


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ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

UNITED STATES AND CHINESE MILITARY BASES IN THE HORN OF
AFRICA: OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS FOR ETHIOPIA

BY

MANGISTU EJETA SIMA

NOVEMBER, 2020

ADDIS ABABA

**UNITED STATES AND CHINESE MILITARY BASES IN THE HORN OF
AFRICA: OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS FOR ETHIOPIA**

BY

MANGISTU EJETA SIMA

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ART IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY**

ADVISOR

DR. SOLOMON MEBRIE

NOVEMBER, 2020

ADDIS ABABA

Addis Ababa University

College of Social Sciences

Department of Political Science and International Relations

This is to certify that the thesis prepared by Mangistu Ejeta, entitled “United States and Chinese military bases in the Horn of Africa: Opportunities and Risks for Ethiopia” submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations and Diplomacy, has undergone the due process of examination and accepted as meeting the essential standards of the University pertaining to quality and originality.

Approved by board of Examiners:

Solomon Mebrie (PhD)

Advisor

Signature

Date

Firehiwot Sintayehu (PhD)

Internal Examiner

Signature

Date

Belete Bizuneh (PhD)

External Examiner

Signature

Date

Demeke Achiso (PhD)

Chairperson

Signature

Date

Declaration

I have hereby stated that this thesis entitled "United States and Chinese military bases in the Horn of Africa: Opportunities and Risks for Ethiopia" comprises my own original work, has never been presented for a degree in any other university, and that all sources of materials used for this thesis have been duly recognized.

Name: Mangistu Ejeta

Signature_____ November, 2020

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AMISOM	United Nations-mandated African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
CSLs	Cooperative Security Locations
CTF-151	Combined Task Force One Five One
EPRDF	Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force Somalia
EU	European Union
EXIM Bank	the Export-Import Bank of China
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FMBs	Foreign Military Bases
FOSs or FOB	Forward Operating Sites or Bases
FOCAC	Forum of China Africa Cooperation
GERD	Ethiopia on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
HoA	Horn of Africa
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MOBs	Main Operating Bases

MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Government Organizations
NSSA	National Security Strategy of America
OBOR	One Belt One Road worldwide project of China
OEF-HOA	Operation Enduring Freedom-Horn of Africa
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
PLA	Chinese People's Liberation Army
PLAN	Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nation
UNMISS	United Nation Mission in South Sudan
US/ USA	United States/United States of America
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development's

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Abstract

Foreign military bases are usually related to great powers' foreign policy. It has been used for global supremacy to control important routes to strategic locations, to consolidate might and influence, and to secure vital interests. The rise of China as a global economic power has now intensifying global powers' strategic competition mainly with the United States. The plantation of the foreign military bases in the strategic areas of the world is part of the security/military competition of global power strategic competitors. The Horn of Africa has been at the center of global powers' attention for a long time. This thesis aimed to analyze the risk and opportunity of the establishment of the United States and Chinese military bases in the Horn of Africa for Ethiopia. The study also looked at Ethiopia's reaction to the issue as well as wider implications of the presence of Chinese and United States military bases for the states of the region. Depending on the qualitative examination of texts, and semi-structured interviews, the study has identified and analyzed potential opportunities and risks for Ethiopia in security, political, economic, and humanitarian aspects. As an opportunity, the study has found that the presence of the two great powers' bases in the region can play a stabilizing factor in the region which is national interest and foreign policy goal of Ethiopia. It can enhance Ethiopia's international trade, creates an enabling environment to attract foreign direct investments, and provide a vast market opportunity for the competing great powers in Ethiopia. It also helps in providing and supporting humanitarian assistance in the times of emergency. As risk, in the security aspect, the presence of their military bases in the Horn can allow the US and China to conduct a direct or indirect military operation in every corner of Ethiopia, facilitate for intervention, may erode the possibility of designing independent military strategy or security policy, and enable them access Ethiopia's national secrets easily. Politically, it can promote militarization that may lead to political instability. It may undermine Ethiopia's strategic importance, its aspiration for regional leadership, and the democratization process. In the economic aspect, it can pose challenges to Ethiopia's access to port services, and reinforce economic intervention. The study revealed that Ethiopia considers the establishment of foreign military bases in the Horn as an implication of changing geopolitical dynamics of the Horn and global system; and started to take some initiatives at the national level as a response to deal with new developments in the region. However, according to the study, what determines potential opportunity or risk are the national interests of the US and China in the region or Ethiopia, the extent of their cooperation and competition as well as the internal political dynamics of Ethiopia which is uncertain at present or in the near future. The study also indicates that the presence of their military forces in the Horn has implications of competition, cooperation, and tension among China and the US which could be tied to security/military, geopolitical and geo-economic issues. Thus, can affect the security, political, and diplomatic relations of the states of the region as well as influence the balance of power in the region. Therefore, the study suggests that changing the started initiatives into practice, having a realistic national security policy, the strategic capacity to identify and resolve risks are very important. Focusing on principle-based diplomatic relations; economic diplomacy and the nonaligned foreign policy approach also determine the extent of opportunity or risk. Likewise, ensuring internal stability and unity as well as working at the regional and continental levels to develop a common and optimal strategy for engagement with external powers will enable Ethiopia to minimize risks and benefits from its opportunities.

CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the topic of the study. It explains the background, states the problem, and presents the research objectives. Research questions, significance of the study, study area, research methodology, scope and limitation of the study are also contained here.

1.1. Background of the study

In the present world, the security environment is characterized by competition among great powers which is intensifying in some areas of the world. The security/military competition is raised and intensifying in various geographical regions around the world, including the Horn of Africa, as a result of the increasing use of military threats in some cases, and the military modernization process of China and Russia as well as the United States' (US) commitment to the development of military technologies. Basing troops in strategic areas of the world is part of the military competition among the leading world powers. The Horn of Africa (HoA) is the region which is located in the North-Eastern part of Africa, and considered as part of three other regions: the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and the Gulf of Aden (Bereket, 1980; Rotberg, 2005; Dahir, 2019). It has been at the center of global powers' attention because of the desire to control the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Though the dynamics of its strategic importance is changing, this strategic interest of great powers will continue in the future.

Conceptually, there is no consensus among scholars on the definition of the HoA regarding which states are included in the region and which are not. For instance, for Woodward (2006:1), Iyob and Keller (2006:115), and Leenco (2004:8), it comprises Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Sudan. Oğultürk (2017:121) and Kidane (2011:1) define the Horn in geographical and political expression. By its geographical meaning, for them, it consists of Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea. By its political definition, it enlarges to “the Greater Horn” by attaching Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, and South Sudan into the region and all countries of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). Bereket (1980), Abdilahi and Zhe (2019) also share Oğultürk and Kidane's geographic definition of the Horn. For De Waal (2015) and Redie (2013), it consists of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, and South Sudan. For this study, the researcher used the Horn of Africa as the region which comprises seven states, which are much interconnected in social, political, religious, economic aspects as well as

influence each other in their interaction with one another, with the near and far external powers. These constitute Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, and South Sudan.

Historically, the Ottoman Turks and Egyptians were involved in the region and influenced the religious affiliations of the societies of the region. When we come to state formation, it can be said that all the states of the Horn are the creation of colonialism or were influenced by it (Bereket, 1980; Redie, 2013). The HoA was highly influenced by the politics of the Cold War confrontation in the 1950s, 1960s, and the 1970s (Bereket, 1980; Oğultürk, 2017). After the Cold War, the rise of terrorism especially since 9/11, the “War on Terror” has highly influenced the political dynamics of the Horn countries. Currently, it has become the place where Western great powers, “emerging powers” of Asian and the Gulf States are competing with each other to establish military bases (Sun and Zoubir, 2016; Oğultürk, 2017). At present, there are more than ten military bases (facilities) of foreign countries in the Horn hosted by Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea; including drone and naval bases of the USA in Kenya; and that of international institutions. There are also reports that Russia and Turkey are agreed with Sudan; and India and Egypt are searching to establish their bases in the Horn (De Faakto Intelligence Research Observatory, 2019). The proliferation of foreign military bases in the HoA is becoming a topic of discussion because of the rising importance of the Red Sea coast in terms of security, economy, regional geopolitics, and geo-strategy, with the rise of China and global strategic power competition.

Military base is “an installation created to serve as support for military operations and logistics” (Lersch and Sarti, 2014:87). Foreign military base (FMB) is an armed force located outside of the territory of the basing country; which involves a facility directly owned and operated by the military or its branches that shelters military equipment and personnel, and facilitates training and operations (Vine, 2015:6); aimed at reducing the threat of distance or to give a quicker response (Zeijden, 2009:2). It is “one aspect of military planning” (Vanveltner, 2005: xiii), and “usually related with great powers’ foreign policy” (Lersch and Sarti, 2014:87). It has been used to promote states’ economic and political objectives; secure lines of communication, intelligence programs, as a connector of markets and military logistics abroad in history (Ibid:95). According to Vanveltner (2005:xiv), the location of bases reflects the basing state’s perception of its role in the international system, especially concerning the application of force in international politics.

Though the establishment of foreign bases focuses primarily on protecting basing states' interests and projecting its influence in rising competition, the presence of the US and Chinese militaries in the Horn could be seen as their commitment to secure the region, willingness to involve in potential future conflicts to stabilize situations and protect the regional common interests while securing their national interests. These can be an opportunity for Ethiopia to achieve regional peace and security which is part of its foreign policy goal. It may also help to secure major interstates infrastructure and large investments in risky areas, and facilitates security cooperation that can strengthen Ethiopia's military. Likewise, the competition among the US and China can provide Ethiopia the opportunity to benefit from their various programs and initiatives they provide to maintain the existing partnership, in the security and economic aspects. On the other hand, the presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the region can be seen as a threat to Ethiopia's national security if they confront each other. It may facilitate to conduct any type of military operation in the country, can play a role to minimize Ethiopia's strategic importance and hegemonic aspiration in the region. Likewise, it can expose Ethiopia to direct or indirect interference in its internal affairs and it can have a destabilizing effect on the political and diplomatic relations of the country with its neighbors.

The study is intended to analyze the potential opportunity and risk of the presence of the United States and Chinese military bases in the Horn for Ethiopia on security/military, economic, and political aspects; and to examine the dynamics of other foreign powers security activities as well as the reaction of Ethiopia towards the proliferation of foreign bases in the region. The recent competition between both great powers (US and China) to assert their influence and dominance in the HoA has led to what has been referred to as the "Second Scramble for Africa". The study therefore attempts, also, to look at how Ethiopia can formulate and projects its foreign and security policy toward such development.

1.2.Statement of the problem

"Foreign basing is an established instrument of power projection that addresses a wide spectrum of the political, military, economic and other interests of states" (Rogers and Simon, 2009:7). In Africa, FMBs represent the symbol of great power's sphere of influence, enhancing basing states' intervention or influential capabilities in the security, military, economic, and political as well as diplomatic affairs of African states, to protect its interests (Sun and Zoubir, 2016). As the

recent relations between China and the USA at the global level have become a feature of competition and tension, China's expanding economic and military presence in the Horn, as well as the US's reaction to that, has drawn scrutiny. The presence of military forces of the US and China in the Horn can be the cause of rivalry and cooperation based on their national interests in different situations. The cooperation, competition, and confrontation of these powers could have both opportunity and risk on the overall political, economic, security, and diplomatic relations of the region and Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is one of the two landlocked states in the region and found at the nucleus of the region sharing a boundary with all of its neighbors. Its socio-economic as well as political and security conditions are much interconnected and influence each other with its neighbors. What threatens any of its neighbors may be considered also threats to Ethiopia; and also what happened in Ethiopia influence all states of the region as well. Having and maintaining a good relationship with both China and the US is in the national interest of Ethiopia. Of course, currently, Ethiopia has good relations with almost all security actors in the region. However, the intensity of growing global or regional competition and confrontation of China and the US, the size of their military forces, and the extent of interests they have in Ethiopia or the overall region, the stability of the region and the internal political dynamics of Ethiopia, the extent of Horn states relations with one another and with both China and the United States determine the impacts that the presence of the two great powers bases in the region may have for Ethiopia.

Hence, the presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the Horn needs careful consideration for Ethiopia both to minimize its potential risks and benefit from its opportunities. There are journal articles and scholars' opinions and analyses that dealt with the competing foreign powers in the region. Gashaw and Zelalem (2016), for instance, have tried to analyze the risks and opportunities of the competing foreign powers on Ethiopia's security, but it is not a detailed study and the authors have not framed the issue theoretically. Esrael (2018) has conducted an academic study that examines the expansion of FMBs in the Horn and analyzes its challenges and opportunities to Ethiopia's policy in the region; but the study largely focused on the Gulf countries' engagement and its impacts on policy orientation of Ethiopia in the region. Melvin (2019a) examined the politics of foreign powers' security competition in the Horn and its implications for the politics of the region. Mehari (2019), in his opinion published on Aljazeera's

editorial stance, postulate foreign basing in the region as “a new cold war in Africa” and examined its implications for African peace and security.

Thus, the existing inquiries regarding foreign bases in the region don't reflect the opportunities and risks of the presence of military bases of global competitors (US and China) in the region for Ethiopia. Likewise, whereas the competition and incidence of confrontation of China and the US in the region are increasingly attracting the attention of scholars, there is no academic study that has specifically examined the impacts of growing military/security interests of the two powers in the region on Ethiopia found at the heart of the region to the best of the researchers' knowledge. By taking these gaps into account, the study is intended as a contribution to fill the gap by examining historical dynamics of great power's involvement in the region, the empirical evidence, views of some government officials and researchers, and foreign and security policy orientation of Ethiopia towards new developments in the Horn.

This study, therefore, aims at examining foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa, and specifically, the analysis of opportunity and risk of the presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the region for Ethiopia.

1.3. Central argument of the study

The presence of military bases of the United States and China in the Horn of Africa is a threat to Ethiopia's national security. It can also be an opportunity for Ethiopia to achieve its security, political and economic interests.

The presence of military bases of the US, China, and others in the HoA serves for the proliferation of weapons, promotes militarization, and implies the possibility of conflict and war in the Horn of Africa. It can be a threat to the national security of all countries in the region. It may destabilize the region's states and provoke conflict and create the very insecurity they can't prevent. It can cause violence in the region, and undermine international instability; and may influence the policy decision of the region's states (Ludlam, 2012:4; Zeijden, 2009:2). On the other hand, the presence of great powers' military bases and the missions behind the presence like counter-terrorism and violent extremists, counter-piracy and armed robbery can stabilize the region which is the national interest of Ethiopia and support for Ethiopia's counter extremism operations. It may help to ensure the maritime security of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean and increase Ethiopia's international trade providing security for its ships also. The initiatives that the

US and China provide for partners in course of their geopolitical, geo-economic, and security competition could have various opportunities, and Ethiopia can benefit from such initiatives.

1.4.Objective of the study

The main objective of the study is to analyze the opportunity and risk that the presence of military bases of the USA and China in the Horn of Africa has for Ethiopia.

In the process of analyzing the relevant issues, attempt has been made to:

- i. Review relevant conceptual and theoretical perspectives on foreign (great powers) military installations.
- ii. Examine the rationales behind basing troops abroad, history of basing troops on the land of others and in the Horn of Africa.
- iii. Assess foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa.
- iv. Examine the reaction of Ethiopia towards the development.
- v. Explore the implications of presence of great powers military bases in Horn of Africa for states of the region.
- vi. Use the results with regard to the above objectives as basis for identifying lessons for researchers and policy makers as well as make some suggestions that may help to have stronger foreign and security strategy.

1.5.Research questions

- What are opportunities that the presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the Horn have for Ethiopia?
- What are risks that the presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the Horn have for Ethiopia?
- Which countries are opening bases in the Horn of Africa? What are the rationales behind foreign military bases in the region?
- How has Ethiopia reacted towards this development and how can it minimize the risks and optimize its opportunities?

- What theoretical perspectives can best explain the presence of great powers military bases in the Horn of Africa?
- What are some of the implications for the states of the region?

1.6. Study area

This study was designed to analyze the opportunity and risk that the presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the HoA could have for Ethiopia. The United States and China are the first and the second-largest economies in the world respectively. They have great influences in international politics; and a strategic competitor to each other. Their decisions, as permanent members of the Security Council, have a global impact. Both powers compete and cooperate on various international issues; and have their own national interests in HoA which may include security, political, trade, investment, or resource. Especially, both have a geostrategic, geopolitical, and diplomatic interest - to win diplomatic support from Africa in the international arena. The US has more security and political interests than economic interests in Africa as well as in the Horn. On the other hand, China has more economic and political interests than security interests. Ethiopia is a strategic partner for both states; and is considered as a marketplace for them to reach all African states, for it hosts African Union (AU) and various regional and international institutions.

The United States has the largest and permanent military base in Djibouti and other military facilities in other parts of the region, and the Chinese base in Djibouti is the first of its history on the land of Africa, and considered as marking point for the shift of its foreign policy principle of non-interference. Historically, the involvement of great powers in the HoA has influenced the political, social, cultural, religious, economic, and security aspects of the states and society of the region. The recent history of Syria and Libya since 2011 also implies how the national interests of great powers, especially those with veto power in the United Nations (UN), can affect the overall security, economic and political dimension of one region and individual states. Moreover, the increasing global competition and confrontation between the US and China in some strategic areas as well as in the Horn, the growing interests of various non-traditional security actors to the Horn, the volatile nature of the region and the geographic setting and land lockedness of Ethiopia as well as the current internal political situation of the country make the military presence of China and the US in the Horn more sensitive for Ethiopia.

1.7.Methodology of the study

1.7.1. Sources of data and method of data collection

The study uses both primary and secondary source of data. The method of data collection is determined by the type of questions to be answered, the nature of the research objectives and the research problems to be addressed. In the same vein, the study also used both primary and secondary data collection instruments. Consequently, the thesis used the review of literature as an instrument for secondary data collection and semi-structured interviews as a primary data collection instrument. Interviews helped the researcher to collect first-hand information from people in the field; and it was powerful instrument in getting narrative data that allowed the researcher to examine and expand the interviewee's responses and views in greater depth. Thereby, semi-structured interview mainly key informant interview were employed in this research. In depth interview forms the basic source of primary data for this research. In-depth interviews enable researchers to explore the feelings and experiences of respondents in detail to explore their perspectives on the presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the Horn. In light of this, semi-structured in-depth interview is employed to explore the views of the selected informants. Key informants are those individuals who have a privileged social position in the research setting, which in turn gives them specialist knowledge about processes and happenings (Payne and Payne, 2004). Information from key informants is valuable and useful, since it is likely to be more extensive, detailed and privileged than ordinary peoples (Ibid). For this study, the key informants were selected purposively on the basis of their specialist knowledge on the subject matter and positions they occupy at respective government organizations. Purposive sampling is utilized for selection of participants of the interviews because respondents were selected on the basis of their position and knowledge of the subject matter as the nature of the research requires specific first-hand information from professionals in the field and concerned institutions.

Accordingly, though it was planned to be collected from November 2019 - April 2020, in-depth interview was conducted from November 25, 2019 – June 15, 2020 with officials and experts at Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Defense Minister, Ethiopian Foreign Relations Strategic Studies Institute, to examine the extent to which they are aware of, and concerned about the issue as concerned institutions of the country.

Personal interview was conducted with senior researchers from Center for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation Ethiopia and one military expert from National Peacekeeping Center of Ethiopia, to share and understand their experiences and views, to help the researcher expand his view to analyze how the presence of military bases of the United State and China in the Horn can benefit and challenge Ethiopia. Whereas conducting semi-structured interviews, the researcher prepared interview guide line which shows a clear list of issues to be addressed and questions to be answered in English language. This checklist allowed for in-depth examination, greater flexibility and permitted the interviewer to keep the interview within track of the aim of the study during the interview process. While conducting interviews, the researcher take notes properly by actively by listening the views of the respondents, and asks follow up questions to get valuable information from the interviewee. On the other hand, secondary data is collected from books, journal articles, government publications, unpublished materials, media outlet sources, and internet sources. In the process of conducting interviews, the outbreak of Covid-19 in Ethiopia in March 2020, which interrupted many government work at some institutions, made difficulty to get selected officials from Defense Minister as planned and delayed the plan to finish conducting interviews by the end of March 2020.

1.7.2. Method of data analysis

Data analysis is the process that a researcher uses to reduce collected data to its interpretation to make sense of them. It involves examining and evaluating the data that is collected from both primary and secondary source so as to develop detailed explanations. Based on the research questions being asked, and the appropriateness of the technique for making the sense of the data, this paper employed qualitative data analysis process. In qualitative data analysis, data which is collected through various instrument of data collection requires data organization, reduction through summarization and categorization, identifying and linking themes in the data (Barbara, 2004:96-97). Qualitative data analysis enabled the researcher to discover the stories, and to identify and interpret acquired data to make statements about implicit and explicit dimensions of the issue under study. Thus, the researcher used trend and interpretative analysis techniques to attach significance and meanings to the collected data; offer explanations, and draw conclusions.

