

Regional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution: Roles of the African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Resolving Violent Conflict in South Sudan

Submitted by: Aziza Geleta

Supervisors: Professor Amr Abdalla

Professor Sunday A. Okello

A Dissertation Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Peace and Security Studies.

Addis Ababa University
Institute for Peace and Security Studies
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
January, 2018

Addis Ababa University

School of Graduate Studies

This is to certify that the dissertation prepared by Aziza Geleta, entitled: Regional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution: Roles of the African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Resolving Violent Conflict in South Sudan submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Security Studies complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality

Signed by the Examining Board:

Internal Examiner _____ Signature and Date _____

External Examiner _____ Signature and Date _____

Supervisor _____ Signature and Date _____

Supervisor _____Signature and Date _____

_____

Director of the Institute/Graduate Program Coordinator

Abstract

South Sudan got its independence on 2011 after an exercise of referendum, demonstrating to the whole world the conclusion of one of the longest conflicts in recent African history. Nevertheless, it was not long before many people across the world got shocked as a result of gloomy report of near a genocidal massacres and destruction of villages. Indeed since then the country has been struggling, with complete absence of law and order.

African regional and sub-regional organizations including African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have staged an increasing concern and got actively involved in this matter encouraged by the idea of prompting "African solutions to African problem". Thus, this dissertation was therefore conducted with the aspiration of assessing the causes and consequences of South Sudanese conflict and the determination to investigate the role and contribution of African Union (AU) and Inter-Governmental Authority (IGAD) towards resolving conflict in South Sudan.

In doing so, this dissertation applied qualitative methodological approach and also made use of both primary and secondary sources. The key instruments through which data were collected includes; Documentary Analysis, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), Key Informant Interviews (KIIS) and In-Depth Interview. Documentary Analysis was used to provide background, to track change and development. At the same time 10 Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with various discussants were also conducted each consisting of 6 participants. The Focus Group Discussions (FGD) was designed to draw upon participant's attitudes, feelings, experience and reactions. What is more, 55 In-Depth interviews were also conducted with various participants of the research to obtain comprehensive information, to understand participant's response deeper and gain more extra knowledge and insight. Besides all this, 28 Key Informant Interview (KIIS) were also conducted with academician, regional leaders, political analysts, peace and security experts, ambassadors, diplomats, higher government officials, staff and coordinators of AU and IGAD.

Furthermore, findings of the study suggest that there are historical, political, economic and social causes of the conflict. Plus, the study also indicated that there are some political, economic and social consequences of the conflict in South Sudan, which has significant adverse effect both within South Sudan and to the region. Yet to minimize the effect of the conflict in South Sudan and consolidated peace a number of policy options have been forwarded by this research undertaking. As far as AU and IGAD concerned, there are some strength and weakness that has been registered as a result of this regional and sub-regional organizations practical intervention.

Keywords: - Power, AU, IGAD, Causes, Consequence, Regional Organization, Sub-Regional Organization, Conflict and Mediation.

Acknowledgement

To write and undertake this PhD research and dissertation was an amazing, rewarding and fulfilling journey. Catching up with a number of literatures to read through, staying up until late night and giving-up almost nearly all my weekends, made this adventurous journey an incredible and life changing experience.

I am indebted to many people who have made this journey worthwhile and without whose support and encouragement, its completion would have been difficult. While, I can never thank them enough for their support, guidance and encouragement, I would like to mention few, as a token of my appreciation. With profound sense of humility, I extend my deepest gratitude for ALLAH, the almighty for his guidance and grace in my life and also in undertaking this research.

I would also like to express my profound gratitude to my PhD advisors Professor Amr Abdalla and Professor Sunday A. Okello, whose help, academic guidance, inspiring suggestions and supervisory encouragement, continuously helped me from the inception to the completion of this study. Professor Amr Abedalla and Professor Sunday A. Okello scholarly advice and unstinting academic inputs helped me to make this research undertaking a better dissertation.

My sincere thanks go to my each and every anonymous Key Informant Interviewees, Focus Group Discussion discussants and In-depth Interview participants for their welcomed responses and readiness to provide me with the necessary documents for the study. Along with this I greatly acknowledge Dr Alex De Waal, H.E Former Foreign Minister of Ethiopia Dr Tedros Adhanom, Former State Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and the current Ambassador of Ethiopia to Egypt, Ambassador Taye Atske-Selassie, Ambassador of Ethiopia to London, Ambassador Ababai

Demessi, United Nation Human Right official for the United Nation Mission in South Sudan, Mr Achut Acharya, United Nation Protection of Civilian site officer Mr Tatenda Malan.

My everlasting respect, love as well as my foremost gratitude goes to my mother Leyla Yesuf, my father Geleta Dessalegn, my sister Dr. Melika Geleta, my brother Kalid Geleta, and my aunt Meyra Yesuf (**My Solders of Hope**) who have always been by my side in every aspect including my significant inspirations to become the second Doctor in the family. Without you all this will never ever be possible and I am indeed blessed to have you all.

I am also grateful to a number of outstanding individuals who have given me their precious time to help me think through and put this dissertation all together Mr Patrick Gilkes, Mr Memar Ayalew, Mr Biniyam Ephrem, Mr Yonatan Gebermedhin, Mr Nurye Yassin, Mr Abdulkadir Mohammed, Mr Mekonnen Amare, Mr Getachew Tesfaye, Mr Johnathan Izudin, Mr Hibamo Ayalew disserves my most profound thanks and appreciation for their valuable time and contribution in one way or another on this dissertation. I would also like to extend my heartfelt appreciation to Mr Memar Ayalew and Mr Joerg Stahlhut for their relentless collaboration in identifying pertinent officials at the African Union and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and securing interviews. In addition I cannot complete my acknowledgement without mentioning Mr Achut Acharya and Mr Malan along with their colloquies at UNMISS for helping me in identifying pertinent In-depth Interview interviewees and FGD participants in UNMISS Juba PoC site near the Airport. My special and foremost heartfelt thanks also goes to Mr Yonas Tariku Metaferia and Dr Fana Gebresenbet.

Moreover, I thank Alexandre Hryszkiewcz, Aklilu Bekele, Amina Mohamad, Brendan Fitzpatrick, Basco Alan Sequeira and Faith Bwibo for the friendship and support these individuals extended to me over the years. It is also my greatest pleasure to extend my deepest gratitude for Mrs Sada Mohamed for her valuable contribution in the process of accomplishing my dissertation.

I would also like to express my appreciation to the Government and People of Germany along with DAAD academic exchange scholarship program for the financial support they have rendered me to undertake my PhD study with no worry. Likewise, I would like to extend my deepest appreciation to the United Nation Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) for granting me with a special training scholarship. Plus, I also would like to thank One Young World for offering me a European Union-One Young World Peace Building Scholarship and nominating me as One Young World Peace Building Ambassador.

The staffs and students of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies and the staffs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia are also worth of my appreciations for their consistent question "when are you going to submit your dissertation and graduate" always kept me on my toes reminding me of my obligation to complete and submit my dissertation.

Aziza Geleta Dessalegn

January, 2018

Table of Contents

Abstract I
Acknowledgement III
List of Tables XI
List of Figures XII
Timeline of Major Events Related to South Sudan Conflict XIII
List of Acronyms XVI
Chapter One 1
1. Introduction 1
1.1 The Context of This Research 2
1.2 Statement of the Problem 4
1.3 Objectives of the Study 9
1.3.1 General Objective of the Study 9
1.3.2 Specific Objectives 9
1.4 Research Questions 9
1.5 Significance of the Study 10
1.6 Scope, Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 11
1.7 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 12
1.8 Organization of the Dissertation 15
Chapter Two 17
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 17
2.1 The Concept of Peace 17
2.2 The Concept of Conflict and the Theories of Conflict Resolution 20
2.2.1 The Concept of Conflict 21
2.2.2 Theories of Conflict 25
I. Relative Deprivation Theory 26
II. Greed and Grievance Conflict Theory 27
III. Human Needs Theory 30
IV. Frustration- Aggression Theory. 31
V. Identity Formation Theory 32
VI. Structural Conflict Theory 33
VII. Psycho-Cultural Theory 34
2.2.3 Consequences of Conflict 38
2.3 Mechanisms for Handling Conflicts 40

2.3.1 Conflict Prevention 40
2.3.2 Conflict Management 42
2.3.3 Conflict Resolution 44
2.4 Types of Conflict Resolution Mechanism 47
I. Mediation 48
II. Negotiation 49
III. Conciliation 51
IV. Arbitration 51
2.5 Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations towards Conflict Resolution 53
2.5.1 Regionalism in Historical Perspective 53
2.5.2 Meaning of Regional Arrangement and Agencies 60
2.5.3 Criteria for Defining of Region and Regional Organizations 62
2.5.4 Debate on Regionalism 63
2.5.5 Theories of Regionalism 65
I. Realism and Neo-Realism 65
II. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism 67
III. Constructivism 70
2.5.6 The Role of the African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 72
Chapter Three 74
3. Research Methods and Methodology 74
3.1 Research Methods 74
3.2 Inductive Versus Deductive Research Approach 75
3.3 Epistemological and Theoretical Perspective 76
3.3.1 Epistemological Perspective 77
3.3.2 Theoretical Perspective 78
3.4 Data Types and Sources 79
3.5 Study Area, Population, Sampling Frame, Variable and Sample Size 83
3.6 Data Collection Techniques 85
3.7 Research Quality Issues 87
3.8 Ethical Considerations 89
3.9 Data Analysis 89
Chapter Four 90
4. The Historical Backdrop to the Current Conflict in South Sudan 90

4.1 Country Profile of the Republic of South Sudan.....90
I. Geography.....90
II. Government.....91
III. History.....92
IV. Economy.....92
V. Ethnic Groups.....94
VI. Languages.....94
VII. Population.....94
VIII. Religion.....95
4.2. The Pre-Historic south Sudan.....95
4.3. The Independence of South Sudan.....107
4.4. The Genesis of the Current Conflict /From Conflict to a Conflict.....109
Chapter Five.....111
5. Data Presentation, Analysis and Discussion.....111
5.1 Data Presentation.....111
5.1.1 General Characteristics of Respondents.....112
A. Respondents by Sex and Age.....112
B. Respondents Religious Status.....114
C. Respondents by Marital Status and Family Size.....115
D. Respondents by Level Education.....116
5.2 The Genesis/Causes of the Current Conflict in South Sudan.....117
5.2.1 Internal Causes of the Conflict.....117
5.2.1.1 Historical Causes.....117
5.2.1.2 Political Causes of the Conflict.....121
I. Power Struggle.....121
II. Corruption, Patronage and Impunity.....126
III. Militarization and Arm Proliferation.....133
IV. Weak Institutional Capacity.....137
V. Instrumentalization of Ethnic Identities.....139
VI. Lack of Inclusiveness and Participatory State Apparatus.....143
VII. Lack of Mechanism to Promote Check and Balance.....144
VIII. Lack of Commitment towards Nation Building.....148
5.2.1.3 Economic Causes of the Conflict.....149
I. Oil as Causes of the Conflict.....149

II. Marginalized Over Economic Resource Distribution 151
5.2.1.4 Social Causes.....153
I. Past Rift.....153
Chapter Six.....155
6. Consequence of South Sudanese Conflict.....155
6.1 Internal Consequences of the Conflict.....156
6.1.1 Political Consequences.....156
I. Predicament on Democracy.....156
II. Absence of Rule of law.....157
III. Violations of Freedom of Expression and Censorship of the Press/Media 159
IV. Human Right Violation.....161
 Extra Judicial Killing.....163
 Arbitrary Arrest and Detention.....164
 Rape and Other Sexual Violence.....165
6.1.2 Economic Impact of the Conflict.....167
I. Crippled the Economy.....167
II. Reduced Oil Production.....169
III. Capital Flight.....171
IV. Destruction of Property.....172
V. Depreciated the Value of South Sudanese Pound (SSP).....173
VI. Unemployment.....174
6.13. Social Impact.....175
I. Impact on Social Networks.....175
II. Self-Recruitment into Armed Groups.....177
III. The Impact of the Civil War on Movement of People and Humanitarian Needs 178
IV. The Psychological Impact of the War on Children and Women 181
6.2 External Impact of the Conflict.....183
6.2.1 Political and Socio-Economic Consequences.....183
I. Refugee Influx and Ethnic Conflicts.....183
II. Diminution of Trade and Investments.....186
Chapter Seven.....188
7. The Role of African Union towards Conflict Resolution.....188
7.1 The Path from Pan-Africanism to the Organization African Unity.....188

7.2 The Path from the Organization of African Unity to the African Union 192
7.3 The African Union 196
7.4 The African Union and Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution197
I. Conflict Prevention 199
II. Conflict Management....200
III. Conflict Resolution....203
7.5 The Role of African Union (AU) towards Conflict Resolution in South Sudan 204
7.5.1 The Strength of the African Union towards Conflict Resolution in South Sudan 211
7.5.2 The Weakness of the African Union towards Conflict Resolution in South Sudan....212
Chapter Eight 214
8. The Role of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) towards Conflict Resolution Efforts....214
8.1. Historical Backdrop to the Founding of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)....215
8.2. Vision, Mission, Principles, and Major Activities of IGAD....217
8.3. Organs of IGAD....218
8.4. Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD and Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution 220
8.5. The Role of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) towards Resolving Conflict in South Sudan 221
8.6. The Strength of Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Mediation in South Sudanese Conflict....232
8.7. The Weakness of Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in South Sudanese Conflict Resolution Effort 234
Chapter Nine 246
9. Summery and Conclusion of the Study 246
Chapter Ten....264
10. Policy Options....264
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH....273
Bibliography 274

List of Tables

Table 1: Links between specific objectives and methods to achieve them.....81
Table 2: Percentage Distributions of Respondents by Sex and Age.....113
Table 3: Percentage Distributions by Religious Status.....114
Table 4: Percentage Distributions of Respondents by Marital Statuses and Family Size.....115
Table 5: Trading Economics South Sudan Economic Forecast of 2016-2020.....168
Table 6: IGAD Members Countries Profile.....215

List of Figures

Figure 1: Framework of Analysis 15
Figure 2: Burton – Human Needs Theories 30
Figure 3: The Relationship between- Epistemology, Theoretical Perspectives and Methods 77
Figure 4: Map of South Sudan 91
Figure 5: Percentage Distribution of Respondents by Level of Education 116
Figure 6: Participants Response to the Immediate/ Incident Causes of the Conflict 121
Figure 7: Corruption Index of South Sudan 130
Figure 8: Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Administrative Structure 219

Timeline of Major Events Related to South Sudan Conflict

1899-1955	South Sudan is part of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, under joint British-Egyptian rule.
1956	Sudan gained its independence.

First Civil War

1962	Civil war led by Anya Nya movement began
1969	Group by Col Jaafar Muhammad Numeiri seizes power and outlined policy of autonomy for south.
1972	Government approved autonomy for southern Sudan in a peace agreement signed in Addis Ababa.
1978	Oil discovered in Unity State in southern Sudan

Second Civil War

1983	Fighting breaks out again between north and south Sudan, under leadership of John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), after Sudanese President Jaafar Numeiri abolishes South Sudan's autonomy.
2002	Talks in Kenya lead to a breakthrough agreement between southern rebels and Sudanese government on ending the civil war.

North-South Peace Deal

2005 January	North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ends civil war; deal provides for a permanent ceasefire, autonomy for the south, a power-sharing government involving rebels in Khartoum and a south Sudanese referendum on independence in six years' time.

2005 July — Former southern rebel leader John Garang is sworn in as first vice-president. A new Sudanese constitution which gives the south a large degree of autonomy is signed.

2005 August — South Sudanese leader John Garang is killed in a plane crash. He is succeeded by Salva Kiir Mayardiit.

2005 October — Autonomous government is formed in South Sudan, in line with the January 2005 peace deal. The administration is dominated by former rebels.

Independence Referendum

2009 December — Leaders of North and South reach deal on terms of referendum on independence due in South by 2011.

2011 January — The people of South Sudan vote in favor of full independence from Sudan.

New State Born

2011 9 July — Independence day.

2013 March — Sudan and South Sudan agree to resume pumping oil after a bitter dispute over fees that saw production shut down more than a year earlier. They also agreed to withdraw troops from their border area to create a demilitarized zone.

2013 June — President Kiir dismisses Finance Minister Kosti Manibe and Cabinet Affairs Minister Deng Alor over a multi-million dollar financial scandal, and lifts their immunity from prosecution.

2013 July	President Kiir dismisses entire cabinet and Vice-President Riek Machar in a power struggle within the governing Sudan People's Liberation Movement.

Civil War

2013 December	Civil war erupts as President Salva Kiir accuses his former vice-president, Riek Machar, of plotting to overthrow him.
2014 August	Peace talks begin in Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa and drag on for months as fighting continues.
2016 April	Riek Machar finally returns to Juba and is sworn in as first vice-president in a new unity government - but is sacked in July after further conflict and goes back into exile.

List of Acronyms

AU	African Union
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
IGOs	Inter Governmental Organizations
UN	United Nation
AUPSU	African Union Peace and Security Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
HNT	Human Needs Theory
CRT	Conflict Resolution Theory
SPLA	Sudanese People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-IO	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement –In Oppositions
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
TGoNU	Transitional Government of National Unity
RoSS	Republic of South Sudan
NLC	National Liberation Council
IDP	Internally Displaced People
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMISS	United Nation Mission in South Sudan
PDF	Protection and Deterrent Force
CoH	Cessation of Hostility
MVM	Monitoring and Verification Mechanism
FGD	Focus Group Discussion

KII	Key Informant Interview
WFP	World Food Program
IDI	In-Depth Interview
ISS	Institute of Security Study
OCHA	UN office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Chapter One

1. Introduction

This study is about regional mechanisms of conflict resolution. As a result, the roles of African Union (AU) and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in resolving South Sudanese conflict have critically been reviewed and analyzed. The data for this particular study were also conducted with academicians, regional leaders, political analysts, peace and security experts, victims of the war, ambassadors, diplomats, higher government officials, staff and coordinators of African Union (AU) and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

The outcomes of this study were obtained from December 15, 2013 till the return of SPLM-IO leaderships including Dr. Riek Machar from their exile to Juba on April 2016. Consequently, this study does not include the second phase of the conflict that has happened on July 8-12, 2016 in Juba Presidential palace, which then quickly spread in some part of the country and cost many lives. At the same time, it has also forced a score of people to become displaced including the former First Vice President Dr Riek Machar (Sudan Tribune, 2017).

As a matter of fact, the war started on the evening of 15th December 2013 between members of the Presidential Tiger Battalion and VIP Guards, which has fought for reasons that are yet to be fully disclosed by this research. Yet the December 2013 conflict has sparked off shooting and violence in various residential neighborhoods in Juba. Indeed, during that first night, many people were killed while many others, fled to the compound of the United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) near the

airport in Juba since then the country has been in a complete absence of law and order.

Accordingly, this research explored the experiences attitudes, feelings, views and reactions of academicians, regional leaders, political analysts, peace and security experts, victims of the war, ambassadors, diplomats, higher government officials, staff and coordinators of African Union (AU) and Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) related to the cause and consequence of conflict in South Sudan along with the role of African Union (AU) and Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) towards resolving conflict in South Sudan .

This chapter captures (1.1) The Contexts of the Research (1.2) Statement of the Problem, (1.3) The Objectives of the Study, (1.4) The Research Questions, (1.5) The Significant of the Study, (1.6) Scope, Limitations and Delimitations of the Study, (1.7) The Conceptual and Theoretical framework of the Study, (1.8) The Organization of the Study.

1.1 The Context of This Research

Peace and Security are indispensable for social and economic development. Maintaining peace, security and stability in the twenty first century, continues to remain a vital challenge for international community including multilateral, regional and key sub-regional organizations such as the United Nation (UN), the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In fact violent conflicts deteriorate the economic development of countries and threaten human rights, democratic values and fundamental freedoms (Mearsheimer, 1995). Thus, the international community has authoritative responsibilities to maintain peace,

security and stability in troubled areas with a considerable regional and sub-regional apparatuses.

With the end of the cold war, international society got actively involved in promoting peace security and stability worldwide. Sixty-one peacekeeping operations have been initiated by UN Security Council since 1948 and the UN Security Council has authorized forty-eight peacekeeping operations since 1990 (United Nations, 2008). The major goal of these peace keeping operations is to ensure peace, security and stability at global and regional level.

The African Union (AU) as a regional and international power is also engaged in promoting peace, security and stability on the continent. It accepted the protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of African Union on July 2002. The protocol proclaims that the African Union has a primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2007). In addition, the protocol emphasis that promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability are essential for strong economic and democratic development on the continent.

In a similar vein, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is playing a significant role in promotion of peace and security in the horn of Africa. Indeed, the peace and security outlook for the horn of Africa remains bleak. The conflict appraisal includes protracted state collapse in Somalia, deep hostility between Ethiopia-Eretria, a fragile peace agreement between North and South Sudan, continuing instability in South Sudan (David, 2008). Indeed, South Sudan is currently engulfed by internal instability. A confluence of factors including economic, political and the intensification of armed opposition contributed to the augmentation of war in South

Sudan on December 15, 2013. South Sudan has been struggling, since then, with complete absence of law and order.

The South Sudanese people have gone through all kinds of misery in the past four years. The anarchy, violence and poverty forced many South Sudanese to be displaced, become refugees, and thousands lost their lives. The effects of the general anarchy in South Sudan have not only affected the population of South Sudan, they have also had a spillover effect on the horn of Africa region and the international community. The problem of refugees, the smuggling of small arms and the light weapons and the spread of terrorism are all threats emerging from South Sudan, mainly affecting the horn of Africa and international community in general (Ibrahim, 2013). Therefore, with the mandate United Nation delegated, regional and sub-regional institution has been forced to engage in such kind of conflict (Abass, 2010). As a result, it is paramount matter to assess the cause and implication of conflict in South Sudan along with the role of regional and sub-regional institutions toward resolving conflict in the South Sudan.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Conflict is expected incidence in the very existence of mankind starting from individual's interaction with their environment to their interaction at the international level. More often than not a good number conflict shares a similar feature and dynamics in a sense that most conflicts are fought for the reason of fulfilling the unmet interest and values of two opposing sides over specific matters (Yagcioglu, 1996).

The continent of Africa has been a theater of conflict that has displayed conflict among its own various communities, contending for the ownership of various types of

resources and dominance. These struggles for ownership of resource and dominance inevitably lead individuals as well as political, economic, social, and religious groups to conflict. In fact, scores of violent conflicts of one form or another have made miserable Africa and exerted a heavy toll on the continents societies, polities and economies, depriving them of their development potential and democratic possibilities (Zeleza, 2008). Off course one cannot deny the fact that some conflict can have a productive contribution in bringing about positive changes in prevention of past and future victimization. Nevertheless, Africa has had encountered and continue to face many violent conflict that have devastating effects on the mere existence of the people of Africa many in every aspect entrenched and rooted in socio, economic and political dynamics, which have unfavorably altered the development potential of the content. Besides, many of African conflicts had diverted the resources that could have otherwise been used productively (Alexander, 2005). What's more, violent conflicts of as such in Africa have witnessed that conflict can and possibly transcend national boundaries with adverse impacts on regional stability (Marino, 1999). In this sense consequently violent conflicts can certainly pose fundamental challenges to regional and international peace and development.

The causes of the conflicts are as complex as the challenges of resolving them are difficult. Nevertheless, their costs cannot be in doubt as it was also mentioned clearly in the aforementioned paragraph. Millions of people has been killed, injured and was forced to migrate due to the devastating impact of conflict in Africa. A recent case in point on this regard is the South Sudan. Indeed, lately the peace and security outlook for South Sudan remains depressing. Yet South Sudan became independent in 2011 after an exercise of referendum which casted an almost 98.8% of vote, demonstrating to the whole world the conclusion of one of the longest conflicts in recent Sub-

Saharan African history (Awolowich, 2015). Globally welcomed as the world's newest state, the hopes and wishes of the international community for South Sudan were far from what we are now witnessing. In fact, many South Sudanese welcomed the newest nation in the world with the hopes of a more peaceful and prosperous future for its citizens (Mehari and Abel, 2013). A sea of people waved flags in a blur of color as the South Sudan's flag was hoisted high into the air. Many embraced each other and cried as the new national anthem was sung for the very first time ever (Awolowich, 2015). However, this optimism was punctured by the onset of internal conflict on December 15, 2013. Since then the country has been struggling, with complete absence of law and order. The South Sudanese people have gone through a worsening humanitarian crisis, and there are concerns that it could enter a vicious cycle of increasing instability, politically and economically. The effects of the general anarchy in South Sudan have not only affected the population of South Sudan, they have also had a spillover effect on the horn of Africa region and the international community (Berouk, 2014; Dereje, 2014 and Mehari and Abel, 2013).

Subsequently, violent conflict of as such is harsh and undesired phenomenon in mankind. The need for resolving and if possible eradicating it is unquestionable. According to the United Nation Charter and many other international legal instruments, regional and sub-regional institutions have increasingly been considered as the main instruments in conflict resolution in recent peace and security agenda (Boehmer.et al, 2004).

The international community's recent strategies in maintaining order and stability, the United Nation Security Council most Resolutions, agenda 2063 and the most recent plan for peace, vision of peace 2020 and among other documents, considered regional and sub-regional institutions as a good entry point in achieving peace objectives as

well as restraining the dangerous trend in any kind of conflict (Ibrahim, 2013). Regional and sub-regional institutions has been said to register substantive result in view of making participatory peace activity realizable (Brian and Dauda, 2011). Therefore, the international community has been paying increasing attention to these institutions as a crucial element to meet the poor people's needs in conflict affected areas like South Sudan.

In line with this it is indicated that addressing the issues of conflict like South Sudan is necessary step towards making our continent effective centers of development (Boehmer.et al, 2004). Various studies have been conducted in the area of international, regional and sub-regional institutions role. One of the earlier studies by Babacar Diouf (1998) reviews the future of conflict resolution in Africa, and the role of OAU in the process. A good number of previous studies of the role regional and sub-regional institutions in much of Africa focuses on peacekeeping and peace enforcement (Paul,2013 and Funmi,2010) in terms of performance and effectiveness (Healy and Sevenson, 2008; Borchgrevik and Lie, 2009; Thruelsen,2009) rather than peacemaking.

Most of the aforementioned studies have much of their focuses on peace keeping and enforcement: performance and effectiveness rather than assessing peacemaking towards conflict resolution. A few other studies dealt with the role of regional and sub-regional institution towards resolving conflict. These include a study by Katende (2011) that looks into the role of international and regional organization effectiveness in resolving conflict. However, this study does not consider South Sudan which has peculiar characteristics distinct from great lake region of Africa. Another Study by Kidist (2009) assesses the role of regional and sub-regional organization towards conflict resolution by exclusively focusing on Somalia. Consequently, it fails to give

some account on this organizations role to resolve conflict in the current troubled South Sudan. In the event of addressing these organizations role in South Sudan most studies give much of their emphasis on one or two ingredients (either ethnic identity or power struggle omitting other structural causes) as far as cause of the conflict is concerned along with giving much emphasis to its internal implication rather than focusing on both the internal and external consequence of the South Sudanese war (Ashley, 2013). Above and beyond this, the conflict in South Sudan is very dynamic conflict involving persistence changes as far as the causes, consequence, and the role of regional or sub-regional organization are concerned and thus requires continuous research undertaking to arrive at possible recommendations that can consolidate peace in the country.

In these fields, regional and sub-regional organizations, especially the African Union and Inter Governmental Authority on development (IGAD), have gained a wealth of experience and have proven their value. While challenges regarding the capacity of these organizations to become effective partners in peacekeeping continue to draw the attention and resources of international community, the structures and activities undertaken by this regional and sub-regional organizations to resolve conflict and consolidate peace have received much less consideration. It is the aim of this study to help close this gap by contributing to a better understanding of the role and activities played by African Union (AU) and Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) in conflict resolution of South Sudan. Together with this, this dissertation addresses the causes and consequences of South Sudan conflict so as to draw a lesson for many countries of Africa.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

1.3.1 General Objective of the Study

The general objective of this research is to analyze the role of regional organizations towards resolving conflict in South Sudan. It analyzes the strength and weakness encountered by these regional and sub-regional organizations as a mechanism to resolve conflict and pave ways to peace in the country in particular and the horn of Africa in general.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the research are to: -

- Assess causes and dynamics of conflict in South Sudan,
- Identify the major internal and external consequences of South Sudanese conflict,
- Investigate the role/contribution of Africa Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority (IGAD) towards resolving South Sudan's conflict.

To help answer the above major specific questions the study adopted various methodology that takes into account Key Informant Interview, In-depth interview and Focus Group Discussion along with secondary data analysis.

1.4 Research Questions

Generally, the study attempts to answer to some general and specific questions:

I. General Question

- What are the role and contributions of regional organizations towards resolving the conflict in South Sudan?

II. Specific Questions

- What are the causes and nature of conflict in South Sudan?

- What are the major internal and external consequences of South Sudanese conflict? and how do the conflict affect both South Sudanese people as well as the people in the region?
- What role and contribution have the Africa Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) been able to contribute towards conflict resolution in South Sudan?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This dissertation is believed to generate a paramount data about the cause and implication of conflict in South Sudan not only this but it also aspires to provide a significant insight on the role and contribution of regional and sub-regional institutions towards resolving conflict in South Sudan. Thus it will provoke a considerable discussion on weather regional and sub-regional institutions like AU and IGAD can resolve conflict in Africa in general and South Sudan in particular where the outcome of conflict is outrageous.

This dissertation will therefore serve policy makers, donors, program managers, NGO personnel, researchers, ambassadors, government officials, practitioners and other international and regional institutions to acquire best understanding about the cause, consequence, process of intervention and the level of contribution of regional and sub-regional organization in resolving South Sudan's conflict. The result also gives insight into the limitation and challenges of these institutions in an effort to address issues of resolving conflict and see relevant areas of interventions to increase their effectiveness. In addition, the dissertation will also serve as a pointer towards need for further study in the area.

1.6 Scope, Limitations and Delimitations of the Study

This study is limited to selected regional and sub-regional organizations who are participating in conflict resolution scheme of South Sudan. The rationale behind this is that conducting research up on all of the operating institutions and stakeholders in South Sudan will be time taking and financially constraining. Together with this the researcher's particular interest is to focus on South Sudan which is most current ongoing conflict with a potential of disrupting regional peace and security. Therefore, it may not have a scientific justification to assure the reader that the final conclusion coming out of this study is representative and applicable to all international, regional and sub-regional institution and different kinds of conflict throughout the globe. However, some significant lessons can be drown from such kind of intensive research. Furthermore, the very nature of the research topic is recent and dynamic, materials availability and access were significantly adding burden. As the civil war has and is still raging the concern for the researcher safety and security was a significant challenge. Along with this various warring parties and participant's apprehension has also posed threat and hindrance. As far as communications mechanisms were concerned interpreters are vital but interpreters might attach their own perspective and outlook of the issue at a hand and this indeed added obstacle to capture the full view of participants. However, despite all these limitations, the researcher has tried to put her unreserved and unwavering effort to follow harmless channels in order to fill the constraint voids.

Furthermore, the outcome of this study were obtained till the return of SPLM-IO leaderships including Dr Riek Machar from their exile to Juba on April 2016 and therefore this study does not include what happened after another conflict erupted on July 8-12, 2016 in Juba Presidential palace and then quickly spread in some part of

the country and cost many to lose their lives and got displaced including the then First Vice President (Sudan Tribune, 2017).

1.7 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

The contemporary history shows that Africa has had a high prevalence of conflicts. The effects of these conflict situations to the socio-economic development are immense. This phenomenon has raised more questions than answers. For example, what are the causes and the consequences of conflict in Africa as well as is there any role for regional and sub-regional organizations (like AU, IGAD, ECOWAS, SADC) in the maintenance of regional peace and security and if so, how effective are they? This question has polarized the debate on the role and potential contribution of regional intergovernmental collective security organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security in the post-Cold War period (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). Some scholars argue that regional organizations play only a limited role and that even when they do so; it is often in pursuit of their political, socio-economic or strategic self-interests (Mearsheimer, 1995). On the other hand, some academics are of the view that regional organizations not only have a role to play but have emerged as a viable framework for the maintenance of regional peace and security (Boehmer et al., 2004 and Brian and Dauda, 2011). Indeed, the author of this dissertation pursue that regional organizations have a paramount role to play and have emerged as a feasible structure for the maintenance of peace and security in general and conflict resolution in particular. As conflict erupted in South Sudan on December 15, 2013 the African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as regional and sub-regional body respectively sprang in to action by emerging as a viable framework for the maintenance of regional peace and security (Sudan Tribune, 2013a and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2013a). In fact, this two

regional and sub-regional bodies immediately dispatched its Ministerial and Heads of States delegations to assess the situation on the ground and then they both attempt to facilitate numerous meetings between the conflicting parties to attain peace in the country (Sudan Tribune, 2013a and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2013a).


Furthermore, there are various conflicting schools of thoughts that still play a leading role in today´s debates about international politics. Realists, Neo-Liberal Institutionalists, and others have long debated the utility of regional and sub-regional organizations. Most agree that regional and sub-regional organizations matter in some form or in certain contexts, but there is no consensus as to the extent of regional and sub-regional organizations influence and how best to treat regional and sub-regional organizations analytically as an aspect of world politics. By holding that regional and sub-regional organizations matter, participants in the debate usually mean that they should be capable of altering state behavior (Kidist, 2009). On one side in the debate, constructivists and neo-liberal institutionalists contend that regional and sub-regional organizations are (or can be) a central component of world order (Boehmer et al., 2004 and Brian and Dauda, 2011). On the other side, many realists argue that regional and sub-regional organizations are only marginally influential in world politics and that regional and sub-regional organizations typically reflect status quo power relations (Mearsheimer, 1995).

Constructivists and neo-liberal institutionalists argue that global politics is increasingly organized around regimes and institutions that foster cooperation by providing information and organizational structure, promoting norms and common belief systems, and reducing transaction costs. Realpolitik should become less important with the rise of multiple channels of interaction and the growing in number

of non-state actors, leading to a decline in militarized violence (Brian and Dauda, 2011).

Neoliberal institutionalists accept much of the functionalist/Kantian prescription for international politics, but they also accept the realist tenets of systemic anarchy, the importance of power, and the preeminence of states' interests. Collective security and cooperation are nevertheless feasible where states share common or complementary interests and where states value absolute over relative gains. Regional and sub-regional organizations help to foster cooperation by encouraging reciprocity through regularizing interactions. Indeed, the neo-liberal institutionalist's perspective may be construed as the strongest advocate for regional and sub-regional organizations, given the lack of alternatives once one accepts anarchy as endemic to international affairs (Boehmer et al, 2004 and Brian and Dauda, 2011). Subsequently as to the researcher the theory of neo-liberal institutionalists and constructivists contributes a lot for this research analysis. Subsequently, the researcher theoretical stand point dwells on neo-liberal institutionalist's and Constructivists theoretical paradigm. While conceptual work by realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism is extensive, the empirical literature on institutions contribution in conflict resolution endeavor is decidedly sparse. It is unclear whether regional and sub-regional institutions are as effective (or ineffective) as partisans claim. Indeed, the limited scope of empirical research may have retarded theoretical development. Theory stands to advance most quickly when confronted with contrasting evidence. As a result, the current research will void this gap.

Figure 1: Framework of Analysis



Source: The Author

1.8 Organization of the Dissertation

The study is organized as follows. The first chapter deals with the introduction which includes: background of the study, problem statement, objective of the study, significance of the study, research question, and the scope and limitation of the dissertation as well conceptual and theoretical framework of the study. Chapter two reviews literature pertaining to conflict and conflict resolution theories along with this theoretical debate on the role and contribution of regional organization and sub-regional organization in resolving conflict will be presented. Research method and methodology will be dealt with in chapter three. Moreover, chapter four, chapter five, chapter six, chapter seven and chapter eight will take in to account the data presentation, analysis and

discussion of the collected data. Finally, chapter nine will present the conclusion based on which some possible policy options can be derived from on chapter ten.

Chapter Two

2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

In this section, the knowledge relevant to the topic will be reviewed using secondary data sources. The purpose of this section is to avail readers with the necessary concepts and literatures to understand and known about causes and consequences of conflict and the role of regional and sub-regional organization towards conflict resolution in general and South Sudan in particular.

This segment therefore comprises two major parts; the first part deals with the general theoretical concept of conflict with its different categories of conflict handling mechanisms. The second portion will discuss the role of regional and sub-regional organization in conflict resolution endeavor. However before directly preceding to the concept of conflict the author of this dissertation have found it very mandatory to understand what the concept of peace really is so that one can easily understand what conflict is and its various consequences. As a result, the following section will try to dwell upon the concept of peace.

2.1 The Concept of Peace

To write about peace is to write about everything and nothing; it is neither precise nor sufficiently vague to be discarded completely as a subject of serious inquiry; the closer one approaches it the more does it recede, yet it is frighteningly important. However, this is in the nature of human affairs: the more important the matter, the vaguer and the more difficult becomes the thinking about it. Indeed, if it had already been conquered intellectually and mastered technically, then it would no longer have been so important because it would no longer loom so high as a problem (Galtung, 1978). In fact, in this case some other problem would have taken its place.

So far we have used the term peace several times more or less with the understanding that the term has a convincingly clear, well understood and agreed upon meaning. Since this is far from the case, as already indicated in the introduction, the concept of peace has to be explored further.

Various scholars have attempted to supply various terms that refers to peace. Among this scholars David (2008) defined peace as "freedom from civil clamour and confusion" and positively as a state of security or order within a community provided by law, custom or public opinion. Again Christie (2006) defined peace as "a mental or spiritual condition marked by freedom from disquieting or oppressive thoughts or emotions". This is peace in its personal or inner sense peace of mind as well as "calmness of mind and heart, serenity of sprit" (inner peace).

In addition to this Robert (2006) defined peace as a tranquil state of freedom from outside disturbance and harassment. Peace also implies harmony in human or personal relations: mutual concord and esteem. This is what we might call interpersonal or inter-subjective peace. Furthermore, Keller (2006) defined peace as a state of mutual concord between and or within government thus absence of hostilities or war.

In a similar vein Gibsons and Mollans (2012) viewed peace as absence of activity and noise deeps stillness; deep autiteness, or what may be called positive inner peace. Moreover, there are many other scholars who personified peace as one that makes gives or maintains tranquility. Perhaps peace is like happiness, justice, health and other human ideals, something every person and culture claims to desire and venerate, but which few if any achieve, at least on an enduring basis. However, peace is different from happiness, since it seems to require social harmony and political

enfranchisement, whereas happiness appears, at least in modern culture, to be largely an individual matter.

Peace is linchinpin of social harmony, economic equity and political justice but peace is also consequently ruptured by war and other forms of violent conflict. Like happiness, peace remains so near and yet, like enduring love so far.

Johan Galtung (1978), a founder of peace studies and peace research, has proposed a very important distinction between "positive" and "negative peace". "Positive" peace denotes the simultaneous presence of many desirable states of mind and society, such as harmony, justice, equality and so on. "Negative" peace has historically denoted the "absence of war" and other forms of large scale violent human conflict.

All in all, the author of this dissertation sums up the above scholar's assumption of peace from three perspectives so as to arrive at precision and normative understanding of peace. First of all, there is the old idea of peace as a synonym for stability or equilibrium. This conception of peace also refers to internal states of a human being, the person who is at peace with himself. It also covers the law and order concept, in other words the idea of a predictable social order even if this order is brought about by means of force and the threat of force. In general, this concept does not exclude violence, since the soldier can have peace with himself on the battlefield.

Then there is the idea of peace as the absence of organized collective violence, in other words violence between major human groups; particularly nations, but also between classes and between racial and ethnic groups because of the magnitude internal wars can have. We shall refer to this type of peace as negative peace. And then there is a third concept of peace which is less clearly defined. This is peace as a synonym for all other good things in the world community, particularly cooperation

and integration between human groups, with less emphasis on the absence of violence.

The first concept of peace is less interesting for our purpose since it does not explicitly include absence of major forms of violence and war, and includes an equilibrium assumption which probably is shared by very few groups or nations today. The concept of positive peace is also problematic as long as it remains so vague, and therefore the researcher follow the usage found with the famous peace researcher and founder of peace studies, John Galtung definition of peace comprising both positive and negative peace. Thus it can be used in the sense of the presence of many desirable items such as harmony, justice, equality along with the absence of war and other forms of organized, collective direct and indirect violence.

2.2 The Concept of Conflict and the Theories of Conflict Resolution

The debate on the concept and the theories regarding conflict and conflict resolution require deeper look to permit us to understand the complex definitions and different arguments of scholars, practitioners and sometimes peace makers on what conflict is and how it can be identified, explained and categorized. It is noticeable in some part of the world that conflicts seem to be persisting for decades and even longer sometimes. However, those conflicts appear to have different causes and each can be explained from different theoretical perspective. For instance, John Burton argues that conflicts arise from human needs that can either be ontological, values and/or interests oriented. For him the first needs (ontological) are not negotiable. Values, however, display a minimum aspect of being resolved and interests are those needs that can be negotiated (Burton, 1990). Wallensteen argues that “conflicts are solvable”. For him no matter what the outcome might be, conflicts will end one day or another and this

precede their resolution which is one way to find peaceful solutions to conflicts (Wallensteen, 1998).

This section will define, explain and discuss through theoretical approaches and the work of scholars what conflict and conflict resolution mean so as to present some sort of background to further discussions in the next chapters.

2.2.1 The Concept of Conflict

Most of the time we use the term conflict to express a situation whereby two opposing sides having different positions vis-à-vis a specific matter. This in fact can, for instance, be a conflict between a husband and wife, merchant and her or his client, between parties within a state or between two states. For this dissertation it is imperative to declare that the author concern is about conflict that encompass group of people and society within a state. Thus the focus will rather be on the common factors that explain actions such as why conflicts occur and what makes them different.

According to John Burton (1990), conflicts are "behaviors that have the potential of being destructive of persons, properties and systems". For him, the questions that lead to conflicts are not the ordinary ideas, theories, preferences and interests about which debates and negotiations are conducted as part of ordinary social life. Rather, they are those whose bases are deeply rooted in human behavior. In other words, conflicts are expressed through the manner in which people react to differences and reflect their frustrations concerning each other's behavior. Burton further links conflict to power, and as such, for him a conflict would be "a situation in which authorities or power is being exercised without the sanction or approval of those over whom it is being exercised" (Burton, 1990).

Burton (1987) further contends that conflict may not be over material goods and symbols that cannot be shared, but over commonly held or universal goals such as identity, recognition, a sense of control through effective participation, security and such basic needs that we know are a part of the human developmental process.

What Burton seems to be emphasizing is that when people's aspirations are frustrated in a given situation by others, irrespective of whether they are close to them or not, whether they involve power or material interests, it becomes difficult to reconcile interests involved in such situations.

On the other hand, James Laue (1987) defines conflict as the: "natural competition between two or more parties about scarce resources, power and prestige. Parties in conflict believe that they have incompatible goals, and their aim is to neutralize, gain advantage over, injure or destroy another".

From the above definitions, a conflict may be regarded as differences between and among individuals. These differences are further complicated by the nature of the conflict, mostly over goals, power, values, motives, ideas, and resources. Most of the time in the African context, conflicts are often related to resources, power struggles, and in some cases the marginalization of the minority by the majority or *vice versa*, or political manipulation of the less developed groups by the sophisticated elite. In case of intra conflicts, the outcome often tends to be a conflict between the central government and the regions. The demands for equal participation in the government or recognition of a group's interests by the ruling group are some of the causes of most conflicts in Africa (Faleti, 2006), and these seem to fall within the framework of Burton and Laue's definitions of conflict.

Johan Galtung provides another definition of conflict. He states that "an action-system is said to be in conflict if the system has two or more incompatible goal-states" (Galtung, 1978). In this system, the distinction is made between action-systems consisting of individuals and collectivities and another distinction is made between inter- and intra-system conflicts.

Individuals in this system represent human beings and collectivities represents nations. Galtung (1978) defines intra-system conflict as: "a conflict that can be found in the smallest subunits of the system, down to the individual actor, whereas inter-system conflict splits the system in parts, each subsystem standing for its own goal-state". On the other hand, Galtung (1978) defines the conflict behavior approach as being "concerned with the behavior of the persons in this particular situation".

In the case of South Sudan, Galtung's "individuals" in the action-system represent groups that are considered dangerous by the ruling elite, the "outlaws", those deemed by the government as a threat to its existence. On the other hand, the "collectivities" represents the central governments that are run by elites, whose aim is often to remain in power and would do anything to sustain the status quo. Again, some of the conflicts in which the AU and IGAD have been engaged fall within Gultang's definitions, because most of these conflicts pitted central governments against rebel groups, who either felt alienated or their views were assumed to be neglected by the government.

For Ashley (2013), conflict is defined as a "situation of tension" which could be caused by a number of factors including the degree to which the needs of a person were in a state of hunger or satisfaction. This definition does not clarify the extent to which needs can be determined but expose us to the existence of tension and dissatisfaction over needs.

Morton Deatson (1991) presents another definition of conflict. According to Deatson, "conflict is a pervasive aspect of existence. It occurs at all levels of social life: the interpersonal, inter-group, inter-organizational and international" (Deatson, 1991). According to him, most conflicts are mixed-motive conflicts, in which the parties have both cooperative and competitive interests. In other words, a conflict can be constructive as well as destructive (Deatson, 1991). From this perspective conflict may be defined as a process that originates when one individual perceives that another party has frustrated, or is about to frustrate, over goal or concern of his or hers.

At their initial stages, some conflicts in Africa in which the AU and IGAD was involved tended to follow Deatson's (1991) and Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe's (1993) progress system, although as they escalated and reached stalemate stages, they took different forms. While the causes of some conflicts in Africa tend to be rooted in material or political interests, at later stages of their progress, some motives or interests become more important than others do, such as the ethnic group's survival or preservation of the group's dignity and prestige. This is often the case particularly in those instances relating to intra and inter-group conflicts.

Each definition of the concept of conflict provide different understanding but all of them acquire same basic identification especially the presence of actors or parties, the existence of incompatibility and the presence of action. For Wallensteen, conflict is defined as "a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scare resources" (Wallensteen, 1998). Wallensteen's definition of conflict here focuses on the availability of scares resources. However, one can ask whether all conflicts are about resources. In addition, there are some conflicts that are about ideology, cultures differences, and religions and so on. These cannot be to some extent related to resources, because the presence

of conflict over resources most of the time requires the existence of tangible goods such as money or oil. But that does not totally mean resources equal materials. It may also be services, for example, the exclusion of a group of people from the public services based on their ethnicity, religion or region. Such situation can bring awareness and the probability of having conflict in such country is high.

From the above definitions of the concepts of conflicts, it is possible to conclude that a conflict by its nature involves interests of some sort. Moreover, for any conflict to occur at least two parties have to be involved. The manner, in which each party perceives the other, also seems to determine the level of the differences involved. Furthermore, for any conflict to be resolved it is necessary for the mediators or the parties to the conflict to identify the causes and understand its dynamics and the interests involved in the situation. Subsequently the following section tries to scrutinize the common factor that serves as the rationale behind many conflicts in Africa by applying theoretical concepts.

2.2.2 Theories of Conflict

Peace and conflict studies are concerned with the transformation or resolution of conflict and the building of amicable and positive peace (Galtung, 1978). However, successful and effective conflict resolution requires through and systematic understanding of the root or remote cause of the conflict, which would consequently provide the fundamental ground on which strategies for resolution, prevention and intervention can be mapped-out by conflict resolution and negotiation experts, peace researchers, activists, agents and /or concerned institutions. In order to understand peace and conflict resolution mechanisms, it is important to look at the theories underpinning the subject. The theories must be such that they help in understanding of

the cause of conflicts. Though there are many theories pertinent to different conflict issues, it would be good to consider some of them in order to have an insight. These are among many;

I. Relative Deprivation Theory

The concept of relative deprivation dates back to ancient Greece. Aristotle articulated the idea that conflict is driven by a relative sense or feeling of inequality, rather than an absolute measure (Cited in Gurr, 1993). According to Gurr (1993), "For Aristotle the principal cause of conflict is the aspiration for economic or political equality on the part of the common people who lack it, and the aspiration of oligarchs for greater inequality than they have". Thus it is a discrepancy in both instances between what people have of political and economic goods relative to what they think is justly theirs.

Accordingly, the relative deprivation theory focuses on political and economic inequality. Box-Steffensmeier et al., (2005) assert that if people perceive that there is a gap between what they are currently getting and what they deserve to get, it creates discontentment. There is a general feeling that the society owes them. Thus the hypothesis of this theory states that if the gap is too big for a reasonable group of people within a specific population, there is a likelihood that the people will rebel. Therefore, as per this theory, the basic cause of conflict is disproportionate allocation of resource within a society, combined with poor economic performance, which creates sense of deprivation. Thus the theory refers to the assumed gaps between be reduced (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2005).

II. Greed and Grievance Conflict Theory

Greed and Grievance is an argument that seeks to understand the motivations of combatants in civil warfare. Those who support the greed model believe that combatants perform a cost benefit analysis and take up arms when fighting will improve their situations, and those who support the grievance model say that combatants are motivated by religious, ethnic, identity, political and social class grievances. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler spearhead the greed and grievance argument in their paper for the World Bank entitled "Greed and Grievance in Civil War". At that particular moment Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler developed an econometric model which tends to explain the outbreak of rebellion and civil war. Their study was conducted on data from 79 large civil conflicts dating from 1960 to 1999 with a quantitative method. Originally, this theory concluded that higher per capita income reduces the risk of civil war due to the high opportunity cost of rebellion, while the existence of natural resources in low income states together with a large dually polarized population increase its probability. In fact, in a later study, Collier found explanations based on grievances, which he lists as inequality, repression, and ethnic and religious fractionalization, largely inadequate in explaining the emergence of civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). However, the author of this dissertation found it very imperative that greed and grievance are insufficient in and of themselves to cause conflict. Rather they must be combined in such way that can explain and analyze why groups take arms. Because a large number of combatants take arms for the reason that they have been marginalized based on their religion, ethnic identity, political and economic, social class. Which off-course has instrumental power to mobilize a certain group as a collective group to fight back those injustices. Nevertheless, in the meantime some member of the combatants might

take this opportunity as a means to enrich themselves in the process owing to their personal greed for wealth and power. Likewise, the political elite might exert all the necessary effort to acquire and get hold of more than what one needs or deserves to sustain their power and legitimacy.

Accordingly, the author of this dissertation view, greed as something that reflects elite competition over valuable resources including both economic and political resources. In other word it is excessive desire to acquire and posse more than what one needs or deserves, especially with respect to political and material wealth. On the other hand, grievance is a relative deprivation and the feeling of marginalized which produces and fuels conflict.

Many communities consist of different segments and some of these segments may have grievances that can lead them to violence in their aim to resolve the grievances. Rugumamu and Gbla (2003) assert that the possibility of a conflict occurring is inherent in all communities. The divergence in views and interests among different groups of people is natural, but how divergences are expressed and managed will determine whether the conflict will be political (peaceful) or violent. As a consequence, center of attention needs to be given to how grievances are managed by those who feel aggrieved and those who promote inequalities and inflict injustices.

