Political History of Tigray:
Rivalry for Power (1910-1935)

A Thesis Presented to
The School of Graduate Studies
Of the
Addis Ababa University

In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in History

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June 2003
ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Political History of Tigray:
Rivalry for Power (1910-1935)

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Adviser

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Examiner

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Examiner
DECLARATION

I, the undersigned declare that this thesis is my work and that all sources used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents ................................................................. i
Key to Transliteration .......................................................... iii
Acknowledgement .................................................................. v
Preface .................................................................................. vii
Abstract ................................................................................ x

Chapter

I. Background ........................................................................ 1

1.1. An overview of the Political History of Tigray from the Battle of Mätäma to the Battle of Koräm ........................................................ 1
1.2. The Battle of Koräm.................................................................. 9
1.3. An overview of Tigray from the Battle of Koräm to the Battle of Ākhora................................................................................. 14

II. The Battle of Ākhora .............................................................. 20

2.1. Prelude and the causes of the Battle of Ākhora ...................... 20
2.2. The conduct of the Battle of Ākhora and its results .............. 32
2.3. The Battle of Gidära and its results ........................................ 36
2.4. The central government's handling of the conflict in Tigray
and the subsequent attempts for the extradition of Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé ............................................................... 40
2.5. The submission of Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, the restoration of his territories and the opposition against him in Tigray .................. 46

III. The escape of Lej Iyasu to Tigray and the Tigrean chiefs' rivalry .... 54

3.1. The escape of Lej Iyasu and the central government's suspicion over Ras Seyum ................................................................. 54
3.2. Lej Iyasu's escape to Tigray; Ras Seyum's attitude towards Lej Iyasu and the opinions against Ras Seyum ........................................ 58
3.3. Lej Iyasu's escape to Bora-Selawa; the relation between Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa and the capture of Lej Iyasu and its
IV. The rebellion of Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq ..................................................69
   4.1. The causes for the rebellion of Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq ..............69
   4.2. The battles conducted during the rebellion of Däjjač Kassa and their results. .................................................................71
   4.3. The response of the central government to the rebellion of Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq; Ras Seyum's return from Addis Ababa and his threatening Awaj. ..................................................74
   4.4. Däjjač Kassa's submission to his father ........................................78
   4.5. Däjjač Kassa rebelled again ........................................................79
   4.6. Däjjač Kassa's submission and his fate ..........................................80

V. Tigrean chiefs' rivalry and the centralization process .......................88
   5.1. The centralization process and the fate of Tigrean hereditary chiefs .............................................................................88
   5.2. The attitude of the Tigrian rival chiefs to the revolt of Ras Gugsa Wäle and to the public trial of Ras Haylu Täklä-Haymanot. .........................................................................................94
   5.3. Emperor Haylä-Sellassé's centralization and Ras Seyum-Ras Gugsa rivalry. ...........................................................................98
   5.4. Tigrean chiefs' rivalry and the marriage connections with the leading members of the central government ....................105

VI. The Tigrean chiefs' rivalry and its impact on Italian invasion of Ethiopia .........................................................113
   6.1. General Italian policy on Ethiopia ..................................................113
   6.2. Ras Gugsa and the Italians ..............................................................117
   6.3. The death of Ras Gugsa and the continuation of the rivalry between Ras Seyum and Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa. .............119
   6.4. Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa's defection to the Italians ...............126

V11. Conclusion .....................................................................................133
Notes ....................................................................................................135
Bibliography .....................................................................................187
Key to Transliteration System

I. The seven orders of the Ethiopic alphabet are represented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Transliteration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>( u )</td>
<td>Bā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>( u&lt; )</td>
<td>Bu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>( u= )</td>
<td>Bi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>( v )</td>
<td>Ba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>( u? )</td>
<td>Bē</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>( w )</td>
<td>Be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>( x )</td>
<td>Bo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Regarding the sixth form in the above list, it must be noted that the “e” will be suffixed to the letter only if the letter is vocalized or stressed. Otherwise it would not be required at all. As a general rule also, the “e” is not required when the sixth form is the last letter of a word.

Example: S´U` = Māmher
          wÉ` = Bedder

III. Palatalized sounds are represented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Transliteration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>g</code></td>
<td>Š</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>†</code></td>
<td>Č</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>–</code></td>
<td>Ň</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>¶</code></td>
<td>Ž</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. Glottalized sounds are represented as follows:

- $\ddot{e}$ = J
- $k$ = Q
- $\ddot{o}$ = T
- $\ddot{u}$ = Č
- $\ddot{g}/\ddot{i}$ = S
- $\ddot{a}$ = P
- $\ddot{o}$ = $\ddot{A}$ = (Pronounced as in Tigriña Agamā)
- $n$ = H = (pronounced as in Tigriña Haramat)
- $\ddot{a}$ = Kh (pronounced as in Tigriña Ākhorā)

V. Germination is indicated by doubling consonants:

E.g: Kābbādā Tāsāmma

IV. General Examples:

- $\ddot{y}$ = Abatā
- $\ddot{e}$ = Lej
- $\ddot{e}$ = Arāgawi
- $\ddot{e}$ = Māngāśa
- $\ddot{e}$ = Aqaqi
- $\ddot{e}$ = Noñño
- $\ddot{e}$ = Asimba
- $\ddot{e}$ = Taytu
- $\ddot{e}$ = Ākhora
- $\ddot{e}$ = iHāī, Sāhaynāš
- $\ddot{e}$ = Āgamā
- $\ddot{e}$ = ewPf, Sebḥat
- $\ddot{e}$ = Dājjazmač
- $\ddot{e}$ = Pētros
- $\ddot{e}$ = Čārgār
- $\ddot{e}$ = Zānābāwārq
- $\ddot{e}$ = Gāž
O\!S\!^A = \textit{Humära}
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I joined the Graduate Program of the Department of History as a student I have been interested and prepared to write my thesis on another topic despite the disapproval of the topic by the department. Hence, I found the task of changing a topic for an M.A. thesis, in a very short period of time, not an easy task. Ato Tsegay Berhe, a staff member of the Addis Ababa University, however, helped and encouraged me, with compliment, to develop an interest in the study of the political history of Tigray (1910-1935). It is, therefore, a pleasure to acknowledge with gratitude the assistance and encouragement I received from him in having an interest in the topic I have worked on.

I have drawn up on the help of many people in the research for this thesis. Of the many who helped me to facilitate my research, my brothers, Ato Girmay G/yohannes, Ato Habtom Tsegay and Ato Mekonnen G/Tsadiq, who were very helpful during my fieldwork at Adigrat and in Maqalle, deserve my special thanks. They did all they could to assist in the success of my fieldwork. I recall with great pleasure the hospitality and encouragement I received from them and I am indebted to them very much indeed. I also thank all my informants for sharing with me their wide knowledge and experience and for enduring the many hours of interviews I made with them. From among my informants Dr. Zewde G/Sellasse who also provided me with almost all the photographs, which I included in my thesis, deserves special thanks.
I will always be grateful to my advisor, Dr. Tecle-Haimanot Gebre-Sellasse, for giving his time and energy, for counseling me, and for reading the draft of my thesis and for critically commenting on it.

The constant encouragement of my brothers, Ato Teklay G/yohannes, Ato G/Egeziabher G/yohannes, Ato Mekonnen G/yohannes, Ato Haile-Sellasse G/yohannes and my sister Tsehaynesh G/yohannes, and of my friends, Ato Abadi G/Kidan, Ato Teklu Equar and Ato Tarekegn G/Eyesus has also been a valuable prop throughout the period of my research and preparation of the thesis. I thank them all indeed.

My special thanks also go to my Italian language teacher at the Addis Ababa University, Signorina Irene Tosato, whose support in translating some of the Italian texts, necessary for the thesis has been invaluable. It is with immense gratitude that I acknowledge her contribution to the success of my work.

An indefatigable lady, Eyerusalem Mahitem, has typed my thesis with hardly a word of complaint about the intricacies of the transliteration system. I thank her very much indeed.

Finally, I want to express my indebtedness to my friend and staff member at the Aksum Senior Secondary School, Ato G/Giorgis G/Kidan, for making light of difficulties, which could have been almost insurmountable all through the years of my stay at the university.
PREFACE

The period between 1910 and 1935, in Tigray, was a period of complex games of political rivalries and alliances among the various chiefs and strong individuals. However, almost no attempt had been made to study the political history of Tigray, especially taking political history of Tigray between 1910 and 1935 as a main theme. Many studies, however, have a passing reference to the rivalries among the regional nobility in the region. It is Haggai Erlich who made an attempt in relation to this period. But his attempt is mainly limited to the period from 1930 to 1935 and dealt mainly with the Ethio-Italian relations. He also depended mainly on British and Italian Foreign Office documents and sources by paying little attention to local sources (mainly to the oral sources).

The problem which this thesis will attempt to solve will, therefore, be the existence of a wide gap in the literature on the study of the political history of Tigray in general and the period between 1910 and 1935 in particular. Particular attention is also given to the internal power struggle among the Tigrean chiefs and the relation, which their struggle had with the activities of the central government.

The principal purpose of this theses is to make an attempt to reconstruct the political history of Tigray between 1910 and 1935, to identify and analyze the various historical materials and arouse further scholarly interest in the topic, to contribute to fill some of the gaps in the literature about the political history of Tigray, in the twenty five years before the Italian
aggression of 1935, to meaningfully put the political history of Tigray in the broader context of Ethiopian history (because some of the events were either generated or were profoundly affected by factors which could be considered national), to contribute to fill some of the gaps in the literature on the study of regional political history of Ethiopia and will be able to relate the implementation of the imperial government’s centralization process in Tigray and other parts of Ethiopia.

In the thesis I have, therefore, attempted to:

- assess the nature of the internal power struggle among the Tigrean chiefs and the struggle between the Tigrean chiefs and the central government;
- identify and assess the different attitudes of the Tigrean chiefs to the power struggle between Lej Iyasu and Ras Tfäři, and their relation in regard to the problem of Lej Iyasu and the campaign against Ras Gugsa Wällè;
- identify and assess the objectives and results of the marriage alliances wich Ras Tfäři (later Emperor Haylä-Sellassè) made with the major Tigrean rivals in the period;
- identify the central government’s attitude to the traditional local rivalries in Tigray;
- identify and assess the Italian policies and activities in Tigray and how the political game in Tigray became a factor contributing to the making of Italian aggressive policy and enabled foreign penetration into the interior parts of the country.

The study is based on written (primary and secondary) and oral sources. The written sources include archives, theses, journals, manuscripts and books of European and Ethiopian languages, collected from different areas. Materials, which could be sources for the political history of Tigray are not, however, exhaustively consulted. This was due to many factors. The
main problem was the problem of having access to the archives of the Ministry of Interior. I regret this lapse. The other problem was the problem of interpreting materials written in Italian language, although I have made an attempt to solve the problem by learning the language to myself and by seeking the help of others. Due to the existence of immense Italian sources for the period under discussion and due to the existence of Italian language problem, I cannot, therefore, claim that the Italian sources are exhaustively utilized.

The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first provides a background, which highlights the political conditions of Tigray from the death of Emperor Yohannes IV at Mätäma (1889) up to the Battle of Koräm (1909). The second focuses on the conditions, which led to the Battle of Ākhora (1914) and the death of Ras Sebhaät and his two sons. The third chapter deals with the relations between the escape of Lej Iyasu to Tigray and the Tigrean chiefs’ rivalry, and their relation with the central government in relation to the problem of Lej Iyasu. The fourth chapter seeks to examine the causes and the results of the rebellion of Däjjač Kassa Seyum and his ultimate fate. The next chapter deals with the relation between the Tigrean chiefs’ rivalry and the centralization process, and the different attempts made for marriage alliances among the Tigrean chiefs and the leading members of the central government. The last chapter analyzes the Tigrean chiefs’ rivalry and its impact on Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.

This thesis cannot, however, make the claim that it is exhaustive and complete; much remains to be done. It is only a preliminary attempt hoping that it would highlight a plausible interpretation of the internal rivalry among the chiefs in Tigray.
ABSTRACT

Following the unexpected death of Emperor Yohannes IV, Negus Menelik was crowned Emperor and the political ambition of some of the Tigrean chiefs to crown Ras Mängäša as Yohannes IV’s heir was barred, and Tigray entered into a political turmoil. The continuous efforts to regain the throne and the rivalries among the Tigrean chiefs were, therefore, the major factors affecting the course of events after the death of Emperor Yohannes IV.

After Ras Mängäša’s death, the principal antagonists in Tigray- Däjjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, Ras Sebḥat, Ras Gugsa Araya, Däjjjač (later Ras) Seyum were involved in constant power struggle and engaged in rivalry to influence the central government to gain favour and to obtain the overlordship of the whole province of Tigray.

During the last reshuffles in the administrative posts of the country made by Emperor Menelik, on 22 April 1902, Däjjazmač Abatä Bwayaläw was appointed Wagšum and governor general of Tigray in the presence of Däjjjač Seyum, Däjjjač Abreha and Däjjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé. Däjjjač Abreha rebelled opposing the appointment of Däjjjač Abatä as an overlord of Tigray and was, however, defeated at the Battle of Koräm, in October 1909.

The power struggle among the Tigrean nobility continued after the Battle of Koräm, which led to the Battle of Åkhora, on 25 February 1914, in which Ras Sebḥat and his two sons were killed. The causes and the consequences of the battle are discussed in the thesis.

The relation between the Tigrean chiefs (mainly Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa) due to the deposition, escape and arrest of Lej Iyasu was also attempted to be identified in the thesis.
In Tigray the son of Ras Seyum, Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq, rebelled against his father and against the central government in 1918 and he achieved initial victories. The thesis, therefore, attempts to give a highlight on the causes and results of the rebellion of Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq.

Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa, who were both the grandsons of Emperor Yohannes IV, remained rivals to gain the title of Negus of Tigray until the death of Ras Gugsa in 1933. They attempted to gain popularity and influence in the central government and to win the favour and support of the central government at the expense of one another. Emperor Haylä-Sellassé unable to impose an effective control over Tigray, however, attempted to achieve an internal balance of power, and finally succeeded in preventing any one of Yohannes IV’s descendants from becoming Negus, through diplomacy and marriage ties. Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, aware of the potential trouble and danger from Tigray by Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa for being deprived of their legitimate patrimony, attempted to placate them by marriage ties to the Shewan royal family, by bonds of matrimony. As a result marriage ties were arranged between the children of the Emperor with the children of the two grand-sons of Emperor Yohannes IV, although it had little effect on the loyalty, especially, of Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa.

At the time when the Tigrean chiefs were conducting their rivalries, the Italians, who never forgot the ignominy of their defeat at the Battle of Adwa, worked hard to woo the Tigrean chiefs to their interests. Thus, they finally succeeded to gain Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa’s defection to their side, which facilitated their penetration in to the Ethiopian interior.
CHAPTER ONE

I. BACKGROUND

1.1 An Overview of the Political History of Tigray from the Battle of Mätäma to the Battle of Koräm

After Emperor Yohannes IV’s unexpected death in 1889\(^1\) Ras Mängäša, together with Ras Alula, led his men back to Tigray. But the designation of Ras Mängäša as the successor of Emperor Yohannes IV was not fully accepted by the Tigrean chiefs. By the time Ras Mängäša arrived at Mäqällä, the capital of Tigray, civil unrest had already started as the news of the death of Emperor Yohannes IV spread.\(^2\) Thus, division and rivalry developed among the different chiefs of Tigray and Emperor Yohannes’s army entered into disarray after the Battle of Mätäma. This paved the way for a power struggle among the chiefs of Tigray who failed to form a united front.\(^3\) Hence Tigray entered into political turmoil\(^4\) and the Tigrean notables were in a precarious situation.

Negus Menelik crowned himself as Emperor of Ethiopia and the political ambition of some of the Tigrean notables to crown Ras Mängäša as Emperor Yohannes’s heir was barred.\(^5\) Hence the geo-political center of the Ethiopian Empire shifted from Tigray to Shewa.\(^6\) The continuous efforts to regain the throne lost to the Shewans and the rivalries among the Tigrean notables were, therefore, major factors affecting the course of events and relations with the new Emperor based in Shewa after 1889.\(^7\)

After the death of Emperor Yohannes IV, the sharp split within the Tigrean nobility, the rinderpest epidemic, followed by the Great Famine, were in no condition to sustain any real
opposition to Menelik’s claim to the throne. The political crises due to the intermittent civil wars that followed the death of Emperor Yohannes IV, which devastated the region, could hardly be attributed to a single factor, namely the irresponsibility of the notables of Tigray alone. One of the most important elements to be considered was the attitude of Emperor Menelik II towards the situation in Tigray, whereby the Emperor let the chaos to take its course. To explain the effect of the internal power struggle and rivalries in Tigray and Emperor Menelik II’s attitude towards the situation, Nägadras Gábrä-Hiwät Baykädañ wrote as follows:

... Tigre, during the time of [Emperor] Menelik II was absolutely ruined. Wherever you go [in Tigray], one cannot get a developed village. The number of traces of her ancient development exceeds those of the present . . . Poverty reigned in the region until it became an area of mockery to others. When every part of the country [Ethiopia] live in peace, Tigray was not, however, relieved from bandits and robbers. Her chiefs always live in fighting against each other. The poor Tigrean peasant, however, thought that Emperor Menelik had caused the conflict among the Tigrean nobles and they highly blamed the Shewan Emperor [Menelik II] for that . . . It would be incorrect if one concludes that Tigray was ruined by Emperor Menelik II. It is, however, ruined due to lack of agreement among the Tigrean chiefs themselves. No one can attack such a tribe of warriors [Tigray] if had harmony within itself. Emperor Menelik II, however, should be blamed for one thing. He did not consider the Tigrean people as his own people. Whenever a bandit, who had been making people suffer, surrendered to him [Emperor Menelik II] he would receive him and pardoned him and then would give him appointments and rewards.
After his coronation Emperor Menelik II appointed Däjjac Seyum Găbră-Kidan (also known as Abba Gobäz), the son of Ras Bitwădăd Găbră-Kidan and Etégé Denqenäš, the sister of Emperor Yohannes IV and ex-wife of Emperor Täklä-Gyorgis, as the overall governor of Tigray by which he added one more divisive element to Tigray. Däjjac Seyum joined hands with Šum Āgamä Sebhät who had already rebelled against Ras Mängäša and in about mid-January 1890 fought at Zeban-Če’a, a village near Hawzén. The fighting lasted for about three days and claimed the life of many people.

When Ras Mängäša submitted to Emperor Menelik II he might have expected that Emperor Menelik would offer him the crown of Tigray. But Emperor Menelik II, while promising him that he might earn it by loyalty and service to him against Italy, only recognized his title of Ras. In Tigray Ras Mängäša sought Italian and British support for his aims to assume the title of negus and have over Tigray the same absolute power that Täklä-Haymanot had over Gojjam and which Menelik had earlier exercised over Shewa. This was stubbornly refused by the Emperor as he felt that Ras Mängäša’s real intention was the emperorship. It was a combination of Emperor Menelik’s refusal and the absence of external support that led Ras Mängäša to feel rancour against Emperor Menelik thereafter. Emperor Menelik must have indeed made a critical error in his refusal to name Ras Mängäša negus. The grant of the title could have cost the emperor very little while, on the other hand, it might have softened the bad feelings between him and the Tigreans. Emperor Menelik was unwilling to let that power out of his hands. Because the designation of Ras Mängäša as negus would have enabled him to appoint his subordinates as Rases and Däjjazmaces. Emperor Menelik was, therefore, cautious not to give such privileged title to any one but only to confirm the title of negus already granted to
Negus Täklä-Haymanot of Gojjam by Emperor Yohannes IV, in 1881. Emperor Menelik II made a proclamation in December 1898 deposing Ras Mängäša and nominating Ras Mekonnen of Harar governor of Tigray. He also drew his last ax on the Tigrean dynasty, on 18 February 1899, by removing and exiling Ras Mängäša to Ankobär, until his death in 1906 and exiling Ras Sebhat to Harar until 1909. Täklä-Sadiq Mäkurya in relation to the detention of Ras Mängäša writes as follows:

Ras Mängäša marched from Tigray to Addis Ababa to be pardoned by Emperor Menelik. Emperor Menelik, however, sent Ras Mängäša to Ankobär to be detained by arguing that you [Ras Mängäša] had rebelled against me two times and after you failed in your rebellion you came to submit; if I pardoned you again you will rebel for a third time and shake my already stabilized government.

Ras Mekonnen, the emperor’s nephew, was appointed governor of Tigray. He was believed to be the man best able to diffuse the explosive situation and ensure the security of the area, which had worried Emperor Menelik for a long time. On 31 January 1899 Ras Mekonnen named Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé governor of North-Western Tigray, i.e. Adwa and its surroundings as well as Šerä, because the latter had rebelled against Ras Mängäša until his submission to Ras Mekonnen in January 1899. Hence contributed to the fall of Ras Mängäša. Ras Mekonnen also appointed Däjjac Tädla Wahed temporary Meslänè of the areas around River Wär’e and Amba Alajä; Däjjac Hagos Täfäri to Āgamä and Keltä Awal’lo; Däjjac Tädla Abbagubän to parts of Indärta, Azäbo and Arho. Ras Mekonnen also made an Awaj (decree), in his name, to be announced in all parts of Tigray about the appointment’s he made and called on the remaining
minor rebel chiefs to submit to him or to his appointees. Quoting Martini, Ras Mekonnen’s Awaj reads:

*Capi ed armati che vogliono seguire Ras Mangescia sono liberi di farlo: quelli che vogliono restare al loro paese devono presentarsi ai capi da me [Ras Mekonnen] nominati: chi non si presenta a nessuno sarà considerato come ribelle.*

Chiefs and armed men, who want to follow Ras Mängäša, are free to do so; those who want to remain in their areas have, however, to present themselves to the chiefs named by me [by Ras Mäkonnen]. He who does not present himself to any one will be considered a rebel.

Emperor Menelik gave parts of the region between Wär’e and Täkäzè to Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassè and confirmed the title of Däjjazmac, which had been given to Gäbrä-Sellassè by Ras Alula in 1897, towards the end of 1900.

With the growth of this state of affairs in Tigray Däjjac Gugsa (the son of Araya-Sellassè and the nephew of Ras Mängäša), and Däjjac Seyum Mängäša emerged as the leading rebel leaders in Tigray. Däjjac Gugsa was the governor of Raya-Azäbo appointed by Ras Mängäša in 1897. Däjjac Seyum had also been appointed governor of Tämbèn by his father in the same year. It was not also uncommon for Ras Mekonnen to make them fight against each other by sowing seeds of discord among the rebels.

After Ras Mekonnen ruled Tigray for about 18 months, Ras Wällè Bitül was appointed as a new governor of Tigray in May 1900. In May 1902 Ras Wällé, however, left Tigray and returned to Yäjju. After the governorship of Ras Wällè, Emperor Menelik divided Tigray into three parts which were then given to native Tigrean appointees in July 1902. The area from the River Wär’e to the Märäb River, which includes North-Western Tigray (Adwa, Aksum, and Šerä) was confirmed to Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassè; Tämbèn, Indärta and its adjacent areas, Keltä-
Awla'lo as well as Raya-Azäbo (at the time known as Inda-Mäkoni) were given to Däjjac Abreha Araya (1873-1917). Ågamä was given to Šum Ågamä Dästa (d. 1914)\textsuperscript{36}.

Although Tigray was now placed under native chiefs, jealousy and feelings of rebellion were still alive among many of them. The two descendants of Emperor Yohannes IV, Däjjac Seyum Mängäša and Däjjac Gugsa Araya-Sellassè were offended to see Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassè, Däjjac Abreha Araya and Šum Ågamä Dästa elevated to the above-indicated posts. It appears that these two Däjjazmačs (grand-sons of Emperor Yohannes IV), together with many other minor rebel chiefs, continued their opposition against the new and faithful appointees of the government.\textsuperscript{37} They particularly threatened Däjjac Abreha, because he had assumed overordship of the areas which had been their traditional power base.\textsuperscript{38} Hence, in September 1902, Däjjac Seyum Mängäša and Däjjac Gugsa Araya marched to Mäqällä in an attempt to occupy the capital by attacking Däjjac Abreha Araya. Both sides fought for three days at a place called Āddi-Šum Dehun, in the outskirts of Mäqällä. The fighting ended with the defeat of Däjjac Gugsa and Däjjac Seyum who retreated to Tämbèn\textsuperscript{39}. Thus, throughout the period the three appointees of the central government had serious security problems in their own respective territories. They were all the time threatened by the rebels.\textsuperscript{40} According to Cipolla, Däjjac Seyum used to declare the Ketät (mobilization) at least once a month with the intention of making war on the neighbouring lands in order to gain the governorship of the whole of Tigray\textsuperscript{41} and to rule over his father’s province by defeating the other notables.\textsuperscript{42} In relation to this Cipolla wrote:

\begin{quote}
[Seium] Fa rullare il Kitet ossia aduna la sua gente in armi una volta quasi ogni mese, col proposito di muovere guerra ai vicini e dice di volere, ottenere assolutamente il governatore del Tigre [in about 1906]\textsuperscript{3}
\end{quote}
Seium] declares Kitāt, i.e. he assembles his people to take up arms, almost once in a month with the purpose to enter into war against his neighbours, and he states that he absolutely wants to obtain the governorship of Tigray for himself.

The central government kept its usual indifferent attitude towards the situation in Tigray. So as it had imposed its indirect control over Tigray, it did not attempt to solve the problem of turbulence in it.⁴⁴

The descendants of Emperor Yohannes IV, who considered Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassè as an intruder and a usurper, were particularly hostile to him. To this effect Cipolla wrote: [Geбра Sellassè] È nemico mortale di Seium⁴⁵ [Gābrā-Sellassè] is the mortal enemy of [Raš] Seyum].

When Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassè was in Addis Ababa, in 1903, Dājjac Seyum and Dājjac Gugsa got the opportune moment to launch an attack on Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassè, entered Adwa, and looted the town in June 1903 in his absence.⁴⁶ The rebels were also joined by Dājjac Abreha Hagos and Dājjac Hagos Tāfāri who resented the appointment of Šum Āgamā Dāsta over the whole of Āgamā district.⁴⁷ This led Emperor Menelik II to take urgent measures. Emperor Menelik II, therefore, sent Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassè with about 12,000 troops against the 3,000 rebel forces.⁴⁸ Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassè entered Adwa, on 11 December 1903, triumphantly with hardly any resistance.⁴⁹ Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassè then began peace negotiations with the rebels. Dājjac Seyum and Dājjac Gugsa Araya submitted to Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassè on 27 December 1903 and on 28 December 1903 respectively.⁵⁰ Dājjac Seyum Māngāša went to Addis Ababa with Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassè to pay homage to Emperor Menelik II. Emperor Menelik II, therefore, made Dājjac Seyum governor of Keltā-Awla’lo and, later, added Tämbèn and Abārgällä to him by taking
them from Dājjač Abreha, who was now left with only Indārta and Inda-Mākoni.51 Gār’alta was also given to Dājjač Gugsa as a fief.52 From this time onwards Dājjač Seyum started to prove his loyalty to the central government. Even after his father’s death at Ankobār, in December 1906, Dājjač Seyum showed no opposition to the government.53 Nevertheless, this betrayal of Dājjač Seyum signaled the beginning of inter-family friction and rivalry with Dājjač Gugsa Araya, which became a dominant feature of Tigrean politics in the 1920s and 1930s.54

After Ras Māngāša’s death in 1906 the principal antagonists: Dājjač Gābrä-Sellassè, Ras Sebḥat Arāgawi, Dājjač Gugsa Araya-Sellassè, Dājjač Abreha Araya-Sellassè and Dājjač Seyum Māngāša, were involved in constant power struggle, and in the rivalry to influence the central government to gain favour and grant one of them the overlordship of Tigray.55 From among these Tigrean chiefs Dājjač Gābrä-Sellassè, however, established a strong and lasting relationship with Emperor Menelik II.56 He was one of the highest and most trusted appointees of Emperor Menelik II57 and as an expression of his affection, Emperor Menelik II gave Dājjač Gābrä-Sellassè one of his grand-nieces [Wāyzäro Amaräč] as a wife,58 and in November 1906 gave him areas in northern Tigray as restä-gult.59 For the names of the areas over which Dājjač Gābrä-Sellassè was appointed refer to Appendix I.60

Dājjač Gugsa, who had already been frustrated at Dājjač Seyum’s betrayal and submission, decided to give up his rebellion. Accordingly, in July 1907, he went to Addis Ababa allegedly with Dājjač Gābrä-Sellassè. Emperor Menelik II received him in a spirit of reconciliation. To Dājjač Gusga’s dismay, Emperor Menelik in what amounted to exile sent him to Wälläga as a district governor in Ras Dāmes’s governorate. Dājjač Gugsa remained there until 1916 when he was brought back by Empress Zäwditu, his step mother, who then appointed him
as governor of Raya-Azäbo and Bora-Seläwa, bestowing up on him the title of Ras. Ras Gugsa remained a faithful vassal of the central government throughout Zäwditu’s reign. He demonstrated his enthusiastic loyalty to the diarchy in capturing Lej Iyasu in 1921 for which he was made Leul in 1930 – hence Leul-Ras.

1.2 The Battle of Koräm

Däjjač Abreha was the son of Ras Araya the Elder who was the governor of Indärta during the period of Emperor Yohannes IV and maternal uncle and chief councilor of Emperor Yohannes IV. In 1902 Emperor Menelik II promoted him as governor of Tämbên, Indärta and Inda-Mäkoni. Däjjač Abreha expressed his loyalty to the central government between 1902 and 1906 through his relentless efforts to subdue the two rebels: Däjjač Seyum and Däjjač Gugsa Araya.

At the beginning of 1907 Däjjač Abreha introduced a new and special levy (tax) known as Čeralahmi. One of my informants, Ato Kehešän, informed me that Däjjač Abreha had introduced a new type of taxation which would make a cow to pay tax: according to the words of my informant “LQT> f์w HKM” [Let the cow pay tax]. The Čeralahmi tax was to be levied on every one who owned a cow. The amount varied depending on the number of cattle one owned: a farmer who owned one cow had to pay one thaler. Some sources indicate that the new tax was introduced to raise money for an ambitious building programme of the present palace, Abreha Castle, in Mäqällä. This new type of tax faced opposition and the people of Āgamä and Keltä-Awla’lo refused to pay. Däjjač Abreha then punished severely the people of Ašebi-Därra, in Keltä-Awla’lo, for refusing to pay the new tax. The central government was, however, displeased with what Däjjač Abreha had perpetrated in Ašebi-Därra and, according to my
Informant, Emperor Menelik punished Däjjač Abreha and made him pay about 80,000 thalers. Due to the displeasure of Emperor Menelik with what Däjjač Abreha had perpetrated at Așebi-Dārra it was feared that Däjjač Abreha would be revoked from his domain and that his associates in Indārta were encouraging him to rebel by composing poems like the following:

\[\begin{align*}
&\text{You, who have the odour of momona (tree) and lemon,} \\
&\text{Hey, for they did not revoke you from your domain,} \\
&\text{Henceforth, do according to your boldness.}
\end{align*}\]

While Emperor Menelik was incapacitated due to his illness starting from April 1908, Empress Tāytu tried every thing in her power to have the ailing Emperor declare his daughter, Zāwditu, heir to the throne. Empress Tāytu believed that she could manipulate Zāwditu and have her as a dominant figurehead with real power resting in her hands. To achieve this, Empress Tāytu controlled access to the Emperor and began to promote the interests of her associates. However, against these hopes, in May 1909, Emperor Menelik declared that Lej Iyasu was his chosen heir to the throne.

As a result, in the uncertain future and gloomy days when Emperor Menelik lay dying, a bitter struggle for power was being waged between the Empress and Ras Tāssāma (the Regent). The Empress who was bitterly opposed to the regency, having hoped to have the power in her own hands, summoned to her aid the chiefs of her native province and usurped the imperial
Empress Taytu endangered Lej Iyasu’s power in 1909-1910 and became the de facto head of state. The time after 1909 was, therefore, marked by the absence of any one individual at the helm of the state with real authority.

Emperor Menelik made his last reshuffle in the administrative posts of the country. According to this reshuffle, Däjjazmač Abatä Bwayalāw (1871-1917) was made Wagšum and governor general (overlord) of Tigray in April 1909, transferring him from Kāmbata, to which he had been attached for a long time (1896-1909). Ras Sebḥat was also released from Harār prison where he had remained for about eleven years and was appointed over Āgamā by the orders of Empress Taytu as part of the government’s reshuffle in the Imperial court. As a result, Tigray was found divided among Dājjāč Abreha Araya, Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassē Barya-Gaber and Ras Sebḥat Arāgawi, all of them under the governorship of Wagšum Abatā.

When Dājjāč Abatā was named Wagšum and overlord of Tigray, Dājjāč Abreha Araya together with Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassē, Dājjāč Seyum and all the provincial governors were called to Addis Ababa early in 1909 to hear Emperor Menelik’s arrangements for the succession. Even though Dājjāč Abreha's immediate reaction to Dājjazmač Abatā's appointment over Tigray was not clearly known, he had, however, nominated a group of elders as his representatives who went to the palace to appeal against Dājjazmač Abatā's appointment asking the Emperor to review the appointment he made over Tigray. But his request was not accepted. Sources explain that Dājjazmač Abatā’s appointment as supreme governor of Tigray, by Emperor Menelik, was attributed to the grave mistake of Dājjāč Abreha who had mutilated the people of Ašebi-Dārra for refusing to pay the Čeralahmi tax, as this act had vexed Emperor Menelik II.
Consequently, while Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassè remained in Addis Ababa Däjjač Abreha, under the pretext that he would go first and prepare a reception in honour of the newly appointed Wagšum Abatä, went to Máqällä and then rebelled rejecting the authority of Wagšum Abatä. Däjjač Seyum had also returned to Máqällä. At the beginning of October 1909, Däjjač Abreha marched south wards from Máqällä to Koräm to stop the approaching newly appointed governor over Tigray. According to Corrado Zoli, Däjjač Abreha rebelled, claiming that he was the legitimate heir of Emperor Yohannes IV after the death of Ras Mängäša, since he was the Emperor’s cousin. Däjjač Abreha strongly insisted that Wag should be administered under Tigray instead of Tigray under Wag. Däjjač Abreha has said, according to Mekonnen that “It is a humiliation to see Tigray being governed by Wag while I am alive.”

Many Tigrean chiefs, although they did not want to fight against Däjjazmač Abatä, expressed negative feelings against the Shewan-dominated government in general and were bound to be offended in particular by Däjjazmač Abatä's appointment as an overlord of Tigray. This was not only because Däjjazmač Abatä was a Shewan but also because he bore the title of Wagšum. This title had traditionally belonged to the hereditary rulers of Wag-Lasta, descendants of the Zagwè Kings.

When Wagšum Abatä started his journey to Tigray he was accompanied by Ras Sebḥat. Däjjač Abreha marched south to Koräm and fought against Wagšum Abatä. The Battle of Koräm started early in the morning of 7 October 1909. The reluctance or refusal of many of the notables of Tigray, to support Däjjač Abreha in the campaign against Wagšum Abatä brought a serious shortage of man power for Däjjač Abreha's army. The rebellion of Däjjač Abreha gained no support both from the Tigrean notables and from the people, particularly from the people of
Indärta due to the Čeralahmi tax. It was, according to Marcus, Dājjač Dāsta, son of Wagšum Guangul who supported Dājjač Abreha in his rebellion. In addition to the modern weapons of Wagšum Abatā's soldiers, Ras Sebḥat’s active participation on the side of the Wagšum enabled him to gain the upper hand in the fighting.

Annaratone, who was called from Dāssè to Koräm to take care of the wounded, writes about the Battle of Koräm as follows:

La lotta fu breve, accanita, violenta, sanguinosa . . . nell’ultimo combattimento invece i caduti furono qualche migliaio con numerosissimi feriti; circa il 31.5% dei combattenti.