1.8. Ethical consideration

To endorse ethical consideration while conducting this research, principles of informed consent and voluntary participations were applied. Earlier to the involvement of the respondents to the interviews, introduction of the researcher, and sufficient clarifications with regard to the purpose and objectives of the study as it is purely for academic purposes were offered to them so that their good will is obtained to provide responses to the interviews. Likewise, the respondents consent on whether to use their name as a source or not to use is asked and agreed up on. In the same way, some respondents preferred to remain anonymous and they were guaranteed the supreme privacy that their names and positions were not compromised.

1.9. Scope of the study

This study covers foreign powers military bases in the HoA, focusing on analysis of opportunities and risks of China and the USA's military presence for Ethiopia. In the thesis, the notion of the term 'Horn of Africa' is used in the sense of 'political definition' which comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan.

1.10. Significance of the study

The study is essential since it focuses on an important issue for Ethiopia's security. By assessing the existing FMBs in the HoA as well as analyzing opportunities and risks of the presence of the two leading global powers for Ethiopia, the study gives an insight for those who are dealing with the issue. By searching for new insights, it provides the intellectual satisfaction of knowing about- just for the sake of knowledge. It also provides the basis for the social scientist to do something better on why foreign powers establish their military bases in the HoA, and how Ethiopia could cope with the issue; as well as to aware scholars and policymakers to work on to have foreign policy and security strategy that can deal with dynamic and changing global and regional environment within a time.

1.11. Limitations of the study

It is important to clearly note a major limiting factor in the conducting of this thesis. The primary data obtained for the study is limited to Ethiopian side. Due to financial problem, making visit to military facilities of China and the USA in Djibouti was impossible, limiting the amount of balanced data that could have been collected. Given this, the least expensive means of obtaining

data was expected to be from the Embassy of USA and China in Addis Ababa. However, the original plan and repetitive trial to make interview with representatives of the Embassies was not realized because of lack of cooperation from both embassies. Hence, data are gained from sources within Ethiopia; from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense and Ethiopian Foreign Relations Strategic Studies Institute, as well as from personal views of senior researchers from Center for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation Ethiopia. However, with data obtained from Ethiopian side; and extensive secondary data from related literatures, and documents of relevant institutions, maximum efforts have been made to examine and analyze obtained data without much affecting the efforts to realize the overall objectives of the study.

1.12. Organization of the study

The thesis is organized into six chapters. The first chapter emphasis on background of the study and includes introduction, statement of the problem, major assumption, objective, research questions, methodology and methods of the study, significance, scope, and limitation of the study. The second chapter is about conceptual framework, the rationales, and theoretical explanation of foreign military base. In this section, the relations between foreign policy and foreign military base, and the foreign policy dynamics of Horn African states were discussed and analysed in well manner. The purpose of this chapter is aimed at giving brief view on the nature and applications of the concept of military base and theories as analyzing tools in the process of the study.

Chapter three focus on general background of foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa. In this section, the paper examined the history and nature of great powers military bases on the land of others, historical overview of foreign bases in the region, the overview of the existing FMBs in the Horn (what they look like). The purpose of this section is to provide general descriptions of foreign military bases in the region to help to have better understanding of the dynamics of foreign powers security activities in the region as analyzing tool in the process of the study.

Chapter four and five discusses the finding of the paper. This is followed by the conclusion, and some suggestions for the future.

CHAPTER TWO

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND RATIONALES OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES

This chapter briefly introduce foreign military base so that it presents concepts of military base and foreign military base, its categories and terminologies; theoretical perspectives about the presence of foreign military bases in the Horn; rationales of foreign military bases connecting with its history; its relationship with foreign policy, and finally examines rationales of foreign powers military presence in the Horn and the foreign policy dynamics of the Horn Africa region.

2.1. Foreign military base: Conceptual framework

The military base has no single and agreed definition. According to Collins English dictionary, a military base is “a facility for the storage of military equipment and the training of soldiers”. The U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary defines a military base as an area or facility from which a military force begins its offensive operations. Lutz (2009:4) defines it in two ways: literal and political. Literally, bases are “barracks and weapons depots; staging areas for war-making and ships repair facilities; golf courses and basketball courts”. Its political definition according to Lutz is “spoils of war, arms sales showrooms, toxic industrial sites, and collections of customers for local bars, shops, and prostitution” (Ibid:4). For Lachowski (2007:1), the term base in military strategy is used for “a location from which operations are launched or supported, or an area or location containing installations or facilities that provide logistical or other support”. Vine (2015:3) define base as “any place, facility, or installation used regularly for military purposes of any kind.” According to Robert Harkavy, the terms "base," "facility," and "access" are used interchangeably, to express military bases. The term “access” or “military access” refers to “all types of bases and facilities (including technical installations), aircraft overflight rights, port visit privileges (often not involving any permanent military presence by the user), and the use of offshore anchorages within sovereign maritime limits” (Harkavy, 1982:14). The term “base” is to refer to “where the user has exclusive extraterritorial control, either via compulsion or by treaty” (Ibid:15).

Military bases are classified as navy, land, and air bases; and their roles are different based on their location and size (Lersch and Sarti, 2014:28). It may be located under the sea, on the sea, on air, in space, and on land. The size of bases can be vast installations, small spy bases or

intelligence facilities, joint training camps, equipment stores, rest and supporting facilities, radar sites, and refueling stations (Harkavy, 1982; Lachowski, 2007; Ludlam, 2012; Vine, 2015; Lersch and Sarti, 2014). The establishment of bases can be in the form of the port, landing rights for military, intelligence aircraft, and refueling and flyover rights (Lutz, 2009). Vine (2015:3) specifically listed what military bases constitutes as nuclear weapons installations, training areas, ports and airfields, missile testing facilities, arsenals, military schools, repair facilities, warehouses, drone bases, barracks, intelligence facilities, listening and communications posts, paramilitary bases, rehab facilities, and military hospitals and prisons.

FMB (s) refers to an area on land or on sea beyond a sovereign state's jurisdiction, which is stationed with a certain number of armed forces having organized institutions, military facilities and military activities (Harkavy, 2007; Krepinevich and Work, 2007). It is an installation, reservations, settlements created to serve as support for military operations and logistics (Lersch and Sarti, 2014:87; Krepinevich and Work, 2007). It implies "unrestricted access and freedom of operation for the user state both at the base and from it" (Lachowski, 2007:1). FMB "include air-support infrastructure, forward-deployed expeditionary maritime capabilities, long-range strike and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, and ground forces such as lightly armoured vehicle units" (Ibid:8). "Some bases have the ability to host the most sophisticated and powerful weaponry in the military's arsenal, including nuclear attack submarines, aircraft carriers" (Vine, 2016:6). It is a symbolic marker of the establisher's power and credibility abroad (Lutz, 2009).

FMB can be put into different categories based on different criteria. For instance, according to the difference of duration, it can be divided into permanent (with a long-term target) and ad hoc (with a short-term target) bases (Krepinevich and Work, 2007; Lachowski, 2007). Based on the difference of functions, it can be divided into army bases, air bases, naval bases, logistic bases, communication bases, arsenal bases, etc. Krepinevich and Work (2007:11-22), categorize military bases as: interior or exterior bases; exclusive, shared and participating bases; campaign and expeditionary bases; forward, peripheral, intermediate, remote, and sanctuary bases; chokepoint bases; main operating bases; forward operating sites; cooperative security locations; mobile bases; global attack forces. To have an understanding of the concept of some of these categories, campaign and expeditionary bases are basing structures constructed temporarily for specific support. Chokepoint bases are operated because of geography or trade flows, where the

free flow of commercial or military sea traffic is concentrated or constrained; and can enhance a great power's global mobility; decrease the global mobility of its adversaries; or force a potential enemy to do battle under unfavorable circumstances (Krepinevich and Work, 2007:11).

According to Harkavy (2007), O'Hanlon (2008), Lachowski (2007), and Krepinevich and Work (2007), FMB can be also categorized as Main Operating Bases (MOBs), Forward Operating Sites or bases (FOSs or FOB), Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) and Lily Pads based on their size, location, and geostrategic purpose. MOBs are the strategic hubs or largest military installations, with permanently stationed combat forces, extensive command, and control facilities, and strengthened defenses as well as family-support facilities; located in friendly host countries. It is strategically vital installations serve for long-term as anchor points for processing, training and combat; and considered as basing the state's political commitment to its key allies and a symbol of power projection around the world (Rogers and Simon, 2009:8). FOSs or FOBs are smaller facilities used primarily as starting points for forces that serve on a rotating basis or may not have any permanently stationed troops; and expandable, host-state facilities that are maintained by only a modest basing state support presence (Krepinevich and Work, 2007; O'Hanlon, 2008; Lachowski, 2007). They "can deploy for shorter periods for purposes such as bilateral and regional training purposes" (O'Hanlon, 2008:12); and "can rapidly be reinforced in times of crisis" (Rogers and Simon, 2009:8). CSLs are little; the basic, forward-operating facilities with no permanent forces presence, maintained by contractors or the host country, and designed largely for contingency access and serve as the focal point for security cooperation activities or in areas for peace support operations of basing state (Krepinevich and Work, 2007; O'Hanlon, 2008; Lachowski, 2007; Harkavy, 2007). Lily pads are the minimally equipped training and deployment sites (Lachowski, 2007), "which occupy remote locations and are either secret with limited numbers of troops, few amenities, and rely mostly or entirely on private military contractors" (Vine, 2015:17).

According to Vine (2015:17), and Krepinevich and Work (2007), terminology like "forward operating site", "cooperative security location" and "lily pad" is sometimes used to refer to military bases; and different nomenclature is to minimize perceptions about the size and significance of a base, to soften the negative political overtones, to avoid potential opposition from the public and as a response to losses of bases. It is to reduce friction with host nations and avoid regional sensitivities.

With these conceptual frameworks discussed above, the paper will try to assess the general background and category or typology of foreign military bases operating in the Horn of Africa in the next chapter.

2.2. Theoretical explanation of foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa

Theories help us to conceptualize important events that take place in the real world by clarifying relationships among the concepts (Liebel, 2011). It is lenses or filters that direct us the way of understanding some phenomenon, and to explain the world of international relations and the dynamics of world politics (Donnelly, 2005; Dunne; *et al.*, 2013). Contemporary field of international relations offers multiple perspectives on how to select and interpret facts in the world. Since each theories of international relations focuses on different aspects of world politics, they have different answer for why states establish their military bases abroad.

International relations theories like liberalism, constructivism, security dilemma, balance of power theory, theory of imperialism, theory of geopolitics and regional complex theory can explain about foreign military bases in the Horn based on its respective view and assumptions of international political system. However, this paper examines the perspectives of realism and its variants. The researcher chose realism because it takes the world as it is and endeavor to think through events and offer advice to policy-makers trying to negotiate the challenges of the real world.

2.2.1. Realism

The underlying assumption of realism is that the world is filled with security competition and war (Mearsheimer, 2001; Sutch and Elias, 2007). Realists focus on the concept of interests and power; and on great powers in its view of international relations because they consider these states dominate and shape international politics. They believe that the behavior of great powers is influenced mainly by their external environment (structure of the international system). For them, all great powers act according to the same logic regardless of its culture, political system, or type of government. Realists hold that calculations about power dominate states' thinking and that states compete for power among themselves (Mearsheimer, 2001, 2013; Ned Lebow, 2013).

Realists see military bases as one of the mechanisms that used powerful states to expand, control others and dominate the realm of world politics or to dictate its terms in history (Sutch and Elias, 2007). Classical realists, which argue that nations expand its political interests abroad when its

relative power increases; and how great powers understand themselves lead them to the need for self-restraint and prompts aggressive foreign policies (Ned Lebow, 2013; Lobell, 2010), view the increasing competition for establishing military bases in the Horn as an expression of great and emerging power's expansive political and economic interests in the region. On the other hand, it implies the perception they have for one another as a 'threat to their national security or their economic development' that led them to be in the region. Realists may suggest that a military base is needed for great powers to have a permanently mobilized force ready to confront threats wherever it may appear in the region.

Neo-realists argue that states are forced to compete with each other for power because they desire security (Sutch and Elias, 2007); and security is the "highest end of international politics" (Heywood, 2013:409). They hold that the nature of the international structure is defined by anarchy and distribution of capabilities (measured by the number of great powers within the international system classified as (uni-, bi- and multipolar) based on its polarity (Lobell, 2010; Ned Lebow, 2013). For them, major events in international politics like the end of the cold war, a cold war, and major world wars were happened because of changes in the system that resulted from shifts in the balance of capabilities among states (Sutch and Elias, 2007; Donnelly, 2005). Neo-realists may argue the current proliferation of FMBs in the HoA as part of power projection to maintain security; and as the reflection of the changing system of international order from a unipolar system dominated by the USA since the end of the cold war to a multipolar system in which the rising China, Russia, and others influence the dominance of the USA in international affairs.

Its variants (defensive and offensive) may explain about FMBs based on their assumption about what states should give priority in an anarchic international system to survive, relying on whether security or power (Schörnig, 2014; Mearsheimer, 2013). Defensive realist claims that states seek wealth, advantage and flourishing; peace and prosperity; and want to protect their sovereignty, autonomy, and independence (Donnelly, 2005:42). For them, major powers seek to maximize their security by preserving the existing balance of power through mostly defensive strategies; which encourages them to engage in the political, military, and economic expansion (Lobell, 2010). Therefore, for defensive realists, FMBs in the HoA is for defensive purpose against any threat to national security, and maintain the political and economic interests of its respective state in the region. Offensive realists argue that the ultimate goal of states is to be the

hegemon in the system; and assumes great powers as rational actors – which are aware of its external environment and think strategically about how to survive in it (Lobell, 2010; Mearsheimer, 2001, 2013). They argue that great powers fear each other, and how much states fear each other determines the severity of their security competition (Mearsheimer, 2001, 2013). Thus, for offensive realists, it can be a mechanism by which states ensure security from far enemies, support its economy by securing their international trade route, maximize its power and influence in the region, and promote their political ideology abroad. On other hand, military bases imply security competition among great powers and some emerging powers, and how much they fear each other.

Therefore, realism and its variants view the presence of foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa as an instrument of powerful states to achieve their foreign or security policy objectives and maintain the security of their national interests in the Horn. This shows that realism has direct relevance to explain the rationale behind the presence of foreign military bases in the Horn. Hence, this thesis used realism as an explanatory framework to analyze the opportunity and risk that the presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the HoA have for Ethiopia.

2.3. The rationales of foreign military bases

The rationales behind FMBs can be best understood with its historical background. Historically, basing military forces in a foreign soil dates back to the history of warfare or ancient Greece and its city states' expansion and wars in the fourth century BC (Harkavy, 1982:14; Lersch and Sarti, 2014:84). During Peloponnesian war, basing was related to supply distribution and foreign help from allied city-states (Lersch and Sarti, 2014:84). Later, Persians and Romans used it to control land access routes to strategic locations for their imperial power and their conquered territories (Ibid). From the fifteenth to mid-twentieth century, the expansionist powers used it to consolidate their might and influence, and to secure vital interests (Rogers and Simon, 2009:8; Harkavy, 1982:44-50). During the Cold War, the two superpowers - the Soviet Union and the USA used FMBs for global supremacy, to support nuclear deterrence, containment, control of satellite states, and access to sources of energy; and to improve the strategic communication lines of each alliance while weakening those of the others (Lachowski, 2007; Vine, 2009 & 2015; O'Hanlon, 2008; Lersch and Sarti, 2014:86).

According to Glaser (2017:3-4) and Vine (2009:42; 2015:6), base was a key foundation and essential tools for securing imperial control; and political, economic, and military control over the other since ancient Greece, Roman, Egyptian and Chinese empire to the British and French empires in the Indian Ocean and around the globe. Foreign basing, in the earlier hegemonic cycles, have been established and used for conventional power projection, for the purpose of expansion, warfare, imperial control or aspirations and, to protect economic interests and to promote trade - either through direct control of territory or through indirect control over the political economy, laws, and foreign policy to maintain some forms of rule over far regions (Glaser, 2017:3-4; Harkavy, 2007:15). Specifically, it was used for deterrence or protection of the homeland from sudden attack, arms sales and transfers for clients and during war, to protect corporate assets overseas, for ship repairs, rest and recreation (Harkavy, 2007:15-16).

Today, “the bases remain as strong part of the nation’s grand strategy as ever” with three broad strategic justifications: to deter potential aggressors, to reassure friends and allies, and to enable a rapid military response for any operational contingency (Glaser, 2017:5). The roles of bases, are power projection, “care projection” on humanitarian ground, deterrence or counterbalancing functions, arms resupply during conflict and arms transfer during peaceful times, coercive or gunboat diplomacy, shows of force, force interposition, peacekeeping, protection of security of oilfields and sea lines of communication, defense of home and an ally or allies, and etc (Harkavy, 2007:14-15; Vine, 2009; 2015; Lutz, 2009). It also uses for intelligence gathering, counter-terrorism and extremists, counter piracy and expeditionary missions, for purposes of trade and ensuring access to resources (Lachowski, 2007; Vine, 2015); as well as to address the perceived emerging threat among the near-peer competitors, like USA, China, and Russia (O’Hanlon, 2008).

Broadly, FMBs may have strategic, military, political, economic, security and psychological reasons. It can be seen as expressions of a nation’s standing, commitment to supply allies with security, willingness to status and capability to capture or control and secure important commercial shipping and opening foreign markets to trade, to achieve military dominance, political and economic considerations (Harkavy, 2007:19; Vine, 2015:9). It is an important symbol of state’s attitudes, approaches to foreign and defense policy, and an instrument of political change (Lutz, 2009). According to Vine (2015:11), the rationale of establishing military base abroad is based on “how leaders of basing state thought about the very idea of defense and

the newly expansive concept of national security.” It is rooted in “a strategic belief that the security of the nation and the prevention of future wars” that is to engage quickly a hostile threat to the security of its interests or allies, to deter the potential aggressor, and to provide a capability for flexible and timely response to other crises and war (Vine, 2015:10 &11). It helps to contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges world is facing; to gain military control of the space, gather intelligence; facilitate the strategic use of communications and space technologies (Lutz, 2009; Krepinevich and Work, 2007); to “structure the character of other nations” and shape the future of the world (Vine, 2009:46).

Ohtomo (2012:19-20) discussed the very rationales of FMB as the international and domestic factors. The international factors are the established strategic interests, and common strategic interests of establisher and host, that is if there is a need to counter a particular threat or enemy, fighting war, collecting intelligence, military exercises and transit. The domestic interests are expansionist or imperialistic policy of establisher. For Adam (2017), it is directed towards attainment of national security objectives (collection of intelligence, supply chain support for certain operation, and communication needs). It has recently reflects the great powers' competition for strategic access to acquire the strategic value of a small state (Harkavy, 1982:14-15).

For Harkavy (1982:16), the general purposes of foreign military base is between defensive and deterrence or “providing support for military forces and military operations near the anticipated scene of force deployment, and the providing of a military presence at locations critical to national policy and to overall foreign policy credibility.” Having troops abroad helps to demonstrate the economic and military power or to enhance national security and successful foreign policy of a country beyond ones' own border (Lyons, 1978; Krepinevich and Work, 2007); by providing a credible capacity to move, employ, and sustain military forces abroad and the ability to impose the will of the nation and its coalition partners on any potential competitors or adversaries in the occupied region convincing that not aspires to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests (Glaser, 2017:3; Lutz, 2009:10). It enable to achieve advantages in global strategic reaction, geographic positioning of forces, and force concentration and support, and thereby contribute to a favorable strategic balance in both peace and war time (Krepinevich and Work, 2007).

Bases have played an important role in the United States expansion and its development as an “empire” (Vine, 2009:46). It is “a beginning place to provoke anti-American sentiment in the countries where they were located”; and “the tangible manifestation of the grand strategy of primacy that has driven the US approach to the world for decades” (Glaser, 2017:12 & 13). According to Glaser and Vine, foreign bases for the US are an insurance policy on stability - maintaining peace, providing symbols for its commitments to allies and friends and stabilizing influence abroad (Glaser, 2017:3; Vine, 2015:3).

2.3.2. Foreign policy and foreign military base

The access to basing for military forces is part of diplomacy and the oldest and most enduring permanent feature of relations between nations (Harkavy, 2007:1). The term foreign policy has been defined in various ways by scholars; however, they agree that it is concerned with behavior of a state towards other states. Foreign policy is “a political practice” (Campbell, 1992:69). It is considered as high politics or concerned with security, the very survival of the state (Heywood, 2011). It promotes nation’s economic, political, and security interests. A country’s foreign policy and diplomacy is affected by the changing nature of the global and regional politics (AS, 2018).

