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**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY**  
**SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES**  
**INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES**

**RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA: ITS  
IMPLICATION FOR THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE  
HORN OF AFRICA**

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**JUNE, 2019**

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## **DEDICATION**

**My heartfelt dedication goes to my father who loves education utmost. Even though, you are not seeing me where I am, so far I'm keep going where you want to see me!!!**

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## **List of Acronyms**

AAU	Addis Ababa University
IPSS	Institute for Peace and Security Studies
PSIR	Political Science and International Relations
ARDUF	Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front
CDRC	Center for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation
EEBC	Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission
EPLF	Eritean Peoples Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
FANSPS	Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GERD	Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
HoA	Horn of Africa
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
TAND	Tigray Alliance for National Democracy
TPDM	Tigray People’s Democratic Movement
TPLF	Tigrian Peoples Liberation Front
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN	United Nation
USD	United States Dollar

## **Abstract**

*This paper examines the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea and its implications for the peace and security of the Horn of Africa. Following the failure to adhere to the verdict of the Algiers agreement, the two countries have been under the situation of 'no war, no peace'. During this period, the security of the HoA was destabilized in terms of proxy wars and financial and material support to the opposition groups of one another. More importantly, the act of supporting subversive activities had distracted the peace and security of the two countries in particular and the region in general. Now, the two countries have ended their two decades of stalemate which heralded a new era for peace and security of the HoA. So, the major objective of the researcher is to explore the rapprochement between the two countries and its implication for the peace and security of the HoA. To do so, the researcher employed qualitative research methodology. Interview and key informant interview were used to extract primary data from member states' embassies sited in Addis Ababa like South Sudan, Eritrea, and from organizations of the AU and IGAD. Moreover, Neighboring Countries Directorate General Desk Offices of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, AAU' Department of PSIR and IPSS were used as institutions where primary data was extracted. Document analysis was used as a secondary data collection instrument. The finding of this study reveals that, as the HoA is characterized by security complex where member countries support opposition and insurgent groups of one another, the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea played a tremendous role in terms of ending supporting of opposition and insurgent groups. For instance, insurgent groups like OLF, Ginbot-7, ONLF, ARDUF, and TPDM returned to their home lands in order to carry out a peaceful struggle. The rapprochement serves as a lynchpin to bring the Horn of African countries together. Kenya, Somalia, and South Sudan are the beneficiaries of Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement. Although Sudan and Djibouti are not beneficiaries in the same magnitude with that of Kenya, Somalia and South Sudan. Furthermore, the rapprochement will enhance people-to-people interaction that can realize aspiration of regional integration. Despite the above prospects, the rapprochement has pitfalls. The rapprochement's natures of state-centric, non-institutionalized, lack of inclusivity of different stakeholders make the rapprochement's journey to tracks of uncertainty. Resolving the aforementioned challenges with a clear and transparent policy framework is the recommendation of the study.*

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Background of the study

After Eritrea's official independence in 1993, Ethiopia and Eritrea have multifaceted relations regarding culture, blood, language, religion etc. (Kidane and Okbzaghi, 2005). The two countries had established a formal state-to-state relations and different agreements were concluded to regulate their bilateral relations. These protocols encompass defense pact, harmonization of economic and trade policies, and all public affairs including tourism, education, and health care services (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000).

Arrangements were made for Ethiopia's continuing use of the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa and in return, Eritrea has used Ethiopia's currency. Initially, the relationship between the then Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi and Isias Afeworki were close and harmonious. They had been comrades in the struggle against the Derg regime of Ethiopia (Sally, 2008:12), though Ethiopia and Eritrea were in an incredible relationship for four consecutive years from its independence until the year 1997. The bilateral relationships between the two deteriorated after the year 1997 as implementations of the above arrangements were not supported by institutions and legal frameworks. Most importantly, the two governments did not negotiate on the measures to be taken after Eritrea adopted its own currency which resulted in creating suspicion and mistrust between the two countries. Besides this, a difference in ideology between TPLF and EPLF, economic rivalry, and their unfinished business especially in terms of border demarcation leads the two sisterly nations in to small conflicts before the 1998-2000 full-scale war that costs a lot in social, economic and human casualties (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000).

After the Algiers agreement, Ethiopia and Eritrea have been in a relation of 'no war, no peace.' This prolonged their impasse for the past two consecutive decades and led into a serious instability and mutual destabilization that cut across the national and economic security interests of both countries (Jason Mosley, 2018:7). According to Amanuel (2019), in time of 'no war, no peace' stalemate, both Ethiopia and Eritrea have supported and host oppositions of each other which had been responsible for destabilizing the peace and security of the two countries in

particular and the Horn of Africa (HoA) in general. According to Martin Plaut (2016:41), who has been keenly following the politics of the HoA for more than three decades argues that, Ethiopia and Eritrea confronted each other since 2000 in a situation which can be described as ‘no peace, no war.’ For him, the conflict as well as the rivalry and the proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia and the support of insurgents spoiled the peace and security of the HoA. The past twenty years between Ethiopia and Eritrea can be described as shaky and disastrous especially, communities who live on both sides of their mutual border were victims of the situation of ‘no war, no peace’ as long as the communities have a history which is tied up by a yoke together.

The coming of the new Ethiopian Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed in April 2018, immediately heralded that Ethiopia would accept the 2002 boundary decision of the independent commission established by the 2000 peace settlement without any precondition which was insisted by Eritrea for long (Susan and Payton, 2018). This adds the two countries in a new era of rapprochement that has ended a situation of ‘no war, no peace’ which was a hurdle of peace and security between Ethiopia and Eritrea in particular and the HoA in general. Therefore, this study has been focused on to analyze the possible challenges and opportunities of the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea and its implications for the peace and security of the HoA.

## **1.2. Statement of the Problem**

The HoA is one of the most turbulent regions in the world which is characterized by hosting inter-state and intra-state conflicts (Medhane, 2004). The region is the most militarized and conflict-ridden region in Africa, which has been a battlefield for several intra and inter-state conflicts. Among this, the Ethio-Eritrean and the South-Sudanese conflict took place in the HoA (Shinn, 2009, cited in Berouk Mesfin, 2011). Since its independence, Eritrea has been engaged in conflicts with almost all of its neighbours including Yemen, Djibouti, Ethiopia and the Sudan (Birhanu 2013, cited in Redie, 2013). Among these, the war conducted from 1998 - 2000 between Ethiopia and Eritrea has distracted the security of the entire region. It was one of the most dangerous wars in the Horn of Africa with high spillover effect to neighboring countries (Temesgen, 2012). The HoA is characterized by inter and intra-state conflicts where most conflicts have a high spillover effect and transnational in nature as countries of the region host the same ethno-cultural communities that make conflicts in the region often interlinked and

create security interdependence. In such a complex system, even smaller states attempt to challenge the big ones like Ethiopia by creating alliances and counter-alliances or supporting proxies. For instance, Eritrea's hostility towards its neighbor, Eritrea's invasion of Ethiopia and its continuing proxy war with Ethiopia in the soil of Somalia hosting oppositions of Ethiopia and neighbouring countries, and finally, the presence of Al-Shabbab in Somalia, has been a continuous threat for the peace and security of the HoA (Dehez 2008: 10-14). Peter Woodward (2002:193), strengthened this fact by mentioning Eritrea's regional agenda of playing a role above its size and impoverished situation that led accusations of being aggressive towards its immediate neighbours; Yemen, Djibouti, and Sudan.

It is also generally believed that the Eritrean regime had provided support to anti-government movements of its neighbours, most notably Ethiopia, for instance Oromo Liberation Front, Ogaden National Liberation Front, Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, the Tigray People's Democratic Movement and Ginbot-7 can be enumerated as insurgent movements which have got military bases and training from Eritrean government (Plaut, 2016). Following the coming of a new prime minister in Ethiopia, Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed in April 2018, immediately heralded that Ethiopia would accept the 2002 boundary decision of the independent commission established by the 2000 peace settlement without any precondition which was insisted by Eritrea for long (Susan and Payton, 2018). After a few days of silence, Eritrea has also positively reacted to the peace call which was delivered from Ethiopia. This brings the two countries in a new era of rapprochement that has ended a situation of 'no war, no peace' which was a hurdle of peace and security between Ethiopia and Eritrea in particular and the HoA in general.

For the past few consecutive months, the Prime Minister has made an incredible move in ending the war and decriminalizing insurgent groups who had received base and military training in Eritrea notably the OLF, ONLF, ARDUF, TPDM and Ginbot-7 have come back to their homeland, Ethiopia (Nanjala, 2018; Aaron Maasho, 2018). For Eritrea, making peace with Ethiopia opens a new path which leads out of isolation. The Ethiopian Prime Minister has submitted a request to the United Nations Secretary General to lift sanctions against Eritrea executed since 2009 sanctions like travel bans, an arms embargo and economic restrictions against Eritrea in 2009 and the request became realized on 15 November 2018. The sanctions

were imposed based on concerns that the Eritrean government was funding and arming the Somalia extremist group, Al-Shabbab. Lifting sanctions could also help to unlock new paths for investment and economic growth needed in the country and to recover from its previous economic devastation (Susan and Payton, 2018).

The rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea needs a critical investigation to identify whether the rapprochement has either a positive or negative spillover outcome on the peace and security of the HoA. The rapprochement's spillover significance has gone beyond the two countries and it has a spillover outcome on the entire region. Moreover, the restoration of peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea marked the beginning of the end of Horn of African 'cold war' as the two countries were seriously busy in support of rebel groups by hosting at home and involved in the internal affairs of other states of HoA through supporting opposing sides. So, as the issue is new and contemporary, there are scant literatures or studies which are written about this new peace development and its implication for the peace and security of the HoA.

Among these, "Ethiopia's policy towards Eritrean refugees and migrants: Altruism or extension of the conflict" Studied by Kidest Dawit (2017), and "people to people communication in future peace building between Ethiopia and Eritrea the role of the youth" by Lwam Gebrekidane (2012) are among the few. But both of these studies have a gap in exploring this new peace development and its implication for the peace and security of the HoA since they were conducted before the advent of this contemporary peace development. Most studies which were conducted before this rapprochement became obsolete (outdated) and incapable to explore this new peace development in the entire region. Moreover, there are other articles and scholarly opinions on the issue. Among these, "The Conundrum of present Ethiopian Foreign Policy—in search of a Roadmap for Ethiopia's Foreign and National Security Policy and Strategy" written by Ambassador Dr. Tekeda Alemu (2019). The veteran Ambassador critically scrutinizes Ethiopia's foreign policy since 2002 as outdated and doesn't consider current developments in the HoA in particular and the world in general. The ambassador culminated his view by recommending the need for a new Foreign policy that wisely considers new developments in the region. In addition, "Ethio-Eritrean Peace Agreement Good for democratic Horn and Strong IGAD" written by Yosef Ketema (2018). And *Ethiopia & Eritrea Perspectives: Survival and Security in Geopolitics of the Red Sea* written by Amanuel T. Muhzun (2019). The aforementioned two writings are not full-

fledged researches rather scholastic opinions in form of article. The arguments are not emanated from an extensive research study. Moreover, they did not incorporate reactions of other states towards Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement.

As a candidate of peace and security studies, I strongly believe that the new peace development between Ethiopia and Eritrea is extremely sensitive and unpredicted state of affairs in the HoA. Hence, I suppose that this kind of unforeseen agenda needs to be prioritized and scrutinized critically. This contemporary peace development could be presumed as the beginning of a major shift in the discourse of peace and security in the HoA. From the past couple of decades of stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Djibouti has been a beneficiary of the deadlock by providing a monopoly port service for Ethiopia.

The study questioned what will be the reaction of Djibouti following Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement as Djibouti has been the main gateway of Ethiopia to the rest of the world and as a result Djibouti has been getting billions of dollars annually for the past years. Moreover, the study also questioned and analyzed to answers the reactions of other states of the region towards Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement. These questions made a huge contribution in provoking the researcher to fill the gap by examining the possible implications of the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea for the peace and security of the HoA.

### **1.3. Objective of the Study**

#### **1.3.1. General Objective of the Study**

The study will explore, describe and analyze the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea and its implication for the peace and security of the HoA.

#### **1.3.2. Specific Objectives of the Study**

Specific objectives of this study are intended to:

- ❖ Explore whether the ongoing rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea will have implications for the peace and security of the HoA.
- ❖ Analyze how other states of the region reacted to Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement.
- ❖ Scrutinize the challenges and prospects of the rapprochement.

#### **1.4. Research Questions**

The study aims to answer the following research questions:

- ❖ What are the peace and security implications of the ongoing rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea for the HoA?
- ❖ How do other states of the region react to Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement?
- ❖ What are the challenges and prospects of the rapprochement?

#### **1.5. Significance of the Study**

As the issue is contemporary and ongoing, it would fill the existing gap in the area and it serves as a reference for those who will conduct a study on the area. Moreover, it also serves as an input for policy makers of the country.

#### **1.6. Scope of the Study**

Geographically, the study is limited to the HoA depends on the researcher's delimitation of the sub-region and it mainly explored the issue of peace and security of the HoA following Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement. To study the issue, the researcher has scrutinized the relation between Ethiopia and Eritrea starting from the situation of 'no war, no peace' since 2000.

#### **1.7. Limitation of the Study**

During the time of conducting this study, the biggest challenge has been the pace of the rapprochement was so fast. This in turn makes the rapprochement unpredictable. To surmount this challenge, the researcher had keenly followed the issue and visited new happenings until the end of the study.

## **1.8. Organization of the study**

The study comprises six chapters. The first chapter is introductory part of the study which includes background of the study, statement of the problem, general and specific objectives of the study, research questions, significance, scope and limitations of the study. The second chapter is about literatures and documents which are related and written with the concept of peace and security and the theory employed to conduct the study. The third chapter mainly deals with the methodological part of the study that gives brief information on how the study was conducted. The fourth and fifth chapters of the study offer data analysis and presentation that discusses the major findings of the study by scrutinizing the data that had been acquired through several sets of instruments. The last chapter culminates the study by providing conclusion and the way forward.

## CHAPTER TWO

### 2. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

As peace and security are the main subjects of this study, the researcher will provide a brief discussion of the two concepts. On the definition and conceptualization of security, we will see the inextricable link between peace and security, and the imperative for the securitization of peace, i.e. peace perceived as a security issue. Therefore, Peace and security are two sides of the same coin: one cannot exist without the other- both are mutually reinforcing. This Chapter has been divided into two major sections: the first section deals with conceptual definitions of peace and security as well as related concepts; while the second, focuses on the review of related literature of the study.

#### 2.1. Definition of Key Terms

##### 2.1.1. On the Concept of Peace

As far as the concept of peace is concerned, many scholars forwarded several definitions and concepts towards peace. The term “peace” is often equated with harmony and lack of conflict or violence. Despite an assumed shared understanding of the word, peace usually embraces different connotations depending upon the context in which it is used and the person using the term. In order to clarify some of this conceptual confusion, Johan Galtung (1967), a prominent peace researcher, cited in Grewal (2003:2) identified two forms of peace which are ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace’. ‘Negative peace’ is a form of peace which can be accomplished as a result of the absence of war or direct conflict. Negative peace can also be achieved by force particularly when certain group’s superiority prevails over the other contending groups by way of the use or threat of force (Ibeanu, 2007: 34). On the other hand, ‘positive peace’ is characterized by integration, social justice and equality. For Galtung, there are different conceptions of peace, first “peace as a synonym for stability or equilibrium. This conception of peace also refers to internal state of a human beings, a person who is at peace with himself” (Galtung, 1967: 12), and there is the second idea of peace as

*“the absence of organized collective violence between major human groups; particularly nations, but also between classes, racial and ethnic groups, [He] refer this type of peace as negative peace”* (Galtung, 1967: 12).