[The fighting was short, relentless, violent, and bloody ... In the last fighting, the fallen were nearly one thousand with many wounded: about 31.5% of the fighters.]

According to Zoli, about 2000 people died and about 1000 wounded from both sides during the bloody war. Important followers and notables, most of whom were close relatives of Dājjač Abreha lost their lives at the battle. Qāñazmač Kāmbelḥatu (Dājjač Abrehaš Indārāsè and war general and the governor of the town of Māqāllum and its outskirts), Dājjač Abrehaš brothers: Dājjač Tāfāri Araya (governor of Sahārti) and Dājjač Rādda Araya (governor of Dedeba) died at the battle. Late, in the afternoon of 10 October, Dājjač Abreha himself had been slightly wounded and was captured by Ras Sebḥat. After his capture at Koräm Dājjač Abreha was sent to Addis Ababa and sentenced to life imprisonment. This was, however, changed and Dājjač Abreha was released about the end of 1911. Dājjač Abreha died, on 16 May 1918, in Addis Ababa.

Dājjač Seyum was in Tāmbèn when the Battle of Koräm was fought. When the central Government ordered him to help Wagšum Abatā, Dājjač Seyum accepted the order willingly,
because he wanted to avenge his defeat at Āddi-Šum-Deḥun by Dǎjač Abreha. But he met Wagšum Abatā four or five days after the battle. According to Cipolla, Dǎjač Seyum was closely following the fighting between Wagšum Abatā and Dǎjač Abreha in order to put himself immediately on the side of the winner. In relation to Dǎjač Seyum’s stand Arnaldo Cipolla wrote the following:

When Abreha went against Abatā, Seyum followed the march of the Tigreans, maintaining some degree of distance, discovering every day a new excuse to justify his delay. In this way he was able to avoid compromising himself, waiting for the result of the fighting between the two biggest opponents and to put himself in the side of the winner.

However, it is more likely that Dǎjač Seyum was willing to help Dǎjač Abatā to have Dǎjač Abreha defeated so as to prove his loyalty to the central government. Although Dǎjač Seyum did not participate in the fighting against Dǎjač Abreha, he was given the areas of Dǎjač Abreha (Indärta) besides his former areas of Tāmbrēn and Abārgāllā after the battle. Ras Sebḥat’s active participation at the Battle of Korām made him appear as a dignitary of the central government and apparently began to rule Āgamā with better administration than ever before.

1.3 An Overview of Tigray from the Battle of Korām to the Battle of Ākhora

The Battle of Korām had important consequences both in Tigray and in the central government. After the battle Wagšum Abatā went to Māqāllā and stayed there for few months. Dǎjač Abreha, although Dǎjač Abatā defeated him, aborted Empress Taytu's plan for Tigray in
particular and her national political ascendancy (1908-1910) in the country in general by inciting the battle.\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Wagšum} Abatä’s victory at the Battle of Korâm precipitated the power struggle that ensued between Empress Taytu and the Shewan nobility. His resounding victory over Däjjač Abreha backfired on the Empress. Hoping that her brother would rule Tigray effectively and fearing at the growing prestige and popularity of \textit{Wagšum} Abatä, Empress Taytu induced the Council of Ministers to issue an order to \textit{Wagšum} Abatä to hand over the province of Tigray and to surrender weapons in his possession to Ras Wällè in Yejju. Hence, Ras Wallè was appointed as the new overlord of Tigray for the second time (from the end of October 1909 to March 1910). \textsuperscript{114} At this time, according to Täsfayohannes, there was also a rumour that Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassè was also removed from his governorate of Adwa, Šerä, Aksum, and Haramat. \textsuperscript{115} This act of the Empress was a humiliation both for \textit{Wagšum} Abatä and Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassè. \textit{Wagšum} Abatä, as one of Emperor Menelik’s generals of the early days and staunchly loyal to Emperor Menelik, may not have had any personal grudge against the Empress. But, because of the respect he enjoyed among the Shewan nobles, she might have considered him a threat to her power. \textsuperscript{116} \textit{Wagšum} Abatä protested to his fellow Shewans against the order of the Empress to hand over the province of Tigray and to surrender weapons in his possession to Ras Wällè in Yejju. \textsuperscript{117}

\textit{Wagšum} Abatä started his journey to Addis Ababa with his victorious army in January 1910 without leaving a deputy in Tigray. It is said that Ras Wällè had refused to accept the offer to him of governor of Tigray. But his refusal could probably have been due to the great hostility to him, in Tigray. \textsuperscript{118} Hearing that \textit{Wagšum} Abatä was marching to Addis Ababa the Empress sent her force under the leadership of Azaj Zäamanuel and \textit{Wagšum} Abatä’s march was halted at
This was because the Empress wanted to prevent Wagšum Abatä from joining hand in the intrigues which were being conducted against her in Addis Ababa.120

At this time Empress Taytu had controlled all the activities of the central government that the agent of the American Legation in Addis Ababa expressed the dominant role still played by the Empress, in his letter, to the Secretary of State (Washington), of 15 January 1910, as follows:

*For the time being, the queen maintains her supremacy at the Gibbi and I am credibly informed that practically every decision now arrived at by the government is at her instigation, or subject to her consent*...121

The rather ambitious activity of Empress Taytu had certainly aroused the feeling of some people like Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassè in particular and the Shewan and Tigrean chiefs in general.122 At this juncture, the regent and the Shewans who were worried much and infuriated even more about the Empress’s aims and nepotistic policy of political appointment decided to take all effective measures to strip her of all powers.123 Consequently these discontented chiefs with the initiative of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassè and the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nägadras Haylä-Gyorges, and several of the Shewan and Tigrean chiefs who had suffered more from the caprices and dislikes of the Empress conducted the *coup d’etat* against Empress Taytu.124 They revoked almost all her appointments and some of her marriage arrangements. They also made a series of arrests of members of her faction.125

According to the manuscript written by Täsфayohannes, there circulated a prophecy, of obscure origin, recounting that a person born from Tigray would snatch the imperial throne from Emperor Menelik.126 This, according to Täsфayohannes, produced considerable hatred against Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassè from the Empress. Although it has not been established the prophecy was
known to all.\(^{127}\) As a result, Däjjač Gärbrä-Sellassè became the victim of the Šumšer of Empress Taytu.\(^{128}\) Däjjač Gärbrä-Sellassè who was the victim of the Šumšer of Empress Taytu\(^ {129}\) was, therefore, one of the leading spokesmen against her\(^ {130}\) and she was arrested by him,\(^ {131}\) on 30 March 1910.\(^ {132}\) In relation to the coup d'etat against Empress Taytu and the role Däjjač Gärbrä-Sellassè played, Täsfayohannes wrote as follows:

[When Emperor Menelik's illness showed no sign of improvement ... Empress Taytu started to conduct šumšers. To take the government to Gondar she started to strengthen her relatives by appointments ... It was also suspected that, either from a magician or a hermit, she came across knowing that a person from Tigray will snatch the government. From this time onwards she highly hated Kebur Däjjač Gärbrä-Sellassè. As a result she took off Āgamä, Haramät, Šerä, and Aksum from Däjjač Gärbrä-Sellassè. Only Adwa remained for him. Kebur Däjjač stayed in Addis Ababa. Ras Wälē who was appointed over Yäjju and overlord of Tigray came to Tigray to administer. It was again discussed that my master [Däjjač Kidanä-Maryam of Wälqayet] heard a secret that he was revoked from his administration of Adwa. Adwa was given to Däjjač Kidanä-Maryam of Wälqayet. At this time while we had been informed secretly to attack him [Däjjač Kidanä-Maryam] if he would come to Adwa, and while we were awaiting his arrival [to Adwa], knowing nothing worse would come against him than what he was facing at this time in the hands of Empress Taytu, Däjjač Gärbrä-Sellassè instigated the Shewan nobles and agitated them against Empress Taytu. Däjjač Gärbrä-Sellassè agitated the Shewn nobles such as \(^ {133}\)]
Fitawrari Habtä-Gyorgis and Ras Dämesè by stating that how you can keep silent while Empress Taytu was playing tricks with the government and snatching the governorship from you. He then made oath with them [to oppose Empress Taytu's interference in government affairs]. . . . [He told the Shewan nobles that] why Empress Taytu is playing tricks with the government while Emperor Menelik has [already] told us that Lej Iyasu is his heir and told us that if he betrays you let him give birth to a black dog and if you betray him let you give birth to a black dog . . . Hence they told Empress Taytu that it is the duty of Lej Iyasu to make šumšers (reshuffles) [in the government not you] and asked her to simply carry the duty of taking care for Emperor Menelik's health. The person who took the role of spokesman is Kebur Däjjač Gibrä-Sellassè. When Empress Taytu replied to him that why he should care while he was an alien [a person from Tigray not from Shewa] person Däjjač Gibrä-Sellassè replied that it was Emperor Menelik who had brought all of us [in Addis Ababa], none of us was born in Addis Ababa.

My informant, Däjjač Zewde Gibrä-Sellassè also confirmed the above statement and told me that when Däjjač Gibrä-Sellassè requested Empress Taytu not to intervene in state affairs she insulted him by saying “∫” [shepherd] and he replied that “∫ÊT KU’Kê∫ ˘lí= G<≤’U ˘Í™’ ‘u”’ [had it not been for Emperor Menelik we all had been shepherds].

The defeat of Empress Taytu's group, on 30 March 1910, was a clear indication that the Crown Prince, Lej Iyasu [1896-1935] was on the ascendancy. After the coup d'etat, Empress Taytu was, therefore, made to have the duty to care for Emperor Menelik's health and all state affairs were entrusted to Ras Tässäma and the Crown Prince, Lej Iyasu.

In May 1910 Ras Wäldä-Giorgis was appointed over Begemeder and Tigray. Under his command in Tigray were: Ras Sebhät (governor of Āgamä), Däjjač Gibrä-Sellassè (governor of Adwa, Šerä, Tämben, Haramat, Indärta, Keltä-Awla'lo, Gär'alta), Däjjač Gugsa Araya (governor of Abärgällä and Bora-Seläwa) and Däjjač Abära Tädla (Inda-Mäkonì, Wäjjärat and Azabo).

When Lej Iyasu came to power Däjjač Abreha, who was his brother-in-law was released towards the end of 1911. Paradoxically Wagšum Abatä was jailed while Däjjač Abreha was
released. Following Däjjač Abreha's defeat at the Battle of Koräm Tigrean chiefs' need for the throne of Emperor Yohannes IV was subdued. After the Battle of Koräm Däjjač Gugsa Araya and Däjjač Seyum Mångäša emerged as the two powerful local rulers under the central government. After the death of Ras Sebhat and the defeat of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassè in 1914 Däjjač Seyum Mångäša was, however, left as a *de facto* ruler of all parts of Tigray for a while.

Shortly before March 1914 an order was sent by Lej Iyasu to all the chiefs to come to Addis Ababa, evidently for the purpose of being present at his coronation. As a result an invitation was, therefore, sent to Däjjač Seyum to come to Dässe for the coronation. The best chance for Däjjač Seyum was to accept the invitation and in return to be sent to Tigray as viceroy. He accepted the invitation and attended the ceremony. Thus he was excluded from being a possible future rival to the throne of Ethiopia. Däjjač Seyum Mångäša, during the coronation of Ras Mikael, was made Ras and Tigray was allotted to him. By making this appointment, it was thought that the Tigrean chiefs would not rise any objection to the overlordship of Ras Mikael. A process of elimination of the rival claimants to supreme authority in Tigray in the meantime reduced their number to only potential and principal families that were equally influential and mutually hostile.
CHAPTER TWO
THE BATTLE OF ĀKHORA

2.1 Prelude and the Causes of the Battle of Ākhora

Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassè was one of the youngest and educated councilers of Emperor Menelik II. The family of Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassè could trace its genealogical root to one of the most important families in Tigray, that of Šum Āgamā Wāldu. ¹ [Refer Appendix:II]. His father Dājjac Barya- Gaber who was the appointee (Balāmual) of Emperor Tewodros II ruled over an extensive territory, which extended from Fārās-May to Akalā-Guzay during the reign of Emporior Yohannes IV. Barya–Gaber died in March 1889, at the Battle of Mätāma² while Gābrā-Sellassè was only about fifteen years old. ³ Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassè was educated at an Italian mission school near Massawa⁴ and spoke Italian.⁵ His Italian language ability was so great that it was expressed by Cipolla as follows: Un capo interessante che parla benissimo la nostra lingua è Degiac Gabresillasie, capo di Adwa…⁶ [An interesting chief who speaks our language very well is Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassè, the chief of Adwa…]. Emperor Menelik gave him the title of Dājjazmač.⁷

Ras Sebhat was also the descendant of Dājjac Sebagades from Āgamā, who governed Āgamā from 1818 to 1831, ⁸ and of Šum Āgamā Wāldu and was also the maternal uncle of Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassè.⁹ The family of Sebagades, at the period under discussion, was headed by Ras Sebhät Arāgawi, the hereditary prince and governor of Āgamā.¹⁰

The period before 1914 for Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassè witnessed a period of cordial relations with some of the Tigrean chiefs and a time of hostility with others. The descendants of Emperor Yohannes IV namely Dājjac Seyum and Dājjac Gugsa Araya considered Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassè as an intruder and a usurper and were hostile to him.¹¹ His hostility with Dājjac Seyum (his
future father-in-law) was high. To this effect Cipolla wrote: ... [Gabresellasie] è nemico mortale di seium ... [Gabra-Sellassee] is the mortal enemy of [Ras Seyum]. Some others, such as Ras Sebhat, were envious of his relation with the Italians and his acceptance at the court of Emperor Menelik. Dājjač Gābrā-Sellassè had the favour and support of Emperor Menelik who seemed to trust him more than any of his Tigrean colleagues. It was probably this special favour and attention of Emperor Menelik that made the other Tigrean chiefs jealous of Dājjač Gābrā-Sellassè and made them to try and find all means of antagonizing him with the central government.

After the defeat of Dājjač Abreha at the Battle of Korām and after the coup d’etat plotted against Empress Taytu, in which Dājjač Gābrā-Sellassé played an active role, Dājjač Gābrā-Sellassé was made governor of north western Tigray (Aksum, Adwa and Šerā) as well as Haramat, which had been under Dājjač Abreha, until the end of 1909. As a result of the reshuffle, Āgamā, which was under Šum Āgamā Dāsta was given to Ras Sebhat in 1909, after he was released from his detention in Harar. At the Battle of Korām Ras Sebhat, because he had some old grudges against Dājjač Abreha, fought on the side of Wagšum Abatā against Dājjač Abreha. His active part at the Battle of Korām made him appear as a dignitary of the central government.

Shortly before the death of Emperor Menelik II Ras Sebhat and Ras Seyum, due to the existence of some grudges and jealousy, accused Dājjač Gābrā-Sellassé of intriguing and making secret agreements with the Italians against the security of the central government. This accusation rose again after the death of Emperor Menelik II and after Lej Iyasu assumed power. The short reign of Lej Iyasu which was generally characterized by a number of dissatisfactions
and disappointments seemed, therefore, to be greatly felt in Tigray than in any other part of the country. At this time the political situation in Tigray grew to be worse and badly unstable. The major chiefs were quarrelling one against the other. The main chiefs who were quarrelling one against the other were Ras Sebhat, Däjjac Seyum and Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé. Other sources explain that Ras Sebhat and Däjjac Seyum were jealous of Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé because he was more educated, thus was acceptable to the central government. One of my informants state that "The Amhara had both affection and fear towards Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé.

It is difficult to identify the exact cause for the conflict among Ras Sebhat, Däjjac Seyum and Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé, which led them to a battle. It should, however, be clear that Tigrean chiefs at the time under discussion, were capable of warring against each other over trifles. The gravity of the conflict and the situation in Tigray, however, had an effect on the rest of the country at the moment when Emperor Menelik II's death had become generally known and before Lej Iyasu was firmly seated on the throne. The fact remains, therefore, that there was an internal problem in Tigray, which required very careful handling by the central government.

Some sources explain that the conflict between Ras Sebhat and Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé originated over the possession of the Āgamä district. Ras Sebhat was the governor of Āgamä, while Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé was the governor of north west Tigray (Šerä, Adwa, Aksum) and Haramät. Although my informant, Däjjazmač Zewde, tells me that Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé had proposed to and begged, Emperor Menelik for the release of Ras Sebhat and his appointment over Āgamä, other written sources state that Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé was always coveting Āgamä. With typical ineptitude, mindless of the consequences to his empire, Lej Iyasu gave a
half promise of the governorship of the district to Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé and played Ras Sebhat against Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé by his promise to bestow the former's district of Āgamä on the latter. This got to the ears of Ras Sebhat and naturally roused his suspicions and dislike of Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé, who, moreover, had never been popular with the other chiefs of Tigray by reasons of his being a ranker and of comparatively, low birth, while they had inherited their districts from their forebears. Personal rivalries and the scramble for regional positions, therefore, complicated the relation between Ras Sebhat and Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé. Supporting the existence of such a rivalry Täsfayohannes wrote that Ras Sebhat, at one time said to Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé in Addis Ababa that: [whether it is my lordship or yours will be confirmed in our country (Tigray)].

In such unreliable situation, Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé who might have been exasperated by the frequent accusations made against him by the Tigrean chiefs and who was rather always cautious and on the alert made an all-round preparation for a possible clash against his opponents. To this effect he increased his relations with the Italian authorities in Eritrea to a closer degree of intimacy and friendship and requested them for modern rifles and ammunitions. His request was accepted. Some informants told me most emphatically, and the Italians themselves accepted it in their report that it was an undoubted fact that they had supplied Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé with about three thousand rifles and about three hundred thousand ammunitions a little before January 1914. These new rifles which fired nine bullets were commonly known, in Tigray, as Wäčäfo or Gäbrä-Sellassé Āynät [Like that of Gäbrä-Sellassé].

The Italians attempted to justify their supply of arms to Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé. According to the sources Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé wanted to re-inforce himself with arms, three
years before the conflict with Ras Sebḥat that he wanted to buy arms. Count Colli told him that he could get the rifles from the Italian government through Eritrea at a price of four dollars each. The sources further indicate that Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassė either because he had not paid for them or for some other reasons did not draw the rifles from Asmara until 1914 just before the battle with Ras Sebḥat. Other sources explain that the number of the rifles was about two thousand and that they were a clear gift. The point is that, on Count Colli’s own showing, the Italian government supplied Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassė with a large number of arms. The transaction was unknown to any body and the Eritrean governors were not arm sellers and the inference is that they gave the arms to Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassė, for some political reasons. There was also an Italian political agent in Adwa on intimate terms with Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassė. The Italian agent must, therefore, have passed the rifles, supplied by the Italian government, to Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassė, not long before the fight with Ras Sebḥat.

Worried about Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassė’s close contact with the Italians and his acquisition of the new rifles and partly because of either conflict of interest or jealousy of one kind or another Ras Sebḥat and Dājjāč Seyum renewed their accusation of Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassė of intriguing with the Italians against the security of the central government, after the death of Emperor Menelik II.

Count Colli, who was Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassė’s friend, emphatically denied any recent gift or sales of arms to Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassė. Count Colli who was aware of the rumours of Italian supplies of arms to Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassė, however, told Major Dodds that...ill disposed persons were bringing up a matter of three years ago when Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassė was supplied with some arms by the Italians. Based on the grant of these rifles, there were also rumours that
Dajjac Gabra-Sellasse was instigated to revolt by the Italians with whom he was always in the best of terms. But it was a rumour, of course, in which there can be no foundation. The fact that Lej Iyasu had asked the advice and assistance of Count Colli, to solve the conflict in Tigray, shows that the government did not attach any importance to the rumour that the Italians were instigating Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassē to rebel. It is also interesting to remember at this time that Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassē fought against his country at Adwa in 1896 on the side of the Italians. In relation to this, Corrado Zoli writes that

...Degiac Ghebresselase, che era stato educato nella colonia Eritrea, era stato nostro soldato, aveva lealmente combattuto per la nostra causa e, in seguito alla pace del 1896, era ritornato apertamente in servizio del suo paese,...

[Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassē who was educated in the [Italian] colony of Eritrea was our soldier, he fought for our cause with loyalty, and then due to the peace of 1896 he returned to serve his country...]

Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassē was, in consequence, imprisoned for some time but afterwards reinstated. The Italians were also considering Ras Sebḥat as their great enemy, at the time under discussion. Under this circumstances it would not be, therefore, surprising that rumours were current that Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassē was being assisted by the Italians and had crossed to their territory for protection later on.

After the death of Emperor Menelik II and the coming to power of Lej Iyasu, rumours reached the ears of Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassē that Ras Mikael would be appointed an overlord of Wāllo and Tigray. As a result Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassē told Ras Sebḥat and Dājjac Seyum of the rumours and expressed his annoyance of Lej Iyasu's plan to place Tigray under the overlordship of Wāllo. Thus Dājjac Gābrā-Sellassē called on Ras Sebḥat and Dājjac Seyum to help him
oppose the appointment of Ras Mikael as an overlord of Wällo and Tigray. This, therefore, seems to have touched the feelings of Ras Sebḥat, Dājjač Seyum and Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé that they made a pact against any immediate "Amhara" overlord, and to restore Emperor Yohannes's crown. They also made an oath not to betray each other by stating #ÖKS ŸU×õ ¾Épq ŸU Sʾi ¼pØ…$ [Let he who betray be reduced to the size of teff and to the thickness of a needle], near Adwa at a place called Ādi Mahläka (¯Ç= TQK‡). Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé had also assured Ras Sebḥat and Dājjač Seyum that he would bring rifles from the Italians for their plan. The sources disclosed that these three Tigrean chiefs had further planned to make Dājjač Seyum the overlord of Tigray and Ras Sebḥat and Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé to be under him. Tsehay Haile had quoted what one of his informants had told him about what Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé had secretly corresponded with Ras Sebḥat and Dājjač Seyum as follows:

Negus Menelik is dead. I [Gäbrä-Sellassé] am the son of princes [descended from] and you are also the son (descendant) of princes; but Dājjač Seyum is the son (descendant) of an Emperor. Let us crown Dājjač Seyum and hit the Shewans

Some of my informants do not want to disclose the contents of the pact reached among the three chiefs. They simply prefer to inform me that three of them had a secret [UiØ` 'Ã`cU][They had a secret]. They were only few of my informants who disclosed that the pact was not to accept an “Amhara” overlord over Tigray.

According to the general belief of my informants, Ras Sebḥat who was looking for any opportunity that would offer him a chance to damage Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé’s reputation made use of this intrigue to work hard in accusing Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé of having the intention of
openly defying Lej Iyasu's rule in general and the appointment of Ras Mikael as an overlord of Wällo and Tigray in particular.

The call of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé to Ras Sebḥat and Däjjač Seyum to oppose Ras Mikael's appointment as an overlord of Tigray and Wällo also reached the ears of Ras Mikael. According to my informants Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, later on, wrote a letter to Ras Sebḥat in relation to their agreements. The letter was, however, sent forth to the central government by Ras Sebḥat as evidence of Ras Sebḥat's earlier accusations of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé's intrigues against the central government. The letter was again sent back to Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé by one of his friends in the central government, to show him that his plans were disclosed. Hence, Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé understood that Ras Sebḥat was working hard to accuse him of intriguing against the government.

Täsfayohannes Berhanä, who was one of the trusted followers of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé wrote the cause for the conflict between Ras Sebḥat and Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, in his manuscript, as follows:

Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé had exchanged words of discord with Ras Sebḥat in Addis Ababa... Ras Sebḥat has also boasted against Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé by saying that my lordship and your's would be seen (identified) in our country [Tigray]. He did not end it by saying that only, but
told [Ras Mikeal] that if he [Gäbrä-Sellassé] loves you [Ras Mikeal] he should have married your daughter. [Ras Sebhat] further wrote to Ras Mikael against Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé by reporting what Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé had done and even that he had not done. He also reported to Ras Mikael that Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé had met the Italian governor [of Eritrea] at Hazämo. My master [Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé], however, by arguing that Ras Sebhat is his father [elder], was in need of solving the problem through the mediation of elders without bloodshed. [Ras Sebhat] However, succeeded to have Ras Mikael and Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé be quarrelled by lying against Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé. Ras Sebhat told Ras Mikael that Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé had said to them [Ras Sebhat and Ras Seyum] that because Emperor Menelik is dead a Shewan should not rule us again. He further stated that, he also told Ras Seyum that if you want guns I will give you in the amount of what you need, I have guns which Emperor Menelik allowed me to buy in the exchange of one gun for seven birr, you would mobilize this way [in southern Tigray] and I shall mobilize and fight against Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis [in the western Tigray direction], in the war we all will not perish (die) and, at the same time, we all will not be alive, the throne (power) will, therefore, be to the lucky who survived the fighting. When [Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé] shared the above opinion with Ras Seyum, Ras Seyum vacillated in his stand and betrayed us after he had a discussion with Ras Sebhat ... Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé was forced to fight ... and we had finally fought [against Ras Sebhat].

After the rumours of the secret agreement among the three Tigrean chiefs got to the ears of Ras Mikael, he sent a message to Däjjač Seyum informing him that both of them are the sons of Emperor Yohannes IV and requesting him to recognize his appointment as an overlord of Wällo and Tigray and promised him to give his daughter in marriage.\(^{73}\) Ras Mikael, therefore, seemed to have succeeded in his efforts, so that, on 27 January 1914, Ras Sebhat and Däjjač Seyum denounced Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé as a rebel in Mäqällä and in Adwa.\(^{74}\) In this manner Ras Sebhat and Däjjač Seyum ingratiated themselves with the central government. Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, however, made an announcement, on 28 January 1914, at Hawzén, of his unchanged loyalty to Lej Iyasu and Ras Mikael\(^ {75}\) and wrote a letter to Lej Iyasu requesting permission to come to Addis Ababa to give an account of himself against the accusations made against him.\(^ {76}\) Consequently Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé was ordered to come to Addis Ababa to give
an account of himself, on 5 February 1914. When Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé wrote a letter to Lej Iyasu asking such permission Ras Mikael had also sent a message to Ras Sebḥat informing him that Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé's aim to come to Addis Ababa was to attack him that he ordered Ras Sebḥat to prevent the coming to Addis Ababa of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, by any means. When Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé heard of the correspondence between Ras Sebḥat and Ras Mikael he was furious with and demurred the order to come to Addis Ababa to give an account of himself and gave as his reason that he feared Ras Sebḥat would usurp his territory in his absence.

Täklä-Şadiq Mäkurya wrote why Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé demurred the orders from the central government to come to Addis Ababa and gave an account to the accusations from Ras Sebḥat against Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé as follows:

[During the reign of Lej Iyasu, when Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé was administering Adwa and Šerä there were rumours, in Addis Ababa, of his secret correspondence with the Italians. As a result, in order to investigate the truth an order was sent to Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé to come to Addis Ababa to give an account of himself. After he had started his journey towards Addis Ababa, because he had some grudges with Ras Sebḥat and Däjjač Asgädom (Ras Sebḥat's son), he feared that they would occupy Adwa after he came to Addis Ababa. After he had hesitated in his decisions, for a while, he changed his mind and demurred to come to Addis Ababa and requested the Eritrean governor to send him arms. The civil war among the Ethiopian chiefs was favourable to the Italians that they immediately sent him about 3000 guns. . . They also gave him promise for additional guns.]
Count Colli told Major Dodds that he was in telegraphic communication with the disaffected chiefs of Tigray and he had advised them all, individually, to bring their grievances for settlement to Addis Ababa and on no occasion to attempt to settle them by open hostilities. According to the sources, Counti Colli had also been asked by Lej Iyasu to use his influence to persuade Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassié to come to Addis Ababa to give an account of himself, which he did with the result Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé promised to come in if the other chiefs were also ordered to do the same. Consequently the order was issued and Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé started his journey, after hesitating for a while, with his large army. Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé's hesitation to come to Addis Ababa was due to the fear that during his absence his opponents may act to modify the situation in Tigray.

Afew days after quitting Adwa news reached Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé that Däjjac Seyum intended to oppose his journey to Addis Ababa. Däjjac Seyum had really marched towards Hawzén. It was also reported that Ras Sebhat, Däjjac Abära Hagos, Fitawrari Germay Mängäsä, Šum Tämbën Maru, attacked Hawzén and destroyed any thing they got in the house of Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé and threatened to invade Adwa. On the news of this invasion Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé was forced to return and protect his territory from his enemies. He again demurred to come to Addis Ababa and sent a telegraphic message to Addis Ababa asking what steps he should take with Däjjac Seyum and Ras Sebhat. Failed to comply with the order to come to Addis Ababa, thereby, got himself into disfavour with the central government. Ras Mikael who was then at Wärrä-Ilu, on his way to Addis Ababa, was ordered to quit Wärrä-Ilu and to return to Dässé to watch proceedings and to await further orders from the central
government. Ras Mikael, therefore, appeared to have fulfilled the instructions and remained in Dässé awaiting further orders.

When the central government attempted telephone to Däjjāc Gābrā-Sellassē in reply to his earlier telephone message the line was found cut, and although the interruption was only a temporary one, Ras Sebḥat took the opportunity to throw further suspicion on Däjjāc Gābrā-Sellassē by denouncing him that he has purposely cut the line. Däjjāc Gābrā-Sellassē was then openly considered a rebel and was opposed by Ras Sebḥat with whom Däjjāc Seyum had thrown in his lot. Ras Sebḥat's activity was a means of expressing his personal grievances and advancing his own interests. He was primarily interested not in the case of the central government but in finding a pretext to further accuse Däjjāc Gābrā-Sellassē and to gain favour for himself from the central government. To this effect Ras Sebḥat worked assiduously to undermine Däjjāc Gābrā-Sellasse. On 8 February 1914 Ras Sebḥat was said to have invaded Däjjāc Gābrā-Sellassē's village in Dābrā-Damo which was under the governorship of one of his followers named Fitāwrari Bereš.

Although the central government was imploring Däjjāc Gābrā-Sellassē through the service of the Italians to come to Addis Ababa and give his accounts as a test of loyalty, Däjjāc Gābrā-Sellassē continuously demurred the orders. Owing to Däjjāc Gābrā-Sellassē's repeated refusal to come to Addis Ababa, and worried too much about the worsening conditions in Tigray, orders were consequently sent to Däjjāc Seyum, Ras Sebḥat and Ras Wälđä-Gyorgis, the governor of Gondar, to force Däjjāc Gābrā-Sellassē to come to Addis Ababa, if he would not do so voluntarily, from the central government. As a result, on 14 February 1914, Ras Wälđä-Gyorgis had received orders to proceed at once with his troops to restore order in Tigray by
forces of arms. On 22 February 1914, in comply with the order, Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis in turn ordered all his available riflemen to assemble at his residence at Dänqäz, close to Gondär. Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis and his army, which had been compared to "a swarm of locusts" in number, was ready to march to fight against Däjjač Gääbrä-Sellassé, on the grounds that the latter did not obey Lej Iyasu.

Eventhough Däjjač Gääbrä-Sellassé had married the daughter of Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis (Amaräč), Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis was hostile to Däjjač Gääbrä-Sellassé and the Italians while he was friendly to Ras Sebat. To this effect the Italian agent in Adwa has reported, to the Italian Legation in Addis Ababa, that Däjjač Gääbrä-Sellassé has declared to him his hatred against Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis and towards his march to Tigray as follows:

... Non posso accetare Ras Uoldeghiorghis né come padrone né come giudice né come conciliatore perché é notoriamente accerimo nemico ... Se Ras Uoldeghiorghis riuscira a venire in Tigrai Potra occupare il paese ma non riuscira mai a prendere me ed il Tigrai sara tutto sottosopra... Ora mi sono assolutamente convinto che tutto cio che é accaduto é stato voluto in Addis Ababa per togliermi di messo mettere in Tigray Ras Uoldeghiorghis nemico mio e degli Italiani.

I cannot accept Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis as a chief nor as a judge not even as a mediator because he is notoriously a fierce enemy... If Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis will be able to come in to Tigray he could occupy the region but he will never able to take me, and Tigray will totally be up side-down... Now I am totally convinced that all what happend was ordered from Addis Ababa to get me out and put, instead, in Tigray Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis, my enemy and the enemy of the Italians.

Through the good office of Count Colli, Däjjač Gääbrä-Sellassé had again actually started his march for Addis Ababa, on the morning of 21 February 1914, hoping the other chiefs (Ras Sebat and Däjjač Seyum) would follow him immediately. It was then hoped that a
peaceful settlement was in view\textsuperscript{110} and the order which was given to Ras Wälédä-Gyorgis was cancelled immediately.\textsuperscript{111}

\textbf{2.2 The Conduct of the Battle of Ākhora and its Results}

While Ras Wälédä-Gyorgis has been ordered to remain inactive and to return to his headquarters as soon as Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé was on his way to Addis Ababa, on the evening of 21 February 1914, Dājjač Seyum had marched against Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé.\textsuperscript{112} This might be accounted for the fact that the government had issued prior orders to both Ras Sebhāt and Dājjač Seyum to attack Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé if he did not start his march to Addis Ababa. Dājjač Seyum in compliance with this order might have marched towards Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé in ignorance of the latter's departure.\textsuperscript{113} Dājjač Seyum, however, desisted from taking action on hearing that Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé had resumed his journey.\textsuperscript{114}

Meanwhile news again reached Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé that Ras Sebhāt was marching on Adwa\textsuperscript{115} and had invaded his territory.\textsuperscript{116} Ras Sebhāt who was considered as the author of every intrigue against Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, his persistent enemy,\textsuperscript{117} had obviously acted aggressively against the orders of the central government by invading Gäbrä-Sellassé's territory, of Hawzén\textsuperscript{118} and in attempting to intercept Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé's march to Addis Ababa.\textsuperscript{119} According to Täsfayohannes, who had been an eye-witness to all the activities and the relations of the Tigrean chiefs,\textsuperscript{120} Ras Sebhāt's forces had raided Hawzén, Dājjač Gäbrä Sellassé's territory, and spoiled the feast and Täj prepared for his reception.\textsuperscript{121} Ras Sebhāt also sent a letter of challenge to Dājjač Gäbrä-Sellassé stating: ĖŌ" Ǯ$LÅH{}$S\textsuperscript{[It} If you are a hero come and fight].\textsuperscript{122} In reply to
the letter of challenge from Ras Sebhat Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé also sent a letter which, according to Täsfayohannes, states:

*I do not know boasting after having drunk a glass of Täj and Aräqi [alcohol]. Before it becomes shame for you, for retreating, after having drunk other’s Täj and after having entered another’s town, let us met at a plain, do not retreat, I am coming.*

Despite the flagrant provocations and threats, Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé had no desire to go in to open hostility and confrontation with the Tigrean chiefs. He tried to resolve the problem carefully. Ras Sebhat, who wrongly calculated the forces of Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé was not, however, really willing to accept the peaceful approach. Owing to the repeated summons of the central government and his repeated demurre to go to Addis Ababa and perhaps knowing well what would awaited him if he went to Addis Ababa and subsequently having understood that Ras Sebhat would not accept any peace proposal, Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé counter marched against Ras Sebhat, meeting Ras Sebhat half way between Adwa and Adigrat at Ākhora (in Haramat) on 25 February 1914. At the Battle of Ākhora Ras Sebhat fought with about 1,500 armed men while Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé had a force of about 10,000 well equipped men. Their engagement was for a short period of time but it was very severe. It lasted for about an hour and a half. At the battle Däjjac Gàbrä-Sellassé gained decisive victory killing Ras Sebhat, in action, with his two sons (Däjjac Asgädom and Däjjac Araya) and his troops suffered heavy casualties. About a thousand of Ras Sebhat’s men against five hundred of Däjjac Gàbrä-Sellassé’s men were either killed or wounded. Däjjac Gabrä-Sellassé had a
cannon which he himself was firing against Ras Sebhat's forces and the cannon helped him to gain an upper hand in the fighting.\textsuperscript{134}

Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, however, grieved sincerely over the demise of his uncle (Ras Sebhat).\textsuperscript{135} Däjjač Libän (Ras Sebhat's grand-son) was captured at Äkhora\textsuperscript{136} that Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé grieved by the casualties of the battle was said to have asked Däjjač Libän if the result was "good" stating: $\text{#I} \text{Ku} \text{f} \text{PÄi}$ [Hey the Libäns, is this good?] and Däjjač Liban is said to have answered to Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé’s question by stating: $\text{#} \text{Ku} \text{Q} \text{E}$ $\text{ÄK}$ $\text{ÄN}$.\textsuperscript{137} [I, Libän, though I did not make the heap be fallen, I moved down a lot].