As far as grievance is concerned Collier and Hoeffler (2004) identify three types of grievance namely, hatreds between groups, political exclusion and vengeance. Hatreds between different ethnic groups or hatreds between religious groups are believed to be one of the most frequent causes of the civil conflicts. These hatreds can only exist in communities which have ethnic diversity or have multiple religious' ideologies. Thus, hatreds between groups also exist in the communities that are

fractionalized compared to those that are of the same origin. However, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) observe that polarized communities are more prone to conflicts than those with otherwise.

Political exclusion can occur when certain people are denied political rights and participation. It can also occur when minorities are not protected through constitutional provisions. Some communities may be victimized for supporting certain leaders in the past that may not be in power or are considered a threat. They may also be victimized for holding certain views which may not be favored by the majority (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

Political exclusion can also occur when the poor are marginalized. A good example is when there is skewed wealth distribution in favor of the rich and also when there is inequality in resource distribution among regions or provinces. Where the rich regions or provinces use their influence to get hefty portions of national resources at the expense of the poor regions or provinces the latter may advocate for secession and may even go to war to achieve this. This, in Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) view would give them the ability to control their own resources and destiny. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) add that democracy which is cherished worldwide may not be inclusive when minority groups are denied privileges extended to majority groups by the system. The incentive to exploit those in the minority increases the larger the size of the minority. This is so because the large minority is a threat to the privileges enjoyed by the majority. They may also be threatened that the minority may catch up with them in numbers, wealth, and so on. There is therefore more potential to exploit the large minority in order to suppress them. On the other hand, if a small minority is insignificant and does not pose a threat to privileges even if the privileges are extended to them. Hence there is no justified potential to exploit them. Those who are


excluded or victimized according to this theory may rise to fight those who abuse them in order for them to be included and have victimization stopped. This then leads to a civil war.

III. Human Needs Theory

Human Needs Theory (HNT) was applied by Abraham Maslow, John Burton, Marshall Rosenberg and Manfred Max-Neef as a generic or holistic theory of human behavior (Tewodros, 2015). It is based on the hypothesis that humans have basic needs that have to be met in order to maintain stable societies (Burton, 1990). As John Burton describes:

"We believe that the human participants in conflict situations are compulsively struggling in their respective institutional environments at all social levels to satisfy primordial and universal needs-needs such as security, identity, recognition and development. They strive increasingly to gain the control of their environment that is necessary to ensure the satisfaction of these needs. This struggle cannot be curbed; it is primordial".

Figure 2: Burton – Human Needs Theories



Adopted from Burton (1990)

This struggle for primordial needs is theoretically related to the frustration-aggression theory which is based on the stimulus response hypothesis. The frustration of not satisfying these needs leads to aggression and subsequently, conflict. What distinguishes Human Needs theory from the frustration aggression theory is that the former is concerned only with absolute requirements (need) while the latter is also concerned with wants and desires. Burton (1990) further state;

"Now we know that there are fundamental universal values or human needs that must be met if society is to be stable. That thereby provides a non-ideological basis for the establishment of institutions and policies. Unless identity needs are meet in multi-ethnic societies, unless in every social system there is distributive justice, a sense of control, and prospects for the pursuit of all other human societal developmental needs, instability and conflict are inevitable".

There are some bold assumptions in this theory which emphasis the fact that this struggle cannot be curbed; instability and conflict are inevitable; these are contentious statement with far reaching implication. If the hypotheses of this theory are correct, if there are certain human needs that are required for human development and social stability, then the solution to conflict must be the ability to create an environment in which these needs can be met by all segments of societies. This is where human needs theory meets Burton Conflict Resolution Theory (CRT).

IV. Frustration- Aggression Theory

The basic assumption of the Frustration-Aggression theory is that all aggression, whether interpersonal or international, has its root causes in the frustration of one or more actors' goal achievement. That is to say that conflict can be traced to the un-fulfillment of personal or group objectives and the frustration that this breeds. Since

the demand for basic human needs has always exceeded the supply, all human conflict can be traced to an actor's failure to obtain what it needs. The Frustration-Aggression theory rests on the basic stimulus-response hypothesis (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

V. Identity Formation Theory

The concept of identity is a commonality today. It can be invoked to defend political, economic, cultural and social positions because identity carries authority, identity is its own authority, beyond rationality, preference, choice. It is somehow bequeathed and internal to the self. Identity has to do with the essence or core of the self, that which defines the person or which the person uses for self-definition.

Though there have always been differences among people and tensions within people, this theory illustrates about individual's belongingness to a group through primordial ties of blood, kinship, language and customs. People have always faced issues of figuring out just who they were, how they might reconcile their different desires and aspirations and how they ought to relate to others (Calhoun, 1994).

Claims of an identity group to an autonomous status are supported by their cultural and religious concern. Such claims can be used instrumentally to promote individual and collective interests when ethnic distinctions are deepened by denial of right and economic security (Jeong, 2000). Conflict resolution in this theory is that conflicting parties identify threats and fears; they each feel and build empathy and reconciliation between themselves. Reaching at an agreement that recognize the core identity needs of all parties could be answered by building appropriate resolution strategies (Jeong, 2000).

VI. Structural Conflict Theory

This theory emphasizes that behaviors of people are affected or influenced by the unequal distribution of advantages in their society (Jeong, 2000 and Gultung, 1969). The theory's basic orientation originated first from the radical structural theory developed by the Marxist dialectical school which had the likes of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels as its major exponents. The second orientation is from liberal structuralism with Ross Marc and Johan Gultung as the main exponents (Jeong, 2000). Gultung in his 1969 classic work "violence, peace and peace research" first used the term structural violence to explain the indirect nature of the violence, as it "is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances" (Gultung, 1969). The theory therefore demonstrates that "serious conflict is embedded in an inequitable social and economic system, reflecting prolonged exploitation supported by coercion", which inherently creates a situation of disadvantaged and advantaged, as such re-defining a new relation which breeds a conflict situation (Jeong, 2000). According to Saith (2011) inequality has come to carry an intensifying salience in socio-political terms, there is a rising tide of informed opinion that inequality has powerful, often cataclysmic implications. Therefore, when people experience unequal access to public goods within their societies, the tendency to revolt against the existing inequalities in their societies becomes imminent.

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) submit that "the main argument of the structural conflict theory is that conflict is built into the particular ways societies are structured and organized". This is a clear interpretation of Karl Marx's structuralist's position, to which he contends "those structures, particularly economic structures, determine the action of agents" (cited in Jeong, 2000). In the same perspective, Galtung (1969) used

the “conflict triangle” to show that conflict is a dynamic process involving structures, attitude and behavior which constantly change and influence one another. As the existing structures change, one group gains an advantage while another group is disadvantaged; the new structure could be oppressive in nature with each party's interests remaining paramount. This will in turn lead to conflictual behavior which subsequently grows and becomes violent. Thus, structural conflict theory demonstrates the effects of inequality in societies, and how changes in existing structures could lead to conflict.

VII. Psycho-Cultural Theory

Psycho-cultural theory explains the intensity and intransigence of conflict coming out of earlier anti-psychological views of social and political condition of one group over the other thus eventually resulting conflict. It provides a central role to culturally rooted social and psychological process which produces dispositions, which invoke security fears and deep-seated threat to identity (Jeong, 2000 and Christie, 2006). Conflict management and resolution proposals which follow from psycho-cultural theory focus on either altering disputant’s deep seated mutual fear surrounding the issues of identity and security or putting an effort in the process of lowering their salience. To do this, parties must come to recognize the connection between past losses and present fears, and to engage in collective giving, mourning and reconciliation. Psycho-cultural interpretation theory does not deny the relevance of either power inequalities or interest based proposals for peacemaking but sees as a critical first steps in conflict management/resolution to change the mutual hostile interpretations that antagonists hold (Christie, 2006).

All in all, South Sudan has been plugged by conflict right after independence and the crisis associated with conflict has continued to put a significant amount of pressure on South Sudanese people and the people in the region. In fact, conflict in South Sudan have inescapably claimed countless human lives, caused and continue to cause enormous human sufferings, damaged properties, weakened the already fragile economies and debilitated the environment (Getachew, 2015). Thus the conflict has inflicted colossal human tragedies and humanitarian crises that are of concern to the international community and to global and regional security. To explain and analyze the cause of conflict in South Sudan the author of this dissertation will make use of relative deprivation and greed and grievance theory of conflict. The justification behind the choice of these theories dwells on the fact that these theories covers wide range of factors and indicators which the author believes will be enough to explain the eruption of a civil war in South Sudan. Gurr argued that when there is a large gap between value expectations and value capabilities, then those who are denied opportunities from the value expectations and value capabilities feel angry and frustrated, and push for violence through anger and disappointment (Gurr, 1993). As a matter of fact, the conflict in South Sudan suggested that there was a gap between the South Sudanese people expectations and the government achievement. In fact, when South Sudanese people voted for independence from Sudan with a great majority, their aspiration at the back of their mind was peaceful and prosperous South Sudan. Unfortunately, some scholars are of the opinion that this has not materialized and in fact according to Awolich and Akol (2013) in late 2012 the SPLM leadership dispatched members of the political bureau to visit the 10 states of South Sudan with the major aim of expressing gratitude to the people for the unwavering and overwhelming support they have rendered thought the years of liberation struggle and

thus leading a successful referendum that unquestionably guaranteed independence. However, Awolich and Akol (2013) argue that many from their visit started to get the idea that the people of South Sudan has been condemning the government of South Sudan for its failure to deliver essential services such as road networks, health facilities, security and education among other. Subsequently many elite rebel organized themselves as rebel entrepreneurs to express and voice their concern regarding the gap between what they were expecting at the eve of South Sudanese independence and the reality on the ground Awolich and Akol (2013) noted. Accordingly, Awolich and Akol (2013) argue that subsequently they have started to openly condemn the government for not living as to its people expectations. Therefore, this research undertaking aspires to assess whether there was a sense of gap between what they were expecting at the eve of South Sudanese independence and the reality on the ground and plus do the elites contend for power by manufacturing social divisions and blowing them out of proportion with threat, fear and hate discourse and propaganda or not.

As far as the theory of greed and grievance is concerned, some combatants in South Sudan indicates that they have performed cost benefit analysis and taken up arms to improve their situations, and others combatants are motivated by ethnic hatred, political repression, political exclusion and economic inequality (Getachew, 2015). Ethnic or religious hatreds are according to Collier and Hoeffler (2004) widely perceived as a cause for grievances and civil war. They occur in societies that are multi-ethnic or multi-religious and are a result of polarization. According to Collier and Hoeffier, if an ethnic group is dominant in percentage, above 45% in a country, the risk for civil war increases. The author will thus attempt to look for evidence regarding ethnic or religious hatreds and if it exists see how they contribute to

conflict. In addition to this the theory asserted that political repression often differs between peace and conflict episodes but increases the chance for civil war. Therefore, the author will attempt to search for the empirical evidence of a political repression and if it exists, attempt will be made to assess its outcome. Political exclusion on the other hand could also give rise to grievances especially if there is clear ethnic majority who extract power and other political resource possibility of a given society at the expense of minorities. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) name this particular situation ethnic dominance. The situation in South Sudan is good example and the author will exert every essential effort to present detailed analysis of the situation at a hand and see if there was any political exclusion and what this contributed to the conflict. Furthermore, economic inequality is also another grievance that can possibly lead into a civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The author of this research carefully notes that the relationship between economic inequality and rebellion is significant and thus the researcher will thus put forth indispensable effort to investigate the issue at hand.

Despite the fact that the theory isn't primarily used in qualitative research design, qualitative analysis ought to take place because the very natures of some research questions including this author's piece demands its application or utilization. The rationale behind this position is that most grievances including ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion and economic inequality, all recognized to motivate and contribute conflicts and civil war are nevertheless hard to measure in numbers. They are there for various reasons but no one can really measure how big the hatreds are in number alone. What one can measure is how these hatreds affect the given situation and look for correlations.

2.2.3 Consequences of Conflict

Violent conflicts of one type or another have afflicted Africa and exacted a heavy toll on the contents societies, polities, and economies, robbing them of their developmental potential and democratic possibility (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The causes of the conflicts are as complex as the challenges of resolving them are difficult. But their costs cannot be in doubt. The consequences of violent conflict are profound and far reaching. Modern technologies of war give armies the capacity to kill scores of people efficiently and brutally. But the consequences of war extend far beyond direct battlefield causalities.

Conflict involves resource allocation and expenditure, as well as, often, revenue rising to cover costs and processes of accumulation of assets and capital. It mobilizes and reallocates labor power and affects the quality of the labor force as well as labor market participation (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). All these and other aspects of violent conflict affect the lives of poor people, including the very poorest. Expenditure diversion may reduce capital and recurrent spending on social and economic infrastructure, including transport and communications infrastructure, health and education provision, agricultural marketing facilities and extension services (King, 2015). Infrastructural decay and depreciation can stall poverty reduction processes. Violent conflict also typically brings direct damage to infrastructure. Damaged roads, railways and bridges, for example, pitch people into deeper poverty (both aggravating the conditions of chronic poverty and increasing the pool of 'transient' poor) by restricting mobility, increasing scarcity of consumption goods and productive inputs and raising their price, making markets less accessible, making it harder to get to schools and health care services and increasing the costs

and difficulty of migration (Ibrahim, 2013). Further, violence often ruins schools and health facilities and even basic housing.

In addition, conflict can set in motion a cycle of degradation and human vulnerability. Human vulnerability refers not only to the exposure to negative environmental change, but also to the ability to cope with such change through either adaptation or mitigation (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Conflict contributes to the breakdown of social cohesion and the disruption of local governance systems; this in turn may result in established safety nets become unavailable. The increase in social and economic vulnerability, as result of conflict, may in the face of environmental and land degradation, trigger new tensions and conflict over critical resources, such as water or food (Homer-Dixon, 1999). The incidence of poverty may increase, not only through the loss of livelihoods but also as a result of a growing inability of people to cope with change. This loss of resilience is also directly linked to diminished access to public services, resulting in, for example, an increasing incidence of ill health, a contraction in formal employment opportunities, the destruction of subsistence livelihoods, and other entitlements failures which affect consumption and nutrition, thus weaken of social cohesion and heighten insecurity (Collier and Hoeffler's ,2004).

The displacement of people is a major social and economic cost of serious conflict, in the short term as well as in post-conflict periods. Typically, the casualties of modern armed conflicts are civilians. Because conflict often takes on ethnic overtones, and because modern African conflicts generally involve militias and guerrillas rather than regular troops, it is all too easy for civilians to be targeted just because they share the same ethnic or cultural identity as an enemy group. In deed women and children are a major target of conflict and violence (Homer-Dixon, 1999).

What is more, displacements impact directly the neighboring countries, as refugees flee across international boundaries. However, impacts on neighboring countries are not limited to these population movements and there may be multiple effects on social cohesion and economic opportunities. There are often complex cross-border links at different levels and between different actors, this includes cross-border operations of armed opposition groups, the international and local arms trade, and the sale of natural resources, narcotics, and other commodities used to sponsor conflict. Around centers of conflict, there are often extended zones of bounded instability which experience sporadic violence (Kidist, 2009).

2.3 Mechanisms for Handling Conflicts

2.3.1 Conflict Prevention

The prevention of violent conflicts became important early after the end of the Cold War. Instances such as the genocides in Rwanda, ethnic wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and state failure in Somalia indicated the necessity of finding ways to avert conflicts from escalating into war, human disasters and regional instability. The purpose of international action to deal with such situation was to curtail the spread of violence and find a solution at an early stage. It is these ambitions that oftentimes are described as conflict prevention (Gibsons and Mollans, 2012).

Various scholars provide diverse conceptualizations and explanation as to what the concept of conflict prevention refers to. Among this scholars Munuera (1994) identified conflict prevention as the application of non-constraining measures (those that are not coercive and depend on the goodwill of the parties involved), primarily diplomatic in nature.

Likewise, Lund (1996) equate it with preventive diplomacy and conceptualized it as "actions taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change".

According to Boutros-Ghali (1996) "conflict prevention is the use of diplomatic techniques to prevent disputes arising, prevent them from escalating into armed conflict (…) and prevent the armed conflict from spreading".

On the other hand, Wallensteen (1998) asserted that conflict prevention is a constructive action undertaken to avoid the likely threat along with the use or diffusion of armed force in a political dispute. Likewise, Hugh Miall (1999) stated that it is an action which prevents armed conflicts or mass violence from breaking out.

Moreover, Carment & Schnabel (2003) viewed conflict prevention as "a medium and long-term proactive operational or structural strategy undertaken by a variety of actors, intended to identify and create the enabling conditions for a stable and more predictable international security environment".

All in all, most of the conceptualization suggested by various scholar's dwells on the idea of any structural means to keep intrastate or interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence and the use of armed force, to strengthen the capabilities of parties to possible violent conflicts to resolve their disputes peacefully, and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that produce those tensions and disputes.

2.3.2 Conflict Management

Conflict management, as a concept, has been conventionally associated with conflict containment. According to Hugh Miall (1999) "conflict management theorists see violent conflicts as an ineradicable consequence of differences of values and interests within and between communities". This theorist regard resolving such conflicts as unrealistic, the best that can be done is to manage and contain them, and occasionally to reach a historic compromise in which violence may be laid aside and normal politics resumed (Miall, 1999). This definition assumes that conflicts are irresolvable and that handling is limited to containing them and ending the violence.

However, other theorists believe that it is possible to eliminate conflicts. Therefore, they see conflict management as a stage in the handling of conflicts, which could be followed by later stages. For instance, John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary have divided what they call "ethnic conflict regulations" into two main sections: conflict management and conflict termination. This distinction is based on the idea that the former is concerned with the handling of the consequences of differences between adversaries, whereas the latter is concerned with terminating them (Mc Gary and O'Leary, 2009).

John Burton (1990), in turn, distinguishes between "settlement of conflict" and "resolution of conflict". He defines a conflict as settled if the outcome entails a loss for one side and a gain for the other, or a compromise in which all or some of the parties are losers to some degree. An example is a situation where the parties are obliged to share a scarce resource so that none is completely satisfied. In some cases, this can be the result of coercion. However, the conflict is resolved if the outcome fully meet the needs and interests of all the parties concerned. This situation occurs

where the parties agree to exploit and share a resource in such a way as to completely satisfy everyone's values and interests (Burton, 1990).

Peter Wallensteen (1998) emphasizes the containment function of conflict management method and theory: according to him, conflict management typically focuses on the armed aspects of conflict, bringing the fighting to an end, limiting the spread of the conflict and, thus, containing it. Conflict resolution is more ambitious, as it expects the parties to face jointly their incompatibility and find a way to live with or dissolve it.

It could be concluded, therefore, that the main trend in peace and conflict studies is to define conflict management as being on the same level as conflict settlement or containment. In other words, the general view of conflict management is that it is less advanced or that it covers a narrower range of treatment of conflict in comparison with other, more ambitious or advanced methods of dealing with issues of conflict. Fisher and Keashly (1996) state that while they make no claim that there is a universally accepted typology for the methods used in addressing conflict, there are consistent terms, seen as steps in a process. Each step taken includes the previous one. The authors classify these steps as conflict prevention, conflict settlement, conflict management, and conflict resolution. In their view, the definition of conflict management is that it "aims to limit and avoid future violence by promoting positive behavioral changes in the parties involved".

In line with the earlier interpretation, which is widely adopted, some scholars suggest that conflict resolution is phases in the treatment of conflict, which are more advanced than conflict management. In their view, conflict resolution can be used "to describe the field of conflict studies as a whole" (Mc Gary and O'Leary, 2009 and Burton,

1990). The idea stems from their definition of conflict resolution as “addressing the wider social and political sources of a conflict and seeking to resolve the negative energy of war into positive social and political changes” (Burton, 1990). This view is discussed in detail later in the following section.

2.3.3 Conflict Resolution

The process of conflict management is the foundation for more effective conflict resolution. As mentioned in the aforementioned sections, there is distinction between conflict management and conflict resolution. However, the concepts often are confused or integrated in an inappropriate manner. Indeed, conflict resolution as mentioned above refers to the resolution of the underlying incompatibilities in a conflict and mutual acceptance of each party’s existence, while conflict management refers to measures that limit, mitigate and/or contain a conflict without necessary solving it (Gibsons and Mollans, 2012). On this regards, conflict resolution theories address the deep-rooted sources of conflict, which are taken to be structural and cultural. Apart from conflict management where the cause of conflict is a consequence of the anarchical nature of the international system, conflict resolution theorists “argue that conflict has an ontological base in human needs, the denial of which causes violent conflict” (Mc Gary and O’Leary, 2009). This interpretation of conflict has been greatly influenced by Burton’s work on human needs theory. Burton distinguishes between needs that are universal human motivations conditioned by biology; values, which are ideas, habits, customs and beliefs characteristic of particular social communities and interests which are the aspirations of individuals or identity groups within a social system (Burton, 1990). Interests can be negotiated while “needs will be pursued by all means possible” (Burton, 1990) as they are

ontological. The needs that seem to be important are security, identity, recognition, food, shelter, safety, participation, distributive justice and development (Burton, 1987).

Burton does not clarify the conditions under which these needs should be met but he does encourage theorists and practitioners to broaden up the scope under which they analyze conflict. In this vein, the focus is on getting the parties to recognize their common needs and he suggests that this is achieved when parties to disputes are brought together in a face to face analytical dialogue, facilitated by a third party. Inevitably they soon discover that they have the same ultimate goals. Once it is discovered that goals are held in common, the stage is set for a search for means that satisfy all parties to dispute (Burton, 1990). The methodologies developed to address the root causes of a conflict are non-coercive and binding activities such as facilitation or consultation in the form of controlled communication, problem-solving mediation or round tables. These activities are facilitated by a third party that does not seek to provide a solution to sides, but rather to create an environment where both sides can reflect upon their situations and create solutions for themselves. More importantly the key aspect of conflict-resolution is to deepen and broaden the analysis of conflict. This is done by including a greater number of actors involved in the process, like civil society groups, academic institutions, all forms of civil mediation or citizen diplomacy groups and local and international conflict resolution instruments (Burton, 1990).

The analysis as well as the broader participation of actors drawn in conflict resolution activities demonstrates that “the parties do have a choice. They are not trapped by fate. They can control their own future” (Gibsons and Mollans, 2012). Interestingly

enough this approach shows that “once the relationship between the parties have been analyzed satisfactorily, once each side is accurately informed of the perceptions of the other, of alternative means of attaining values and goals, and of costs of pursuing present policies, possible outcomes are revealed that are acceptable to all parties” (Burton, 1990). While the starting point of this approach is therefore largely non-discursive in its focus on needs, the proposition for conflict resolution relies on the transformation of conflictive discourse through self-reflection and a broadening of dialogue between conflict parties.

In other conflict resolution theories, the focus shifts from tackling frustrated needs to the psychology of inter group relations. The work of Fisher and Keashly, for example stress the importance that, once a conflict is initiated, the perceptions, attitudes and interaction of the parties become crucial elements of determining its further course. Typically, there is an escalating spiral of increasing intensity in which the relationship between the parties moves towards destructive competition and finally to a “malignant social process” from which the parties are unable or unwilling to extricate themselves (Fisher and Keashly, 1996).

The focus here lies on the examination of subjective aspects of conflict as the main hindrances to resolution of interest-based issues. This implies that a third party intervention should take into account the mix of the objective and subjective elements that interact as the conflict escalates and de-escalates this is also known as contingency approach (Burton, 1990). Conflict-solving as the main focus of conflict resolution is based on objective perception of conflicts and promotion of more effective communication practices in order to resolve conflict.

2.4 Types of Conflict Resolution Mechanism

Fundamentally at the present time there are numerous types of conflict resolution mechanism, which are acknowledged by researchers and peace study experts and there are also other conventional conflict resolution forms considered rudimentary, violent and objectionable. Nevertheless, an acknowledged and reputable type of conflict resolution mechanism in a certain parts of the world may not necessarily be acknowledged in other parts of the world. Besides, the usefulness of a conflict resolution mechanism depends on the socio-economic, political and cultural environment of the area. In the past, conflicts have been resolved in different ways whereby some rudimentary mechanisms like prizing opponents with excessive power, the surrender of frightened opponent, chasing one of the parties, avoidance, bloodshed acts etc. Contemporary types of conflict resolution mechanism flourished out of the idea that there are in fact much better alternatives than resorting to violence. In fact, this realization came to picture with the fact that conflict is not in actuality better resolved by forcing frustrated and aggravated conflicting party into submission. Rather there are a number of mechanisms that can be handy and acceptable for resolution of conflict namely: Mediation, Negotiation, Conciliation and Arbitration (Tewodros, 2015).

Chapter VI of the United Nation Charter demonstrate that any conflicting parties associated with any dispute that have a greater potential to cause danger to the maintenance of international peace and security are obligated to look for a remedy by mediation, negotiation, enquiry, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own preference. Likewise, Chapter VIII of the United Nation presents all the necessary likelihood for

regional organizations intervention in the maintain of peace and security within their own particular region based on explicit or implicit authority established by the United Nation Security Council (The United Nations Charter, 1945).

I. Mediation

Mediation is a structured, dynamic, interactive process where a neutral third party assists conflicting parties in the process of resolving conflict through the use of specialized communication and negotiation systems. Basically, mediation is based on needs, rights, and interests of the parties and it is a voluntary, informal, non-binding process whereby a third external party is involved to press forward process of conflict resolution between the conflicting parties (Burton, 1990). Supposedly, mediators are anticipated to be unbiased and impartial nevertheless in reality a good number of mediators put forward their hidden agenda up on the table of conflict resolution (Mearsheimer, 1995). Successful mediators will never attempt to pressurize or inflict decision or conclusion on the parties to a conflict. Rather they usually aspire to change the dynamics of the conflict condition through establishing mutual interest and bringing about workable alternative towards the conflict settlement (Babacar, 1998). Mediation opens up an avenue for the communication of parties to conflict where they are not able to generate commonly acceptable resolutions by themselves. More often than not mediation process is brought into being by an external mediator like a regional or sub-regional organization, inter-governmental organization, non-governmental organization or foreign government trusted by the parties in the conflict among others (Brian and Dauda, 2011).

What is more, for more than centuries, mediation has played a significant role both in Africa and other parts of the globe. Indeed, Zartman on this regard has made his own

personal remark on the techniques of mediation in African traditional community. He even then went further to state that mediation in African traditional community was done by a nonaligned third party, who has achieved a significant high opinion of the parties to the conflict through individual characteristics such as uprightness and wisdom. According to Zartman these mediators were actually more of ethical mediators and not mediators with might. This kind of mediators, he added, was formulators and not manipulators (Zartman, 2008). This all sum up into a series of assertion regarding the need to avert military actions and resolve conflicts through mediation. A good number of researchers and scholars generally affirm that successful mediation is dependent upon two factors: the personal skills and characteristics of the mediator and the environmental and contextual factors relevant to the conflict in question (Zartman, 2008 and Brian and Dauda, 2011). However, these factors are not easily evaluated because the process of mediation can be difficult in a protracted conflict, which mostly involve extended mediation attempts, which includes several third parties and an ever-changing environment (Burton, 1990).

II. Negotiation

Negotiation is one of conflict resolution mechanism which basically dwells upon the creation of an enabling environment for communication with pre-established procedures between the representatives of parties engaged in disputes and conflict. More often than not during a conflict, negotiation aspires to spot out mutual interests and aims to develop unilateral or multilateral initiatives in quest of ultimate objectives, to de-escalate a conflict situation, or to generate equally acceptable remedy towards resolution of a certain conflict (Brian and Dauda, 2011). Like mediation negotiation is also interest based and the conflicting parties have strong

control over the result and course of action. Negotiation encompasses a number of tactics among which compromise, bargaining, and concessions (Babacar, 1998)

Essentially, a person who is negotiating should in no ways insist concessions on the matter as a pre-requisite for friendly relations, or formulates concessions in an effort to acquire friendship. “Strategies that encourage a fine problem resolution comprises visualizing oneself in others shoes; steer clear of accusations, understanding, clarifying perceptions, elucidation and not mounting emotions; via appropriate symbolism, listening vigorously; and speaking logically and purposefully” (Rabow 1990). Recognizing only the position of the two conflicting parties, without a good understanding of their interests or otherwise, will not provide a solution to the problem (Rabow 1990). For instance; there may be two sisters who are struggling over an apple. Every one of them is asserting their right to own the apple. Nevertheless, one of the sisters is interested in receiving the apple fruit for her fruit juice, while the other needs the apple seeds to make some herbal medications. It will therefore be necessary to resolve these competing claims and to share the apples if the interest and needs of the two sisters are recognized. Basic human needs such as economic wellbeing, security, recognition, a sense of belonging, and control over one's life are often not fulfilled because negotiators are instead splitting hairs over narrower positions. The interests of all parties to conflict and who are major stakeholders in a negotiation should be adequately represented or else, if the interests are not sufficiently addressed it may prevent any attempt of settlement of conflict (Zartman, 2008). What follows is to produce a solution that satisfies all those interests of the parties to a conflict.

III. Conciliation

Conciliation principally is a voluntary and an informal transfer of a conflict to impartial and non-aligned party and thus recommends a non-binding settlement. Conversely the viability of conciliation may only be applicable if the parties to the conflict agree to the involvement of a conciliator (Rabow 1990). If the parties to the conflict agree to the involvement of conciliator, the conciliator will therefore eventually meet with the parties to the conflict independently and confidentially in an effort to resolve their disparities. Moreover, conciliation possibly will involve investigations and assessments by impartial and non-aligned party to assist more ordered method of conflict resolution. Every one of the disputing parties is consequently asked independently and confidentially to make precedence to their individual list of interest. Under such circumstance the conciliator continuously encourages the parties to a conflict to compromise their objectives one at a time, beginning with the least significant and then running towards the most significant for each party in turn (Brian and Dauda, 2011).

IV. Arbitration

Arbitration as a method deals with a legal-judicial procedure by which an arbitrator pay attention to parties in a conflict, evaluate the proof presented to it from both conflicting sides and afterward issues an arbitration judgment intended for concluding the conflict for once and for all (Brian and Dauda, 2011). Within this conflict resolution method parties to the conflict point their accusations and demands, and then a legal-judicial process is set aside which will obligate the parties to readily adhere the final verdict. The verdict is assumed to be lasting and binding. More often than not, the mainstreams of arbitrators are selected by the parties of the conflict.

Nevertheless, the process of arbitration may perhaps differ due to pre-planned procedures (Brian and Dauda, 2011). Arbitration to some extent resembles to adjudication nevertheless differs in the sense that arbitration could be both formal and informal. Those which are diplomatic or political arbitrations are considered formal, while arbitrations in private business sector relations might be informal. Compared to other forms of third-party verdicts which are basically binding by its nature, arbitration has some advantages and may be the only practical form for the resolution of some major conflicts (Babacar, 1998).

In conclusion, through this extensive literature the author of this dissertation clearly demonstrated various academic theories correlated with the causes of conflicts, consequences of conflicts and various conflict resolution mechanisms. Plus, the author of this research has also made a clear choice as to which theories of conflict can be applied to inform the concepts and inquiry of this research questions. Therefore, this research study has made use of relative depravation theory and the greed and grievance theory to analysis the research question at hand. As far as conflict handling mechanisms concerned, the research employed conflict resolution as its tool to analyze the process of conflict in South Sudan. Conflict resolution addresses the deep rooted sources of conflict, which can be holistic in nature. The theoretical paradigm of Neo-liberal institutionalism and Constructivists has also been taken into account. The subsequent section will therefore dwell upon the third research questions concerning the role of regional and sub-regional organizations towards conflict resolution.

2.5 Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations towards Conflict Resolution

Introduction

The significant increase in number of regional organizations since 1945 is one of the major developments of modern day international relations. The United Nations Charter apportioned to regional organizations the authority for the maintenance of peace and security in a manner that its forerunner, the covenant of the League of Nations, did not (Abass, 2004). Those mandates are enclosed in chapter VIII of the UN charter and hand over certain authorization to what the charter mentioned as "regional arrangements and agencies". Subsequently this section indeed, will dwell upon the way in which regional and sub-regional organizations originally have been given a moderate role within the United Nation collective security system and how over the year's regional organizations progressively took up the lead themselves and verified to be in time fundamental actors in maintenance of international peace and security.

2.5.1 Regionalism in Historical Perspective

The apprehension between universalism and regionalism has always been on the table in global endeavor to organize peace and security (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2006). In fact, following the outburst of the First World War states thought of the importance of organizing themselves in an international community under a more universal, effective umbrella, which resulted in 1919 in the founding of the first international organization with the aspiration to promote international achievement and cooperation of international peace and security, the League of Nations (Abass, 2004). Notwithstanding the universal move towards attaining peace, the Covenant of the League of Nations accepted that regions between states has to be acknowledged, given that these structure of partnership formerly existed (Congress of Vienna and

Rhine Commission) prior to its establishment and to achieve the similar aspirations (Abass, 2004). Nevertheless, regardless of the acceptance of their presence and its substantive stipulations under Article 21, the League of Nations did not provide regional organizations a clear-cut role and as a result regionalism within the League of Nations did not gain foremost intellectual concentrations (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2006). The operations of the League of Nations turned out to be somewhat short lived, as the outbreak of the Second World War ultimately led to the crumple of the League of Nations that cease to work well to achieve its primary objective (Abass, 2004).

During the Second World War, more than a few conferences were organized between the big powers to make a decision upon the way in which security could be structured internationally after the warfare would come to an end, so as to keep away a conflict of such scale would ever occur again (Schreur, 1995). Not everyone was however enthusiastic to ascertain yet another international organization, possibly for the reason that the failure of the League of Nations was still brand new in many people's mind. The former United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston Churchill statement is a case in point in this regard in which he pleaded in 1943 for the formation of a number of regional councils rather than a world organization (cited in Abass, 2004). Regardless of these suspicions towards a world organization, the four superpowers (USA, USSR, UK and China) strong-willed upon the organization of the United Nations at some point in the Washington Conversations on International Peace and Security Organization, commonly known as the Dumbarton Oak Conference in 1944(Hettne and Soderbaum, 2006). The United Nations were expected and is also currently believed to become an international organization delegated with the preservation of international peace and security. During the Dumbarton Oak Conference not only the founding of the United Nations was concluded, but also the fundamental guiding

principle on how the United Nations should make certain of its objectives were in fact outlined. The groundwork was laid down to answer the basic questions concerning how membership should be structured, the configuration of the Security Council as last authority to make a decision upon the utilization of force and the allotment of the permanent seats within the Security Council along with the veto right (Marchal,2009). However, they took a Universalist approach though because the principal responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council was imagined, leaving nearly no room for regional organizations (Schreur, 1995). Following, the major allied powers managed to conclude the Second World War; the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals formed the foundation for the United Nations Conference on International Organizations (generally recognized as the San Francisco conference). As the propositions were greatly influenced by a global focus, the Universalist advance has molded the tone of the San Francisco discussions. In spite of the strong stress by the triumphant powers on a universal emphasis of the United Nations system, few, in particular Latin American and Arab states, required the acknowledgment of the role and legitimacy of regional organizations in preserving and securing peace (Abass, 2004). The nearly absence of regional organizations at that time made the relative basis for cooperation to attain a prominent place for regionalism within the United Nation Charter, nevertheless, limited (Marchal,2009). No more than the Arab and the American states had formed regional charters in that instance (Abass, 2004). Regardless of the lack of coordination between regional adherents, the enthusiastic debate between Universalists and Regionalist inclinations that followed enforced the Universalists to make essential concessions in approval of regionalism (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2006).

The regionalist fear was paid attention upon the fact that permanent members of the Security Council not coming from a particular region could avert regional enforcement measures and conflict resolution alternatives, by applying their veto power. This concern resulted the Latin American States to preserve the stand that they wanted either to set aside dispute settlement entirely for regional organizations or to rule out the Organization of Inter American States from the subordination of regional agencies to the United Nations. Even though a good number of states approved upon the necessity of Security Council authorization and consequently saw it as no alternative to rule out the OAS from the subordination to the UN, a concession was reached to secure the regional need for autonomy (Potter, 1943). Previously in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals some suggestion were made to regional organizations, which would form the beginning of the separate Chapter of the United Nation Charter which would be completely dedicated to regional organizations (Articles 52-54 Chapter VIII). To fortify the stands of regional organizations in the United Nation collective security framework, a number of imperative amendments were made during the San Francisco Conference (Graham and Felicio, 2006). The initial way in which the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were reviewed in a way that the main concern was given to regional agencies to resolve disputes in a friendly manner, prior to turning to the Security Council for assistance. The Security Council should subsequently function as a way of final resort. This concession can be found in two places of the final text of the United Nations Charter. Initially, it has been represented in Article 33(1) of Chapter VI which focuses upon the pacific settlement of disputes in general. The provision specifies that: "*parties to any dispute (...) shall first (...) search for a solution by negotiation enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of*

their choice". Moreover, Article 52(2) of Chapter VIII United Nation Charter affirms that United Nation Members which connect themselves in a regional arrangement or agency should "*make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes before referring them to the Security Council"*. By including these two provisions, there was equally room for regional organizations to contribute to the maintenance of peace, giving them a crucial role in the peaceful settlement as well as for the Security Council to function as the ultimate authority to decide upon enforcement action.

Yet, even if some concessions had been made, regional arrangements or agencies were eventually still under the complete primacy of the Security Council, as the concluding statement of Article 53 UN Charter stipulates: "*no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council*". Accordingly, it can be said that with regard to enforcement measures, in general the Universalist approach towards peace and security prevailed. Consequently, the United Nations Charter can be considered as a formula in which Universalism and Regionalism was both facilitated, but at the same time delimited regionalism, especially in the case of coercive action (Graham and Felicio, 2006). The compromise between Universalism and Regionalism thus resulted in a universal approach with conditioned regionalism.

Conversely, the Cold War strains between the two super powers (USA and USSR) which were at that point impacting global political issues and international relations in 1947 averted the improvement of cooperative relationship between the Security Council and existing regional arrangement. The Security Council itself was incapacitated by the veto given that the USA and the Soviet Union were blocking

United Nation involvement in regional clashes in which they themselves were either specifically or in a roundabout way involved (Marchal, 2009).

The more significant autonomy was nevertheless not accomplished by every regional organization. The period has a distinction between regional defense alliance and other regional organizations (Abass, 2004) Alliances progressively took up more extensive security obligations which were initially part of the Security Council command. While the UN itself mostly involved itself in local peacekeeping obligations. Chapter VIII regional organizations contributed considerably less critical part than the makers of the United Nation charter initially had imagined or presupposed. They were not utilized as "safeguard or a platform for first resort" (Graham and Felicio, 2006).

But with the end of the Cold War, the Security Council ended up in the position again to go about as definitive and last power in the maintenance of peace and security. Specifically, when the Security Council effectively halted the Iraqi intrusion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Security Council was accepted to be completely working again (Marchal, 2009). This restored positive thinking, nevertheless hurriedly gone off to some faraway place as in the rest of the 1990s the Security Council turned out to be incapable to adequately intervene in Rwanda, Somalia and Yugoslavia, which without a doubt can be seen as some of the significant conflict of the world.

The incapability to viably intervene was further advanced by the changing character of conflicts. Despite the fact that the initial emphasis of the United Nation Charter was on interstate conflicts, the period denoted the approximate absence of armed conflict between states. On the contrary, there was a huge increment of conflict within state. Civil wars, guerrilla endeavors and terrorist acts turned into the fundamental difficulties of international peace. The character of the conflicts progressively gained

a different dimension and more lessons to be drawn. As regional organizations were probably be in tune with the current conflict and were more probably guarantee a convenient and timely response, the United Nations began to depend on them all the time. Also, since the number of conflicts rose dangerously by including interstate conflicts to the mandate of the Security Council, the United Nations confronted extreme financial hardships to react to all conflicts at once (Abass, 2004). Besides, despite the fact that the cold pressures were disintegrated and the Security Council was completely in capacity once more, the veto framework still ended up being excessively politicized, making it impossible to work proper. Most frequently veto-rights were utilized to block activity, while the need for action was clear. These political constraints made regional organizations come to understand that there was a void in the collective security system. As one of their intentions was to guarantee peace and security within their region, they took up what has been left to be done by the Security Council as their very own major aspect of regional mandate (Graham and Felicio, 2006).

Due to these political, financial and practical constraints, prominent within the United Nations began to realize that the involvement of regional organizations could relieve some of the burden of the Security Council and the United Nations in the pursuit of peace and security. In the publication of *an Agenda for Peace,* pursuant to the Security Council Summit meeting in January 1999, this realization was for the first time openly expressed by Security-General Boutros-Ghali: *"What is clear (...) is that regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving (...) preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building. Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and*

security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs" (cited in Hettne and Soderbaum, 2006). This statement could be seen as a turning point as finally the role of regional organizations was recognized and it was acknowledged that the Security Council alone would not be capable to ensure international peace and security. Thus this statement can also be viewed as the birth of the development of a regional-universal security-partnership (Schreur, 1995). Hence the importance of regional organizations has been emphasized ever since.

In the previous section it became clear in due time that regional organizations increasingly have attained a more significant role in the field of peace and security. As their influence seems to expand further, it becomes crucial to specify what kind of regional arrangements and agencies can be classified as addressee of the Chapter VIII provisions.

2.5.2 Meaning of Regional Arrangement and Agencies

Since the establishment of the United Nation several relevant actors have failed to provide a clear definition of regional arrangement and agencies due to inadequacies of the necessary provisions, which are capable of identifying what consists of regional arrangement and regional agencies (Abass, 2004). Indeed, intentionally or unintentionally, participants at the San Francisco conference has also failed to characterize elements of Chapter VIII (Abass, 2004).

In spite of the fact that there were clear inadequacies of provisions to crystal clearly define what consists of regional arrangement and agencies, Article 52 of Chapter VIII

somehow have most paramount elements in this regard. Upon this article, the charter specifies regional arrangements or agencies as entities which are organized consistently with the purposes and principles of the United Nation charter to help with the resolution of local disputes (The United Nations Charter, 1945). Indeed, article 52(1) UN Charter reads: "*Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations*". The only criteria which can be distracted from this article is that regional arrangements should be dealing with peace and security issues, appropriate for regional action and consistency with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the provision does not supply any definition of regional arrangement or agencies but makes it crystal clear in Article 52(2), member states are encouraged to exert all the necessary effort to attain pacific settlement of local disputes with the support of their local regional arrangements or agencies before any attempt of resort to the Security Council. Subsequently, the provision demonstrates that regional security was forecasted as being as an option to direct United Nation engagement. Despite this, the Charter deliberately or not provides no sufficient clarification and definition of regional arrangements and agencies. Thus requiring some criteria to allow useful and flexible definition, for a group of states to deal with a matter appropriate for regional action and contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, a closer look will be taken at the criteria's which are set forth by scholars in order to determine which organizations can be defined as part of Chapter VIII regional organizations.

2.5.3 Criteria for Defining of Region and Regional Organizations

It has been advocated by some scholars that there should be geographical proximity between states forming region and regional organization (Abass, 2004 and Graham and Felicio, 2006). The rational for this view consists, among other things in that, territorial proximity justifies claims to regionality. In fact, a grouping of countries of such a nature shall be considered as regional arrangement or regional organizations by reason of their proximity, communality of interest or cultural, linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities, which makes them jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may rise between and within them. Such kind of instruments serves as a tool for the maintenance of peace and security of their region, as well safeguarding of their interests and the development of their economic and cultural relations (Graham and Felicio, 2006).

In a similar vein Joseph Nye defined an international region as "a limited number of states linked together by a geographic relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence. He then went on to define regionalism as "the formation of inter-state groupings on the basis of regions". Nye proceeded to conceptualize regional organizations as one whose membership is restricted in principle and in practice on the basis of geographical contiguity and this contiguity involves a proximity and compactness (Nye, 1968).

On the contrary some writers have proposed the operational scope of regional organizations as the main criterion for defining a region. According to Taylor, rather than subscribing geographical proximity for its own sake "a selection has to be made". However, this cannot overlook the "recurrent theme" which is a concern with that particular scale of geographical area and is best fitted to the performance of tasks

judged crucial for the welfare of individuals or for the advantage of government (Taylor, 1993). Taylor suggested that the geographical dimensionality (in contradiction from the nature) of the tasks that a particular organization wishes to perform. Therefore, if a particular task to perform extends beyond the geographical confines of member states, there is logic in extending the region beyond that which geography ordinarily defines it to be (Taylor, 1993). In deed Ellen-Frey Wouters defined a regional organization "as a permanent, inner and outer–directed multifunctional association, located in particular geographical area, serving a number of states which are mutually interdependent and share certain interests, need, characteristics and loyalties" (Wouters, 1969).

2.5.4 Debate on Regionalism

Debate concerning the role of regional arrangements or agencies towards resolving conflict has been a substantial matter of international peace and security. Regional Organizations or arrangement articulate and represent the changing world order. Today our world faces several and pervasive challenges which put a pressure upon limited resources and thus making the utilization of regional arrangements as an inevitable mechanism of resolving conflict and bringing about sustainable peace (Boehmer et al., 2004).

Many advocates of regional arrangements or agencies affirms that the existence of common history, traditions culture and other social characteristics will facilitate levels of cooperation and interaction that are not always possible at the global level. In fact, according to these scholars the shared experience and outlook will demonstrate more conducive environment for attaining normative agreement leading to substantive action (Kidist, 2009 and Boehmer et al., 2004). Certainly, this is reinforced by the

limited geographical space whereby size, proximity and the shared beliefs and values will eventually make higher degree of cohesion possible. Indeed, the relatively small geographical area involved with a regional arrangement also allows for more efficient allocation of resources and delegating of tasks, but this is not always prominent feature. What is more, states and societies are likely to follow and accept the obligations involved with a regional arrangement since the supervisory bodies created will possess greater legitimacy due to the undeniable fact that this arrangements and agencies have a greater understanding of the more localized situation (Kidist, 2009). This is a relative consideration and is asserted in relation to the actions of a universal arrangement which may be seen as an unwarranted or illegitimate interference due to a lack of understanding or appropriate consideration of the particulars on the ground (Brian and Dauda, 2011). Regional arrangements increase the possible range of options available to address particular problems and may also provide alternative forms of participation in conflict resolution processes. Furthermore, the presence of a regional arrangement helps to ensure a lasting commitment to the issues and problems facing the region allowing for root causes to be dealt with and addressed, rather than just reacting to crises as they arise (Boehmer et al., 2004).

On the contrary opponent of regionalism and advocates of universalism affirms that the actual commitment of states to regional projects may not be wholly authentic as states may selectively use regional or universal arrangements and procedures depending upon self-interested needs. The homogeneity of states and societies, be it in social, cultural or economic terms is not a given within any region and this may actually create major obstacles to any level of cooperation. In some regions the differences in views and the geographical closeness has led to deep seeded antagonisms and continued physical conflict between close neighbors (Mearsheimer,

1995). The solidarity and sense of common purpose in regional arrangements alluded to above may be nonexistent either due to conflicting ideological views or the existence of regional powers that are able to manipulate the regional arrangement in the pursuit of their own self-interested goals (Mearsheimer, 1995). This often leads other states to turn to universal arrangements in order to ensure their voices are heard and avoid manipulation by regional powers. At the practical level regional arrangements may suffer from a lack of resources that are necessary and thus this may impede collective action as well as limiting human capacity which is critical to cooperative activities (Kidist, 2009). This would require contribution from universal arrangements or even other regional arrangements to fill the gaps in knowledge and experience. All in all, these debate by opponents and proponents of regionalism will continue to exist in varying degrees within all regional arrangements and no one factor in isolation is determinative of the effectiveness of regional arrangements in international organization or governance.

2.5.5 Theories of Regionalism

I. Realism and Neo-Realism

Theories of realism characterize the global system as anarchic and sovereign nation states as the principal actor in this system. Basically, power and interest play a significant and primary role in this theoretical approach (Mearsheimer, 1995). This theoretical paradigm considers international politics as a competitive, state of war, zero-sum game in which national interests of each state are achieved at the expense of others. Conflicts between states are common as there is no central power in the international arena; it is dominated by conflict, anarchic and self-help system. The calculation of the gloomy future relation and existence prompts a state to always have

a fear of other states. Consequently, this insecurity confines interstate cooperation. Nevertheless, as states are rational actors, they emphasis upon their relative gains and desire to amplify their security hence they make good deal with other states and establish balance of power in order to hamper the existence and emergence of hegemony (Kidist, 2009). In the 1970s, traditional realism encountered condemnation by neo-realists who reformed the realist tradition and made it applicable to the circumstances after the Second World War (Mearsheimer, 1995). Waltz (1979) in Theory of International Politics conceptualize the premises of neo-realism and argues that unlike realism which is based on reductionism by explaining international outcomes through elements at national and sub-national levels, neo-realism tries to explain political outcomes through systemic features on a scientific platform. Since classical realism takes the state as the unit of analysis and focuses on the state behavior, it cannot explain the repetitions in the international system. In addition, as it assumes a direct link between states interaction and international outcome, it cannot explain similarity. On the other hand, neo-realism takes system as unit of analysis to explain why different units behave similarly. Political structure restricts the state behavior and leads to similar international outcomes. The root of power for classical realist is the human nature (Mearsheimer, 1995) while Waltz accentuates the anarchical system stressing states to accumulate power in order to survive. What is more, neo-realism distinguishes domestic and international politics. While national politics is sphere of authority, of administration and of law, international politics is realm of power, of struggle and of accommodation (Waltz, 1979). According to realist/neo-realists, international realm is characterized by conflict, competition and suspicion between nation-states (Burchill et al., 2001). Realism/neo-realism distinguishes politics from other domains. They consider politics as an autonomous

sphere and pay limited attention to the interaction between the culture, economics and politics. Realism also makes a distinction between high and low politics. While high politics is about security and military issues, low politics is about social and economic ones. Hence, realism subordinates' nonmilitary issues to military ones by highlighting military power and security of a state as the most imperative realm (Gilpin, 2001). It perceives the regional arrangements as an obsolete precaution against globalization. Geopolitics allows taking hold of the problem of national power. The primary concern of states is not only to amplify power nevertheless to safeguard their positions in this system. Consequently, balancing is the behavior induced by the system (Waltz, 1979). Security alliances, collective security and regional arrangements are the ways of attaining this end.

Regionalization is a mechanism to broaden national interests and aspirations rather than an option to a state centered international system (Gilpin, 2001). According to the realist paradigm, there is a zero-sum game between the regional blocs in which each member state exerts their own effort to maximize their own individual relative gains in terms of resources, wealth and security (Mearsheimer, 1995). Regionalism reduces to bare bones the conflict at the international realm by uniting the states collectively under the leadership of one or more dominant powers. Nation-states improve their security against external threat by involving in a regional bloc (Burchill et al., 2001). The justification behind the formation of regional blocs is political and effectiveness of integration process depends on the enthusiasm and willingness of one or more superpowers.

II. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

Akin to realists, neo-liberal institutionalists also understand the rational analysis and observe the nation-state as the principal actor and the international arena as anarchic;

nevertheless, they also acknowledge the role and contributions of transnational and non-state actors in international politics. They consider institutions as efficient instrument for attaining international cooperation. International institutions diminish insecurity and amplify predictability of others action for the reason that they provide knowledge and information. Rules, norms and principles limit and regularize the states actions (Boehmer et al., 2004). Therefore, they facilitate coexistence and cooperation among states, thus maintenance of the international order. International regimes are also significant in the formation of international order. Regimes are group of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures around which actor's expectations converge in given area (Brian and Dauda, 2011). Security regimes are "those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate". They encourage the development of stability since states value peace and cooperation in order to steer clear of military threat and decrease the cost of attaining peace (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). Furthermore, regimes make government policies more predictable and more reliable by rendering information as a result shared information can lead to agreement and joint action (Keohane and Nye, 2001).

According to this theory, international politics is illustrated by economic and political interdependence. States being conscious of the weakening of their control try to broaden their control by cooperating with other actors. In the present day, internationalization of conflict, environmental, economy and ecological problems threaten not one state but all states in general so they become more interdependent not only in economic realm but also in political and social realms for complete security. Besides, the cost of total control is very high due to the lack of capability to deal with rapid changes. According to Keohane and Nye (2001), globalization made the

unilateral actions of nation-states inadequate. States facing the effect of globalization will become willing to cooperate and some of this cooperation will take place on a regional level. It also entails that by acting cooperatively they can achieve collectively, not at the expense of others. In the politics of interdependence, domestic and transnational as well as governmental interests are drawn in so domestic and foreign policy becomes closely related (Keohane and Nye, 2001). In contrast to neo-realism, liberal institutionalism states that initially, national interests are supposed to be domestically generated and not driven from a state insecurity concern; secondly, at the time of bargaining states look for their relative intensity of interests not by military or material power potential (Boehmer et al. 2004).

Furthermore, in the modern-day, economic affairs became as significant as the concept of military. Economic affairs can lead political outcome or political affairs can have an effect on economy. As a result, there is interaction between different domains. In addition, force is often not an appropriate way of achieving other goals such as economic and ecological welfare (Keohane and Nye, 2001). Besides, the only problem among states is not the military threat. Nowadays, trade disputes, migration and terrorist attacks are also among the problems that states are coming across. Hence, today, security is not firmly a national matter; it requires international collaboration. All in all, complex interdependence stresses that each state has relative power with different states of affairs. There are shared effects among countries so there needs not to be a zero-sum game. Given that states make up the system, they can transform it. Anarchy can be customized by inter-state cooperation. Institutions and international regimes are the tools for this cooperation.

III. Constructivism

Theories of constructivism basically call attention to the role of ideas, socialization and normative value development in the regional arrangements (Wendt, 1999). Regionalism is a political and social mission in which diverse actors interact and level themselves by looking at the non-members as well as the other member states. The rules and norms of the regional arrangement reshape the identity of the member states in time. The constructivist approach expresses that world politics is based on ideas and conventions. In this approach normative structure and idea are as important as the material structures. What give meaning to the objects or concepts is the common agreement among agents. Consequently, the system is socially constructed. Constructivism acknowledges power and interest as imperative factors in international life since their effects are a function of culturally constituted idea (Wendt, 1999). Similar to neo-liberal institutionalists, constructivists also recognize that institutions matter. Nevertheless, from the constructivist approach, regional institutions have a wider role and contribution than just functional one. In fact, for constructivist, regional institutions constitute actors and shape their interests and identities.

According to constructivism, security cannot be defined with no indication to inter-subjective perceptions. Perceptions of security and insecurity are related to values, beliefs and identities. The collective, inter-subjective understanding of member states gives meaning to regional formation. It is a social process that interaction between the member states leads to common social perceptive. In this process, each member state redefines its own identity and interest; thereby they get closer to each other. Wendt (1999) argues that states are at the beginning pre-social actors with basic needs. The interaction with other states leads them to redefine self and become cooperative. Regionalism would be described from this approach not as a consequence of

institutional or structural factors, rather as a mechanism for states to change the current international system and create new alliances and identities (Wendt, 1999). Regional arrangements can also be formed through interaction and building of new loyalties.

All in all, as the author of this research mentioned, the current research will make use of the theory of Neo-liberal Intuitionalism and constructivism as a basic lens or theory of the research since both can contribute a lot for this research analysis. Also, as conflict erupted in South Sudan on December 15, 2013 the African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as regional and sub-regional body respectively sprang in to action by emerging as a viable framework for the maintenance of regional peace and security. In fact, these two regional and sub-regional bodies immediately dispatched its Ministerial and Heads of States delegations to assess the situation on the ground and then they both attempt to facilitate numerous meetings between the conflicting parties to attain peace in the country. Thus, their action can be related with ideas of neo-liberal institutionalist and constructivist theory. Subsequently, the researcher theoretical stand point dwells on neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism theoretical paradigm.

2.5.6 The Role of the African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

The involvement of regional and sub-regional organization like African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development **(**IGAD) to improve security arrangements in Africa in general and the Horn of Africa in particular have taken place in the context of a broad international consensus that international and regional organizations should play a greater part in maintenance of international order. As it has been mentioned in the aforementioned section the United Nation's Charter VIII articulated a new collaborative relationship between the United Nation and regional bodies for the management of regional crises (Funmi, 2010). As a matter of fact, increasingly, regional and sub-regional groupings are now a day's seen as the first resort for problems transcending national borders, leaving the wider international community to deal with problems that cannot be solved at lower levels. Accordingly, there has been considerable external encouragement for the development of African regional organizations capable of addressing peace and security problems. Although the structural conditions that have favored the emergence of regionalism elsewhere are often lacking in Africa (Paul, 2013) the concept of regionalism has considerable resonance and chimes in Africa with African aspirations to handle continental problems without external interference.

The establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002 marked an important shift towards consolidating African peace and security activities at the regional level (African Union Peace and Security Council Department, 2007). The AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the key decision-making body in the new architecture. Its guiding principles include the traditional tenets of respect for sovereignty and non-interference alongside some more radical, interventionist principles incorporated in

the AU's Constitutive Act. These include the right to intervene in a member state in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act) and the right of member states to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security (article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act). The 15-member council can authorize the deployment of peace support missions, recommend intervention on behalf of the AU, and approve the modalities for intervention to restore peace and security. The AU's peace and security architecture provides the institutional setting within which IGAD operates. The PSC is required to harmonize its activities with regional mechanisms on the continent. In practice the AU looks to the sub regional organizations to lead on crisis management within their own regions (African Union Peace and Security Council Department, 2007) this has certainly been the case in the Horn of Africa, where the PSC has consistently endorsed all the initiatives emanating from IGAD. The current crisis of South Sudan being part and parcel of horn of Africa peace and security concern, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has led the efforts to engage the warring parties in mediations to stop the fighting and bring sustainable peace.

Chapter Three

3. Research Methods and Methodology

Basically in any research undertaking the ways of obtaining, organizing and analyzing data plays a significant role. Subsequently the following section will provide an overview of research methods, data type, source, study area, population, sampling frame, sample size, the data collection techniques and data analysis process that has been employed in meeting the objectives of this research.

3.1 Research Methods

Crotty (1998) defined research methodology as

"*The strategy, process, plan of action or design lying behind the choice and use of particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcomes.*"

The choice of the research methodology is influenced by the researcher's theoretical perspective and also his/her attitude towards the ways in which the data will be used (Gray, 2004). It should also explain the rationale behind the selection of the methods adopted (Crotty, 1998). The present dissertation has undertaken qualitative research methodology to research the overall aim of the research. The justification behind the utilization of qualitative method is, the method helps to understand process, event and relationships in the context of the social and cultural situation. In other words, qualitative research is concerned with developing explanations of social phenomena. That is to say, it aims to help the researcher and reader to understand the social world in which we live and why things are the way they are. Instead of generating numerical data supporting or refuting clear cut hypotheses, qualitative research aims to produce

factual description based on face to face knowledge of individuals and social groups (Crotty, 1998). Plus, Strauss and Corbin (1990) claim that qualitative methods can be used to better understand any phenomenon about which little is yet know. They can also be used to gain new perspectives on things about which much is already known, or to gain more in-depth information that may be difficult to convey quantitatively. Thus, qualitative methods are appropriate for this research study where the researcher has determined that quantitative measures cannot adequately describe or interpret the situation at hand. The ability of qualitative data to more fully describe a phenomenon is an important consideration not only from the researcher's perspective but from the reader's perspective as well. "If you want people to understand better than they otherwise might, provide them information in form in which they usually experience it" (Gray, 2004). Due to all this reasons subsequently this dissertation follows and makes use of Qualitative research analysis, which is typically rich with detail and more meaningful insights.

3.2 Inductive Versus Deductive Research Approach

At this point in time a researcher shall put in plain words which research design is being pursued in his or her research undertaking. Thus the author of this research has found it very imperative to categorize the research design in terms of deductive or inductive research approach. According to Gray (2004) inductive and deductive research designs are different in the following way: deductive research design also known as testing a theory, is a research design in which the researcher put together a theory or hypotheses and designs a research tactic or strategy to test the formulated theory, on the flip side of the coin, inductive research design also known as building a

theory, in which the researcher begins with collecting data in an effort to develop a theory.

In similar vein Marshall (1997) asserted that "When *researchers first begin to open up any new line of enquiry there will be no useful theories available from which to deduce propositions for testing. Knowledge has to begin with collecting facts and then trying to find some order in them. This is known as induction. Deduction is the technique by which knowledge develops in more mature fields of enquiry. It involves a sort of logical leap. Going a stage further than the theory, data is then collected to test it* (Marshall, 1997).


Thus the current study takes in to account deductive research design as a major tool of its undertakings. The rationale behind this choice lies in view of the fact that the author of the research strongly believes that deductive approach gives the chance to have more explanation of what is going on. Therefore the researcher has started the research process by developing a theory or hypotheses and designed a research strategy to test the formulated theory.

3.3 Epistemological and Theoretical Perspective

Besides the researcher exerting an effort to make a distinction on qualitative vs. quantitative and inductive vs. deductive research approaches, Crotty (1998) avow that any given research should clarify its epistemological and theoretical perspectives so that the researcher could not allege to be objectivist, subjectivist and constructivist at the same time. In this research Crotty (1998) is employed as a guide to form the dissertation theoretical and epistemological approach. The views, thoughts, beliefs and experiences of the research participants were assessed and examined by following a research string of constructivism- interepretivism/phenomenology (see figure three).

The choice and justifications behind selecting this approach will be discussed in detail in the following section.

Figure 3: The Relationship between- Epistemology, Theoretical Perspectives and Methods



Source: Adopted from Crotty (1998)

3.3.1 Epistemological Perspective

Fundamentally epistemology is a technique of explaining and understanding how we know what we know. Crotty (1998) highlights that epistemology deals with supplying a philosophical foundation for choosing what type of knowledge we want and how we can make certain that they are both sufficient and rightful. Therefore one can conclude that epistemology make sure to address two questions; how do we know the world? What is the relationship between the inquirer and the known? Following the above considerable clarification of what epistemological perspective is, it would be mandatory to clarify this research's epistemological perspective. Accordingly; this dissertation epistemological stance dwells on constructionism.

Constructionists identify reality as if it is socially constructed (Crotty, 1998). According to this theorists construction is present in the mind of individuals and it is the responsibility of the researcher to understand, reconstruct, analyze and critique participants outlook in a way that show the path to meaningful result/outcomes (Gray,2004). However one needs to be careful of the fact that social constructionism refers to constructing knowledge about reality not the other way round that is constructing reality itself (Crotty, 1998). In this sense, the aim of the researcher is to understand and reconstruct people's beliefs and so as to reach a common consensus. Thus this research study has under taken constructionism as its epistemological stance.

3.3.2 Theoretical Perspective

According to Crotty (1998) theoretical perspective is a philosophical point of view which is capable of guiding the methodology and therefore render context for the course of action and its logic and criteria. As a theoretical perspective this study made use of interpretiveism. Basically interpretiveism depends on a steady interpretation and reinterpretation of the premeditated, meaningful responses of participants and researchers (Gray, 2004). The most important objective of the interpretivist is to comprehend the meaning of social phenomena from the point of view of those who have experienced it and those who have the necessary expertise in it. In this theoretical perspective the researcher has the responsibility to interpret the occurrence of an event and formulate what meanings are embodied in people's point of view and actions (Crotty, 1998). In other words besides the theoretical perspective of constructionism, it is essential for the interpretivists to uncover the subjective

meanings or realities which stimulate people's actions in order to understand and make sense of these actions which is meaningful for the research (Gray,2004).

In addition to this, this research has also used phenomenology. This theoretical perspective holds that any effort to understand social reality has to be based on people's experiences of social reality. For this reason phenomenology suggests that we must lay aside our prevailing understanding of phenomena to the best of our ability to allow participants to express their point of view related to the phenomena and thus the realities to "speak for themselves". Here all the necessary efforts are exerted to avoid ways in which the prejudices of researchers bias the data. To reach such understanding, the researcher conducted in-depth interviews with participants of the research who have directly experienced the phenomenon. What is more, this research study is both descriptive and explanatory. The logical reason for this is that descriptive studies are able to provide a picture of a phenomenon as it naturally occurs and collect accurate and authentic data and description respectively. Likewise explanatory study sets out to explain and account for the descriptive information.

3.4 Data Types and Sources

As it has been clearly mentioned in the previous section, this research study is descriptive and explanatory research. The underlying justification for this is that, this research study aims to describe the subjective reality of the civil war situation while explaining the real nature and implication of the conflict along with African Union (AU) and IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) peace mediation role.

Primary data was collected to attain the research objectives regarding the cause and consequence of South Sudan civil war and the role and contribution of African Union

(AU) and Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) towards resolving conflict in South Sudan using Key Informant Interview, Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and In-Depth Interviews using checklists.

In addition to this, in order to address objective related with the cause and nature of South Sudan's conflict secondary data sources was obtained from published and unpublished documents as well as Key Informant Interview with relevant interviewee (see Table 1) besides other international sources like International Crisis Group, World Bank, Trading Economics, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), United Nation Higher Commission for Refugee, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) , The United Nations Mission In South Sudan (UNMISS), African Union(AU), Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Institute of Security Studies (ISS), and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung has been used to gather more information.

Table 1: Links between specific objectives and methods to achieve them

No	Specific Objectives	Indicators/ Type of Data	Source of Data /Unit of Analysis	Data Collection Method	Method of Data Analysis
1	Assess cause and nature of conflict in South Sudan,	Historical, Social, Economic and Political indicators	Document, Academicians Regional Leaders, Political Analysts, Peace and Security experts, Victims of the war, Ambassadors, Diplomats, Higher Government Officials, Staff and Coordinators of AU and IGAD	Documentary Analysis, Key Informant Interview, In-Depth Interview and AU and IGAD Annual Progress Report Review, Statement and Communiqué	Document Analysis, Synthesis of Key Informant Interview and In-Depth Interview Results
2	Identify major internal and external	Social Economic	IDPs of the war, Civilians,	Focus Group	Document Analysis,

	consequence/ implication of South Sudanese conflict	and Political consequences	Academicians Regional Leaders, Political Analysts, Peace and Security experts, Ambassadors, Diplomats, Higher Government Officials, Staff and Coordinators of AU and IGAD	Discussion, In-Depth Interview, Key Informant Interview and Documentary Analysis	Synthesis of Focus Group Discussion, Key Informant Interview and In-Depth Interview
3	Investigate the role/contribution of AU and IGAD in resolving South Sudan's conflict	Strengths, Weakness, Opportunity and Challenges associated With resolving conflict in South Sudan	Academicians Regional Leaders, Political Analysts, Peace and Security experts, Ambassadors, Diplomats, Higher	Key Informant Interview and Documentary Analysis	Synthesis of Documents and KII Interview

			Government Officials, Staff and Coordinators of AU and IGAD		

Source: The Author

3.5 Study Area, Population, Sampling Frame, Variable and Sample Size

Study Area: The areas of this study are South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Washington DC. The current research on April 2016 has addressed the specific objectives by directly going to South Sudan and visited one of Juba's Protection of Civilian Camp (PoC) which is found near the airport in Juba. Following which, from April 10 to 15, 2016 the researcher along with other two research assistances conducted FGD and IDI with Internally Displaced South Sudanese.

Again due to the fact that Addis Ababa is the diplomatic hub of various embassies and international organizations, Addis were also selected as one of the study areas. Indeed Addis Ababa is the headquarters of African Union and the liaison office for IGAD. Plus Addis Ababa is one of the top destinations for academic conference tourism. Consequently, Key Informant Interviews were therefore conducted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with higher officials, academicians, regional leaders, political analysts, peace and security expert since 2015 to 2016. As a matter of fact the current research had also conducted two Key Informant interviews on 2015 with Academician and peace and security expert in Washington DC. Yet the researcher has also eventually complemented the research data collection with documentary analysis as well.

The actual focuses of this research undertaking is basically on regional mechanisms of conflict resolution: roles of the African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in resolving violent conflict in South Sudan. Although regional mechanisms of conflict resolution activities are distributed throughout the world, due to limitation in time and financial resource, the study has been carried out on African Union (AU) and Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Population: refers to the set of people or entities to which findings are to be generalized. In analyzing the role of regional and sub-regional institutions on conflict resolution focus has been given to key informants of various organizations including AU and IGAD and various other key informants (including academicians, regional leaders, political analysts, peace and security experts, ambassadors, diplomats and higher government officials) that are crucial to accomplish the mission of this dissertation.

Therefore, to address objective one and two, the author of this research has conducted 55 In-Depth Interview, 10 FGD consisting of 6 participants in each group and 28 Key Informant Interview. This population is given priority due to the need of getting empirical evidence. Indeed the total size of the population has consisted of both male and female participant.

Variable: the research variables are causes of the civil war, the international and internal implication/consequence of the civil war and conflict resolution role of African Union (AU) and Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Sampling Frame: the sampling frame was therefore produced through purposive sampling for the FGD, KII and In-Depth Interview.

Sampling Procedure: The researcher used purposive sampling to select Key Informants, Focus Group Discussion participants and In-depth Interview participants. Purposive sampling is known as deliberate sampling or non-probability sampling. This sampling method involves purposive or deliberate selection of particular units of the social phenomena or constituting a sample which represent the study area (Kothari, 2004). Therefore, the study employed purposive sampling, with those who are well versed on the research questions and have necessary personal experiences. Purposive sampling is considered desirable when the respondents are few and have known characteristic to the study intensively (Kothari, 2004).

With regards to sample selection and determination of the size of the subjects the researcher has tried to incorporate none biased procedure and maximum precision while recognizing research ethics and design. In addition to this during field research interviews and discussion, open ended question were prepared for various participants on the bases of specific groups' status. Plus the researcher has also attended various meetings, discussions, and peace negotiation forums and other academic forums on South Sudan civil war and regional and sub—regional organizations conflict resolution role.

3.6 Data Collection Techniques

Data for this study was collected through Documentary Review, Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and In-Depth Interview.

I.Documentation: Since documentary analysis is capable of providing background, tools of tracking change and development along with verification of findings this research has used Documentary Analysis as one of its data sources. Subsequently, the documents involve information and data from African Union, Inter-governmental

Authority on Development (IGAD) and other prominent institution's press release, communiqué, annual progress reports, book, monographs, journals and articles.

II. Focus Group Discussions (FGD): was conducted to complement the Documentary Analysis, Key Informant and the In-Depth Interview data. The main purpose of the Focus Group Discussion has been to draw upon participant's attitudes, feelings, experience and reactions. FGD participants were selected purposively so as to be effective in terms of information gathering, time and cost. A total of 10 FGDs has been conducted each consisting of 6 participants. All the FGD has employed and followed the funnel approach (this approach involves the use of broad question followed gradually by more narrow questions) in collecting information.

III. In-Depth Interview: - In order to obtain compressive information and to understand participants response deeper, and gain more extra knowledge and insight In-Depth Interview was found imperative. Accordingly the researcher has conducted 55 In-Depth Interview with research participants.

IV. Key Informant Interviews (KIIS): Key Informant Interviewee of this research were selected purposively because they are knowledgeable about issues related to regional institutions role, strength, limitation and the nature and causes of conflict in South Sudan. Subsequently Key Informant's interviews have been conducted with academicians, regional leaders, political analysts, peace and security experts, ambassadors, diplomats, higher government officials, staff and coordinators of AU and IGAD. Over all 28 Key Informants Interviews were conducted. For this purpose interview guides were prepared that elicit responses on various aspects related to the cause, implication and role of regional institutions on conflict resolution based on selected indicators.

In conducting the In-depth Interviews, Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions, the researcher has mate most of the participants at a place of their convenience i.e. at a place of their choice. Furthermore the Key Informant Interviews, In-Depth Interview and the Focus Group Discussion, lasted for 30 min to an hour in addition to this, with informed consent of the participants an attempt has been made to audiotape record all KII and FGD except in cases where some key informant interviewees requested otherwise for which the research have relied on taking detailed notes of the responses of informants and discussant.

3.7 Research Quality Issues

Various techniques have been employed to ensure data reliability and validity.

Reliability: In order to collect reliable data, the researcher has designed Key Informant Interview guides, In-Depth Interview guides and FGD guides through an elaborated procedure which involves a series of revisions under the guidance of the research supervisors/advisors to enhance data quality. Also quotes from interview and statement from documents and discussion was used as references to ensure reliability. The researcher has used checklist of questions when making personal interviews with respondents so as to achieve data consistency and completeness.

Furthermore, research assistants/translators has been nominated and trained for two days on administering the interview and discussion guides along with this training was also provided on recording of any other useful information they came across within in the field. Field notes was made and edited immediately after data collection on a daily basis.

Validity: To ensure validity the study has applied triangulation technique by using In-Depth Interviews, Key Informant Interviews, FGDs and secondary data sources

concurrently. In addition, data collection instruments has been presented and refined to ensure lucidity of contents within the context of each questions aim. The qualitative data collection instruments are designed in such a way that they measure attitudes and opinions of respondents to the maximum degree as possible.

In addition, before data entry into computer a series of pretest has therefore been conducted. The data scanning and scrutiny technique has been employed from In-Depth Interviews, Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions available to respondents to examine and validate the responses to instrument so as to ensure content validity and reliability.

Generalizability: the word generalizability can be defined as the extent to which research results/outcomes are applicable to other populations or samples. It involves the usefulness of one set of findings in explaining other similar situation. This can be assessed based on precision of the data interpreted, the genuineity of capturing the phenomenon, i.e. quality of field work, analysis and interpretation. Also, the extent to which the sample studied is representative to the original population (Kothari, 2004). Accordingly the author of this research has not left any stone unturned to arrive at sufficient level of precision while making interpretation that attempt to capture the phenomenon. In addition to this the sample studied are representative to the original population. But it may not have a scientific justification to assure the reader that the final conclusion of this study is representative and applicable to all international regional and sub-regional institution and different kinds of conflict throughout the globe. However some significant lessons can be drown from such kind of intensive research.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

The researcher considers the research values of voluntary participation, confidentiality, anonymity to ensure protection of respondents from any possible harm that could arise from participating in the study. Thus, the researcher has clearly introduced the purpose of the study as a partial fulfillment of PhD study program and requested the respondents to participate in the study on a voluntary basis such that refusal or abstaining from participating was permitted. The researcher has also assured the respondents confidentiality and protection from any possible harm that could arise from the study since the potential findings would only be used for the intended purposes. The respondents were promised to be provided with feedback about the findings of the study.

3.9 Data Analysis

The data has been analyzed qualitatively by making use of data collected from various participants. The qualitative analysis was made possible first by undergoing through data reduction process in order to identify and focus on what is significant and transform the data into a simplified format that can be understood in the context of the research questions. Followed by thematic analysis whereby data's has been grouped into meaningful patterns and/or themes. Next to identifying themes, the data's were appropriately assembled, organized, and compressed into a display that facilitates conclusion drawing. The displays include table/matrix and textual display. Finally to draw a conclusion and recommendation, the author of the research step back and interpreted what her findings mean, determined how the findings help her to answer the research questions and draw implications from her findings. At the end to verify these conclusions the researcher revisited the data (multiple times) to confirm the conclusions that have been drawn.

Chapter Four

4. The Historical Backdrop to the Current Conflict in South Sudan

Peace and Conflict studies can hardly get anywhere without relying on careful historical analysis and description of social movements in history. In fact every significant political phenomenon lives in history and requires historically grounded analysis for its explanation. Thus, the following Chapter would eventually be capturing the historical backdrop of the current conflict along with some country profile as a hors d'oeuvre.

4.1 Country Profile of the Republic of South Sudan

I. Geography

South Sudan officially the Republic of South Sudan, is a landlocked country in northeastern Africa that gained its independence from Sudan in 2011. South Sudan is found lying near the Equator in the tropics between latitudes 3° and 13°N, and longitudes 24° and 36°E. With an area of 248,776 square miles (it is estimated to be the seventh-largest country in Africa, the 42th-largest country in the world) (Oxfam, 2013). Its current capital is Juba, which is also its largest city. South Sudan is bordered by the Republic of the Sudan to the north, Ethiopia to the east, Kenya to the southeast, Uganda to the south, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the southwest and the Central African Republic to the west (Central Intelligence Agency,2016).

Figure 4: Map of South Sudan



Adopted from : (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016).

II. Government

The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly ratified a transitional constitution shortly before independence on 9 July 2011. The constitution was signed by the President of South Sudan on Independence Day and thereby came into force (Oxfam, 2013). It is now the supreme law of the land, superseding the Interim Constitution of 2005. The constitution establishes a mixed presidential system of government headed by a president who is head of state, head of government, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. It also establishes the National Legislature comprising two houses: a directly elected assembly, the National Legislative Assembly; and a second chamber of representatives of the states, the Council of States (Mulugata, 2015).

III. History

The territories of modern South Sudan and the Republic of the Sudan were occupied by Egypt under the Muhammad Ali Dynasty, and later governed as an Anglo-Egyptian condominium until Sudanese independence was achieved in 1956 (Salih,1994). Following the First Sudanese Civil War, the southern sudan autonomous region was formed in 1972 and lasted until 1983 (Da Waal, 2014). A second Sudanese civil war soon developed and ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. Later that year, southern autonomy was restored when an autonomous government of southern sudan was formed (Mamdani, 2014). South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011, following a referendum that passed with 98.83% of the vote. It is a United Nations member state, a member state of the African Union, and a member state of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Mulugata, 2015). South Sudan has suffered internal conflict since its independence; it has the highest score on the fragile states index (Oxfam, 2013).

IV. Economy

South Sudan's economy is now highly oil-dependent. Despite the potential oil wealth it is one of the world's weakest and most underdeveloped economy, with South Sudan having little existing infrastructure and the highest maternal mortality and female illiteracy rates in the world as of 2011. The years since the 2005 peace accord ushered in an economic revival and investment in utilities and other infrastructure but industry and infrastructure in landlocked South Sudan since 2013 still remain severely underdeveloped with poverty that is still widespread, following several decades of civil war (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016).

Subsistence agriculture provides a living for the vast majority of the population. South Sudan has little infrastructure - just 60 km of paved roads. Electricity is produced

mostly by costly diesel generators and running water is scarce (Oxfam, 2013). The government spends large sums of money to maintain a large army; delays in paying salaries have resulted in riots by unruly soldiers. Various conflicts in South Sudan have resulted in a large number of civilian deaths and displacement. South Sudan depends largely on imports of goods, services, and capital (African Development Fund, 2013).

Despite these disadvantages, South Sudan has abundant natural resources. Such as petroleum, iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver, gold, diamonds, hardwoods, limestone and hydropower (African Development Fund, 2013). South Sudan produces nearly three-fourths of the former Sudan's total oil output of nearly a half million barrels per day. The government of South Sudan derives nearly 98% of its budget revenues from oil (Mamdani, 2014). Oil is exported through two pipelines that run to refineries and shipping facilities at Port Sudan on the Red Sea, and the 2005 oil sharing agreement with Khartoum called for a 50-50 sharing of oil revenues between the two entities. But that arrangement was set to expire with independence. The economy of South Sudan undoubtedly will remain linked to Sudan for quite some time, given the long lead time and great expense required to build another pipeline. In January 2012, the breakdown of talks on the sharing of oil revenues led South Sudan to halt oil production and halve public spending on all but salaries. A deal in March 2013 provided for Sudan to resume pumping South Sudanese oil in May, and created a demilitarized border zone (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016).

V. Ethnic Groups

South Sudan is inhabited by more than 60 ethnic groups but they are grouped in to three main ethnic groupings: the Nilotic communities in the Upper Nile and greater Bahr El Ghazal; the Nilo-Hamitic communities who occupy Equatoria; and the Bantus who also live in Equatoria and Western Bahr El Ghazal. In spite of the fact that there are more than sixty ethnic groups in South Sudan, the Dinka (Nilotic), the Nuer (Nilotic), the Bari (Nilo-Hamitic) and Shilluk are among the major ethnic groups present in South Sudan. The Shilluk (Nilotic) constitute a historically influential state along the White Nile, and their language is fairly closely related to Dinka and Nuer. The Dinka and Nuer live in the South, mainly around the swamps on the Nile and Bar el Ghazal rivers and are located in the extreme south together with the Bari, Acholi and Lotuhu people. The Azande, Bor and Luo tribes are located in the west of the region (Da waal, 2014 and Mulugata, 2015).

VI. Languages

The official language of South Sudan is English but there are over sixty indigenous languages spoken in the country including Arabic. Most of the indigenous languages are classified under the Nilo-Saharan language family, the remainders belong to the Ubangi languages of the Niger–Congo language family, and they are spoken in the south-west (Oxfam, 2013 and Central Intelligence Agency, 2016).

VII. Population

As of January 2015, the population of South Sudan was estimated to be 11,665,025 people (even though the exact figure is disputed) and a predominantly rural subsistence economy. Due to external migration the population has continuously declined. During 2015 South Sudan population is projected to increase by 289 643 people and reach 11 954 668 in the beginning of 2016. The natural increase is expected to be positive, as the number of births will exceed the number of deaths by 293 025. If external

migration will remain on the previous year level, the population will be declined by 3383 due to migration reasons (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). It means that amount of people who leaves South Sudan to settle permanently in another country (emigrants) will prevail over the amount of people who moves into the country in order to settle there as permanent residents (immigrants).

VIII. Religion

There are conflicting reports as to the religious beliefs in South Sudan, though all agree that the three main religions are Africa traditional religion, Christianity, Islam and unaffiliated (Oxfam, 2013).

4.2. The Pre-Historic south Sudan

The peoples of southern Sudan have suffered nearly two centuries of colonial rule under the Turko-Egyptian, the Mahdiya, the Anglo- Egyptian, and the post-independence northern Sudan regimes. Under the order of Muhammad Ali, who carved out an autonomous dynasty in Egypt under nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Empire, Turko-Egyptian armies invaded in 1820 the region that is present-day northern Sudan and consolidated control from Khartoum (Girma, 1997). Eager to secure new sources of military manpower, the Turko-Egyptian regime tapped into a growing local slave trade by seizing male slaves for the armies of Egypt and by allowing private traders to sell females and children in northern Sudanese, Egyptian, and Arabian markets. The regime also forced the development of a Sudanese cash-crop economy and extracted taxes from the free population (Beshir, 1984). At its peak by 1880, the Turko-Egyptian regime had a sphere of administrative and economic influence that extended to the Red Sea in the east, to Darfur in the west, and into parts of what is now southern Sudan. Nevertheless there was considerable

resistance. The Sudanese people resented the Turko- Egyptian rule from inception. They were provoked primarily by the oppressions and the inadequacies of Turko - Egyptian administration. These included the heavy taxation, the crude manner by which taxes were collected. Plus the people were highly frustrated by the slave trade from the local population together with absolute control over all Sudanese trade which destroyed livelihoods and indigenous practices (Salih, 1994).

Matters were further complicated by the arrival of the British in 1873 who assumed responsibility over Egypt in order to protect their interests in the Suez Canal and ensure repayment of loans to that government. General Charles Gordon was appointed governor of Sudan and he immediately intensified the anti-slavery campaign initiated a decade earlier. Sudanese Arab leaders, however, saw British efforts as well as the appointment of General Charles Gordon as a European Christian attempt to undermine Muslim Arab dominance in the region (Voll, 1991).

On June 29, 1881, a Sudanese Islamic cleric, Muhammad Ahmad, proclaimed himself the Mahdi. Playing into decades of disenchantment over Egyptian rule and new resentment against the British, Ahmad immediately transformed an incipient political movement into a fundamentally religious one (Girma, 1997). Urging jihad or "holy war" against imperial Egypt, Ahmad formed an army. Therefore the Turko-Egyptian occupation ended in 1882 when the northern Sudanese revolted under the leadership of Mohammed Ahmed. The British, having occupied Egypt in 1882, intervened militarily but were unable to stifle the rise of the Mahdi.

Indeed by 1882 the Mahdist Army had taken complete control over the area surrounding Khartoum. After the Mahdi's forces occupied Khartoum, they successfully established Sudan's first theocratic state and used Islam as a unifying

force (Girma, 1997). Subsequently, like the preceding rule the peoples of south sudan were treated cruelly and brutally under the Mahdist rule. Even if the slave trade had continued with greater vigor, the Arabic language and Islam were imposed on the south by force and Shari'a became the law of the land (Beshir, 1984). However, this failed to achieve the expected success in Sudan and only worsened the division between North and South (Francis, 1998). Despite strong resistance by southerners against the government's action, they were successfully suppressed by the Mahdi's military forces (Girma, 1997).

Then, in 1883, a joint British-Egyptian military expedition under the command of British Colonel William Hicks launched a counterattack against the Mahdists. Hicks were soon killed and the British decided to evacuate the Sudan. Fighting continued however and the British-Egyptian forces which defended Khartoum in a long siege were finally overrun on January 28, 1885. Virtually the entire garrison was killed. General Charles Gordon, the commander of the British-Egyptian forces, was beheaded during the attack (Salih, 1994). In June 1885 Ahmad, the self-proclaimed Mahdi, died. As a result the Mahdist movement quickly dissolved as internal strife broke out among rival claimants to leadership. Hoping to capitalize on internal strife, the British returned to the Sudan in 1896 with Horatio Kitchener as commander of another Anglo-Egyptian army. In the final battle of the war on September 2, 1898 at Karari, 11,000 Mahdists were killed and 16,000 were wounded (Beshir, 1984). Thus in 1898, the Mahdist state fell to the Anglo-Egyptian expeditionary forces and Sudan became a British colony for more than half of a century.

In January 1899, an Anglo-Egyptian agreement restored Egyptian rule in Sudan but as part of a condominium, or joint authority, exercised by Britain and Egypt. Although

the agreement emphasized Egypt's indebtedness to Britain for its participation in the reconquest, the agreement failed to clarify the juridical relationship between the two condominium powers in Sudan or to provide a legal basis for continued British presence in the south. Britain assumed responsibility for governing the territory on behalf of the khedive (Girma, 1997).

Therefore starting from 1899, Sudan was ruled by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. Despite, the fact that Egypt had little influence in reality (El Mahdi, 1965 and Albino, 1970). Ever since the time of the Anglo–Egyptian ruling, Sudan had been officially divided into areas the north and the south and many divisions have surfaced from the legacies of colonialism in south. The British observed the south as a buffer that could maintain English values and beliefs, such as Christianity, and in due course be developed and segregated into a separated political entity or integrated into British East Africa. On the contrary in the north, Egypt treasured Islamic values to be in charge of political control of the country (Girma, 1997 and Beshir, 1984). As a result the overwhelming disproportionate economic and political power came to be centered in the north, thus the two regions cultural and religious identities eventually become greatly divisive.

Deng (1978) calls the Condominium a "British rule with Egypt as a rubber-stamp half". Trying to control half of the world at the time, the British did not have the force to occupy Sudan. Like in other colonies across Africa, they had to institute the "divide-and-rule" policy in Sudan. They wanted Sudanese to distrust, fear, and fight each other, instead of their colonizers.

The "divide-and-rule" policy separated southern sudanese provinces from the rest of the country and slowed down their economic and social development. The British

authorities claimed that the south was not ready to open up to the modern world (Metz, 1992). At the same time, the British heavily invested in the Arab north, modernizing and liberalizing political and economic institutions and improving social, educational, and health services (El Mahdi, 1965, Eprile, 1974; Metz, 1992; O'Ballance, 2000).

The British Condominium government had nothing against Islam in the northern parts of Sudan. In fact, the British encouraged Islamization of the north through financial help for building mosques and pilgrimage travels for Muslims (Girma, 1997). In southern sudan however, with the help of Christian missionaries, they wanted to prevent the spread of Islam (O'Ballance, 2000) and "preserve purely African way of life and Christianity of the southern people" (Albino, 1970). Wenger (1991) and Metz (1992) claims that the British at this time planned to attach southern sudan to the British colonial East Africa.

Another colonial experiment that slowed down development of southern sudan had been the "indirect rule" policy. In order to prevent educated urban class and religious leaders from influencing social and political life in southern sudan, the British authorities gave "power" to the tribal leaders and ruled through them (O'Ballance, 2000). While the "divide-and-rule" policy separated the north and south, the "indirect rule" divided the south into hundreds of informal chiefdoms. The British authorities made their "indirect rule" policies official through the "Southern Policy" document.

The Southern Policy stated that, "the policy of the government in southern sudan is to build up a series of self-contained tribal units with structure and organization based upon indigenous customs, traditions, and beliefs" (Albino, 1970). These southern tribal units were to be completely separated from the rest of the country. Under the

Policy, northern officials were transferred out of the south, trading permits for northerners were withdrawn, and speaking Arabic and even wearing of Arabic dresses were discouraged (Albino, 1970; Eprile, 1974; Deng, 1978; O'Ballance, 2000; Metz, 1992).

Deng (1978) notes that the period of the British rule in the south was the "longest period of peace and security in history, at least from invasion and the use of crude force." Toynbee (cited in Albino, 1970) believes that, while the British had prevented the oppression and exploitation of the southern sudanese by their northern countrymen, they did little to help the south "to learn how to hold their own in the modern world."

The British administration reversed its Southern Policy in 1946, stating that the southern sudanese were "inextricably bound, both geographically and economically, to the Arab north as far as future development was concerned" (Eprile, 1974 and Metz, 1992). One of the reasons for this abrupt decision, writes Eprile (1974), was a need to repay northern sudan for helping Britain during World War II.

As a result the United Kingdom and Egypt concluded an agreement in the year 1953 which aspires to endow the Sudanese with self-government. Nevertheless the situation awakens another incidence of war which is usually referred as the first civil war also known as the "Anya-Nya" meaning "snake poison". The rationale behind this war was the overwhelming sentiment of under representation and discrimination felt by the south (Girma, 1997). Therefore many southerners formed a military movement which can represent and fought the south sudanese outlook of prejudice. Therefore from 1955-1972 the brutal civil war was stuck between the Sudanese government and southern rebels who have insisted a greater sovereignty for the south sudan. The

southerners were further irritated by the very basis of exclusion from the security sector and bureaucracy. Plus the increasing racial, religious economic disparities and persecution pursued by the government and the state institution further aggravated the situation worse. Subsequently as a government in the north cold-shoulders the lack of southerner's political and economic power, the war eventually intensified and a significant amount of southerners fled as a refugee (Metz, 1992).

In addition to the underrepresentation and discrimination the southerners were further exasperated by "Sudanization" process, a state policy pursued by the Sudanese government and the state institutions. This policy has been seen by many southerners as favoring the better–educated northerner's over the peripheral population. The "Islamization" state policies of the subsequent post-independence government again has further exacerbated and fueled war in the country. The consequence of the first civil war was outrageous leading to the death of an estimated 500,000 causalities, 180,000 refugees and up to one million internally displaced civilians (Eprile, 1974 and Deng, 1978). By the year 1972 the war came into a conclusion with the signing of Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted significant regional autonomy to southern sudan on internal issues. To be more specific the Addis Ababa Agreement gave the south large measure of regional autonomy, allowing the region to have its own elected assembly and executive body that would be responsible for most matters except external affairs, national defense and national planning (Beshir, 1984 and Girma, 1997). It further stipulated that the southern boundaries be "as they stood" the day Sudan became independent. It recognized the southern religious beliefs, languages and traditional laws, and asserted the equality between "Islam, Christianity and Indigenous traditional beliefs as religions of the people of the Sudan" (Beshir, 1984). The agreement also pledged to re-integrate the Anyanya

guerrilla fighters into the national defense forces, to resettle and rehabilitate people dislocated by the war, and to create better conditions for development opportunities (Deng, 1987). Conversely scores of southerners felt that this peace agreement was frail and blurred and that Khartoum did not adequately adhere to the provisions.

The accord seemed unfeigned. Nimeiri himself declared to his nation that "I recognize the historical and cultural differences between the North and the South and I believe that the unity of our country must be built upon these objective realities. The southern people have the right to develop their respective cultures and traditions in a united southern sudan" (Beshir, 1984). Indeed, the creation of a single southern region gave its people a greater sense of representation and a better prospect of participating in the affairs of the country than they had previously. The Addis Ababa Agreement was the most important event in the political history of post-independence Sudan. It underscored that national unity is possible in diversity. Nimeiri was justifiably given much credit for acceding to important southern demands. Sudan enjoyed a period of relative peace and stability in the decade of the 1970s (Salih, 1994).

After a while Nimeiri vanquished his former communist allies and shifted from his earlier Soviet disposition to alignment with the Western world and conservative Arab countries. The country was able to lure considerable foreign investment loans from the Western governments and banks and the multilateral finance institutions (Girma, 1997). The idea of turning Sudan into the breadbasket of the Middle East gained acceptance and attracted substantial investment from the oil-rich Arab countries, thanks to the oil boom of the early 1970s. Sudan received the largest US economic and military aid in Africa after Egypt for its support of the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel in the late 1970s. Together international lenders "poured more than $2 billion into Sudan's agriculture" between 1975 and 1985 (Voll, 1991).

Nearly all the investment in agriculture in 1970s occurred in the northern region. By the end of the 1970s, however, Nimeiri's popularity began to languish as the country's economic situation-exacerbated by the world recession, hiking oil prices, and mismanagement and corruption-deteriorated. As the economic crisis came to a head, the IMF intervened and imposed austerity measures (currency devaluation, reducing subsidies, lifting price controls, increasing cash crop exports, raising interest rates, freezing wages, liberalization of trade). In the south dissatisfaction escalated as people found themselves in a more pitiful situation socially and economically than they were before the Addis Ababa accord. In spite of relative peace and stability, poverty, disease, and illiteracy remained in the significant vast majority of the southern population (Salih, 1994). Many southerners had hopes for their region's economic and social development. However, no meaningful economic development took place in the region after the restoration of peace. Although southern sudan possesses considerable wealth in agriculture, livestock, and minerals, the Nimeiri government failed to pay significant attention to the social and economic development needs of the region. The number of primary schools increased somewhat, but most lacked adequate facilities and teachers. The central government planned a number of development projects for the south but failed to implement most of them. For instance, some of the unrealized projects included Nzara and Mongalla textiles, Malakal paper industry, Wau brewery, Tonj Kenaf, Melut and Mongalla sugar projects, Kapoeta cement factory, and Beden electric plant (Garang, 1987). The few projects that the government helped implement failed because of poor planning and inadequate infrastructural support. Some projects were not completed, not because of lack of funding, but because the central government attempted to deny the south any substantial benefits. Two such projects are the Jonglei canal water project and the oil

exploration project in Bentiu (Francise, 1998). As Nimeiri's support in both the north and the south deteriorated, he sought to make alliance with northern opposition parties and the powerful Muslim Brotherhood. This opportunistic political marriage with old foes especially with the Muslim Brotherhood, the most contumacious opponent of the southern sudanese demand for self-determination further alienated the south and tensions began to escalate. In the early 1980s, the twilight of his rule, Nimeiri made a series of blunders that led to the undoing of his most notable accomplishment, peace between north and south (Garang, 1987).

What is more in 1979 US based Chevron Company discovered significant oil reserves estimated at 5 billion barrels in Bentiu District of Upper Nile (Mawson, 1984). Soon after the discovery, the Nimeiri government attempted to deny the south ownership of this precious resource. At first, the government tried unsuccessfully to redraw the boundaries between north and south so that the oil reserves fell within the territorial jurisdiction of the north (Bennett, 1987). This was contrary to the Addis Ababa Agreement that recognized the southern boundaries inherited from the colonial rule. After the annexation attempt failed, the government came up with another plan to refine the crude oil at a different site than where it was found. At first it wanted to ship the crude oil to a refinery to be constructed at Kosti in the White Nile Province in the north. A while later, it dropped this idea in favor of pipe lining the crude oil from Bentiu to Port Sudan on the Red Sea for export (Girma,1997). As expected, the south which wanted the oil refined where it was located vehemently opposed the measure. The south became convinced that the central government intended to plunder the newly discovered oil reserves for the benefit of the north with the south standing to gain very little.

Thus the Addis Ababa Agreement, which has ended up the first civil war, has failed to utterly chase away the tension that had originally caused it, principally in view of the south. What is more, when Shari'a , or Islamic law was commenced the north-south conflict was reignited and the incident of the second civil conflict of Sudan has become unenviable incident. The second civil war, fought between the central Sudanese government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), began in May 1983 with the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement and ended on January 2005. The conflict was largely a continuation of the First Sudanese Civil War of 1955 to 1972(Daoud, 2012). Number of scholars and analysts are of the same opinion regarding the expansion of oil wealth greatly contributed to the second phase of Sudan's civil war, and that the sharing of oil revenue was a key component of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Mamdani, 2014). These two periods of civil war brought great suffering particularly to the population in the discriminated south where a significant number of people have perished. Although it originated in southern sudan, the civil war spread to the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. It lasted for 22 years and is one of the longest civil wars on record. The war resulted in the independence of South Sudan six years after the war ended (Le Riche, 2014).

Since the second civil war began in 1983, a large number of people died as a result of fighting, disease and hunger. Another millions civilians fled the area, moving mostly to Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda (Althus, 1999). Much of this devastation was due to irresponsible government tactics. According to US government and international human-rights officials, the Islamic state in Sudan committed "gross human rights violations" and worked to aggravate wide scale famine throughout the country (Locante, 1993). Other than deaths, Christian and other religious minorities saw their civil rights restricted continually during the course of the war. Amnesty International

reported “disturbing accounts of extrajudicial executions, disappearances and torture” carried out by the Islamic government in the north (Locante, 1993). During the war, non-Muslims in government controlled areas were subject to shari’a, or Islamic law. Under the 1991 penal code, for example, all non-Muslims were banned from most jobs in the government, including the military and judiciary, could not testify against Muslims in courts, and were required to memorize the Qur’an to learn Muslim-based curriculum in the schools (Locante, 1993).

The size of both the government’s military and the rebel organizations grew over time due to aid from outside forces. At the turn of the century, over 50 percent of the government budget was spent on military supplies (Daoud, 2012). Aid from countries such as Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Libya also contributed to the growth of government forces (Girma 1997). The exact size of the rebel organizations was difficult to measure given that the insurgency was generally unorganized and heavily fractionalized, with alliances between rebel groups changing sometimes on a daily basis.

The largest rebel organization in Sudan was the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army). Led by John Garang, the SPLA had great success in the early years of the war. After eight years of fighting, it was able to drive the national army out of most of the south (Jok & Hutchinson, 1999). In August 1991, the SPLA split into two warring factions between the Dinka and the Nuer, two of the largest ethnic groups in the south (Daoud, 2012). Later, it divided into two main factions including (1) the SPLA Torit faction led by John Garang and (2) the SSIM (South Sudan Independence Movement) led by Rick Machar. In 1997, South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) group concluded a peace agreement with the Government, forming the UDSF (United Democratic Salvation Front) (Fisher, 1999). After forming this alliance, Machar’s

SSIM was able to plunder, steal and destabilize the peace process while the government turned a blind eye due to the alliance (Fisher, 1999). Most reports considered the Garang-led SPLA faction as the main rebel organization in Sudan; however, many other such organizations fell under the umbrella of rebel groups called the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), to which the SPLA belong. These included the Sudan Alliance Forces, the Beja Congress Forces, and the New South Brigade (The Military Balance, 2003-2004) (Daoud, 2012).

Peace talks between the southern rebels and the government made substantial progress in 2003 and early 2004, although skirmishes in parts of the south continued. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on 9 January 2005 in Nairobi. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 between the two major warring parties ushered a new era, a peaceful era but with its unique challenges (Sunday,2014). The need to address "[…] outstanding issues related to boundaries, citizenship, economics, security, and the status of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Agreement in these areas is essential for ensuring a peaceful era in which to lay a solid foundation for post-conflict reconstruction" (De Waal, 2014a).

4.3. The Independence of South Sudan

The Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM) after signing the CPA came to recognize the fact that they had came closer to accomplishing the ambitions of self-determination, southern autonomy, independence or radical national transformation. The CPA came up with a significant viable guarantee to secure the people of southern Sudan with an alternative for succession within six years (Sunday, 2014). Furthermore, the peace agreement established a new government of National Unity in the north and Interim Government in south Sudan (GoSS). In deed the

agreement takes in to account permanent ceasefire and accord on wealth and power sharing (De Waal, 2014). Moreover, the agreement further called for a six year interim period, in which the National Congress Party (NCP) and the southern based SPLM share control of a government of National Unity (GoNU) and at end of the specified period the southerners have the right to vote on whether to remain part of united Sudan or succeed and thus create a new born country South Sudan (Mulugeta, 2015). The CPA concludes by setting a date for democratic election to be well thought-out, as a result a referendum of self-determination was geared up for south sudan on 2010. Accordingly the election was held on April 2010 and the referendum in January 2011. Upon the referendum majority of the southerners voted in a favor of independent South Sudan. Therefore this day marked southerners hard-won right to self-determination a reality by voting for separation in historical referendum. Finally on July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) legitimately declared independence and its succession from the north and thus eventually become the 54th member state of African Union (Mulugeta, 2015).

South Sudan's declaration of independence in July 2011 manifested the conclusion of the peace agreement, and subsequently, the SPLM become the new countries army. Even though the whole world has expected the emergence of the newly independent nation would alleviate tensions between the divided regions the reverse has happened. In fact several dynamics continue to underpin the years of civil war, most principally dispute over resource, governance and power. What's more, unresolved border disputes and tension over natural resources in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states has resulted in a spiral of violence that has sent hundreds of thousands of Sudanese into neighboring countries as refugees (De Waal, 2014a).

4.4. The Genesis of the Current Conflict /From Conflict to a Conflict

Many people across the world has been and is still in shock as depressing report of near genocidal massacres and destruction of villages and towns in South Sudan dominate the international media. This devastation came nearly three years after the world communities, with a great sigh of relief, celebrated the declaration of independence in July 2011 with people of South Sudan after many decades of civil wars. It was hoped and justifiably so, that this independence was the change needed to bring peace to this land in which many generations have only known war and suffering (De Waal, 2014b). However, South Sudan is in the news again for nothing but violent conflict that has raised fears of genocide.

In the evening of 15 December 2013 South Sudan's outlook for the future changed dramatically within a few hours. Members of the presidential Tiger Battalion fought for reasons that are yet to be fully disclosed by this research, sparking off shooting and violence in various residential neighborhoods in Juba. During that first night many people were killed while many others, fled to the compound of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) near the airport in Juba. The following morning, the South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit appeared on national television in full military uniform, something he had not worn since the end of the war and accused his former vice President Riek Machar and several others of plotting a military coup (Sunday,2014).

