ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GRADUTE STUDIES

ASSESSING THE LOCAL INTEGRATION OF URBAN REFUGEES: A COMPARTIVE STUDY OF ERITREAN AND SOMALI REFUGEES IN ADDIS ABABA

BY

WOGENE BERHANU MENA

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ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES OF ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FILFILLMENT OF THE REQUIERMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University and that sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

_____

Wogene Berhanu

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Abstract

The study examines the local integration of Somali and Eritrean refugees in Addis Ababa. It is a comparative study of the host-refugees integration taking the case study of Eritreans and Somali refugees. In this study, Gofa Mebrat Hail for Eritrean refugees and Bole Michael for Somali refugees in Addis Ababa were selected based on their numerical upper hand as well as the prolonged settlement of the refugees in the respective areas. Qualitative research methodology was employed and semi-structured interviews with refugees and host communities, and key informant interviews with ARRA and local authorities were conducted. In addition, FGDs with refugees and host communities of the study areas were held. The respondents for both interviews and FGDs were selected purposively. The historical and ongoing relations between Ethiopia and the refugee producing countries, as structural factor, impacted not only the country's policy direction towards the refugees' but also the refugees' and the hosts' perception towards local integration. The study revealed that Somali refugees are more integrated with the host communities than Eritrean refugee in the respective areas despite the cultural compatibility of the latter because of the interplay of structural, refugee and host community related factors. The prolonged settlement and engagement of Somali refugees in both formal and informal economy in the area resulted in the refugees' progressive integration with the host communities by dwindling prior mutual mistrust and misperceptions. However, the securitization of Somali refugees in the area by interlinking them with the insecurity and terrorism in their country has been obstructing the intensive integration by creating fear among the refugees and the host communities. On the other hand, the Eritrean refugees perceive the especial treatment provided for them as politically motivated and temporary. Consideration of Ethiopia as country of transit and the subsequent lack of motive on the side of host communities caused low level of the refugees' integration with locals.

Key words: Refugee, urban refugees, local integrations, status fluidity, *de facto* integration

Abbreviations and Acronyms

A.D. - Anno Domini

AIAI- Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya

AMISOM- African Mission in Somalia

ARRA- Administration of Refugees and Returnees Affair

CPA- Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DICAC- Development Inter-Church Aid Commission

ELF- Eritrean Liberation Front

ELM- Eritrean Liberation Movement

EOC-DICAC- Ethiopian Orthodox Church Development and Inter-Church Aid Commission

EPLF- Eritrea peoples Liberation Front

EPRDF- Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front

EU- European Union

FGDs- Focus Group Discussions

ID- Identification

MA- Masters of Art

MOD- Mareehaan-Ogaaden-Dhulbahante

NGOs- Non-Governmental Organizations

OAU- Organization for African Unity

OCP- Out-of-Camp Policy

ONLF- Ogaaden National Liberation Front

PFDJ- People's Front for Democracy and Justice

Ph.D. - Doctor of Philosophy

SNM- Somali National Movement

SPLM/A- South Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army

SPM- Somali Patriotic Movement

SRC- Supreme Revolutionary Council

SSDF- Somali Salivation Democratic Front

SYC- Somali Youth Club

SYL- Somali Youth League

TFG- Transitional Federal Government

TPLF- Tigray People Liberation Front

UAE- United Arab Emirates

UIC- Union of Islamic Court

UN- United Nations

UNESCO- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNICEF- United Nations Children's Fund

UNHCR- United Nations Higher Commission for Refugee

USA- United States of America

USC- United Somali Congress

USD- United States Dollar

WSLF- Western Somali Liberation Front

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

The history of refugee is as long as the history of human being. Throughout history people flee their homeland to escape the fear of persecution, war and violence. Until the establishment of United Nations Higher Commission for Refugee (here after UNHCR) in 1950 under the auspices of United Nations as refugee regime and the Refugee Convention of 1951 as legal instrument, the issue of refugee had been governed by customary laws. The issue of refugee protection are set out in international refugee regimes such as United Nations Refugee Convention of 1951, the 1967 Refugee Protocol, Organization of African Unity Refugee Convention of 1969, international human right laws and national refugee laws where they exist (Betts, 2009:53; Mogire, 2009:19).

As the leading authoritative UN agency in protecting refugees, UNHCR has been working in collaboration with state and non-state actors to protect and bring durable solution for refugee problem (Betts, 2009:54). The three durable solutions for refugee situation which are promoted and utilized by UNHCR based on their order of preference are: voluntary repatriation to the country of origin, local integration in the host state, and resettlement in the third country (Crisp, 2004:1). Although voluntary repatriation to home has been identified as the best solution both by the host states and UNHCR, the refugee situation in most cases especially in Africa lasted for decades due to prolonged nature of conflict in their home land. And the 'temporary permanent'[1] situation of refugees in the camps continued. On the other hand, because of perceived and real condition of identifying refugees as security threat and economic burden in the third country of resettlement, the prospects for resettlement are far from rosy. Given protracted conflict and violence in their homeland to repatriate and distant prospect for resettlement, local integration becomes the viable policy alternative as durable solution (Crisp, 2004:5; Dryden-Peterson and Hovil, 2004: 26).

The word 'refugee' still conjures up images of warehoused people under tenant. But currently this picture no longer tells the full story of life for refugees with overweighing urban refugees (International Rescue Committee 2015). Urban areas as the hub of multiculturalism relative to rural spaces, have real potential for local integration though the integration cannot be

[1] The phrase '*Temporary Permanence'* is used by Angwenyi (2013) to explain temporary character of the refugee camps in both their *modus operandi* and physical features while protracted situation of most of the camps make them permanent.

spontaneous. As of 2016 report of UNHCR, currently, over 60% of total 19.5 million refugees in the world are hosted in urban environment either legally or illegally. In line with the expansion of urbanization and *protracted refugee situation*[2] in camps, the degree of urban refugees has been increasing also in Africa (Beversluis et al., 2016:2; Rogge, 1986 as cited by Kibreab, 1996:132).

In 1997, UNHCR came up with policy that discourage urban refugees by restricting the protection space with the perception of urban refugees were exceptions rather than norm. Nevertheless, the institution encountered immediate denunciation from different NGOs and human right groups. By expanding protection space for urban areas, the 2009 policy of UNHCR secured the right of urban refugees (UNHCR Policy, 2009)[3]. Although the positive contribution of policy framework and legal instruments is undeniable, what matters most is the state policy directions and praxis significantly affects the local integration of urban refugees with the host communities (Dryden-Peterson, 2006:384; Landau, 2006:309).

Frome 1960s to early 1980s, most of African states had been known for their policy of settlement with the provision of land and other support for refugees' thereof promoting self-reliance and avoid dependence at *prima facia* basis (Fielden, 2008:6). Unfortunately, the mass exodus of refugees continued after decolonization period to escape civil war, interstate wars, political oppression, and draconian human right violations which was further exacerbated by the Cold-War contention.

The continent has been unrelenting in producing refugee since 1960s. The Cold-War period, as *a golden age* in refugee history worldwide for ideological reason supplemented by Pan-African solidarity and donors' incentives, promoting zonal development approach to refugee settlement and self-sufficiency of refugees were basic policy direction of most of African states (Crisp, 2004:2; Milner, 2009:21). In evaluating the refugee policy of most of African states in post-independence period, from 1960s to 1970s, Bonaventure Rutinwa (1999) classified it as *the era of open-door policy*. However, in the last two decades the aforementioned generosity of African states have been changed and most of them have been implementing strict encampment policy with limited chance for settlement and local integration. In 1980s, the major factors for their opposition towards local integration was their weak economy. Since 1990s, security concerns have become the major reasons to resist

[2] According to UNHCR, Protracted Refugee Situation is a situation in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five or more years in a given asylum country.
[3] UNHCR, 2009. UNHCR Policy on Refugee Protection and Solution in Urban Areas.

local integration (Jacobsen, 2001:11). Thus, most of the Africa states discourage urban refugee settlement by making it illegal with immediate consequences that hinders the process of local integration among other factors (Crisp, 2004:2).

Horn of Africa, as one of the most conflict-ridden region in the world, is known for mass exodus of refugee. At the heyday of Cold-war, especially from the late 1970s to 1980s, the region has shown the largest influx of refugees because of inter-state and intra-state wars. The situation continued in the post-cold war era. Nindi (1986:98) expressed the region as 'belt of refugee producing and receiving region'. Currently, the region is the biggest source of refugees worldwide next to Middle East. According to 2016 UNHCR report, among top ten refugee producing countries in the world, three of them are from the Horn (Somali, South Sudan and Eritrea)[4]. On the other hand Ethiopia and Kenya as the biggest refugee hosting countries also found in the region (UNHCR, 2016)[5].

From 1970s to early 1990s, Ethiopia was considered as the largest refugee producing country in Africa that climbed to more than a million. The major destination for this refugees were mainly Sudan, Somalia and Kenya (Assefaw, 2006:22). For the last two and half decades, Ethiopia has been hosting refugees from neighbouring countries of South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Yemeni and others countries from Great Lake Region. The absence of central government in Somalia since 1991, ongoing civil war in the youngest state of South Sudan, and political oppression and human right violation in Eritrea are the major factors for the refugees' flight to Ethiopia (Assefaw, 2006:59; International Crisis Group, 2014).

Alike other African countries, the structure of refugee settlement in Ethiopia is mainly confined to the camps in isolated rural areas for perceived or real economic burden and security concern of the state. Although camps considered as impermanent settlement for refugee in temporary emergency, most of refugees in the country have been in camp for prolonged time. Urban settlement is only permitted for those refugee with few exceptions. However, self-settlement mainly and assisted settlement (insignificantly) of refugees in urban areas increasing for different pull and push factors. Hence, refugees found in different urban areas of the country such as Addis Ababa, Adama, Jijiga, Gambella, Shire, Mekelle, Assosa and Samara among others. In Addis Ababa among the others, the Somali and Eritrean

[4] According to UNHCR Report of 2016, with 1.1 million refugees, Somali is the third refugee producing country in the world. South Sudan is the fourth (800,000) and Eritrea is the ninth (411, 300).
[5]According to Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2016, Ethiopia as the fifth refugee hosting country in the world with the refugee population that exceeds 800,000 and Kenya the seventh in the world with more than 553, 900 refugees population.

refugees have settled for a long time in addition to their numerical upper hand (UNHCR Ethiopia, 2016). As mentioned above, UNHCR identified local integration as one among the durable solution for refugee situation especially in urban areas. However, local integration as a two way process impacted by both the refugees and the host communities' perception towards local integration in addition to the state's policy praxis. Therefore, critically examining the local integration of Somali and Eritrean refugees in Addis Ababa from both refugees and host communities' perspective in comparison is the focus of this study.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

According to UNHCR country operation profile, Ethiopia, the world fifth refugee hosting country next to Turkey, Lebanon, Pakistan and Islamic Republic of Iran, is the home for huge number of refugees from neighbouring countries of South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and others with total number of 829,925 (UNHCR Ethiopia Factsheet, March 2017). The *open-door policy*[6] and its geographical proximity to the refugee producing countries has made the country a preferable destination for refugees particularly from Somalia and Eritrea. More than 56% of refugees in Ethiopia are from Somalia and Eritrea (UNHCR Ethiopia Factsheet, March 2017).

With the absence of central government since 1991, Somalia has become one of the biggest refugees producing country in the world. Starting from 1988, Somali people fled the conflict in the country and settled in Ethiopia; a country which 'they traditionally seen as enemy' (Assefaw, 2006:64).

On the other hand, Eritrea, the state that got *de jure* statehood in 1993, has become another source of refugee exodus *en masse* mostly since 2001. They flee to escape grave human right violation, compulsory and open-ended military service, political suppression and religious persecution in the country (Kibreab, 2014:15; Webster, 2011:15). Given the long and shared history between the two countries, the direction of Eritrean refugee flight is mainly to Ethiopia. In addition to aforesaid factors, zero cooperation between the government of

[6]The Ethiopian policy towards refugee can be considered as Open-door Policy quantitatively based on opening its border for the refugees and allowing them to enter in to the country. But qualitatively, the policy is limited by denying the refugees with some basic rights like the right to movement, the right to employment, and the right to education.

Ethiopia and Eritrea makes the country more preferable than the neighbouring states like Sudan.[7]

Under the Refugee Proclamation of 2004, Ethiopia follows the *encampment policy*[8] that confines the refugees in the camp which leaves urban refugees at *'the state of limbo'*[9] with few exceptions. The 2010 refugee scheme provided Eritrean refugees with status for *Out of Camp*. Irrespective of restrictive encampment policy and limited support outside of the camp, either legally or illegally, significant numbers of refugees stays in urban area of the country for extended period of time. Refugees are seeking refuge in Ethiopian cities and towns such as Mekelle, Adama, Jijiga, Shire, Samara, Assosa, Gambella and Addis Ababa for different pull and push factors. Indeed, the exact number of refugees living in Addis Ababa is not known despite the suggestion of official figures. Similar with the progressive trend of refugee urbanization globally, the number of urban refugees has been rising with average annual growth of more than 50 percent since 2008 in Ethiopia as per the UNHCR population statics online data base. According to UNHCR August 2016 report, the number of registered urban refugees settled in Addis are more than 20,000. Refugees from countries such as Somali, Eritrea, South Sudan, Yemeni and the Great Lake Region (Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania) are the major ones in Addis Ababa (UNHCR2016). From this total, more than half are from Eritrea and Somalia (UNHCR Registration Unit, 2016).

As per DICAC Report of March 2017, the number of assisted refugees of Eritrea and Somali settled in Addis Ababa for special case of protection purpose or specialized medical care are 594 and 853 respectively. But the number of self-settled refugees of both countries are by far greater than officially recognized and assisted refugees in Addis Ababa as Jacobson noted that the government is incapable or choose to turned blind eye for the situation (Jacobson, 2006:274).

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[7] As cited by Webster, S. (2011). Getting Beyond politics and bad blood: The protection of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia, Unpublished MA Thesis, American University in Cairo, Cairo. *See* Tesfa-alem Tekle, *Eritrean opposition condemns refugees' deportation by Sudan*, Sudan Tribune, Sept. 24, 2008, *available at:* http://www.sudantribune.com/Eritrean-opposition-condemns,28730; *Gedab News, Eritrean Refugees: Victimized by Sudan, Neglected by UNHCR*, Jan. 3, 2008, http://www.awate.com/portal/content/ view/4709/19/.

[8] Art. 21 (2). '…Head of the Authority may designate places and areas in Ethiopia with in which recognized… refugees shall live…' Refugee Proclamation No. 409/2004. Federal Negarit Gazeta of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, No. 54, 2004.

[9]According to Crisp (2002), state of limbo is a situation which refugees find themselves in a trap that: 'they cannot go back to their homeland, in most cases because it is not safe for them to do so; they are unable to settle permanently in their country of first asylum, because the host state does not want them to remain indefinitely on its territory; and they do not have the option of moving on, as no third country has agreed to admit them and to provide them with permanent residence rights'.

According to the joint report of ARRA and EOC-DICAC as of March 2017, around 192, 000 refugees as assisted urban refugees, *Out-of-Camp Policy* beneficiary and as unregistered asylum seekers, are settled in Addis Ababa on permitted and unpermitted ground. Among them, more than 90% are from Somalia and Eritrea.

Review of researches on the issue of urban refugees in the case of Ethiopia revealed the existence of scanty studies in the area. Even those studies about urban refugee integrations with the host communities undertaken the issue of local integration as unidirectional (only from refugees' perspective) while integration is a multidimensional (the detail will be discussed in the literature review section of second chapter). There are a large number of Eritrean and Somali refugees in Addis Ababa. The interaction and integration of the refugees with the host communities has its own ups and downs. In the two study areas selected in Addis Ababa indicates the integration and interactions are impacted by refugee perception, cultural in-(compatibility), historical and ongoing interstate relations between the refugee hosting and producing states, host communities' attitude towards the refugees and policy or structural related aspects in interrelated manner. In addition, the impact of such factors as facilitator or obstructer of local integration varies for the two refugee groups.

Therefore, this study assesses the local integration of Eritrean and Somali refugees in Addis Ababa comparatively from both refugees and host communities perspective as a two-way process thereof analyses factors impacting local integration.

1.3. Objective of the Study

The main objective of the study is to assess the local integration of Eritrea and Somali refugees with the host community of Addis Ababa in a comparative manner thereby analysing the impacting factors from refugees, host communities and policy perspective.

1.3.1. Specific Objectives of the Study

- To explore the existing trend of local integration of Somali and Eritrean refugee with local communities in respective areas of Addis Ababa.
- To assess the host communities perception towards the local integration of respective refugee groups.
- To examine the refugees perception and barriers for local integration in Addis Ababa.
- To examine and analyse the impacting factors as both facilitator and obstructers for local integration of the two refugee groups in respective areas comparatively.

1.4. Research Question

The major question of the study is do the Eritrean and Somali refugees locally integrated with the host communities and what are the factors that impacted the integration process?

1.4.1. Specific Questions

- How far does the two refugee communities integrated with the host communities in Addis Ababa?
- How the local communities perceive about their local integration with the refugees of the respective countries?
- How the refugees perceive about their local integration with the host communities?
- What are the real and perceived challenges and opportunities for local integration of both refugee communities in comparative manner?

1.5. Methodology of the Study

Methodology is a general framework that guides the research (Kothari, 2004:8). Conventionally, qualitative, quantitative and mixed are the three methodologies for research. To arise from their epistemological foundation, quantitative is based on positivist philosophy (understanding reality through scientific methods and statistics) whereas qualitative is rooted in interpretation (since the research setting and people within it are to complex and mysterious to understand through natural science technique) as the base to understand social setting (Bryman, 2003:69). Qualitative methodology is about understanding personal experience, phenomenon and detailed understanding of processes in the social world (Kalof *et al*., 2008:79; Dawson, 2002:14). The major guideline for selecting methodology of the study as a framework is the research problem or the nature of the study (Bryman, 2003:69). The nature of this study requires qualitative methodology hence it needs the assessment of refugees' integration with the locals by seeking the perceptions, attitudes and experiences of both communities thereof.

1.6. Methods of Data Collection

Method of the research is generally the techniques of data collection and inquiry (Kalof *et al*., 2008:79; Dawson, 2002:14). Data for the study was collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data were collected through in-depth interview with the refugees and the host communities, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with the refugees and the host communities and key informant interview. The nature of the study needs detail, rich and

getting insight of the respondents without pigeon-holing them, qualitative interview was employed as the major tool of data collection. In qualitative interview, unstructured and semi-structured interviews are the two major types (Bryman, 2012:501). Since semi-structured interview provides the interviewees with great leeway to reflect their perception with the regard to the issue freely while fairly directed towards the specific topic to be covered, it's found appropriate to the study. An interview and discussion conducted for two months (from January 12, 2017 to March 10, 2017) and a total of twenty respondents from the refugee and host communities in respective area were participated. Both the refugee and host community respondents were selected purposively through gatekeepers by hanging around the research areas. Out of 20 respondents, 10 were from refugees (five Eritreans and five Somalis refugees) and 10 from the host communities (five from Bole Michael and five from Gofa Mebrat Hail).

According to Allan Bryman, Focus Group Discussion is a preferable means to have knowledge on how individuals discuss certain issues as member of a group rather than simply as individuals (Bryman, 2012:501). Local integration as multidimensional process that needs the perceptions and efforts of individuals not only as individuals but also as a member of the group (both in hosts and refugees), conducting focus groups discussion as data collecting technique is proper. Accordingly, a total of four FDGs were conducted (i.e., two FDGs with the refugees and two FGDs with the host communities in Bole Michael and Gofa Mebrat Hail). In each FDG, six discussants were participated (a total of twenty four). The discussants were selected purposefully based on their long time settlement in the respective area. The selection of participants from the host community was undertaken with the collaboration of the respective Woreda Administration. The discussants from the refugees of both Eritrean and Somali were selected by using the gatekeepers in the respective area.

To triangulate the data collected from refugees and the host community, eight key informant interviews were conducted. From them, six were with the local authorities of Bole Sub-City Woreda 1 and Nefas Silk Lafto Sub-City Woreda 6. One key informant interview with the Senior Protection Officer of AARA and one with Assistant Professor of Law at Addis Ababa University were conducted. For this study, the selected areas for assessing refugees' local integration with the host communities are Bole Michael also known as 'Little Mogadishu of Addis Ababa' for Somali refugees (UNHCR-PRM, 2012) and Mebrat Hail for Eritrean refugees. The benchmarks for sampling the areas were number of the refugees in the area and

their settlement in the area for relatively long period of time. This research employed comparative method since the major goal of comparative research design is to identify and search for communality and differences (de Bruijn et. al., 2006). Among many refugee groups settled in Addis Ababa, the Somali and Eritrean refugees are selected based on their large presence for relatively prolonged period of time and historic attachment with the host state and host community as communality makes them comparable cases. In addition, the variation in the level of integration with the host community in respective areas and impacting factors from refugees, host community and policy related issue to wards local integration are taken as major differences for two refugee groups.

To substantiate the data incurred from primary sources and to develop conceptual framework, secondary sources of data such as books, journal articles, published and unpublished thesis, newspapers, governmental and non-governmental organizations report, newspapers, and study reports were consulted. The data collected from both primary and secondary sources were analysed through qualitative means.

1.7. Scope of the Study

The refugees of both Eritrea and Somalia are not settled in confined manner in Addis Ababa. One can find the refugees of both communities in Bole Michael, Mebrat Hail, HayHulet, Tekle-Haymanot, Gerji and other parts of Addis Ababa. For this study, the selected areas for assessing refugees' local integration with the host communities are Bole Michael for Somali refugees and Mebrat Hail for Eritrean Refugees for above mentioned factors. The local integration about the refugees of both communities with the host people outside the specified areas is beyond the scope of the study.

1.8. Significance of the Study

This study will provide valuable knowledge and understanding on the issue of local integration of urban refugees with the host community by seeking to assess Eritrean and Somali refugees in Addis Ababa comparatively. Since the issue is under-researched with paucity of literatures, the study attempts to fill the gap thereof it will be springboard for further research in the area. In addition to academic significance, the study will also have policy relevance for both state and non-state actors to enhance the local integration of the refugees with the host communities as a viable solution.

1.9. Limitation of the Study

During the study, the researcher has faced some challenges. On issues, especially related with security and some of illegal activities, wining the consent of respondents was very tough and took extended time. At the end, the researcher agreed with the respondents not to mention their name in any way or use only their first name without mentioning father name. Another challenge faced was the issue of language. Although majority of the refugee respondents from both Eritrea and Somalia are able to communicate in Amharic, some of their accents were very difficult to understand. However, with exertion of time and resource, the researcher collected all the available and reliable data for the study.

1.10. Organization of the Study

This study has six chapters. As introductory part, the first chapter consisted of background of the study, statement of the problem, methodological issue and methods of data collocation, objectives of the study, research question, scope, significance and limitation of the study. The second chapter is devoted to framing concepts and reviewing literatures on urban refugees at the continental level in general and Ethiopia in particular. The third chapter dealt mainly with the driving factors for Eritrean and Somali refugees in their own country that have been contributing for the flight and its dynamics.

The fourth chapter allocated for assessing the historical trend of refugee hosting in Ethiopia and examining factors for the country's choice of 'open-door policy' beyond traditional hospitability and humanitarianism. In addition, this chapter paid attention on why and how Eritrean and Somali refugees chose to settle in Gofa Mebrat Hail and Bole Michael respectively in particular and Addis Ababa in general. The fifth chapter focused on assessing the local integration of Eritrean and Somali refugees in the respective location and critically examining the impacting factors (as facilitator or obstructer) from refugees, host communities and policy perspective in comparative manner. Finally, the study ended up by offering a concluding remark.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2. Introduction

This chapter has two major sections. The first section provides conceptual framework on the issue of refugee, urban refugee and its salient feature vis-à-vis other settlement patterns, local integration in the context of first country of asylum and impacting factors from policy, refugee and host communities perspective. This section is followed by reviewing available and significant literatures on the urban refugees of African cities in general and Addis Ababa in particular in relation to the subject of the study.

