitarian and economic aspects of the agreement urge signatories to respect diversity and endorse inclusivity.

Political and Security Provisions: Due to the intensity of the armed conflict among warring actors, the agreements were comprised of Security amendments. A security arrangement was made

aimed to bring together warring parties under one umbrella. According to the security arrangements of both agreements, the capital Juba and other capitals were not going to be demilitarized, instead, there was a re-deployment of the armed forces to a different location. The presidential guard remains the same with few changes. The changes include that the government forces not to mingle with civilians while militarized with uniforms or arms. This was a very good arrangement made that can build confidence to dispel fear among civilians. There will not be foreign armed forces to neutralize the capital but only joint integrated police who shall also be deployed in South Sudan regions with UNMISS' Protection of Civilians (PoC) site.

Another security arrangement stressed the unification of the warring forces months after the signature of the agreement. This arrangement was positive in dis-allowing political leaders to use their respective armed groups to fight/bully their counterparts or the civilians who are largely the victims of the conflict. This arrangement was especially fruitful during the 2018 agreement because most warring actors who have signed the peace agreement are expected to commit to the protocols.

Both agreements also urged the standardized conventional defense forces of the Republic of South Sudan to take their national duty rightfully, far from regionalism or tribalism, or nepotism. The Agreement further stresses that all the allied forces from neighboring countries shall not interfere in the South Sudanese armed conflict. This according to the situation on the ground refers to the forces of Uganda (supporting the Government) and The Republic of Sudan (Supporting both warring parties). In terms of the power-sharing structure at the National Level of, the 2015 agreement executive positions were divided between The Government controlling 53%, SPLM IO-33%, Former Detainees -7%, and Political formations who attended the 2014 Addis Ababa Symposium to hold the rest 7%.

The 2018 agreement on the other side has divided the positions between the Government 55%, SPLM-IO 27%, SSOA: 10%, and OPP: 08%.

Table 14: 2018 Power sharing among warring South Sudanese Actors

Political Actors	Power Sharing at Presidency	Power Sharing at Council of Ministers	Deputy Minister	Power Sharing at National Legislative Assembly	Power Sharing at State and Local Governments
TGONU	3 (50 %)	20 (57%)	5 (50%)	332 (60 %)	55 %
SPLM-IO	1 (17%)	9 (26%)	3 (30%)	128 (23%)	27%
South Sudan Opposition Alliance	1 (17%)	3 (9%)	1 (10%)	50 (9%)	10%
Former Detainees	1 (17%)	2 (6%)	(0%)	10 (2%)	0%
Other Opposition Parties	(0%)	1 (3%)	1 (10%)	30 (5%)	8%

Source: IGAD: 2020

Table 14 shows that The Government shared the highest number of representatives across various national positions followed by SPLM-IO; the largest opposition group in South Sudan. Former Detainees on average have the lowest share in power. Some armed political actors weren't around the peace negotiating table during the 2015 agreement and their absence has left them from sharing position at a national level, however, during the 2018 agreement, most armed political actors were present that paved a way for the holding of executive positions in the Republic of South Sudan.

In the 2015 agreement, some powers have been taken from the President and given to the First Vice President while in the 2018 agreement gives some power of the president to the First Vice president followed by the second-third-fourth and fifth vice president respectively. The Presidency during ARCSS had three members (President, First President, and Vice President) and 30 cabinet Ministers, but in the 2018 R-ARCSS, the Presidency and the cabinet are composed of six members and 35 Ministers respectively. This manifests a significant increase in the number of executive and decision-making bodies disproportionate to the actual population of the country.

In the process of making reforms, the Two agreements have returned members of Parliament at the national or states level who were previously dismissed with the outbreak of the civil war. Both agreements managed to reduce the monopoly of power and wealth at the Presidency level and distribute it among the council of ministers, the parliaments, and the states. The agreements have

the power to tackle differences and conflicts among warring by creating neutral forces in the capital that could make sense of safety predictability. This is welcoming in a way that the agreement has taken away the absolute power individuals can have. Additionally, the power was further shared among the council of ministers in case the president and the first vice president failed to reach a consensus. In both agreements, the Council of Minister with 67% and 23 quorums will have complete power over the divided Presidency in final decision-making on essential issues of governance and leadership.