In the week that followed, an estimated thousand people were killed. Eleven members of the SPLM/A elite, including its former Secretary General Pagan Amum, former ministers, and the former SPLA chief of staff's were detained under charges of the

attempted coup (De Waal, 2014a and Sunday, 2014). Several SPLA commanders defected from the army to join a rebellion that had just been born. Riek Machar, the former Vice President, fled Juba during the night of the 15th December, 2013. He strongly denied the charges of the putsch but declared himself the leader of what quickly had become an armed rebellion against the government in Juba (De Waal, 2014a). This conflict has its root in political, social and economic factors. Consequently the preceding section will resort to analyze and investigate the political, social and economic grounds that resulted conflict in South Sudan on December 15, 2013 and continued until recently.

Chapter Five

5. Data Presentation, Analysis and Discussion

Introduction

This chapter and the following chapters deal with data presentation, analysis and discussion that have been collected from both primary and secondary sources. Subsequently, the collected data will be presented in line with the research objectives of this study. Which are: Assess the major causes and dynamic of conflict in South Sudan, Investigate both the internal as well as external consequences of the conflict in terms of: political, social and economic indicators and finally investigate the role of the African Union(AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) contribution towards resolving conflict in South Sudan. As indicated in the methodology section, data collected through Documentary Analysis, Key Informant Interviews, Focus Group Discussion as well as In-depth interviews will be systematically presented, analyzed and discussed in the following sections.

5.1 Data Presentation

South Sudan is a nation with millions of people dying due to war, hundreds of thousands of people forced out of their homelands as internally displaced persons, tens of thousands as refugees in neighboring countries. The nation is caught in a vicious circle of civil war and inhuman practices, sexual slavery, ethnic hatred and turmoil, isolation, economic exploitation, food shortages and starvation, and pervasive destruction and devastation of South Sudan itself, its infrastructure, resources and people. In the following section the author of this research would like to show the general characteristics of In-depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) research participants' personal profile. These participants have given a significant

data for the research question concerning the causes of the conflict and internal consequences of the civil war. Therefore, the general characteristics of the respondents presented in the following section only describes participants of In-Depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion and does not include the Key Informant of the research.

5.1.1 General Characteristics of Respondents

A. Respondents by Sex and Age

According to the In-depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion (FDG) conducted, the total participants of this particular research are 115 out of which 52.21 % are female whereas 47.79 % are male participant. This is so because the author of the research want to be inclusive as far as gender equality is concerned. Plus as it has been clearly avowed on the literature review regarding the consequence of conflict in Africa women and children are venerable. Subsequently in order to take this into account, 52.21% of the study participants are women. Despite the participation of women is more or less superior, there is still an attempt made to entertain men's voice as well. Therefore as much as possible inclusiveness and comprehensiveness of the two gender perspective was given priority.

Table 2: Percentage Distributions of Respondents by Sex and Age

Description		Number of Respondent	Percentage of Respondent
Sex	Male	48	41.66%
	Female	67	58.33%
	Total	115	100%
Age	18-35 Years	83	72.5%
	36-46 Years	22	19.16%
	Above 46 Years	10	8.3%
	Total	115	100%

Source: In-Depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion of 2016

As indicated in Table 2, out of the total respondents, 83 (72.5%) of them are in the age range of 18-35 years, 22 (19.16%) of respondents are in the age range of 36-45 years and only 10 (8.3%) of respondents are in the age range of over 46 years. Subsequently, the researcher comes in term with the fact that the majority 83 (72.5 %) of the respondents classified under the productive age category (18-45). Furthermore only 10 (8.3%) of the participants have an age of over 46 years. Hence, the majority of the research participants are in the productive age that they can work to change their life and their country.

B. Respondents Religious Status

Table 3: Percentage Distributions by Religious Status

Description		Number of Respondent	Percentage of Respondents
Religious Status	Christian	81	70%
	African Traditional Religion	19	16.66%
	Muslim	3	3.33%
	Unaffiliated	12	10%
Total		115	100 %

Source: In-Depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion of 2016

According to the above Table (Table: 3) the majority 81 (70 %) of the total respondents was Christians, while 19 (16.66%) of the respondents were following African Traditional Religion. And the remaining 3 (3.33%) and 12 (10%) were Muslims and Unaffiliated respectively. In almost similar proportion, with religious follower of South Sudan, large numbers of followers are Christians followed by

African Traditional Religion, whilst the remaining are Unaffiliated and followers of the Islamic religion. One observation confirmed by this study is that none of the religions seems to be altering the prevalence of conflict and consequences of the conflict.

C. Respondents by Marital Status and Family Size

Table 4: Percentage Distributions of Respondents by Marital Statuses and Family Size


Description		Number of Respondent	Percentage of Respondents
Marital Status	Single	17	15%
	Married	44	38 %
	Widowed	46	40 %
	Divorced	4	3.4%
	Separated	4	3.6%
	Total	115	100 %
Family Size	1-4	23	20 %
	5-10	78	68%
	More than 10	14	12%
Total		115	100 %

Source: In-Depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion of 2016

The above table revealed that, 17(15 %) of respondents are single, 44 (38 %) are married, 46(40%) of respondents are widowed, 4 (3.4 %) of them are divorced and whereas 4(3.6 %) of them are separated. These indicate that the mainstream participants are widowed. Following the number of widow's research participants, the number of married who have participated in both in the In-depth Interviews and Focus Group Discussions is higher which is related with the consequence of the current conflict. With respect to family size, 23 (20 %) of the respondents have the family size of 1-4, 78 (68 %) respondents have a family size of 5-10 and 14 (12 %) respondents have a family size of more than 10. This shows that most of the In-depth Interviews and Focus Group Discussions participants have 5-10 family size. This has implication on subsisting large family size with war torn economy and limited income.

D. Respondents by Level Education

Figure 5: Percentage Distribution of Respondents by Level of Education



Source: In-Depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion of 2016

As indicated in Figure 1, from the total respondents, 20 (17%) are illiterate, 25 (22 %) can read and write, 44 (38 %) of respondents have primary level of educational achievement (1-8), 23 (20 %) high school (9-10), 2 (2 %) respondents are Diploma holders and 1 (1%) respondents have BA Degree and above. This shows that the majority of the In-depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion participants have low level of education. Only 3 % of the respondents have diploma and above. This has implication on how the conflict is exerting a pressure on educational sector.

In addition to In-Depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion with research participants there was a Key Informant Interview and Documentary analysis applied as an effective data collection technique. As a result Key Informant Interview with academician, political analysts, diplomats, government official, IGAD officials and AU officials has been conducted.

5.2 The Genesis/Causes of the Current Conflict in South Sudan

5.2.1 Internal Causes of the Conflict

5.2.1.1 Historical Causes

From Key Informant Interviews with a Political Analyst the author of the research learnt that long before the eruption of violence in December 2013, political stability in South Sudan was in jeopardy by the protracted and unsettled historical rivalries between President Kiir and former Vice President Machar, tracing back to the 1990s. Thus, the current internal crises within the SPLM/A could historically be mapped out back to the establishment of the SPLM/A itself (Gil, 2014). In fact Key Informant Interview with one respondent from the academics affirms this authenticity by stating

the fact that at the beginning of the birth of the movement in 1983, divergence over leadership and vision within the party led to an internal fight between two factions (KII, Professor Rhodes, July, 2015, Washington-DC). To be more specific and precise, after being a major in Sudan's national army, Kiir joined the SPLM led by John Garang in 1983, and assisted in establishing the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). By comparison, Machar joined the SPLM/A in 1984 (Gil, 2014 and SUDD Institute, 2014). Main while two kind of ideological thinking over vision and leadership started to revolve around the group, which has split the group into different faction. One on the one hand was made up of Separatists whose principal intention was an outright independence of southern sudan and the other faction encompassed Unionists led by Dr John Garang who demanded fighting for the transformation of the old Sudan into a New Sudan. Disapproving Garang's aspiration of a United Sudan with recognition of the south and fighting for South Sudan's secession, Machar broke away and established the SPLM/A Nasir group in 1991, which evolved, and turn out to be the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) in 1995 (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2011 and SUDD Institute, 2014).

Even though the differences were basically ideological and tactical, the fight that ensued between these two factions pitted the Nuer against the Dinka in the end, thereby resulting in the beginning of political rivalry (Girma, 1997 and SUDD Institute, 2014). Not only has this but also the situation culminated massive displacement and deaths in the two communities. Khartoum uses Riek Machar as new proxy in the civil war in what had been a relatively successful counter-insurgency approach against the SPLM/A (Koos & Gutschke, 2014; Awolich, 2014 and Gil, 2014). As a result of internal tensions within his group that was weakened militarily,

Riek decided to pursue a peace agreement with the Sudanese government and eventually negotiated and signed what was known as the Khartoum Peace Agreement in 1997 (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2011). In 2002, Riek Machar apprehended that the Khartoum Peace Agreement was a travesty as the government successfully stifled any chance for its meaningful execution, following which he started communicating with Dr John Garang, the then leader of the SPLM/A (SUDD Institute, 2014). In January 2002, Machar welcomed and agreed to amalgamate back into Garangs SPLA, and he was made the third man in the SPLMs power structure. The return of Riek Machar and Lam Akol to the SPLM lend a hand to unite the people of South Sudan prior to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 (Awolich, 2014).

Following Dr John Garang's death in 2005, his deputy, Salva Kiir Mayardit, became the SPLM chairman and commander-in-chief of the SPLA, the President of the Government of South Sudan, and the first vice president of the Republic of South Sudan, Riek Machar became his deputy and Lam Akol became the foreign minister of the South Sudan (SUDD Institute, 2014). This was largely to appease ethnic tensions and launch a process of reconciliation and national cohesion. The prospects for the envisaged referendum and independence of South Sudan propelled this unity, as South Sudan’s secession was the one thing only few South Sudanese diverge with at that particular moment (Gil, 2014).

Subsequent to the signing of the CPA, the SPLM held its Second National Convention in 2008. In this convention, ciphers of power struggle emerged as Riek Machar sought to contest for the SPLM chairmanship, a position that would make him president in the 2010 elections (Awolich and Akol, 2013). Nevertheless, President Salva Kiir keep

hold of his position and also expressed publicly that he did not want to work with Riek Machar and the then SPLM Secretary General, Pagan Amum, aiming to appoint people of his choice (SUDD Institute, 2014). Even though the meeting was highly politicized, the delegates voted to keep the status quo to make certain continuity and unity within the party in the face of the 2010 Elections against Sudan's ruling party, the National Congress Party (NCP). Consequently, Kiir was reconfirmed as the chairman, Riek Machar his first deputy, and Pagan Amum the secretary general (Awolich & Akol, 2013; Gil, 2014 and SUDD Institute, 2014).


In spite of the fact that Salva Kiir choose Riek Machar as his running partner to keep the party's and peoples harmony, the 2010 Elections created an additional source of tensions within the SPLM. The undemocratic procedures to choose party candidates for diverse political positions used by the Political Bureau (SPLMs main and highest political organ) resulted and hurt relations among companions within the party (Awolich, 2013). Those who were not elected to compet on the SPLM tickets stood as independent candidates, and most of them lost in the elections. This move essentially led to some notable rebellions in Unity, Jonglei, and Upper Nile states. The rebellion was led by David Yau Yau, George Athor, Gatluak Gai, Johnson Oliny and others particularly, from these areas (Sudd Institute, 2014). Over all from the above section once can crystal clearly observe that the historical competitive nature of the political elites since the inception. Certainly the rationale behind this historical competition could be power, power has the supremacy to influence and control major state instruments.

5.2.1.2 Political Causes of the Conflict

I. Power Struggle

The December 15, 2013 violent conflict that erupted in South Sudan and which pushed the country towards civil war was the result of diverse factors, but the most direct and immediate appear to have been the political disputes between the country's leader's over-power.

Figure 6: Participants Response to the Immediate/ Incident Causes of the Conflict



Source: In-Depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion of 2016

As indicated in Figure 2, from the total In-Depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion respondents, 82(71%) believe that the immediate cause of the conflict is directly related with power struggle between the political elite and 33 (29%) respondents think that it is not power which is the immediate causes of the conflict (FGD and IDI, 2016, Juba). In an attempt to gather more detailed data and input the researcher has attempted to incorporate the In-Depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion result along with documentary analysis and Key Informant Interview.

Subsequently Key Informant Interview has also been conducted with academics, diplomats, higher government officials along with AU and IGAD officials and other International organization stuffs.

Therefore according to the Key Informant Interview that has been conducted with one of the Academician, the researcher learnt that prior to the outbreak of violence on December 15, 2013, there were some elements of signals as early as 2008 that threatens the ideal aim of sustainable peace (KII, Dr. Jeffrey, January, 2016, Addis Ababa). Specifically the divergence within the party indicates violence.

In similar vein a Key Informant Interview conducted with one of the African Union officials shows that, conflicts emerged within the SPLM in 2008/9 as southern sudan prepared to hold elections in 2010. At that particular moment, disparities between the President and Pagan Amum, the former Secretary General of the SPLM had jeopardized to ruin progress towards elections. The disparities were in due course resolved, with large scores of people urging for unity of purpose as the elections and the final referendum come close (KII, Dr. Kambudzi, April, 2016, Addis Ababa).

Again basing upon the Key Informant Interview with other academics, the other indicator that can demonstrate power struggle as causes of conflict in South Sudan was the relationship between the President and his Vice President. Indeed according to one of this academician personal expressions "before *the year 2010 elections, the relationship between the two political elites was already tense and edgy, and that these divergences were cold shouldered due to the very basic need of the group for unity within the party during the Interim Period (2005-2011)*" (KII, Dr. Maria, January, 2016, Addis Ababa). In deed many of the research participants continuously stressed on the fact that the split in 1991 within SPLM, and the rearrangement of the

SPLM leadership to integrate Riek Machar on his return were to a certain extent accountable for the cold relationship that continued in the government following independence ($FGD_{1,3,\ 7}$, April, 2016, Juba). What is more according to the exhaustive Key Informant Interview with one of the diplomat interviewed, in the year 2010, the two leaders are said to have supported adversary candidates in a number of key electoral positions, particularly the governorships of several states (KII, Mr Husini, August, 2015, Addis, Ababa).

Plus other respondents who are and used to be South Sudan government officials described to the researcher a good insight as far as working relationship between the two leaders is concerned. In fact they mentioned the existence of difficult working relationship and that throughout the interim period and after independence, there had been no smooth and positive communication between the Office of the President and that of the Vice President, with each recruiting other relationships and working directly with other government officials. Based on the remarks of South Sudanese government official who served with both of the political leaders "*there is no harmonized and effective working relationship between the Office of the President and the Vice President's office and vice versa, for extended period of time for this reason it gives the notion that there were two parallel governments, and that the political disparity within the SPLM merely accentuated the factionalism revolving around the two leaders"* (KII, Mr John, April, 2016, Addis Ababa) .

Furthermore during the period of independence the highest members of the Political Bureau visited South Sudan's ten states, which were aimed at extending gratitude to the people for their unreserved support during the years of the liberation struggle and of leading a successful referendum that guaranteed independence (Awolich & Akol, 2013 and SUDD Institute, 2014). Instead of congratulatory intentions, these political

leaders promptly found a condemnation of the party alleging that the government had not been able to deliver the extremely needed services such as road networks, security, health facilities and education, among others (Awolich and Akol, 2013). In March 2013, after the arrival of the SPLM leaders from the field, a meeting of the Political Bureau was held to deliberate on the criticisms. At the meeting, the major party leaders accused each other for the noticeable failure in the social, economic and political conditions (SUDD Institute, 2014 and Awolich & Akol, 2013). Particularly, Pagan Amum and Reik Machar confronted the President openly, blaming him for failing the party and declared their intentions to overthrow him from the party chairmanship in the next 2015 SPLM National Convention (SUDD Institute, 2014 and Awolich & Akol, 2013).

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Political Bureau was apparently divided and people became increasingly angry. The President took the challenges presented against him as a pre text to take away power from his own hands. To show his frustration, in April 2013 he removed delegated powers from Riek Machar and rumors of government reshuffle followed thereafter (Awolich, 2013 and Blanchard, 2014). By July 2013, especially on the occasion of South Sudan's Independence Anniversary, the split within the party became apparent. Pagan Amum, the SPLM Secretary General, who usually ran the ceremony of such proceedings, was not present. Even during the anniversary commemoration, the President on purpose rejects to recognize the presence of Riek Machar at the ceremony (Awolich, 2013 and SUDD Institute, 2014). After the Independence Anniversary, party officials were talking publicly about the internal party politics centered on the political divergences over the party's leadership and future direction that highly led to splits (International Crisis Group, 2014). Despite the fact that the condition in the party was going out of

control, the President decided to dissolve the entire cabinet, including the sacking of top leaders like Riek Machar (the former-vice president and the current SPLM-IO rebel leader) and Pagan Amum (the former SPLM Secretary General) (Koos and Gutschke and SUDD Institute, 2014). This measure of the President resulted in the formation of a new government that excluded all those who diverged with him in various areas and this in turn aggravated the crisis, particularly, when he offered very senior cabinet positions to people from outside the party who had recently joined the SPLM (Awolich & Akol, 2013).

Moreover, the President dissolved, the SPLM party structures in November 2013, in that the political prospect of a number of SPLM leaders was undoubtedly threatened (SUDD Institute, 2014). The suspension of the party structures fundamentally annoyed those who were removed and seemingly consolidated the two factions under Riek Machar and Pagan Amum against the President (Blanchard, 2014 and Awolich & Akol, 2013). As it was plainly stated by the Sudd Institute (2014), under the leadership of Riek Machar on December 6, 2013 these groups held a joint press conference, in which they strictly criticized the President and his new government and accused him for dragging the country purportedly into chaos. This press conference seriously heightened the internal party crises and provoked fears among citizens. The government led by Vice President James Wani Igga reacted to the press conference furiously and it was noticeable that the country was in deep crisis. Only a week after the press conference the violent events of December 15, 2013 was ensued (International Crisis Group, 2014).

As a matter of fact political rivalries between the two men continued. Kiir and Machar have significant disparities on fundamental aspects of the country's leadership and party, and governance and direction. The two men believe in two different kinds of

relations with Sudan. Contrary to Machar, Kiir is willing to maintain good relations with Sudan and collaborate with Khartoum regarding their respective insurgents. Machar also diverged with Kiir in the manner of running the country and has criticized Kir for his 'dictatorial' tendencies (Gil, 2014). Article 101 of South Sudan's Transitional Constitution, vested numerous powers on the President, who can run state affairs with very limited consultation, including removal of elected officials (Transitional Constitution of Republic of South Sudan, 2011). President Kiir over used these powers, notably after Machar declared in March 2013 his intention to contest for the party chairmanship (Blanchard, 2014 and Awolich & Akol, 2013).

The numerous dismissals of SPLM officials from most of the executive positions consequently are indicative of the result of a long-term struggle for power between Kiir and Machar (Gil, 2014). Political disputes were also fuelled by the corruption, patronage and impunity by both sides, leading to an even more complex crisis (Breidlid and Arensen, 2014).

II. Corruption, Patronage and Impunity

Even though South Sudan's current conflict stems in large part from a long-running competition within the elite class for power and profits, the effect of corruption shouldn't be overlooked. Corruption symbolizes a menace to the stability and security of societies, weakens the institutions of democracy, ethical values, justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and rule of law (De Waal, 2014b). According to this research inquires related to corruption with academics, political analysts and with some of the Focus Group Discussion participant's the researcher heard and learned that corruption has been a major problem for South Sudan since they have gained independence and also before independence as well. It has conquered levels of gross and egregious theft, for which no potential moral or historical justification can be

advanced. Key Informant Interview with one of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) official stipulates this fact and she stated that "*Corruption has also played a major role, both in the destruction of the country as a whole and specifically in the isolation of its people from their rulers and thus providing an enabling environment to the current conflict.*" She further added that the new state was also dominated by the military elite which is strongly fragmented and marked by competing clientelist networks along tribal and ethnic lines (KII, Mrs Hanna, February, 2016, Addis Ababa).

In fact the diverging interests of the military elite are kept in balance around the President Salva Kiir administration which forces the regime to eventually become susceptible to the demands of the many competing groups and thus open up to corruption and clientelism (Lacher, 2012). Correspondingly, a Key Informant Interview with one of the experts in South Sudanese peace and security issues also adhere to this fact and he stated in his own particular words saying "*from the time of the CPA in 2005, the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) has put forwarded efforts into incorporating potential rebels and pleasing allies by appointing them to senior rewarding or symbolic posts"* (KII, Mr Berouk, June, 2016, Addis Ababa). These arrangements often consume large proportions of the state budget with ministries, agencies and commissions growing in number. National and State Parliaments serve above all as instruments of patronage (Lacher, 2012). A number of the Focus Group Discussion participant has also voiced governors appointing members of their own clan without observable functions (FGD_2, April, 2016, Juba). According to the Key Informant Interview with one of the academician avowed that political accommodation, as an approach for stability, is a way of favoring the patronage system. In this regard, the respondent further added that "South Sudan's state was

turning into the private property of its leading political class, putting the affairs of governance and the wealth it produces well away from citizens reach" (KII, Professor Rhodes, July, 2015, Washington-DC). As a result the existence of widespread corruption especially in a society overwhelmed by mass poverty and very high levels of unemployment has a deeply corrosive effect on the trust of the people towards the government and thus this has also eventual contribution to crime and political disorder.

Indeed in a political sphere, corruption damages democracy and good governance by flouting or even subverting formal processes. Corruption in legislative bodies alters representation and distorts accountability; corruption in public administration results in the unequal distribution of services (De Waal, 2014b). Generally corruption erodes the institutional capacity of government as procedures are overlooked, resources are siphoned off, and public offices are bought and sold. At the extreme uncontrolled corruption can lead to state fragility and destructive conflict and push a state into "Continuous cycle of institutional anarchy and violence" said the key informant interviewee from Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (KII, Mr Camlus, February, 2016, Addis, Ababa).


A political analyst from the Key Informant Interview affirmed that corruption in South Sudanese's political cycle and the public sector is also marked by segregation of the vast majority of citizens from natural resource benefits (KII, De Waal, August, 2016, Addis, Ababa). This incident has resulted grievance and treat which has nurtured participation in and mobilization for, violence (De Waal, 2014b). There was also a clear indication from the Focus Group Discussion that being from the same ethnicity as the political group in power was key tool to being able to benefit financially, politically and socially in a varied, heterogeneous country such as South

Sudan. This is therefore reflected in the mode of appointment in the public service/civil service where merit is not necessarily the exclusive basis of appointment and this has corrupted the process of institutional, and governance system, severely weakening institutions. A 35 years old man from the In-Depth Interview has also said "being *of the "right" ethnicity and having the correct association is key to achieve positions. Public appointments are used to prize those who have been part of the "right" ethnic group and those who were member of the liberation struggle"* (IDI_{28}, April, 2016, Juba).

In this regard, a Key Informant Interview with a political analyst and expert in Peace and Security issues has also narrated the situation as follow; "There *is this type of development that we struggled and you did not struggled. This has been part of conversation and social training and it has formed the divergences amongst the South Sudanese who voted for independence apart from achievement that all of them participated from whenever they were. Nevertheless still the idiom is there, we struggled, and you differences between the senior officials and even the people themselves*" (KII, De Waal, August, 2016, Addis Ababa).

Furthermore, various institutions established to rank countries standing as far as corruption and fraud issues is concerned, continues to rank South Sudan among the worst countries. A case in point in this regard is Trading Economics ranking of South Sudan for corruption in the following graph.

Figure 7: Corruption Index of South Sudan



Source: - Trading Economics (2015)

Once more Transparency International has also ranked South Sudan and perceived the country as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. South Sudan scored 15 point out of 100 on the 2014 corruption index. Again corruption index in South Sudan averaged 14.50 points from 2013 until 2014, reaching an all-time high point in 2014.

Additionally, merely about 10 to 20% of the country's revenue goes to the states and rural areas whereas the rest remains in Juba and has become the reward for which the country's armed actors are maneuvering (International Crisis Group, 2014). In fact on this regard Alex De Waal (2014), who was also one of the key informant of this research state that "*corruption has turned out to be the lifeblood of politics, rendering the ways to appoint armed actors, uphold the political power balance, and fund patronage networks*". In spite of the formal economy's free-fall, the illegal economic activity continues to flourish. On the top of this nevertheless budgets and other finances are diverted from various sectors. Key Informant Interview with one of the

political analyst who basically work on issues of South Sudan conflict asserts this eventual fact and it is therefore presented in the following statement; "*there has been a great deal of speculation about the amount of money that has been sidetracked, but many assert the total amount to be in the billions of dollars*" (KII, Mr Andrews, December, 2015, Addis Ababa). Nevertheless again as many can remember in 2012, President Salva Kiir lay blame on 75 ministers and officials of having stolen $4 billion in state funds and demand the money to be returned, but according to news reports, only 1.5% of this sum was actually recovered (Aljazeera, 2014). Furthermore, only a fraction of the recovered wealth was actually reinvested into the country and revenues from the oil sector are rarely reinvested in critical sectors of the economy, as evidenced by the lack of implementation of the petroleum revenue management bill, which would allocate oil revenue to non-oil sectors of the economy (Nyathon et al, 2016). The lack of development outside the oil sector has left South Sudan among the world's poorest nations. Meanwhile, elites on both sides have the resources to maintain an armed conflict that began in December 2013 and has since killed tens of thousands of people, displaced over millions, and has left another millions, or around 40 percent of the population, food insecure (Mulugeta,2015).

What is more, since South Sudan's independence, the government has largely squandered its economic potential and political goodwill, by becoming a kleptocracy where political power is leveraged to secure wealth (De Waal, 2014b). In deed the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 between Sudan and the SPLA was followed by large increases in government funds. In 2004, the total revenue managed by the SPLM Ministry of Finance was $120,000, 000 however by 2006 it had expanded to $1.7 billion, and between 2008 and 2014, South Sudan's total budget was SSP 52 billion, or US$18.2 billion. In addition to this the country has been

a major beneficiary of international assistance, anticipated at roughly US130 dollars per capita until 2013 (King, 2015). This aid has permitted South Sudan levels of public spending to amplify without any viable and real investment in infrastructure and South Sudanese livelihood improvement. Nevertheless an enormous amount of aid and other finances was rather spent on patronage network development with no legal apparatus taking individuals accountable for committing such offences (King, 2015). This is so because since independence, South Sudan has been controlled by a small, rotating set of elites who move immaculately between positions in government and the frontlines of the rebellion, as political situations change.

Key Informant Interview conducted with a political analyst attempted to indicate how the current conflict started and how political power was used to benefit certain individual at the expense of other. Below is the statement of this political analyst; " *In July 2013, President Kiir reshuffled his whole cabinet, eliminating prominent elites, such as former Vice President Riek Machar, and firing a group of ethnically diverse cabinet ministers and high-level officials. Most of these individuals had played most important roles in the country's political and economic decisions in the post-independence government, and after being pushed out of the government, many joined a political opposition bloc that soon devolved into an armed opposition. Meanwhile, President Kiir has sought to consolidate power around his loyalists, particularly those from his home state of Warrap*" (KII, De Waal, August, 2016, Addis Ababa). This unequal representation in ruling circles positively will have a prominent effect on the current conflict.

Besides the Key Informant Interviews, many participants from the Focus Group Discussions demonstrated the fact that citizens commonly face demands for bribes in their dealings with government institutions to access basic public services. Coming to

the reasons for paying bribes, the majority of the respondents have reported "to stay away from a problem with the authorities" or "to speed things" ($FGD_{2,4,5}$, April, 2016, Juba). All in all, what has been described as widespread corruption in South Sudan by the research participants has constituted a grievance and threat which has cultivated participation in, and mobilization for, violence. This demands clear need for a leadership in the control and accesses of public posts and natural resources. Plus deep reforms are necessary in these particular areas so as to equalize the current inequality and enable the South Sudanese people to benefit developmentally. All this according to the author of this research alleviate the disconnection between the government and the population of South Sudan.

III. Militarization and Arm Proliferation

The linkage between conflict and militarization is an established process in South Sudan current conflict. A report released by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) state that South Sudan has shown a steady rise in military expenditure from $982m in 2013 to $1.08bn in 2014, making it the principal spender in the region. In fact in South Sudan, defense still consumes an excessive share of national budgets, easily outstripping social spending. Fortunately on this regard the author of this research have had a Key Informant Interview with one diplomat from Ethiopia and the diplomat said " South Sudan exclusively depends on oil revenue and oil covers 98 % of the national revenue and oil sector generate an approximate gross oil income of $3.38 billion. After deducting $884million in payments to Sudan for the usage of the pipeline and other fees and another deduction of repayments of loan to donors and international financers, juba remains only with $1.715 billion from oil revenues. The government as a result spends 60% of its overall net oil revenues on

military" (KII, Mr Daniel, March, 2016, Addis Ababa). This has created resentments and grievances by the local community because government is using its large amount of revenue to strengthen itself and fight back the opposition which is at the expense of livelihood improvement of South Sudanese and the coming generation said the diplomat from Ethiopia.

Another dimension of militarization in South Sudan conflict is related to aspects that support the increase and persistence of guerrilla movements. The very few opportunities for employment available to young men also help to explain recruitment into guerrilla movements. In-Depth Interview with 38 years old man substantiates the above statement by saying "The guerrilla organization presents opportunities for survival, rewards, recognition and advancement not available to most civilians in South Sudan" (IDI_{15}, April, 2016, Juba). Where the guerrilla movement is financially sound and internationally recognized some of its members to play the role of diplomats overseas to the point of being recognized as actors to reckon with in the international scene. This factor of the persistence of guerrilla movements has produced what could be referred to as the "institutionalization of the guerrilla mentality" in some of its members, such that some individuals become hesitant to give up the life of a guerrilla even after peace is negotiated to end the conflict said the African Union Peace and Security Council Department official (KII, Braham, July, 2016, Addis Ababa).

Closely related to the increase and persistence of guerrillas is the fact that there is increasing assumption that there are certain neighboring states surrounding South Sudan who are willing to encourage a group interested to revolt, or at least support their activities. A Key Informant Interview with a diplomat further added upon this point he said "the *physical fact of multiple borders makes them difficult to keep watch*

over successfully. Accordingly, the use of guerrillas to intervene in another state is a strong element in many of African conflicts including South Sudan and at times a favored foreign policy tool" (KII, Ambassador Fisseha, June, 2015, Addis Ababa). Supplying arms to guerrillas, serving as conduits for weapons coming from outside and providing bases and training facilities are the principal interventionist tactics used.

In fulfilling its functions of guardian of authority and legitimacy, the South Sudan government attempts to accumulate enough instruments of coercion to deter potential domestic challengers and discourage external aggressors said official from African Union. Consequently the government of South Sudan typically imports a bulk of modern weapons systems and recruits people into the military. The bulk of imported modern weapons are usually in the hands of the soldiers and these soldiers whenever they feel that they are mistreated or they are being used rather than taking advantage of the system political disorder will become an eventual reality. In fact this was what happened on December 15, 2013 when some of ethnically Nuer presidential guards fought Dinka presidential guards (Breidlid and Arensen, 2014). Therefore importation of modern weapons and illegal means's to the take hold of weapon has brought about unintended consequences that back-fire the current crises

Correspondingly, as far as the other cause of conflict in South Sudan is concerned the existence of plentiful weapons as a consequence of past war should not be omitted from the analysis of the potential causes of the current conflict. The second civil war in Sudan lasted approximately more than two decades and resulted in high militarization and arms proliferation among civilians (Small Arms Survey, 2014). Therefore prior to South Sudan independence, the civil war in Sudan had devastated the whole country with most of the country transformed into a war zone. "*Every*

person in the country had access to arms, either from the Government of the Sudan, the Sudan's People Liberation Army or the militias" said the political analyst from the Key Informant Interview of this research study (KII, Dr. Dersso, April, 2016, Addis Ababa). The Government of Sudan in fact has supported various ethnic groups and proxy militias to fight with each other and also to fight with the Sudan's People Liberation Army (SPLA) to weaken its position as a setback strategy during the liberation struggle (Small Arms Survey, 2014). The existence of plentiful of weapons from past war and the aforementioned ways of supporting proxy militias has contributed to the current conflict of South Sudan.

In addition to this, civilians get hold of arms through the porous border of South Sudan since neither the government nor Sudan's people liberation Army had complete control of the whole country , the Lord's of Resistance Army (LRA) formerly used South Sudan as their operational base to fight the government of Uganda. The existence of the LRA has left behind a number of weapons in civilian possession even after the LRA departed South Sudan (Breidlid and Arensen, 2014). Moreover, numerous South Sudanese are nomads. They often travel to neighboring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda, where they obtain arms and ammunition. So the flow of arms in and out of South Sudan is not managed and controlled even today (Small Arms Survey, 2014). Not only this but also some militias and tribal fighters. for example senior SPLA generals such as the late George Athor and David Yau, Who defected after they were denied tickets in the 2010 general election by the ruling party, turned into rebels and supplied weapons and ammunitions to civilians to serve their political agenda (Mayank,2015).

Furthermore a Key Informant Interview with officials from African Union Peace and Security Council department demonstrates that some civilians acquired firearms for

personal protections where adequate civilian protections services were found limited. However, the weaponries are being misused by civilians (KII, Dr. Kambudzi, April, 2016, Addis Ababa). In fact a Key Informant Interview with one of the political analyst on this regard is narrated as follow: "The *arms trouble was further exacerbated by the influx of arms from rebel groups to the communities. The query that hangs in the mind is weather the arms are astutely used or being misused by the civilians. Apparently, there could be need for civilians to be armed"* (KII, Mr. Lucas, December, 2015, Addis Ababa). Likewise another Key Informant from the Key Informant interview said "*though the earlier war has ended, the SPLA constantly fails to prevent arm proliferation and alter its solider from returning to civilian life*" (KII, Moses, February, 2016, Addis Ababa).

IV. Weak Institutional Capacity

As a matter of fact, the breakdown of institutionalization of the political system and disregard for the rules of the game is also the potential causes of the current crisis. The Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was established on a weak groundwork. On this regards interview with one of the respondents from the academics suggests that "*Among other reasons the crisis in South Sudan is also associated with the inability of relevant institutions to manage and mediate conflicts, which splits out into the army, and subsequently the general population. Additionally, South Sudan beyond the political conflict, the country encounters a challenge of weakness or absence of institutions and the lack of institutional capacity within the state appears to be a case in point*" (KII, Mr Negusu, January, 2016, Addis Ababa). The establishment of institutions was based on ethnic aggregation and personality cults. Key Informant Interview with a political analyst affirms the above statement when he described his

personal view as follow “The political system entrenched institutionalized mistrust where political leaders had more faith in ethnic protegees than in national institutions enshrined in the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (TCRSS)” (KII, Mr Pyton, December, 2015, Addis Ababa). Established institutions were highly politicized without taking due note of rules and regulations governing them. Conversely, where there were such rules and regulations they were relegated to the margins of the modus operandi (De Waal, 2014a). These structures were inherited by the government of South Sudan at independence on 9 July 2011. Further, little attention was paid to national reconciliation. Political leaders fail to spot the opportunity to promote post-conflict peace building among the people and institutions after the unity of South Sudan was demonstrated during the Referendum vote of January 2011 (Debay, 2012).

Structural problems in the creation of political institutions add another dimension to the current crisis. The conclusion of long civil war witnessed integration of multiple strata of civil and military organizations into political units like political parties, the civil service and security sector institutions. These institutions were composed of blocks of war time groups whose attitudes and behavior structurally undermined nation building processes said Key Informant from the academics (KII, De Waal, August, 2016, Addis Ababa). This could clearly be seen in entourages of people holding top national executive positions. They recruited armies of body guards from their family members, clans, tribal or regional clusters (De Waal, 2014a). This fact demonstrates the composite of the fragile political system before and after independence of South Sudan.

The basis of democracy consists of political parties. The Sudan People's Liberation Party/Army (SPLM/A) was by far the most dominant political institution in the political system of South Sudan. Relations between the party and the army remained, nevertheless, imprecise (The Enough Project, 2014). The function of national defense was constitutionally conferred on the SPLA while the role of governance became the responsibility of SPLM as the majority party in the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) and The Council of States (CoS). The composition of the SPLA lacked an integrated structure for national defense (Awolowich, 2015). Loyalty of the army was separated between political factions of the SPLM and its leaders to the extent that neutral political observers regarded the army as instrument of individuals in the party said one of the political analyst and Key informant of this research study (KII, Mr Berouk, June, 2016, Addis Ababa). The policy of rewarding rebel groups with integration into the army created severe imbalances in the structure of the SPLA at the expense of peaceful regions in other parts of South Sudan. Hence, personal and structural disputes were developing into dangerous levels to the extent that people began to speculate the bitter end of squabbles within the SPLM/A (Blanchard, 2014 and Awolich & Akol, 2013).

V. Instrumentalization of Ethnic Identities

The concept of ethnicity in Africa in general and South Sudan in particular is a commonality at the present time. It can be invoked to defend political, social and cultural positions because it carries authority, beyond rationality, preferences or choice. In fact ethnicity can be an instrument of socio-political mobilization and can also inspire organized violence and political instability (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2011 and Ylönen, 2012). Mareng (2009) put forwards that there is a sense that a scores of

conflicts in Africa have a political basis that also acquired an ethnic dimension, with civilians being intentionally targeted on their basis of ethnicity. Various divisions within the ruling party (SPLM/A), from the time of 1990s to present, turned the country into violence influenced by ethnic instrumentalization (Breidlid and Arensen, 2014). In spite of the fact that more than 60 ethnic groups make up South Sudan, the current conflict in South Sudan reflects the underlying tension and mistrust among the country's two main different ethnic groups: the Nuer and the Dinka. Even though Dinka and Nuer fought collaborating together against the government in Khartoum for decades, the relation between them remains uncertain. This uncertainty largely dates back to Sudan's civil war (1983-2005) when the SPLM and SPLA (and factions within them) competed for power by mobilizing supports around ethnic lines (Gil, 2014). These two groups have supplied the bulk of the guerrilla forces that have been fighting and struggling since 1983 to overthrow a northern dominated, national state government in Khartoum increasingly guided by Islamist political agendas and ideals (SUDD Institute, 2014).

These struggles have coalesced around two main figures: Dr John Garang supported by Kiir, a Dinka, and long-standing Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA, and Dr Riek Machar, a Nuer, who formed the break-away SPLA-Nasir faction following his botched coup attempt against Garang in August 1991(Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2011 and Sørbø, 2014). Initially, the two men as mentioned in the previous sections divided over the question of whether or not the SPLA should abandon its declared aim of creating a united, democratic, secular Sudan in favour of self-determination or political independence for the South. It was not long, however, before questions of nationalism gave way to a more basic drive for self-preservation. Both Garang and

Machar eventually reached for the ethnic card (Gil, 2014). What followed were years of increasingly anarchic south-on-south violence that have since destroyed hundreds of Dinka and Nuer communities throughout the Western Upper Nile, Bahr-el-Ghazal and Jonglei Provinces. Indeed, the bloody conflict exploded mainly between ethnic Dinka and ethnic Nuer, leading to the killing of thousands of civilians on both sides and mass starvation (Ottaway & El- Sadany, 2011 and Koos & Gutschke, 2014). One of the grossest human rights violations at that time and attributed to troops commanded by Machar was the Bor massacre in which at least 2 000 Dinka were killed in Bor, Jonglei State's capital. This planted bitterness and hatred between the two ethnic groups (Ottaway & El- Sadany, 2011 and Koos & Gutschke, 2014) and it was one of the grossest human rights violations.

As a result, the 1991 split more than any other incident drove the two communities apart, especially after thousands of Dinka civilians were killed allegedly in Bor massacre by the orders of Machar. These political feuds were tuned along ethnic lines and became a duel of superiority of one ethnic group over the other (Ottaway & El-Sadany, 2011 and SUDD Institute, 2014). However, twenty years later, in August 2011, Machar publicly apologized for his part in the massacre hoping that it would bring unity to the Dinka and Nuer tribes. The apology received mixed reactions by individuals belonging to the Nuer community whom regretted that the reconciliation was not a two way process (Sørbø, 2014).

Despite Machar apology, the event remained fresh in the collective memory of the Dinka and the Nuer with a potential to fuel resentment in the current struggle (Koos & Gutschke, 2014 and Sørbø, 2014). Hence, the current crisis in South Sudan also reflects the underlying tension and mistrust among South Sudanese belonging to the country’s two main different ethnic groups: the Nuer and the Dinka. As a result, the

ethnic targeted killings reported during the current crisis resonate with inter-ethnic violence generated by the SPLM/A split between the Garang faction (Dinka), supported by Kiir, and the Machar (Nuer).

Moreover, on this regard a Key Informant Interview with one of the expert in peace and security issues confirms that the disorder of political structures relating to ethnic groups has been a significant contributor to the power struggle among the South Sudanese communities (KII, Dr. Dersso, April, 2016, Addis Ababa). All in all, while much of the conflict is political, there are also ethnic drivers to the escalating violence, and the two are often difficult to distinguish. Dinka and Nuer ethnic identities were deliberately politicized during the Second Civil War, and militarized structures within communities, such as the Gelweng, Titweng and White Army/Bunam that remain powerful reference points for many young Dinka and Nuer (International Crisis Group, 2014). The polarization and arming of communities along ethnic lines in this conflict, and the manipulation by the powerful elites are a key factor that risks a rapidly deep and wide war with serious of regional humanitarian and political consequences (South Sudan Protection Cluster, 2014). Moreover, the persisting political behavior in South Sudan based on ethnic strongman patronage loyalties tend to hinder broad-based national development by conning it along ethnic, clan or family lines (Ylönen, 2012). Above and beyond as it was the case in 1991, ethnicity was not the initial cause of the sparking of violence in December 2013, although it was used in the conflict to target various groups of the society. Moreover, the unhealed wounds and lack of justice and reconciliation from atrocities in the past have also contributed to the spread and intensified fighting of the December 15, 2013 conflict

VI. Lack of Inclusiveness and Participatory State Apparatus

Inclusive governance is significant to the realization of democracy and peace dividends in states emerging from conflict. In principle, it offers platform for equitable representation of the ethnic majority, minority, marginalized and indigenous groups in public decision making bodies as well as ensuring that these groups benefit equally from development initiatives. However in South Sudan, the exercise of inclusivity has been marred with contradictions between constitutional provisions and extant practices (Radon & Logan, 2014). In fact, according to Key Informant Interview with higher government official, political parties in South Sudan are found to be the foci for rewarding the warlords named as freedom fighters at the expense of participatory civilian structures, the nerves of ethnic factionalism over nationalism, exercise of centralized nomination system (KII, March, 2016, Addis Ababa), all of which breed disaffection and tensions among the citizenry.

Additionally, the opposing political parties in South Sudan on the contrary were almost having no political influence and power (Awolowich, 2015). These parties institutions were built by converse underpinning and eventually altered the democratic principles of universal suffrage as espoused both in the TCSS (2011) and the political parties Act (2012) (TCSS,2011 and Awolowich, 2015). Key Informant of this research said again many aspects of elitism and centralized nomination systems paralyzed the SPLM and other opposing parties leading to disaffection amongst the citizens in general and the party's members in particular (KII, De Waal, August, 2016 , Addis Ababa).

Moreover, the observed militarization of public service, perception of ethnic favoritism in public employment and appointments, marginalization of regions

outside the urban centers, and unequal share of national resources comprise practices that violate the foundations of inclusive governance (Awolowich, 2015). These ills in the exercise of inclusivity compounded with the inability to meet the 25% quota threshold for women & minorities across appointive and elective positions cast doubt on significant aspect of legitimacy and accountability in post independent South Sudan (Mayai, 2014). For large scores of people the issue of equitable delivery of public service and goods has always been another concern. In fact before the outburst of the conflict in December 15, 2013 many South Sudanese were on the virtue of complaining the visible divergence in economic development among the 10 states and the devolving of additional funds at the expense of the others has thus frustrated and fueled the cause of conflict in South Sudan (Gil, 2014).

VII. Lack of Mechanism to Promote Check and Balance

Unsurprisingly, most accountability institutions before the eruption of the current conflict in South Sudan were in their embryonic stages (Mayai, 2014). Participants from the Focus Group Discussion stated that establishing effective checks and balances mechanism has been more neglected and were difficult to entrench in South Sudan especially in a system encompassed by patronage based and dysfunctional institutions (FGD, April, 2016, Juba). Appropriate case in point in this regard by one of the higher officials from the African Union Peace and Security Council department was the constitution of South Sudan itself. "An *interim constitution written by the SPLM was amended without serious review just before independence to serve as a transitional constitution. In addition to this until today the transitional constitution gives extraordinary powers to the president with almost no checks afforded to other branches of government*" (KII, Dr. Dersso, April, 2016, Addis, Ababa). The President cannot be impeached. He can dismiss the national and state assemblies and remove

the Vice President and state governors from office, as well as any justice or judge (The Enough Project, 2014 and Awolich and Akol, 2013). President Kiir exercised these powers in several occasion particularly when he removed state governors and the Vice President from office and dismissed his entire cabinet (Aljazeera, 2014 and Blanchard, 2014). In the same way, Key Informant Interview result with Ethiopian diplomat shows a similar case when he stated the fact that "*Article 101 of the Transnational Constitution concentrated a lot of powers in the position of the President that analysts described South Sudan politics as a zero-sum game. The constitution allows the President to single handedly ran the state affairs with very limited consultation including removal of elected officials which is definitely seen as a direct threat to principles of democratic governance and constitutionalism"* (KII, Mr Daniel, March, 2016, Addis Ababa). Data collected from the Focus Group Discussion participants also shows that the basic concept of a written constitution, which is in the position of providing the formal rules for how the state will function is still not familiar to most South Sudanese (FGD, April,2016, Addis Ababa).

In addition to the constitution, election can also be a good example on this regards. The first elections ever held throughout South Sudan took place prior to independence in 2010 as part of the CPA process, with contests at the national (then the united country of Sudan), regional (within the GoSS), and state levels (Mayank, 2015). In the South, the elections were marred by intimidation and violence by the SPLM (Mayank, 2015). Key Informant of this dissertation and a political analyst affirms this in his own statement *"The selection of SPLM candidates for office at the state and local levels was also highly controversial, with the party's headquarters overriding many state level party nominations. Some election results were completely disregarded at the state level. With no judicial recourse or other accountability*

structures through which to challenge these outcomes, several disgruntled losers took up arms including David Yau Yau in Jonglei state" (KII, De Waal, August, 2016, Addis Ababa).

Similarly the legislature were also very fragile in that the South Sudan National Legislative Assembly (NLA) is dominated by the SPLM, which holds more than 90 percent of its seats with the remainder were held by 5 opposition parties (Awolich and Akol, 2013). Most members were elected based on geographic constituencies, party lists, and a women's list. Yet some were appointed by the President. Legislation originates almost entirely from the executive and the NLA exercised little independent oversight of the executive in the form of hearings, investigations, debates, or budget management (Blanchard, 2014). Participant from the In-Depth Interview said "Most parliamentarians have infrequent contact with their constituents and were elected based on loyalty to the SPLM" (IDI_8, April, 2016, Juba). The majority of the population resides in rural areas and is still largely unfamiliar with these new political institutions, their representatives, and how they relate to the use of state resources or the presidency said participants from the Focus Group Discussions (FGD_2, April, 2016, Juba).

Likewise South Sudan were also lacking a functioning independent judiciary with the power to interpret laws and rule on the legality of executive actions, much less provide recourse to justice for citizens (The Enough Project, 2014 and Awolich and Akol, 2013). A Political Analyst and a Key Informant of this research said "Laws were poorly disseminated throughout South Sudan and there was a confusing array of customary chiefs' courts, which are appointed by state ministries of local governments, and government courts, which fall under the judiciary" (KII, Mr Payton, December, 2015, Addis Ababa). Participants from Focus Group Discussion said

courts at all levels were vulnerable to bribery and were also widely perceived to disadvantage the poor (FGD_2, April, 2016, Juba). South Sudan's states still rely on scarce roving mobile courts for formal justice. Recourse to public defenders, particularly for death row inmates, remains rare (Mayai, 2014). The lack of viable recourse options through the courts, consequently, may lead more citizens to seek alternative dispute resolution methods, including through violence. The perpetrators of this violence, many said from the Focus Group Discussion, are able "to kill innocent people, loot livestock, destroy property, abduct women and children and commit acts of sexual violence with impunity" (FGD_3, April, 2016, Juba). Increasing accountability for violent crimes through public prosecutions and trials, especially for rural populations, would have helped to ease people frustrations and ethnic hatred which will eventually resort to bloody conflict.

Again as far as political parties were concerned opposition parties were very weak, in terms of both resources and capacity, and were regularly intimidated and harassed by SPLM affiliated security agents (The SUDD Institute, 2013 and Awolowich, 2015). Several parties were also led by former commanders of rebel factions who opposed the SPLM/A during the war, who were depicted inherently sometimes as a suspect and dangerous in the eyes of the ruling party. Most retain loyal armed forces that can be mobilized to fight (Mayank, 2015). Reflective of its military origins, debate within the SPLM was not encouraged, dissent was not tolerated, and decisions emanate from the top (Breidlid and Arensen, 2014). The SPLM as a party were virtually indistinguishable from the Government of South Sudan and therefore does not advocate for higher standards of accountability or checks on government abuses of power (International Crisis Group, 2014). All in all, South Sudan's government and various institutions unfortunately has not provided mechanism for extending

accountable system for many of rules violated and committed by its forces and others, nor demonstrated the will to hold them accountable (Gil, 2014).

In summary, the absence of justice and accountability made several militia leaders to continue committing human rights violations particularly taking away innocent lives in the name of democracy and good governance (Radon and Logan, 2014). They know very well that there will be no justice and accountability at end of the day, but rather the Government will pay back by appeasement, pardon, general amnesty and finally integration into military and political structure of the government as commanders and constitutional post holders. In this situation, one must be confident that the condition erodes sense of national belonging and nationhood in South Sudan and cultivate sense of grievance and frustration upon South Sudanese citizens.

VIII. Lack of Commitment towards Nation Building

As it has clearly been mentioned in the previous section of this dissertation, the SPLM/A independence struggle ended through a negotiated Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, which aimed to achieve democratic transformation as well as self-determination for the people of South Sudan (Debay, 2012). However, the post-independence period also ushered in a number of challenges for the new state. These challenges were glaring and indicated troubled future times although the state with support from the international community was more concerned with state formation, establishing power structure and authority, as opposed to nation building which would require addressing the underlying drivers of conflict so as to establish a united South Sudan with a common idea of national identity (Sørbø, 2014). The emphasis to state formation however led to the emergence of certain contradictions which included the consolidation of a lot of powers to the presidency, an undisciplined army, highly militarized society, and the unwritten power sharing agreement that unfairly excludes

other ethnic groups and some other minorities (The Enough Project, 2014 and Awolich and Akol, 2013).

Despite the overwhelming support for independence, the country remains deeply divided along ethnic and tribal rivalry, thus a dysfunctional state (International Crisis Group, 2014). These contradictions have been in play and according to Mahmood Mamdani, caused the questioning of government of South Sudan's leadership at personal, ethnic and ideological levels (Mamdani, 2014). Therefore at this juncture the government needs to move towards the direction of dismantling what had remained a structure accountable to party levels only. And that politically reforms are mandatory, since the state army still lacks a semblance of a national army given that most of them are the collection of militia which are also controlled by ethnically affiliated generals (The Enough Project, 2014).

