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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/16964
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dc.contributor.advisorBekele Gutema(Prof)en_US
dc.contributor.authorMelsew, Lulie-
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-31T12:21:54Z-
dc.date.available2017-08-31T12:21:54Z-
dc.date.issued2017-06-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/16964-
dc.description.abstractFreedom is very much contentious yet desirable and worth pursuing. As it has been under multifaceted “attacks” and infringements, so many defenses of it have been made. Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of freedom is one of the powerful and arduous defenses of freedom against its enemies. His theory is worth pursuing because of its treatment and defense of both ontological and practical freedom. It tries to establish the ontological foundation of freedom and to analyze the conditions of practical freedom. In defending freedom, he argues that the fundamental interrelation of human beings is conflictual; although practical freedom is limited, ontological freedom is absolute; and the Look, scarcity, practico-inert totalities with their exigencies and counter-finalities, and bad faith induce conflict and hence the alienation and suppression of freedom. Sartre suggests existential psychoanalysis, pure reflection and group praxis to fight the alienations and suppressions of freedom and to remedy conflictual relations. I argued that Sartre’s theory should be complemented, rectified and surpassed to have significance in our effort to secure our freedom. The fundamental interrelationship of human beings is essentially “caring” and conflict is only a deficient type of care-relation. Being a human being by itself is care; my co-existence with others is pervaded by care. Likewise, even if it is the case that conflict underlies our relation, Sartre’s remedies are not much help to effect the avoidance of “his” conflictual relations and the realization of freedom because they may end up merely in providing a reflective awareness of one’s freedom or in identification of one’s fundamental choice or relieving the factical impotence of serial individuals. The horizon of practical freedom must be widened. So, the translation of Sartrean ontological freedom into practical terms must be sought in caring-relation, cultural change, redesigning of technology, and political and ethical measures.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherAAUen_US
dc.subjectBad faith, Being-with, Care, Freedomen_US
dc.titleRethinking sartre’s theory of freedom: beyond purifying reflection, group praxis and conflictual human relationen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
Appears in Collections:Thesis - Philosophy

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