

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES**

**DERADICALIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF ISLAM: A COUNTER  
EXTREMISM MEASURE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE IGAD**

**BY**

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**ADDIS ABABA**

**MAY, 2016**

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**THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES ADDIS  
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By: Berhanu Taye

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## **ACRONYMS**

AIAI- Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyyaa

AMYC- Ansar Muslim Youth Center

AQEA- al Qaeda in East Africa

ARS- Alliance to Resistance in Somalia

CEWARN- Conflict Early Warning Network

CVE- Countering Violent Extremism

ICPAT- The IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism

IGAD- Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

ISIS- Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

ISSP- IGAD Security Sector Program

RJ - Restorative Justice

SSR- Security Sector Reform

SST- Security Sector Transformation

UMISOM- UN Mission in Somalia

UIC- Union of Islamic Courts

USD- Dollar (the legal currency of the United States of America)

VE- Violent Extremism

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## **ABSTRACT**

*Individuals or groups pass through radicalization then violent extremism stages before they become terrorists. Islamic extremism/radicalism is a political ideology employed for non-religious ends. The research aimed at identifying counterterrorism mechanisms and ways of incorporating deradicalization in the IGAD framework. Data were collected from Key Informants and documents. Through thematic, content and comparative analyses, the finding showed that IGAD and its member States hardly adopt deradicalization but for Sudan. The ISSP is to launch a Center of Excellence for CVE to counter extremism and facilitate inter/intra faith dialogues. Background-factors leading to radicalization are perceived/real grievances resulted from social, economic, political, historical and personal experiences. Principles of AfSol, Human Development Theory and RJ would be appropriate approaches to counter radicalization and its factors. Deradicalization will dry out human, material, financial and moral resources of terrorism thereby weakening terrorism from its nucleus. Local mechanisms at grassroots-level would effectively address radicalization and its threats by fighting the Islamic extremist ideologies. Governments must cooperate their efforts, and share experiences and resources using the IGAD platform. Human rights and legitimate questions must get due attention. Islam must own deradicalization processes, and provide institutional and conceptual tools for countering extremism and terrorism committed under its name.*

### **Key Words**

*Deradicalization, CVE, Islamic extremism, IGAD, ISSP, Radicalization*

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# CHAPTER ONE

## BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Under this Chapter introductory discussions about the IGAD, deradicalization, problem statements, and objectives of the research, research questions, and significance of the study will be made. The Chapter comes to an end by highlighting readers about the organization and structure of the Thesis.

### 1.1. INTRODUCTION

IGAD was established as a response to regional draught related problems. However, areas in which it takes part are expanding time to time. IGAD has launched its strategic plan on October 1-2, 2005 in Khartoum, Sudan. The strategic plan on peace and security for the years 2010-2014 was adopted in 2010. Besides the four divisions at headquarters in Djibouti, IGAD maintains specialized institutions and programs based in the capital cities of its other member states among them the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), and the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) are all based in Addis Ababa (IGAD, 2010).

The IGAD is the premier regional organization for achieving peace, prosperity and regional integration in the IGAD region. It assists and complement the efforts of the Member States to achieve and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs, *inter alia*. In addition, it plays roles in harmonization of policies with regard to trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources, and promote free movement of goods, services, and people within the region.

Following the 9/11 attack, military force has been the first option. Many extremists or terrorists were killed while many more others captured. Terrorists held in different detention centers have used the opportunity to interact other inmates, disseminate extreme versions of Islam, and made the detention centers venues of radicalization and recruitment. Many of them were rejoining the same or more violent extreme groups. Recently, the need for deradicalization and rehabilitation

programs are being applied in many parts of the world. Many countries launched the programs to tackle the dangers posed by people coming back from abroad.

East Africa, especially the IGAD region, is located in one of the volatile places of the World. The war torn Somalia has been facing attacks from lots of terrorist groups for more than two decades. The government of Eritrea is being accused of assisting Al-Shabab and other terror groups in the region. Kenya has suffered several attacks in the hands of Al Shabab militants. Local Islamic Jihadists declaring allegiance to international terror groups like Al- Qaida and ISIS seem to have support from young Muslims in the region. Plus, a recent study indicated that there are signs of radicalism and radical groups rising in IGAD member states (Ltd, 2015).

In 2008, the IGAD most terror attacks in East Africa did not have international linkage. They were attributed to domestic or sub-regional insurgencies. Most casualties from terrorism in East Africa are not linked to international terrorism but to domestic insurgencies in the sub-region. Loss of life or property in the East African communities attracted less attention compared to few victims in the sub-region who came from the West. People complain that this is due to the UN agenda focused on Western victims or interests as targets of international terrorism (Dempsey, 2006, p. 8).

The IGAD sub-region faced some more problems because of regional intra and inter-state conflicts that led to or exacerbated instability, poverty and political conditions conducive to terror groups' activities.

Statistics shows terrorist attacks are steadily rising targeting civilians and in so many interests throughout the IGAD and the rest of Africa. Despite intensive military actions and reform of criminal legal system to deal with terrorism, the number of people joining Jihadist/militant groups is far from decreasing. The IGAD and member states seem to pay not due attention to tackle the root causes of Islamic extremism.

This research has explored the current trend in the region regarding Islamic radicalization as a root cause of terrorism. Radicalization is also affected by push (background problems crating grievances) and pull (radicalization tactics like promises) factors leading to radicalization.

## **1.2. MEANING OF DE-RADICALIZATION**

Several terms are used to refer to the phenomenon of deradicalization, including ‘desertion,’ ‘demobilization,’ ‘defection,’ ‘rehabilitation,’ ‘reconciliation,’ ‘dialogue,’ and ‘disengagement.’ The main reason for the use of different terms in different societies seems to be a realization of the socio-political activities attached to each term. But two of these terms, deradicalization and disengagement, are used more frequently. The former is mainly used in Asian societies, and the latter in European ones. Deradicalization and disengagement can be defined as the process of individual and collective withdrawal. Disengagement refers to a behavioral change, whereas deradicalization implies a cognitive shift, i.e. a fundamental change in understanding (Hayat, 2009).

## **1.3. CAUSES OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM**

The 9/11 terrorist attacks triggered the United States led global war on terror. On the wake of the attack, a number of militants and terrorists were killed, captured and imprisoned. However studies proved that prisons and detention facilities themselves became centers for radicalization and recruitment for extremists’ causes. Leaders and masterminds of terrorist groups used the opportunity to motivate and further radicalize fellow prisoners to join their respective Jihadist groups. The killings and military actions could not reduce the number of young Muslims joining Jihadist groups. As a result, policy makers have noticed that the war on terror is not only a military war but also war of ideas. Thus, a war on terror cannot be won by mere killing or imprisonment of terrorists.

Intelligence activities, boarder security, military actions, detention of terrorists are relevant and necessary. But, efforts were needed to eliminate hatred, intolerance and extreme interpretations of religion. The causes and methods of radicalization were studied in order to identify the root-causes of violent interpretation of Islam. Radical groups were attracting lots of young Muslims from all walks of life into militancy and suicide bombing. Deradicalization and rehabilitation programs were launched in some countries as counter-extremism/radicalism alternative strategy. Different attempts and results have been registered following such programs.

## **1.4. SUBJECT MATTER OF DERADICALIZATION**

Sometimes, one can notice a blurred demarcation between reinstatement and deradicalization. The former deals with how to place criminals back to the society abandoning crimes. Crimes are known evils to both the victims and perpetrators. Whereas deradicalization programs generally deal with attempts to help individuals renounce violence which they considered it as if it is their noble religious duty.

Deradicalization mechanisms are applied by different countries through religious institutions, government agencies, security institutions, NGOs, the internet... etc.

Deradicalization programs mainly aim at bringing the radicalized individuals, who have not taken part in any violent activity, back into the mainstream. Its “soft” approach has three components (Boucek, 2008):

- a) *Prevention*: deterring individuals from getting involved in violence;
- b) *Rehabilitation*: to encourage supporters and sympathizers to renounce violence;
- c) *After Care*: To prevent recidivism and to reintegrate people into society.

## **1.5. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

The IGAD framework seem to lack institutions or authorities to fight religious extremism. In spite of some attempts to reform convicted terrorists, the rehabilitation program does not look effective enough to make religious radicals renounce violence.

Deradicalization attempts by non-Muslims may not have the required attention from radicalized Muslims. Radicals seem to be more open to fellow Muslims than “the infidel” government or other bodies working on rehabilitation or deradicalization. There has been little attempts to utilize Islam and Muslims institutions to deal with Islamic extremism in the region.

## **1.6. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

### **1.6.1. General Objective**

The general objectives of this research is to identify the extent of Islamic Extremism, the methods used by extremists to radicalize Muslims and the possible deradicalization programs that can be employed by the IGAD to fight the root-causes of extremism/terrorism.

### **1.6.2. Specific Objectives**

The specific objectives of the research are to:

- a. identify the root causes of Islamic extremism in the IGAD region;
- b. identify the magnitude, types, nature, tactics of Islamic extremism;
- c. evaluate different methods of deradicalization in the context of the IGAD region;
- d. analyze the capacity/capability of the IGAD to deal with Islamic extremism;
- e. identify deradicalization mechanisms relevant at the IGAD and individual member states levels.

## **1.7. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The research will deal with the following questions:

- i. What are the factors for Islamic extremism/radicalization in the IGAD region?
- ii. How are convicted or captured terrorists/radicals being reformed to abandon radical attitudes?
- iii. What structural mechanisms does the IGAD and its member States have so as to address root causes of Islamic extremism?
- iv. What roles should Islamic Institution play in the deradicalization process?

## **1.8. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

Having explored the gaps, the challenges and opportunities available in the counter extremism measures, the research is hoped to come up with lots of findings and ways forward. The results will significantly contribute findings that could serve as a spring board for further study on the

subject of deradicalization. They also contribute ideas for the ongoing IGAD effort to establish a better counter extremism mechanism.

Since radicalization and violent extremism are not limited to one particular religion only. We could see them in many religions and non-religious groups. The findings of this research may significantly contribute to the literature on the subject matter.

## **1.9. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY**

The thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter deals with introductory discussions. The second chapter highlights readers about the research methodology.

Under the third chapter, concepts are discussed and related literatures are reviewed. Terms like radicalization, CVE and deradicalization have been introduced and discussed. By looking into the biographies of some ideologues of Islamic extremists as well as by reviewing some theoretical discussions, the chapter exposes the relationship between Islam as a religion and extremism/terrorism conducted in its name.

Chapter Four is devoted to present data collected from primary and secondary sources. The framework of the IGAD, Islamic radicalization, and mechanisms for countering extremism were analyzed.

The fifth chapter focuses on discussion of data and findings. With thematic and content analysis methods, the chapter exposes the strength and weakness of CVE techniques of the IGAD as well as its member states. Then it proposes way forward by suggesting some policy considerations.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY/METHODS**

This Chapter briefly explains the research design in nutshell. The data collection and analysis methods, the data presentation, ethical considerations limitations of the study are included under this part too.

#### **2.1. RESEARCH DESIGN**

The basic goal of this study is to come up with a sound, detailed and clear information that can reveal radicalization and CVE related issues. In order to achieve this end, detailed accounts of the nature and extent of Islamic radicalization in the IGAD region and the possible ways of countering Islamic Extremism were mandatory. So as to obtain necessary data for such kind of investigation the appropriate methodological design is qualitative research design.

Because, it is appropriate to understand, explain, explore, discover and clarify situations, feelings, perceptions, attitudes, values, beliefs and experiences of a group of people. The study designs mainly entail the selection of people from whom the information, through an open frame of enquiry. The parameters of the scope of a study, and information gathering methods and processes, are often flexible and evolving; hence, most qualitative designs are not as structured and sequential as quantitative ones. On the other hand, in quantitative research, the measurement and classification requirements of the information that is gathered demand that study designs are more structured, rigid, fixed and predetermined in their use to ensure accuracy in measurement and classification (Kumar, 2011, pp. 117-118).

##### **2.1.1. Literature Review and Content Analysis**

For the purpose of this research, data were collected from document analysis pertaining to policy directions, partnership documents, regional and international reports, and scientific researches done in relation to Islamic radicalism, CVE and deradicalization.

Literatures were selected based on their relevance to the research questions. Literatures giving backgrounds, theoretical perspectives, and insights into motivating factors of Islamic radicalism and CVE or deradicalization were reviewed.

The contents of deradicalization or CVE related documents available at the IGAD were analyzed so as to discover important data necessary for the research.

### **2.1.2. Case Study**

The biographies of prominent figures and philosophical ideologues of Islamic extremism were reviewed in order to get the underlying factors behind radicalization in Islam. The stories and biographies of eight intellectual ‘fathers’ of radical Islam have been reviewed. By so doing, important information was obtained giving more insight into why and how Muslims choose the path of radicalized interpretations and violence. This also helped to look into the effective and efficient ways to tackle radicalization and extremism within the Islamic teaching itself.

### **2.1.3. In-depth Interview**

Most of the data collected were from key informants since the research has been done on a relatively newer and developing topic. This technique has provided the research with the opportunity to get relevant data from appropriately selected informants. As the design of the research indicates, this research is based on detailed information about matters directly and indirectly related to the topic under investigation. Logically, this demands in-depth account of the key informers in the IGAD and its member States.

Accordingly, in-depth individual interview with key informants, researchers, and peace and security specialists of the IGAD and its member states has been used as primary data collection tool. To be specific, key informants from IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP), the police, religious institutions, intelligence, terror suspects, and other individuals having relevance to the issues of Islamic religious VE and CVE were interviewed.

#### **2.1.4. Sampling Techniques and Sample Size**

This research is a qualitative descriptive type which is not intended for generalization but a case investigation to obtain a clear picture and make the necessary recommendation for that particular setting. Accordingly, it is the appropriateness of informants that makes the difference than how many informants have been involved.

Hence, the sampling techniques for this research is purposive sampling targeting those individuals who have the highest knowledge because of their:

- Position at the ISSP;
- Strongest position in IGAD member States as decision makers or advisors in peace and security issues;
- Roles in the major security related partners of the region in general and member States in particular; and
- Special exposure to the subject matter of this study as researchers, stakeholders, responsibilities or in related ways.

Snowball sampling technique was also applied to include individuals, with important information, as recommended by initially chosen Key Informants.

By employing the criteria and sampling methods, a total of 16 individuals, who were willing, have been interviewed.

The interviews were conducted mainly by using set of questions indicated under Annex-1 and Annex-2, which are attached at the end of this Thesis. But the interview was not limited to the preset questions only. More questions were put on the table for further clarification and counterchecking information for the sake of veracity.

Data were collected so as to obtain a clear picture of what dangers that Islamic extremism has been posing and the countering measures available at a country or the IGAD level. Experiences of Sudan on deradicalization were reviewed and analyzed.

The criteria of selection were having special or highest knowledge, and their status as decision making in the IGAD security structure or in member states.

## **2.2. DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION**

The data analysis and presentation of this research is made in a descriptive manner. Data obtained from data collection methods has been interplayed with the theoretical framework of the study and analyzed thematically in a way that address the research questions and objective.

## **2.3. LIMITATION OF THE STUDY**

Since the topic is on a relatively newer trend in the IGAD framework, the limited availability of literature is the primary challenge for the study. Several key informants were not available for interview due to official engagements. Some offices and dignitaries have refused to give information directly or through extended and repeated appointments.

Some information/data obtained could not be used for research purpose due to their confidential nature or they are classified and not available for public use.

No data was obtained in the case of Eritrea as it is under suspension from the IGAD and no otherwise means was available to get information during the research period.

In addition, time and financial constraints hindered possible research visits to other IGAD member states.

To overcome the aforementioned limitations, the researcher has managed to approach informants by attending meetings organized by the IGAD on CVE related topic. The forums helped a lot to reach the concerned authorities and states' representatives for interviews. Triangulation methods used to avoid the researcher's and interviewees' possible biases.

Findings and interviews were cross-checked with secondary data. Some interviewees were interviewed again to cross-check their stories with data from similar interviews or from other primary sources as well as from secondary sources.

## **2.4. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Since the research topic is too sensitive to the followers of the Islamic religion, due attention has been paid to respect the religion and its culture during interviewing and in writing the Thesis.

Some informants, especially the terror suspects and people close to their cases believe they are radicals. Any perception of whatsoever in its nature was not challenged or attacked during data collection.

Due to the sensitive nature the data collected, many of the key informants requested for their identity totally kept confidential. Some other agreed their identity could be revealed but demanded that they must be anonymous for some part of the information they have provided the researcher with.

In recognition of their request their identity was classified totally or partially. They were given codes as “KI-number”. KI means key informant and the following number is the code assigned to identify them.

Some informants showed restraint from expressing their genuine intellectual understanding or express views in a manner that defends an institution or group they belong to. Strong ethical consideration and crosschecking stories were used to reduce information biases.

In writing the Thesis, due attention was given to produce it in a purely academic manner.

## CHAPTER THREE

### DEFINITIONS, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This Chapter is devoted, firstly, to brief discussions on meanings and concepts of terms. Then, various literatures reviewed on the subject matter follows. The literature review introduces readers with why prominent figures of Islamic extremism choose violent ways. Then, theoretical analyses on radicalization and root causes of radicalization were made in a bid to lay grounds for the next Two Chapters that presents data and discussion parts respectively.

#### 3.1. MEANINGS AND CONCEPTS OF TERMS

Similarly, the meanings of ‘jihad’, ‘extremism’, ‘violent extremism’, ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalism’ and related concepts are points of contention among scholars and institutions.

##### 3.1.1. The Concept of Jihad

*The reasons for Jihad . . . are these: to establish God's authority in the earth; to arrange human affairs according to the true guidance provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of one man over others since all men are creatures of God and no one has the authority to make them his servants or to make arbitrary laws for them. These reasons are sufficient for proclaiming Jihad.*

- Sayyid Qutb (Devin R.Springer, 2009, p. 17).

The aforementioned quote suggests that jihad’s aim will be establishing theocratic government to replace what they call arbitrary rules, to stand against the enemy (satanic forces and systems) and to ‘arrange human affairs according to the guidance of God’. The statement made by Sayyid Qutb looks, he believes that waging jihad is to be motivated by zeal to replace justice under Islamic law on the demise of satanic forces and their way of life. This statement of Qutb, however, begs questions regarding who “all the satanic forces” are and who has the say to proclaim “satanic

forces” with what criteria. It could lead to all non-Sharia administrations and non-Muslim states to be labeled as satanic. Once a group or a country or a way of life is said to be satanic, it may lead to attack such system.

The term ‘jihad’ in Arabic literally means “to struggle” or “to strive”. In Islamic context, may be understood as spiritual (*jihad bil-nafs*) and jihad by the sword (*jihad bil-sayf*). Traditionally, majority of Muslims regard the former as the ‘grater jihad’ while the later as violent and ‘lesser jihad’. However, Islamic radicals abuse the “the sword verses of the Qur’an” by giving the sword jihad as ‘the greater’ one (compared to spiritual jihad) so as to legitimate unconditional warfare and violence in the name of Islam. Proponents of violent jihad are convinced and try to inculcate that their violence is right both politically and morally on the ground that it is divinely sanctioned. Osama Bin Laden once made it clear that the use of weapons of mass destruction are justified in jihad (Devin R.Springer, 2009, pp. 18-19).

### **3.1.2. Counter Violent Extremism (CVE)**

Scholars define CVE in different ways. According to Humera Khan, CVE means, ‘use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to go to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives (Khan, 2015). Will McCants and Clint Watts define CVE as ‘measures to reduce the number of terrorist group supporters through non-coercive means (Watts). Counter Violent Extremism (CVE), also called as ‘counter-radicalization’, is regarded as a solution to the problem of violent extremism and radicalization (Romaniuk, 2015).

#### ***What is CVE?***

CVE also involves a range of activities that governments and other stakeholders may pursue to prevent radicalization; including but not limited to messaging, such as speeches, television programs, leaflets, and social media; engagement and outreach, such as town halls, roundtables, and advisory councils; capacity building, such as youth and women’s leadership initiatives, community development, and community safety and protection programs; and education and

training, such as of community leaders, public employees, and law enforcement institutions (Neumann, 2011).

The lack of having a definition that unites the understanding of CVE use to create confusions on the method to be used, the target group of VE and the possible stakeholders that have to take part in the measure. Sometimes, making distinctions between measures that are CVE specific and those CVE relevant might help to deal with confusions related to CVE. The following quotation may be good to highlight the issue.

*To avoid such confusion, a distinction is sometimes made between measures that are CVE specific and those that are CVE relevant. The former covers those measures designed to prevent or suppress violent extremism in a direct, targeted fashion. These measures are more likely to address behavioral and cognitive radicalization. By contrast, CVE-relevant measures are framed more generally, intending to reduce vulnerability to extremism in an indirect way. These measures, which primarily address cognitive radicalization, are more likely to be advanced through education, development, and women's rights and youth initiatives. More generally, the term "CVE relevant" is sometimes used as a catch-all phrase to cover a broad range of initiatives that are thought to impact violent extremism in some way. On this point, throughout this report, examples are noted wherein practitioners have considered the term "CVE" to be a liability, particularly in advancing CVE relevant measures. It is not uncommon for practitioners to implement measures to counter violent extremism while seeking to avoid the CVE label. Either way, CVE-relevant measures often aim to build "resilience," which is the psychological, social, cultural, and physical capacity of individuals and communities to sustain their well-being and, in particular, to resist and respond to extremist influences (Romaniuk, 2015).*

### **3.1.3. Violent Extremism Vs Radicalization**

Violent extremism may be understood to mean ‘advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives’ (USAID, 2011) “violent extremism” differs from “terrorism”. Even though there is deep disagreement in defining the term terrorism, it is not the same with violent extremism. The former carries politically motivated meaning usually understood to involve indiscriminate attacks. Whereas ‘violent extremism’ takes a broader meaning that emphasizes on all forms of contemporary non-state towards ideologically motivated violence (Romaniuk, 2015).

Radicalization refers to the process by which individuals turn to be violent extremists. Scholars distinguish between cognitive radicalization and behavioral radicalization. The former implies the ‘possession of extremist beliefs and feelings’ while the latter means ‘manifestation a determination to commit violence in furtherance of extremist beliefs and feelings (ibid). In other words, the distinction may be drawn by defining sympathizers as those who support or promote the cause from those who act to promote it, will help to distinguish between non-violent and violent extremism (Romaniuk, 2015; Watts, 2012).

‘Radicalization’ may be conceptualize “as a process characterized by increasing commitment to and use of violent means and strategies in political conflicts” to bring about a change in perceptions towards “polarizing and absolute definitions of a given situation, and the articulation of increasingly radical aims and objectives”. It may be targeted against certain social groups, or societal institutions and structures. Increasing use of violent means may also be regarded as an element of radicalization. However, the two dimensions of radicalization – “action (behavior) and attitudes (aims and perceptions) – are closely linked, but must not be understood as necessarily depending on or even corresponding to each other” (Porta, 2011, pp. 6-7).

Some scholars define ‘Radicalization’ as "increased preparation for and commitment to intergroup conflict and violence." An individual's escalating commitment is ostensibly driven by changes in "beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the in-group." This definition associate radicalization with situations of conflict between groups (Moskalenko, 2008, p. 416).

Some writers tried to show that radicalism and extremism differ based on the possibility of recognition to diversity by individuals or groups regarded as extremist or radicals. For example, Dr. Alex P. Schmid wrote:

*Extremists strive to create a homogeneous society based on rigid, dogmatic ideological tenets; they seek to make society conformist by suppressing all opposition and subjugating minorities. That distinguishes them from mere radicals who accept diversity and believe in the power of reason rather than dogma. In the context of democratic societies, (violent) extremist groups, movements and parties tend to have a political program that contains many of the following elements: a) Anti-constitutional, anti-democratic, anti-pluralist, authoritarian; b) Fanatical, intolerant, non-compromising, single-minded black-or-white thinkers; c) Rejecting the rule of law while adhering to an ends-justify-means philosophy; and d) Aiming to realize their goals by any means, including, when the opportunity offers itself, the use of massive political violence against opponents (Schmid A. P., 2013, p. 9).*

Schmid noted the behavior of extremists on the political left and right, religious-fundamentalist orientation and ethno-nationalism. He states that such groups or individuals tend to show four traits inclined towards totalitarianism, in their struggle to gain, maintain or defend state power, to show a propensity to prefer, on their paths to grasp their political agenda.

- A) Use of force/violence over persuasion;
- B) Uniformity over diversity;
- C) Collective goals over individual freedom; and
- D) Giving orders over dialogue (Schmid A. , 2011, p. 630).

In the Western society perspective, the benchmark by which radicalism and extremism are assessed in terms of the so called Western ‘core values’ like democracy, rule of law, pluralism, separation of state and religion, equality before the law, gender equality, freedom of thought and expression and the like. Some governments use the term ‘violent extremism’ as quasi-synonym for terrorism and insurgency (United States Bipartisan Policy Center. National Security Preparedness Group, 2011).