The 2015 peace agreement was signed by few signatories, unlike the 2018 peace agreement. One of the reasons for the collapse of the ARCSS was the absence of most of the warring parties which were holding base and fighting the government during the time of the 2015 peace effort. Regarding the Justice Sector, even though the lack of rule of law has continuously been cited as part of the root causes of the civil war, there is little urge to overhaul the justice sector that oversees constitutional order and rule of law. As the case with the 2015 deal, the judiciary remained a peripheral focus of the mediators, parties, and the agreement itself despite its critical role in ensuring accountability, the balance of power, and justice that are important ingredients of a stable country. On the positive side, the R-ARCSS has put in place mechanisms to restructure and reform the justice sector to deliver its mandate by focusing more on accountability on amending constitutional order than taking more time on the conflicting actors who are breaking the orders.

Economic Provision: Regarding the wealth distribution of the country, both agreements have blocked state governments from extensive exploitations of revenues but rather framed the distribution of revenue in a way that once they are centrally collected, it will be distributed under the equitable distribution of revenues in the spirit of sharing rural community developments vis-a-vis population proportionality. For the implementation of the provisions of the agreement during the three months pre-interim period and beyond, the 2015 agreement underlined IGAD-Plus in consultation with all stakeholders to constitute a Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) as well as National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC). Other important institutions shall also be constituted or reconstituted (e.g., the National Elections Commissions, the National Constitution Review Commission, etc.) for the same purpose. The 2018 agreement is the same except that the JMEC was named the Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission or R-JMEC.

Social Provision: The two agreements stressed the importance of inclusivity of diversity, strengthening the community relationship, transparency, accountability, truth, apology, reparation, compensation, healing, harmony, reconstruction, and development that should become a norm by the advent of the value of peace to South Sudan.

4.5. Sustainability of the peace agreement/ the stakeholder's perspective?

4.5.1. Post-2018 agreement situation

The 2018 peace Agreement was followed by promises in various sectors especially the question of inclusivity and equality was the main topic that attracts the attention of the actors who were directly involved in the armed conflict of South Sudan and during the process of the peace agreement on September 12, 2021. Several actors responded differently about the situation in South Sudan. The situation is categorized as politically, economically, and socially situations.

Politically speaking, some respondents reflected their optimism about the fruits of the 2018 peace agreement. The first respondent stressed that the government of the Republic of South Sudan has been very active in the realization of a multi-stakeholder format for each phase of negotiations, However, some tasks are pending and will be implemented ahead including the security sector reforms, such as police and military reforms, and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program (Respondent 1, 2021). Respondent 2 agreed with the remark and recalled examples to define the post-2018 peace agreement situation as stable. “Since the agreement was reached, President Kiir has also signed a declaration giving amnesty to the troops, army generals, and leaders of the SPLM in Opposition. The amnesty included Vice President Machar and was an important gesture showing Kiir’s commitment to moving on from the senseless war. Moves such as these inspire optimism because they suggest that the government of South Sudan is finally committed to creating a functioning republic. So far Kiir and Machar have shown a willingness to act responsibly towards the successful implementation of the peace process. But a lot remains to be done”(Respondent 2, 2021). Respondent 3 on their part has referred to the 2018 peace agreement as more inclusive in terms of Gender and other mediator groups active during the time of the armed conflict in South Sudan. The comparative peaceful period after the latest signature is an indication of commitments by signing actors and the inclusiveness of responsible