After the death of Ras Sebhat his remaining followers dispersed abandoning the battle field.\textsuperscript{138} After the fighting was over and after the condition was normalized Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé personally, it is reported, walked into the battle field and identified the corpse of the three chiefs (Ras Sebhat, Däjjač Asgädom and Däjjač Araya) and ordered that they be buried at the monastery of Gundagundo.\textsuperscript{139} Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé released the captives to bury their master. After he was released, Däjjač Libän joined Däjjač Seyum with some of Ras Sebhat's followers.\textsuperscript{140}

After the fighting in Äkhora, Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé did not proceed to Ägämä himself. Only few of his chiefs pillaged Adigrat.\textsuperscript{141} Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, then, went to Hahaylā and occupied a position near Inda Abba-Gärīma\textsuperscript{142} for another possible confrontation, probably with Däjjač Seyum.

Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, it appeared, reported the fighting himself and asked the central government for a doctor to attend to the numerous wounded. Lej Iyasu and other officials of the central government, however, occured Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé of the incident and it is said that
Lej Iyasu was furious at the whole affairs and emphatically refused the request. On hearing of the incident orders were, however, sent to Ras Mikael, Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis and Däjjač Seyum, immediately, to mobilize their army and be in readiness for further orders.

The battle of Ākhora, thus, according to the words of Tsegay Berhe

... brought an end to one of the strongest and colourful Agame chiefs from the house of Subagadis. It also marked the end of 'Agame prominence in both the regional and national politics.

After the Battle of Ākhora there was great joy in the camp of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé. As an expression of the success of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé in defeating Ras Sebhät, it is said that, a reciter named Wäyzäro Täklä (a lady from Hahaylä) has recited the following in Tigriňa:

\[ \text{YSÅ Ňụ̃‘ÄU œw ¯§^˜ Snî œM¯M‘NAU cNE+*U œ¨<^˜ v ŗuÉ Ñwū} \]

How did you treat them at Ākhora?
You identified and picked out the main three,
Abba Kebäd Gäbru [Gäbrä-Sellassé] is susceptible to provocation.

2.3 The Battle of Gidära and its Results

After the death of Ras Sebhät and his two sons became known, there was a movement of troops from Āgamä and Haramat to encircle Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé. Däjjač Seyum mobilized his forces from Indärta, Raya-Azäbo, Keltä-Awla'lo and Āgamä, also marched on Adwa from Mäqällä and stationed near Inda Abba-Sahma. Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé who left the scene of his victory over Ras Sebhät took up a position east of Adwa near Inda Abba-Gärima in readiness for Däjjač Seyum. This action on the part of Däjjač Seyum was not countenanced by the
central government which sent orders to Däjjač Seyum not to attack Däjjač Gabrä-Sellassé but to await orders and Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis, who had been ordered to advance to Tigray. Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis, of whose intention the government was suspicious, did not arrive due to the fact that the government had countermanded the order. This was apparent from the fact that Abunä Pétros has been ordered by Lej Iyasu to proceed at once for an attempt to make peace between the chiefs. Abunä Pétros, however, has returned to Adwa without seeing either of them.

While the memory of the Battle of Ākhora was still fresh and most of the wounded men were still suffering from their wounds, a fighting took place between Däjjač Gabrä-Sellassé and Däjjač Seyum at a place called Gidāra (also called Āddi-Bahri), on 3 March 1914, in which the former was defeated. At Gidāra Däjjač Gabrä-Sellassé fought with only about a thousand tired and exhausted followers against about 15,000 of Däjjač Seyum's. Däjjač Seyum encouraged by the news of the mobilization of Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis fought the battle strongly. Däjjač Gabra-Sellassé, however, abandoned by his tired and exhausted followers was easily defeated. Many people died at the fighting. The casualties from both sides were very great, which Täsfayohannes portrayed it as follows: [The corpse of the dead piled up, one on the other, and seemed a washed cloth stretched on the edge of a river (to be dried)]. Däjjač Bärhé Wädi Mešäla, follower of Däjjač Seyum died. Fitäwrari Mäsfen, follower of Däjjač Gabrä-Sellassé was wounded. Däjjač Gabrä-Sellassé himself was also wounded, although it was slight. A splinter of a stone had injured his eye and he had later asked for a medical aid from the Italians.

Däjjač Gabrä-Sellassé, once he had lost the upper hand in the battle, made good his escape and with a handful of soldiers has taken refuge in a fortress near Adwa and later went
to Ragayellé.\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Dājjač Gābrā-Sellassē}'s defeat at Gidāra was attributed to the desertion of many of his followers during the fighting.\textsuperscript{166} At Gidāra \textit{Dājjač Gābrā-Sellassē} encountered \textit{Dājjač Seyum} with tired and exhausted soldiers.\textsuperscript{167} Many of his followers among whom the most notable ones such as \textit{Dājjač Tāklā-Haymanot} of Damo-Gālīla, \textit{Dājjač Yayeňšät} and \textit{Dājjač Imbayā} of Na'adīr joined the camp of \textit{Dājjač Seyum}.\textsuperscript{168} Some of \textit{Dājjač Gābrā-Sellassē}'s men who were captives of the fighting declared that they were misled by their master who told them that \textit{Ras Sébḥat} was in rebellion against the government and they were made to believe that their master was in the right.\textsuperscript{169}

As a result of \textit{Dājjač Seyum}'s victory over \textit{Dājjač Gābrā-Sellassē} there seems to be a lot of \textit{fukāra} and meritment in the camp of \textit{Dājjač Seyum}. Exchange of poems praising \textit{Dājjač Seyum} also took place. In response to one of the poems recited in the camp of \textit{Dājjač Seyum}, apparently insulting \textit{Dājjač Gābrā-Sellassē}, \textit{Wāyzāро Tāklā} had said the following in Tigriňa in a rather exaggerated tone, most of the time praising \textit{Dājjač Gābrā-Sellassē}:

\begin{verbatim}
+ iv jUm ÖÅĂ `uMj " iPɔĂ ÅÔOXĂ'
X eK æc'UuĂ cw<f æÅSKdĂ'
|`]`[j"u?" oP + æc'UuĂ cw<f æÅSKdĂ'
|Mj æc"<L'KA ŐS Ŋ"Mi. æc'UuĂ cw<f æÅSKdĂ'
wSj[ë<eSe<e=K< wSÈö" P"dĂ'
ae vµE Ňw(,"È æK SdĂ'
Př=" n'c< dMdă'
ae vµE Ňw(,"ÈČ=I ¾K< U SdĂ::
YSv µvE Ňw(,"uKE ÅwHM Åwj"'
YSĂ Ňu '"AU æw "Ş"'
ae vµE Ňu="UuĂ 'ādų- n<"'
YSĂ Ňu '"AU æw ŇĂ"'
f< f "< M'AU w'Uš w'ţO:"'
["A "<" æÅfTĂ "a"'
\end{verbatim}
Did you call Abba Kebäd, my lord a scribe?

The women of Bora and Seläwa sent their men but none was spared,
The women of Indärta, Tämbén and Selarti sent their men but none was spared,
The women of Keltä-Awla’lo, Ágamä and Gär’alta sent their men but none was spared,

He [Gäbrä-Sellassé] first used machine-guns and then plough with canons,
Can there be a man the like of Abba Kebäd Gäbru [Gäbrä-Sellassé].
He [Gäbrä-Sellassé] mows and his servants (soldiers) heap,
Thus there can never be the equal to Abba Kebäd Gäbru [Gäbrä-Sellassé].

Can the like of Abba Kebäd Gäbru [Gäbrä-Sellassé] be called a däbtära,
How did you tackle (treat) them at Ákhora,

Abba Kebäd cannot be dealt with provocations,
How did you tackle (treat) them at Gidära,
You humiliated them all with Wäçäfo and with Wejjegra.

The women of Indärta don’t boast,
The women of Tämbén don’t boast,
The women of Bora and Seläwa don’t boast,

Can the like of Abba Kebäd be called a däbtära,

When Abba Kebäd senses fury,
Let you educate your children and sent them to monastery.

Likewise from the camp of Däjjač Seyum a certain reciter recited the following in
Amharic, most probably in reply to the above long poem, fulminating against Däjjač Gäbrä-
Sellassé who happened to escape wounded:
How can be denied about his defeat (defeat of Gābrä-Sellassé),
He fled away sensing harassment,
Pouring out his blood in floods,
Made his way to Asmara, a muslim land.

This was directed to Dājjac Gābrä-Sellassé to make it clear that he was defeated and finally retreated.

Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis has again been ordered with about 50,000 men to proceed to Tigray with instructions to capture Dājjac Gābrä-Sellassé and restore order. He entered Adwa ten days after the Battle of Gidāra. Some of the most important chiefs in Addis Ababa including Ras Dämesé, Dājjac Bälča, and Dājjac Kassa were also under orders to hold themselves in readiness to go to Tigray. Dājjac Gābrä-Sellassé then retreated across the Märäb River when he heard the news of the coming of Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis to Tigray. The order to march to Tigray was given to Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis before the news of Dājjac Gābrä-Sellassé's defeat was confirmed and has not been cancelled. With the help of Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis Dājjac Seyum managed to establish a relative peace and order in Tigray. Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis sent his army as far as Märäb River in search of Dājjac Gābrä-Sellassé. Dājjac Gābrä-Sellassé was, then, forced to move to Ragayellé, in the Eritrean-Ethiopia border, and stayed for most of his refuge life until about the end of 1918. Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis asked the Italians to hand the fugitive over to him. The Italians, nevertheless, seemed to be unwilling to hand over their long time friend and denied emphatically Dājjac Gābrä-Sellassé's entrance to Eritrea and their protection to him.

According to different sources, the death of Ras Sebḥat and the escape of Dājjac Gābrä-Sellassé were considered as fortuitous events and a solution to the problem in Tigray. Dājjac
Gäbrä-Sellassé, after his escape, was not looked upon as a further source of trouble. This was because Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé did not have the chance to raise troops to make another problem and his capture, although presenting difficulties owing to the impregnable position of the fortress in which he had taken refuge, could only be a matter of time.  

*Däjjač* Seyum in defeating *Däjjač* Gäbrä-Sellassé had solved a difficulty for the central government and for him, and was fostering hopes of acquiring the areas of both Ras Sebhät and *Däjjač* Gäbrä-Sellassé.  

*Däjjač* Seyum understood that he had nothing to gain but everything to lose by opposing the authority of the central government. He then started working towards strengthening relation with the central government, in a way that would support the extension of his territory. This hope had, therefore, influenced *Däjjač* Seyum's future attitude towards the central government.

2.4 The Central Government's Handling of the Conflict in Tigray and the Subsequent Attempts for the Extradition of *Däjjač* Gäbrä-Sellassé.

The manner in which the government has dealt with the problem in Tigray could be open to severe criticism. The central government, in handling the situation, has shown extra-ordinary lack of decision and judgment in taking its measures for the restoration of order and justice by condemning *Däjjač* Gäbrä-Sellassé as a rebel on the words of Ras Sebhät alone. In condemning *Däjjač* Gäbrä-Sellassé with out sufficient evidence and favouring the representations of Ras Sebhät, the government made a great error to which the subsequent strife and bloodshed could be attributed. Had the government had given definite and pre-emptive orders to the chiefs to come to Addis Ababa, with out showing prejudice to one or the other in
giving the orders, or had it had the courage to adopt the measures of *laissez-faire* and left the matter to the priests, the Tigrean incident would in all probability have been avoided.\(^{189}\)

The indecision of the central government had also been very marked in its dealings with *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis to whom the government has given orders to proceed to Tigray on three separate occasions and immediately afterwards countermanded its orders.\(^{190}\) The central government has shown a strange weakness in issuing coherent or decisive orders in connection to *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis.\(^{191}\) On three occasions it ordered the *Ras* to go to Tigray and after each order it cancelled the instructions.\(^{192}\)

The reason, on the part of the government, in holding large reserves in readiness at Addis Ababa for trouble in Tigray and its indecision to the role of *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis could only be supposed that the government had mistrusted the intention of *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis since the beginning of the conflict in Tigray. It was also apparent that while recognizing *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis as a proper person to carry out any measures for the restoration of order adopted by the central government, in his position as an overload of the northern provinces, it feared letting him enter the disaffected area. The vacillating orders to him showed both the recognition of his authority and the central government’s mistrust of his intentions.\(^{193}\) Why the central government feared *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis can, however, only be surmised. In the first place the central government might have feared that *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis Aboyä, who was the son of Wäyzäro Ayahlušem (daughter of King Sahlä Sellassé) and cousin of Emperor Menelik II,\(^{194}\) could, if he chose, be the most powerful claimant to *Lej* Iyasu's throne,\(^{195}\) that he might side with Däjjac Gääbrä-Sellassé, who was married to his daughter, Wäyzäro Amaräc,\(^{196}\) and with him defy the central government; or the central government might have realized the danger of the Tigrean
chiefs resenting outside interference by uniting themselves to oppose *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis.\textsuperscript{197} That is, if *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis was sent on a punitive expedition against any of the Tigrean chiefs it might have the result of raising the Tigrean chiefs together against the central government. It was suspected that although they might have differences among themselves the Tigrean chiefs would sink their differences in their "common" cause against the central government.\textsuperscript{198} Thus, general revolt in Tigray might also have had far-reaching results in the other parts of the country against the newly established government of *Lej* Iyasu.\textsuperscript{199}

Since the death of *Ras* Sebhät and the escape of *Däjjač* Gäbrä-Sellassé the objections to the entry of *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis in Tigray, however, had to a large extent be removed. It was unlikely that the Tigrean chiefs were strong enough, with the loss of *Ras* Sebhät and *Däjjač* Gäbrä-Sellassé to contemplate opposing *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis.\textsuperscript{200} But whatever their reasons were, it cannot, unfortunately be doubted that the lack of coherent or decisive orders and decisions brought about the unnecessary loss of life and bloodshed.

Another and very possible explanation of the government's mistrust of *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis was due to the fear that *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis and *Ras* Mikael, between whom bad feelings had long been existed, might take this opportunity, where their armies were mobilized, to settle their differences by force of arms.\textsuperscript{201}

After the Battle of Ākhora and with the knowledge of all the possible problems, the central government reluctantly allowed *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis to enter Aksum,\textsuperscript{202} on 13 March 1914.\textsuperscript{203} The object of *Ras* Wäldä-Gyorgis's movement was to restore Tigray to a normal condition and to install new chiefs in the place of *Ras* Sebhät and of *Däjjač* Gäbrä-Sellassé.\textsuperscript{204}
Lej Iyasu and Nägradas Haylä-Gyorgis had brought up, for the first time, for discussion the question of the extradition of Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé and his family with Count Colli, on 28 March 1914. Count Colli absolutely refused to discuss the extradition of Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé’s wife and children on the ground that they had committed no offence. With regard to Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé he attempted to convince Lej Iyasu that the fugitive was not in Eritrea and claimed that they did not know his whereabouts. The Ethiopian government, however, firmly believed that Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé has gone over to the Italian territory of Eritrea and asked that he should be handed to the Ethiopian government in accordance with the terms of a treaty that existed between Italian-Eritrea and Ethiopia. The treaty refered to was made in February 1904 and by a curious coincidence was signed on the part of Ethiopia by Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé himself. Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé who went to Asmara on behalf of the government of Ethiopia, in January 1904, had discussed a possible joint solution to the problem of bandits who were crossing the boundaries of Ethiopia and the Italian colony of Eritrea by committing crimes. The terms of the treaty state that the Italians shall receive a written guarantee of just treatment and a fair trial for the fugitive they handed over. The Italians expressed that they had been concerned with the concentration of Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis’s forces at the border. The presence of a large number of Ethiopian troops near the Eritrean border had caused much anxiety in the Italian colony of Eritrea. The Italian authorities, it appears, feared that the mobilization of troops and the existence of Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis in the Ethio-Eritrean border suggested the intention of the Ethiopian government to invade Italian territory. In view of this fear one cannot but wonder to what extent the Eritrean authorities have been associated with Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé in the problem of the Tigrean chiefs and it can only be suspected that they have
meddled rather too far in the Ethiopian politics, and when trouble broke out feared the results of their exhibition of sympathy and possibly of support to their old friend, Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé against their "enemy", Ras Sebḥat. According to Italian sources Ras Sebḥat was identified by the Italians as: ...nostro grande nemico Ras Sebhat... [... our big enemy Ras Sebhat ...].

In view of the Italian fear of Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis's army, the Ethiopian government, in the course of the discussion, proposed that it would immediately order Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis to quit Tigray and return to Gondar and that it would strictly adhere to the treaty of 1904 and give a guarantee that Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé would be fairly dealt with and be granted a just trial. As a result Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis was recalled from Tigray in around Easter of 1914.

Sources disclose that Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé was known to be near the Eritrean border. If he crossed it he would have to be surrendered under the existing agreement. This obviously, had been badly seen by the Italian authorities that Count Colli sent a private message to Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé warning him on no account to cross the frontier. According to an Italian source Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé did not want to submit himself to the central government but to stay with the Italians in Eritrea. The same Italian source discloses that Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé had said: Non ho nessuna intenzione di presentarmi al governo Scioano. O morro o staro con voi [I have no intention to present myself to the Shewan government. I will be with you or will die]. The attempts for the extradition of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé was, therefore, unsuccessful. Thus, on 5 May 1914, Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis left Adwa.

Meanwhile Ras Mikael was crowned Negus of Wällo, Tigray and Bägémeder, on 31 May 1914, by Abunä Petros. Since no chief had yet been appointed to the area of Ras Sebḥat and Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé Negus Mikael gave the title of Ras to Däjjač Seyum and made him
governor of Tigray. Thus, winning supremacy over the lords of Tigray, Ras Seyum then gave Adwa to his son Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq, También to his brother, Däjjač Germay Mängäša and Āgamä to Däjjač Kassa Sebḥat. Hence, it became relatively possible for Ras Seyum to govern Tigray in peace until the rebellion of his son, Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq in 1918. Däjjač Kassa Sebḥat ruled Āgamä between 1914 and 1918, and from 1941 to 1948.

From March 1914 till the coronation of Empress Zäwditu Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé lived in and around Ragayellé. His life as a refuge was rather obscure. Little or nothing is known about it. How and when he was getting his food supply is not also clearly understood. Täsfayohannes who was among the people who followed Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé during his escape, wrote that the Italians were supplying them with substantial quantity of flour and were also conducting repeated cattle raiding.

During the campaign of Sägellé, in 1916, Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé was secretly approached by one of the government officials: Käntiba Wässäné Zäämanual. Taking the political tension at that time it could be inferred that the mission of Käntiba Wässäné was to woo Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé not to join hands with the pro-Iyasu intrigue against the central government. In Addis Ababa there was a fear that Ras Seyum Mängäša who was the brother-in-law of Lej Iyasu and who had developed friendly attachment to the family of Ras Mikael and consequently also to Lej Iyasu was being suspected of hiding Lej Iyasu and of joining hands against the central government in the future, supporting Lej Iyasu. Due to this great fear and suspicion it seems to be more likely that the central government had a plan to make Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé governor of Tigray in case Ras Seyum mobilized his troops in support of Lej Iyasu. Presumably, therefore, Käntiba Wässäné’s mission was probably to instruct Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé to take over Adwa on
the back of Ras Seyum if he was to mobilize his forces against the central government in support of Lej Iyasu.\textsuperscript{230}

2.5 The Submission of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, the Restoration of his Territories and the Opposition Against him in Tigray

Eventhough it is not definitly clear whether Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé had asked the central government for pardon or the central government itself called him from his place of refuge, Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, who had been one of the most respected and trusted officials of Emperor Menelik II,\textsuperscript{231} re-entered the services of the central government a short time after the coronation of Empress Zäwditu and after he had spent about three and half years in the bordering territory of Eritrea as a refugee.\textsuperscript{232} Taking the political situations at that time it seems plausible that the central government wanted to have a loyal appointee, in case Ras Seyum proved to be on the support of Lej Iyasu, to which Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé was the best choice that the central government could make.\textsuperscript{233}

Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé's entry from Ragayellé to Addis Ababa took him a long time. The land route could have been much shorter for him than the sea route, but he chose the sea route and travelled from Ragayellé to Asmara and from Asmara via Massawa to Djibouti by sea route and then via Dire-Dawa to Addis Ababa.\textsuperscript{234} The reason why he chose the sea route could be because of his fear of a possible attack by some of his enemies along his way to Addis Ababa. In October 1917 Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé had entered Addis Ababa and was assigned to stay for a while at the house of Ras Tässäma.\textsuperscript{235} Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé had been with his wife, Wäyzäro Amaräč when he submitted.\textsuperscript{236} Ras Seyum, hearing Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé's journey to Addis Ababa, had marched to Addis Ababa and assured his allegiance to the central government.\textsuperscript{237}

47
Then Däjjač Gãbrä-Sellassé had reconciled with Ras Seyum and Däjjač Kassa Seňat at Addis Alam in October 1917.238

Soon after his entry Däjjač Gãbrä-Sellassé was reinstated in his former territory, 239 but resided in Addis Ababa.240 He was soon able to win the favour of the Empress just as he had won the favour of Emperor Menelik II. In 1919 Däjjač Gãbrä-Sellassé was, therefore, entrusted to go to Jerusalem on the question of the Ethiopian church there.241 After he returned, in February 1922, most of his former territories and his honour in Tigray were restored.242

Soon after he was told about the restoration of his former territory, Däjjač Gãbrä-Sellassé sent a telegraphic message on 5 Genbot 1914 E.C. (13 May 1922) to Fitäwrari Tädla Sahlu and Mälakä-Berhanat Gãbrä-Sellassé who were his most trusted officials and his proxy in Tigray, instructing them to make an announcement, on his behalf, of his appointment and to keep peace and order until he sent his own representative.243 The content of the telegraphic message (Awaj) sent by Däjjač Gãbrä-Sellasé, dated 5 Genbot 1914 E.C, could be referred to Appendix III.

According to different sources, even though a reciprocal grudge between Däjjač Gãbrä-Sellassé and Ras Seyum continued to exist, their relations seemed to have improved due to the intervention of Empress Zäwditu.244 It was also reported that Däjjač Gãbrä-Sellassé was assigned to administer Adwa with Ras Seyum's approval.245 An arrangement was also made, later on, for a marriage tie between Ras Seyum's daughter Wälätä-Israel and Däjjač Gãbrä-Sellassé to make the reconciliation between Ras Seyum and Däjjač Gãbrä-Sellassé complete.246

In June 1922 Däjjač Gãbrä-Sellassé sent, to Adwa, his young rather politically immature son, Däjjač Täklä-Haymanot, as his authorized proxy.247 Däjjač Täklä-Haymanot was educated in Milan (Italy) together with his brother Däjjač Yohannes, who died in Milan in June 1924.248
On his way to Tigray Däjjač Täklä-Haymanot married Wäyzäro Denqenäš, the daughter of Ras Haylu Täklä-Haymanot of Gojjam, in June 1922, at Däbrä-Marqos. Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé also sent a document of šumšer (reshuffle of appointments) which he had made in his territory with his son, Däjjač Täklä-Haymanot and warned the chiefs in his domain not to combat with any of the šums who were against Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé in 1914 but now ready to submit to him. On 1 July 1922 Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé also sent a letter to the Italian consul in Addis Ababa informing that he had sent his son to Adwa, as his authorized proxy, and requested the Italian Consul to renew and extend his support, which was given to himself in the past, to his son.

Presumably the restoration of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé's power in Tigray might have produced some kind of jealousy or uneasiness among some of the Tigrean chiefs, mainly Däjjač Germay Mängäša and Šum Āgamä Kassa. The different telegraphic messages which Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé sent to his loyal chiefs, such as Fitawrari Tädla Sahlu and Däjjač Haylu, at different times, indicate the existence of opposition against Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé in Tigray immediately after he was restored to power. Sources from the American Legation in Addis Ababa also indicate that the appointment of Däjjač Täklä-Haymanot as Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé's proxy in Tigray ignited revolt and several of the governors of the nearby districts organized their armies and marched against him. The sources further explain that a battle had been fought for a short duration in which Däjjač Täklä-Haymanot was defeated and escaped unhurt. After the announcement of the restoration of Adwa to Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé there was also a wide spread brigandage in the areas restored to him that people were eagerly awaiting for the arrival of
Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé to Adwa.\textsuperscript{257} This could be supported by the following poem which was widely recited at that time:

\begin{verbatim}
If you do not come [to Adwa] on I Hämlä,
We shall suffer a lot,
Let alone in other areas, banditry reigned in Wär’e.
He who was crippled started to extend his leg (to join banditry)
He who was blind started to see (to join banditry).
\end{verbatim}

The fact that Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, by his telegraphic message, requested his loyal chiefs in Adwa (Fitäwrari Tädla Sahlu and Däjjač Haylu), to report to him through telegram, about those chiefs who recognized his overlordship and about those who sided with Däjjač Germay Mängäša, against him, shows the existence of an opposition against the re-appointment of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé in Tigray.\textsuperscript{259} His telegram to Fitäwrari Tädla Sahlu and Däjjač Haylu reads:

\begin{verbatim}
Inform me through a telegram [the list of] the Tigrean nobles who submitted to you. [And] inform me [the list of] the Tigrean nobles who went to [the side of] Däjjač Germay. 10 Säne 1914 E.C.
\end{verbatim}

Däjjač Germay Mängäša and Šum Āgamä Kassa refused to accept the restoration of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé’s power and the appointment, as his proxy, of Däjjač Täklä-Haymanot in August 1922.\textsuperscript{261} Šum Tämbén Asfaw who was the follower of Däjjač Germay also refused to
recognize Däjjač Täklä-Haymanot as his overlord.\textsuperscript{262} Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé’s telegraphic message to Fitawrari Tädla Sahlu, sent on 19 August 1922, requesting to report to him about the situations in Tigray and about whether or not a confrontation was started among Däjjač Täklä-Haymanot’s forces and Däjjač Germay’s forces showed that Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé was much worried about the situation in Tigray.\textsuperscript{263}

Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé was also highly grieved by the activity of his opponents especially by the activity of Blatta Wäldä-Mikael, who was a telephone operator and who seemed playing an active role in the conspiracy against Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé. In relation to this Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé sent a telegraphic message, on July 1922, to Fitawrari Tädla Sahlu to deprive Blatta Wäldä-Mikael of his territory and to expose him of his conspiracy and secret dealings with the central government against Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé aimed to depose him.\textsuperscript{264} Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé’s telegraphic message in relation to Blatta Wäldä-Mikael reads as follows:

\textit{Until I would send a new order to you, disinherit (revoke) Blatta Wäldä-Mikael of his entire domain. Stay supplying him with food supplies as an ordinary telephone operator. After assembling all the chiefs tell Belatta Wäldä-Mikael, the following, in front of the chiefs on my behalf: you are good for nothing, you are an ordinary telephone operator, you can do no harm to a person like me by spying against. I am the friend of the government and I am in Addis Ababa with the government. You can do no harm against me in the face of the government. You are a spy, knowing that I am not there [in Tigray] you are collaborating with the Tigrian chiefs in defaming me.}
As soon as he arrived at Adwa Däjjač Täklä-Haymanot called some of his father's important officials and friends like Gerazmač Täsfayohannes Berhane, a trusted follower of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, Fitawrari Tädla Sahlu and Fitawrari Alabaš Gäbrä-Sadiq (Gäbrä-Sellassé's former chief judge). All these helped him to re-establish his father’s power in Tigray.  

Many people recognized him as a rightful and duly authorized proxy of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé with the exception of some of his father's arch-enemies like Ras Gugsa Araya and Däjjač Germay Mängaša to whom Fitätwrari Tädla Sahlu, Däjjač Haylu Dära, Mälakä-Berhanat Gäbrä-Sellassé, officials of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, approached to know his attitude towards the appointment of Däjjač Täklä-Haymanot. He had first assured them that he would recognize Däjjač Täklä-Haymanot but changed sides later. Attempts for the reconciliation between Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé and Šum Āgamā Kassa were also made. These attempts finally resulted in making an oath not to treat each other as hostile partners and laid down the ground for future peaceful relations. The attempt for the reconciliation between Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé and Šum Āgamā Kassa and the terms which Šum Āgamā Kassa accepted can be referred to Appendix IV.

The subversive activities of Ras Gugsa Araya against Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé which started as early as 1900 was still inherent in Ras Gugsa's mind. Ras Gugsa was irritated of the decrease in his command. He needed appointment over Šerä and appealed against the appointment of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé to his former territory. Furthermore Ras Gugsa considered the approval by Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé of the appointment, by the central government, of Däjjač Abära Tädla over Azäbo, as an act committed against him. Däjjač Abära Tädla of Azäbo-Inda-Mäkoni was the friend of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé and he was favourable...
to him that he declared Kität (mobilization) in support of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé on the eve of the Battle of Ākhora.274 Hence, since the defeat of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé Ras Mikael had imprisoned Däjjač Abära Tädla and gave Azäbo-Inda-Mäkonī to one of his chiefs named Däjjač Yemär.275 When Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé was pardoned Däjjač Abära Tädla was, however, reinstated over Azäbo.276 The appointment over Azäbo of Däjjač Abära Tädla and the decrease in his own territory might, thus, have irritated Ras Gugsa causing him to oppose Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé and his proxy in Tigray. Nevertheless Däjjač Täklä-Haymanot was able to assume full power as his father's proxy.277

According to the reports of the Italian Colonial Hospital at Asmara, Däjjač Täklä-Haymanot, however, died of tuberculosis, on 30 June 1925,278 while he was under medical treatment in Asmara.279 When Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé was told of his son's death he went to Adwa to attend his son's funeral ceremony.280 He then began to administer his territory himself. Certain Tigrean elders also proposed a marriage arrangement between Ras Seyum's daughter, Wälätä-Israel, and Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé to avoid future hostilities.281 Thus, six months after his arrival at Adwa Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé married Wäyzäro Wälätä-Israel, in 1925.282 The marriage was primarily designed to cancel the age old enmity between Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé and Ras Seyum.283 By this marriage arrangement Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, thus, gained the friendship of Ras Seyum who was his long time enemy.284

The return of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé to Tigray again produced some kind of jealousy or uneasiness among his enemies. Because of either probably of jealousy or conflict of interest some of the Tigrean chiefs like Däjjač Täklu Mäšäša, Däjjač Germay Mängäša and Šum Tämbén Gäbrä-Mädhin285 instigated by his arch-enemy, Ras Gugsa Araya,286 were always trying to
antagonize him with the central government. They were constantly and allegedly accusing him of conspiring against the security of the country. In 1926 the opponents of Dājjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé accused him of buying new weapons from the Italians and planning to rebel against the central government when he was importing water pipes and other necessary materials to install water taps and construct the well of Mayšum at Aksum.

In December 1926 there were applications from Tigray addressed to the Regent Ras Täfäri, Ičägé Gäbrämänfásqdu and to Dājjäč Mulugéta accusing Dājjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé of about twenty-one crimes committed against the central government. The points about which Dājjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé was being accused of, according to the application of the opponents of Dājjäč Gābrä-Sellassé, addressed to Ras Täfäri, and to Ičägé Gäbrämänfásqdu, in December 1926, could be referred to Appendices V and VI respectively.

As a result of the accusations against Dājjäč Gābrä-Sellassé, at different times, Dājjäč Gābrä-Sellassé was again required to come to Addis Ababa, in July 1927. He was then sentenced for confinement in Méča (Gojjam) which had been given to him as a fief, after his return from Jerusalem in 1922. He went to Méča, on 3 December 1928, and stayed there for about a year. He was then pardoned, but this time his years of active participation seemed to have come to an end mainly because of health reasons. Consequently Dājjäč Gābrä-Sellassé died, on 16 October 1930, at the Holy water of Mitäq Amanuel, at the age of 57 years.
CHAPTER THREE

THE ESCAPE OF LEJ IYASU TO TIGRAY AND THE TIGREAN CHIEFS' RIVALRY

3.1 The Escape of Lej Iyasu and the Central Government's Suspicion over Ras Seyum.

On 27 September 1916 Lej Iyasu was deposed and Emperor Menelik's daughter, Zäwditu, was named Empress. Lej Iyasu had been in Harar when he heard of the news of his deposition. He, then, collected his followers to fight against the Shewans who deposed him. The fighting took place at Mä'eso in Harar. Lej Iyasu was, however, defeated but managed to escape to the Afar area.

Different attempts had been made to restore Lej Iyasu to power. While Lej Iyasu was in the Afar area he heard that his father, Negus Mikael left Wällo for Addis Ababa to fight against the Shewans. Lej Iyasu, therefore, left the Afar area for Shewa. On his arrival at Ankobär news, however, reached him that his father lost a bloody battle at Sägällé on Tegemt 17, 1909 E.C. (27 Oct. 1916) and his father was taken as a captive.

After Lej Iyasu heard of his father's defeat at Sägällé he left Ankobär and returned to the Afar areas and later encamped at Mäqdälla. On his arrival at Mäqdälla, fighting took place between his forces and the forces of Ras Abatä. Ras Abatä won the fighting and Lej Iyasu escaped. On 27 August 1917, a further fight took place in Wällo between Lej Iyasu and Fitawrari Habtä-Gyorgis, the Minister of war. The Fitawrari won the battle and Lej Iyasu escaped again to Awsa. Ras Yemär, Negus Mikael's governor of Raya-Azäbo and Inda-Mäkoní, and Fitawrari Serah Bezu had joined the battle in support of Lej Iyasu, but was
defeated. Lej Iyasu then began to wander about in the Awsa area, where he lived for about three years.

Immediately after the overthrow of Lej Iyasu, Ras Täfäri decided to make some arrangements with the major chiefs who might otherwise tip the scales in Lej Iyasu's and his father's favour. These were Ras Dämessé, whose son was married to one of Negus Mikael's daughters, and Ras Seyum who was his son-in-law. Ras Täfäri must also convince Ras Haylu of Gojjan and Ras Wälä-Gyorgis of Gondar to give practical support instead of just a lip-service to the Shewan army. Ras Täfäri, therefore, wanted to make sure that while he was fighting in the field there was no treachery in other parts of the country that would stab the new regime in the back. As a result, Ras Täfäri wrote to Ras Seyum, on 3 Tiqemet 1909 E.C [13 October 1916], justifying the overthrow of Lej Iyasu and demanding that Ras Seyum recognize Empress Zäwditu and himself as the rightful authority and the need for his cooperation to preserve the Christian Empire. By his letter to Ras Seyum, Ras Täfäri states:

...Äa<r u:Ö=x=xwH@<` t`f "ÖYƒ r<Ç==" S'D"~U l'u<U u<U ÙUN@U mw< J< Sj< vv<f< i'MÒ c=ÅekU< ¢@U K=ƒÄåÅ ŽÒM< ÷i b[N<" Åe wKA—Å ÆÅ ÅM< Äa<x U ¾方便 ÈeÅ ÈM< Èl< ÈkK<f" i'MÒ xHÄT<f ÖM)< ÆUF xHÄT<f KTÔ<f" ÒÖe<l KTÔÖf eKj< "ç:" ... Æe-U KHÄT<f" KSÒë<f- ÙO ¾T>Åuuf õ<" vK<uf x¼Ç=Ø\"

. . . When by the will of God the notables, the people, the Abun and the Légé discussed and made Empress Zäwdita to ascend to her father's throne, they also made me the Crown Prince. Thus, I am delighted and I would like you to share my happiness. This was done because Lej Iyasu neglected the throne and the religion entrusted to him, decided to strengthen the Islamic faith and weaken the government . . . So it is timely, for you, to think for your religion and government that you should be faithful and strong to the central government at your domain.