In the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives, states adopt different strategies; and military strategy is one of those. The “military compatibilities and political will are an important to back states’ diplomacy by force when necessary” (AS, 2018:4). Thus, the use of military power is considered as the ultimate tool of international relations, whether used defensively or offensively, giving a measure of international freedom of action to the state involved. The military strategy involves a fundamental part in a countries foreign policy to protect the state, and to protect one’s interest in the face of opposition from other states (Ibid).

National Security Strategy of America (NSSA) (2015) expressed military as one of instrument of the US power to lead the world, to defend enduring national interests while providing essential leverage for its diplomacy. The US consider international security as a center of its foreign policy with the belief that it serves its interests, upholds its commitments to allies and partners, and addresses threats that are truly global (Ibid). According to Lersch and Sarti (2014:86), bases serve to protect the basing states’ nationals abroad and support its allied governments. Basing access has been an element of the U.S. foreign policy for a long time (Glaser, 2017:11). So, military base abroad is its foreign policy element or instrument in this regard. Pham, views

China's involvement in international peace keeping, and the establishment of China's first overseas military installation called a "logistics facility" in Djibouti, as "the assertive foreign policy posture of current Chinese leader Xi Jinping" (Pham, 2016:13). Base in Djibouti is leverage for China's diplomacy to better protect its growing overseas interests (Chaziza, 2018:15). Likewise, Operation ATALANTA supports Britain's foreign policy objectives in Somalia, to build capacity in terms of maritime and coastguard law enforcement and provides long-term security to the region (HM Government).

Hence, the concept of foreign policy and the rationales of basing military abroad discussed in the above part are interconnected. Similarly, the changing dynamics of international system and the very importance of military power as a determinant of states foreign policy indicate that the presence of military base on the land of other, for great powers, is one instrument of their foreign policy to change or maintain international order; to further and defend their national interests - if diplomacy fail, or strengthen its leverage; and to attain its foreign policy goals or its national interests. Harkavy (1982:16) explained this relation as "military base provide the overall foreign policy credibility". For Harkavy, bases and its strategic access have been an element of diplomacy and military strategy; and even the patterns of global diplomacy and military requirements determine features, locations and numbers of major power's foreign bases (Ibid:44 & 16).

Thus, the above discussions show that there is a strong relation between foreign policy and foreign military bases. It is one instrument of foreign policy of basing states, and may serve as an effective diplomatic leverage, influencing the decision making process, as well as acting a potential deterrent on targeted states' behavior or action in the region.

2.3.3. Rationales of foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa

Horn of Africa is a suitable region for great powers' competitive game of strategic positioning for economic or hegemonic advantage; and has been the victim of the politics of geo-strategic interest for too long (Redie, 2013:1). Recently, it has become the space for the broader competition of great and emerging powers. The strategic importance of the Horn is its location as adjacent to some of the world's most important sea lanes, notably the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, through which most of Europe's maritime trade with Asia must pass and its proximity to the Middle East – the oil rich region (De Waal, 2017:4). It "serves as the back door to the

troubled Persian Gulf, the source of much of today's international terrorism" (Rotberg, 2005:94). It is the most militarized and "conflict-ridden" region on the African continent largely because of regional and global dynamics.

The rationales behind the recent competition of foreign powers to establish military bases in the Horn can be seen as geopolitical, geo-economic, geo-security imperatives of great powers such as China, America and some emerging regional powers. It has been driven by the economic rise of China, newly emerging global security threat like pirates and terrorism, and for scarce resources. Maritime security is an international issue (De Waal, 2019:5). Piracy threatens the flow of international commerce - affects energy prices and commercial interests of great powers, and endangers lives and assets particularly in Somali coast (Harris, 2017). States used bases to secure maritime routes, their citizens overseas from threat, and to evacuate them when necessary, in instances of terrorism or general instability, as the United States did in South Sudan (2013 and 2016) and China in Yemen (2015) and Libya (2011) (Chaziza, 2018; Harris, 2017). It also helps to advance global leadership in Africa especially for great powers like China and the USA.

For the USA, military presence in the Horn is part of the global war on terrorism, to counter violent Islamist groups and piracy in the region. Its strategic attention is securing the shipping lanes that link the Suez Canal and the Middle East, especially against pirate attacks in Bab el Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden (Bernard, 2015; Burgess, 2015). According to Sun and Zoubir (2016:116),

US military deployment in Djibouti in the past two decades has been driven mostly by geopolitical considerations: ensuring logistical support for wars in the Gulf; securing the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a strategic maritime transport choke point and one of the most trafficked waterways in the world; maintaining stability in the Horn of Africa; carrying out counterterrorism activities, military training, humanitarian intervention, and anti-piracy measures; guaranteeing the flow of oil and the protection of energy investments; facilitating cooperation with current and/or potential Western and African allies; and conducting public diplomacy.

Gashaw and Zelalem (2016:792) discussed in detail the reasons for the US military bases in the Horn as to ensure its energy security by protecting access to oil and gas reserves, by protecting oil source by military facilities and bases in the region; to neutralize terrorist groups from Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen; and to protect its Middle East important ally, Israel. On the other hand, it is argued that the US military bases are to maintain a balance of power against China in the region (Sun and Zoubir, 2016; Tull, 2009; Redie, 2013). According to Volman (2009:14-15),

it can be seen as a response to the increasing influence of China and Russia in Africa, to protect access to strategic raw materials in Africa, and to develop a “grand strategy” of its own that will contain China’s efforts.

China claims its base in Djibouti as to provide military logistics to counter-piracy missions, support Chinese peacekeeping forces in the region, facilitate the evacuation of its nationals in crisis situations, and supports its humanitarian operations (Downs, *et al.*, 2017:29-32; Ursu and Berg, 2018:3). But America and some scholars view China’s move as a power projection. Bernard (2015:444), for instance, connect what he called China’s strategic goal “negotiating substantial energy, mineral development, and construction contracts and increasing its trade with the region” and security and stability for the presence of its base in the region. For Coats (2019:25), China’s military facility in Djibouti is “probably exploring bases, support facilities.” It helps to extend its global economic, political, and military interests under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) - a worldwide project that connect the world and claimed as diminish the US influence (Ibid). “Base reflects China’s maritime (and other) expansionary intentions” (Harris, 2017:23). It is a guarantee for the security of its citizens in the region and ensure stability to increase its investment grow (Chaziza, 2018; Harris, 2017). It is to increase its power projection capabilities in the HoA and the Indian Ocean, to prevent maritime in the Red Sea from being interrupted, energy security, to increases its diplomatic influence, to increases overseas military posture, and access to some of the fastest-growing economic markets and natural resource deposits (Chan, *et al.*, 2018). For Downs *et al.*, (2017:vii), “China’s facility in Djibouti is a concrete manifestation of China’s new naval strategy of near seas defense, far seas protection” – to refer to “the Chinese navy’s responsibilities to protect China’s interests abroad.”

China’s motives in establishing its military base in Djibouti is for geo-economics and geo-strategic aims (Chaziza, 2018). Its strategic goals are:

guaranteeing the freedom of navigation for its maritime trade and oil imports; protecting heavy energy investments; facilitating cooperation with current and/or potential Mideast and African allies; maintaining a global posture and image in international politics; ensuring logistical support for Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy activities in the region; securing the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a strategic maritime transport chokepoint and one of the most trafficked waterways in the world; maintaining stability in the Horn of Africa (Chaziza, 2018:8).

Its geo-economic aims are ensuring the security of Chinese overseas investment and economic interests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, energy security, to enable increase its trade through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, for success of BRI (Ibid:8-9). Chinese geo-strategic aims are to project its power in MENA region and beyond to challenge the US geopolitical interests in the region, and as aspiration to become a global power and challenges the existing world order, and to challenge the India to build a frictionless projection of power in the Indian Ocean as well as to quickly respond to any crisis developing around the region that might affect freedom of navigation for its maritime trade or oil imports or security changes developing around Africa, the Middle East, and Europe (Chaziza, 2018:9-11).

For the European powers (Britain and France), foreign basing is used as a tool for their national security strategy (Rogers and Simon, 2009:14). For Britain, it is part of its security and foreign policy (Lersch and Sarti, 2014). It can be considered as a product of historical circumstances, and merged with current operational and geopolitical requirements (Ibid:16). Its facilities in the Horn have missions of “protecting the security of the Gulf of Aden to ensure its oil and natural gas supplies, ensuring freedom of navigation, and to build capacity in terms of maritime and coastguard law enforcement and thus provide indigenous long-term security to the region” (HM Government). France has economic and security interest in the Horn region. Its military base in Djibouti may have strategic functions of prevention, deterrence, protection and intervention in this changing strategic environment (Rogers and Simon, 2009:15). It ensures its secured military platform to maintain its position in East Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean, and enables it to monitor the safety and security of maritime traffic (both military and commercial) through the Babel Mandeb into the Red Sea (Styan, 2013; Gashaw and Zelalem, 2016). It is also part of its East Africa policy, and used to keep the Chinese and Russian influence at the lowest possible level in the region, to help find new gas reserves in Eastern Africa (Redie, 2013).

Turkey uses military bases in the region to support for its strategy of monitoring both Africa and its relations with gulf countries, and to narrow the influence of the Gulf countries according to Styan (2013) and Melvin (2019a). For the Gulf countries, “the Horn of Africa is a second-tier security and political concern; and the recent wave of Gulf engagement with the HoA has been driven by a host of political and security factors” (De Waal, 2017:12). Saudi’s military presence in the region is intended both as a defensive and a potential offensive measure in its pan-regional conflict with Iran (Gashaw and Zelalem, 2016). Saudi Arabia uses it to detect and intercept

Iranian supplies to the Houthi militias passing through the Somali coast; and to counter the influence of Turkey in the region (Rashid, 2017; Melvin, 2019b:13).

For the UAEs, military presence in the Horn is the part of its strategic competition among the Middle Eastern states; to ensure security of the Indian Ocean and a commitment to Saudi leadership of the peninsula as its wider strategic interests; to deter its adversaries, and preserve its national interests; both domestic and international (De Waal, 2017; Adam, 2017:185). Adam (2017) views the UAE's intention to build up a military base in Berbera as a security and economic interests. The security reason of the UAE is regarding the Yemeni conflict, and it uses its base in the Horn for backing internationally recognized government against Shia clans called the Houthis; for war against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula - the Yemeni-based terrorist group; and to gain strategic and economic route in the Indian Ocean and HoA. The economic reason of the UAEs is that "since Emirates are among the immediate beneficiaries of Strait of Hormuz to export its oil supplies which is largely controlled by Iran, a safe passage to the Indian Ocean via Aden or Berbera is under consideration to serve as an alternative route" (Adam, 2017:186-187). Hence, the military base in Berbera is best suited for these purposes, and able to secure commercial and economic interests in the water of Indian Ocean (Ibid).

Other states like Japan, Italy, and Germany may have their own national security interests for their presence in the region; however, their justification broadly is to counter piracy and international terrorism. Additionally, the three international naval task forces operating in the Horn: the Combined Maritime Forces, Operation Atalanta, and the EU Training Mission are focused on maritime security to counter Somali piracy operations (Melvin, 2019b).

2.4. Foreign policy dynamics in the Horn of Africa

The foreign policies of African states have always been shaped by rapidly changing international, regional and domestic environments. According to Wright (1999:2), the main factors that shaped foreign policy of African states during the early period of independence or during cold war were "the impact of colonialism, membership of international governmental organizations (IGOs), the role of resources, nonalignment, security and sovereignty, economic development, and centralized decision making." Artificial borders have always provided interesting dynamics for foreign policy in promoting territorial security (Ibid:13).

Following the end of the Cold War, new foreign policy agendas emerged across the continent, with a complex set of competing interests in the continent. In particular, regional cooperation and economic integration, and the recognition of non-state actors in the foreign policy decision-making processes have gained prominence on the continent's agenda (Wright, 1999:16-17). On the other hand, the end of Cold War diminished or minimized the strategic importance of some region and states of Africa. The September 11, 2001 (commonly known as 9/11) terrorist attack has brought new international attentions to African foreign policy agenda due to its clear potential to become both a breeding ground and a safe haven for terrorists (Mills, 2004; Lyman, 2009). Nowadays, global powers and major regional players - including Turkey, and the Gulf Arab states have become heavily engaged in the continent and in the Horn Africa's region.

In dealing with great powers, the major focuses of African countries are economic, political and security interests. Thus, the foreign policy of African states is inevitably determined by these power's global or regional influence and national interests. This may leads states of the continent or the Horn to reshape their foreign policy, to conform to these power's interests aligning with their own, based on calculating the best way to benefit from these powers' move. It could be seen from this point of view that Ethiopia is drafting the new foreign policy document. Having this general understanding about African foreign policy, the thesis will proceed specifically to the dynamics of foreign policy in the HoA region.

Foreign policies of individual Horn states are influenced by a number of factors. Woodward in his work of (2002) and (2006) explained four main factors: the first is the structure and character of domestic politics has a direct impact on foreign policies pursued. The degree of instability within a particular country largely reflected in attempts to exploit external linkages for regime survival. Secondly, Economic development in the Horn in particular and in Africa in general has often been viewed largely in terms of external trade and foreign direct investment. A third factor is strategic significance, as a region is placed at the strategic position at the point of convergence of Africa, Europe and Asia, as well as a gateway to the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. Finally, nationalism ideology which has been a significant aspect of international politics, central to the ending of imperialism and the catalyst for the independence of states in Africa and elsewhere in the twentieth century.

The Horn of African states' foreign policies have been characterized by mutual intervention through backing one another's political oppositions (Williams, 2011). The foreign policies of states in the Horn have contributed significantly to conflict and mutually destructive activities. Regional players outside the Horn have range of interests in the foreign policy of the region. Developments in the region have been influenced by events in the Middle East and Gulf region. Attracting interests of actors outside the region and the tendency of the countries in the region to seek out opportunities to align themselves with global agendas is another feature in the foreign policy of the HoA (Ayoob, 1978). "The Horn was also an area of significant international rivalry" (Woodward, 2002:3). Throughout the colonial era, Cold War and global war on terrorism, countries in the region aligned themselves to one or another powers to gain support (Ayoob, 1978; Woodward, 2006). The Cold War politics exacerbated the hostile relationships among states of the region with granting of weapons to their client regimes; and provided states of the region with opportunity to follow client-patron style of foreign policy (Ayoob, 1978; Woodward, 2006). "Combating global terror" was once the US's strategic priority which has led many states of the region including Ethiopia to change their foreign policy orientation toward one another, and to pass antiterrorist legislation to show that they are willing partners in the global war on terror and to get technical and military assistance from US (Iyob and Keller, 2006:110).

CHAPTER THREE

3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

This chapter assesses the historical background of foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa, overview of foreign bases in the region, and finally highlights general features and types of foreign military bases in the Horn.

3.1. The history of foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa

The history of foreign military forces in the HoA was connected with trading or porting and expansion of foreign powers, and goes back to the arrival of Ottoman Turks in 1500 and Portuguese expedition in 1516 with seizure of Zeila (Omar, 2001:11). The European basing process in the region was related to their intention of colonial expansion (Harkavy, 1982), and they took strategic locations at first in the name of trading purposes. According to Omar (2001:28), British claimed Berbera town of Somaliland for trading purposes for the first time in 1825, and established themselves thereafter. Italy was devoted basing in the region to protect its East African holdings (Harkavy, 1982:72). “Italy took over the Red Sea port of Assab in 1882 from the Rubattino Shipping Company, which had gained it through fraudulent purchase in 1869, and occupied Massawa in 1885”; it used these ports as a base to invade Ethiopia in the 1890s (Bereket, 1980:2). It had several airfields, military garrisons, naval base and port in Somalia and Eritrea which provided entry points for shipments of war materiel and troops to invade Ethiopia in the 1930s (Harkavy, 1982:72). Italy expanded its bases in East Africa, during and after the Ethiopian War (Harkavy, 2007:87).

The French occupied Djibouti in 1887 and used it as a base to create a colonial territory in Eastern Africa that would link with their West African possessions (Omar, 2001:14; Bereket, 1980:2). Kagnew, which later become strategic importance as a vital part of its global communications and intelligence network for the USA, was a base for an Italian military facility, and also for Britain (Woodward, 2002).

With the beginning of the Cold War, the Horn attracted the attention of superpowers for basing purposes. The US established a communication base at Kagnew, Eritrea, in 1943 by leasing from Britain. With Eritrean federation to Ethiopia in 1952, U.S. signed 25 years military agreement

with Ethiopia in 1953 to secure the use of Kagnew base and naval facilities in Massawa until 1977 to control the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and the Middle East and curb activities of the Soviet Bloc (Redie, 2013; Woodward, 2002; Schwab, 1978). It was the biggest of all the US strategic air bases; center of all American air space operations from the Korean War to the Vietnam War (Mangi, 1987:96). The US paid Ethiopia \$7 million per year for the lease of Kegnew. It further provided the training and equipment, which was valued at more than \$250 million, for the Ethiopian army during the 25-year period (Redie, 2013:486; Schwab, 1978:12). The US had also concluded military agreements with Somalia and Kenya, gaining access to American naval and air forces. By their diplomatic relations in 1980, Somalia allowed the US to have access to its air and port facilities. In 1982, with the spending of \$24 million, the US repaired oil storage and other facilities in the port of Berbera. In April 1980, it also concluded a military agreement with Kenya for the naval and air access at the Kenyan port of Mombasa and air field of Embakasi and Nanyuki, by which the United States were to spend \$26 million to improve the port facilities at Mombasa and to provide other fleet support (Mangi, 1987:101-102).

The former Soviet Union also began assisting Somalia in 1962 in constructing port facilities at Berbera, which were completed in 1969 (Schwab, 1978). In addition, the Soviets made use of the southern ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo (Woodward, 2002). Naval support networks including two soviet communication facilities in Berbera and the air base was opened at Hargessa in 1972, aimed at protecting Russian interests in the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, and generally the HoA region (Adam, 2017; Schwab, 1978). The port of Berbera, which latter leased by the US, was available to the Soviet Navy in 1972 (Harkavy, 1982:189; Adam, 2017:184). According to Harkavy (2007:131), Soviet Union have had military installation at Dahlak Archipelago which was the maintenance facility and supply depot for Soviet naval combatants operating in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, including surface ships, attack and cruise-missile submarines and auxiliaries. It also have had two signals intelligence facilities (Ibid:139).

With the disintegration of Soviet Union which marked the end of the Cold War and supremacy of the USA, Africa in general and the Horn in particular, were diplomatically and militarily given least importance in the US policy maker at least up to the rise of international terrorism, largely after the so called “9/11” 2001 (Redie, 2013). However, the region has experienced a substantial increase in the number and size of foreign military deployments since 2001 - the coming of the US followed by Spain, Italy, Germany, Japan, UAE and others. Currently, the

presence of foreign militaries in the HoA is increasing, with a wide variety of international security actors - from Europe, the United States, the Middle East, the Gulf, and Asia – are operating in the region.

3.2. Overview of currently operating foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa

Currently, USA, China, France, Britain, Germany, Spain, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Italy, Japan have their military facilities in the region. Djibouti only hosts military facilities of (USA, China, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) and also permitted Saudi Arabia. Eritrea hosts military base of Israel, UAE and permitted Russia. Somalia hosts military facilities of United Kingdom, USA, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and EU; Sudan permitted Turkey to establish base at Saukin; Kenya hosts the UK and the US's lily pad facilities. Styan (2016:7) sees the hostage of Djibouti's foreign military facilities as its primary strategic objectives in 21st-century to reduce economic and military dependence on France and to ensure a manageable balance of power with Ethiopia, by using its location as the main economic asset. For Sun and Zoubir (2016:116-118), Djibouti's hostage of great powers' bases are considerations of geopolitical – to counterweight to what it perceives as a dangerous geopolitical environment, geo-economics – to attract revenues from leasing land and to strive for economic aid, and the fears of radical Islamism. The next sub-section tries to highlights the general descriptions of foreign power's military facilities in the region.

3.2.1. Military bases of the United States

At present, the United States has a large military base in Djibouti and some small military facilities in many parts of the region (in Kenya and Somalia), with relatively around 5000 personnel stationed permanently and temporarily. The US leased the former French Foreign Legion base from Djibouti in 2001 following the September 2001 attacks; established and deployed a joint task force known as A Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) to the base in Djibouti in 2003, with around 2000 US military service members as well as personnel from allied countries as a military mission both to counter militant Islamism and piracy (Styan, 2013:9; Vertin, 2019:14). In 2007, the then president announced the establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM); and in 2008, responsibility for the CJTF-HOA was transferred to AFRICOM that assumed authority over the US forces in the region (AFRICOM posture statement of 2018).

In Djibouti, the US has the large and permanent military base in Africa which, is known as Camp Lemonnier, now controlled by AFRICOM. It was initially stationed on 97 acres (39 hectares) according to Melvin (2019b:20), and as of 2019, expanded to 590 acres by a \$1.4 billion investment as contracts issued in 2012 (Vertin, 2019:14); and by \$240 million worth of contracts in October 2018 to expand base facilities and provide infrastructure to support the U.S. Air Force's largest cargo jets as part of the long-term development of the base (Melvin, 2019b:20). The expansion includes a new headquarters, barracks, hangars, and airfield improvements and the use of adjacent Djibouti airport and port facilities (Vertin, 2019:14). The US leased a land for Camp Lemonnier for a 20 year in 2014, at an annual cost of \$63 million. The rent of facility increased from 38\$ million to 63\$ million (Ibid). But according to Vine (2016), its annual rent is \$70 million.