There is also the third concept of peace- “peace as a synonym for all other good things in the world community, particularly cooperation and integration between human groups, with less emphasis on the absence of violence. [He] refer to it as positive peace” (Galtung, 1967:14). Grewel (2003:4), succinctly put, Galtungs classification of peace, as

*“negative peace: is not always by peaceful means. Positive peace is structural integration, optimistic, preventive, peace by peaceful means. Grewel further argues that, what Galtung in most of his work has sought to project was and still is positive peace as a higher ideal society.”*

Grewal (2003:1), further elaborated ‘negative peace’ is the absence of direct violence, absence of war while, ‘positive peace’ mainly refers to the integration of societies peacefully as it goes far deeper into cooperation and interdependence among societies. In this fact ‘negative peace’ is a peace which we see as tried to be enforced and implemented by a single dominant body in the world like either the super powers or the United Nations with a might to do it. This is done in a belief that it may bring and secure integration or what is called ‘Positive peace.’ However, Galtung did not agree with the above mechanisms unless all around and total disarmament is made. He outlines it as multilateralism, arms control, international conventions, balance of power activities, etc. which are all policies and proposals of negative peace. Rather he put the policies and proposals of ‘positive peace’ by employing effective communication, engaging in peace education, functioning international cooperation, good skill of conflict resolution, arbitration and negotiation skills as well as management skills (Grewal, 2003). In the aforementioned discourses, I have succinctly illustrated the concept of peace. To meet the purpose of this study, peace will be analyzed in its negative form.

### **2.1.2. On the Concept of Security**

Regarding the concept of security, scholars of the discipline find it hard to reach a consensus on a definition of security since there are numerous variations and assumptions on the concept. For scholars like Waever (1995), security has an everyday meaning which can be understood as being secure, safe, not threatened and the like. On the other hand, the Dictionary of International Relations defined the term security as a term that represents the absence of threats, and being safe from danger as well as feeling safe from danger (Evans & Newnham, 1998). Ayooob (1984:42), held the traditional conception of security which is a product of historical and political development that could be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia.

Westphalian state in 1648 had ushered the original aim of peoples' security. The period also marked the beginning of international politics in which sovereign states started to interact in a more structured manner; at this moment, the initial people's insecurity from the absence of organized social and political institutions altered to the safety of the established common social and political institutions, i.e. the state (Jemal, 2017). In this regard, Cottey (2007) cited in Bjarnadóttir (2012) argued that in international politics the definitions of security had been associated with the protection of sovereignty of the state which stressed on the preservation of territorial frontiers, political independence and core values of states from foreign threats.

Accordingly, the security of the state can be maintained and ensured primarily through its military capabilities to defend its interest in anarchic international order. The primacy of national security where state is the referent object to which another strong aggressive state in anarchic international system considered as a threat to its survival rooted in the realist traditions of international politics (Jemal, 2017). The Westphalian dogma of state sovereignty reached at its apex during the Cold War, "when the notion of 'security' used to be defined in political/military terms as the protection of a state's boundaries, its integrity and its values against the dangers of a hostile international arena" (Doty, 2000: 73 cited in Kaya, 2009:8). Finally, when we see the lexical definitions of the concept of security, it refers to the absence of threat or a lack of vulnerability to the particular referent object (Bjarnadóttir, 2012 cited in Jemal, 2017).

The concept of security has evolved and moved beyond its traditional roots of being strictly a value of the military or political sphere. To pursue the development of a strong and secure state, the state alone can no longer be treated as the sole referent object of security. Buzan and Waever (2003:71), offer a re-conceptualized definition of security- A security threat is an issue that's posited (by securitizing actors) as a threat to the survival of some referent object (nation, state, the liberal internal economic order, the rain forests), which are claimed to have a right to survive. The re-conceptualized definition of security highlights the element of perception, whereby security threats must be perceived as such in order to facilitate whether it is necessary to act or not to act and thus, from this point, two further definitions are offered; securitization and desecuritization.

❖ For Buzan and Waever (2003:491), securitization is defined as

*“the discursive process through which an inter-subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.”*

❖ Essentially, the idea of securitization highlights the process by which a threat is treated equally by all involved as being a mutual and imminent concern that requires action. Regarding to regional securitization, it requires all actors to view or depict an issue or referent object with equal emphasis as harmful or threatening. This may be contrasted to the previous concept of security in which the actors who decided which threats were most dire were solely from within the state – as the state was acting as the one and only unit within the international system.

❖ De-securitization is defined as *“the discursive process by which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as a threat.”* (Buzan and Waever, 2003:491). By contrast, de-securitization is the process by which those involved acknowledge that the threat is no longer an imminent reality posing danger

Three decades ago security began to have another dimension, this dimension was called ‘human security’, the concept of human security began to have widespread attention and recognition after its appearance in the 1994 Human Development Report, a document produced annually by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The report, emphasized on call for a conceptual shift towards the protection of people rather than states, the report argues,

*“The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust...Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives.”*

(UNDP, 1994: 22). So, security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

From the aforementioned definitions of security, relatively, there is a consensus on the lexical definitions of security. However, beyond this simplified lexical conceptualizations, the term security has been defined in a number of ways by various entities in deferent contexts.

So what we deduce from the above discussion is that, starting from the peace of Westphalia until the past three consecutive decades, the center of the conceptualization of security was state centered and security was narrowly defined without the incorporation of the notion of human security. For the purpose of this study, the researcher have employed the notion of security which gives primacy for national security that makes the state as the main reference object. In the definition and conceptualization of peace and security, we found the inextricable link between peace and security, and the imperative for the securitization of peace, i.e. peace perceived as a security issue. So, Peace and security are two sides of the same coin: one cannot exist without the other- both are mutually reinforcing.

### **2.2.3. No war, No peace**

Leenco (2006), the situation of ‘no war, no peace’ includes a time span since the two contested each other following the verdict of the Boundary Commission. Berhe, (2017), defined the situation of ‘no war, no peace’ between Ethiopia and Eritrea as the people on the opposite sides of the border are under the condition of unstable state of mind regarding to the security of one another, and denied the hopes of peace and fraternal brotherly/sisterly relationship among the peoples of the two countries

For the purpose of this research, ‘no war, no peace’ refers to the period starting from 2002 up to the advent of the contemporary rapprochement between the two countries, this period is characterized by a proxy war between the two, backing insurgent groups to dethrone each other, and working to destabilize the peace and security of one another in particular as a result affecting the region in general.

### **2.3.4. Rapprochement**

According to Merriam Webster dictionary, the word rapprochement comes from a French word ,ra- ,prōsh- 'mä<sup>n</sup> which means the establishment of or the state of having a cordial relation. Besides this, rapprochement refers to reestablishment of harmonious relations between warring parties.

In addition to Merriam Webster dictionary, Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary defined rapprochement as an agreement reached by opposing groups warring factions. For the purpose of this study, rapprochement means ending a stalemate between two states (Ethiopia and Eritrea) and reaching in to an agreement.

## **2.2. Theoretical Framework**

### **2.2.1. Regional Security Complex Theory**

Regional Security complex theory was first designed by Barry Buzan in his book entitled “People, States and Fear” (1991) that aimed to set a conceptual framework to provide a critical understanding to security studies. Security complex is a group of states whose primary security concerns are linked together sufficiently and closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another (Buzan, 1991). Their security complexes are also exposed to four major types of threats and their interaction: balance of power contests between great powers; lingering conflicts which emerge between states; intra-states conflicts that are usually spillovers of internal politics; and conflicts that arise from trans-national threats caused, for instance, by the rise of radical Islam and informal networks, state fragility, demographic explosion, environmental degradation or resource scarcity (Buzan, 1991).

Besides to this, theory of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) was updated by Buzan and Waever in 2003, in their work entitled “*Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security*”. As far as RSCT is concerned, its main argument is the ‘regional’ level as the locus of attention to study and analyze security. The authors justified “since decolonization, the regional level of security becomes autonomous and prominent in world politics, which was more accelerated by the end of the cold war” (Buzan and Waever 2003:3). In this theory, Regional Security Complex can be presumed as a building block of RSCT. In this theory regional security complex can be defined as “*a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.*” Besides, it refers to “*most political and military threats travel more easily over a short distance than over long ones, insecurity is often associated with proximity*” (Buzan and Waever, 2003:11). Moreover, regional security complex can be understood as “*durable patterns of amity and enmity take the form of sub global, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence.*” (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 45).

In this fact applying the conceptual framework of Buzan's "Regional Security complex Theory" in his book entitled "People, States and Fear" (1991), and updated work of Buzan and Waever in 2003, in their work entitled "*Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security*" Provides adequate unit of analysis. The jointly work between Buzan and Waever is very crucial in this research to scrutinize issues of securitization and de-securitizations. It is comprehensive and adaptable enough to be applied to the HoA as long as the political fate of each state in the region has always been inextricably intertwined with that of neighboring states. Indeed, no state in the Horn of Africa has been insulated from the problems of the other states no matter how distant and how strong or weak.

To wrap up, in RSCT, regional security complex is the building block and the national security of one state would not defined in isolation from the other: close security interdependence because of geographic proximity. So, the presence of a state of enmity between states of a specific region, would lead the states to host oppositions of one another which destabilizes the peace and security of the region and themselves. On the other side, an amicable relation between states would have its own positive impact on the concerned region and the states within it. Let's see the aforementioned concept of RSCT of a region in form of figure.




Figure 2.1. RSCT  
**(Developed by the Researcher).**

The above figure illustrates security interdependence of states which found in the same regional security complex as the security of one state is linked with the others and it is unlikely to express the security of one in isolation from another. The happening of conflict or cooperation in one of the state would not only affect a single state alone, rather, it would have a spillover effect on the entire region.

### **2.3. Delineating the Horn of Africa**

Before conferring varies delineation of the HoA, it is sound to render the definition of region. For the purpose of this research, the researcher has employed Buzan's definition of "region". For Buzan (1991:188), "region"

*"means a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is locked with each other because of geographical proximity."*

The delineation of HoA based on countries it includes are different from author to author. Conventionally, the HoA comprises Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea which are labeled as "core countries" of the region; nonetheless it embraces geopolitically the adjacent states of Sudan and Kenya (Farer, 1979:1; Danfulani, 1999:37 cited in Berouk Mesfin, 2011). For Buzan and Waver (2003:231), the HoA includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan, Scholars like Medhane (2004), argues in strictly geographic terms, the HoA comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia can be labeled as the 'core countries' of the HoA. But, he acknowledged that, there are other countries like Kenya and Sudan fitting to the definition making the HoA "Greater Horn of Africa." Mesfin (2004) also made Ethiopia as the epicenter of the HoA. For him, Ethiopia is the nucleus of the HoA and countries sharing boarder with it are automatically qualified to be part of the region. Accordingly, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan share boarders with Ethiopia, making them part of the HoA. Besides, the aforementioned countries, Mesfin also include Uganda and Kenya as part of the region as they share boarder with other HoA and being a member of IGAD which can be labeled as "Greater Horn of Africa."

For the purpose of this research, the researcher borrows the definition of Medhane and Mesfin, i.e. the HoA comprised countries which have a common boundary with Ethiopia, because as it is stated earlier, Ethiopia is the nucleus of the region. So, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan are delineated as member states of the HoA. Besides this, the researchers' justification for the incorporation of three countries (Sudan, South Sudan, and Kenya) beyond the core countries of the HoA is that, the researcher found the rapprochement has a spillover effect beyond the core countries of the HoA.

## 2.4. Regional Security Complex of the Horn of Africa

For Berouk Mesfin (2011), the HoA is the poorest region in the continent of Africa which is manifested by the presence of “per capita income, life expectancy and literacy are among the lowest in the world, and adult and infant mortality are among the highest in the world”. Moreover, the region is prone to deadly drought and that affects crop and livestock production. The region is one of the most turbulent regions in the world which is characterized by hosting inter-state and intra-state conflicts (Medhane, 2004). Moreover HoA is the most militarized and conflict-ridden region in the continent of Africa, which has been a battlefield for several intra and inter-state conflicts. Among this, the Ethio-Eritrean and the South-Sudanese conflict took place in the HoA (Shinn, 2009, cited in Berouk Mesfin, 2011). Since its independence, Eritrea has been engaged in conflicts with almost all of its neighbours including Yemen, Djibouti, Ethiopia and the Sudan (Birhanu 2013, quoted in Redie, 2013).

Markakis (1998:5), as cited in Tafesse Olika (2009:3), explained “*the HoA is a region with a multitude of physical, social, cultural, economic and other integrating features.*” From this, we can deduce that, the region is very interconnected and the fates of the countries are interlocked with each other. Moreover, Tafesse (2009), strengthened it by arguing that, “conflict inter-linkage has made the HoA as a region of “security complex.” Conflicts in the Horn of Africa in general are intractable and closely interconnected; the unfolding of conflict in one country can easily spill over into neighbouring areas (Dehez 2008: 10-14). This is due to the fact that the region is exposed to similar political and socio-economic contexts. Politically, states of the region have accustomed Politics of mutual destabilization: in time of conflict states host opposition of one another that destabilizes the peace and security of themselves and the entire region. In addition to this, states of the region connected by history, overlapping peoples; meaning, having the same ethno-cultural groups into different political jurisdictions. For instance, the Afar people are divided between Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea, Tigray speaking people are found on both sides of Ethio-Eritrean border, Similarly, Somali speaking peoples are divided between Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya, again, Ethiopia and Kenya share Oromo ethnic group. Several other different groups also span across Kenya-Sudan, Ethiopia-Sudan, and Eritrea-Sudan frontiers (Tafesse, 2009:3&4).

The discontent of one ethno-cultural groups in one country would have a spillover impact over the other. For instance, Djibouti comprises two major ethnic groups: the Issa Somalis and the Afars. The major structural cause of conflict in Djibouti is the perception of political and economic marginalization on the part of the minority population, the Afar. This led in to Political frustration in which the minority Afars feel excluded and discriminated against by the majority Issa and have established the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), representing the Afar people, launched an armed insurgency since 1991 recruited its fighters from Afars in Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. Moreover, after Ethio-Eritrean full-scale war, Ethiopia and Eritrea made Somalia as their theatre of proxy war with a spillover impact to other members, especially on Kenya and the same is true for Eritrea and Sudan; still accused each other for subversive activities (Tafesse, 2009).

To wrap up, there is a security complex among countries which are located in the *HoA*. A conflict that happened in one of them has a high spillover effect in to other countries of the region. The security, as well as an insecurity of member states of the region will not be explained in isolation from the other. The following figure clearly illustrates the Regional Security Complex of the HoA.




Figure 2.2. RSCT of the HoA

As we have seen from the above figure, all states have a close geographic proximity with one another meaning, there is security interdependence; if there is insecurity in one of the states, it would have a spillover effect over the others.