5.2.1.3 Economic Causes of the Conflict

I. Oil as Causes of the Conflict

Long before the atrocious conflict erupted on December 2013, South Sudan was already demonstrating all the indicators of the resource curse. Ninety-eight percent of the government's annual operating budget and 80 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were coming out of the oil industry, making South Sudan the most oil reliant country in the whole world (Nyathon et al, 2016). As a matter of fact oil production is one of the most imperative natural resource of the South Sudanese economy. In fact South Sudan is more dependent on oil than any other oil-exporting country in the world. For instance, between 2005 and 2011, oil exports amounted very high and accounted for 98% of total state revenues (Eveleens, 2014). But at that particular time rather than make use of this revenue to invest in public services and infrastructure to improve livelihoods, the government financed a military and security

apparatus. From the time of independence in 2011 as well, for example, South Sudan has allocated significant % of oil revenue to the military and security services, and only 10% to infrastructure and 7% to education (Nyathon et al, 2016). In addition, the excessively politicized antagonism of controlling the oil resource advantage had weakened the SPLA/M to use the oil wealth for the diversification of the South Sudanese economy. It had ignored the agricultural sector and held in reserve South Sudan to be highly dependent on imports of food and other commodities (Getachew, 2015). The already low competitiveness of the agricultural sector, let alone industrial and service sectors decreased even more due to the oil revenues coming in, showing the classical feature of the Dutch disease. On the top of this SPLA Government officials had embezzled much of the revenues from this sector and deposited the money in foreign countries (Tiitmamer and Awolich, 2014). Plus investments had concentrated in construction with a great bias towards the capital of Juba (Nyathon et al, 2016). Juba was benefiting a lot from oil money at the expense of other states in South Sudan. As a result every development effort by government has taken Juba into account as a major priority area.

South Sudan's reliance on oil revenue combined with Juba's skewed priorities has exacerbated political divisions among the ruling elite. This has in turn hindered efforts at building democratic institutions capable of bridging the divide between warring groups. Again the oil revenue, has failed the SPLM leadership to avoid investing in human resources, livestock and agriculture, upon which 80% of the population relies for basic needs. The power brokers and military leaders of the SPLM, most notably President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, the former Vice-president and the current rebel leader were full of activity claiming loyalty of various groups who can make sure or guarantee their own cut of national oil revenues (Tiitmamer and Awolich, 2014).

Meanwhile, other politicians in Juba have used the resources generated from oil exports to forge alliances with rural leaders along ethnic lines. It is no coincidence, for example, that following the escalation of violence in Juba on 15 December, 2013, rebels supporting Machar, the Nuer leader, immediately marched into, and took control of, large parts of the oil-rich Blue Nile and Unity states (De Waal and Victor, 2016). The rebel leaders real strategy is to put pressure on Kiir leadership in Juba, in order to gain greater access to political office and hence to the economic rewards of oil.

Therefore it is partly because of these reasons that discontent begun building up within the general population. Accusations of oil resources being unevenly distributed, allegations of corruption and development opportunities plus jobs awarded to a few became common (Tiitmamer and Awolich, 2014). Yet also after the CPA in 2005 most of the leaders of South Sudan just exchanged military uniforms for suits. Allegedly many of them begun amassing wealth and enriching themselves at the expense of other South Sudanese (Eveleens, 2014). This caused further discontentment within the population. The political disagreement that begun in December 2013 thus found ripening ground. Therefore, many persons disgruntled with the government became sympathizers, and joined the SPLM/A in opposition.

II. Marginalized Over Economic Resource Distribution

Prior to the outbreak of conflict profound inequalities and marginalization are professed in South Sudanese politics both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, South Sudan is heavily centralized, regardless of its quasi-federal splitting up into states. State governments are inadequately resourced, as a result there is little capacity to mobilize state populations for development against the center or against each other (Douglas, 2014). Contestation for their governorships has so far been within the

SPLM, although not always without violence. This said, distribution of patronage from oil revenues is much of the glue that binds them to the center (Tiitmamer and Awolich, 2014). County administrations are both ethnically based and appointed, leading to dissent over interference by the governor and sometimes rivalry with traditional leaders. More significantly, there remains little presence of the civilian state administration in rural areas where the largest part of the population lives (Douglas, 2014). The population thus lives significantly outside the reach of the state. There is little capacity of individuals or civil society to hold the authority at any level to account (Douglas, 2014).

Horizontally, South Sudan is deeply fragmented between its tribes and many more clans, most of which now control at least one county administration (The Enough Project, 2014 and Awolich and Akol, 2013). These exert competing claims to the state on their commissioners, legislators and sometimes governors and ministers especially in times of inter-communal violence. Eastern equatorial demonstrates the steady fragmentation of counties into tribal shares, as adversaries within county struggle for political and accompanying resources (De Waal, 2014b). The struggle at times goes far beyond individual figures access to power and patronage. While almost all tribes or clans whine of exclusion relative to their neighbors or larger groups. In this regard there are also some visible infrastructural differences among various tribal or clan based vicinities and this has therefore inculcated resentments (King, 2015).

In addition to exclusion between various ethnic and clans based areas there are two groups who are largely barred from power; these are the youths and the women's. Youths and women encompass a large share of the population of South Sudan and representation to this vast majority in political and socio-economic state of affairs is paramount. Struggles for political office are primarily between those who proved

themselves in the liberation struggle in one faction or another (De Waal, 2014a). Avenues for political advancement for the younger generation are quite limited, including within their own societies and communities, where elders dominate. While the 25% quota for woman's representation in the legislature is a start, there are few female leaders as ministers or senior civil servants, governor and commissioner. Women's voices are largely excluded from the household and the government state of affairs through customary authorities to party politics (Mayai, 2014). This systemic exclusion and marginalization of tribes, clans, youths and women has created resentment and has exploded like a ticking bomb on December 15, 2013 together with other numerous reasons mentioned above.

5.2.1.4 Social Causes

I. Past Rift

Even though the Dinka and the Nuer fought side by side against the government in Khartoum for decades, their affiliation has been ambivalent. As it has also been mentioned in several parts of this research study sub sections in 1991, internal leadership struggles between late SPLM leader John Garang (Dinka) on the one side and his deputy, Riek Machar (Nuer) on the other led to a crack within the SPLM. Machar created the SPLM-Nasir faction (Gil, 2014). Thus during this time the most important blowback for the SPLM was not only that a large faction of its troops broke away in a critical phase of the war, but also that the SPLM-Nasir faction switched sides to ally with the central government in Khartoum (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2011).

After becoming Khartoum's new proxy in the civil war, the SPLM-Nasir, consisting mainly of Nuer fighters, killed at least 2,000 Dinka civilians in the town of Bor, in what was known as the Bor massacre, on 15 November 1991 (Ottaway & El- Sadany,

2011 and Koos & Gutschke, 2014). Even though this happened almost a quarter of a century ago, the event remains present in the collective memory of the Dinka and the Nuer and has the potential to fuel resentment in the current struggle.

Chapter Six

6. Consequence of South Sudanese Conflict

Introduction

The South Sudan conflict is one of the most severe humanitarian crises at the moment, which has immensely caused myriad misery and devastation on innocent citizens in terms of lives lost, their livelihood, social and individual relations, and undoubtedly not to bring up smash up to property, indicates at large the in excusable failure of the country leadership. Rather than managing their divergence in a civil manner, the country‘s political leaders unfortunately let bloodshed to freely wander the streets, and this eventually has far greater impacts in political, economic and humanitarian terms. In fact these consequences will be presented in the following section and sub sections.

In order to address the objectives of the research and establish facts and circumstances that can be described and explained, the researcher met and held a discussions and conducted interviews with regional, international and national leaders, South Sudanese citizen victims, refugee, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and academician/ intellectuals. The researcher has also visited various sites including PoC camp in Juba South Sudan for IDPs, where most of the victims of the conflict currently reside. The researcher also contacted various officials and other stakeholders in Addis Ababa as well.

6.1 Internal Consequences of the Conflict

6.1.1 Political Consequences

In this heightened, polarized war, there are a number of political consequences that the South Sudanese society are forced to grapple with. Among the various political consequences of South Sudanese civil war which in fact will eventually be described in the subsequent sections, there are various significant incidents described by the Focus Group Discussions participants whereby some South Sudanese citizens identify themselves politically along ethnic lines. These kinds of situations have significant consequences in terms of instability, political and otherwise. Taking this and other issues in a mind the following sections will present several other political consequences of the South Sudanese civil war.

I. Predicament on Democracy

In several democratic cultures, political parties are one of the actors and are instrumental in nurturing the democratic process in a given country. They represent various views, opinions and aspirations within the society. According to this researcher interview with a political analyst South Sudanese democratic development is continually altered by the civil war and the following is his personal statement about the civil war consequences on the democratic fundamentals "*it should be noted herein that the war in South Sudan has entirely interrupted if not put to a halt to the democratic process in the country. For instance the election programmed for the general elections in 2015 was post-phoned to a different date despite the establishment of the Elections Commission and appointment of the Commissioners thereto. Yet again the South Sudanese political parties were not registered despite enactment of Political Parties Act"* (KII, Mr Payton, December, 2015, Addis Ababa). With the ongoing violent conflict and ethnic divide and tensions the democratic

process in South Sudan is at stake, given the fact that there are divergences in provision of basic democratic principles due to politically and ethnically charged motives. In order to asses weather the conflict has a pressure on democratic values and practice of the citizens an interview was made and majority (80 (70%)) of them believe that the conflict has restrained there democratic right fundamentals stipulated on the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan. Basically the In-Depth Interview respondents explained that the right to vote, the right to equality, the right to freedom of assembly and the right to choose where to live has been significantly altered by the conflict (IDI_{32}, April, 2016, Juba).

Similarly, participants from the Focus Group Discussion said that most office post is not allocated based on democratic principles rather by individual loyalty and ethnic background. In fact some of the participants responded that due to the conflict democracy has turned out to be luxury. In addition, the development of the democratic process is being undermined by the closure or the manipulation of the political institutions thus affecting development programs and national reconciliation and healing processes (FGD_4, April, 2016 Juba). One participant from the In-Depth Interview said some of the members of the National Legislature joined the rebellion adding to a lack of representation in their respective constituencies in the National Legislature (IDI $_{15}$, April, 2016, Juba).

II. Absence of Rule of law

A Key Informant Interview with officials from African Union and with Academician shows that there is a complete absence of the rule of law due to a discrepancy between the law of the land and reality on the ground. The justification which several times presented for this discrepancy can be traced from what happened following the December 15, 2013 Juba fighting that divided public opinion as to whether that was a

coup D'état or a mutiny or both. During that time some military officers and 11 SPLM political figures were arrested and detained by the Government on the reasons that they had planned, organized and perpetrated a failed coup. Nevertheless contrary to the constitutional provisions the suspects were detained for a very long time and were not brought to court until 11th March 2014 ever since their arrest on the 16th of December 2013. The investigation process took to a certain extent long with government justifying the delay as necessary given the complexity of the alleged offences. In the meantime, intervention of Kenya and the release of 7 out of 11 detainees who were taken out of the country by President Kenyatta was unprecedented and very unusual which was considered as undermining the authority of South Sudan in conducting its judicial process said participants of the Key Informant Interview (KII, Mr Berouk, June, 2016, Addis Ababa).

On March 11, 2014, the remaining 4 detainees namely: Pagan Amum former SPLM Secretary General, Oyai Deng Ajak former National Security Minister in the Office of the President, Majak D Agot former Deputy Defense Minister and Ambassador Ezekiel Lol were presented before Juba High Court, in Central Equatoria state under heavy security deployment and excessive interference (International Crisis Group, 2014 and Gal, 2014). The four accused were charged under Chapter V of the Penal Code Act of the 2008 on offences of treason, subverting constitutional government, insurgency, publishing and or communicating false statements prejudicial to South Sudan and undermining authority of or insulting the President among others (International Crisis Group, 2014 and Gal, 2014). It is to be noted that this is the first trial that court of independent South Sudan is hearing. Needed therefore is a conducive environment provided to both the presiding judge and defense lawyers far away from any kind of intimidation or interference that would defeat purpose of

justice. Accordingly, some of the Key Informant Interview and documentary analysis data there was a clear sign of absence of law in South Sudan, particularly perpetuated by its court proceeding and judicial process.

III. Violations of Freedom of Expression and Censorship of the Press/Media

With the outbreak of violence on 15 December 2013, a sharp deterioration of freedom of press and amplified censorship of the press was evident according to the Key Informants Interview and In-Depth Interviews conducted by the author of this research. Since then as the conflict intensified the climate for freedom of expression in South Sudan had progressively worsened. A case in point in this regard is a narration of a thirty nine years old man who used to work as a freelance writer for the government media "*beginning from mid-January 2014, there were a number of incidents relating to harassment, illegal arrest, detention, intimidation, and expulsion of national and foreign journalists, as well as the surveillance and censorship of media houses*". He further added that number of human rights defenders and local human rights organizations also reported that they were being threatened and that their property had been looted (KII, Mr John, April, 2016 Addis Ababa).

Similarly, participant of this research who is also academician said Juba Monitor's distribution was for short term suspended numerous times and copies of the newspaper were confiscated by National Security Service (NSS) personnel. He said on another occasions "*Juba Monitor's distribution copies were allegedly appropriated after the publication of an article referring to the 2015 elections and* he further added that *likewise on 24 March 2014, another copies were allegedly confiscated at the Juba airport after arriving from Khartoum where they had been*

printed, purportedly because the newspaper was assumed to contain statements critical of the Government. The next day, the National Security Service (NSS) had told media houses that newspapers would be closed if they publishes articles that were critical of the Government or written by an identified opinion writers who are considered to be condemnatory" said the academics (KII, Wondwossen, January, 2016,Addis Ababa).

Again a 28 years old South Sudanese journalist who is currently residing in Addis Ababa said that only 2 radio stations in Juba were broadcasting their usual programming due to surveillance and intimidation by National Security Service (NSS) personnel. She said the Arabic-language newspaper Al-Maghar Asiysia was allegedly suspended by the Ministry of Information indefinitely on the justification that it had published false information, failed to comply with Government policy, and covered stories on the rebels. Legal efforts to revoke the suspension have apparently not been successful until today said the women (KII, Ms Margaret, April, 2016,Addis Ababa).

A higher official from Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights said that since the outbreak of the conflict to the present day "several *media channels reported to the human right department of the United Nation that the Minister of Information had warned journalists in a telephone conversation not to broadcast or publish interviews with armed opposition leaders in South Sudanese media*". He added that the Minister of Information consider this to encompass revolutionary activity and an offence, despite the fact that the responsible organ did not refer to a specific legal provision to validate the assertion. Therefore the higher official of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights said the measure seems to have been applied retroactively (KII, December, 2015, Addis Ababa). Plus, the 28 years old South Sudanese journalist whom currently

residing in Addis Ababa said on 13 March 2014, an international correspondent was questioned and briefly detained by NSS for an interview he had conducted with Dr. Riek Machar. She said he was released after a few hours following pressure from the embassy of the country of his nationality (KII, Ms, Margaret, April, 2016, Addis Ababa). Therefore as a result of all this and few other cases the relationship between the government and some local Medias has also deteriorated.

IV. Human Right Violation

Within the parameters of international human rights law states are accountable to guarantee the protection and preservation of human rights and fundamental freedoms at all times, in war and peace alike. Regardless of the fact that South Sudan has not yet ratified any core global or regional human rights treaty, South Sudan nevertheless is bound by provisions of international human rights norms which comprise customary international law irrespective of treaty ratification. Fundamental provisions in Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) have attained this status (UNMISS, 2014).

In the same way, the most essential human rights obligations, in particular those originating from peremptory international law (*Jus cogens*) oblige both the State and armed opposition groups to respect human rights in times of peace and during armed conflict. In particular, international human rights law requires states, armed groups and others to respect the prohibitions of extrajudicial killing, maiming, torture, cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, enforced disappearance, rape, other conflict related sexual violence, sexual and other forms of slavery, the recruitment and use of children in hostilities, arbitrary detention as well as of any violations that amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. Some or all of these

acts, when commuted in a certain context or with a particular intent, also constitute international crimes; war crime or crime against humanity (UNMISS, 2014).

The responsibility of the Government to respect, uphold, and promote human rights is principally stipulated in the Transitional Constitution of Republic of South Sudan (Transitional Constitution of Republic of South Sudan, 2011). The bill of rights protects several fundamental human rights, including the right to life and human dignity; the right to liberty and security of the person, including the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention, the right to a fair trial, and the right to equal protection before the law (Transitional Constitution of Republic of South Sudan, 2011).

Fundamentally the Constitution also includes provisions on states of emergency, declaring that despite the fact that part of the bill of rights may be suspended, the protections of the right to life, prohibition on torture, right of non-discrimination, the right to proceedings, and right to a fair trial may not be limited. For other rights, derogations are permitted only if they are clearly proclaimed in accordance with the law, limited to what is strictly required by the situation, and not discriminatory. Nevertheless, the declaration of a state of emergency for Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile States issued by the President when the conflict erupted does not spell out which provision of the bill of rights declared to suspend (UNMISS, 2014 and Tewodros, 2015).

The rights to life and physical integrity are also protected by South Sudan‘s criminal law in several provisions of the Penal Code Act, 2008 (cited in Sorbo, 2014). Ordinary criminal provisions prohibit murder; bodily injury and intimidation,

kidnapping, abduction and violations of personal liberty, offences related to rape and other sexual offences, armed robbery; and damage to or destruction of property, among others (Tewodros, 2015). Likewise the Sudan People's Liberation Army Act, 2009, provides for the establishment, governance, and discipline of the SPLA. It establishes a system of military justice for both criminal and disciplinary offences and provides that criminal offences are adjudicated by military courts. In addition, it also provides for exclusive civilian jurisdiction over crimes committed by SPLA members against civilians (Cited in Tewodros, 2015). Despite the existence of the necessary regulatory framework participants of the research study has expressed their concerns over human right violation. Therefore in order to evaluate the major human right violation in South Sudan as a result of the current conflict the author of this research collected data from internally displaced persons(IDPs), regional, international and national leaders, government officials, South Sudanese citizen ,victims and academician/ intellectuals. As a result a combination of this data collected and analyzed will be presented in the following section.

- **Extra Judicial Killing**

In the period between mid-December 2013 and 2016, armed forces on both sides targeted and killed hundreds of civilians, often because of their ethnicity and or their political loyalty. Many respondents from this research In-Depth Interview expressed that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Security forces, opposition forces and ethnically based groups were also responsible for extrajudicial killings in conflict zones during the year 2013-2016. One of the In-Depth Interview respondents said that before joining the IDP camp his eldest son was beaten to death by SPLA soldiers just because he was Nuer and he refused to give them cattle in Unity state. The man said there are also other community members

who have had experienced a similar problem nevertheless there was no attempt made to investigate the crimes committed (IDI_7, April, 2016, Juba). In the same way a middle aged women said that on April 2014 nine armed men in police uniforms carrying weapons, stormed her and her family residential home in Juba as part of a robbery, shooting and killing and she said this men killed the father of her three children and his brother right in front of her and her children. She added that they were struggling to rape me but my husband was fighting them with his brother but they shot them both at the end and left due to a phone call. Later on three of the perpetrators of the crime were held by police but the rest were not she added (IDI_{55}, April, 2016, Juba). The eventual and virtual total impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of serious violations and abuses has had the pernicious effect of fostering even more violence. Again another respondent has also said there is no family who did not get somebody killed. My family lost five university students. They were found in the house and murdered with high machine guns. Everybody who is still alive now is because he/she run to the UNMISS compound in Juba or neighboring countries refugee's camps as a refugee (IDI_{54}, April, 2016, Juba).

- **Arbitrary Arrest and Detention**

The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan recognizes the civilian police service as the only law enforcement authority in South Sudan. Neither the SPLA nor National Security Service (NSS) consequently has any authority to engage in criminal justice actions. The Transitional Constitution explicitly prohibits the SPLA from having any internal law and order mandate except as may be requested by the civilian authority whenever it is necessary. National Security Service is authorized by the Transitional Constitution to focus on information gathering, analysis and

advice to the relevant authorities. Despite these explicit provisions, "both the SPLA and National Security Service have continued to arrest and detain individuals, often for long periods of time, without the involvement of prosecutors or courts" said participant from the In-Depth Interview (IDI_9, April, 2016, Juba). In this essence, they operate in a space above the law and with virtual impunity.

Another case in point in this regards is an In-Depth Interview made with a young man. The young man who used to be part of the SPLA said he was arrested by SPLA and released recently but before his arrest his house was searched without warrant and in addition to this he was not told why he was arrested. This young man said he was in prison for six month without appearing to the court. There are many civilians and people from military who are arbitrarily arrested and some detained without committing a crime as such or knowing the reason of their arrest for that matter the young man added (IDI $_{12}$, April, 2016, Juba). Similarly, one married women also said her husband used to be working to a government but at a certain point he stops working for the government for two months and so one day they came at their house asked for her husband and she said he is not here but they forced her to tell them the truth or they will kill her two children right in front of her so finally she told them his whereabouts and they found him and put him in a comenicado (IDI_{27}, April, 2016, Juba).

- **Rape and Other Sexual Violence**

The researcher heard and received information from witnesses and survivors of rape, gang rape, murder, killing, sexual assault, torture, cruel in human and degrading treatment as well as abductions from the data collected both from In-Depth Interview and the Focus Group Discussion. A range of statements from the participants reflect

an insight into the level and severity of acts of conflict related to sexual violence which was committed against the civilians. One of the survivor who is at that particular moment living in UNMISS PoC site witnessed and revealed that three lactating Nuer women who is sisters and sister in law to her, had been abducted by a group of armed Dinka SPLA soldiers a few days after the outbreak of the conflict in Juba and taken to Bor in Jonglei, where they were kept in captivity and subjected to sexual slavery in very ruthless living conditions with limited access to food and water (IDP_{41}, April, 2016, Juba). Similarly, a female Nuer IDP accounted how she had been forced to marry SPLA soldier, and then subjected to sexual slavery and torture. A group of Dinka SPLA soldiers allegedly murdered her husband and 10 other Nuer soldiers in December 2013, and then forced her and the other widows into sexual slavery. She was regularly beaten, denied meals and water and kept in isolation but finally managed to escape and move to PoC site in juba (IDP_{42}, April, 2016, Juba).

What is more, a woman with a physical disability, who had been living in Malakal town and now moved to Juba PoC camp, faced severe physical and sexual assaults which she was subjected to between May and June 2015. In fact on other several occasions, when the SPLA-IO gained control of the town, the woman was frequently assaulted by SPLA-IO soldiers who came to her home in search of food and money. On one instance, she was beaten until she was unconscious. Some of the soldiers, who were often drunk, continually sexually assaulted her (IDP_{37}, April, 2016, Juba). Plus most of the respondents interviewed said that their villages had been attacked by a mixture of SPLA soldiers and armed militia who, among other violations, abducted and raped girls and women on a large scale.

Yet again during a Focus Group Discussion meeting all participants openly stated that they had either been raped or have heard a case of rape. In a group interview with

men, they indicated that it had become a practice for parties to the conflict and civilians during attacks "*to kidnap women and do whatever they want*". Pregnant women, lactating mothers and minors have not been left or spared. Many respondents witnessed seeing women being raped and then killed. Sometimes, as described, women and girls were burned in their tukuls after being gang-raped (FGD_9, April, 2016, Juba). One In-depth participant of the research said: "*If you confronted them or looked at them with negative facial expressions when they are raping you, they will definitely kill you in few minutes time*". Other participants related how civilians, mainly women and girls, were victimized by all the parties to the conflict (IDI_6, April, 2016, Juba). One woman said having been gang-raped by three SPLA soldiers and witnessed how other women and girls suffered the same suffering when SPLM/A-IO reconquered her village (IDP_{36}, April, 2016, Juba).

Incidents of sexual violence were not confined to attacks on villages, but also extended to women who were fleeing their villages to seek refuge and IDP at the UNMISS PoCs and neighboring countries respectively. A young girl narrated how she and another girl had been raped by soldiers allegedly belonging to the SPLA and armed militia on their way to the IDP camps. She said that "*after raping us, they took all our clothing's; we toddled with no close on to PoC camps and only received clothes from other women when we reached here*" (IDP_{13}, April, 2016, Juba).

6.1.2 Economic Impact of the Conflict

I. Crippled the Economy

In economic terms, the conflict has had a prominent consequence on South Sudan. Estimations by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) imply that real Growth

Domestic Product (GDP) has declined by around 15% in 2015. For the reason that much of South Sudan‘s economic activity is informal, it is difficult to quantify the exact decline in South Sudan‘s output that has resulted from the conflict, nevertheless severe economic consequences have become increasingly apparent, and the country‘s fiscal position has deteriorated as government revenues have decreased (De Waal and Victor, 2016). This has resulted in budgetary constraints and the abandonment of government plans to increase investment (King, 2015). Unfortunately, if the conflict in South Sudan is not resolved as soon as possible the situation of the economic deterioration in South Sudan is expected to continue for the next coming years according to Trading Economics Economic Forecast of 2016-2020.

Table 5: Trading Economics South Sudan Economic Forecast of 2016-2020

GDP	**Actual**	**Q2/16**	**Q3/16**	**Q4/16**	**Q1/17**	**2020**	
GDP Annual Growth Rate	15.90	7.5	5	3.96	-3.49	6.66	percent
GDP	13.28	12.15	11.59	11.02	12.85	19.9	USD Billion
GDP per capita	2048.00	1569	1543	1517	1543	1603	USD
Labour	**Actual**	**Q2/16**	**Q3/16**	**Q4/16**	**Q1/17**	**2020**	
Unemployment Rate	12.00	16	16	16	12	12	percent
Population	11.74	12.32	12.41	12.41	12.41	13.61	million

Prices	Actual	Q2/16	Q3/16	Q4/16	Q1/17	2020	
Inflation Rate	202.50	221	229	240	273	290	percent
Food Inflation	227.10	268	281	286	286	287	percent
Trade	**Actual**	**Q2/16**	**Q3/16**	**Q4/16**	**Q1/17**	**2020**	
Balance of Trade	4987.00	-1624	-1549	-1475	-1030	2064	SSP Million
Exports	2660.00	6797	6963	7129	7687	11531	million SSP
Imports	7647.00	8760	8820	8880	8981	9476	million SSP
Government Spending	5433.00	4736	4426	4116	4327	5587	Million SSP

Source: Trading Economics South Sudan Economic Forecast of 2016-2020

II. Reduced Oil Production

The civil war has significantly disrupted oil production, led to capital flight and destroyed markets and infrastructure in major cities. As mentioned on the above sections 98 per cent of government revenues were derived from oil industry (De Waal, 2014b). Since the outbreak of the civil war in South Sudan, the continuing armed fighting is exerting a considerable negative impact on South Sudan oil industry, with existing investors and asset holders reducing investments and potential investors being deterred by instability in the country (King, 2015). Key Informant

Interview with a political analyst shows that oil production in South Sudan was approximately 240,000 Barrel of Oil Per Day (BOPD) at the end of 2013, but this is according to him believed to have fallen to around 165,000 BOPD in 2014 and much less in 2015 and 2016. Once more he further added that ineffective ceasefire agreements and declining oil exports due to low production refers operations in South Sudan will continue to be affected in short or medium term (KII, De Waal, August, 2016, Addis Ababa). Similarly another political analyst also said despite South Sudan have a proven reserves and potential for further exploitation, oil companies are not willing to invest until the political and security situation in South Sudan improves. The situation is further exacerbated by South Sudan reliance on Sudanese pipelines to export crude oil. Despite the fact that the government has explored the possibility of constructing new pipelines through Uganda and Kenya, these plans have not progressed post the feasibility study due to the ongoing conflict said the political analyst and participant of this research study (KII, Mr Payton, April, 2016, Addis Ababa). South Sudan pays between $ 9.1 and $ 11Billion (bbl) to use Sudan facilities and an additional $15 bbl as compensation for the country's lost oil revenue after independence. The country currently has no other export routes if the existing pipelines are cut off. Without alternative route, South Sudan will remain vulnerable to shutdown threats and unfavorable transportation contracts (Nyathon et al, 2016).

Therefore all this means not only that the government will be forced to run a war with diminished resources threatening its ability to maintain critical salary commitments to the army , but also that returning to pre-2012 shutdown production rates anytime soon as an eventual possibility. In addition to this with global oil prices rising in response to reduced production, the impact of the conflict is felt well beyond South Sudan's borders (De Waal, 2014b).

III. Capital Flight

Trading partners and investors from Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan plays a considerable role in South Sudanese economy (Mehari and Abel, 2013). The country had quickly become an integral trading partner for its neighbors and Uganda's biggest export market. Despite this the war has damaged many businesses and much of the market infrastructure which the domestic and regional investors relied upon (Dereje, 2015). Insecurity and violence targeting foreign nationals forced many regional businessmen to leave. A 42 years man said he used to work with foreign investor engaged with restaurant business but due to the ongoing conflict the foreigner asset was destroyed so he was forced to depart from the country leaving him and other employee's unemployed. The man further added that the economic environment is very good but there is constant insecurity which terrifies both the local people and foreigners to remain in the business (IDI$_{53}$, April, 2016, Juba).

The ongoing conflict has also put a pressure upon many goods, including important food stuffs. A group of women from the Focus Group Discussion said this pressure coming out of the ongoing conflict has resulted tightened supply of food and food items. The women's from FGD further added that many households in South Sudan are forced to squeeze or compress the daily meal to once or twice due the conflict pressure on food items (FGD$_3$, April, 2016, Juba). Initially most of food and food items were fulfilled by foreign investor's production and food items import (Getachew, 2015 and King, 2015). Therefore South Sudan's conflict if not resolved early its economic crisis will reverberate through the region, providing despicable burden both for the South Sudanese and the neighboring countries citizens.

IV. Destruction of Property

As it has clearly been reiterated above, the right to property is protected under the South Sudan Transitional Constitution and international law. Therefore, in such conflict situations all parties to the conflict have the constitutional and legal obligation to respect and protect the right to property. According to the Focus Group Discussion participants, the consequences of the current conflict between the government and rebels have been very overwhelming. There have been pervasive destructions and looting of property in South Sudan. The researcher has recognized that property destroyed include government institutions, private homes, shops, vehicles, herds of cattle among others (FGD_8, April, 2016, Juba). Respondents from the In-Depth Interview affirmed that both SPLA and SPLA-IO committed offensive attack on civilian property and systematically burned homes and entire villages and looted property (IDI $_{32,37,34,35,}$ April, 2016, Juba). In most occasion shelters were intentionally burned after household items, clothes and food had been looted. The Focus Group Discussion participants said that many people who had fled their villages ahead of the attacks later returned to find their homes completely burnt or empty. In some instances, food stocks and seeds stored in huts that could not be taken had been looted said a woman from the Focus Group Discussion (FGD_3, April, 2016, Juba).

The conflicting party's attacks were also characterized by the massive burning of home and livestock, in particular cattle. Indeed participants from the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) said cattle, being one of the fundamental wealth indicators for many ethnic groups in the area, became the primary objective of the attackers during the military offense. For many of the allied militias who fought alongside of SPLA and SPLM-IO, this was an opportunity to loot and increase their cattle herds she noted. In addition to this the participants of the research established that there has

been extensive destruction of education and health facilities (FGD_1, April, 2016, Juba).

V. Depreciated the Value of South Sudanese Pound (SSP)

South Sudan's current conflict has rapidly depreciated the value of the South Sudanese Pound (SSP), besides shortages of hard currency, significant dependence on imports of food items has contributed for its depreciation (King, 2015)**.** The informal exchange rate of South Sudanese Pound against the US dollar reached an all-time low of 18 South Sudanese Pound to 1 US Dollar in October 2015 compared to an official rate of 2.9 South Sudanese Pound to 1 US Dollar in previous years. In actual fact, South Sudanese Pound has now reached a point of losing its original value by 1000% (Frontier Economics, 2015). In marketing principals, when money lose value the investors virtually lose interest to invest in the country (King, 2015). At the moment, the cost of living has soared very high in the country as results of sky rocketing prices in the market whereas demand and service have also declined. In this connection, South Sudan has now reached the level of hyperinflation which amount to the total crumple in living standard or in the worst case scenarios the country is virtually pronounced bankrupt (King, 2015). The price of staple foods, such as sorghum, maize and beans, are at record high (up to 150% compared to average) (Frontier Economics, 2015 and King, 2015). The decline in oil revenue has crippled the Government's social services sector and negatively affected more than significant percent of the population. Since December 2013, an additional one million people have been pushed below the poverty line (De Waal, 2014b).

VI. Unemployment

Despite an abundance of natural resources, including large oil deposits, South Sudan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. More than 90 percent of the population lives on less than a dollar a day (Trading Economics, 2015). Young people in South Sudan face tremendous challenges in finding work and earning a steady income. The situation is particularly difficult for youth with limited education. The lack of educational and economic opportunities for youth, fragile markets, and weak governance are the legacy of a protracted conflict with Sudan and continued political uncertainty within the new nation (Gal, 2014). This uneducated, unskilled and underutilized population of young people, combined with politically motivated ethnic tensions, threatens to prolong conflict in South Sudan and further isolate its young people from pursuing productive and non-violent futures (Gil, 2014 and Sørbø, 2014).

Several people in South Sudan struggle to find work and make ends meet due to the ongoing conflict. According to the In-Depth Interview and the Focus Group Discussion result with the research participants, many youth are engaged in daily labor. According to the FGD, work is often unsteady and sometimes illicit. Conversations with the FGD participants during Focus Group Discussions also confirmed that many people due to lack of formal employment, they said they were engaged in activities (both legal and illegal) to make money. For example, during the FGDs, some women shared that they are many women in South Sudan who are engaged in brewing and selling homemade alcohol to have enough money for daily food and other necessities due to lack of other options. In addition to unskilled labor unemployment rate a group of men in the FGD has also said, unemployment rate is not limited to unskilled labor only but it is also very high among the university and college graduates and former SPLA combatants ($FGD_{5,}$ April, 2016, Juba). Therefore,

unemployment has become an eventual reality and ideality has become the order of the day.

Furthermore one middle age men from the FGD said in addition to the brutal conflict, our country economic policy has also contributed for the sky rocketing unemployment rate: the following is the exact quote from the man description "As an open policy being practiced by South Sudan government based on material interests, almost all the international NGOs used to bring expatriates either from overseas or selectively from the neighboring countries of Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. Such vacancies like managerial positions, field coordinators and the simplest jobs like watchmen, drivers and cooks were also brought from the neighboring countries while South Sudanese citizens were capable to fill those vacancies at ease. The government never questioned the NGO's motives in the country with respect to their working conditions and interests, employment policy and the accountability of the donor's moneys intended for helping the needy people in our country". This kind of open economic policy as the man said crowded job opportunity for the locals (FGD_2, April, 2016, Juba). Worsening the case much more severe for many active job seekers than what it should have been the case.

6.13. Social Impact

I. Impact on Social Networks

Armed conflicts have profound effects on social relations between family members, neighbors and friends, on how communities relate internally and with other communities and on the operation of local institutions and their relation with state level institutions (Putnam, 2000). These changes are caused to a large extent by changes in household composition and the displacement and migration of households

to safer areas. In this case a 36 years old man said “before I came to this PoC camp I was married and have three kids but starting from the outburst of the civil war the SPLM-IO solders used to repetitively come and continually kill people and loot property around our village to gain economic resources that will enable them to sustain their war endeavor so the repetition of this incident made me to consider the idea that if my children stayed here for long they will be distressed and may even be killed” Therefore the only option he have found as a viable means is to send them to Uganda with his brother but he said he regret his decision because since then no one have heard about the whereabouts of his brother and his three children (IDI_{17},April, 2016, Juba). The other effect of this civil war is that many social relations between family members are also changing due to lack of trust among each other. This is off course is caused partly by the dynamics of the conflict itself, such as people are now spying on each other, different groups turning against each other, and loss of trust amongst communities has also become an eventual reality. These effects of the civil war result often in changes and/or the breakdown of social relations and social cohesion and in loss of risk-sharing arrangements. In fact In-Depth Interview with a 33 years old woman confirms this fact. The women said she was married to Nuer man and her family who are a mixture of Shaluk and Dinka was in a good term with him before the outbreak of the conflict but since the conflict brook out the relation between her husband and her family degraded and put her in a strange position. “The only choice I have got to resist his family and my family pressure was to leave him because every night he beats me for my family’s negative reaction” said the women ($IDI_{22,}$ April, 2016, Juba).

Similarly, the violence generated by armed conflict has also resulted in a breakdown of the main components of social capital in South Sudanese society. Social capital is fundamental to the establishment of social cohesion and economic stability, as well as creating the conditions for successful and sustainable economic growth. Respondents from the African Union said "*One of the major heartbreaking outcomes of the armed conflict in South Sudan is the breakdown (or the outright destruction) of social capital and the social fabric*" (KII, Ambassador Hiruy, April, 2016). The impact of this breakdown on household welfare is very dramatic as households now no longer can be able to rely on community relations in times of difficulty especially on the eve of great food insecurity looming around many South Sudanese. In similar vein participants from the Focus Group Discussion said due to the existing conflict many people do not trust anybody and under such circumstance they said they have found access to particular employment or credit arrangements based on informal ties very difficult (FGD_9, April, 2016, Juba). In addition, political forces may strengthen some forms of social capital that either feed into conflict itself or constitute the tipping point for the outbreak of violence said academics participant of this study (KII, Professor Rhode, July, 2015, Addis Ababa).

II. Self-Recruitment into Armed Groups

Armed conflict in South Sudan has opened up new opportunities for many, and a number of actors have used the conflict and violence as a means to try to improve their position and to take advantage of the opportunities offered by conflict. Despite the potentially high individual costs, many have chosen to participate in fighting due to presence of significant selective incentives. A case in point in this regard is In-Depth Interview with a 40 years man who is currently residing in the PoC camp he

said " *to most South Sudanese youth becoming a fighter is away to improve welfare and is a livelihood coping strategy.*" He further added that getting recruited may also be viewed as viable alternative to unemployment by many (IDI_{20}, April, 2016, Juba). A political analyst and also Key Informant interviewee of this research said many have perceived the conflict as a means of getting access to food and clothing as well as recognition and sense of becoming valuable that was otherwise not possible. He also said a low return to agriculture and high rates of unemployment along with the severity of the civil conflict has pushed many young men in South Sudan into militias (KII, Dr. Tedros, March, 2016, Addis Ababa).

III. The Impact of the Civil War on Movement of People and Humanitarian Needs

Armed conflicts are usually accompanied by large population movements. Civilian populations are often targets for both armies and rebel groups trying to expand their territorial control, weaken support for opposing groups, increase their own support base and/or add to their resources through looting and appropriation of valuable assets and sites (Vargas, 2007). This would ultimately encourage population flights from areas of more intense fighting or areas where the outbreak of violence is expected. The recurring attacks on South Sudan civilians and the destruction of homes and crops during the conflict resulted in the widespread forced displacement of civilians living in the affected areas. This is evident from the In-Depth Interview result where many respondents said a number of people fled from various parts of South Sudan states to the UNMISS PoC sites and refugee camps in the neighboring countries. In addition to the tens of thousands of people who had fled to the PoC sites, a large number of the displaced have been hiding in swamps outside villages that have been

destroyed said respondent from African Union (KII, Ms Bineta , July, 2016, Addis Ababa).

The inhabitants of South Sudan are also internally displaced due to the current conflict. In fact according to the data from United Nation High Commissions for Refugee (UNHCR) more than 2.3 million people , one in every five people in South Sudan have been forced to flee their homes since the conflict began, including 1.66 million internally displaced people (with 53.4 per cent estimated to be children) and nearly 744,102 refugees in neighboring countries. Some 185,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) have sought refuge in UN Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites, while around 90 per cent of IDPs are on the run or sheltering outside PoC sites (UNHCR, 2015). Owing to the fluidity of displacement, it is hard to find out the number of IDP returnees (UNHCR, 2015). Nevertheless, humanitarian partners like United Nation Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimate that some 300,000 will be in need of assistance in 2016 and 2017 respectively. Thousands of homes have been damaged during the fighting and various people have been displaced multiple times because of frequent attacks. Thousands of people living with HIV, Thyroid , mental health problem and other diseases that require frequent health check-up and consistent medication have seen their life-sustaining treatment interrupted without possibility of continuation due to displacement (United Nation Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2015).

Almost one in every three schools in South Sudan has been smashed, damaged, occupied or closed, affecting the education of more than 900,000 children, including some 350,000 who have been forced out of school by the conflict. More than 686,200

children under age 5 are estimated to be acutely malnourished, including more than 231,300 who are severely malnourished (UNICEF, 2016). Between 15,000 to 16,000 children are estimated to be recruited by armed actors in South Sudan (Human Rights Watch, 2015). More than 10,000 children have been recorded as separated, unaccompanied or missing. A teenager girl in South Sudan is three times more likely to die in childbirth than complete primary school. An estimated one million children are thought to be in psychosocial distress (UNICEF, 2016).

The United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2016) estimated that between 50,000 to 100,000 people across South Sudan had been killed in the period December 2013 to November 2014. This number amplified as fighting continued 2015 and 2016. In Leer, Mayendit and Koch counties of Unity State alone, an estimated 1,000 civilians were killed, 1,300 women and girls were raped and 1,600 women and children were abducted from April to September 2015. Mortality has been aggravated by acute malnutrition and disease, including an unprecedented malaria outbreak and a cholera outbreak in 2015 (United Nation Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2016).

What is more hunger and malnutrition has spread all over South Sudan. In fact 3.9 million People; nearly one in every three people in South Sudan were severely food insecure and 3.6 million were considered to be stressed, in September 2015 (WFP, 2015). An estimated 30,000 people were facing catastrophic food insecurity in Unity State, leading to destitution, and starvation, death (Frontier Economics, 2015). Livelihoods have been destroyed by the conflict and economic decline, with livestock looted, killed and prone to disease and crops destroyed or planting delayed due to

violence, displacement and unfavorable weather. Many pregnant and lactating women are malnourished due to the impact of the conflict (Sudan Tribune, 2015).

South Sudan is one of the most infrastructurally challenging places in the world and has one of the most underdeveloped communications technology infrastructures. The incredibly under developed and under maintained roads makes 60 per cent of the country inaccessible by road during the rainy season (The International Crisis Group, 2014). Earlier to the conflict, healthcare was enormously hard to access in South Sudan, with an estimated 0.15 doctors per 10,000 patients and 0.2 midwives/nurses per 10,000 people. The increasing cost of living and consequences of the conflict have undermined people's ability to access safe water, including due to the destruction of water points. 110 million square meters of land is contaminated by landmines and explosive remnants of war (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2016).

IV. The Psychological Impact of the War on Children and Women

The conflict in South Sudan has made children in South Sudan afraid of what their future holds. They have experienced tremendous violence and are frightened that it will return. They have psychological trauma which will make them to fear that they will be forced to flee or that their tents will be destroyed again (UNICEF, 2016). Many women from the Focus Group Discussion said their Children live in fear. They believe that the armed conflict may again be directed at them and their families. In fact many Focus Group Discussion participants further added that their children's still remember when armed men forced them to leave their homes, and most of them still are in deep fear and distress without the hope of returning back to comfort or

familiarity of home said the Focus Group Discussion participants ($FGD_{3,}$-April, 2016, Juba).

Participants in all Focus Group Discussion said most women and children are afraid of what will happen to them and their families. Armed groups were a concern for their children (FGD_3, April, 2016, Juba). A woman from the In-Depth Interview further added that children inside these sites are afraid of adults fighting, a common occurrence that she link to increased alcohol consumption, distress and cramped living conditions (FGD $_6$, April,2016, Juba). Among children who go to school, where they are supposed to be able to escape violence and stress some still feel that this places are not safe due to fear of abduction said the women's from the Focus Group Discussion (FGD_7, April,2016, Juba). Plus they said fighting among the children terrify some children because of what they have experienced due to the ongoing conflict. In this regard a narration by 28 years mother is presented "My daughter said she would like to see normal behavior because since the outbreak of conflict people's behavior has changed because of the trauma. She always feels scared and still remembers bad things" (FGD_7, April, 2016, Juba).

Failure to deal with the effects of distress and fear has significant repercussions on individual children and jeopardizes the future of South Sudan. Long-term stress can have life-long impacts on learning, health and development. One year ago, a 45 years old woman said her children and her other family member fled their home during a night of violence and took IDP at the United Nations base until today. She said they came with big machine guns (and) they started firing guns at us. The family tried to defend themselves although this deterred the first attackers the women remembered that they returned the next morning in larger numbers, so the family fled. "My husband told us that we need to go to UN camp to seek safety and we started walking

to UNMISS reached here. On our way we saw many people at the street who have been killed" she said (IDI_{30}, April, 2016, Juba). In addition to this women's from the Focus Group Discussion said many in South Sudan continues to live at risk of physical harm and violence, including armed recruitment, sexual violence, maiming and injury of themselves and their children. In fact many women from the Focus Group Discussion said their children say they don't want to return to the crisis; their homes, churches and schools (FGD_3, April, 2016, Juba).

6.2 External Impact of the Conflict

Besides its consequence on South Sudanese citizen's the current conflict of South Sudan has a far reaching external consequence to the peoples and states of the region. This is compounded by the fact that the region constitutes interlinked regional security complexes. Plus due to the approximately near location to South Sudan each neighboring state like Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and others would eventually be forced either implicitly or explicitly to shoulder the political and socio-economic consequences of the South Sudanese current conflict. Therefore the following sub sections has given paramount importance to the analysis of a number of actual and potential political, economical and social consequences of the current conflict of South Sudan upon the mere existence of the Horn of African countries.

6.2.1 Political and Socio-Economic Consequences

I. Refugee Influx and Ethnic Conflicts

The influx of refugees from South Sudan into the neighboring states of Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda is a major consequence which countries of the horn of Africa have to grapple with. Unfortunately, if the current civil war in South Sudan continues, the probability of refugee influx creating pressure on host countries of region is

expected to worsen (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2015). According to United Nations High Commission for Refugees, by February 2015, an estimated 744,102 South Sudanese had crossed into neighboring countries of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan. The large number of people movement from South Sudan to neighboring countries is continually generating pressure on security and service delivery systems. This influx of refugees will not only strain resources in host countries, but also compromise national and regional security as it will exacerbate proliferation of illegal small arms and light weapons (Berouk,2014).

In addition to this, the influx of these refugees is provoking ethnic conflict in neighboring country likes Ethiopia. In this regard starting from the first and the second civil war Ethiopia has been a home of South Sudanese refugee and hosted them with the important service deliveries. Unfortunately, Gambella which is one of the regional state of Ethiopia and the first regional state that South Sudanese have to step in when they cross the border between South Sudan and Ethiopia is currently suffering from the politics of number. Number matters the most in politics of Ethiopia's federal system, since power is allocated in direct proportion to the population of the country's ethno-cultural communities. Thus in this regard Gambella is suffering from one of the most contentious issues, which is the politics of numbers that has complicated the relation of the two of the region's major ethnic groups, the Anuak and the Nuer (Dereje, 2011). Both the Anuak and the Nuer have a cross-border settlement in South Sudan as well. Until the mid-1980s the Anuak constituted the majority of Gambella's population. Conversely, the massive influx of refugees since the outbreak of the second Sudanese civil war in 1983 has considerably changed the region's demography (Dereje, 2014).

The relative numerical superiority of a certain ethno-cultural community would, accordingly, entitle it to take more seats in regional and national parliament than the other. Taking into account of the Nuer larger presence in Gambella regional state, the Anuak pursued a historical argument for political entitlement over the Gambella region, justifying that most of the Nuer in Gambella are not Ethiopian citizens. In the same way the ongoing civil war has already produced hundreds of thousands of refugees, mostly hosted in refugee camps in Gambella. By mid-May 2016, the number of South Sudanese refugees in Gambella rose to 429,546 predominantly ethnic Nuer (UNHCR, 2016). In fact the Ethiopian government is hosting the refugees with assistance from international organizations. Nevertheless, the new refugee phenomenon in Gambella is looked at only from a humanitarian point of view, while it may have longer-term political implication for the area as well.

For quite long time, the Anuak have felt marginalized by the influx of Nuer refugees into the Gambella region, a demographic concern compounded by massive migration. The current Nuer migration in to Gambella regional state due to the ongoing civil war may renew tensions if Anuak suppose the Nuer current refugees are here to stay, further altering the area's demographics in their rival's favor. The Anuak consider themselves to be the main indigenous group but the continued influx of Nuer refuges affects the power balance. Indeed evidence shows that some Nuer political elites are using the refugees to gain political advantage, by issuing Ethiopian ID cards to Nuer refugees, thus invoking tension between the regional political leadership and the federal institution of the administration for refugee affairs (Dereje, 2014). In addition the Anuak political organizations have also already politicized the refugee influx. Justifying that, the expansion of the refugees camps in the Anuak land is nothing else than ethnic cleansing (Dereje, 2015). Consequently the current ongoing South Sudan

civil conflict shall be viewed through the lenses of longer-term political consequence for the Ethiopia in particular and the countries in the region peace and security in general.

II. Diminution of Trade and Investments

The protracted violence in South Sudan has had and will persist to have a number of effects on Kenyan, Ethiopian, Ugandan and Sudanese economy. Many Kenyan, Ethiopian, Ugandan and Sudanese nationals stand to lose their huge investment advantage from South Sudan (International Crisis Group, 2015). Ever since the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), investors from the region have made significant inroads into South Sudan (Berouk, 2014). Many investors from these countries have invested in various sectors including hotel, banking, insurance, aviation, construction, hospitality, and information and communication technologies (ICT), transportation, and wholesale and retail trade. Since the escalation of the conflict, a number of these countries businesses men, especially those outside Juba have remained closed or have slowed down operations, while others have been looted by the warring factions (International Crisis Group, 2015). In addition, a number of citizens of Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan working in the country have since been forced to return home with the huge loss in employment opportunities. A number of workers were providing substantial human resources to the South Sudan and remittance to their own countries before the conflict started (Berouk, 2014).

Furthermore, work on mega infrastructure projects that have impact on the region's (socio-economic development such as the Lamu Port-South-Sudan-Ethiopia (LAPSSET) corridor and standard gauge railway will certainly encounter impediments. The development of this crucial infrastructure is important for trade in

the region. The LAPSSET corridor, jointly launched in March 2012 by Ethiopia, South Sudan and Kenya involves the construction of a new transport corridor from the new Port of Lamu through the Kenyan towns of Garissa and Isiolo with one part of the corridor connecting Kenya and Ethiopia. The other part of the corridor will connect Kenya and South Sudan through Isiolo and border town of Nakodok. The LAPSSET project comprises a new road network, a railway line, an oil refinery at Lamu, an oil pipeline, airports in Lamu and Isiolo, and resort cities in Isiolo and at the shores of Lake Turkana. Not only is this major project envisaged to foster transport linkages between these neighbors, it is expected to promote and expedite trade along the corridor. Yet, South Sudan's instability has endangered and deferred the construction of these important projects (Dereje, 2015).