2.1. A Conceptual Framework

2.1.1. The Notion of Refugee

The issue of refugee is not a contemporary agenda or problem in global arena. Offering sanctuary for frightened and weary strangers, victims of persecution and violence is part of humanitarian tradition throughout history. Prior to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the understanding of refugees had been equivalent to involuntary migrants that flee their residence of origin due to conflict, persecution, famine or natural disaster in a wider sense. Limiting the scope of refugee had got little concern till the end of First World War because of relatively small number of the refugees in limited geographical areas, albeit of sovereignty concern (Hathaway, 1984:348; Betts and Loescher, 2011:2). Nevertheless, in the Post-WWI period, the mass exodus of refugees that fled the war coincided with aftermath political nationalism, security concerns and economic depression in the western world, the states started to follow narrow and guarded[10]approach to the conception of refugee. Since then, attempts have been made to internationalize and legalize the concept of refugee (Holborn, 1938:681; Zolberg et al., 1989: 18).

As response to the then recurring refugee crisis in Europe (mainly as a result of the collapse of Ottoman Empire and Russian Revolution), League of Nations came up with the definition of refugee under 1926 Arrangement. According to this arrangement, refugee is'… a person

[10] Prior to the post-WWI arrangements, the concept of refugee have had general and wider connotation for a person who have forced to flee his/her country. But the inter-war arrangements and conventions provided refugee status and legal protection for specific groups of people (Russians, Armenians, Assyro-Chaldeans, Turkish and later Germans and Austrian). And they were only ratified by eight countries with some reservation on their obligations. In addition, the instruments had emphasised on non-refoulement and avoiding non-admittance specifically. This implicates how the conception of refugee was narrow and guarded in the post-war era.

who does not enjoy the protection of his government…and has not acquired another nationality.' However, the refugee status was categorically limited only for people from Russia and Ottoman Empire. Regardless of extending countries of origin for special refugee groups under succeeding arrangements and conventions[11], they were highly reactive response for the problem rather than pre-arranged solutions) and limited to specific countries specified by the arrangements. At the wake of the Second World War, the concept of refugee was defined legally under the 1951 Refugee Convention. According to Article 1 of the convention, refugee is a person:

> *…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to return to it.*

Alike preceding arrangements and conventions, the definition of refugee under the 1951 Convention has not been emancipated from spatial and temporal limitation. The Convention is temporally limited only to the event before 1951 (Hyndman, 2000:8; Shacknove, 1985:275). This is clearly stipulated under Art.1(2) of the Convention by restricting the sources of refugees' fear of persecution '[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January1951…'. The geographical or spatial limitation of the convention is also reflected by restricting the scope of the events occurred in Europe. Although the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugee removed the time limit and events based feature of the Convention, the 'individualistic' conception and persecution-based phrasing has persisted (Milner, 2009:7). In continent like Africa, known for mass displacement of refugees, individual screening of refugee is practically impossible. In addition both the Convention and Protocol excluded civil strife, general violence, famine and other factors that disturb public order as justifications for refugee influx in absence or incapability of centrally governing body.

[11]The 1928 Arrangement that extended the refugee status for Assyrians, Assyro-Chaldean, and Turkish refugees; *An Arrangement relating to the Legal Status of Russian and Armenian Refugee (1928)*; *The 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees*- considered as a millstone for refugee protection and served as a model for *the 1951 Refugee Convention*; *The 1938 Convention concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from German.*

The 1969 Organization of African Unity came up regional complement with salient challenge to the Convention and comprehensive conception of refugee (Shacknove, 1985:275). In addition to UN Convention phraseology of refugee, under Art. 1(2) OAU Convention incorporated:

> *The term "Refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part [or] the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.*

Thus, any person who falls under UN Convention is also incorporated under OAU Convention since the later incorporates the former. As a common denominator, both UN and OAU Conventions identified refugees as persons with well-founded fear that crossed international border when their country of origin either cannot or will not protect that leaves them in need of international protection (Hathaway, 2005:193). However, the scope of refugee conception under international or regional refugee specific instruments have direct repercussion on their protection. The narrowly conception of refugee will result in exclusion of significant number of people in threatening circumstance and results in denial of international protection for them (Shacknove, 1985:276).

Given the mass influx of refugee[12] as the major character of Africa, using OAU's broadened definition of refugee is reasonable and appropriate. Although scholars like Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2014) dubbed all migrants outside the scope of conventional refugee definition as voluntary migrants, it's difficult to put clear-cut difference between refugees and other types of migrants. In African countries in general and the Horn of African states in particular where extreme poverty, absence of socioeconomic opportunity, civil strife, political repression and persecution as justifications for flight are highly intermingled, considering persecution as the only rationale for refugee flight become very guarded perspective (Schröder, 2015). The situation is further complicated by long history of cross border migration, transnational identities, and artificial plus porous boundaries that the countries have with limited state capacity to control their border (Martín and Bonfanti, 2015; Mengisteab and Bereketeab, 2012). As result, after entering the host state regularly or

[12] According to Karen Jacobsen (1996), *refugee influx* is defined as a condition which occurs when, within relatively short period (a few years) large numbers (thousands) of people flee their place of residence for the asylum country.

irregularly, they become legal refugees or even citizens of the state that make their status very fluid (Mengisteab and Bereketeab, 2012). Therefore, given the aforementioned situations of the region, applying conventional and restrictive definition for refugee is problematic thereby excludes people in need of protection.

Refugee as a person that needs international protection aforesaid, the protection is carried out through international refugee regimes while the primary responsibility of sovereign host state is uncontested. Under Higher Commissioner of League of Nations, several institutions were created to protect refugees internationally: the Nansen International Office for Refugees (1931-1938), the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany (1933-1938), the Office of the High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees (1939-1946) and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (1938-1947). Prior to UNHCR, International Refugee Organization was established under UN (Shacknove, 1985; Hathaway, 2005).

However, unlike preceding institutions of refugee protection, UNHCR established in 1950 as permanent international institution (after three years of 'temporary authority'-from 1951 to 1954) and authoritative body as UN agency (Gallagher, 1989:582; Jaeger, 2001:736). In line with supporting legal protection, UNHCR is responsible for promoting refugee camp (albeit of their non-existence under the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol) and non-camp or temporary (camp) and seeking durable solutions (repatriation, local integration and resettlement) as refugee protection mechanisms (Gallagher, 1989:581; UNHCR Statute, 1950).

2.1.2. Refugee Settlement: Camp vs. Urban Refugees

After crossing the international boundary in need of protection from the other state, the refugees settle in different way. In open situation, they may settle spontaneously in unoccupied area in the territory of the other state, spread out over a wide area or hosted by local communities (urban or rural). On the other hand, refugees settle in pre-planned camp or transferred to newly established camp (Deardorff, 2009:8; Jacobsen, 2001:5). Jacobsen categorized refugee settlement broadly in to two: organized and self-settlement. Assisted settlement, camps and local settlement are under organized settlement while self-settlement includes settlement among the local community in urban or rural areas without direct official assistance either nationally or internationally. But given the fluidity of refugee settlement process, it's difficult to have fixed settlement frame (Jacobsen, 2001:6-7).

Conceptualizing and understanding refugee camps and their salient feature as settlement pattern has an important implication to understand the very reason of refugees' settlement in urban areas. Refugee camp lacks clear cut definition under international law or specific international refugee regimes. The physical appearance of camps can vary 'from hotel to hell' as Murphy (1955) stated in (Schmidt, 2000:4). But almost all refugee camps have shared characters especially with their impact over the refugees. The major features of settlement in camp as part of organized settlement are: restricted geographical space and limited freedom of movement; segregation of refugees from local communities; dependency on aid; temporariness and over crowdedness among others (Deardorff, 2009:9; Hyndman, 2000:88; Malkki, 1995:118; Schmidt, 2000:5). Assisted rural or local settlements also share common character of organized, restricted space, segregation from host community, and limited freedom of movement with refugee. However, unlike camps, local settlements have more permanent structure and opportunity for refugees' economic self-sufficient with access to land in rural areas (Jacobsen, 2001:7).

Under international refugee regimes such as UNHCR, as an institution responsible for refugee protection, nothing has been said about camp though it has been considered as a standard and temporary means to handle refugee crisis (Angwenyi, 2013:16; Arendt, H. cited in Hyndman, 2000:7). Although it's difficult to identify the origin of refugee camps, Malkki traced their genesis as response to refugee crisis during World War Second to settle those displaced by war (Malkki, 1995). The very assumption behind camp establishment is quick, temporary and emergency phase response to the refugee crisis (Feldman, 2007:49). Functionally, the refugee camps' suitability for effective control over relatively defined territory have made them favoured choice to host state with security and economic concern (Deardorff, 2009:5). As a main body responsible for refugee protection and assistance, UNHCR also prefer camp to convince donors and humanitarian organizations (Sytnik, 2012:10). Thus, camps have been considered as impermanent settlement whereby refugees wait for other durable or 'permanent' solutions.

Although camps are praised as convenient place to provide protection and aid distribution for refugees in the phase of emergency temporarily, the protection effectiveness, appropriateness and its temporary nature has been continuously challenged since early 1990s (Black, 1998; Smith, 2004 and Van Damme, 1995 as cited in Kaiser, 2006:597). Some Foucauldians like Schmidt (2000), identified refugee camps as containment space that implicate power relations than shelter. Moreover, Crisp criticized camps as places that refugees enforced to trade-off

'all their right' to 'right to life' (Crisp 2003: 125). International institutions working on human right protections like Amnesty International and Human Right Watch have also been campaigning the setbacks of refugee camps for human right protection (Schmidt, 2000:11).

In contrary to the basic assumption of refugee camps as temporary solution for the situation, most of the refugees found themselves in intractable and protracted period having 'no solution in sight' (Crisp, 2002). Given, prolonged conflict in refugee producing countries and near to close door policy of resettlement countries, proliferation of protracted refugee situation become a norm than exception (Sytnik, 2012:5).

In addition to the price paid in terms of human right violation, economic hardship and frustration, the 'temporary permanence' of refugees in camps have direct and indirect implications for the security predicament of the host states and the refugees. By intensifying competition for scarce resource with locals when the donation decline and engaging in criminal activities as coping strategies, protracted refugee situations are sources of insecurity indirectly. Militarization of refugee camps, arms trafficking, by being source of soldiers and mercenaries recruitment, protracted refugee situations have become the direct sources of security threat (Deardorff, 2009:4; Loescher and Milner, 2005:8).

In spite of all aforementioned backdrops and criticisms from researchers, institutions working on human right protections and even acknowledged by UNHCR, as of 2016 UNHCR report, around one third of the total refugees in the world are warehoused in camps. Thus, awaiting in intractable state of limbo with all difficulties have been insisting refugees to look for other solution either legally or illegally as major push factor.

Under international refugee regimes, refugees have right to be protected no matter where they live (Jacobsen 2006:276). Both under UN and OAU Conventions, urban-rural settlement dichotomy of refugee does not exist. In line with the growing urbanization globally, the proportion of urban refugees have been dramatically increasing to their counterpart in the camp or rural areas. Divergent to iconic image of refugees in camp, however, more than 60% of refugees worldwide settled in urban areas (UNHCR Report, 2016). By acknowledging refugee urbanization, UNHCR revised the outdated refugee policy of 1997 that discourage refugees' settlement in urban areas. The revised urban refugee policy of 2009 removed the spatial limit in refugee settlement and recognized urban area as 'legitimate protection space' (Edwards, 2010). Both self-settled and assisted refugees found in areas designated by the government as urban from both urban and rural background are considered as urban refugees.

But the number of self-settled refugees take the lion share (Jacobsen, 2001:9; Jacobsen, 2006:274).

However, in practice, developing states in general and African states in particular follow restrictive and dichotomized refugee settlement policy. Kuhlman (1994:122) distinguished that 'whenever African governments have recognized the existence of a refugee problem, they have favoured organized settlement over allowing refugees to settle where they choose'. Most of the states have been implementing restrictive encampment policy while those states with no camp like Egypt and South Africa follows dichotomized refugee status determination procedure for urban and rural refugees (individual refugee determination for urban refugees while *prima facia* refugee determination procedure for rural) (Jacobsen, 2006:274; Kagan, 2007:12). With few exceptions, almost all African states spatially segregate refugees in the camp as a means to protect their embedded security and economic concern though both difficulties preceded the refugee presence and have little or no strong correlation with the refugees' settlement. Hence, they unvaryingly oppose the presence of refugees in urban areas (Fábos and Kibreab, 2007:4-5). With the absence of legal status, the consequence of settling in urban area stretches from denial of recognition and support to detention and forced deportation to the camp (Campbell, 2006).

Aside from those legal restrictions, economic hardship and marginalization of urban refugees in the cities of low and middle income countries, refugees appeal urban areas for different reasons. The rationales for favouring urban space are related to pull factors in urban areas (real and expected) and factors that push from camps. Lack of security, lack of adequate education and medical service, limited livelihood and harsh climatic conditions are the major push factors in camps for refugees to settle in urban areas legally or illegally. Often refugee camps are found in economic and geographical peripheries of the host states (Crisp, 2002:5). These setbacks of refugee camps are further aggravated by the prolonged settlement in camps without durable solution in sight (Pavanello et.al, 2010:14).

On the other hand refugees quit camps and seek refuge in urban areas for different pull factors. Among them looking for better security, economic self-reliance, better service (education and health), to negotiate with international agencies for resettlement and existence of financial institutions in cities since incomes of most of urban refugees depends up on remittance (Fábos and Kibreab, 2007:7). In line with the above push and pull factors, refugees managed to live in the urban fabrics of the cities of '*Global South*' albeit of their

ambiguous legal status (Campbell, 2006:401). Although host states resistance to local integration as durable solution for urban refugees is apparent, refugees integrated with locals in different aspect and at level (Campbell, 2006; Crisp, 2004; Harrell-Bond, 2000; Jacobsen, 2001).

2.1.3. Understanding the Concept of Local Integration

Among the three durable solutions identified by UN Convention and UNHCR, local integration is the second preferable solution for refugee problem next to voluntary repatriation. Integration is a highly chaotic, complex and debatable concept in the refugee studies (Korac, 2003:52). Robinson pointed out integration as 'a word used by many but understood differently by most' (Robinson, 1998:118). In refugee studies literature and international refugee regimes, scholars used different concepts to define and explain integration like assimilation, adaptation and accommodation. Some definitions put integration as a one way process thereby equating it with assimilation. The 1951 UN Refugee Convention is the forefront international refugee regime that equates integration with assimilation. According to Art. 34 of the Convention: '[t]he Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees…' Thus, it plainly calls for sates effort to assimilate refugees to the host society and naturalizing them as integration.

On the other hand, UNHCR defined local integration as a complex and gradual process with legal, economic, social and cultural dimensions that needs the effort of both refugee and the host society. However, the same institution (UNHCR) employed granting of citizenship in the country of asylum as a necessary condition to estimate the number of locally integrated refugees (UNHCR, 2005).

Although most of the scholarly works[13]recognized refugee integration as multi-dimensional process (economic, social, cultural, legal and political), they narrowly branded citizenship as a necessary condition and foundation for local integration if not sufficient. Almost all of the above mentioned works defined, measured and implicated refugee integration in the West. As a matter of fact, the issue of integration is highly discussed in Western countries in line with resettlement as third country of asylum (Dryden-Peterson, 2006:382; Rai, 2015:39). And local integration with granting of permanent asylum was highly practiced during Cold-War in the West (Jacobsen, 2001:2).

[13] Ager et.al. (2002), Ager and Strang (2008), Castles et.al. (2001), Faist. T. (1995), Saggar, S. (1995), Favell, A. (2001). Alba, R. and Nee, V. (2003), and Kivisto, P. (2005).

But as per Robinson's suggestion, since the concept of integration contextualized and varies geographically and temporally, understanding the concept of integration in first and third country of asylum similarly is not reasonable (Robinson, 1998:118). Ager and Strang (2008) also agree about the absence of universal definition and context specific nature of integration. Alexandra Fielden further reinforced this position by drawing the distinction between local integration in first countries of asylum (which are generally developing countries) and in third country of resettlement (Fielden, 2008:1). Thus, rather than narrowly understanding viability of local integration from naturalization perspective, employing broader definition of local integration in first country of asylum suits better.

According to Crisp (2004), local integration is a process that consists of legal, economic and social dimensions in interrelated manner. To begin from legal process, 'refugees are granted a progressively wider range of rights and entitlements by host states'. These rights and entitlements includes the right to 'seek employment, to engage in other income-generating activities, to own and dispose of property, to enjoy freedom of movement and to have access to public services such as education' (Crisp, 2004:1). The progressive realization may lead to granting citizenship but not must for local integration. Beyond this, the refugees in global South get the legal recognitions including citizenship and related benefits in the host states not only through formal state institutions and policy directions but also through different informal manners thereby resist the state control. The issue of invisibility that create enabling environment to hide themselves from being illegal for refugees', is the major pull factors in urban area among others. The invisibility of the refugees and the fluidity of their status can prevent the refugees from being captured by the state as illegal and to involve in different activities which they are not legally entitled (Landau, 2010:179; Frischkorn, 2013; Polzer, 2009).

The major factors that pave the way for fluidity of refugee status in African countries are the people with common history, culture, ethnic group, religion and way of life that artificially separated by colonial boundaries (Mengisteab and Bereketeab, 2012:102). This enabled the refugees to defy state control by being invisible and changing their identity as citizens of the host country in addition to the limitation of state capacity. These creates alternative means for *de jure* integration in an informal manner, despite the obstructing policy environment.

Negotiating with local authorities is another means that the urban refugees acquire the legal rights and entitlements to settle in urban areas and to engage in different economic activities.

Unlike in Western countries, the refugees in African countries rarely have formal means to influence and negotiate state policy that negates their interest (Frischkorn, 2013:148; Polzer, 2007:49; Polzer, 2009:93). By using corruption as a negotiating mechanism, the refugees defy their status thereby acquire the legal status though the process is not trouble-free. This trend has been reflected in South Africa for Mozambican refugees (Polzer, 2007; Polzer, 2009), different refugee groups in Lusaka (Frischkorn, 2013) and in Kenya (Campbell, 2005; Campbell, 2006) among others.

Secondly, local integration as economic process is about progressive attainment of self-reliance and living standard in comparison to locals including amenities such as access to housing, public utilities, health service and education (Crisp, 2004:1; Kuhlman, 1994:7; Harrell-Bond, 2000). The level of economic integration mainly defined and measured in terms of achieving self-sufficiency and level of living standard of the refugees comparably to the host community rather than in absolute term. In addition, however, intensive economic engagement of refugees results in meaningful interaction that primarily contributed for socio-cultural integration by lessening different sorts of barriers (Mekuria, 1998:174; Jacobsen, 2001:9). Thirdly, it's a social and cultural process which enables 'refugees to live among or alongside the host population, without fear of systematic discrimination, intimidation or exploitation by the authorities and peoples of the host population' (Crisp, 2004:1). Jacobsen further understands socio-cultural integration as when refugees' socially networked in to the host community with little distinction between the standard of living of refugees and the host community and refugees feel at home in their host country (Jacobsen, 2001:9).

Moreover, since almost invariably African states formally ruled-out local integration as part of durable solution and seldom grant refugee status, incorporating *de facto* integration of refugees as part of local integration would be important (Jacobsen, 2001:2). In understanding the context of urban refugees as mainly self-settled refugees deviated from states policy direction in developing countries, most notably in Africa, their integrations resemble to *de facto* integration (Crisp, 2004:6). *De facto* integration is about integration of self-settled refugees out of official channel or assistances of state and non-state actors. Refugees are *de facto* integrated when they are not in physical danger, able to sustain their livelihood, access to amenities and are socially networked to the host community (Jacobsen, 2001:9). Thus, local integration is a multi-dimensional (legal, economic and socio-cultural) and interrelate process that fundamentally driven and impacted by both refugees and host community rather than stand-alone policy response.

2.1.4. Factors Impacting Refugee-Host Community Integration

Since local integration is a complex and multi-dimensional process as mentioned above, impacted by refugee related, host community and policy related factors. However, those personal or refugee related, environmental or policy factors are not mutually exclusive. Rather one factor can be effect of or cause for another. Hence, incorporating and understanding the impacting factors from refugees and host communities perspective enable us to have comprehensive view on the issue.

2.1.4.1. Refugee-Related Factors

Starting from UN Refugee Convention of 1951, states have been responsible for refugee integration as assimilation thereby considering refugees as passive integrators to host state or community. However, refugees are active and primary decision makers in making their home within their host community (Griffiths et al. 2005; Korac, 2009 as cited by Frischkorn, 2013:15; Jacobsen, 2001:21).

First, the refugees plan to stay in the host country affects their level of integration with the host community. When the refugees considered their first country of asylum as a transit country to resettle in developed countries (legally or illegally-by using smugglers) or go to their homeland, they see no reason to invest in their life in the host country (Grabska, 2006:301). Hence, the refugees' intention and aspiration for resettlement in the third country of asylum or repatriation has impact on their perception towards local integration (Ager and Strang, 2010:595).

Secondly, the psychological compatibility or the social connections of refugees with the local community have impact on the refugees' integration with locals. The social connection can be reflected in terms of language, culture, ethnic background and/or historical ties (Fielden, 2008:4). Ager and Strang dubbed these elements as 'facilitators' for integration (Ager and Strang, 2008:182). Among those facilitators, language is mainly identified as central to the process of integration. To orient oneself and communicate with the host community, knowing the language of host community (not always a single language) is important for refugees. In addition, as 'soul of culture', linguistic knowledge enables refugees to understand the culture of the host community easily (Thiong'o, 1986). The absence of language knowledge obstruct interaction of refugees with the host communities that results in sense of insecurity, mistrust and frustration. Thus, the degree of existing similarities of language, culture and social values

between the host communities and the refugees on one hand and the refugees' interest to know and understand the hosts are the significant factors for local integration.

The level of trust based on their past experience towards the host state and its people have also impacted the refugees' perception towards local integration. For example, based on their past experience in Sudan with perceived and real Arab domination, the South Sudan refugees in Cairo were full of mistrust and suspicion towards host communities with Arab culture (Grabska, 2006). Therefore, the plan of their stay, the level of shared identity and perception of trust towards local communities are refugee-related factors that impact the local integration.

2.1.4.2. Host Community Perception towards Local Integration

The perceptions of local communities towards refugees have a great impact on the local integration. From the time of their settlement in urban areas, host communities have impact and impacted by the refugees. The host communities' perceptions towards refugees from different states are diversified based on different aspects. Sharing of socio-cultural elements, the expectation toward the duration of settlement, historical prejudices or common historical heritage, and economic issues are the major factors that have effect on the host communities' perception towards the refugees thereby impacting the phase of local integration.

The socio-cultural issues have direct impact on shaping the host communities perception towards refugee either for good or worse. The socio-cultural aspects encompass cultural, linguistics and other social values. The presence of shared identity in terms of ethnicity, linguistic and cultural affiliation between the host communities and the refugee facilitate the integration process while the absence obstructs it (Fielden, 2008:4). On his work on urban refugees in Cairo, Grabska (2006) revealed how dark skinned African refugees who were identified as black Africans exposed to discrimination by Egyptians while other refugees from Arab states are not.