The British Crown Prosecution Service, for instance, defines ‘violent extremism’ as

*... the ‘demonstration of unacceptable behavior by using any means or medium to express views which foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of particular beliefs’ – including those which provoke*

*violence (terrorist or criminal) based on ideological, political, or religious beliefs and foster hatred that leads to violence (Canna, 2011, p. 52).*

The Australian government made a statement that treats violent extremism and terrorism as one and the same. It also made the criteria of as follows:

*... [T]he concept “violent extremism” is often interchanged with terrorism, political violence and extreme violence. The literature covering ‘violent extremism’ employs the concept in a way that suggests it is self-evident and self-explanatory. Often enough the need to “counter violent extremism” is noted in the literature but no actual definition of what ‘violent extremism’ constitutes, is provided. The fact is, the terms violent extremism, political violence, political terrorism and terrorism have been used interchangeably in the Australian and international literature examined. Thus no real distinction between violent extremism and terrorism has fully evolved, in fact, it remains an evolving concept (Minerva Nasser-Eddine, 2011, p. 9).*

Hence, from the above meanings given to ‘violent extremism’ and ‘terrorism’, it may be noticed that neither governments nor scholars hold similar understanding of the terms. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study violent extremism is understood to mean ‘holding of a violent attitude or having the conviction to use violence to promote/ further a certain objective’. Whereas, terrorism refers to the actual indiscriminate use of force or attacks pledged against targets.

#### **3.1.4. Radicalization: Definitions Given by some Governments**

The European Commission defined radicalization as ‘the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism’ (Staun, 2009, p. 9)

The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) defines the term as ‘a process, by which a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political or ideological objective’ (COT, 2008).

According to the Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), radicalization is ‘the pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order, which may involve the use of undemocratic methods that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (AIVD, 2004).

The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also gave a mean to ‘radicalization’ as ‘The process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect social change’ (HSI, 2006, p. 2).

For the Swedish Security Service (Säpo), ‘Radicalization can be both: ‘a process that leads to ideological or religious activism to introduce radical change to society’ and a ‘process that leads to an individual or group using, promoting or advocating violence for political aims’ (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 2).

### **3.1.5. Conceptualizing Radicalization**

Like the term ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalization’ faces lots of controversies regarding what meaning does the concept conveys. Politics and ideology play their role for the disagreement on what really radicalism and radicalization meant to connote.

Joshua Saini defines ‘radicalization’ as “the process by which individuals – on their own or as part of a group – begin to be exposed to, and then accept, extremist ideologies” (Sinai, 2012). According to Saini, radicalization is understood in terms of a ‘process’ of exposure to radical or extreme ideology. If this definition holds right, ‘Islamic radicalization’ may imply the process exposing individuals or groups extremist education or propagation of extreme interpretations. This definition lacks the elements to define ‘what extremist ideology’ might denote. The term ‘extremist’ must be defined so as to make his definition more comprehensible.

Akil N. Awan, Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’ Loughlin (2012, p. 125) came up with another definition for ‘radicalization’. They said, it is a “phenomenon that has emerged in the early twenty-first century because the new media ecology enables patterns of connectivity that can be harnessed by individuals and groups for practices of persuasion, organization and the enactment of violence. The very possibility of this happening but uncertainty about how it happens created a conceptual vacuum which ‘radicalization’ filled”. This definition tells how radicalization exacerbated due to the media or modern communication mechanisms. But, it is short of elements that define or describe what radicalization actually means. However, a close look at the definitions suggests that radicalization may be understood to be ‘persuasion’ of violence.

Radicalization may also be defined as ‘the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology’ (Braddock, 2010, p. 179).

A writer has argued that ‘radicalization must be conceptualized as the term is politicized than intellectualized. He suggested the following definition for ‘radicalization’:

*...an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes. The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialization away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilization outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognized as appropriate or legitimate (Schmid A. P., 2013, p. 18).*

In spite of various elements enshrined in definitions given to ‘radicalization’, almost all writers and governments mentioned above seem to agree that the term conveys a ‘process’ by which individuals will be introduced to an extreme and intolerant view. The writer of this Thesis is of the opinion that radicalization is a process ending up with violent extremism or radicalism which in turn leads to terrorism. It is important to look into the reverse mechanism of radicalization. The next section will introduce, compare and contrast concepts of ‘disengagement’ and ‘deradicalization’

### **3.1.6. Disengagement vs Deradicalization**

The term ‘disengagement’ denotes an individual's departure from terrorist-related activity (Horgan, 2009). Researches show that terrorists may disengage from violence holding or abandoning radical views. Sometimes, they may do so “even without leaving or disavowing” terror organizations. Deradicalization is a rather complex process. Individuals do not abruptly and spontaneously “de-radicalize”; they may do so through time and after experiences making them evaluate “the necessity and justifications for violence, and lose faith in the tactic of terrorism”.

Since the fantasy of the terrorists' life is more dynamic than the reality of living it, many of them disillusioned and decide to leave terrorist movements. It is also possible that their internal moral limits can no longer accept the ethos of the terror groups (ibid).

The radicalization process itself involves some 'push' and 'pull' factors, which intron influence disengagement as well. A 'push' factor refers factors attributable the terror group that drive members to get out of it. Disillusionment is one of the determinant 'push' factors leading to disillusionment and then to disengagement of members of the group. It occurs when unattainable objectives or promises, violent methods or existence innocent victims, flawed dynamics because of jealousies and other imperfections in the group or its leadership could create dissatisfaction. Sometimes, disillusionment a terrorist happens when his/her status in the group is suppressed or diminished. Disengagement is also possible for a reason beyond disillusionment. For instance, "some succumbed to the accumulation of stress and pressures attendant to the terrorist lifestyle. Others wrestled profoundly with group loyalties and demands that competed with family bonds and obligations" (Borum, 2011, p. 45).

A factor from out-of-group that attracts members to leave it are regarded as 'pull' factors. Non-militant life style, especially, starting families free from stressful militancy and incentives of "rehabilitation" or "alternatives" with possible opportunity of education, employment assistance, new social networks, and economic relief etc. for disengagement from terror groups (ibid).

### **3.2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RADICALISM**

Finding the root ideologies behind terrorism in the name of Islam has been hot issue in the media and researches. Understanding the nature and countermeasure against radicalism in Islam have not been easy task to accomplish. Many analysts were trying find answers for questions raised in relation of the agenda of terror group as well as the identity of scholars, leaders and members or sympathizers of these groups. One possible option to address these questions would be to look at the historical development of jihadist ideology that being used as philosophical foundation to justify radicalism and violence within Muslim nations and beyond. Extremist ideology of

justifying violence as if it is the will of God has its trace in the Islamist “resurgence” movement dated back in the 19 and 20<sup>th</sup> century (Devin R.Springer, 2009, pp. 17-18).

The Islamic awakening mainly was the product of social, economic and political conditions existing the Middle East. The decline of the Ottoman Empire and the advent of colonial rules of the French and the British in the 19th century sparked the Arab-led resurgence. The League of Nations mandate to French and British rule over the Middle East following the first World War, the establishment of Israel in 1948, the West support for Israel, the corruptive regimes in many Muslim nations, and several local and international events have contributed a lot for the prevalence of extreme Islamists as a reaction to resent full conditions in the Middle East (Devin R.Springer, 2009, p. 19).

In post-World War II, more and more factors added up to strengthen the ground for Extremist Islamic movements in and around the Middle East. The following quotation will help to put it in short:

*Secular regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—and governmental corruption in many countries—led a number of hardline Muslim extremists to feel frustrated by their inability to impact the social and political dynamics of their own countries in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Moreover, it has not been unusual for them to view their traditional norms and customs as being under assault by the ongoing modernization and secularization occurring in the urban areas of their countries. Some have attempted to lobby for change and traditional mores in a nonviolent manner, while others have opted to take the other path to change. In their eyes, Islam has been seen as losing the battle against the decadence of the West. Failed economies, repressive regimes, the catastrophic Arab loss of the 1967 war against Israel, overcrowding, high unemployment, the breakdown of traditional religious and social values in the face of globalization, and revolution have all led to the Islamic resurgence. In the following sections, we examine in more detail the ongoing Israeli Palestinian problem along with a number of the key developments in Egypt, Iran, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia that were crucial to the emergence and evolution of modern-day violent political Islam as embodied by groups like Hamas, Hizballah, and al-Qaeda ((Devin R.Springer, pp.19-20).*

The quoted text highlights some historical and political ground factors that led Muslims and Muslim governments were exposed to political Islam. The biographies of the intellectual ideologues of Islamic extremism and terrorism, summarized under this Chapter, tell readers that historical, political, social and economic factors led them to adopt violent and extreme

interpretation of Islam. The biographies reveal, disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of Israel at the heart of the Middle East were important factors. The Israel factor and movements in some Muslim countries will be reviewed briefly under the next sections.

### **3.2.1. The Israel-Palestine Factor**

The Israel-Palestine issue plays a fundamental role in the current confrontation between Islamic radicalism and the West. Following the creation the state of Israel in 1948 at the center of the Muslim world, millions of Palestinians were forced to live in refugee camps within six months. The coalition Arab countries lost the war with Israel in six days has made it clear that the Arab nations are too weak militarily and politically. The then Palestinian and Arab refugee in large numbers created a collective narration about Zionist colonizers occupying ancestral lands and homes of Palestinians. In addition, the Israel victory in the wars of 1956, 1973 and 1982 with massive help from the USA, has reinforced the feeling that the West is attacking Arabs. The cumulative effect of which is opening up a fertile ground for Islamic radicalization and terror attack against Israel. The cycle terror attacks and the hard Israeli repression as well as the U.S. support for Israel helped jihadist groups to justify attacks (Devin R.Springer, 2009, p. 20).

### **3.2.2. Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt**

The Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood is an organization founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 promoted Islam to counter the then existing Monarchy and British colonialism in Egypt. The brotherhood is said to be “the largest traditional breeding ground for Muslim extremism”. The Brotherhood showed support for Gamal Abd-al-Nasser who came to power through the 1952 coup that ousted King Farouk. The “Arab Nationalist Agenda” and secular politics pursued by Nasser gave little role to Islam in the public sphere. On January 16, 1953, the Egyptian government announced that all political parties were abolished. Since the Islamic Brotherhood was formed as a non-political association, it could survive the ban. However, the continuous suppression against the activities of the Brotherhood has affected the capability of the organization from instigating Islam-oriented change in Egypt (ibid, P.21).

Following the attempted assassination of Nasser on October 26, 1954 by a Member of the Brotherhood, the Egyptian government has taken serious measures against the group. Headquarters were destroyed he Brotherhood, its leaders were arrested and tortured, the group was subjected to propaganda designed to discredited it, and mass arrests, torture, and execution opted for “the battle against political Islam”. Later on, negotiations between the Egyptian government and the Islamists helped to get many prisoners released. “Once released, many of them became the new voices of Islamic extremism, affecting successor generations both inside and outside Egypt.” (ibid)

### **3.2.3. The Iranian Revolution**

The Iranian Shi’ite Islamic revolution of 1979, was successful to overthrow western backed regime and replace it with “radical Islamist regime”. The seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran by supporters of the revolution and the failed rescue attempt of the US, “the first successful Islamic revolution in modern times became an inspiration for radicals and invoked fear among Sunni rulers throughout the Muslim world”. It is worth noting that the attempted Islamic movement of Sunni-Muslims in Egypt, under the Muslim Brotherhood, has failed to bring change. “Although the new Iranian regime was Shi’ite, this demonstrated to the Sunni jihadists that a religiously based political leadership could gain power. The events in Iran simultaneously made the establishment of a Sunni-based Islamic power that would counter Shi’ite influence all the more urgent.” (ibid, p.22)

### **3.2.4. Algeria’s Islamist Movements**

In the 1991 election, the Algerian secular government has lost the majority of seats to an Islamist group called the Islamist Salvation Front (FIS). The Algerian military has cancelled the result and banned all religious political parties. Algeria descended into “jihadist-related violence” with varying magnitude. FIS waged attacks on the government so as to force the latter to return to elections. A group named Armed Islamic Group (GIA) has declared all-out war against the Algerian government. It went to the extent of attacking French civilians in

Algeria. France, the friend of the Algerian secular government, has responded by cracking down on Algerians living in its territory. GIA retaliated this with direct attack on France. In 1994, the group hijacked an Air France airplane, and organized series of bombings in 1995.

However, GIA, being a coalition of various jihadist factions, could not avoid in fighting induced by ideological differences and personal rivalries. Leaders of the group could not put similar methods or strategies to further their agenda too. Some tried to negotiate with the Algerian government, others opted for establishing an Islamic State after the ousting the government through violence. The group could not select and focus on the kind of enemies it targets. It declared war against the government, non-violent members of FIS, journalists, soldiers and their families, and against any one linked with the Algerian government (Devin R.Springer, 2009, pp. 22-24).

Series of assassinations were committed since March 1993 against people who had no link with the government. The group conducted indiscriminate violence cause lots of civilian casualties costing it the rapid loss of public support. It also suffered internal schism that made it vulnerable to its enemies. The experiences of GIA is mentioned by jihadists as an example and warning of what-not-to-do by jihadist groups. The loss of public support against GIA has opened the floor for the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). In 2006, GSPC joined al-Qaida (Devin R.Springer, 2009, pp. 22-24).

### **3.2.5. The Role of Saudi Arabia's Wahhabism Doctrine**

The Sunni monarchy of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia has invested some portion of the influx of oil wealth on social programs and heavily funded educational programs that stress on strict Wahhabist interpretation of Islam. In 1970s and 1980s, the Kingdom relied on foreigners for various types of jobs while it has a high population growth rate. This Saudi system created huge number of Wahhabist young male, many of whom ended up in fighting as *Mujahidin* in the Soviet-Fagan war in 1980s. The young generation of Saudi of 1980 is known to be highly inspired by puritan view of restructuring societies with Wahhabism (Devin Springer, 2009, p. 25).

Following the decline of oil revenues in late 1980s and early 1990s, Saudi cut public spending and entitlements. This coupled with the awareness of "how much of the oil revenue had actually gone in to the pockets of the rulers to support lavish life styles, feelings of resentment deepened, with

their heavily religious educations, these young men became easy targets for radicalization. Both factors led to discontent that could be mobilized by Islamists.” Resentments among radical elements grew stronger and stronger after the Saudi king asked the US to station troops to protect it against the threats from Iraq and Iran, and because of the war against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. People of the kingdom have felt that the Saudi has let infidel troops roam over the land of the two Holy Cities of Islam (ibid).

To quash the dissent among the people of the Kingdom, the then King Fahd persuaded Wahhabist and secured theological cover for his actions in exchange for the clerics establishment enjoying more control over the Kingdom (ibid). The consequence was summarized as follows:

*In reaction to the establishment clerics’ move, many young Wahhabis and Salafis who were influenced by Egyptian writer Sayyid Qutb, including Usama bin Laden, began to split ideologically and socially from the traditional Wahhabi establishment. This split continues to cause a great sense of unrest in the Kingdom among the Wahhabi Ulama. The younger clerics, who are more numerous because of the Saudi baby-boom in the 1970s and 1980s, tend to oppose the Royal Family, which is supported by the older generation of clerics. The older generation of Wahhabi clerics, many of whom were essentially bought off by the Royal Family, supported the jihad in Afghanistan by supplying ideology and money to the religious schools that provided the ideological base for the anti-Soviet war (Ibid, p.26).*

### **3.3. INTELLECTUAL FATHERS OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM**

Under this part of the paper I will try to give highlights on the personalities and writings that has inspired the present radical interpretation used to legitimize systematic violence in the name of Islam. Attention will be given to those earlier figures underlying the philosophical foundation for Islamic extremism for worldwide jihad.

#### ***Ibn-Taymiyyah***

*Ibn-Taymiyyah* is one the major figure influencing the ideologue of Al Qaida. He was a Syrian professor of Islamic law, born in 1262. In his writings, he taught that further interpretation of the Quran amounts to heresy. Islam cannot be subjected to politics and a ruler who fails to implement Sharia is an apostate. And consequently, those who do not abide by his interpretation of Islam would constitute legitimate targets of rebellions and attacks. Jihadists still use the term ‘apostate’

to refer to governments run by Muslims who fail to implement Sharia law (Devin R. Springer, 2009, p. 28).

Ibn-Taymiyyah argues Jihad assumes the same level as "the five pillars of Islam" (prayer, pilgrimage, alms, the declaration of faith, and the fast of Ramadan). He teaches that the life of the Prophet himself calls for Jihad. Killing of non-believers is mandatory to conquer and defend lands for the Muslims. Where it is necessary to defeat non-believers, killing Muslims is justified too. He rejects "the worldly borders", and asserted that Muslim lands must be under one administration without any dividing boundary. His arguments were adopted by al Qaeda in its war against the US in the Middle East and globally (ibid, p.29).

### ***Muhammad Ibn-Abd-al-Wahhab***

*Muhammad Ibn-Abd-al-Wahhab* (1703–91) is the founder of the most puritanical Islamic sect known in two names as *Wahhabism* (taken from his name) and *Salafism* ('Salaf' in Arabic means 'ancestors' denoting companions of Mohamed the prophet). He proposed the return of Islam to "its revealed sources". He labeled all innovation and traditions developed since 950 A.D. (C.E.) as idolatry and heretical. Wahhabism teaches that Jihad must be waged against all non-Wahhabist since they are 'bad' Muslims. He also introduce the practice of 'takfir' (declared Muslims as disbelievers) to legitimize attacks on Muslims by designating them as apostate (Devin Springer, 2009, pp. 30-31).

Influenced by Ibn-Taymiyyah's arguments, Abd al-Wahhab expressed his hatred towards Egyptian and Ottoman decorations, arts, tobacco smoking, hashish imbibing, durum pounding [drum pounding is common among Ethiopian Muslims too] and the like. According to him, such peoples are not Muslims but "imposters masquerading as Muslims". He also showed strong dislike toward Bedouin Arabs due to their practices of honoring saints, erection of tombstones, and "superstitious" revering of graves or places (Crooke, pp. 2-3).

Ibn-Abd-al-Wahhab called for a literal interpretation of the Qur'an free of analogies and metaphors. "Abd-al-Wahhab also established a second principle that is often quoted in jihadist justifications: whoever does not declare takfir against the disbeliever is a disbeliever himself. Al-Wahhab's

forces set out to destroy shrines and other sacred objects. They even destroyed the sacred Shi'ite pilgrimage site in Karbala, Iraq.” (Devin R.Springer, 2009, p. 31).

Among his basic doctrines the following look vital to consider so as to understand the ideology behind the present Islamic extremism:

- All Muslims must individually pledge allegiance to a single Caliph (leader),
- Institutionalized faith under one ruler, one Mosque and one authority (the three pillars doctrine),
- All Muslims who do not follow his interpretations are not true Muslims (the *Takfir* doctrine), and,
- The penalty against non-true Muslims and non-Muslims who refuse to convert should be killing, violating their wives and daughters, and confiscation of their possessions (Crooke, pp. 3-5).

Al-Wahhab has succeeded in reshaping Saudi's religious doctrines and in providing “key philosophical rationales for future generations to pursue the global jihad” (Devin R.Springer, 2009, p. 31). Under the next two Chapters of this thesis, we will further look into his influence on the policies and strategies of Islamic extremists active within the IGAD region.

### ***Rashid Rida***

Rashid Rida (1866–1935) an Egyptian Scholar proposed that adoption of Salafism was the only way to alleviate Western imposed impurities and colonialism. He analogized the secular government systems who fail to implement Saria with the pre Islam Jahiliyya or ‘god-less society’. His arguments have contributed to the later day radicalization (Devin Springer, 2009, p. 31).

### ***Hassan al-Banna***

Hassan al-Banna (1906–49) is another influential Egyptian figure, a student of Rashid Rida, who founded the Sunni Islamist group called Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928. In 1940, the Brotherhood developed a political mission under Salafism ideology. Al-Banna's arguments seem to be reactions to the then existing colonial experiences of Muslim Lands, socio-economic

problems, and the inability of Arab governments to defend Muslims lands. He suggested that “true Islam” is the only way out and called for Violent Islamic Jihad to repel these weakness from Muslim lands. Al-Banna believes in evolutionary anticolonial Islamic revival would be effective than revolution (Gerges, 2007, pp. 23-24). His strategy was:

*Focusing on training future generations according to the precepts of his Islamic system. Many social services, including schools, infirmaries, and classes and lectures on Islam, were established. Several widely read newspapers and magazines were published by the Brotherhood, which eventually began to establish factories and take control of trade unions. While denouncing colonialism and imperialism, al-Banna emphasized that to rebuild a community of the faithful, the primary goal must be to call Muslims to return and re-appropriate their faith in its fullness or totality of vision. Along with advocating reforms, al-Banna and the Brothers began looking toward a military option (Devin R.Springer, 2009, p. 31).*

On the wake of the WWII, in-Egypt factors like anti-British rule and anti-injustice sentiments as well as the formation Israel in 1948 contributed a lot to make the Brotherhood more political and form underground paramilitary force. Writers assert that before they become Egyptian presidents, Gamal Abd al Nasser and Anwar Sadat had been members of the group. The group expanded its anti-colonialism military movements with the primary goal of calling Muslims to “return and re-appropriate their faith in its fullness or totality of vision.” The group was banned in 1948 following the killing of Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi, Egyptian Prime-minister. Then Al-Banna was executed in 1949. The consequence of which were the group go underground attracting more members and opening the floor for radicalism than for moderate movements (Devin R.Springer, 2009, pp. 31-32) (Gerges, 2007, pp. 24-25).

### ***Abu-al-A’la Mawdudi***

*Abu-al-A’la Mawdudi*, contemporary to Al-Banna, was also an Islamic revivalist in line of Wahhabism. He wrote about purifying Muslims from the influences of the West, corrupt traditions and heretical practices. He founded *Jama a-Islami*, in the model of Al-Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood, which become a central Pakistani political player after the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Like Al-Banna’s Brotherhood, *Jama a-Islami* followed a bottom-up-change approach by “the indoctrination of future generations through the use of schools, mosques, publications, and social programs” (Devin R.Springer, 2009, p. 32). This indoctrination mechanism might have influenced the method or radicalization adopted by various terror or extremist groups.

He argues that [violent] Jihad a war with the evil, thus, it is the duty of believers to:

*Wipeout oppression, wrongdoing, strife, immorality, arrogance and unlawful exploitation from the world by force of arms. It is their objective to shatter the myth of the divinity of 'demi-gods' and false deities and to reinstate good in the place of evil... Jihad is as much of a primary duty of the Muslims concerned as are the daily prayers or fasting. One who shirks it is a sinner. His very claim to being a Muslim is doubtful. He is a hypocrite whose 'Ibadah and prayers are a sham, a worthless, hollow show of devotion. ...those Muslims who do not fight and to perhaps even bring violence against them [are] kuffar, or unbelievers (Ibid).*

### ***Sayyid Qutb***

Qutb is considered as a leading Islamic thinker as his philosophy is cited by many extremists around the world to justify 'propagation and protection' of Islam by violent means. His arguments are used by Jihadists to legitimize attacks on Western interests, fueling insurgency in the Muslim world, and attacks on Muslim government with the view of establishing their version Islamic law. Followers of his view did assassinate Egyptian president Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981 (Devin R.Springer, 2009, pp. 33-34).

Qutb got his Islamic 'awakening' as a "reaction to the rampant sexual promiscuity, drunken behavior, and capitalism he encountered in the United States" while he was pursuing his study between 1948 and 1951. In 1951, he was recruited into Muslim Brotherhood and assumed leadership of the department for the propaganda of Islam. Following the failed assassination attempt on Nasser, he was sentenced to 25 years with hard labor in 1955. Serving the prison term, he wrote lots of Quranic commentaries. His powerful book *Milestones* went out of the traditional Muslim Brotherhood's revivalism and took revolutionary perspective crating theological grounds for jihadist policies and strategies (Gerges, 2007).

According to Qutb, the West and other secularized societies were demonized and portrayed as legitimate targets for believers to attacks in ce these societies were viewed as enemies of Islam:

*Islam provides a legal basis for the relationship of the Muslim community without her groups....This legal formulation is based on the principle that Islam—that is, submission to God—is a universal Message which the whole of mankind should accept or make peace with. No political system or material power should put hindrances in the way of preaching Islam. It should leave every individual free to*

*accept or reject it, and if someone wants to accept it, it should not prevent him or fight against him. If someone does this, then it is the duty of Islam to fight him until either he is killed or until he declares his submission* (Devin Springer, 2009, p. 35).

He was released from prison in 1965, but he was rearrested and handed on August 29, 1966 for his activities in the Muslim Brotherhood. His legacies to future generations of extremists include the use of *takfir*, the theory that modern society is *jahiliyya*, and the belief of a Christian-Jewish conspiracy against the Islam (ibid, pp36-37).