actors to the subsequential round tables for peace negotiations. Respondent 4 on the other side recounted on power division structure outside the gender context and underlined The armed conflict, causality, and related reports have reduced since the signing of the agreement due to warring actors' inclusivity. Another respondent also reflected their optimism about the post-agreement situation. “ different actors have come a long way for the realization of the 2018 peace agreement. South Sudan is just 3 years away from the 2018 agreement which means that the country needs progress to heal. The deal certainly offers a promising end to South Sudan War. South Sudan once had a broken political system, but that the parties were now working hard to reform the country’s “tainted image” and ensure lasting peace in the country. The country was in a broken system of governance; it’s not in terms of the political aspect only, but through this peace agreement, however, there is good progress after the 2018 agreement which overall satisfied the interest of the majority (Respondent 5, 2021). The transitional government is strongly committed to the constitutional review and this is seen with the implementation of certain important tasks like the political party’s reconciliation and joint action which realize a comparatively peaceful period. The agreement contains action points whose implementation capacity requires a certain period and needed a gap for realization. Additionally, the National Action Plan can be strengthened by aligning the pillars of the WPS agenda; participation, prevention, protection, recovery, and relief; with provisions in the R-ARCSS. Part of this revolves around the urgent need to raise awareness about the peace agreement to all stakeholders involved in the conflict and at the communal level. By awareness building, South Sudanese can develop a sense of ownership over the peace agreement (Respondent 6, 2021).

In the meantime, some respondents said otherwise regarding the stability post-2018 peace agreement situation in South Sudan. Respondent 7 stressed that there were ideological differences within political parties that led to defection from signing political actors. There are still unnamed political parties that didn’t participate during the 2018 peace agreement, and the full-inclusiveness of all political parties, no one is left behind, isn’t achieved yet. There is a lack of political will by the signing actors who missed the deadline to form the transitional government as mentioned during the 2018 peace agreement(Respondent 7). Smaller conflicts are still ablaze and the threat of a return to full-blown civil war remains. South Sudan is a diverse country that lacks basic institutions. The country is still so fragile that it might not be possible to peacefully govern without broadly accommodating its diverse groups. The South Sudanese need to revisit the political

systems so that the country can come up with a model that works for itself, a model in which South Sudan can rule its people by consensus rather than by exclusion, and it is a process that can be done through a national conference at some point in the future. (Respondent 8, 2021). This opinion is supported by another Respondent 9 who participated during the 2018 agreement and reflected on the neglect to respect the constitutional orders. The neglect arises due to the selfish interest by political actors to respect the agreement. This ideological difference in the case of the National Salvation Party has divided its leadership into two. It is important to make a total reconciliation (fair share of power) among all political actors to achieve absolute stability (Respondent 8, 2021). Respondent 9 also stated few political parties' express reservations on the Revitalized Agreement, such are not insurmountable if approached inclusively. There are still some individuals or groups who are fighting among one another due to polarized political stances and the lack of political commitment to finally work as a coalition/ transitional government. This is a radical ideological stance that should be abandoned by these very few individuals (Respondent 9, 2021).

Economically speaking, South Sudan's nascent economic recovery driven by the 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement, rising oil prices, and a resumption in oil production was derailed in 2020 by locust invasions, floods, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Economic activity was disrupted by measures to contain the spread of COVID-19, social distancing, and restrictions on movement and business operating hours. The service sector, which accounts for 6.1% of GDP, was particularly hard hit. Floods and locusts hammered the agriculture sector, which accounts for 15% of GDP and employs 80% of the population. The oil sector, which accounts for 70% of GDP and more than 90% of public revenues, was damaged by the collapse of global oil prices. Public and private consumption, the key growth drivers on the demand side in 2019, was also hurt by COVID-19. As a result, real GDP growth is expected to decline by 3.6% in 2020 after expanding by 7.4% in 2019. Inflows, mainly remittances and foreign direct investment, widened the current account deficit to 4.5% of GDP in 2020 from 2.7% in 2019. The economic slowdown is also expected to aggravate poverty and unemployment, with disproportionate effects on youth and women (ADB Report, 2021). The 2011 report by African Developmental Bank clearly shows South Sudan has recovered since the 2018 agreement despite the decline in growth due to COVID-19 but not an armed conflict. However, the global phenomenon which hindered the economic growth has the power to incite war once again if the level of poverty, unemployment, and related consequences

increase pushing the youth to join already existing defected armed groups or newly formed armed actors.