## **2.5. Literature Review**

In this part of the paper, the researcher would like to bring lessons from other region on how peace between two countries has changed the regional security complex of a given region. For the purpose of this research, the researcher took how the regional security complex of Middle East region has been impacted through bilateral peace between Israel and Egypt in the Camp David Accord suits perfect. The war between Egypt and Israel has ended through Camp David Accord which has been mediated by United States of America. The peace accord does not only change the relation between Israel and Egypt, rather it has changed the regional security complex of Middle East Region.

### **2.5.1. Arab-Israel Wars**

Before moving into Camp David Accord that resolved the war between Egypt and Israel, it is essential to provide some historical backgrounds of Arab-Israel wars. Indeed, the Arabs and the Israelis have fought four (4) wars against each other. The Israelis labeled Israel's 1948-49 clashes with the Arabs as their "War of Independence" which brought the state of Israel into being by force of arms as Britain relinquished the mandate for Palestine. The second war occurred in 1956 when President Nasser had nationalized and then closed the Suez Canal, which led to an Anglo-French invasion of Egypt (Edgar, ND: 4). The third Arab-Israel wars had been a "Six Day War," fought in June 1967. After making a preemptive air strike on Arab airfields, the Israel had destroyed the air force of Jordan, almost destroy that of Egypt, and badly attack those of Syria and Iraq. At the end of the war, in the north, Syria lost the Golan Plateau, in the East; Jordan lost its West Bank; the more prosperous part of the Hashemite Kingdom, in the South, the Egyptians lost the Gaza Strip and the whole of the Sinai desert and peninsula. The fourth war between the Arabs and the Israelis, which broke out in the Middle East on 6 October 1973, is known to the Arabs as the "War of Ramadan," to the Israelis as the "Yom Kippur War," and generally to non-partisans in the West as the "October War of 1973."(Edgar, ND: 5).

So, all the above wars had been taken place because of the belief that traditionally, there were an Egyptian Pan-Arabism and hostility toward Israel as the "illegitimate, temporary, Zionist entity" were largely based on a profound sense that the Palestinians had been wrongly displaced, and that Arab land was forcibly taken from the Palestinians when Israel was established in 1948

(Shibley, ND: 2). As the researcher illustrated above the regional security of Middle East Region had been seriously spoiled by the Arab-Israel war until Israel's neighbor Arab countries accepted the state of Israel as an entity in the region.

A major transition had been happened in the Middle East on 28 September 1970 when President Nasser died and succeeded by Anwar Sadat. At first President Sadat seemed to be trying diplomacy by giving the Roger's Peace Plan a chance. This peace initiative, proposed by United States Secretary of State William P. Rogers, in December 1969, specified Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in return for Arab assurance of a binding peace commitment, but it was rejected by the Israelis. Sadat launched a peace initiative of his own on 5 February 1971 that, if the Israelis would make a partial withdrawal, the Egyptians would clear and reopens the Suez Canal. Unfortunately this proposal came to nothing, simply contributing to the undercurrent of rising discontent within the country at the continuing military inaction against Israel. Until, the 1973 Arab-Israel war, Israel and other Arab countries especial Egypt had undergone under the condition of 'No Peace, No War'. After the situation of 'No Peace, No War' between Israel and Egypt and other Arab nations, the fourth war between the Arabs and the Israelis, had been broke out in Middle East on 6 October 1973, is known to the Arabs as the "War of Ramadan," to the Israelis as the "Yom Kippur War," and generally to non-partisans in the West as the "October War of 1973." In this fourth Arab-Israel war, Israel became victorious again (Edgar, ND: 5). When Israel became victorious in all fronts against the Arabs in four consecutive Arab-Israel wars the State of Israel were reinforced in Arab minds. In addition, confrontation with Israel became a costly business for Egypt and Syria; as portions of their own territories were occupied and many of their people became refugees (Shibley, ND: 2&3).

Although, there were many unsuccessful attempts to mediate Israel and other Arab states, Camp David Accord has led its cornerstone for the existence of peace between Israel and other Arab states in the Region. Following the aforementioned accord, Israel got its recognition and other Arab states regained their lost territories during their four Arab-Israel wars. The researcher has provided the details of the accord in the following sub-sections. Moreover, the researcher would like to illustrate other unsuccessful attempts and Camp David Accord to mediate the Arab-Israel conflict in the following sub-sections.

### **2.5.2. Camp David Accord**

Although Israel and Egypt had been in a state of war since 1948, the road to Camp David began in the wake of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. In that war Israel had soundly defeated the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, and had occupied the West Bank and Gaza (the only parts of Palestine not under Israeli control), Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, and Syria's Golan Heights. As a result, the reality and durability (if not the legitimacy) of the State of Israel were reinforced in Arab minds. In addition, confrontation with Israel became a costly business for Egypt and Syria; portions of their own territories were occupied and many of their people became refugees (Shibley, ND: 2&3). As we have seen from the aforementioned evidence, Israel became hugely unchallenged in four consecutive Arab-Israel wars militarily. Arab countries become exhausted and tired of wasting war logistics and lost their territories in different war fronts to Israel and made their citizens refugees.

Before the advent of Camp David Accord, there was a lengthy discussion among members of the United Nations Security Council, and a final draft of Security Council Resolution was presented by the British Ambassador, Lord Caradon, on November 22, 1967. This resolution, numbered United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (UNSCR 242) which comprises provisions and principles which had been hoped to end the Arab-Israel conflict. Although, the resolution had failed to end the conflict, it became the cornerstone of Middle East diplomatic efforts in the coming decades (Palestine Facts, 2010 cited in Carlton, 2011:7).

Camp David Accords was a Framework for Peace in the Middle East region that includes Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. Jimmy Carter was one of the main architects of the Camp David Accords received much credit, and domestic and international praise for his achievement in promoting peace between Egypt and Israel. Carter gave much of his time and energy to the Arab-Israeli conflict (Mohammad, 2012:48). In his keynote speech of the 25th anniversary reunion of the Camp David Accords on September 16, 2003, former American president Carter reminded Camp David Accords and he argued that, there were basic elements for peace, but obviously peace was not achieved.

Additional wars took place and the latest one was in 1973. When we went to Camp David, it was with an effort to continue the process that had been begun a long time before. The former president illustrated that, to brought peace in the region the most important thing was, first Arabs recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace. Second was Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, with exceptions that had to be negotiated for Israel's security and thirdly the Palestinian case was very indispensable (Jimmy Carter, 2003). To strengthen the former presidents idea, For Shibley (ND: 1), state survival was the most important thing for Israel as other Arabs nations especially Egypt who galvanize other Arab states consider Israel as "the illegitimate Zionist enemy" that had displaced the Palestinian people.

The Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel, concluded with the mediation of the United States on September 17, 1978, represent a remarkable event in Middle East history. For three decades Egypt had been Israel's most avowed enemy, having fought four wars and championed the pan-Arab and Palestinian causes. A generation of Egyptians grew up knowing Israel simply as "the illegitimate Zionist enemy" that had displaced the Palestinian people. *"When President Anwar el Sadat of Egypt announced his intention to visit Jerusalem, in a gesture that led to Camp David, most people were surprised, some indeed shocked; Israelis danced in the streets in a state of euphoria"* (Shibley, ND: 1).

And when the accords were finally signed, the repercussions were equally dramatic: Egypt, the historical leader of the Arab world, was expelled from the Arab League, and the Egyptian people showed no great enthusiasm. The outcome of the Camp David process had a substantial impact on superpower interests, the chances of war, and regional politics in the Middle East. As far as key terms of the accord are concerned, there are two separate agreements. The first, between Egypt and Israel, stipulates Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai (including settlements and bases) in return for which Egypt would sign a peace treaty with Israel and normalize relations, including an exchange of ambassadors and allowing travel across borders. In addition, much of the Sinai would be demilitarized, and a multinational force would be stationed there to prevent future hostilities. The second agreement provided for a three-stage framework to determine the status of the West Bank and Gaza. Following the peace treaty has been signed, ambassadors exchanged, and Israel has withdrawn from the Sinai, little has been done about the West Bank and Gaza.

Nonetheless, despite massive criticism of the accords, the assassination of Sadat, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the peace treaty has survived and it has played an incredible role to stopped further Arab-Israel wars (Shibley, ND: 29).

### **2.5.3. Significance of Camp David Accord: Regional peace and Security**

As far as the importance of Camp David Accord is concerned, irrespective of its defects it has played a tremendous role to stopped further Arab-Israel wars with the exception of few inter-state conflicts. Besides, the Accord had its own significance for the advent of relative peace and security in Middle East Region as it was illustrated in the above sub-sections of this study.

The Camp David Accords were the first attempt at negotiations to achieve peace in the Middle East. It led to the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty which brought down the curtains on a conflict that had lasted for the better part of three decades since the British Mandate. For their efforts at establishing peace in the volatile region, Sadat, and Menachem Begin, the then president of Egypt and Prime Minister of Israel respectively shared the Nobel Peace Prize for the year 1978 for bringing peace for Israel and Egypt and for the peoples of Middle East Region in general (Anup Patwardhan, 2018).

For Mohammad (2012:49), Camp David Accords had brought invaluable lessons that can be learned from looking at its outcomes. For him the Accord could be presumed as a model for future peace agreements between Israel and Arabs on the following grounds: First, American auspices could produce an agreement based on the principle of “land for peace”. The Accords proved that negotiations without the United States have had little chances of success. Second, Camp David would eventually reduce Israeli fears and security concerns. Third, Arabs realized that there could be no war with Israel without Egypt, so they had no choice but to negotiate with Israel. Moreover, there are also other prominent developments raised from the signing of the Camp David Accords. The first being the protection of human life, in the thirty years before Camp David Egypt and Israel had engaged in multiple wars, but in the thirty years since they have avoided all conflict, potentially saving numerous causalities. Finally, Egypt and Israel employed resources for positive development that previously had to be spent on the military or lost in wars could now be diverted to domestic programs in dire need of funding (Mohammad, 2012:49).

Finally, the Accord enabled both nations to receive billions of dollars from the United States in the form of aid and grants, along with the help that Egypt was to receive in modernizing its military. These Accords also helped to an extent in reducing Israel's worries on the border that it shared with Egypt. Furthermore, the signing of the Accords in 1978 had not only established peace between the two neighbors but also paved the way for the Oslo Accords of 1993, and the signing of the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty in 1994, which further helped in reducing the violence that wreaked havoc in the region (Anup Patwardhan, 2018).

To wrap up, Camp David Accord had played a phenomenal role to end the three decades of the Arab-Israel war and it has changed the Regional Security Complex of Middle East Region. Lastly, the Accord had been served as a milestone for further accords that had been in the region which were crucial for the advent of peace and security in the region.

#### **2.5.4. How Ethiopia and Eritrea spoiled the peace and Security of the Horn of Africa**

After Eritrea's official independence in 1993, Ethiopia and Eritrea have multifaceted relations regarding culture, blood, language, religion etc. (Kidane and Okbzaghi, 2005). The two countries had established a formal state-to-state relations and different agreements were concluded to regulate their bilateral relations. These protocols encompass defense pact, harmonization of economic and trade policies, and all public affairs including tourism, education, and health care services (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). Arrangements were made for Ethiopia's continuing use of the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa and in return, Eritrea has used Ethiopia's currency. Although Ethiopia and Eritrea were in an incredible relationship for four consecutive years from its independence until the year 1997. The bilateral relationships between the two had been deteriorated after the year 1997 as implementations of the above arrangements were not supported by institutions and legal frameworks. Most importantly, the two governments did not negotiate on the measures to be taken after Eritrea adopted its own currency which resulted in creating suspicion and mistrust between the two countries. Besides this, a difference in ideology between TPLF and EPLF, economic rivalry, and their unfinished business especially in terms of border demarcation leads the two sisterly nations in to small conflicts before the 1998-2000 full-scale war that costs a lot in social, economic and human casualties (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000).

After the Algiers agreement, Ethiopia and Eritrea have been in a relation of ‘no war, no peace.’ This prolonged their impasse for the past two consecutive decades and led into a serious instability and mutual destabilization that cut across the national and economic security interests of both countries (Jason Mosley, 2018:7). According to Amanuel (2019), in time of ‘no war, no peace’ stalemate, both Ethiopia and Eritrea have supported and host oppositions of each other which had been responsible for destabilizing the peace and security of the two countries in particular and the HoA in general.

According to Martin Plaut (2016:41), who has been keenly following the politics of the HoA for more than three decades argues that, Ethiopia and Eritrea confronted each other since 2000 in a situation which can be described as ‘no peace, no war.’ For him, the conflict as well as the rivalry and the proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia and the support of insurgents (OLF, Ginbot-7, ONLF, ARDUF, and the TPDM. ONLF) spoiled the peace and security of the HoA. The past twenty years between Ethiopia and Eritrea can be described as shaky and disastrous especially, communities who live on both sides of their mutual border were victims of the situation of ‘no war, no peace’ as long as the communities have a history which is tied up by a yoke together. Therefore, the deadlock between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which lasted for two decades, had destabilized the peace and security of Ethiopia and Eritrea in particular and the HoA in general. Ethiopia and Eritrea had given territories under their jurisdiction for the two countries’ opposition and insurgent groups with the aim of toppling down one another. Eritrea had given its territories for insurgent groups of almost for all countries of the HoA. Thus, it is possible to deduce that the pattern of mutual subversion between Ethiopia and Eritrea had created insecurity in Ethiopia and Eritrea which had a spillover mutual destabilization over other member states of the HoA. This shows that, the occurrence of conflict or insecurity in one of them cannot be elaborated in isolation from the Horn of African security complex. Sharing the same ethno-cultural population (Afar people found in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, Somali speaking peoples found in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya, Tigrgna speaking people found in Ethiopia and Eritrea) make the insecurity of the HoA trans-boundary.

Finally, The coming of the new Ethiopian Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed in April 2018, immediately heralded that Ethiopia would accept the 2002 boundary decision of the independent commission established by the 2000 peace settlement which was insisted by Eritrea for long (Susan and Payton, 2018). This adds the two countries into a new era of rapprochement that has ended a situation of ‘no war, no peace’ which was a hurdle of peace and security between Ethiopia and Eritrea in particular and the HoA in general. Therefore, this study has been focused on to analyze the possible challenges and opportunities of the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea and its implications for the peace and security of the HoA.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Research Methodology**

Under this chapter, the main task of the researcher is to deal with the methodological approaches that are used to conduct this study. Therefore, research design, sampling technique, data collection techniques, data analysis and presentation and ethical considerations have been incorporated.

#### **3.1. Research Design**

This study employed qualitative research approach. The rationale behind employing this method was qualitative approach is very vital to explore, investigate, and understand behavior, events, and theories (Creswell, 2003). Looking phenomena and experiences from the perspective of individuals is the major significance of qualitative method. Moreover, qualitative research is very important to scrutinize how people viewed their social world (Creswell, 2003). In this study, qualitative data allows and in fact facilitates understanding of experiences, perception and process in context and from multiple perspectives. The qualitative methodology is also important to discuss a complex political phenomenon (Khotari, 2004). Therefore, employing this methodology made the research plausible.

##### **3.1.1. Sampling Technique**

Based on the research problem that the study intends to address, the researcher has employed a non-probability sampling technique. Among different non-probability sampling techniques, the researcher has used purposeful sampling technique to collect the necessary data to conduct the study.