### ***Ayman al-Zawahiri***

Al-Zawahiri was an Al-Qaeda strategist and ideologue. He introduced an ideology to shift the strategic enemy of Islam from Middle Eastern regimes to the Western governments, USA to be specific. He argues the corrupt Middle East regimes and their Western allies have formed what he calls “alliance of Evil”. He also identified Israel as a Jewish state waging a “Zionist Crusade” against Islam. His near term plan was attack “Crusader-Jewish” interests wherever they are (Devin Springer, 2009, p. 43).

And the long-term plan is divided into two halves: The first half consists of earnest, diligent work, to change these corrupt and corruptive regimes. The tactics to be used include formation of organizations that leads the struggle, winning public support, and bringing change by all forms of force and sacrifice. Whereas, the second half of al-Zawahiri’s long-term plan for resisting the “Zionist Crusade” focused on exhorting Muslims to take personal actions against the west. He argued that Americans understand the language of force only. He asked Muslims to carry out their religious duties “by hurrying to the fields of jihad like Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, for jihad preparation and training”. The end of the preparation is to make the fit for the struggle against the Jewish state, the West and the non-believers (Devin Springer, 2009, pp. 44-46).

Al-Zawahiri planned to penetrate Jordan and launch attacks on Israel. He also advocate the al Qaeda’s strategies for Islamic movements in Somalia back in 1990s. With a bid to unite Somali forces and create an Islamic national front, the strategy proposes these five measures:

1. *Expulsion of the foreign international presence;*
2. *Rebuilding of state institutions;*

3. *Establishment of domestic security;*
4. *Comprehensive national reconciliation; and*
5. *Economic reform and combating famine* (Ibid, p.47).

Radicalization is emphasized by al-Zawahiri as the “strongest weapon” of an Islamist group or *Mujahidin* is winning the support of Muslim masses surrounding them and taking actions the public does not show objection to. He showed that the *Mujahidin* must be a nucleus and must win the hearts of “the masses, but also of its tribes, elders, scientists, merchants, and otherwise distinguished persons.” (Devin Springer, 2009, pp. 46-48).

### ***Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi***

Al-Maqdisi is an important Takfiri ideologist who asserted that democracy is an equivalent of a religion. Thus according to him, anyone who adopts the democratic process is a polytheist as stated in his book *Democracy is a Religion*. Al-Zarqawi’s Legal Committee’s also rejected the Western democracy as ungodly because of:

1. *The people are the source of authority, not God;*
2. *Because of freedom of religion, people are able to renounce religion;*
3. *People are the sole arbiters in disputes, not God;*
4. *Freedom of expression allows people to criticize and curse God and Islam;*
5. *The separation of religion from the state;*
6. *Political parties are protected, regardless of their beliefs, ideas, and morals; and*
7. *Democracy upholds the stand of the majority, even if the majority approves evil* (Al-Maqdisi, n.d.)

The biographies of the above eight prominent figures of Islamic radicalism and terrorism exposes, social, economic, political and other factors are real motives for the violent path they chose to follow. It would be logically implied that they were not motivated by zeal for the religion; but, they instrumentalized Islam so as to provide ideology to mobilize Muslims for non-religious political ends.

### **3.4. INTERNAL POWER RELATION IN JIHADI GROUPS**

Terror groups' leadership exhibits savagery but at the same time extreme dedication and rationality to achieve their strategic ends. Al-Qaeda developed a manual for Islamic militants following its objectives. It states two sets of agenda: long-term and short-term goals. The former deals with big ends like bringing the world under their version of Islamic law. The latter focusses on all objectives leading to the final end including operations against "individuals and the enemy sector" and the way to confront "repressive regimes" (Devin R.Springer, 2009, p. 19).

Terror groups look very kin to control possible internal fractions or impediments that could create obstacles. They use all means necessary to keep the organization intact and pursue the designed goals at all costs. For instance, the al-Qaeda jihad manual instructs Islamic militant groups to remove any person who block the group's way to success. "They are admonished to properly utilize an individual's unused capability while striving for precision in performing tasks and working collectively." The activities such groups Islamic militant organizations often operate secretly in the underground. Thus, disciple for the tasks assigned and to lead are taken seriously (Devin R.Springer, 2009, p. 19).

### **3.5. FROM RADICALIZATION TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

Under this section, literatures dealing with theoretical and empirical analyses on factors leading to radicalization will be reviewed so that they yield theoretical and conceptual frameworks applicable for upcoming discussions in the next Chapters.

#### **3.5.1. Theoretical Discussions on Radicalism/Extremism**

The threat and ideology of extremism requires new "strategies, aims, and tactics than are used in a traditional war". A long-well-planned preventive counter terrorism strategy must be in place. Due attention must be paid to terrorist radicalization and recruitment as well as the tactics radicals use to engage young Muslims into violent activities. The effort must begin with conceptual clarity


and good insight into the nature and extent of the problem (Borum, 2011, p. 57). To use any of the theories suggested regarding the relationship between radicalism and violence, it will be appropriate to take the following assumptions into account:

- There is no single cause, but multiple causes, for radicalization. Broad ‘push’ factors including grievances and specific ‘pull’ factors interplay to drive and attract individuals into radical or extreme ideologies.
- Support for radical groups and to their ideologies must be viewed contextually in terms of fabrics of familiar, economic, social, and political arrangements.
- The route for radicalization are multiple. In addition individuals following the same path may have different outcomes.
- “For some persons, religion leverages their attachment to a grievance. For others, a grievance leverages their attachment to religion.”
- Group affiliation causes ideological commitment for some people, but for others the reverse is true.
- Some individuals engage in violent actions because of their strength of “personal conviction and commitment” to the extremists’ cause. The vice versa is correct for other people.
- “Not all terrorists even radicalize.”
- Violent extremism and terrorism as a psychosocial dynamism passes through at least three phases: “(1) becoming involved, (2) being involved—synonymous with engaging in unambiguous terrorist activity, and (3) disengaging (which may or may not result in subsequent de-radicalization).” In many occasions, radicals take multiple roles in different times or simultaneously (Borum, 2011, pp. 58-59).

Mere holding radical attitudes or voicing them does not necessarily lead to violence. Engagement in violent activities may be motivated by “personal relationships and loyalty to a group”. Writes suggest that the level of radicalization also has its own impact on violent activities of radicals. Radicalization can be classified to “micro, meso, and macro levels”, as well as individual versus group and organizational levels” (Porta, 2011, pp. 6-7). Donatella Della Porta argues:

*Radicalization, in other words, is a phenomenon composed of various processes which should be distinguished analytically as they seem to be driven by different mechanisms, follow different patterns, and need to be understood in their social and political context. Especially the latter aspect needs further scrutiny. The concept of radicalization is often used in a way that focuses attention on “radical groups” or certain individuals considered prone to radicalization, suggesting that the problem of violence lies with some quality intrinsic to these groups and individuals, rather than being a result of a larger conflict and societal and political conditions. Radicalization may more profitably be analyzed as a process of interaction between violent groups and their environment, or an effect of interactions between mutually hostile actors. It takes, for example, the form of escalation processes between protest movements and state security forces, or of escalating confrontations between different social groups. Moreover, radicalization may be an expression as well as a trigger of larger social change (Porta, 2011, p. 8).*


Some writers came up with some explanations how radicalism develops into violence. Borum put forward a four-stage conceptual model for the rise of a “terrorist mindset”. His conceptual framework describes how grievances and vulnerabilities grow into hatred against a designated group or individuals and how it gradually turned into a justification to legitimize violence. According to Borum, the stages of radicalization looks as follows (Borum, 2011, p. 37):



Based on the above levels of process of radicalization, Borum said, the process begins with the framing of some “unsatisfying event, condition, or grievance (It's not right) as being unjust (It's not fair). The injustice is blamed on a target policy, person, or nation (It's your fault). The responsible party is then vilified—often demonized—(You're Evil)”. Then justification or impetus for aggression would be achieved (Borum, 2011, p. 39).

According to Moghaddam (2005) there are five levels process for violent radicalization as “a stair case to terrorism”. He used the metaphor of a “staircase” that becomes narrower and narrower as it ascends to the next floor. He says, the feelings of discontent or grievance and “perceived adversity (framed as perceived deprivation) form the foundation and fuel for stepping initially onto the path to terrorism. Fewer and fewer people ascend to each successive level, though,

leaving a relatively small number of people who actually progress to the point where they engage in terrorism.”



This model suggests that the desire to alleviate adversity and to improve situations people find themselves in sets as a ground for grievances. Where attempts to improve these conditions fail, it

leads to “frustration, producing feelings of aggression, which are displaced onto some perceived causal agent (who is then regarded as an enemy)”. As the anger builds up, some people tend to become increasingly sympathetic towards violence extremist ideology and to the terrorist groups that would act against their enemy. “Some of those sympathizers eventually join an extremist group, organization, or movement that advocates for, and perhaps engages in, terrorist violence. At the “top” or final level among those who have joined are those who overcome any barriers to action and actually commit a terrorist act” (Borum, 2011, p. 39).

The New York Police Department's (NYPD) Intelligence Division has developed a widely used model of radicalization among researchers and experts on the field of terrorism. According to the NYPD report, individuals from “Western home-country who ultimately adopt a Jihadi-Salafi ideology” passes through a linear four-stage process: **pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization** (Borum, 2011, p. 41). Borum further elaborated the four stages as:


*Pre-radicalization characterizes the period before an individual is exposed to jihadi-Salafi ideology. Self-Identification marks the process of exploring Salafi Islam, adopting its ideological tenets, and affiliating with its proponents. Indoctrination is the intensification stage, both for the individual's beliefs and for his commitment to the ideas, to action, and to his like-minded collective. Finally, rather than referring to the end stage as “action,” the NYPD model calls it Jihadization, but the character of the stage is essentially the same as in the FBI assessment. The hallmark is the individual's acceptance of, and commitment to, his individual duty to act on behalf of the cause (Ibid).*

A European researcher Precht, commissioned by the Danish Ministry of Justice, summarized the “broad contours” of radicalization in the following way:

*Radicalization often starts with individuals who are frustrated with their lives, society or the foreign policy of their governments. A typical pattern is that these individuals meet other like-minded people, and together they go through a series of events and phases that ultimately can result in terrorism. However, only a few end up becoming terrorists...a four-phase “typical pattern of radicalization” that also parallels the conceptual models advanced by the FBI and the NYPD Intelligence Unit, the stages of Pre-radicalization; Conversion and identification with radical Islam; Indoctrination and increased group bonding; and Actual acts of terrorism or planned plots... small group dynamics and identification are often powerful accelerants of commitment to*

*extremist ideology of the radicalization process at different phases* (Precht, 2007).

The finding of Precht's also sketches a four-phase pattern of radicalization regarding Islamic radicalization. His model looks very much similar to the one developed by NYPD, which is stated just above. He outlined the four stages as (ibid):



Precht's model looks similar to NYPD's Model except for the former is specific enough to call the final stage 'actual act of terrorism or plots' of violence. The latter's model used the term 'jihadization' to denote the final stage of terrorism. This expression lacks specificity and may also disregard the meaning assigned to 'jihad' which is legal according to non-radical Islamic interpretation. One thing that worth noting from Precht's statement is "small group dynamics and identification are often powerful accelerants of commitment to extremist ideology" compared to the large ones (ibid).

However, the fourth stage proposed by Precht, the act terrorism, is the outcome of radicalization than the being part of the process of it. In the writer of this Thesis opinion, radicalization must be regarded as completed at the stage that violent attitude or ideology is formed in the minds of individuals passing through the process. Consequently, the fourth stage must be regarded as an outcome of radicalization process and taken out of the Model.

Precht (2007) outlines three categories of motivational factors for radicalization as: *background factors*, *triggering factors* and *opportunity factors*.

*Background factors*, according to refer to Precht, personal struggles with religious identity, experiences with discrimination, and lack of social integration. By *triggering factors*, he speaks people (such as a mentor or charismatic leader) and events (such as policy actions) "that might provoke or incite either antipathy or activism". The final category *opportunity factors*, makes up

“an individual's degree of access and likelihood of exposure to extremist ideas or adherents within her or his sphere of activity. These include physical and virtual spaces such as the Internet, mosques, penal institutions, and social groups/collectives” (Precht, 2007).

Precht observed that homegrown terrorism is a “sociological phenomenon” having belongingness, identity, group dynamism and values as crucial parts of radicalization process. He also noted the role of religion in the transformation process. It plays vital part in two ways. For some people, it serves as a mere mechanism for achieving non-religious cause under the name of religion. For some others, it lays a common denominator to motivate individuals “at a crossroad in their life and wanting a cause” (ibid).

In 2008, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), found out "There is a lack of clear understanding or consensus on what motivates an individual to become a terrorist and to engage in violent acts. Without such an understanding, we are limited in our ability to employ appropriate strategies and tools for preempting terrorism. (CSIS, 2008; Borum, 2011). The CSIS report did not propose a specific process model for radicalization, but it stated that

*...neither demographic nor socioeconomic factors emerge as strong predictors of radicalization. Feelings of shame and humiliation, the report says, often serve to forge a bond between a vulnerable individual and a charismatic leader, and catalyze acceptance of the radical narrative and its associated values and attitudes. Travel to Pakistan or Afghanistan seemed to be one of the most consistent behavioral factors observed among those who became radicalized into violent extremism (ibid).*

Joint Military Information Support Center (JMISC) surveyed existing conceptual models of radicalization and associated empirical research, attempting to create an integrated analytic framework. They identified the following seven interacting components: *Motivations, Socially-Facilitated Entry, Progressive Entry, Intensification, Ideology, Threat/Defense, and Belonging /Identity.*

- A. **Motivations:** Motivations may or may not be the ultimate "why" of terrorist activity, but in this model they do function as an initial impetus. Motivations are composed of both "push" factors, such as grievances, and "pull" factors, which may serve as instrumental (e.g., money) or expressive (e.g., perceived importance) incentives.

- B. ***Socially-Facilitated Entry***: individuals may very often be exposed to extremist ideas and to extremist groups via “family and kinship networks or social institutions, such as schools, religious training centers, or sometimes prisons”.
- C. ***Progressive Entry***: researches show that becoming a violent extremist is not an abrupt or a one- time decision, but it develops or escalates through time. It passes gradual escalations, or series of isolated actions or decisions that add up to prime an individual to extremist level.
- D. ***Intensification***: radicalization as a group based activity, group socialization, group leaders and dynamics among its members usually nurture, shape and influence the thoughts feelings, attitudes and behavior of individuals towards violence.
- E. ***Ideology***: is “a narrative that follows some form of a script about something that is wrong/not right and some person or entity being to blame for it”.
- F. ***Threat/Defense***: is a formulated or real out-of-group threat against a group serving as a key factor to hold the in-group united. It is vital element to legitimize or rationalize the use of violence or offence with a view of defending against the threat.
- G. ***Belonging/Identity***: individuals may be drawn to “violent extremist ideologies and groups because they feel a need for belonging or because they lack some kind of identity or a sense of personal meaning, which group affiliation can provide” (Mazarr, 2004, p. 39).

The NYPD stage model has the individual transformation and works as the focal point taking the ‘radicalization’ as a bottom-up process. Similarly, the Danish Intelligence Service, also known as PET, has developed a phase model that centers on “the influencer/radicalizer,” one who plays important role in the processes of radicalization. Exposure to radical ideas and meeting a ‘radicalizer’ marks the beginning of the process. Then, it advances on to new religious beliefs or practices and changed behavior. As a result, the process enters a new phase of “a narrowing of the person's circle of friends and family and results in the so-called 'hardening phase,' which includes 'reviewing of and interest in very violent videos' displaying terrorists in battle and the killing of hostages” (Moskalenko, 2008, p. 416).

### 3.5.2. Empirical Studies on the Causes of Radicalization

Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former CIA Case Officer, based on media and courtroom testimonies, has concluded that most Jihadist militants have good economic and educational background. They came from middle class families, brought up in secular manner, some have college-level education but working in unskilled occupations, most of them are married, had many children, those having criminal background were few, and majority of the have joined jihadist movements in their early twenties (Sageman, 2008).

According to Segeman, these individuals were radicalized in the bottom-up approach; i.e. they were not radicalized by leaders of a radical group. But, the process was populated by "Young men chasing thrills, fantasies of glory, and sense of belonging to group and cause, who mobilize through social networks". He noted that these closed collectives usually possess a common sense of global or local "moral outrage" and serious personal experiences, and usually motivated by "Anti-American and Anti-Semitic sentiment than by deep Islamic doctrine" (Sageman, 2008).

After the year 2002, a study was made on biographies of 240 militants from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and from other Arabic Speaking countries and interviews made with former jihadist militants as well as their families and acquaintances regarding the terrorist group "al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula". The study focused on who joined and why the group, what radicalization methods and recruitment reasons might be specific to Saudi Arabia. The militants under the study were predominantly males in their late twenties, many of them underwent al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan, great majority of them were Saudi nationals from different localities and tribes, mainly had a high-school education like ordinary Saudis have, and very few had a pre-radicalization criminal record (Hegghammer, 2006, p. 46). The Study showed the roles played by the jihadists in two three and came up with the following observation:

*First are the "top commanders," who were "lifestyle jihadists" who came to Afghanistan as teens, worked through al-Qaida's growth in the 1990s, and had practical experience with armed jihad. Second are the "ideologues" with no battle experience, only religious training and mediocre achievements. Third are the "fighters"—a diverse group composed of young jihad veterans, older veterans (who couldn't lead) coming out of retirement, and new recruits. They had a mix of political (more nationalist than social-revolutionary), religious, and personal motivations, and often embarked on a radical path even before enlisting in AQAP [al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula] (Ibid).*

Another study was conducted on individuals having European residence who took part in 31 Jihadist operations carried out in Europe between 2001 and 2006. The individuals were mostly in their mid-Twenties while engaged in militant jihadist activity. Most of them had origins from North Africa. Like the majority of Muslim migrants, the jihadists were from the lower socio-economic strata. Nearly One-Fourth of them were brought up in Muslim families, while another One-fourth of them were converts to Islam. Almost a third of them completed college education. 15% were unemployed, and One-Third of them had worked in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs (Bakker, 2006, p. 44; Borum, 2011).

Two in Three of them appeared to have families at the time of arrest. Approximately a quarter of them had a prior criminal conviction for crimes like Possession illegal arms. Around 5% reportedly have the history of mental illness of some type. The fact that One-fifth of them have kinship relations, and another 18% are linked through friendship and social connections highlights how social networks might facilitate entry into emphasizing the importance of social networks in facilitating radicalization and joining Islamic militancy movements (Bakker, 2006, p. 44; Borum, 2011).

A research done on three thousand Amsterdam residents, including 321 Muslims, revealed two uncorrelated themes among reasons for radicalization. The first view has a *religious dimension* with a very orthodox religious stance among the Muslims guided by religious commitment. Whereas, the second view has a *political dimension* motivated by “mistrustful of the established order and find it troubling that Muslims in Dutch society are treated unjustly”. The two dimension were found out to be independent and one does not necessarily lead to the other. However, Muslims influenced by either of the dimensions have shown increased the probability of radicalization. Besides, the research indicated three possible related roads taking to radicalization (Tillie, 2006). They are:

- a. ***Need for meaning and stability***: Some participants of the research were converts to Islam making radical break with their ‘meaningless old life style’ in search ‘order and calm’.
- b. ***Need for commitment***: for those young Muslims who to feel insecure or alienated, involvement with new friends in mosques provide them with sense of recognition,

acceptance and security. They tend to practice Islam more actively than their classmates or parents.

- c. ***Need for justice***: Most of the young men in the study had a strong feeling that the existing systems discriminate against Muslims. “This can be anything from a brother who is hassled by the police or the current events in Iraq or Palestine.” These young men have a strong feeling that Muslims are being discriminated against. They believe, Islam is the reaction for the ongoing injustice (ibid).

In 2006, a research, commissioned by the European Commission's Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security, reviewed documents, conducted field observations interviews with stakeholders as well as with former formers radicals in France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The outcome showed the then tendencies of Islamists recruitment and mobilization in Europe (Rodgers, 2007). The key findings may be summarized as follows:

- A. European mosques, “once a hub for the propagation of extremist ideas and rhetoric, are no longer prominent in their presence or influence”. Extremists chose to go underground because of intensified scrutiny by government security agencies. Now their activities are more difficult to monitor.
- B. Radical imams (who tend to appeal more to converts) are losing their influence, particularly in Southern Europe. On the contrary, newer Islamist activists took the major role as mobilizers or "engines" of Islamist militant recruitment. The activists exploit “conflicts of role and identity among young Muslims to align them with extremist subgroups and against the West”. Language and identity are less relevant among Southern Europe Muslims unlike Muslims in the U.K. and France who have migrated recently.
- C. The ability of radical mosque to attract Muslims is declining. But other places of “vulnerability” seem to take over. Places such as “prisons or other social institutions in which marginalized individuals” are becoming "gateway organizations" of Islamist radicalization. They facilitate exposure and connection to militant ideas and the social influence by those people who promote them.
- D. “The Internet has come to play an increasingly important role in recruitment and mobilization, particularly appealing to "seekers" and facilitating "home-grown" self-starter groups” (Rodgers, 2007).

An empirical study was also done on 117 home grown jihadists regarding the behavioral manifestation of radicalization process in the United States and United Kingdom (Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, 2009). It identified the following characteristics of radicalization among Muslim extremists:

- Adopting a Legalistic (Rules-Based) Interpretation of Islam
- Trusting Only Select (and Ideologically Rigid) Religious Authorities
- Perceived (Incompatible) Schism between Islam and the West
- Low Tolerance for (and Personalized Reaction against) Perceived Theological Deviance
- Attempts to Impose Religious Beliefs on Others
- Political Radicalization (Western Conspiracy to Subjugate Islam) (Ibid).

However, researchers could not come up with a clear and general profile on individual's transformation from radical into violent extremist. Salafi Jihadists mostly are more educated, and financially and occupationally secured than it was initially anticipated. In Denmark, studies show that most radicals were found to be immigrants. According to samples taken by Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, the radicals noticed were of low socioeconomic, educational, professional backgrounds.

Goli and Rezaei made empirical analysis classifying the participants of the research into four ranks. The fourth group designed to include the most radicals who hold “radical Islamic views in terms of expressive, explicit, and consistent affiliation with and support for militant radical Muslim groups” (Rezaei, 2010, p. 48). The following four requirements were designed to identify ‘radical Muslims’:

1. *Advocate for Islam as a religious ideology.*
2. *Join the interpretation of Islam as holistic, distinguishing between true and false Islam, acknowledging Islam as a binding prescription for activities in Din [Religion], Dunya [Way of life], and Dawla [Government].*
3. *Submit to the idea that the final goal of Islam is conquest of the entire world.*
4. *Agree that fulfilling that end legitimizes the use of any means, including violence (ibid).*

Goli and Rezaei discovered that 70 % of the “radical Muslims” were Sunni, 76% of them were male, 38 % of were between the age of 21 and 24 years, 10% were converts. The study also prove that there was no correlation between income and support for radical Islam. It is also found out that Muslim radicals exhibit the following traits *inter alia*:

- a) *More dissatisfied with life in general;*
- b) *More preoccupied with the international conflicts in Muslim countries;*
- c) *Lonelier;*
- d) *More likely to have experienced discrimination;*
- e) *More likely to want to marry only another Muslim;*
- f) *More likely to believe all Muslim immigrants should follow Islam;*
- g) *Opposed to certain behaviors, such as drinking alcohol, which are prohibited by Sharia law;*
- h) *More likely to have become more religious within the past three years; and*
- i) *More committed to religious duties like paying Zakat and Khoms, daily prayer, etc (Borum, 2011, p. 55).*

### **3.5.3. Religiosity Vs Radicalism**

Is there any connection between religiosity and Islamic Radicalism? A study in 2005-06 shows that there is no significant difference between radicals and non-radical Muslims in terms of religiosity. Based on a new Gallup World Poll of more than 9,000 interviews in nine Muslim countries (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia), religion is considered as very important aspect of their daily life for 92% of radical and 91% of moderate Muslims. Whereas, 56% of radical and 59% of moderate Muslims had attended religious services in the preceding seven days of the study (Esposito, 2006).

Is it hatred to the west’s civilization that is actually make Muslims go radical? It a common accusation by the west that radicals hate the Western civilization and way of life. But on the contrary 39% of radical and 36 % of moderate Muslims in Muslim countries admire the West, in particular its technology, democratic system, and freedom of speech. Radical Muslims that the West lacks respect for Islam and trying to control them by imposing the latter’s values. They feel that non-interference in belief and policies of Muslim nations will improve relations with the West.

Moderates, on the other hand, are more eager to build ties with the West through economic development (ibid).

### **3.5.4. Marginalization/Deprivation vs Radicalism**

Does economic deprivation have anything to do with Islamic radicalism? Studies show that many of those regarded as Islamic radicals are not economically disadvantaged. Rather, they are often better educated than non-radical fellows and a good deal of them have undergone University educations. Surprisingly, many of them are engineers – a profession that is less associated with religion as well as with a religiously inspired movement (Gambetta, 2016).