Regarding the societal situation in South Sudan, There is interchangeability with the political and economic situation in South Sudan. The transformation of South Sudan from conflict to recovery has a direct positive impact on the stability of a community. Despite there is the progress made after the signing of the 2018 agreement compared to the first peace agreement, the progress needs a crucial move to bring about long-lasting changes. According to the UN, there has been minimal progress on constitution-making, transitional justice, and economic reform and perhaps most significantly, the unification of forces is yet to occur despite multiple self-imposed Government deadlines. Thousands of troops fester in cantonment sites without shelter, health care, or food. The power vacuum at the local level has opened opportunities for spoilers and national actors to exploit local tensions and fuel violence, the impact of which was seen in Jonglei in 2020 (UN,2021). The UN report was supported by Respondent 10 who stress there is a worrying surge in violence between heavily armed community militia that Government forces have yet to contain. There have to exist initiatives involve civil affairs and human rights staff to bring communities together and deter violence. This has a consequence on the social situation in South Sudan.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. CONCLUSION

Since the outbreak of the South Sudan civil war in 2013, Millions have fled, killed, and become vulnerable until the signing of the R-ARCSS (2018 peace agreement). During this fight, the role of women has evolved from being victims to taking part in the armed conflict, involving themselves in leadership decisions of political parties and pushing force for realizing peace signatures. This study focused on addressing the role of women in the armed conflict, their place during the 2015 and 2018 agreement, and gathering stakeholders' opinions on the sustainability of the peace agreement focusing on the post-agreement situation. qualitative and quantitative data were collected from primary and secondary sources. And all 15 political parties were included in the analysis. The Tobit regression model is estimated to address women's role in the armed conflict, document reviews were carried out to assess the place of women in the two agreements, and key informant interviews were conducted to get the opinion of stakeholders on the post-agreement situation.

The signing of the peace agreement brought 15 political actors with little or strong influence on the situation of violence in South Sudan. The result of the Tobit regression analysis shows that the proportion of female executive members within the political party doesn't have a significant effect on the intensification of the conflict. This implies that incidents of conflict are not correlated with the composition of leadership. Furthermore, the situation of violence is dependent on the number of combatants the actors have to fight against their counterparts. It is also influenced by the ethnic composition of the actors which is a triggering factor for the outbreak of the South Sudan civil war after the Dinka-Nuer division in 2013. The duration of the formation of the political parties also influenced the number of armed conflicts and the situation of violence as the formation of a political party implies the birth of a new enemy and additional war. The result of the Tobit regression analysis shows that the number of female leaders within the political party doesn't impact the intensification of the conflict.

The 2015 and the 2018 agreements were signed to bring long-standing stability. These agreements were inclusive of various actors as negotiators, mediators, and observers. Among these actors

include women who have taken part in the agreements in the aforementioned capacities. The involvement of women has increased from 2015 to the 2018 agreement where the later agreement shows a relatively peaceful period. This may indicate that women involved in the peace process matters for the realization of stability in the Republic of South Sudan.

Results of key informant interviews with stakeholders show that there were majorly optimistic opinions on the sustainability of the 2018 peace agreement but with certain reservations. The reservation is mostly related to the ability to maintain the inclusivity of all actors as stated in the agreement and commitment to answer critical questions in sectoral and justice reform. The processes of implementing mechanisms should include all stakeholders. In the meantime, all actors with a responsibility to protect and address flaws by coordinating at a national level can establish a successful beginning. Without this discourse, a failure will result in that might bring the 2016 incident.

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APPENDIX A

Research Questions

First, I appreciate your willingness and cooperation to answer these questions!

1. What were the roles played by women within the conflict as members of the warring parties?
2. What were the criteria to select South Sudanese women to take part during the peace effort?
3. In which areas were women peace negotiators unsuccessful and successful?
4. Compare and contrast the impacts of women as negotiators both in the ruling and the other political parties?
5. What has South Sudan achieved for having women around the table?
6. Can you emphasize women's current impact on the promotion of peace, solidarity, linkage, and partnership between the former warring parties?
7. Tell me about the transitional government and women's share of Holderness within the process? how did the woman within the cabinet come to fruition?
8. How do institutions link among each other to realize national stability and what is the impact of women within this institution in creating peace and people-to-people relationship? The sustainability of the peace agreement?