Ghazaleh Pascale (2003:25) further argued how race matters with the regard to Egyptian hosts perception by quoting his respondent 'the darker your skin, the less you are accepted'. Campbell (2006) also strengthened the impact of ethnicity by identifying the different level of relation and perception of the local people in Nairobi towards refugees of different ethnic group. This is also true for refugees from Eritrea with similar ethnic group in Sudan. The Eritrean refugees who share common ethnicity with Sudanese host communities are able to

work and settle in urban area and participate in different economic activities with locals irrespective of encampment policy of Khartoum. But refugees from Somali and Kenya in Sudan have not entitled these privileges (Fábos and Kibreab, 2007: 4). However, this does not mean sharing of culture spontaneously and automatically resulted in host-refugee integration. Rather, the socio-cultural compatibility can be a facilitator factor for integration based on the refugees' interest to integrate, the hosts' attitude towards the refugees, and other policy related factors (Mekuria, 1998; Kibreab, 1989).

Secondly, the expectation of the host communities towards the duration of settlement and desirability of repatriation or resettlement has impact on the perception of local communities towards integration. At initial phase of their arrival, host communities view refugees as guests and hosts perceptions are mainly welcoming and assistance based (Kibreab, 1989). However, when this expectation of temporariness changed to protracted situation, the hosts perception changes to resentment by viewing refugees as competitors for scarce resource in the urban fabric or source of security threat. This trend is reflected in the host communities of Mexico (Montejo, 1999 as cited in Jacobsen, 2001:9), Somalia and Sudan (Kibreab, 1989), Guinea, Kenya and Tanzania (Jacobsen, 2001). In contrary, the protracted situation may facilitate local integration where there is prior experience and long history of refugee movement by developing the perception of refugees as part of their community in the hosts (Jacobsen, 2001:19-20). Extended stay has contribution for *de facto* integration by enabling linguistic and cultural adaptation (Fielden, 2008:4). This is reflected in the case of Angolan 'refugees' who were highly integrated and difficult to differentiate them from locals in Zambia (Bakewell, 2000:361).

The host communities' perception towards the economic implication of refugees' settlement is another major factor that has impact on the local integration. When the host communities perceive refugees as burden over social goods and services (health, education, and housing) and competitor in labour market especially unskilled labour market, it hinders the integration process. In addition, when the host communities perceive refugees as working economically better than them, discriminations and resentments become common (Betts, 2008; Campbell, 2005). On the other hand, when the host communities view refugees as source of labour, consumer of goods and services, creator of new business opportunities and cross-border trade, the phase of integration is augmented (Campbell, 2006:405;Grabska, 2006:302-304; Codjoe *et al.* 2013:439). Thus, the buy-in from the host communities has a significant impact for local integration.

2.1.4.3. Policy Related Factors

Policy related issues are another factors that have impact on the local integration of refugees and the host communities. Most of African states, as first country of asylum, urban refugees are technically do not (unrecognized the refugees existence)-or should not exist (the refugees' settlement as illegal). Perceiving refugees as sources of security threat and economic burden are commonly propagated justification for opposing the presence of refugees in urban areas developing countries. As result they have never developed clearly defined policy towards urban refugee that places refugees at state of legal limbo (Campbell, 2006:401; Fábos and Kibreab, 2007:5). In addition to their liminal and marginalized position, the securitization of refugee issues develop sense of 'outsider' among refugees and sense of 'cultural othering' within the host communities (Kibreab, 2000:272). Securitization also create unfavourable environment for the refugees by fostering xenophobia within the host people (Fábos and Kibreab, 2007: 5). Even for those assisted refugees that are legally settled in urban areas, states reservation to some rights granted under international refugee regimes limit their access to education, employment and legal protection. Limits on these rights have impact on putting the refugees' perceptions towards local integration under question by making their livelihood unstable (Grabska, 2006:292). Thus, policy inclusion or exclusion has direct impact on integration process by creating the sense of insider or outsider on the side of refugees.

Nevertheless, the policy direction and its praxis have considerable discrepancies for different refugee groups (Buscher, 2003; Jacobsen, 1996:655). In Cairo, the refugees from Sudan have access to public education and health service while refugees from other African countries (Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, and Somalia) are denied those rights (Soliman, 2016:21; Grabska, 2006). The privileges are extended to Palestinian refugees which has direct linkage with Arab solidarity (Grabska, 2006:293).

Jacobsen (1996) provided factors that influence the host country policy response to refugee through different cases. Host country's relation with refugee sending countries (historical and ongoing), the concern of political reputation and security concerns are the major issues that influence host states policy direction towards refugees. Although hosting of refugee seems purely humanitarian at its face value, it holds, implicitly or explicitly, 'political humanitarianism' (Webster, 2011:27). When the host state grants refugee or asylum seeker status, tacitly or plainly, the host state is recognizing the sending state's inability or

unwillingness to protect its citizens. Some states utilize refugee hosting as a venue for shamming the unfriendly or enemy states.

The West Countries hosting of refugees as ideological pawns to embrace and discredit communist countries in cold-war period revealed this circumstance (Hathaway, 1990:150; Haddad, 2008:3). This was also reflected in the Horn of Africa and Karadawi exposed how the Sudanese government viewed refugees as object of its foreign policy in dealing with its contentious relation with Ethiopia from 1960s to early 1980s (Karadawi, 1999). After admitted as refugees and using them for their end, however, the treatment may vary depending up on the historical relation of the sending and receiving state. 'Refugees fleeing country which has traditionally been an enemy of the receiving country may be treated with the hostility directed towards all natives of that country' (Jacobsen, 1996:665).

To sum up, factors related to refugee perception, host communities related concerns and policy impacts towards local integration are not mutually exclusive. Rather they are highly interrelated and reinforcing factors either as facilitators or barriers to local integration.

2.2. Review of Related Literature

2.2.1. Literatures on Local Integration of Urban Refugees in African Context

Local integration is one among the three stated durable solutions for the problem of refugees by UNHCR (Kobia and Cranfield, 2009:7). It's common to find different literatures about urban refugees and the issue of integration in urban areas of the West (Dryden-Peterson, 2006:386; Rai, 2015:39). In Africa, extensive works have been done on refugees in camps and rural settlements. Nevertheless, in developing countries in general and Africa in particular, the issue of urban refugee study has got attention in the late 1980s and Kibreab identified the issue as 'what the eye refuses to see' (Kibreab, 1996:131). Most of the scholarly works focused in some cities such as Cairo, Johannesburg, Nairobi, Kampala, and Khartoum (Dryden-Peterson, 2006:386). Works on these areas are thematically organized and reviewed as protection oriented from urban refugee perspective (refugee-centric), the issue of local integration from host communities perspective and holistic view towards local integration and refugee protection that incorporates the perception of refugees, host communities and host state.

2.2.1.1. Refugee-Centric Perspective

Most of the scholarly works on urban refugees in Africa provided major emphasis for protection challenges that the refugees face in the fabric of the cities. And identified policy related gaps as the major source of these challenges (Grabska, 2006; Landau, 2006; Bernstein and Okello, 2007; Soliman, 2016; Kagan, 2011; Belvedere, 2004).

Egypt is one among few countries that host refugees in urban areas without established camp in the country. Although large number of urban refugees are settled in Cairo and other cities in Egypt, the possibility for local integration is ruled out at officially policy level while the prospect for resettlement is very limited (Grabska, 2006:292; Kagan, 2011:25). According to Grabska's (2006) work under the title *'Marginalization of Urban Space of the Global South: Urban Refugees in Cairo'*, the major emphasis was given to the issue of policy related protection gaps in Egypt as the major hampering factors for local integration of Sudanese refugees with host communities in Cairo. Irrespective of the researcher's recognition of other sources of problem related to refugees and host communities, Grabska opened policy related marginalization of urban refugees as the Pandora Box. Thus, by revealing the contribution of Sudanese refugee in marginalized space of Cairo as agent of socio-economic change, albeit of their limited legal status, she argued for removing of policy restriction as sufficient solution to solve the refugee problem. Furthermore, Soliman (2016) discussed for policy challenges in Egypt that hinders local integration of African refugees in Cairo thereby arguing local integration as viable solution by implicating the far-reaching mutual benefits for both refugees and host communities.

On the other hand, the Republic of South Africa (RSA) is the only country that provides legal status for urban refugees in Sub-Sahara Africa. However, the scholarly works on the issue criticized ineffective policy implementation as the major source of refugee protection challenges and local integration in the country. Landau (2006) assessed the protection challenges that faced urban refugees in Johannesburg because of institutional failure. Thereof, the research vows for the necessity of positive obligation from the state side as crux for refugee protection and effective local integration. In addition, Belvedere (2007) in her article disclosed how refugees in South Africa internally excluded through inefficient policy praxis, in spite of legal inclusion and recognition of urban refugees in the country.

Bernstein and Okello (2007) under their article entitled '*To be or Not to be: Urban refugee in Kampala*' criticized the exclusionary policy of the Ugandan government towards urban

refugees that left urban refugees in state of limbo. Thus, providing the refugees with the right to choose their settlement and supporting their decision through policy response are the major recommended directions by the researcher to facilitate local integration and refugee protection. In his MA Thesis, Avery Ainslie (2013) also argued that the states policy direction in line with international refugee regimes as the major source of protection gap for refugees in urban area.

2.2.1.2. Host Communities' Perspective

The influx of refugees into urban areas markedly impacted the host communities (Bailey, 2004; Crisp, 2009). In the cities of Global South, both the refugees and the host communities mainly face similar socio-economic difficulties and shares unprivileged neighborhood. According to Salem (2013) under research entitled 'Understanding African Refugees Integration in Cairo through the Eyes of Underprivileged Host Communities', disclosed the underprivileged condition of the host communities in Cairo as the major hindering factor for integration of African refugees. Hence, solving the socio-economic problems of the host communities and viewing the issue of integration from host communities' perspective as a master key to protect refugee and facilitate integration process.

2.2.1.3. Holistic View towards Urban Refugees' Local Integration

The protection of refugees and their integration with the hosts can be facilitated or weaken based on interlinked and mutual interdependent factors rather than stand-alone refugee perspective/policy related factors or host communities perception. Gaim Kibreab (1996) assessed Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in Khartoum. In his article, Kibreab argued for the importance of understanding of policy related response, the local populations' perceptions and refugee motivation as an important means to protect refugees in urban areas thereof facilitating local integration.

Campbell (2006) revealed the importance of incorporating institutional perspective, refugee perspective and community-oriented perspective in dealing with refugee protection, mechanisms of survival and possibilities of integration for Somali refugees in Nairobi. For local integration to be a viable solution for Somali refugees in Nairobi, Campbell vows for the necessity of protecting the right and human security of refugees, the host community, and the interest of host state in combination. Pavanello et al. (2010), under their working paper entitled '*Hidden and Exposed: Urban Refugees in Nairobi, Kenya'*, integrated the views of refugees, host communities and policy related actors towards the urban refugees in Nairobi

from Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Great Lake Region states (Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi). Their findings revealed that the areas of refugee protection and livelihood are highly interlinked with incorporating the perception of the host communities and policy related measures in holistic manner.

In the case of Ethiopia, the issue of urban refugee in general and their local integration with the hosts in particular got little attention. Webster (2011) assessed the protection challenges that Eritrean refugees had been encountering in Ethiopia and refugees in Addis Ababa only from the refugees' perspective. According to the researcher, the source of protection challenges emanates from Eritrean state officials and Ethiopian administrators who pursue their political interest. Thus, the analysis is mainly statist that underscores the multi-dimensional sources of protection challenges and ignores the perception of the host communities towards the Eritrean refugees. Conversely, Kibrom (2016) assessed the socio-economic impact of Somali refugees on the host community in Addis Ababa from host communities' perspective and recommended repatriation of refugees to their host country as solution to minimize the burden over the host community while the situation in Somali is still tough.

On the other hand, Ali (2014) analysed challenges of social integration for the refugee women of Great Lake Region (Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo) in Addis Ababa through refugees' lens. Ali in his work dubbed the refugees from those four countries as homogenous group by understating their heterogeneity based on the language, culture, and national identities. The researcher acknowledged refugees as active decision-makers and primary social actors in integrating with the host community which can be considered as the strong part of the study. However, the study failed to include the perception of host communities towards the refugees' integration from Great Lake Region though the researcher recognized integration as interactive and a two-way process when conceptually framing the study. Therefore, the aforementioned studies, about urban refugee integrations with the host communities approach the issue of local integration as one-directional (only from refugees' or hosts' perspective) while integration is a multidirectional. All in all, it's fair to identify the issue of local integration of urban refugees with the host community in Addis Ababa as under-researched aspect. Moreover, the local integration of Eritrean and Somali refugees as the largest refugee groups in the city, have been neglected. This study assess local integration of Eritrean and Somali refugees with local communities

and impacting factors from both refugees and host communities perspective in Addis Ababa comparatively.

Alike other urban refugees in Global South, the Somali and Eritrean refugees in Addis Ababa have settled in the cities for relatively prolonged time with real and perceived challenges. Notwithstanding those challenges, refugees motivated to settle in urban area because of their life style in their home country (especially for those refugees from urban areas, it's very tough to settle in camps of remote rural areas), in search for self-reliance, to have strong linkage with UNHCR to facilitate the fortuitous for resettlement, in search of better life as the citizens of the country do and the opportunity of anonymity among others (Fábos and Kibreab, 2007).

However, the adversity of challenges and the level of integration of those refugees with the local community varies with and impacted by host government policy direction, the host state's relation with refugee's home state (both historical and ongoing) and the host states' political motive, the local community perception towards local integration with the refugees and the refugees' perception and interest towards local integration among others (Buscher, 2003). Thus, given the variations for the aforesaid factors among others, studying the local integration of two refugee groups comparatively provides deep understanding in the area.

CHAPTER THREE
CAUSES AND DYNAMICS OF REFUGEE FLIGHT FROM ERITREA AND SOMALIA

3. Introduction

The Horn of Africa[14], characterized by entrenched poverty, weak or oppressive governments, and the major conflict-ridden region in the world, known for relentlessly producing of refugees. Interstate and intrastate wars, environmental degradations, oppressive political environment, famine (mainly because of intentional or unintentional policy direction of actors more than drought per se) have been the major causes for refugee flight from the region. The dynamics of conflicts within or between states in the region, natural disaster, and economic hardship are highly interlinked and one can be the effect or cause for another (Mesfin, 1999:153; Assefaw, 2006:3; Berouk, 2010:2).

Currently, the region is the biggest source of refugees worldwide next to the Middle East. According to 2016 UNHCR report, among top ten refugee producing countries in the world, four are from the Horn of Africa (Somali, South Sudan, Sudan and Eritrea). UNHCR Report of 2015 showed, with 1.1 million refugees, Somali is the third refugee producing country in the world. South Sudan is the fourth (800,000), Sudan is the fifth (628, 800) and Eritrea is the ninth (411, 300). The drivers for the flight of refugees' are largely civil wars, interstate conflicts, and the collapse of the central government, state repression, and natural disaster. However, these reasons are not clearly discerned rather often overlap. Therefore, this chapter explains the causes of refugees' flight from Somalia and Eritrea thereby indicate the dynamics of mass exodus from the two countries.

3.1. The Driving Factors and Dynamics of Refugee Flight from Somalia

3.1.1. The Driving Factors for Refugee Flight from Somalia

Somalia, mainly with pastorals and agro-pastorals people having nomadic culture, migration is considered as at the heart of the people's livelihood (Gundel, 2002:262). However, the events that would lead to the culmination of Siyad Barre's regime and the resulting civil war that has left Somalia without a central government for more than two decades are considered

[14] The Horn of Africa, as both geographical and geopolitical region, has a diverse definition. According to Mesfin, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia are mainly the Horn states; and South Sudan, Sudan, and Kenya are partially in the Horn based on the level of potential interaction. Mesfin Wolde Mariam (1999: 68).

as the major genesis for the refugee flight from the country (Lewis, 2002; Bulhan, 2008; Hammond, 2013). To understand the cause of refugee flight from Somalia, it's necessary to understand the political and historical contexts in the country that preceded and triggered the situation. Thus, the causes and dynamics of refugee flight in Somalia have broader political and historical grounds.

3.1.1.1. The Dictatorship of Siyad Barre and Clan Politics

The former British Somaliland and Italian-administrated United Nations Trust Territory of Somalia merged and formed the Republic of Somalia on 1 July 1960. The aftermath of independence, Somali Republic faced serious challenges that emanate from identities and institutional plurality in addition to their dual colonial heritage. These pluralities were reflected in the legal system[15], linguistic fragmentation (using English, Arabic, and Italian as official language-described as *babelian bureaucracy*), and administrative plurality including the tax system. Another major challenge that had got emphasis since the establishment Somali Youth Club (SYC), which later changed to Somali Youth League (SYL) as a political organization, was the replacement of clan loyalties and schisms by national political consciousness. And the issue of clan affiliation was officially buried immediately after independence as jeopardizing factor for the unity of the Republic and full realization of Pan-Somali goal in broad (Lewis, 1972:386; Lewis, 2002:167-170; Lewis, 2004:497).

Ironically, the post-independent governments had been considering clan representation in policy making, office distribution and mobilization of political support. Finally, the multiparty parliamentary Somalia democracy deteriorated to corruption, patronage and revealed 'a true bonanza of clan-politics' (Balthasar, 2014:232). In October 1969, the democratically elected civilian government was overthrown by an unexpected and bloodless coup that put Siyad Barre at the helm of Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). In the beginning, the military oligarchy of Barre's government promised the elimination of corruptions (cleaning-out Augean stable) and clannism thereby restoring justice and democracy in the Somalia Democratic Republic (Lewis, 1972:401; Laitin, 1976:449). A year later, the Coup was changed into Revolution. And Scientific Socialism or what Lewis (2002) called it 'Scientific Siyadism' was declared as official state ideology that unit the republic and vehemently denounce 'tribalism' with harsh legal consequence.

[15] There had been five legal systems that coexisted in independent Somalia until 1963, at least officially: Italian Law, British Common Law, the Indian Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes, Islamic Sharia, and Somali Customary Law.

However, instead of abolishing clannism, the Siyad Barre's government exploited the denunciation campaign as a ruse to hide the clan affiliation of his regime (Bulhan, 2008:243). From the very establishment of the Supreme Revolutionary Council and Council of Ministers that the Daarod clan, in which Barre himself was a member, had 53% and 40 % respectively that implicated the hidden objective of manipulating clan politics. Nevertheless, the people paid little attention because of the rhetoric of revolution and their lust for change or had no choice to reject the decision by any means. Through cajoling and propaganda, the regime sustained for not more than half a decade. Later on, the regime start intimidation and violence as the means to control the public through draconian law and harsh actions (Bulhan, 2008:187).

After winning half a battle through false promise, in 1974, Barre perfected the system of oppression by removing deputy president officially and by increasing the share of Daarod clan in supreme Revolutionary Council from 40% to 45% with special emphasis to his clan Mareehaan. Because of ultra-clan affiliated patronage, the Mareehaan (clan of Barre), the Ogaaden (the clan of his mother) and Dhulbahante (the clan of his son-in-law) clans with acronym *MOD*, were considered as the ruling clans. But the elites from these clans were by no means the representatives of the people as elected ones did before the Coup. Rather they were the extension of clan affiliated patrimonial system. The whole system of the government including the judiciary became the tool of the governing elites and their clan-based patronage (Lewis, 2004:501; Compagnon, 2013:12). Thus, the military regime of Barre's manipulated the clan identity to the system of the divide -and-rule that ended up in unrelenting all out civil war with a scorched-earth policy that made Somalia the land of the exodus.

However, it was not only the government of Barre that responsible for the disintegration of the state and ceaseless conflict that resulted in the exodus of refugees for a protracted time. Those military and political leaders that had lost power under the regime started to mobilize their faction against the regime under the umbrella of clan identity to share the piece of *national cake*. Even after the end of Barre's dictatorial regime, the competitions for the political supremacy (which highly intertwined with economic power) by turning their gun over one another have been continued. Thus, as the response to the repressive measure, natural disasters and the economic hardship as result of political tyranny, since the late 1970s, Somali people have been displacing as a refugee at a different scale (Assefaw, 2006:63; Hammond, 2013:56).

3.1.1.2. The Beginning of the End- The Ogaden War (1977-1978)

Since the European scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century, Ethio-Somalia Border had been known by confrontation. After Somalia national independence, the bone of contention between Ethiopia and Somalia in the borderland grown-up to a brief but the full-fledged war in 1964 (Morone, 2015:94). In the first half a decade after the bloodless coup, the government of Barre mainly concentrated on the intensification of local development and consolidation of the regime's power through different means. Up until the outbreak of Ogaden War in 1977, the regime's cruelty and draconian measure were enclosed under the banner of the *raison d'état* of protecting the nation state and to triumph the goal of Pan-Somali Unity. Against the backdrop of lingering public discontent towards the regime and drastic effect of the famine (that took the life of more than 20, 000 people) thereby to divert the growing tension within the regime itself, Barre revived the vision of Pan-Somalia by provoking war with Ethiopia and conquering the Ogaden region (Gundel, 2002:257; Lewis, 2002:226; Bulhan, 2008:230).

After burring the effigy of clannism publically under the slogan of 'Socialism unites, tribalism divides', the regime ironically exhumed the clan identity as unifying factor for Pan-Somalia nationalism. Barre raised a nationalist fervour as a super glue to easily unite the people and to recruit an army in so doing to extend the life of the regime. In addition, he calculated the historical prestige that he would be acquired by incorporating the 'lost territory' of Somalia and the economic advantage that the regime would have by gaining additional territory quickly given that Ethiopia had sunk in to internal turmoil (Ahmed and Green, 1999:117; Bulhan, 2008:231).

However, the Horn of Africa as one of the most important theatres of Cold-War between the two super powers because of its geo-strategic location, the realignment of the super powers changed the balance of force decisively. Although the USA lined up with Somalia, it was too little and too late. With the alignment of Soviet Union and its client mainly Cuba, East Germany, and South Yemen to Ethiopian, the war ended up with the defeat of Barre's Somalia (Gebru, 2000:661; Lewis, 2002:236-239; Gorman, 1981 as cited in Assefaw, 2006:53; Hagmann, 2014:18).

Beyond mere defeat and retreat of Somali arms from Ethiopia, the war had brought unexpected and wider impact over the Siyad Barre's government and the disaster for the state of Somalia in general (Clapham, 2006:23).

3.1.1.3. Outbreak of Civil War as the Fiasco of Ogaden War

A month after the war, disillusions and discontents with in the army clearly reflected by the aborted Coup under the initiation of the Majerteyn clan and after the Coup, the armed force started to wage war against its own people. The clan system that Barre exhumed and politically manipulated for his own advantage backfired and different clan based movements were organized against the regime. The earliest of these movements were the Somali Salivation Democratic Front (SSDF) established in 1978 which was mainly the Majerteyn sub-clansmen associated with the aborted coup of April in that year (Bulhan, 2008:343; Terdman, 2008:31).

The Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed in1981 by members of Isaaq clan. The Ogaaden war resulted in the unprecedented influx of refugees en masse from Ethiopia (Ogaaden) to Somali that reached more than 1.1 million in the beginning of 1980 (USCR[16], 1980 as cited by Assefaw, 2006:54). At the initial phase, the refugees were warmly received. Later on, when a large number of refugees' settlement had become asymmetrical with the refugee relief economy and the government incorporation of aid in to political economy among other factors, intensified tension between locals and the government. Given their traditionally contentious relation, the presence of mainly Ogaaden clan refugee (albeit of the presence of non-Somali Oromo refugees) in Isaaq dominated areas of the north, contributed to the further perception of the issue as part of northern alienation by the government. Moreover, the Barre's government recruited militias from the refugees and used them to further repress the Isaaq clan in the north. This further complicated the issue (Lewis, 2002:252; Assefaw, 2006:64).

Both factions (SNM and SSDF) including Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) used Ethiopia for the base by 'discarding the sacred cow of Pan-Somali nationalism' (Bulhan, 2008:344). They had been supported by the Ethiopian government as a response for Somali backing of Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) from Ogaaden clan and United Somali Congress (USC) from Hawiye were among the strongest ones against the regime (Lyons and Samatar, 1995:78; Mukhtar, 1996:550; Lewis, 2002:252; Assefaw, 2006:64).