For instance, Mohammad Atta, the 9/11 mastermind was an architectural engineer who was active at the start of modern Islamic radicalism. In 1970s, three of the significant violent groups in Egypt had founders, leaders and members with a background of technical education. *Saadedin Ibrahim*, the first sociologist to study the early violent Islamists, interviewed 34 members of the *Military Academy Group* and *al-Takfir*, who were imprisoned in the late 1970s. 29 of them were either graduates or university students, and of the 25 of these for whom he reports the subject, nine were engineers, six doctors, five agronomists, two pharmacists, two were studying technical military science, and one of them did literature (Gambetta, 2016).

The connection between Islamism and engineering is also evident in places beyond the Middle East. Two of the three men who in 1987 founded *Lashkar e-Toiba* group are professors at the University of Engineering and Technology of Lahore. The group is identified with Pakistani Sunni fundamentalists, which fight against India's sovereignty over the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In South East Asia *Jamaa Islamiya* recruited “many technical faculty members, including architects, engineers, geophysicists, chemists, and robotics engineers”. The three leading suspects in the September 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta were individuals who underwent engineering University education (Abuza, 2006, p.78).

The same goes to Shiite Islamism, engineers enjoy prominence in the ‘radical’ Iranian cabinet, and among them the former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad trained as a civil engineer. He played an active role in the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution with his fellow engineering students

at the University of Science and Technology in Teheran. The Lebanese Shiite group *Hezbollah* too has a very strong link with engineers (Gambetta, 2016, p. 5).

*Hezbollah* was founded in 1982. It established *Jihad al-Binaa* so as to take part in the reconstruction of civil infrastructure and private housing in Lebanon. According to Judith Palmer Harik, “this is an interesting organization because it is chock-full of professionals – contractors, engineers, architects, demographic experts.” About 2000 engineers and architects that were members of *Jihad al-Binaa* have been involved in the reconstruction of Lebanon after the war with Israel in August 2006 (Gambetta, 2016, p. 5).

### **3.5.5. Radicalism in Islam and Anti-Americanism?**

Muqtedar Khan identified two principal causes from which Muslim anti-Americanism stems:

- A) The manifestly unjust consequences of current and past US policies toward the Muslim world, and
- B) The use of America as the “designated other” in Islamist discourse that seeks to reconstruct an Islamic identity and create a global Islamic political power (KHAN, 2003, p. 417).

Among the policies of the U.S.A., its support for Israel, for authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and for opposition to Islamic regimes in Afghanistan, Sudan, Iran, and Algeria fuel anti-Americanism in Islamic World. The sanctions, “preemptive war” and occupation against Iraq have been considered by many Muslims as proof that the United States is determined to destroy Islam and Muslims (ibid).

Under the Islamists’ discourses, the heart of building the concept of Islamic civilization involves direct opposition to the distorted image of the West in general, and Anti-Americanism in particular. The first tactic used by Islamists is defining the contemporary West as ‘imperial, morally decadent, and un-Godly’. ‘They posit Western power and values as the cause of all Muslim problems. Then they envision a revived Islamic civilization as just, moral, and God-centered—the antithesis of their imagined West’. They depict that Islam and its values will revive only where, in their view, the West is defeated and all Western values were rejected (ibid).

Political, military, economic, and intellectual independence from the West has always been modern political Islam's overriding goal. These Islamists believe and teach that 'Islam should be the sole source of values, laws, and governance in Muslim society, the failure to achieve their goal for nearly a century, in combination with real and perceived injustices committed by the United States and its allies against Muslims, has engendered an extremely vitriolic hatred of America and given birth to radical Islam' (Ibid).

Muqtedar Khan argues, 'these radicals—truly, rogue Islamists—are willing to do anything to destroy America. They and their discourses are globalizing anti-Americanism and spreading an ideology of hatred and killing. In the process they are undermining the moral fabric of the Muslim world by corrupting Islam's message of justice, mercy, submission, compassion, and enlightenment' (Ibid). It looks that this of Khan fits the meaning given to Islamic radicalism or extremism.

Muqtedar Khan Puts the treat and consequences Islamic extremism as follows:

*Rogue Islamists constitute a threat both to America and to Islam. An effective response to this threat requires a complex strategy that counters the Islamists' worldview and delegitimizes their discourses. This strategy should expose the fallacies of their radicalism and underscore the devastating consequences it could bring to Muslims and the world by triggering a long and bloody global conflict between America and the Muslim world. An essential element in this strategy is the promotion of liberal Islam. Liberal Islam challenges the radical Islamist worldview. While also using Islam as its foundational idiom, it provides an alternate interpretation of Muslim reality and a more positive vision in which all Muslims can find hope (ibid).*

The masterminds of radical Islam have focused on two basic aspects of contemporary radical Islamist Ideology, with deep roots in Islamic theology and exegesis, in order to gain legitimacy. They are the concepts of 'the external and internal enemy, and the more modern totalitarian concept of the Islamic vanguard' (Alexiev, 2011, p. 20).

### ***External enemy***

The class of 'external enemy' is founded on the blunt comparison of *believers vs. infidels*. This is a central standard of the Muslim faith and something every Muslim intuitively understands. For the devout it is an article of faith. The 'us-versus-them concept' is a metaphor for the 'good vs. evil and darkness vs. light'. Alexander Alexiev compared this view with the twentieth-century

totalitarianism, especially with in the Nazis' "pure Aryan race" and "miscegenation Jews", "subhuman Slavs"; and that of the communists' classification of 'proletariat versus the bourgeois class' antagonism. In similar fashion, Islamic radicals use the dichotomy method to 'paint an elaborate image hostile external enemy' causing 'Muslim backwardness' and an existential threat to Islam. They blame the West and its allies, especially Israel since 1948, as enemies of Islam who jointly have been causing Muslim backwardness through imperialist and colonialist policies. In addition, they consider West to be the threat against Islamic norms 'because democracy and popular sovereignty that leave no room for the sovereignty of God and therefore push Islam out of its rightful place at the center of man's universe'. The effect of such perception/image was a strident demonization of the West as essentially a subhuman civilization worth destruction so that Islam should survive and triumph as ordained by sharia (Alexiev, 2011, pp. 21-22).

The term "new *jahiliyya*" is used to demonize the West. *Jahiliyya* refers to the dark-age of pre-Islamic ignorance and paganism of the desert Arabs before Muhammad the prophet. The thirteenth-century scholar *Ibn Taymiyya* and other 'Orthodox Muslims' used the term to defame identified enemies. It was first given a radically different meaning by *Abul Ala Mawdudi* gave it a radically different meaning in 1939 to denote "a state of affairs, rather than a historical period, and as a sweeping condemnation of modernity and its incompatibility with Islam". For him, "new *jahiliyya*" only mean "a new barbarism that had taken over the West and presented a mortal danger to Islam" (Mawdudi, 1986). The concept was further explored by *Mawdudi's* disciple and prominent Islamist author in his own right, *Abu-l-Hasan Ali Nadvi*, who in turn influenced *Sayyid Qutb* and other Muslim Brotherhood thinkers (Alexiev, 2011, p. 22).

As the ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, *Sayyid Qutb* advanced the concept of the 'West and modernity as the new *jahiliyya*' and made it as an essential guideline for extreme Islamic interpretation. He took 'modernity', as the sworn enemy of Islam because it did not allow any place for God's *haqimiyya* (sovereignty). He made it clear that the choice for believers are two: either *jahiliyya* or Islam. *Qutb* posited that "the very survival of Islam depended on fighting the West and modernity by all means available, including violent jihad because those who have usurped the authority of God and are oppressing God's creatures are not going to give up their power merely through preaching (ibid).

*Sayyid Qutb* is known to be the first Islamic thinker who boldly spoke that the West can be defeated and called for full confrontation with the West “as a way to re-energize Islam and reassert its supremacy”. In his view, this was possible because “Western civilization had lost its *élan vital* and found itself in a state of accelerating moral depravity and social decline”. According to *Qutb*’s Islamic liberation theology’, Islamic society is the only civilized society all other societies are backward in all standards. As a result, in his view, the ultimate victory is preordained in favor of Islamic order and sharia law, which not valid just for Muslims, but are part of “that universal law which governs the entire universe, including the physical and biological aspects of man (ibid).

### ***Internal enemy***

Internal *jahiliyya* was another innovative explanation given by *Qutb* to describe what he called the cultural influence of the West over Muslim society attacking the Islam from within *Ummah* [the people, the believers]. Alexander Alexiev has put the situation and its effects as follows:

*...And it followed logically that the supporters and promoters of jahiliyya in majority Muslim societies, including all Muslim governments not ruling according to sharia, had become apostates and deserved to be treated accordingly. The idea of conducting violent jihad against self-professed Muslims, of course, ran afoul of key Quranic injunctions and had been practiced on any scale in the past only by radical sectarians, such as the seventh-century Kharijites and the followers of Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the violent Wahhabi creed, in the eighteenth century. Abd al-Wahhab, who along with Ibn Taymiyya emerged as the patron saint of the Islamist movement in the second half of the twentieth century, was notorious for inciting murderous campaigns against Muslims whom he did not consider sufficiently pious, which usually meant that they did not believe in his extremist teachings. Such Muslims, in his view, were apostates worse than the infidels themselves and deserved to be killed, which he encouraged on a regular basis. For most of his long career he maintained that the main enemy of Islam was the Ottoman Empire, a state he considered a nation of heretics ... which corrupted Islam from within (Alexiev, 2011, p. 23).*

*Sayyid Qutb* sought to overturn the dominant value in the Sunni Muslim countries that deny Muslims the right to revolt against injustice or unjust Muslim rulers. He attempted to legitimize revolt in mainstream Sunni believes. He posed a new theory stating, “If sharia is not the law of the land, neither the state nor its rulers could be considered real Muslims, and it was therefore the duty of the believers to fight them”. This radical doctrine had far-reaching impact triggering or influencing Islamic movements by legitimizing the use of violence against Muslim rulers. For instance, his thought promoted radicalization activities that gave rise to the establishment of various terrorist groups in Egypt as well as in other countries. The scenario further exacerbated to cause a number of terrorist incidents; like the assassination of the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981, and set the forum for further ‘Islamic Terrorism’ phenomena that we still see in the world (Alexiev, 2011, p. 24).

### **3.5.6. Are Islamists anti-Western Civilization?**

It is common to hear expressions that describe Islamists as anti-West and anti-Western civilization. Are they true? Under this section of the thesis I would like to look into some points made over the issue.

Most Islamists make claims of ‘purely Islamic in inspiration’ that seemingly amounts to total rejection of the West and its values. Earlier Islamist thinkers, such as *Jamaluddin Afghani*, *Rashid Rida*, and *Muhammad Abduh* are very well known for their assertions that broadly rejected the West and its values. Nevertheless, they never denied its achievements and were, in fact, willing to borrow from it in order to combat Muslim backwardness (Alexiev, 2011, p. 22).

The truth seem to be several Islamist leaders and thinkers were highly influenced by and borrowed significantly from modern Western political ideologies and movements such as nationalism, communism and fascism. The techniques of hierarchically organized groups, propaganda techniques, ideological indoctrination and mass mobilization mechanisms are actually copied from the West. A well-known radical Muslim, *Sayyid Abu al-A‘la Mawdudi* boldly acknowledged that his version of Islamism was a ‘revolutionary party comparable to communism and fascism’. Some argue that *Hasan al-Banna*, the founder of Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt, was inclined towards

fascist ideas and organizational techniques. The ostensible anti-Western puritan Sayyid Qutb emphasized the vitally important role of the Islamist ‘vanguard’ in organizing, mobilizing and properly ‘educating’ Muslims (Bale, 2009).

Sayyid Qutb took the credit for introducing Leninist concept of the ‘communist party as the vanguard of the revolution’ in the form of Islamic vanguard, which laying the ground for modern totalitarian roots of Islamism. Lenin’s lack of trust in the proletariat’s capacity to carry out the socialist revolution by itself as it was held by a “‘false consciousness” can easily been adopted by Qutb and in the ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood. They teach that the Muslims are incapable of rising against the enemy on their own. Thus, they believe, “the enemy could be defeated only if the revolution was headed by a vanguard, a small dedicated group of ideologically committed, trained and organized revolutionaries”. This vanguard leads Muslims in the struggle against the enemy (non-believers and the morally corrupt Muslims) and towards the ultimate revival of Islam (Alexiev, 2011, p. 25).

The vanguard concept, has since then become a guiding power of the Islamist movement. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, leading Islamist activist and scholar, described ‘Islamic vanguard’ as “the first and most important task for the revival of the Islamic movement”. According to his analysis, the first and foremost activity must be the formulation of an Islamic vanguard “capable of leading the contemporary society of Islam without isolation or leniency, and curing the diseases of the Muslims with medicines that have been prescribed by Islam alone”. He also listed seven areas in which the Islamic vanguard must be active to achieve its goals. They deal with “indoctrination, proselytism, propaganda work, and introducing Islamic standards in economics, education, and politics. Jihad is only one of these fields of pursuit’ (Al-Qaradawi, 2000, p. 31).

Therefore, it would not be appropriate to disassociate Islamic extremists from Western values or civilization. At least those in the leadership or shaping ideologies seem very much influenced concepts and methods developed by the West and other non-Muslim nations or groups or individuals.

## 3.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### 3.6.1. Major Concepts

#### Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Radicalization

Defining terms like *terrorism*, *violent extremism* and *radicalism* is a very difficult task as scholars fail to agree on their meanings. However, for the purpose of this research, **violent extremism** may be understood to mean ‘advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives’ (USAID, 2011).

**Terrorism** carries different motivational factors involving indiscriminate attacks. Whereas ‘violent extremism’ takes a broader meaning that emphasizes on all forms of contemporary non-state towards ideologically motivated violence (Romaniuk, 2015).

Whereas **radicalization** refers to the process by which individuals turn to be violent extremists by increasing commitment to and use of violent means and strategies in political conflicts (Porta, 2011, pp. 6-7).

Before individuals or groups become terrorists, they pass through to steps: radicalization then violent extremism. Thus, addressing these two stages, especially the radicalization aspect looks a better logical approach to resolve or minimize the terrorism. The following four features describe the characteristics of violent extremists:

- ✓ Use of force/violence over persuasion;
- ✓ Uniformity over diversity;
- ✓ Collective goals over individual freedom; and
- ✓ Giving orders over dialogue (Schmid A. , 2011, p. 630)

#### Disengagement vs Deradicalization

The term terrorist ‘disengagement’ denotes an individual's departure from terrorist-related activity. Deradicalization, on the other hand, refers to abandoning radicalized or terrorist ideologies acquired during the radicalization process (Horgan, 2009).

## Islam vs Islamic Extremism or Islamic Radicalism

Islam is a faith that has nothing to do with violence like any other faith. However, understandings or interpretations of religion may cause extremism when combined with political views. The current pro-jihad and pro-Sharia movements are motivated by the so called political Islam than by religious Islam. While outlining the distinction between Islam as a faith and Islamism as a political ideology, one has to refute the claims of Islamists that their religion based worldview qualifies them as the “True Believers”, an attractive coverage for suicide and terrorism in the name of Islam (Tibi, 2008, pp. 17-20) .

As it can be seen from the discussions made under the preceding two Chapters, *Islam as a faith* has nothing to do with *extremism or radicalism* and terrorism that we see in the IGAD region and elsewhere in the World. The latter is more of using or abusing Islam as a political ideology to promote a political objective than to promote the religion itself.

Even though Islam is the mainly raised these days in connection with radicalization, other religions including Christianity are mentioned in connection with radicalism. Radicalization is apolitically motivated activity taking religious covers. Both Christianity and Islam were used as covers for political or extremists end in the IGAD region (North Consult C. L., 2015, p. 80).

### Factors for Extremism at Global Level.

This Chapter has examined the factors that led philosophical fathers of Islamic radicalism to adopt violent and extreme ideologies in the name of Islam. The following ideologues of Islamic extremism were identified based on their relevance to compare their influences over Islamic extremism in the IGAD.

<b>Names</b>	<b>Country of Origin</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Reason for radicalization</b>	<b>Influence over</b>
<i>Ibn-Taymiyyah</i>	Syria		Secularism, moral corruption and corrupt politics	Al Qaida

<b><i>Muhammad Ibn-Abd-al-Wahhab</i></b>	Saudi Arabiya		Hatred towards Egyptian and Ottoman cultures and ways of life	Terror groups following Wahhabism or Salafism
<b><i>Rashid Rida</i></b>	Egypt		-anti-Western domination, anti-Western way of life, anti-colonialism sentiment	Hassan al Banna
<b><i>Hassan al-Banna</i></b>	Egypt	Islamic Brotherhood of Egypt	anti-British rule and anti-injustice sentiments Colonial experiences of Muslim Lands, socio-economic problems, and the inability of Arab governments to defend Muslims lands	
<b><i>Abu-al-A'la Mawdudi</i></b>	Pakistan	Jama a-Islami of Pakistan	Anti-West, anti-corrupt traditions and “heretical” practices of other cultures	
<b><i>Sayyid Qutb</i></b>		Islamic Brotherhood of Egypt	reaction to the rampant sexual promiscuity, drunken behavior, and capitalism he encountered in the United States	Al Qaeda, ISIS; And others
<b><i>Ayman al-Zawahiri</i></b>	Saudi Arabia	Al Qaeda	Anti-west and anti-Israel	Jihadists in Afghanistan, Somalia...
<b><i>Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi</i></b>			Influenced by Islamic extremism of his predecessors, anti-Western democracy, anti-Secularism	

The above table summarizes the discussions made in how Islamic radicalization preferred as a way out from social, economic, political and personal problems. The above personalities are very influential ideologues for the terrorist groups we know at the regional and global level.

From the summary done in the above table, the reason for the individuals' developing radicalism or extremism in the name of Islam is hardly based on zeal for the religion. Islam and its values were given an extremist interpretation so as to bring about the kind of ideal state proponents would like to see in Muslim countries and elsewhere around the world. The table also showed us that the factors for radicalization seem similar with those the IGAD region is experiencing.

### **3.6.2. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework**

Under this part, the theories embodied in the literature review done above are summarized. Then, the conceptual framework, which lays the ground for the analyses in the next chapters, is introduced.

#### **Theoretical Framework**

As we can see from the reviewed literature done under this Chapter, it looks clear that radicalization is a root cause for violent Islamic extremism; and the latter mainly cited as a root cause leading to terrorism. The main theme of this thesis is to address the center of the root cause, i.e. radicalization. It is noted that there is no single cause for radicalization.

Some radicals are disadvantaged in terms of economic, education, social, political and related matters. While some others, especially those in the leadership, are better off economically and are well educated but motivated by political factors.

Among the political factors, the Arab-Israel or Palestine-Israel issue, pre and post-colonialism historical relation with the West could be cited as grounds for radicalization. Some others have their motive from the dream of reintroducing the glorious days of Arabs and Islam. They wish to bring those days back so as to get upper hand against the West and any enemy standing their way.

Cultural differences may also be mentioned as factors. As we can observe from the experiences of Hassan al-Banna, the American way of life and democracy made him develop resentment against their culture and led him to develop an extreme interpretation of Islam.

The factors could be differing but what we can see from the reviewed literatures is that religiosity in Islam has nothing to do with the radicalization and violence being committed in the name of the religion. The religion and its teaching seem to be abused as means to motivate individuals and groups furthering political goals than to promote Islamic values.

Precht's Model, pre-radicalization refers to conditions existing on the ground that might be exploited by Islamic Extremists to attract individuals or groups into violently extreme interpretation of Islam. This grounds could be problems having some or no connection religion. The above table shows political, social economical and related issues are the underlying factors why many people in the IGAD region buy Islamic extremist ideologies.

At the second Stage of Precht's Model, people get exposed to radical views and join terrorist groups or convert to the latter's version of Islam. This theory seem to be relevant to IGAD. For example, Al-Zawahiri's strategy for operation in Somalia and elsewhere proposes five measures: *Expulsion of the foreign international presence; Rebuilding of state institutions; Establishment of domestic security; Comprehensive national reconciliation; and Economic reform and combating famine* (Devin R.Springer, 2009, p. 41).

## Conceptual Framework

In the next chapters, the writer of the Thesis will try to test whether political, socio-economic deprivation or marginalization play are behind radicalization and violent Islamic extremism in the IGAD region.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **ISLAMIC EXTREMISM AND CVE IN THE IGAD REGION: NATURE, CAUSES, EFFECTS AND MEASURES TAKEN**

Under this chapter, data collected from primary and secondary sources are presented and analyzed. The discussion under this Chapter mainly focuses on presenting what the research has discovered in relation to the nature, causes and effects of Islamic radicalism both at the IGAD region and member states level. It especially points out the major actors in Somalia and beyond in the terrorism and counter-terrorism fight. After going through this chapter readers will have a good picture of the factors leading Muslims to radicalization in the region and the efficacy of the counter radicalization measure being employed by different stakeholders.

#### **4.1. IGAD and ISSP: Mandate, and Structure**

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) established in 1986 by the then drought afflicted six Eastern African countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. The State of Eritrea was admitted as the seventh member of the Authority at the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa, September 1993. South Sudan is the newest member (Abebe, 2016).

Currently, IGAD has a specialized division called ISSP dealing with terrorism, VE and CVE. It mobilizes resources for the implementation of emergency, short-term, medium-term and long-term programs within the framework of regional cooperation. In the context of regional security, IGAD provides mechanisms within the region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter-State and intra-State conflicts through dialogue (Abebe, ISSP, radicalization and deradicalization in the IGAD region., 2016).

## 4.2. Counter Terrorism and Counter Extremism in the IGAD

Between the attack of September 11 2001 and September 2006, the UN Security Council has been focusing on legal and other security related measures to counter terrorism. But since 2006 September so as to deal with terrorism, the Security Council adopted a holistic approach targeting underlying cause such as poverty, lack of good governance, and socio-economic marginalization. It also has put a clear strategy of fighting terrorism through respect for human rights, rule of law. To implement this the UN Has established a ‘Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force bringing different UN entities and various “specialized agencies, funds, and programs, with a view to improving the cooperation and coordination” against terrorism (Rosand, 2009, p. 5).

The strategy also encourage The IGAD sub-region to engage in a holistic, “softer” and long-term strategy to counter terrorism. This method may be described as a “human security” approach to counterterrorism taking “African” view in to account. Donors and the United Nations mad attitudinal change and preferred to approach the terrorism threat with development strategies targeting “disaffected and marginalized groups and parts of the sub-region which are potential breeding grounds for terrorism” (Rosand, 2009, p. 5). As a result, the UN had the following four pillars of the strategy in place:

- a. measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism;*
- b. measures to prevent and combat terrorism;*
- c. measures to build states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations in this regard; and*
- d. Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism (Rosand, 2009, footnote 1).*

The UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force has exerted lots efforts on launching the UN Counter-Terrorism Handbook, raising the necessary funds, ensure UN member states retain a sense of ownership over the Strategy, mobilize expertise knowledge, improved coordination and cooperation, achieved awareness creation and policy commitment from different stakeholders, outreaching civil society engagement, coordination of the anti-corruption efforts, and worked on

to help stakeholders be responsive to the on-the-ground realities, needs, and priorities of the sub-regions (Eric Rosand, 2009, pp. 6-9).

Countries of the region have been doing a lot in areas of support in terms of equipment; training for police, judges, and prosecutors; improving border control and monitoring of unpatrolled coastlines; strengthening interdepartmental cooperation; upgrading communications equipment and facilities; combating terrorist financing; detecting document forgery; and combating arms trafficking. Some countries would benefit from assistance in drafting and adopting counterterrorism legislation, while others require assistance in refining existing legislation. Support is also needed to address more fundamental capacity issues, such as strengthening democratic institutions and the judicial system, combating corruption, improving governance, dealing with internal and external conflicts, and targeting vulnerable communities (ICPAT, 2008 and Eric Rosand, 2009)..

In many countries, even assistance building roads and rail links are needed not only to improve the prospects for development and regional integration, but to help improve the lives of vulnerable and marginalized communities and integrate them into wider society. In Somalia, outside support is critical to empowering the Transitional Federal Government to provide basic government services, in particular education, so that it can act as an effective alternative to extremist groups and ideologies (ICPAT, 2008 and Eric Rosand, 2009).

Since the nature of radicalization and terrorism show international and local aspects, international, regional and bilateral cooperation may be required to address the problems on case by case basis. The IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT) was established to coordinate between countries and international donors to respond to specific needs and priorities of each country in the sub-region (Eric Rosand, 2009).

The ISSP aimed at building capacity both at regional and national level to counter terrorism and transnational crimes. It relies on “a framework of four pillars: Counterterrorism; Transnational Organized Crime; Maritime Security; and Security Institutions Capacity Building” (ISSP, 2015).