Camp Lemonnier houses up to 4000 military personnel as reported in 2017 (Vertin, 2019:14; Melvin, 2019b:21); and a broad range of the US ground, air and naval units like the US Air Force squadron of F-15Es and F-16 combat planes and air tankers over the years (Defence Web, 2019; Styan, 2013:9). Under the CJTF-HOA, the troops in Djibouti have participated in a joint allied patrol of the Red Sea coastal area and carries out a series of civic action and military training programs as well as gathering intelligence on possible terrorist infiltration throughout the Horn (Lyman, 2009:279). Camp Lemonnier serves for conventional and launching-pad for drone surveillance and attacks, as well as the logistics hub for anti-piracy and other multilateral missions in the region (Styan, 2013:12). Its function expanded with the expansion of the facility. At present, its primary focus is counterterrorism activities in the Horn and Yemen, including Special Forces operations and one of the US government's most active Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) programs (Styan, 2016:9; 2013:10).

According to the United States Africa Command Posture Statement (2018:7),

Camp Lemonnier is an enduring U.S. military installation that serves as a vital hub for Security Force Assistance, operations, and logistics for five combatant commands. ... It provides, operates, and sustains superior service in support of combat readiness and security of ships, aircraft, detachments, and personnel for regional and combatant command requirements; and enables operations in the Horn of Africa while fostering positive U.S.- African relations.

It is “the centerpiece of a network of the US drone and surveillance bases stretching across the continent, and serves as a hub for aerial operations in the Gulf” (Melvin, 2019b:21). A second military facility in Djibouti was opened, at Chabelley Airfield in 2013 to conduct drone operations in Yemen and Somalia as well as the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, following traffic incidents at Djibouti’s Ambouli airport (Defense Web, 2019).

In Kenya, the US has four bases at Mombasa, Manda Bay, Laikipia and Wajir. Its military have been using facilities, called lily pads, or cooperative security locations, since the 1990s, to support its intervention in Somalia and, to support counter-terrorism activities (Defense Web, 2019). In 2004, the US forces were reported to be operating from a forward operating location at Camp Simba in Manda Bay on the Kenyan coast. By 2012, the base had been considerably upgraded and the runway extended. The base hosts on average 200 - 250 personnel and more than 500 at maximum (Melvin, 2019b:22). In 2015, there are two ‘cooperative security locations’, one at Kenya’s Laikipia Air Base and one at an airfield at Wajir in north-eastern Kenya - with few or no permanent US military personnel with prepositioned equipment and logistics supplies, which are used for training and are available for contingency operations. It also had access to facilities at an airport and a seaport in Mombasa - a cooperative security location (Ibid).

In Somalia, the US has around six military facilities located at Kismayo, Baidoa, Bosaaso, Mogadishu, Baledogle and Berbera (Melvin, 2019a). In 2015, it was reported to be operating drones and conducting counterterrorism missions from a base at Kismayo Airport (Defence Web, 2019:2). In 2017 Camp Baledogle, located at a former Soviet Union airbase developed. The base facilities and capabilities have been updated, including a \$12 million upgrade. In 2018, it was reported that six additional military sites were being prepared in Somalia. At the end of 2017, there were more than 500 the US military personnel based in Somalia. The build-up of the US forces in Somalia has occurred as attacks against the Islamist group al-Shabab have increased significantly (Ibid).

In Ethiopia, the USA has operated a number of military installations in Ethiopia since 2003, principally as part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA) (Vine, 2016). Installations have included short-term forward operating locations and sites for launching UAVs and surveillance operations across the Horn and East Africa (Ibid). For example, the US military

has used an airbase in Arba Minch, to launch drones. This installation reported as closed at the end of 2015. The US military has also conducted military training for Ethiopian forces at the Hurso Training Academy while based at Camp Gilbert in eastern Ethiopia, near the town of Dire Dawa. However, there is no publicly known active US installation in Ethiopia currently (Defence Web, 2019:2; Melvin, 2019b:21). But according to De Waal, 2019:6), the U.S has drone base in Ethiopia.

3.2.2. Military base of China

China, though has built its commercial relations with African countries over many decades, has no history of military facility installation in Africa up to 2017 (Downs, *et al.*, 2017). It has become increasingly involved in international peacekeeping under the UN stability-and-security operations, and have been operating in the Gulf of Aden and other waters off Somalia, as part of a multinational naval effort to counter Somali piracy since 2008 (Pant and Haidar, 2017:5; Dahir, 2019:8). Since 2008, china has a continuous naval anti-piracy presence in the HoA region; and deployed 26,000 personnel to the region to undertook a variety of maritime security operations and contribute to security issues of the continent (Melvin, 2019b:3). According to Rogers and Simon (2009:18), China is constructing “an extensive line of ‘lily pads’ that will connect its mainland seaboard with the Middle East and East Africa” as geostrategic considerations.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) established its first foreign military facility in Djibouti in 2017. The facility is officially termed by Chinese as a “Logistics Support Base” and called ‘a strategic strong point’ by Chinese policymakers and experts, denoting a forward presence designed to support the ability of the Chinese military for long-range force projection (Pant and Haidar, 2017:1). The need for such logistics was highlighted for China in 2011, when its military and civilian air and maritime assets evacuated about 35,000 Chinese nationals from Libya, and in 2015, when the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) evacuated around 800 Chinese and other foreign nationals from Yemen, taking them by naval frigate to Djibouti to board flights home (Melvin, 2019b:3).

The naval facility is China’s first - ever and only permanent overseas military base in Africa and placed on the 36-hectare (90 – acre), located at six miles from the United States’ base, adjacent to Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port, a new facility operated and financed in part by a Chinese state-owned company. It is an investment of \$590 million and 10 year lease for 20\$ million a year

(Vertin, 2019:12). The base provides access to Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport for Chinese military operations; and suggested that it could potentially accommodate 10,000 personnel (De Faakto, 2019:5).

China's military base in Djibouti has barracks, a paved area and eight hangars for helicopters and UAVs, and naval facilities. Since the base opened, expansion has continued with the construction of a 450-metre pier that can accommodate naval flotillas, including large warships. It is estimated that the base has the capacity to accommodate several thousand troops. Currently, a marine company with armoured vehicles is reportedly stationed there (Defense Web, 2019:3).

According to Downs, *et al.*, (2017:vi), the Chinese base “will include storage for fuel, weapons, and equipment, as well as maintenance facilities for helicopters, and commercial and military ships”. It will have the capability to support at least five mission areas: counter piracy, intelligence collection, non-combat evacuation operations, peacekeeping operations, and counterterrorism operations (Ibid:vi). There are arguments that the opening of China’s base is a response to the Pentagon’s expansion across Africa and can be seen as part of an increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean through the construction of a network of military and commercial facilities (Defense Web, 2019). For Vertin (2019:13), China’s facility is an evidence of the integration of Chinese military and commercial interests. There are also reports that China is planning to build other naval base in Mombasa that will serve to strengthen Chinese efforts in crisis response, including in the evacuation of its citizens according to Pant and Haidar (2017:7).

3.2.3. France’s military base

France “has had a military presence in Djibouti since the establishment of a French protectorate in 1883 – 87”; and it is “the largest permanent French forces in Africa” (Melvin, 2019b:6). France has several military facilities at several areas in Djibouti including Djibouti–Ambouli International Airport, a naval base, Chabelley Airport outside the capital, and runs reconnaissance posts at maritime frontiers, including Ras Doumeira and Ras Bir at Obock, small military outposts and landing strips (Styan, 2013:12). “The Air Base 188 became a joint support base in 2000, and is collocated with the U.S Camp Lemonnier” (Vertin, 2019:14). Other French outposts have hosted other European troops partnering in anti-piracy efforts, such as Spain, German, and the logistical support staff involved in the EU’s anti-piracy mission, EU Naval Force Atalanta (EUNAVFOR, Operation Atalanta) (Vertin, 2019:14; Melvin, 2019b:6).

According to Rogers and Simon (2009:12), French bases in Djibouti includes

the 5th Régiment Interarmes d'Outre Mer, the 13th Demi-Brigade de Légion étrangère and a detachment from the Aviation légère de l'armée de terre, namely five 'Puma' and two 'Gazelle' helicopters. The Navy has a tank and infantry unloading ship and two barges for carrying material. The Air Force has ten 'Mirage 2000', 'Transall' transport aircraft, a 'Fennec' and two Puma helicopters, located in an air station at the Djibouti International Airport.

Currently, French has around 1,900 military personnel in Djibouti: 1,400 permanently at Camp Monclar situated between the city center, the airport and the US facility at Camp Lemonnier; and around 500 on rotation between France and other regional bases according to Styan (2013:11) and Defense Web (2019). It leased these bases for 10 year by defense treaty made in 2011 with Djibouti and came to force in 2014, and pays 36\$ per year (Vertin, 2019:14; Styan, 2013:11).

According to Melvin (2019b:6), France's bases in Djibouti has a multiple services of military operations like air and naval base, desert training center and support for EU-led counter piracy Operation Atalanta. The garrison, also known as the Advanced Operational Base is equipped with helicopters and a squadron of Mirage combat jets, as well as heavy equipment to support infantry units, and intended to be available in the case of a crisis in the HoA or to deploy to the Indian Ocean or the Middle East as necessary (Ibid). A standby force offers protection to French nationals and responds to regional crises in its area of permanent responsibility. The naval base plays an important logistical role in supporting the French and allied navies in the region and is strategically important for France's ability to send its nuclear attack submarines into the Indian Ocean (Styan, 2013:12). It also tasked with the defense of Djibouti territory and airspace, fostering regional cooperation in the framework of sub-regional organizations, contribution to regional stability, and the projection of pre-positioned forces to eventual operations, supporting the work of EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states in the Horn region, and the protection of maritime vessels (Rogers and Simon, 2009:12; Melvin, 2019b:6).

3.2.4. Military base of Japan

Japan has its own military base in the Horn, Djibouti, established in 2011 for the first time since the end of the Cold War II (Island of Society, 2017). It first arrived in Djibouti in 2009 as part of global anti-piracy efforts. It is 15 hectare or 37.1 - acre facility adjacent to Djibouti airport and Camp Lemonnier (The Trumpet, 2018). As of 2015, Japan had spent \$40.1 million on construction work at the base (Vertin, 2019:15). Japan is reported to pay an annual rent of \$30 million for the facilities (Styan, 2013:13). Since 2011, Japan has stationed a Japan Maritime

Self-Defense Force destroyer and two P-3C maritime reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft at the base to conduct anti-piracy missions. The base was used to support Japanese participation in United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in 2012–17 (Melvin, 2019b:11). It currently contains a port and one destroyer, an airfield that hosts patrol planes, and accommodations for at least 180 troops (The Trumpet, 2018).

The base houses 600 personnel; and is operated by Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces, which have participated in multi-national maritime efforts to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali coast; it also provides transport, logistical supply, medical services, naval peacekeeping operations, naval resupply, peace keeping - United Nations-South Sudan, humanitarian missions, support of multinational operations, Air Force capability-patrol planes, access to joint civilian airport operations & American, French, and Italian expeditionary bases, to rescue and evacuate Japanese interests working in Africa, countering Chinese power and influence in the region, and promote Japanese Regional influence (Island of Society, 2017; Styan, 2013:13).

3.2.5. United Kingdom's military bases

United Kingdom (UK) has military facilities in three countries (Kenya, Djibouti and Somalia) in the region. According to Melvin (2019b:19), UK maintains a number of military sites in Kenya, most notably the British Army Training Unit Kenya in Nanyuki, which operates under long-standing cooperative security agreements. Around 400 British military personnel are based in Kenya. The UK supports the British - Kenya Mine Action Training Centre and the International Peace Support Training Centre. There are its military personnel in Djibouti at Camp Lemonnier (US military base) in order to collaborate with the US forces in the Horn of Africa (De Faakto, 2019:2). British Special Forces have also been sent to Djibouti to counter threats from Yemen to shipping transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, alongside the deployment of Royal Navy warships (Melvin, 2019b:19). Since 2017, the British Security Training Centre in Somalia has provided training for Somali National Army troops within the UN-mandated African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The UK training operation comprises 85 military personnel and is spread across two military bases, one near Baidoa and the other in Mogadishu (Ibid). UK also uses Operation ATALANTA as a key in support of its foreign policy objectives in Somalia (HM Government). Since its launch in December 2008, the UK has commanded the EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) appointing a Royal Navy or Royal Marine Operation Commander (Ibid).

3.2.6. Military bases of Italy, Israel and Spain in the Horn

Italy has its own base in Djibouti, opened in 2013, and it is the operational logistic base of the Italian armed forces outside the national borders; considered by the Italian government a permanent outpost in an area of enormous strategic importance (De Faakto, 2019:3). It is an air force military branch, with unknown number of personnel currently according to Downs, *et al.*, (2017). But according to Melvin (2019b:10) it operates with 80 personnel; and has capable of hosting 300 troops. Italy's base is located next to Djibouti –Ambouli International Airport, and the annual cost of the lease on the base is reported to be \$2.6 million (Melvin, 2019b:10; Vertin, 2019:15). According to De Faakto Intelligence Research Observatory (2019:3), the base is intended to support Italian naval activity in the region, mainly Operation Atalanta and the operation of UAVs, such as fighting terrorism, surveillance of mercantile traffic, liberation of hostages, kidnap and ransom operations, and training local police as part of the European training mission in favour of the Somali army.

According to Melvin (2019b:10), there are reports that Israel maintained small naval teams in the Dahlak Archipelago and Massawa and a listening post on Soira (Amba Sawara) mount in Eritrea, in 2012. Israel's presence is intended to gather intelligence and monitor Iran's Red Sea activities.

Spain is also based at the French facilities in Djibouti, since 2008, to involve in the EU's Operation Atalanta, and maintains around 50 personnel to support the mission. It has deployed maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (P-3C) to support Operation Atalanta (Melvin, 2019b:14).

3.2.7. Turkish military bases

In 2009 Turkey joined Combined Task Force-151 (CTF 151), the multinational counter-piracy task force off the Somali coast (Melvin, 2019b:14). In the context of contributing to international efforts to resolve the Somali conflict, Turkey opened a military base in Mogadishu in 2017 to train recruits for the Somali National Army (Ibid:14). Turkey regards it as a military training camp rather than a military base. Spread over 4 km² and reported to have cost \$50 million to construct, it can accommodate 1500 trainees at a time (Vertin, 2019:10). More than 200 Turkish military personnel are reported to be stationed at the base, which is Turkey's largest overseas military facility. Turkey is also providing Somalia with training support and equipment to

establish the country's navy and coastguard. It is a one and a half square miles, for 20 year lease by the name of port of Mogadishu (Ibid:10).

Sudan signed an agreement with Turkey for transferring Suakin Island to Turkish navy, to maintain civilian and military vessels and any kind of military cooperation. Suakin is located in a very strategic area off the Sudan in the Red Sea, and is currently scheduled to host Turkish naval ships (Melvin, 2019b:14-15; Vertin, 2019:9-10).

3.2.8. Military base of United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia

United Arab Emirates (UAEs) development of the base began in 2015, in Eritrea for a 30 year agreement (Vertin, 2019:2). The facility consist a military airfield with new aircraft shelters, a deep water naval port, and buildings for storage and housing. The UAE has deployed a substantial number of Emirati naval, air, and ground assets. Aircraft which include Mirage 2000-9 and F-16 combat aircraft, helicopters, military transport and maritime patrol aircraft, fighter jets, armored ground units, and UAVs to the base for use against opposition forces in Yemen. In addition, a large ground contingent is reported to have been operating from the base, consisting of a battalion-size force equipped with Leclerc battle tanks, docking facilities, barracks, and hangars accompanying the existing runway. Assab has also been used to train and dispatch Yemeni forces as well as troops and mechanized units from neighboring Sudan, who in 2015 were also enlisted by the Saudi-UAE coalition to fight in Yemen (Vertin, 2019:3; Melvin, 2019b:16-17).

In 2016, the UAE was granted a lease to develop the military airport at Berbera on the coast of Somaliland, which had been built by the Soviet Union (Adam, 2017:185; Melvin, 2019b:17). This grant was after Dubai Ports World won a concession to manage Berbera port, and a subsequent deal in Bosaso port (Puntland, Somalia) (Berg and Meester, 2018). The UAE has begun construction of a combined military air and naval base on a 25-year lease. It is the 16-square mile facility (Vetin, 2019:3). When complete, the combined base will comprise an integrated 42 km² facility with two parallel runways and a deep water naval base, at a reported cost of \$90 million. The agreement on the military base is linked to broader aid and multimillion-dollar commercial agreements between Somaliland and the UAE (Melvin, 2019b:17).

Similarly, Saudi Arabia has increased its military presence in the region, particularly in connection with the conflict in Yemen. Saudi Arabian armed forces were initially based in

Djibouti. Since the breakdown in relations between the UAE and Djibouti in 2015, Saudi Arabian forces have relied on Gulf Countries Cooperation (GCC) facilities at the port of Assab in Eritrea, which Saudi Arabia was cooperated with UAEs in its establishment. In 2016, Saudi Arabia concluded a security agreement with Djibouti that was intended to lead to the establishment of a military base at reported sites of Obock, a small port city across the Gulf of Tadjoura to the north (Vertin, 2019:11; Melvin, 2019b:13). Though there are reports that an agreement had been reached on construction of the base (Downs, *et al.*, 2017; Berg and Meester, 2018), no new military facility has been opened in Djibouti up to 2019 according to Melvin (2019b:13).

3.2.9. Multilateral military missions in the Horn of Africa region

Since 2002, various international military missions involving foreign forces have been operating in the Horn of Africa region. At present, the Combined Maritime Forces, Operation Atalanta, and the EU Training Mission are operating.

The Combined Maritime Forces is a US-led, 33-state naval partnership with a focus on counterterrorism, preventing piracy, encouraging regional cooperation and promoting a safe maritime environment. Established in 2002 to coordinate the US allies engaged in naval activities in the Horn of Africa region, it is commanded by a US Navy vice admiral, who also serves as commander of the US Navy Central Command and the US Navy Fifth Fleet (Styan, 2013; Melvin, 2019b).

Operation Atalanta is the EU's first joint naval mission since December 2008 to counter Somali-based piracy in the high seas of the Indian Ocean and armed robbery within Somalia's internal seas' to ensure the protection of a key EU Sea Line of Communication for European commercial activity and security; and to expand the EU's geographical and geostrategic reach (Styan, 2013:12; Rogers and Simon, 2009:3). Atalanta's main objective is "protecting vulnerable vessels off the coast of Somalia by deterring, preventing and repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery" (Pichon and Pietsch, 2019:18). Its mandate also includes protecting World Food Programme vessels and other vulnerable shipping, monitoring fishing activities off the coast of Somalia, and supporting EU missions and international organizations working to strengthen maritime security and capacity in the Horn region. Djibouti and Kenya (Mombasa) hosts planes of this operation. Atalanta operates a forward logistics hub in Djibouti, alongside EU member

state contingents deployed in support of the operation. On 30 July 2018, the Council of the EU extended its mandate until December 2020. EU naval forces make use of both French and US facilities in Djibouti, adding an additional layer of military and maritime intelligence-sharing (Pichon and Pietsch, 2019:18).

European Union Training Mission in Somalia is the EU's military training to the Somali National Army under the EU Training Mission in Somalia since 2010. Initially operating from Uganda, the mission relocated to Somalia in 2014 and currently consists of 203 civilian and military personnel from eight EU member states and Serbia (Melvin, 2019b:25; Pichon and Pietsch, 2019:19). "In November 2018, the European Council extended the mandate of the mission until 31 December 2020" (Pichon and Pietsch, 2019:19).

Features and types of foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa

Generally, FMBs in the HoA includes land-based facilities (permanent bases, ports, airstrips, training camps, semi-permanent facilities and logistics hubs) and naval expeditionary base on permanent or regular deployment; conventional and surveillance forces, the launching-pad for drone surveillance and attacks, the logistics hub for anti-piracy and other multilateral missions, enduring military installation, "lily pads," or cooperative security locations, forward operating location, sites for launching UAV and surveillance operations across the Horn and East Africa, multinational naval facility, logistics support base, a standby forces, security training center, international and regional military operations and training missions, ground, air and naval units stationed permanently and temporarily.

Foreign military facilities in the region consists of storage for fuel, weapons, and equipment, maintenance facilities for helicopters, and commercial and military ships, barracks, airfield, hangars for helicopters and UAVs, and naval facilities.