[Refere to Appendix VII for the complete text of the letter].
Consequently, on 15 October 1916, Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis, the governor of Bägemider, since 1910, was ordered to march from Däbrä-Tabor through the Dälanta route to Wällo for a double purpose. Apart from preventing Iyasu from strengthening his position in Wällo, Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis's march was aimed at forestalling any military support from Ras Seyum for Negus Mikael, before the Battle of Sägällé and afterwards for Lej Iyasu. Different sources describe that as the son-in-law of Negus Mikael Ras Seyum was said to have been grieved over Negus Mikael's defeat at the Battle of Sägällé. In Täkläyäsus's manuscript Ras Seyum's and Ras Haylu Täkä-Haymanot's grievance of the defeat of Negus Mikael at Sägällé was expressed as follows: #e HÃK< e_e¿U u"Ñ<Y T>›?M ÉM SJ° }Kkc<..§ [Ras Haylu and Ras Seyum felt sad and cried due to Negus Mikael’s defeat].

After the Battle of Sägällé when the central government asked Ras Seyum to come to Addis Ababa, he was reluctant to accept the order. In Addis Ababa it was feared that Ras Seyum who was the brother-in-law of Lej Iyasu and who had developed friendly attachment to the family of Negus Mikael and consequently also to Lej Iyasu was greatly suspected of joining hands with the pro-Iyasu group and would fight against the members of the central government who organized the coup d'etat against Lej Iyasu.

At the time when there was a great suspicion towards the attitude of Ras Seyum, there are sources which explain that the central government had approached Däjjac Gëbrä-Sellassé by one of the government officials, Käntiba Wässäné Zä'amanuel, who was an Ethiopian Consul at Asmara, while Däjjac Gëbrä-Sellassé was a refugee in the Eritrean border areas. Even though the mission of Käntiba Wässäné was not very well understood it could be inferred taking the
political tension and the fear of the central government of Ras Seyum’s attitude into consideration. Even though Lej Iyasu was deposed but not captured, there seems to have been fear of the possible revival of Lej Iyasu’s political power or of a counter coup d’etat. Consequently the newly established central government began to watch the would be supporters of Lej Iyasu with close eyes. One of the greatly suspected supporters of Lej Iyasu was Ras Seyum Mängäša. At this time it was feared that Ras Seyum would help Lej Iyasu to regain power. Thus the central government wished to have a loyal appointee in case Ras Seyum proved to be insubordinate. Däjjač Gabrä-Sellassé who had shown his loyalty during the reign of Emperor Menelik was, therefore, the best choice that the central government could make. Because of this great fear and suspicion it seems, therefore, to be more likely that the new government, set up in Addis Ababa, had a plan to make Däjjač Gabrä-Sellassé governor of Tigray in case Ras Seyum mobilized his troops in support of Lej Iyasu. Presumably, therefore, Käntiba Wässäné’s mission was probably to instruct Däjjač Gabrä-Sellassé to take over Adwa on the back of Ras Seyum if he was to mobilize his forces against the central government. It seems under this pretext that Däjjač Gabrä-Sellassé was called in 1918. At the same time Käntiba Wässäné was also instructed to contact Ras Seyum and explain to him why a coup d’etat was organized against Lej Iyasu. Probably because of this contact or any other unknown reason, Ras Seyum did not move in support of Lej Iyasu, as it was feared.

In February 1917 when Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis was crowned Negus of Bägéméder, Tigray was also brought under his jurisdiction. After evading the government's order to come to Addis Ababa, for some time, Ras Seyum finally accepted the order and in April 1917 he was already in Addis Ababa after he had appointed his son, Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq his mesläne.
attitude of *Ras* Seyum towards the central government's order to come to Addis Ababa was explained by Täkläyäsus as follows:

...^E E¿U Ó" uóf Óv u=K<j " ÒôcÓ ã€fÓa %EL uÔÉ Ñw, 'u" ÕØâ }Ç=e }nn }ÝS<: :Ý=Á u%EL ^e e¿U KHÑ\ KfÓ_ UeK@ Ml"Á\ Ti "X" gÆc < }Ç=e }uu }ÝS:<28

. . . *Ras* Seyum who had hesitated, for long, to accept the order to come to Addis Ababa had finally accepted the order and came to Addis Ababa that he [Ras Täfäri] suspected him of complicity [with Lej Iyasu] and made him under solemn obligation not to leave Addis Ababa. Hence *Ras* Seyum appointed his son, Däjjazemač Kassa, as his proxy and passed the rainy season in Addis Ababa.

In 1918 when it was heard that the son of *Ras* Seyum, Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq, rebelled against his father and the central government, *Ras* Seyum was allowed to return to Tigray. It had already been clear that no helping hand had extended to *Lej* Iyasu from Tigray.29

3.2 *Lej* Iyasu's Escape to Tigray; *Ras* Seyum's Attitude towards *Lej* Iyasu; and the Opinions against *Ras* Seyum.

After wondering about, in the Awsa area, for about three years, *Lej* Iyasu left Awsa, in 1919 for Tigray, the territory of *Ras* Seyum who at that time was married to *Negus* Mikael's daughter, Wäyzäro Täwабäč.30 The reason why *Lej* Iyasu went to Tigray was because he had the impression that *Ras* Seyum being his brother-in-law would help him to fight against the central government and restore his power.31 According to the sources *Lej* Iyasu begged *Ras* Seyum to fight for him but *Ras* Seyum refused to do so.32
Lej Iyasu, nevertheless, settled first in Šekät at a village named Amäntilla (near Quiha) in Indärta and, according to one of my informants, Ras Seyum had secretly brought Lej Iyasu from Amantilla to Mäqällä later, and he had him hidden at the church of Mädhani-Aläm under the host of the church leader named Liqä Wäldäyäs Liqä Mädhani-Aläm.

Many of my informants informed me that when it became evident that Lej Iyasu was hidden in Tigray, the central government requested Ras Seyum to procure Lej Iyasu's unconditional surrender. The same sources also alleged that when the pressure to procure Lej Iyasu's unconditional surrender was increased, on Ras Seyum, from the central government Ras Seyum was said to have combed the area around Ādigudäm and Arra, superficially, aimed at capturing Lej Iyasu. It was at this time that the people of Ādigudäm and Arra who were displeased at Ras Seyum's deeds, desperately, composed the following metaphoric verse in Tigreña which blames Ras Seyum.

What wrong is done by the people of Arra and Ādigudäm [to let them be suffer], While his escape [Lej Iyasu's] was towards Mäqällä. [While there are hiding places in Mäqällä].

The verse has a double meaning and was composed to uncover Ras Seyum's secret for hiding Lej Iyasu in Mäqällä. The first meaning seems to express that what wrong has been done by the people of Arra and Ādigudäm to let them suffer from Ras Seyum's measures while Lej Iyasu's escape was towards Mäqällä, and the second seems to mean what wrong has been done by the people of Arra and Ādigudäm where there were hiding places (HÇS) in Mäqällä. It was,
therefore, clear that even though Ras Seyum did not fight for Lej Iyasu's cause against the central government, he was sympathetic to Lej Iyasu and had close touch with him until Lej Iyasu left Ras Seyum's territory to that of Ras Gugsa Araya. Major Dodd's report, on 8 June 1920, established beyond doubt that Ras Seyum's sympathies were with Lej Iyasu through the influence of his wife who had persuaded Ras Seyum to show a sympathetic attitude towards her brother, Lej Iyasu.

While Lej Iyasu was in Ras Seyum's territory, Ras Seyum promised, and also attempted, to use his good office and influence in the central government to procure easy terms of surrender for Lej Iyasu. Some sources also explain that Lej Iyasu had accepted Ras Seyum's good office and sent a message to the central government in 1919, through Ras Seyum, in which he stated that he could no longer endure his existence and desired to surrender. Based on Italian sources, Major Dodds (The British Legation) also reported that by August 1920 Lej Iyasu had conducted a long and secret conversation with Signor Polaire (Italian Agent at Adwa), at Mäqällä, in which he stated that he was in touch with Empress Zäwditu who desired his surrender.

The central government (probably Ras Täfäri) had replied, through Ras Seyum, to Lej Iyasu's request of surrendering himself, that it would accept his unconditional surrender, but replied that it saw no reason to treat Lej Iyasu leniently and that he should be chained. Ras Seyum was very angry with the reply of the central government because he wished to procure easy terms for Lej Iyasu's unconditional surrender.

Worrying too much about the worsening conditions in Tigray and in view of Ras Seyum's annoyance with the reply of the central government, the central government considered
important to send a mission consisting of chiefs, in December 1919, to discuss the problem in relation to Lej Iyasu, with Ras Seyum so as to procure Lej Iyasu's unconditional surrender.\textsuperscript{47}

In view of Ras Seyum's sympathy to Lej Iyasu and his annoyance with the replay of the central government there were various rumours and conflicting reports as to Ras Seyum's real attitude and intentions. Based on his sympathy to Lej Iyasu some sources disclosed that Ras Seyum's sympathy amounted to a promise, to Lej Iyasu, to give him any assistance in his power\textsuperscript{48} and was endeavouring to raise Tigray in support of him.\textsuperscript{49} Moreover, according to some sources, Lej Iyasu was also expected to march at the head of an army composed of Tigray, Wállo, Lasta and Bägemedir to attack the central government.\textsuperscript{50} In relation to Ras Seyum's attitude towards Lej Iyasu, Aläqa Kenfä wrote the existence, in Addis Ababa, of paradoxical rumours as follows:

\begin{verbatim}
... Ÿ›ÇAE ›uv u²AI ²S” Ñ>²? ^E E¿U MÏ Ác< ... dÄeTS< k” „p u=k’ K1 {’È} k” UHKG< »w_ l”V<KG< ÉM Ŷ” u”Ô»=wH@ “K >k< "K”vK Ä“M” ÁÖV 1 1 {’È }’È } MÝÆU ŸYÉE MÎf<” Àl”Tr.” X »ef< K”” c”< wKÁ u=M MÎT SU”» u2 {G<Kf} ”N” ïpU k<” ’È ŶfÓ_ SMkl Ú” »ÄgMVH<”U 2}— {G<K}— } KÛ”f ì+e+c”È èšY /”G<” ò”N”} }”KÜ<”U ’u”<
\end{verbatim}

. . . At this time, in Addis Ababa, there was a rumour, which states that Ras Seyum had promised to help Lej Iyasu and to die for his cause, though victory is in the hands of God, if the reconciliation failed. Others, however, state that Ras Seyum did not betray [the central government] by arguing that if he had really betrayed, the central government, why did he then chain and hand over his son, Däjja č Kassa, to the central government. The other side also argues that the coming of his son [to Addis Ababa] had a double advantage for Ras Seyum: the fact that his [Ras Seyum's] forces would not, henceforth, be divided in different fronts and the fact that he would gain time to prepare for a confrontation.

Owing to the disinclination of the Tigrean chiefs, mainly Ras Gugsa and Däjja č Gäbrä-Selllassé (who remained loyal to the central government at the time) to oppose the central government, the rumours in regard to Ras Seyum's intentions were highly exaggerated. Lej Iyasu
did not, therefore, succeed in raising a following sufficient to start a revolt against the central government from Tigray.

However, owing to an ignorance of Ras Seyum’s real intention and as long as Lej Iyasu remained at large in proximity to Ras Seyum, the situation in the north was somewhat obscure that the central government has been inclined to suspect Ras Seyum and inconsequence had him very closely watched. Furthermore, while the central government was inclined to think that an expedition to Tigray was unnecessary and that the problem could be arranged satisfactorily with Ras Seyum through emissaries, his rivals (Ras Gugsa Araya and Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé) considered the necessity of conducting an expedition against Ras Seyum and Lej Iyasu.

Even though it was not clear if he had an ulterior motive, Signor Piacentini, was also constantly urging Ras Täfäri to take action against Lej Iyasu and Ras Seyum and to end the problem with Lej Iyasu once and for all. Because of the existence of Italy's insatiable land hunger it could be inferred that this ambition of the Italians could engender a suspicion that Italy welcomed a rupture between the north and the south, that is the central government and Tigray, to serve her own ends. But whether these ends were represented by a desire to rid themselves of Ras Seyum, who has always been considered by the Italians as a thorn in their side, and replace him by some one of their own choosing, or to take the opportunity of a general upheaval of the country to enlarge Eritrea, it was difficult to know. Italian hatred for Ras Seyum and their need to get rid off him could be seen from the reports of De Martino [Eritrean Governor] to the Ministry of Colonies dated 27 March 1917. De Martino reported about Ras Seyum as follows: 

*Ras Seyum credo uomo infido e pericoloso. Distarsi di lui é certo nostro interesse e tale opinione*
ho manifestato al Conte Colli di Felizzano.⁵⁸ [I believe that Ras Seyum is a treacherous and a dangerous man. I owe interest to be at distance with him and I expressed this opinion to Conte Colli di Felizzano].

The central government gradually, therefore, became aware that as long as Lej Iyasu remained at large in proximity to Ras Seyum, intrigues and feelings of unrest and uncertainty would continue to hamper the administration of the central government. It thus decided to conduct an expedition to Tigray, in October or November 1920. The expedition was to be demonstrative or punitive depending on intermediate circumstances. It was argued that the expedition was necessary to illustrate the existence and the power of the central government.⁵⁹

On 1 January 1920, Ras Täfäri sent a letter to Ras Seyum with Däjjazmač Dästa Damţäw (later Ras) and other officials by which he tried to persuade Ras Seyum of the necessity of handing over Lej Iyasu to the central government.⁶⁰ The letter threw light to the existing suspicion of Ras Täfäri against Ras Seyum's relation with Lej Iyasu⁶¹ by stating: "... ḥuʔU ḡ<k< ṣæ<çu Möl LÄ ḥTÄŌ[Øi SJ". "[Ω=]@U c<Ù Ùe|’." <::...⁶² [ . . . All what worrys me is about your loyalty and of your being unsuspected to our throne, which is known to God and all men . . . ]. Ras Täfäri gave an oracular advice to Ras Seyum that as a loyal subject he must act as his loyalty prompts him.⁶³ This was because loyalty required detaining Lej Iyasu, and an admission by Ras Seyum that Lej Iyasu had been in Tigray under Ras Seyum's hostage.⁶⁴ [Refer to Appendix VIII for the complete text of the letter].

Owing to the repeated summons of the central government and perhaps knowing well what would await him if he did not do like wise and probably in reply to the above mentioned
letter, a mission from *Ras* Seyum, headed by a priest, was sent and arrived at Addis Ababa in August 1920\(^{65}\) to discuss matters fully with the central government.\(^{66}\) The mission brought assurance of *Ras* Seyum’s continued loyalty towards the central government.\(^{67}\)

While the conditions were like this the problem was further complicated by the action of *Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé*.\(^{68}\) *Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé* who had entered Addis Ababa, from his refuge, after he had been given pardon in 1918, was constantly intriguing against *Ras* Seyum in the hope of achieving the downfall of the Tigrean governor and acquiring the governorship for himself.\(^{69}\) In this endeavour he was supported by the Italians who had no liking for *Ras* Seyum. *Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé* enlisted the aid of the Italian Legation to send two "servants" with letters to Tigray through Asmara. The so called "servants" were in reality Tigrean chiefs who, on arrival in Eritrea, proclaimed their identity and disclosed the purport of the letters they carried.\(^{70}\) These letters emanating from *Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé* informed the Tigreans generally that they should be prepared for a "revolution" against *Ras* Seyum and should join up their hands with the central government's army under *Ras* Täfäri as soon as it arrived.\(^{71}\) Even though *Ras* Täfäri declared emphatically that the letters were not authorized by the central government\(^{72}\) and *Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé* did so on his own responsibility,\(^{73}\) they were not harmful to the interests of the central government and that *Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé* beyond being excluded, for a moment, from the council of meeting of the central government has not been otherwise punished.\(^{74}\)

3.3 *Lej* Iyasu's Escape to Bora-Selawa; *Ras* Seyum and *Ras* Gugsa’s Relations; and the Capture of *Lej* Iyasu and its Consequences on *Ras* Seyum.
Although Ras Täfäri was imploring Ras Seyum, by different means, to hand over Lej Iyasu, as a test of his loyalty, preparations for the proposed expedition to the north were hanging fire, and when Lej Iyasu heard of Ras Täfäri’s proposal to send another mission consisting of thirty chiefs to discuss with Ras Seyum Lej Iyasu has broken his word to Ras Seyum and after having made his guards drunk had escaped to Bora-Seläwa, to the area of Ras Gugsa Araya. Emperor Haylă-Sellassé wrote in his autobiography about the escape of Lej Iyasu, from Ras Seyum’s territory, to that of Ras Gugsa Araya by stating that Ras Seyum attempted to reconcile Lej Iyasu with Empress Zäwditu and himself, but he was in dilemma about offering the throne to the one at the expense of the other, and finally he allowed Lej Iyasu to leave his territory.

The governor of Tigray, Ras Seyum, made an attempt for reconciliation [between Lej Iyasu and the central government]. But, because it was very difficult [for the issue of government and throne] to request any one to leave hold of the government and the throne and to hand it over to another one that by halting his attempt for reconciliation Ras Seyum let him [Lej Iyasu] to leave his domain.

After Lej Iyasu left Ras Seyum’s territory, Ras Seyum was disembarased of any obligation to Lej Iyasu and he was in all probability to respond to the summons of the central government and come to Addis Ababa. Ras Seyum has asked for the instructions and wishes of the central government and has been told that as a loyal subject he must act as his loyalty prompts him. The general situation in Tigray has, therefore, been exceptionally quiet during the last month of 1920, since the retirement of Lej Iyasu to the area of Ras Gugsa, and interests in
the affairs of the north has also diminished since the general interest at that time was also centred on the preparations for the feast of Täskar (in memory of Emperor Menelik) fixed for 28 January 1921.

When it became clear that Lej Iyasu entered into the domain of Ras Gugsa Araya, the central government ordered Ras Gugsa to capture him. But as rapprochement with the central government was the best precondition to outbid Ras Seyum and obtain favour from the central government, Ras Gugsa accepted the order to capture Lej Iyasu, but expressed his fear of Ras Seyum for having a secret understanding with Lej Iyasu to declare war on him and of snatching Lej Iyasu from him. He, therefore, requested help from the central government. Ras Dästa Damțäw and other officials were, thus, sent to Tigray to help Ras Gugsa capture Lej Iyasu.

Emperor Haylā-Sellassé, in his autobiography, wrote Ras Gugsa's response to the central government's order to search for and capture Lej Iyasu, and Ras Gugsa's fear of Ras Seyum as follows:

... Ras Gugsa had said that I would have searched for [Lej Iyasu] but I am afraid if there exist a secret dealing between Lej Iyasu and Ras Seyum, and as a result he requested for our help to prevent any attempt from Ras Seyum to snatch Lej Iyasu [after his capture] from him. As a result, we sent Lej [later Ras] Dästa Damțäw, Dääjazemač Gētačāw, Dääjazemač Haylā-Sellassé, Fitawrari Waqé, Dääjazemač Wäsänē Terfé and Dääjazemač Wälđā-Sellassé, to Tigray to help Ras Gugsa search for Lej Iyasu and bring him to Addis Ababa.
For reasons of political expediency Ras Gugsa seems to have exaggerated Ras Seyum's sympathy to Lej Iyasu at that moment. Thus, Ras Dästa Damțäw and other officials were sent to Tigray to help Ras Gugsa capture Lej Iyasu.\textsuperscript{89}

After he left Ras Seyum's domain, Lej Iyasu was safe for a while up to the time of his capture. But when one of his followers, according to one of my informants, named Aräru,\textsuperscript{90} was caught in Mayčäw, while he was in his way to Wällo, he divulged Lej Iyasu's hidding place\textsuperscript{91}: a monastery in Seläwa.\textsuperscript{92} As a result, on 28 January 1921, Ras Gugsa Araya's forces and a few from the forces of Ras Dästa Damțäw left Mayčäw to procure Lej Iyasu's surrender\textsuperscript{93} and succeeded in capturing him\textsuperscript{94}, by surprise, in a monastery called Qäbsëya Täklä-Haymanot around Seläwa.\textsuperscript{95} Lej Iyasu did not resist when Ras Gugsa requested his arrest in a respectful manner.\textsuperscript{96} This was described by the Italian agent at Adwa as follows:

\textit{Egli [Lej Iyasu] non oppose alcuna resistenza e si consegna personalmente al Ras che lo dichiarò in arresto dopo esserglisi inginocchiato dinanzi e avergli baciati piedi.}\textsuperscript{97}

\textit{Lej Iyasu did not offer any resistance and he personally consigned himself to the Ras when the Ras declared the arrest of Iyasu after having himself knelt down and kissed Iyasu’s feet.}

Ras Gugsa has prostrated himself on the ground and kissed the feet of Lej Iyasu as an expression of showing respect to him.\textsuperscript{98} The captive and captor immediately made their way for Mayčäw where they arrived at noon, on 31 January 1921.\textsuperscript{99} When Lej Iyasu was caught he was poorly dressed. The Italian agent at Adwa had also the following to report in relation to the conditions of Lej Iyasu while he was caught:

\textit{... Disse che Ligg Jasu fu trovato in un piccolo posto presso una chiesa in condizioni di vestiario pietose tanto che Ligg Desta dovette cedergli il mantello.}\textsuperscript{100}
He said that Lej Iyasu was found in a small place next to a church, wearing clothes of such horrible condition that Lej Dästa had to give him his own mantle.

After his arrest Lej Iyasu was not chained but was firmly watched in Mayçäw. On 3 February 1921 the capture of Lej Iyasu was made known in Addis Ababa with a simultaneous booming of cannons of the imperial army. But still there was a fear, in the central government, that Ras Seyum might attempt to make Lej Iyasu free. Lej Iyasu's capture, however, removed a potential source of trouble and his safe return to Addis Ababa would allay the government’s anxiety. Ras Täfäri was anxious to see Lej Iyasu sent to Harar where he felt he could be sure of the prisoner's safe detention.

To test the loyalty of certain provincial governors and to gain an opportunity to display his power, Ras Täfäri conducted a huge military expedition to the north on the pretext to receive Lej Iyasu from Ras Gugsa Araya. The expedition consisted of about one hundred and twenty thousand men and its destination was Dässé. The expedition has the intention of having Lej Iyasu delivered to him from Ras Gugsa Araya, even at the cost of war.

Lej Iyasu was finally handed over, to Ras Täfäri, on 21 May 1921 ceremoniously, at an assembly of provincial officials who had been cautiously waiting his arrival at Dässé. He was, then, made fast to chains, heavily guarded by Ras Täfäri’s own body guards, and was immediately sent to Wärä-Illu. Ras Haylu and Fitawrari Habtä-Gyorgis remained behind watching the Imperial Army growing daily, until about 120,000 were available, for a campaign against Ras Seyum. Ras Seyum, however, saw that resistance would be folly and on 11 June 1921 went to Dässé, to renew his allegiance to the Empress and the central government.
Täfäri, then, returned to Addis Ababa, on 20 July 1921. Ras Seyum who had been accused of complicity with Lej Iyasu was ordered to join the march back to Addis Ababa. He was then relieved of his posts and deprived of his province. He was also made under solemn obligation not to leave Addis Ababa for some years.

Ras Seyum's territory of Adwa was taken from him and given to Däijjač Gäbrä-Sellassé; and Indärta was taken from Ras Seyum and rewarded to Ras Gugsa Araya. It was, then, decided that Lej Iyasu should be kept in Fečé (Sällallé) under the custody of Ras Kassa, where he remained for about eleven years, until his escape in 1932.

The arrest of Ras Täfäri's rival [Lej Iyasu] gave Ras Gugsa Araya a chance to outbid Ras Seyum Mängäša in proving loyalty to the central government, as competition between Ras Gugsa and Ras Seyum in seeking favour and prestige from the central government was the most important factor in their relations. The central government was fully aware of Ras Seyum's attitude, which in fact was known to Ras Täfäri himself and he was in consequence likely to remain passive so as not to rouse the central government to action against him.122
CHAPTER FOUR

THE REBELLION OF DÄJJAČ KASSA ABBA YELAQ

4.1 The Causes for the Rebellion of Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq.

Ras Seyum had been governor general of all parts of Tigray since he had been raised to the rank of Ras.¹ He was unchallenged after the death of Ras Sebḥat and the retreat of Dājjač Gābrä-Sellassé in 1914.² Ras Seyum also made his own appointments in Tigray, by which he gave Adwa, Aksum, and Šerä to his son Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq; Tämbén to his brother Däjjač Germay Mängäša; and Āgamä to Däjjač Kassa Sebḥat.³ Ras Seyum was working hard to show his loyalty to the central government so that he might obtain favour and influence. When the central government promoted Ras Gugsa Araya, by reappointing him to Raya-Azäbo, as a possible counter weight to Ras Seyum, Ras Seyum wanted to overcome this by seeking marriage alliances and other mechanisms with the members of the central government.⁴ Ras Seyum, hence, ruled Tigray in relative peace until his son Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq rebelled in 1918.⁵

Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq's rebellion was attributed, by different sources, to different factors. Some of my informants attributed the causes for Däjjač Kassa's rebellion to his personal character.⁶ According to the different sources Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq was restless, ambitious and bold in character,⁷ and had a deep spirit of "Tigrean resistance against Shewan dominance in Tigray".⁸ He was portrayed as a sworn enemy of the "Shewan domination over Tigray" by some informants,⁹ who admired and identified him as ḥabboña: a Tigreña concept which refers to a specific quality of determination and integrity of objective. In this case they mean that he aimed at restoring the throne of his grandfather, Emperor Yohannes IV.¹⁰
My informant Fitawrari Iyasu attributed Däjjač Kassa's rebellion to his personal character by stating "ìÔw-xÄ k+K j\'w w\'ûM"11 [. . . aimed to live [rule] after killing his father] and Qañazmač Gäbrä-Egezyabehér and Däjjazmač Zewde stated that Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq was highly influenced by a "childish" character ["èf ¾Øp±U 'Ã"]12 [He was influenced by a childish character]. Gerazmač Dästa Haylu also identified Däjjač Kassa's rebellion to his restlessness ("Ô"ì— eK´'u") [because he was restless in character].13

There are also sources which attribute the motive for Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq’s rebellion to his personal friendship and admiration for Lej Iyasu14 and, as collaboration with the outsiders was the order of the day, with the Italians.15 But I could not get sources which could confirm Däjjač Kassa's rebellion to be attributed to his personal friendship either to Lej Iyasu or to the Italians, with the exception that his step mother was Lej Iyasu's sister and with the fact that his father was being suspected of having sympathetic attitude towards Lej Iyasu.16

According to many of my informants it seems more plausible to attribute Däjjač Kassa's rebellion to his "anti-Shewan" attitude.17 According to the same sources Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq did not want to be ruled by a "Shewan".18 The rebellion, according to the informants was, therefore, aimed against the central government and against Ras Seyum who had recognized the central government's Shewan hegemony over Tigray.19 In his rebellion Däjjač Kassa requested his father to claim all what his grand father, Emperor Yohannes IV, had ruled and refuse openly to acknowledge the authority of Empress Zäwditu and Ras Tāfäri.20

However, as it was clearly known, unrest in Tigray was always persistent and the political conditions of the area, at that time, contained elements of instability due to the limited
control exercised by the central government. It is, therefore, possible to speculate that the cause for the rebellion of Kassa Abba Yelaq was not different from the existing socio-political conditions at the time. The rebellion was, therefore, a means of his personal grievances and advancing his personal interest than being conscious of his descent from Emperor Yohannes IV.\textsuperscript{21} He was primarily ambitious of increasing his control: "... Cassa che chiaramente mirava ad ingrandire suo Commando"\textsuperscript{22} [...] Kassa who was clearly ambitious to enlarge his territory...], states an Italian source to show the increasing ambition of Dājjač Kassa to advance his control. The appointment of Ras Gugsa Araya over southern Tigray by the central government,\textsuperscript{23} and the consequent decrease of his father's territory by this appointment, could therefore, be the main cause for the rebellion of Dājjač Kassa Abba Yelaq.\textsuperscript{24} To this effect, an Italian source states that:

\begin{quote}
In Tigray Degiac Cassa, probabilmente d'accordo col padre Ras Seyum, non intende cedere il Tigray meridionale a Ras Gugsa, ed ha nominato il Fitaurari Area per prendere il comando delle regioni assegnate dal Governo Etiopico a Ras Gugsa.\textsuperscript{25}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
In Tigray, Dājjač Kassa, probably agreeing with his father, Ras Seyum, did not want to leave southern Tigray to Ras Gugsa and he nominated Fitawrari Araya as a chief for the region assigned from the Ethiopian government to Ras Gugsa.
\end{quote}

\section*{4.2 The Battles Conducted During the Rebellion of Dājjač Kassa and their Results}

After the rebellion of Dājjač Kassa became known, Dājjač Täka, the representative of Ras Seyum in Indärta,\textsuperscript{26} sent Mälakä-Berhanat Abreha and Fitawrari Wäräs, who were also the followers of Ras Seyum, for a peaceful settlement of the problem.\textsuperscript{27} This plea for a peaceful settlement, however, failed due to Kassa Abba Yelaq's refusal.\textsuperscript{28} Meanwhile, Kassa Abba Yelaq attacked Dājjač Haylā-Maryam Gäzaheñ of Ṣādāya and Fitawrari Bitāw Wäldä-Sellassé of
Imbasänäyti at a place called Da'räk (Hahaylä) at the beginning of January 1918. Däjjač Haylä-Maryam and Fitawrari Bitäw were defeated and retreated. The fighting, according to the informants, claimed the life of many people.

Furthermore, Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq declared war against Däjjač Germay Mängäša (his uncle), and who was the representative of Ras Seyum in Tämbén. They fought a battle at May-Āläqeti in January 1918 for a short period of time but with much casualties on the side of Däjjač Kassa. At the fighting about hundred people died from both sides. At the fighting Däjjač Germay had occupied a strategic position that enabled him to inflict heavy casualties against the forces of Däjjač Kassa. Nevertheless, although Däjjač Germay had strategic position the fighting finally ended with his defeat and was forced to withdraw towards Ābbi-Āddi (Tämbén). Däjjač Kassa, then, followed the retreating forces of Däjjač Germay and fought against them at a place called Kunalä, in Tämbén. Däjjač Germay was defeated again and Tämbén became under the control of Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq. Many people died at Kunalä from both sides. From the side of Däjjač Kassa, Fitawrari Haylu Wahed, Qäñazmač Yelma, Qäñazmač Wälde and others died. From Däjjač Germay's side many people were made captives, but were freed immediately. From among the notables Däjjač Araya Abära, Ras Seyum's nephew, died fighting against Däjjač Kassa.

After the defeat of Däjjač Germay at Kunalä, Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq continued his march towards Mäqällä. When he heard that Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq was approaching towards Mäqällä Däjjač Täka, the representative of Ras Seyum in Indärta, left Mäqällä to save Mäqälla from destruction. When Däjjač Kassa was informed that Däjjač Täka would not fight against
him he entered Mäqällä, on 5 January 1918, unchallenged. After he entered Mäqällä he had confiscated arms and the property of the chiefs who had been under his father's command but refused to recognize him as their overlord. The following poem was composed during the rebellion of Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq to indicate his victories against Däjjač Haylä-Maryam and Däjjač Germay, and the retreat of Däjjač Täka and Däjjač Kassa's control of Adwa, Tämbén and Indärta:

How are you Abba Yelaq Kassu [Kassa],
Putting [Däjjač] Haylä-Maryam in chains,
Thereafter he left for Tämbén hastily.
Däjjač Germay was easily defeated,
Thereafter he left for Mäqällä hastily,
Däjjač Täka retreated to the bushes,
He rested after he retrieved the three alga (domain),
He the giver of money pouring on carpets.

When Däjjač Kassa entered Mäqällä the people from Bora had secretly taken Ras Gugsa's son (probably Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa) who had been in Mäqällä with Ras Seyum before Ras Seyum went to Addis Ababa, to save his life from any possible measure against him by
Däjjač Kassa. This event could, therefore, give light to the assumption that Däjjač Kassa's rebellion could possibly be by opposing the appointment of Ras Gugsa Araya over southern Tigray and this aim made him to develop hatred against Ras Gugsa's son.

According to an Italian report, issued on 9 January 1918 from Asmara, Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq, in about the beginning of January 1918, had an army amounting to about thousand men. But the number of his followers had soon increased, in few months, that he claimed his army to be amounting to about six thousand, by the end of March 1918. From among these about half were with rifles and the rest without. His followers were mainly from Adwa, Šerä and Aksum.

In Tigray many notables of Ras Seyum had refused to support and acknowledge Däjjač Kassa. He, therefore, made some Šumšers. Däjjač Mäsfen, who was the governor of Haramat, repeatedly refused orders from Däjjač Kassa to go to Mäqällä and to recognize Qänazmač Amaha, who had been the governor of Dallul, therefore, superseded Däjjač Kassa's overlordship in his command of Haramat. On 26 March 1918 Däjjač Kassa nominated Fitäwrari Abay Gäbrä-Täklä governor of Iggällä in place of Däjjač Asäfa, who had refused to acknowledge Däjjač Kassa as his overlord. Däjjač Haylu, who was the governor of parts of Šerä did not follow Däjjač Kassa, in his rebellion, and was awaiting the return of Ras Seyum from Addis Ababa, being loyal to him, at Šerä.

4.3 The Response of the Central Government to the Rebellion of Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq; Ras Seyum's Return from Addis Ababa and his Threatening Awaj (Decree).
When the news of the rebellion of Däijač Kassa Abba Yelaq was heard in Addis Ababa both Empress Zäwditu and Ras Täfäri were highly worried about the rebellion. They sent a telegram through the service of the Italians, on 17 Terr 1910 E.C, to Däijač Kassa. The telegrams of both the Empress and the Regent had almost similar message. The telegram contained the usual greetings to Däijač Kassa and stated that Ras Täfäri was about to go to Wällo to stabilize the area and made Ras Seyum to stay for a while, after Ras Seyum had already started his march to Tigray, so that they would depart from Addis Ababa together. The telegram further stated that they heard that Däijač Kassa had fought against Däijač Germay, and requested him to tell them the reason for the fighting and to inform them about the security in Tigray, the conditions of the harvest and any other developments in Tigray through a telephone via Asmara. The telegraphic message of Empress Zäwditu and Ras Täfäri to Däijač Kassa can be read from Appendices IX and X.

After he heard of the rebellion led by his son and the incidents that took place, Ras Seyum started his march to Tigray from Addis Ababa and arrived at Koräm, on 22 March 1918. Ras Seyum was welcomed in Koräm. Talamonti mentions the reception ceremony arranged, for Ras Seyum, in Koräm as follows: Il ritorno del Ras é accolto con soddisfazione [the return of the Ras was welcomed with satisfaction]. It was with Ras Gugsa Araya and Däijač Tädla that Ras Seyum arrived at Koräm. After they had waited for few days at Koräm they started their march and arrived at Mayčäw, on 30 March 1918. Ras Gugsa remained at Mayčäw while Ras Seyum and the others continued their march to Mäqällä.
When Däjjač Kassa heard of the news and after he had confirmed the certainty of the return of his father from Addis Ababa to Mäqällä he decided not to openly confront his father. He left Mäqällä to Tämbén and then to Adwa through Hawzén. Ras Seyum, hence, entered Mäqällä on 7 April 1918 with out any resistance.