Thank You Very Much!

APPENDIX B

Facts about South Sudan

2011 9 July - Independence Day.

2011 August - UN says at least 600 people are killed in ethnic clashes in Jonglei state.

2012 January - South Sudan declares a disaster in Jonglei State after some 100,000 flee clashes between rival ethnic groups.

2012 April - After weeks of border fighting, South Sudan troops temporarily occupy the oil field and border town of Heglig before being repulsed. Sudanese warplanes raid the Bentiu area in South Sudan.

2012 August - Some 200,000 refugees flee into South Sudan to escape fighting between Sudanese army and rebels in Sudan's southern border states.

2012 September - The presidents of Sudan and South Sudan agree trade, oil and security deals after days of talks in Ethiopia.

2013 March - Sudan and South Sudan agree to resume pumping oil after a bitter dispute over fees that saw production shut down more than a year earlier. They also agreed to withdraw troops from their border area to create a demilitarised zone.

2013 June - President Kiir dismisses Finance Minister Kosti Manibe and Cabinet Affairs Minister Deng Alor over a multi-million-dollar financial scandal, and lifts their immunity from prosecution.

2013 July - President Kiir dismisses entire cabinet and Vice-President Riek Machar in a power struggle within the governing Sudan People's Liberation Movement.

2013 December - Civil war erupts as President Salva Kiir accuses his former vice-president, Riek Machar, of plotting to overthrow him. Rebel factions seize control of several regional towns, thousands are killed and many more flee. Uganda troops intervene on the government's side.

2014 January - A ceasefire is signed but broken several times over subsequent weeks, and further talks in February fail to end the violence that displaces more than a million people by April.

2014 April - UN says pro-Machar forces sack the oil town of Bentiu, killing hundreds of civilians.

2014 August - Peace talks begin in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa and drag on for months as fighting continues.

2016 April - Riek Machar finally returns to Juba and is sworn in as first vice-president in a new unity government - but is sacked in July after further conflict and goes back into exile.

2016 November - UN sacks Kenyan commander of its peacekeeping mission over the failure to protect civilians in Juba during July violence. Kenya withdraws its troops from the peacekeeping mission. Japanese peacekeepers arrive in South Sudan, the first time in nearly 70 years that Japan has deployed its soldiers overseas with a broad mandate to use force if necessary.

2016 December - A UN commission on human rights says a process of ethnic cleansing is underway in several parts of the country, a claim that President Salva Kiir denies.

2017 February - A famine is declared in parts of South Sudan in what the UN describes as a man-made catastrophe caused by civil war and economic collapse.

2017 May - President Kiir declares a unilateral ceasefire, launches national dialogue.

2017 August - The number of refugees fleeing violence in South Sudan to Uganda passes the one million mark, according to the UN.

2018 August - President Kiir signs a power-sharing agreement with Riek Machar and other opposition groups in a bid to end the civil war. The deal will see Machar return to government as one of five vice-presidents.

SOURCE: BBC Africa (<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14019202>)