###### **3.1.1.1. Purposeful sampling technique**

Purposive sampling technique depends on the judgment of the researcher's deliberate choice of a participant due to the qualities that the participant possesses. Participants were selected based on their positions and expertise.

Totally sixteen peoples were included in the study; of which, 6 of them were key informants from AU, Peace and Security Department, Permanent Mission of the State of Eritrea to the AU and UNECA, South Sudan Ambassador Extraordinary and plenipotentiary Ethiopia and Djibouti,

permanent Representative to AU, IGAD and UNECA, IGAD, Institute of Peace and Security Studies.

The rest 10 were included in an interview from IGAD and Neighbouring Countries Directorate General Desk Officers, Institute of Peace and Security Studies, Political Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa University.

### **3.1.2. Data Collection Method**

To carry out this study, the researcher has employed both primary and secondary data collection methods. Interview and key informants interview were used as primary data collection methods. Finally, document analysis was also employed to collect the necessary information to accomplish the study. As a notice, the researcher has given a due focus on document analysis and used primary data to support it.

#### **3.1.2.21. Interview**

In this study, the researcher interviewed a total of sixteen informants six as key informants from IGAD, from embassies sited in Addis Ababa which includes South Sudan, AU and IPSS and the rest ten informants; five from IGAD and Neighbouring Countries Directorate General Desk Officers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, two from Department of Political Science and International Relations in Addis Ababa University, and two from Institute of Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University and one from a weekly writer on the HoA.

#### **3.1.2.2.2. Document Analysis**

In this method of data collection, the researcher carefully analyzed periodicals and research outputs from CDRC, ISS Africa, Horn of African Bulletin and different scholars in the area.

### **3.1.3. Data Analysis Technique**

As far as data analysis is concerned, the researcher has used a qualitative way of data analysis. First, the researcher has transcribed the data which was collected through interview, document analysis and key informant interview and then organized the data by categorizing them by context. The researcher has employed triangulation for the sake of ensuring the credibility of the study.

#### **3.1.4. Ethical Consideration**

As Creswell (2003), has noted clearly, ethics in research is very crucial to come up with a credible and a reliable study. So, the researcher has mentioned names and addresses as well as positions of respondents only those who voluntarily and kept confidential those who have not.

## Chapter Four

### Data Analysis and presentation

#### 4.1. Ethiopia and Eritrea: Hurdle for the Peace and Security of the Horn of Africa

Since its independence, Eritrea has troubled relations with its neighbours in different times. These are Yemen, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Sudan (Birhanu 2013, cited in Redie, 2013). Among Eritrea's conflict with its neighbours, the war conducted from 1998 - 2000 between Ethiopia and Eritrea has distracted the security of the entire region. It was one of the most dangerous wars in the HoA with a high spillover effect to neighboring countries of the region (Temesgen, 2012). The 'no war, no peace' stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea affected the lives of millions in both countries and the stability of the whole region. Under 'no war, no peace' situation, the direct military confrontation was replaced by proxy war and hosting insurgent groups and assisting opposition groups was started. Both states openly have been providing financial and material support to the oppositions of each other, both states orchestrated their territory to be used as training and launching grounds for subversive activities. Politically, 'no war, no peace' means a diplomatic game where one side tries to isolate the other. This had its own effect on their neighbours as if they forge a good relation with one of them, while the other perceives it in a wrong way. Besides this, the situation forced the two states to deploy their armies around the border which costs a huge expenditure reduced from social-economic service budgets (Tariku, 2014). The situation had let the two states lost social, economic and diplomatic benefits.

Tewodros, African Studies lecturer in Addis Ababa University cited in Yosef Ketema (2018), argues that, because of the two countries' hostile relations, insurgent groups and terrorists had been taking advantages of the situation in carrying out various terrorist acts in the region. Regional organizations like IGAD had been accustomed to lack of consistency in decision making on various regional and international matters. And this, in turn, has played a big role in weakening IGAD in terms of creating influence on building sustainable peace and economic partnership with other regional players as it was disturbed by the move which had been made by Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Eritrea's aspiration of becoming a hegemon state in the HoA made Eritrea aggressive and led in to a conflict with its immediate neighbours; Yemen, Djibouti, Sudan and Ethiopia (Peter WoodWard, 2002:193). For Amanuel (2019), in time of 'no war, no peace' stalemate, both Ethiopia and Eritrea supported and hosted oppositions of each other. This act has destabilized the peace and security of the two countries in particular and the region in general. Interview with Key informant (05) and (06) ascertained the fact that Ethiopia and Eritrea had been mutually destabilized the region when the two moved to contain each other.

In the period of 'no war, no peace', both Ethiopia and Eritrea were so busy to destabilize one another by hosting and supporting rebel groups of the two states (Jason Mosley, 2018; Martin 2016 and interview with Key informant (05) and (06). For instance, the Eritrean government has given tremendous support to OLF, Ginbot-7, ONLF, ARDUF, and the TPDM. ONLF fighters have been fighting for the secession of Ogaden. Ethiopia also reacted by supporting and hosting the Eritrean rebel groups (Wuhibegezer 2014:44; Jason Mosley 2018:7; Plaut, 2016). In such a complex system, even smaller states were attempted to challenge the big ones like Ethiopia by creating alliances and counter-alliances or supporting proxies. For instance, Eritrea's hostility towards its neighbor, Eritrea's invasion of Ethiopia and its continuing of proxy war with Ethiopia in the soil of Somalia after the end of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, hosting opposition groups of Ethiopia and neighbouring countries, and finally, the presence of Al-Shabbab in Somalia, had led to mutual destabilization of the HoA (Dehez, 2008: 10-14).

Therefore, the deadlock between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which lasted for two decades, had destabilized the peace and security of Ethiopia and Eritrea in particular and the HoA in general. Ethiopia and Eritrea had given territories under their jurisdiction for the two countries' opposition and insurgent groups with the aim of toppling down one another. Eritrea had given its territories for insurgent groups of almost for all countries of the HoA. Thus, it is possible to deduce that the pattern of mutual subversion between Ethiopia and Eritrea had created insecurity in Ethiopia and Eritrea which had a spillover mutual destabilization over other member states of the HoA. This shows that, the occurrence of conflict or insecurity in one of them cannot be elaborated in isolation from the Horn of African security complex.

Sharing the same ethno-cultural population (Afar people found in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, Somali speaking peoples found in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya, Tigrgna speaking people found in Ethiopia and Eritrea) make the insecurity of the HoA trans-boundary. The following figures succinctly illustrate how the HoA looks like in time of ‘no war, no peace situations of Ethiopia and Eritrea.




Figure 4.1. Succinctly illustrate how the HoA looks like in time of ‘no war, no peace situations of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

(Developed by the Researcher)

#### **4.1.1. Horn of Africa: A Hub for External Powers Rivalry**

The HoA is strategically vital as it connects Africa, Asia, and Europe. That is why superpowers, as well as emerging powers of the Middle East are on the race to scramble the HoA. To do this, they had established their military base on the Red Sea coast (Tsegay, 2019). The region attracts the attention of major powers and emerging powers of the world. Currently, the HoA is hosting a number of military bases of various countries who are rivals on permanent bases. China and USA are ardent rivals politically as well as economically at the global level, China and Japan are regional as well as global rivals and finally the two leading Gulf powers, UAE and Saudi Arabia, are among others here to counter the coming of Iran as well as to deter Qatar's influence in the region. The presence of rival powers in the turbulent region could fuel tension in the entire region, and instigate confrontation among the states (Gashaw and Zelalem, 2016). So here, hosting external powers which have a variety of forces in terms of power, ideology as well as the level of adversity, is making the HoA a region encircled by external powers that are characterized by a diversified national interest.

Here, what the researcher wants to show is that, the region is a venue of plenty of national interests of the super powers and emerging powers of the Middle East that has been landed in the HoA to scramble the region for their own sake. So it is in the midst of all the above things that the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been heralded. Even though, it seeks a further study on the issue, specifically, KSA and UAE take the lion share for the advent of the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. As Charles, Anouar, and Dawit (2019), succinctly illustrated in a document that was presented in Tana Forum, the intervention of the Gulf countries in the politics of the Horn could be the weakening of IGAD, and its security architecture which create suspicion among member' states of the region as the Gulf States themselves divided along different alliances, and forged a relation that can scramble states of the Horn along with their interests. For instance, in the case of Sudan, beyond the conflict between Sudan and Eritrea, at the back of the two, there are the Gulf actors whose interests are overlapped each other or actors found in different alliances; KSA and the UAE on one side and Turkey and Qatar on the other side.

This makes the conflict between Sudan and Eritrea much worse even now, while Sudan is under a military transitional government. As Saudi and Emiratis had played a tremendous role in bringing Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia to work together, the process would have completed the circle if it was successful in bringing Sudan on board. But it didn't. Even though, the tripartite arrangements between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia has its own merit, it create a suspicion, mistrust, and enforced other members of the region to be skeptical which can be perceived as a challenge (Getachew, and Dr. Abdeta 2018:33-36).

KSA and the UAE had been striving to curb the advent of Turkey and Iran in the HoA. The Yemen crisis has given the Saudi government another reason to look towards the HoA. To do this, in 2016 the Saudi government announced its intention of opening a permanent military base in Djibouti and commenced the construction immediately (Lavinder, 2017). The UAE was another power that had a military presence in Djibouti until it encountered disagreement with the government of Djibouti over a lease which resulted in diplomatic cut for short period of time between the two countries (Lavinder, 2017). It had also tried to maintain its presence through Dubai Ports World (DPW) Company who had signed an agreement with the Djibouti government in order to govern the Djibouti port, until the Djibouti government decided to take over UAE's last possession in that country. However in recent years Eritrea has begun attracting the attention of foreign powers, especially, the Gulf nations. As part of their geopolitical rivalry, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE sought to have a military cooperation with Eritrea which includes the opening of military bases (Blanche, 2017, Sudan Tribune, 2017).

For the past couple of years, the UAE has been using its new military base in Assab during its fight against the Houthi rebels. "The base has been used in operations to retake Aden, as well as training Yemeni counterterrorism forces, blockading Houthi-held ports, and sending humanitarian assistance into Yemen" (Lavinder, 2017:2). The Eritrean government has leased the port for UAE for thirty years with a potential of renewal. After the happening of the aforementioned events, especially, after the UAE's departure from the port administration of Djibouti, the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been heralded.

To wrap up, the presence of the external powers in the HoA will determine the fate as well as the peace and security situation, and the relationship between the states in the Horn and the external powers that are in the region. Regardless of the fierce rivalry of external powers in the HoA, neither the AU nor IGAD have articulated a regional political and security strategy which is capable to defend the aforementioned pressures exerted by external powers (Charles et al., 2019). Moreover, the authors mentioned that the panacea for the mess is that, the AU and IGAD should work together with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Arab League, and with other organizations and states to make the HoA a stable region.

#### **4.1.2. The Rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Its implication for the Peace and Security of the two Countries**

In this sub-topic of the study, the researcher has critically analyzed the implications of Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement for the peace and security of the HoA. Prior to this, the researcher would like to critically examine what drives the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement and its implications of the rapprochement for the peace and security of both countries themselves and then, the region.

##### **4.1.2.1. Factors for the Advent of Ethio-Eritrean Rapprochement**

After the Algiers agreement, Ethiopia and Eritrea have passed a relation of ‘no war, no peace’ for the past two consecutive decades. But, suddenly, the rapprochement commenced in June 2018 with the unconditional acceptance of the Algiers agreement by the Ethiopian government. Lots of justifications have been illustrated on how the rapprochement happened. Internal changes with in Ethiopia and external factors played a significant role for the advent of the rapprochement. Among these, Interviewee (09) insisted that, the internal ‘political reform’ with in Ethiopia because of the protests in Amhara and Oromia, regional states brought a new incumbent Prime Minister who had heralded the end of Ethio-Eritrean stalemate by accepting the Algiers agreement without any precondition. Besides this, the interviewee mentioned USA, UAE, and KSA played a significant role behind the curtain for the advent of Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement. On the other hand, the advent of newly emerging powers of the Middle East, countries like UAE and KSA, who are rapidly scrambling the HoA to contain the influence of Turkey and Iran, have made a good job in mediating a stalemate that has been persistent for the past two consecutive decades.

The Key informant (02) also raised the visit of Donald Yamamoto; a veteran on the politics of the HoA, shows the tacit involvement of the USA on the rapprochement to contain China's influence in the region.

Key informant (06) illustrated, the following rationales are the driving factors for Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement. The internal political 'reform' within Ethiopia, the international community particularly the west pushed Eritreans to end their stalemate with Ethiopia, and the massive exodus of Eritrean people forced Eritrea to accept the peace offer from Ethiopia. According to interviewee (03), the 'reform' within the EPRDF made a paradigm shift on a stubborn stance of the front towards Eritrea; it means peace with Eritrea is crucial. Moreover, the interviewee also illustrated the influence of external powers especially; UAE and KSA hastened the pace of the rapprochement and took the big credit for the happening of the rapprochement.

Following the aforementioned justifications, we found that the initial statement from the executive committee of the EPRDF issued on June 5, 2018, with the coming of a new Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed indicated that his government's willingness to unconditionally accept the terms of the Algiers Agreement and the rulings of the EEBC (Demessie, 2018:3). Ethiopian Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed, during his inaugural statements on April 02, 2018, told the public, his government is ready to resume dialogue and diplomatic relation with Eritrea. Although similar promises had been made by his predecessors Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegne, but failed due to lack of mutual trust. Key informant (06) *"confirmed the repeated quests of former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn to normalize the relation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, but, we insisted no as we haven't trusted them."*

What Prime Minister Abiy said: *"We are fully committed to reconcile with our Eritrean brothers and sisters.* This was one of his statements in appealing the Eritrean people and the government for peace and bilateral cooperation. After Ethiopia's decision to fully implement the Algiers Agreement, Eritrea initially remained quiet, but after a while, Eritrean leadership has accepted Ethiopia's call for the peaceful relation of the two countries. Then the two countries exchanged a state visit directly at the highest level and triggering a rapid series of events (Getachew and Dr. Abdeta, 2018:25-28). President Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea, who had been

quite stubborn for two decades, has later accepted to Prime Minister Dr. Abiy's earnest call during 'Martyrs' Day' of June 20, 2018, in Asmara.

He said that, *"the lost opportunity between the two sisterly nations is so regretful."* Soon, on June 23, 2018, the government of Eritrea sent a delegation to Addis Ababa, led by Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh and Head of Political Affairs Yemane Gebreab. The delegate was received directly by the Ethiopian Prime Minister along with his high government officials and dignitaries. Both parties got together by sharing great emotions and good fraternal communications indicating fast and meaningful relations to come (Amanuel, 2019). The changes have created a reality that no one expected. Then Prime Minister Dr. Abiy and president Isaias have exchanged state visit that highly heralded normalization of relations, the opening of the two embassies in the capitals of the respective countries, Ethiopia's unilateral push for the lifting of the sanctions on Eritrea in the United Nations Security Council are all seen as moving parts of the rapprochement (Getachew and Dr. Abdeta, 2018:25-28). On July 9, 2018, during Prime Minister Abiy's trip to Asmara, the two governments signed a 'joint declaration of peace and friendship' which formally ended the state of war between the two countries. On September 5, 2018, the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia signed a tripartite agreement in Asmara, committing the three governments to work on regional peace and joint economic cooperation (Demessie, 2018:3). Following this, On September 16, 2018 Ethiopia and Eritrea have made an agreement entitled "Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation" at Jeddah, KSA. The agreement has seven articles.