As the response to the resistance from these armed groups, the government acted disproportionately inhuman by targeting clans. In addition, the regime distributed weapons to

[16] United States Committee for Refugees (1980)

its allies to attack enemies that the regime had got from the external powers (Soviet Union, US, and some Arab states). On the other hand, Ethiopia had been a source of the army for opposition factions in Somalia. The awash of the country with arms has become another contributing factor for exacerbation of unrelenting civil war and refugee influx (Elmi and Barise, 2006:37; Clark, 1992/93:112).

The response reached its decisive stage when the government forces engaged in extremely harsh measure against the Isaaq clan based SNM including aerial bombardment even on those unarmed civilians in the town of Hargeisa in Northern Somalia (a city in the self-declared state of Somaliland since 1991 but still unrecognized) on May 31, 1988. This marked significant forced displacement in Somali modern history with more than 400,000 refugee flight to neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya without forgetting the parallel number internally displaced (Assefaw, 2006:64).

However, all these clan affiliated armed factions had nothing in common except ousting the dictatorial regime of Siyad Barre from power. After the end of Barre's regime in 1991, the factions even further splintered in to sub-clan level that endeavoured to establish a national government with differing mechanisms and others striving to control and maintain their clan territories. This scotched-earth policy of controlling territories, looting and destroying the assets of the 'other clans' by different armed factions dragged Somalia in to ceaseless civil war with the absence of central government. Menkhaus (2004:156) identified the situation in Somali from 1988-1992 as 'the genuine state of civil war'. At the height of the conflict in 1992, the Somali refugees reached about 800,000 that fled to the neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Yemen. In addition, nearly two million were internally displaced (Griffiths, 2003:1). Thus, the civil war has been the major driving factor for the influx of Somali people as a refugee to the neighbouring country and throughout the world.

3.1.1.4. The Man-made Famine as Driving Factor for Refugee Influx

Although famine has no single definition that everyone agrees up on, it's the catastrophic or serious food crisis (because of food availability decline, distribution to entitlement failure and political response) that result in excess death that would not have occurred in otherwise.[17] The cause of famine can be man-made, natural or both. Man-made or artificial causes for famine include deliberate or undeliberate public policy failure, oppressive political system,

[17]According UN, Famine is a triple failure of food production, people's ability to access food and political response by government and international donors.

and wars (not only by destruction of outputs and capital but also by affecting the economic incentives of production, distribution, and political incentives of public protection) among others. Natural causes for famine include drought, a natural disasters like flood, high wind and plant diseases (Sen, 2000:11; World Ecology Report, 2008).

As natural cause for famine, it's common to witness drought in the Horn of Africa in general and Somalia in particular; but not often ended-up in famine. In 1992, Somali had lost nearly half a million people in the worst man-made famine in the continent. The major implication for non-drought based famine in Somalia was that the epicentre of it had been the most productive inter-riverine agricultural region of South Somalia. The scorched-earth policy followed by the remnant of Barre's force and other military factions, looting, and blockage of aid such as food and medicine were the major causes of the famine (Mukhtar, 1996:551; Dagne, 2009:95; Samatar, 2011).

After their defeat, the remnants of Barre's army in the inter-riverine region committed destroying of everything in the villages including infrastructure, looting, and killing of the cattle for nearly one year. The region was confined by the forces and destruction of the power-addicted forces of General Muhammad Farah Aideed (the leader of United Somali Congress with Ali Mahdi Mohammed that had fought together until they ousted Barre), Barre and Morgan (Barre's son-in-law) from north, southwest and south respectively that made the area ' the triangle of death' (Mukhtar, 1996:551; Peterson, 2000:23). On the other hand, the army factions that controlled different territories had been looting and blocking the international aides from reaching to the starved population whom they considered as 'enemies'. And they started to use food as a weapon of war against farmers and pastoralists (Terdman, 2008:37; Samatar, 2011). Thus, as part of escaping the deadly man-made famine, hundreds of thousands have fled their home land and took refugees in their neighbouring countries.

Another terrible famine stubbed Somalia again in 2011. In analysing the cause of devastating famine of 2011, Abdi Samatar blamed 'the war on terror' and Ethiopia's invasion and involvement in Somalia as geopolitical causes for the famine. And internally, the weak and incapacitated Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and al-Shabaab as basic causes of the famine.

With the denial of the existence of famine and prohibition of any assistance locally by al-Shabaab and the TFG failure to have the plan or action to respond to the disaster 'nationally', the Somali faced the second major starvation with in two decades. With the failure of rainfall, much of the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Eritrea) were almost equally affected by the drought in 2010/2011 in addition to Somalia. In other areas including Somaliland and Puntland, the drought did not result in famine though there responses were inadequate. But the sever famine occurred in South and Central Somalia (the regions known by agricultural productivity in Somalia) particularly which were controlled by al-Shabaab according to the United Nations Report[18]. The al-Shabaab highly contributed for the famine by forcing out the Western aid organizations and by blocking the starving peoples from fleeing in addition to the denial of famine in the area (Gettleman, 2011). This clearly illustrated that the cause for the famine was not drought *per se*.

From international side, USA denied its aid with a fear of al-Shabaab diversion of aid to terror act though criticized by many including UN officials as the ungrounded politicization of humanitarian aid (Gettleman, 2010). The Ethiopia invasion and continued involvement in Somalia further destabilize the country by radicalizing many Somalis (as response to external threat) that contributed to the famine (Samatar, 2011; Solomon, 2014:352). Thus, with the absence defence against famine locally (al-Shabaab denial of famine and failure to assist in areas under its control), nationally (with the weakness of TFG and absence of the central government in general) and politicized and cautious response of denial internationally resulted in mainly man-made disastrous famine in Somalia for the second time. Thus, the sever famine coupled with ongoing conflict, resulted in external displacement of more half a million refugee from Somalia (Robinson et.al. 2014:29).

Therefore, the Machiavellian tactic of Barre and the all-out civil war in the post-Barre period, the scorched-earth policy of the armed factions, the man-made famine that has stubbed Somalia frequently and the involvement of international and regional actors that further fuelled the conflict have been the major causes for the flight of Somali peoples'.

From the above mentioned causes for the refugee flight from Somalia, the civil war in the post-Barre period and the resulting man-made famine that resulted refugee exodus *en masse* are mainly generalized violence rather than the product of government. In this regard, the

[18] UN News Center (2011, July 20). UN declares Famine in two regions of Southern Somalia. Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39086#.WJ7yHok97IU.

causes of refugee flight from Somalia have been mainly related to the fear of persecution that emanated from the generalized violence rather than government attributed (because there has been no central government in Somalia since 1991). In addition, the source of fear of persecution for the Somalia refugees, especially in the post-Barre era, is not mainly because of race, religion, nationality, being the member of particular social group, and/or political opinion; rather indiscriminate persecution. Thus, the OAU Refugee Convention of 1969 that includes civil strife and general public disorder as cause of refugee flight rather than the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 and 1967 Protocol that excluded the generalized danger, best fits to understand Somalia refugees.

3.1.2. The Dynamics of Somalia Refugee Flight

Nearly for the last three decades, Somalia has been engulfed with inter-clan civil war with an intermittent period of relative peace or period of *cold peace* (Allo, 2008:202). The period from 1988-1992 was mainly known for the largest influx of refugees from Somalia to the neighbouring countries and throughout the world. The combined effect of clan based civil war and man-made famine as result were the major causes for the flight. For a decade (1996-2006), relative peace prevailed in Somalia with short term and localized violence. These resulted not only in the decline of refugee flight from the country but also a significant number of repatriation from neighbouring country (Hammond, 2013).

However, in the period from mid-2006 to 2012, the relative peace shattered and renewed exodus of refugees had witnessed. At this phase, the major cause for the displacement was the military confrontation between Union of Islamic Court and Ethiopia with a green light from the USA (under the banner of intervention by TFG's invitation and self-defence) (Samatar, 2007:158; Allo, 2008:202; Hammond, 2013:62). This renewed conflict interlinked with the famine of 2011/2012 (conflict-induced famine), resulted in another period of large refugee influx. In spite of the defeat of UIC, it resulted in the birth of the Islamist militant group called al-Shabaab (has been designated as terrorist organization by the USA and its allies since 2008), dubbed as 'child of the War on Terror' (Pham, 2011:155; Hansen, 2013:5). But the War on Terror has given more war and more terror than ever in Somalia[19].

Starting from late 2011, al-Shabaab retreated back from most of Mogadishu, Kismayo and other major towns with the combined effect of pressure from AMISOM (African Mission in

[19] From 2001 to 2015, Somalia has faced 88 suicide attack that had been close to none before the specified time according to the Reality Check in Aljazeera. Accessed from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-X_lBovik_w.

Somalia), political infightings and its unpopular policies (Hammond, 2013:64; Loubser and Solomon, 2014:7). Thus, as the third phase, the Post-2012 has been considered as a period of relative calm and has renewed optimism in the country with low level of refugee flight. Nevertheless, with uncertain and rapidly changing security environment, the possibility for repatriation of refugees in its full sense has still been tough.

3.2. Causes and Dynamics of Refugee Flight from Eritrea

Eritrea, including its nomenclature, was created by the Italian colonial power in 1890 (Pool, 1980:7; Woldemikael, 2013: v). After half a century under Italian colonial rule and a decade long British administration as a protectorate (military administration from 1949 and civilian administration till 1952), Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia 1952. But in 1962, the government of Ethiopia disbanded the federation and incorporated Eritrea as part of Ethiopian province. Preceding to the official dissolution of the Federation, Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) was established and started a confrontation with Ethiopia. And later, Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) was also established in September 1961 (Markakis, 1988:58; Kibreab, 2000:250; Assefaw, 2006:43).

The intensity of the conflict and the response of Ethiopian government at a time for the guerrilla war until 1967 had not been severing and generated a sizable refugee from Eritrea. In 1967 because of the large-scale military confrontation and offensive reaction from the Ethiopian government, nearly 28,000 refugees fled the area sought asylum in Sudan (Markakis, 1988:58; Kibreab, 2000:267; Assefaw, 2006:43-45). However, from 1952 onward, a considerable number of political activists, trade union leaders and others who had been advocating Eritrean independence (from Independence Bloc) were fled to border towns in Sudan in fear of persecution though their number was not parallel to the post-1967 period. Because of their number, mixed migration (both fear of persecution and unemployment) and absence of any institution in Sudan responsible for refugee issues, they had not considered as refugees by the government of Sudan until 1967. Generally, in pre-Revolutionary Ethiopia, political persecution, economic strangulation and military measures had been the major causes for the flight of refugees from Eritrea (Wolde-Yesus, 1992: 61; Kibreab, 2000:254-68; Kibreab, 2008:397-403).

In the revolutionary period, the refugee influx from Eritrea had been highly increased because of Ethiopian counter-offensive and scorched-earth policy to silent the resistances. The disunity within and between the liberation movements had been another contributing factor

for refugees' flight. From 1972 to 1975 and in 1980/1981, there were wars between ELF and EPLF (Eritrea peoples Liberation Front) that enforced many people to uproot. The large scale military confrontation and the exodus of refugees' *en messes*, as result, had been continued until the end of the 1980s (Wolde-Yesus, 1992:82-94; Assefaw, 2006:51-53; Hepner and Tecle, 2013:380). However, the aforementioned refugees' flight and the driving factors for them were not from the state of Eritrea. Rather, it was from Eritrea which had been part of Ethiopia until 1991.

After 30 years of armed struggle, Eritrea seceded and gained *de facto* statehood in 1991 and *de jure* two years later. At the wake of secession, the optimism for development and democratization was raised with in the new state supplemented by its amicable relation with Ethiopia. However, the repression of Isaias Afewerki's regime has begun at its early stage when no party has been permitted to function openly except People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) as ruling party in February 1994 Third Part Congress of EPLF. Although the constitution that ratified in 1997 recognizes the multi-party democracy, it has not been implemented since then. After the border war with Ethiopia (1998-2000), the government has got convenient alibi to put the state under siege mentality and perpetual state of emergency (Ogbazghi, 2011:2; Kibreab, 2009a: 30; Kibreab, 2009b:42). Thus, because of the indefinite national service, religious and political persecution and slavery-like forced labour as driving factors for refugee flight, Eritrea is one of the largest refugee producing country in the world.

3.2.1. Indefinite National Service and *Warsai-Yikaalo* Development Campaign

In 1991, before the country got *de jure* statehood, Eritreans had been required to perform national service under Proclamation No.11/1991. The proclamation largely targeted the unemployed youth by exempting large categories of people from the National Service. But a few years later, it was replaced by another. The 1995 proclamation required all Eritreans (between the age of 18 and 50) to perform National Service with limited exceptions (the 30 years' war veterans and physically and mentally disabled persons)[20]. The eighteen months National Service comprises of military training for six months (since July 1994) and providing active military service and development works for twelve months. The military training consists of political indoctrinations in addition to physical and soldierly training.

[20]The National Service Proclamation No. 82/1995. Retrieved from: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8d3af4.htm (translation).

The National Service has multifaceted goals. Sustaining the freedom and sovereignty of Eritrea as a small state (both geographically and demographically) was the goal at the forefront. The service also intended to socialize and transmit the devotion and national values (enhancing national unity) of the ex-EPLF fighters to present and future generation. In addition, it aimed in promoting the physical well-being and the work ethics of the people to reconstruct the nation (National Service Proclamation, 1995).

For the nation ruined in the war for more than three decades, nothing wrong with engaging in National Service and *Warsai-Yikaalo* Development Campaign as a post-war reconstruction strategy (Kibreab, 2009b:47). The practice neither derogated from the practice of most governments with the policy of universal conscription nor international legal frameworks that Eritrea ratified[21]. However, after a bloody war with Ethiopia from 1998 to 2000, the eighteen months National Service has become open-ended and further strengthen with the introduction of *Warsai-Yikaalo* Development Campaign in May 2002. Warsai-Yikaalo Development Campaign extends the National Service indefinitely by allocating the conscripts that have been serving in the military to the development related projects and services (Aman, 2010:96; Riggan, 2016:68).

In addition to the indefinite time that the conscripts serve, the national service consists of involuntary nature with the consequence of harsh penalty (that extends from five years to death) that even extends to the families of draft evaders and deserters. The non-compliance also results in the loose of citizenship. Their families have been facing arrest unless they can afford to pay 3500 USD to the government. At the height of its involuntary nature, the government has been applying *shoot-to-kill policy* at the border of Sudan and Ethiopia on draft evaders and deserters (Kibreab, 2009b:51-52).

Beyond compulsory military service, any task including public work (if not voluntarily), falls under the purview of forced labour as per the 1957 Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour. But the conscripts of Eritrea's National Service, afar from public service, they have been forced to provide unpaid labour (or with very low payment) for the benefit of high ranking military officials, for 'partystatals' (party owned enterprises) to use the word of Christopher Clapham (2006), and government officials under the national reconstruction

[21] The Convention Concerning Forced Labour (FLC) of 1930, The Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (AFLC) of 1957 and other international Human Right Laws. Eritrea ratified both international legal instruments (FLC and AFLC) on 22 February 2000. In addition, these norms are pointed out by International Law Commission as *jus cogens* (Rozakis, 1976 as cited in Kibreab, 2009b:49).

programme (Kibreab, 2009b:48; Aman, 2010:100). The United Nations Commission of Inquiry that established by the Human Right Council in its 2016 Report[22] concluded the national service in Eritrea as 'the crime of enslavement'.

As result of this indefinite national service and compulsory labour that the conscripts forced to provide service for high ranking national officials, hundreds of thousand Eritreans have been *voting with their feet* despite the *shoot-to-kill policy* of the government.

3.2.2. The Political Repression, Ethnic and Religious Persecution

After official separation from Ethiopia and became the new state in 1993, the expectations of Eritreans and the international community toward democratization and development of Eritrea had been high. And many mainstream media and the Western states labelled Eritrea among the Renaissance African States with their new generation leaders [23](Woldemikael, 2013: vii). The optimism of Eritrean democratization has started to lapse in early 1994 when People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) became the only *vanguard* and officially recognized party in the country. The leaders publically expressed the establishment of different political parties and civil society organizations as centrifugal forces for national unity and political viability of the nation (Kibreab, 2009b:42; Woldemikael, 2013: v).

The ratification of the 1997 constitution that recognizes multiparty system in the country sparked the anticipation of democracy. However, a year later the Ethiopia-Eritrea war (1998-2000) was broken and the regime suspended the implementation of the constitution since then as part of the state of emergency. Although the war officially ended after the signing of Algiers Agreement on 12 December 2000 with Ethiopia, the *no peace no war* stalemate has continued. By exploiting this conditions under the cover of defending national security and sovereignty of the state, the regime has been governing Eritrea exceptionally (Kibreab, 2009a:38-45; Ogbazghi, 2011:8).

Under the enduring state of emergency with the cover of protecting national security and sovereignty, the constitution was suspended. This has made the leader sovereign over the population with no right and protection (Woldemikael, 2013: viii). There is no freedom of

[22] Report of the detailed findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea. Accessed from:http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIEritrea/A_HRC_32_CRP.1_read-only.pdf.
[23]The African states that dubbed as the Renaissance States with Eritrea were South Africa, Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia. And the new generation Africa leaders in the late 1990s were Isaias Afewerki, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. This notion popularized by Bill Clinton during his African journey in March 1998 though he didn't mentioned their name.

expression and any journalists or activists against the regime are subject to detention and harsh punishment. Since the 1993 referendum and election for National Constituent Assembly, no elections have ever taken place. The critics of the government and the relatives or families close to them are subject to arbitrary detention, forceful disappearance and torture according to the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights although the government rejected the report as 'totally unfounded and politically motivated campaign to undermine the political, economic, and social progress the country is making' (Aljazeera, 2015[24]; Report of Commission on Inquiry on Human Right in Eritrea, 2016:24-25).

In addition to political repressions, ethnic based persecutions have been witnessed in Eritrea since the end of the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean War. The ethnic Kunama people that consist of two percent of the Eritrean total population have been subjected to Eritrean government's retaliation campaign as collaborator with Ethiopia for not fleeing or resisting during the war or 'expected amount of enmity vis-à-vis the Ethiopians. As result, the peoples have been subjected to forced disappearance, extra-judicial killing and detention. To escape the persecution, thousands of Kunamas fled to Ethiopia (Abbink, 2001:451).

In Eritrea, the 1995 religious proclamation recognized the religious plurality in the country and stipulated the separation of state and religion. This was further strengthened by the unimplemented constitution of 1997. Up until the very beginning of 21st Century (1991-2000), the freedom of religion was respected with few instances of persecution. But in 2002, the government ordered the closure of all religious groups except four officially recognized ones: 'Islam (Sunni sect); the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church; the Eritrean catholic Church; and the Eritrean Evangelical Church as part of Lutheran World Federation)'. This resulted in religious persecution of all other religious group followers except the recognized ones and they have been also targeted by the regime (Mekonnen and Selam, 2014:244).

The Jehovah's Witnesses have been subjected to religious persecution since 1993 that related to their refusal to participate in the referendum. The manifestations of their persecutions include confiscation of properties, arbitrary detention and revocation of their citizenship as result of being conscientious objectors. Other minority religious groups such as Pentecostals, Born Again Christians, Seventh Day Adventists, Buddhists, and Baha'is have also been

[24] Aljazeera News (2015, July 31). Eritrea blames human exodus on human trafficking. Retrieved from: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/eritrea-blames-migrant-exodus-human-trafficking-150731053318736.html.

suffering from detention and closure of churches since the 2002 decree. Eritrean Muslims (Wahhabis) have also been suffering from religious persecution which barley reflected with the detention of dozens of students who belong to the Islamic religious group-Wahhabism. Hundreds of Muslim clerics who opposed the government intervention in the appointment of their religious leaders were also subjected to detention and enforced appearance (Kibreab, 2009b:57; Report of Commission on Inquiry on Human Right in Eritrea, 2016:160). These implicate that peoples have been subjected to persecutions for reason of political opinion and for being the member of specific religious groups. These well-founded fears of persecutions enforced them to flee their country and have made Eritrea among one of the fastest emptying countries in the world by uprooting five thousand refugees per month according to UNHCR Report of 2015.

Therefore, significantly since 2001, universal, compulsory and open-ended National Service and its concomitant *Warsai-Yikaalo* Development Campaign, repressive political environment (suppression of voice), persecution for being the member of a particular religion groups and a gross human violation have been the major driving factors for haemorrhaging of Eritreans.

Although the above mentioned factors are the major factors for the Eritrean refugees flight *en mass*, the diaspora culture and the resulting imitative character of the 'prospective refugees' also played important role at least in intensifying their exodus (Assefaw, 2013). According to the UNICEF estimation of 1994, from 3-3.5 million population of Eritrea, around one million had fled the country (Plaut, 2016:169). The prior settlement of these large population of the country (either as refugees or migrants) in developed countries with better socio-economic and political conditions encourage the people to considered exile as an option. In addition, it enables the refugees to make a considerable decision by having important information about the country of further flight thereby 'lowering their threshold of tolerance for hardships' (Assefaw, 2013:4; Collier and Hoeffler, 2014). Thus, the diaspora culture as pull factor for the refugees' flight has contributed its part for the Eritrean haemorrhaging and also impacted the refugees' local integration with the host communities in the first country of asylum which will be discussed in chapter five.

CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND POLICY DIRECTIONS OF HOSTING REFUGEES IN ETHIOPIA

4. Introduction

This chapter discusses the historical trajectory of refugees hosting in Ethiopia and the policy directions of the successive regimes in the country. The chapter has three major sections. The first sections provides the historical overview of refugee hosting experience in Ethiopia. The second section analyses the policy response of the country in different period and factors that have been shaping the country's reaction to the influx of refugees from different countries beyond humanitarian hospitability. In addition, this section examines the countries 'open-door policy' towards hosting refugees. The final section discusses the encampment policy of the country and few exceptions for the refugees of different countries to settle legally in Addis Ababa. The push and pull factors for the Eritrean and Somali refugees to settle in Addis Ababa and their settlement pattern in specific area is also discussed under the section.

4.1. Historical Overview of Hosting Refugee in Ethiopia

Ethiopia has a long history of being a sanctuary for those fleeing from different forms of persecution in their homeland. The Ethiopia's welcoming culture of hosting refugee date back to Muslims refugees that fled the persecution of Quraysh in early 7th Century A.D and got hospitable reception by the then king and people (Sergew, 1972:182). This historical trend has also been continued in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century's, and after the beginning of First World War when Ethiopia had afforded asylum for those Armenians that escaped the Ottoman Turkey Empires' massacres (Pankhurst, 1981:267). In the period of Africans struggle against colonialism, Ethiopia had been a sanctuary and source of support for numerous refugees from different African countries mainly from South Africa, South West Africa/Namibia, and Zimbabwe (Khasiani, 1984:29; Wondewosen, 1995:7; Belete, 2012).

Horn of Africa is mainly characterized by producing and hosting of refugees due to interstate and intrastate conflict and Ethiopia is not the exception. The mass influx of refugee to Ethiopia has begun in the late of 1960s with the outbreak of the first civil war in Sudan (Johnson, 2003:21; Assefaw, 2006:67). The disagreement within Sudan (between North and South) preceded the independence of the state in 1956 that clearly magnified the patchwork from the beginning. The nature of state (unitary vs. federal), the issue of religion (secular vs.

Islam as state religion), and national identity (Sudanism vs. Islamic identity with overpowering Arabism) had been the major points of divergence between the North and South (Johnson, 2003:21; Assefaw, 2006:67; Kalpakian, 2006:47).