After his arrival at Mäqällä Ras Seyum attempted to approach his son through peaceful means and advised him to give up the rebellion. Däjjač Kassa who had been in Tämbén since 13 April 1918 responded to his father's call for peace positively with a letter asking pardon. This request for pardon was not, however, whole hearted. This was manifested in his immediate measure of cutting the telephone line so as to cut Ras Seyum's communication with Adwa. Information from people who had been very close to Däjjač Kassa disclosed that Däjjač Kassa did not intend to accept his father's call and to submit himself. The letters he wrote to Ras Seyum, requesting pardon, were simply to deceive his father, so that he could get enough time to prepare for a confrontation against his father.

When Däjjač Kassa refused to accept his father’s call and when Ras Seyum's attempts for a peaceful solution failed, Ras Seyum decided to punish his son. Ras Seyum, therefore, issued a threatening Awaj (decree) at Mäqällä, on 15 April 1918 that repeatedly declared Däjjač Kassa a rebel. Moreover, Ras Seyum personally, by a telephone, called on all the notables in Adwa to be faithful to the central government and towards him and not to support Däjjač Kassa's rebellion.

Even after the return of Ras Seyum from Addis Ababa the supporters of Däjjač Kassa were, however, creating problems. An Italian source explain that Ras Gugsa had informed Talamoni that Fitawrari Araya of Čärčär had declared his support to Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq.
and the people of Šärarä-Mellaš (in southern Tigray) rebelled under the leadership of Fitawrari Araya of Čärčär. The rebels fought and arrested three sub-district governors who had been sent to administer the area under Wagšum Kábádä. The revolt of the people of Šärarä Mellaš was very dangerous and threatening to Wagšum Kábádä that he asked Ras Gugsa Araya for help against the rebels by stating, according to the Italian source, *Se mi aiutate ora bene se no andro direttamente ad Addis Ababa* [If you help me now fine, if not I will directly go to Addis Ababa].

Owing to Däijač Kassa's refusal to submit to Ras Seyum, Ras Seyum continued his march from Mäqällä westwards to beat him. He arrived at Aksum on 10 May 1918. Däijač Kassa heard of his father's march also retreated to Ādét (near Aksum) with his about 2000 armed followers. After his arrival at Aksum, Ras Seyum proclaimed an *Awaj* against Däijač Kassa and his followers. Ras Seyum's threatening *Awaj* as obtained from an Italian source, reads:

*Chi segue degiac Cassa é considerato ribelle, i suoi beni saranno confiscati perdita in dulti e Gulti autorizzo i nemici a denunziarli.*

[He who follow Däijač Kassa is considered a rebel, his goods (property) will be confiscated and he will loss all his gult, and I authorize the enemies be denounced.]

One of my *informants*, supporting the above source, also informed me that Ras Seyum had announced that anybody who support Däijač Kassa would to be beheaded.

When Ras Seyum was at Aksum announcing his *Awaj* against Däijač Kassa, Däijač Kassa was, however, marching towards the south from Ādét: either towards the areas which were under the command of Ras Gugsa Araya or towards Mäqällä unidentified. By this action he
wanted to divert the direction of his father's march against him. He wanted to return to Adwa, if his father changed his direction towards Mäqällä, following his father's footsteps. At this time, fear reigned in Mäqällä among the people that Dājjāč Kassa might return by taking another direction to enter Mäqällä and provoke disorder again. Informants informed me that the news of his rebellion and his "fame" was widely spread that "SīSī ĀwHM 'Ān" [His coming was always expected frightfully]. De Martino (Eritrean Colonial Governor) in his report of 10 May 1918 from Asmara to the Minister of Colonies-Rome, wrote that the situation in Tigray was unchanged even after the arrival of Ras Seyum in Mäqällä.

Moreover, Dājjāč Kassa had asked the Italian agent to allow him to take refuge in the Italian colony of Eritrea in case the forces of his father marched against him. By the end of May 1918, the followers of Dājjāč Kassa had already entered Qohayn (in the Italian Colony of Eritrea). My informant informed me that in Asmara the market was disturbed on three different occasions due to a distant and false threatening information about the rebellion and approach of Dājjāč Kassa Abba Yelaq. An Italian agent worried about the situation also wrote that he was cautious about the condition in Tigray and had decided to hold Dājjāč Kassa in a place far from the colony supervising (watching) him in case he effectively entered into the Eritrean territory. This seemed that Dājjāč Kassa Abba Yelaq's request to take refuge in the Italian colony of Eritrea would not gain acceptance.

4.4 Dājjāč Kassa's Submission to his Father.
After a long process of negotiation Däjjač Kassa and Ras Seyum, however, reached a reconciliation, through the mediation of Däjjač Maru Arram of Tämbén (an official of Ras Seyum), though the peace was temporary, in June 1918. At this reconciliation Ras Seyum recognized Däjjač Kassa’s previous command over Adwa with some increase in his territory in other parts.

Even though Däjjač Kassa had reconciled with his father and the situation in Tigray by August 1918 seemed peaceful, it, however, remained incomplete. This was because, inspite of the agreement for Däjjač Kassa’s submission nothing has been said about the return of the arms and the property that he has confiscated from the chiefs who had been under his father’s command. Moreover, Däjjač Kassa reached at a peace agreement neither with Däjjač Germay nor with Däjjač Abära Hagos, the brother and cousin of Ras Seyum respectively, until October 1918.

In September 1918 the region was relatively peaceful and Ras Gugsa re-entered Mayčaw on 26 September 1918 and towards the end of September 1918 Däjjač Kassa’s followers, who had been fugitives, gave up to Däjjač Germay in Tämbén. In the second half of October 1918 Däjjač Kassa went to Mäqällä and concluded a final reconciliation with his uncle, Däjjač Germay, and with other notables who had opposed him during his rebellion.

4.5 Däjjač Kassa Rebelled Again

When a meeting of the leading Tigrean chiefs has been called in Addis Ababa for August 1919, Ras Seyum telephoned to Addis Ababa to say that he and his son, Däjjač Kassa, were reconciled, and they might both come to Addis Ababa. Moreover, when Ras Gugsa of Tigray
arrived at Addis Ababa for the meeting of the chiefs news had reached Addis Ababa that Ras Seyum was travelling to Addis Ababa via Asmara and Djibouti, but on his arrival at Asmara he heard that his son, Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq, had again risen in revolt, in April 1919, and was compelled to return. Ras Gugsa Araya who arrived at Addis Ababa had also reported that he had almost to flee for his life through the country of Ras Gugsa Wälé.

At this time different sources explain differently about the intentions of Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq's rebellion. The Daily telegraph of Friday 4 April 1919 reported under the title "Revolt in Abyssinia" the intention of Däjjač Kassa in a highly exaggerated tone as follows:

... the son of Ras Seyum has revolted and declared himself king under the name of King Theodor... and is reported to be very brave. He has gathered a large following.

Other sources also express that Däjjač Kassa had aimed to crown himself "Emperor" supported by local chiefs and had fifteen to twenty Däjjazmačes under him.

Even though Ras Seyum worked hard to show his loyalty to the central government his immediate return, however, gave the impression that Ras Seyum was playing with the central government and was in agreement with his son. Ras Gugsa Wälé who was said to be on his way to the meeting of the chiefs in Addis Ababa refused to go to Addis Ababa and it was reported that he was sympathetically disposed towards the "rebels" in Tigray. The central government which was suspicious of both father and son (Ras Seyum and Däjjač Kassa) was, therefore, made to believe that Ras Gugsa Wälé was a sympathizer of the "revolutionaries" (Ras Seyum and Däjjač Kassa). The impression that Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa Wälé were sympathetic to the rebellion was evidently false as there were different sources to the effect that there had been fighting between father and son, and that the later has suffered a serious defeat.
By 2nd May 1919 Ras Seyum was reported to be at Mäqällä and Däjjač Kassa was reported to be moving around the Eritrean frontier. Ras Seyum, therefore, organized his men and marched against his son again. Däjjač Kassa and Ras Seyum's forces fought at Haṣābo (near Aksum). One of my informants mentioned a name Täsfay Mädäbay who had been from among the followers of Däjjač Kassa who was ordered by Däjjač Kassa to fire on Ras Seyum, from a distant place, during the fighting, surprisingly, he had struck at the umbrella of Ras Seyum, but missed the Ras. One can now safely argue, therefore, that Ras Seyum was not sympathetic to the rebellion of his son.

Däjjač Kassa's forces were defeated and forced to retreat to Mädäbay (Šerä). When Däjjač Kassa fled to Mädäbay Däjjač Maru and other officials of Ras Seyum followed him. They fought against Däjjač Kassa at Korfa ho, but through emissaries they asked him that he would be forgiven if he returned to Adwa and if he acknowledged his father's and the central government's power. Däjjač Abreha Hagos of Šerä and other notables of Tigray acted as mediators promising Däjjač Kassa for a peaceful solution and reconciliation with his father.

4.6 Däjjač Kassa's Submission and his Fate

Owing to the repeated plea for peace and perhaps knowing well what would awaited him if he refused, Däjjač Kassa notified that he was about to accept the plea for peace. Däjjač Kassa was then taken to Adwa and expressed penitence to his father, according to Greenfield, ...bearing a stone on his back with a knife tied around his throat - the traditional sign of submission and repentance. Despite Däjjač Abreha Hagos's promises for pardon from Ras Seyum Däjjač Kassa was, however, thrown naked to the ground and punished about hundred lashes on
arrival. According to informants, Däjjač Kassa used to punish his opponents forty lashes each but his father beat him eighty lashes. According to Greenfield, Däjjač Kassa did not cry out when he was being punished and afterwards was carried to a nearby hut. The punishment was severe; he was not expected to live at first but later recovered. He was then taken to Mäqällä first, and after few weeks stay at Mäqällä to Addis Ababa, as a test of Ras Seyum's loyalty, via Bägémédé and Gojjam fearing that the people of Raya-Azäbo might intercept to free Däjjač Kassa. Ras Seyum has, therefore, stamped out the revolt in Tigray and then chained his son, and sent him to Addis Ababa. It was Däjjač Täka of Indärta who took Däjjač Kassa to Addis Ababa on behalf of Ras Seyum. Ras Seyum has been exasperated by the repeated rebellion of his son and he was anxious to be seen as loyal in the eyes of the central government that he handed over his son whom he had considered as an obstacle to his projected mission of gaining favour and influence in the central government.

Däjjač Kassa arrived at Addis Ababa, on 1 Terr 1912 E.C. (in about the second week of January 1920), and was confined in the house first of Ras Berru and then of Ras Gétačaw. Ras Gétačaw was the husband of Wäyzäro Astér Mängäša, Ras Seyum's sister.

On 3 Yakatit 1913 E.C., a year after his confinement, Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq managed to crawl through a window and escaped from the house of Däjjač Gétačaw on a horse. But on his way to Tigray he was intercepted by the countrymen in the area between Sälalé and Gendä-Bärät around Adabärga. According to Empress Zäwditu's letter to Ras Seyum, Däjjač Kassa killed three people, wounded two others and he was finally killed in the confrontation with his five followers, on 7 Yäkatit 1913 E.C.
Aläqa Kenfâ’s manuscript describes the escape and fate of Däjjač Kassa, although it contains some discrepancies in the number of deaths and the place where Däjjač Kassa was killed with the description in the official letter of Empress Zäwditu to Ras Seyum as follows:

On Wednesday 2 Yäkatit 1913 E.C. Däjjač Kassa Seyum after he got permission to have entered a prostitute named Eyärusalém in to his room of detention, and after he made himself free from the quraña, by pretending to sleep, left the room leaving the woman behind in the empty room. On 5 Saturday Yäkatit [1913 E.C.] it was heard that he was caught by the countrymen in Bulga at Käsäm. He died on Monday 7 Yäkati with his four followers. He was killed after he was wounded on his chest by [a rifle named] Wejegra and on his neck by a spear. His corpse remained lying down on the ground for about four days, until people who went to the area, from Addis Ababa, identified that it was Däjjač Kassa’s corpse. The followers of Däjjač Gétačäw who went there identified the corpse. Because he [Däjjač Kassa] was shot by a mesläné (government proxy) that any body who arrived before his death beat him up with stones. The shoes that he put on were foreign origin and were beaten while they were being worn. It is said that all [the dead men] were mutilated. All the corpses were, then, made to arrive at Addis Ababa and be buried at the church of St.George.

A letter from Empress Zäwditu to Ras Seyum, dated 7 April 1921, explains that although Ras Seyum chained his son to the central government because of his loyalty to the government, the government refrained from sending Däjjač Kassa to the place of his detention and kept him at his sister's house with Däjjač (later Ras) Gétačäw so that he might be counselled, as he was the son of Ras Seyum. The letter further explains that the intention of the central government was to settle the problem with his father by peaceful means when Ras Seyum
went to Addis Ababa since, according to the letter, Ras Seyum's action was out of good will to the central government. The letter states:

... Äh *X* U"U J KS"eœe S"<ÄÉ wKl À— jsf w_fmÝ< "— ÀÔV Á} Mì "< uTKj ÿTjÌupuf jNi d"cÉ į"Ç=SÝ wK" ÿ=G< ÿjT jÇe Ÿuv jÁ= t ŸÁÀ a je, S"Ñhj u?f ŸÁÌj Tj Ñ@< 4< ÿÉ jekÜ"< 'u'... ¥—T Hdw } K— efM eKj[Ôa< efSx "') eTU]" Acw""""U dK" wK" u' U"M(e ... 121

... Though you arrested and sent to us Däjjazemč Kassa because of your loyalty to our government, we refrain from sending him to the place of his detention and kept him in this town [Addis Ababa] at his sister's [Wäyzäro Aster Mängäša's] house with Däjjazemč Géticacw so that he might be advised as he is your son. . . Our intention was to settle the case peacefully when you come, since your action was out of good will to us. . .

In her letter to Ras Seyum, Empress Zäwditu also explained the details of the escape and death of his son and expressed her sorrow of Däjjač Kassa's death, and appreciated Ras Seyum's loyalty. For detailed information refer to Appendix XI.

Even though Empress Zäwditu expressed her appreciation of Ras Seyum's loyalty, shown by his handing over his son, rumours were also persistent in Addis Ababa of Ras Seyum's correct intentions. There were sections of the nobility who were dubious of Ras Seyum's action who regarded his action not as an expression of loyalty to the central government but as a camouflage which Ras Seyum wanted to use in order not to be blamed for his relations with Lej Iyasu. This section of the nobility viewed Ras Seyum's action in handing over of his son to the central government as it was planned to help him in two ways, in his preparation to fight against the central government supporting Lej Iyasu. According to this section of the nobility, Ras Seyum's action would first save Ras Seyum's forces from being splitted into fighting against his son and against the central government, second it would help Ras Seyum to get time for
preparation against the central government. This attitude of the nobility towards Ras Seyum's action was explained by Aläqa Kenfä as follows:

... At this time, in Addis Ababa, there was a rumour, which states that Ras Seyum had promised to help Lej Iyasu and to die for his cause, though victory is in the hands of God, if the reconciliation failed. Others, however, state that Ras Seyum did not betray [the central government] by arguing that if he had really betrayed, the central government, why did he then chained and handed over his son, Däjjač Kassa, to the central government. The other side also argues that the coming of his son [to Addis Ababa] had a double advantage for Ras Seyum: the fact that his [Ras Seyum's] forces would not, henceforth, be divided in different fronts and the fact that he would gain time to prepare for a confrontation.

There were, however, sources which attribute Ras Seyum's handing over of his son to the central government as a mere manifestation of his loyalty to the central government, to the extent of sacrificing any thing, even at the expense of his son. One of my informants informed me that Ras Seyum had a firm belief on the central government that he was not in a position to see it be shaken and be disturbed by stating that: [Le'ul Ras Seyum had a belief on the government that he did not want to see it shaken (be in trouble)]. Some others attribute Ras Seyum's action as an expression of his eagerness to acquire better post and favour from the central government than his contemporaries. Ras Seyum, therefore, wanted to out bid his rival chiefs in Tigray even at the expense of his son. This was confirmed by one of my informants who stated that: [Ras Seyum
was the friend of the Shewans and eager for power]. According to informants Ras Seyum did not, of course, chained and sent his son to Addis Ababa to be killed but his action was to express his loyalty to the central government by handing over his son.

My informants told me that intrigues were woven behind the escape and death of Däjjač Kassa. According to these informants there was a secret arrangement by some members of the central government, who had hatred against Däjjač Kassa, to pave the way for his escape from the place of his detention in the house of Ras Gétačāw and the assignment of people to intercept and kill him on his way. This was expressed by one of my informants as follows: [They killed him by conspiring against him. Some made intrigues to let him escape from his place of detention and some others awaited and killed him in his way to escape]. Aläqa Kenfā's manuscript also supports the existence of an intrigue in the death of Däjjač Kassa.

Many of my informants informed me that Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq was portrayed as a sworn enemy of the "Shewans" and was being considered as a moving spirit of "Tigrean resistance against the Shewan hegemony in Tigray", by his supporters. Hence, after Ras Seyum chained and handed over Däjjac Kassa to the central government, and more after his death was heard in Tigray, his supporters felt very sorrow and blamed Ras Seyum for handing over his son in exchange for his ambition for better post and favour from the central government. Some of my informants are still sensitive about the handing over of Däjjač Kassa by Ras Seyum and express their feelings by saying [He [Ras Seyum] had handed him [Däjjač Kassa] over to the enemy].
Tigrean elders seem to have different opinions and feelings towards Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq. Many people, in Tigray, still admire the "bold" character of Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq.\textsuperscript{138} One of my informants informed me that "\textls[-13]{"When his name [Däjjač Kassa’s] was mentioned market places were being disturbed."} The same informant states that Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq #UK< ƒÔ<Á ≥w³ « ≥a≤ [He was disturbing all parts of Tigray].\textsuperscript{140} Some people also related Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq's character to that of Emperor Yohannes IV and Ras Seyum's character to that of Ras Mängäša by saying #X Ñ-*X ñ¿U ñ£S\textsuperscript{141} [Kassa [Däjjač Kassa] as Kassa [Yohannes IV] Seyum as Ras Mängäša].

According to my informants the supporters of Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq in Tigray, expressing and admiring his bravery, composed many popular verses. One of them reads as follows:

\begin{verbatim}
ë¢ô ææ ð³U SîS¡
\textls[-13]{'Å<Ø ëE ð³K±\textsuperscript{142} —

Hey, you made them frightened [though killed],
Never mind, no one would spare his life from death.

Many popular verses were also composed which fulminate against Ras Seyum for handing over his son and his subsequent death. Some of these verses read:

\begin{verbatim}
æû~U çç= S³Nh ±Å fìKK< ±Å fÈ³ñ~
—
Snw ÿ<UA ã³j_D>

You, the family of Ras Mängäša, how could you be cheated,
Is your tomb dug in Shewa?

±±K± ±éç= ±ë
\end{verbatim}

89
Oh, Ras [Seyum] the fool, Ras [Seyum] the fool,

Don’t you remember that of your father’s, Ras Mängāša’s [fate],

Who remained chained at the cave at Ankobär,

How could one’s son be sent chained for remembrance (of Ras Mängāša’s fate)].

You, Ras Seyum the fool,

How can Kassa Abba Yelaq be chained and sent to Awsa,

When he say that I shall restore my father’s [throne], that of Wärésaw Kassa [Yohannes IV’s].

Should the blame [for hiding Lej Iyasu] be directed against the people of Arra,

While his [Lej Iyasu’s] escape was towards Mäqällä,

You [Ras Seyum], who hung his son as a cat.
CHAPTER FIVE

TIGRIAN CHIEFS' RIVALRY AND THE CENTRALIZATION PROCESS

5.1 The Centralization Process and the Fate of Tigrean Hereditary Chiefs

It is noted that Emperor Menelik II abolished the political organizations of the conquered people and put appointed governors (mostly war leaders who participated in the conquest of the southern provinces) in power. However, since Emperor Menelik had neither instituted organizational control nor developed modern means of communications for easy check upon newly emerged provincial chiefly families, most of them were in a position to resist later centralization process.¹

The political struggle that characterized Ethiopia from 1906 (when Emperor Menelik II fell ill) up until the death of Empress Zäwditu in 1930 weakened the central government and strengthened the grip of the various feudal lords on their provinces.² The Rases were more or less independent in the northern provinces and look up on themselves as kings owing scarcely more than lip-service to an emperor remote in the capital. They paid their own armies, maintain their own customs etc.³ The chiefs were allowed to rule the country with which their families had been associated until some misdeed or act of disloyalty brought deposition.⁴ Ras Täfäri's idea has been, therefore, to transfer authority from the old governors, ruling by privilege, to the elective representatives of the people, and to substitute the dues paid in kind to the local chiefs, to a system of taxation, in money instead of livestock and grain, to be paid directly to the capital. In the same way, officials were to receive their salaries from a national treasury instead of from the
provincial Rases.\textsuperscript{5} The period was, therefore, characterized by endemic struggle between the central authority and the regional chiefs, the former trying to subdue the various regions and the latter zealously guarding their autonomy and semi-independent existence.

Empress Zäwditu's heir, Ras Täfäri had been a leadig centralizing figure whose power had grown constantly.\textsuperscript{6} During the period of Empress Zäwditu there were different attitudes towards the administration of the country. Thus, three different groups emerged. The most conservative elements headed by Fitawrari Habtä-Gyorgis stood for the maintenance of the old feudalistic structure of government. The progressive group, under the leadership of Ras Täfäri, had plans to break the power of the feudal governors in favour of centralized administration, while the faction led by Empress Zäwditu attempted to steer a middle course.\textsuperscript{7} But as these groups were almost equally matched in influence and following, none of them could succeed in achieving its goal. This situation, therefore, allowed the existence of strong provincial rulers with complete power over their subjects and territories.\textsuperscript{8}

As heir to the throne, Ras Täfäri worked hard to lay the foundation of his power.\textsuperscript{9} The centralization of administration, which had both political and fiscal dimensions, was the cornerstone of his policy.\textsuperscript{10} To succeed in his policy he had, therefore, to curb the power of the three traditional conservative elements (the church, the regional nobility and the military) which in the past had driven the country to the verge of civil war, or had even destroyed the political entity as in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} C.\textsuperscript{11}

From 1926 onwards, after the death of the Minister of war, Fitawrari Habtä-Gyorgis, Ras Täfäri was left with only the Empress to oppose his reforms\textsuperscript{12} and his position in the central
government was strong enough for him to openly orient his policy on centralization at the expense of the provincial warlords on selective modernization, and on the building of a new state machinery.\textsuperscript{13} Up on coming to power his main goals were to reform the government, modernize the army and police force. He wanted to bring the power of the central government to the provinces, and to follow a gradual clearing out of all the imperial favourites, who had no qualifications for governing except for their military prestige.\textsuperscript{14} By his policy, \textit{Ras} Täfäri generally aimed at a systematic erosion of the power of the regional nobility, which he had accomplished from 1916 to 1935.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, during his years as regent and heir he demonstrated his political astuteness by pursuing a policy of modernization.\textsuperscript{16}

On 7 October 1928 \textit{Ras} Täfäri crowned \textit{Negus} Täfäri\textsuperscript{17} and, on 2 November 1930, he was coronated Emperor: Emperor Haylä-Sellassé\textsuperscript{18} in the presence of the representatives of the countries such as Great Britain, Italy, France, Belgium, the USA, Germany, Japan, Holland, Greece, Sweeden, Turkey, Poland and Egypt.\textsuperscript{19} Accession to Emperorship was, therefore, an important milestone in his process of introducing the policy of centralization.

On the Ethiopian side no untoward incident has marred the new Emperor's assumption to imperial power. All the provincial governors were summoned to Addis Ababa when \textit{Negus} Täfäri was crowned Emperor. \textit{Ras} Gugsa Araya and \textit{Ras} Seyum have obeyed \textit{Negus} Täfäri’s summons to come to Addis Ababa.\textsuperscript{20} Almost all the important chiefs and governors attended, with their followers, the coronation ceremony.\textsuperscript{21} The rumours of possible trouble in the north against Täfäri’s coronation, therefore, proved unfounded.\textsuperscript{22}
The important chiefs such as Ras Kassa, Ras Haylu, Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa Araya, were all kept in Addis Ababa, after the coronation of Negus Täfäri, until the constitution of 1931, which purported to strip of their powers in favour of the Emperor, was proclaimed. Before the coronation it was confidently anticipated that Ras Kassa, Ras Seyum and Ras Haylu would be made kings. This, however, has not been eventuated.

Once he became emperor in 1930, Haylä-Sellassé began implementing the plan for reform and reconstruction. His basic strategy has been to extend central control gradually over the periphery, while allowing only very few and weak channels from the periphery to the centre so that to eliminate those hereditary chiefs or to limit their power considerably, thereby to concentrate power in his own hands. The methods to achieve this goal include improving communications, introducing a regular standing army in place of provincial levies, closer administrative supervision and the shuffling of appointments, well all used to reduce the power of the governors, notably Ras Seyum Mängäša and Ras Gugsa Araya in Tigray and Ras Haylu Täklä-Haymanot and Ras Gugsa Wälle in Gojjam and Bägemeder respectively. For this reason he had risked offending the powerful Rases: Ras Seyum, Ras Gugsa Araya and Ras Kassa who considered themselves as possible claimants to the imperial throne. They expected to be rewarded, as it was in the olden days, with crowns of their own. They expected that they would be made kings when Negus Täfäri was made king of kings (Emperor). But this was what the Emperor did not wish to see in the new Ethiopia, which he was envisaging. He wanted an end not an increase to the system of petty kingdoms proliferating over the country.
Having thus organized his army, the Emperor began to lay the legal foundation for his centralization scheme. The first thing he did with regard to this was the promulgation of a constitution whose sole purpose was the concentration of power in his own hands and to lay down the principle of imperial control. He sent messages to all the Rases to tell them that it would be formally signed in November 1931 and that their presence was, therefore, required in Addis Ababa to witness the signing of the constitution and also to take their place in the new House of Parliament as the first Senators of the Empire. This was the first move by the Emperor to attack the Rases on their ground and break up their feudal powers. The constitution of 1931 also confirmed Emperor Haylë-Sellassë's line as the only legitimate line, descended "without interruption from the dynasty of Menelik I, son of King Solomon of Jerusalem and of Queen Sheba". The constitution, thus, gave the Emperor exclusive rights in various spheres of governmental activities, which heretofore were shared by the hereditary chiefs. The parliament that was established by the constitution was also to serve as a means to the centralization programme. It was meant no more than a source of legitimacy for the laws made by the Emperor and to submit them for approval by the influential lords from the provinces that filled up the institution.

A Senate and a Chamber of deputies were established. The Emperor was to appoint members of the Senate from among the nobility who have for a long time served the country as princes or ministers, judges or high military officers. Not all the places were, however, immediately filled, but Ras Haylu, Ras Seyum, Ras Dästa and a few others were named soon after wards. The chamber of duputies was also to be nominated, but "by the nobility and the local šums until the people were in a position to elect." To further re-inforce his position Emperor
Haylä-Sellassé, therefore, appointed Ras Seyum, whom he trusted less than Ras Gugsa Araya to the Senate, in order to prevent him returning to Tigray.  

Though the Senate existed in name, its functions were, however, nebulous, virtually every phase of the government being supervised and frequently directed by the Emperor. The fact that the greatest nobility as well as local lords were both incorporated, by appointments to the Senate, emphasized the Emperor's need to try and keep them under his eyes in Addis Ababa, and so lessen their direct control in the provinces. The government of Ethiopia, at the time was, therefore, to all intents and purposes a one man affairs.

The Imperial government of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé devised various checks and balance mechanisms to integrate Tigray to the evolving Empire. Although the Tigrean nobility could unite to defend the province against the centralization process, they were often divided among themselves. The Tigrean noble's internal divisions were also encouraged by the Shewans so that they could achieve an internal balance and prevent any of Emperor Yohannes IV's descendants from becoming the negus (king) of Tigray. Emperor Haylä-Sellassé attempted to undermine Tigrean autonomy by dividing authority in the province between two rival descendants of Yohannes IV: Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa Araya. The Emperor has broken the power of the old nobility as an independent political force suggesting that the province be administered by paid officials appointed by the central government. The central government, therefore, reduced Tigray to a semi-autonomous buffer region, but it has never been able to fully control it or deprive its leading families of their centuries old supremacy. As a result the central government had to depend on local leaders and continue the ancient practice of building political loyalty through dynastic marriages in Tigray. In some cases the nobility was bought off by
titles or assignments to diplomatic posts. In other cases the nobles were raised to the powerless rank of Senator and compelled to remain in Addis Ababa under the watchful vigilance of the government and far from their regional backers.\textsuperscript{44}

In his reign as Regent and Emperor, Emperor Haylä-Sellassé steadily undermined the power of the traditional forces and promoted the authority and bureaucratic apparatus of the central government. Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, unlike Emperor Minelik II, therefore, succeeded in centralizing political power so well that his personal writ ran untrammeled from the palace down to the Čeqašum, the lowest organ of government authority.\textsuperscript{45} The church, the regional nobility and the military all have yielded to the inexorable political pressure from the centre.\textsuperscript{46} This was, nevertheless, completely fulfilled after 1941 when the Emperor succeeded in fashioning a modern bureaucracy, armed force, police and a security branch. The Emperor thus routed the regional ruling houses.\textsuperscript{47} The imperial force directly under the control of the Emperor became stronger than the regional armies, and became an instrument of the state. The nobility lost its original character as a military aristocracy. Thus centralization that began during the era of Emperor Tewodros II was nearly completed during the reign of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé.

5.2 The Attitude of the Tigrean Rival Chiefs to the Revolt of Ras Gugsa Wälé and to the Public Trial of Ras Haylu Täklä-Haymanot.

The year 1930 was critical for Ras Täffäri. The Ogaden was in disorder and in the autumn of 1929 there was a serious rising of the peoples of Raya Azäbo\textsuperscript{48} and the Afar.\textsuperscript{49} The northern Rases also took advantage of the situation to defy the central government. Ras Gugsa
Wälé who ruled Bägémeder and who had long been a thorn in the side of Ras Täfäri rebelled. *Ras* Seyum in Tigray and *Ras* Haylu in Gojjam also proved disloyal to the government.  

*Ras* Gugsa Wälé, Queen Zäwditu’s husband, felt much aggrieved at *Ras* Täfäri, collected an army and was prepared to march on the capital in a bid for the throne abetted by the Italians in Eritrea and by *Ras* Haylu and *Ras* Seyum. *Ras* Haylu sent him some two hundred pack animals as a token of sympathy. *Ras* Haylu and *Ras* Seyum proved disloyal to the central government by showing sympathy to *Ras* Gugsa. Endowed with great guile than *Ras* Gugsa Wälé, *Ras* Haylu and *Ras* Seyum urged him to a confrontation and were standing by ready to give support to the revolt. Ultimately both were bought off before the insurrection even got under way.

*Ras* Gugsa Araya and *Ras* Seyum were invited to cooperate against the rebellion of *Ras* Gugsa Wälé by the central government. But they moved very slowly to respond to the request of the Emperor. According to the Italian Consul, P. Franca, the attitude of *Ras* Seyum towards the rebellion of *Ras* Gugsa Wälé was that of “indifference”. On one hand he wanted to do his best to be seen faithful in the eyes of Negus Täfäri and on the other hand he was slowly mobilizing his forces to get time to see the result of the conflict to give support to *Ras* Gugsa Wälé. As regards to *Ras* Gugsa, who has long been counted as Täfäri’s man but frictions have lately arisen over his mistreatment of his wife (the niece of *Ras* Täfäri), an evidence that he had secretly promised help to *Ras* Wälé was also discovered, although Erlich wrote that *Ras* Gugsa Araya had proved his loyalty to the future Emperor. *Negus* Täfäri sent the War Minister, *Ras* Mulugéta, north and dispatched an aeroplane, the first to be used in Ethiopia, to the region. *Ras* Gugsa was killed
after his troops had been dispersed by the bombs and machine-guns of the French biplanes. By the end of March 1930 the rebellion was over. The defeat and death of Ras Gugsa Wälé, at the Battle of Ančäm on 31 March 1930, was followed by the appointment of Ras Kassa Haylu, Negus Täfäri's relative and most trusted confidant as governor of Bägémeder.

As the province of Bägémeder had become under the control of the central government with the fall of Ras Wälé, the Emperor's campaign against the provincial autonomy seemed to be approaching success in the north. When the war was over Negus Täfäri was careful to express gratitude to all who had aided him and was specially generous in his praise of Ras Gugsa Araya and Ras Seyum Mängäša, although he can have harboured few illusions concerning the part which they had played in the war against Ras Gugsa Wälé. From that time onwards Ras Seyum had gradually come round to the side of Negus Täfäri by understanding that the introduction of progressive ideas in Ethiopia can hardly be resisted and was, in fact, the country's only hope of preserving its independence.

At the same time Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa, both once again in Addis Ababa, found another opportunity to express loyalty to the Emperor. The opportunity was furnished by the public trial of Ras Haylu Täklä-Haymanot, the hereditary prince of Gojjam, for engineering the escape of Lej Iyasu from prison.

Negus Täklä-Haymanot of Gojjam and Ras Mikael (Lej Iyasu's father), it is said, were in good terms. Ras Haylu who knew very well this relation, won the friendship of Ras Mikael by being one of those who initiated the idea that Ras Mikael be crowned Negus. During the short reign of Lej Iyasu, Negus Mikael's friendship proved valuable to Ras Haylu. Ras Haylu's eldest
daughter, Wäyzäro Säbläwängël, had been married to Lej Iyasu. When she was divorced from Lej Iyasu she had been sent back to her father and brought back with her the only child of the marriage (a daughter).

When in 1916 Negus Mikael attempted to bring back to power his deposed son, Lej Iyasu, Ras Haylu promised to line up with him against the coup makers. At the last moment, probably realizing the hopelessness of the task, he, however, chose to remain neutral. But as his intentions were not secret he incurred the enmity of the new occupants of power at the centre, particularly that of the Regent, Ras Täfäri.

After the coronation of Täfäri as Emperor Haylä-Sellассé, of the powerful Ethiopian nobles who were forced to submit to the constitution, Ras Haylu was not prepared to give in without a fight. Ras Haylu discontented by the centralization process was engaged in secret dealings with such powerful rulers as Ras Seyum of Tigray and Ras Gugsa of Bäгémeder in an effort to strengthen his position and be rewarded the title of Negus. He complemented this with the amassing of wealth through the imposition of various types of taxes and levies on his subjects. It was even said that he had established contact with the Italians, probably through their consulate at Däbrä-Marqos. It was true that Ras Haylu was accustomed to show much autonomous in his own territorial administration and had on severa occasions ignored orders from Ras Täfäri. Angered by the act of the Emperor, for taking away of the district of Agäw-Meder from him, Ras Haylu engineered the escape of Lej Iyasu in 1932 from Fečé, hoping to have him back to power, and thereby achieve his goal of becoming Negus of Gojjam, Agäw-Meder and Damot. His actions were, however, discovered that he was implicated in the escape
of *Lej* Iyasu from prison and was arrested and punished his contumacy with disinherittance and to life imprisonment, in April 1932.81

Emperor Haylā-Sellassé was then at liberty to appoint his own officials over Gojjam and proceed with his scheme of centralization.82

Gojjam, which was ruled from the 18th C by its own dynasty and which had been enjoying a certain degree of autonomy in its internal administration83 became, after the imprisonment of *Ras* Haylu, the governorate-general under a direct appointee of the Emperor, *Ras* Imeru Haylā-Sellassé.84 Most of the governors under *Ras* Imeru were direct appointees of the central government, both from Shewa and Gojjam, depending upon the allegiance they showed to the Emperor.85 The year 1932, therefore, marked the end of dynastic rule in Gojjam with the fall of *Ras* Haylu Täklä-Haymanot, the last dynastic ruler of Gojjam. Gojjam, therefore, became, in the words of Christine Sandford, one of "the model provinces" of administrative reforms of Emperor Haylā-Sellassé.86

Although *Ras* Haylu and *Ras* Seyum had a firm firendship,87 both *Ras* Gugsa Araya and *Ras* Seyum did their best to praise the Emperor and to condemn *Ras* Haylu as a traitor deserving capital punishment.88 There were, however, rumours that *Ras* Seyum would shortly receive the fate of *Ras* Haylu.89 The Emperor meanwhile exploited the situation in two ways. He appointed his most trusted man over Gojjam and he further strengthened his position by taking care to publicize *Ras* Seyum's association with *Lej* Iyasu and *Ras* Haylu.90

5.3 Emperor Haylā-Sellassé's Centralization and *Ras* Seyum-*Ras* Gugsa Rivalry
After the death of Ras Sebhat, in 1914, until both Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé and Ras Gugsa died in the early thirties, they and Ras Seyum were involved in constant political machination to influence the central government to grant one of them overlordship of the whole province. Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa, both being the grand-sons of Emperor Yohannes IV and of course considered themselves legitimate claimants to the governorship of Tigray and possible claimants to the imperial throne, remained rivals to the end.