Foreign bases in the Horn are considered as a center of operations for protecting and upholding sovereignty of its respective countries over the overseas territory in Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and Gulf Aden; and projecting power into the surrounding geographic region. Specifically, some functions of FMBs in the region are: counter violent extremism, especially Islamist extremism, counter piracy and armed robbery in the HoA and in the high seas of the Indian Ocean; support the basing state's Air Force's largest cargo jets; to offers protection to their nationals and to evacuate when necessary; protecting World Food Program vessels and other vulnerable shipping,

monitoring fishing activities off the coast of Somalia, and supporting regional missions and international organizations' works to strengthen maritime security and capacity in the Horn region, encouraging regional cooperation and promoting a safe maritime environment; support basing states naval activity in the region; to responds to regional crises by training local police; provides transport, logistical supply, medical services; support of multinational operations and humanitarian missions; and peacekeeping operations. Bases in the region also serve as operating drones, contingency and aerial operations; provides support for combat readiness-security for ships & aircraft detachments, personnel for regional and combatant command requirements; joint allied patrol of the Red Sea coastal area and carries out a series of civic action and military training programs as well as gathering intelligence on possible terrorist infiltration throughout the Horn.

On the other hand, some powers like the USA, China, Japan and others uses their military facilities in the region for countering and competing one another power and influence in the region, and promotes one's own regional influence; enable their own military operations in the HoA while fostering positive relations with Horn states; supports joint and allied forces military, civilian personnel and their defense department contractors; support their intervention in Somalia; liberation of hostages, kidnap and ransom operations.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS OF THE PRESENCE OF THE USA AND CHINESE MILITARY BASES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA FOR ETHIOPIA: PRESENTATION OF DATA

The paper under this chapter present the basic data obtained from conversations, the words of respondents reproduced to the best of researcher's ability from the field notes, data from policy documents and reports of relevant institution, as well as quotes and views of some writers from secondary sources.

4.1. Basic data obtained from sources

According to Dr. Abdata Diribsa, Executive Director of Center for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation Ethiopia (Interview on June 10, 2020), the presence of military forces of China and America in the HoA can be part of international or regional peacekeeping, logistical hub, for the strategic importance of the area to control the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, for power projection and maybe "to use the region as a buffer zone for their competition." It "can be seen as stabilizing factor for Ethiopia; if they cooperate, their bases can prevent arms and drug trafficking in the region; can help as logistical supply and protect logistical routes for Ethiopia." However, America worries about its strategic interests around the HoA with the growing influence of China in Ethiopia and Djibouti as well as about its base in Djibouti. The forms of competition have concentrated on logistical and military aspects from the US side, and China has focused on the logistical and economic aspects as the vital part of their engagement. Likewise, "they are trying to monitor the activities of one another and to employ strategy to this effect."

The potential rivalry between the US and China may influence states of the region to side with one or another, and invite them to interfere in the internal affairs of the region's states; "their large military presence might force them to take measures that they believe will protect their stakes at all costs." For instance, as Ethiopia's import-export trade as well as security and strategic engagements depend on the corridor Djibouti provides, if they enter into rivalry and if they control Djibouti or influence its policy orientations towards Ethiopia, the presence of their bases can affect Ethiopia "distorting its logistic services, and market". The presence of the US and Chinese forces may militarize the region and affect power relations in the region, "creating

asymmetric balance and undermine Ethiopia's regional leadership aspiration" according to Dr. Abdata (June 10, 2020).

Mr. Ejige Aso, Minister Counselor on Eritrea and Somalia's affairs under neighboring countries affairs directorate at Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interview on Nov. 25, 2019), argues that the missions of bases - ensuring maritime security and counter-terrorism and violent extremist are an opportunity for Ethiopia in enhancing its international trade and regional stability. The presence of bases can also facilitate security cooperation. On the other hand, as China and the US are officially getting into strategic competition in some strategic areas of the world, there is a probability of conflict of interests among them in the region, and this could destabilize the region in general and Ethiopia in particular. As Ethiopia is vulnerable to any risky matter in the region, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs perceives the US and Chinese military presence as a threat. "It can make it easy for any direct military operation and espionage of our military" as Mr. Ejige said.

Dr. Belete Belachew, a senior researcher at the Center for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation Ethiopia (Interview on June 15, 2020), argues that though it depends on the diplomatic approach Ethiopia follows towards foreign powers in the region, military bases could have security and economic opportunity for Ethiopia. For Dr. Belete, "the primary value of US and Chinese military bases in the region is to protect the security interests of their respective countries." Economic security and other interests are secondary; thus, it facilitates security cooperation and trade – securing maritime routes and as some bases are interconnected with commercial interests and port developments. He argues that Djibouti (for instance) is under the pressure of foreign powers; and in the near future, Djibouti alone may not determine its own fate. For Ethiopian entire reliance on the port of Djibouti, basing their military facilities and forces can give the US and China the ability and opportunity to control or influence Ethiopia's export-import process, even on a specific product to be imported or exported; challenge the independent relations among its neighbors; "could twist the arms of Ethiopia" as well. And Ethiopia could face the challenge to import weapons in case if war occurs with their ideal ally in the region as Dr. Belete said.

According to Mr. Melaku Muluaem, the Director of Ethiopia's Foreign Relations Strategic Studies Institute (Interview on Feb. 02, 2020), both China and the US have economic,

geopolitical, security, and political interests in the region. Ethiopia's strategic importance for both of them is the fact that Ethiopia hosts AU and other institutions through which they can meet all Africans; the population number of Ethiopia provide them the market opportunity for their product, as well as to win international influence in international institutions, especially in UN Security Council. "Countering terrorism and piracy as well as supporting peacekeeping operations in the region are the explicit reasons they established their military bases in the region; and these missions all are an opportunity for Ethiopia in security, military and economic aspects." In the security/military aspect, it may facilitate military cooperation and training. It can help to exchange military intelligence, build military capability to actively counter international terrorism, and provide experience in its planned navy for the protection of its ships on the sea. In the economic aspect, it gives protection for the international sea transportation and also provides security protection for Ethiopia's shipping; provides protection for regional infrastructures and could enable economic movements or interactions even in crisis situations.

As a risk, the US and China's military competition in the region can militarize the region; could minimize Ethiopia's influence in the region and widen suspicion. Even though it depends on the approach of China, if they get into conflict in the region, proxy war may promote and destabilizes the region. The potential destabilization of the region can hamper Ethiopia's basic infrastructures like railroad, aviation, internet network, and others; thus, pose a national security threat. The presence of great powers military bases can contribute to developing the very existing mistrust among the region's states. As trust is very important to develop infrastructural connections, mistrust disrupts it and poses a barrier to economic integration initiatives at the regional level. The use of the bases to carry out military operations in other countries may establish grievance of certain groups or future enemies for host states (Interview with Mr. Melaku, February 26, 2020).

Ethiopia can benefit from the US's military presence in security and economic aspect, and from China, more in economic aspect as its facility is part of its worldwide project – OBOR - which includes various investments according to Mr. Molla Belete, the Director of Great Lakes affairs under the directorate of neighboring countries affairs at MoFA (Interview on Feb. 17, 2020). In the security aspect, its mission of counter-terrorism and piracy operations supports Ethiopia's foreign policy goal of playing a stabilizing role in the region. It may facilitate to create cooperation that may help Ethiopia to strengthen its capability to fight terrorism in the region

independently or collectively. It can also help in exchanging military intelligence. In the economic aspect, more benefit could be from China's base as it is mainly to protect its projects and investment in the region as well as secure maritime routes. In deterring piracy, it has conducted more than 30 operations. There was an instance where Ethiopian ships are targeted and saved from the attack. So it helps Ethiopia in the securitization of the region from terror acts especially securing Ethiopia's border; and secure Ethiopia's shipping transport on maritime.

As a challenge, according to Mr. Molla (Interview on March 09, 2020), Ethiopia perceives the military presence of the US and China as well as that of other powers in the region as threats to its national security. In the security aspect, the bases could serve to spy Ethiopia's security sector as well as Ethiopia's military strength and weakness, which would enable them to conduct military operation they want to do toward Ethiopia or transfer it into any force that wants to attack Ethiopia directly or indirectly. The presence of foreign bases can militarize the region. If the two currently competing powers (China and US) inter into conflict, there could be a possibility of a proxy war that can destabilize the region. If such condition occurs, it directly affects Ethiopia's interests as there could be a probability to block its transportation routes; and "even there is the possibility of Ethiopia to be like Yemen or Syria." In the economic aspect, the geo-economics competition between these powers could affect Ethiopia's international trade or market for export production. In the political aspect, it has the potential of influencing the political decision of Ethiopia as well as other countries especially those who try to challenge Ethiopia's right to use the Red Sea water resources for establishing its navy. It can cause diplomatic deterioration and weaken the current positive interactions as well as initiatives of Ethiopia in the region. But this depends on Ethiopia's internal political stability (Mr. Molla, March 09, 2020).

According to experts from FDRE Ministry of Defense Interviewee V (Interview on May 19, 2020), and Interviewee VI (Interview on May 21, 2020), Interviewee IV, from National Peacekeeping Center of Ethiopia (Interview on March 10, 2020), facilitating joint military training; experience sharing in peacekeeping operations in the region, and sharing military intelligence are the main opportunities. On the other hand, military bases in the region are one of the sources of illegal small arms trafficking. It also facilitates covert operations and military espionage as well as its cooperation with various NGOs and development agencies is risky for Ethiopia's national security and stability according to Interviewee V, IV, and VI.

China's New 2019 Defense White Paper, *China's National Defense in the New Era*, (p:1-2), indicates that China recognizes the rise of international strategic competition. It considers the adjustment of the US's national security and defense strategies as provoking and intensifying the competition among major countries and undermining global strategic stability. The White paper notes that PLA actively promotes international security and military cooperation and refines relevant mechanisms for protecting China's overseas interests. The PLA's Djibouti support base entered into service in 2017 is part of this strategy. China also stated in its 2019 Defense White Paper that it needs to have an active and proper military relationship with the United States under the principles of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation.

According to Leulseged (2019:1-2), China's engagement in the Horn is driven by its desire to see the success of its global project, considering the Horn as a strategic gateway into Africa. Its presence in the region and Djibouti, in particular, has roused US's suspicions; and led to shifts in its foreign policy priorities to "countering China's influence", and; even to consider its global infrastructure-led investments and development as an instrument of submissiveness. China considers the reactions of the US about the opening of its base in Djibouti as the containment strategy against it and a threat to its national security according to Mr. Melaku (Feb.26, 2020) and Dr. Abdata (June 10, 2020). The "success of Chinese worldwide projects implies the fall of America. So, America needs to counter its movement of the economy" Mr. Melaku (Interview on Feb. 26, 2020). For Leulseged (2019:2), the presence of both veto powers can initiate conflicts in the region as witnessed in the war in Syria; and may also provide an entry point for them to exploit the Horn's many unresolved domestic problems.

According to the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) posture statement of (2020), (2019), and (2018), the US's bases in the region is aimed to achieve the US foreign policy goals of maintaining its influence, strategic access and continue to advance its national interests in the region in this era of global power competition. It believes that the US interests are achieved in stable nations with effective, well-trained and disciplined militaries and growing economies. So that, the US military activities directly support its diplomatic and development efforts in the region, cooperating with the Department of Defense, Department of State, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the broader interagency and American businesses. United States committed to addressing partner's security needs by assisting in building capable and professional militaries to meet the basic conditions for economic development and stability

(AFRICOM posture statement of 2020:7; 2019:3). The command works with partners and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the region through improved security capability, military professionalization; and its military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises (Ploch, 2007:1-2).

Regarding China's opening of a military base in Djibouti, the AFRICOM posture statement of (2018:11) stated that the US views "security and access to Djibouti as a top priority"; "carefully monitoring Chinese encroachment and emergent military presence", and "continue to monitor the development to ensure the US interests are not deterred." The US also considers the presence of non-traditional security actors in the region such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAEs, as both challenges and opportunities to its military mission in the region (Ibid, 2019:5). As an opportunity, the US believes those actors can pursue helpful and constructive interests to develop the region's economic, infrastructure, humanitarian, and security sectors. However, with emerging markets and a growing consumer class like Ethiopia, they often employ exploitative tactics and "debt trap" diplomacy to garner undue influence (AFRICOM posture statement, 2019:7). On the other hand, the United States fears that they may diminish its influence by undermining its development and diplomatic efforts in the region (Ibid, 2018:3).

According to the *Trump administration's new Africa strategy of 2018*, as highlighted by National Security Advisor Ambassador, John R. Bolton, on (Dec.13, 2018), America consider the rapidly expanding China and Russia's financial and political influence across Africa as a threat to its operations in the region. United States worries about Chinese strategic initiatives, like OBOR, its foreign direct investment toward Africa, its increasing public debt to Djibouti and Ethiopia, its plantation of a military base in Djibouti, and the fate of Doraleh Container Terminal. To win the strategic competition, the US will focus on advancing its trade and commercial ties with nations across the region, countering the threat from Radical Islamic Terrorism and violent conflict and ensuring the effectiveness of aid as well as supporting successful, accountable, and effective peacekeeping missions. Bolton highlight that America developed a new economic initiative known as "Prosper Africa" which "will support the US investment across the continent, grow Africa's middle class, and improve the overall business climate in the region" supporting American jobs and expand market access for the US exports while promoting sustainable growth in African countries.

For Interviewee VI, Interviewee IV, and V, military bases of great powers can ease or facilitate the military operations of any kind, including conquest. For Wilbert van der Zeijden (2009), from *A Beginner's Guide*,

Foreign military bases are an integral to preparations for war, facilitate for invasion, serves to proliferate weapons, increase violence and undermine international instability, peace and security. Base are launching platforms for military maneuvers: Aerial bombings in Pakistan are launched from Diego Garcia; the Manta base in Ecuador is used to coordinate covert military actions in Colombia; military facilities in Iraq and Turkey are used as coordination centres for 'behind the lines' intelligence missions into Iran and Syria (Zeijden, 2009:2).

Lersch and Sarti (2014:84-85) state that foreign bases were one of the ways by which the scramble for Africa was realized in 19thc; it is a mechanism to maintain the control; and infrastructure of wars for great powers. Superpowers used FMBs "to block and deter each other's presence", as well as "to provide global mobility and to increase influence in regional conflicts during the cold war" (p:93). "Goals such as the War on Terror, control of markets and natural resources and strategic positions" as well as issues regarding lines of communication and intelligence programs underlie motivations for states to establish bases overseas at present (Ibid:97).

Vertin (2019) and Adam (2018), postulate the presence of the US and China as indicative of the continued scramble for strategic control of Africa. For Vertin, "the proliferation of seaports and military facilities on the Red Sea coast has been the manifestation of the so-called new scramble for Africa" (Vertin, 2019:1). Mehari (2019) and Leulseged (2019) postulate it as a new Cold War in Africa involving military, economic and diplomatic preeminence in a situation of a multi-polar world. Chaziza (2018:10) quoted Djibouti's Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Ali's comment on America's and Chinese military base as "the Americans have enough technology, fighter aircraft, and drones [here] to control each and every piece of this land and even beyond. Why should the Chinese not have the right to also use those materials ... to preserve and protect their interests in the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb?" FMBs in the Horn are undermining the national sovereignty of the region's states (African Union, 2019).

Bases sometimes planned in keeping with strategic and political goals, bureaucratic and political-economic imperatives of basing state; and have been used to control the political and economic life of the host nation, extracting important political and military support, for its activities in

some cases (Lutz, 2009:8). For Harkavy (1982:17), a large garrison or complex of bases for the long-term stationing of troops, aircraft, or naval vessels are types of bases which are potentially most threatening to a host's sovereignty and dignity. Such bases were an important aspect and purpose of imperial domination from the 19thc on up to the Cold War period (Ibid:17). During Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in the 1930s, its bases in the region had provided entry points for shipments of war materials and troops (Harkavy, 1982:72). Britain and France have used their bases for maintenance of the flow of oil and other raw materials from overseas colonies and client states, and; to keep open many of its sources of raw materials ensuring security and freedom of their large corporations which was operating in colonial areas (p:84). After World War II, economic and military aid was a major instrument of diplomacy and "came to exist in a quid pro quo relationship with bases within the western alliance" (Ibid:109). The Base is the facilitator of war. It was used as a major shipment of arms for the US and Soviet Union to client states during the 1977-1978 war between Ethiopia and Somalia, and major wars in other parts of the world (Harkavy, 2007:3). During the Cold War, the US's presence in the Horn led to its involvement in Ethiopia's domestic affairs, and its policy was concentrated on keeping Haile Sellassie in power as well as keeping the Horn free from communism (Iyob and Keller, 2006:101).

According to Frederick *et al.*, (2018:vii & xiii) and Vine (2015:3), there are two opposing views regarding the impact of great powers FMBs. Proponents of the military base view it as a stabilizing – helps to maintain the peace, symbol of commitment for partners, deter adversaries, and provide stabilizing influence abroad. Others view bases as a mechanism of expansion and maintaining hegemony, makes conflict more likely, provokes adversaries, and encourages allies to adopt more reckless policies, and makes the use of force by basing states more likely. For Frederick *et al.*, (2018:xiv), bases can be an effective tool in deterring interstate war but is not likely to affect the likelihood of intrastate conflict. Chinese and the US's troops' presence in the Horn may enhance the security of partners against external threats, "which could allow the government to divert resources toward internal repression;" and "increase the human rights abuses of its partner government" (Ibid:62).

CHAPTER FIVE

5. ANALYSIS OF OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHINESE MILITARY BASES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA FOR ETHIOPIA

Under this chapter, the paper categorizes the above presented data into themes; connect the data to show how one concept may influence one another; present the analysis of major opportunities and risks summarizing the result; and finally examine Ethiopia's reaction to the proliferation of foreign military bases in the region.

5.1. Major opportunities

5.1.1. Security/military opportunity

According to Dr. Belete (Interview on June 15, 2020), the US and China's immediate strategic interests can be to protect their economic, political or other; however, security is the "primary value" of the presence of military bases in the region. For all participants in this study, the Horn African stability is a prerequisite for the economic benefits that both the US and China seek in their relations, as well as for stable diplomatic support, and global leadership image that both need to achieve. Both states share an interest, which is likely to continue, in the stabilization, counter-terrorism and violent extremism agendas of Horn states or in defeating armed robbery on the sea and cross-border criminal networks, for their political and economic interests (Interview with Mr. Melaku on Feb. 26, 2020; Dr. Abdata on June 10, 2020). The proponents of FMB consider the presence of the US and Chinese forces in the Horn as a stabilizing (Frederick *et al.*, 2018:vii). According to the AFRICOM posture statement of (2019:10 & 2018:7), fighting against state fragility and violent extremist organizations are of the US's new strategic priorities. Its forces in the region focuses on building the capability and capacity of its partners to a crisis response through strengthening its security cooperation; and also provides and sustains service in support of combat readiness and security of ships (Ibid). In Downs, *et al.*, (2017:vi), it is indicated that the Chinese base in Djibouti supports peacekeeping operations in the region. The stability of the Horn is also one of the main pillars of Ethiopia's foreign policy and security strategy of 2002 and the draft foreign policy document of 2019.

According to Frederick *et al.*, (2018:57), the military presence of the US and China in the region can help to respond to crises and to reduce the risk of interstate conflict or wars in the region; can

affect inter-state conflict behavior; and can influence the strategic calculations of key domestic or regional security actors. During the Cold War, the US threat perceptions and strategic calculations were principally concerned with preventing interstate war and containing the Soviet Union (Ibid). The US may apply this strategy in its new containment of China; and in the sense, its base could prevent interstate war in the region. “Since the end of the Cold War, and especially in the post-9/11 era, the US bases has also increasingly focused on supporting partner states against internal challengers, addressing state fragility and instability in areas central to the Global War on Terror” (Ibid:57). Ethiopia was one of the benefiter of the strategy, and also it has helped in stabilizing the country relatively. China also has an interest in the stability of the countries in which it has many citizens and significant investments as Ethiopia (Interview with Mr. Molla, March 09, 2020; Mr. Melaku, Feb. 26, 2020; Interviewee V, May 19, 2020; Interviewee VI, May 21, 2020).

For all participants in this study, launching an ant-terrorism attack in and outside the region is the rationale behind the presence of some powers, and they have been doing it as well. The primary US interest, largely after 9/11, was security from violent extremist attacks against its embassies, businesses, and citizens in the region. Indeed, it had providing continued drone attacks from their military base in Djibouti as well as sharing important intelligence with Ethiopian forces in the process of retaking Somalia from the Al-Shabab terrorist group (Interview with Interviewee V on May 19, 2020; VI, May 21, 2020; IV, Nov. 25, 2019). As discussed in chapter two of this paper, the increased vulnerability of Chinese to the terrorist attack, have led China to join the anti-terrorist campaign with the international community in cooperation with regional as well as global powers. China’s military facility in Djibouti is aimed to serve the purpose of counter-terrorist activities which could endanger its investment and its citizens in the region (Interviewee V, VI; Mr. Molla; Mr. Ejige; Mr. Melaku). It is the manifestation of its willingness and readiness to share the burden of ensuring regional security, and to join the international community to fulfill its international obligations fighting against terrorism, jihadist militants and regional piracy which threatens global seaborne trade of goods and oil in the HoA region (Dahir, 2019:9).