APPENDIX D

Excel-Input

Dur. Month.Formation	Dur.Year.Formation	Dur.Year.Coflict.Month	Dur.Year.Coflict.Year	Conflict	Exec- Male	Exec- Female	Exec-Prop	No. armed group	Number of Armed Conflicts	EDU- Leader	Age of the leader	Ethnicity	Troops
70	5.833333333	37	3.083333333	1	7	0	0	1	3	20	61	0	17
57	4.75	24	2	1	4	0	0	1	1	12	71	0	8.5
51	4.25	18	1.5	1	17	5	0.22727273	1	2	12	57	0	125
56	4.666666667	23	1.916666667	1	28	1	0.03448276	1	1	12	61	0	130
54	4.5	21	1.75	1	15	0	0	1	1	18	57	1	50
50	4.166666667	17	1.416666667	1	5	0	0	1	1	18	68	0	15
54	4.5	14	1.166666667	1	6	0	0	1	1	20	61	1	8.5
452	37.66666667	47	3.916666667	1	25	6	0.19354839	1	15	12	70	1	250
96	8	47	3.916666667	1	19	0	0	1	4	25	68	1	165
59	4.916666667	20	1.666666667	1	4	1	0.2	1	1	23	57	0	8.5
96	8	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	18	82	1	0
96	8	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	18	62	1	0
60	5	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	23	50	0	0
60	5	0	0	0	5	1	0.16666667	0	0	18	62	1	0
72	6	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	18	47	1	0

APPENDIX E

General Information about the data

Name of the group/political Parties	Status 1: Armed Group 0:No-Armed Group	Duration of formation (Month)	Duration of conflict (Mon)	Number of Armed Conflicts	Troops	Leader of Political Party	Age	Edu. (Yrs.)	Executive Committee Composition Male/Female	Political Party Ethnic composition (Diverse or not)
Federal Democratic Party (FDP)	Armed Groups (1)	70	37	3	15k-20K AVG. 17K	Peter Gadet	61	20	M: 7 F:0	Ethnic (0)
National Democratic Movement (NDM)	Armed Groups (1)	57	24	1	7K-10K AVG. 8.5K	Lam Akol	71	12	M:4 F:0	Ethnic (0)
National Salvation Front (NAS)	Armed Groups (1)	51	18	2	120K-130K AVG. 125K	Thomas Cirillo	57	12	M:17 F:5	Ethnic (0)
South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM)	Armed Groups (1)	56	23	1	130K	Bapiny Montuil	61	12	M:28 F:1	Ethnic (0)
South Sudan National Movement for Change (SSNMC)	Armed Groups (1)	54	21	1	50K	Bangasi Joseph Bakosoro	57	18	M:15 F:0	Diverse
South Sudan Patriotic Movement (SSPM)	Armed Groups (1)	50	17	1	15K	Costello Garang Ring Lual	68	18	M:5 F:0	Ethnic (0)
South Sudan United Movement (SSUM)	Armed Groups (1)	54	14	1	7K-10K	Peter Gadet	61	20	M:6 F:0	Diverse
SPLM	Armed Groups (1)	452	47	15	250K	Salva Kirr	70	12	M:25 F:6	Diverse
Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO)	Armed Groups (1)	96	47	4	150K-180K AVG.165K	Riek Machar	68	25	M:19 F:0	Diverse
United Democratic Republic Alliance (UDRA)	Armed Groups (1)	59	20	1	7,000-10,000 AVG. 8.5K	Gathwech Koang Thich	57	23	M:4 F:1	Ethnic (0)
National Agenda	Political Formation (1)	96	NONE	NONE	NONE	Joseph Ukel Abango	82	18	M:12 F:0	Diverse
National Alliance People's Democratic Movement (PDM)	Political Formation (0)	96	NONE	NONE	NONE	Kornelio Kon Ngu	62	18	M:5 F:0	Diverse
SPLM Leaders Former Detainees (SPLM-FD)	Political Formation (0)	60	NONE	NONE	NONE	Dr. Hakim Dario	50	23	M:5 F:0	Ethnic (0)
	Political Formation (0)	60	NONE	NONE	NONE	Pagan Amum	65	18	M:5 F:1	Diverse
Umbrella	Political Formation (0)	72	NONE	NONE	NONE	Peter Mayen Majongdit	47	18	M:5 F:0	Diverse