#### *Article One*

*The state of war between the two countries has ended and a new era of peace, friendship and comprehensive cooperation has started.*

#### *Article Two*

*The two countries will promote comprehensive cooperation in the political, security, defense, economic, trade, investment, cultural and social fields on the basis of complementarity and synergy.*

#### *Article Three*

*The two countries will develop Joint Investment Projects, including the establishment of Joint Special Economic Zones.*

*Article Four*

*The two countries will implement the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission decision.*

*Article Five*

*The two countries will promote regional and global peace, security and cooperation.*

*Article Six*

*The two countries will combat terrorism as well as trafficking in people, arms and drugs in accordance with international covenants and conventions.*

*Article Seven*

*The two countries will establish a High-Level Joint Committee, as well as Sub-committees as required, to guide and oversee the implementation of this Agreement (Addis Standard, 2018).*

Although, the agreement has been signed between the two countries, it is not clear and public. For these, key informant (06) argues that, the two countries has established a committee which works on the issue. But, the agreement lacks clarity as well as being transparent for the general public of the two countries.

To put succinctly the implication of the rapprochement on the peace and security of Ethiopia and Eritrea, it is very crucial to scrutinize pre-rapprochement period of ‘no war, no peace’ between Ethiopia and Eritrea in short and precise manner.

Key informant (03), argues that, the ‘no war no peace’ situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea created unstable state of mind on the two peoples on the opposite sides of the border regarding the peace and security of one another. The situation highly affects the two countries in general and the border communities in particular. Being in the borders of the two countries makes insecure the border communities and forced them to give a huge focus for security by neglecting their social and economic affairs.

Their security vulnerability coerced them to apart from social and economic aspects. For Key informant (03), the youth which is the productive force of the border community serves as ‘militia’ to protect the security of their community instead of harvesting land. In addition, the presence of military camp in the border area has had its own huge environmental impact. The key informant added the ‘no war, no peace’ situation exposed the border communities of the two countries to face difficulties in social services like schools, Health centers, and infrastructures which is still experiencing a difficult time than the rest of Ethiopia and the opposite is true for Eritrea too. Finally, the key informant has illustrated that the youth since long started to migrate either to the major towns and cities in Ethiopia or mostly trying to enter in to the Middle East like Saudi Arabia illegally with the help of smugglers by crossing the Red Sea and as a result, they faced many casualties. In another case, both Ethiopia and Eritrea have supported and hosted opposition forces. They have supported each other’s domestic rebels and each of them were convinced that the fall of the other regime is imminent. The Eritrean government has given tremendous support to OLF, “Ginbot 7”, and ONLF. The ONLF fighters have been fighting for the secession of Ogaden for the last five decades. Ethiopia also reacted by supporting and hosting the Eritrean opposition groups (Wuhibegezer 2014:44; Jason Mosley 2018:7).

Olivia (2018:16) expressed the emergent of ‘no war, no peace’ had high economic and human casualties for both and president Isaias employed the military stalemate to consolidate power and eliminate all potential competitors and contenders for power which enabled him to be the only head of state since Eritrea’s independence, to bring the whole population under his rule. Key informant (01) Ethiopia and Eritrea were in a situation of “‘no war, no peace’ for the past two consecutive decades and the Key informant labeled this ‘no war, no peace’ situation as a ‘cold war’ between the two which had hugely affected the social, economic and political aspects of both countries. Moreover, the situation dismantled people-to-people relations by interrupting the movement of people and goods, telephone calling and by separating families in the territory of the two countries. As it is articulated in the above discourse, Buzan and Waever concept of RSCs, works perfectly. Here, the insecurity of the border communities between Ethiopia and Eritrea was caused by the geographical proximity of the two states. This case shows, how “most political and military threats travel more easily over a short distance than over long ones, insecurity is often associated with proximity” (Buzan and Waever, 2003:11).

Besides this, the move that the two countries made one against the other had a spillover effect to their near neighbours through proxy war. For instance, Ethiopia and Eritrea were in the soil of Somalia as the state of Somalia has proximity towards the two and share a Somali speaking people with Ethiopia. So, this shows how political and military threats travel easily in to near neighbours of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

To strengthen this, illustrating the idea of key informant (02) is very appropriate, who argues that Ethiopia and Eritrea were in the soil of Somalia through proxy war. Ethiopia and the allied forces had supported the transitional government of Somalia on one side whereas on the other side, Eritrea was accused for the support of Al-Shabaabbi. As a result of this, UNSC had imposed sanctions on Eritrea. The key informant described the pre-rapprochement period between Ethiopia and Eritrea as a situation of ‘no peace no war.’ Especially Eritrea had been in a quarrel with Sudan and Djibouti. This shows that Eritrea was in a tense relationship with its neighbours.

Now, it’s possible to explore as well as scrutinize implications of the rapprochement for the peace and security of Ethiopia and Eritrea as far as the researcher have been explaining what the two countries look like in their ‘no war, no peace’ period of stalemate. The rapprochement has ended the past two consecutive decades of ‘no war, no peace’ situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea and it ushered the beginning of Ethio-Eritrean bilateral relations and it is a golden opportunity to deal with the challenges and to nurture the opportunities so long as the rapprochement is an ongoing process. Moreover, the rapprochement have a constructive implication for peace and cooperation, as well as for new security architecture in the entire region beyond the two countries (Getachew and Dr. Abdeta, 2018:24). The rapprochement opened a new chapter for the two countries to stop marching one against the other to spoil peace and security of the two countries in particular and the region in general. It also helps a landlocked Ethiopia to get an alternative sea outlet through Assab and Massawa. Whereas for Eritrea, it gave her an incredible opportunity for the lifting of sanctions and avoided a status of being a pariah state and served as a panacea to open a new path out of isolation. To do this, the Ethiopian prime minister has already submitted a request to the United Nations Secretary General to lift the sanctions against Eritrea.

It was successfully lifted on 14 November 2018 which was imposed by UN Security Council (arms embargoes, travels ban, and asset freezes) on Eritrea in 2009 for nine consecutive years that will play a significant role in terms of ending its tenure of being a pariah state and play an indispensable role for the recovery of Eritrean economy and to attract foreign investors for the country (Susan and Knopf, 2018; interview with Key informant (04), and 01, 2019).

Amanuel (2019), illustrated the reactions of different segments of societies of both Ethiopia and Eritrea as follows;

*“The very majority people of Ethiopia and Eritrea are so happy about the ‘News’ telling initiatives for peace and relationships between each other. Several political oppositions operating within the Ethiopian Nation and from the diaspora; experiences and analyses of intellectual and scholarly publications educating people; artist singers and dramas grabbing the emotions of folks; religious leaders; interviews and speakers including from the international community have all loudly voiced their opinions. The general message or approach is to heal past wounds for harmonious relationships and share interests with recognition of deep historical ties in cultures and governance between the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea.”*

Susan and Knopf (2018) are optimistic about the rapprochement that a land-locked Ethiopia will have much to gain from the normalization of the relationship. Among these, negotiating to have access to Eritrea’s seaports which will boost economic growth by serving as an alternative to Djibouti’s and reduces security threats which comes from Eritrea.

The researcher found a similar argument from Getachew and Dr. Abdeta (2018:35), who claim that, the lifting of sanctions removes the major hurdle of Eritrea by boosting its economy and bringing the country back into the community of nations. If the rapprochement is going to be handled wisely, the lifting of sanctions will also infuse positive energy into the effort to realize a meaningful peace, cooperation and integration even in the HoA. Given the strategic importance, diverse resource potentials and current development trajectories of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, their combined resources could be used to realize an economic transformation of huge proportions. Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea is also widely expected to reduce the flow

of migrants across the Mediterranean by rendering redundant policies that have supposedly led to the outflow of migrants in search of better opportunities (Demessie Fantaye, 2018: 4). Moreover, the Ethiopian Prime Minister's Office cited in Liangyu (2018) illustrated that,

*"It is a significant step towards deepening the economic, social and cultural ties the sisterly nations of Ethiopia and Eritrea enjoy and It will have far-reaching effects in improving the stability of the Horn of Africa region and in building a lasting peace and normalization of relations among the countries in the region."*

The formal agreements and negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia have been accompanied by the lifting of the proscriptions against the factions of the OLF, ONLF, “Ginbot-7” (G7) and others. All of these rebel groups of Ethiopia have been based in Eritrea and their return to Ethiopia was happened because of the rapprochement. In a reciprocal gesture, the Ethiopian government has also formally requested Eritrean opposition organizations which are found in Ethiopia, to cease their activities against the Eritrean government. Travel and trade ties between Eritrea and Ethiopia have been restored (Martin, cited in Demessie Fantaye, 2018:3). This will highly reduce external vulnerability from Ethiopian insurgents who fortified in Eritrea and a threat from Eritrea too. Amanuel (2019), also argues that, the opposition leaders of Ginbot-7, OLF) and TAND have all welcomed the call of the Ethiopian government to get together for peace and reconciliation and agreed a peaceful political struggle at home.

To conclude, the discourse in the above sub-title tells that the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea is very crucial for the two in particular and the region in general. The rapprochement helped Eritrea to found itself free from UN’s sanctions and join the international community that makes Eritrea to be no more a pariah state. The two countries will not be fortifications of the rebel groups of the two countries if the rapprochement is going to be realized. It is the outcome of the rapprochement that brought back insurgent groups like; OLF, ONLF, “Ginbot 7” (G7), TAND, and others which reduce external security vulnerability that comes from the soil of Eritrea and the inverse is true for Eritrea too. Moreover, the rapprochement is very indispensable for Ethiopia to get another access to the sea which will minimize a total port dependence on Djibouti that which will play a huge role in cost reduction as well as proximity for its northern parts of the country.

### **4.1.3. Challenges and Prospects of the Rapprochement**

#### **4.1.3.1. Challenges of the Rapprochement**

As far as challenges of Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement are concerned, key informant (01) started his argument by reminding the ‘honey moon’ period of the two countries which was started after Eritrea’s independence in 1993 until they entered in to a full scale war from 1998-2000, the two sisterly nations were in a good relationship. Key informant (01) argues that, the reason behind the stalemate between the two was, their relationship was not institutionalized. To strengthen this, Martin (2016:27), *“Reminded the period from 1993 up to their full scale war (1998-2000), the relation between the two was not governed by institution. If president Isaias had a serious issue that he wished to raise concerning Ethiopia, he simply contacted the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, and vice versa.”* Martin added, *“The absence of appropriate institutions undermined the relations between states in two crucial ways. Firstly, it left many scopes for misinterpretations and accusations. Secondly, it meant that if the relationships between individuals broke down, there were no official structures to fall back upon. Personal relationships and personal histories entangled with state relations. Even when committees were established, they operated with such informality that when challenged by the critical events that led to the border war, they failed to function effectively.”*

Now, Ethiopia and Eritrea are found in a process which is similar to that of their past juncture. So, there is no guaranty for the continuity of the rapprochement unless their relations are managed by institutional frameworks. The rapprochement is limited to higher officials of the two countries even though, the general public is happy with rapprochement, there is a limited people to people relation, no involvement of AU and IGAD, lack of peace and security (internal instability) with in Ethiopia itself, geopolitical dynamics of the region (existence of several actors with diverse interest), lack of transparency, and non- institutionalized nature of the rapprochement are enumerated as challenges of the rapprochement (interview with key informant( 01) and (03); Dr. Tekeda, 2019). Moreover, according to interviewee (03), in time of the ‘no war, no peace’ situation, no parts of Ethiopia has been a social, economic and security victim than the border community of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

If the rapprochement is genuine enough, it has to start from the border community; from Tigray and Afar Regional states as the two regional states have proximity as well as shared similar ethnic groups than the rest regions of Ethiopia. The interviewee reminded the coming of ‘Eritrean public diplomacy’ to strengthen people to people relation which has been in Amhara regional state in Bahirdar and in Southern Nation Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia in Hawassa, Addis Ababa, and in Adama, could not attained its goal. Interviewee (10), strengthen the above idea by mentioning the importance of strengthening people to people interaction and for this, establishing people to people interaction with the border community has a massive importance to strengthen the rapprochement. Unless, it will be challenging to expect a good people to people interaction at center of the two countries. For key informant (06), Implementation of the Algiers accord, economic disparities between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Eritreans found themselves lag behind Ethiopia economically) has created fear, historical animosity between TPLF and Eritrean government in power, and Eritrea’s lack of giving recognition for the Afar and Muslim communities within Eritrea can be mentioned as challenges of the rapprochement between the two sisterly nations. Moreover Key informant (06), “labeled TPLF as a big challenge for the rapprochement as the enmity still continued to be a challenge for the rapprochement until the veteran militants become out of the game.”

Current internal instability and displacement of peoples with in Ethiopia, ‘undemocratic’ nature of Eritrean government, Djibouti’s fear of port fee reduction and a sense of ‘betrayal’, isolation of IGAD and AU especially when Ethiopia and Eritrea signed their peace agreement in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia reduces its transparency for the region in general and for their peoples in particular. Moreover, the rapprochement is not clear and transparent, it has no a clear road map (not clear where the rapprochement starts and ends), unpredictable nature of the rapprochement, and finally, the nature of government i.e. Ethiopia has a ‘democratic’ and Eritrea has a ‘dictator’ one, which has its own implication on the rapprochement. For this, reminding the dissolution of the Ethio-Eritrean Federation as Eritreans’ assumed they were a head of the then political system of Ethiopia (interview with, Key informant (03), 2019; Interviewee (02) and (01), 2019).

Dr. Tekeda Alemu (2019), a veteran diplomat who served his country for almost three decades and who was formerly the State Minister for Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative of the FDRE to the United Nations until September 2018, reminded the two countries first rapprochement that had been started after the independence of Eritrea culminated with a full scale war due to lack of institutions and legal frame work. For him, the contemporary rapprochement also now found in the same juncture which is similar to the first one in which its fate depends on in the hands of persons and parties but not on the larger publics of the two countries.

According to key informant (02), in the case of Eritrea, power is centralized at the hands of president Isaias Afeworki and there is no other democratic institutions that can handle the rapprochement which makes the rapprochement unpredictable and fear is hovering on the peoples of Eritrean that the rapprochement could engulf their freedom as the rapprochement is not transparent and public. Moreover the interviewee illustrates that higher officials of TPLF are not happy with the political reform in Ethiopia in general and with Eritrea in particular which is an extra challenge to the rapprochement. Interviewee (03) expressed the challenges of the rapprochement as follows; it is not principled or institutionalized, international and regional organizations were not involved in the rapprochement, it is based up on the will of the leaders (it can be mentioned as a relation between Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed and President Isaias Afeworki), implementation of the Algiers agreement itself will be so difficult for the border community of the two countries. In contrary to the idea of key informant (02), Interviewee (09) argues that, if the two countries are extremely committed to end their deadlock, Badme; the flash point of conflict for the two countries was not their concern, and the peoples within Ethiopia and Eritrea would be happy and in need of people to people interaction if the two countries would give a due emphasis.