### *Hard and Soft Measures*

Despite the fact that these efforts were exerted some writers commented that weak governance and fragile democracies played negative role by escalating the threat than diminishing it. Anti-

terrorism laws have been misused causing human rights violations and repressions of civil societies as well as to crack down on some groups. Other countries who don't have issued anti-terror laws were accused of employing "questionable administrative procedures to pursue their counterterrorism objects" where no human rights protection were built in. the lack of respect for human rights and rule of law counter-played in East Africa undermining the public support for countering terrorism. In the region 'hard' measures received much emphasis compared to broad based 'soft' approaches to counterterrorism. A 'soft' but a long-term strategy plays greater role in addressing the root-cause of terrorism by preventing violent radicalization /extremism/ through political, economic, and social development (Eric Rosand, 2009, pp. 12-13).

### **4.3. Manifestation of Violent Extremism in the IGAD Region**

This section will briefly introduce the nature and manifestation of Islamic extremism as observed in the IGAD region.

#### **4.3.1. Nature and Area of Influence of Terrorists/Extremists**

Extremism and terrorism in the name of Islam is already global by its nature. In the IGAD region Islamic Extremism takes three forms: *local, regional and International* (Abebe, 2016).

- a. *Local extremism* refers to groups organized locally in a country within the local context without having any external or regional connections.
- b. *Regional extremism* denotes terrorist or extremist groups operate at regional level across borders. They usually have connections and affiliations with international or transboundary terrorist or extremist groups.
- c. *International extremism* refers to groups organized by global actors with or without affiliations or connections to a specific country or region (ibid).

### 4.3.2. Region-wide Threat: Al-Shabab

Al-Shabab's area of operation is no more limited to Somalian territory. It has fighters from Somali society as well as from other African, Middle Eastern and Western countries. According to a study conducted by ISSP, al-Shabab is aspiring to become "a truly regional organization, with membership and horizons that transcend national borders." (Abebe, Transnational terrorism In the Horn and East Africa Region: the Case of Al-Shabaab, 2016). Therefore, Al Shabab is a regional terrorist/extremist group based on the definition given above.

Evidences show, al-Shabab is active in Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. It has inflicted terror attacks in five of these countries. The most suffering ones are Somalia and Kenya. In addition to that the group has organized specialized military wings so as to bust or intensify its terrorist activities in the region (ibid). For example,

- a. **Jaysh Ayman**: literally means 'citizens of non-Somalis' is a military wing of al-Shabab organized to conduct military operations in and against Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. And,
- b. **Jaysh al-Usra**: this is Al-Shabab's military wing organized and dedicated to operations against Ethiopia. *Jaysh al-Usra* means 'the army of hardship'. The group is composed of both Somali and non-Somali jihadist fighters under the command of *Ali Diyaar Warseme*. The military wing has a base in Somalia in a place called *Diinsoor* with an approximately 500 fighters. It is noted that the wing has significant number of Ethiopian Somalis and Oromo contingents as well as small number of Ethiopian from other ethnic groups (ibid).

The group has broad connections with Al-Qaeda and its East African wing. Recently, one faction of Al Shabab has attached itself with another international terrorist group called ISIS. The group is establishing recruitment centers and affiliated Islamic extremist groups in many countries including Kenya, Ethiopia and Tanzania. It has acquired capacities and capabilities to stage attacks across the region (Abebe, 2016). As a result, all the above information implies that unlike other terrorist groups in the region, Al Shabab has transnational terrorist group that needs a region-wide coordination and solution.

#### **4.4. Common Issues Relating to Deradicalization Attempts in IGAD Region**

From data collected during the study reveal that the following are common impediments to possible deradicalization mechanism as a CVE in the region.

##### **4.4.1. Conceptual problems**

An informant said that the problem to effectively and efficiently deal with ‘radicalization’, ‘terrorism’ and violent extremism begins with the meanings attached to the terms. The terms are open to controversies in relation to their meaning and which group or individual can be called ‘a radical’, ‘a terrorist’ or ‘an extremist’. The terms are too politicized to come up with meanings that could work across systems (Simon, 2016).

Countries within the IGAD region have anti-terrorism laws that goes to the extent of classifying political oppositions as terrorists. In fact, terrorism differs from political opposition and insurgency basically in the use of violence indiscriminately. But, anti-terrorism laws merge all individual and group political dissents as terrorism. This has added more problem in finding definitions for the aforementioned terms to implement a counter measure at the regional level. Remember that Nelson Mandela had been imprisoned for twenty-five years and labeled as a “terrorist” by many Western countries. Later on he declared a hero and a freedom fighter. Many African leaderships assume power through armed struggle and other “violent” activities and yet they classify similar movements as terrorist ones (Simon, 2016).

‘Radical’ ideas were the basis for many new and innovative political solutions. They have shaped the world in various ways challenging accepted ideas and authorities. The ideas behind the establishment of organizations like the UN, AU and IGAD were radical or new. The black right activists of the USA were facing the same labelling at their initial stages (Simon, 2016). Thus, the term must not be confused with the current use of ‘radicalism and radicalization’ in the IGAD region and elsewhere. Even violence must be considered seriously. Some sorts of violence justified under international human rights laws and even under domestic laws of IGAD member states (KI-10, 2016).

Save the natural conceptual ambiguities in the use of ‘radicalization’ and related concepts, many countries in the IGAD region define them in manner that confuses terrorism with opposition,

freedom fighters, insurgents, activists and other forms of political deviations from the lines drawn by incumbent. Therefore, the fight against terrorism is being abused by repressive regimes to suppress any challenge against their authoritarian and totalitarian rules (KI-10, 2016). For instance, “the Ethiopian anti-terror law subjects Muslims who brought legitimate and constitutionally guaranteed questions to take government’s hands out of the administration of religious affairs.” (KI-08, 2016)

#### **4.4.2. Religion vs Real and Perceived Attacks against It**

Religions play a vital role in shaping the social and political cohesion in IGAD region. If any religious society is told that their religion is under threat from an identified enemy, they will risk everything and take any action necessary to defend it. Terror and extremist groups use rhetoric with similar messages that may turn Islam or a version of Islam against non-Muslims or Muslims who did not buy the extreme ideologies. Islamic extremists and terror groups operating in the region have this common tendency (KI-10, 2016).

Since Islamic texts including the Quran were written in archaic Arabic, good proficiency in the language will give an individual a higher level acceptability among the Muslim. Those who underwent religious study in Arab countries, enjoy even a better privilege and respect. The dependence of the majority of Muslims on Arabic speaking scholars for interpretation of Islamic scriptures, allowed extremists to propagate their politically oriented views as if they were Islamic beliefs and commandments. Extremists could find a better chance to inculcate radicalized agenda under the cover of teaching Islamic interpretations (KI-10, 2016).

Various schools have been established and run by foreign and/or local extremists educated jihadist training schools like in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such schools also known in Arabic as *Madrassas* have got little oversight from governments until recently. Lack of centralized leadership over mosques and *Madrassas* let extremists and jihadists to remain unnoticed for quite a long time in many parts of the region. Experts suggest that *Madrassas* and mosques should be place under the ownership and direct control of Muslim communities or a centralized Islamic

Institution must be formed to guard Islam and its values from extremism and terrorism (personal observation from meeting at Harmony Hotel, March, 2016).

IGAD member states and the international community in general had been focusing on the hard measures (military and criminal punishment) as a strategy to counter terrorism. Later the issue of countering violent extremism (CVE) has been getting momentum within the region and in the eyes of the international community working with the IGAD (Daniel, 2016). However, another interviewee has a different perspective of IGAD's role. He says, IGAD follows the 'soft' measure approach from the outset. It has been focusing on capacity building in the areas of intelligence sharing, capacity building for justice systems, and facilitating cooperation in bilateral and multilateral level (Abebe, 2016).

#### **4.4.3. Border and System Related Problems**

Weaknesses in the state machinery, porous borders, poorly-patrolled coastlines, poor-legal system to deal with terrorism, less-governed or ungoverned territory and generally weak state machinery to provide security against terrorism have contribute a lot for the problem. As a result, these factors drew the attentions of stakeholders in the sub-region and from outside (Abebe, 2016).

Besides, uncontrolled movement of people across borders, lack of formal extradition and information sharing mechanisms have further complicated matters. However, "the Kampala Statement" adopted by the IGAD in September 2007 has laid the platform for sub-regional cooperation against terrorism. It also helped in facilitating of extradition of suspects in a manner that pays due regard for basic human rights principles.

#### **4.4.4. Rivalry in the Region**

Intra-regional rivalry or competition is also another impediment against security cooperation in the IGAD region. Overcoming these impediment will increase the possibility of "developing effective partnerships and programs aimed at promoting the holistic message of the Strategy that take into account and are tailored to address the needs and realities of the sub-region" (Eric Rosand, 2009, p. 14).

## **4.5. Country Specific Cases in the IGAD**

This section is devoted to present data describing the nature, extent and causes of radicalization and extremism in the name of Islam. Since no data is available for Eritrea, it was not included in the discussion. In addition, South Sudan is not part of it as the country is new and no experience is found relating to Islamic extremism.

### **4.5.1. Somalia**

Somalis, traditionally, are among the most open and peaceful societies known. Changes began to appear in 1980s when Zaid Barre, the then president of Somalia, began to harshly treat Islamic leaders and Sheiks. The harsh treatment led to the rise of dissents among Somalis. Some elements of radical Islam began to plant its root in Somalia. *Dahari Awes*, a colonel in the army but expelled by Barre, was responsible for the formation of Extremist groups like al-Ittihad al-Islamiyah. He had trainings from Islamic extremist groups active in Afghanistan. Al-Ittihad is considered to be the mother for most terror and militant groups grew later in Somalia (KI-02, 2016).

Somalia have continued to pose threats against neighboring countries like Djibouti and Kenya as it is a spring board for terrorists attacks across borders. Weak or absence of government control in Somalia coupled with “inter-clan rivalry and banditry” have further compromised border security in Northeastern Kenya that facilitated criminal and terrorist elements to actively operate. In addition, Kenya has “a large international population and significant tourist sector” and Djibouti, being a base for US and western European troops, “offer international terrorists more “high value” and Western-related targets” (Eric Rosand, 2009, p. 11).

Besides, Somalia’s people is highly divided among clans, which usually find themselves in rivalry of many sorts: trade, cattle, political power...etc. Following the fall of the Zaid Barre’s government, Somalia has descended into stateless conflict zone. As a result, it became a focal area for International terror groups as well as to the international community aspiring to counter terrorism (KI-02, 2016).

The Ethio-Eritrea conflict made Eritrea side with and provide support for insurgents and terror groups in the war-torn Somalia. Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyyaa (AIAI) (a hub for terror groups against

Ethiopia too), Al-Qaeda, and a small but extremely violent jihadist cell led by *Aden Hashi 'Ayro*, and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), that defeated the US-backed warlords in 2006 can be mentioned (Dempsey, 2006, p. 8).

The clan-centered attitudes of the public caused too strong rift among the Somalis. Islamist extremists came up with Islamic Reform as an ideology unifying Somalia, especially against the intervention of the West. [Remember that the al-Qaeda man Iman al-Zawahiri, also proposed his own solution for Somalia]. The US made a failed military intervention which served as a ground invoked by international and local extremist groups to attract the people into radicalization in the name of Islam. In the beginning, Islamization looked a viable option to unify Somalia. However, which version of Islam created a rift among Islamists. In addition, deeply rooted clan-based divisions among the people exacerbated the situation. The scenario becomes inconvenient to International terror organization like al-Qaeda (KI-02, 2016).

Al-Qaeda was forced to move its training camps to other places. Its wing in the Horn of Africa has relocated its command center to Yemen, the Middle Eastern Country (KI-10, 2016).

Somalia was under warring factions of warlords until they grouped into two and divide Mogadishu into two. In 1993, the warlords have established Islamic Courts at two districts in order to get legitimacy in the eyes of the people and the international community. Even though the number of the districts with Islamic courts have grown into four, they were abolished by contending warlords a while after (KI-02, 2016).

Another form of Islamic Courts were established in 2004. This time they were attached to the clan system. Because, the warlords were mainly disbanded to either joining other militant groups or become merchants. As merchants, they used to run businesses ranging from small trading units up to big telecom service provision. Thus, to preserve and protect their business and property interests, the former warlords showed unabated support for the courts. Then Islamic Courts from different clans formed the 'Union of Islamic Courts' or UIC, an umbrella coordinating their activities across clan areas. UIC managed to turn legitimacy to itself. It has never promoted an extremist ideology followed by terror groups operating in Somalia. Consequently, it has created resentment among and from radicalized members of UIC (KI-10, 2016).

The following are some of extremist groups taking prominence in Somalia:

### ***Al-Isla***

Al-Isla was formed in 1960 as a non-political Islamist group. It used to operate in Somalia providing social, economic, educational services for a significant number of Somalis. Its importance had been growing steadily since the fall of Zaid Barre in 1991 and reached at its climax after the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in 2006. Following the Ethiopian Intervention, the group had decided to stage resistance movements (KI-02, 2016).

However, the question ‘how and by what means or method should the resistance go ahead’ has created two factions within the group. One faction proposes the use of all means including violence against Ethiopians; while another advocates for adopting pacific “paper and pen” means of resistance. Those who advocate the first option have left to form their own group called *Dumile Jadid* (new blood). The name suggests that the group is the new blood of Somalia standing for Islam and Somalia. Whereas the pacifist group remained within the organization of al-Isla (KI-02, 2016).

Al-Isla is still prevalent in Somalia providing some social and educational services to Somalis through NGOs it has affiliations with. The mosques under its sphere of influence are identifiable with the black flag they fly (KI-02, 2016).

### ***Dumile Jadid***

This group has been responsible for various attacks against Ethiopian army intervening in Somalia in 2006, along side of other extremist Islamic militant groups. The current Transitional Federal Government in Somalia has included many *Dumile Jadid* members. They deny the existence of the group and their membership in it, though (KI-10, 2016). Trusted security sources proved that the president of the transitional government and his security advisor do belong to the group. They influence the policies their government follows showing less committed stance against radicalization and violent extremism dominating the countries groups. They show less friendly gesture towards countries who sent armies into Somalia to fight terrorism (KI-06, 2016).

### ***Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyah***

Al-Ittihad is an Islamist extremist group established in 2005 (some argue it was established as resistance group after the Ethiopian military intervention in 2006) by an Afghan trained militant

leader called *Ayro*. Then *Godane* of Somaliland took over the leadership. Al-Shabab has attached itself with Somali clans. The Ethiopian army defeated the UIC army in 2006 (KI-02, 2016).

Then after, the Eritrea government brokered an alliance among different Islamist militants, former officials and clan leaders of Somalia. As a result, the Alliance to Resistance in Somalia (ARS) formed in Asmara. However, the Islamist groups had the upper hand in the Alliance. The alliance was infiltrated by defeated UIC militants, former officials, and clan-based Islamic extremists (Daniel, 2016).

But, the International community call for establishment of transitional government in Somalia had resulted in division among the members of militancy. Moderate groups joined the effort made to establish a transitional government (Daniel, 2016).

### ***Hizbul al-Islam and al-Shabab***

*Dahir Awes* is responsible for the creation of Islamic extremist groups *Hizbul al-Islam* and *al-Shabab* basically to counter the Ethiopian involvement in Somalia conflict (KI-02, 2016).

Al-Shabab allied itself with ARS and fought against *Ras Kimble militants* (a group supported by Kenya). Then the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia joined al-Shabab fighter to defeat Ras Kimble fighters but they lost the fight. The Ethiopian-backed *Rheine* clan fighters contributed much to secure victory over the Kenyan-backed Ras Kimble fighters. Hizbul al-Islam and al-Shabab had been fighting each other until the former merged itself with the latter (Daniel, 2016).

These show us that even if the groups in Somalia claimed to Islamist or Jihad groups, religion does not look their priority as they claim it. More of clan and ideological interests play greater role than religiosity and religious causes.

The following are some of the features and factors involving Islamic extremism in Somalia.

#### ***i. The Regional, the Diaspora and the Arabs factors***

Somalis in the diaspora and almost all Arab and Muslim nations had backed the Islamic Court Union in the beginning. Whereas, all IGAD members states with the exception of Ethiopia expressed their support for al-Shabab. IGAD members lacked common understanding over the teething troubles in Somalia, especially when it comes to intervention. Varied national interests and the Ethio-Eritrean rivalry made things complex for united action in Somalia. Multiple

membership in different regional organization had its impact to divide the attention of IGAD member states over Somalia problem (KI-02, 2016).

Al-Shabab used to enjoy direct and indirect military support from some regional and other Muslim countries even after it declared jihad against Ethiopia. The Somali diaspora and Islamic Jihadist groups provided al-Shabab with material, finance, and fighters in addition to showing moral support. This was alarming for Ethiopia. That is why Ethiopia has been play very active role in both the military and diplomatic options to defeat al-Shabab and other extreme Islamic militants operation In Somalia and across the IGAD region (Daniel, 2016).

### *ii. Why Somalis are getting radicalized?*

Before the fall of Zaid Barre in 1991, Somalis were known as one of the most open society. Most of the time they use to be welcoming and friendly. Islamic radicalism began to get ground among a few individuals following the harsh treatment of Islamic religious leaders by Barre's government. Radicalization began to get into the public as a unifying ideology for Somalis divided on clan systems and suffering from warlord induced fighting. Then, the "Christian war led by Ethiopia against Muslims in Somalia" become a leading factor to attract Somalis into radicalization (KI-02, 2016).

Nowadays, **economic** problems take the upper hand than religion and ideological convictions. Children born before and in 1991 (when President Barre thrown off power), are now around and over twenty-five years of age. They grew a stateless chaotic environment, majority of them experiencing the horrors of war such as killings, displacement, rape and various forms victimization. Some of them took part on inflicting violence including killing (KI-02, 2016).

Most of these young Somalis are married and have children. However, only 5 percent of the youth managed to get employment. They need income to support their family. Ideology is secondary for these kind of people. They easily fall for the causes of terror groups call because they earn a good deal of money. They kill or bomb or scarify themselves to earn money for their families. For instance, the military of the Transitional Government pays one hundred US Dollars (USD) for a soldier. But, for a foot fighter al-Shabab pays USD 200, clan leaders around USD 300, and the USA pays USD 600 per month. Thus, for many young Somalis one who pays more is more attractive to join (Daniel, 2016).

Another factor contributing for radicalism in Somalia is the attitude relating to “**Christians are attacking Muslims**” rhetoric. This view has been used as a ground to pulling many Somalis into radicalization. Beginning from the Ethiopian intervention in 2006, many al-Shabab and other terror groups managed to win the hearts of Somalis as if Ethiopia is a Christian nation attacking Muslims. The rhetoric continued against peacekeepers operating in Somalia. Some Somalis were heard for suggesting that Christian troops should leave Somalia and replaced by peacekeepers from non-neighboring Muslim countries (KI-11, 2016).

Gender plays its roles too. Masculinity in Somalia, like many African Society, is associated with violence. Some Somali women encourage their young relatives to join militancy (KI-02, 2016). But, some argue that gender has minimal role in Somalia’s radicalization and terror related matters. For instance, it is a woman who has organized and conducted the bombing of Jazira Hotel. She managed to get employed in the hotel so as to plan and facilitate the attack (Daniel, 2016).

**Marginalization** may also be taken as another factor to attract some Somalis into radicalization. Since Somalia has a strong clan-linked system influencing social, economic, political spheres in the country, minority clan groups have been disenfranchised. They have grievances over the Somalia system long before the fall of President Barre. Thus, tendencies show that individuals of smaller clans who have been marginalized or feel they were marginalized are easier to radicalize compared to members of larger clans (Daniel, 2016).

**Security** is another factor in radicalization process. This can be seen from three vantage points. Firstly, day to day security against violence such as killing, gender based violence or looting. Secondly, general sense of security is better experienced by joining terror groups than by the government. Thirdly, to exit or oppose the terror group or militants will cost lives and property. In consequence, those who know radicalization is not the appropriate path to follow will not speak out or stand against it. As a result, radical views go into the society unchallenged, attracting many as the only viable option for the war-torn Somalia (KI-06, 2016).

Another element that attracts people into radical groups is **criminal motives**. Some Somalis join radical groups with the view of engaging in and benefit from illicit trade and piracy, *inter alia*. Arms trade, trafficking in humans, illegal border trades in cattle could be some motives to attract Somalis into terror groups. Membership in such groups will give them more leverage to access trade routes and protect their interests (Daniel, 2016).

### *iii. Complains against Radicalism*

Some Somali women complain of the imposition of strict dress codes unsuitable for their comfort and to weather conditions. Freedoms and rights of women have been severely diminished compared the era of President Zaid Barre. What is happening is un-Somali treatment for women under the name of Islam. Some even went to the extent of complaining that “we were Muslims before what is new about Islam to bring us under this condition? (KI-02, 2016)

### *iv. Challenges to Disengage and Deradicalize Somali jihadist*

As we have seen it above Somalis are highly attached and pay allegiance to their own clans. This clan system has contributed positively and negatively in the anti-terror struggle. Positively, it had weakened the chance of international terrorist organization like al-Qaeda and ISIS from unifying the country under their destructive causes. Negatively, the clan system has made it difficult to have a government unifying Somalia under a federal government. Besides, when one militant group is defeated, it runs back to the clan and reorganize or comes back in a different organizational set up (KI-02, 2016).

Economic and social services are better provided by groups like al-Shabab than any government in Mogadishu. Thus, without resolving such problems or winning the trust of the public that the government will provide services better, it is difficult to deal with extremist ideologies. Developmental solutions in terms of education, employment and social services should address these problems (Abebe, 2016).

Above and beyond, *Ulamas* who usually teach the “moderate Islam” or “true Islam” has little or no chance to come out to teach against extremism. There must be a mechanism that can access the society so as to challenge radicalism with moderate Islam (Abebe, 2016).

The issue of security for those challenging radicalization and refusing to join terror groups is another challenge. Evidences reveal many are afraid to talk against extremism and fear for their life if decline the request to join terror groups (KI-02, 2016).

Gender also plays its role as a **pushing factor** into membership of terror groups. The concept the society gives for *masculinity* is very much related to being strong and violent. Mostly, women encourage their sons, husbands and other male relatives to engage in conflicts as a sign *manhood*.

Some attempts to change the concept of *masculinity* as peaceful and hard-worker brought positive result to attract fighters out of Somali fighting groups (KI-02, 2016).

Some terror groups like al-Shabab have regional bases outside of Somalia. For instance, al-Shabab has training camps in Kenya and Tanzania. It has been waging attacks in Kenya on several occasions. It could not be successful in Ethiopia for two reasons: strong security system and the public's awareness of the benefit of peace compared to Somalia's chaos has closed fertile grounds for its operation (Abebe, 2016).

Border is another factor affecting radicalization and efforts to countering it. "False border" caused the division of one community into different territories under two or more sovereign countries. Hence, when a terror or a radicalized group associates itself to a clan living across borders, it will make it difficult to trace radicals in terms of hard and soft measures (Daniel, 2016).

Misconceptions about Ethiopia and IGAD peacekeeping forces has been creating a big challenge. Terror groups use the rhetoric that Ethiopia and the peacekeeping force are Christians in taking over the Muslim nation. Many Somalis lack the fact that more than a third of Ethiopian population is Muslim and Ethiopia is not a Christian but a secular nation with religions and cultures enjoy equal protection (Abebe, 2016) (Daniel, 2016).

In addition to the factors discussed above, the society tends to readmit individuals disengaged from terrorist groups. Many of former jihadists complained that they were facing alienation and threats of attack both from their former comrades and from the society they just rejoined (KI-02, 2016). This show that much must be done to raise the awareness of the society on how to reintegrate former jihadists or radicals back into normal societal position. Otherwise, failure to reintegrate the coupled with the possible revenge from both the society and the jihadist groups will play a negative role in the effort to pull individuals from terror groups and deradicalize them.

#### **4.5.2. Ethiopia**

The Ethiopian situation is much different from that of Somalia. Somalia is one nation speaking the same language and sharing the same religion, Islam. While Ethiopia is a country of more than 80 nations, nationalities and peoples speaking different languages. Ethiopians asymmetrically fall in

different language and religious groups. The same language speaking group may belong to different religions or sects of a religion.

The composition Ethiopian and Somali people set up and the peace and conflict scenario currently existing. It looks paradoxical but some factors are worth mentioning why Ethiopia is less victimized by terror and violent extremism compared to Somalia. The well established deep-rooted culture of tolerance that has been difficult to shake despite several attacks committed against Churches and Christians by radicalized individuals in the name of Islam. Muslims stood on the victims sides and assist them attacks on the wake of attacks (KI-11, 2016).

However, this tradition of tolerance and peaceful coexistence have been facing challenges at different points of time. Few years back different radical elements from both Christians and Muslims have been exchanging inflaming remarks against each other. CDs, newspapers, magazines, books...etc. were published with contents ranging from insults and counter insults to beliefs of a religion up to messages calling for violence against views or interpretations (Daniel, 2016).