The disagreement had grown and turned into civil war in 1963 between the northerners dominated central government and the southern forces (Anya-Nya). The guerrilla warfare tactic of the Anya-Nya and the government's brutal response by targeting the civilians' life and livelihood resulted in the uprooting of thousands internally and more than 172, 000 fled to the neighbouring countries- Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Congo, and Uganda. According to the UNHCR Online Database[25], at the end of 1969, 20000 Sudanese refugees (from the south) had found asylum in Ethiopia that marked the first mass refugee influx to Ethiopia. The signing of agreement between the government of Sudan and the Southern Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Addis Ababa resulted in subsiding of the war (Kasfir, 1977:143). As result, a significant number of refugees from Ethiopia repatriated to their homeland. Thus, in the period from late the 1960s to 1983, Ethiopia had hosted the refugees mainly from the Southern part of Sudan with the average of 13,300 per year (UNHCR Online Data Base, 2016).

The period from 1984-1997, Ethiopia had become a sanctuary for a large number of refugees in the country's history. The abrogation of Addis Ababa Accord in 1983 by the Khartoum government and the resulting Second Civil War was responsible for the sheer increase of refugee flight from the southern part of Sudan to Ethiopia and other neighbouring countries. In addition to the conflict between the government and the South, the intra-South conflict had contributed a lot for acute refugee flight from Sudan (Assefaw, 2006).

The attack of the Somalia National Movement (SNM) on the Barre's force in Hargeisa and the brutal response of the government in 1988 marked the beginning of the dire refugee flight from Somalia with the lion share influx to Ethiopia. Thus, refugee entry to Ethiopia reached 773,764 in 1990 (UNHCR Online Data Base, 2016).

With the significant repatriation of Somali refugees to Somaliland and the existence of relative calm also in other parts of Somalia, the number of Somali refugees settled in Ethiopia had declined progressively from 1998 to 2008. According to UNHCR Report of 2002[26],

[25] UNHCR Online Data Base (2016). Retrieved from: http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview.
[26] UNHCR and WFP Collaboration Bulletin, 22 May 2003. Accessed from: http://www.unhcr.org/4e1ee78a0.pdf.

about 250,000 Somali refugees repatriated to their country that resulted in the closure of seven refugee Camps out of eight as of May 2005 'for good' (Moret et al. 2006:34).

On the other hand, from the second half of the 1990s, the refugee flight from south Sudan had decreased mainly because of the strength of the South Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) that enabled it to provide protection in large areas for civilians. The Sudanese Second Civil War that had continued for more than two decades, culminated with the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 that resulted in sharp decline of new refugee influx from south Sudan and repatriation to some extent (Assefaw, 2006).

Although the period from 1998-2008 witnessed a decline in the refugee influx in general, the Eritrean refugees have become the new refugee group influx to Ethiopia since the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrea War (1998-2000). The strengthened repression with forced labour force and indefinite national service in Eritrea since 2001 (Bundegaard, 2004; Kibreab, 2009b), the Ethiopian involvement in Somalia in 2006 and 'an extraordinary sequence of political shocks in 2006 and 2007' that resulted in the catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Somalia in the succeeding years (Menkhaus, 2007:357), and the ongoing civil war since 2013 in the youngest state of South Sudan resulted in another period of sharp increase in the mass influx of refugees to Ethiopia. According to the UNHCR Report of March 2017, Ethiopia is the fifth most refugees hosting country with 829, 925 refugees from twenty-one countries. More than 94% are from the neighbouring states of South Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea.

Table 1. Number Refugees from different Countries in Ethiopia

No.	Refugee country	Number	Percent (%)	Remark
1	South Sudan	366,198	44.1	
2	Somalia	246,742	29.7	
3	Eritrea	168,447	20.3	
4	Sudanese	41,031	5,	
5	Yemenis	1643	0.2	
6	Others•	5864	0.7	
	Total	829,925	100	

- The source countries are mainly the Great Lake Region (Rwanda, Burundi, Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda). In addition, there are few refugees from the following countries: Afghanistan, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Tanzania).

Source: UNHCR Factsheet and EOC-DICAC Report as of March 2017.

4.2. Policy Response to Refugee in Ethiopia

Ethiopia has been praised for its culture of generosity and hospitability of hosting refugees from different states for a long period with open-door policy (Khasiani, 1984:31; UNHCR, 2014). Assefa (1992) and Awoke (2011), argue that humanitarian benevolence and historical hospitability as the major driving factors for Ethiopian hosting of refugees. However, it's important to recognize the underpinning considerations and driving factors behind the principles and practices of refugee policy without entirely discounting the culture of hospitability that Ethiopia has. The policy response towards hosting refugees in Ethiopia has been driven by diverse but mutually inclusive factors: its relation with refugee producing state, national security concern, the need for assistance from international refugee regimes, state capacity to control its border, and calculation to have political reputation rather than mere humanitarian hospitality.

Consistent with the refugee policies of African states at large, the open-door refugee policy of Ethiopia in the 1960s and 1970s had been mainly driven by the ideology of Pan-Africanism and anti-colonial struggle (Ibrahim, 1987 as cited in Wondewosen, 1995:7; Rutinwa, 1999; Belete, 2012). Moreover, Ethiopia's relation with the refugee producing countries had played a great role in the above specified period. From 1956-1964, Ethiopia had an amicable relation with the UMMA-led government of Khartoum that resulted in restrictive policy towards refugees from south Sudan and denial of the existence of any refugee in Ethiopia's territory. This restrictive measures even reached the level of closing the border for refugees and rejecting the offer of UNHCR assistance to refugees in 1963. However, after the 1964 coup, the government of Katim Khalifa had publicly pronounced its support to the Eritrean Liberation Front. As retaliation for Sudan's publicizing of the existence of about three hundred thousand Eritrean refugees in its territory, Ethiopia allowed the presence of around twenty thousand south Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia thereby exploited the refugee issues to internationalize the problem of south Sudan (Belete, 2012:67).

The retaliation measure on the side of Ethiopia continued in the era of Derg since the mid-1980s as a response for the Niemer's intensive support for the cause of Eritrean secessionists. During this time, the Ethiopian government rejected the refugees' self-sufficiency scheme proposed by UNHCR and preferred encampment instead. The major reasons were showing the world that Ethiopia was not only producing refugees, but also hosting them thereby obtaining international reputation. In addition, Ethiopian government wanted to

internationalize the problem of the south Sudan as retaliation measure for the Khartoum's support of insurgent groups in Ethiopia. Moreover, the Ethiopian government allowed the South Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army to administer the refugee camps that made the camps in the western Ethiopia– the most politicized camp in the world (Assefaw, 2006:87).

After the fall of Derg in 1991, the EPRDF government expelled the SPLM/A from Ethiopian territory as payback for the Sudan's government favour and support for TPLF and EPLF during their war with Derg. Although the EPRDF-led government had not officially ordered the refugees to leave, with the ousting of the SPLM/A, which had been administering the camp, around 280,000 south Sudan's refugees went back to Sudan (Assefaw, 2006; Belete, 2013).

Similarly, the Ethiopia's policy orientation towards the Eritrean refugees has been directed by the country's relations with the government of Eritrea in the post Ethio-Eritrea border war (Webster, 2011:23). In addition, the institutional set-up that has been responsible for managing the issue of refugees in Ethiopia has clearly shown how the issue of hosting refugees bears a resemblance to national security issue than humanitarian. From 1963 to 1988, Relief and Rehabilitation Commission under the Ministry of Interior had been responsible for management of refugee issue as part of national security agenda (Khasiani, 1984:33). Since 1988, Administration for Refugee and Returnee Authority (ARRA) has been administering the refugee issue as high policy agenda under Ministry of Interior (1988-1994), Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs (1994-2004) and National Intelligence and Security Service (since 2004). Thus, under the successive regimes the issue of refugee has been the high policy agenda in Ethiopia and part of national security and foreign policy. Furthermore, unlike many African countries that provided responsibility of administering refugees to other bodies mainly UNHCR, the Ethiopian government has been taking primary responsibility through the aforementioned institutions throughout the three regimes which shows the sensitivity of the refugee issue as high policy agenda.

Discussing the openness of the refugee hosting policy, according to Milner (2009), the open-door policy can be classified as quantitative and qualitative. When the countries permit the physical presence of refugees in their own territory with limited social, economic and freedom of movement, the policy response dubbed as open-door policy quantitatively. Qualitatively open-door policy towards refugees includes granting of wider economic and social rights such as the right to work, access to education and health care service and the

freedom of movement. Until 2004, Ethiopia's legal responsibility and the directing policy towards hosting refugees had been mainly guided by the 1951 UN Convention of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol as well as the 1969 OAU Convention on Refugees that the country acceded.

Ethiopia acceded to these global and regional refugee instruments with the reservation on the articles that grant the refugees with the right to movement, education, health care service, and employment, own and dispose of property. To this end, the Ethiopian refugee policy fits quantitative openness than the qualitative one. In 2004, the aforementioned instruments incorporated to the municipal law under Refugee Proclamation No. 409/2004. Although the proclamation is praised for the incorporation of both UN 1951 and the OAU 1969 definition of refugee and prohibition of detention and persecution for any illegal entry, it persisted with the reservation that preceded it.

In addition to the above-mentioned factors, the state capacity to control its border should also be noted. Like many other African countries, Ethiopian borders are porous, inadequately policed and not delimited. This limitation in capacity has been further aggravated by the political violence domestically. In the late 1980s, the Derg government was more preoccupied with its war with the TPLF and EPLF in the north. This incapacitated the government to control the border and that resulted in the influx of Somalia refugees to Ethiopia in addition to its support for the Somalia National Movement (SNM) and retaliation response for Barre's support for Western Somalia Liberation Movement (WSLM). As result, the refugees not only settled in the camps and rural areas spontaneously; but also in urban areas at large (Ciabarri, 2008:78).

Thus, humanitarian hospitability or what Milner (2009) called 'traditional hospitability' cannot be a sufficient explanation for the open-door policy of Ethiopia even in a quantitative manner. Rather, the rationale for its openness incorporates the interstate relation with the refugee producing state, the state capacity to control the influx of refugees and calculation of international refugee regimes assistance and reputation.

4.3. Refugees in Addis Ababa

Addis Ababa, as a permanent capital of Ethiopia, was found in 1886. Since its' foundation, different foreigners such as Greeks, Armenians, Indians and Arabs among others have been living in Ethiopia. At the wake of its foundation, the city had afforded sanctuary for those Armenian refugees under Emperor Menelik II that fled the persecution of the Ottoman Empire. By fleeing the massacre in their homeland under the Ottoman Empire in 1894 and under Turkey 1909, many Armenians fled to Ethiopia and settled in Addis Ababa, Harar and Dire Dawa (Garretson, 2000:59-67; Pankhurst, 1981:267). According to Garretson (2000:66), 'Ethiopia became a reliable….haven for the Armenian Diasporas after the Ottoman and Turkish persecution of Armenians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century…and lived in the capital more than any foreign group'. This trend continued under the regency of Ras Teferi Mekonnen (later Emperor Haile Selassie I) when Ethiopia gave refuge for forty orphan refugees (*Arba Lijoch*) of Armenia. Beyond providing a haven, Armenian refugees were well entrenched commercially and had the right to work freely in Ethiopia including within the palace and other cities in the country thereby contributed to the development of Addis Ababa (Pankhurst, 1981:271).

This Ethiopian culture of generosity and policy response for the refugees, however, had faced challenges with the influx of refugees from neighbouring states in the post-independent period. Until 2004, although Ethiopia did not have a comprehensive policy dealing with refugees, the successive regimes have been known for providing camps for refugee settlement (by themselves or in collaboration with international refugee regimes) rather than encouraging self-settlement. In assessing the Ethiopian refugee hosting policy, Khasiani (1984) acclaimed the openness of the refugee reception policy to the height of *de jure* integration by naturalization though he did not substantiate his argument based on empirical evidence. Ethiopian has been known for its encampment policy consistent with many African states. The explanations for the policy direction are the real and apparent consideration of refugee as a security threat, economic burden and politically publicizing the issue of refugee vis-à-vis the refugee-sending state. Currently, Ethiopia has twenty-five refugee camps which are managed by the government (UNHCR, 2016)[27].

[27] UNHCR Newsletter of December 31, 2016. Accessed from: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/53439.

According to the Ethiopia Refugee Proclamation No.409/2005 Art.21 (2):

> *…the Head of Authority (the security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority) may designate places and areas in Ethiopia within which recognized refugees, persons who have applied for recognition as refugees and family members thereof shall live, provided that the areas designated shall be located at reasonable distance from the border of their country of origin or of former habitual residence.*

This clearly stipulates the encampment policy that the country has been implementing thereby ruling-out refugee settlement in the urban area with few authorized exceptions. According to ARRA, specialized medical reason, protection concerns, and higher education cases are the three major exceptions where by the refugees get the opportunity to settle in the urban areas with monthly allowance and other assistance. When the refugees face serious medical cases which are beyond the capacity of health institutions in and around the refugee camps, then the refugees are referred to health center in Addis Ababa and get the chance to settle in the city. Under protection concern, refugees who face serious security risk based on clan, religion or other factors, and refugees with high profile, get permission to settle in Addis Ababa as permitted and assisted urban refugees[28].

Another ground for the urban settlement that has been provided in terms of the opportunity only for Eritrean refugees since 2010 is the *Out-of-Camp Policy (OCP)*. The scheme allows self-sufficient Eritrean refugees to settle in any part of the country including urban areas. Thus, unless for one or more of the aforementioned exceptions, the refugees are required to settle in camps.

Irrespective of those few opportunities to settle in urban areas, there are a lot of factors in the camps that push the refugees to quite camps, and pull aspects in urban areas (relatively better socio-economic conditions) that attracts the refugees to settle in urban areas of Ethiopia in general and Addis Ababa in particular. Inhospitable condition in the camps, absence or limited access to services like education, health care, and security problem with protracted situation in camps are the major push factors for refugees to settle in Addis Ababa and other urban areas (Moret et al. 2006:34). In addition, most of the refugee camps in Ethiopia are found in the periphery of the country that suffers from poor economic condition and social

[28]Interview with Haile Selassie Gebremariam, April 2, 2017.

infrastructures even prior to refugee settlement (Dereje, 2009:650). In line with Jacobsen (1996) argument, regardless of government policy that necessitated the refugee settlement in designated areas, the government often lacks capability to enforce the restrictive law and turn blind eye for the issue of urban refugees. As of March 2017 ARRA data estimation, Addis Ababa has more than 192,000 permitted and unpermitted refugees from different countries.

Table 2. Status of Refugees settled in Addis Ababa

No.	Categories of refugees and asylum seekers in Addis Ababa	Number	Remark
1	Assisted Urban Refugees	4104	
2	Unassisted Urban Refugees	16,000	Out-of-Camp Policy Beneficiaries (Eritrean Refugees)
3	Non-Permit Holders	12,000	Estimation (registered as refugees in camps but settled in Addis Ababa in unpermitted manner)
4	Unregistered Asylum Seekers	More than 160,000	Mainly Somali Refugees[29]

Source: Report of Assisted Urban refugees by DICAC as of March 31, 2017 and interview with ARRA Refugees Protection Department, April 12, 2017.

[29]Haile Selassie Gebremariam *op.st.* and as cited by Alemayehu *et al.* (2010).

4.3.1. Why Addis Ababa—Bole Michael for Somali Refugees and Mebrat Hail for Eritrean Refugees?

Fig. 1. Map of Bole sub-City Woreda 1 around Bole Michael



Source: Addis Ababa City Administration, Urban Planning and Information Institute, 2016.

Figure 2. Map of Nefas Silk Lafto Sub-City Woreda 6 around Gofa Mebrat Hail



Source: Addis Ababa City Administration, Urban Planning and Information Institute, 2016.

As explained in the preceding sections, there are pull factors that attract refugees to settle in an urban areas. Better security, economic self-reliance, better service (education and health), preferable places for secondary movement, to negotiate with international agencies for

resettlement and existence of financial institutions in cities (since incomes of most of urban refugees depends up on remittance) are among the pull factors for the refugees to settle in urban areas (Fábos and Kibreab, 2007:7). Addis Ababa, as both economic and political capital of Ethiopia, refugees especially with an urban background, choice Addis Ababa for access to better social services such as education, health in addition to better economic opportunity to be self-sufficient.

This rationale is true for both Eritrean and Somali refugees that have settled in Addis Ababa. According to Somali refugee respondents they preferred Addis Ababa mainly because of better education for their children, health service, and accessibility to get remittance, and opportunity for them to have income rather than sit and wait in the camp for monthly ration for an indefinite period of time[30]. The Moret et al. (2006) study on the path of Somali refugees also implicated the hard living experience as the major driving factor for refugees to settle in the urban area even without being documented. Similarly, the Eritrean refugees, prefer Addis Ababa due to better social services, and access to have remittance in Addis Ababa in addition to its significance as negotiating place for resettlement and illegal secondary movement[31].

Refugees, as forced migrants from their homeland, the push factors in their country play a significant role than the pull factors in the host country (Kunz, 1973:132). But after crossing the international boundary, though limited, refugees make choice for their settlement depending upon different factors. Prior experience in the host country, social network, refugees' background (from urban or rural areas), states willingness or capability to determine the type and form of the settlement are among the factors that determine refugee settlement in the host state.

Social networks, as sources of information, material and emotional resources play an important role for refugee settlement in particular area (Jacobsen, 2006:282). According to the study of Gail Hopkins (2006) on the Somali refugees in London and Toronto, in choosing their settlement destination, the prior existence of communities from ethnic group or nationality plays a great role. This again reflected in Somali refugees' settlement in Eastleigh of Nairobi (Campbell, 2006).

[30] Focus Group Discussion with Somali Refugees, January 14, 2017.
[31]Focus Group Discussion with Eritrean refugees, February 19, 2017.

The preceding settlement of Ethiopian Somali in Bole Michael has played leading role in the settlement of Somali refugees in the area. More specifically, the person called Jamma has played important role for making Bole Michael 'a little Mogadishu'. According to Somali refugee respondents, that is also shared by host communities, Jamma has been providing almost all kind of services for refugees such as guesthouse, shops for those who engaged in different business, bus service from Jigjiga to Bole Michael (through Jammac Jiis Bus) and health service through Jamma Clinic. In addition, Jamma provided telephone services for refugees to have contact with their families and relatives abroad (even in the time when only Ethio-telecom had been providing the service) and the *hawala* service (means transfer in Arabic). These are justifications shared by many refugee respondents for their selection of Bole Michael for their settlement. The interview with Jamma also confirmed the refugees' justification[32]. The initial aim of the refugees when they settle in the area was mainly to facilitate the process of resettlement in the Middle East and Western countries. With the dwindling opportunity for resettlement left many refugees with no solution but started to engage themselves in a different business in Bole Michael[33].

For example, in Toronto, for the selection of specific site or district of settlement within the city, the clan affiliation of the refugees, as important livelihood coping mechanism, has played significant role in Somali refugee settlement in Toronto: Daarod and Hawiye clan members tend to live in Etobicoke, West Toronto, and Isaaq clan members in York, North York, and Scarborough (Hopkins, 2006). This trend again clearly reflected in the settlement pattern and decision making of Somali refugees in Addis Ababa in general and Bole Michael in particular. In Bole Michael, there are sites that got their name after clan in Somalia such as *Jiira*[34] *Marhan* and *Jiira Majartain*.

On the other hand, the prior experience of refugees in Ethiopia has played an important role for Eritrean refugees in choosing their settlement in Gofa Mebrat Hail. Before their deportation after the outbreak of 1998-2000 bloody war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, there had been many Eritreans in different parts of the country as Ethiopian citizens. One of the refugees with prior experience stated that:

[32]Interview with Jamma from the host community, January 16, 2017.
[33]Focus Group Discussion with Somali refugees, January 14, 2017.
[34]To loosely define the word ***Jiira***, it means a curve or specific settlement in Somali language.

> *Many Eritreans, including me, had been here (Mebrat Hail) as the resident for a long period of time before we deported to Eritrea during Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2000. Most Eritreans here had garages, and different wood and metal working center. That is why many refugees followed those who have prior experience of living in this area.*[35]

This prior experience has created fertile ground for other refugees to settle in the area. In addition, the presence of co-ethnic group (Ethiopian Tigreans') has created an important social network for the settlement of many Eritreans in Mebrat Hail. This contradicts with the argument of Webster (2011) that Eritrean refugees prefer dispersed kind of settlement for sake of anonymity (mainly for security reasons) by diluting their identity in Addis Ababa. The finding of this study shows, however, that because of the large settlement of Eritrean refugees in Gofa Mebrat Hail, the respondents from the host community considered even Ethiopian ethnic Tigreans as Eritrean refugees[36]. In addition, the names of different sites in Mebrat Hail is well known not only by refugees but also by host community got their names after Eritreans, such as *Asmara Adebaby* (Asmara Squares*), Cinema Impero (*areas with the house design similar with *Cinema Impero* in Asmara*), Godana Harinet* (Liberation Street) are another strong implication for visible settlement of Eritrean refugees in Addis Ababa.

Both Eritrean and Somali refugees preferred certain area for different reasons. The Eritrean refugees' preference of Gofa Mebrat is mainly related to the prior experience of some refugees in the area and the newcomers also followed the existing network. On the other hand, the presence of co-ethnic Somali in Bole Michael has contributed important role for the selection of the district by the refugees' settlement. This settlement pattern of the refugees in concentrated manner has its own impact on the local integration process that will be discussed in the next chapter.

[35]Interview with Teklay Hagos, January 27, 2017.
[36]Focus Group Discussion with the host community, February 25, 2017.

CHAPTER FIVE

ASSESSING THE LOCAL INTEGRATION OF ERITREAN AND SOMALI REFUGEES IN ADDIS ABABA

5. Introduction

As it discussed under chapter two, local integration, is among three durable solutions for the refugee problem (repatriation and resettlement are the remaining ones). Local integration is a multidimensional process that consists of the economic, social, legal, and political aspects. In the countries of resettlement, the level of refugee integration with the hosts' is determined by the following variables: employment, education, health service and finally naturalization (Ager and Strang, 2004). In developing countries in general and Africa in particular, however, host governments policy directions and practices discourage integration and prefer encampment and segregated rural settlements instead with the exception of Republic of South Africa and Egypt with all limitations (Kibreab, 1989; Malkki, 1996; Karadawi, 1999).

The concept of integration is chaotic and understood by different scholars differently, but it has basic indicators in assessing the local integration of refugees with the host communities. When refugees live among or alongside the host population without fear of exploitation and discrimination from both the host communities and the local authorities, it's the indication for the process of socio-cultural integration (Jacobsen, 2001:9; Crisp, 2004:1); economically, the progressive attainment of self-sufficiency and the level of living standard (their livelihood strategies) in comparison to host communities in addition to active engagement in different economic activities are the major indicators for local integration of refugees with the host communities. Refugees' ability to pursue their livelihood has impacted the status of refugees in the host country in general and in urban areas in particular.

Like many African states, Ethiopia also ruled-out local integration of refugees as among durable solution for refugee integration. However, more than 20,000 legally recognized and more than 170,000 undocumented refugees that government sources confirmed (the estimate for undocumented refugees should be taken with a pinch of salt as there is no way they would be able to know their exact number) have been settled in Addis Ababa for more than two decades. Among them, Eritrean and Somali refugees take the lion share.

Therefore, this chapter mainly assess the local integration of Eritrean and Somali refugees with the host community in Gofa Mebrat Hail and Bole Michael in Addis Ababa respectively.

The chapter has two major sections. The first section discusses the existing level of Eritrean and Somali refugees' integration in comparative manner by using different parameters. In addition, the chapter discusses status of the refugees and how they resist the state control in addition to their livelihood strategies and interaction with the host communities are also discussed under this section. The second section critically analyses factors that impacted the local integration process from refugees, host community, and policy perspective. It addresses the level of local integration of the two refugee groups with the host communities' comparatively.