The rival regional chiefs in Tigray were in need of having the title of Negus. It laid with the Emperor to confer the title of Negus which was not heritable. Emperor Yohannes IV crowned Menelik and Täklä-Haymanot Neguses of Shewa and Gojjam respectively. Lej Iyasu crowned his father, Ras Mikael, Negus of Wällo and Tigray. Empress Zäwditu also gave the title of Negus to Ras Täfäri and Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis. Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, however, in conformity with his policy of centralization and his desire to curb the power of the hereditary chiefs has refused to give the title of Negus, thereby disappointed some regional governors in the country and was able to prevent any one of the descendants of Emperor Yohannes IV from becoming totally supreme in Tigray.

By the time of Negus Täfäri’s coronation as Emperor Haylä-Sellassé the only two remaining candidates for supremacy over Tigray were the two grandsons of Emperor Yohannes IV. These were Ras Gugsa Araya and Ras Seyum Mängäša. Except in one episode, in 1902 and 1903, when they fought Däjjač Abreha Araya at Āddi-Šum-Dehun (near Mäqällä) and when they joined hands to invade Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé's territory in Adwa and Šerä, Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa remained sworn rivals to the end. When Emperor Menelik's heir, Lej Iyasu,
competed against the central government, *Ras* Seyum was favourable to *Lej* Iyasu. Following *Lej* Iyasu's defeat *Ras* Seyum was slow to discern the growing power of *Ras* Täfäri. *Ras* Seyum failed to surrender *Lej* Iyasu when *Lej* Iyasu was trying to find shelter in his territory, and was consequently to spend most of the 1920s as an exile in the capital. Gugsa Araya in contrast was made *Ras* (in February 1918) by the central government, with which he continued to ally himself during the 1920s.\(^{102}\) Having married the niece of *Ras* Täfäri, Yäšašwärq Yelma, in 1921,\(^ {103}\) he captured *Lej* Iyasu and handed him over to the future Emperor.\(^ {104}\)

*Ras* Täfäri considered *Ras* Seyum as a threat. At a time when many of the powerful nobles were merely awaiting a suitable opportunity to unseat him, *Ras* Täfäri decided to make a tour of the Near East and Europe, and the problem of his authority being undermined in his absence was met by the expedient of splitting his rivals and taking the most dangerous of them to Europe with him. Thus when *Ras* Täfäri sailed to Djibouti in April 1924 his entourage included *Ras* Seyum Mängäša, *Ras* Haylu, *Däjjäč* Gäbrä-Sellassé, etc.\(^ {105}\) *Ras* Haylu was known to be obsessed with the idea of becoming *Negus* of Gojjam, as a step towards becoming Emperor and *Ras* Seyum, a grand-son of Emperor Yohannes IV, was also suspected of having ambitions towards the occupation of *Ras* Täfäri's seat.

There were, however, different opinions about the reason why *Ras* Täfäri wanted *Ras* Seyum to accompany him in the tour. Powell and Rey explain that *Ras* Täfäri was advised and warned that his enemies would almost certainly seize the opportunity offered by his absence from the country to plot against him and the proposed journey (tour) might quite conceivably result in his deposition.\(^ {106}\) *Ras* Tafari, therefore, according to the words of powell, "invited the
more dangerous of his enemies to accompany him—a tempting invitation which, as they know ful-
well, it was not safe to refuse.”

Although some other sources tried to explain that Ras Seyum’s accompaniment of Ras Täfäri in his tour to Europe as a reflection of his importance and influence at the central government and as Yäkber Täkätay (a dignity’s follower), considering the political situations at the time it seems, however, correct to think that Ras Täfäri wanted Ras Seyum to accompany him, in his tour, because he had suspected him of rebellion, and found it necessary to watch and keep Ras Seyum close to him. Not entirely sure of his position, Ras Täfäri after his coronation as Negus was again accompanied on his trip of convalescence by Ras Seyum and Ras Haylu, in January 1928, when he was ordered by a doctor to go to Djibouti for a chance of air when he suffered from a bad attack of influenza.

In 1926 having married into the Shewan elite by espousing in 1926 Wäyzäro Asädä Asfaw (his first wife had died in 1924/25) Ras Seyum was, however, reinstated over western Tigray with Adwa as his capital.

On 14 April 1930, Negus Täfäri ordered the two Tigrean rival chiefs to report to Addis Ababa for the coronation. The coming of Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa to the capital for the coronation together with the practically all the other important chiefs of the country was a most obivious sign of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé’s supremacy. Belatedly understanding the situation, Ras Seyum ordered (in his absence) a huge ceremony to be held in Adwa on coronation day, at which speeches flatering the new Emperor were to be made.
Beyond the symbolic importance of the chiefs' coming to the capital, the occasion served Emperor Haylā-Sellassé practically. The two Tigrean chiefs and many of the other provincial chiefs were forced to stay until the proclamation, on 16 July 1931, of the country's first modern constitution (which was in itself a step towards centralization at the expense of their power).\[115\]

*Ras* Seyum and *Ras* Gugsa Araya signed the constitution of 1931. The signing of the constitution implies the acceptance and confirmity, by the signators, of Emperor Haylā-Sellasse's line as the only legitimate line descended from the dynasty of Menelik I, and the weakening of the position of the regional nobility, since its primary aim was to lay down the principles of imperial control over local and central government. *Ras* Seyum, Šum Tämben Gābrā-Mādhin and *Dājjač* Kassa Sebhāt were made members of the Senate, by which the Emperor wanted to watch and keep close to him in Addis Ababa and weaken their direct control and influence in the province.\[116\]

Meanwhile in Tigray itself, the Emperor started exploiting the absence of *Ras* Seyum and *Ras* Gugsa to strengthen his indirect control of the central government. In June 1931 a postal service was established in Western Tigray.\[117\] In October 1931 the Emperor's Consul in Asmara, *Nägadrasy* Wädajo Ali, was given imperial right to re-organize the Tigray customs and to control its monopoly of alcohol.\[118\] More significantly he was also given jurisdiction over the Holy City of Aksum, which had been previously under *Ras* Gugsa's jurisdiction. While the two chiefs were in the capital, the Emperor also exploited the fighting that broke out between the followers of the two chiefs, in their absence, and used it as an opportunity throughout the 1930s to send various
envoys to take charge of Aksum. Another important event was the appointment of an Amhara, Abunä Yesaq, as a bishop to the province.\textsuperscript{119}

It was only in November 1931 that Ras Gugsa was permitted to return to Tigray, after accepting that his deputies be appointed by the Emperor.\textsuperscript{120} On his way back to Mäqällä he passed as usual through Asmara, but this time he started building friendly relations with the Italians. Ras Gugsa Araya, renowned in the 1920s for his anti-Italian attitude, was changing his orientation in the face of Emperor Haylä-Sellasse's growing centralism.\textsuperscript{121}

Meanwhile, Ras Seyum, as one of the chiefs of Tigray, was competing with his contemporaries to get favour and influence with in the central government. Ras Seyum who was also indecisive like his father, Ras Mängäša, competed with other chiefs until he held a superior post to theirs. It was the desire of the chiefs to be superior over their countrymen even if they were under the control of the central government.\textsuperscript{122} Ras Seyum was, however, confined to the capital unable to return to Adwa. Aware of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé's suspicions he now did his utmost to prove his loyalty. He made sure that information from Adwa on the coronation of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé as well as on any ceremonies and speeches praising the Emperor would be published in the newspaper, Berhanena Sälam.\textsuperscript{123}

Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa Araya were always members of opposing factions. From the fact that both Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa were descendants of Emperor Yohannes IV there sprung a deadly personal rivalry, each of them did not want to accept one another as supreme, both politically and military.\textsuperscript{124} Their bickerings were sources of great anxiety to Emperor Haylä-Sellassé which at once had realized were a great safeguard to him. While he was anxious that
they should not combine against him, and to that extent was glad of their rivalry, it was a great
hindrance to his plan for reform that the two governors would never co-operate.\textsuperscript{125} The co-
operation and unity of \textit{Ras} Seyum and \textit{Ras} Gugsa was desired neither by the central government
nor by the Italians since both wanted to secure their rule without any opposition in the area.\textsuperscript{126} The
Emperor, however, never broke faith with either of the rival chiefs or allowed one to grow
stronger at the expense of the other. Yet in all the intrigues, which surrounded him he always
managed to think one move ahead of his opponents.\textsuperscript{127} He, therefore, appointed the two cousins
each governor of one half of the province of Tigray. \textit{Ras} Seyum was given control of western
half of Tigray while \textit{Ras} Gugsa took the eastern half.\textsuperscript{128}

\textit{Ras} Gugsa and \textit{Ras} Seyum, then, knew that their chances to become \textit{Negus} and real
masters in Tigray lay in the hands of the central government. The two rival chiefs, therefore,
attempted to gain popularity and influence in the central government in different directions and to
win the favour and support of the government at the expense of one another.\textsuperscript{129} Each one of them
was watching one another's activity for a chance to outbid each other in demonstrating loyalty to
the central government. But their loyalties had several times shifted as a result of palace
manoeuvres. If one of them received any mark of friendship from either the Emperor or his
opponents, the other immediately made overtures to the opposite. Thus, it was never possible to
be certain on which side either of the Tigrean chiefs was to be found, while the presence of Italy
in the background added yet another imponderable, to what was already an impossible tangled
problem.\textsuperscript{130}
On 25 September 1932, the Emperor ordered the two Tigrean chiefs to return to their respective territories in Tigray. Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa were the only hereditary chiefs, in the empire, left in practical control of the province of Tigray at this time. Both were also closely connected to the Emperor by the marriage of their children. The ostensible reason for their departure was said to be primarily due to the desire to represent the Emperor in receiving the king of Italy during his visit to Eritrea, should he decided to visit the Ethio-Eritrean frontier during his forthcoming stay in Eritrea. Ras Gugsa and Ras Seyum had been, however, sent back to their provinces not only to great the king of Italy on the frontier but also to be present there with large armed force to show the Italian king that Ethiopia had large army.

While Ras Gugsa Araya had only been in Addis Ababa for a few months, having come here for the wedding of his son to one of the Emperor's daughters, the departure of Ras Seyum has of interest in as much as he had been in Addis Ababa uninterruptedly since before the coronation of Emperor Haylā-Sellāssé. The fact that the Emperor had allowed both the Tigrean Rases to leave Addis Ababa might be taken as an indication of the fact that he had felt that their loyalty was not so open to suspicion at that time. It is also hardly conceivable that the Emperor would have allowed them to depart if he had not been sure of them. It could also be gone further to say that by the two marriages which had been taken place, between their children, the Emperor had held pawns for their good behaviour.

Emperor Haylā-Sellassié in his centralization process, unable to impose an effective centralization over Tigray, had paid some attentions to the hereditary position of Tigray which was ruled by the two grand-sons of Emperor Yohannes IV, Ras Gugsa Araya and Ras Seyum,
and where opposition and rebellion was most likely to appear.\textsuperscript{140} He attempted to achieve an internal balance of power and finally succeeded in preventing any one of Yohannes IV's descendants from becoming \textit{Negus} without resorting to force but through flexible diplomacy and marriage connections.\textsuperscript{141} Although \textit{Ras} Gugsa and \textit{Ras} Seyum represented traditional provincialism, Emperor Haylâ-Sellassé felt that their mutual opposition effectively neutralized their threat to him.\textsuperscript{142} The attempt by the descendants of Emperor Yohannes IV to influence the central government to grant one of them the overlordship of the whole province or any one to be supreme in the province was not, therefore, succeeded.\textsuperscript{143}

Although Tigray was not affected directly by centralization, at least her hereditary chiefs now seemingly had strong interest in the constructed marriage connections. The Tigrean chiefs had, therefore, maintained some sort of political autonomy from the central government up to the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian war, though they did not have the power of absolute decision over Tigrean affairs.\textsuperscript{144} Tigray had, therefore, remained largely outside the direct administration of the central government until 1935.\textsuperscript{145} Unfortunately, for Ethiopia, this preservation of traditional patterns invited foreign involvement that the system was too weak to withstand.\textsuperscript{146}

\textbf{5.4 Tigrean Chiefs' Rivalry and the Marriage Connections with the Leading Members of the Central Government}

Marriage connection was an ancient practice and was one of the significant factors in the creation of close affinities between the important families and for the building of political loyalty in the reign of Emperor Menelik II. It was often used by political leaders to enlist the support of outstanding personalities as part of their general policy of pacification and consolidation. It was
equally regarded by the notables as a means of winning the favour of their superiors and of strengthening positions already held, as well as of acquiring and maintaining economic benefits. The outcome, nevertheless, was not always satisfactory. Attempts were, therefore, made to tie the Tigrean chiefs with the Shewan ruling house through the traditional mechanism of marriage alliances, in the period under discussion.

Emperor Menelik II married off his daughter, Zäwditu, to the son of Emperor Yohannes IV, young Araya-Selllassé, in October 1882, for political reasons, while she was about six and a half years old. Emperor Yohannes IV tried to put a stop to the continual trouble by marrying his son to the daughter of Emperor Menelik II. By this marriage it was hoped to establish a strong dynasty has not Zäwditu's husband, Araya-Sellassé, died in 1888. This, however, made the marriage alliance useless and the strife be continued.

Many of Emperor Menelik's previous marriages were prolific, but none of the male offsprings survived. The question of succession was, therefore, a subject of endless speculation and prediction. After his coronation Emperor Menelik also arranged several marriages, probably hoping thereby to secure the throne through the increased loyalty of some of the notables as well as by getting a grand-son as a successor. He, for instance, recognized a twenty-three years old girl, Šäwarägga, as his daughter and married her off to Ras Mikael in 1892.

Following 1892, Emperor Menelik II himself did not appear to have been very active in marital politics. However, his wife Empress Taytu brought the art to a new peak of refinement. She raised a few of her kinsmen, the most outstanding being Ras Wäle, Ras Gugsa Wäle, to high political positions and created a network of conjugal and blood affinities through out the
Empire. As a result Wäyzäro Käfäy, daughter of Ras Wälé and niece of Empress Taytu, was married to Ras Mängäša Yohannes, following the latter's submission in 1893, after he was made to divorce his former wife, Wäyzäro Tafäsäč.

In June 1903, when Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé went to Addis Ababa he was welcomed by Emperor Menelik II and established strong and lasting relationship with the Emperor. Recognizing the importance of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé and as an expression of his affection Emperor Menelik offered Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé Wäyzäro Amaräč, one of his grand nieces, the daughter of Ras Wäldä-Gyorgis, although she was still the wife of Däjjač Damțe and was the mother of a daughter of seven years old. Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé married Wäyzäro Amaräč by divorcing his former wife, Wäyzäro Mäsäläč, the mother of Lej Täklä-Haymanot Gäbrä-Sellassé and Däjjač Yohannes. According to Annaratone, Emperor Menelik II called Wäyzäro Amaräč and said:

Tu lascierai tuo marito e la tua bambina ed andrai sposa di deggiacc Gabra Sellasse, mio governatore del Tigre. Dono a te questo segno della mia alta imperiale attenzione e benevolenza mettendoti a lato di una così grande, ricca e potente regione.

You will leave your husband and your daughter and you will marry Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé, my governor of Tigray. I offer this to you as a sign of my high imperial attention and benevolence in putting you at the side of a chief of such a big, rich and powerful region.

This infact indicates to us how much Emperor Menelik needs Gäbrä-Sellassé's friendship either to secure his rule in Tigray or some other reasons.

In 1909 Däjjač Abreha Araya was also married to an eleven years old girl, Yätmañu, niece of Ras Mikael. In May 1909 Lej Iyasu was also married to a six years old daughter of
Ras Mängāša Yohannes and Wäyzäro Käfäy Wälé, named Ṣegé-Roman Mängäša who was renamed Aster Mängäša, latter on. This and other marriages were made in order to mollify Tigray and to represent her hereditary family in the court, in case, Lej Iyasu succeeded Emperor Menelik II to power.

Even after Empress Taytu was stripped of her power, her methods of rule continued to be practiced. Ras Täsämma, and subsequently Lej Iyasu, followed her policy and techniques in the formation of alliances to strengthen their power. Lej Iyasu himself also took the daughter of Ras Haylu and then confirmed his father-in-law in the governorship of Gojjam.

When Ras Täfäri became regent Ras Seyum was ambitious of a marriage arrangement between his son, Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq, and Ras Täfäri's daughter, Tänäñärq. Ras Seyum had, therefore, asked Ras Täfäri in 1917 for the marriage arrangement between Däjjač Kassa and Tänäñärq. It was, however, by ignoring the marriage arrangement that Däjjač Kassa Abba Yelaq rebelled in 1918. Even after he started his rebellion there were efforts to quell the rebellion, by calling Däjjač Kassa to give up his rebellion in return for the marriage arrangement. This, however, did not deter Däjjač Kassa from his rebellion. Thus the marriage arrangement was not practically implemented due to Däjjač Kassa's refusal.

Wäyzäro Yāšašwärq Yelma, grand-daughter of Ras Mekonnen was also married off to Ras Gugsa Araya in 1921. Ras Gugsa divorced off his wife Gäzačeñ Gäbrä-Hiwät, who was from Samrä-Sāḥarti and married to Wäyzäro Yāšašwärq Yelma. He, however, divorced her and they did not have a child from the marriage.
In 1926 *Ras* Seyum Mängäša was married to Wäyzäro Aṣādā Asfaw, who was the daughter of the grand-son of *Negus* Sahlä-Sellassé: Asfaw Dargé Sahlä-Sellassé, after the death of his wife, Tāwabäē Mikael in 1925.

After Empress Zäwditu's death, Emperor Häylä-Sellassé found himself with the same problem that had exercised the mind of Emperor Menelik II: how to keep peace with the descendants of Emperor Yohannes IV. The two claimants to the overlordship of Tigray were the cousins, *Ras* Seyum and *Ras* Gugsa Araya. Both were in addition possible claimants to the Imperial throne. From this fact a deadly personal rivalry and the scramble for provincial positions has sprung and complicated their relations, which Emperor Haylä-Sellassé at once realized was a great safeguard to him. He has also better acquainted with the situation in the country than to think about trying to further humiliate *Ras* Seyum and *Ras* Gugsa. Understanding the growing tendency of the Italians to achieve subversion, Emperor Haylä-Sellassé found it advisable to endeavour to reach at a constructive compromise with *Ras* Seyum and *Ras* Gugsa to be achieved by an old Ethiopian political tradition to bind two of the families of Emperor Yohannes IV to him through intermarriages. Emperor Haylä-Sellassé's awareness of the potential trouble and anger from Tigray by *Ras* Seyum and *Ras* Gugsa, due to the depriving of their legitimate patrimony made him to placate them by marriage alliances to the Shewan family by bonds of matrimony. As a result, marriage alliances were arranged by the Emperor to build a sort of compromise between him and the descendants of Yohannes IV through the marriage of his two children to the children of the two grand-sons of Yohannes IV. In joining the Emperor with marriage alliances the Tigrean chiefs must have expected higher offices and other similar appointments by the Emperor.
On 5 May 1932, in a European-style royal ceremony, the Crown Prince Asfa-Wäsän wedded to Ras Seyum's daughter Wäyzäro Wälätä- Israel. The speeches made on the occasion emphasized the significance of the event. Asfa-Wäsän was the officially proclaimed heir, thus the house of Yohannes IV was again to have a share in the Emperorship. Emperor Haylä-Sellassé was said to be paying an old Shewan debt: in 1882 Yohannes IV had married his son Araya-Sellassé to Negus Menelik's daughter, Zäwditu. The fact that the bride groom, Asfa-Wäsän, was a sixteen-years old boy and the bride (who was the widow of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé) already had two children, did not bode well for the future of the marriage. Nevertheless it was supposed to lay the future constructive coexistence between the Tigrean chiefs and the Emperor. According to Mosley, this marriage arrangement was:

... a piece of dynastic calculation which took no consideration on the Prince's feeling or, of course, of Seyum's daughter. The idea was to bind the whole of Tigray close to the Emperor and to Shewa.

By marrying his daughter to the Crown Prince, Ras Seyum looked forward to the advantages of sharing a grand-child with the Emperor, and hoped that if ever there was going to be a Tigrean Negus, he would be the man.

Ras Gugsa felt defeated and humiliated because of the marriage of Ras Seyum's daughter to the Crown Prince and asked the Emperor for a marriage of his daughter to his son, Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa.

Many of my informants informed me that Emperor Haylä-Sellassé (Ras Täfäri at that time) had promised Däjjač Kassa Sebhat (governor of Āgamā after 1914) for an engagement with his daughter, Zänäbawärq, while both the couples were in their childhood. Knowing this
well but due to his eagerness to bind his son with the daughter of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, Ras Gugsa decided to make an intrigue to have the promise for marriage arrangement between the son of Ras Sebhat and the Emperor's daughter futile. According to the informants, Ras Gugsa, therefore, went to Däjjač Kassa Sebhat well prepared for the intrigue that he wanted to make, and "advised" him against the promised marriage and told him that he would, instead, give him his own daughter for marriage, uncommon to the existing custom that a girl's family asked the boy's family for marriage arrangement. Däjjač Kassa, according to the same source, as an expression of his respect to Ras Gugsa and as it was not the custom of the period to refuse accepting such an offer from a "respected family" such as Ras Gugsa, replied in the affirmative. Ras Gugsa, therefore, made Däjjač Kassa Sebhat, immediately, sign for his acceptance of the marriage arrangement. Having the signed document Ras Gugsa went to the Emperor and asked him for his daughter's hand for a marriage to his son, Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa. According to the informants, when the Emperor replied that he had no daughter which he could give him for marriage to his son, Ras Gugsa asked for Princess Zänäbäwärq. When the Emperor told Ras Gugsa that he had already promised Däjjač Kassa for a marriage with her, Ras Gugsa replied that Däjjač Kassa had already made an arrangement for a marriage with his daughter and showed to the Emperor the document which was signed by Däjjač Kassa for the marriage arrangement with the daughter of Ras Gugsa. The informants further state that annoyed by the action of Däjjač Kassa the Emperor allowed for a marriage arrangement to be made between his daughter, Princess Zänäbäwärq and the son of Ras Gugsa Araya, Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa.

As evidence of complete equality between the chiefs (Ras Gugsa and Ras Seyum) and to further stabilize the situation by maintaining the balance of power in Tigray the Emperor's
second daughter, Princess Zänäbëwärq, was, therefore, given in marriage to Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa. On 16 June 1932 in a similar pompous ceremony the thirty-two years old bride groom married the Emperor's beloved fourteen years old daughter. Mosley commented also on this marriage alliance by stating that it was arranged "to soothe Hailesellassie Gugsa's resentment" that "the Emperor gave him the title of Däjjazmač and something else-the gift of his youngest daughter in marriage." The aim of the Emperor to bind the two grand-sons of Emperor Yohannes IV, through the marriage alliances, however, had little effect on their loyalty and did not abate Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa's ambition and anger. The Princess, Zänäbëwärq, died from influenza, on 25 March 1933, a few months after she and her husband arrived at Mäqällä. The funeral ceremony was conducted in Addis Ababa; uncommon to the existing custom that funeral ceremony of a wife should be conducted in her husband's home. This was interpreted as a reflection of the Emperor's extreme displeasure with Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa.

The marriage alliance between Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa and Princess Zänäbëwärq did not proceed normally from its start. The absence of luxury of the palace, the development of a cruel and neglectful behaviour of Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa towards her, all made the Princess unhappy. The Princess was thoughtful of the fact that her happiness in the palace had been sacrificed for political reasons that she was prepared to do her duty. The Emperor knew all the conditions but took no measure fearing that it might stir up trouble with the Princess.
mutually hostile, each of whom married into the Emperor's family and each aiming at obtaining his support to overcome his rival and become negus of Tigray. In a span of a few months the carefully balanced arrangement was, however, destroyed: first Princess Zänäbäwärq died and then Ras Gugsa Araya.

The death of the Emperor's daughter, Zänäbäwärq, had ended the marriage connection with Däjjač Haylā-Selassé Ggsa. It also ended the Emperor's need to create a mutually neutralizing balance between Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa. The balance was, therefore, destroyed and the traditional power struggle continued which the Italians took advantage of the state of affairs to win Däjjač Haylā-Selassé Ggsa to their side.

The Emperor's need to bind the families of Ras Seyum with his own family did not end up with only the marriage ties between the Crown Prince and Le'elt Wälätä-Israel. The son of Ras Seyum, Ras Mängäša Seyum, was also married to the grand-daughter of the Emperor, Princess Ayda Dästa, on 30 January 1938 [22 Tirr 1930 E.C]. Princess Ayda Dästa is the daughter of Princess Tänañäwärq and Ras Dasta Damţew.

The marriage alliance between the Crown Prince and Le'elt Wälätä-Israel was, however, ended in 1944 when the Crown Prince, Asfa-Wässän, divorced her as they had no son and heir, and married Wäyzäro Mádfäryaśwärq Abäbä in April 1945.
CHAPTER SIX

THE TIGREAN CHIEFS' RIVALRY AND ITS IMPACT ON ITALIAN INVASION OF ETHIOPIA

6.1 General Italian Policy on Ethiopia

Different sources attempt to explain the Ethio-Italian relations and the role this relation played to the internal rivalries. After the Battle of Dogali the Italians resorted to diplomacy, and in their attempt to make Ethiopia an Italian protectorate, tried to exploit Tigrean-Shewan rivalries for power.¹ After their defeat at the Battle of Adwa the Italians had briefly followed a policy of retrenchment in relation to their colonial interests in North-East Africa,² although they never forgot the ignominy of their defeat.³ Italy under Prime Minister Marchase di Rudini reduced her colonial budget by more than half and renounced her policy of expansion which was energetically being followed by Francisco Crispi. These changes, however, did not last long that the Italian changing policies and the love-hate relationship with Ethiopia reoccurred at different times.⁴

The Italian policy makers, after the Battle of Adwa, faced a major dilemma between the contradictory options in their relation with Ethiopia. The first was an orientation towards Ethiopian Emperors, aimed at achieving Italian strategic goals in Ethiopia through diplomacy (pacific approach) and in co-existence with the centralization process in Ethiopia. This policy was identified as a Shoan Policy (Politica Scioana).⁵ The other option was a more aggressive design: the policy of subversion in the north which was identified as a Tigrean policy (Politica Tigrina), since Tigray was the main target of this policy.⁶ Politica Tigrina was aimed at creating buffer zones between Italian positions in the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia's centre by encouraging
provincialism; to promote decentralization through subversion; and encouraging Ethiopian power game and making it an instrument for Italian influence and penetration.

The Italian Colonial Governor of Eritrea and the Colonial Office were the supporters of the Politica Tigrina. Antonio Baldissera and later Corrado Zoli were doing their best for the subversive option. Corrado Zoli was also supported by Emilo De Bono (A Minister of Colonies), himself dedicated to Politica Tigrina. The Politica Scioana was being followed by the Italian Foreign Ministry and the Italian Legation in Addis Ababa. Pietro Antonelli and Giuliano Cora, the Italian Foreign Minister to Ethiopia from 1926, pursued the Politica Scioana. According to Erlich, Cora saw Ras Täfäri a leader who deserves Italian support for his centralization process in the fields such as communication and banking, which culminated in the friendly agreement signed between Italy and Ethiopia, on 2 August 1928. Patrino Di Manchi, who replaced Cora in 1930, also followed the same line until his dismissal in 1932.

A more significant aspect of the history of Tigray was the rivalries of the sub regional chiefs and warlords over the whole province. They wanted to maintain their hereditary position vis-a-vis the central government and strengthen their hold and influence over their followers through co-operations with the Italian authorities in Eritrea. Indeed, particularly all the prominent post Mätäma Tigrean chiefs, at one stage or another, joined hands with the Italians seeking alliance or aid against the central government or against their local Tigrean rivals. This was an important aspect of the then existing Ethiopian political reality. It was also a means for the Tigrean rival chiefs to fulfil their old aim of becoming undisputed rulers of Tigray.
In the northern provinces of Ethiopia (Tigray, Bägéméder and Gojjam) the long standing feudal rivalry between the hereditary chiefs and the central government was rekindled and manipulated by the Italians, whereby many of the rival chiefs, at one time or another, capitulated to the Italian interests in their bid to restore power taken away from them by the central government.¹⁷

As his main interest lay, of course, in Tigray, Corrado Zoli, a sworn fascist governor of Eritrea, was doing his best to build subversive options backed by the Minister of Colonies, Emilo de Bono, himself a dedicated follower of Politica Tigrina. As a result, Corrado Zoli tried to promote relations with Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa. In April 1930 when they passed through Asmara, on their way to Negus Täfäri’s coronation ceremony in Addis Ababa, he tried to smooth the relation between Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa. This was in order to pave the way for his policy of Politica Tigrina.¹⁸ The Italians were equally embarrassed by the rivalries of Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa Araya, for it was quite clear to the Italian authorities in Eritrea that the refusal of the two chiefs of Tigray to act together in any way would be a great hinderance in the penetration either peacefully or militarily, of the province in the Eritrean border. If one of the chiefs was to be won over by the Italians, for instance, that would be sufficient to make the other their implacable enemy. It was, therefore, good policy on the part of the Italian governor at the port of embarkation to attempt reconciliation between the two lords (Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa).¹⁹

As part of the policy of Politica Tigrina Corrado Zoli played a part in fomenting the revolt of Ras Gugsa Wällé²⁰ and the Italians in general played a role to trigger off an uprising in Tigray
and other parts of Ethiopia so as to precipitate the fall of the Emperor and the Ethiopian Empire.  

The two Italian policies (Politica Tigrina and Politica Scioana) in Ethiopia competed with each other, though the emphasis was sometimes shifting towards one or the other. The period from 1927 up to 1932, however, saw the apex of the confusion of the Politica Tigrina and Politica Scioana. In the early 1932 Italy, however, had abandoned her policy of Politica Scioana instead adopted the policy of subversion. Paterno Di Manchi was called to Rome and was not replaced until 1933.

The emphasis on the policy of subversion, according to Erlich, was due to the growing of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé's centralization and modernization policies which would not tolerate fascist Italian interests. By his centralization, Emperor Haylä-Sellassé wanted to change Ethiopia's traditional political fluidity and to stop the constant competition between the centre and the various provincial chiefs which facilitated foreign penetration. The desire of the Italians for an exclusive economic monopoly, and using Ethiopian territory to unite Italian-Somaliland with Eritrea by means of railways; and their encouragement for a separate development of Eritrea, apart from Ethiopia were also the interest of the Italians.

Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Colonies were, therefore, asked to prepare reports assessing the options in the horn. In 1932 De Bono, who was to play an important role in shaping Italy's policy, left for the region. His report made a strong case for intensive subversion. Benito Mussolini recommended an intensive subversive activity to be conducted under the co-ordination of a Political Office, centred at the Addis Ababa Legation,
and an Intelligence Office co-ordinating activities of the various Italian consulates at Adwa, Dässé, Däbrä-Marqos, Deré-Dawa and Gondar. The primary agents of the policy of Italian penetration were the Italian consuls in Ethiopia. They acted on the orders of an especially constituted political bureau, under the supervision of the Italian Military High Command in East Africa. The head of the Officio Politico [Political Bureau] was Colonel Vittorio Ruggero who until 1934 had been the military attaché in Addis Ababa. Centers for Italian activities were located throughout the Empire. The Italian consulates opened at various times, in the early 20th c., in Adwa, Däbrä-Marqos and Dässé, played an important role in this policy of subversion, as well as in the gathering of vital political and military intelligence. Wherever there was a record of discontent and wherever it seemed that chiefs or native population would be susceptible to bribes or promises, there the Italians sent their propaganda. Greenfield also explains that Italy had appointed many consuls and agents in places where there was no even a single Italian or any reason for their presence. These people carried on intensive propaganda, and a vital political and military intelligence activity and stir up feelings in different parts of the country, against the central government. Italian propaganda by encouraging separatism and playing on local antagonism, inherent in Ethiopia, to the central government also offered a vision of a free, richer life under Italian rule. Above all the Italians tried to make sure that provincial chiefs would not lead their people against Italy and the outlying inhabitants would not join the arms raised by loyal Rases to support the Emperor's guerrilla force in a war with Italy.

The Italians aware of the ethnic and religious divisions, that christian Eritreans were Tigreans and not Amhara, worked to their benefit as they encouraged the separate development of Eritrea apart from Ethiopia. For about thirty years, before the fascist invasion of Ethiopia in
1935, the Italians, therefore, assiduously wooed the Tigrean chiefs to prepare the ground for the former's invasion of Ethiopia, in Tigray.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{6.2 Ras Gugsa and the Italians}

Tigray was one of the main targets of the Italian policy of subversion\textsuperscript{36} due to the \textit{Adwa Complex} (Stemming from Italy's 1896 defeat by Ethiopia on Tigrean soil, any further war with Ethiopia must begin with an invasion of Tigray,\textsuperscript{37}) and the existence of the weakest link in the Emperor's chain of command. The Italians, therefore, worked hard to woo the Tigrean chiefs.\textsuperscript{38} Ras Gugsa Araya, especially, has been assiduously courted by the Italians, as he ruled one of the northern areas on which they had their eye, but his dislike and mistrust of the Italians was too deep in the period up to the end of the 1920s.\textsuperscript{39}

\textit{Ras} Gugsa Araya, renowned in the 1920s for his anti-Italian attitude was changing his orientation in the beginning of the 1930s, in the face of Emperor Haylā-Sellassē's growing centralism.\textsuperscript{40} From the beginning of the 1930s he had been friendly with the Italians, and until his death in 1933 the Italians counter-balanced the rivalry between him and \textit{Ras} Seyum Māngāša by supporting \textit{Ras} Gugsa Araya.\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ras} Gugsa had started improving his relations with the Italians in Asmara after the coronation of Emperor Haylā-Sellassē.\textsuperscript{42} The need of \textit{Ras} Gugsa Araya for the establishment of relations with the Italians can be understood from one of the letters written to him by Riccardo Astuto, Eritrean Governor, on 9 February 1932.\textsuperscript{43} (Refer to Appendix XII).