Instances of Wahhabism or Salafism indoctrination movements going on preaching intolerance targeted against moderate or long-existing Islamic interpretation and non-Muslim faiths (KI-06, 2016).

The *Awalia* School in Addis Ababa used to be a center for radicalization under the guise of teaching Islamic interpretations (KI-11, 2016). The school had been a breeding ground for Salafi/Wahhabi extremist political Islam. The purpose of which is to produce as many young Muslim radicals as possible to declare jihad against the Ethiopian government with a view of bring it down and replace it with an Islamic government that would implement Sharia law (KI-06, 2016).

An interviewee argues that there are Islamic extreme elements showing allegiance with or moral support to international or regional terrorist organizations (KI-11, 2016). Growing numbers of Ethiopians (mainly ethnic Somalis and Oromos) in Al Shabab ranks are forming discrete units in Ethiopia targeting the country itself and its interests in Somalia (Abebe, 2016).

One of the informants argued that there has never been religious tolerance in Ethiopia. Rather Muslims were discriminated in varies aspects. For instance, he says, “Muslims were not allowed to own or possess immovable property in Ethiopia. That is why we see them in mostly in trading

businesses than in land tilling.” He says, almost all Ethiopian leaders have been Christians who incline to prosecute Islam. There are sayings “*ye-Islam haggeru Mecca...*” suggesting that Muslims do not belong in Ethiopia but in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. As a result no wonder if any educated Muslim develops sense of being religiously discriminated (KI-09, 2016).

Another informant partially agree with the existence of historical discrimination in Ethiopia. But, he maintains that the culture of tolerance is part of the Ethiopian Muslims and Christians. This culture had faced challenges during and after the Ahmed *Grag*n conquest of central and northern Ethiopia in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Some other instances of challenges to tolerant Muslim-Christian culture occurred to a limited extent during the Somali invasion of Ethiopia in 1970s and recently in several places. But the culture holds up despite instances. This informant stresses that political leaders before 1991 had been less tolerant to Islam for political reasons, which does not reflect the popular attitudes of Christians toward Muslims and Islam. When asked about what causes “recent signs of radicalism among some Muslims”, he responded “it has international and regional background to replace the Ethiopian government with an Islamic one that follows extremist interpretation of Islam.” (KI-06, 2016)

As it can be seen from the above two paragraphs, religious tolerance and historical discrimination against Muslims somehow controversial points. However, perceived or real, the issues must be handled carefully. Real historical injustices must be addressed well and those merely perceived must be openly discussed. Claims and counter-claims may add up to create rift between or within religious groups rather than leading to solutions. Above and beyond, they may lead individuals to radicalization and violent extremism. Al Shabab and other groups may exploit the situation to achieve their goal against Ethiopia.

Al Shabab nearly reached to its long-sought goal of striking Ethiopia when a team of suicide bombers deployed in Addis Ababa in 2013. Their mission was to blow themselves in Addis Ababa stadium where the Ethiopia vs Nigeria World Cup qualifier much would be held. But, accidentally, they blew themselves before they leave the house they had been hidden in (Abebe, Transnational terrorism In the Horn and East Africa Region: the Case of Al-Shabaab, 2016).

The involvement of some Arab countries (names are purposely omitted) financing radicalizations in Ethiopia by extremist Islamic groups or individuals was noted. Individuals assuming some form positions at government offices were also found linked with activities relating to furthering

extremist objectives. Mosques and schools linked with Islamic extremism are not uncommon in many parts of the country. The government is taking lawful measure before the symptoms grow in two a level of disaster. Laws are being promulgated to effectively deal with terror threats (KI-06, 2016).

In March 2014, prior to his death by US drone strike, Al Shabab's Amir Ahmed Abdi Godane renewed his call for jihad against Ethiopia. In October 2014, Al Shabab's plan to bomb public places in Addis Ababa around Bole area was interrupted and two suspects were caught. Their trainer Abdi Rashid Dheere was arrested too (Abebe, 2016).

### **4.5.3. Sudan**

Before the Islamic Revolution led by the Sudanese National Islamic Front, Sudan was a secular state. Non-Muslim Sudanese were allowed to practice pagan and Christianity. President Numeiri made policy changes and intolerance developed against non-Muslims and non-Arabic speaking Muslims in the country. Rebellions began in the western and southern part of the country. *Anany I* and *Anany II* rebellion movements were born. *Anany* means 'sea serpent or sea snake'. The first *Anany* was halted as the then Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie succeeded in brokering a peace deal between the government and the rebels (KI-02, 2016).

However, extremist Islamic ideology and policies combined with international dynamism resulted in the *Anany* second rebellion, which is ended with the cessation of South Sudan (KI-02, 2016).

Sudan has been in the US list of countries sponsoring terrorism for a while. The al-Qaeda former leader Osama bin Laden had been hiding in Sudan before he fled to Afghanistan. Many Islamic Extremists in Eastern Africa have visited some Islamic educational institutions at Khartoum, the capital of Sudan (KI-10, 2016).

However, an informant totally disagrees with the above "allegations against Sudan". He argues, "Sudan follows the moderate *Sufis*' interpretation of Islam. The government being Islamic does not mean extremist or terrorist. This is a result of misconceptions and anti-Islam propaganda of the West." He maintains that Sudan has nothing to do with Islamic extremism in the region or

elsewhere in the world. It has established an exemplary center for deradicalization to counter extremist ideologies of Sudanese diaspora (KI-03, 2016).

An informant says the so called ‘deradicalization center’ was rather “a re-radicalization center as many of those pass through it joined different international terrorist groups.” (Mehari, 2016)

But, another informant argues the center has lots of successes even though detailed information is not available at the IGAD level. He gave examples of ways Sudan used to fight radicalism such as the state media, civil societies, Islamic scholars and professionals so as to disseminate a message describing “the true nature of Islam as anti-violence” (Khalid, 2016).

An independent study commissioned by ISSP seem to concur with the positive contribution of the deradicalization attempts by Sudan. The study showed that Sudanese government has opened specialized schools (Center for Renaissance and Civilized Communication and the International Center for Intellectual Dialogue with Radicals). By using traditional and scientific methods, the schools have succeeded in transforming radicals into peaceful ones and assist them to establish a livelihood within the society. The government has involved non-governmental actors like youth associations, women’s organizations, workers’ unions and students association (North Consult C. L., 2015, pp. 60-61).

However, the study does not tell the possibilities of recidivism and the rate of deradicalization among the captured radicals. The good lesson we may take is deradicalization is more efficient in making radicals renounce violent attitudes that is barely available in the ordinary justice system.

The program of deradicalization implies, if Sudan was inclining towards radicalism following the Islamic revolution, then it is a changed Sudan countering radicalization.

#### **4.5.4. Djibouti**

Djibouti has been in the list of enemies of Al Shabab for two main reasons: because of its role in supporting the Somali Federal Government and its pro-Western orientation. In 2014, Al Shabab suicide bombers blew themselves off at a popular restaurant targeting American military personnel but failed to hit their target. However, the risk of attack remains despite the fact that the group

rarely shows its presence in Djibouti (Abebe, Transnational terrorism In the Horn and East Africa Region: the Case of Al-Shabaab, 2016).

#### **4.5.5. Uganda**

The case of Uganda is another living example how Al Shabab grows to be a regional terrorist organization despite all the military actions taken against it. After the 2010 simultaneous bombings in the capital Kampala leaving 74 dead and 70 other injured, multiple Al Shabab's planned attacks were averted before they get realized. In March 2015, however, Islamic extremists assassinated the chief prosecutor who leads criminal proceeding against terror suspects (Abebe, 2016).

#### **4.5.6. Tanzania**

Tanzania is said to be the new fertile ground for Al-Shabab's regional jihad. The group used the country as a place of hide out, recruitment, and springboard to launch attacks elsewhere in the IGAD region. A group named *Ansar Muslim Youth Center (AMYC)* led by *Sheikh Salim Abdul-Rahim Barahiyan* is both a principal Al Shabab affiliate and linked to AQEA- al Qaeda in East Africa. AMYC is a network for hardliners such as: Islamist preachers, Mosques ran by radicals, Islamic Social centers, schools, businesspersons who fund militant activities, and multiple armed youth scattered throughout the country but cooperating each other when the need arises (Abebe, 2016).

Many Tanzanians were intercepted on their way to join Al Shabab. Tanzanians constitute the second largest Al Shabab contingent of foreign fighters next to Kenyans. At least two Tanzanians took part in the Garissa University attack killing more than 140 students. The threat of Islamic terrorism is intensified as Al Shabab trained and experienced militants are returning home in several occasions (Abebe, 2016).

Consequently, reports prove, both radicalization and terrorist attacks are on the rise in Tanzania. Recruitment is done by networks propagating Wahhabist version of Islam (Abebe, 2016). Hence, Al Shabab is expanding its area of influence in terms of attacks and radicalizing Muslims for its cause.

In the writer's opinion, 'hard' measures (military and anti-terrorism criminal laws) alone could not be effective enough to avert terrorism. More recruits are joining the group. The military measure, on the contrary, may be justifying the propaganda the terror group disseminates. Muslims joining Al Shabab might have bought the rhetoric that Christians have been staging attacks against Islam in the Muslim land, Somalia. This may be taken as one more ground necessitating to fight the ideology behind Islamic extremism. The next Chapter will analyze the matter in more details.

#### **4.5.7. Kenya**

Kenya is a country largely suffering from attacks by Al Shabab and its Kenyan affiliate *Al-Hijra*. The country hosts the biggest number of Somali refugees. In addition, it has been serving as a ground for Al Shabab's training camps and a passage for jihadists coming from Tanzania and other countries (KI-05, 2016). Let us briefly look into the cases of Al Shabab and Al Hijra in Kenya.

##### ***Al Shabab***

Al Shabab has between 7000-9000 militants of Kenyan origin. It mainly conducts operations and recruitments in the North Eastern districts of Kenya: Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, coastal areas, and in Nairobi. Proximity to Somalia and the existent of Somali ethnic group across borders have added to conducive environments for Al Shabab and its affiliates. Even though *Abu Musa Mombasa* and *Samantha Lewthwaite* were named as leaders of the group in Kenya, its operations and leaders are not well known (North Consult C. L., 2015, pp. 12-13).

Anti-Al Shabab measures became difficult as Al Shabab infiltrates Somali refugee camps and Kenyan Somalis. It is a difficult task to identify Kenyan from non-Kenyan Somalis. Corrupted officials and weak security structure have contributed a lot making the country vulnerable to attacks from Al Shabab and its affiliates. The group finds it easier to make Kenya route for its region-wide movements in relation to recruitment, training and operation (KI-05, 2016).

In addition to the problem of telling Somalis as Kenyan and non-Kenyan, some Kenyan Somalis have been reported for collaborating with non-Kenyans to secure valid Kenyan official documents for the latter in collaboration with corrupt officials (North Consult C. L., 2015, p. 13). It can be

noticed here how the combination of corrupted system and inside help endangers a country and other countries who rely on official documents of a sovereign nation.

Al Shabab funds its activities from contributions collected from mosques located in Nairobi, Mombasa, and North Eastern parts of the country. Reports indicated that the group has its hands in poaching of wildlife in Kenya. Furthermore, mosques serve as recruitment centers attracting young Muslims into the terrorist causes of the group through radicalizing and inducing them with luring cash (North Consult C. L., 2015, p. 13).

From these facts it may be concluded that Kenya lags behind even in terms of legal and military measure in countering Al Shabab. The group seem to be self-sustaining in both human and financial means necessary to operate in Kenya and elsewhere.

A key informant says, the group has additional funding from its international connections like al Qaeda and other terrorist funding entities. The group has links that enables it to conduct operations throughout Kenya undetected by security establishments. Provision of vital information and coordination, which are necessary to stage attacks in Kenya, have been outcomes of combined plot with international and local terrorist groups (KI-05, 2016).

### ***Al-Hijra***

Al-Hijra is an Al Shabab affiliated local terrorist group providing necessary support for and executing missions given by Al Shabab, *inter alia*. The group use to work with the Al Shabab wing in Kenya by recruiting Muslims and facilitating movements of militants or jihadists for operation sakes (KI-05, 2016).

In 2006, the group was first founded by a Kenyan Somali as a grassroots organization with a declared purpose of assisting young Muslims under the name of Muslims Youth Center. However, the founder has later, in 2009, joined Al Shabab in Somalia. The Center had been recruiting the youth to fight in Somalia. In 2012, the Center changed its name to ***Al-Hijra*** and officially declared itself as a Kenyan affiliate of Al Shabab (North Consult C. L., 2015, p. 13).

The group gets its funding mostly from radical Muslims in Nairobi and Mombasa. The most visible terrorist attack waged by this group is the Westgate Mall bombing in Nairobi in 2013. The group has lost several of its leaders since 2014. But, its areas of operation do not show any sign of

narrowing down. It has been active in Majengo area of Nairobi, Mombasa, and in coastal areas of both Kenya and Tanzania (North Consult C. L., 2015, p. 13).

The case of al Hijra indicates that Al Shabab follows tactics that makes it difficult to defeat it through military actions or other forms of hard measure. The terror groups seemingly are becoming relevant to the day to day lives of Muslims in the region that is helping them to survive and sustain themselves. Therefore, hard measures do not look the appropriate options to alienate the groups from the hearts of Muslims providing vital supports the groups critically need. Consequently, the war on terrorism in Kenya or at the IGAD region may not achieve the desired victory.

#### **4.6. Impact of Radicalization on Livelihoods**

Radicalization has affected everyday lives of the peoples of the IGAD region. Cases differ from one country to another. The trend in nutshell shows that tensions are developing across the region among the public and with the governments. The image of Islam is tainted with negative impressions by wrongly associating it with intolerance, violence and even with terrorism. Based on information the researcher managed to obtain from interviewees, the following are experiences of some countries illustrating what is going on in the IGAD region.

##### ***Somalia***

Somalis have made drastic changes of livelihood since the fall of Zaid Barre in 1991. They used to have a culture of tolerance and peaceful coexistence at individual, clan or other forms of national or international societal structures. Since the outbreak of violence in the country, it became a fertile ground for Islamic extremism that redefines how women should dress, behave and interact in the society (Daniel, 2016). Wahhabist radical Islam mainly has replaced the predominant tolerant form of Islam in Somalia. That led Somali youngsters to develop hatred towards the traditional views of Islam and against non-Muslims in the region (KI-12, 2016). The following are major shifts in Somali's livelihood and their relationships in terms of gender, clan, and religion...etc.

- a. Somali women were barred from Swimming at Somali beaches (KI-12, 2016);
- b. Strict dress-codes were introduced sanctioned by severe punishments (KI-12, 2016);

- c. Women were forced to leave public lives and roles they used to enjoy before 1991 and were limited to domestic roles like child raising. The situation worsens for widows who have to support their elderly and infant family members. (KI-12, 2016);
- d. Gender-based Violence, such as rape and killing, has become frequent in war-ravaged parts of Somalia. Many women were raped at the presence of their family members (Jazeera, Sisters of Somalia, 2013). Some were forced to marry fighters despite the ‘Islamic’ ideology followed by fighters (Harper w. , 2013) (Watch, Somalia Report 2013, 2013).
- e. The suffering is not only limited to Somalis living in Somalia. Somali refugees have also been facing radicalization related problems in addition to the ones following their displacement from home (Wajir Story).
- f. War and terror groups made life difficult in Somalia. Absence of reliable source of income coupled with persistent instability have led many to join terror groups to carry out terrorist missions in and outside of Somalia (KI-02, 2016).

### ***Ethiopia***

Internally, Ethiopia is peaceful and not much affected by radicalization compared to Somalia and Kenya. However, informants do not seem to agree on the existence and extent of radicalization. Some argue that Wahhabist-Salafist extremists are trying their best to enroot Islamic extremism with a target of establishing “an Islamic state” in Ethiopia (KI-06, 2016).

Whereas others argue that it is the government intervening in the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion. They cite two instances to substantiate their position. Firstly, the government unfairly imprisoned duly elected leaders and charged them under the Anti-Terrorism law so as to put unelected pro-government leader in place. Secondly, the government is trying to inject a new sect called *al-Habash* which is basically unacceptable to Ethiopian Muslims (KI-09, 2016).

But another informant argues that the aforementioned view does not describe what the government does and what is happening in reality. He reminds “everyone” that radicalization is not limited to Islam or any particular religion in Ethiopia. Elements of extremism can easily be traced in all religions and non-religious societal frameworks. But, what has been done in Islamic Extremism recently worth noticing. A moderate Islamic cleric was killed in *Wollo* due to his stance against a new radicalized interpretation of Islam and for his pro-peaceful-coexistence position. Killings and

burning of religious facilities by those who aspire for an Islamic government in Ethiopia. The ones in prison were charged/convicted for crimes that they can be freed by courts if they have nothing to do with the alleged acts (KI-06, 2016).

In spite of the controversies between proponents and opponents of the government side of the story, researches show there are some elements of violent extremism in Ethiopia. The IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) identified violent extremism taking two forms: structural and physical.

- a. *Structural violent extremism in the name of Islam* may be understood to mean non-physical violence done against individuals or groups who do not follow the extremist ideology. Social and economic means are used (Abebe, 2016).

An informant said that there are many instances where the Muslim extremists impose higher price on non-Muslim buyers. This occurs in both whole-sale and retailor points of sales (KI-11, 2016).

Another instance could be the event in the province of *Shoa-Robit*, north Shoa. Radicalized Muslims bought off all animals before the Christians go to market for the 2016 Easter. This was planned to negatively affect the long-practiced tradition of celebrating holidays together and positive attitudes shared among followers of both religions. Similar tendencies can also be observed elsewhere; but, the majority of Ethiopian Muslims did not buy this intolerant form of Islam (KI-11, 2016).

- b. *Physically violent extremism in the name of Islam*. Physical violence refers to killings, infliction of injuries, damaging properties and similar manifestation violence. Even though extremists do not have the support of the Majority of Muslims, several Churches were burned down, followers killed or displaced in several occasions due to acts of Islamic violent extremists. They are not only targeting non-Muslims, any one objecting their cause may suffer. The killing of the Islamic leader in *Wollo* is a good example (KI-11, 2016).

From the Above information, we can observe that radicalism is gaining some ground in Ethiopia. The problem is limited to a circle of a few radicals Muslims as informants say. But, we must be proactive to resolve it by studying its root causes and possible ways of countering them. The next Chapter will discuss the possible ways of addressing the matter in further detail.

## ***Sudan***

Radicalization in Sudan show various patterns of factors. Poverty and literacy, lack of democratic governance and repressive regime in Khartoum, cultural marginalization of some Sudanese societies, huge economic gap between the rich and the poor, local conflicts and insurgencies going on throughout the country, ungoverned long borders and infiltration of foreign forces, refugees and migration towards Europe crossing its territory are the major factors attracting people to radicalization (North Consult C. L., 2015, pp. 57-59).

## ***Uganda***

Unlike Ethiopia and Somalia, Uganda has a smaller number of Muslims. The threat of internal radicalization by implication is lesser compared to that of Ethiopia and Somalia. However, Uganda is not shielded from Islamic radicalization (KI-07, 2016).

An informant has stressed that children were radicalized by Muslim extremists to the extent threatening to kill their own mothers. The children were between the age of ten and thirteen. It was difficult even to talk to them as they consider everyone as ‘infidel’ except for their mentor in radicalism. They were brainwashed to do anything for their “true faith and their true God-Allah.” (KI-07, 2016)

## ***Kenya***

In Kenya, the most common place to propagate radicalized interpretations are refugee centers and Islamic schools called *Madrassas*. Al Shabab attacks and killings is increasing resentments against Islam in general and Somalis in particular. There are many instance that Somalis stand up to terrorists and try to protect Christians from Al Shabab offensives. But the main stream media does not report them. Reporting them would have revealed the true nature of extremists is totally different from what moderate Islam teaches and what actual Muslims do for Humanity (KI-05, 2016).

Historical and alleged current political and economic discrimination against the Muslims living along coastal areas were some of the ground factors of radicalization in Kenya. Government appropriation of lands in coastal area for development and tourism purpose had negatively affected livelihoods of the poor local Muslim communities. Combined with the radicalized propaganda of

terrorist groups active in Kenya, young Muslims have been radicalized and joining terror groups. Another factor Somalis taking refugees in Kenya has been susceptible to radicalization (North Consult C. L., 2015, pp. 10-15).

#### **4.7. Factors Affecting Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in the IGAD**

An assessment made in 2014 has identified a number of challenges to Security cooperation in the IGAD region that can be classified in to three groups as contextual, domestic and multilateral constraints (ISSP, 2014, p.13). This section of the Thesis examines the three constraints as follows.

##### **4.7.1. Contextual Constraints**

Arms proliferations; technology developments such as the internet and mobile money transfer mechanisms; ungoverned areas or areas hardly under governments' control because of geographical distance or hostile terrain; unstable common borders areas; and many refugee camps attract criminals and extremist groups. This areas are mostly outside of governments' capacity to regulate and monitor activities and movements. The use of varied lingua franca by member states poses another constraint of effective communications and then cooperation in the region. The need to translations from one to another official/working languages is both time consuming and affect the content of the information as it may get lost in translations (ISSP, 2014, pp. 13-14).

##### **4.7.2. Domestic Constraints**

Because policy choices and resource allocations, IGAD member state show disparities with respect to capacity implement and capability to coordinate their efforts. Their justice sectors exhibit huge gaps in terms of skills of personnel, facilities, rules and procedures guiding day to day activities. This created lack of harmony among member states to share experiences and/or resources to effectively and efficiently deal with radicalism/terrorism in the region (ISSP, 2014, pp.14-15).

Systematic weaknesses in issuing national identity cards/documents, registration of business owners and shareholders, management of borders and foreigners information...etc. are common problems to identify extremist related matters and take appropriate measures. Corruption amplifies

the problems. Corruptive practices are being exploited by extremist groups to carry out operations undetected and thwart post facto investigations (ISSP, 2014, pp. 15-16).

### **4.7.3. Multilateral Constraints**

Asymmetrical variations in national security and legal frameworks constitute great impediment in region-wide coordinated counter-extremism/terrorism measures. Existing obstacles have forced IGAD member states' security services to resort to informal arrangements instead of official lines (ISSP, 2014, pp. 16-17). An interviewee argued that IGAD cannot force decisions unless member states agree and show willingness to implement them. Practically, IGAD provides the forum for coordinating efforts; and facilitates for member states to carry out their obligations (Khalid, 2016).

Even though tendencies indicate efforts go toward harmonization, member states differ in many aspects including definitions given to crimes and how to address them. Since ratifications of international treaties and conventions are uneven in the IGAD region, multi-lateral cooperation in countering security threats is difficult. For example, the IGAD conventions on mutual legal assistance and extradition is signed only by two IGAD members: Ethiopia and Djibouti (ISSP, 2014, pp. 16-17). This behavioral pattern of member states could be one more impediment to bring about an IGAD led deradicalization mechanism within the region.

### **4.7.4. Countries Supporting Terrorist Groups and Extremism**

Eritrea is usually identified with Somalia-based terror groups. Intelligence and UN reports implicate Eritrea for provisions of base, finance, material and trainings for Al Shabab fighters and other groups (Abebe, 2016).

Reports indicate that Sudan has some connections with Islamic radicalization. An informant argues Sudan had a successful Islamic Revolution next to that of Iran. Sudanese National Islamic Front put Sharia laws in place and opted for intolerant policy against non-Muslims in the Sudan. The country used to follow a relatively tolerant policy toward communities in western and southern part of the country including the now independent country, South Sudan (KI-01, 2016).

The late al-Qaeda figure Osama bin Laden was in Sudan before he moved to Afghanistan to lead his terrorist operations. Al Qaeda in East Africa is highly linked with terror groups operating in the IGAD region; Al Shabab being the main one (KI-01, 2016).

Many young people from *Jimma, Harrar*, and other parts of Ethiopia had secretly travelled to Sudan to attend studies at Islamic University. Many of them were found engaged in radicalization and violent extremism in the name of Islam when they got back home (KI-06, 2016).

It looks unfortunate to observe the aforementioned facts in the IGAD region. State-sponsored terrorist groups would be difficult to defeat as they enjoy support and secure bases in sovereign territories. Besides, similar facts would undoubtedly divide member states efforts and wills against terrorism and/or radicalism. The IGAD and its partners need to exert much effort to unite member states against any form of radicalism to overcome terrorism.

#### **4.7.5. Support from International Terrorists and Arab Countries**

Some Muslim countries and reach or powerful individuals in Muslim countries support radicalization in finance, moral and ideology. Supports come in various covers like funds to build mosques or Islamic schools and relief organizations. Some trade and investment undertakings were implicated in covert and overt participation in radicalization of Muslims (KI-10, 2016).

ISIS and al-Qaeda have their hands in the region terrorist movements. Recently, a contingent from Al-Shabab has declared its allegiance with ISIS. Many al-Qaeda trained fighters participate in the militant and bombing attacks staged by Al Shabab both in Somalia and elsewhere in the IGAD region (KI-02, 2016).

Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood had trained many Islamic extremist leaders in Al-Shabab and others active before the advent of this group. There are reports that the Brotherhood operates in Sudan and to some extent in Ethiopia too (KI-01, 2016).

#### **4.7.6. Corruption**

Corruption poses serious vulnerabilities to many IGAD member states. The Kenyan situation may be regarded as one of the worst if not the most dangerous one in the region. For instance *Feisul Abdulla*, a Comorian, led attacks in Kenya. On the eve of one of the attacks organized by him, he was detained by Kenyan police for credit card fraud. But reportedly, he managed to get released

and escaped despite it was known to the police that there is American bounty on him (Abebe, 2016). As a result, corruption may be a challenge that hinders preventive and post-attack efforts.

#### **4.8. Reforming Radicals and the Roles of Islam in the IGAD Region**

All of the informants interviewed for this research pointed out that there is no special detention or prison facility in the IGAD member states for radicalized individuals. Commander Abebe says radicals must not be detained or imprisoned separately from other inmates before or after conviction. The reason he gave is that it give them the chance to get more radicalized and plot for attacks after their release. He prefers to get them in mixed with detainees or prisoners of other crimes so as to deter them to communicate freely (Abebe, 2016).

But, the writer of this Thesis finds it paradoxical. If we detain or imprison them together in a separate cell or facility it is possible that Commander Abebe be right. If imprisoned with inmates in there for other crimes, they may get the chance to radicalize more people.

One way or another, countries do not have a special facility to handle detainees at pretrial processes and while serving prison terms after conviction. And no research is done and no country reports are available at the IGAD level on how Islamic radicals are being handled at the judiciary and correction institutions. IGAD is working on member states' capacity building in the judiciary and security sectors on how to deal with terrorism or radicalism (Abebe, 2016).

The advantages and disadvantages of having separate prison facilities for captured radicals may be debatable. The issue of having special reforming mechanism does look controversial to informants. They agree that police stations, courts, prosecutors and correction institutions need to adopt deradicalization processes to reform radicals. Otherwise they will remain with their extremist or radicalized position. All informants agreed that there is no country that has a special deradicalization process designed to help extremists to renounce their ideology and refrain from future violence.

The Ethiopian Council of Inter-Religious Forum for Peace is basically aimed to counter inter or intra-religious intolerance that may lead to violence. The Council was established for the purpose of countering elements of radicalization and extremism that were emerging in religions be it in

Christianity or Islam or any other religion. The Council promotes tolerance, reviews interreligious and intrareligious groups' behavior and take appropriate corrective measures. It also promote dialogue to identify common grounds among religions so as to maintain Ethiopian culture of tolerance (Abba Hailemariam, Intre-religious Council in Ethiopia, 2016).

Therefore, with the exception of Sudan's attempt to deradicalize terror suspects in 2008, the researcher found no institution or mechanism dealing with deradicalizing radicals using Islam and Islamic ways.

**4.9. Chapter Summary and Conclusions**

The data collected and presented under this Chapter indicate that Islamic extremism or radicalization at the IGAD traces its roots from social, economic, cultural or historical and political ground factors. The factors and their extent of prevalence differ from one country to another. Some of them are common for several countries while others look country specific.

Poor response to expectations for better socioeconomic conditions and wider democratic space has contributed to frustrations. Consequently, it causes radicalization of some of the youth segments of societies. Radical solutions to the unacceptable state of affairs appeared to be ways out making it easier to justify violence. The introduction of extremist religious ideology into what essentially was a combustible mix of frustrations and contradictions has contributed further to the radicalization of susceptible groups and the ready acceptance of violence. The fact that much of the region is populated by people of different faiths, the growth in religious assertiveness has resulted in further tensions and created an enabling environment for the resort to terrorist violence.

In order to summarize the factors for radicalization, as understood from the data collected the following table is significant.

<b>Country</b>	<b>Factors for radicalization</b>	<b>Places for radicalization</b>
Somalia	-President Zaid Barres's era secularism, marginalization of Islamic figures -Economic -Political unity under Islam	Mosques, Islamic Schools, clans, Social networks

	-Resistance against troops of Ethiopia and Christians -Provision of services and security by Terrorist groups.	
Ethiopia	-Real or perceived historical and cultural marginalization -Real or perceived government intervention in religious and administration matters -Aspiration for establishment of Islamic government under Sharia law	Mosques, Islamic Schools, Some “Secular” Schools
Kenya	-Countering Involvement in the fight against Al Shabab -Real or perceived marginalization	Refugee camps, Islamic Schools, Social networks
Tanzania	-Solidarity with Muslims in Somalia	Islamic Schools, social and business networks
Sudan	-Marginalization and alienation, -illiteracy and poverty -undemocratic rule by the government	Islamic schools, Social networks

From this table we can observe common grounds and country specific factors for radicalization. Radicalization in the IGAD region seem to be better explained by the four level of Islamic radicalization process explained by Precht’s Model.

In the next Chapter the findings reported here and the Precht’s model will be applied and discussed.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **DERADICALIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF ISLAM WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE IGAD**

This Chapter is devoted to discuss and analyze how deradicalization can be introduced in the IGAD. Data presented and theoretical discussions made in the previous Chapters will be interwoven with possible policy considerations so as to make critical discussions. The gaps and strong sides of the practices of reforming radicals were evaluated. Roles Restorative Justice, AfSol, gender, Islam and human development principles may play were evaluated to come up with possible ways forward to implement deradicalization within the context of Islam.

#### **5.1. Causes/Factors for Radicalization in the IGAD Region**

The data collected and presented under Chapter Four of this Thesis indicate that Islamic extremism or radicalization traces its roots from social, economic, cultural or historical and political grounds when viewed at the IGAD region level. The factors differ from one country to another. Some factors are common for several countries while others look country-specific. The extent of prevalence of the factors also varies.

As it was discussed under Chapter Four, Ayman Al-Zawahiri's number one aim, expulsion of foreigners from Somalia, is still said aloud by Al Shabab and other groups operating in Somalia. Therefore, the main reason why Al Shabab identifies itself with Islam will better explained by Al-Zawahiri's motive for involving al Qaeda in Somalia.

In addition, Al-Zawahiri's strategy in Somalia must be taken seriously as Al Shabab is predominantly an al Qaeda affiliate in the global terror network as we have seen under Chapter Three of this Thesis. Besides, ISSP identified that Al Shabab receives financial, moral, material, and human (jihadist) support for its operation in Somalia and elsewhere in the region. As the group is part of the global terrorist network al Qaeda, it adheres to and follows the Wahhabist ideology of the latter (Abebe, ISSP, radicalization and deradicalization in the IGAD region., 2016).

Thus, what we conclude from the case of Somalia is radicalization in the name of Islam is a combination of the social, political and economic situation being exploited by international terrorist groups and their regional affiliates. Then further indoctrination and terrorist plot or acts seem naturally follow the radicalization. In the meantime, Islam is being instrumentalized to win support for radical groups.

As already discussed under Chapter Four, Precht outlines three categories of motivational factors for radicalization as: *background factors*, *triggering factors* and *opportunity factors*.

His theory seems appropriate to explain radicalization process in the IGAD region and especially in Somalia. Al Qaeda's strategy for Somalia includes uniting its clans under Wahhabism and achieving non-religious goals using the cover of the religion.

*a. Background factors:* from the data summarized under Table at the end of the Preceding Chapter, we can notice that real or perceived historical discrimination against their religion is one of the factors of radicalization of Muslims in Ethiopia.

The first among Somali Islamic extremists have experienced discrimination in Somalia during the time of Zaid Barre in 1980s. Dahari Awes, a colonel in the army who was expelled by Barre, was responsible for the formation of Extremist groups like al-Ittihad al-Islamiyah. He had trainings from Islamic extremist groups active in Afghanistan. Al-Ittihad is considered to be the mother for most terrorist and militant groups in Somalia (PI-02, 2016).

*b. Triggering factors:* according to an informant video and publications carrying messages of charismatic figures in the terrorist network play greatest role in inciting radicalization among Muslims as observed in the IGAD region. Video messages of Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri have been influential triggering factors in the regional Islamic radicalism (Abebe, ISSP, radicalization and deradicalization in the IGAD region., 2016). The Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia has increased the number of Somalis and non-Somali Muslims joining terrorist groups as they were attracted by the call to resist "Christians Crusade on a Muslim land" (Daniel G. (., 2016).

- c. **Opportunity factors:** as it is reported under Chapter three of this Thesis as well as under Table Two above, social networks, Islamic Schools, mosques and other places create the opportunity to radicalize Muslims. Self-radicalization is observed by having access to Islamic Extremist propaganda disseminated over main-stream or social media, *inter alia*.

As a result, factors for Islamic radicalization in the IGAD region may be regarded as social or economic or historical or political factors or a combination of any of them combined with extremist or terrorist ideologies. The IGAD, member states and the international community must review their policies and approaches in a manner that addresses the root causes of Islamic radicalism and violent extremism.

## **5.2. Deradicalization in the Framework of IGAD**

Under this section of the Thesis, questions relating the possibility of incorporating deradicalization in the IGAD framework; and the possible mechanism to adopt will be looked into.

### **5.2.1. Introducing Deradicalization into the IGAD**

The director of ISSP says, the IGAD has ISSP as a mechanism entrusted to deal with the terrorism and CVE. The IGAD or ISSP involve in non-military capacity building efforts. ISSP has been working for a considerable time on capacity building tasks for justice sectors of member states. Assistance was made to help states promulgate laws and establish institutions to effectively handle security matters including terrorism (Abebe, ISSP, radicalization and deradicalization in the IGAD region., 2016).

ISSP is on the way to launch Center of Excellence for CVE. The main objectives of the Center disseminating counter-extremism messages, as well as facilitating inter and intra faith dialogues. But it is not panning for now to involve itself in the deradicalization processes that is under discussion in this Thesis (Abebe, ISSP, radicalization and deradicalization in the IGAD region., 2016).

Having a Center of Excellence for CVE is a basic opportunity to make deradicalization process an issue at the level of and in the framework of the IGAD. The Center would pave the way to resolve basic questions relating to whether and how deradicalization programs would fit into the purpose and nature of IGAD.

The IGAD does not have the power to impose decisions and policies on states. It is rather an Inter-Governmental entity relying on member states decisions and endorsements. Varying needs or interests of member states and international donors' affect the IGAD's performances, negatively or positively (Abebe, ISSP, radicalization and deradicalization in the IGAD region., 2016). Thus, competing interests and lack of coordination could be taken as possible challenges against deradicalization efforts at the IGAD level. However, the move to establish Center for CVE implies, IGAD member states and donors or partners are heading towards harmonization of interests and coordination of efforts to address VE.

Launching the Center of Excellence for CVE in Djibouti was given a green light to go ahead. Hence, its major objectives may be expanded to include assisting and coordinating IGAD member states to implement deradicalization programs in their respective jurisdictions as a means to CVE. Experience sharing with Sudan and other countries may not contradict the stated objectives of the Center. Without contradicting its objectives, the Center can coordinate efforts and policies of countries toward putting deradicalization programs in place.

The ISSP has already began a pilot program intra-faith dialogue in Somalia so as to test the efficacy of the planned tasks of the Center. The stakeholders would be all walks of life in Somalia: clan and religious leaders, women and youth associations, law enforcement bodies, the media and so on are to be involved (Abebe, ISSP, radicalization and deradicalization in the IGAD region., 2016). Making similar pretests would be vital to observe the possible challenges and opportunities of CVE and deradicalization in the IGAD region.

### **5.2.2. Tools for Deradicalization**

The ISSP plans to use all available means of communication to engage groups and individuals. Dialogue, online or printed media (Abebe, ISSP, radicalization and deradicalization in the IGAD region., 2016).

The positive and negative roles of media is very much known for African especially in connection with the genocide in Rwanda.

Over time, Peace Journalism help society at large to think and speak about non-violent and creative ways of dealing with conflicts. In this regard, media can play a role in informing public about conflicts, analyzing and helping to resolve them. “Peace Journalism makes audible and visible subjugated aspects of reality.” Peace Journalism is based on the proposition that the choices journalists make while covering conflicts tend inescapably either to expand or contract the space available for society at large to imagine and work towards peaceful outcomes to conflicts (Mc Goldrick and Lynch, 2000). If the mass media always echo the conflict and violence neglecting successes and peaceful stories, it plays negative roles. On the contrary, the media looks a key to disseminate peace education and counter-extremism messages.

If properly exploited the media plays major role. Al Shabab’s attacks in Kenya are available in major media outlets. But when a Muslim does something against terrorists it does not get attention. For example, a Kenyan Muslim, who lost his life defending Christians from Al Shabab jihadists did not get enough coverages in major media outlets compared to the focus killings use to ‘enjoy’ (KI-08).

### **5.3. Reforming Radicals in the IGAD Region: Policy Considerations for Deradicalization**

The writer of this Thesis has tried to show the fact that the IGAD region lacks the ‘smart’ or ‘soft’ mechanism to deal with the ideological aspect of Islamic violent extremism or radicalism and terrorism.

With the exception of Sudan’s attempt to deradicalize radical Muslims through institutionalized and participatory way, the region does not look to possess any deradicalization mechanism in the proper sense of the term. However, the writer found out some inter-faith dialogue mechanisms in Ethiopia and Kenya.

The Ethiopian Council of Inter-Religious Forum for Peace is basically aimed to counter inter or intra-religious intolerance that may lead to violence. It promotes dialogue to identify common grounds among religions so as to maintain Ethiopian culture of tolerance (Abba Hailemariam, 2016). This Council is short of dealing with radicalized individuals and ways to reinstate de-radicalized individuals effectively back to peaceful life styles.

As it was pointed out at the end of the preceding Chapter, there is no reforming mechanism as such available for radicalized individuals or former terrorists undergoing trial processes or serving prison terms. Prisoners will definitely be freed at the end of prison terms. A radical who considers non-Muslims as infidel and enemy of his/her version of Islam, will not be expected to renounce violence by any length of prison terms or for fear of punishment. S/he is highly likely to take punishment sanctioned by a secular/‘infidel’ state machineries as a ‘martyrdom’ received for Islam.

One of the tenets of Criminal Punishment is helping criminals become good citizens in or out of prisons using different reforming and rehabilitation mechanisms. In majority of cases, crime is considered as evil in societies and those who commit them. Correction or rehabilitation is expected to be effective if we succeeded in renouncing of criminal attitudes.

However, it will not be easy to deal with terror suspects or convicts who are brain washed at least in two aspects. First, whatever they have done is right and is a fulfillment of their mission ordained by Allah. Second, government justice system is ungodly and evil that they should not obey.

Therefore, Islamic values and Muslims look better fit to reform Islamic radicals or terrorists than the ordinary justice system working alone. Since they are radicalized in the name of Islam but with extremists’ version of it, the appropriate version of Islam must counter their violent ideology. Besides, Muslims well versed in Islam will be the right people so as to counter violent ideologies from the perspective of knowledge and image in the eyes of radicals.

Generally, this section of the Thesis will try to come up with possible ways and policy matter to be adopted for deradicalization efforts. We have discussed the factors for radicalization above. For the economic factors of radicalization, human development approach seem the appropriate measure. For social, political, historical and related factors to more policy options are suggested by the writer: Restorative Justice and AfSol. The policy options will be discussed as follows.

### **5.3.1 SOFT/SMART MEASURE TO DEAL WITH RADICALIZATION**

‘Soft measure’ refers to non-military and extra-formal approach focuses on tackling the ideology behind violent extremism that possibly leads to terrorism. The soft measure is more of an intellectual and participatory approach against radical or extremist ideologies as we have seen in the deradicalization attempt by Sudan. Islamic scholars, associations of youth women and teachers, and civic societies were stockholders. That is why it was said successful. Then, it seems appropriate to call it a ‘Smart Measure’ than soft measure as it provides better opportunities to effectively fight terrorism from its heart; i.e. by addressing its underlying causes.

This approach is termed by IGAD experts as soft measures. The writer would rather use the term ‘smart measure’ as it was striking right into the nucleus of violent extremist or terrorist ideology. Managing to help extremists or terrorists renounce violence the best way to address the problem. No human cost involved and material or financial destruction did not occur like in the case of military measures. Unlike the formal justice system that uses punishment, Smart measures focuses on root causes and background factors not restricted by rules and procedures of the state.

As it is discussed in previous Two Chapters, Islamic radicals regard the State as “evil”, “ungodly”, “enemy of Islam” and so on. Government institutions and corrective offices will not have any place in the heart and minds of radicalized Muslims. Legal punishments and “worldly” prison terms may not have the desired effect of renouncing violent ideology of extremists. The reason is, it was designed for criminals in general not specifically for people injected violent attitudes in the name of a religion. Islamic radicals would do anything to obey and fulfill what is right under their extreme view.

As we have seen it under the literature review part, ideologues for Islamic extremism used counter-terrorism military actions taken in the Muslim world as additional factor to radicalize Muslims. Military action may destroy a group or contingents but it has never seen reducing extremism nor terrorism. More terrorist group come out.

As it is discussed under Chapter Four of the Thesis, in spite of the military actions taken involving several regional countries, Al Shabab is still active in Somalia. It is expanding its areas of operation across the IGAD region and beyond. Kenya has been experiencing recurring attacks. The group

has training and recruitment centers in several across the region. This is a good living example that military measure may not always destroy terrorist groups.

This is not to deny the role military and legal actions play in countering violent extremism (CVE). Military measure counter armed and eminent attacks, halt advancements of terrorist army, and may also help to create a scenario that frustrates jihadists by delaying or denying anticipated victories. Deradicalization has its own place that military and legal actions cannot take. Fighting the motivating ideology than the terrorist army with hard military measure.

Deradicalization, if successful, will dry out human, material, financial and moral resources vital for terrorism. The reason would be people would not have the ideological solidarity to support jihadist or terrorist groups any more. It may go further to make such individuals or groups alienated from the hearts and lands of Muslims leading the CVE to a victory over terrorism.

### **5.3.2. When and How to opt for Deradicalization**

Deradicalization may bear better fruits if attempts made at two main stages of radicalization and/or participation in terrorism. Firstly, the earliest possible stage before any harm is done is said to be the best one. At this level, no harm is done, no victims and no reprisal come out yet. Individuals or groups at this stage are easier to renounce violence than the ones who were already in violent activities. Another easier stage is to renounce violent attitudes would be following frustrations due to false promises or unrealized expectations and noticing atrocities minds could not bear, among others. But, extra efforts are needed to resolve sense of reprisal developed because of participations in terrorism. The director of ISSP agrees with these lines of arguments (Abebe, 2016).

### **5.3.3. Human Development Approach**

Security and development are closely connected. Development enlarges human choices. Insecurity cuts life short and impedes the possibility of using human potential to reach one's goals. As human security directly affects economic growth. When people join conflicts or seek refuge, they cannot contribute for the economic betterment of their community. Imbalanced development that involves

horizontal inequalities is an important source of conflict. Therefore, “vicious cycles of lack of development which leads to conflict, then to lack of development, can readily emerge. Likewise, virtuous cycles are possible, with high levels of security leading to development, which further promotes security in return.” (Stewart, 2004).

Proponents of Human Security Theory argue that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. Global vulnerabilities must be dealt with human-centered, multi-disciplinary understanding of security involving a number of research fields, including development studies, international relations, strategic studies, and human rights. The UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 (UNDP, 1994) has been used as a milestone publication in the field of human security, with its argument that insuring "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" for all persons is the best path to tackle the problem of global insecurity (Sciences, 2016).

Different from "Freedom from Fear", it expands the focus beyond violence with emphasis on development and security goals. Thus, the Report sought to influence the UN's 1995 World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen. Personal security, Community security, Political security, Environmental security... (UNDP, 1994).

### ***Nexus between Economic Insecurity and Radicalism***

Major Islamic radicalism based conflicts somehow correlated with lack of development and resultant factors. Under this sub-section, the writer will look into practical examples from Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Syria so as to highlight the nexus between development issues and insecurity.

In 1970s and 1980s, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia relied on foreigners for various types of jobs even though it has recorded high population growth rate during this period. Many young Saudi Arabians could not get employment or security of employment. This Saudi system created huge number disfranchised youth willing to take all measures against the Saudi rulers. A significant portion of them joined Wahhabist groups, many of whom ended up in fighting as Mujahidin in the Soviet-Afghan war in 1980s. The young generation of Saudi of 1980 is known to be highly inspired by puritan view of restructuring societies with Wahhabism (Devin Springer, 2009, p. 25).

Most of young Somalis in Somalia are married and have children or bear the responsibility to maintain their families. However, only 5 percent of the youth managed to get employment. They

need income to support their family. Ideology is secondary for these kind of people. They easily fall for the causes of terror groups call because they earn a good deal of money. They kill or bomb or scarify themselves to earn money for their families. For instance, the military of the Transitional Government pays one hundred US Dollars (USD) for a soldier. But, for a foot fighter al-Shabab pays USD 200, clan leaders around USD 300, and the USA pays USD 600 per month. Thus, for many young Somalis one who pays more is more attractive to join (Daniel, 2016).

Similar nexus has been noticed in the ongoing conflict of Syria. Currently, Syria has the highest unemployment rate in the Arab world. ISIS pays salaries to its fighters ranging between USD 400 and 1,200 per month. The Free Syrian Army, backed by the West, pays USD 36; Syrian Army pays USD 63; and Jabhat al-Nusra pays USD 100 per month. As a result, ISIS grew stronger in terms of fighters willing to die for the Islamic State the group wish to put in place (Mhidi, 2016).

Therefore, responding to developmental needs will have an impact in reducing the number of individuals who joins or fights for terrorist groups. The issue of covering the costs for implementing developmental measures must be seriously thought over too. In the writer's opinion, the cost would be less in terms of financial, material and human loss incurred due to both by terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism military actions. In the wars against terrorists Civilians die, infrastructures destroyed, socio-economic systems are lost and the like.

Even if the ultimate goal of destroying terrorist is achieved and terror becomes no more a problem, the losses in lives cannot be restored and the cost of rebuilding infrastructures would be much higher compared to developmental expenses. To our dismay, trends show that intensification of military measures could not halt terrorism. It is rather looks increasing and varying its nature. For instance, as it was discussed in the previous Chapters, Al Shabab is expanding its area of influence across the IGAD region despite it has lost several battles to the UMISOM and Ethiopia.

Al Shabab has been influential in Somalia in many aspects. It pays more to its fighters and provide better security compared to what the government in Mogadishu could. Hence, developmental approach would contribute to address some root causes of terrorism. It may result in reducing the number of existing or new fighter willingness to be members of terrorist groups for want of basic needs.

### 5.3.4. Restorative Justice

Where a convicted terrorist is sent to prison, s/he will be expected to come out at the end of the prison term. Unless s/he renounces violent ideology leading to violent extremism and terrorist activities, recidivism and rejoining terrorist groups is possible. In addition, unless the animosity or sense of reprisal created in the society or in the minds of victims are resolved, former terrorists may be in danger of revenge attacks. Or at least, they find it difficult to lead a peaceful livelihoods among such people.

Such fears of revenge attack as well as the impossibility to get reinstated in the society, may become a push factor to rejoin terrorist groups for those disengaged; and holding-back factor for jihadists from leaving terrorist groups. Thus, using the restorative justice concept will, in the writer's opinion, increase the probability of resolving internal animosity and reprisal from the perspectives of the jihadists or terrorists and the society or victims side.

By so doing, it would be possible to develop additional smart way to disengage jihadists and deradicalize violent extremists as their fear of societal revenge and exclusion will reduce significantly.

For the historical injustices and sense of marginalization happened in the past, restorative justice looks a critical option. RJ may help to bring about societal harmony by reducing hard feelings or resentments created in the minds of groups or individuals. The debate over whether the resentments or hard feelings had actual or merely perceived backgrounds, must be of a secondary matter. Priority must be given to the resentment, its consequences and ways of handling them so that we reduce the possibility of it leading to radicalism. Let us briefly see the meaning and application of restorative justice.

Restorative justice (RJ) has been defined as

*....a process through which parties with a stake in a specific offence collectively resolve how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future. RJ can take the form of victim-offender mediation either through direct contact between the offender and victim or indirect communication involving third parties. It can also involve restitution or reparation where this is agreed between offenders and their victims. (CPS, 2016)*

RJ is appropriate to bring about:

- *Victim satisfaction: To reduce the fear of the victim and ensure they feel 'paid back' for the harm that has been done to them;*
- *Engagement with the perpetrator: To ensure that they are aware of the consequences of their actions, have the opportunity to make reparation, and agree a plan for their restoration in the community; and*
- *Creation of community capital: To increase public confidence in the criminal justice system and other agencies with a responsibility for delivering a response to anti-social behavior (CPS, 2016)*

RJ may take one or more of the following options:

- a. Direct processes:*** the offender communicating directly with the victim and the victim's family or supporters. As the specific situation may demand, the community or community leader or other persons may attend where necessary.
- b. Indirect processes:*** where direct process is not appropriate for safety, efficacy or other reasons, indirect process of RJ may be opted for. The process will be conducted through mediators going-between or shuttling between the two sides/parties looking for mutually acceptable resolutions of disputes (CPS, 2016).