According to military experts from the Defense Minister of Ethiopia, the US’s military engagement in the region is not new and Ethiopia has been working with its forces, undertaking joint military exercises and training programs in the professional development of its military forces. For Melaku, China doesn’t want its worldwide projects to destroy by any power, so that it

wants to cooperate militarily with Ethiopia to protect its infrastructure in the region (Interview on Feb. 26, 2020). As stated in the AFRICOM posture statement of (2020: 8 & 11), conducting engagements and exercises to strengthen key partnerships and to improve partners' capabilities in basic military skills, maritime security, counter violent extremist organization efforts, counter-trafficking, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and control of key infectious diseases is an important tool in global power competition. In its statement of (2019:17), it also stated that the US forces at Camp Lemonnier engaged in security cooperation activities, contingency operations, and logistics support; and the base is a vital link to build stability in the region. Gathering intelligence on possible terrorist infiltration throughout the Horn is one of the missions of US bases and China's logistic supply base, as discussed in chapters two and three of this paper.

Ethiopia is benefiting from security cooperation programs, including intelligence sharing initiatives, and personnel joining in the US and China's military education and training programs (Interview with Interviewee V, May 19, 2020; VI, May 21, 2020; IV, Nov.25, 2019). The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia to dislodge a radical Islamic government in 2006 was supported by the intelligence and material backing of the US (Lyman, 2009:279). If they cooperate, the US and Chinese bases in the Horn could provide support for solving the region's and the country's political and military crises early, increasing military competency and efficiency (Interview with Mr. Melaku on Feb.26, 2020). It could help in particular Ethiopia's forces deployed for peacekeeping and building relatively more professional militaries that can tackle external threats, planned terrorist attacks, and protect sensitive areas such as oil installations (Interview with Interviewee IV on Nov.25, 2019).

As stated in the AFRICOM posture statement of (2019:20), the US provides different programs and initiative for its partners. According to China's 2019 defense white paper, China also promotes training and assistance programs for African military officers; including PLA officers as liaisons. For instance, after 9/11, the US provided a \$100 million counterterrorism initiative for East Africa and the Horn (Lyman, 2009:276). China also has used military programs – arms sales, military training programs, and other security assistance programs, to strengthen the military capacities of its key allies and to bolster its ties (Volman, 2009:10). Ethiopia has been a strategic partner for both powers; a primary security partner for America, a primary economic partner for China; and a benefiter of various military and security programs and initiatives from

both powers largely in the past two decades (Ibid:15-18). Such initiatives help Ethiopia to support its counterterrorism, maritime security, and overall military professionalization efforts that can help to build its capabilities and create dedicated forces. Likewise, the cooperation of United States forces' security activities in the region with other agencies like USAID supports the efforts to reduce the spread of harmful ideologies, strengthen the governments to protect citizens (AFRICOM posture statement of 2020:7 and 2019:4 & 20). Such cooperation can promote stability and security, good governance, and has positive role in political stability of the region (Ibid).

5.1.2. Economic opportunity

For Dr. Belete, “the main concern of China and US in the Horn is about maritime security” (Interview on June 15, 2020). Maritime piracy, illegal fishing, and armed robbery at sea are considered a threat to the global and regional economies (Pichon and Pietsch, 2019:3). It directly or indirectly impacts Ethiopia's development effort increasing the costs of imports and export. Countering piracy and armed robbery in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is also one of the rationales that have caused the establishment of so many foreign military bases in the region, as discussed in chapters two and three of this paper. Offensive realists also view it as to support their economy by securing international trade routes. Counter piracy involves “protection of infrastructure, economy, environment and society from certain harmful acts occurring at sea” (Ibid:3).

China came to the region largely to fight piracy besides its peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations; and it has also conducted many operations on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to counter piracy as Mr. Melaku and Mr. Molla said. According to the China's 2019 Defense White Paper, its base in Djibouti has provided equipment for the maintenance of escort task groups, offered medical services for officers and sailors on board, and conducted joint medical exercises with foreign militaries. The military facilities of the two great powers in the Horn provide technical assistance and logistic hub for counter-piracy and armed robbery, and merchant ships in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean; it also secures Ethiopia's ships from possible attack of piracy and armed robbery (Interview with Mr. Ejige, Nov. 25, 2019; Mr. Molla, March 09, 2020; Mr. Melaku, Feb. 26, 2020; Interviewee IV, March 10, 2020; Interviewee V, May 19, 2020; Dr. Belete, June 15, 2020). Likewise, it could help coastal nations to develop maritime security

capacities to protect their territorial waters that may contribute to those countries' economic health by using the resources of fishing (Ursu and Berg, 2018:2).

The "Horn of Africa has emerged as a key link in extended networks of bases, ports and trading routes for integrated military and commercial purposes" (Melvin, 2019a:5). The Economy is the secondary value of FMBs in the Horn (Interview with Dr. Belete, June 15, 2020). Mr. Molla and Mr. Melaku believe that though the US troops presence is associated with more of security, it also associated with the accelerated economic and social development in the region, mostly Ethiopia, with the aim of greater access to trade and investment in the future for its companies (Interview on March 09 & Feb. 26, 2020). For China, Djibouti is regarded as one of the most important trade corridors in connecting Africa within its OBOR project (Interview with Mr. Melaku, Feb. 26, 2020; Dr. Abdata, June 10, 2020; Dr. Belete, June 15, 2020). Its military base is interconnected with the security of the project and large investments in the region; and the strategic rationale behind the military base is to protect its rapidly expanding investments across the Horn region (Interview with Mr. Melaku; Mr. Molla; Mr. Ejige; Interviewee V). All other respondents share this argument. The presence of the United States and Chinese forces can remove some of the security burdens for other partner states; allow the region's governments to reinvest funds planned for security into other aspects (infrastructure or welfare projects), which can lead to economic improvements (Frederick *et al.*, 2018:63). Likewise, the presence of the Chinese military in the region is interconnected with commercial deals such as port development which could help Ethiopia to diversify and secure its outlet to the sea, as Mr. Melaku and Dr. Belete said.

The presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the Horn can provide security guard for Ethiopia's large investments and cross-boundary infrastructures from terrorist acts (Interview with Mr. Melaku, Feb.26, 2020; with Mr. Ejige, Nov. 25, 2019). This could be by sharing intelligence of suspected terrorist act or if Ethiopian government request for security provision incases; but there is no empirical evidence these respondents observed in this regard as they said. For Ethiopia, infrastructure especially that connects states of the region is very important to the economy. Inter-states infrastructures like the Chinese-built railway from Addis Ababa which is intended to improve Ethiopia's import and export efficiency as it is linked to the port of Doraleh, and to link Ethiopia to China's global BRI; the water pipeline that connects Djibouti to Ethiopia's water source; and the planned oil pipeline from Ogaden to Djibouti are some of the investments aimed to accelerate Ethiopia's economic growth and regional economic integration

(Downs, *et al.*, 2017:iv). The security of these projects is very important for Ethiopia and the presence of Chinese forces may play the role of guard service from terrorist acts (Interview with Mr. Melaku and Mr. Molla). Chinese laborers, diplomats, investors and projects have been exposed to increasing risks in the region from the early 2000s. For example, in 2007, Chinese workers from Petroleum Exploration Company were killed and seven others were kidnapped by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia (Dahir, 2019:8). In 2008, nine China National Petroleum Company staff was kidnapped in Sudan and five died; and in 2012 Sino Hydro's construction site was attacked by the Sudan People's Liberal Movement (Ursu and Berg, 2018:2; Thrall, 2015). According to Downs, *et al.*, (2017:iv), the Chinese base is aimed to improve its military expeditionary capabilities to better safeguard its citizens and assets in the region as well as allows China to protect its heavy investment in the oil sector of Sudan and South Sudan and exploit the large potential oil reserves found in Ethiopia and Somali coast.

As it is highlighted in the background and chapter two of this paper, one of the rationales of FMBs in the region is the geo-economic competition of great powers in the region or to promote basing states' economic objectives. Geo-economics is the economic area of foreign policy which involves trade promotion; investment policy; and economic, financial and commercial negotiations (Spohr and Silva, 2017:159). Great powers use their military bases to support their economic competitiveness in emerging markets, by minimizing the risks of doing business in the region for their companies (Harris, 2017; Chaziza, 2018). The US Strategy toward Africa 2018 focuses on economic partnerships to build self-reliance among its African partners in the era of great power competition with external actors; and aims to advance trade and commercial ties. It also prioritizes foreign assistance to help its key African partners to achieve sustained economic growth and self-reliance to combat transnational threats (AFRICOM Posture statement, 2019:13). According to Downs, *et al.*, (2017:29-32), finding new markets for its construction companies, supporting OBOR economic initiative, and showing its standards and technologies in overseas projects to attract new business opportunities are of several reasons for China's presence in the HoA. For Mr. Melaku, base increase China's ability to secure its economic interests in the region; and its soft engagement like China Africa Cooperation Forum, shared future and other initiatives provide support for Ethiopia's economic activities (Interview on Feb. 26, 2020). Ethiopia has been one of the benefiteres of various China's economic initiatives in East Africa (Odgaard, 2018:83-84).

5.1.3. Humanitarian opportunity

Humanitarian support operation is one of types of missions executed by militaries based in the Horn of Africa (Downs *et al.*, 2016:29). There is coordination with the US forces in the region and the US humanitarian assistance and civic action projects as well as various diseases prevention programs that may support the development and health sectors of the region's states (AFRICOM posture statement of 2019; 2020). The cooperation of CJTF – HOA with USAID and regional African governments to respond to flood emergencies and conducting civic action projects such as digging wells and building schools in places where development agencies have identified critical needs is an opportunity on the other hand (Burgess, 2015; Ploch, 2007). As it is mentioned in chapter three of this paper, Chinese PLAN has conducted various humanitarian operations during Libya, Yemen crisis and South Sudan civil war. Its 2019 defense white paper also praise PLANs humanitarian operations of such conditions and indicates that its logistic facility in Djibouti will continue to provide similar services in the future. Thus, the presence of military forces of China and the USA may also help in providing and supporting humanitarian assistance at the time of emergency.

The paper, under this sub section, presents that the presence of the USA and Chinese military forces in the region may have three major opportunities for Ethiopia in security/military, economic and humanitarian aspects. Accordingly, the paper identified four major ways through which Ethiopia can benefits from the presence of United States and Chinese military bases in the HoA in security/military and economic aspects.

In the security aspect, the presence of the United States and China's military forces in the region can play a stabilizing factor in the region. Though it depends on the national interests of the basing country, the presence of bases can prevent interstate war and state fragility in some cases. Counter-terrorism operations of their forces can securitize the region from the acts of terrorism and violent extremist groups. Such operations can enhance interstates cooperation to detect and disrupt terrorist activities in the HoA. The stability and security of the Horn is the national interest of Ethiopia and play great role in the realization of its foreign policy goal in this regard. The Horn stability allows Ethiopia to deal more effectively with its internal affairs. Second, cooperation with the US and Chinese forces on counter-terrorism and violent extremist group mission can provide great opportunities for bilateral and multilateral training on defense

capability, peacekeeping; and thus, support to have special military capabilities for Ethiopia's forces experiencing their differences in-depth and incorporate them into their skill. Counter-terrorism operations of the US and Chinese forces in the Horn can also assist Ethiopia to combat terrorism to secure its border and to play its role in ensuring regional peace and security. Bases could also facilitate regional collective action to counter potentially destabilizing forces if they cooperate.

Thirdly, military intelligence operations and intelligence sharing initiatives of bases enable Ethiopian commanders and military officials informed and conduct effective military operations against any threat to Ethiopia's national security in the region. It may provide Ethiopian military officials and commanders the knowledge of the intention, weakness and strength as well as both systemic military operations of security actors in the region. Having such knowledge is very important in international politics, and; enables Ethiopia to develop effective counterintelligence mechanism. Fourth, security initiatives in course of their competition can improve Ethiopia's security sector relations with both powers and can help Ethiopia to address and resolve emerging security issues internally on its own, strengthen government capacity to protect its citizens. Such initiatives can help Ethiopia to defend its border and has a positive role in the political stability of the country – as it can help it to secure its border and regulate its internal environment on a sustained basis. It can also assist in its security sector reforms.

Generally, the presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the Horn support Ethiopia to achieve its foreign policy goal of ensuring regional peace and security. It improves Ethiopia's military capabilities, encourages self-sufficiency; may support Ethiopia in strengthening the effectiveness of its military and security sectors, with training and capacity building acquired by security cooperation and intelligence sharing. Thus enable the country to have experienced, well-informed and confident military forces that can deter any potential threat or aggression to national security and respond to crises early. Moreover, it may strengthen Ethiopia's military capability for the future as a driving factor for further military modernization. Having strong and informed security capacity provides Ethiopia the confidence to generate cooperative initiatives of problem-solving mechanisms in the regions and across the continent.

In the economic aspect, the missions of military bases like counter-piracy and armed robbery in coastal areas of the region can secure international trade and oil shipping route, secure Ethiopia's

ships from possible attack of piracy and armed robbery; and finally, ensure maritime security on the Red Sea. It also supports coastal nations to develop maritime security capacities to protect their territorial waters and promote the fishing industry in the region. Security of international trade routes and maritime security on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean promote commerce and trade; and may give confidence and encourage companies of these global powers to invest in Ethiopia. Ethiopia can also benefit from the economic health of its neighboring coastal nations. Second, bases can help Ethiopia to establish the security environment required to attract foreign direct investment or for economic opportunity as well as trade to flourish, facilitating the engagement in professional military education and training which may support the government in this regard. It could allow the government to reinvest funds planned for security into infrastructure or welfare projects which can lead to economic improvements removing some of the security burdens. Furthermore, the interconnection of military bases and port developments gives ample opportunity for Ethiopia by diversifying its outlet to the sea.

At third, the military forces of China and the US in the Horn can provide security guards for major transnational infrastructures (pipelines, railways, and roadways) that connect Ethiopia with its neighbors; and add effectiveness for its economic successes. Ethiopia has been trying to find potential oil resources for a long. However, because of the security problems and poor infrastructure, it couldn't use its potential resources. The presence of the US and Chinese military in the region may provide guard services for the upgrading and enhancing of its infrastructural capacity or for the success of the planned projects in risky areas. Likewise, the security of China's oil company in the region can also help Ethiopia, as the oil that is refined in South Sudan (for instance) by China is also important to acquire it through a cross-border pipeline. It also indicates that their investors, with potentially minimizing security risks, will invest heavily in the region in the future which is likely to have furthered positive benefits and could have a significant economic impact for Ethiopia. Fourthly, Ethiopia may also benefit from rivals' economic and development initiatives tied to the presence of their base that they may employ to acquire strategic support in their new global competition. Their soft engagement can help in strengthening poor infrastructures in the region and Ethiopia.

In sum, the security services that military forces of China and the US provide for international trade routes, inter-state infrastructures, large investments at risky areas; and their geo-economic competition for global influence can provide Ethiopia the opportunity to enhance its international

trade, to accelerate its exploration and extraction of its potential resources, and creates an enabling environment to attract foreign direct investments and to provide a vast market opportunity for the competing great powers. Furthermore, counter-piracy operations provide an asset to the planned development of navy force for Ethiopia as experience sharing.

5.2. Major risks of the US and Chinese military bases in the Horn of Africa for Ethiopia

5.2.1. Security/military risk

All participants to this research believe that the presence of the United States and Chinese military facilities and forces can be seen as a threat to Ethiopia. It can ease operations like assassination of individuals, expansion, warfare, imperial aspirations - through indirect control over the political economy, laws, and foreign policy (Interview with Mr. Molla, March 09, 2020). As stated on Conference on the US Foreign Military Bases (2018:1), FMBs are “centers of aggressive military actions, threats of political and economic expansion, sabotage and espionage.” Bases are symbols of the ability of the basing states to inter illegally in the lives of sovereign nations and peoples (Ibid). “Many of the 300 overseas military interventions and invasions of the US in the past century were only possible because the US had well-positioned military facilities to launch and support these military operations” (Lersch and Sarti, 2014:91). Bases undermine regional security and represent vulnerability to foreign attacks (Ibid:96). The US used Saudi facilities in the 2001 war in Afghanistan; it also used the Saudi and Kuwaiti facilities during the Iraq war to remove the regime (Styan, 2013; Chaziza, 2018). Bases are launching camp for military activities, and its installations that provide troops, weapons and intelligence are military targets, thus, it is a threat of attack (Ludlam, 2012:2). According to Vine (2015:14), the USA uses its base for the domination of the most strategically important areas of the world; and to keep the world as much as possible within the rules of an economic and political system favorable to its interests. The comment of Djibouti’s Foreign Minister mentioned above implies that military bases of China and the US enable them to conduct any military operation in every part of the region.

The cooperation of military bases with development agencies, governmental and NGOs to accomplish their missions complicate the presence of great power’s military facilities in the region. There is cooperation between the US forces in the region and its development or aid agency like USAID and its embassies Burgess (2013). There was incidence where the US forces

under CJTF-HOA were cooperated with USAID and the US embassies in the sub-region in its covert action projects; and there were instances when armed the US military personnel entered the Ogaden Somali region, confronted by Ethiopian security personnel, and attempted to deceive them into thinking that they were Red Cross aid workers in 2007 according to Burgess (2013:6-7). As the experts from defense ministry said, they have no adequate information about the incidence, but they know that CJTF-HOA covert action teams were asked to leave the Ogaden by the then Ethiopian higher official of defense, based on perception that the team was supporting forces associated with the ONLF. China may also combine its strategic elements of economic, political and security with economic, diplomatic and military interference in the Ethiopia (Washington post, 2018). This is because the link between the Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway, the Doraleh Multipurpose Port and military base can enhance the movement of Chinese military and civilian personnel into and out of Ethiopia (Downs, *et al.*, 2017). Its base in Djibouti also shows a clear change of its foreign and security policy priority from its traditional non-interference (Chaziza, 2018:7). The Chinese forces, government agencies and Chinese companies like China Rail Construction and China National Petroleum Corporation were cooperated in 2014 to evacuate its citizens from Libya (Pant and Haidar, 2017:4).

Based on realists' view of behavior of great powers, the military presence of China and the US in the Horn involves the reflection of changing system of international order, and the intention to changes or to maintain structure of international system. Regarding the intensity of relations of these powers, Mr. Melaku, Mr. Molla, and Mr. Ejige argues that there could be a potential rivalry for global influence among China and the US. Such condition could leads to interferences in the internal affairs or conflicts of Ethiopia, as it was happened during the Cold War period (Interview on Feb.26, 2020; March 09, 2020; Nov.25, 2019). On the other hand, the importing of foreign forces to carry out security operation has significant influence on the region's ability to develop its own internal security arrangement (Interview with Dr. Belete, June 15, 2020). Realists consider it as an instrument to control or dominate the security realm of the states of the region. Christian (2019) relates such security dependency to Africa's reliance on imported foreign products at the expense of promoting industrialization and local products. According to Interviewee IV, V and VI, military bases may give China and America the chance to spy Ethiopia's military strength and weaknesses that is not good for Ethiopia's national security (Interview on March 10, 2020; May 19 & 21, 2020). Experts from Foreign Affairs Ministry

argues in the same line that it can facilitates for spying our military and can influence Ethiopia's political decisions on regional matters. Having the secret of Ethiopia's military capability is risky and if they want to do that, they can give it any enemy or force that need to attack Ethiopia (Interview with Mr. Molla; Interviewee IV, V, and VI).

5.2.2. Political risks

The presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the Horn militarize the region and as result, could lead to political destabilization in the region and Ethiopia. The paper tried to highlights the concept of military base, in chapter two, as a “facility for the storage of military equipment”, “barracks and weapons depots”, “staging areas for war making”, “arms sales showrooms” and “test-ranges for new weaponry.” The fact that both the US and China are arms producers and that they are entering into security competition in various strategic areas of the world could militarize the Horn (Interview with Dr. Abdata, June 10, 2020). Djibouti's bases of the two world powers contain some of the most advanced weapons systems in the region according to Ex Africa Business Risk Intelligence (2018). According to Melvin (2019a:3-5), the militarization of the Horn region involves a physical presence in the form of foreign military infrastructure (bases, ports, airstrips, training camps, semi-permanent facilities and logistics hubs) and naval deployments; external military missions that follows it on wider mandates; and rapid expansion in foreign-owned and managed ports in the Horn region, as well as in transport infrastructure. According to Redie (2013:489), “the fight against piracy represented the peak of international militarization of the region.”