Chapter Seven

7. The Role of African Union towards Conflict Resolution

Introduction

The foundation of the African Union as part and parcel of the Pan-African ideals motivated organization is completely far from an abrupt occurrence that has not been predicted in the history of Africa. Instead it was an outcome of the longstanding Pan-African engagements in diverse phases of history. It is in fact quite difficult to have all inclusive figure of the African Union historical ancestry without paying much consideration to the movements of Pan- Africanism, which may perhaps be assumed as a cornerstone of the Organization African Union, the African Union and any other future economic and political integration involving the African countries.

Thus the fortitude of Pan-Africanism has been utilized as a paramount instrument for the establishment of cooperation among African peoples and states in diverse generations, and is anticipated to be strong force in the upcoming years as well. Subsequently, before immediately departing to the assessment of African Union role and the contribution of this regional body towards conflict resolution in South Sudan the author of this dissertation has found it very critical to have a brief view on the historical developments and structural configuration of the African Union.

7.1 The Path from Pan-Africanism to the Organization African Unity

The Organization of African Union was the outcome and quintessence of the basic principles of the age-old Pan-African movement (Timothy, 2005). In fact in due course Pan-Africanism has become an imminent movement especially in a collective resistance against racial prejudice (Sabelo, 2010). Certainly this movement was a

significant instrument which was fundamentally dedicated to restore the dignity of black men and women, advocating there return to their mother land and revitalize African culture. The movement was led by black North American intellectuals most notably Marcus Garvey (1885-1940) and W.E.B Du Bois (1868-1963) despite the fact that the two intellectual's approaches and philosophical ideals were completely different (Carbone, 2002). Starting from 1900 a number of pan-African conferences including the Westminster conference were prearranged to put together plans for the improvement of black people situation and protection of native Africans from white oppressor's discriminations (Sabelo, 2010).

Accordingly, ever since the winding up of World War II Pan-Africanism has become a potent force and a key effort for the independence of various entities from shackles of colonialism. Starting from the 1945 Manchester congress, African intellectuals like Leopold Senghor, Sekou Toure, Kwame Nkrumah, and Jomo Kenyatta has become a prominent figure in the movement (Carbone, 2002). The number of conferences that has been going on has been further strengthened and was also organized in Africa at the beginning of the twentieth century which re-uttered the dream and target of the Pan-African movement. Consequently, the cause was changed from a sentimentalizing platform for racial cohesion to a movement for independence of the African people by paying increasing attention to the various ways of abolishing colonialism and backing of African nationalism. Thus fundamentally the basic objectives of the movement have revolved around complete political independence for the entire continent and fraternal cooperation between African. As a consequence most of the conferences that were held in Africa vibrated these aspirations (Timothy, 2005).

Nevertheless, the path to continental unity was crammed of hindrance. Given that many independent African countries came out of colonialism to locate themselves

wrapped up into regional and ideological blocs that were, paradoxically, the seeds of the Pan-African conferences. Indeed just before the emergence of the Organization of African Union, there exists an inter-state politics in Africa which was illustrated by rising contention between the Brazzaville, Monrovia and Casablanca blocks/groups (Carbone, 2002). The Brazzaville group for the most part encompasses twelve African countries that are of French speaking and who were part of the former French colonies namely; Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, People's Republic of Congo, Dohomey (the present-day Benin), Mauritania, Gabon, Upper Volta (the present-day Burkina Faso), Senegal, Niger, Chad and Madagascar. The Brazzavilleian group's first met in Abidjan. The meeting was organized by Cote d' Ivoire French President Felix Houphouet- Boigny, who wanted the French speaking states to mediate in the Algerian war of independence without alienating France. Guinea, under Sekou Toure, condemned the meeting and Togo turn down the meeting to attend. The similar group met again in Brazzaville in December 1960 and signed their Brazzaville charter (Sabelo, 2010 and Carbone, 2002). The Brazzavile group despised the communist interference into Africa, they also vehemently supported France on the Algerian conflict, and pledged to stay on the sides of France no matter what happens. Plus the group also approved the United Nations Policy on Congo-Kinshasa (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) at the time. This group believes and promotes the idea that African Unity shall be accomplished through economic cooperation, not political integration. Therefore this group basically upholds gradual approach to the concept of Africa Unity starting with regional economic and culture co-operation but not political integration (Sabelo, 2010).

On the other hand the Monrovia Group take into account of Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Dahomey (the present-

day Benin), Malagasy Republic, Chad, Upper Volta, Niger, People's Republic of Congo, Gabon, Central African Republic, and Tunisia. The Monorovia Group was formally created from May 8-12 1961. This group favored a gradual approach, similar to the Brazzaville Group, to the conception of African Unity (Timonthy, 2009). The Monrovia and Brazzaville group had corresponding outlook as far as Mauritania is concerned, which, both had supposed Mauritania had all the necessary legitimacy to independence. They also had approved the United Nation Policy on Congo. In addition to this the Monrovia group had also agreed on quite a lot of elements which were shortly reissued as the "Lagos Charter of the organization of African and Malagasy states" subsequent to a meeting of the similar countries (including Congo-Kinshasa) in Logos, Nigeria, in January 1962. The five principles they endorsed later formed the basis of the OAU charter. This principles includes complete equality and sovereignty of African countries, legitimacy of each African country to survive and not subject to annexation by another state or entities, voluntary union of one state with another, non-interference in the domestic affairs of African countries and no state to harbor dissidents from another state (Timonthy, 2009).

The Casablanca group, on the contrary, consists of seven countries that first met in the Moroccan city of Casablanca in January 1961. The seven countries which made up of the Casablanca group consists of the then Algerian provisional government, Ghana, Egypt, Guinea, Libya, Mali, and Morocco. This group was led by the then President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah (Brown, 2010). The group is perceived to be radical and passionate advocates of the immediate Union of the African continent (El-Ayouty and Zartman, 1884). Upon the occasion of the Casablanca group meeting seven African countries were invited but they declined, namely; Ethiopia, Gambia, Liberia, Nigeria, Togo, Tunisia and Sudan. Yet none of the twelve Brazzville Group members were

requested to this congregation (Brown, 2010). Moreover during the meeting the group adopted the "African Charter of Casablanca," which avowed their strong will to attain African unity. The Casablanca group disapproved of the United Nation policy on Congo especially because of the way its Prime Minster Patrice Lumumba, was take care of. The group believed in the Algerian independence struggle and advocated political unity for Africa as a precondition for economic cooperation. This group also supported Morocco, which had positioned territorial assertion on Mauritania (Sabelo, 2010). The kind of entity foreseen by the Casablanca group was a federal government supported by the mobilization of resources all along socialist lines. President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah stated that for "economic unity to be successful, it must be accompanied by political unity". Kwame Nkrumah believed that "the two are indivisible, each mandatory for prospective prominence of Africa, and utilization of the total resources available". Nkrumah over and over again accentuated the socialist move towards Africa's development; complete social and economic development in Africa can only be attained within the best possible zone of development, which is the whole of African continent, and under the guidance of all African Union government following policies of scientific socialism (Carbone, 2002). All in all regardless of the differences among the three regional and ideological blocs the Organization of Africa Unity was created for the reason that they were amalgamated on other state of affairs as the Organization Africa Unity Charter and the organizations subsequent activities put forward (Brown, 2010).

7.2 The Path from the Organization of African Unity to the African Union

Owing a significant and deepest gratitude to a number of African intellectuals who have initiated and advocated the very essence of African Unity to African continent, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in May 25, 1963 by thirty

two African Heads of States that had achieved independence at that point in time (Brown, 2010). In fact May 25 is celebrated annually around world as the African Day or African Liberation Day (Timothy, 2005). Despite the fact that the organization members at the outset was thirty two nations steadily over the years twenty one other states has also joined the organization, with South Africa becoming the 53rd member in 1994. Subsequently during that time almost each and every African states has finally become the member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) apart from Morocco, which pull out from the OAU in the year 1984 following the entrance of Western Sahara as an independent state (Carbone, 2002).

As it had clearly been stipulated on the organization of African Unity Charter the principle aspirations of the OAU's were to advance the solidarity and unity of African state, synchronize and strengthen their collaboration and efforts to realize a better life for the peoples of African, preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member state, get clear of all form of colonialism and apartheid, encourage international collaboration within the United Nations framework and harmonize members economic, political, diplomatic, educational, cultural, health, welfare, scientific, technical and defense policies (Brown, 2010).

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has played a significant contribution to many of African State. In fact when the continent of Africa were not allowed and encouraged to speak on various international arena, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was the firm voice of the African States to the whole world. Plus the OAU settled quite a lot of boundary disputes among different member states. From its inception, the political independence of African states was paramount Pan-African demand and obligation. To address its principal aspiration, the organization established a special financial account to assist liberation movements in opposition to colonial rule

in Africa (Sabelo, 2010; Timothy, 2005 and Brown, 2010). This in due course contributed for the independence of more than quite a few African countries such as Guinea-Bissau in 1974, Mozambique, Angola, Cape Verde and Sao Tome in 1975, Zimbabwe in 1980 and Namibia in 1990 (Sabelo,2010). The fight against apartheid and white minority rule in South Africa was for quite a long time most important concern of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Consequently when the new democratic South Africa joined the league in 1994 it was an immense victory for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Carbone, 2002).

Nevertheless the continued existence and significance of the organization had over the time encountered innumerable crises and was confronted by these troubles. Among several others, the organization had been threatened by severe internal political crises and civil wars within and among member states. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) during that time demonstrated its inability to resolve or manage many of this conflict including conflict in Rwanda, Liberia, Somalia, Siera Leone, Burundi, and Democratic Republic of Congo and thus was recorded as instances of the regional organization's failure to defend (Timothy, 2005). Many of these protracted conflicts have outrageous impact on the overall circumstances of the OAU, which had eventually put the regional body into toothless and unproductive dealings. Plus the ideological cleavages, among its member states or divergent leanings towards opposing ideological blocs in international system had been exerting pressure on the mere existence of the OAU (Carbone, 2002). On the top of this the OAU was overwhelmed by devastating economic and financial challenges (Brown, 2010). Moreover, all the above concerns together had virtually downgraded the continental body into practical insignificance during its last years. Furthermore, on economic terms the OAU was set to achieve better life for the peoples of Africa, yet it did not

achieve as much as Africa remains wrecked by hunger and famine and typified by illiteracy, poverty and inadequacies of sufficient economic growth. Thus the OAU was less efficient in dealing with the problem of neo-colonialism and Post-colonialism (Sabelo, 2010).

Taking into account of the emerging shortcomings of the OAU, the continental body on 1979 established a committee to review the Organization of African Unity Charter and to restructure the organization by equipping it more accurately for the challenges of the continent in a varying world. However, in spite of several meetings, the charter review committee failed to establish essential and fundamental modifications or they failed to come up with well-organized roadmap that successfully shepherd the organization into the new globalization era (Brown,2010).

Consequently, for quite long time the situation started to increase and got even worse over time. In fact more resources were committed on organizing meeting and summits than sorting out new resolution that should have been coming into picture from many of the previous meetings. Unfortunately there was little change in the structure or the efforts of the continental body for 20 years between 1979 -1999. Despite all this on the 9th of September , 1999 a summit was held in Sirte, Algiers realizing the need for urgent action to issues of poverty, HIV epidemics and many more which was continuously faced by the continent and the organization (Brown,2010). At the end of the summit the OAU Heads of State and Government issued the Sirte Declaration calling for the establishment of a new African Union (Sabelo, 2010). The vision for the Union was to build on the OAU's work by establishing a body that could accelerate the process of integration in Africa by supporting the empowerment of African states in the global economy and address the multifaceted social, economic and political problems facing the continent (Brown, 2010). Following this summit, three other

summits were held in the lead up to the official launching of the African Union, the Lome Summit (2000), which adopted the AU Constitutive Act, Lusaka Summit (2001), which drew the road map for implementation of the AU and Durban Summit (2002), which launched the AU and convened its first Assembly of Heads of State and Government (Brown, 2010). A significant number of OAU structures were carried forward into the AU. Similarly, many of the OAU's core commitments, decisions and strategy frameworks continue to frame AU policies. However, while the footprint of the OAU is still strong, the AU Constitutive Act and protocols established a significant number of new structures, both at the level of major organs and through a range of new technical and subsidiary committees. Many of these have evolved since 2002 and some are still under development (Sabelo, 2010 and Brown, 2010).

7.3 The African Union

With the end of cold war and the reshaping of international political scene, African Heads of State recognized that OAU framework was no long adequate to meet the needs for greater continental policy coordination, strong economic growth, and that greater commitment to democratic government at national level was necessary to strengthen African's own voice on international stage. Hence African States on May 26, 2001 in Addis Ababa created the African Union (AU) as a successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and lunched on 9 July 2002 in South Africa (Akokpari et al, 2009). This inter-governmental organization for African States was created with the aim of strengthening integration among member states and voice of African continent in global affairs. Given that the African Union overarching objective is the emergence of "an integrated prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic forces in global arena" (Paul, 2011). Unlike the OAU which was set up among other things to defend the sovereignty, territorial

integrity and independence of African states and the eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa, the African Union has a much border set of objective, including the promotion of peace, security, and stability, democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance; and human and people's rights (Paul, 2011). In fact the constitutive act of the AU under Article 4 (h) states that "the right of the African Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity". Likewise, article Article 4 (j) also states that "the right of member states to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security". This is very critical as the African Union (AU), has the ambition to create an Africa imbued with justice and peace, an interdependent and robust Africa determined to map for itself an ambitious strategy. Principally, the African Union requires each of its member states to promote and protect human and people's rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture. Governments coming to power through unconstitutional means are not allowed to participate in the activities of the Union and the Union is also required to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance (Paul, 2011).

7.4 The African Union and Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

As alluded in the previous sections of this research study, Peace and Security Council has been established by the African Union as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and also as a collective and early-warning arrangement to facilitate a timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. The 15 member PSC is the African Union's pivotal decision making body on conflict and crisis (Paul, 2011). As a structural and long-term

response to the African peace and security challenges, comprehensive and dynamic African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) were set up. The APSA consists of several components, structures, themes in particular a Panel of the Wise, which promotes high–level mediation efforts; African Standby Force (ASF) a rapid reaction for peace support operation, built around 5 sub-regional brigades; a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); a Military Staff Committee (MSC); and a Peace Fund made up of African Union member state and partner contributions to promote Peace and Security Council (PSC) department work (Paul, 2011).

According to article 6 of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union protocol, the African Union in general and the Peace and Security Council in particular shall function in areas which take into account of the following; the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa; early warning and preventive diplomacy, peace-making , including the use of good offices mediation, conciliation and enquiry, peace support operations and intervention pursuant to article 4(h) and (j) of Constitutive Act, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction , humanitarian action and disaster management and other function as may be decided by the Assembly (Sabelo, 2010).

The functions of the council as enumerated above embrace the continents conflict prevention, management and resolution, which are essential for sustainable peace on the continent. In fact the idea of peace and security regime for Africa is also found upon article 3(F) of the African Union Constitutive Act which provides that African Union (AU) shall promote peace, security and stability on the continent (Abass, 2010). A peace and security regime under the African Union should therefore aim at fulfilling this objectives;-

I. Conflict Prevention

In ensuring peace and security conflict prevention play a significant role. In fact according to Levitt(2001) preventing conflict should always take into account the ways of forestalling conflict altogether or at least dismantling it in its preliminary phase, with firm commitment to trust building, coalition building and negotiated settlements (Levitt, 2001). From practical point of view, this may be accomplished through an assortment of means, particularly through preventive diplomacy or preventive deployment. Previously in many instances the African Union has been engaged in mediation and preventive diplomacy specifically in Liberia, Burundi, Sudan and Mauritania. Nevertheless no Conflict Prevention mechanism can be effective with no risk assessment and early warning system (Abass, 2010). In deed on this instance article 12 of the Peace and Security Council of African Union protocol set up the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) (Sabelo, 2010).

The Continental Early Warning System consist of a surveillance and monitoring unit, which serves the whole continent all together and along with the surveillance and monitoring centers of the regional apparatuses. The principal organ is situated at the Conflict Management Directorate of the African Union, which is commonly known as "the Situation Room" and this room is accountable for gathering necessary data and evaluate it in terms of suitable early warning indicators. These CEWS indicators are developed based on apparently defined and recognized social-economic, political, military and humanitarian indicators, which are utilized to evaluate continental social-economic, political, military and humanitarian developments and prescribe significant course of action (Engel and Porto, 2009).

The surveillance and monitoring center of the regional mechanism plays a significant role in the practice of gathering data and examining it and which thus contribute as a

fundamental unit for Africa's peace and security process (Engel and Porto, 2009). Information gathering and examining are conceivably the most imperative functions of every conflict maintenance scheme and are crucial for crisis prevention, as they supply decision makers with essential information to allow them to take important actions prior to conflict spiral.

In consequence to this, article 12(5) of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union protocol clearly stipulates that the African Union Commission chairperson shall make use of the data collected through the CEWS timely to recommend the Peace and Security Council on possible conflicts, threats to peace and security and thus propose the best course of action (Paul, 2011). This article requires the chairperson to make use of the information gathered by CEWS for carrying out responsibilities and functions falling under his/her job description in the African Union.

II. Conflict Management

In same way the Africa Union take the notion of Conflict management as something very essential for the maintenance of peace and security. Principally Conflict management is aspired to reinstate everyday existence to normality in the incident of conflict. Successful Conflict management course of action necessitates appropriate analysis of the conflict at hand. In fact the Council has a vital role which takes in to account, if needed, the utilization of coercive methods to avert conflict (Engel and Porto, 2009). Nevertheless such coercive methods shall be exercised within the appropriate international norms and standards. What is very essential in this regard is Menkhaus examination of African conflict. He in fact said the misunderstanding of most of African's conflicts is to blame for the many of the unsuccessful peace operations and diplomatic initiatives of the continent since 1992. Conversely , the

erroneous early warning systems together with the African Union member states collapse of being active in the conclusion of conflicts in Africa is arguably responsible for the continent's protracted conflicts (Menkhaus, 2006). Although the Peace and Security Council would not want to encounter the cost of underestimating conflict, as the process of conflict management is basically intended at bringing to an end the antagonism of the conflicting parties and guarantee peace and security, noting more, noting less. This will eventually minimize the humanitarian crisis.

Besides this, article 13 of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union Protocol give the legal bases for the establishment of the African Standby Force. The African Standby Force is a collection of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military elements, and is geared up for swift deployment at proper note. Based on the proper notice of the African Union Commission with the approval of either the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly the troop contributing countries are demanded to deploy the standby contingents with the required apparatus for operations (Engel and Porto, 2010). Thus , the standby force among other is authorized to conduct surveillance and monitor missions, support various peace missions and intervene in a member state based on article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act.

What's more the African Union principally consider conflict management as an integral item to the physical and legal protection of displaced people and aspires to prevent the rise of refugee flows and IDPs (The Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2002). In fact from practical viewpoint, Levitt avows that conflict management shall aspire to set up order through what he personally describe "intense preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, sanctions and peace enforcement or humanitarian intervention" (Levitt, 2001).

In addition to this the continental body in its various legal provisions reiterate the need to promote trust and confidence with respect to migrants and IDPs, to ensure peace, security and stability for purposes of encouraging voluntary repatriation. On this regard article 6 and article 15 of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union can be a case in point, whereby humanitarian action was given much more emphasis (Timothy, 2009). Humanitarian intervention necessitate an answer to human rights violations that are a menace to peace and security and such a reply may consist of the application of force so as to avert any potential human right violations. Likewise the African Standby Force is mandated under article 13(f) of the Peace and Security Council of African Union Protocol to render humanitarian assistance in order to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations in conflict areas, among other things. Indeed the African Standby Force legal provision is sufficiently prepared to embark on humanitarian activities with the authorization of the chairperson of the African Union Commission and is also in charge of assisting the undertakings of the humanitarian agencies in various missions (Engel and Porto, 2009). Basically adequate legal provisions to take on humanitarian action are very important in many of African conflicts, and in this respect Marshall (2005) observes.

"When conflict erupts in many poor African countries in particular and any other place in general the possibility for the occurrence of a humanitarian crisis is direct and harsh….(it) alters patterns of livelihood and its major victims are non-combatant population."

III. Conflict Resolution

The concept of Conflict resolution deals with a plethora of activities that looks for ways to tackle the root cause of any conflict state of affairs. It must be observed as a dynamic instrument and not isolated from other mechanisms of conflict handling which intend to control conflict situation as well as find lasting remedy thereto (Burton, 1990). In fact among the various conflict handling stages, Conflict resolution is very essential and mandatory stage. Nevertheless this phase is reliant upon the effectiveness of the process of conflict management. In line with this Sandole and van de Merwe (1993) asserts that conflict resolution is a more comprehensive apparatus which is based on mutual problem sharing between the conflicting parties where by deep rooted causes of conflict are addressed so that the situation is no longer violent, hostile and exploitative (Sandole and Merwe, 1993). It is therefore no wonder that the Peace and Security Council protocol give priority to address the underlining causes of conflict as conflict resolution aims at bring together all the necessary human and other resources to address, for example the political, economic, and social causes of conflict. There are certain minimum principles that guide the African Union in conflict resolution. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of African Union outlined the basic principles of operation for the organizations. Some of these fundamental principles comprises; sovereign equality and independence among member states of the Union, establishment of common defense policy for the African continent; peaceful resolution of conflict among and within member states of the Union through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly; prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among member states of the Union through such appropriate mean as may be decided upon by the Assembly (Paul,2011).

7.5 The Role of African Union (AU) towards Conflict Resolution in South Sudan

Right after the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan, on December 17, 2013 the Former Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU), Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma in press release expressed her and African Union's concern about the conflict in South Sudan particularly the safety and security of the civilian population. Following which the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union urged the Government and leadership of South Sudan and all other stakeholders to exercise maximum restrain and overt any further escalation (Sudan Tribune, 2013a and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2013a).

In the meantime Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma also command Prime Minster Hailemariam Dessalegn of Ethiopia, in his capacity as chair of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the then chair of the Union, for his timely initive to dispatch ministerial delegation to Juba, comprising Ministers and high level officials from Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya , Somalia , Sudan and Uganda as well as the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security (Sudan Tribune, 2013a and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2013).

Similarly on December 18, 2013 the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), held its 409th meeting. Upon this occasion the Council was briefed by the Commissioner for Peace and Security and by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Sudan to the AU, on the situation of South Sudan. During that time the Council noted with deep concern the fighting that broke out in Juba and other locations in South Sudan, arising from disagreements within the leadership of the ruling Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) (African Union Peace and

Security Council ,2013a and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2013a). It has also expressed deep concern at the seriousness of the humanitarian consequences on the civilian population, as the fighting has claimed hundreds of lives and displaced thousands other. Subsequently the Council stressed the need to rapidly and effectively address the situation in South Sudan , with a view to avoid serious implications for the long term security and stability of South Sudan , as well as for the neighboring countries, bearing in mind the then situation in Central African Republic(CAR) and other peace and security challenges in the region. The Council had also urged and appealed to the leadership of South Sudan and all other stakeholders to exercise utmost restraint, and refrain from any action and statement likely to further exacerbate the situation and seek solutions to the current problems through dialogue and reconciliation (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013a and Sudan Tribune, 2013a).

In addition during its 409th sessions meeting the Council had recalled the relevant AU's instruments, emphasizing the rejection by the AU of the use of force to settle political differences as well as the critical importance of respect for human rights, the rule of law and constitutional legality. Furthermore, the Council endorsed the statement issued by the Chairperson of the Commission on 17 December 2013 that stated AU's readiness to assist in finding a peaceful solution to the situation of South Sudan (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013a).

In a bid to seek political solution for the conflict in South Sudan and adhere to the command of Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma on December 19, 2013, the first high-level delegation from the region travelled to Juba. The delegation was led by the former Ethiopian Minster of Foreign Affairs and the then Chairman of the Africa Union Executive Council and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Dr

Tedros Adhanom, and comprised Foreign Ministers of Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Special Representative of Secretary General for United Nations Mission in Sudan and a representative from African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) are also included in the delegation. The delegation was received by South Sudan former Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Barnaba Marial Benjamin in Juba and met President of the Republic of South Sudan Salva Kiir at his office and was briefed about the situation (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2013a).

Likewise few days later Ethiopian Prime Minster Hailemariam Dessalegn and Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta went to South Sudan capital, Juba in attempt to mediate between the conflicting parties (Tesfa-Alem, 2013). The two leaders concluded there first round of talks with President Salva Kiir and left to Kenya for the 23rd IGAD Extra-Ordinary Session for further consultations with IGAD members on ways of finding an all-inclusive solution to the political crisis facing South Sudan (Tesfa-Alem, 2013).

On the 23rd IGAD Extra- Ordinary Session, IGAD member states condemned all unconstitutional actions to challenge the constitutional order, democracy and rule of law and in particular condemned changing the democratic government of the Republic of South Sudan though uses of force. Besides this they had also further condemned the violent escalation of conflict in South Sudan and called on all parties to refrain from steps that will inflame the conflict further particularly along ethnic and sectarian lines (IGAD, 2013a).

Again the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 410th meeting which was held on 24 December 2013, was briefed by the Commission on the

evolution of the situation in South Sudan. The Council expressed Africa's deep dismay and disappointment that the continents' newest nation descended so rapidly into internal strife, and at the failure of political leaders in the country to live up to the hopes and aspirations of their citizens and to respond to the goodwill and solidarity expressed by Africa and the rest of the international community (The African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013b). Furthermore the Council expressed special alarm at the escalation of ethnic mobilization by belligerents, and emphasized that such mobilization of ethnic forces has the potential of causing untold human suffering, tearing apart the social fabric of South Sudan in a manner that causes irreparable societal division and damage, and undermining the institutions of government and security, including the cohesion of national army, and the viability of South Sudanese state (The African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013b). Therefore the council reiterated its call for all concerned South Sudanese stakeholders to act in a sprite of patriotism and vision for greater national interest. Along with this the Council in fact strongly urged the parties to the conflict to immediately stop ethnic mobilization, and strongly warned all those involved against the dire consequences of their actions. In the meantime the Council had also called for an immediate end to any incitement, hostile or ethnic messages, and requested that an opportunity be provided for national figures, religious leaders, and others to transmit messages of peace and reconciliation through national media and other appropriate outlets (The African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013b).

What is more, as part of its response to the crisis in South Sudan, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 411th meeting held at the level of Heads of State and Government, in Banjul, Gambia on 30th December 2013, the Chairperson of the Commission, in consultation with the Chairperson of the African

Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) and other relevant AU structures, mandated to urgently establish a Commission to investigate the human rights violations and other abuses committed during the armed conflict in South Sudan and make recommendations on the best ways and means to ensure accountability, reconciliation and healing among all South Sudanese communities (The African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013c). In pursuance to this decision, the Chairperson of the Commission appointed as members of the AUCISS the former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria (Chair), Honorable Sophia Akuffo of Ghana, Ms. Bineta Diop of Senegal, Professor Mahmood Mamdani of Uganda, and Professor Pacifique Manirakiza of Burundi. The established Commission had sworn its members on 12 March 2014, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Dersso, 2015a).

In the implementation of its mandate, the AUCISS undertook extensive consultations with the South Sudanese stakeholders, including the Government, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement In Opposition (SPLM/IO), political parties, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), civil society organizations, and other South Sudanese parties. The AUCISS also consulted with IGAD, the countries of the region, the United Nations (UN) and other international stakeholders (The African Union Commission of Inquire on South Sudan, 2015). The Council requested the above mentioned Commission to submit its report to the Council within in a maximum period of three months. However the report has been ready for release for quite some time, but was withheld by the AU Commission because of its fears that it would derail the process of reaching a peace deal between Kiir and Machar's constituencies (Dersso, 2015a).

Yet the African Union's long-awaited report on the crisis in South Sudan was released on October 27, 2015 entitled the Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan consisting of 315 pages document which is very extensive

(Dersso, 2015a and The African Union Commission of Inquire on South Sudan, 2015). This document strongly makes the case that there was ethnic targeted killings of hundreds of Nuer and Dinka tribesmen in Juba. The method by which the killings were committed proves their widespread or systemic nature. Key among its findings is that the violence that precipitated the advent of the current war was not spontaneous and isolated event. The commission instead found that struggle for political power and control of natural resources revenue, corruption and nepotism appear to be the key factors underlining the break out of the crisis that ravaged the entire country. In particular, the report notes that the December 15, 2013 conflict is rooted in weak institutions within the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), that manifested themselves in factionalism as its leader struggled for power. This factionalism found expression in military, then engulfed the population along ethnic lines and finally pushed the country into a brutal civil war (The African Union Commission of Inquire on South Sudan, 2015).

Furthermore the report describes that there are also grounds to believe that atrocities against civilians throughout the conflict in various parts of South Sudan were committed in a widespread or systematic manner. The report describes crime such as murder, extermination, torture, rape, persecutions on political grounds as well as inhuman and degrading treatments was committed against civilians. The Commission found international crimes which could constitute either war crimes or crimes against humanity including killings, murder, rape and sexual violence (SGBV), forced displacement/removal of population, abducted children associated with conflict used in servitude and beaten, looting, pillage and destruction of property, disappearances , torture, and targeting of humanitarian workers and property. Other human rights abuses that the report notes are violations of freedom of expression and of the media,

and the discrimination entailed in the targeting of individuals on grounds of ethnic origin. Furthermore the Commission on the report stated that both sides to the conflict have violated human right, with perpetrators including soldiers, militia, rebels and civilians (The African Union Commission of Inquire on South Sudan, 2015).

Besides this the report reiterated that all of the groups that the Commission met with emphasized the need for accountability for the atrocities committed, especially given the entrenched impunity. In fact the report clearly stipulated that people want an acknowledgement of the wrong deeds done, an expression of remorse, as well as accountability in the form of retributive justice and a formal criminal process to end the rooted culture of impunity (Dersso, 2015a). The Commission concluded that criminal prosecution alone is insufficient and therefore there is a clear need for a process to ensure reconciliation and sustainable peace. In order for this to begin, they stated that those with the greatest responsibility for the atrocities at the highest level should be brought to account and mechanisms should be established to address other concerns specific to victims of violations and crimes (The African Union Commission of Inquire on South Sudan, 2015).

Many respondents had little or no confidence in the national judicial or political system to deliver accountability particularly in relation to the top political and military leaders. That in combination with the current capacity of the national criminal justice system, led the Commission to recommend an "Africa-led, Africa-owned, Africa-resourced legal mechanism under the auspices of the African Union supported by the international community, particularly the United Nations to bring those with the greatest responsibility at the highest level to account" (The African Union

Commission of Inquire on South Sudan, 2015). These justice and reconciliation initiatives will be essential for helping the country heal.

The Commission's report also describes their recommendations for addressing institutional weaknesses and longstanding structural issues in South Sudan, including systemic failures in security sector reform. The report recommends a comprehensive review of security sector reform initiatives that include delinking the army from the SPLM and the creation of an ethnically diverse army that "reflects the face of South Sudan" (The African Union Commission of Inquire on South Sudan,2015). But yet the African Union has not exerted any effort to implement this recommendations suggested by the African Union Commission of Inquire on South Sudan and stop the entrenched culture of impunity.

7.5.1 The Strength of the African Union towards Conflict Resolution in South Sudan

Even though there are certain weaknesses that have been registered by the African Union, the regional body has done a significant contribution in urgently displaying the conflict in South Sudan to the international community and various peace and humanitarian partners. The African Union constitutive act and various legal protocols gave a paramount prominence to the nonviolent, peaceful settlement of regional conflicts as a means for attaining peace in Africa in general and South Sudan in particular (Paul, 2011). To which the regional body needs to be prized for.

Plus the African Union and its member states has invested significant amount of time and money to take effective collective measures to tackle conflict in South Sudan and bring about peace and stability to the region. In addition to this, African Union along with its sub-regional and international partners has been capable enough to be able to

convene in very short period of time. A very good example on this regard is the African Union attempt to deploy preventive diplomacy measures on the 19th December 2013 to contain violence while sent a delegation of its Executive Ministers of Foreign Affairs and then its Heads of State to meet the parties to conflict (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2013a). The African Union has also since then offered a good office by using it sub-regional organization particularly the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). What is more the African Union initiated a peace building and accountability process through the establishment of the AUCISS and mobilized different stake holder to respond to issues arising from the conflict. Moreover, the Africa Union in collaboration with IGAD was successful in getting parties to conflict to Sign the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan on August 2015. By signing the documents, the conflicting parties were committing themselves to accountability, reconciliation, healing as well as the need to end impunity in the country.

7.5.2 The Weakness of the African Union towards Conflict Resolution in South Sudan

According to a Key Informant Interview with one of the peace and security expert, despite many of the socio, economic, political and humanitarian indicators indicated crisis were looming in South Sudan since the birth of the nation in 2013, the African Union did little to intervene at critical stages of conflict build up regardless of the reports provided by the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and significant other research groups (KII, Ms. Jennifer, November, 2015, Washington-DC). Notwithstanding of the African Union role remains crucial and instrumental on conflict prevention and management in the region and amongst its members. In

addition to this the "African Union has also failed to be strong and consistent pressure on warring parties to abide by the agreement's terms and to permanently put aside any plans to resort once more to war" Key Informant from the academics added (KII, Maria, January, 2016, Addis Ababa).

Plus the African Union has also fall short of capability to take decisive steps to deal with the worsening and seriously impeded humanitarian access to affected populations in South Sudan. A Key Informant Interview with one of the political analyst affirms the aforementioned fact by stating "*The African Union must have denounced the existing direct and indirect restrictions imposed by the warring parties on humanitarian agency personnel and humanitarian supplies*". What is more the African Union has also delayed the report of the African Union Commission of Inquire on South Sudan (AUCISS) due to initial worries that the release of the AUCISS report will further destabilize the country or the peace agreement however the measure have affected the momentum of the African Union's interventions which has altered the effective and efficient implementation of the peace agreement as well as the AUCISS's recommendations (KII, Dersso, April, 2016).

Chapter Eight

8. The Role of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) towards Conflict Resolution Efforts

Introduction

As it has clearly been presented in the previous sections of this dissertation, the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in the preservation of international peace and security was appropriately documented under Chapter VIII of the United Nations. In fact the United Nations Report entitled An Agenda for Peace (1992), call attention to the idea that regional and sub-regional organizations can be utilized to assist United Nations and regional peace endeavors across range of operations starting from preventive diplomacy to post conflict peace building efforts (Cited in Healy, 2014).

The organization of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Africa is one of the eight sub-regional organizations established for this significant cause. In deed Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) at present is playing a significant role in stabilizing conflict ridden South Sudan (Dersso, 2015b). This chapter will therefore elaborate on the role of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in South Sudan's conflict resolution efforts. The main role of the third party in an analytical problem solving process is that of facilitator. In the case of IGAD, a sub-committee comprising Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Uganda, Sudan and Somalia were delegated to resolve the conflict in South Sudan.

8.1. Historical Backdrop to the Founding of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

Prior to the official inauguration of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) , the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was established in 1986, with the objective of addressing environmental crises that brought about food insecurity and famine in the Horn of Africa. The onward motion for the establishment of IGADD came from United Nation agencies, which has taken into account of the pressing call for sub-regional coordination agency to deal with problems of famine and drought of the region. The founding members were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda (Healy, 2011). In 1993, Eritrea joined the organization after its independence and later on after the organization transformed into IGAD South Sudan joined the organization on 2011 subsequent to the country's independence (Dersso, 2014). The headquarters is located in Djibouti. It is one of the African Union's (AU) recognized Regional Economic Communities (RECs), with over 200 million people and an area of 5,233,604 square kilometers (World Bank, 2013).

Table 6: IGAD Members Countries Profile

Country	**Population in millions**	**GDP Per Capita estimates in 2013 (in US $)**	**GDP Growth in Percentile**
Ethiopia	**94.10**	$46.87 billion	**10.4%**
Djibouti	**0.90**	$1,46 billion	**5.0**%
Kenya	**44.35**	$44.10 billion	**4.7**%
Sudan	**37.96**	$66.55 billion	**-6.0**%

Somalia	**10.50**	$917.0 million	**-1.5** %
Uganda	**37.58**	$21.48 billion	**5.8**%
Eritrea	**6.33**	$3.44 billion	**1.3**%
South Sudan	**11.30**	$13.80 billion	**-24.4**%

Source: (Dersso, 2014**).**

Notwithstanding the organization's narrow original scope, Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) congregation made available a platform for meetings between member states to resolve other issues of mutual interest and states of affairs including peace and security. Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGAD) facilitated peace among and within member's states. In fact in 1994 the members of Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) had come to the understanding that the developmental problems of the region extended far beyond the consequences of drought and environmental degradation (Kidist, 2009). Indeed, in that same year the organization began what was to be a long involvement in attempts to help resolve Sudan's protracted civil war. Almost as a reasonable result of this diplomatic initiative, an extraordinary summit was convened in Addis Ababa in April 1995 to discuss on possible ways to give a new lease of life to the organization and expand its activities into related spheres. Following this, in Nairobi on March 21, 1996, Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) member states decided to transform the organization into the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Healy, 2011). An amended charter was signed, outlining the new tasks and alterations to the organization's structures. The new Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was launched in Djibouti on 25

and 26 November 1996. The great emphasis was placed on the need for peace and security as an essential prerequisite for development. Three priority areas were identified: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and Humanitarian Affairs, Infrastructure (Transport and Communications) Development, and Food Security and Environment (Dersso, 2014).

Accordingly, the need for engaging Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) in peace processes particularly the Somali peace processes in addition to Sudanese peace process was also another major reason that brought about the formation of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Great emphasis was also given to regional economic integration (Healy, 2011). Plus above and beyond the revitalization of IGAD was made possible due to the existing good relations between member states. Accordingly since the establishment of IGAD, the Horn of Africa promoted policies of peaceful relations and a new era of cooperation and co-existence. Hence due to this significant initiative there was political will and new energy to address the security issues in the region through revitalized sub-regional organization (Healy, 2011).

8.2. Vision, Mission, Principles, and Major Activities of IGAD

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has the vision of "becoming the premier sub-regional organization for achieving peace, prosperity, and regional integration in the Horn of Africa." The mission of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is to assist and complement the efforts of the member states to achieve, through increased cooperation, food security and environmental protection, promotion and maintenance of peace and security and economic cooperation and integration (Kidist, 2009).

The principles and values of IGAD include:

• Promotion of good governance


• Protection of human rights through institutionalization of democracy and transparency

• Promotion of a sense of community that aspires to maintain peace in the region and the peaceful resolution of disputes between and within member states (Dersso, 2014).

8.3. Organs of IGAD

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the supreme policy-making organ of the Authority. It decides the objectives, guidelines, and programs of IGAD and meets once a year. A Chairman is selected from the member states in rotation (Kidist, 2009). The other important organ of IGAD is the Council of Ministers. It is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and one other Focal Minister designated by each member state. The Council formulates policy and approves the work program and annual budget of the Secretariat during its biannual sessions. The Council of Ministers meets twice in a year (Dersso, 2014). The Committee of Ambassadors is comprised of IGAD member states' Ambassadors or Plenipotentiaries accredited to the IGAD headquarters in Djibouti. It convenes as often as the need arises to advise and guide the Executive Secretary. The Secretariat, the executive organ of IGAD, is headed by an Executive Secretary appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government for a term of four years and renewable once. The Secretariat assists member states in formulating regional projects in the priority areas, facilitates the coordination and harmonization of development policies, mobilizes resources to implement regional projects and programs approved by the Council, and reinforces national infrastructure necessary for implementing regional projects and policies (Dersso, 2014).

Figure 8: Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Administrative Structure



Source: Dersso, 2014

The Executive Secretary is assisted by four directors heading four divisions: 1) Economic Cooperation and Social Development; 2) Agriculture and Environment; 3) Peace and Security; and 4) Administration and Finance (IGAD 2008). Given that the author of this dissertation major stress dwells upon the directorate of peace and security, the following discussion will eventually focus on IGAD and its role in peace and security states of affairs (Healy, 2011).

8.4. Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD and Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution

Since the establishment of IGAD, creating an effective security policy among member states has been primary aim of the organization. Conflict prevention, management and resolution has since been identified by Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as priority areas of operation given that economic growth and poverty reduction programs are strongly associated with the peace and security agenda (Dersso, 2014). To guaranty sustainable development, common security is the major prerequisite. In fact besides the above justification IGAD strong involvement in peace and security of the region have taken place in a particular context of a broad international consensus that sub-regional organizations are important actors in maintaining international peace and security (Healy, 2011). As one of the sub regions that represent the Horn of Africa, IGAD has to play a forefront role in conflict management and conflict resolution with the close coordination and support of United Nations and Africa Union. A peace and security strategy of IGAD has been entrenched for a collective goal of member states. Perhaps on this regard article 18 of the IGAD charter made it crystal clear that member states agreed "… to act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability, which are essential prerequisites for economic development and social progress". They committed themselves to take collective and effective measures to cooperate for peace building and security; to establish an effective consultative mechanism and to deal with interstates disputes and conflicts with in this mechanism (Abdulrahman, 2012). What is more IGAD gave a significant importance for capacity building and awareness creation, based on its early conflict warning system. The prominent mission in this regard is the establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the Horn of

Africa (Dersso, 2014). CEWARN is the regional coordinating office taking the lead in implementing the IGAD mandate in consultation with the various stakeholders. The establishment of CEWARN is a clear evidence of the regional leader's long term commitment to ensuring peace and stability by defusing or anticipating conflicts.

8.5. The Role of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) towards Resolving Conflict in South Sudan

Soon after conflict broke-out between factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) supporting President Salva Kiir and those supporting his former vice President Rick Machar, the sub regional organization, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) sent its ministerial delegation led by Ethiopia on December 19, 2013 (Sudan Tribune, 2013a and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2013a). The major aim of this visit by IGAD ministerial delegation was to show solidarity and to seek an end to the ongoing South Sudan fighting. Signifying the grave nature of the crisis and possibly due to the challenges the ministerial mediation effort has faced, on 26 December 2013, the Ethiopian Prime Minster Hailamariam Dessalegn and President of Kenya Uhuru Kenyata traveled to Juba. The delegation of the ministers and then heads of state met President Salva Kiir and urged both sides to engage in dialogue (Tesfa-Alem, 2013).

On 24 December 2013, Reuters News Agency reported that Dr. Machar had requested President Kiir to release his "Comrades" who were under detention so that they could be evacuated. Together with this, Machar also requested the withdrawal of Ugandan troops before entering in to a serious of dialogue with government as precondition. Dr Machar added that if the President met his demand they could begin their dialogue straight away. The government on its part had demanded unconditional ceasefire

before it engages in the dialogue (Reuters News Agency, 2013). Plus, rejecting Machar's proposal of meeting in Addis Ababa, the Juba government immediately insisted the dialogue needed to take place in Juba (Mehari and Abel, 2013). This seems to be at the beginning the first challenge for IGAD to grapple with.

To avoid unnecessary tension and perceptions, Nairobi was selected by IGAD to become an alternative venue. The selection of Nairobi was not random selection rather it was a purposeful selection to avert possible tension between the two conflicting parties over the venue. Therefore after the selection of the venue, IGAD Heads of State and Government hurriedly convened an emergency summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on December 27, 2013 in the capital city Kenyan, Nairobi (Mehari and Abel, 2013). This meeting helped in forging what was initially regarded, and rightly so as a critical sub-regional response to the crisis, essentially showing its commitment to mediate between South Sudan's warring parties. The December 27, 2013 summit decided to appoint its special envoys to negotiate an agreement between the warring parties in South Sudan. It appointed Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin from Ethiopia. General Lazarus Sumbeiywo of Kenya and General Mohammed Ahmed Mustfa El Dabis of Sudan (IGAD, 2013a).

Following IGAD Heads of States and Government summit IGAD organized the first round of talk between the two South Sudanese warring parties on January 4, 2014 in Addis Ababa Ethiopia. Upon this first round of talk strong diplomatic effort was exerted to bring the two parties in to peaceful conflict resolution. But due to significant delay over the issue of political prisoners, a Cessation of Hostilities (COH) agreement was signed after 19 days on 23 January 2014 (Mehari and Abel, 2013). Essentially the COHA was an agreement to end the hostilities in order to create an atmosphere for the parties to engage in a meaningful dialogue. Besides ending the

direct fighting and hostile propaganda, the parties had also agreed to open humanitarian corridors to relive the suffering of vulnerable people. As part of confidence building measures, the parties had also discussed the withdrawal of foreign troops and the lifting of the state of emergency. There was also the acceptance of the proposed Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) to report and monitor any violations to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. The parties also settled to expedite the release of the political detainees. Unfortunately on 25 January 2014, however both sides were reported to have breached the truce (Apuulp, 2015). This was a result of serious of strategic mistake committed by IGAD mediations. The mediation failed to get their priorities right following the signing of the COHA. Instead of seizing the momentum already set in motion with the signing of the COHA, to push the parties towards political settlement, the focus somehow switched from the need to observe the cessation of hostilities and reach a peace agreement, to the release of political detainees. Partly, the reason why the entire cessation of hostilities agreement was ignored is because there was not even any matrix on its implementation (Apuulp, 2015).

In a similar vein MVM an important part of the COHA, was not operational until late April 2014. Furthermore, even after the operationalization of MVM, it was not so clear which institution was responsible for holding the parties accountable in the event of violation. According to Senior IGAD official familiar with the process since the COHA signing the parties to the conflict have never picked their representative to the MVM team. Second the withdrawal of all foreign forces, especially Ugandan troops, had become a demand from the SPLM/A-IO. The accountability was essentially abounded, except in few instances where the IGAD special envoys issued statements condemning both parties for violations of the COHA. No other serious actions were

taken, so the parties continued to issue barrages of hate propaganda against each other in direct contravention of the agreement (International Crisis Group, 2014 and IGAD, 2014a). Looking back at the process that led to the signing of the COHA, the parties were not seriously interested on implementing the COHA's provisions but also did not want to disappoint the region and international community. The parties did not want to be seen as an obstacle to the cessation of hostilities agreement. So they reluctantly signed it. On their part, the international peace envoys saw the need to show something for their efforts and so the COHA was rushed into signing without adequate preparations for its implementation.

Notwithstanding the first round of talk and its results IGAD organized the second round of talks which took place on March 2014. Sadly the second talk did not yield any significant outcomes except the authorization of an IGAD Protection and Deterrent Force (PDF) intended to monitor and enforce the ceasefire as part of MVM. The force initially comprises personnel from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Ethiopia. Small group of 90 Ethiopian peacekeepers was deployed in July as part of the PDF (IGAD, 2014a). Partly the proposal for deployment of the PDF might also have been prompted by the fact that UNMISS personnel have been attacked while carrying out their mandate. Together with this the Protection and Deterrent Force (PDF) was also authorized as a way to speed up the withdrawal of foreign troops to ensure peace and stability in the country and to improve the capacity of the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism to monitor the COHA (Fleischner, 2015). Nevertheless this force never materialized.

Another new ceasefire, achieved during the next round of peace talks in April 2014, was also short lived as accusations emerged 5 days later that both sides had violated

the truce in Unity, Jonglei, and Upper Nile states. On 22 May, 2014 a new round of fighting displaced more than 2000 people in Upper Nile State (Apuulp, 2015).

Peace talks that focused on the formation of a transitional unity government were also followed. However, such an objective proved very difficult to accomplish given the diverging views of both sides on what the new government should look like. IGAD was forced to adjourn the subsequent round of peace talks because the rebels boycotted the negotiations accusing IGAD of "unfair inclusivity" in the selection of stakeholders' process (Akol, 2014). Another round of peace talks failed again because of the opposition's refusal to take part in the talks, bringing the process to a standstill and dimming any hopes that a comprehensive agreement would be reached.

On May 9, 2014, President Kiir and Machar signed a new agreement to resolve the crisis in South Sudan. Under the agreement, the two principle protagonists in the conflict for the first time agreed to a transitional government of national unity and for an all-inclusive peace process bringing together the government, the SPLM/A in opposition, former detainees, political parties civil society, and faith based leaders. Nevertheless, President Kirr afterward claimed that he had signed the agreement under duress as Ethiopian Prime Minster Hailmariam Dessalegn had threatened to arrest him if he did not sign (Mabior, 2014 and IGAD, 2014b). Therefore the efforts being made by the East African regional block, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to resolve South Sudan's on-going crisis, was once again through away.

Yet again IGAD member countries with a collaboration of troika (composed of America, England and Norway) made an effort to let the two conflicting party came around the table and negotiate. Therefore another peace negotiation has taken place at

Ethiopia, Bahardar city. As a result from September 22 to October 5, 2014 another round of mediation has taken into place. In fact the major aim or title of the negotiation revolve around the structure of the transitional government, new constitutional reform, ceasefire, security and other related issues (IGAD,2014c). Nevertheless no fruits of peace by this mediation were yielded.

On 10 November 2014 the two warring parties committed once again to abide by the CoH agreement signed in January 2014, with the most recent document including an implementation matrix. IGAD threatened to take strict actions if the two sides failed to abide by the agreement, giving both sides of the conflict 15 days to hold consultations with their constituents in order to work out the details of a power sharing accord. Nevertheless, the deadlines has passed and UNMISS has also reported heavy fighting between the government and opposition forces (Apuulp, 2015).

On March 5, 2015 another negotiation had taken place on the outcome of the earlier mediation that has not led a mutual agreement between the two conflicting party. Indeed the United Nation Security Council has sanctioned those stakeholders identified as an obstacle for further peace mediation. However progress on the peace mediation has not still been viable. In similar vein America and England has made a similar effort to sanction those stakeholders assumed to be obstacle for the peace mediation (UNSC, 2015).

Finally IGAD crafted a compromise agreement for South Sudan after the previous round of talks. The IGAD compromise agreements proposes giving President Salva Kiir's government the lion's share of power in a transitional government, but hands a majority of the state parliamentary seats in the Great Upper Nile region to the main armed opposition movement, led by former vice president Riek Machar. Among other proposals is the

creation of a new post of first vice president, which would be filled by Machar. Both sides have rejected parts of the proposed deal, but have shown up in Addis Ababa to try to hammer out an agreement by August 17 deadline set by an expanded mediation team, including IGAD member states, IGAD Plus countries which includes the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway; the European Union, the United Nations, the African Union, five African nations, and China (Deresso, 2015b).

But what emerged by the 17 August 2015 deadline was only a partial agreement. It was signed by the armed opposition leader Riek Machar and the then reinstated secretary-general of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) Pagan Amum, on behalf of the former detainees. Ominously, President Salva Kiir did not sign, but was persuaded by the mediation team to take 15 days for consultations. The additional 15 days earned him no opportunity for securing a better deal his government was after. As all other signatories including the SPLM-IO and the former detainees signed the agreement during the 17 August signing ceremony in Addis Ababa, his refusal to do the same left his government isolated and cornered. In substantive terms as well, the only option available to him even with the additional 15 days was to sign the deal without any changes or amendments. The alternative option was made more costly with the United Nation introduction of a resolution for imposing new United Nation sanctions that the US proposed (Dersso, 2015b).

It thus came as no surprise when the announcement came from Juba that President Kiir would finally sign the deal long before the end of the 15 days. On 26 August in the presence of regional leaders and other invited dignitaries, he entered his signature to the compromise agreement (Lunn, 2016).