### ***Challenges to RJ***

Restorative justice may not work unless the process gets legal backing by which governments recognize and enforce the process as well as outcome thereof. Otherwise, matters resolved by RJ might be subjected to judicial processes that would go against the outcome achieved through it. And as a logical consequence, people will never use the process and the community, the country and even The IGAD region will miss one more possibility for effective deradicalization.

The possible challenges may be pointed as:

- Legal impediments;
- Lack of common understanding and coordination among IGAD member states;
- Lack of capacity and capability to combine RJ with the formal justice system

### ***Opportunities for RJ***

As part of Africa, the IGAD region has reach local cultures and practices in managing and resolving conflicts. The clan system of Somalia and other local mechanisms may be helpful to put RJ in place. The issue of using local alternative mechanisms is discussed in a better detail under this Chapter in the title devoted for AfSol.

If governments come together at the IGAD level and find ways to give chance to indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms historical marginalization, past injustices and sense of reprisal may be effectively resolved. That in turn brings about opportunities to make and maintain positive peace. Applying RJ to ongoing efforts of countering violent extremism will play a vital role at least in three basic ways, in the writer's opinion. First, it contributes to make and maintain peace between former terrorists/extremists and the society. Second, it may serve as a pull factor to disengage more individuals from terrorist and/or extremist groups. Third, it may become a holding factor not to join or rejoin terrorist groups.

### **5.3.5. Roles AfSol and Gender Play**

Generally speaking, AfSol may be understood to mean 'African-led solutions to African challenges in peace and security'. The following text can be taken as operational definition for AfSol.

*[It is]....a holistic political, socio-cultural, economic, and intellectual endeavor, aimed at managing peace and security challenges in Africa at different levels of African political institutions and social organizations. The endeavor is to functionally be owned and undertaken by, and for, the Africans peoples, their institutions, and leadership but in collaboration with the international community. Most importantly, it is a people- grounded process, enriched by the African traditions, values, beliefs, philosophies and wisdom related to conflict resolutions/ management (Kunda et al, 2013, p. 84).*

The basic tenets of AfSol under the afore-quoted text involve three key aspects: ownership, values and commitment. Ownership implies Africans and their institutions must be responsible to undertake the actions necessary to find solutions under the leadership of Africans only. Besides, ownership implies solutions must be viewed in and sought from the context of indigenous cultures (traditions, values, beliefs, philosophies and wisdom related to conflict resolutions/ management)

prevalent in Africa. Therefore, AfSol is a set of principles that calls for African solutions for problems in Africa by African means, values and commitment.

Local ownership that implies each local people or country should identify reform/transformation of existing CVE methods and responsible institutions

This principle aims at avoiding the undue influence of donors and Western or alien methods over the community facing problems. It is consistent with the AfSol principle of *ownership* in which Africans are to identify *African* problems and solutions thereof. Solutions must be in accordance with the indigenous values and run by the local community as opposed to foreign imposed or top-down solutions. AfSol encourages Africans to prevent and manage African conflicts, without the risks of losing African values through global influences. Besides, the notion of Ubuntu (collectivism) where “one sees oneself through others”, AfSol’s strategy is based on pillars of ownership, commitment shared values (AfSol, September 2014).

Therefore, involvement of local community in security-related activities offers alternative solutions, methods to identify and mobilize African intellectual knowledge, and local-interest-oriented principles that define and shape security mechanisms in Africa. When we link this to the topic under discussion, deradicalization must be owned by local Muslims and local communities. Extreme religious interpretations and countering methods imported abroad must not take importance. Indigenous understandings and values must be promoted to counter extremism and radicalism in Islam.

In the following sub-sections the writer highlights the roles that principles of AfSol may play in connection with deradicalization efforts in the IGAD region. Especially, this sub-section tries to point out the importance of gender and indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms when deradicalization is opted for as CVE in the region.

### *Women’s Role in AfSol: Instances from Somalia and South Sudan*

Let us compare two practical solutions from Somalia (documentaries: *sisters of Somalia* and *women of Wajir*) with current situation of South Sudan to examine gender roles on the ground.

*Sisters of Somalia* is a documentary film done about sexual violence in the war-torn Somalia. It had a sense of history, with a woman named *Asha Hagi* returning to Somalia as she put it, “a

paradise lost”. She and the local women have contributed to the Somali peace process inspired by Albert Einstein’s saying, ‘the world is a dangerous place not because those who do evil but because those who look on and do nothing’. The film portrays the grassroots approach combined with the government would better serve Justice and peace (Jazeera, Sisters of Somalia, n.d.).

The film gave a more truthful and balanced portrayal of life in Mogadishu than many other media reports. It showed the good, the bad and the ugly. It reports the possibility of peace amid ongoing violence, including that against women, which has for many years remained a largely unexplored and damaging secret (Harper M. , 2013).

The women’s way of dealing with the truth to reach local/grassroots solutions shares some common aspects with truth and reconciliation processes. Taboo subject of rape and its perpetrators were addressed boldly. Some participants’ denial “Somali men can’t commit it” did not hold longer. Because, Somali men (old/young) did it, who were left unpunished. The audience hesitated first, and then the panelists accept it as a problem and began to debate how to penalize it. Some said the rapists should be castrated; while others recommended customary punishments for rape; whereby compensation was paid to the victim’s clan and/ or the rapist had to marry the woman to ‘maintain her dignity’ (Jazeera, Sisters of Somalia, n.d.).

Their approaches agree with AfSol principles of ownership and commitment; i.e. they have generated ideas, control the process and committed up to the end result. The women own the solution and worked with the government to bring some criminals to justice. Asha as the wife of Somalian PM contributed to access government officials and draw their help when necessary (Jazeera, Sisters of Somalia, n.d.). Asha’s experience reveals how women could be vital as peace activists. Similar roles possibly contribute to deradicalization efforts that might be adopted in Somalia or elsewhere in the IGAD region.

Asha showed us that the youth is the future of Somalia and educating them against violence but for peace was the hope for Somalia. And her approach was working better than intervention made by international and regional powers in this respect.

Another success story is that of Somali refugee women in Wajir Country of Kenya. The women organized themselves so as to tackle conflicts and violence committed between armed men. They identified the problems, actors, opportunities and challenges. The highly masculinist/patriarchal clan system give little public role in the society. However women are not only passive victims they can influence war or peace through their men. The women used the local elders to call meetings to make men talk about the consequences of violence in warring clans. They discovered common grounds, i.e. all leaders agree that violence ends up in harming both sides and they agree to work on cessation of hostilities and disarm. Dialogue-negotiation-mediation contributed to settlements. The women owned the process directly and through their men. Later on, council of elders was established to monitor situations and to sanction against any perpetrator of violence within the community. They even succeeded in buying the support of local business community to finance efforts. Job creation to the youth helped to defuse warring attitudes (WajirStory.).

This case portrays the positive effect of women over traditional societies in IGAD region. Women's role combined with economic assistance will bear positive fruits in the deradicalization process. They may use masculinity and redefine it to mean moderate and peaceful so that they can draw their male relatives or family members from the traps of terrorist groups.

Unlike some feminist movements these women did not engage themselves in blaming men/masculinity for violence or in talk of representation issues when addressing problems. The UN or regional actors could not give the solutions as Asha and others did. Human rights Watch issued a report regarding the suffering of Somali women under the title 'Hostages of the Gatekeepers' (Watch, 2013) but with no avail. Identifying problems, possible solution, designing strategies to address short as well as long term needs of the women were the steps taken. The sisters owned the process and the solution and employed tactics to make stakeholders committed to the solution.

'Similar situations exist in South Sudan where women make up 60% the total population, but suffering various forms of direct and indirect forms of violence (News, 2015). Different attempts made to involve women in the south Sudanese peace process. Women of South Sudan face similar structural and conflict related violence in a highly patriarchal society. They also share the same

value with the Somali women in terms direct and indirect roles played in peace as well as war making (Dahlström, 2012).

### ***Gender Role in Siiqqee Institution***

Ethiopia is a home for diverse local dispute resolution mechanisms. For instance in *Gadaa* system, traditional justice and administrative system of the Oromo, women play major role in making and maintaining peace in many places. Within the *Gadaa* system, *Siiqqee* institution stands for women's ritual, political and social power in the society with no man taking part in it. If the balance between men and women was broken, a *siiqqee* rebellion using different sanctions against their men would be initiated to restore the law of *Waaqa* [God] and the moral and ethical order of society (Kumsa, 1997).

*Siiqqee* and similar institutions in the IGAD region might be helpful to work with. Because, such mechanisms would contribute a lot in redefining masculinity and developing counter radicalization mechanisms at the grassroots level. If it does not the involvement of women and gender sensitive approach will be highly relevant at least for Somalia's context.

### ***Clan and Indigenous mechanisms***

Under the preceding Two Chapters of the Thesis, it is reported that Somalia is highly divided among rival clans. The division is too wide making the country difficult even to harbor international terrorist groups. Noticing the fact, Ayman Al-Zawahiri of al-Qaeda was kin to unite the country under his extremist ideology. The fight against terrorism is difficult as every group traces back to its own clan. In the writer's opinion, strong allegiance to clans might help to open a forum for deradicalization efforts. If Somalis pay great respect to their clan and their clan system as it has been said, deradicalization would be more effective and efficient if owned by clan and clan leaders.

Indigenous cultures and communities must be allowed to handle deradicalization efforts as they are closer to the problem than governments or inter-governmental organization could be. Besides, they may enjoy greater acceptance by the society, and by individuals and groups who are about to be de-radicalized.

Therefore, involvement of women and indigenous mechanisms at grassroots levels offer alternative solutions, methods to identify and mobilize African intellectual knowledge, and local-interest-oriented principles that define and shape policy in Africa. Besides, the above cases imply that resources and interventions must be employed to assist similar grassroots efforts than top-down impositions. Local mechanisms arising and existing at grassroots-level applying different restorative and/or traditional justice systems... would effectively address radicalization and its threats by fighting the Islamic extremist ideologies in their local and national communities. Locals must be allowed to own process as well as results of dispute management/resolution with commitment using shared values.

### **5.3.6. Islam in Deradicalization Efforts**

#### ***i. Role of Islam: lessons to learn***

Some countries underwent deradicalization programs in a bid to reform captured Islamic militants. The programs were found to be effective and efficient to help Islamic extremists/terrorists renounce violent attitudes and rejoin the society as reformed individuals. The model followed by some countries may give practical lessons in order to adopt deradicalization programs in the IGAD.

These processes were done in the participation and context of Islamic values. Ground factors and rhetoric leading to radicalism and VE are shared across the globe as it was discussed under Chapter Four. Let us take some examples from Singapore, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen so that we learn from their experiences on deradicalization.

Following the internal Jihadists threats from the Southeaster militants of *Jemaah Islamiyah*, Singapore launched a Religious Rehabilitation Group in 2003. The rehabilitation program was set up to reform captured militants and to reverse extreme interpretations of Islam by radicalized Jihadist group. About 30 Islamic clerics and families of the captured militants have participated in the program (Muhammad, 2009).

The clerics used group discussions to neutralize violent attitudes by re-educating captured terrorists violence-oriented interpretation of Islam as incorrect illegitimate, and not Jihad in the Islamic sense. The program has succeeded in neutralizing the effects of extremist indoctrination

and rehabilitation of former militants. As a result many of the former militants have been released and reinstated back into the society as reformed peaceful civilians (Ramakrishna, 2009).

Saudi Arabia is said to have a well-known deradicalization program in the Middle East. Members of the deradicalization committees had visited prisoners and detainees, who were accused and convicted of terror related charges. The program had religious sub-committees playing the vital part as an Advisory Body throughout the deradicalization process (Boucek, 2008).

The program facilitated for religious scholars and Imams to re-educate detainees/prisoners on the non-radical teachings of the Quran. Whether it is acceptable or not, families of the detainees or prisoners were warned that they will be held accountable in case the formers rejoin terrorists (Boucek, 2008).

The program looks effective when we see it in terms of recidivism. Around 2,000 prisoners were enrolled in the religious counseling program in 2004. Around 700 of the 2,000 had been released by 2007. However, nine had been rearrested for similar engagement on suspected terrorism related activities. (Montlake, 2009). Proponents of the program argue that releasing the rehabilitated detainees effectively counters militant propaganda.

Yemen has launched a deradicalization program in 2002. It had a committee made up of Yemeni clerics and judges. The committee focused its attention on intellectual debate and dialogue, with religious scholars trying to change the ideologies of Jihadists. Voluntary participation is a prerequisite. Under the deradicalization program, 364 suspects had been released until June 2005 (Taarnby, 2009).

The experiences of the three countries reviewed above shades some light how deradicalization is more appropriate countering mechanism for radicalization. Deradicalization of Islamic extremists or terrorists will bear better fruits if Islamic scholars and non-state stakeholders participate in the process. No one looks better equipped with the knowledge and legitimacy to defend the religion's values or images than Islamic intellectuals.

The involvement of Family members and other sections of the society played important roles as we have seen above. Therefore, deradicalization of Islamic Extremists or terrorists must be handled by moderate Islamic figures and scholars. Participatory and AfSol-style grassroots level solutions will be more effective and efficient.

IGAD in general and ISSP in particular must work on coordination and harmonization of policies and laws of member countries so as to mainstream similar deradicalization programs at regional and country levels.

### *ii. Ownership of the Process*

All the roles discussed above must be done under the context of Islam. From the discussions made under this and preceding Chapters, it can be inferred that Islam and Islamic extremism or terrorism has nothing in common. Islamic radicalism or extremism are more of using the name of Islam as a political ideology to mobilize Muslims for non-religious objectives. Therefore, Islamic extremism may be more explained with the term ‘political Islam’ which is different from ‘Islam as a faith or religion’.

As a result, Islam itself may be regarded as a victim of political manipulation by terrorists for non-religious ends. Muslims have been suffering from terrorist attacks like non-Muslims have. In addition, many of them were deceived by rhetoric as if their religion is under attack or it is Allah’s commandments they were serving while they in fact commit inhumane atrocities.

Islam also has the intellectual and conceptual tool to counter extremist ideologies promoted under its name. It would be logical and effective to let Islam and its non-extremist scholars to own processes of countering Islamic VE and/or terrorism with deradicalization methods.

The government, regional and international actors should limit themselves to assist such local efforts. This will combine the positive aspects of AfSol principles and gender sensitive solutions.

### **5.3.7. Additional Measures**

As we have discussed under the previous Chapter, challenges of lack of coordination among IGAD member states and corruption are creating hindrances to countering terrorism.

Coordination looks mandatory to bring about effective deradicalization method. Experience-sharing, resource mobilization, and capacity building may be better served if they are done at the IGAD level than as individual country.

Another advantage to handle CVE and deradicalization at the IGAD level could be coordinate resources and policies that could be applicable at region-wide or in-country level. Learning from the experiences of Center for CVE and countries that have used deradicalization methods, IGAD member states must reform and harmonize their legal systems. Harmonization of systems and mainstreaming deradicalization programs would give the Center, ISSP as well as indigenous institutions chances to engage in deradicalization processes or programs hand in hand with Islam and Islamic institutions.

Due to the dynamic nature of the challenges the region faces, IGAD should strive for establishing partnerships and alliances on policy matters, development, information sharing, capacity building and facilitating research and technology development. Competition for hegemony and animosity prevalent among IGAD member states will only facilitate for radical groups to get save heavens across the region. Assisting terror groups to wage proxy wars make things worse. Thus, IGAD must work on to help member states choose the path of cooperation against terrorism and extremism than completion or rivalry.

## CHAPTER SIX

### CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD

Many young Muslims in the IGAD region and elsewhere have been fighting, bombing and engaging themselves in various terrorist activities. Most of the time, they have been doing so, with a belief and conviction that these are the way to further Islamic values and Islamic causes. They chose violence as they were convinced, one way or another, extremist violent approach is the appropriate Islamic path than moderate peaceful approach of protest.

Nevertheless, *Islam as a faith* has nothing to do with *extremism or radicalism* and terrorism that we see in the IGAD region and elsewhere in the World. The latter is more of using or abusing Islam as a political ideology to promote a political objective than the religion. Islamic extremism may be more explained by the term ‘political Islam’ which is different from ‘Islam as a faith or religion’.

Before individuals or groups become terrorists, they pass through two steps: radicalization then violent extremism. Thus, addressing these two stages, especially the radicalization aspect looks a better logical approach to resolve or minimize the terrorism.

Even though Islam is mainly raised these days in connection with radicalization, other religions including Christianity are facing similar fate. Radicalization is a politically motivated activity taking religious covers. Both Christianity and Islam were used as covers for political or extremist ends in the IGAD region.

Global Islamic radicalization opted for as an ideology to mobilize Muslims against identified unpleasant social, economic, political and personal issues. The stories of major ideologues for the Islamic terrorist groups imply that they were induced by social, political and economic problems than zeal for Islamic values when they resorted to extremist interpretation of Islam.

Islamic radicalization at the IGAD region also traces its roots from social, economic, cultural or historical and political background factors. The factors differ from one country to another. Some of them are common for several countries while others look country specific.

Social networks, Islamic Schools, mosques and other places create the opportunity to radicalize Muslims. Self-radicalization is observed by having access to Islamic Extremist propaganda disseminated over main-stream or social media.

At the IGAD region terrorists and violent extremists manifest themselves in three ways: local, regional and international. The war-torn Somalia is the major breeding and operating ground for terrorist groups and Islamic radicalization. Al Shabab is expanding its area of influence beyond Somalia.

With the exception of Sudan's attempt to deradicalize radicals through institutionalized and participatory way, the region does not look to possess any deradicalization mechanism in the proper sense of the term. However, the research identified some inter-faith dialogue mechanisms in Ethiopia and Kenya. There is no mechanism available to deradicalize former terrorists undergoing trial processes or serving prison terms.

ISSP is on the way to launch Center of Excellence for CVE. The main objectives of the Center will be disseminating counter-extremism messages, as well as facilitating inter and intra faith dialogues. It is a basic opportunity to make deradicalization process an issue at the level and in the framework of the IGAD.

Deradicalization, if successful, will dry out human, material, financial and moral resources necessary for terrorism as people would not have the ideological motive or conviction to support jihadist or terrorist groups. It may go further and make such groups alienated from the hearts and lands of Muslims leading the CVE to a total victory over terrorism.

AfSol principle of *ownership* in which Africans are to identify *African* problems and solutions thereof. Solutions must be in accordance with the indigenous values and run by the local community as opposed to foreign imposed or top-down solutions. AfSol encourages Africans to prevent and manage African conflicts, without the risks of losing African values through global influences. Besides, the notion of Ubuntu (collectivism) where "one sees oneself through others", AfSol's strategy is based on pillars of ownership, commitment shared values.

Islam must own deradicalization efforts for several reasons. First, its values were subjected to manipulations, its image spoilt and associated with violence, Muslims too are victims of terrorism and counter terrorism hard measures, and so on. Second, it has the necessary scholastic and moral

authority, *inter alia*, to clarify its true doctrines and values. It would be logical and effective to let Islam and its non-extremist scholars to be owners of the process of countering violent extremism with deradicalization. The government, regional and international actors should limit themselves to assist such local efforts.

Gender sensitive approach will also be necessary as women are not only passive victims of violence but are capable of contributing in both peace and violence. The women's way of dealing with the truth to reach local/grassroots solutions shares some common aspects with truth and reconciliation processes. This approach may work better than intervention made by governments, regional and international powers in this respect.

Cases portrayed the positive effect of women over traditional societies in IGAD region. Roles of women combined with economic and other forms of support will bear positive fruits in the deradicalization process. They may contribute to redefine masculinity to mean moderate and peaceful so that they can draw their male relatives or family members out from the traps of terrorist groups.

Local mechanisms arising and existing at grassroots-level applying different restorative and/or traditional justice systems... would effectively address radicalization and its threats by fighting the Islamic extremist ideologies in their local and national communities. Locals must be allowed to own process as well as results of dispute management/resolution with commitment using shared values.

Governments must cooperate their efforts, and share experiences and resources using the IGAD framework. Human rights issues and legitimate questions must be given due attention. Otherwise, no country is shielded from Somalia's scenario. Zaid Barre's failure to wisely handle question have led radicalization to root itself in the country. Repression may lead to further radicalization that goes underground, making it harder to trace and resolve it later on.

Real historical injustices must be addressed well and those merely perceived must be openly discussed. Developmental needs, perceived or actual feelings of marginalization or discriminations based on religion, present or past injustices real or perceived must be handled wisely to resolve

them with peaceful methods. Civic societies, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, other local social structures and democratic institutions must be assisted to develop capacity and capability to contribute for deradicalization efforts.

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## LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS

Key Informant	Date	Month	Year	Remark
Abba Hailemariam M		Nov.	2016	Intra-religious Council in Ethiopia
Abebe Muluneh (Commander)	12	May	2016	Interviewed twice before the stated date in October and November
Daniel G.	03	May	2016	causes for terrorism and radicalization in Somalia
Mehari Tadele, Dr.	18	March	2016	(expert, researcher)
Khalid.	09	March	2016	(From IGAD)
KI-01	18	February	2016	(NGO, expert)
KI-02	18	March	2016	(official)
KI-03	18	March	2016	(official)
KI-04	17	March	2016	(official)
KI-05	17	March	2016	(official)

KI-06	20	March	2016	(official)
KI-07	18	March	2016	(official)
KI-08	10	April	2016	(from NGO)
KI-09	12	April	2016	(expert)
KI-10	06	April	2016	(expert)
KI-11	05	May	2016	(private individual, activist)
KI-12	18	March	2016	(Researcher)

## **Annex-1**

### **QUESTIONS FOR KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW**

**(For experts/ officials of the IGAD)**

Dear.....

My name is Berhanu Taye, a final year student at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS). I am writing my MA Thesis on the title, “**Deradicalization in the Context of Islam: a Counter Extremism Measure within the Framework of the IGAD**”.

The central aim of the research is to examine the salient features of Islamic extremism (extremism in the name of Islam), and radicalization hand in hand with the existing countering mechanisms at the level the IGAD and its member States. Hard measures (military actions and criminal punishment) have their part to play in CVE. This research will focus on factors for radicalization and any attempt made to address the root cause of VE, i.e. radicalization.

The following are questions that need to be answered in due course of the interview.

- i. What looks like the nature and extent of VE in relation to Islam?*
- ii. What are the root causes of Islamic extremism in the IGAD region?*
- iii. What are the successes and shortcomings of the current counter terrorism/extremism measures in the IGAD region?*
- iv. What mechanism does the IGAD have to deal with root causes of Islamic extremism?*
- iv. How and in what ways is Islamic extremism affecting and threatening livelihoods in the region?*
- v. At what stage of extremism would CVE be effective?*
- vi. How are Islamic institutions and scholars taking part in CVE and deradicalization?*
- vii. How are convicted or captured terrorists/radicals being reformed to abandon violence in the future?*

*viii. What possible mechanisms and procedure should be in place to fight Islamic extremism in the region?*

Since, you are selected as a key informant for this research, I kindly request for your cooperation.

Thank you very much.

Berhanu T.

## **Annex-2**

### **QUESTIONS FOR KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW- 2**

**(For experts/officials of IGAD member States)**

Dear.....

My name is Berhanu Taye, a final year student at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS). I am writing my MA Thesis on the title, “**Deradicalization in the Context of Islam: a Counter Extremism Measure within the Framework of the IGAD**”.

The central aim of the research is to examine the salient features of Islamic extremism (extremism in the name of Islam), and radicalization hand in hand with the existing countering mechanisms at the level the IGAD and its member States. Hard measures (military actions and criminal punishment) have their part to play in CVE. This research will focus on factors for radicalization and any attempt made to address the root cause of VE, i.e. radicalization.

The following are questions that need to be answered in due course of the interview.

- i. Is there any Islamic extremism related problem in the country?*
- ii. What are the root causes of Islamic extremism in the country?*
- iii. . How is Islamic extremism and/or terrorism being countered?*
- iv. How and in what ways is Islamic extremism affecting and threatening livelihoods in the country and in the region?*
- v. Are there any successes and challenges observed in reforming terror suspects?*
- vi. Is there any experience of deradicalization as a CVE measure?*

*vii. What roles Islamic institutions and scholars are playing in the country to deradicalize Islamic extremists?*

*viii. How are convicted or captured terrorists/radicals being reformed to abounded violence in the future?*

Since, you are selected as a key informant for this research, I kindly request for your cooperation.

Thank you very much.

Berhanu T.

## **DECLARATION**

I, the undersigned, declare that this Thesis is my original work and has not been produced and presented in any other academic institution. All sources of materials used for the dissertation have been duly acknowledged.

Berhanu Taye

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Confirmed by

Amr Abdalla (Ph.D.)

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_