5.1. Fluidity of Somali and Eritrean Refugees Status in Addis Ababa

The Ethiopian Refuge Proclamation No.409/2004 defined refugee in an inclusive manner by incorporating both UN Refugee Convention of 1951 and OAU Convention of 1969 under Article 4. According to ARRA Legal Protection Department, the refugees and asylum seekers can be categorized into four major groups: Assisted Urban Refugees, Unassisted Urban Refugees (Eritrean Refugees who are beneficiary of Out-of-Camp Policy), Non-permit Holders (those refugees from camps without permission to settle in urban areas), and Unregistered Asylum Seekers (mainly Somali refugees)[37]. UNHCR Report of March 2017 indicates that 594 Eritrea and 853 Somali Assisted Urban Refugees are settled in Addis Ababa either to get special medical service or for justifications in relation to security of the refugee. These groups get legally authorized document from ARRA that enable them to get a monthly allowance from DICAC. In addition, the Out-of-Camp Policy, provided the Eritrean refugees who are self-sufficient to live in the area that they choose to live with relatives outside the camp since 2010[38]. These groups of refugees have special ID card that identifies them as Out-of-Camp beneficiary.

Refugees of all nationality outside the aforementioned scope (both non-permit holders and unregistered asylum seekers) are considered as illegal though not subjected to arbitrary detention. Ethiopia has been praised for granting freedom from arbitrary detention for illegal entry or presence under Art.13 (6) of the Refugee Proclamation (Webster, 2011). The legal and institutional commitment of Ethiopian government cannot be something underestimated. However, most states in Africa and the Horn states in particular, not only share border, but

[37]Haile Selassie Gebremariam *op.st*.
[38]Haile Selassie Gebremariam *op.st*. (Although being self-sufficient is a necessary justification to become the beneficiary of Out-of-Camp Policy, ARRA doesn't have strict checking mechanism about the level of refugees' self-sufficiency according to Haile Selassie).

people with common history, culture, ethnic group, religion and way of life that enabled the refugees to defy state control in addition to limitation of the state capacity to control its border. The existence of this shared identity and limit in the state capacity paved the way for invisible integration of people across the border disregard of state policy directions (Mengisteab and Bereketeab, 2012:102).

The status of both Eritrean and Somali refugees in Addis Ababa is highly fluid. Both refugee groups have the same ethnic groups that share almost everything in common in Ethiopia (Ethiopian Somali ethnic group for Somali refugees and Tigrean ethnic group in both Eritrea and Ethiopia).This enabled the refugees to have Ethiopian passport as Ethiopian citizen regardless of government restrictive policy. One of the Somali refugee respondents revealed that he has three passports of three countries while his status is considered as a refugee by Ethiopian government (Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Djibouti).

According to him:

> *I have been living in Addis Ababa for the last two decades with some times to Djibouti and Somaliland. I got Ethiopian ID card from Ethiopia Somali Regional State and passport with that ID card. And I got Djibouti passport in my stay there for one and half a year. Then Somaliland passport*[39].

According to Somali refugee respondent 'I am a Somali refugee when I approach ARRA and UNHCR, whereas I am purely Ethiopian when it demands'[40]. The local authorities also confirmed the difficulty that they face in identifying Ethiopian Somali and Somali refugees and the absence of any compiled data with the regard to Somali refugees in the area[41].

The majority of Somali refugee respondents have an Ethiopian passport or ID card. Moret et al. (2006) study reinforces the above claim that Somali refugees purchase Ethiopian ID, especially from Ethiopia Somali Regional State to have access to work and legal residence. The majority of the respondents, however, illustrated that it has been very tough to get ID from Ethiopia Somali Regional State since 2006 (mainly related to Ethiopian intervention in Somalia). These days they prefer to purchase Addis Ababa Residential ID card instead. As

[39]Interview with Anonymous 1, January 25, 2017.
[40]Interview with Anonymous 2, January 25, 2017.
[41] Interview with Yohanis Mezgebu and Haile-Meskel Eshetu, January 12, 2017.

means of resisting state authority, refugees exploit negotiating[42] the enforcement efforts mainly through corruptions as one mechanism. In explaining how the refugees get ID card in Addis Ababa or in the Somali Regional State, one respondent said 'money can ease the challenge'. Parallel to this finding, refugees in Lusaka buy residential cards as a way to avoid their exploitation by local police officers and illegality (Frischkorn, 2015:219). Similarly, the presence of Kenyan Borena facilitated the acquisition of work permit (though not permitted legally in Kenya) in Nairobi for Ethiopian refugees, from Oromo ethnic group (Campbell, 2005:13).

On the other hand, Eritrean refugees who claim as *amiche* [43](those were born in Ethiopia to Eritrean parents, and deported with their families as the border war began), argued about the possibility of re-acquire Ethiopian nationality though it's at the expense of their refugee status. Article 22 of 2003 the Ethiopian Nationality Law[44] stated that a person who was an Ethiopian national and who has acquired foreign nationality by law shall be re-admitted upon his request to Ethiopian nationality when he returns to Ethiopian domicile and renouncing his previous nationality. But the law provided three measure conditions for re-claiming Ethiopian nationality rather than automatically given as of right: return to Ethiopian domicile (a person's intention to permanently or indefinitely reside in the country)[45], renouncing their Eritrean nationality, and applying for Security, Immigration, and Refugee Affairs Authority.

As result, re-acquiring Ethiopian nationality is very difficult, if not impossible, for reasons related to both the refugees and the government. First, majority of the refugees including *amiches*' do not considered Ethiopia as their place of permanent settlement. In addition, since the Ethiopian nationality law doesn't permit dual citizenship, the Eritrean refugees consider denouncing their nationality as betrayal of their country by citing the cost that they had paid for thirty years to secede from Ethiopia[46]. From Ethiopian government part, with the stalemate of '*no peace no war'* condition between the two countries, it may not be such easy

[42] Negotiating rights by the refugees: The way that the refugees get access to what they need out of formal policy directions that includes corruption, religious ties and/or co-ethnic group or clan identification in the areas of settlement (Polzer, 2009).
[43]The refugees adopted the name *Amiche* from Italian drama of Michelangelo Antonioni - *Le Amiche* that shows when a young woman returns to her home town of Turin to set her life from Rome.
[44]Ethiopian Nationality Proclamation No.378/2003.
[45]According to *Ethiopian Civil Code* Art.183, domicile is defined as 'The domicile of a person is the place where such person has established the principal seat of his business and of his interests, with the intention of living there permanently'.
[46]Interview with Anonymous 1 and 2, on February 3 and 4, 2017 respectively.

for Eritrean refugees to be naturalized[47]. Thus, although it seems legal loophole that enables *amiches'* to re-acquire their previous Ethiopian nationality and to integrate in *de jure* manner, the challenges from both refugees and the inter-state relations (both historical and ongoing) makes it very tough.

As mentioned above, most of the respondents do not prefer formal naturalization at the expense of their refugee status[48] even its possible. Because they don't want to lose the opportunity for resettlement though the prospect is far from rosy and other allowance benefits that they have been getting as refugees in addition to their sense of nationality. Instead, they prefer to have Ethiopian ID card in an informal way mainly to have access to work that refugees do not have rather than to get access to legal residence like Somali refugees. The refugees use corruption and co-ethnic ties in the area as a means to get the ID card[49]. In a similar manner, urban refugees in Cairo do not need to acquire Egyptian Residence Permit that undermines the chance of resettlement according to Grabska (2016) research finding. Thus, both refugee groups of Eritrea and Somali in respective areas resist state control of formal prohibition of work permit and limit on freedom of movement for refugees by making their status fluid.

Many scholars in the area[50] and international refugee regimes argued about the significance of legal framework and formal policy directions towards work permit for local integration of refugees with the host community. In contrary, most of the African countries including Ethiopia prohibit refugees' engagement in income generating activities and settlement in the urban area with few exceptions. But the refugees are not passive actors in the process; rather they have subverted the legal constraints of the state through local informality (negotiating with local officials mainly through corruption) and through their co-ethnic groups in Ethiopia. This enabled both Eritrean and Somali refugees to resist the state control and involve in different economic activities at different level in deviant to the formal state policy directions. Thus, shared identity, lack of state capacity to control its border and right of residence with negotiating capacity of the refugees have facilitated the invisible integration of refugees with the host community and show how much the boundary between refugees and citizens is blurred.

[47]Interview with Mahari Redie (Ph.D.), on May 22, 2017.
[48]According to Art.7 (3) of Ethiopian Refugee Proclamation No.409/2004, acquiring Ethiopian nationality is among the conditions that result in cessation of refugee status.
[49] Interview with Anonymous 1 and 2, February 3 and 4, 2017 respectively.
[50]Landau (2006), Jacobsen (2001), Crisp (2004) and Soliman (2016) to mention few.

5.2. The Livelihoods of Eritrean and Somali Refugees in Addis Ababa

5.2.1. Eritrean Refugees Livelihood in Addis Ababa

Livelihood, as the capabilities, assets (physical, human, social and financial capital) and activities required for a means of living (Chambers and Conway, 1992:5). A strategies for livelihood, as a process of choosing activities and assets to maintain and improve livelihood, comprises of both tangible assets/resources and intangible assets like social capital (Winters et al., 2001:8). In dealing with the livelihoods of refugees, one needs to incorporate different capitals such as legal, economic, cultural, social, and others that the refugees use for their daily substance of life in the host community. Like urban refugees in other countries[51], several strategies of livelihoods are evident for Eritrean refugees in Gofa Mebrat Hail: relying on remittance, financial assistance from UNHCR, hired and working in different sectors informally, running small businesses, working in informal sectors as labourers and in a formal sectors.

Eritrea is one of the countries that have highest Diasporas in the world (one out of three). The diasporas of Eritrea are dispersed almost throughout the world 'from Australia to the United States; from the South Africa to Norway' (Plaut, 2016:170). To this end, the most obvious livelihood strategy for Eritrean refugees in Mebrat Hail is receiving oversea remittance as part of social capital. For most of the Eritrean refugees in Addis Ababa, remittance from families and relatives is the major source of livelihood according to the refugee respondents[52]. In line with this, most of the Out-of-Camp Policy beneficiaries brought remittance from their families and friends abroad as a major justification for their ability to support themselves, in addition to, a guarantee of Ethiopian sponsor (Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014).

The refugees use the remittance for different purposes: to fulfil their basic need including house rent, to cover social service expenses like education fee (mainly in private schools for them and their children), preferable health service, and very few use the money as starting capital to engage in income generating activities[53]. For transfer of remittance, the refugees mainly prefer personal one instead of the exchange through financial institutions because of

[51]Somali refugees in Nairobi (Campbell, 2006; Pavanello et al., 2010); Somali and Sudan refugees in Cairo (Grabska, 2006; Soliman, 2016), different countries refugees in Kampala (Bernstein and Okello, 2007), Refugees from different Sub-Sahara African countries in Lusaka (Frischkorn, Rebecca (2016)).
[52]Focus Group Discussion with Eritrean refugees, February 19, 2017.
[53]Focus Group Discussion with Eritrean refugees, February 19, 2017.

their high cost of transfer. In connection to this, Eritrean refugees also engaged in the black market of hard currency as part of additional income generating activities in Addis Ababa[54].

Eritrean refugees under Assisted Urban Refugee categories have been getting the monthly allowance through EOC-DICAC (The Ethiopian Orthodox Church Development and Inter-Church Aid Commission). But the allowance is not enough to cover all living expenses according to all respondents. EOC-DICAC also agrees with the claim of refugees about insufficiency of the monthly allowance for the high living cost of Addis Ababa (EOC-DICAC, 2016). Thus, as a coping mechanism, they engage in different income generating activities informally and sometimes formally.

Among indicators of local integration, refugees' participation in the local economy is the major one. Those Eritrean refugees that successfully negotiated and have Ethiopian ID card or passport are working in the formal economy as Ethiopian citizens without losing their refugee status. The major business areas that they engage in are shops, barber shops, beauty salons, and wood and metal work center, coffee houses, café, grousers, restaurants, and pool houses. Another means that Eritrean refugees engage in a formal economy is through a business partnership with Ethiopians. During Focus Group Discussions with the refugees, one refuge discussed that:

> *I have a wood work experience in Eritrea. But Ethiopian government does not permit refugees to engage in any income generating activities. So they only option for me is either to be hired informally or to work formally in partnership with Ethiopian citizens by having a legal agreement. And I preferred the latter*[55].

However, the vast majority of Eritrean refugees in Gofa Mebrat Hail heavily rely on remittance and their engagement in income-generating business activities are limited. With regard to access to social utilities, they have access to public education, health services and basic consumption goods such as food oil, sugar and bread flour from local authorities through refugees' status card or OCP beneficiary special card without facing a big challenge[56]. This is again reinforced by the local authorities that they have been treating

[54]Interview with Anonymous 3, February 3, 2017.
[55]Focus Group Discussion with Eritrean refugees, February 19, 2017.
[56]Focus Group Discussion with Eritrean refugees, February 19, 2017.

Eritrean refugees as Ethiopians even with some favour towards the refugees as part of the country's move to normalize the relations with Eritrean people[57].

As discussed in chapter two, achieving self-sufficiency rather than depending on aid and pursuing equivalent living standard in comparison to locals are among indicators of local integration in *de facto* manner. More than 20,000 Eritrean refugees are settled in Addis Ababa, and only 594 (less than 3%) get assistance and the remaining are self-reliant mainly through remittance. In this regard, most of the Eritrean refugees are self-reliant through oversea remittance rather than relying on monthly hand outs and most of the refugees are pursuing the living standard equivalent to or even better than the locals. Beyond self-reliant and living conditions, however, active involvement in business (both formal and informal) is the major indicator of economic integration of refugees with the host communities that pave the way for social and cultural integration (Mekuria, 1988:149). Ager and Strang expressed the importance of engaging in economic activities as a way to make interaction with the host communities' thereby removing barriers like language and negative attitude (Ager and Strang, 2008:170). Thus, since the vast majority of Eritreans livelihood in the area is highly relies on remittance with narrow engagement in income-generating business activities, it's fair to implicate their economic integration as limited.

5.2.2. Somali Refugees Livelihood in Addis Ababa

Somali refugees with different status (Assisted Urban Refugees, Non-permit Holders, and Unregistered Urban Asylum Seekers) found in different part of Addis Ababa such as Megenagna, Haya Hulet, Shola, Saris, Gerji, Mebrat Hail, Bole Michael and in other parts. However, the vast majority of Somali refugees are mainly found in Bole Michael that made the area as 'Little Mogadishu'. For more than two decades, refugees from the different parts of Somalia have settled in Bole Michael area (currently the area is under Woreda 1 of Bole Sub-City). The Somali refugees like Eritreans and other urban refugees, have both productive (by using natural resources, financial and human capital for maintaining and improving their livelihood) and reproductive (mainly by using social capita[58]) livelihood strategies.

Somalis are among the most dispersed people in the world with 1-2 million Diasporas settled in more than 60 countries. During the colonial period, the United Kingdom and Italy were

[57]Interview with, Degu Yacob, Chief Sergeant Bahilu Tafese, and Commander Girma Tekle, March 2, 2017.
[58]According to Ian Scoones (1998: 8), Social capital – is the social resources (networks, social claims, social relations, affiliations, associations) upon which people draw when pursuing different livelihood strategies requiring coordinated actions.

their main destination and later in the 1970s and 1980s, a large number of Somali migrated to the Gulf States for mainly economic reason. Outbreak of civil war in the late 1980s and the resulting state collapse resulted in the third wave of acute flight for Somali people (Fagioli-Ndlovu, 2015:10; Knerr, 2012:228). EU, Norway, and Switzerland are home for 14% (about 280,000) and of Somali Migrants and refugees in the world while 7 % (150,000) are living in the US (Global Research Center for Research on Globalization, 2016). South Africa and Middle East countries also host a significant number of Somali refugees and migrants. This enabled the vast majority of Somali refugees in Bole Michael to pursue their livelihood through oversea remittance as the major source of income that transferred by informal banking system called *hawala or hawalaad*.

In Bole Michael, it's common to witness Somali refugees running different businesses in both informal and formal economy. According to the refugees, in the beginning, there was hope for resettlement in the developed western countries. With hope for resettlement, they started to engage in informal economy such as selling electronics materials, clothes, perfumes and other items from guesthouse rooms. However, with the dwindling prospect for resettlement and far from in sight hope for repatriation, they started to engage actively in different aspects of the local economy in both formal and informal manner though the state policy prohibits refugee engagement in wage earning works[59]. Those who are working in the formal business have certificates from the local authorities and also have Ethiopia passport or residential ID card of Addis Ababa or Ethiopian Somali Regional state.

Before the settlement of Somali refugees, Bole Michael was mainly residential that had even farmland with poor infrastructures including the road network. Peoples from Ethiopian Somali ethnic group like *Jamma*, as mentioned previously, had settled in the area before the coming of refugee and bought the residential house from local peoples and started to change it to commercial hubs like a guesthouse, shops, café, and restaurants. But later on, the refugees themselves started to rent residential blocs from local people and change it to commercial center by modifying the houses that benefited the local people by having a relatively high price from rent and modification of the house itself for good. One elder respondent in the area witnessed the situation as follows: 'This area had been close to a rural

[59] Focus Group Discussion with Somali Refugees, January 14, 2017.

area with few business activities. Somali refugees invested their money and changed the neighbourhood. They pay a relatively high rental fee and modify the houses'[60].

The local authority also appreciates the Somali refugees' role in transforming the area from residential to a commercial area by expressing 'the Somali refugees' settlement in our Woreda made the area economically vibrant that relates to prior experience in their country'[61].

Currently, guesthouses, cloth shops, café and restaurants, chat (stimulant leaf), internet café, shops, and mini-supermarkets are the major areas that Somali refugees engaged. Most of the guesthouses in Bole Michael are owned by Somali refugees. They rent the whole compound from the local people and make it guesthouses for those refugees that come to the Addis Ababa from refugee camps in Somali regional state for a medical reason, stay those who visit their family in the city, and for other business related cases[62]. The Somali refugees have a strong transnational network with co-ethnic ties in their country of origin, the host country (Ethiopia) and some countries in Middle East such as United Arab Emirates (UAE). This can be seen from the type of materials that are sold in Bole Michael such as Somali clothes, other cloth items, mobile telephones, tablet computers, laptops, and packed foods and beverages from Dubai and Gulf states. Most of the items are imported through Ethiopia Somali Regional State.

With frequent smuggling of goods from Somalia to Ethiopian Somali Regional State, Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority dubbed eastern part of the country particularly Ethiopia-Somalia border areas as a major contraband corridor that stretches to Addis Ababa with a significant damping-out share (Habtamu and Wubeshet, 2016:1). This transnational linkage as part of reproductive and productive livelihood strategy in combination facilitated Somali refugees' economic integration in Bole Michael. The Eritrean refugees' lack this that limits their economic integration in addition to refugee related and policy linked factors that will be discussed in the forthcoming section of this study.

The clan system is the most important social capital that supports Somali refugees as another livelihood mechanisms. As discussed in preceding chapter, the settlement pattern of the refugees in Bole Michael has created enabling environment to utilize the network. One

[60]Interview with Getachew Mehatebu-host community member, February 5, 2017.
[61]Interview with Yohanis Mezgebu, February 12, 2017.
[62]Focus Group Discussion with Somali Refugees, January 14, 2017.

participant in the focus group discussions expressed: 'what my clan member face, whether joy or misery, I do too'[63]. The same trend of Somali refugees' reproductive livelihood strategy of using clan as social capital is asserted in Cairo (Al-Sharmani, 2004) and Nairobi (Campbell, 2005; Campbell, 2006). However, there are a large segment of economically poor Somali refugees in Bole Michael. Some work for those Somalis who have business center and others are engaged in a small business like selling tea (including the Somali tea with milk), coffee, scarves, chat, and milk in the roadsides. There are also translators (mainly from the Somali language to Amharic) for the newly coming refugees from camp who come to Addis Ababa mainly for medical purpose and resettlement process. This is another work area that the refugees generate income. This enabled the Somali refugees to pursue equivalent living standard and some with even better in comparison with the host community.

Thus, from the parameters of self-sufficiency, the majority of Somali refugees in Bole Michael are self-reliant by having remittance, using their clan based social network, and engaging in an informal and formal business activities that enabled them to pursue relatively equivalent and even somehow better living standard with the host community. In addition, the Somali refugees' active engagement in income generating activities in the host area further paved the way for their *de facto* integration with the host community though local integration is officially ruled out[64] through the country's encampment policy.

5.3. Somali and Eritrean Refugees Socio-Cultural integration with the Host Communities

Socio-cultural integration, as a process, is mainly starts with the establishment of contact between refugees and host communities. This interaction begins with interpersonal communication or 'friendliness' between the refugees and the host communities that extends to intensive social interaction. This interaction gradually eases barriers to integration and enables the refugees to live alongside with the host community that further develops to forming social networks such as marriage and participating in different social institutions (Mekuria, 1998:174; Jacobsen, 2001:9; Crisp, 2004:1). Communication (language), cultural (in-) compatibility, the settlement pattern of the refugees, mutual perception for one another, the level of economic interaction between the refugees and the host communities are among

[63]Focus Group Discussion with Somali Refugees, January 14, 2017.
[64]In 2011, UNHCR identified resettlement as the only remaining solution for Eritrean and Somali refugees in Ethiopia by citing the government policy direction. UNHCR (2011). Country Operations Profile-Ethiopia. Accessed from: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483986.

the factors that impact the socio-culture integration. These factors as prism are used to assess the socio-cultural integration of Eritrean and Somali refugees in their respective settlement area.

5.3.1. Eritrean Refugees-Host community Interaction

Historically, Ethiopia and Eritrean used to share not only common people and common culture; but also common country-Ethiopia. It was the Italian colonial control in 1890 that created the state of Eritrea including its name. After half a century under Italian colonial rule and a decade-old British Military Administration, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1952. For around four decades until Eritrea got *de facto* statehood in 1991 and *de jure* in 1993, they had had a common country (Pool, 1980:7; Markakis, 1988:58; Woldemikael, 2013: v). This historical unity enabled people of the two states to share a lot of things in common including culture and religion. Ager and Strang (2008:182) identified language and cultural knowledge as the facilitators for integration. In this regard, Eritrean refugee's knowledge and similarity of the host culture can be considered as an essential means to reduce barriers for integration. One of the respondents in Focus Group Discussion has commented the following:

> *It's not as such difficult for us (Eritrean refugees) to communicate with the host community; because we share a lot of cultural elements in common…the way we dress, the food we eat, the manner we celebrate different social events and other issues. All in all, the cultural similarity between Ethiopia and Eritrea made our stay in Addis Ababa easy.* [65]

Interpersonal communication as a base for integration, Eritrean refugees mainly those who had been in Ethiopian before deported to Eritrean during Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2000, speak Amharic well with no discernable accent that facilitated the probability of integration. Other refugees also speak Amharic as the main language of the host community though they have some difficulty with the regard to accent. However, sharing of culture and understanding of language can be the facilitators for socio-cultural integration of refugees with the host community rather than spontaneously leads to it. Facilitating effort of sharing culture and language to socio-cultural integration can be impacted by refugees' engagement in different economic activities, the settlement pattern of the refugees, and their interest towards integration.

[65]Focus Group Discussion with Eritrean refugees, February 19, 2017.

Social integration starts with the establishment of contacts between refugees and their hosts. According to Mekuria (1988:174), 'it is through social interaction that barriers are removed and attitudes change. (...) [C]ommon interests are recognized and accommodations made only if interactions take place'. And economic integration is considered as the first and the most important step to have such interaction between refugees and host communities (Mekuria, 1988:149; Ager and Strang, 2008:170). As assessed in the preceding section, Eritrean refugees' engagement in different economic activities in Gofa Mebrat Hail is limited that resulted in minimum social integration of Eritrean refugees with the hosts. This low interaction is further limited by their settlement pattern, which is confined only to their fellow refugees and co-ethnic groups in the area that in turn resulted limited interaction with the host communities.