In early 1933 \textit{Ras} Gugsa Araya's health deteriorated. This enabled him to develop his relations more with the Italians in the open, through their medical services.\textsuperscript{44} An Italian Physician, Dr. Piero Lecco, arrived at Māqāllā on 17 February to take care of \textit{Ras} Gugsa and
stayed with him until his death in 1933.\textsuperscript{45} In his letter to Riccardo Astuto, dated 18 \textit{Meyazya} 1925 E.C (in about the last week of April 1933), \textit{Ras} Gugsa Araya explained the role the Italians played to save his life through their medical service and he had expressed his gratitude to Riccardo Astuto for letting Dr. Piero Lecco to treat him.\textsuperscript{46} The content of \textit{Ras} Gugsa's letter to Riccardo Astuto can be seen at Appendix XIII. Dr. Lecco had also submitted a very long report to the Eritrean governor explaining about the treatment he made to \textit{Ras} Gugsa and about \textit{Ras} Gugsa's plan to ally himself with the Eritrean governors.\textsuperscript{47}

6.3 The Death of \textit{Ras} Gugsa and the Continuation of the Rivalry between \textit{Ras} Seyum and \textit{Däjjac} Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa.

\textit{Ras} Gugsa Araya named his son, \textit{Däjjac} Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa, his heir just before he died of syphilis on 26 April 1933.\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Däjjac} Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa, reasonably, expected that he would succeed his father especially as he was the Emperor's son-in-law. The Emperor no longer thought of him as worthy of great trust after the death of his daughter (Princess Zänäbäwärq) that he did not confirm \textit{Ras} Gugsa's deathbed nomination of his son as his heir.\textsuperscript{49} The Emperor was similarly opportunistic to use \textit{Ras} Gugsa Araya's death to continue his relentless programme of centralization of authority.\textsuperscript{50} The Emperor called \textit{Däjjac} Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa to Addis Ababa first to look him over and he must have been also strongly tempted by his coarse manners to disinherit him.\textsuperscript{51}

\textit{Ras} Gugsa's death, therefore, upset the balance on which the Emperor's Tigray arrangement rested. \textit{Däjjac} Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa was no match for \textit{Ras} Seyum. After the death of Princess Zänäbäwärq, the Emperor at once began to favour \textit{Ras} Seyum.\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Däjjac} Haylä-
Sellassé journeyed to Addis Ababa and asked for the extension of his territory and for his father's title of Ras, but without success. A full year of intrigue was, therefore, to pass after the death of Ras Gugsa, before the Emperor could make a decision concerning the territories of the late Ras. Ras Gugsa's territories had been Āgamā, Haramat, Gär'alta, Abärgällä, Saḥarti, Selāwa, Bora, Indärta, Keltā-Awla'illo and Inda-Mākoni. After the death of Ras Gugsa the two Tigrean chiefs (Ras Seyum and Dājjāč Haylā-Sellassé) tried to undermine each other's position and gain the Emperor's favour. Ras Seyum wanted to be offered the whole of the province while Dājjāč Haylā-Sellassé Gugsa worked to obtain, at least, his father's territories. Members of the Central government, however, worked to persuad the Emperor to weaken both Ras Seyum and Dājjāč Haylā-Sellassé Gugsa and install elements of modern administration over Tigray. The Emperor, nevertheless, believed that only traditional leadership could work in Tigray. Of the two rivals the Emperor, however, seemed at first to favour Ras Seyum. Meanwhile Ras Seyum and Dājjāč Haylā-Sellassé started the campaign of defamation, which was customary in such situations.

At this condition, Dājjāč Haylā-Sellassé Gugsa thought that he could gain what he wanted by flattering the Emperor on the one hand and secretly building an Italian option on the other hand. In June 1933, still in Addis Ababa, he wrote confidentially to the governor of Eritrea, Riccardo Astuto, and asked to purchase a house in Asmara. The Italians considered this a step of great significance and finally Dājjāč Haylā-Sellassé Gugsa was secretly permitted to buy a house in Asmara. On the other hand Ras Seyum was also doing his best to prove his loyalty by making speeches flattering the Emperor as the greatest and most enlightened modernizer, and by demonstrating strong anti-Italian feelings and policy. He, however, remained suspect by the
central government that through out 1933 and the first half of 1934 the Emperor sent all sorts of agents to spy on Ras Seyum.59

The Emperor's distrust of Ras Seyum and Däijač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa continued to grow.60 Ras Seyum and Däijač Haylä-Sellassé were in general great worry to the Emperor that Lej Tädla Haylä was sent, in August 1934, to visit Adwa, Aksum and Mäqällä and to spy against Ras Seyum and Däijač Haylä-Sellassé, 61 who were accused of establishing cordial relations with the Italians against Ethiopia at that time.62 And, on 14 March 1935, a special envoy was also arrived at Aksum from Addis Ababa. This envoy was Nägadras Wädajo Ali,63 the former Ethiopian Consul in Asmara and later the Director of the Municipality of Addis Ababa.64 Nägadras Wädajo Ali, who was a sworn enemy of Ras Seyum, was to settle in Adwa and assume imperial responsibility over the whole range of matters. These include political affairs connected to relations with Italy, the telephone and other communications with Addis Ababa; imperial taxes, management of local schools, propaganda in Eritrea among Tigreans and in Tigray itself inorder to promote understanding with the central government, control of war materials and finally general supervision over internal affairs including receiving complaints of the population-in the name of the Emperor.65

Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, in the face of growing Italian threat, thought nothing of trying conclusions with Tigray's traditional leadership. He, therefore, agreed in May 1934 to make Ras Seyum, Emperor Yohannes IV's only surviving grand-son, governor of Tigray in return for the central government's administrative control over the province's finance.66 After hesitating for a long time he also made Ras Seyum Military Commander of the whole province, in May 1934, 67
and enlarged his territory by adding Aksum, Bora, Seläwa, Haramat and Gär'alta at the expense of Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa. On the ground that he was too young and inexperienced to deserve more Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé was officially appointed governor of eastern Tigray on the condition that he would acknowledge his uncle, Ras Seyum, as his overlord: a subordination that infuriated him. This appointment include his governorship over the territories of Indärta, Āgamä, Inda-Mäkoni, Wäjjärat and Azäbo. In times of war he was to be under Ras Seyum's command. Däjjac Kassa Sebh at was also appointed over Keltä-Awla'llo, under Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa. The appointment of Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa over Āgamä might be the cause for the worsening of the relations between him and Däjjac Kassa Sebh at this time.

Although Ras Seyum's financial and economic prestige remained unchanged the new arrangement had increased his political and military prestige in Tigray and in the central government. Ras Seyum, however, lost Sälämt which was given to the governor of Wälqayet. Sälämt had been, until then, under the administration of Ras Seyum.

The political game, in Tigray, was now open again and this time with Italy's purposeful and intensive interference. The rivalry of Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa ended only in Ras Gugsa's death in 1933 was, therefore, perpetuated by Ras Gugsa's son, Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa, after Ras Gugsa's death.

In early May 1934 Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa came to Addis Ababa and visited Conto Vinci. As usual he demonstrated his high cordiality and friendship to the Italians. He expressed his discontent of the Emperor's offer of some of his father's territories to Ras Seyum and needed their return. He further expressed, to Conto Vinci, his being discontented of the Shewans for
their control of all the activities of the country, even in the peripheries, where there were intelligent, educated and able men who could bring good results in the administration of the country.\textsuperscript{81}

On 27 May 1934 Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa also arrived at Asmara, unknown to the representative of the Ethiopian Consul in Asmara, and at the night of 28 May 1934 met secretly with Governor Astuto of Eritrea.\textsuperscript{82} At this time he also declared that he wanted to ally himself with the Italians at the footsteps of his father.\textsuperscript{83} According to the Italian source,\textsuperscript{84} Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa made a long conversation with Astuto and decided to put himself in the service of the Italians and to be loyal to their orders.\textsuperscript{85} Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa in his conversation also told Astuto that in his stay in Addis Ababa he had understood that Emperor Haylä-Sellassé was purposely fomenting hatred among him, Ras Seyum and Däjjac Kassa Sebhat aimed at creating total anarchy in Tigray and when their administration collapsed the Emperor would install Shewans over Tigray.\textsuperscript{86} According to the report of Astuto, Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa wanted to collaborate with the Italians and take orders from them to prevent the \textit{calamity}.\textsuperscript{87}

The fact that Aksum, Bora, and Seläwa, which had belonged to his father, were given to Ras Seyum Mängäśa after Ras Gugsa's death; the fact that he was not allowed to inherit his father's title of Ras while his rival, Ras Seyum, was elevated above him (Ras Seyum's appointment as a Military Commander of Tigray) and was more frequently consulted than he was when decisions were taken, made Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa to feel humiliated and became envious of Ras Seyum and mistrustful of the Emperor.\textsuperscript{88}
Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa asked the Emperor for an increase in his rank and possessions in Tigray and was tartly told that he had proved a bad enough governor of what he had already held, and must learn to rule before he could expand his horizons. From the moment of this refusal Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé was greatly irked by the treatment he received at the hands of the Emperor and went over to the Italians. As quoted by Mosley, Marshall de Bono wrote of Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa:

*Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé* Gugsa was the son-in-law of the Emperor, but he was a mal-content. The Emperor... had deprived [Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé] Gugsa of a good part of his territories in order to increase the power of Ras Seyum; hence there was little sympathy between the two chiefs of Tigre; indeed there was positive if not manifest enmity. Our intelligence agents and the whole personnel of the consulate at Adwa wisely took advantage of this state of affairs to win [Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé] Gugsa to our side [Italian side].

The Italians took advantage of the rivalry between Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa and Ras Seyum to worsen the bitterness, which Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa had developed against his father-in-law. The interest of the Italians in Tigray and the fact that Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa was favourably inclined to them made them believe that after his submission other chiefs from nearby places would follow, attracted by high salaries and honours. It was also Italy's interest to be able to document the defection of chiefs, to show Europe that Italy was not occupying Ethiopia, but "liberating it" from feudalism, and eliminating slavery. Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa was, therefore, important to the Italians not only because he had held the rank of Däjjač but also he was the great grand-son of Emperor Yohannes IV and the son-in-law of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, therefore, presumably a figure of the first importance. The policy of making direct contact with those *Rases* and notables who bore some grudge against the Emperor, like
Dâijač Haylâ-Sellassé, was, therefore, intensified by the Italians on the eve of their invasion of Ethiopia.  

Dâijač Haylâ-Sellassé Gugsa came several times to Addis Ababa between 1933 and 1935 to ask the Emperor for an increase of his territory. The Emperor, however, refused on the ground that he had not yet shown capacity to govern what he had. Dâijač Haylâ-Sellassé found it more convenient and comfortable to make the journey northwards by way of Eritrea rather than southwards over Ethiopian territory. From the Eritrean frontier the Italian consul in Mâqâllâ arranged for him to be sent by car to Asmara, where he was being treated as an honoured guest. The treatment he received in the hands of the Italians and his imagined slight at the Emperor's court made Dâijač Haylâ-Sellassé an easy prey to the Italian promises of high reward for his cooperation. Although how much the Italians paid for Dâijač Haylâ-Sellassé Gugsa's defection was not known the Italians hoped to manipulate him as an Italian puppet for propaganda purposes, with in and out of Ethiopia.

Shortly after his arrival at Asmara to take over the fascist command, De Bono also began receiving letters from Dâijač Haylâ-Sellassé Gugsa complaining of his lowly position in the Ethiopian ranks and asking him for instruction as to his mode of conduct. Until the attack against Ethiopia actually began De Bono discouraged, according to his words quoted in Mosley, "...any impulsive act, any premature move, which would have broken the eggs before we [the Italians] were ready to make the Omelette." De Bono recommended Dâijač Haylâ-Sellassé Gugsa to keep quite; to show himself apparently obedient and reconciled; until the day, which was to come soon, when he would give him categorical instructions.
Ras Seyum with his wife Le’elt Aṣādā Asfaw, arrived at Asmara on his way from Addis Ababa to Adwa, by February 1928, and expressed his interest of having cordial relations with the Italians and his animosity with Ras Gugsa. Nevertheless, Ras Seyum's attitude towards the Italians had never been constant. The undecided character of Ras Seyum in his loyalty to the Emperor and in his need for establishing relations with the Italians could be seen in the letter he wrote to Riccardo Astuto on 23 Meyazya 1925 E.C. [about the beginning of the month of May 1933].

P. Franca wrote about the attitude of Ras Seyum, on 16 August 1934, as follows:

...Il suo [Ras Seyum's] attegiamento verso di noi allora è stato come attualmente, cordiale senza sincerita, pauroso e sostenzialmente ostile per quanto desideroso di evitare ogni conflitto diplomatico.

His behaviour towards us was, and is still, cordial without sincerity, fearful and basically hostile, although desirous to avoid any diplomatic conflict.

The Italians had also tried to counter-balance Leul Ras Seyum by supporting Ras Gugsa first, and his son Dājjāč Haylā-Sellassé Gugsa, after the death of Ras Gugsa. With regard to Ras Seyum, as quoted by Greenfield, de Bono writes:

... [Ras Seyum] declared his loyalty to the Emperor but he was not really sincere, and was always undecided in his ideas. In his character he was a precise reflection of his father [Ras Mängāša]. Unknown to the central government, we were still exchanging greetings in February and March [1935] and he had accepted a present which I had to his little boy.

The letters which Ras Seyum wrote to Orazio Luigi Vinci, on 7 April 1934, asking for a debt of about 5,000 Birr, and, on 7 May 1934, expressing his happiness for being appointed over Aksum, Bora, Selāwa, etc, show the type of relation existed between the Italians and Ras Seyum on the eve of the Italian invasion on Ethiopia. (For the letters refer to Appendices XIV and
XV). Ras Seyum who was nibbling at the political Bureau was also promised by the Italians, according to Greenfield, to offer him the Ethiopian throne if he would fight against the central government in support of the Itaians. This offer if done, could, however be, aimed not more than creating their own puppet.

6.4 Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa's Defection to the Italians

Two weeks before the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, Nägadras Wädajo Ali visited Mäqällä, and from there he had flown to Addis Ababa. He reported to the Emperor that Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa was in the pay of the Italians and was concerting revolt with the Italian consulate at Mäqällä. Emperor Haylä-Sellassé asked him for a proof and Nägadras Wädajo Ali produced bank receipts for deposits made by the Italians into the account of Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa. Still the Emperor did not believe that one of his chiefs was planning treachery. "Most of my rases take money from the Italians", the Emperor said, "It is bribery without corruption. They pocketed Italian money and remain steadfast to Ethiopia". Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, therefore, refused to believe the story and considered the King's man (Wädajo Ali) jealous of Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa. The Emperor as a result did not act against Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa. The Emperor who had once decided that Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé was good enough to be made a Däjjazmač and his son-in-law and being the descendant of Emperor Yohannes IV, who was the enemy of the Italians, could not possibly be a traitor though there were rumours of his correspondence with the Italians and his feeling of being discontented. In relation to Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa, Emperor Haylä-Sellassé in his autobiography wrote as follows:
His father [Ras Gugsa Araya] and Ras Seyum were always rivals and jealous of each other, over the lordship of Tigray, that after the death of his father [Ras Gugsa Araya] and when two small territories which were under his father's control, were given to Ras Seyum, he used this measure as a pretext to aggravate the conflict between him and Ras Seyum which had already been started during the time of his father. The Italians after having heard of the conflict between him and Ras Seyum had already started to correspond with him that when some people informed us about the relation between Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa and the Italians we did not accept what they had informed us arguing that a person who considered himself a descendant of Emperor Yohannes IV would not be suspected of betraying Ethiopia.

By ignoring the rumours against Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa's secret dealings with the Italians, Emperor Haylä-Sellassé was sending war materials, logistics that were necessary for the inevitable war with the Italians, and a military uniform for Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa, which would identify his rank. Meanwhile, Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa, to hid his double dealings, also wrote many letters full of highly flattering expressions of devotion and loyalty, and expressing his gratitude to the Emperor. As quoted by Täklä-Sadiq Mäkurya, one of the letters sent by Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa to Emperor Haylä-Sellassé to express his gratitude for sending a military uniform can be referred to Appendix XVI.

Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, therefore, refused to replace Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa or to alter the military plan he had worked out in the north when the Italian invasion began: a plan by
which Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa and his army of about 10,000 men would hold Mäqällä while the army of Ras Seyum, further north, would gradually fall back and join them, so that they could fight together against the Italians.\textsuperscript{121}

\textit{Däjjač} Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa, on the other hand, had been waiting for an opportunity when he could secure the governorship of all Tigray.\textsuperscript{122} He also wanted to lead his army against his rival in Tigray, Ras Seyum Mängäša, should that wily chief actually take the field.\textsuperscript{123} He hoped to obtain feudal precedence but at the hands of the Italians. The Italian invasion was, therefore, an opportunity he did not want to miss. Believing that he would be able to gain the diminished traditional rights and prerogatives of his family, Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa, therefore, became the first Ethiopian to defect to the Italians in 1935.\textsuperscript{124} Although he did not defect to the Italians, one of my informants, Fitawrari Iyasu, had been one of the followers of Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa with his father, Šum-Seläwa Tässäma, when he defected to the Italians. Fitawrari Iyasu and Haläqa Bärhé informed me that Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa told his followers that he had decide to defect to the Italians and fight against the Shewan supermacy. Hence, he called on all his loyal followers to follow him to the Italian side,\textsuperscript{125} and made one of his followers, named Haylu Tämbén, to make the following poem to incite hatred against the central government and attract many followers.\textsuperscript{126}

\begin{verbatim}
ÝSÄ =n<U c= Áhri ÉUie’
Snw=U g° )H>ie’
Møf <UuÁ Tø”Á M’ie’
Áñ>U ¾KÁ ðTjf Iliie’
Áñ>U ¾KÁ U>jf uiwiie’
Mñwi<UuÁ ¾Lø”Á M’ie’\end{verbatim}\textsuperscript{127}
O, the family of Däjjazem Haylä-Selassé Gugsa, how do you do?

Your tomb is constructed in Shewa,

We [always] see those who enter [go], not those who came out [return],

Henceforth, there will be no acceptance for ordinance to provide you fatty meat,

Henceforth, there will be no acceptance for ordinance to provide you a honey juice,

Because we saw only those who enter [go] but not those who came out (released).

In relation to the cause for Däjjazem Haylä-Selassé Gugsa’s defection Täklä-Sadiq Mäkurya wrote the following:

After the death of Princess Zänäbäwärq, he (Däjjazem Haylä-Selassé Gugsa) had been assured, from the Emperor’s words, that the honour which he had gained from the marriage with the Princess would not be dwindled inspite of his wife’s death. Hence, though it faced an opposition from others, the Emperor appointed him over his father’s former territory and over Mäqällä. In spite of this, in a time when Däjjazem Haylä-Selassé Gugsa was feeling dissatisfaction for being unmatched with Ras Seyum in terms of both title name and territory size, the Italians, had secretly corresponded with him and promised him to give the whole Tigray by taking it from Ras Seyum, after their victory, that based on this Italian promises he was awaiting a favourable time to change side to the enemy.

According to informants, many of the nobles in Tigray who were under his command had advised him not to defect to the Italian side but to go to Šeftnät so that they would support him against the central government. He, however, decided to go to the Italian side that, on the night of 8 October 1935, after cutting the telephone line providing the only link between Ras Seyum and Addis Ababa, he defected to the Italians, followed by few of his followers.
Ultimately, on the afternoon of 11 October 1935 Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa with only about 1,200 men and eight machine guns reached the Italian out post at Idaga Hamus and joined the Italians there. Many of his followers did not accept the idea of defecting to the Italians and fought against the Italians as patriots during the war.

The original plan for his defection had been that he would be seen loyal to the Emperor and make no move and stay in Mäqällä until the actual battle for the town began, by which time he could have been joined by Ras Seyum's army and his betrayal would have spread chaos, collapses and dismay along the whole of the Ethiopian front. But Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa had learned of Wädajo Ali's visit to the Emperor and believed that his fate was sealed. He waited until the Italians had begun their attack and then marched northwards and joined them.

The effect of Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa's defection was to leave a vacuum behind Ras Seyum into which he was sucked. This gave Mussolini a big propaganda victory for which he was waiting. Adwa was occupied, on 6 October 1935, and the shames of 1896 revenged.

Next come Aksum, occupied on 15 October 1935. From the Italian military point of view Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa's defection opened the road to Mäqällä that it was occupied by the Italians on 8 November 1935. Italian entry into Ethiopia was, therefore, greatly facilitated by the defection of Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé. Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa's action gave Mussolini a virtually bloodless propaganda victory, and its moral effect, though less than had been hoped for, was to cause several of the minor chiefs in Tigray to submit without a fight. Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa was later made, by the Italians, Ras. The defection of Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa probably had negatively affected the morale of some Ethiopians who wanted to fight and
produced an adverse effect in the military situation. Däjjazmač Kábändä Tásämmä wrote about Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugs’a’s defection and its effect as follows:

Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugs’a’s defection and its effect as follows:

General De Bono notified Rome of Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugs’a's defection to the Italians, and his defection was hailed, in Rome, as an event of great significance, auguring the dissolution of Emperor Haylä-Sellassé’s empire. But it was greatly exaggerated so that Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugs’a’s men became 10,000 in number. Later it became to be recognized that the military significance of the defection was comparatively slight. The number of men said to have deserted with him dwindled even in the Italian versions to about one thousand, while it was estimated on the Ethiopian side as roughly two hundred. But, even though Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugs’a had only succeeded in persuading a few of his men to desert, this was even undoubtedly important to the Italians because he was the Emperor’s son-in-law. European opinion was, however, that the defection which was clearly pre-arranged, probably represented the beginning of an attempt on the part of the Italians to push the claims of a rival dynasty and eventually to set a puppet king in Tigray. Däjjač Haylä-Sellassé Gugs’a was rewarded and
appointed as Governor of the whole Tigray by the Italians. He was also given the title of Ras.

Ras Seyum led the army from Tigray in person during the war and as a loyal supporter of the Emperor fought resolutely against the Italians before submitting to their rule. It was clear, at that time, that if Dăjjac Haylă-Sellassé was to be on the Italian side Ras Seyum would fight against them to the last drop of his blood. In September 1935, when the Italians crossed the Mărăb River Ras Seyum fought them at a place known as Da’iro Tăkli, near the Mărăb, where he had stationed his men. Ras Seyum was helped by Dăjjac Maru of Tămbĕn and Dăjjac Găbră-Mădhin of Šeră at the fighting with his about 16,000 men. The determination which Ras Seyum and his followers showed at the fighting and their final defeat, mainly due to the lack of logistics and ammunitions was expressed, at that time, by the following poem:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Dăjjazmač Găbră-Madhen of Šeră}, \\
\text{Is fighting against [the war] plane,} \\
\text{Găbră-Madhen of Šeră and Dăjjazmač Sahlă,} \\
\text{Had it not been for lack of bullets he [they] might have crossed [the River] Mărăb.}
\end{align*}
\]

After the Italo-Ethiopian war the only available survivor was Ras Seyum. Since the restoration, the Emperor has kept him at Addis Ababa, presumably because he did not feel able to trust him to return to Tigray, though it was understood that he was the titular governor general of Tigray. After an abortive effort to put in a Shewan governor, he was duly confirmed as the
governor of the whole province and remained as such until his death. It is relevant to notice that he was succeeded by his son, Leul Ras Mängäša Seyum, who remained governor until mid-1974.\textsuperscript{158}
CONCLUSION

In the period under discussion one can easily find out that the socio-political conditions of Tigray were unchanged from the last quarter of the 19th C. Rivalries between the same families still continued. The main chiefs who were quarrelling one against the other were Ras Sebhat, Däijač Gābrā-Sellassé, Ras Gugsa and Ras Seyum, which their number was, later on, reduced to only potential and principal families that were equally influential and mutually hostile: Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa. The continuous efforts to gain the title of negus of Tigray, and the rivalries among the ambitious rival Tigrean chiefs became a major factor affecting the courses of events and relation with the central government in the period under discussion.

The gravity of the conflict and the situation in Tigray had an effect on the rest part of the country. The cooperation and unity of the hereditary chiefs of Tigray were, however, desired neither by the central government nor by the Italians since both wanted to secure their rule without any opposition in the area. When the ambitious Tigrean rival chiefs compete one against the other the central government did what it could to achieve an internal balance of power among the leading chiefs, and devised various checks and balance mechanisms in order to integrate Tigray in to the evolving empire, although their bickering were sources of great anxiety to the central government. Hence the central government succeeded in preventing any one of Yohannes IV's descendants from becoming negus of Tigray, although the Tigrean chiefs saw the central government's centralization and modernization process as a plan devised to deprive them of their traditional rights. The emperor, therefore, undermined the Tigrean chiefs’ ambition to become negus of Tigray by dividing authority in the province between the two rival descendants of Yohannes IV: Ras Seyum and Ras Gugsa. He appointed the two cousins each governor of one
half of the province of Tigray. He also broke the power of the nobility as an independent political force by suggesting that paid officials appointed by the central government administer the province. The central government, therefore, reduced Tigray to a semi-autonomous buffer region but it has never been able to fully control it or deprive its leading families of their centuries old supremacy. As a result the central government had to depend on local leaders and continued the ancient practice of building political loyalty through marriage ties with the rival Tigrean chiefs. In some cases the nobility was also bought off by titles or assignments to diplomatic posts. In other cases the nobles were raised to the powerless rank of senator and compelled to remain in Addis Ababa under the watchful vigilance of the central government and far from their regional backers.

A more significant aspect of the history of Tigray was also the strategic location of the region and the Italian interest in promoting Tigrean autonomy from Ethiopia, and the Tigrean rival chief’s desire to maintain their hereditary position and strengthen their hold and influence over their followers through cooperation with the Italian authorities in Eritrea. Almost all the rival Tigrean chiefs at one stage or another, attempted to join hands with the Italians by seeking alliance or aid against the central government or against their local Tigrean rivals as a means to fulfill their old aim of becoming undisputed ruler of the region to be legitimized by obtaining the title of negus from the emperor. The attempts of the Tigrean rival chiefs to join hands with the Italians by seeking alliance or aid against the central government was not however aimed at the separation of Tigray from Ethiopian or was not a modern sense of Tigrean nationalism or regionalism. It was rather a means of obtaining promotion at home with in the framework of the
Ethiopian political power game. This political game in Tigray had, therefore, contributed much to the Italian aggressive policies in the 1930s.
NOTES

CHAPTER ONE


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8 Mekonnen, p. 4.

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10 Gäbrä-Hiwot, pp. 5-6.

11 Mekonnen, pp. 7-13; Tsegaye, p. 154.


13 Mekonnen, pp. 7-13; Tsegay, p. 154.

14 Ibid. p. 18.

15 Ibid, p. 75.

16 Ibid.

18 Tsegay, p. 165.


20 Marcus, The Life . . . , p. 216.

21 Mekonnen, p. 94; Täklä-Sadiq, p. 135.


25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid, volume II, p. 381;

28 Täsfayohannes Berhanä (Däjjazmač) Tenš YäHiwät Tarik Mastawäša, (NALE: M.S. No 20/01/1), p.2.

29 Tsehay, p. 16


31 Hadera, pp. 2-3.

32 Mekonnen, p. 98.

33 Ibid., p.99.

34 Täklä- Sadiq, p.135.

36 Ibid.; Hadera, p. 3; Mekonnen, p. 106; Teshay, p. 18.

37 Martini, Il Diario . . . V. III, p. 62; Tsehay, p. 17.

38 Mekonnen, p. 107.

39 Hadera, p. 3; Mekonnen, p. 108.

40 Mekonnen, p. 108.


42 Hadera, p. 4.

43 Cipolla, p. 134.


45 Cipolla, p. 134.


47 Hadera, p. 5; Mekonnen, pp. 109-110.


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62 Mekonnen, p. 111.

63 Yätelqu Ras Araya Ağer YaHiwät Tarik, A.A.U., IES Ms. 876.


65 Mekonnen, p. 114.

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68 Ibid.


70 Mekonnen, pp. 115-116.

71 Informant: Ato Kehešän

72 Ibid.

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78 Hadera, p. 6; Kenfä Adisu (Aläqa), Tarikä Näräst (A.A.U; IES. Ms. No. 1996; Marcus, The Life . . . p. 217; Coppet, pp. 621.

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80 Mekonnen, p. 118; Tsegay, p. 168.

81 Tsegay, P. 168.

82 Cipolla, P. 36; Täklä-Sadiq, pp. 146-147.

83 Mekonnen, p. 118.

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86 Cipolla, p. 36.

87 Informant: Ato Kehešän; Mekonnen, p. 119; Coppet, p. 621; Täklä-Sadiq, pp. 146-147; Mars’e-Hazän, p. 71.

88 De Castro Lincoln, Nella Terra Dei Negus (Milano, 1915), p. 529;


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90 Ibid.

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92 Mekonnen, p. 121.

94 Cipolla, p. 36; Coppet, p. 621.

95 Mekonnen, p. 122; Coppet, p. 621.

96 Hadera, pp. 6-7; Mekonnen, pp. 121-125; Tsegay, p. 168.


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58 *Informant*: Abba Haylä-Maryam.

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116 ASMAI: 37/7/62: Teodorani to the Eritrean Governor, 8 February 1914; Salvago to MdC, 21/2/1914.


120 Informant: Däjjazmač Zewde.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.

123 Täsfayohannes, p. 13.

124 Tsehay, p. 45.

125 Ibid.

126 O'Mahony, p. 183; "Seyum Mängäša...", p.1; Täsfayohannes, p. 13; Gobäzé,P.56.

127 Tsegay, p. 170; FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 8 March 1914.

128 Tsegay, p. 170.

129 Tsehay, p. 45.


132 Ibid.; O'Mahony, p. 183; Gobäzé,P.56; Yaqob, pp. 152-153; Informants: Ato Gäbrä-Šadiq, Gerazmač Đästa; Fitäwrari Iyasu.

133 Tsehay, p. 45.

134 Informants: Abba Haylä-Maryam; Balambaras Esṭifanos; Haläqa Bärhé.

135 Tsehay, p. 46.

136 Informants: Ato Gäbrä-Šadiq; Ato Haylä; Balambaras Esṭifanos

137 Informants: Ato Gäbrä-Šadiq; Balambaras Esṭifanos.
138 Informants: Haläqa Bärhé; Qañazmač Gäbrä-Egezyabehér.

139 Täsfayohannes, p. 13; Tsehay, p. 46.

140 Tsehay, p. 45.


142 Ibid.

143 Ibid., "Situazione Tigrai", 2 March 1914; FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 1 March 1914.


145 Tsegay, p. 170.

146 Tsehay, p. 46


150 Ibid; FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 1 March 1914 and 3 March 1914.

151 FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 3 March 1914.

152 Ibid, 5 March 1914.


154 FO: 371/A 1878: Dodds to Grey, 8 March 1914.

155 Hadera, p.8; Informants: Ato Tāka; Gerazmač Dästa; Fitawrari Iyasu; Dājjač Zewde.

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Täsfayohannes, p.14; Informants: Haläqa Bärhé; Haläqa Abay; Qañazmač Gäbrä-Egezyabehér.

Informants: Haläqa Abay; Fīråwrī Iyasu.

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ASMAI: 37/7/64: "Promemoria Riservato", 18 March 1914.


Täsfayohannes, p.15; Informants: Ato Täka; Gerazmač Dästa; Balambaras Esṭifanos; Däjjazmač Zewde.


Tsehay, p.46: Informants: Haläqa Bärhé; Haläqa Abay; Qañazmač Gäbrä-Egezyabehér.

Tsehay, p.47.

FO: 371/A1878: Doughty Wylie to Grey, 16 May 1914.

Tsehay, pp. 48-49; Informant: Haläqa Abay; Kebād was the name of Däjjjač Gäbrä-Sellasse’s horse.

Tsehay, p.50; Informant: Haläqa Abay.

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Lincoln, p.541; Gobäzé, P.56; FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 8 March 1914.

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FO: 371/A1878: Dodds to Grey, 13 March 1914.


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TäsRAYOHANNES, p.18.

Tsehay, p.52.

Informant: Däjjazmač Zewde.

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ASMAI: 37/12/119: De Camillis to MdC, 15/10/1917.

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255 Steffanson, V.II, p. 17.

256 Ibid.

257 Informant: Halåqa Abay.

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263 Dâjjâc Gâbrä-Sellassé to Fitâwrari Tâdla Sahlu, 19 August 1922, NALE, No. 20-01-03K.

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270 Ibid.

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272 ASMAI: 54/36/146: "Tigre", 18 May 1922.
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276 *Aläqa* Kenfä, p. 103.

277 Tsehay, p. 59.


279 *Ibid.,* Tsehay, p. 64

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282 *Ibid., Informants: Ato Kehešän; Ato Haylä, Balbaras Mulaw.


284 Tsehay, pp. 64-65.


287 Tsehay, p. 57.

288 Täsfiyohannes, p. 24; *Informants: Balbaras Estifanos; Däjjazmač Zewde.

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293 Tsehay, p. 67.

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31 FO: 371/4395: Major Dodds to Earl Curzon, 8 June 1920; Berhanena Sälam, Säné 9, 1924 E.C.; Käbädä pp. 48-53; Täklä-Sadiq, p. 166.


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34 Informant: Balambaras Mulaw.


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6 Informants: Ato Dästa; Qañazmač Gäbrä Egezyabehér; Fitäwrari Iyasu; Däjjazmač Zewdé

7 Informant: Dajjazmač Zewde; Gerazmač Dästa; ASMAI: 54/36/146: De Martino, "Politica", 25/9/1918.

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13 Informant: Gerazmač Dästa.

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17 Informants; Gerazmač Dästa; Fitawrari Iyasu, Balambaras Mulaw; Ato Haylä.

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63 Ibid.

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101 Informant: Abba Haylā-Maryam.

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104 Hadera, p.13; Informants: Ato Dästa; Halāqa Abay; Balambaras Mulaw.

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114 Empress Zäwditu to *Ras* Seyum, 29 *Mägabit* 1913 E.C.

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116 Empress Zäwditu to *Ras* Seyum, 29 *Mägabit* 1913E.C.


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126 *Informant*: Gerazmač Dästa

127 Hadera, p.14; *Informants*: *Haläqa* Abay; Gerazmač Dästa.

128 *Informant*: Haläqa Abay.

129 *Informants*: *Haläqa* Abay; *Haläqa* Bärhè; Gerazmač Dästa.

130 *Informants*: *Haläqa* Bärhè

131 *Informants*: Ato Kehešän; Qäňazmač Gäbrä Egzyabèhèr.

Informant: Qäňazmač Gäbrä -Egezyabehër.

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CHAPTER FIVE

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4 Perham, p. 271.

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15 Bahru, "Haylasellasse...", p. 33.

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48 Hess, p. 113.

49 Perham, p. 64; Greenfield, p. 161; Steffanson, V. II, pp. 185-186.

50 Perham, p. 64; Harmsworth, p. 189.

51 Steffanson, V. II, p. 238; Harmsworth, p. 189.

52 Barker, pp. 51-52.


54 Nega, p. 18.


56 Barker, pp. 51-52; Mosley, p. 159.

57 Asfa, p. 291; Greenfield, p. 162.


59 Steffanson, V. II, p. 239.

60 Asfa, p. 292.


62 Perham, p. 64.

63 Barker, pp. 51-52.

64 Perham, p. 64.

65 Abdussamad, p. 27; Greenfield, p. 162; Käbädä, p. 93; Harmsworth, p. 189.

66 Bahru, "Hayläsellasse...", p. 33.

67 Asfa, p. 292.
68 Ibid.

69 Erlich, Ethiopia..., p. 140.

70 Nega, p. 16.

71 Abdussamad, p. 78; Rey, The Real..., p. 219.

72 Perham, p. 83; Aläqa Kenfä.

73 Nega, p. 16.

74 Bahru, A History..., pp. 143-144.

75 Nega, p. 17.

76 Ibid.

77 Abdussamad, p. 73; Perham, p. 271; FO: 371/13101: Bentinck to Chamberlain, 13 December 1927.

78 Nega, pp. 18-19.


80 Nega, pp. 18-19.

81 Abdussamad, p. 79; Bairu, "Two of...", p. 46; Bahru, A History..., p. 181.

82 Abdussamad, p. 79; Nega, pp. 18-19; Mehari, p. 15; Bahru, "Hayla...", p. 33.

83 Bairu, "Two of...", p. 47.

84 Abdussamad, p. 79; Bahru, "Hayla...", p. 33.

85 Mehari, pp. 15-16.

86 Ibid.

87 Informant: Fitawrari Iyasu.

88 Erlich, Ethiopia..., p. 140.

89 FO: 371/16102: Barton to Simon, 18 April 1932.
90 Erlich, Ethiopia..., p. 140.

91 Gilkes, p. 35.


93 Perham, p. 81; Informants: Däjjazmač, Zewde; Fitawrari Iyasu.

94 Ibid.

95 Hayläsellassé, p. 39.

96 Ibid

97 Gilkes, p. 35; Perham, p. 81.

98 Erlich, Ethiopia..., p. 137; ASMAI: 54/37/151: Scudieri to the Italian Legation (A.A), 19/3/1934.

99 Hadera, p. 3.

100 Tsehay, p. 28.

101 Informants: Haläqa Abay; Fitawrari Iyasu; Ato Haylä; ASMAI: 54/37/149: "Voci di mutamente negli alti comandi del Tigrai", 14 April 1927.