APPENDIX F

Regression Output

Tobit Regression Thursday June 24 12:23:49 2021 Page 2

```
20 . regress NumberofArmedConflicts DurMonthFormation ExecFemale Ethnicity ///
> EDULeader Ageoftheleader
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	15
Model	184.63848	5	36.9276961	F(5, 9)	=	21.64
Residual	15.3615196	9	1.70683551	Prob > F	=	0.0001
				R-squared	=	0.9232
				Adj R-squared	=	0.8805
Total	200	14	14.2857143	Root MSE	=	1.3065

NumberofArmed~s	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
DurMonthForma~n	.0331526	.0058447	5.67	0.000	.0199309 .0463744
ExecFemale	.3649446	.3219217	1.13	0.286	-.3632929 1.093182
Ethnicity	-.945587	.7815767	-1.21	0.257	-2.713636 .8224623
EDULeader	.1033047	.10645	0.97	0.357	-.1375019 .3441113
Ageoftheleader	.0174015	.0451235	0.39	0.709	-.0846751 .119478
_cons	-3.81533	3.793125	-1.01	0.341	-12.39597 4.765314

```
21 . predict erreg2, resid
```

```
22 . bpagan DurMonthFormation ExecFemale Ethnicity EDULeader Ageoftheleader
```

Breusch-Pagan LM statistic: **5.189356** Chi-sq(5) **P-value = .3932**

```
23 . whitetst
```

White's general test statistic : **15** Chi-sq(14) P-value = **.3782**

```
24 .
```

```
25 . regress NumberofArmedConflicts DurMonthFormation Troops ExecProp Ethnicity ///
> EDULeader Ageoftheleader
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	15
Model	191.248656	6	31.874776	F(6, 8)	=	29.14
Residual	8.75134428	8	1.09391804	Prob > F	=	0.0001
				R-squared	=	0.9562
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9234
Total	200	14	14.2857143	Root MSE	=	1.0459

NumberofArmed~s	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
DurMonthForma~n	.0299948	.0044056	6.81	0.000	.0198355 .0401541
Troops	.0146632	.0052407	2.80	0.023	.0025781 .0267484
ExecProp	-.0166811	3.662902	-0.00	0.996	-8.463348 8.429986
Ethnicity	-.949358	.6207011	-1.53	0.165	-2.380697 .4819813
EDULeader	.0781543	.0755969	1.03	0.331	-.0961724 .252481
Ageoftheleader	.0046044	.0351758	0.13	0.899	-.0765113 .08572
_cons	-2.69617	2.78857	-0.97	0.362	-9.126625 3.734285

Tobit Regression Thursday June 24 12:23:49 2021 Page 3

```
26 . predict erreg3, resid
27 . bpagan DurMonthFormation Troops ExecProp Ethnicity EDULeader Ageoftheleader
Breusch-Pagan LM statistic: 3.388741 Chi-sq( 6) P-value = .7587
```

```
28 . whitetst
White's general test statistic : 15 Chi-sq(14) P-value = .3782
```

```
29 .
30 . regress NumberofArmedConflicts DurMonthFormation ExecProp Ethnicity ///
> EDULeader Ageoftheleader
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	15
Model	182.685007	5	36.5370015	F(5, 9)	=	18.99
Residual	17.3149927	9	1.92388808	Prob > F	=	0.0002
				R-squared	=	0.9134
				Adj R-squared	=	0.8653
Total	200	14	14.2857143	Root MSE	=	1.387

NumberofArmed-s	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
DurMonthForma~n	.0372282	.0047308	7.87	0.000	.0265264	.04793
ExecProp	1.691906	4.78963	0.35	0.732	-9.14299	12.5268
Ethnicity	-1.116941	.8193106	-1.36	0.206	-2.97035	.7364685
EDULeader	.04887	.0992884	0.49	0.634	-.175736	.273476
Ageoftheleader	.0048996	.0466488	0.11	0.919	-.1006272	.1104264
_cons	-2.104422	3.687453	-0.57	0.582	-10.44602	6.237175

```
31 . predict erreg4, resid
32 . bpagan DurMonthFormation Troops ExecProp Ethnicity EDULeader Ageoftheleader
Breusch-Pagan LM statistic: 5.663451 Chi-sq( 6) P-value = .4619
```

```
33 . whitetst
White's general test statistic : 15 Chi-sq(14) P-value = .3782
```