The proliferation of bases make difficult to effectively monitor the movement of weapons to and from these foreign military bases (Christian, 2019; Interviewee V, May 19, 2020 and VI, May 21, 2020). Arms sale and military funds to the region's states are also increasing (Interview with Mr. Molla, March 09, 2020; Interviewee VI, May 21, 2020). The intraregional competition (to bolster regime security, to strengthen their position vis-à-vis neighbors, and in return for financial assistance and investment) among countries of the Horn is a major factor in the militarization of the region (Melvin, 2019a:10). There are claim that China provides arms and military funds to countries that are destinations for its exports and spaces of its energy extraction; and is militarizing the region (Pant and Haidar, 2017:5). Djibouti is emerging as a strategic transit center for illegal weapons smuggled between Yemen and Somalia (Washington post,

2018). There is speculation that weapons smuggling from China to Djibouti, and that Chinese weapons are transferring from its base in Djibouti onto the black market (Interview with Interviewee VI, May 21, 2020). There is also accusation that the United States used the military base as a hub for weapons trafficking and as a location to conduct illegal surveillance on its competitor; threat to the independence of states in the region and is contrary to the interests of regional peace and security (Pettyjohn and Kavanagh, 2016:29-31). During the Cold War, both superpowers produce weapons for transfer to client actors as a means of fuelling their ideological rivalry; and arms brokers were increasingly involved in the transfer of new and surplus weaponry into contemporary conflict zones (Rogers, 2009:82). Currently, the illegal arms transfer is proliferating in Ethiopia. According to Mr. Molla, Interviewee VI and IV, FMBs are one of sources of illegal arms trade in the region including government military depots, and terrorist organizations (Interview on March 09, 2020; May 21 & March 10, 2020).

Militarization may leads to fragility, political oppression and authoritarian political systems as well as civil war (Interview with Dr. Abdata, June 10, 2020). It may lead leaders of Ethiopia to militarily response to ethnic violence, resolve internal disputes; and may affect commercial trade and threatens freedom of navigation as more states establish competing military positions (Estelle, 2018:2). “Small arms can facilitate violent crime; provide the means to exacerbate instability” (Rogers, 2009:2). It have used as vehicles for local violence and for internationalizing violence in the wake of the Cold War (Ibid:1). It could leads to inter-state conflicts among states of the region. The destructive war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977-78 over the disputed Ogaden region war; coupdetat; civil war, subjugation of other group in the country or region was results of militarization during the Cold War according to Ex Africa Business Risk Intelligence (2018) for example. If major powers are drawn into the internal instability and conflicts of the Horn and these become part of their international competition, there is the risk of further fragmentation and a substantial escalation of regional conflicts (Melvin, 2019a:10).

The presence of the US and Chinese bases in the Horn can destabilize diplomatic relations and widen the existing mistrust and suspicion among states of the region. For Dr. Belete, the desire to control the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean is the strategic interests of great powers and continues in the future (interview on June 15, 2020). Their presence can be for power projection and to use the region as a buffer zone for their competition (Interview with Dr. Abdata, June 10, 2020). As

stated in its posture statement of (2019:14), the AFRICOM strives to further the US alliance and seek new partnership to counter the activities of China in the region to win the destabilizing influence over the region, based on the strategy of strengthening partner network. Permitting base for one state can be said creating an association with that states' foreign power's policy, which may involve a loss of sovereignty to at least some degree, in diplomatic language (Interview with Dr. Belete, June 15, 2020 & Dr. Abdata, June 10, 2020). According to Sun and Zoubir (2016:116-118), the rationales for Djibouti's hostage of foreign military forces are its own geopolitical and geo-economic calculations; as well as its fears of radical Islamism. Its geopolitical concern is about its neighbours – like Eritrea in the north, Somalia in the south and even Ethiopia. It fears Ethiopia considering or suspecting its economic development and political stability may revive the vision of Haile Sellasie's political integration (Tafesse, 2018:141); and Ethiopia's close relations with Eritrea and its plan to have stake in Berbera port could challenge its position as the main maritime hub for its large economy (Berg and Meester, 2018:16). Somali government criticizes Ethiopia accusing it as 'balkanizing Somalia and need to weaken the Somali unity' on the issue of Berbera port deal (Interview with Mr. Molla, March 09, 2020). Eritrea also fears Ethiopia's military modernization, especially, navy plan (Ibid). Mr. Melaku, Mr. Molla, Mr. Ejige, Interviewee IV and VI have similar view that there is fear and suspicion also from Ethiopian side in that the hostage of Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia's FMBs could leads to threat to its national security by militarizing them or creating security grouping that directed on Ethiopia. There is always mistrust and suspicion between states of the region; and proliferation of foreign forces increases suspicion and mistrust that has been the dynamic feature of the Horn's foreign policy (Interview with Mr. Molla, March 09, 2020; Interviewee V, May 19, 2020; Mr. Ejige, Nov. 25, 2020). Added to the previously existing features of the region's foreign policy, the military presence of the two global strategic competitor in the region could influence diplomatic relations of neighboring states; and can weaken the regional organization's initiatives as it may affect participation in regional cooperation accords, particularly when other local states that are not friendly with the competing powers are involved (Interview with Dr. Abdata on June 10, 2020).

The presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the Horn may undermine Ethiopia's strategic importance and aspiration for regional leadership. The US relied on Ethiopian military might and intelligence for its strategic interests of preventing the region, specifically Somalia

from becoming a safe haven for al-Qaeda or other transnational jihadist groups (Interview with Mr. Melaku, Feb. 26, 2020; with Dr. Abdata, June 10, 2020). According to Mr. Ejige, Mr. Melaku, and Mr. Molla, Ethiopia is a good market, and a one-stop shopping center where it can widen its diplomatic skills among African delegates at the AU, the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and other international organizations for China. Ethiopia's strategic importance to both the USA and China is largely based on its internal stability and its commitment to collective peace and security. However, "Ethiopia's persistent ethnic violence, political unrest and instability can minimize its role from regional peacekeeping commitments; and also limit its capacity for critical diplomatic engagements" (Estelle, 2018:1). The United States' shift of strategic interests from fighting terrorism towards the global political and economic competition with China and Russia could lead to shifting of partnership system (Interview with Dr. Abdata, June 10, 2020). America, at present, needs to diversify its positioning and strategic partnership in the region. There are reports that it has begun building land-based supply routes from the Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti to other the US camps across the Horn of Africa like Berbera – its old facility (Ibid). Likewise, the rent from the land of military bases and the military support from foreign powers can strengthen and militarize the coastal states of the region (Interview with Mr. Ejige, Nov. 25, 2019 & Mr. Melaku, Feb. 26, 2020). For Djibouti, for instance, added to many million dollars in annual income from bases, it may provide a guaranteed security umbrella, and could be a means for expanding its influence within the Horn or part of its branding policy (Interview with Dr. Abdata & Dr. Belete). Mr. Molla and Interviewee VI share this argument in the same line. Such situations may lead small states or even non-state actors, separately or jointly, to counter-balance Ethiopia's power in the region (Interview with Mr. Melaku, Feb. 26, 2020; Dr. Abdata, June 10, 2020; Dr. Belete, June 15, 2020).

5.2.3. Economic risk

The presence of foreign bases "may open the door for other forces to prevent Ethiopia's use of the port by imposing their will on Djibouti" (FDRE, 2002:95). According to Tafesse (2018:146), "the power that control northeast African seashores can affect Ethiopia's access to the sea." Ethiopia's foreign policy document of 2002 and the draft document of 2019 also recognize this argument. The colonial powers were battling over the sea ports in the region to block the transit of firearms to Ethiopia (Ibid:147). The establishment of a military and naval presence in Djibouti with many financial arrangements may reduce Ethiopian influence and leverage over Djibouti

and furthermore shift the prevailing pattern of relations between the two interdependent states according to Dr. Abdata (June 10, 2020). Before the coming of China, Djibouti's port access was easy for Ethiopia; however, after Chinese involvement in the port investments, it has become challenging even though various agreements are signed (Interview with Dr. Belete, June 15, 2020). It could lead to asymmetrical balance (Interview with Dr. Abdata, June 10, 2020). The reapproachment of Ethio-Eritrean relations and Ethiopian government's efforts to diversify the outlet to the sea can be considered as an important initiative to minimize the potential risks in this regard. However, the growing military forces of China and the USA as well as other foreign powers like UAE and Saudi Arabia in areas of close proximity to Djibouti, Eritrean and Somalia's port may raise prospects of potentially destabilizing effects on Ethiopia (Interview with Mr. Melaku, Feb. 26, 2020; Mr. Ejige, Nov. 25, 2019; Interviewee V, May 19, 2020).

One of the rationales for military basing in the region is geo-economic competition as presented in chapter two of this paper. The current geo-economic competition among China and the USA is competition for access to large markets, young populations as well as a burgeoning middle class that enjoys increasing purchasing power; and Ethiopia is a fore country in the Horn in this regard according to Mr. Melaku. At present, America is advancing trade, and provision of aid to get competitive advantage over China for its foreign policy goal of countering China's influence (Leulseged, 2019). Likewise, the Chinese base in Djibouti is to provide security for its economic activities in the region (Interview with Mr. Melaku, Feb. 26, 2020; Interviewee VI, May 21, 2020). Economic interests can lead to geopolitical competition and different types of conflicts including military ones. The geo-economic competition between major powers could affect Ethiopia's international trade or market for export production (Interview with Mr. Molla, March 09, 2020; Mr. Melaku, Feb. 26, 2020; Dr. Belete, June 15, 2020). "Even the trade war between China and the USA that seems far from Ethiopia have directly affected Ethiopia's export market of Chinese companies product" as Mr. Molla said. There was incidence when "America blocked the exportation of potassium heading to China by the allegation that it could use for uranium production" Dr. Belete.

The perception that the US and China have for one another, at this time, as a threat to one another's national security and economic development may raise tension between them in the region. Any type of conflict whether it is between great powers or within the Horn states can disrupt Ethiopia's infrastructures that contribute great to its economy for Mr. Molla (March 09,

2020), Mr. Melaku (Feb.26, 2020) and Interviewee VI (May 21, 2020). For instance, during the Ethiopia-Somalia war of 1977-1978, the Somali forces cut off the railway line and prevented Djibouti port of giving service to Ethiopia (Interview with Mr. Melaku, Feb. 26, 2020; Dr. Belete, June 15, 2020). During the Ethiopia-Eritrea (1998-2000) conflict, Eritrea accused Djibouti of allowing Ethiopia to use its port for importing military arms for the war use; and even Eritrea seeks to undermine Djibouti's close ties with Ethiopia at different times (Interview with Dr. Belete, June 15, 2020).

Based on the above presented data and the historical overview of great power's military bases in one state or region, it can be concluded that the presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the Horn may have security, political and economic risks for Ethiopia.

In the security aspect, first, it may put Ethiopia's national security at risk. The military bases of the US and China in the Horn allows them to monitor, control and to conduct direct attacks against individuals and groups they think that hostile to their interests in the country. If, as realists argue, the US and China use their bases in the region as an instrument to expand, control and dominate the realm of the region's politics to achieve their own foreign policy goal, it may serve as coercive to direct the domestic and foreign policy of Ethiopia into their interests; or to manipulate events in the country into their interest of control and access to resources and profit. It shows that they can use force if their demands are not met. Especially, the presence of the US bases almost in all parts of the region, for instance, along which its current influence and challenge on Ethiopia regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is threat to Ethiopia. If the US wants to do that, it could allow Egypt - to use its base to attack the GERD project. It can even interrupt the importation and transportation of construction material used for the project by using its military forces in the region. It may also encourage other governments to use their military forces to invade or challenge Ethiopia, as it did to Somalia in 2006.

Second, bases facilitate intervention. The cooperation of the US and Chinese military activities with various agencies operating in the country can support various political, economic, diplomatic and humanitarian efforts of Ethiopia. However, it can also expose Ethiopia to interference in its internal affairs and influence various policy orientations. The US has a long experience in interfering with the affairs of other states at different times. The presence of many the US troops in the region and its cooperation with its different agencies operating in the

country may increase its influence over Ethiopia, allowing it to achieve its strategic aims easily. Chinese extensive engagement in the country by itself can make the Ethiopian government and industries vulnerable to economic, diplomatic, and military espionage. Ethiopia's telecom network, for instance, is built by a Chinese company and it is likely to share secret information with the Chinese government or military forces in the region. Hence, the cooperation of various agencies and private contractors with their respective forces in the region is a high risk for the sovereignty of Ethiopia on its internal and external affairs. It also facilitates the intervention into any matter or conflicts that these powers think to have the potential of destroying the power structure and administrative infrastructure of their friendly client and consider it as a posing threat to their geostrategic interest. The involvement of one power, for instance, China, in Ethiopia's internal conflict invariably draws the involvement of a rival power (US) on the opposite side of the conflict. Such intervention may aim at regime change, influence policy orientation of the country, make easy covert operations, which may include political, economic, and paramilitary, in the country and spread of their values and ideology.

Third, bases can influence the development of Ethiopia's military or security sector. As both the US and China are the major partner of Ethiopia, the presence of their bases in the region can help to facilitate security cooperation with Ethiopia. However, security commitment and cooperation with forces in the bases provide, especially, through joint military exercises and professional military education, may also allow them to build more relationships and a greater understanding of Ethiopia's decision-making processes. It directly influences the development of Ethiopia's militaries, and to build up their capabilities to conduct independent operations in Ethiopia. It may lead Ethiopia to underinvest in its own security and diminish its overall military resources available to deter potential adversaries and make adversaries more likely to initiate conflict. In that, it may increase the security dependence of Ethiopia to deter potential enemies or adversaries to its national security independently in this uncertain global political system. The initiatives tied to the strategic competition of the two great powers supported by military forces in the region may erode the possibility of designing independent military strategy or security policy of the Horn states as well as Ethiopia. Fourth, espionage and surveillance operations of bases in the region can lead the US and China to pursue technologies that could potentially increase both sides' incentives to strike first; or even to pursuing aggressive expansion to secure militarily important areas. Bases facilities that serve as intelligence operations enable them to

monitor all email, phone, and data communications traffic of the country's officials. Espionage and surveillance missions supported by advanced technologies may enable them to access Ethiopia's national secrets easily and can expose access to its adversaries.

Generally, the presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the Horn of Africa is a threat to the national security of Ethiopia. It facilitates direct or indirect interferences to internal affairs of the country, allows them to conduct any military and covert operations in any part of the country, to either directly overthrow governments or pose pressure at the negotiations table, to influence the political situation and policy orientations of the country.

In the political aspect, it can be summarized as: first, bases promote militarization and political instability that follows it. The presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the region, whether it is for defensive or offensive purposes, can militarize the region or may make states of the region adopt more militarized policies that can lead to conflict, and destabilize the political situation of states of the Horn. The military/ security competition may lead China and America to form security partnerships and relationships with regional state and non-state actors to promote their regional interests, project power, and to shape the broader regional balance of power. The effort to diversify or maintain security partnerships may lead them to arms transfers, and military assistance to their client or partner to reassure the level of commitments to their defense or support. Likewise, such competition may make them establish transfer routes for illegal small arms transfers in the region. Militarization can strengthen the capacity of small states, terrorist organizations, and/or armed groups or various ethnic militias; could lead to political instability in the country; and initiate inter-state conflicts as the region's states borders are interconnected.

Second, the military bases of great powers can widen the existing mistrust and suspicion among states of the region; as well as may destabilize healthy diplomatic relations between the Horn states and Ethiopia. As the diplomatic implication of permitting foreign military bases is creating an association with the foreign power's policy, the presence of the US and China's or the US allies' military base in the Horn may destabilize the diplomatic relations of Ethiopia with neighboring states by creating a security dilemma, and suspicion if Ethiopia perceives that there is a power that intends to destabilize it using that base. It also could invite third-party involvement to disrupt the neighboring state's relations with Ethiopia. Likewise, the potential for tension or conflicts between these great powers makes it difficult to Horn states to have

independent foreign policy orientations towards Ethiopia and one another. Widening mistrust and unhealthy diplomatic relations could lead to instability or inter-state conflict in the Horn of Africa.

Third, it may undermine Ethiopia's strategic importance and its aspiration for regional leadership. Any conflicts in the region have a direct impact on Ethiopia and could be seen as a threat. Ethiopia's instability may minimize its importance to China, as there could not be a stable market in the absence of peace. In line with this, the presence of a large number of China and the US forces in the region may give them the position of the Horn African leadership on security issues on the region or it will militarize the US and China's foreign policy in the Horn Africa. This means that the Ethiopian army's role in regional security and foreign policy will diminish, and will minimize Ethiopia's strategic importance to the US and its Western allies. Similarly, reliance on foreign military presences may lead to foreign policy initiatives of smaller states like Djibouti and Eritrea aimed at gaining a more significant international profile or enhanced relations with the foreign power at the expense of Ethiopia. Added to militarization, such initiatives could change the balance of power in the region with their strategic positioning and can challenge Ethiopia's aspiration for regional leadership.

Likewise, the presence of the US and Chinese forces and its missions in the region may undermine the democratization process in Ethiopia. If the government manipulates the missions of these powers' military forces in the region; and if foreign forces stationed in our neighbors indirectly capacitate the government to put down rebellion or opposition groups; or align with opposition movement with a mission to overthrow the government, there is a possibility of undermining the democratization process and could lead to human rights abuse in the country. The contribution of military bases in undermining democratization process of the country can also be seen as a consequence of militarization and covert operations. Similarly, it can enhance the internal security capabilities of governments to violate human rights and encourage them to rely on the use of force to stay on power and block political reform, in host states of the region; then become a challenge to Ethiopia as a refugee hostage.

Generally, the presence of the US and Chinese military base in the region can militarize the region, disrupt diplomatic relations of Ethiopia with neighboring states, undermine the democratization process, and could directly affect the political situation of the country. It has a

destabilizing effect and strategic implications to undermine Ethiopia's strategic importance and its aspiration to regional leadership.

In the economic aspect, presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the region, first, may cause the shift of the prevailing pattern of economic relations between Ethiopia and neighboring states. It may lead to an asymmetric balance of power in the region and poses a challenge to Ethiopia's access to port services. Second, may disrupt Ethiopia's infrastructures that contribute greatly to its economy, if the missions and competitions of their military forces in the region generate instability or inter-state conflict in the Horn. Likewise, the continuous presence of large numbers of the US and Chinese military forces in HoA may make host states a potential target for Islamist terrorists or militant groups such as al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab. This could affect Ethiopia's international trade, if, for example, terrorists target ports of Djibouti and infrastructures that connect Ethiopia to the ports. Finally, the interconnection of military bases and port development as well as the massive investments by China and the Gulf countries in the HoA reflects the ties between security and economic interests of these powers in the region. This implies that the economic intervention of foreign powers into the region and military bases reinforce each other. The economic aspects of great power intervention pose the economic exploitation or continuation of the imbalance of trade relations and dependence on the export of primary commodities. On the other hand, the interconnection of bases and ports may make Ethiopia to deal with third-party to have access to ports in the region. Thus, the presence of the US and Chinese bases might help them to assert their influence and dominance on the market of the country; and to keep Ethiopia as much as possible within the rules of their political-economic system.

5.3. Ethiopia's reaction to the presence of foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa

The current international dynamics have been greatly influenced by the so called "rising or emerging" powers like China, India and others whose main goal is to promote their development and to increase their military projection both domestically and internationally (Pham, 2016; Chaziza, 2018). The power structure of international system seems going to multipolar system. Such "shifting power dynamics create both opportunities and risks for cooperation" and "significantly impact the future of major power relations" (NSSA, 2015:4). It also creates new form of power projection abroad through stationing military personnel at strategic location of the

world. Such development and changes seems alarming all states across the world to redefine and reinterpret their foreign policy specially to deal with those issues concerned with global security threat (Negeera, 2018).

Ensuring national security and safeguarding national survival is the first and foremost goal of Ethiopia's foreign affairs and security policy (FDRE, 2002; 2019). As stated in Ethiopian Foreign Policy and National Security and Strategy of 2002 and draft documents of foreign relations policy of Ethiopia (2019) its foreign relations are determined by the dynamic interplay of domestic and external factors (regional and global). Thus, the presence of the military bases of great powers in the Horn determines the foreign policy approach and orientation of the country. Both documents (FDRE, 2002; and 2019), indicates that Ethiopia's foreign policy is primarily based on internal challenges stated as: poverty, backwardness and internal political instability, and focuses on building internal capacities to reduce external vulnerabilities. However, the revised draft document of foreign relations policy consider the changing of the region's geopolitical conditions, regional and continental integration and the condition of international system as basis of foreign affairs policy (FDRE, 2019).

According to Mr. Molla and Interviewee VI, Ethiopia is aware of all global and regional changes (interview on March 09, 2020 & May 21, 2020) respectively. The new Ethiopia's foreign and security policy is on the process and it considers such developments globally and regionally. Ethiopia is establishing navy and strengthening it, working on strengthening IGADs cooperation initiatives; and supporting IGAD initiatives on following the interaction of foreign forces in the region. At African Union level, there is a beginning to create one organ in African Union on the Red Sea's security issues. However, "we cannot sure of the development of things in the future; but I think we have to create system that can deter these risks" (Interview with Mr. Molla, March 09, 2020).