This is, however, not to refute the positive role of ethnic enclaves to preserve refugees' identity and social capital for support at the initial stage of settlement. But heavy dependence on such enclave results in a fragile social bridge between the refugees and the host community that becomes a barrier for socio-cultural integration (Duke et al., 1999:119; Hale, 2000 as cited in Ager and Strang, 2008:179). Almost all the interviews with both refugees and host communities reinforce that the refugees' interaction is mainly limited among themselves and their co-ethnic Ethiopian Tigreans' in the area. This resulted in a weak social interaction between Eritrean refugees and the host communities except for those host people from Tigrean Ethnic group. In addition, some of the host community respondents have bad feeling toward the Eritreans overwhelming vote for session of Eritrea from Ethiopia through referendum in 1993 and the bloody Ethiopia-Eritrea war (1998-2000)[66].

Eritrean refugees have friendliness kind of social contact with their host community that can be understood as a lack of conflict and sense of acceptance or what Ager and Strang (2008:180) call it 'sense of safety and security'. During FGD, the refugees expressed that the local people including authorities accepted them without systematic discrimination except few perceived the high house rent price[67]. The refugees' involvement with local people is occasional. Thus, regardless of cultural compatibility and shared history between Eritrean refugees and the host community, the refugees' limited engagement in the local economy

[66] Interview with Anonymous 1 and 2, Tekalign Tarekegn and Fregenet February 20, 2017.
[67] Focus Group Discussion with Eritrean Refugees, February 19, 2017.

(formal or informal) and lack of interest to integrate (refugee-related and policy-related factors that will be discussed later), resulted in weak socio-cultural integration.

5.3.2. Somali Refugees and the Host community

Historically, successive Ethiopian regimes (Imperial, Derg and EPRDF) considered the irredentist claim of Somalia governments (since the coming of Somali as a state in 1960) as threat to the territorial integrity of the country. While from Adeb Adde (Aden Abdulle Osman Daar as First President of Somali Republic in 1960) to Siyad Barrre, the Somalia governments considered Ethiopia as 'colonizer' of their 'lost territories' with only some colour changes in their Pan-Somalia policy. This contentious relation between the two countries resulted in two major wars in 1964 and 1977/78 (Ogaaden War), with several skirmishes between their borderlands (Gebru, 2000; Lewis, 2002; Assefaw, 2006).

These disharmonious inter-state relations have impacted the people of the two respective countries. Assefaw (2006) dubbed the Somali refugees decision to settle in Ethiopia since 1988 as 'unconsidered' (as result of the acute condition in the country) because of the majority of Somali refugees perception towards Ethiopia as an enemy state. In expressing their prior perception towards Ethiopians, the respondents used to think the country as enemy state[68]. This perception has also been reflected among the host communities as a threat to the state. The respondents from the host communities reflected the historical wound of Ogaaden war in particular and Somali conflict-based relations with Ethiopia as factors for their lack of interest to interact with the refugees at the initial stage[69].

One of the respondent that settled in Bole Michael since 1996 explained the challenges that Somali refugees encountered from the local people as follows:

> *In the first decade of our settlement, we faced (with his families) a lot of challenges. The local people considered the Somali refugees as historical enemies, aggressors, and those who do not pause from destructing the country. As result, it had been very difficult to interact with the host communities that further worsened by our inability to speak Amharic.*

This historical mistrust/misperception between refugees and host communities as a barrier to interaction has been widened by the language and cultural difference between the two.

[68]Focus Group Discussion with Somali Refugees, January 14, 2017.
[69] Focus Group Discussion with host communities in Bole Michael, January 18, 2017.

Culture as a set of typical spiritual and material feature of society or social group, it consists of the way of living, values, and beliefs (UNESCO, 2002: 4). Irrespective of clan difference, culturally, Somalis are a homogenous society with the vast majority of its people follow Islam as their religion. As result, when Somali refugees came to Addis Ababa, they were exposed to different way of living (the way they dress, the food they consume, social networks), values, beliefs and religion practices from them. They faced a great challenge to make even interpersonal interactions with the host people. In addition, they explained their interaction with the host people had been discriminatory. One respondent in FGDs explicated that as: 'Even in business interaction, the host communities increase price of any goods and services has a double standard (high price for Somali refugees and normal price for *Habesha*). On the other hand, the host communities' respondents also share the previous existence of this discrimination. According to the host community respondent: 'when the business persons told us exaggerated price for a given good, we used to say them 'I am not Somali; tell the price in Amharic' and they told us the revised price. But that trend has been changed'[70].

As a coping mechanism for these challenges, Somali refugees preferred to restrict their interaction with co-ethnic Ethiopian Somali in Bole Michael by forming the enclave of co-ethnic groups thereby hide within them. The initial plan of many refugees was to resettle in Western countries or to repatriate to the homeland of Somalia. However, when the prospects for both solutions became far from reach in the near future, the refugees started to engage in different business activities mainly informal economy and later in a formal economy by using their fluid status. Jaji's (2009) finding implied that residential settlement of Somali refugees in Eastleigh has reduced the refugees' interaction with the host community. This is again reflected in this study by Eritrean refugees.

Nevertheless, with protracted settlement in the area and refugees active involvement in different economic activities, the interaction between host people and Somali refugees in Bole Michael has become intensive. Many scholars in the area agree that economic interactions provide the refugees and the host communities the opportunity to have an understanding of the culture of each other and develop language skill in an interactive manner thereby building trust for intensive social interaction (Mekuria, 1988: 149; Jacobsen, 2001; Ager and Strang, 2008:170 to mention few).

[70]Focus Group Discussion with the host community, January 18, 2017.

Somali refugees in Bole Michael explained the progressive betterment of their social interaction with the host communities. According to the majority of the respondents 'with continuous interaction in business issues enabled us to understand the way of living, values, and beliefs of the host community and also to share our own. That is why many of us now can communicate in Amharic with some discernable accent'.[71]Some of the host community members, especially those who work with the refugees in the different area, have developed their Somali language skill. Some even work as translator (locally called *toorjuman*) mainly from the Somali language to Amharic for refugees who come to the area recently. In this regard, Campbell (2006) finding shows that prior tenuous relations between Somali refugees and host communities in Eastleigh (Nairobi) have become better, though not perfect, in broader areas because of their constant economic exchange.

This progressive and strong economic interaction between Somali refugees and the host communities in Bole Michael resulted in what Bress (2009:164) dubbed as 'meaningful contact and intensive social interaction'. The social interactions have been also developing to the formation of social networks such as marriage between refugees and the host communities. During FGDs, the respondents expressed marriage between Ethiopians and the refugees is becoming common than an exception. One of the respondent has Ethiopian wife who follows Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity while he is Muslim[72].

However, this is not to claim that the progressive conditions about the interaction of refugees and host communities are undisputable, lacks misperceptions, and mistrust. Some refugees complain still about lingering misperception of host community towards Somali culture and 'othering' them[73]. Whereas there are also host community respondents that complain about the 'diluting effect' of Somalis in Bole Michael because of their numerical advantage, communal lifestyle, and capital to do business[74]. Some host communities' respondents complain about the demographic domination and flourishing of café and restaurants with Somali mills and cloth shops. Corresponding to this argument, some of the Thai hosts' have a feeling of being overwhelmed by the Burmese refugee culture (Bress, 2009:160). But as discussed in chapter two, integration as a two-way process is different from 'inserting of one group amidst another' (Ager and Strang, 2008:177). Rather it's the process of mutual accommodation.

[71]Focus Group Discussion with Somali Refugees, January 14, 2017.
[72]Focus Group Discussion with Somali Refugees, January 14, 2017.
[73]Interview with Anonymous 1, January 27, 2017.
[74]Interview with host community members (Mitike Tadewos and Daniel Moges), January 20, 2017.

Another issue in the process of socio-cultural integration is the way that refugees treated by the local authorities. In comparison to the host people, the refugees complain about the discriminatory treatment especially by local authorities that need a bribe[75]. With all this challenges, both refugees and the host communities underlined the progressive change in their socio-cultural integration as result of constant economic interaction and a long time settlement in the area[76].

5.4. Factors Impacting the Local Integration of Refugees and Host Communities

5.4.1. Policy Related Factors

The policy response of the host state towards refugees can be positive, negative or do nothing (because of lack of capacity, willingness or when considering the refugee issue as insignificant). According to Jacobsen (1996), the policy choices among the above three depends upon different factors. Among them, interstate relations between the refugee-host state and refugee-sending state, political calculation, and national security consideration are the major factors that influence the policy response of the host state. And the response also varies for different refugee groups (Jacobsen, 1996:655). Local integration as a multi-dimensional and mutually inclusive process, the structural factors have an impact on the perception of both the refugees and host community as agents. To this end, it's important to analyses structural factors that have impacted Eritrean and Somali refugees' perception and host communities perception (as agents) in the respective area towards local integration.

5.4.1.1. Politicization of Eritrean Refugee Protection

Eritrean refugees are the only refugee group in Ethiopia who have the right to choose their place of settlement either in an urban area or rural by providing their ability to be self-sufficient or other sources of support in Ethiopia through Out-of-Camp Policy. From the beginning, the move was praised by UNHCR via its Spokesman Andrej Mahicis as a tool to strengthen people-to-people relation of the two countries that were a single entity before 1993 (UN News Centre, 2010)[77]. The strong socio-cultural linkage between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the social networks that Eritrean refugees have in different parts of Ethiopian cities and

[75] Interview with Anonymous 2, January 28, 2017.
[76] Focus Group Discussion with Somali Refugees, January 14, 2017 and Focus Group Discussions with the Host community members, January 18, 2017.
[77] UN News Center (2010, August 10). UN welcomes Ethiopian Policy to allow Eritrean Refugees to live outside camps. Accessed from: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=35576#.WQw4BkrkfIU.

minimum security risk that Eritrean refugees can pose on Ethiopia are the major justification given by Ethiopian officials (Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014).

Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia also get special treatment from local authorities. The Eritrean refugees' themselves recognized extraordinary treatment that they receive from the security personnel and other service providers in Gofa Mebrat Hail. In presence of quarrel between the refugees and the host people, the security personals clearly favour the refugees even at the expense of the hosts'[78]. The special treatment that the Eritrean refugees receive in Ethiopia affects the perception of the hosts' communities towards the refugees by creating sense of resentment. During the Focus Group Discussion, the participants from the host community implicitly expressed the refugees' treatment is better than the citizens and sometimes they wish to be Eritrean refugees[79]. One interviewee expressed his resentment as follows: 'In Ethiopia, it's better to be Eritrean refugee than Ethiopian citizen because they have all right including the right to have a peaceful demonstration against their government in Asmara while we can't'.[80] In the provision of other services like basic consumption goods (food oil, bread flour, and sugar), the local authorities serve Eritrean refugees in an equivalent manner or even sometimes give priority to them[81].

Ethiopia has been honoured internationally for its adherence to the principle of non-refoulement and freedom from arbitrary detention that is granted under Ethiopia Refugee Proclamation 409/2004. However, as far as Eritrean refugees are concerned, Ethiopian government commitment of protection went beyond formal policy directions. The Ethiopian government facilitates the release of those Eritrean detained in Egypt for trying to cross Egyptian boundary illegally to Israel. The dedication went further by paying travel expense from Cairo to Ethiopia through Ethiopian Embassy in Cairo (Webster, 2011:31).

In spite of these favourable structural grounds for integration, the Eritrean refugees' aspiration to integrate with the host community in Gofa Mebrat Hail is low. Although Abebe Aynete (2016) identified Ethiopian refugee treatment as confidence building attempt not as a tool to weaken the regime in Asmara, the refugee respondents mainly share the latter. The refugees consider the treatment they receive from Ethiopia government as mainly politically driven and subject to change rather than mere humanitarian protection. The first rationale that

[78]Focus Group Discussions with Eritrean refugees, February 19, 2017
[79]Focus Group Discussion with the host community, February 25, 2017 and Interview with Anonymous 3, February 28, 2017.
[80]Interview with Anonymous from the Host Community, February 28, 2017.
[81]Interview with, Degu Yacob, March 2, 2017.

they provide for mistrust of Ethiopian protection commitment towards Eritrean refugees is the interstate relations between the two countries. Since the cessation of the 1998-2000 war through Algiers Agreement, the relations between the states have been in 'no peace no war' stalemate.

International and regional refugee legal instruments such as the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to Status of Refugees and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problem in Africa consider hosting refugee as humanitarian and apolitical. But when a country hosts refugee, tacitly or openly, it recognizes and publicizes the refugee producing countries inability or lack of willingness to protect its people. According to Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (2011), the issue of refugee, from the cause of flight to policy response, is an integral part of international politics and International Relations. And when the relation between the refugee-sending and receiving state is contentious, the host state generously treats the refugees mainly to delegitimize the sending state as a foreign policy tool. This trend was mainly reflected during the Cold-War period. In the USA, until late 1980s, the refugees from Communist countries and the Middle East got special treatment as part of the state's foreign policy direction to delegitimize the communist states as the countries where people live in fear of persecution (Teitelbaum, 1984:432; Hathaway, 1990:150).

In line with this, the source of Ethiopian government's generosity and commitment towards Eritrean refugees in a specific manner cannot simply emanates from the country's culture of hospitability. Rather it's part of Ethiopian policy to delegitimize the government in Asmara thereby to gain reputation from international community. The Eritrean refugees' responses in Gofa Mebrat Hail show similar perception. One respondent said: 'we are grateful for a good treatment that we receive from Ethiopian government, but I am not sure whether it's apolitical'[82]. Another respondent consider such treatment as more of politically driven than merely humanitarian though temporarily contributing for the refugees' protection[83]. Hence, it's questionable to degrade the element of politicization of hosting and treating of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia as totally Isaias Afewerki's government allegation as argued by Abebe Aynete (2016).

[82]Interview with Anonymous 1, February 15, 2017.
[83]Interview with Anonymous 2, February 28, 2017.

The prior experience of deportation from Ethiopia is another source of fear and mistrust towards the current policy favour. After the break of 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea war, both countries deported citizens of another state from their territory as a source of security threat. Since the start of the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998, nationals of both countries had to return to their places of origin. Between May 1998 and August 2001, estimated 75, 000 people of Eritrean origin that were living in Ethiopia returned to Eritrea. And Eritrean government also expelled around 70,000 Ethiopians from Eritrea. At the time of expulsion, the Ethiopian government implicated Eritreans as the threat for national security (Human Rights Watch, 2003). By having this experience and some of the Eritrean refugees in Gofa Mebrat Hail with the living experience of deportation, they argue that there is no guarantee against history repeating itself[84]. It's the same government even with similar officials that identified people of Eritrean origin in Ethiopia as aliens and threat to the national security during the war[85]. Given the persisting deadlock situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, it's possible to identify the two states are on the brink of war. To mention the recent ones, the two countries have experienced provocations and reprisal skirmishes in March 2012, 2015, and 2016 around their border (Abebe, 2016:1). This uncertain relation between the two states heightened the sense of potential insecurity among the refugees.

Therefore, regardless of special treatment provided for Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia, the structure failed to positively affect the perception of the agents (refugees) towards local integration because of their prior experience towards Ethiopian government, their mistrust of the host government treatment as politically driven and temporary, and the ongoing contentious relation between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

5.4.1.2. Securitization of Somali Refugees - Victim of Insecurity or Threat for Security?

Of many global issues, the concern of refugee is becoming complex worldwide agenda for political decision makers and scholars (Hakovirta, 1993:35). Up until the end of cold war, the issue of refugee was considered as merely humanitarian. In spite of their humanitarian dimension, refugee issues have perceived and real security implication to the refugee-receiving state as well as the region in general and the host community in particular. This refugees' security repercussion over the host state has been mainly related to the mingling of

[84]Interview with Anonymous 4, February 14, 2017 and at the time of Focus Group Discussion (February 19, 2017), the refugees implicitly raised the issue of prior deportation as scar in their mind.
[85]Interview with Anonymous 3, February 27, 2017.

combatants with refugees in the refugee-hosting country, refugee militarization, illegal arms trafficking, and linking refugees with a rise in crime in the host communities (Mogire 2009:15; Kirui and Mwaruvie 2012:161). Apart from this, the revisionists such as Ullman (1983), redefined security and incorporated economic and socio-cultural issues under the realm of national security. However, starting from late 1990s and especially aftermath of 11 September 2001 attack on New York, the refugees have been considered as threat of not only national but also global security and hence have been among the targets in the 'war on terror' or 'counter-terrorism adventures' (Jaji, 2014:637).

In the Horn of Africa, a region characterized as security hotspot, the association of refugees with terrorism began even prior to 9/11 terrorist attack. It was in 1998 when terrorists bombed US embassies in East Africa (Kenya and Tanzania) that the issues of refugees were linked with terrorism though there has been no evidence that the attackers are either refugees or asylum seekers in Kenya or Tanzania. In Kenya, anti-terrorist oppressions started to target Somali refugees as a source of terrorist threat by associating them with the situation in their home country (Amnesty International, 2005[86]). Hence, refugees, who are the victim of insecurity and terrorism at home among other factors, become a threat to security in the host state.

Both the Derg regime and the incumbent government in Ethiopia, have suspicions towards Somali refugees (Assefaw, 2006). This suspicion towards Somalis has become high after Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia in 2006 given the porous border that Ethiopia has with Somalia and the smuggling of goods and people across the eastern border. According to Woldeselase (2010:173) as government position, the terrorist attacks targeting Ethiopia by Ogaaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)-dubbed as a terrorist group by Ethiopian government from its base in Somalia has been highly intensified since 2007 that has to do with Ethiopian intervention in Somalia. In his review of Ethiopia's security challenge in the Horn of Africa, Goitom (2013:10[87]) identified the influx of Somali refugees to Ethiopia with the absence of central government in Somalia as the major source of security threat. This has brought an extended consequence for Somali refugees in Ethiopia.

[86]Amnesty International (2005). Kenya: the Impact of anti-terrorism operations on human right. Accessed from: https://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/info/AFR32/002/2005/.
[87]Goitom, Belay (2013). A Review of Ethiopian Security Challenges in the Horn of Africa. Strategy Research Project. Accessed from:http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA588599.

In the way of justifying why the Out-of-Camp Policy is exclusively applicable to Eritrean refugees and excluding other refugee groups, Ethiopian officials provided potential security risk with especially emphasis to Somali refugees (Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014).The singled-out targeting of Somali refugees as a security threat is not merely linked to economic competition and some local criminal activities; rather, the policy direction towards the Somali refugees has been related to geopolitical and security context in the region in general and association with al-Itihad al-Islamiya until 1997 (that claimed responsibility for ten terrorist attacks in Ethiopian Somali Regional State, Dire Dawa, and Addis Ababa)[88]and al-Shabab since 2006 in particular. Bole Michael area under Woreda 1 of Bole sub-City in Addis Ababa as a district with a large number of Somali refugees has been highly securitized especially after 2006. The presence of security personals is high in Bole Michael with both with military and non-military uniform according to the refugee respondents.

The local officials also confirmed that the security issue in their Woreda has taken special attention and they have been working on the issue with the Addis Ababa City Administration, Federal Government, and the refugees in collaboration that associated with the presence of Somali refugees in their district at large. The Woreda's security officer specified the October 13, 2013 bomb blast in the district, that the Ethiopian government alleged al-Shabab for the action (al-Shabab also claimed responsibility on its Twitter account[89]), as justification for high-security alertness[90].

It's not unique for the Ethiopian government in relating refugees with terrorism thereby considering them as source of security threat. Most of European countries have been closing their border and other Western countries including USA bar refugee from entering to their country. In Africa, countries like Kenya and Uganda identified the refugees from terrorist ridden countries such as Somalia as source of terrorist worry. However, none of them substantiate their fear with empirical evidences. In contrary, the research finding by PEW Research Centre and others revealed that practically, there is no real nexus between refugee and terrorism. And the terror attacks in Brussels, Paris or Westminster Bridge were committed by the born-nationals of the respective countries rather than refugees (Bove and Böhmelt, 2016).

[88]Mapping Militant Organizations (June 18, 2016). Al Ittihad Al Islamiya. Stanford University. Accessed from: http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/99#attacks.
[89]Fortin, Jacey (21 October, 2013). Is Ethiopia in al-Shabab's hit list? Bomb blast in Addis Ababa that killed two Somalis raises the stake for country's security. Accessed from: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/10/ethiopia-al-shabab-hit-list-201310211211366477.html.
[90] Interview with Inspector Alemayehu Desta (Head of Bole Michael Police Centre), February 11, 2017.

In relation to the securitization measure, the Somali refugees complain about the forceful detention and sometimes disappearance of their fellow refugees in the area by government forces[91]. According to Buzan et al. (1998: 23), when the issue is securitized, "it is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure'. The response of both the refugees and the host community that again confirmed by the local authorities, the security concern in the area has been different from the conventional ones in other areas in the city. One of the Woreda administration office head explained the existence of sudden security operations by both Addis Ababa City Administration and the Federal Government either in collaboration with them or without their knowledge. As result, the refugees' hide their status and claim themselves as Ethiopian Somali though the targeting sometimes includes Ethiopian Somalis because of the local authorities' inability to distinguish between them[92].

This securitization of Somali refugee issue in Bole Michael created fear and mistrust on the refugees that discouraged the refugees from building sustainable livelihood in the area. Although the refugees have been engaged in different business activities in the area but they refrain from investing in big businesses like hotel investment and big market centres as of Eastleigh in Nairobi and other immovable properties (Campbell, 2006). Rather they prefer to engage in trade, providing service as occupant (by hiring the houses from locals) and other informal businesses. The securitization also created fear among the host community towards the refugees as a potential source of the threat[93]. Fábos and Kibreab (2007:5) argued in a parallel manner about the effect of securitization in fostering paranoia and xenophobia among the host communities. Thus, the securitization of Somali refugee issue by the government as a structural factor among others negatively affected the agents (the Somali refugees' and the hosts') perception towards local integration in the area.

[91] Interview with Anonymous 3 and Anonymous 2 from Somali refugees, February 3, 2017 and February 5, 2017 respectively.
[92] Interview with Anonymous 1 and Anonymous 4, and Anonymous 5 from Somali refugees, February 3, 2017 and February 5, 2017 respectively.
[93]Interview with Anonymous 1 (from host community), January 19, 2017.

5.4.1. Eritrean and Somali Refugee and Host Communities Perceptions towards Local Integration in Addis Ababa

The refugees' and the host communities' perception towards local integration in the host country is impacted by different factors. The host communities' expectation towards the duration of the refugees stay in the area has an impact on the relations between the hosts and the refugees. When the host communities identified the refugees as temporary guests in the area, the treatment provided by the host community for the refugees is mainly positive and sometimes assistance based (Kibreab, 1989). In the case of Eritrean refugees in Gofa Mebrat Hail, the host community perceives the refugees in the area as temporary guests that resulted in the positive treatment from the host community though it's not the only justification for the relations. In spite of the positive treatment and other shared socio-cultural elements, the hosts' perception of the Eritrean refugee hood as temporary has obstructing impact on the local integration process. When the hosts perceive the refugees stay in the area as short and them as a guest, the hosts become reluctant to have enduring socio-economic interaction with the refugees. The same trend was reflected in Somalia between the Ethiopian Somali refugees and the hosts after the Ogaden War of 1977/78. Irrespective of sharing ethnicity even with homogenous culture and religion, the hosts had been reluctant to integrate with the refugees because of the host expectation of the refugees stay in the area as short (Kibreab, 1987).