```
34 .
35 . swilk erreg1 erreg2 erreg3 erreg4
```

Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data

Variable	Obs	W	V	z	Prob>z
erreg1	15	0.94227	1.119	0.223	0.41175
erreg2	15	0.97154	0.552	-1.176	0.88022
erreg3	15	0.93951	1.173	0.315	0.37626
erreg4	15	0.95332	0.905	-0.197	0.57812


```

5 left-censored observations at NumberofAr~s <= 0
10 uncensored observations
0 right-censored observations

```

```

52 . predict yhat3
(option xb assumed; fitted values)

```

```

53 . bctobit
Bootstrap replications (499)
-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
1 2 3 4 5
...x..x.....x...xxx.xx.xx.x...xx..x.x.....xx. 50
.....x.....x.....x.....x.x.....x.....x... 100
x...x..x.....xx...xx.x.....x..x.....xx..... 150
..x...x..x.....xx.xx.x.....x.....xx..... 200
xx.....x..xx..x...xx.....x.....x.....x..... 250
xxx.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x..... 300
.....x..x.....x.....x.xx...x...xx...x..... 350
.....xx.xx.....x.....x..x..x.....x..... 400
.....x.....x..x..x.....xx.....x..x..... 450

```

```

LM test of Tobit specification
Bootstrap critical values
lm %10 %5 %1
2.3568 9.35278 10.609398 12.886676

```

```

54 .
55 . tobit NumberofArmedConflicts DurMonthFormation ExecProp Ethnicity ///
> EDULeader Ageoftheleader, ll(0)

```

```

Tobit regression
Number of obs = 15
LR chi2(5) = 22.49
Prob > chi2 = 0.0004
Pseudo R2 = 0.3329
Log likelihood = -22.54213

```

NumberofArmed~s	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
DurMonthForma~n	.0384681	.0054156	7.10	0.000	.0264014	.0505348
ExecProp	1.617052	5.602061	0.29	0.779	-10.86512	14.09922
Ethnicity	-1.670733	.9838526	-1.70	0.120	-3.862893	.5214276
EDULeader	.0540205	.110313	0.49	0.635	-.1917721	.2998131
Ageoftheleader	.0205702	.0580981	0.35	0.731	-.1088805	.1500209
_cons	-3.331332	4.459621	-0.75	0.472	-13.26799	6.605323
/sigma	1.506319	.3686037			.685019	2.327619

```

5 left-censored observations at NumberofAr~s <= 0
10 uncensored observations
0 right-censored observations

```

```

56 . predict yhat4
(option xb assumed; fitted values)

```

```

57 . bctobit
Bootstrap replications (499)
-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
1 2 3 4 5
.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x..... 50
.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x..... 100
.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x..... 150
..x...xx.....x.....x.....x.....x..... 200
.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x..... 250
..x.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x..... 300
.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x..... 350
.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x..... 400
.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x.....x..... 450

```

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LM test of Tobit specification
 Bootstrap critical values
 lm %10 %5 %1
9.8637 8.38520 10.73128 13.217676

```
58 .
59 . forval i=1/4{
      2. gen error`i'= NumberofArmedConflicts-yhat`i'
      3. }
```

```
60 .
61 . swilk error1 error2 error3 error4
```

Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data

Variable	Obs	W	V	z	Prob>z
error1	15	0.97483	0.488	-1.419	0.92206
error2	15	0.96581	0.663	-0.813	0.79197
error3	15	0.97875	0.412	-1.753	0.96024
error4	15	0.95269	0.917	-0.171	0.56776

```
62 . sfrancia error1 error2 error3 error4
```

Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data

Variable	Obs	W'	V'	z	Prob>z
error1	15	0.98306	0.366	-1.773	0.96186
error2	15	0.97512	0.538	-1.094	0.86312
error3	15	0.98593	0.304	-2.100	0.98215
error4	15	0.96066	0.851	-0.286	0.61245

```
63 .
64 . log close
      name: <unnamed>
      log: C:\Users\HP\Desktop\Biruktayet\Regression.smcl
      log type: smcl
      closed on: 24 Jun 2021, 12:22:22
```