To show how the rapprochement is not institutionalized and wouldn't governed by legal frame works, mentioning a step by step complete closure of border between the two countries starting from December, 2019 until all borders closed without giving any justifications illustrates very well.


After a while silence from both states, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nebiyat Getachew cited in Brook Abdu (2019), spoke in a press conference that the two countries are in negotiation and preparing a legal framework to institutionalize the rapprochement between the two countries as a justification for the complete closure of the border between the two countries. On the side of Eritrea, the Eritrean government gave “legal arrangements” as a justification for the closure of the borders (Eritrean Information Ministry cited in Brook Abdu 2019; key informant (06)).

Finally, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in an interview with Voice of American (2019), as far as the border closure concerned, the Prime Minister said that

*“It is closed because of a security threat that affects both Ethiopia and Eritrea”, moreover, the Prime Minister explained argued the closure of border will goes on until the end of threats that spoils the peace and security of the two countries”.*

In addition to the above challenges of the rapprochement, the displacement of peoples with in Ethiopia; a country which hosts others countries refugee makes the issue strange. According to the Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID), Ethiopia leads the world in the number of internally displaced people living within its borders. Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) explained the 2.9 million new displacements that occurred in Ethiopia are the highest in the world and four times as many in 2017. The following map depicts five countries with most new displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa.

## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA



Map 4.1. The five countries with most new displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2019.

**Source: CGTN Africa (2019). Ethiopia tops list for most internally displaced persons.**

Accessed from <https://africa.cgtn.com/2019/05/13/ethiopia-tops-list-for-most-internally-displaced-persons/> retrieved on 15/05/2019

Unless, this serious new displacement of peoples is not stopped, it would be an extreme hurdle for the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea and it will have a spillover effect for neighbouring countries of the region which in turn spoils the peace and security of HoA. Belete, 2018 cited in Demessie (2018: 5), argues that, Even though, the supports of Gulf States such as the UAE and the KSA have been essential for the success of the rapprochement, it would have its own drawback to those who stand in opposite alliance of these countries, i.e. the UAE and the KSA.

Demessie (2018: 5), argues that the “*state-centric character, the lack of public consultations and absence of People-to-people peace initiatives are the defining feature of the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement.*” Besides this, the rapprochement did not incorporate non-state actors such as religious institutions, civil society and borderland communities in the process. Finally, the rapprochement will provoke Eritreans to quest for the enjoyment of their human and democratic rights which are reinstated in the 1997 constitution. Besides this, they will ask to hold elections which were prohibited in Eritrea for long by employing the conflict with Ethiopia as a justification. On the case of Ethiopia, the rapprochement will pose a challenge in relation with Ethiopia’s access to the sea in which the issue still dominates the political discourse of Ethiopia. This was clearly reflected in and even contributed to the fracture within EPRDF soon after the 1998-2000 war with Eritrea, as well as in the 2005 elections (Getachew and Dr. Abdet, 2018:26).

Generally, as far as the challenges of the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement is concerned, the literatures as well as interviewees of the researcher jointly argues that, the rapprochement is not governed by institutional frameworks, it is not clear and transparent, it does not incorporate regional, continental and international organizations (like IGAD, AU, and UN), state-centric and it doesn’t include non-state actors such as religious institutions, civil society and borderland communities especially, the Peoples of Tigray and Afar since the peoples of the two share the same ethnic groups and have geographical proximity than any other parts of Ethiopia has to be involved in the process of the rapprochement.

#### **4.1.3.2. Prospects of the Rapprochement**

In this sub-topic, the researcher would like to analyze and render the prospects of the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement for Ethiopia and Eritrea in particular and for the entire region in general by scrutinizing the views of interviewee and documents related to it.

Key informant (01) explained that, as long as the peoples of Ethiopia and Eritrea are one people who live in a different territory, it is a golden opportunity for reunion, peace, cooperation and to work together in their social, economic, political affairs, and for the peace and security of the HoA. In addition to this, the key informant (01) argues that, the prospect of the rapprochement is not only for Ethiopia and Eritrea; it is an opportunity for the entire region to change regional integration from aspiration into realization. For interviewee (01) the rapprochement gives a tremendous lesson for the two countries to revisit their past and an opportunity to offer a panacea for the way forward. Moreover, the interviewee argues that, the rapprochement helped Eritrea to be free from an extreme sanction and isolation which is a great opportunity to the recovery of its economy, and to attract foreign investments as its location is convenient for transportations. On the other hand, the rapprochement is an impetus for Ethiopia to have an alternative sea outlet which has close proximity for its northern parts of the country. Besides this, Ethiopia will get a massive opportunity which enables it to increase its role in the region as Eritrea was its biggest challenge which imposed challenges by following the footsteps of Ethiopia. Ethiopia gets an opportunity to galvanize the region for economic integration by incorporating Eritrea which would serve as another impetus. Even though, Key informant (01) and interviewee (01) succinctly mentioned the above points as fruits of Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement, interviewee (02) has a different perspective which is contrary to them. Interviewee (02) argues that nothing has been changed from the first Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement that has been held in 1993. For this he strengthened his idea by mentioning as today's rapprochement is not institutionalized that does not left out from the hands of the two leaders.

As far as the prospect of the rapprochement is concerned, key informant (05), has seen 'a green light' on economic prospects such as: exchange of goods and services that the two countries has and Ethiopia will get access to sea through Assab and Massawa at a cheap price compared with Djibouti. Besides this, key informant (05), forecasted that government change will take place on both countries in the future, and in the meantime, it gives a huge lesson for the upcoming regimes.

The formal agreements and negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia have been accompanied by the lifting of the anti-terrorism proclamation against exiled insurgent groups like the OLF, ONLF, and “Ginbot-7.” All of them were previously based in Eritrea and their return to Ethiopia was happened because of the rapprochement. In a reciprocal gesture, the Ethiopian government has also formally requested the Eritrean opposition organizations based in Ethiopia to cease their activities against the Eritrean government (Martin, 2018 cited in Demessie 2018:3). This massively reduces the external security vulnerability of both Ethiopia and Eritrea that enables the two countries to change their focus from security in to economic development.

Amanuel (2019), after he critically scrutinizing what Ethiopia and Eritrea have to recognize each other by investigating the geopolitical situation of the two countries, in his writing entitled “*Ethiopia & Eritrea Perspectives: Survival and Security in Geopolitics of the Red Sea.*”, argues that the rapprochement provides a big lesson for fellow Eritreans to understand and recognize the following fact:-

*“Eritrea has great strategic value to Ethiopia, but much less strategic value to the rest of the world. Any country with sea territory or a water gateway would not mean it benefits its people unless there is a unique partnership and permanently reliable market value attached to socio-economic endeavours. Eritreans indeed have to regret the lost opportunities of generations, and move forward with full understanding, courage and determination.”*

This gives a tremendous lesson for both Ethiopia and Eritrea to leave their old mindset and forge a relationship which will have a trickledown effect for the rest countries of the HoA in terms of preserving peace and security, and integrating the whole region.

Demessie (2018:4), a researcher in the Horn of African bulletin, claims that the rapprochement is an opportunity to revisit policies and strategies which will provide better opportunities that reduce the flow of migrants across the Mediterranean in search of better opportunities. Tekleab (2018), in his part, argues that as Ethiopia is a catalyst of the regional economic and political integration, the rapprochement gives a huge impetus for its peacekeeping role since Ethiopia has participated in the global UN Peacekeeping Missions of Ivory Coast, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia. So, the rapprochement with Eritrea means, Ethiopia will get an energy which is converted from a challenge in to an impetus that pushes forward. Moreover, the

rapprochement is an opportunity for the two countries to deconstruct the wrong narrations which had been used for political purposes.

To culminate this sub-title, as we have seen in the above discourse, the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement produced huge opportunities or prospects for Ethiopia and Eritrea in particular and for the entire region in general. For Ethiopia and Eritrea, it brought peace in the sky of the two countries by playing a massive role to get victory over their past ‘no war, no peace’ situation. Besides this, the rapprochement enabled Eritrea to out from its past sanctions and isolations and in turn to attract foreign investment towards it and to install a bilateral relationship with Ethiopia and to forge a relationship with its neighbours. In the case of Ethiopia, the rapprochement is a golden opportunity to normalize its relation with Eritrea that enables to get another alternative sea outlet and it gives a huge impetus to work for regional economic integration and regional peace and security as the two were against one another. Most importantly, the rapprochement has provided a massive leverage for Ethiopia in terms of having a suitable alternative sea outlet, most importantly for the northern part of the country. Here below, the researcher would like to illustrate in form of table how Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa are near to northern parts of Ethiopia as follow.

**Table 4.1. Illustrate the proximity of various ports in the region with major cities in Ethiopia.**

<b>Regional ports</b>	<b>Ports</b>	<b>Distance from Ethiopia’s major cities (in Kilo Meters)</b>				
<b>Country</b>	<b>Ports</b>	<b>Addis Ababa</b>	<b>Dire Dawa</b>	<b>Bahir Dar</b>	<b>Mekelle</b>	<b>Hawassa</b>
<b>Eritrea</b>	<b>Massawa</b>	1163	1686	1003	391	1443
	<b>Assab</b>	869	945	987	899	1007
<b>Djibouti</b>	<b>Djibouti</b>	910	324	1021	940	1048
<b>Somalia/Somaliland</b>	<b>Berbera</b>	964	483	1561	1736	1102
	<b>Mogadisho</b>	1507	1091	2006	2243	1171
	<b>Kismayu</b>	1979	1619	2534	2771	1227
<b>Kenya</b>	<b>Mombasa</b>	2077	2548	2632	2869	1797
<b>Sudan</b>	<b>Port Sudan</b>	1881	2404	1326	1788	2161

Source: Ministry of Transport (2006) cited in Yohannes (2017:193).

According to the above table, the port of Assab has relative proximity to most major cities of Ethiopia, especially for the northern parts of the country. Ethiopia could soon have the option to use Eritrean ports, Assab, and Massawa which are closer and more convenient, especially, to the northern parts of Ethiopia. It is unlikely that Ethiopia will terminate using Djibouti's ports altogether, rather, they can be used as an option with a high probability of port fee reduction. Yohannes (2017), argues that, economically speaking, the port of Assab is the most efficient port, next to Djibouti's ports, for Ethiopia in comparison with other ports. To wrap up, culminating the rapprochement in an institutionalized manner and strengthening the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea is an incredible task that will benefit both countries.

## Chapter Five

### **5.1. Rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Its implication for the Peace and Security of the Horn of Africa**

To briefly put the implications of the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement for the peace and security of the HoA, it is very crucial to analyze reactions of the neighbouring states of the region towards the rapprochement. The researcher believes that, clearly knowing how each states of the HoA reacted to the rapprochement is very helpful to reach at a conclusion on its implications for the peace and security of the HoA. Let us highlight with Djibouti's reaction towards the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement. Since Djibouti has been the main gateway of Ethiopia to the rest of the world, and as a result, Djibouti has been getting billions of dollars annually for the past years.

#### **5.1.1. Djibouti's Reaction to Ethio-Eritrean Rapprochement**

For the last two decades, Djibouti has benefited economically from the stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. But when the two countries began to normalize their ties, it is an indisputable fact that the revenue of Djibouti which is generated from the port service will decrease, and will make Djibouti unhappy. It couldn't be a good news for Djibouti as long as the restored relationship would create trade relationship, and grant the landlocked Ethiopia another option to get access to a new port through Eritrea (Kelsey Lilley, 2018). According to the Ethiopian foreign policy, the port service should be provided through a fair and sustainable manner in order for both countries to benefit better in the long term (FANSPS, 2002). Accordingly, Ethiopia pays over 1 billion USD annually for the service to the government of Djibouti (Yohannes, 2017).

Since the dawn of the new millennium, Djibouti has become a military garrison as it is hosting various military bases of different nations, and in turn it gets revenue for leasing its land. For instance, China pays about 100 million USD annually for its first ever foreign military base in Djibouti, the U.S. pays around 70 million USD annually for camp Lemonnier and France which was the colonial father of Djibouti pays 30 million USD per year (Lyman, nd, Sun and Zobir, 2016). Furthermore, there are other strings attached to the package such as economic and military aid; Djibouti receives annual military training from the U.S. troops.

China has also increased its economic aids, and projects in Djibouti immensely. Not only the influence of Ethiopia but France's influence over its former colony, Djibouti has decreased because of the presence of another source of income which increases Djibouti's leverage (Sun and Zoubir, 2016). On the side of Ethiopia, it has relied on a single port for the past years which undermines its leverage with the exception of the recent moves to bargain with other neighbours to develop new ports as an alternative.

So, what we can understand from the aforementioned facts is that, the coming of many global powers and the Gulf States to Djibouti to forge a military base, especially the advent of China, has boosted its ambition to become a global transit port which helped the state of Djibouti to generate a huge amount of money that gave a leverage against its giant port user, Ethiopia. In another scenario, the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea is an impetus to undermine Djibouti's leverage over Ethiopia by reducing revenue generated from the usage of its port. That is why scholars like Kelsey Lilley (2018), has claimed that the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement is a bad news for Djibouti who has staked its country's growth on its role being a primary choice to serve Ethiopian economy. Assuming the continuance of normalization, Ethiopia could soon have the option to use Eritrean ports, Assab and Massawa which are closer and more convenient, especially, for the northern parts of Ethiopia. It is unlikely that Ethiopia will terminate using Djiboutian ports altogether, rather, it can be an option with a high probability of port fee reduction. But, in contrary to the idea of Kelsey Lilley (2018), Interviewee (03) forwarded his view as follows.

The interviewee advocates as long as Ethiopia have/had a huge port infrastructure for the past two decades in Djibouti, it would be very difficult to make an immediate shift in to Eritrean ports of Assab and Massaw as it by itself costs a lot investment.

As far as the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement and its implication for Djibouti is concerned, Key informant (01) argues that, in a simple logic, it would create an option for a non-littoral Ethiopia to get a sea outlet, and it will decrease the revenue of Djibouti which is generated from port service. But, here, also the key informant argued that, the political-economic integration is a panacea to avoid such kind of discontents throughout the region. Moreover, he argued that, unless the competition between Djibouti and Eritrea is healthy to provide a port service for Ethiopia, the conflict will come back and spoil the peace and security of the region.

According to Interviewee (01), expressing the implication of the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement on Djibouti, first, reminded us the importance of Djibouti for the past two consecutive decades, and its importance for the upcoming future too, then if there is no peace between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, Ethiopia will not be able to use Djibouti's port safely as Djibouti itself is in conflict with Eritrea. The interviewee acknowledged that, the port fee that Ethiopia is going to pay for Djibouti will decrease when Ethiopia begin to use Eritrean ports. This in turn, will make Djibouti unhappy as Djibouti fears port fee reduction. For interviewee (03), at the beginning of the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement, Djibouti felt a sense of isolation for not being informed and consulted. But later on, the travel of the foreign ministers of the three countries (Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia) to Djibouti lubricated the discontent. In his view, the revenue of Djibouti will not decrease because of the rapprochement for the following reasons. First, there is a well-developed port service in Djibouti as Ethiopia and Djibouti developed it very well. Second, it takes time until the port infrastructure in Eritrea is installed, and ready to function. Thirdly, as the population of Ethiopia is greater than the aggregate of all countries of the Horn, and economy of Ethiopia is relatively bigger that enables Djibouti to receive sufficient demand of port service.