On the other hand, at initial phase (for about a decade according to the refugees and the host communities), the relation between the Somali refugees and the host communities in Bole Michael had been far from harmonious. The presupposed misperception and mistrust between the refugees and the host communities that mainly emanated from the interstate relations (between Ethiopia and Somalia) have contributed to disharmonious relations. The situation was further worsened by the socio-cultural incompatibility between the hosts' and the refugees as discussed previously. However, with the prolonged settlement of Somali refugees in Bole Michael in addition to their involvement in different economic activities have contributed for the gradual and progressive interaction between the refugees and the host communities thereby lessening the mistrust between the two. Thus, the protracted settlement of Somali refugees in the area contributed to *de facto* integration by enabling the refugees and the host to adapt the culture and language of one another.

As primary and active decision makers in the integration process, the refugees' desire and aspiration has a direct impact towards the local integration. The refugees plan to stay in the

host community in particular and the host country, in general, is another factor that has an impact on the local integration. When the refugees considered the host country or locale as a place for transit, they have no reason to invest their life in the host community. According to the Eritrean refugee respondents in Gofa Mebrat Hail, their major desire is to settle in European countries by any means (either legally with limited opportunity or illegally by smugglers) despite their knowledge about the risky journey through the desert and the Mediterranean Sea[94]. The Aljazeera Correspondent Stefania Prandi's interview with Eritrean refugees in Addis Ababa also strengthen the finding that the refugees considered Ethiopia as the starting point for making their way to Europe[95]. Further, Assefaw (2013) identified imitating the prior experience of the resettled refugees as the major explaining variable for Eritrean refugees' perception of the first country of asylum (mainly Ethiopia and Sudan) as a transit country. While Massa (2017:128) identified the historical and current hostile conditions between the two states as the major reasons for Eritreans' feeling of Ethiopia as a country of transit.

According to UNHCR Operational Portal as of March 2017, Eritreans have found on top five nationalities that crossed the Mediterranean Sea illegally. In line with this, Eritreans have long been the second nationalities next to Syria in applying for asylum in Europe with the highest approval rate especially since 2013 as per the report of International Organizations for Migration. Thus, since the refugees have short plan to stay in Ethiopia in general and the study area in particular, they see no reason to invest their life in the locale that becomes the obstructing factor local integration of Eritrean Refugees in Gofa Mebrat Hail. Grabska (2006:300), along with this line, identified Sudanese refugee short plan and attitude towards their stay in Cairo as among the factors for lack of local integration with the host community in Egypt.

With all the difficulties at the initial phase as aforementioned, the Somali refugees plan to stay in Bole Michael was short like the Eritrean refugees. Let alone the refugees that fled persecution in their home country, it has been conventional than an exception for people of the developing countries in general and Africa, in particular, to vote with their feet by crossing natural and manmade difficulties as a refugee or/and migrant. The Somali refugees had had a strong aspiration to settle in prosperous countries either legally or illegally.

[94] Focus Group Discussion with the Eritrean refugees, February 19, 2017.
[95] Stefania, Prandi (10 March, 2016). Eritrean Refugees in Ethiopia. Accessed from: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/03/eritrean-refugees-ethiopia-160306065928790.html.

However, that dream came true for few and far from rosy for many. With dwindling and prolonged opportunity for resettlement, the refugees started to involve in different business activities that facilitated their intensive interaction with the host community.

In spite of their engagement and progressive socio-cultural integration with the host communities, the Somali refugees are in dilemma to have full integration. The dilemma is highly impacted by the securitization of Somali refugee issue in the area and still existing aspiration to settle in Western countries by any means. Parallel to this finding, Mozambican refugees in South Africa (Polzer, 2007) and Angolan refugees in Zambia (Bakewell, 2000) regardless of initial challenges, the prolonged settlement of the refugees with consequent socio-economic interaction, identified as facilitating factor for refugees' local integration in the respective areas.

Socio-economic impact of the refugees' presence on the host communities is another factor that has a facilitating or obstructing impact on local integration. With the regard to Eritrean refugees in Gofa Mebrat Hail, the host communities that involved in service sectors like grocery, hotel, café, restaurants and house renting considered the refugees' presence as a source of additional market opportunity despite their complaint about frequent quarrel of the refugees after drinking. Others associate the refugees' presence as the major cause for high house rent price in the area. According to the respondents of the host community, Eritreans afford high house rent fee because they have remittance and allowance from UNHCR in addition to their living in a group[96]. However, with their limited engagement in different economic activities in the area, the economic impact of the refugee presence over the host community is not as such visible and significant.

The perception towards the economic impact of Somali refugees over the host communities in Bole Michael varies according to the different strand of the communities. Those who engaged in different business from shoeshine boy to hotel owners agree upon the positive impact of the refugees' presence in Bole Michael. They explain the impact by comparing the areas before and after the coming of Somali refugees. Before they came, the area had been more of rural than urban one and even the urban-like areas were slum and shanty. In addition, they created large job opportunity in temporary and permanent manner. By citing their 'expending culture', the host community members engaged in different business admire the refugees for creating new business opportunity. However, when we come to the issue of high

[96] Focus Group Discussion with host community members, January 18, 2017.

cost of house rent, they complain the refugee presence as the major factor for skyrocketed price. Irrespective of these complains, those people who engaged in different business activities see refugees as the agent in transforming their urban space by making the local economy vibrant[97].

Other strands of the communities who express the impact of refugees are those who rent their houses either for commercial or residence purpose. They agree about the relatively high price of houses rent in Bole Michael and its relation with the presence of Somali refugees. And they have been advantageous from that although they are not willing to tell the exact price of the rent (that related to the fear of tax). Although they talk about the positive impact of refugee presence vis-à-vis their advantage, they complain about the shortage of basic consumption goods such as food oil and sugar as result of the Somali's high spending on the specified goods with a high price[98]. The local authority also implicates the refugee presence in the area as a scapegoat for the shortage of basic consumption goods in addition to the lack of established distribution system[99]. Public and private servants (hired workers), pensioners, and other parts of the society with no business interaction expressed the refugee presence in Bole Michael as the major factor for the high price of goods and services in the area that they have been struggling to sustain[100]. In aggregate, it's fair to conclude that the Somali refugees in Bole Michael have been positively contributing for the local economy.

As far as the social impact of the Somali refugees is concerned, regardless of the progressive social interaction between the refugees and the host communities, some respondents within the host community pointed out refugees as a scapegoat for social ills in their community such as chewing chat, drunkenness, smoking shisha, and extravagancy[101]. Thus, contrary to the conventional and the government's assumption of the refugees as a burden to the economy (as a major justification of discouraging local integration as a viable solution), the refugees are not only self-sufficient and economically integrated but also contributing to the local economy.

[97]Focus Group Discussion with host community members, January 18, 2017.
[98]Focus Group Discussion with the host community, January 18, 2017 and interview with those who rent their house (Yemisrach Abate and Daniel Moges, January 20, 2017.
[99]Yohanis Mezgebu *op.st*.
[100]Focus Group Discussion with host community members, January 18, 2017 and interview with the host community member (Yemisrach Abate, January 21, 2017).
[101]Interview with Daniel Moges, February 8, 2017 and Focus Group Discussion with the Host Community, January 18, 2017.

To sum-up, the refugees' consideration of their stay in the area as temporary and Ethiopia as a transit country and the subsequent perception of the refugees as guests by the hosts', and the refugees perception of their treatment as politically motivated resulted in a limited socio-economic interaction of Eritrean refugees with the host communities in Gofa Mebrat Hail and insignificant impact over the hosts'. On the other hand, the protracted settlement of the refugees in the area with active economic engagement resulted in a visible socio-economic impact on the host community thereby facilitating the social interaction between Somali refugees and host community in Bole Michael.

CONCLUSION

Ethiopia has been praised by different international refugee regimes and academicians for its open-door policy towards the refugees. Ethiopia's refugee policy and hospitability in hosting refugees through successive regimes determined and shaped by the inter-state relations with the refugee-producing country, the state capacity to control its border, the need of foreign aid and international reputation. Furthermore, the country's refugee policy is open-door quantitatively rather than qualitatively because of its restrictions on the refugees' rights such as the right to movement (except for Eritrean refugees), employment, education and others. Ethiopia's encampment policy towards the refugees with few exceptions has confined the refugees in the refugee camps and prohibit their settlement in urban areas. However, due to different push factors in the camps and pull factors in urban areas, a number of refugees have settled in urban areas of the country in deviant to the government policy.

The refugees in Addis Ababa are categorized as permitted and non-permitted. Under permitted categories are refugees who need special medical service, whose security is at stake, those who get higher education opportunity, and *Out-of-Camp Policy* beneficiary (for Eritrean refugees). According to the government estimate, more than 192,000 refugees with different status from different countries are found in Addis Ababa though the country does not have urban refugee policy yet. Among them, more than ninety percent are from Somalia and Eritrea. Both Eritrean and Somali refugees are found in different parts of Addis Ababa but mainly settled in Gofa Mebrat Hail and Bole Michael respectively.

The findings of this study show that the presence of co-ethnic group in Bole Michael as social network has been the major factor for the Somali refugees' large presence in the area. Whereas the prior experience of the refugees and the subsequent social network played a leading role for Eritrean refugees' preference of Gofa Mebrat Hail. In the respective areas, the refugees from both countries settled for relatively long period of time. Eritrean and Somali refugees in the specified area have different kind of interaction with the host communities with variation in their level of interaction. The integration of Eritrea and Somali refugees in the respective areas is impacted by factors related to the policy directions of the host state (structural factors), refugee perception, and host communities attitude. The policy direction of Ethiopian government towards the refugees from Eritrea and Somalia vary based on Ethiopia's historic and ongoing relation with the countries. These structural factors or the

policy direction have impacted the perception of both the refugees and the host communities which in turn affected the host-refugee integration.

Eritrean refugees are the only refugee group with permission to settle in place of their choice and getting special treatment from the local authorities. However, this positive policy direction and practice has not able to change the attitude of Eritrean refugees in the study area. The findings of this study demonstrate that, although Eritrean refugees praise the protection and treatment of the government, they considered it as politically motivated and temporary based on the current contentious relation between Addis Ababa and Asmara rather than purely humanitarian. Their mistrust is based on the pervious deportation of Eritreans from Ethiopia (during Ethiopia-Eritrea war of 1998-2000) as threat to national security threat and afraid of repetition of history.

On the other hand, due to the security condition in Somali and history of war and mistrust (irredentism and the act of aggression on the side of Somalia especially related with the Ogaaden war of 1977/78 and Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia since 2006), the issue of Somali refugees in Bole Michael is highly securitized. Local authorities and the refugees reveal that the handling of security issue in Bole Michael is highly tight and sometimes resulting in fear among the refugees thereby obstructing the local integration of refugee with the host communities in an intensive manner. The securitization of Somali refugee in the area also created senses of fear among the host community having a negative impact on the integration process. It has led to a negative attitude among the host communities towards Somali refugees. In contrary to Eritrean refugees, structural factors have negatively affected the perception of both agents (the refugees and the host communities') towards intensive level of local integrations. Therefore, Ethiopia's historical and ongoing interstate relations with the refugee-producing countries (Eritrea and Somalia) as structural factors have impacted not only the country's policy direction towards the respective refugee groups; but also the refugees' and the host communities' perceptions towards local integrations.

Economically, however, the study reveals that both Eritrean and Somali refugees' are self-reliant and have equivalent or better living standard in relation to the host communities rather than being burden and dependent on aid. In terms of these parameters, it's fair to say both refugee groups in the respective study areas are *de facto* integrated (economically integrated) with the host communities. However, intensive engagement in different economic activities

as a major yardstick for economic integration and primary contributor for other interactions including socio-cultural integration, the two refugee groups have various level of integration. During their stay in Addis Ababa, either for long or short, they have been engaged in different livelihood strategies. The refugees' livelihoods are highly interlinked and direct repercussion over the integration process. The study shows that the majority of Eritrean refugees living in Gofa Mebrat Hail are highly relied on remittance as their major livelihoods strategy with limited engagement in business activities. This resulted in minimum interaction with the host communities and low level of economic integration. On the other hand, Somali refugees in Bole Michael are actively engaged in different business activities (both formal and informal) that resulted in intensive interaction with the host communities and *de facto* integration though remittance is also major source of income for the majority of the Somali refugees in the study area.

Through reservation under UN refugee convention of 1951 and protocol of 1967 and OAU Convention of 1969 that are further maintained under the Ethiopian Refugee proclamation of 409/2004, choosing their place of settlement (except for Eritrean refugees), work permit and engaging in income generating economic activities is prohibited for refugees of any group in the country. Although the obstructing effect of this as structural factor over the refugee livelihood in general and local integration of refugees with the host community in particular is not something undervalued, refugees are also active actors in negotiating the rights in deviant with the state policy direction when they need thereby resisting the state control. In addition to being deviant to state policy direction (prohibition of work permit and movement), the Somali and Eritrean refugees, through ethnic ties and corruption, have acquired Ethiopian identity card and the work permit.

Eritrean refugees who are engaged in a formal economic activities get Ethiopian identity card from either Tigray Regional State or Addis Ababa through corruption and co-ethnic ties in the area. But the majority of Eritrean refugees in the study area haven't engaged in formal economic activities and most of them do not need or consider Ethiopian ID Card as necessary because of their consideration of Ethiopia as a transit country. On other hand, the majority of Somali refugees in Bole Michael have Ethiopian ID card/passport in addition to other countries Passport (some have Somalia and Djibouti passport in addition to Ethiopia). Unlike Eritrean refugees who have right to choose their place of settlement (out of camp), Somali refugees need Ethiopian ID Card/Passport not only to have work permit, but also to settle in

Addis Ababa. In addition, the Somali refugees largely engaged actively in different business activities by having Ethiopian ID Card. This made the status of refugees in the study area very fluid and difficult to differentiate not only for the host communities but also for local authorities.

Having shared culture and history, the Eritrean refugees have advantage of psychological compatibility as facilitator for socio-cultural integration. However, the similarity in socio-cultural elements have not automatically and spontaneously resulted in social integration. According to the finding of the study, Eritrean refugees' social interaction is very limited. The major factors are the Eritrean refugees considered their stay in Ethiopia in general and in Addis Ababa in particular as temporary and as a place for transit. They see no reason to invest socially and economically in Gofa Mebrat Hail. Consequently, the host communities also consider the Eritrean refugees as guests in transit which has contributed for their low level of interaction with the refugees. Hence, the Eritrean refugees' engagement in different economic activities, either formally or informally, is minimum that resulted in limited interaction with the host communities.

On the other hand, variation in culture and historical accounts between Somali refugees and the host communities in Bole Michael have negatively affected the process of socio-cultural integration. However, the active engagement of Somali refugees in different economic activities in Bole Michael resulted in an intensive interaction with the host communities. This has lessened barriers of mutual misperception and cultural disparity progressively, but not totally. Therefore, regardless of the refugees fear to engage in economic activities intensively because of the securitization of their issue, with the existing level of self-sufficiency and their contribution for the local economy in visible manner, it would be pedantic to suggest that Somali refugees are not integrated with the host communities in Bole Michael.

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The UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee, 1951.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Overview of Key Informant Interviewees

No.	Name of the Interviewee	Place of work	Position	Remark
1	Mr. Haile Selassie Gebremariam	ARRA	Senior Refugees Legal Protection Officer	
2	Mahari Redie (Ph.D.)	Addis Ababa University	Assistant Professor of Law	
3	Chief-Sergeant Bahilu Tafese	Nefas-Silk Lafto Sub-City Woreda 6 Gofa Police Center	Head of Gofa Police Center	
4	Commander Girma Tekle	Nefas-Silk Lafto sub-City Woreda 6 Gofa Police Center	Department head of Crime protection in Gofa Police Center	
5	Mr. Degu Yacob	Nefas-Silk Lafto Sub-City Woreda 6	Representative Head of Trade and Industry Office	
6	Mr. Yohanis Mezgebu	Bole Sub-City Woreda 1	Deputy Administrator of Woreda 1	In addition, he is the head of Industry and Trade Office of Woreda 1
7	Mr. Haile-Meskel Eshetu	Bole Sub-City Woreda 1	Head of Justice and Security Affairs Office in the same Woreda	
8	Inspector Alemayehu Tesfaye	Bole Sub-City Woreda 1	Head of Woreda 1 Police Center	

Note: The following lists of respondents especially interviewees do not include a number of respondents that the researcher informally communicated and some even as a get keepers in effort to obtain sufficient and relevant data for the study. By the request of some of the interviewees, their name or father's is withheld and cited as *Anonymous.*

Appendix 2: List of Focus Group Discussion participants (from Somali refugees in Bole Michael)

No	Name of Discussants	Sex	Age	Place of settlement	Remark
1	Anisa Moxammed	F	38	Bole Michael	
2	Ubha Abedi	F	41	Bole Michael	
3	Rashiid Mubarak	M	43	Bole Michael	
4	Ahmed Muhadin	M	35	Bole Michael	
5	Ibrahim Abdulsemid	M	46	Bole Michael	
6	Abdullahi Mooge	M	39	Bole Michael	

Appendix 3: List of Focus Group Discussion participants (from Host Communities in Bole Michael)

No	Name of Discussants	Sex	Age	Place of settlement	Remark
1	Zenebech Endalemew	F	43	Bole Michael	
2	Selamawit Girma	F	35	Bole Michael	
3	Teklegiorgis Habtamu	M	61	Bole Michael	
4	Tamirat Tesfaye	M	47	Bole Michael	
5	Assfaw Desta	M	49	Bole Michael	
6	Destaw Deboch	M	37	Bole Michael	

Appendix 4: List of interviewees from Bole Michael Host Community

1. Mr. Getachew Mehatebu
2. Ms. Mitike Tadewos
3. Mr. Daniel Moges

4. Mr. Jamma Jiis
5. Ms. Yemisrach Abate

Appendix 5: List of Interviewees from Somali Refugees

1. Mr. Anonymous 1
2. Mr. Anonymous 2
3. Ms. Anonymous 3
4. Mr. Anonymous 4
5. Ms. Anonymous 5

Appendix 6: List of Focus Group Discussion participants (from Eritrean refugees in Gofa Mebrat Hail)

No	Name of Discussants	Sex	Age	Place of settlement	Remark
1	Marta Gebre-Egzihaber	F	26	Gofa Mebrat Hail	
2	Sintayehu Awet	M	29	Gofa Mebrat Hail	
3	Senayt Araya	F	29	Gofa Mebrat Hail	
4	Solomon Mebrhatom	M	33	Gofa Mebrat Hail	
5	Tesfaye Mengisteab	M	24	Gofa Mebrat Hail	
6	Yoseph Zeresenai	M	25	Gofa Mebrat Hail	

Appendix 7: List of Focus Group Discussion participants (from Host Communities in Gofa Mebrat Hail)

No	Name of Discussants	Sex	Age	Place of settlement	Remark
1	Tirengo Bezabih	F	37	Gofa Mebrat Hail	
2	Netsanet Markos	F	29	Gofa Mebrat Hail	

3	Girma Tsegaye	M	43	Gofa Mebrat Hail	
4	Addisu Abera	M	35	Gofa Mebrat Hail	
5	Kurabachew Tatek	M	46	Gofa Mebrat Hail	
6	Woldemikael Mengiste	M	39	Gofa Mebrat Hail	

Appendix 8: List of interviewees from Eritrean refugees

1. Mr. Teklay Hagos
2. Ms. Anonymous 1
3. Mr. Anonymous 2
4. Mr. Anonymous 3
5. Mr. Anonymous 4

Appendix 9: List of interviewees from Host communities in Gofa Mebrat Hail

1. Mr. Anonymous 1
2. Mr. Anonymous 2
3. Ms. Anonymous 3
4. Mr. Tekalign Tarekegn
5. Ms. Fregenet

Appendix 10: Interview Guidelines

Interview questions for Authority for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA)

1. How many urban refugees found in different cities of Ethiopia in general and Addis Ababa in particular? And from which countries?
2. What are the justifications for the settlement of refugees in the Addis Ababa? What are the role of your institution in creating enabling environment in their stay in urban areas in general and Addis Ababa in particular?

3. How many Eritrean refugees have been benefited from Out-of-Camps scheme? And what are the challenges and prospects in implementing the scheme?
4. How long can the refugees stay in Addis Ababa and what are the supports provided by your institution? And what does the trend of returning those refugees to the camp looks like?
5. How many unregistered or undocumented refugees are settled in Addis Ababa, why and from which states?
6. Has there been any official count of urban refugees?
7. What policy guideline or administrative directive does Ethiopia have to administer the urban refugees? If any, how do you explain it vis-à-vis the 2009 UNHCR Policy on Urban Refugees?
8. Does Ethiopia recognize local integration as a durable solution for refugees in general and urban refugees in particular? If not, what will be the solution in sight for both registered and unregistered refugees in urban areas in general and Addis Ababa in particular?

Interview guideline for Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with the Refugees

1. How do you describe your relations or interaction with host community (friendship, a social network like idir, attending different ceremonies wedding, funeral, intermarriage…)?
2. How do you interact with your neighbour or the community at large and who take the initiative?
3. What are the challenges you have been facing in your settlement in the area from the local people and please?
4. How do you interact with the local authorities (in accessing different public services like education, health, security and others)?
5. What is your major source of livelihood in the city?
6. How do you express your status in Ethiopia?
7. What is your perception towards integrating with the local community and your plan in the future?

Interview guideline for Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with the Host Community

1. How do you describe your relations or interaction with the refugees (friendship, social ties like idir, attending different ceremonies wedding, funeral, intermarriage…)?
2. During your interaction with the refugees which language do you use?

3. What are the social, economic and/or political effects or contributions do the refugees presence in your community has brought?
4. How do you see the refugees' cultural compatibility with yours?
5. What is your perception towards integrating with the refugees as people that share common fate?

Interview guideline for interviewing the refugees (in-depth interview)

1. When, how and why you settled in Addis Ababa in general and Bole Michael/Mebrat Haile in particular?
2. Are you registered or unregistered refugee under ARRA or other authorized bodies as refugee/asylum seeker?
3. What challenges have you faced any for being unregistered, if any? And any benefit for being registered?
4. What is your major source of livelihood?
5. How do you describe your interaction with the host community (friendship, social ties like idir, attending different ceremonies wedding, funeral, intermarriage…)?
6. How do you interact with the local authorities (in accessing different public services like education, health…) and/or the community? And how you cop-up with those challenges?
7. What is your perception towards integrating with the host community and your plan in the future?

Interview guideline for interviewing the Host Community (in-depth interview)

1. How do you describe your relations or interaction with the refugees (friendship, social ties like idir, attending different ceremonies wedding, funeral, intermarriage…)?
2. How do you interact with the refugees and who takes the initiative?
3. What are the social, economic and/or political effects or contributions do the refugees presence in your community has brought?
4. How do you see the refugees' cultural compatibility with yours?
5. What is your perception towards integrating with the refugees as people that share common fate?

Interview Guideline for Local Authorities (Key informant interview)

1. How many refugees in general found in your Woreda?
2. How do you interact with these refugees?
3. How do you provide services for refugees like health service, if any?

4. Have the refugees been participating in different activities in your Woreda? If so how?
5. What are the social, economic and/or political effect or contribution do the refugees presence in your Woreda has brought?
6. When there is any conflict with the refugees and the local people or between refugees, how do you settle the situation?
7. As a local authority, how do you describe or explain the refugees' interaction with the local people and vice versa?

Interview guideline for Key informant (Assistant Professor of Law at Addis Ababa)

1. How do you explain the interaction between the Ethiopian Nationality Law of 2003 and Refugee Proclamation of 2004, if any?
2. How do you see the right to re-claim Ethiopian nationality under the nationality law of 2003 vis-à-vis Eritrean refugees especially those who deported during Ethiopia-Eritrea war of 1998-2000?
3. What are possible challenges and opportunities to re-acquire Ethiopian nationality for those Eritreans?