Apparently, the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCISS), implementation phase began on August 29, 2015 and the deal was unanimously approved by the country's parliament on September 10, 2015. This crucial period represented a critical step in an effort to end conflict that broke out back in December 2013. However according to one of my Key Informant Interview with one of the political analyst "the signing of the peace accord by the President Kiir on August 26, 2015 was not thought to be a celebratory moment by many given that as the President not fully embraced and welcomed the agreement. He signed the agreement grudgingly and expressing dissatisfaction." He told the attendees of the signing ceremony that "with all the reservations that we have, we will sign this document" he added (KII, Dersso, and April, 2016, Addis Ababa).

President Kiir's lack of enthusiasm for the agreement he signed did not end with him declaring unspecified general reservations in his speeches. In a sign that revealed much deeper and stronger qualm to important portions of the agreement, President Kiir before signing the agreement, initiated a 12 page document detailing a list of 16 reservations. Although he wanted this document to be annexed to the agreement, IGAD leaders declined his request for adding their signatures (Dersso, 2015b). The 72 page long peace agreement consists of eight chapters outlining, among others, the establishment of the Transitional National Unity Government (TNUG) for a 30 month period of time and the formula for power sharing; permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements; transitional justice, accountability and reconciliation; the parameters for the making of the permanent constitution and a robust monitoring and implementation framework (Lunn, 2016). Together with this the Agreement allowed for the establishment of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC). The Commission is chaired by the Former President of Botswana, Festus Mogae. As a

result the JMEC now has the responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict. Likewise, Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) was also formed according to the agreement (Dersso, 2015b).

Despite the actual signing of the agreement and the commencement of its implementation at some point in time, key elements had not been agreed by the parties. Levels of trust remained low and fighting continued to flare up at times here and there. On the top of this, a sign of just how little goodwill there was come in October 2015 when Salva Kiir unilaterally created an additional 18 states, bringing the total number up to 28. The move prompted international criticism as it was counted as a violation of the peace agreement (Lunn, 2016). Indeed the East African regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), has issued strong worded statement calling on President Salva Kiir to suspend his order creating 28 new states and follow the mechanisms provided in the peace agreement he signed in August 2015. Yet, in violation of the Agreement, "the Government of the Republic of South Sudan issued establishment order 36/2015 on October 2015 redrawing the state boundaries of the Republic that expanded the number of states from 10 to 28" (Sudan Tribune,2015). In addition to this, the transitional government should have been put in place within the 90 days deadline marked after the signing of the peace deal, which is before the end of November 2015. However, discussions over its formation only began on 23 December 2015, passed two deadlines and were formed after two days of the arrival of the former First Vice President on April 28, 2016 (Lunn, 2016).

Moreover, Chapter II of the peace deal requires measures such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of all governmental and non-governmental

security into civil society. Along with this the agreement requires that all military forces within Juba shall be redeployed outside a radius of 25km from the centre of the capital Juba within a maximum of 90 days starting a month after the signing of the agreement. All state security actors allied to either party, including Ugandan forces deployed to South Sudan for supporting the government, would have to leave the country within 45 days except in Western Equatoria state, where Ugandan forces have been operating on the basis of a regional arrangement for combating the Lord's of Resistance Army. To do so, efforts has been exerted to demilitarize the capital city, and practical arrangements on the organization of the unified security forces for Juba were signed on 4 November 2015, a few days after Ugandan troops, deployed to support the government, officially withdrew from South Sudan (European Union Parliament, 2016). The opposition troops which would make up part of the joint forces were allowed to enter the capital in January 2016. However, elsewhere in the country IGAD and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) reported numerous ceasefire violations from both sides, in particular in the states of Jonglei, the Upper Nile and Unity (Lunn, 2016). Plus Chapter V of the peace agreement provides for the creation of a hybrid court for South Sudan (HCSS) by January 28, 2016. The Hybrid Court of South Sudan was expected to be set up by the African Union along with the assistance of IGAD and the court was also expected to be independent, and have primacy over any national jurisdiction, with the competence to try serious crimes under international law and relevant laws of the Republic of South Sudan (Lunn, 2016). Yet the Hybrid Court, the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing, and the Compensation and Reparation Authority have not materialized or been set up (European Union Parliament, 2016).

Furthermore as part of the peace accord implementation Dr Riek Machar arrived back to Juba on April 26, 2016. He was immediately sworn in as First Vice-President of South Sudan. Nevertheless his return had been anxiously awaited, after the announcement by the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) that Dr Machar would be arriving in Juba on April 12. However, James Gatdet Dak, Spokesperson for the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement-in-opposition (SPLM-IO), promptly explained that Machar would not actually arrive until 18 April, 2016. But there were to be further delays. On April 11, the JMEC announced that 1,370 SPLM-IO troops and police had been transported from Malakal to Juba as required by phase one of the transitional security arrangements (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2016b). Ethiopia, China and the three troika countries (the US, the UK and Norway) contributed for this key move to take place. Despite this, Machar and the Chief of Staff of the SPLM-IO failed to leave Pagak on either April 18 or on April 19. The delay, according to one of the Key informant from the political leaders said it was because of "logistical reasons", largely due to Dr Machar wanting to bring in additional troops and heavy weapons. This led the JMEC on April 19 to issue a strong statement urging both parties to demonstrate their full cooperation in ensuring the return arrangements for the then First Vice President designate as soon as possible (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2016).

With the delay threatening the whole peace agreement and given the gravity of the situation, on Thursday April 21, 2016, IGAD and the Troika countries took a hand, issuing a statement insisting that Dr Machar should return to Juba by Saturday April 23, 2016 at the latest. On Saturday, however, Dr Machar said he was denied permission to land at Juba by the South Sudan Government as the airport was closed (Sudan Tribune, 2016). On Monday April 25, 2016 General Simon Gatwech, SPLM-

IO Chief of Staff, was able to arrive in Juba and the next day Dr Machar himself finally appeared in Juba and took the oath as First Vice President (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2016).

Two days after the arrival of Dr. Rick Machar in Juba on April 28, 2016 and his swearing in as First Vice President, South Sudan's former warring parties and political rivals finally formed the long awaited Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) to administer the country. The day before the formation of the TGoNU the names of officials to be appointed to ministerial positions were handed to President Kiir (Sudan Tribune, 2016). The President dissolved the previous cabinet and the next day (April 29, 2016) he named appointees to their new ministerial portfolios. Thirty full cabinet ministers and seven deputy ministers took oath of office in a function headed by President Salva Kiir and his two deputies, First Vice President Dr. Riek Machar and Vice President, James Wani Igga. President Kiir appointed 16 of the ministers and 4 deputy ministers, another 10 ministers and two deputy ministers were from the SPLM-IO, the Former Detainees had two ministers and a deputy minister; Other Political Parties also had two ministers and a deputy minister (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2016).

8.6. The Strength of Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Mediation in South Sudanese Conflict

Credit must always be submitted where it dues. Despite some Challenges Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as an organization has done a magnificent job in bringing the South Sudanese crisis to the attention of the international community. Within the IGAD policies, great emphasis was given to the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts as a means for achieving sustainable development including the South Sudanese conflict (Healy, 2014). Member states of Inter-

governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) agreed to invest time and money to take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace and stability. In addition to this, Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has become proficient at being able to convene at very short notice. A case in point in this regard is what happened a few days after the eruption of the December 15, 2013 conflict in the South Sudanese capital Juba, a situation that quickly spread like a wildfire across the country, particularly in the three states of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile, sent disturbing impression around the world (Sudan Tribune, 2013a and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2013). In a bid to halt this crisis, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional bloc of the horn of African countries, immediately sprang into action by sending Council of Ministers to Juba and then it's Heads of States and Government (Sudan Tribune, 2013a and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2013). Having taken this seemingly clear-headed direction, IGAD quickly won a commensurate support from the international community, including notably African Union, Troika, United Nation, European Union, and China, among others (International Crisis Group, 2014). The following narration is Weber and Ajak statement on the above point "very rapid reaction of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), something which had not seen before. Indeed IGAD had a clear understanding that a political negotiation, seeking a cessation of hostilities as the first phase" (Weber and Ajak, 2014).

On the top of this, this sub-regional organization has also made a significant contribution as far as decisions are made because many of the decisions are usually reached by consensus despite most if not all failed. In other word, the current South Sudanese conflict when mediated many of the decisions were reached by consensus rather than imposition. The very basic concept of reaching decisions with the core principles of

consensus have the ability to reduce the risk of any possible disappointment involved in a win or lose voting system. In addition, IGAD in collaboration with Africa Union was successful enough in getting parties to conflict to Sign the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan on August 2015 despite some difficulties involved.

8.7. The Weakness of Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in South Sudanese Conflict Resolution Effort

The IGAD peace process on South Sudan faces several problems. Chief among them is the fact that the belligerents have not honored the cessation of hostilities. The belligerents have broken several cessations of hostilities agreements hence rendering many efforts to resolve the conflict futile. From the beginning of the conflict, both the government of Salva Kiir and the SPLM/A in Opposition have not shown a commitment to end the conflict in South Sudan through mediations. At every turn, the two sides have laid obstacles for resolving the conflict peacefully. For example, before the negotiations commenced in Ethiopia, the SPLM/A in Opposition demanded that all the political detainees had to be released before they would participate in negotiations. In turn, the government of Salva Kiir countered that detainees were criminals who had participated in an attempted coup d'etat and thus had to be prosecuted for treason. While this impasse was overcomed by IGAD securing the release of some of the political detainees, the Salva Kiir government continues to argue that the released detainees cannot participate in the negotiations because he does not want to create and get involved in a three way talks (Mehari and Abel, 2013).

Later on upon the release of the four remaining detainees, President Kiir observed, "I hope these four will not do what the previous seven did, when they travelled to Addis Ababa, and set up a third front" (Sudan Tribune, 2013b). The suggestion that the former detainees should be part of the talks was advanced to promote inclusivity in

the process. However, the government has continued to argue that inclusivity entails that the two main parties to the conflict negotiate and any product of the negotiations will be subjected to a national dialogue in South Sudan (Akol, 2014). On the other hand, Riek Machar opposes the public validation of the negotiations because he fears the government will manipulate the process (Akol, 2014). Meanwhile, fighting has continued in different parts of South Sudan, especially in the states of Unity and Upper Nile in total breach of the CoHA. These events clearly demonstrate the lack of commitment to the negotiations by the two sides. According to one African Union Peace and Security Department officer, "Neither the government nor the rebels want to have a negotiated end to the conflict". According to him, "The government would love to wish the negotiation process away" (KII, Paschal, July, 2016, Addis Ababa). This view is supported by a senior official of IGAD who has observed that "the talks are not going anywhere, as both sides think they can win militarily". For the government, the rebels do not pose an immediate threat to its power in Juba and thus it does not see the value of the negotiations. Under such circumstances it is important to note that belligerents have continually broken ceasefire. Therefore, IGAD's entry point should have been reexamined. Given that it is appropriate for IGAD to be involved at all levels from peace building, conflict prevention, peace keeping, and peacemaking back to peace building.

The second concern is that the mediation seemingly suffered from lack of full mandate and independence. This is presumed from the fact that the mediators hardly tried to resolve any impasses with the parties. Instead, they consulted the Heads of State and Government whenever hurdles were hit. Whilst the pressure from the IGAD leaders was welcomed, it seemingly interfered with the smooth flow of the mediation. Indeed it seems that the mediators were not fully in the process and therefore were not

as creative as they should be and were pulled to all directions. On this regard a narrative of Key Informant Interview conducted with a staff of Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is presented;

"*Structurally, there is a disconnection between IGAD the organization with a secretariat in Djibouti on the one hand and member states that make up IGAD on the other. In resolving regional conflict, the IGAD member states are always undertaking their own initiatives independent of secretariat. On this regard the IGAD special envoys do not report to the IGAD secretariat but to their respective governments. Other than the IGAD secretariat calling the IGAD summit meetings to discuss the situation in South Sudan, it has no role in the day-to-day management of the process. Moreover, under the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy 2010–2014, the IGAD secretariat established a mediation support unit in 2011. The aim of the mediation support unit includes developing a roster of technical experts and envoys in the area of conflict mediation. If properly utilized the mediation support unit could have provided the necessary expertise in mediation, which possibly could have speeded up the process"* (KII, Mr. Moses, February, 2016, Addis Ababa).

Again, according to Key Informant Interview with another IGAD stuff affirmed the fact that the structure of the peace process is cumbersome, requiring the simultaneous presence of five Foreign Ministers with the attending complications and time pressures this entails. The process requires follow up results of the meetings and prepare for further rounds. "With the Ministers pressed for time, the sessions have been too brief, leaving little time for an in-depth exploration of positions, and the intervals between rounds too long" IGAD staff added (KII, Mr. Camlus, February, 2016, Addis Ababa).

Third, differences between the mediators on the pace, modalities and even the objectives of their mediation effort have contributed to the paralysis of the peace process. Recent conflicting economic, security, and political interests between the mediators themselves have further undermined the efficacy and credibility of the process. The various interests and complex rivalries of IGAD member states are presented in the following section.

I. Ethiopia

Ethiopia is the IGAD chair, and former Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin is the lead IGAD Special Envoy (Berouk, 2014). There is a widespread perception that Addis Ababa is the driving force behind the mediation and that it carefully protects this role (Dereje, 2014). Ethiopia views itself as the lead nation of the organization it has chaired since 2008, charged with maintaining regional stability and vying with Uganda for overall regional leadership (Berouk, 2014). Yet, in Somalia where both contribute troops to the African Union Mission (AMISOM) fighting al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab, there has been less overt competition (International Crises Group, 2015). Ethiopia also plays a critical role vis-à-vis Sudan, and between Sudan and South Sudan, including by providing almost all the troops for the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) (Getachew, 2015 and International Crises Group,2015).

Accordingly Ethiopia believes, its interests are best served, by a policy of neutrality. South Sudan borders Ethiopia's restive Gambella state, inhabited by Anuyak and Nuer (who also reside in South Sudan). The area is the location of significant foreign investment in large agriculture schemes (Dereje, 2011). Ethiopian Nuer has joined their kin fighting in South Sudan, and there is a widespread perception that the state government in Gambella is sympathetic to the Nuer dominated SPLM/A-IO (Dereje,

2014). Nevertheless Ethiopia also would like to avoid further upsetting the delicate ethnic balance between Anuyak and Nuer in Gambella or otherwise adding to its own insecurity (Berouk, 2014). There are also economic interests in trade and infrastructure development that were about to commence before the eruption of war in South Sudan (International Crisis Group, 2015). Plus, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) for Ethiopia is a major concern as far as South Sudanese conflict is concerned. GERD is located about 40 kilometers apart from the border with Sudan, and is expected to generate around 6,000 megawatts of power to countries across the region (Berouk, 2014 and Getachew, 2015). Thus Sudan's cooperation is critical to the success of the GERD, causing Ethiopia to hesitate to press Sudan on issues related to the peace process.

II. **Uganda**

It has been argued that Uganda has strong links to the SPLM/A, including decades of joint military deployments **(**International Crisis Group, 2014**).** By the time the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) came to power in Uganda in 1986, the conflict between the Sudan government and the SPLA/M had been raging for close to three years. The outbreak of the second civil war in the south and the formation of the SPLA/M was precipitated by President Gaafar Nimeiri abrogating the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement by dividing the south into three regions and imposing Islamic law on the whole country, including southern Sudan (Deng, 2010).When the NRM government came to power, it faced an insurgency in northern Uganda. The remnants of the defeated Ugandan army, which had taken refuge in Sudan, subsequently launched attacks on Uganda from their bases in Sudan (Getachew, 2015). While the NRA was able to defeat a number of these militia groups using military and peace-talk strategies, including the Uganda People's Democratic

Army (UPDA) and the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) I and II, the most virulent insurgent group was the Lord‘s Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony, which took root in northern Uganda (Mulugeta,2015).

Following the collapse of the peace talks between the LRA and the Ugandan government around 1993–4, the LRA started getting military assistance from the Sudan government. According to Andrew Natsios, the Khartoum government armed and equipped the LRA and allowed it to maintain a permanent military base in the Kit Valley (Natsios, 2012). Kevin Dunn notes that the Sudanese government was instrumental in transforming the rag-tag group of rebels of the LRA into a coherent, well supplied military force, largely though training, sharing of logistics and the introduction of more powerful and sophisticated weaponry such as land mines and rocket propelled grenades (Dunn, 2010). What prompted Sudan‘s support of the LRA was the support that the NRM government had extended to the SPLA/M. Paul Omach has noted that the NRM government was sympathetic to the SPLA/M, (Omach, 2010) and Mari Tripp states that on 29 March 1989, a secret military cooperation agreement was signed between Uganda and Garang committing Uganda to provide equipment and training to the SPLA, as well as passports for travel abroad (Tripp, 2010). Uganda also committed to provide the SPLA with free passage through the country while conducting its operations (Tripp, 2010 and Omach, 2010).

Coming to the current intervention, President Yoweri Museveni sent troops to support South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir at the outset of war and remains South Sudan’s staunchest ally (Mulugeta, 2015). Uganda has often sought to benefit financially and politically from foreign military activities, and its deployment in South Sudan is in the same context (Apuulp, 2015). Uganda participated in the initial IGAD council of ministers visit to Juba in December 2013. Following the visit, the Heads of State

appointed special envoys from Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. Uganda, as a belligerent party, was not included and continues to focus more on securing its interests in country than at the Addis Ababa peace talks (International Crisis Group, 2014). Uganda is seen by many as the kingmaker in South Sudan (African Security Review, 2014). However, political indecisiveness, displeasure with the options on the table and relative acceptance of the status quo mean that its military influence is not translating into the regional political leadership needed to end a conflict that cannot be won on the battlefield (Breidlid and Arensen, 2014). Uganda's posture is shaped by deep animosity toward Sudan and an often instinctive dislike of former South Sudan Vice President Riek Machar, now head of the SPLM/A-IO related to his former relation with Sudan during earlier liberation struggle (Berouk, 2014).

III. Kenya

Kenya's South Sudan policy is guided by the desire for stability necessary to secure its economic interests and growing diplomatic profile in the region and beyond (International Crisis Group, 2014). Even prior to the CPA negotiations, Kenya cultivated a quiet but influential regional role on South Sudan, but its regional diplomacy is also influenced by President Uhuru Kenyatta's International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment in connection with the 2008 post-election violence. He has sought to build a regional coalition against his indictment, the ICC and criminal accountability more broadly. At the same time, many current and former officials have significant investments in South Sudan (International Crisis Group, 2014). This creates the widespread perception that Kenya is pro-Kiir, maintained by the South Sudanese government's repeated requests to move the first mediation to Nairobi (Mehari and Abel, 2013).

In addition Kenya is currently occupied by the issue of terrorism (al-Shabaab) and various ways as to how to fight terrorism. Together with this many officials of Kenya are concerned that sanctions against South Sudanese elites by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the African Union (AU) could negatively impact Kenya's business activities in South Sudan such as banking, insurance, and aviation (Berouk, 2014 and Dereje, 2015).

However, unlike the CPA negotiations, Kenya has rarely led during this process, preferring to stay neutral among sparring neighbors and between the warring parties (International Crisis Group, 2014 and Apuulp, 2015). In an early diplomatic success in 2014, Kenya secured the former detainees' release and hosted them in a secure location in Nairobi. A year later in June, as the SPLM dialogue progressed, Kenya used its leverage (alongside South Africa and Tanzania) to bring former detainees on a visit to Juba (Berouk, 2014 and Dereje, 2015).

Despite this, Kenya's activities on its border with South Sudan in remote Nadapal, near the contested Ilemi Triangle, created further bilateral tension (Berouk, 2014). Yet its overriding focus on security issues at home and in Somalia and its complex interests in South Sudan implies that it is likely to continue seeking middle-ground and a solution that secures its economic interests and limits calls for criminal accountability.

IV. Sudan

Oil revenue is critical to both South Sudan and Sudan, and control over South Sudan's oil fields will be pivotal calculations as conflict evolves. South Sudan's oil-producing areas have experienced decades of violent conflict, involving many of the same actors, though relationships have changed substantially (Getachew, 2015). Since mid-

2013, relations between Sudan's President Bashir and President Kirr have improved, as part of the process of post secession negotiations and Sudan's gradual switch to economic and security cooperation with its neighbors. A good example among several others in this regard is the signing of Cooperation Agreement on September 27, 2012 between the government of South Sudan and Sudan. This Cooperation Agreement entails that the two parties has agreed to cease any form of harbor or support of rebel group from both sides against each other, establish a buffer zone on the border, and form a joint monitoring team to prevent rebel penetration. However there are continuous allegations by various groups that the two groups are acting in ways which destabilize each other. For instance Sudan has allegedly been training rebels along its border to Unity and Upper Nile states and even agreed to open a coordination office for SPLM-IO. This situation has negatively impacted the IGAD led peace process (Fleischner 2015and Nyathon, 2016).

Similarly, the South Sudanese government has allegedly been supporting Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), a coalition of armed groups who is opposing the government of Sudan, with military aid and territorial bases in Unity, Northern, and Western Bahr el Ghazal states (International Crisis Group, 2014). In exchange, Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) is fighting against the SPLM-IO to protect the oilfields in Bentiu and Paloch, which the government uses to fund its military expenses against the rebels. The SRF preferred to fight alongside the forces of Kiir because the group felt worried that Machar would seek help from Sudan, as he did in the early 1990s. Similarly, some Dinka politicians of South Sudan, particularly those from Abyei, Unity, and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states, wanted to use the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) to pressure Sudan to give up the disputed territories at the border of the two countries. The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) and SPLM-IO fight each other

in many places in Unity and Upper Nile states, with the former becoming an active actor in the South Sudan conflict (International Crisis Group, 2014).

What is more, deep mistrust between Sudan and Uganda was another concern why IGAD mediation was facing challenge. Sudan is mainly interested in maintaining its status of dominant power in South Sudan and resisting Uganda's northward interference. Key Informant Interviewee with one academician affirms that Sudan unambiguously fears that "Ugandan active policy is to rob South Sudan of its oil wealth and also to weaken Sudanese influence in the region as well as to deprive Sudan of any political or financial benefit in South Sudan". He further added that "in fact Sudan believes that the Ugandan presence in South Sudan is a source of instability par excellence" (KII, De Waal, August, 2016, Addis Ababa). This perception, an Ethiopian Diplomat adds, has to do directly with the fact that "the Sudanese military and security services have traditionally been anti-Ugandan and do not accept a weakening of Sudanese influence in its traditional zone of influence" (KII, Daniel, March, 2016, Addis Ababa). In geopolitical terms, they consider the growing Ugandan military presence, both land based and aerial, in South Sudan as a direct threat to Sudanese national security interest (African Security Review, 2014).

Moreover, the proximity of Ugandan forces to the oil fields in South Sudan's Unity and Upper Nile states has caused great anxiety in Sudan regarding Uganda's real intentions (Awolich, 2014). With lesser military capabilities, Sudan was deeply concerned by the possibility of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), getting significant amounts of weapons from Uganda. The visits of Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir to South Sudan and vice-versa was supposed to symbolize his personal support for Kiir's government against Machar, who had been for so many years Sudan's key ally (Fleischner 2015). Yet, there are genuine concerns that Sudan might

have already relapsed to its longstanding tactics of supporting South Sudan's distanced opposition forces, which are undoubtedly on the lookout for foreign sponsors and conduits of military support in the region.

The inability to flock together in united approach delivers direct impact on the failure of mediated settlement or its implementation even when agreement is reached. It is necessary for the member to achieve harmony and settle their disputes separately before engaging in the matter of mediating a settlement on South Sudan crisis.

Fourth, IGAD as an organization does not have the capacity (especially financial) to mount a successful mediation. Key Informant Interview with one of the region political analyst affirmed the aforementioned fact and added that "the failure of the organization to operationalize the IGAD Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) in 2005 is a precedent that should be borne in mind" (KII, Dr. Tedros, March, 2016, Addis Ababa). Possibly, the belligerents knowing IGAD's in capacity to bring them to order have failed to adhere to the terms of cessation of hostilities agreement they signed several times.

Fifth, IGAD has been on record since day one regarding the importance of having an inclusive peace process in South Sudan. However, this view remained as an inspirational goal for about long period of time, a period that saw the talks being limited to the warring parties alone. "Contrary to the aforementioned IGAD position, both warring parties were united in their determination to keep other stakeholders out of the talks, arguing that inclusion of parties who are not directly involved in the conflict can make the negotiations more difficult to reach any deal" regional leader and Key Informant of this research asserted (KII, Dr. Tedros, March, 2016, Addis Ababa).

The sixth concern with the IGAD mediation was the fact that IGAD itself did not live up to its end of the agreements; it has been moving the goal posts in the middle of the game. A Key Informant Interview with an academics affirms the aforementioned fact, he said "*at the March 2014 Summit of the IGAD Heads of State and Government, a Protection and Deterrent Force (DPF) was authorized as a way to speed up the withdrawal of foreign troops to ensure peace and stability in the country and to improve the capacity of the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism to monitor the CoHA*". Yet he noted this force never materialized. *"This is on top of the fact that in the August 2014 protocol, IGAD had proposed the creation of the position of Prime Minister; in December 2014, the new proposal nevertheless had the First Vice President*" he added (KII, Dr. Jeffrey, January, 2016, Addis Ababa). This capricious decision making style by the mediation created confusion for the delegations.

Chapter Nine

9. Summery and Conclusion of the Study

South Sudan became independent in 2011, marking the end of one of the longest conflicts in recent sub-Saharan African history and ushering the hopes of a more peaceful and prosperous future for its citizens. However, this optimism was punctured by the onset of internal conflict on December 2013. Since then the country has faced a worsening humanitarian crisis, and there are concerns that it could enter a vicious cycle of increasing instability, politically and economically. Indeed, South Sudan is currently engulfed by internal instability. A confluence of factors including economic, political and the intensification of armed opposition contributed to the augmentation of war in South Sudan on December 15, 2013. South Sudan has been struggling, since then, with complete absence of law and order. The South Sudanese people have gone through all kinds of misery in the past three and half years. The anarchy, violence and poverty forced many South Sudanese to be displaced, become refugees, and thousands lost their lives. The effects of the general anarchy in South Sudan have not only affected the population of South Sudan, they have also had a spillover effect on the horn of Africa region and the international community. The problem of refugees, the smuggling of small arms and the light weapons and the spread of terrorism are all threats emerging from South Sudan, mainly affecting the horn of Africa and international community in general (Ibrahim, 2013).

This study was therefore conducted with the objective of investigating conflict dynamics and the role of regional and sub-regional organizations towards resolving conflict in South Sudan with a particular reference of African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The analysis has employed

qualitative research method given that this research study author has determined with significant justification that quantitative measures cannot adequately describe or interpret the situation at hand.

Data for this study was generated from four key instruments which are; Documentary Analysis, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), Key Informant Interviews (KIIS) and In-Depth Interview. Documentary Analysis was used to provide background, to track change and development. At the same time 10 Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with various discussants was also conducted each consisting of 6 participants so as to be able to draw upon participant's attitudes, feelings, experience and reactions. What is more, 55 In-Depth interviews were also conducted with various participants of the research to obtain comprehensive information, to understand participant's response deeper and gain more extra knowledge and insight. Besides all this, 28 Key Informant Interview (KIIS) were also conducted with academician, regional leaders, political analysts, peace and security experts, ambassadors, diplomats, higher government officials, staff and coordinators of AU and IGAD to increase the validity of the data gathered.

… On the Causes of the Conflict

Findings of the study suggest that the immediate cause of the conflict in South Sudan lies on internal power struggle between the political elites nevertheless there are also other number of political, economical and social factors that has contributed as a causes to the conflict in South Sudan. The research has found that the SPLM who had been the signatory of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has ended the 22 years war but unfortunately John Garang who had led the SPLM since its establishment in 1983, died in a helicopter crush three weeks after his inauguration as the President of the Government of South Sudan. Thus this incident left South Sudan

and Salva Kiir who was John Garang's long time deputy to take over the position of the president and led the south towards independence in 2011. Nevertheless according to many of this research Key Informant Interview results prior to the outbreak of violence on December 15, 2013, there were indications as early as 2008 that all was not well, and that differences within the party portended violence. At the time, differences between the President and Pagan Amum, the then Secretary General of the SPLM had threatened to derail progress towards elections. In fact the KII respondents of this research said the differences were eventually resolved, with many urging for unity of purpose as the elections and the eventual referendum approached. In addition to this another Key Informant Interviewee asserted that the relationship between the President and his Vice President was at edge. In fact the two leaders were already strained, and that these differences were overlooked for the sake of unity within the party during the Interim Period (2005-2011). The SPLM split in 1991 and the reordering of the SPLM leadership to accommodate Riek Machar on his return were partly to blame for the frosty relationship that was carried on between Riek Machar and Kiir after independence. In 2010, the two leaders are said to have supported rival candidates in a number of key electoral positions, particularly the governorships of several states according to this research result. The tensions within the political class exploded when Vice President Dr. Riek Machar, SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amun, and Madam Rebecca Garang, the widow of the late Dr. John Garang, publicly announced their intention to run for the post of Chair of the SPLM, and thus President of the country. Taking this as a crucial concern, President Kiir removed executive powers from Dr. Riek in April. In July, he dissolved the government, removing Riek and others from any government office.

Even though South Sudan's current conflict stems in large part from a long running competition within the elite class for power and profits, the effect of corruption shouldn't be overlooked. According to this research inquires related to corruption with academics, political analysts and with some of the Focus Group Discussion participant's the researcher heard and learned that corruption has been a major problem for South Sudan since they have gained independence and also before independence too. The researcher noted that South Sudan was also dominated by the military elite which is strongly fragmented and marked by competing clientelist networks along tribal and ethnic lines. Plus political accommodation, as an approach for stability has been criticized by many participants as a way of favoring the patronage system. This study has also found that the public service/civil service appointment was not merit based rather they were used to prize those who have been part of the right ethnic group and those who were member of the liberation struggle and this has corrupted the process of institutional and governance system, severely weakening institutions. On the top of this nevertheless the researcher has also found that budgets and other finances were diverted from various sectors. Moreover the research has also learned that the government has largely squandered its economic potential and political goodwill, by becoming a kleptocracy where political power is leveraged to secure wealth.

Besides this, the linkage between conflicts and militarization and arm proliferation is an established process in South Sudan current conflict. This research has found that South Sudan has shown a steady rise in military expenditure since the eve of its independence and afterward. This has created resentments and grievances by the local community because of the assumption that the government is using its large amount of revenue to strengthen itself and fight back the opposition which is at the expense of

livelihood improvement of South Sudanese and the coming generation. The researcher has also learned that there are various neighboring states and groups that suppled arms to guerrillas of South Sudan, serving the country and its guerrillas as conduits for weapons coming from outside and providing bases and training facilities. In addition, the researcher has also found that the government of South Sudan typically imports a bulk of modern weapons systems and recruits people into the military. The bulk of imported modern weapons are usually in the hands of the soldiers and these soldiers whenever they feel that they are mistreated or they are being used rather than taking advantage of the system political disorder will become an eventual reality. Above and beyond the research has found that the existence of plentiful weapons as a consequence of past wars has strong hold as causes of conflict in South Sudan. The second civil war in Sudan lasted approximately more than two decades and resulted in high militarization and arms proliferation among civilians.

In addition to this, the researcher has also learnt that civilians got hold of arms through the porous border of South Sudan since neither the government of Sudan nor the South Sudan's government had complete control of the whole country. The research result has also affirmed the fact that the Lord's of Resistance Army (LRA) has previously used South Sudan as their operational base to fight the government of Uganda. The existence of the LRA has left behind a number of weapons in civilian possession even after the LRA departed south. Moreover Key Informant Interview established that, as numerous South Sudanese are nomads they often travel to neighboring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda, where they obtain arms and ammunition.

As a matter of fact, the researcher has also found that the breakdown of institutions in the political system of South Sudan and disregard for the rules of the game is also the

potential causes of the current crisis. This research study has found that the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was established on a weak groundwork. Indeed according to this research result, the establishment of institutions was based on ethnic aggregation and personality cults. Plus the political system entrenched institutionalized mistrust where political leaders had more faith in ethnic protégées than in national institutions enshrined in the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (TCRSS). Participants of this research study avowed that established institutions were highly politicized without taking due note of rules and regulations governing them. Structural problems in the creation of political institutions add another dimension to the current crisis. As a matter of fact the research has also found that the conclusion of long civil war witnessed integration of multiple strata of civil and military organizations into political units like political parties, the civil service and security sector institutions. As a result these institutions were composed of blocks of war time groups whose attitudes and behavior structurally undermined nation building processes. Together with this, the research learnt that in South Sudan beyond the political conflict, the country encounters a challenge of weakness or absence of institutions and the lack of institutional capacity within the state. What is more according to the data gathered from the documentary analysis Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was by far the most dominant political institution in the political system of South Sudan. Yet the relations between the party and the army were found to remain, nevertheless, imprecise.

The concept of ethnicity in South Sudan is a commonality at the present time. It was found by the author of this research that it was invoked to defend political, social and cultural positions because it carries authority, beyond rationality, preferences or choice. In spite of the fact that more than 60 ethnic groups make up South Sudan, the

current conflict in South Sudan reflects the underlying tension and mistrust among the country's two main different ethnic groups: the Nuer and the Dinka. The mistrust and the underlying tension among this two ethnic groups lies on the killing of 2,000 Dinka by Nuer in the town of Bor on 15 November 1991, in what was known as the Bor massacre. Even though this happened almost a quarter of a century ago, the event remains present in the collective memory of the Dinka and the Nuer and was found by the researcher to have the potential of fueling resentment.

Inclusive governance is significant to the realization of democracy and peace dividends in states like South Sudan emerging from conflict. However the current research has found that in South Sudan, the exercise of inclusivity has been marred with contradictions between constitutional provisions and extant practices. In fact, according to Key Informant Interview with the research participants South Sudan is found to be the foci for rewarding the warlords dubbed as freedom fighters at the expense of participatory civilian structures, the nerves of ethnic factionalism over nationalism, exercise of centralized nomination system, all of which resulted disaffection and tensions among the citizens. Plus there were significant indicators of militarization of public service, perception of ethnic favoritism in public employment and appointments, marginalization of regions outside the urban centers, and unequal share of national resources in South Sudan and thus this all added together and fueled the conflict.

The researcher has also found that South Sudan lack a functioning independent judiciary with the power to interpret laws and rule on the legality of executive actions, much less provide recourse to justice for citizens. Political Parties were found to be very weak, in terms of both resources and capacity. Moreover, according to the In-depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion, South Sudan's government and various

institutions has not provided mechanism for extending accountable system for many of rules violated and committed by its forces and others, nor demonstrated the will to hold them accountable. Furthermore results from the Key Informant Interview affirmed that the international community and South Sudan on independence were more concerned with state formation; establishing power structure and authority, as opposed to nation building which would require addressing the underlying drivers of conflict so as to establish a united South Sudan with a common idea of national identity.

On Economic term this research result has found that long before atrocious conflict erupted in December 2013, South Sudan was already demonstrating all the indicators of the resource curse. Ninety-eight percent of the government's annual operating budget and 80 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is derived from oil, making South Sudan the most oil reliant country in the world and plus other than making use of this revenue to invest in public services and infrastructure to improve livelihoods, the government financed a military and security apparatus showing the classical feature of the "Dutch disease" according to the Key Informant Interview research result. Plus according to the documentary analysis and Key Informant Interview investments had concentrated with a great bias towards the capital of Juba thus Juba benefited a lot from oil money at the expense of other states in South Sudan. As far as marginalization over economic resource is concerned the research has found that prior to the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan profound inequalities and marginalization are professed both vertically and horizontally. Additionally the research has found that the representation and avenues for political advancement of the younger generation and women is quite limited. While the 25% quota for

woman's representation in the legislature is a start, there are few female leaders as ministers or senior civil servants, governor and commissioner.

….On the Consequence of South Sudanese Conflict

As far as the consequence of South Sudanese conflict is concerned the research suggested that the conflict in South Sudan is one of the most severe humanitarian crises at the moment, which has immensely caused myriad misery and devastation on innocent citizens. As many of the participants of these research responses indicated and documented, there have been numerous, repeated incident and patterns of serious and systematic violence against civilians, in many cases in circumstances in which people were targeted due to their ethnic origin. Plus many civilians have been attacked and killed by both sides of armed group in their homes, as well as in places of shelter, including churches, mosques, hospitals, and in government facilities. Tens of thousands have been displaced from their homes, more than 1.5 million of them within the country. Serious violations of international humanitarian law, gross violations of international human rights law and human rights abuses have been perpetuated by all parties to the conflict including attacks against civilians, rape and other crimes of sexual violence, arbitrary arrest and detention, abduction, deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance. Besides these human costs, the food security situation deteriorated drastically taking thousands of lives. Although it is difficult to quantify the decline in South Sudan's output that has resulted from conflict, sever economic effects have become increasingly apparent, and the country's fiscal position has deteriorated as government revenues have decreased. This has resulted in budgetary constraints and the abandonment of government plans to increase investment. Plus according to many of this research documentary analysis results, South Sudan's current conflict has rapidly depreciated the value of the South

Sudanese Pound (SSP) and created shortages of hard currency. In addition to this, economic consequences, the violent conflict caused enormous destruction of infrastructure related to health, education, transportation and communications along with the loss of private assets and flight of financial capital abroad. These economic impacts may be even greater when indirect costs are added, including lost investment, productivity declines, diminished employment opportunities and increased crimes. Besides human costs and economic impact of violent conflict in South Sudan, this research result has found that the people of South Sudan experienced, decay in social capital, loss of trust among and between member of household's communities and ethnic group and intensification of inter and intra-community conflicts. This research has also found that conflict has made children in South Sudan afraid of what their future holds. Results from the Focus Group Discussions asserted that children in South Sudan have experienced tremendous violence and are frightened that it will return. They have psychological trauma which will make them to fear that they will be forced to flee or that their tents will be destroyed again.

….On Regional Consequences of South Sudanese Conflict

What's more this research has found that in addition to its consequence on South Sudanese citizen's the current conflict of South Sudan has also have far reaching external consequence to the peoples and states of the region. This is compounded by the fact that the region constitutes interlinked regional security complexes. Plus due to the approximately near location to South Sudan each neighboring state like Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and others was forced to either implicitly or explicitly to shoulder the political and socio-economic consequences of the South Sudanese current conflict. Therefore the following few paragraphs has given paramount

importance to conclude and summarize the political, economic and social consequences of the current conflict of South Sudan upon its neighbor in the region.

According to this research documentary analysis results, Uganda is highly affected by the contiguity of instability in South Sudan to its territory. In particular, Uganda has been challenged by its concern that unstable South Sudan would become a safe haven to the Lord of Resistance Army (LRA), which has operated in Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo. This research has also learnt that economic interests of Uganda, however, have been crushed due to conflict in South Sudan. In fact Uganda is the largest trading partner of South Sudan, exporting coffee, shoes, vehicles, steels and other agricultural products, amounting to millions of dollars annually. In addition, the research has found that South Sudan employs thousands of Ugandan citizens, especially in the service sector, generating a significant amount of revenue yet this has been challenged by the conflict in South Sudan.

Likewise Sudan significant potential of importing uninterrupted flow of oil from South Sudanese fields was considerably challenged. Although it has lost 75% of the oil reserve together with the secession of South Sudan, South Sudan oil is still an important source of revenue to Sudan. Yet the researcher has found that Sudan was irritated by Uganda's intervention into the conflict since both were supporting rebels of each other. Plus the influx of refugees from South Sudan into the neighboring states of Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda is a major consequence which countries of the region have to grapple with according to this research result. Unfortunately, if the current civil war in South Sudan continues the probability of refugee influx creating pressure in host countries of the region is expected to worsen.

In fact Ethiopia has suffered and might also potentially suffer more notably due to Nuer refugee influx around Gambela region. The research has found that the increase in the number of Nuer's refugee around Gambela region has been a significant problem. The rational for this is that, Ethiopia is currently suffering from the politics of number. Number matters the most in politics of Ethiopia's federal system, since power is allocated in direct proportion to the population of the country's ethno-cultural communities. In this regard Gambella is suffering from one of the most contentious issues which is, the politics of numbers that has locked two of the region's major ethnic groups, the Anuak and the Nuer, into conflict. According to the research result until mid-1980s the Anuak constituted the majority of Gambella's population. However, the massive influx of refugees since the outbreak of the second Sudanese civil war in 1983 and the current South Sudanese war has dramatically changed the region's demography, thus leaving Ethiopia to wrestle with the problem of refugee influx from South Sudan. The research has also documented that Ethiopian economic interest in South Sudan is also at stake due to the conflict. Like Kenya and Uganda, Ethiopia has a large contingent of citizens working in South Sudan. Plus the research has noted that the Ethiopian Airline and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia used to have strong hold. However since the outbreak of the conflict a number of Ethiopians and Ethiopian institutions left the country putting a strain on the countries potential of earning foreign currency and employment for its citizens.

According to this research findings Kenya on the other hand has been affected considerably given that South Sudan has been a destination to Kenyan citizens and banks for employment, investment and business. A crisis in South Sudan has risked all these economic benefits that Kenya enjoys from South Sudan. In addition violence in South Sudan also disrupted Kenya's plan to provide an alternative trade route to

South Sudan to transport its oil, via the port of Lamu. Added to all this, work on mega regional infrastructure projects that have impact on the region's (socio-economic development such as the Lamu Port-South-Sudan-Ethiopia (LAPSSET) corridor and standard gauge railway will experience delays.

….On the Role of African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

As it has been mentioned in the earlier summary and conclusion section of this research study, the study was conducted with the objective of investigating conflict dynamics, (cause and consequence of the conflict) along with the role of regional and sub-regional organizations towards resolving conflict in South Sudan with a particular reference of African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The above section has summarized and concluded the first two specific questions related to the cause and consequences of conflict in South Sudan and the remaining few paragraphs will dwells up on the role of African Union and IGAD towards resolving conflict in South Sudan. Yet the first few paragraphs deals with the African Union and the later section will eventually deal with the role of IGAD.

This research indicates that African Union, the regional body has done a significant contribution in urgently displaying the conflict in South Sudan to the international community and various peace and humanitarian partners. In fact right after the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan on December 17, 2013 the former Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU), Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma in press release expressed her and African Union's concern about the conflict in South Sudan particularly the safety and security of the civilian population. Following which the former Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union urged the Government

and leadership of South Sudan and all other stakeholders to exercise maximum restrain and overt any further escalation. In the meantime Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma also command Prime Minster Hailemariam Dessalegn of Ethiopia, in his capacity as chair of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the then chair of the Union, for his timely initiative to dispatch ministerial delegation to Juba, comprising Ministers and high level officials from Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda as well as the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. In addition to this the research has also found that the African Union has also held a number of meetings and Heads of State meetings on the issues of South Sudan. Besides this, the regional body has also along with its member states invested significant amount of time and money to take effective collective measures to tackle conflict in South Sudan and bring about peace and stability to the region.

In addition to this, the research asserted that the African Union along with its sub-regional and international partners has been capable enough to be able to convene in very short period of time. Furthermore the African Union has also since then offered a good office by using it sub-regional organization particularly the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). What is more the African Union has also initiated a peace building and accountability process through the establishment of the African Union Commission of Inquire on South Sudan (AUCISS) and mobilized different stakeholder to respond to issues arising from the conflict.

Nevertheless regardless of the existence of many socio, economic, political and humanitarian indicators indicating that the crisis were looming in South Sudan , the African Union did little to intervene at critical stages of conflict build up apart from the number of reports that has been provided by the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and significant other research groups. In addition to this, this

research has found that the African Union has also failed to be strong and consistent pressure on warring parties to abide by the agreement's terms and to permanently put aside any plans to resort once more to war. Plus the findings of this research asserts that African Union has also fall short of capability to take decisive steps to deal with the worsening and seriously impeded humanitarian access to affected populations in South Sudan. The African Union must have denounced the existing direct and indirect restrictions imposed by the warring parties on humanitarian agency personnel and humanitarian supplies. What is more, this research result has also affirmed that the African Union has also delayed the report of the AUCISS due to initial worries that the release of the AUCISS report will further destabilize the country or the peace agreement, however the measure have affected the momentum of the African Union's interventions which has altered the effective and efficient implementation of the peace agreement as well as the AUCISS's recommendations.

As far as this research result related with the role of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South Sudan conflict is concerned, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as an organization has done a magnificent job in bringing the South Sudanese crisis to the attention of the international community. Within the IGAD policies, great emphasis was given to the peaceful settlement of South Sudanese conflict.

In fact the result of this research has noted that soon after conflict broke-out between factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) supporting President Salva Kiir and those supporting his former vice President Rieck Machar, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) sent its Ministerial delegation led by Ethiopia on December 19, 2013 and after that a number of meetings and Heads of State summit has been called by this sub-regional organization and has discussed

the issues of South Sudan several times. Member states of Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have also invested time and money to take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace and stability. In addition to this, the research has found that Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has become proficient at being able to convene at very short notice.

However despite the strength of IGAD in the above areas, the findings of this research have asserted that IGAD has failed to reinforce the conflicting parties to honor the cessation of hostilities. The conflicting parties have broken several cessations of hostilities agreements hence rendering the number of efforts futile. From the beginning of the conflict, both the government of Salva Kiir and the SPLM/A in Opposition have not shown a commitment to end the conflict in South Sudan through mediations. At every turn, the two sides have laid obstacles for resolving the conflict peacefully. In this case IGAD's entry point should have been reexamined. Given that it is appropriate for IGAD to be involved at all levels from peace building, conflict prevention, peace keeping, and peacemaking back to peace building. Moreover the research has also found that IGAD mediation suffered from lack of full mandate and independence. This is presumed from the fact that the mediators hardly tried to resolve any impasses with the parties. Instead, they consulted the Heads of State and Government whenever hurdles were hit. Whilst the pressure from the IGAD leaders was welcomed, it seemingly interfered with the smooth flow of the mediation. The research has confirmed that the mediators were not fully in the process and therefore were not as creative and were pulled to all directions.

Furthermore this research result suggests that the structure of the peace process is cumbersome, requiring the simultaneous presence of five Foreign Ministers with the

attending complications and time pressures this entails. The process requires follow up results of the meetings and prepare for further rounds. With the Ministers pressed for time, the sessions have been too brief, leaving little time for an in-depth exploration of positions, and the intervals between rounds too long. In addition to this, this research has also found that the differences between the mediators on the pace, modalities and even the objectives of their mediation effort have contributed to the paralysis of the peace process. According to this research result, the existence of conflicting economic, security, and political interests between the mediators themselves have further undermined the efficacy and credibility of the process.

Besides this the research has also indicated that IGAD as an organization does not have the capacity (especially financial) to mount a successful mediation. Possibly, the conflicting paries knowing IGAD's incapacity to bring them to order have failed to adhere to the terms of cessation of hostilities agreement they signed on various occasion. Plus the author of this research has also found that IGAD has been on record since day one regarding the importance of having an inclusive peace process in South Sudan. However, this view remained as an inspirational goal for about long period of time, a period that saw the talks being limited to the warring parties alone. Contrary to the aforementioned IGAD position, both warring parties were united in their determination to keep other stakeholders out of the talks, arguing that inclusion of parties who are not directly involved in the conflict can make the negotiations more difficult to reach any deal. In other word IGAD-led peace process has mainly focused on Kiir and Machar and thus IGAD has also failed to provide space in the peace process for the active participation of the South Sudanese churches, mosques, elders, women, youth, and civil society, as well as opposition political parties and semi-autonomous armed groups. Their inclusion is critical to ensure that their concerns,

needs, and aspirations are heard and that they can play an active role in shaping and rebuilding their country.

Furthermore this research has also suggested that IGAD mediation and IGAD itself did not live up to its expectation and end of the agreements; it has been moving the goal posts in the middle of the game. For example, at the March 2014 Summit of the IGAD Heads of State and Government, a Protection and Deterrent Force (DPF) was authorized as a way to speed up the withdrawal of foreign troops to ensure peace and stability in the country and to improve the capacity of the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism to monitor the CoHA. This force never materialized. Yet on top of this fact, in the August 2014 protocol, IGAD had proposed the creation of the position of Prime Minister; in December 2014, the new proposal had the First Vice President. This capricious decision-making style by the mediation created confusion for the delegations.

Chapter Ten

10. Policy Options

Based on the findings of this study and the main conclusions drawn, the following policy options can be made to bring about peaceful and prosperous South Sudan.

For the Government of South Sudan and Various Political Leaders

- The Government of South Sudan and various political leaders are advised to commit all the necessary energy to call for an all-inclusive national dialogue as a matter of national urgency. This dialogue however need to be exercised both at political and grass root level. At a political level, an all-inclusive dialogue should be organized with various political leadership circles. Whereas the grass roots level national dialogue must implement nationwide programs with the intention of promoting peace among each and every citizens of South Sudan. This should take place at the each and every community of South Sudan. But above and beyond the political level dialogues, grass root level dialogues yet should also be offered equal attention given that they are mutually reinforcing. Any difficulty associated with achieving peace at the community or grassroots level grow quickly into difficulty of achieving peace at the political level and sporadically vice versa. Dealing with the existing concerns at these two levels will boost the probability of advancing immense progress on the whole pursuit for peace. Nevertheless, it should be noted that peace does not automatically satisfy hunger and an empty peace is no peace. Peace without employment for the thousands of jobless youth, idle militias and other war-ravaged populations will not be sustainable. Thus the GoSS leadership must reduce over-reliance on aid and oil and begin spreading peace dividends beyond Juba to the

hinterlands and establish creative economic and social programs to mop up especially the youthful population, who will otherwise form a critical recruitment pool for rebel generals. Indeed, through innovative programs such as jobs for youth and women and the demobilization and reintegration of tribal militias, the government could tap into and transform the war energy of the population into progressive peace energy for development and societal recovery and advancement.

- The Government of national unity is also suggested to be reestablished with a well-built trust and goodwill and shall be obliged with the duty of facilitating the state for democracy and political reform. This is advised to be done within a framework of opening up democratic space for numerous political actors in South Sudan.
- The Government needs to be committed to further strengthen the existence and cohesion of various political parties. It is also important to work on attaining peace within its own ranks. Some of the rebelling SPLA generals have had issues with the SPLM and its politics. Addressing some of these challenges will go a long way towards alleviating the related problems so that they do not affect the country as a whole. This is particularly true about the internal politics and personality differences that prevail in the SPLM. Also important is for the party to institute and operationalize avenues for redress that are accessible and independent enough to win the confidence of all of its members. In this way, internal political grievances could be addressed at the party level in order not to spawn larger security concerns that may undermine the pursuit of peace in South Sudan.

- Political elites should strive for zero tolerance of corruption and the elimination of ethnic favoritism these are crucial in containing and then steer clear of discontent emerging from the issue of ethnicity, the perceptions of corruption and the personalization of state structures. Plus the security sector, require reform. This is because the culture of the army in the days of the struggle will clearly not be suitable for the role in a democratic environment.
- Despite the recent tension between the two ethnic groups that is Dinka and Nuer, they have had a long history of cohabitation. The two sides therefore have a lot of cultural commonalities and this will be the case for generations to come. The political leadership of these ethnic groups will therefore have to consciously manage their political disagreements in terms of their social and cultural commonalities.
- The Government is also advised to de-ethicize public service in a way that establishes an independent public service commission in its permanent constitution mandated to look into the issues of ethnic balance and professionalizing the public sector. The rationale behind this would be to ensure that the sector is de-scaling the militarization of public service and striking equitable ethnic balance in various sectors to restore inclusive feeling amongst the general public.
- It is also best for Government to ensure representation of women and youth in public leadership, with clearly spelt legal sanctions for non-compliance. Investment in the education of the youth and women should be prioritized to ensure sustainable and full participation in the affairs of South Sudan.