Key informant (02) argues that, as Djibouti was in a border quarrel with Eritrea, the rapprochement creates a wonderful ground to establish a podium to resolve their conflict. But, he argued, at the beginning of the rapprochement, Djibouti has felt a sense of 'betrayal' from the side of Ethiopia as Djibouti expected to be informed and consulted as a sea outlet of Ethiopia. But later on, Djibouti was invited in Jeddah peace accord of Ethiopia and Eritrea. It is obvious that, there was a border clash between Eritrea and Djibouti starting from June 2008. At the aftermath of their border clash, Eritrea started to support a faction called Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) a rebel movement representing the Afar people against Djibouti's Issa who dominated the government of Djibouti (Martin, 2016:66&67).

To wrap up, as it is mentioned in the above paragraphs, the existence of global powers and the Gulf States in Djibouti by establishing their military bases increases the country's economic capacity which could be used as a leverage in dealing with Ethiopia. But, the rapprochement with Eritrea enables a landlocked Ethiopia to get another sea outlet that enables to decrease Djibouti's leverage against Ethiopia. Moreover, as it was observed, Djibouti's dependence on Ethiopia could decrease as time goes meanwhile its dependency on the power stationing

increases. So, the end of the Ethio-Eritrean impasse heralded the use of Eritrean ports, Assab and Massawa that gives a tremendous option for Ethiopia especially for the northern parts of the country. It will also boost the bargaining power of Ethiopia as the rapprochement gives it another choice of accessing the sea. Finally, in simple logic, it is obvious that, Djibouti's revenue generated from port services to Ethiopia will decrease which can be understood as a case that makes Djibouti unhappy. But, as far as peace and security are concerned, the rapprochement will also benefit Djibouti. As discussed earlier, there is an opposition political group of Djibouti based in Eritrea. So, the rapprochement will allow Djibouti to deal with the issue. To be in the circle of the rapprochement as its one opposition group (FRUD) that fortified in Eritrea will be dealt in a manner that will not spoil the security of the country. The presence of Djibouti in the Ethio-Eritrean peace accord in Jeddah is an attempt of making it part of the circle of the rapprochement.

### **5.1.2. Kenya's Reaction to Ethio-Eritrean Rapprochement**

As long as Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement is concerned, Kenya sees it as a step "closer to the dream of lasting peace" in the region. Foreign Affairs Cabinet Administrative Secretary of Kenya, Ababu Namwamba, said that the decision of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki to reopen diplomatic channels means the region has one less problem to deal with. Besides, the secretary argues that, "It is a giant step that moves us closer to the dream of lasting peace, stability and shared prosperity in the Horn of African region".

*"Kenya congratulates the leadership and the peoples of Ethiopia and Eritrea for the historic peace and friendship agreement signed by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and President Isaias Afwerki on 9<sup>th</sup> July, and this is a big victory for all Ethiopians, for all Eritreans, for all of us the neighbors, indeed for all of Africa."* Kenya feels that these events mark a U-turn and could enable both countries and the HoA to redirect resources to development instead of buying arms, for example. Mr Namwamba said that the warm reception of Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed by ordinary Eritreans in Asmara, and the enthusiastic welcome of President Isaias Afwerki on the streets of Addis Ababa itself is an indication that ordinary citizens have always supported normalized relations (Aggrey Mutambo, 2018).

Kenya is a country which was a victim of attacks launched by Al-Shabaab. According to Andrews (2015:4), *“Al-Shabaabbi has launched sporadic attacks in six of Kenya’s eight provinces. A total of 3815 reported incidents cumulatively resulted in the deaths of about 6800 people between 2000 and 2014. To counter this, the Kenyan government has announced several initiatives besides increased intelligence collection, surveillance and police visibility in cities.”* Moreover, the Kenyan government introduced closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance cameras installed in 10 major cities like Nairobi and Mombasa which costs the country 12.3 billion Kenyan shillings (KES) which became operational since 2016. So, all this cost has incurred to curb attacks launched by a terrorist group fortified in the HoA, especially in Somalia called Al-Shabaabbi. The conflict between Somalia and Kenya resolved because of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia who mediated the discussions between President Uhuru Kenyatta and Somalia’s president Mohammed Abdulahi (Wakaya, 2019). According to, Key informant (01), Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, President Isaias Afeworeki, and President Uhuru Kenyatta made a state visit in Juba; South Sudan agreed to work together on the peace and security of the region. As the Ethiopian Prime Minister Office cited in Wakaya (2019), in the meeting held in Nairobi on March 6 the two parties resolved their maritime border dispute before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and they agreed to take appropriate measures before tensions are escalated. For interviewee (07), there is no reason that makes the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement to have unfavorable implications for the state of Kenya. Rather, it is indispensable and it will create another forum to fight against terrorism with Ethiopia and Eritrea and to work together with Ethiopia to alleviate conflicts around Moyale near the Ethio-Kenyan border.

To conclude, the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement has been highly welcomed by the Kenyan government officials, and even Kenya become a beneficiary of the rapprochement as its border (an oil rich area) conflict with Somalia brought into the table after the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed brought Somalia’s President Mohammed Abdulahi in Nairobi. The Prime Minister has created an opportunity by bringing Mohammed Abdulahi, and Kenyatta together to discuss their trouble and to offer a panacea towards it. As most threats of Al-Shabaabbi come from Somalia, Kenya gets a better opportunity towards this threat by working hand in hand with Somalia. So, here in the Kenyan case, the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement has a perfect trickle-down effect to detent a conflict between Somalia and Kenya and to forge a dual alliance towards

the threats launched by Al-Shabaabb. So, here, in a regional security complex, like the HoA, it is not only threats or insecurities that transcend easily in to neighbouring countries, but also good things like the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement that has a positive spillover role to achieve collective security of member states of the region.

### **5.1.3. Somalia's Reaction to Ethio-Eritrean Rapprochement**

Somalia, immediately after its independence launched, and advocated the doctrine of 'Greater Somalia' which was an irredentist policy that had demanded Somali speaking peoples from its neighbours; Ethiopia and Kenya (Kassahun, 2013:82). To do this, Somalia has involved in a full-scale war with Ethiopia twice: in 1964, and again 1977–78. But, it was an unsuccessful attempt that made Somalia collapsed in 1991.

Somalia and Eritrea were once close. Siad Barre, the then Somalia leader had backed Eritrea's long fight for independence from Ethiopia, which was realized in 1993. But, Siad Barre could not prevent Somalia from collapse. Since 2006, it became battle field of the proxy war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Ethiopia had supported a transitional government in Mogadishu while Eritrea was accused of backing the Islamic militants to overthrow the transitional government of Somalia. In return, the UNSC in 2009 imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions on Eritrea for its alleged support of the Al-Qaeda linked with Al-Shabaab. But, after all these things had passed, the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement happened; Eritrea and Somalia agreed to restore their diplomatic relations weeks after the Ethio-Eritrean peace deal. The presidents of Somalia and Eritrea have signed an agreement in the capital of Eritrea, Asmara, to restore their countries' relationship after long years of animosity.

Yemane G/ Meskel, Eritrea's Information Minister, illustrated that, *"The two countries will establish diplomatic relations, and exchange ambassadors."* Immediately after the agreement, the Somalian President Mohamed offered his support for the lifting of sanctions imposed by the United Nation Security Council as follows:-

*"We urge all economic sanctions and embargo imposed on the people of Eritrea must be lifted so that the economic integration of the Horn of African region can be realized,"* (Liangyu, 2018; and Matt Bryden, 2018). On the other side, Amanuel Giorgio, Eritrean Permanent Representative to the UN, heralded the readiness of Eritrea as "Eritrea as a nation is committed to working with all its neighbors.

The peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the tripartite agreement between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, marks the beginning of a new dawn," (Liangyu, 2018). After decades of hostility and rivalry, a recent peaceful relation between the three Horn of Africa nations of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia is considered as a new beginning towards cooperation in the troubled HoA. Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN, Ma Zhaoxu, explained that,

*“The lifting of sanctions is conducive to the peace and development in the region. He also pledged that China will continue to work with the international community to play a constructive role in achieving peace, stability and development for the countries in the Horn of Africa.”*

The United Kingdom, which chaired the drafting process of the resolution to lift the sanctions, said via its Ambassador to the UN Karen Pierce *“the resolution recognizes improvements in regional peace and security”* and the Ambassador argues the rapprochement has a spillover positive impact for the peace and security of the region (Liangyu, 2018). The trilateral agreement between Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia brought Somalia’s President Farmajo into the circle of the peace process which gave him an opportunity to play a regional role to bring Djibouti into the fold which felt as it has located at the ‘periphery’ of the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement (Getachew and Abdeta, 2018:27). Key informant (02), claims that, as Eritrea received many accusations from its neighbours for providing assistance, and Somalia was battle field for Ethiopian and Eritrean proxy, the rapprochement is a golden juncture for the peace and security of Somalia in particular and the region in general. Besides this, the rapprochement can be able to offer a remarkable contribution in terms of reducing the proxy war, and hosting insurgent groups in the region. Lastly, the rapprochement creates a favorable environment to stand together for collective security. According to interviewee (03), the peace between Somalia and Eritrea enables Somalia to relief itself from security vulnerabilities which comes from insurgents who fortified in the soil of Eritrea. Moreover, as Eritrea was accused by aiding Al-shababb against Somalia, now, their restored diplomacy helps a lot to stop such kind of actions.

As we have seen from the above analysis, the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea brought Somalia into the circle of the rapprochement, and in return, the joining of Somalia into the reconciliation process makes the effort of bringing Djibouti, which assumed the rapprochement as it creates a sense of isolation, and fear of the reduction fee that Ethiopia pays for using the ports of Djibouti.

Surely, the implication of the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement on Somalia is so impressive in terms of avoiding a hidden proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and to normalize its relation with Eritrea that was suspected as a supporter of Al-shababbi. Besides this, Somalia is a beneficiary of the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement that helped the country a lot to resolve its maritime border conflict with its neighbor, Kenya.

#### **5.1.4. Sudan's Reaction to Ethio-Eritrean Rapprochement**

Eritrea, immediately after its independence started accusing Sudan of infiltrating anti-regime forces (namely, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement - EIJM) into Eritrea to destabilize the Asmara regime of President Isaias Afewerki. Sudan on its part accused Eritrea of sponsoring the Sudanese dissidents in Eastern Sudan (Amare, 1996, cited in Taffesse, 2009:15). Relations between the two countries further worsened when Eritrea publicly pledged to support the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which includes various Sudanese opposition forces (Amare Tekle, 1996:506; Horn of Africa Bulletin, 1998: 30 cited in Taffesse, 2009:15). Moreover, the Relations between Khartoum and Asmara were strained for several years because Asmara labeled the government of Sudan as it has given support to Addis Ababa before the reconciliation between the two countries in July, 2018 (Sudan Tribune, 2019). However, the relations between the Sudan and Eritrea remained calm and avoided the escalation of the conflict before the happening of the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

But, after the rapprochement, a couple of months ago, the Eritrean government morning issued a statement accusing Turkey's ruling of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Qatar's operational services of backing the opposition ("Eritrean Muslim League" under the mantle of "Eritrean Ulama's League/Eritrean Rabita-i Ulama"). The statement said that the Qatari services funded the groups, and the neighbouring Sudan has allowed its territory to be used for "the nefarious aims". The Eritrean regime labeled these support as follows:-

*"These subversive acts have been ratcheted up especially in the past year with the singular aim of obstructing the peace process and positive developments in the ties between Eritrea and Ethiopia in particular and the whole Horn of African region in general " (Sudan Tribune, 2019).*

The accusation reminded the continuity of the support as it was happened a year ago, on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018, Asmara accused Sudan and Qatar for supporting a radical group led by Mohammed Jumma who had plans, according to Asmara, to organize political and military activities against the government of President Afewerki. But, the Sudanese government did not react to the Eritrean accusations (Sudan Tribune, 2019; Al Arabiya English, 2019).

In the case of Sudan, beyond the conflicts between Sudan and Eritrea, at the back of the two, there were external Gulf actors whose interest overlapped with each other or the actors found in a different alliance; KSA and the UAE on one side, and Turkey and Qatar on the other side. This makes the conflict between Sudan and Eritrea much worse. In reality, Djibouti and the Sudan are on left to the side in the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement. As Djibouti and Sudan are immediate neighbours of Ethiopia and Eritrea, there should be local and regional platforms which can encompass all countries of the Horn if the rapprochement is needed to have a trickledown effect to all member countries of the region (Getachew, Dr. Abdeta 2018:33-36).

As far as Sudan and Ethiopia are concerned, the then minister of the foreign affairs of Ethiopia, Workneh Gebeyehu (PhD), when he presented his six-month report to the House of Peoples' Representatives (HPR) explained the smuggling of illegal arms from Sudan through the Ethio-Sudan border. Unless, Ethiopia and Sudan set a solution to it, it will create unwanted diplomatic setback between the two nations.

The Minister told the parliament that, the Ethiopian government *“has clearly informed the Sudanese President, Omar al-Beshir, and his respective ministers (before the military coup d'état) that the Sudanese government should take the concern of Ethiopia very seriously; and take into account how this uncontrolled arms trafficking would affect the stability and security of Ethiopia.”* Furthermore, the Minister said that, *“We have informed the [Sudanese officials] that they should tighten their border control in their part to deter smuggling. We have clearly informed them that, otherwise, this will eventually lead to impacting our relations.”* (Yonas Abiye, 2019). This shows that there is a movement of illegal arms around the Ethio-Sudanese border which would destabilize the security of the two countries. That's why the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia worried, and reported the problem for the Ethiopian parliament. Moreover, this year, Sudan has been in a serious political rally against the administration of Sudanese President, Omar al-Beshir.

In early February 2019, Sudan faced a massive and a nationwide demonstrations forced al-Beshir to declare a state of emergency. The situation lead the dissolution of the country's central government, and paved the way to appoint a series of military figures as state governors.

As part of the wider measures, Ibn Auf was appointed as the first vice president. Wad Ibn Auf, the head of Sudan's new ruling council, Defense minister and the vice president says a military council will run the country for two years. But, the protesters quickly responded by expressing their opposition. Ahmed Soliman, Africa Fellow at Chatham House, cited in (Al Jazeera, 2019) argues that, Ibn Auf was "very much a member of the old guard." "[He is] among the political leaders who have supported president al-Bashir for a long time and for his whole army career. It's difficult to see this as a transition moving to a new stage of an inclusive government." Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, a Sudanese researcher at Yale University, cited in (Al Jazeera, 2019) said that despite al-Bashir's removal, power remained in the hands of his associates. He add up the following argument

*"The regime is the same as it was yesterday, with the exception of a few figures close to al-Bashir who have been detained."*

Elsheikh cited in Riyaz ul Khaliq (2019), compare and contrast contemporary Sudan's rally with its 2013 political rally which had been five years back from 2018 as follow:-

*"We had huge mass demonstrations like today in 2013 but the response was extreme brutality. So he had been able to put it down but people never stopped. Now, in December 2018, a point of no-return had reached. Al-Bashir removed all the subsidies on the services especially on bread and the petroleum so life became almost unbearable for everybody. Again, the popular uprising was meted out with killings and arrests. They killed around 30 people and arrested 1,000 people. However, Elsheikh said, "this time it was different. Not like the Arab spring, the current Sudanese uprising did not start from the capital but from the peripheries and then moved to the capital."*

Martin Elia Lomoro, the cabinet affairs minister of the Republic of South Sudan, cited in Parach Mach (2019), announced how his country, South Sudan, is alarmed at how things are unfolding in the aftermath of mass protests that have rocked the Northeast African nation since the last December.