All participants of the study believe that Ethiopia have to have and maintain good diplomatic relations with all actors in the region. Currently, Ethiopia diplomatically has good relations with all countries of the Horn of Africa, and with international community (EU, USA, European countries, Asian and Middle East countries); and the country's leadership has also showing more political will to influence regional economic integration and security matters (FDRE, 2019). Though the strategic importance of Ethiopia for the US and China is different, there is

convergence of interests on security matters of the Horn. Ethiopia is trying to leverage the current rapidly changing geopolitical dynamics to enhance its own influence, avoid taking sides, at least publicly, and leverage its geostrategic significance as the region's hegemon to attract much-needed investment from several different partners (Interview with Mr. Ejige, Nov. 25, 2019; Mr. Molla, March 09, 2020; Mr. Melaku, Feb. 26, 2020). Regarding hostage of military base, Ethiopia did not allow foreign military bases in its territory at present, but welcomes international cooperation in security programs, according to experts from Defense Ministry.

Ethiopia understands the implication of the recent geopolitical change around the Red Sea and foreign military bases in the region for it and for the regional security; and indicates the need to tackle or minimize the possible threat to national security and national interests as one of a foreign policy goal (FDRE, 2019). The draft foreign relations policy also consider maritime security and secured port service as a core to Ethiopia's foreign affairs policy to ensure sustainable development through international trade and to attract foreign direct investment. In this policy document, security of port service is indicated as the need to diversify the options to the sea, and the probable exposure of the service to the third party's influence. Likewise, in 2018, Ethiopia announced its plan to launch a naval force as part of the military sector's reform. British Broadcast Corporation (BBC) reported on 14th of June 2018 quoting speeches of PM Abiy as: "We built one of the strongest ground and air force in Africa... we should build our naval force capacity in the future"; and "military reform should take into account the current fast-changing world and socioeconomic and political situation in Ethiopia." Mr. Molla and Mr. Ejige said this initiative is designed to curb potential and imminent dangers. BBC also quoted the argument of Mr. Roba Megersa, head of the Ethiopian Shipping & Logistics Services Enterprise, as "We are afraid perhaps in the future that even Djibouti may not have its own say to really decide on its own fate. This is quite a threat to Ethiopia." And indicate that Ethiopia is concerned about the proliferation of foreign bases in the region and Djibouti's hostage of military bases of US, China and others.

In general, it can be concluded that, Ethiopian leaders and experts are aware of the changing global system and geopolitical dynamics of the Horn Africa region. This can be understood from the start to revise foreign and security policy of the country considering the current and future prospects of global and regional political, security and economic changes. Likewise, the initiative to launch Ethiopia's navy on the Red Sea for the first time; the attempts to diversify

Ethiopia's outlet to the sea; various initiatives in the region in conflict resolution and regional economic integration by leaders are another examples that can be taken as a reaction to the proliferation of foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa. However, the future is uncertain; and the current Ethiopian political situation along with the Nile politics makes also difficult to predict or forecast the impact of foreign forces in the region on Ethiopia. All of the researcher's respondents believe that internal unity, security or stability is an important thing to determine the extent to which Ethiopia is vulnerable to the risks and increase its potential benefits from foreign powers competition in the region.

CHAPTER SIX

6. CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to analyze the risks and opportunities of the US and Chinese military presence in the Horn of Africa for Ethiopia. Its aim is not to drive generalization about the potential risks and opportunities of all foreign military bases in the HoA for Ethiopia by taking that of the US and China as the case study. Rather, it is concerned with examining the concept, rationales, and the nature of FMBs in general, assessing the overview of historical and the present state of foreign bases in the region. Finally it analyzed how the presence of the two leading global powers might benefits and challenges Ethiopia. The study is based on the major assumption that China and the United States of America are the global economic powers of this period and their global interaction is important in determining the structure of future international system as well as the level of cooperation and conflicts on some specific regional or global issue. Likewise, the political and foreign policy dynamics of the HoA as well as the location and position of Ethiopia in the region inevitably invite it into any type of cooperation and conflicts that may occur in the region; and to share from whether the curse or blessing of regional issues.

Accordingly, the paper has found out that, the presence of the United States and China's military bases in the Horn has both risks and opportunities for Ethiopia. It may have security, economic and humanitarian opportunities. As threats or risks, the paper has found that the presence of the US and Chinese military base in the HoA can have security, political and economic risks. Here, even though the presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the region by itself can erode security rather than enhancing it, bases are mainly of instrumental value and are not in themselves be the primary cause of risks or opportunities. The paper also examined the reaction of the Ethiopian government towards the growing interests of great and middle-range powers to influence the region's security and political affairs. According to the information from officials and experts who participated in this study, Ethiopia is aware of the changing regional geopolitics and taking some initiatives to deal with it by revising foreign and security policy as well as strengthening or modernizing its military capability. The draft document of foreign policy considers the regional geopolitics and the changing dynamics of the international system as the basis for Ethiopia's foreign relations. It also emphasis internal political and economic stability as

a basis of foreign policy considering the problem in this regard increases vulnerability to external powers.

However, it is difficult to predict the development of things in the future in the region. The organizational, strategic and intelligence capacity evaluate the logical presence of foreign military bases, to identify and resolve challenges or risks that could arise from it, and the presence of a unified action through the inter-agency processes generating toward the issue is under question. Having such organizational and strategic capacity helps to understand tenets of the US and China's national strategy, as an essential means to understand the future course of their security and military strategy toward the Horn or Ethiopia, and to have a strategic response for potential risk. Furthermore, as it is located at the nucleus of the Horn without any way/right to the sea, the approach of Ethiopia's foreign policy towards its neighbors and leading global powers as well as other basing states in the region needs careful consideration and has a determinant factor of its national security.

Hence, the extent to which it affects or benefits Ethiopia is based on its ability to examine the new initiatives or intentions of traditional and new actors in the region; its internal cohesion and stability; the extent to which it involves in the regional politics; the approach of its diplomatic relations with the US and China and the countries of the region. Thus, Ethiopia needs to have flexible and strategic responsive policy options to deal with the changing regional and global environment, to confront with the todays and future challenges of great power's influence, and other complex regional security matters. Having a strategic responsive policy also helps Ethiopia to increase the effectiveness of its security and military sector to separate events in the region to reduce risks from the new and globally driven development, as well as to help the country to be sure of how things would develop in the region. Ethiopia's organizational and strategic capacity to evaluate and identify or predict potential crisis seems very weak at present. Focusing on principle-based diplomatic relations with neighboring states and all security actors in the region could also determine the degree of risk or opportunity. Ethiopia should not focus on foreign policy behavior which gives priority to short-term interests especially for securing regime survival at the expense of long-term benefits in conducting its security and diplomatic activities with states of the region. It needs to increase transparency and predictability in security affairs to increase stability across the region, to prevent and manage the unpredictable crisis without any foreign powers initiatives. Non-alignment policy orientation with both the US and China is

important to benefits from their competition and minimize potential risks. Likewise, Ethiopia should focus on economic diplomacy (trade, development, and foreign direct investment) when dealing with the US and China, and other actors in the region to maximize opportunities or minimize risks. The increasing economic links and co-operation between Ethiopia and China are positive and created an environment conducive to the promotion of cordial diplomatic relations, as its focus on trade, investment, and infrastructure development are more beneficial for the Horn and Ethiopia. Ethiopia's economic diplomacy needs to go beyond securing foreign direct investment by putting increased emphasis on regional economic integration. Furthermore, internal unity and stability as well as economic development are the foundations, to minimize potential risks and benefits from the military presence of the US and China in the region, and for a strong defense and foreign policy. So that, Ethiopian leaders need to focus on addressing the social, political, and economic problems of the country by using various security and economic initiatives the US and China provide in course of their competition, which could strengthen internal unity and stabilize the country.

The Horn of Africa, one of the most strategically situated regions in the world has attracted the attention of world powers at different time periods. History tells us that the involvement of foreign powers in the region counted for a long, and highly influenced the state formation; the political, economic, and various social aspects of the society of the region. Though the history of foreign military base in the region is tied with foreign power's involvement in the region, it was mostly known during the Cold War period. The incident of "9/11", and the rise of piracy in the region has made the region part of the so-called "Global War on terrorism" and station of foreign military forces. Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia are among the countries in the region that have large coastal lines along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean; and now host more than ten foreign military facilities, with further foreign powers eager to establish their own base as a result of their huge geopolitical significance. The presence of so many FMBs in the HoA could generally imply the shift of global political order from the dominance of the US to a multipolar system; the willingness or commitment of these powers to influence the security matters of an important area of the world; their interests of security, geopolitical and geo-economic competition and expansion; as well as the degree to which they fear each other in their economic and military operations in the region.

The United States and China have had both competitive and cooperative, and recently a sense of conflictual features of relationship. As discussed in this paper, in the Horn of Africa, there has been their cooperation on peacekeeping and countering piracy operations. They both need political stability, economic development, and a stable environment in the region, though it is based on their strategic interests, and this might open opportunities for more cooperation. Moreover, recent China's economic and military engagement in the region could generate greater prosperity and security if the US cooperates with it. United States' consideration of Chinese presence in this aspect as constructive to develop the region's economic, infrastructure, humanitarian, and security sectors; and China's willingness to have an active and proper military relationship with the US based on the principles of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and cooperation could be an implication for the possibility of cooperation. However, the opening of China's military base in Djibouti, along with its global projects like BRI, Silk Road and others, led the US to consider China as a global strategic competitor and this may make each country look to maximize its own interests and may make difficult to find areas of mutual interest and cooperation in the region. The main strategic interest of China is power projection as an aspiration to become a global power and challenges the existing world order, to keep the trade routes open or to ensure continued trade flows, accentuated its One Road One Belt Initiative. The main objective of the US is to maintain its predominance in the region and to achieve this end besides securing the routes of trade flows. Thus, there might be competition between China and the U.S. in the Horn region over issues like commercial interaction, access to natural resources and support for occasional positions on political, economic, and social issues in international forums. Similarly, there could be tension between the two powers in the effort to change the existing international system on China's side and to maintain the status quo on the United States side, on the sale of military equipment and other issues. The United States' willingness to focus on advancing its trade and commercial ties supporting its investment and improving the overall business climate with nations across the region; its consideration of Chinese engagement as exploitative tactics, and its fear that China may diminish its influence in the region by undermining its development and diplomatic efforts in the region manifests the future areas of competition and tension among the US and China.

Thus, the presence of military facilities of both China and the United States in the HoA broadly implies their competition on military/ security, economic and geopolitical aspects which has both

opportunities and risky implications for the region. If they make constructive dialogue on their future roles in the region's affairs and cooperate on counter-terrorism and piracy as well as other potential crisis in the region, their military presence can stabilize, support commercial interaction, advance the harmony of interests in economic and security aspects in the region; thus, encourage sustainable economic growth, successful resolution of pressing regional and global issues, and peaceful settlement of regional disputes. The counter-terrorists and counter-pirates operations and the efforts to secure their friendly regimes can be evidence for the cooperative initiatives they have been. On the other hand, if they compete to maximize their interests and to deter one another, there is a possibility of tension among them in the region. If so, their military in the region can contribute to pose barriers to economic and political stability, widen mistrust among the region's state and affect diplomatic relations, and can weaken regional organizations' initiatives on selective issues. It could help to consolidate military/security dependency, economic fragility, or trade imbalance.

According to Dr. Abdata, Dr. Belete, and Mr. Melaku, the US and China's rivalry or cooperation in the Horn is determined by the interests they want to achieve under different conditions and the way they decide to protect or achieve that interests (Interview on June 10, 2020; June 15, 2020; on Feb. 26, 2020) respectively. The size and placement (in Djibouti) of their military forces stationed in the region could affect the course of regional crisis or prospects for collaboration among them on shared concerns, and also implies the potential of tension among them, according to Mr. Melaku (Feb. 26, 2020). The presence of large forces placed near each other with advanced military technology may lead fears and misperception about each other's intentions and can generate counter action that could result in the risk of conflict escalation in the region. It may imply that both powers have plans or willingness to use force or military intervention that may be more likely to do so in the future in the region; willingness to invest in the military than political, diplomatic, and humanitarian efforts to reduce crisis across the region; indicate their commitment to client states and to promote their own foreign policy objectives militarily; seeking to form indirect rule over the state they think that the influence of other power over it could affect their national interests; and could limit regional or international cooperation in their efforts to improve own position relative to one another.

Theoretically, according to realists, the presence of the US and Chinese military bases in the Horn of Africa implies their own strategic calculation – what region is deemed crucial to their

national security at this time and in the future. It also manifests their wider competition in the international system, their efforts for power projection, to achieve an economic, political, strategic advantage, defense and deterrence mechanism to ensure their national or economic security from far enemy or potential aggressor.

At last, the paper tries to provide some suggestions for the future that are thought to minimize risks and maximize opportunities from the presence of the leading powers' military base in the Horn of Africa. According to Mr. Ejige and Mr. Molla, Ethiopia is conducting principle-based and balanced diplomatic relations with both the US and China and continues in the same approach without siding with one of them (Interview on Nov. 25, 2019; March 09, 2020). Economic diplomacy is the basis of Ethiopia's foreign policy according to the policy document of 2002 and draft document of 2019, and also all participants of the research suggests that it is important to focus on economic diplomacy to minimize vulnerability that could arise from the presence of foreign militaries and to benefits from their presence. Ensuring its own internal stability and unity is another suggestion provided by all participants of this study. Thus, the paper suggests that:

- Ethiopia should have to ensure its internal cohesion; economic strength and political stability.
- Ethiopia need to focus on principle based diplomatic relations with neighboring states and all security actors in the region, and economic diplomacy.
- It need to have the flexible responsive policy options that enable it to separate events in the region and to examine how things would develop in the region to reduce risks from the new and globally driven development.
- Ethiopia need to conduct careful diplomatic activities in a way not to be exposed to the dependency on any of external power, as reliance on external power's cooperation to build strong security and military power may not always match the country's security or military strategy, because every external partner cooperate to meet their own foreign policy and security policy objectives. Thus, Ethiopian leaders and security actors should think and question that what if there never has been foreign military powers in the region while conducting cooperative counter terrorism operations in the region.

- Ethiopia should actively work with its neighbors and other Africans for such initiatives as developing a common strategy for engagement with external powers with a view to achieve their development and to advance regional economic integration. It needs to actively work at IGAD and AU's level, to increase the capacity to prevent foreign exploitation and interstate conflicts which is more critical threats than terrorism.
- Regionally, it needs to increase transparency and predictability in security affairs to improve the habit of mutual distrust in the region; and to develop a capacity in examining a balance between regional development agendas and the costs imposed by external powers, considering as a security complex.

In general, the proliferation of foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa and the existence of the two leading global powers as well as strategic competitors, USA and China need further research on what China, the United States, and other external powers are doing in the Horn of Africa; what impact this is having or will have on particular Horn countries; and what can be done to avoid or mitigate its negative effects in the future, based on observation of military facilities, military activities, and assessing the wide array of security and military strategies of these powers in the region. In doing further research, understanding of the intentions and the implicit rationales of the basing troops in the region from all actors as well as knowledge of the perceptions or perspectives of all states of the Horn Africa on this development helps to give more exact generalization. It broadly implies the need to have flexible and assertive foreign and security policy that can deal with the changing global and regional political and security issues in an uncertain international political system for Ethiopia. For leaders, policy makers, security experts and diplomats, it needs careful consideration while dealing with those actors basing their troops in the Horn, especially while conducting military cooperation, military diplomacy and agreements of diplomatic relations in various aspects.

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Appendixes

I. Interview guide questions

A. Interview questions for Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia

1. What is the perception or perspectives of Ethiopia regarding foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa?
2. How the presence of military bases of the US and China contribute to Ethiopia's economy, politics, military, and security?
 - How it can affect the Ethiopia's economy, politics, security and military?
 - Any information if you (as Ministry) have observed any empirical evidence about risks or opportunity of any foreign military base until now?
3. Do you think there is relation between illegal arms trade and foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa?
4. How Ethiopia is working to separate events to reduce risks and maximize benefits from military bases?
5. What is your view about the condition that may increase Ethiopia's vulnerability to the external powers and what increase its potential benefits from foreign powers competition in the region?
6. In your opinion, do foreign military bases have credibility in deterring the security threats in the region?
7. Do you have anything to add on the basis of our discussions so far?

B. Interview questions for Ethiopia's Foreign Relations Strategic Studies Institute

1. What is strategic importance of Ethiopia for US and China?
2. How the presence of military bases of the US and China contribute to Ethiopia's economy, politics, military, and security?
 - How it can affect Ethiopia's economy, politics, security and military?
 - Do you have any information if you have observed any empirical evidence about the impact (positive or negative) of foreign military bases on Ethiopia until now?

3. There is strong mistrust among states of the region which arise from historical animosities, security threat among or beyond borders and suspicion of states officials about the motives of neighboring states.
 - Do you think the presence of foreign powers, especially US and Chinese military can contribute to mistrust among the region's states?
4. Do you think that the presence of foreign military bases in the region could minimize the Ethiopia's influence in the region?
5. What is your view about the condition that may increase Ethiopia's vulnerability to the external powers and what increase its potential benefits from foreign powers competition in the region?
6. What strategies Ethiopia employing or should employ to ensure that its interests are considered or integrated with those foreign power's mainly with that of China and US interests in the region?
7. Do you have anything to add on the basis of our discussions so far?

C. Questions for Defense Minister of Ethiopia

1. What is the perception of Ethiopia on the presence of military bases of the United States and China in the Horn of Africa?
2. How the presence of military bases of the US and China contribute to Ethiopia's economy, politics, military, and security?
 - How it can affect the Ethiopia's economy, politics, security and military?
 - Do you have any information if you have observed any empirical evidence about the impact (positive or negative) of foreign military bases on Ethiopia until now?
3. Do you think there is relation between illegal arms trade and foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa?
4. How Ethiopia is working to separate events to reduce risks and maximize benefits from military bases?

5. What is your view about the condition that may increase Ethiopia's vulnerability to the external powers and what increase its potential benefits from foreign powers competition in the region?
6. In your opinion, do foreign military bases have credibility in deterring the security threats in the region?
7. Do you have anything to add on the basis of our discussions so far?

D. Questions for Personal interview

1. What is your perspective on the reason states establish military base on the land of the other territory?
2. Throughout the history, foreign military bases have been established and used for the purpose of expansion, warfare, imperial aspirations and there are views such that it facilitates the capture and control of trade and resources.
 - How do you see the current proliferation of foreign military bases in the region with the context of past history?
3. What is your opinion on how the presence of military base of US and China contribute to Ethiopia's economy, politics, military, security, and if any other dimension of its contribution?
 - How it can affect the Ethiopia's economy, politics, security and military?
 - Have you observed information or any empirical evidence about the impacts (negative or positive) of foreign military bases until now?
4. The history of cold war politics reminds us about some Middle Eastern powers involvement in the Horn, in that they were acting as a proxy for super powers.
 - What do you think about the current military involvement of Middle Eastern and Gulf States in the region in line with the presence of China and US?
5. There are views such that the presence of foreign military bases of great powers in the region support commercial interaction and advance the real harmony of interests in economic and security aspects, and also facilitate for interdependence. On the other hand, there is also argument like great powers military base in the region can contribute to consolidate their

trade imbalance, pose barriers to political integration and contribute to mistrust among region's states.

➤ How do you assess these arguments?

6. Do you think that the presence of foreign military bases in the region could minimize the Ethiopia's influence in the region?
7. What is your view about the condition that may increase Ethiopia's vulnerability to the external powers and what increase its potential benefits from foreign powers competition in the region?
8. Do you have anything to add on the basis of our discussions so far?

II. List of key informants

1. Mr. Ejige Aso, Minister Counselor on Eritrea and Somalia's affairs at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 25, 2019, Addis Ababa
2. Mr. Melaku Mulualem, Director at Ethiopian Foreign Relations Strategic Studies Institute, February 26, 2020, Addis Ababa
3. Mr. Molla Belete, Director of Great Lakes affairs under the directorate of neighboring countries affairs at MoFA, March 09, 2020, Addis Ababa
4. Anonymous, Colonel/National peacekeeping center Ethiopia, March 10, 2020, Addis Ababa
5. Anonymous, Colonel/Ministry of Defense, External relations directorate, May 19, 2020, Addis Ababa
6. Anonymous, Colonel/Ministry of Defense, Information forecast and analysis directorate, May 21, 2020, Addis Ababa
7. Dr. Abdata Diribsa, Director and Senior researcher at Center for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation Ethiopia, June 10, 2020, Addis Ababa
8. Dr. Belete Belachew, Senior researcher at Center for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation Ethiopia, June 15, 2020, Addis Ababa

1. Maps of Military bases in Djibouti