For the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

- IGAD is advised to reinforce the parties in a conflict to honor the Cessation of Hostilities Agreements. In the cases of otherwise IGAD shall exert costs to those who have broken the cessation of hostilities agreement. Costs can include targeting top rebel, political and military personnel, interventions to protect civilians and take action to control and slow regional arms flow and contain the violence. In addition IGAD shall be committed to get involved at all levels from peace building, conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacemaking back to peace building.
- IGAD mediators are advised to have effective and adequate mandate and independence. Plus it would also be excellent if IGAD mediators are empowered to resolve any impasses with the parties to conflict rather than immediately consulting or running to the Heads of State and Governments which they represents. While the pressure from IGAD Heads of State and Government is welcomed, it seemingly interfered with the smooth flow of the mediation. Plus IGAD is also advised to exert every effort in ensuring that mediators are creative and were not pulled to all directions.
- IGAD shall urge mediators to follow up results of meeting and development of the country and thus prepare for further rounds with in-depth exploration of positions. Together with this, IGAD shall minimize the interval between various rounds on South Sudan.
- IGAD is also advised to void the gap and differences existing between the mediators on issues of peace, modality and even objectives of their mediation effort. The very existence of conflicting economic, security and political interest between various IGAD mediators themselves shall be resolved and

they shall stand for common agenda that is peaceful and prosperous Africa in general and South Sudan in particular.

- IGAD shall raise fund to enhance its own capacity both in terms of human and financial capacity so that parties in South Sudan conflict will take IGAD seriously and adhere to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.
- IGAD shall provide space in the peace process for the active participation of the South Sudanese mosques, churches, elders, women, youth and civil society as well as opposition political parties and semi-autonomous armed groups. Their inclusion is very important given that inclusion will guarantee to include their concerns, needs and aspirations that can play an active role in shaping and rebuilding their country. Besides this it can have potential to create a sense of ownership among all South Sudanese stakeholders and promote tribal leaders and other local ethnic leaders to peruse peace above and beyond anything else.
- IGAD mediation need to live up to its expectation and does not need to move the goal posts in the middle of the game rather stick to them all the way to the end.
- IGAD needs to develop a peace agreement that addresses the underlying root causes and provide a window of opportunity for long term political solutions. Mediation focusing on power sharing is insufficient unless complemented by mechanisms that can help transform governance structures at local and national levels. In South Sudan , IGAD(now IGAD plus as well) and the warring parties need to think beyond short term political fixes to find approaches that deal with the intrinsic nature of South Sudanese structural conflicts and their historical and government configuration roots. In other

words there needs to be fundamental reforms in the economic, security, public services, judicial and political sectors.

For IGAD Member Countries

- All members of IGAD particularly Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and also Ethiopia needs to recognize the undeniable fact that conflict in South Sudan have sever political, social, and economic consequence to the region. In fact as a region who shares regional security complex and economic advantage, all member states of IGAD shall recognize that there might be some spillover effect associated with the conflict ranging from refugee influx, arm proliferation, crime, illegal trade and inter and intra community conflict. Besides this the member states needs to understand that their economic wellbeing is at stake and well be affected significantly if the conflict persists. It is therefore, the restoration of peace and security in South Sudan is very imperative to their economic and security interests.

For Ethiopia

- Ethiopia needs to exert its assertive role as far as resolving South Sudan conflict is concerned. As the United Nation Peacekeeping force major contributor, African Union head quarter host, IGAD chair and a host nation of the peace talks, Ethiopia shall and must understand the various dynamics and trade carefully in a diplomatic engagement with various stakeholders of the South Sudanese conflict. Ethiopia should therefore further leverage its diplomatic potential to resolve conflict in South Sudan and contain or deter its spillover effect.

For African Union

- The regional body is advised to utilize effectively and adequately any sort of existing socio, economic, political and humanitarian indicators indicating conflict and humanitarian crisis that are assumed to be looming. The rationale behind this is that intervention at critical or initial stages of conflict save millions of live and thousands from displacing within and outside of the country. Besides this, it also has a significant power to deter any conflict from building up and escalating with outrageous consequences. Therefore it is mandatory to effectively and adequately utilize Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS) and significant other research groups.
- African Union is also suggested to exert its strong leverage and consistent pressure on warring parties to a bid by the agreements terms and to permanently put aside any plans to resort once more to war. In cases of conflicting parties resorting to conflict rather than peaceful settlement of conflict, the African Union should apply to all an institutional condemnation to those resorting to violence.
- The African Union needs to take decisive measures in dealing with the worsening and seriously impeding humanitarian accesses to affected populations in South Sudan.
- The African Union is advised to facilitate the platform for the implementation of the African Union Commission of Inquire on South Sudan (AUCSS) research result so as to apprehend impunity and brought it to justice.
- African Union needs to promote inclusive governance, accountability, transparency, justice, conflict prevention and peace building. In addition to

this the Union shall promote trade, investment and sustainable development in the young nation.

For the International Community

- The international communities are suggested to institutionally condemn spoilers of peace and those who resort to violence. This should go a long way towards discouraging similar moves and encourage the need to seek redress through democratic institutions rather than by the barrel of the gun.
- The international community needs to hold violators of the cessation of hostilities and peace agreement accountable. In fact punitive measures shall be instituted to those who persistently bent or spoil the pursuit of peace in the new born country. This can be implemented by making use of targeted sanctions, the naming and shaming of individuals found to be spoilers of peace in South Sudan and international justice instruments.
- The international communities are suggested to promote mentorship programs. Indeed, the international communities are needed to encourage and lend hand in mentorship program particularly in areas of peace, security, economics and finance, diplomacy, justice, military, police, governance and other essential structures so that South Sudan institutional structures can be well built and boosted. In addition to this the mentorship program can help on building on the existing and new bilateral, regional and international relation to help South Sudan attain investment in technical capacity and policy support.
- The international community is suggested to recognize the contribution of peacekeeping missions in conflict state of affairs as a result the United Nation is advised to extend and increase the mandate of United Nation Mission in South Sudan and increase its force to stay engaged in the quest for peace and

the maintenance of security in South Sudan. This will thus enable the necessary security, political, social and economic reforms and restructuring possible

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Finally, the outcome of this study were obtained till the return of SPLM-IO leaderships including Dr Riek Machar from their exile to Juba on April 2016 and therefore this study does not include what happen after another conflict erupted on July 8-12, 2016 in Juba Presidential palace and then quickly spread in some part of the country and costed many to lose their lives and got displaced including the then former First Vice President. For this reason, this study calls for further study, which reflects the second phase of the civil war in South Sudan, taking into account of various stakeholders and experts who have direct link to the conflict in South Sudan.

Bibliography

Abass, A. (2004). *Regional Organizations and the Development of Collective Security. Beyond Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.* OUP, Oxford 2004.

Abass, A.(2010). African Peace and Security Architecture and the Protection of Human Security. In Abass, Ademola, (ed.), *Protecting Human Security in Africa.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abdurahim, S. (2012*).* African Regional and Sub Regional Organizations Security policies: Challenges and Policies. Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi, *Journal of Academic Inquiries*, Volume 7.

African Security Review. (2014). *Explaining the (il) legality of Uganda's Intervention in the Current South Sudan Conflict*, 23 September 2014.

African Union Peace and Security Council.(2007).*Communiqué of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX)*, African Union, Addis Ababa.

African Union .(2002). *The Constitutive Act*. Available at: http://www.au.int/en/sites/Constitutive-Act-en-0.htm. (Accessed on 24 September 2015).

African Union Development Fund. (2013). Juba Power Distribution System Rehabilitation and Expansion Project. *African Union Development Fund*.

African Union.(2002). *Protocol Relating to The Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 2002/2003*. Available at: www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/Protocol-peace%20and%20security.pdf. (Accessed on 25 October 2014).

African Union.(2015).*Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council 411th Meeting at the level of Head of State Government, PSC/AHG/COMM.1(CDXI), Banjul December 30,2013*. Available at: http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-com-411-South-Sudan-30-12-2013-pdf. (Accessed on 4 May 2015).

African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan. (2015).*Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Executive Summary*. African Union, Addis Ababa.

Akokpari, J; Ndinga-Muvumba, A ; Murithi, T; Salim, S, A. (2008). *African Union and Its Institutions*, Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2009.

Akol, Z. D. (2014). Inclusivity: A Challenge to IGAD-Led South Sudanese Peace Process. *The SUDD Institute Policy Brief. PP* 7-12, 2014.

Albino, O. (1970). *The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint*. Oxford. Oxford University Press.

Alexander, A. (2005). Geo-political explanation of Conflict in the Horn of Africa: Prevention and Resolution. *Proceedings of the Second National Workshop of the Ethiopia Chapter of OSSREA (pp. 30-49).* Addis Ababa: Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA).

Aljazeera. (2014). South Sudan President Fires Cabinet. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/07/201372318388499663.html. (Accessed on 29 May. 2014).

Althaus, D. (1999). Inside Sudan's Civil War. Houston Chronicle. Available at: www.chron.com/cs/CDA/plainstory.mpl/special/sudan/321650. (Accessed on 3 February 2015).

Apuulp, K P. (2015). IGAD Mediation in Current South Sudan Conflict: Prospects and Challenges. *Journal of African Security*, Routledge and Taylor and Francis Group.

Ashley S. D. (2013). *Past-Conflict Returnee Reintegration: A Case Study of South Sudan and the Livelihood Approach*. Master of Art Thesis: Department of Naval Postgraduate School, Moterey, California.

Awolich A. A. (2014). Diplomacy: A key to Ending the Worsening Crisis in South Sudan. *The Sudd Institute*.

Awolich, A and Akol, Z. D .(2013).The SPLM Leadership Contest: An Opportunity for Change or a Crisis of Governance?" *The Sudd Institute*.

Awolich, A.A .(2013). SPLM"s Internal Politics: A Catalyst to the Dissolution of Government. *The Sudd Institute.*

Awolich. A. (2015). The Mediation Pendulum and the Challenges that Underlie the Peace Implementation in South Sudan. *POLICY BRIEF, The Sudd Institute*.

Babacar, D. (1998).*The Future of Conflict Resolution in Africa and the Role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).* Master of Art Thesis: Department of Naval Postgraduate School, Moterey, California.

Bennett, J. (1987).*The Hunger Machine*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Berouk, M .(2014) . *The Horn of African Security Complex. The International Relations and Security Network*. Available at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=169057. (Accessed on 19 December 2015).

Beshir, M .(1984). Ethnicity, Regionalism and the National Cohesion in Sudan. In *The Sudan: Ethnicity and National Cohesion,* Bayreuth Mrican Studies Series, Bayreuth University, Germany.

Blanchard, L.P .(2014).The Crisis in South Sudan. *Congressional Research Service*. Available at*:* fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43344.pdf. (Accessed on 19 December 2015).

Boehmer .C, Gartzke. E, and Nordstrom, T.(2004).Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace ? *World Politics, 57(1),* 1-38.

Borchgrevink, A and Lie, J.H. S.(2009).Regional Conflicts and International Engagement on the Horn of Africa. *In NUPI Report*. Oslo, NUPI.

Boutros-Ghali, B.(1996). Challenges of Preventive Diplomacy: The Role of the United Nations and its Secretary-General. In Cahill, Kevin M (ed), *Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars before they Start*, New York: Basic Books and the Center for International Health and Cooperation.

Breidlid, I. M and Arensen, M. J .(2014). Anyone Who Can Carry a Gun Can Go: The Role of The White Army in The Current Conflict in South Sudan. *Oslo: Peace Research Institute (PRIO).*

Brown T, S. (2010). *Organization of African Unity (OAU).*London: Zed Books.

Box-Steffensmeier J, De Boef S, Sweeney K. (2005). Multi Level Stratified Frailty Models and Onset of Civil War: *A Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago,* IL 7-10 April.

Brian, V. I and Dauda, J. (2011). African Union, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of the Recent Key and Zimbabwe Conflict. *International Journal of Development and Conflict, (1),* 61-63.

Burchill S, Richard, D, Andrew L, Matthew P, and Christian R, with Jacqui T .(2001). *Theories of International Relations.* (2nd edition). Houndmills: Palgrave.

Burton, J .W. (1987). *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Hand book.* Lanham, MD and London, University Press of America.

Burton, J.W. (1990) .*Conflict: Human Needs Theory*. London: Macmillan.

Calhoun, C. (1994). *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*. Wiley Blackwell.ISBN.13 978-15578664734.

Carbone, M .(2002). *From OAU to AU: Turning a Page in the History of Africa. The Courier ACP-EU.* Available at :http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/courier/courier194/en/en_030.pdf. (Accessed on 29 September 2016).

Carment, D & Schnabel, A. (2003). Introduction – Conflict Prevention: A concept in search of a policy. In Carment, David & Schnabel, Albrecht (eds.) *Conflict Prevention Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?* Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, cop.

Christie, D.J. (2006).What is Peace Psychology of? *Journal of Social Issues*, 62, 1-17.

Central Intelligence Agency. (CIA). (2016). The World Factbook: South Sudan. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/od.html. (Accessed on 12 January 2016).

Collier, P and Hoeffler, A. (2004).Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4): 478–95.

Crotty, M.(1998). *The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process.* London, Sage.

Daoud, D. M. (2012). *Factors of Secession: The Case of South Sudan.* University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon.

David, F.(2008). *Peace and Conflict in Africa.* Zed Books London.

Deng, B. L.(2010). Social Capital and Civil War: The Dinka Communities In Sudan's Civil War. *Journal of African Affairs*, 109 (435), pp. 231–250.

De Waal, A and Victor, N. (2016). South Sudan: The Price Of War, The Price Of Peace. *Tufts University/Justice and Security Research Programme/World Peace Foundation/Cartoon Movement*, 2016.

De Waal, A. (2014a). Visualizing South Sudan: The Culprit: The Army. *World Peace Foundation*, Available at: http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2014/03/13/visualizing-South-Sudan-the-culprit-the-army. (Accessed 17 June. 2015).

De Waal. A .(2014b). When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes Of The Civil War In South Sudan, *African Affairs*, Vol. 113, No. 452, 2014.

Deatson, M.(1991). Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social and Cultural Influences. In *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Theory*, edited by RaimoVäyrynen, 26-50. London: Sage Publishers Ltd.

Debay, T. (2012). Making Federalism Work in South Sudan: The Challenge a Head. Addis Ababa, *Instituto per Gli studio Di Politica Internationale.*

Deng, F. (1978). *Africans of Two Worlds: The Dinka in Afro-Arab Sudan*. New Haven. Yale University Press.

Deng, F. (2010). *Sudan at the Brink: Self Determination and National Unity*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Dereje, F. (2011). *Playing Different Games: The Paradox of the Identification Strategies of The Anuak and The Nuer in the Gambella Region*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Dereje, F.(2014).The Spillover Effect of South Sudan in Gambella, Ethiopia. *Horn Affairs.*

Dereje, F.(2015). The Adverse Impact of South Sudan Conflict on Ethiopia: *International Law and Policy Institute*.

Dersso, S. (2015b). South Sudan's Peace Agreement: Affirm Promise for Peace or Another False Dawn?. Available At: https://solomondersso.wordpress.com/category/south-sudan. (Accessed on 16 December, 2016).

Dersso. S .(2014). East Africa and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Mapping Multilateralism in Transition. No4, *International Peace and Security*.

Dersso, S. (2015a). Reading the Report of African Union Commission of January on South Sudan (AUCISS). Available At: https://solomondersso.wordpress.com/category/African-Union. (Accessed on 16 December, 2016).

Douglas H, J. (2014). Federalism in the History of South Sudanese Political Thought. *Rift Valley Institute, 2014*.

Dunn K, C. (2010). The Lord's Resistance Army and African International Relations. *African Security*, 46–63, 49.

Ellen, F. (1969). The Prospects for Regionalism in World Affairs. In Falk, Richard; Cyril Black (eds.): *Trends and Patterns*. Princeton.

El Mahdi, M. (1965). *A Short History of the Sudan*. Oxford. Oxford University Press.

El-Ayouty, Y and Zartman , W. (1984). *The OAU after 20 Years*. Preager Publishers.

Engel, Ulf, & Porto, João, Gomes.(2009). *Africa's new Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solution.* Arnhem: Ashgate, 2010.

Eprile, C. (1974). *War and Peace in the Sudan, 1955-1972*. London. David and Charles.

European Parliament. (2016). Peace Agreement in South Sudan Ambitious but hard to deliver. *European Parliament Research Service (EPRS).*

Eveleens. I. (2014). South Sudan: Extremely Poor or Ridiculously Rich. *The African Insights, Economics, Comments, Culture and Analysis.* Available at: http://theafricanists.info/south-sudan-extremely-poor-or-ridiculously-rich/ (Accessed on 29 September 2016).

Faleti, S. A. (2006). Termination of Protracted Social Conflicts in Africa: Victory or Consociation? In I. O. Albert, (ed) *Perspectives on Peace and Conflict in Africa*, Ibadan: John Achers Publishers Ltd.

Fisher, I. (1999). Oil Flowing in Sudan, Raising the Stakes in its Civil War. *New York Times*. October 17, New York.

Fisher, J. and Keashly, L. (1996). A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions: Theoretical and Practical Considerations. In J. Bercovitch (ed.), *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 235-261.

Fleischner, J. (2015). Neighborhood Watch: Mobilizing Regional Action for Peace in South Sudan. *The Enough Project the Political Economy of African Wars*: No.1.

Francis, M D. (1998). *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in Sudan*, Washington DC, Brookings Institution.

Frontier Economics.(2015). South Sudan: The Cost of War. An Estimation of the Economic and Financial Costs of Ongoing Conflict. *Frontier Economics.*

Funmi, O. (2010). Peacekeeping in Africa; the Evolving Roles of the African Union and Regional Mechanisms. *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*.ISBN:978-82-7002-294-6.

Gal, K .(2014). The Root Causes of the Current Conflict. *South Sudan News Agency*. Available at: http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/articles/the-root-causes-of-current-conflict. (Accessed on 09 November 2015).

Galtung, J. (1969). *Essays in Peace Research.* Copenhagen: Ejler.

Galtung, J.(1978). Institutionalized Conflict Resolution: A Theoretical Paradigm. In Galtung, J *Peace and Social Structure: Essays in Peace Research*. Vol. III, 435-483. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers.

Garang, J. (1987). *John Garang Speaks*, London: Kegan Paul International.

Getachew, Z .(2015). Tackling the South Sudan Conflict within a Complicated Regional Security Complex. *The Southern Voices Network: Research Paper*, pp. 1-10.

Gibsons, S and Mollans, S. (2012). *Representations of Peace and Conflict.* Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Gil, M.(2014). South Sudan: The Roots and Prospects of Multifaceted Crisis. Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies, *European Parliament*.

Gilpin, R. (2001). The Political Economy of Regional Integration. In Gilpin, Robert, *Global Political Economy; Understanding the International Economic Order* . Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Girma, K. (1997).Sudan: The North-Sudan Conflict in Historical Perspective. Contributions in *Black Studies: Vol 15*, Article 3.

Graham, K and Felicio, T.(2006). *Regional Security and Global Governance. A Study of Interaction between Regional Agencies and the UN Security Council with a Proposal for a Regional-Global Security Mechanism.* Brussels University Press, Brussels.

Gray, D. E. (2004). *Doing Research in the Real World.* London: SAGE Publications.

Gurr, T. R. (1993). *Minorities at Risk*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Healy S. (2011). Seeking Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa: the Contribution of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. *International Affairs 87, No-1(2011*).

Healy, S. (2014). IGAD and Regional Security in the Horn. In Routledge *Handbook of African Security*, London: Routledge, 2014.

Healy, C. and Svenson, E. (2008). African Union Mission in Somalia- Exemplifying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges. *Foi, Swedish Defense Research Agency.* Stockholm, Sweden.

Hettne, B, & Söderbaum, F.(2006). The United Nation and Regional Organizations in Global Security: Competing or Complementary Logics?. *Global Governance*.

Homer-Dixon, T. F.(1999). *Environment, Security and Violence.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Human Rights Watch. (2015). South Sudan: African Union Putting Justice on Hold. *Human Rights Watch*. 3 February 2015

Ibrahim, A. (2013). South Sudan Secession: Modeling Fiscal Shock and Its Spillover Effects. University of Khartoum. *UNISCI Discussion Paper*, No33.

IGAD. (2013). *Communiqué of 23rd Extra-Ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the situation in South Sudan. State* House Nairobi Kenya.27th of December 2013.

IGAD. (2014). *Agreement to Resolve the Crisis in South Sudan.* 9 May 2014. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

IGAD. (2013a). *Communique of the 23rd Extra-Ordinary Session of the IGAD Heads of State and Government on the situation in South Sudan.* Nairobi, December 27, 2013. Available at; http://igad.int/attachments/725_communique%2023rd%20IGAD%20Extraordinary%20Summit.pdf. (Accessed 4 May 2014).

IGAD. (2014). *Communiqué of the 25th Extra-Ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Situation in South Sudan.* Addis Ababa, 13th March 2014.

IGAD. (2014). *Press Release: IGAD-led Peace Talks on South Sudan Continue in Bahir Dar*. September 2014 Bahir Dar, Ethiopia.

IGAD. (2014a). *Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Army(in opposition) (SSPLM/A In Opposition).* January 2014, Addis Ababa Ethiopia.

IGAD.(2014b).*Agreement on the Status of Detainees between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan(GRSS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army(In Opposition) (SPLM/A In Opposition).* January 2014, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

IGAD.(2014c).*Communiqué of the 24th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the situation in South Sudan.* Addis Ababa January 31, 2014. Available at;

http://igad.int/attachments/751communiqué%20of%20the%20IGAD%20Summit. 31Jan 14 PDF (Accessed 4 May 2015).

International Crisis Group. (2014). South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name, *Africa Report* No. 217, Brussels, Belguim. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/south%20sudan/217-south-sudan-a-civil-war-by-any-other-name.pdf (Accessed 4 May 2015).

International Monitory Fund. (2014). World Economic Outlook Database. International Monitory Fund. Accessed at http://www.imf.org/extrnal/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx. (Accessed 4 May 2015).

James, L. (1987).The Emergence and Institutionalization of Third Party Roles in Conflict. In *Conflict Management and Problem Solving: from International Applications*.

Jok, M., & Hutchinson, S. (1999). Sudan's Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities. *African Studies Review*, *42*(02), 125-145.

Jeong, H. (2000). *Peace and Conflict Studies: An introduction*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Katende, H. (2011). *Effectiveness of African Union in Resolving Conflict in Great Lakes Region of Africa*. Master's Thesis. Addis Ababa University.

Keller, A. (2006). Justice, Peace and History: A Reappraisal. In *what is Just Peace?* (eds),Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kidist, M. (2009).The Role of Regional and International Organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD. *Friedric Ebert-Stiftung*, Addis Ababa.

King, K. (2015). Deteriorating Economic Situation. Juba, South Sudan: *Oxfam*.
Keohane, O, and Nye , S.(2001). *Power and Interdependence*. New York: Longman.

Koos, C and Gutschke, T. (2014). South Sudan's Newest War: When Two Old Men Divide a Nation. *German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA).*

Lacher, W. (2012). South Sudan: International State Building and Its Limits, *Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik, German Institute for the International and Security Affairs*.

Le Riche, M. (2014). South Sudan: Not Just Another War and Another Peace in Africa. *African Arguments*. Available at: http://africanarguments.org/2014/01/28/south- sudan-

not-just-another-war-and-another-peace-in-africa-by-matthew-le-riche/.(Accessed on 24 August 2015).

Levitt, JI. (2001). Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution: Africa- Regional Strategies for the Prevention of Displacement and Protection of Displacement and Protection of Displaced Persons. The Cases of the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD. *DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW*.39-80.

Locante, J. (1993). *Civil War Brings Suffering to Sudan. Christianity Today*. May 17, 1993.

Lund, M S. (1996). *Preventing Violent Conflicts. A strategy for Preventive Diplomacy.* Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Lunn, J. (2016). War and Peace in South Sudan: March 2016 Update Briefing Paper. *House of Commons Library*. Number 7552 14 March 2016.

Mabior, M. (2014). *We Signed Peace Deal under Duress, Kiir Claims. Available at;* http://www.southsudannation.com/we-signed-peace-deal-under-duress-kiirclaims. (Accessed 11 May 2014).

Mamdani, M. (2014). South Sudan and Its Unending Bloody Conflict: No Power-Sharing Without Political Reform. *The East African.*

Marchal, F. (2009). *Growing Regionalism under the United Nations Framework. The Eroding of The Primary Responsibility of The SC In Favor of Regional Organizations.* Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam.

Mareng, D. (2009). The Sudan's Dimensions: A Country Divided by Ethnicity and Religion. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* Vol. 3, No.12 (pp: 532–539).

Marino, C. (1999). *Dimensions of Intra-Inter State Conflicts: a Comparative Study*. Advanced Program in Conflict Resolution Department of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Uppsala University.

Marshall, G.(2005). Focus on Political Instability in Africa. In Monty G. Marshall & Ted Robert Gurr, (eds.) *Peace and Conflict: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy.* Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA, May, 2005.

Marshall, P. (1997). *Research Methods: How to Design and Conduct a Successful Project.* Plymouth: How to Books.

Mawson, A. (1984). Southern Sudan: A Growing Conflict. T*he World Today.* London, England, December 1984, 520-527.

Mayai, T. (2014). Understanding the Emergence of South Sudan's Current Violence: Political, Social, and Institutional Explanations. *The Sudd Institute.*

Mayank, B. (2015). David Yau Yau and South Sudan's Internal Wager with Self-Determination. *African Arguments,* 23 January 2015.

McGarry, J and O'Leary, B. (2009).Power Shared after the Deaths of Thousands. In R. Taylor (Ed.) *Consociational Theory: Mcgarry and O'leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict*, pp. 15-84 .London: Routledge.

Mearsheimer, J. (1995). The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security19(3),*5-49.

Mehari, M and Abel, A.(2013). The Crisis in South Sudan and Its Implication for Ethiopia. *Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD).*

Menkhaus, K.(2006). Governance without Government in Somalia. Spoilers, State Building and the Politics of Coping. *International Security,* 31(3): pp. 74-106.

Metz, C.(1992). *Sudan: A Country Study.* 4th Edition (ed). Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

Miall, H.(1999). What Do Peace Studies Contribute Distinctively to the Study of Peace? *Political Studies Association Conference*, Nottingham, March 1999.

Mulugeta, T. (2015). *South Sudan: Failure in State Building and Its Regional Implications.* Masters of Art Thesis in International Relation, Addis Ababa University.

Munuera, G. (1994). Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons learned from Recent Experience. *Chaillot Paper 15/16.*

Murithi, T. (2005). *The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peace Building and Development*. Ashgate Publishing Company.

Natsios, A. (2012). *Sudan, South Sudan and Darfur: What Everyone Needs To Know*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nyathon J, Hoth M**,** Tiitmamer N**,** Augustino M **.(2016)**. Sporadic Fuel Crisis in South Sudan: Causes, Impacts, and Solutions. 3 March 2016. *The Sudd Institute.*

Nye, J. (1968). *Introduction. International Regionalism: Readings edited by Joseph Nye. Little, Brown and Company, Boston.*

O'Ballance, E. (2000). *Sudan, Civil War, and Terrorism*, 1956-99. London. MacMillan Press LTD.

Omach, P. (2010). The regionalization of rebel activities: the case of the Lord's Resistance Army. In Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe (eds), *Militias, Rebels And Militants: Human Insecurity And State Crises In Africa,* Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Ottaway, M and El-Sadany, M. (2011). Sudan: From Conflict to Conflict. *The Carnagie Papers,* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Oxfam. (2013).*Country Profile of South Sudan.* Oxfam Canada.

Paul, W.(2013).*The Effectiveness of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations in Relation to International Humanitarian Law*. Masters of Art Thesis, Peace Operations Training Institute.

Paul, W.(2011). The African Union's Conflict Management Capabilities. *Council on Foreign Relations.* International Institutions and Global Governance Program, Working Paper.

Potter, B. (1943). Universalism versus Regionalism in International Organization. *The American Political Science Review* 37, no. 5 (1943): 850-862.

Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Rabow, G.(1990). *Replacing War with Non-Violent Dispute Resolution Methods*, New York, Praeger Publishers.

Radon, J and Logan, S. (2014). South Sudan: Governance, Arrangements, War and Peace. *Journal of International Affairs*, 68:1, pp. 149–167.

Reuters News Agencies. (2013). South Sudan Rebels Agree To Ceasefire Talks As Fighting Rages. Available at: uk.reuters.com/article/uk-South Sudan_unrest_idukBRE9BRO4R2013123. (Accesses 3 March 2014).

Republic of South Sudan. (2011). *The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011*.

Robert, A.(2006). Just Peace: A cause Worth Fighting for. In *what is a just peace?(eds),*Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller. Oxford: Oxford University Press pp 128-195.

Rugumamu, S and Gbla, O. (2003*). Studies in Reconstruction and Capacity Building in Post-Conflict Countries in Africa: Sierra Leone and Uganda*. African Building Capacity Foundation.

Sabelo, G.(2010). The African Union and the Responsibility to Protect. *African Human Rights Law Journal*.

Saith, A. (2011).Inequality, Imbalance, Instability: Reflections on a Structural Crisis. *Development and Change, Volume 42, Issue 1*, pages 70–86.

Salih, A. (1994). The Ideology of the Dinka and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. In *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa,* edited by Fuki, K. and Markakis, J., London: James Curry, 1994: 187-201.

Sandole, D. and Hugo, M. (1993). *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Schreuer, C.(1995). Regionalism vs. Universalism. *European Journal of International Law*. Schrijver.

Small Arms Survey. (2014). Excess Arms in South Sudan. *Security:*Forces and Surplus Management. *Small Arms Survey, Issue Brief* 6, April 2014.

Sorbo, M. (2014). Return to War in South Sudan. *Norwegian Peace Building Resource Centre, Policy Brief.*

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2015). South Sudan-Military Expenditure, Current US$. Available at: Available at https://www.sipri.org/reserch/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military-spending/military_expenditure. (Accessed on 17 February 2016).

Strauss, A and Corbin, J. (1990). *Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques*. Sage Publications, Inc.

South Sudan Protection Cluster. (2014a).Macro Analysis of Conflict in South Sudan. Available at: https://southsudan.humanitarianresponse.info/clusters/protection. (Accessed on 4 May2015).

South Sudan Protection Cluster.(2014b). *Protection Trends Analysis*. Norwegian Refugee Council, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Protection Cluster.

Sudan Tribune. (2013). African Union Expressed Concern over South Sudan Security Situation. *Sudan Tribune.* December 2013.

Sudan Tribune. (2017). Another Civil war in South Sudan . *Sudan Tribune.* January 2017.

Sudan Tribune. (2013a). President Kiir released the Four Detainnees. *Sudan Tribune.*

Sudan Tribune. (2015b). IGAD Says President Salva Kiir Violates Peace Agreement. *Sudan Tribune.*

Sudan Tribune. (2016). South Sudan Forms Transitional Government of National Unity. Sudan. *Sudan Tribune.*

Sunday, O. (2014). *South Sudan - From Attempted Failed Coup towards Civil War?* Unpublished.

Taylor, P. (1993). *International Organization in the Modern World: The Regional and the Global Process.* Pinter: London.

Tesfa-Alem, T. (2013). Leaders from Ethiopia, Kenya Attempt to Broker South Sudan Peace deal. In *Sudan Tribune*, December, 26, 2013.

Tewodros, M. (2015). *Causes, Consequences and Role of External Actors In The Current South Sudan Conflict.* Masters of Art Thesis, Addis Ababa University.

The African Union Peace and Security Council. (2013a). *Press Statement of the 409th Meeting on the Situation of South Sudan.* December 19, 2013, the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The African Union Peace and Security Council. (2013b). *Press Statement of the 410th Meeting on the Situation of South Sudan.* 24 December 2013, the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The African Union Peace and Security Council.(2013c). *Communiqué of the 411th Meeting on the Situation of South Sudan.* 30 December 2013, the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The Enough Project. (2014). The Military Dynamics of South Sudan's Civil War Juba-Based Observer. *The Enough Project.*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia. (2013). Coup Attempt in South Sudan: International Community Seek Peaceful Resolution. *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia Week in the Horn.* December 20, 2013 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia. (2016). Dr Riek Machar Sworn in as First Vice –President of South Sudan. *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia Week in the Horn.* Addis Ababa Ethiopia. April 29th 2016.

The Sudd Institute. (2014). South Sudan's Crisis: Its Drivers, Key Players, and Post conflict Prospects. Available at: http://www.suddinstitute.org/publications/show/SouthSudan'sCrisis-Its Drivers-Key-Players-and-Post-conflict-Prospects/. (Accessed on 15 September, 2015).

Thruelsen, D. (2009). *International Organizations: Their Role in Conflict Management.* Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defense College.

Tiitmamer N and Awolich A. (2015).The Impracticality of Sanctions and Why Diplomacy Makes Sense in South Sudan. *The Sudd Institute,* 17 February 2015.

Trading Economics. (2015).South Sudan Corruption Index. Available at: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-sudan/corruption-index.

Trading Economics. (2016).South Sudan Economic Forecasts 2016-2020 outlook. Available At www.tradingeconomics.com/South-Sudan/forecast. (Accessed on 5 November , 2016).

Transparency International. (2011). Global Corruption Barometer. Available At; http://gcb.transparency.org/gcb201011/in_detail/.(Accessed on 15 September, 2015).

Transparency International. (2016). Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. Available At https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/cpi_2015. (Accessed on 15 November, 2016).

Tripp M. (2010). *Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes Of Power In A Hybrid Regime.* London: Lynne Rienner.

United *Nations* Children's Fund (*UNICEF*). (2016). UNICEF South Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report. *The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) Report # 92*, August, 2016. Available At: http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/unicef-south-sudan-humanitarian-situation-report-92-12-august-25-august-2016(Accessed on 28 November, 2016)

UNHCR.(2015). South Sudan Country Profile. Available At: http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/regional.php. (Accessed on 15 November, 2015).

UNHCR.(2016). South Sudan Situation Information Sharing Portal. Available at: <http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/rssreader.php?FeedId=1>, Juba, Geneva. (Accessed on 15 September, 2016).

United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2015). South Sudan Humanitarian Bulletin. *Bi-weekly update*: Juba, South Sudan.

United Nation Security Council. (2015). Security Council Approves System To Impose Targeted Sanctions In South Sudan. United Nation News Center. New York, USA.

United Nations. (2008). African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operations in Darfur. Available At : Http://Www.Un.Org/Depts/Dpko/Missions/Unamid/ (Accessed September 1 2014).

United Nations Mission on South Sudan. (2014). Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report. May 2014. Accessed at http://www.unmiss.unmissions.org/Portals/unmiss/Human%20Rights%20Reports/UNMISS%20Conflict%20in%20South%20Sudan%20-%20A%20Human%20Rights%20Report.pdf. (Accessed on 15 September, 2015).

Vargas, F. (2008*). Seeking to Survive: Territorial Disputes in Civil War and the Killing of Civilians.* Unpublished Manuscript.

Voll, J. (1991).*Sudan:* The *State and Society in Crisis*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Wallensteen, P. (1998). *Preventing Violent Conflict. Past Record and Future Challenges*. Uppsala: Sweden. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, pages 62- 307.

Waltz, K .(1979). *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Random House.

Weber, A and Ajak A. (2014). *Division and Conflict in South Sudan: Domestic Politics Key*. London: Chatham House.

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wenger, M. (1991). Sudan: Politics and Society. *Middle East Report*, No. 172. Pp. 3-7.

WFP. (2015). South Sudan Market Price.*WFP Monitoring Bulletin*. Juba , South Sudan: WFP.

World Bank.(2013). Countries 2013. Available At: www.worldbank.org/en/countery. . (Accessed on 19 March, 2015).

Yagcioglu, D. (1996). The Role of Cultural Differences and Similarities in the Cyprus Conflict.
Availableat:http://www.Stwing.Upenn.Edu/~Durduran/Hamambocu/Authors/Knk/Knk6_13_2001.Htm (Accessed 18 December. 2016).

Ylonen, A. (2012).Limits of Peace through State-building in Southern Sudan: Challenges to State Legitimacy, Governance and Economic Development during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Implementation: 2005-2011", *Journal of Conflictology, Vol.3, Issue 2.*

Zartman, W. (2008).*Negotiation and Conflict Management – Essays on Theory and Practice* Oxford: Routledge.

Zeleza, P. (2008). *Introduction.* In Alfred Nhema & Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, (eds). *The Cause & Cost Of War In Africa: From Liberation Struggle To The War On Terror.* Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern African (OSSREA). Addis Ababa.

Data Collection Instruments

Appendix- 1

Checklist for Key Informant Interview

Key Informant Interview number _____

The Researcher signature _____

Name of supervisor _____sign_____

Date of Interview _____

Interview started at ____: ____hrs

Interview finished at ___: ____hrs (fill at the end)

Checklist for Key Informant Interview of Academicians and higher officials

1. What is your outlook about conflict in South Sudan?
2. What are the cause and nature of conflict in South Sudan?
3. Do you think there is any association between the current South Sudan conflict and power struggle between the political elite? If so how? and why?
4. Do you think there is any connection between the current South Sudan conflict and the historical backdrop of South Sudan? If so how? and why?
5. Is there any correlation between the current conflict in South Sudan and various ethnic groups particularly between Nuer and Dinka elite? If so how? and why?
6. Do you think there is any connection between the current South Sudan conflict and corruption, patronage and impunity? If so how? and why?
7. Is there any connection between the current conflict in South Sudan and militarization and arm proliferation? If so how? and why?
8. Is there any correlation between the current conflict in South Sudan and nation building? If so how? and why?
9. Is there any association between the current conflict in South Sudan and militarization and arm proliferation? If so how? and why?
10. Do you think there is any association between the current South Sudan conflict and institutional development in South Sudan? If so how? and why?
11. Is there any correlation between the current conflict in South Sudan and question of inclusiveness and representation? If so how? and why?

12. Do you think there is any relationship between the current South Sudan conflict and question of accountability? If so how? and why?
13. Do you think there is any connection between oil and other economic resource distribution and the current conflict? If so how? and why?
14. What are the major internal and external consequences of conflict in South Sudan?
15. Does the current conflict have impact on democracy? If so how? and why?
16. Does the current conflict have impact on rule of law? If so how? and why?
17. Is there any human right violation registered as a result of the current conflict? If so how? and why?
18. Does the current conflict have impact on the economy? If so how? and why?
19. Is there any distraction of property registered as a result of the current conflict? If so how? and why?
20. Does the current conflict have impact on social network? If so how? and why?
21. What are the role and contributions of AU and IGAD towards resolving conflict in South Sudan?
22. What are the opportunities for AU and IGAD to resolve conflict and consolidate peace?
23. What are the challenges for AU and IGAD to resolve conflict and consolidate peace?
24. What are the possible strength and limitation of AU and IGAD in conflict resolution?
25. What alternative strategies would you suggest to resolve conflict and help the poor escape the outrageous consequence of conflict?
26. Is there any legal or policy gap or challenges in resolving conflict by regional and sub-regional organization?

Appendix- 2

Checklist for Key Informant Interview of AU and IGAD officials

Name of the Regional or Sub-regional organization _____

Key informant interview Identification number _____

The Researcher signature _____

Name of supervisor _____sign_____

Date of Interview _____

Interview started at ____: ____hrs

Interview finished at ___: ____hrs (fill at the end)

1. What is your outlook about conflict in South Sudan?
2. What are the cause and nature of conflict in South Sudan?
3. Do you think there is any association between the current South Sudan conflict and power struggle between the political elite? If so how? and why?
4. Do you think there is any connection between the current South Sudan conflict and the historical backdrop of South Sudan? If so how? and why?
5. Is there any correlation between the current conflict in South Sudan and various ethnic groups particularly between Nuer and Dinka elite? If so how? and why?
6. Do you think there is any connection between the current South Sudan conflict and corruption, patronage and impunity? If so how? and why?
7. Is there any correlation between the current conflict in South Sudan and militarization and arm proliferation? If so how? and why?
8. Is there any association between the current conflict in South Sudan and nation building? If so how? and why?
9. Is there any relationship between the current conflict in South Sudan and militarization and arm proliferation? If so how? and why?
10. Do you think there is any association between the current South Sudan conflict and institutional development in South Sudan? If so how? and why?
11. Is there any correlation between the current conflict in South Sudan and question of inclusiveness and representation? If so how? and why?
12. Do you think there is any relationship between the current South Sudan conflict and question of accountability? If so how? and why?

13. Do you think there is any connection between oil and other economic resource distribution and the current conflict? If so how? and why?
14. What are the major internal and external consequences of conflict in South Sudan?
15. Does the current conflict have impact on democracy? If so how? and why?
16. Does the current conflict have impact on rule of law? If so how? and why?
17. Is there any human right violation registered as a result of the current conflict? If so how? and why?
18. Does the current conflict have impact on the economy? If so how? and why?
19. Is there any distraction of property registered as a result of the current conflict? If so how? and why?
20. Does the current conflict have impact on social network? If so how? and why?
21. What are the role and contributions of AU and IGAD towards resolving conflict in South Sudan?
22. What are the opportunities for AU and IGAD to resolve conflict and consolidate peace?
23. What are the challenges for AU and IGAD to resolve conflict and consolidate peace?
24. What are the possible strength of AU and IGAD in conflict resolution?
25. What alternative strategies would you suggest to resolve conflict and help the poor escape the outrageous consequence of conflict?
26. Is there any legal or policy gap or challenges in resolving conflict by regional and sub-regional organization?

Appendix- Three

Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Questions Guideline

PoC Camp Branch Name _____

Group leader Code_____

FGD Identification number _____

Name of the FGD Facilitator _____ sign_____

Name of supervisor _____sign _____

Date of Interview _____

Interview started at ____: ____hrs

Interview finished at ___: ____hrs (fill at the end)

List of Discussants

Participant Number	Age	Ethnicity	Religion	Marital Status	Level of Education (in completed years of schooling)	Family Size of the Participant	since when refugees joined the refugee camp
1							
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							

I. Discussion Points

1. What is your outlook about conflict in South Sudan?
2. What are the cause and nature of conflict in South Sudan?
3. Do you think there is any association between the current South Sudan conflict and power struggle between the political elite? If so how? and why?

4. Do you think there is any connection between the current South Sudan conflict and the historical backdrop of South Sudan? If so how? and why?
5. Is there any correlation between the current conflict in South Sudan and various ethnic groups particularly between Nuer and Dinka elite? If so how? and why?
6. Do you think there is any connection between the current South Sudan conflict and corruption, patronage and impunity? If so how? and why?
7. Is there any connection between the current conflict in South Sudan and militarization and arm proliferation? If so how? and why?
8. Is there any relationship between the current conflict in South Sudan and nation building? If so how? and why?
9. Is there any correlation between the current conflict in South Sudan and militarization and arm proliferation? If so how? and why?
10. Do you think there is any association between the current South Sudan conflict and institutional development in South Sudan? If so how? and why?
11. Is there any correlation between the current conflict in South Sudan and question of inclusiveness and representation? If so how? and why?
12. Do you think there is any relationship between the current South Sudan conflict and question of accountability? If so how? and why?
13. Do you think there is any connection between oil and other economic resource distribution and the current conflict? If so how? and why?
14. What are the major internal and external consequences of conflict in South Sudan?
15. Does the current conflict have impact on democracy? If so how? and why?
16. Does the current conflict have impact on rule of law? If so how? and why?
17. Is there any human right violation registered as a result of the current conflict? If so how? and why?
18. Does the current conflict have impact on the economy? If so how? and why?
19. Is there any distraction of property registered as a result of the current conflict? If so how? and why?
20. Does the current conflict have impact on social network? If so how? and why?
21. What are the role and contributions of AU and IGAD towards resolving conflict in South Sudan?

22. What are the opportunities for AU and IGAD to resolve conflict and consolidate peace?
23. What are the challenges for AU and IGAD to resolve conflict and consolidate peace?
24. What are the possible strengths and limitations of AU and IGAD in conflict resolution?
25. What alternative strategies would you suggest to resolve conflict and help the poor escape the outrageous consequence of conflict?
26. Is there any legal or policy gap or challenges in resolving conflict by regional and sub-regional organization?

Appendix- Four

In-Depth Interview Guide Questions Guideline

PoC Camp Branch Name _____

In-depth Interview Identification number _____

Age_____

Gender_____

The Researcher signature _____

Name of supervisor _____sign_____

Date of Interview _____

Interview started at ____: ____hrs

Interview finished at ___: ____hrs (fill at the end)

1. What is your outlook about conflict in South Sudan?
2. What are the cause and nature of conflict in South Sudan?
3. Do you think there is any association between the current South Sudan conflict and power struggle between the political elite? If so how? and why?
4. Do you think there is any connection between the current South Sudan conflict and the historical backdrop of South Sudan? If so how? and why?
5. Is there any correlation between the current conflict in South Sudan and various ethnic groups particularly between Nuer and Dinka elite? If so how? and why?
6. Do you think there is any connection between the current South Sudan conflict and corruption, patronage and impunity? If so how? and why?
7. Is there any correlation between the current conflict in South Sudan and militarization and arm proliferation? If so how? and why?
8. Is there any association between the current conflict in South Sudan and nation building? If so how? and why?
9. Is there any relationship between the current conflict in South Sudan and militarization and arm proliferation? If so how? and why?
10. Do you think there is any association between the current South Sudan conflict and institutional development in South Sudan? If so how? and why?
11. Is there any link between the current conflict in South Sudan and the question of inclusiveness and representation? If so how? and why?

12. Do you think there is any relationship between the current South Sudan conflict and the question of accountability? If so how? and why?
13. Do you think there is any connection between oil and other economic resource and the current conflict? If so how? and why?
14. What are the major internal and external consequences of conflict in South Sudan?
15. Does the current conflict have impact on democracy? If so how? and why?
16. Does the current conflict have impact on rule of law? If so how? and why?
17. Is there any human right violation registered as a result of the current conflict? If so how? and why?
18. Does the current conflict have impact on the economy? If so how? and why?
19. Is there any distraction of property registered as a result of the current conflict? If so how? and why?
20. Does the current conflict have impact on social network? If so how? and why?
21. What are the role and contributions of AU and IGAD towards resolving conflict in South Sudan?
22. What are the opportunities for AU and IGAD to resolve conflict and consolidate peace?
23. What are the challenges for AU and IGAD to resolve conflict and consolidate peace?
24. What are the possible strengths and limitations of AU and IGAD in conflict resolution?
25. What alternative strategies would you suggest to resolve conflict and help the poor escape the outrageous consequence of conflict?
26. Is there any legal or policy gap or challenges in resolving conflict by regional and sub-regional organization?

Appendix- Five

List of Key Informant Interviewee

No	Name of the Participant	Affiliation and expertise	Year of Meeting
1	Professor Edward Rhodes	Professor of Public Policy School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs	12/11/ 2015
2	Mr Lucas van de Vondervoort	Researcher, Arm Expert of United Nation Panel of Expert on South Sudan and Peace and Security expert	19/12/ 2015
3	Mr Andrews Atta-Asamoah	Researcher, Natural Resources and Finance Expert of United Nation Panel of Expert on South Sudan	19/12/ 2015
4	Mr Payton Knopf	Researcher, Regional Expert of United Nation Panel of Expert on South Sudan	19/12/ 2015
5	Alex De Waal	Research Professor at the Fletcher school in TUFTS University and a Political Analyst	23/8/ 2016
6	Dr Jeffrey D. Pugh	Assistant Professor at UMASS Boston Department of Conflict Resolution, Human Security and Global Governance	15/01/ 2016
7	Dr Maria Ivanova	Associate Professor at UMASS Boston Department of Conflict Resolution, Human Security and	15/01/ 2016

		Global Governance	
8	Miss Jennifer L.Hawkins	Institute of International Education Women , Peace and Security Advisor	12/11/ 2015
9	Mr Negusu Woldemedhin	Global Governance and Human Security Expert, Lecturer, PhD student and Researcher	16/01/ 2016
10	Mr Wondwossen S. Wondemagegnehu	Global Governance and Human Security Expert, Lecturer, PhD student and Researcher	16/01/ 2016
11	Mr Moses Chrispus Okello	Conflict Analyst and Works at IGAD CEWARN	8/02/ 2016
12	Mrs Hanna Gebrekiristos	Works at the office of IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan	8/02/ 2016
13	Ambassador Akuel Bona Malwal	Former Ambassador of South Sudan to Ethiopia , the AU, IGAD and UNECA	8/02/ 2015
14	Mr Husni Mustafa	Diplomat of Republic of Sudan	22/07/ 2015
15	Mr Berouk Mesfin	Political Analyst and works at Institute of Security Study (ISS)	8/06/ 2016
16	Mr Camlus OMOGO	M and E officer at IGAD CEWARN of Addis Ababa	10/02/ 2016
17	Dr. Tedros Adhanom	Former Foreign Minister of Ethiopia	24/03/ 2016
18	Ambassador Fisseha Shawl	Current Ethiopian Ambassador to South Sudan	18/06/ 2015
19	Dr. Admore Kambudzi	Director of the Peace and Security Department of AU	28/04/ 2016

20	Dr Solomon Dersso	Political Analyst and Commissioner for AU Commission on Human and Peoples Right	28/04/ 2016
21	Ambassador Hiruy Amanuel	Senior Advisor to the Office of the Special Envoys for South Sudan, UNOAU (Year, 2016)	30/04/ 2016
22	H.E Ms Bineta Diop	African Union Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security	22/07/ 2016
23	Mr Paschal Chem-Langhee	African Union Peace and Security Department Communication Officer	22/07/ 2016
24	Mr Braham Khelaf,	African Union Special Assistant to Commissioner for Peace and Security	22/07/ 2016
25	Mr Daniel Yelama	Former diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and currently working as Political Advisor to the United Nations	12/03/ 2016
26	Mr John Koang Kueth	Journalist from South Sudan	22/04/ 2016
27	Ms Margaret Lowilla	Journalist from South Sudan	22/04/ 2016
28	Mr Achut Acharya	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Right official	25/12/2015

Appendix Six

Ethical Considerations: Approval Letter to Conduct Research

Notification of Approval: United Nation Mission in South Sudan

By email from Conetreeras{ Conetreeras@un.org }

Sent: 14th February 2016 14:37

To:melikageleta@gmail.com;

Cc: peresuad@un.org

Ms Aziza Geleta,

This is to notify you that on 14th February 2016, the Public Information office of the United Nation Mission in South Sudan reviewed and approved your research project. The 2788/2016 forms have been forwarded to UNMISS Juba Protection of the Civilian (PoC) site 03 for clearance to the study voluntary individuals at the Protection of the Civilian (PoC) Site.

Yours sincerely,

Joseph Contereras

Head, Public Information Office

United Nation Mission in South Sudan

Mobile +211(0) 912178739