*“We know that Sudan labored so hard to restore peace and stability and because of that we have the current prevailing peace agreement in South Sudan.”* Sudan and South Sudan have been at odds on a range of issues from disputed borders on the oil-rich area of Abyei and Heglig to trade that has threatened bilateral ties since the latter broke away from Sudan in 2011 under a peace agreement that ended a two-decade civil war (Parach Mach, 2019). As it was argued by Buzan and Wæver (2003), the security complexes of states depend primarily on the pressures deriving from geographic proximity; their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed from one another.” Standing at this point, the worry of Martin Elia Lomoro, the Cabinet Affairs Minister of the Republic of South Sudan becomes real unless the problem in Sudan will not be resolved soon. Besides this, the two Sudans are in a conflict over Abiye which can be a pretext for further escalation of conflicts.

On June 7, 2019, following the suspension of Sudanese membership to AU, Ethiopian Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed arrived in Sudan, and tried to mediate members of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) - which has ruled Sudan following the military coup d’eta of Omar al-Bashir. On Thursday and at least 108 people were killed and more than 500 wounded in Monday’s attacks. reason behind the suspension of Sudanese membership to AU is because of the death of at least 108 people and more than 500 wounded in Military’s attacks, according to the opposition-linked Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors and AU has decided, unless, the military leave the throne for the civilian, the suspension of Sudanese membership to AU (Aljazeera, 2019).

To wrap up, as far as the implications of the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement on Sudan are concerned, Sudan and Eritrea were not in a good bilateral relationship as the two were accusing each other of hosting and supporting opposition groups. Unfortunately, Sudan is under a military coup d’eta, and its people are questing for the advent of a civilian government. Besides this, South Sudan is very much concerned about what is happening in Sudan by fearing its spillover effect on it. This makes the future of Sudan uncertain. Additionally, Sudan is not in the circle of the rapprochement. Gradually, this may impose challenges that will serve as a hurdle of the rapprochement.


### **5.1.5. South Sudan's Reaction to Ethio-Eritrean Rapprochement**

After four decades of war between the Sudan government and Southern insurgents, South Sudan was allowed to vote in a referendum to choose if it wanted to stay with or secede from the country. Preparations were made and a referendum was conducted. Almost 98% of Southern Sudanese voted to be independent of from Sudan (Lauren, 2016:1). In December 2013, civil war broke out in South Sudan itself following a split in the governing SPLM/A party between forces loyal to the incumbent President Salva Kiir, and the then Vice President Riek Machar. Following the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement, President Salva Kiir, and Riek Machar met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed for peace talk in Addis Ababa, in September, 2018. According to Key informant (01), the fruit of the rapprochement is not only for Ethiopia and Eritrea; it is also an opportunity for the entire region to change regional integration from aspiration in to realization. Moreover, the Key informant illustrated that, the floor is open for all Horn of African countries, including the Republic of South Sudan to ride off from troubles, and to realize peace and security of the region and economic integration. He additionally offered that, the peoples of the HoA fight for small things by neglecting the big picture which is called peace and security and regional integration.

Key informant (01), argued beyond the two countries, the rapprochement has its own trickle-down effect on other members of the region. Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed influenced different warring parties of South Sudan to sign a peace agreement In September, 2018. The Key informant has also raised Prime Minister Abiy, President Isaias, and President Kenyatta visited Juba, and agreed to work together for the peace and security of the region. All these thing happened because of the trickle-down effect of the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement. Finally, the rapprochement will enhance people-to-people relation which will have a tremendous role to accelerate the integration of the HoA. But, now, South Sudan is very much concerned with the instability in its neighbor Sudan as its security with Sudan is very much interdependent.

To wrap up, with the exception of the instability with its immediate neighbor Sudan and its internal instability because of a lust for power between President Salva Kiir Riek and Machar, South Sudan is happy and beneficial from the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement as it has an opportunity to install an open diplomacy with both Ethiopia and Eritrea and to work together with Ethiopia on shared issues.

Finally, the researcher would like to wrap up the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea and its implication for the peace and security of the HoA by the following figure.



**Figure 5.1. Illustrates implications of Ethio-Eritrean Rapprochement for the Region. (Developed by the Researcher).**

## Chapter six

### Conclusion and the Way Forward

#### 6.1. Conclusion

As far as implications of the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement for the peace and security of the HoA is concerned, the researcher analyzed and explained the reactions of each states of the HoA in the above section of the paper. When the researcher clearly scrutinizes reactions of each states of the HoA, almost all reacted positively with the exception of Djibouti and Sudan. As we have seen in the above sections, even though Djibouti involved in the circle of the rapprochement through the mediation of Somalian President Farmajo, it has some discontent for not being consulted by the Ethiopian government and fear of port revenue reduction as Eritrea became another option for Ethiopian sea outlet. Djibouti and Eritrea have started a dialogue on their border deadlock through the mediation of Ethiopia although, it is not culminated. As it has been explored in different sub-sections of this study, there is a pattern of amity and enmity in the Regional Security Complex of the HoA before Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement. Now, the pattern of enmity has taken over by the pattern of amity following Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement regardless of external powers influence and Djibouti's discontent on a fear for port revenue reductions, and the situation in Sudan that reaches in the level of uncertainty that would create a security threat if it goes on as it is.

Practically speaking, the implication of Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement on Somalia is so impressive in terms of avoiding a hidden proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and to normalize Somalia's relation with Eritrea in which Eritrea was suspected as a supporter of Al-shababb. Besides this, Somalia is a beneficiary of Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement that helped a lot to resolve its maritime border conflict with its neighbour Kenya. Furthermore, the rapprochement can be able to offer a remarkable contribution for member states of the region to stand together for collective security. Peace between Somalia and Eritrea enables them to build trust, and as Eritrea was accused by aiding Al-shababb against Somalia, now, their restored diplomacy helps a lot to stop one walks against the other. So, the rapprochement is a golden juncture to end mistrust between the aforementioned states and to build mutual trust that contributes a lot for the peace and security of the entire region.

The rapprochement has ended the past two consecutive decades of ‘no war no peace’ situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea and it ushered the beginning of Ethio-Eritrean bilateral relations and it’s a golden opportunity to cooperate and resolve the challenges and to cherish the opportunities. The Lifting of sanctions which was imposed on Eritrea eliminates the major hurdle for Eritrea by boosting its economy and bringing the country back into the community of nations. As still the rapprochement is in a process, if it would be concluded wisely, the rapprochement will also bring positive energy into the effort to realize meaningful peace, cooperation and integration in the region. Furthermore, the rapprochement was a panacea to bring back insurgent groups who had been in the soil of Eritrea for long, such as, OLF, Ginbot-7, ONLF, ARDUF, and the TPDM. This reduces external security vulnerability of the HoA hugely that comes from the soil of Eritrea.

The rapprochement has created a platform which galvanizes states of the HoA together and changed rule of the game in the region by offering a new floor where aspiration of regional integration can be realized. For instance, Somalia and Eritrea, Kenya and Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti have resolved their conflict and found in a peaceful relationship and other states of the Horn are joining them. Somalia and Kenya resolved their territorial conflict through the mediation of Ethiopian Prime Minister, and, Eritrea and Somalia also resolved their stalemate following Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement. Moreover, the rapprochement creates a forum for members of the region by avoiding enmity which is indispensable for regional peace and stability. Here, what we deduce from the aforementioned points is that the security as well as the insecurity of member’s states of the sub-region cannot be explained in isolation of one from the other. Having the same ethno-cultural groups into different political jurisdiction have a massive contribution to make conflict as well as peace trans-boundary. Finally, with no doubt, the presence of external powers in the entire region would affect the peace and security of HoA either positively or negatively.

## **6.2. The Way Forward**

### **6.2.1. The Way Forward for Ethiopia and Eritrea**

So far, the researcher has critically analyzed how the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea has played a positive role in bringing states of the HoA together. Although, the rapprochement has a constructive role for the peace and security of the region, it has potential to get back to its destructive role. To escape from these challenges, the researcher would like to suggest the following points which are crucial to move forward.

- ❖ Ethiopia and Eritrea should alleviate the challenges to the rapprochement by being loyal to the rapprochement; both should make the rapprochement transparent, institutionalized, and all inclusive, most importantly invite regional and continental organizations: IGAD and AU respectively and be wise and cautious to manage security dynamics of the region as the region's space being 'scrambled' with plenty of external actors.
- ❖ Resolving domestic problems, especially bringing back and protecting the security of internally displaced people's needs priority for both Ethiopia and Eritrea and other states of the region. Unless, it would be a trouble for other member states of the region too.
- ❖ Strengthening people-to-people communication, especially with peoples who are located around the border are very vital since the border communities have massive elements of connecting and de-connecting elements of the two sisterly nations.
- ❖ To reduce Djibouti's fear of port revenue reduction, it is advisable for Ethiopian government to be wise in terms of creating a healthy environment that let Eritrea and Djibouti compete for the delivery of port service for Ethiopia.
- ❖ Normalizing the historical animosity between TPLF and the Eritrean government in power will reinforce the rapprochement.
- ❖ Finally, IGAD and AU should be committed to manage the space of the HoA which is crowded with external actors through multilateral cooperation with member states and those who are in the space of the region.

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## **Appendices**

### **Appendix One**

#### **Interview Guiding Questions**

**Part One:** Guiding interview questions which had been conducted with Scholars, officials of IGAD, AU, IPSS and Political Science and International Relations

- ❖ How do you scrutinize the ongoing rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea in terms of peace and security of the two countries?
- ❖ What the rapprochement mean for the neighbors of the two countries (Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, and South Sudan). How do you evaluate their reaction in terms of peace and security of the region?
- ❖ What implications the rapprochement does have for Djibouti in terms of peace and security as well as in terms of port service delivery as long as it is a major sea outlet of Ethiopia?
- ❖ Do you see any opportunity for the region in terms of peace and security from the rapprochement? How can member states exploit the best out of the situation?
- ❖ What are the economic roles of the rapprochement on the region in general?
- ❖ What are the challenges and prospects of the rapprochement in terms of
  - Peace and security
  - Economic role for the region in general
- ❖ What measures should have to be taken to sustain the rapprochement?

**Part Two:** Guiding interview questions which had been be conducted with Embassies of neighboring countries which found in Addis Ababa

- ❖ How does your country see the rapprochement which is going on between Ethiopia and Eritrea? Does it be beneficial for your country in particular and for the region in general in terms of security?
- ❖ How does your country evaluate the rapprochement? What implications it have for the peace and security of the region?
- ❖ How can you describe the peace and security of the HoA in pre and post ongoing rapprochement period?
- ❖ Does the rapprochement would have a role in avoiding a mutual destabilization of the two countries in other states of the region?
- ❖ What kind of benefits do you expect in terms of peace and security as well as economically?
- ❖ What are the challenges and prospects of the rapprochement in terms of
  - Peace and security and its
  - Economic role for the region in general
- ❖ what measures should have to be taken to sustain the rapprochement

**Part Three:** Guiding interview questions to be made with Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia

- ❖ What makes the ongoing rapprochement different from the previous (1993) rapprochement?
- ❖ Is there any move to make institutionalizing the rapprochement?
- ❖ How do you see its implication on the peace and security of the HoA?
- ❖ How do you evaluate the reactions of others states of the region on the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea?
- ❖ How do you appraise the challenges and prospects of the rapprochement in terms of

- Peace and security and its

- Economic role for the region in general

- ❖ What measures should have to be taken to sustain the rapprochement?

**Part four:** Guiding interview questions which had been conducted with officials of IGAD and AU.

- ❖ Does your esteemed organization has involved in the rapprochement?

- ❖ How does your esteemed office see the ongoing rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea? What implications would it have in terms of peace and security of the region in general?

- ❖ What the rapprochement mean for the sub-region (Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, and South Sudan).

- ❖ What can the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea will have a role in avoiding proxy wars of the two countries in other states of the region?

- ❖ How can member states exploit the best out of the situation?

- ❖ What are the challenges and prospects of the rapprochement in terms of

- Peace and security as well as its

- Economic role for the region in general

- ❖ What measures should have to be taken to sustain the rapprochement?

## Appendix Two

### List of Key Informants

No	Name	Position	Date	Place
Key informant (01)	Ambassador James Pita	Ambassador, Extraordinary and plenipotentiary Ethiopia and Djibouti, permanent Representative to AU, IGAD and UNECA	March 19,2019	Embassy of South Sudan Premises, Addis Ababa
Key informant (02)	Commander Abebe Muluneh	Director of Security Sector Reform, IGAD	March 22, 2019	IGAD Office, Addis Ababa
Key informant (03)	Dr. Kidane Kirose,	Director, Institute of Peace and Security Studies	March 27, 2019	AAU, IPSS
Key informant (04)	Ms Emeli <del>Mekonen Ali</del>	Crisis Management Desk Officer at AU, Peace and Security Department	May 07, 2019	AU, Peace and Security Department, interview <del>room</del>
Key informant (05)	Dr. Admore <del>Munori Kombudzi</del>	AU, Director for Peace and Security	May 06,2019	AU, Peace and Security Department, interview <del>room</del>
Key informant (06)	Ambassador Araya Desta	Eritrean Permanent Representative to African Union, IGAD, and UNECA	May 31, 2019	Embassy of Eritrea Premises, Addis Ababa

## Appendix Three

### List of Interviewee

No	Name	Position	Date	Place
1. Interviewee (02)	anonymous	Professor of conflict Studies at Institute of Peace and Security Studies, AAU	March 28, 2019	IPSS, AAU
2. Interviewee (03)	Yayesew Shimeles	Editor in chief Nahoo Television and Deputy CEO	March 26,2019	Ambassador Building, Addis Ababa
3. Interviewee (08)	Professor K. Mathews,	Professor of international Relation at political Science and International Relations	April 30,2019	AAU
4. Interviewee (09)	Tafesse Olike,	Professor of international Relation at PSIR, AAU	April 26,2019	at his residence, Addis Ababa
5. Interviewee (10)	Dr. Mesfin Woldemikael	Professor of conflict Studies at Institute of Peace and Security Studies, AAU	May 28,2019	IPSS, AAU

**IGAD and Neighbouring Countries Directorate General****Desk Officers**

6. Interviewee (04)	Andargu Berhe	Sudan Affairs Desk officer	April 02, 2019	MFA, at his office
7. Interviewee (05)	Hailu Teffera	Djibouti Affairs Desk officer	April 05, 2019	MFA, at his office
8. Interviewee (06)	Terefe Tujuma	Somalia Affairs Desk officer	March 25, 2019	MFA, at his office
9. Interviewee (07)	Dabang Rut	Kenyan Affairs Desk officer	March 25, 2019	MFA, at his office
10. Interviewee (01)	Ojige Osso	Eritrean Affairs Desk officer	March 22, 2019	MFA, at his office

## **Declaration**

I, Adonias Adugna declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree at any other University, and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

**Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Signature:** \_\_\_\_\_