102 Erlich, Ethiopia...p. 137.

103 Greenfield, p. 203; Erlich, Ethiopia..., p. 137; Informants: Fitawrari Iyasu; Däjjazmač Zewde.


106 Powell, p. 188; Rey, In the Country... p. 50.

107 Powell, p. 188.

108 Hadera, p. 17.

184
Yäleul Ras Seyum Mängäša Yohannes Ačer Yähiwät Tarik (with no date, no name of author, an obituary).

Greenfield, p. 158; Marcus, Hailesellassie..., p. 60; Perham, p. 85; Rey, In the Country... p. 50.


Erlich Ethiopia..., p. 138.


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131 FO: 371/16102: Barton to Simon, 3 October 1932, 10 November 1932.

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133 FO: 371/16102: Barton to Simon, 3 October 1932, 10 November 1932.


139 Ibid.; Fo 371/16102: Barton to Simon, 3 October 1932.

140 Bahru, A History..., p. 146.

141 Gilkes, p. 35; Erlich, Ethiopia..., pp. 139-140.

142 Erlich, Ethiopia..., p. 140.

143 Gilkes, p. 35; Erlich, Ethiopia..., pp. 139-140.

144 Greenfield, p. 384.

145 Bahru, A History..., p. 146.

146 Erlich, Ethiopia..., p. 140.

147 Bairu, "Marriage..." p. 21.

148 Ibid., p. 13; Käbadä, p. 31.

149 Käbadä, p. 31.

150 Asfa, p. 287; Greenfield, p. 142.

151 Asfa, p. 287.

153 Ibid., p. 15.

154 Ibid., p. 16; Täkläṣadiq, p. 134.


156 Martini, Il Diario..., V. III, p. 227.


158 Pankhurst, p. 326; Informant: Dājjazmač Zewde.

159 Täsfayohannes, pp. 5-6.


161 Täsfayohannes, pp. 5-6; ASMAI: 54/37/149; "Degiac Gabreselassie Bariagaber."

162 Informants, Qāñazmač GābräEgezyabehér; Dājjazmač Zewde.

163 Annaratone, p. 71.

164 Mekonnen, p. 117.

165 Märsé-Hazän, p. 62.

166 Bairu, "Marriage...", p. 20.

167 Ibid.

168 Hadera, p. 12; Informant: Dājjazmač Zewde.

169 ASMAI: 54/36/146: "Situazione Tigre" 2 November 1918; Informants: Fitäwrari Iyasu; Dājjazmač Zewde.

170 Informant: Fitäwrari Iyasu; Dājjazmač Zewde.


172 Informant: Fitäwrari Iyasu: Dājjazmač Zewde.

Informants: Balambaras Mulaw; Däjjazmač Zewde; Greenfield, p. 203.

Informant: Balambaras Mulaw.

Informant: Fitäwrari Iyasu; Däjjazmač Zewde.

ASMAI: 54/9/27: Franca to MdC, 16 August 1934; Greenfield, p. 203.

Yäle’lt Asädä Asfaw Ačer Yähiwät Tarik, p. 1; Informant: Däjjazmač Zewde.

Informant: Balambaras Mulaw.

Asfa, p. 287.

Erlich, Ethiopia..., p. 139; Perham, p. 85.


Sabelli, V.IV, pp. 156-157.


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Informants: Ato Haylä; Ato Segab; Haläqa Bärhè; Haläqa Abay; Balambaras Estifanos; Däjjazmač Zewde.

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Bahru, A History..., p. 146; Haylä-Sellassé, p. 205.

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Ibid., p. 293.

Erlich, Ethiopia..., p. 143.

Baer, pp. 247-248; Haylä-Sellassé, p. 205.

Yaréd, pp. 15-16; Hess, p. 115; Informant: Ato Täka

Yaréd, pp 15-16; Informant: Ato Täka

Perham, p. 85

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3 Sbacchi, P.4.


5 Bahru, A History …, P.152; Erlich, Ethiopia …, P.141.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Erlich, Ethiopia …, P.141.

9 Ibid.

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19 Asfa, P.288.

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23 Ibid., P.141.

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25 Ibid., PP.141-142.


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40 Erlich, Ethiopia…., P.139.

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46 ASMAI: 54/38/159: Ras Gupsa to Riccardo Astuto, 18 Meyazya 1925 E.C.

47 ASMAI: 54/38/159: Piero Lecco to the Eritrean Governor, 9 May 1933.

48 Marcus, Haile Sellassie…., P.140.

49 ASMAI: 54/9/27: Legazione d' Italia In Etiopia (A.A) to MdC (Roma), 17 June, 1933.

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52 Greenfield, P.176.

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56 Erlich, Ethiopia…., PP. 144-145.
57 Ibid., ASMAI: 54/9/27: Legazione d'Italia in Etiopia(A.A) to MdC (Roma), 17 June 1933.

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63 Erlich, Ethiopia..., P. 150; Informant: Balambaras Mulaw.

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68 ASMAI: 54/37/151: Ras Seyum to Orazio Luigi Vinci, 7 May 1934; ASMAI: 54/9/427: Franca to MdC (Roma), 16 August 1934; Erlich, Ethiopia..., PP.145-146; Zoli, P.245.

69 Marcus, Haile Sellassie..., PP.140-141.

70 ASMAI: 54/9/25: Orazio Luigi Vinci to MdC (Roma), 11/5/1934; Erlich, Ethiopia..., P.146.


72 ASMAI: 54/38/158: Governo dell' Eritrea to Governo della Colonia, 7 February 1935; P. Lucco to Governo della Colonia Eritrea, 22 September 1934.

73 ASMAI: 54/9/27: Franca to MdC (Roma), 16 August 1934.

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Ibid.

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Barker, P. 176; Mosley, P. 199.

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116 Steer, P.144.

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121 Mosley, p. 199.

122 Informants: Fitawrari Iyasu; Haläqa Bärhé.


124 Erlich, Ethiopia..., p. 157; Sbacchi, p. 4; Täklä-Sadiq, p. 249; Informants: Fitawrari Iyasu; Haläqa Bärhé.

125 Informants: Fitawrari Iyasu; Haläqa Bärhé.

126 Informant: Fitawrari Iyasu.

127 Ibid.

128 Täklä-Sadiq, p. 249.

129 Informant: Fitawrari Iyasu.

130 Barker, p. 177.

131 Informant: Fitawrari Iyasu.

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133 Täklä-Sadiq, p. 251; Informants: Balambaras Estifanos; Balambaras Mulaw.

134 Informants: Balambaras Mulaw; Ato Kehešän, Haläqa Bärhé.

135 Barker, p. 177; Mosley, pp. 199-200.

136 Greenfield, p. 201.

137 Erlich, Ethiopia... p. 155; Mosley p. 200.


140 Barker, p. 177.

141 *Informant: Ato Kehešän.*

142 Del Boca, p. 49.

143 Käbädä, p. 127.

144 Del Boca, p. 49.

145 Barker, p. 177.

146 Del Boca, p. 49.

147 Asfa, p. 286.

148 Del Boca, p. 49.

149 Asfa, p. 286.

150 Barker, p. 178.

151 *Informant: Ato Kehešän.*


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154 Hadera, p. 19.


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FO: 371/11574
FO: 371/13101
FO: 371/14595
FO: 371/15389
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ASMAI:37/7/62
ASMAI:37/7/63
ASMAI:37/7/64
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____________: 16 Säné 1924 E.C.

____________: 27 Hedar 1927 E.C.
### III. List of Informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Place of Interview</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abay Bärhé Wäldä-Täklä</td>
<td>Haläqa</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Adigrat Qäbällé 07</td>
<td>21/01/95 E.C.</td>
<td>- A very well versed informant about the Battle of Ākhora and the rebellion of Däjjač Kassa. He recalls most of the poems, which he learned from his elders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Abay Gäbrä-Hiwät Gäbray</td>
<td>Mämher</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Mäqällä Qäbällé 18</td>
<td>13/01/1995 E.C.</td>
<td>- A retired person who served in different posts in the Ministry of Education, in Tigray. He is one of the most outstanding informants with wider interest and exposure to read historical materials. He also claims to be the relative of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bärhé Hagos Gäbrä-Täklä</td>
<td>Šäqa</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>Adigrat Qäbällé 05</td>
<td>20/01/95 E.C.</td>
<td>- A very old man but with good memory of what he saw and informed. He was a tax collector in the region before and after the Italian Invasion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bärhé Häylä-Maryam Kahsay</td>
<td>Haläqa</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Adigrat Qäbällé 05</td>
<td>20/01/95 E.C.</td>
<td>- Former courtier but now in pension. Has a very detailed and vivid knowledge about the relation of the Tigrean chiefs in the period under discussion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Dästa Haylu Araya</td>
<td>Gerazmač</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Adigrat Qäbällé 05</td>
<td>19/01/95 E.C.</td>
<td>- The grand-son of Ras Sebḥat (son of Wäyzäro Haräya Sebḥat) with long years of service in government offices (about 35 years) during the Imperial period. Now he is in pension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Dästa Haylu Mäzgäbä</td>
<td>Ato</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Adwa Qäbällé 06</td>
<td>22/01/95 E.C.</td>
<td>- A very knowledgeable informant. Participated in the fighting against the Italian invasion of 1935. Know about the pre-1935 history of Tigray.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Estīfanos Näga Mädhanyä</td>
<td>Balambaras</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Adwa (Adi Abun)</td>
<td>22/01/95 E.C.</td>
<td>- He claims to be a relative of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé. He served Ras Seyum in different offices. Has a valuable knowledge about the history of the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Place of Interview</td>
<td>Date of Interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Gäbrä-Egezyabhér Abreha Tälla</td>
<td>Qäñazmač</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Adwa (Adi-Abun)</td>
<td>23/01/95 E.C</td>
<td>- A relative of Däjjaç Gäbrä-Sellassé. He served in different government offices. He had once been member of the parliament. Now in pension. He is very well versed informant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Gäbrä-Şadiq Gäbru Hawki</td>
<td>Ato</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Adigrat (Nehbi)</td>
<td>18/01/95 E.C</td>
<td>- Claims to be a relative of Ras Sebhat and is well informed about the Battle of Ākhora.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Gäbru Lāwtä Haylu</td>
<td>Ato</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Mayčaw (Qäbällé 01)</td>
<td>29/01/95 E.C</td>
<td>- A knowledgeable merchant who is the native of Āgamä. He is well informed about the Battle of Ākhora. He recalls most of the poems, which he learned from his elders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Haylä Kahsay</td>
<td>Ato</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Adigrat (Läqay)</td>
<td>19/01/95 E.C</td>
<td>- He is a farmer who knows much about the local tradition. A very knowledgeable informant particularly in genealogy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Haylä-Maryam Araya</td>
<td>Haläqa</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Mayčaw Qäbällé 01</td>
<td>01/02/95 E.C</td>
<td>- A retired teacher. He mostly served in church affairs. He had a sound knowledge on how Lej Iyasu was captured in Tigray.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Haylä-Maryam Täklä-Haymanot Wäldä-Maryam</td>
<td>Abba</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Mäqällä (Qäbällé 16)</td>
<td>14/10/95 E.C</td>
<td>- A monk who lived in different monasteries. He also served and lived in the Ethiopian monasteries, in Jerusalem, for about eleven years. He had a good knowledge of the history of the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Iyasu Aşebha</td>
<td>Fitawrari</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>Mäqällä (Qäbällé 08)</td>
<td>12/01/95 E.C</td>
<td>- Although old enough, he still appears to be a well-versed and informed person on the history of the relation of the Tigrean chiefs. He served as district governor in different times.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Keheşän ‘Enday Hayälom</td>
<td>Ato</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Mayčaw (Qäbällé 01)</td>
<td>30/01/95 E.C</td>
<td>- Although aging his reminiscence on the history of Tigray under discussion remains very clear. Participated at the fighting against Däjjaç Gäbrä-Sellassé.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Mulaw Wäräs Šähayu</td>
<td>Balambaras</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Kuyha</td>
<td>14/01/95 E.C</td>
<td>- He served as a courtier and governor at different times during the Imperial period. Has an interesting memory of the history of the rivalry among the Tigrean chiefs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Place of Interview</td>
<td>Date of Interview</td>
<td>Remark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Segab Hagos Täsfay</td>
<td>Ato</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Adigrat Qäbälé 05</td>
<td>20/01/95 E.C.</td>
<td>- He is a merchant who claims to be the relative of Ras Sebhat. He is well informed about the history of the relation between Ras Sebhat and Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Täka Gäbrä-Egezyabhér Walda-Rufael</td>
<td>Ato</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>Adwa Qäbälé 06</td>
<td>23/01/95 E.C.</td>
<td>- He served in the administrative offices during the Imperial period, for about 30 years. He is now in pension. He is well acquainted with the history of the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Zewde Gäbrä-Sellassé Däjjazmač (Dr)</td>
<td>Däjjazmač (Dr)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>8/7/95 E.C</td>
<td>Is son of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé Barya-Gaber. Is a noted historian and had a very critical and detailed knowledge of the history of Tigray in general. He is also the author of a book on the biography of Emperor Yohannes IV.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendices
Appendix I

[Emperor Menelik’s Letter of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé’s Appointment]

[Source: (wH@^© u?)S²Öwf ŸÂ/k z<Ê Ñ/eLc? S²Öwf: S’Ñw l0’ 20-06-4 uW^ øy ’y’1|”M 1G<8’]

211
APPENDIX:I

[Translation]

[Emperor Menelik’s Letter of Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé’s Appointment]

I, Menelik II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, because he served me, I gave the following areas to the son of Däjjac Barya-Gaber, Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé: from Hahylä, Zeban Haylä, Āddi Zamaru, Agura; from Imba-Sänäyi Şuhän, Mäzäl, Āddi Hayam, Hegur; from Darha, Mayqäyehat, Āgamido; from Inkečäw [Inteço] Addi Hedur and Henta-Hamus which was muslim’s land; from Igäla Säyaba. I made these restä-gult both to his sons and to his daughters. No one should be appointed over them. I shall write this [appointment] at the Kebrä-Nägast in Aksum. 29 Teqemt 1899 E.C. Addis Ababa.

[Source: Original at the NALE, No. 20-06-04]
Appendix III

[Däjjäč Gäbrä-Sellassé’s Awaj, Genbot 5, 1914 E.C. to be proclaimed in Adwa]

ÄÉ[e Yo¬<'] CL XIK< ŶSM< Ŷyw'H f Ñw[YLc? ŶvLUv'e Êvi Ñw[Ç=p< Éf c'w½%EM< 0@ Ål" uelc? t'f<: Å élevé nM õ0ltHK< ŶNuÅ éÈ [Çe'N<: %G<k f'd'O' uS'Ñw ]iò o'<<'] :A Äei Äµj A§<M<:
Ñ'xf 5 k' 1914 Í/U ç=c e Œv

[%Â∫k Ñw[eLc? ô'T" TI]U :Kuf]

Á élevé nM

eT eT eT
%fO_ c'< w²=fwh@: õNE uS'Öef t'f Kw, ÑN' unG<: Àe wKA—M Àe ÂuMi<: ÑN_ [Â]ØÇI cU%KG<: :ÂµI kTHKG<: ^g= u'hl 'ŒE u'ÔÉI e"I Y": 'ŒE k[Ø<U f'Å Ø" ~ ÀÂ ÔMHKG< u%ŠÑAE >k[ØU Ñy'È xi uk": %I< k[ØU K°Èa U_HKG< %MÈI ¥wf ŒN'j XiN_ "MTM": ÊH %uÅMÍ ÔÈ %kTI w~ pxf kxHKG<: :MUIU:
1914 Í/U Ó'xf 5 k' ç=c e Œv Y'T ]iò:

[%Â∫k Ñw[YLc? TI]U] [%Â∫k Ñw[YLc? ô'T]

[Source: ASMAI: 54/36/146, Gäbrä-Sellassé to Tädda Sahlu, 5 Genbot 1914 E.C.]
APPENDIX:III

[Translation]

[Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé’s Awaj, Genbot 5, 1914 E.C. to be proclaimed in Adwa]

May it reach Fitawrari Tädla Sahlu, Mälakä-Berhanat Gäbrä-Sellassé and Balambaras Gäbrä-Šadiq. How are you? I am well, praise be to God. I sent you a decree and made it be read (announced) at the market place in Adwa. All my other orders will arrive soon [at Adwa] with the arrival of Fitawrari Araya Dästa. 5 Genbot 1914 E. C. Addis Ababa.

Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé’s signature.

Decree

The people of Tigray, due to the wishes of God and the benevolence of the government I am re-appointed to my father’s domain. I am, therefore, happy and let you be happy. I listen all that you, my countrymen, have suffered a lot. Do not worry I shall let you be developed. You, the agriculturalist, go on in your agricultural activities, and you, the merchant go on in your trade. To you, the merchant, I shall restore the taxation to its previous state. You will not be taxed everywhere (at every way). Except at one post I made you, the merchant, be relieved from tax on grains. Let you trade and buy cattle and let you made my country be developed. He who mistreat the poor and he who rob the merchants will deserve sever punishment from me. You, who mistreat the poor and rob the merchants will never spare from my punishment. 5 Genbot 1914 E.C. Addis Ababa.

Signature and Seal of Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé

[Source: ASMAI: 54/36/146, Gäbrä-Sellassé to Tädla Sahlu, 5 Genbot 1914 E.C.]
Appendix IV

[Terms for Reconciliation between Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé and Šum Āgamä Kassa Sebhät]

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ĀĒje ŶÄÎłt: Ŵw(Ylc?

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Source: Telegram Message from Lej Täklä-Haymanot Gäbrä-Sellassé to Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellassé, 10 Yäkatit 1915 E.C., NALE, No. 20-01-3/G]
[Terms for Reconciliation between Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé and Šum Āgamā Kassa Sebhat]

An Emergency Telegram Message.

May it reach Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé

After I have just ended the telephone conversation with you, a message of congratulation arrived. In the presence of Gerazmač Wäldä-yäs and in front of a church in Addis Ababa, Šum Āgamā Kassa demanded no money [compensation] and agreed on the following conditions [for reconciliation].

First, you [Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé] will consider (treat) Šum Āgamā Kassa as your son and Šum Āgamā Kassa will consider (treat) you as his father, Ras Sebhat.

Second, if people from Āgamā want to join us, as soldiers, we shall not accept them and they will not also accept people who would go to them from Tigray (Adwa, Aksum, Šerä); and if those Āgamā people who had been with us but wanted to return to Āgamā as soldiers requested us for their return to Āgamā we shall not prevent them to do so, and they will also do the same to the people of Tigray [Aksum, Adwa, Šerä]; and if people from areas other than Āgamā who had been serving Šum Āgamā Kassa as soldiers want to join us we shall accept them but we should return the rifles and other materials given to them from Šum Āgamā Kassa. They will also do the same.

Third, if you accept that you would treat Šum Āgamā Kassa as a father, there will no need for money [compensation]. There will no one who could be an obstacle from the elders (mediators) in our side. Because the elders (mediators) recognized the necessity of having an oath for the reconciliation with in five days that we have concluded an oath for accepting the reconciliation today, 10 Yakatit [1915] E.C. We are, therefore, begging you and the other chiefs in Addis Ababa to do so. 10 Yakatit 1915 E.C.

Lej Täklä-Haymanot.

[Source: Telegram Message from Lej Täklä-Haymanot Gäbrä-Sellassé to Däjjac Gäbrä-Sellassé, 10 Yakatit 1915 E.C., NALE, No. 20-01-3/G]
[A Copy of Qāñazmač Rāda Baykādañ’s Charges (against Dājjαč Gābrä-Sellassé)]

The Crown Prince of the Ethiopian Empire, Ras Täfäri, let God show you the mis-deeds of Dājjαč Gābrä Sellassé. We are appealing to you against the mis-deeds of Dājjαč Gābrä Sellassé by listing down his charges and having our signatures and our seals. First, from the start he brought and led the Italians from Massawa to Asmara. Second, he fought against Ras Mängäša, leading the Italians, at Däbrä-Häyla. . . Fourth, he gave parts of Adeyabo to the Italians (about 28 villages). Fifth, he gave to the foreigners [Italians] an engraved marble-stone on which an ancient history was inscribed in Hebrew and Ethiopian languages, from Aksum . . . Seventh, At the time when the Emperor [Menelik II] died and at the time when the Ethiopians were highly worried [due to the death of Emperor Menelik] he told the secret of the death of Emperor Menelik to the Italians. As a result, Italian war generals came from Italy to Asmara to occupy Ethiopia. He also sent a message to the Ethiopian nobles by stating that the Emperor is already dead, I will give you rifles and bullets and let us fight together against the Shewans. Eighth, after he received rifles and bullets from the Italians, he demurred the call to come [to Addis Ababa] and he destroyed (killed) about 11,700 people in cooperation with the Italians. It was the Italians who picked the dead up. Ninth, after his defeat he retreated to the bush and the Italians were supplying him with food, drink and with rifles and bullets, based on their friendship. Tenth, at the time when it was said that Lej Iyasu will come to force the Italians leave Hämasén, Dājjαč Gābrä-Sellassé had made an agreement with the Italians to receive about 12,000 rifles, 7 cannons, 12 machine-guns and to fight against Lej Iyasu by leading the people of Tigray. In the meantime the throne was, however, transferred to the Empress [Zäwditu] of Ethiopia. He did not, however, refrain from his activities even after the coming to power of the Empress. Eleventh, when the people of Hämasén came to Ethiopia by hating the Italians he made them be detained and forced their return to Eritrea. They, therefore, died in prison. Twelfth, he gave a domesticated lion to the Italians as a gift. Thirteenth, unregretted to the loses which the people suffered due to his refusal to obey the orders from the government and pretending as if he did not kill and as if he did not mis-treat the people, he announced pardon to the people after he was re-
appointed over Adwa. However, he later on accused some people of betrayal some others of fighting against him and made them be suffer one or two years of imprisonment. Fourteenth, when Fitawrari Māngāša was sent to Ras Gugsa Araya by the government he [Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassē] received him as an ordinary soldier. But, later on, when an Italian [general] come to him [Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassē] he received him with high ceremonial reception by having a huge parade which he did not do to the son of Haylä-Sellassē, Makonnen, and to the son of Yelma. The Italian general visited the parade for about three days. Fifteenth, he picked out from its burial place and sent to Rome the skeleton of the Italians [died at Adwa] who Emperor Menelik ordered to be buried unidentified whether it was a Shewan, a Tigrean or a foreigner, fearing that it might cause disease. When the foreigners [the Italians] saw the skeleton of the dead they cried out, as it was a recent event. By recalling the past events the Italians, therefore, started to think for revenge. Sixteenth, when the Italians constructed roads and railways up to our border, Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassē also cleared the road up to Adwa after having received four engineers [from Italy]. He forced people to work on the construction of the road and punished those who were absent. Seventeenth, when [Dājjāč Gābrā-Sellassē] married the daughter of Ras Seyum [Wälätä-Israel] he made Talamonti and other two people his responsible friends (mezzés) at the wedding and married by having fotografhes. Eighteenth, he brought an Italian engineer and showed him Da’dat and its water sources. Da’dat was an important strategic place to use cannons and machine-guns and was also a place where Ras Gugsa had been living in during his days of rebellion. Nineteenth, after having sent his servant named Alämé to Italy he was in constant telephone communications with him for about four months, by using the Italian code and by preventing the Ethiopian telephone operators to use the telephone. Later on, [due to this communication], he brought cannon and machine-gun shooters from Italy to Adwa. . . Twenty-first, while preventing by the use of guards, those Tigrean people from entering into Ethiopia from Eritrea by forcing their return to Eritrea chained, he did not prevent those who want to go to Hāmasēn. Twenty-second, he built a fortress, which was so far unthinkable to be built by any one... 3 Tahsas 1919 E.C. Addis Ababa.
[Source: YāQāṇažma Čāda Baykādañ Kes Gelbač: NALE, No. 7-02-12]
Appendix VI

[Letter of accusation against Däjjač Gäbrä-Sellässé from Qäñazmač Räda Baykädañ to Ečägé Gäbrä-Mänfäsqedus, 3 Tahsas 1919 E.C.]

[Source: NALE, No. 7-02-12]
APPENDIX: VI

[Translation]

Your Excellency, our Lord, Ečágé Gābrā-Mänfåsqedus. . . let God made you see [our problems]. It is known that God to his creatures and King to his soldiers are benevolent (charitable). We, however, appeal to you against Dā́jjač Gābrā-Sellassé by charging him against the mis-deeds he committed against your country, Ethiopia, and against your people. In the country where you have done a lot to make it developed Dā́jjač Gābrā-Sellassé became an obstacle and stood up for its destruction. As a butterfly which set off to made the light off, although it could not spare itself from the heat of the light, Dā́jjač Gābrā-Sellassé, from the start until now did not stop his endeavours to hand Ethiopia over to the Italians though you did not see and listen his deeds and inspite of his unsuccessfulness. In spite of the fact that he is our master (lord) and our brother we accuse him of the crimes due to the fact that we have love for our government and our country. Because he became a thorn to the country and because he is accused of about twenty-one charges, please, for the sake of Menelik and for the sake of your father, Abunä Tāklä-Haymanot, tell these charges against Dā́jjač Gābrā-Sellassé to the Empress and to the crown prince so that we can win. 3 Tahsas 1919 E.C. Addis Ababa.

Tāklä Māšāša
Tāklä-Haymanot Gedäy
Balamberas Gābru
Šāqa Dāsta
Qāñazmač Rāda Baykādañ

[Source: NALE, No. 7-02-12]
Appendix VII

[Translation]

Ras Tafari the Crown Price of the Ethiopian Empire.

May it reach Ras Seyum, how have you passed the rainy season? Praise be to God, am well. When, by the will of God, the notables, the people, the Abun and the Ičégé discussed and made Empress Zäwditu to assend to her father’s throne, they also made me the Crown Prince. Thus, I am delighted and I would like you to share my happiness. This was done because Lej Iyasu neglected the throne and the religion entrusted to him, decided to strengthen the Islamic faith and weaken the government.

Ever since the Gospel was preached in Ethiopia, the people have been steadfast in Christianity. They will not embrace Islam and they cannot live under it. It is also the right time, for you, when you should think more about your religion and your government that you should be strong at your domain. As God, it being his will, has elevated us so timely and [given us] such resolution, it is clear that He will help us in all our undertakings if every one of us, where ever we may be, watches after our state and faith. May God, in his mercy, help us meet in life and enable us to exchange friendly greetings. 3 Teqemt 1909 E.C [13 October 1916], Addis Ababa.

Appendix VIII

[Translation]

[From Ras Tfäri to Ras Seyum]

*Ras* Tfäri Crown Prince of the Ethiopian Empire.

May it reach *Ras* Seyum, how are you. Praise be to God, am well. Though you and I have discussed on the telephone, this week about *Lej* Iyasu, it is impossible to conclude the matter in this manner. We have, therefore, sent our loyal officials with *Däjjazmač* Dästa to give you the letter and to explain the case fully. Ever since you have sent to me concerning this case, I have been very much worried since I thought it to be dangerous to me and trouble some to you as you will learn from the messengers. However, your loyalty and support to our government is unquestionable and known to God and all men. You know that after the deposition of *Lej* Iyasu there have been too much bloodshed all over Ethiopia. Furthermore many people lost their lifes on account of his deceitful oaths for reconciliation two or three times. Find out if he has the same intention for the future. You will get the rest of the details from the delegates we have sent. Do not forget our discussion, which we had in the presence of *Icégé* Wäldä Gyorgis; though he is dead and we are alive. I shall not retract my word until I die. May God help us to meet in life so as to exchange words. 22 *Tahsas* 1912 E.C. [1 January 1920].

Appendix IX

[From Empress Zäwditu to Däijač Kassa]

Queen of Kings Zäwditu of Ethiopia, daughter of Menelik II, King of Kings.

May it reach Däjjazmač Kassa Seyum; how are you? Praise be to God, am well. Because Ras Täfäri was already set on his way to Wällo, to stabilize the area, he made Ras Seyum to stay a while in order they could leave [Addis Ababa] together. They will set on their way in this week. We also heard of the fact that you fought against Däjjač Germay. What was the cause for the fighting? Inform us about the security of the area and the well-being of the harvest regularly, through the telephone via Asmara. 17 Tir 1910 E.C.

Appendix X

[From Ras Täfari to Däjjač Kassa Seyum]

Æ[e ḤAÌ'T: ? X e àU KÒ? l "ÅU" c'w]HM:: r@"A "KÀ "NÌ" KTÅLÅM" c"< KT[ÖÔf SH@É u=Å e ÒÇ=e κuν y'e]< ¥)Ö< u%EL SUĂ< " Aò< Y@ Ô^ Æc? É[e w[ SU<X "< :: N' c"< ÒÅ \ÅAKU:: Ø' 17 k' 1910 £/U

Ras Tafari, the Crown Prince of the Ethiopian Empire.

May it reach Dajzač Kassa Seyum, how are you? Because of the fact that I should go to Wällo to stabilize the area, I let Ras Seyum to stay for a while [in Addis Ababa] after he had already started his journey from Addis Ababa. We shall go together up to Dassé. Are not the area and the people well? 17 Tir 1910 E.C.

Appendix XI

[Translation]

[From Empress Zäwditu to Ras Seyum]

Queen of Kings Zäwditu of Ethiopia Lion of Judah, elect of God Empress Zäwditu daughter of Menelik King of Kings.

May it reaches Ras Seyum, how are you? Praise be to God, am well. Though you arrested and sent to us Däjjac Kassa because of your loyalty to our government, we refrained from sending him to the place of his detention and kept him at his sister’s house with Däjjac Gétačaw so that he might be advised, as he is your son. As we have informed you on the telephone he broke out and escaped on Yäkatit 3rd and travelled on an unknown path between Sälalé, Gendä-Bärät through Adabärğa and Muger lowlands, on foot and with a few followers, where he encountered countrymen who ordered him to stop. But he refused, killed three people, wounded two others and he was finally killed in the fighting along with his six followers. Our intention was to settle the case peacefully when you come, since your action was out of good will to us. Unfortunately God did not wish it and our wishes cannot be fulfilled. What can be done? the wishes of God and men are different. May God condole you. Further more, we have sent our storekeeper, Gerazmac Gäbré to visit you. 29 Mägabit 1913 E.C. [7 April 1921], Addis Ababa.

Appendix XII

[From Riccardo Astuto to Ras Gugsa Araya]

_Governo Dell’ Eritrea_

_Da Asmara a Macalle_

[From Riccardo Astuto to Ras Gugsa Araya]

[Source: ASMAI: 54/38/159: Riccardo Astuto to Ras Gugsa Araya, 9 February 1932, A.A.U., IES, Micro Film]
I received the telegram message you sent me dated 27 Tirr 1924 [6/2/1932]. Marcese Della Stufa had informed me earlier that you were hoping for a visit to Asmara. I also replied to him to inform you that I will receive (accept) your coming with pleasure, and I can also confirm to you that Eritrea will welcome your coming with pleasure. I am, however, sad due to the fact that your coming to Eritrea is due to health problem. However, it is my hope that the weather condition and the medical treatment that you will get in Eritrea will immediately cure you from your disease. I have also sent a message to Doctor Alemagna to accompany you in your journey to Asmara.

Riccardo Astuto
The Governor of Eritrea.
Appendix XIII

[Letter From Ras Gugsa Araya to Riccardo Astuto, 18 Meyazya 1925 E.C.]

[Source: ASMAI: 54/38/159: Ras Gugsa to Riccardo Astuto, 18 Meyazya_1925 E.C., A.A.U, IES, Micro Film]
APPENDIX: XIII
[Translation]

[Letter from Ras Gugsa Araya to Riccardo Astuto, 18 Meyazya 1925 E.C.]

From Ras Gugsa Araya-Sellassé, 18 Meyazya 1925 E.C.
To Riccardo Astuto, Governor.

May it reach to his excellency, Astuto, the Eritrean governor, may peace and health be for you. I thank you for letting Doctor [Leco] to treat me till now. He tried his best to treat and cure me. However, because it was out of the will of God that he could not cure me. He will, therefore, return to Eritrea. 18 Meyazya 1925 E.C.

Ras Gugsa Araya-Sellassé

[Source: ASMAI: 54/38/159: Ras Gugsa to Riccardo Astuto, 18 Meyazya_1925 E.C., A.A.U, IES, Micro Film]
Appendix XIV

[Letter from Ras Seyum to Orazio Luigi Vinci, 29 Mägabit 1926 E.C. (7 April 1934)]

[Source: ASMAI 54/37/151: Ras Seyum to Orazio Luigi Vinci, 29 Mägabit 1926 E.C. (7 April 1934)]
APPENDIX: XIV

[Translation]

[Letter from Ras Seyum to Orazio Luigi Vinci, 29 Mägabit 1926 E.C. (7 April 1934)]

From Ras Seyum
To Orazio Luigi Vinci.

May it reach my friend Orazio Luigi Vinci, the Italian government’s viceroy. I wish you be happy and in peace. Please, for the sake of me, your friend, send me even in the form of debt about 5,000 birr or any amount to your ability, which you would deduct from the amount to be taxed from the Italian Agency in Adwa. I requested you to send me the amount of money I specified above, because I suffer from shortage of money to the feast [probably of Easter]. Send me the money with Berhanä Wändem. For the exchange of the money I have already informed Blatén-Gêta Heruy. 29 Mägabit 1926 E.C. [7 April 1934].

Ras Seyum’s seal

[Source: ASMAI 54/37/151: Ras Seyum to Orazio Luigi Vinci, 29 Mägabit 1926 E.C. (7 April 1934)]
Appendix: XV

[Letter from Ras Seyum to Orazio Luigi Vinci, 29 Meyazya 1926 E.C (7 May 1934)]

[Source: ASMAI: 54/37/151: Ras Seyum to Orazio Luigi Vinci, 29 Meyazya 1926 E.C. (7 May 1934)]
From Ras Seyum
To Orazio Luigi Vinci

May it reach my friend Orazio Luigi Vinci, the Italian government’s viceroy, I wish you to be health and in peace. The Emperor [of Ethiopia], by a decree, gave me Aksum and Bora-Seläwa as madärya, Häramat and Gär’alta as its overlord (qoračenät, and Tigrä-Tigriňi as čekalnät in addition to what I already had, that I am happy and because, knowing that you will be happy, I want to inform you about the appointment with excellence. 29 Meyazya 1926 E.C. [7 May 1934].

Ras Seyum’s seal

[Source: ASMAI: 54/37/151: Ras Seyum to Orazio Luigi Vinci, 29 Meyazya 1926 E.C. (7 May 1934)]
APPENDIX XVI

[Däjjač Haylā-Sellassė Gugsa to Emperor Haylā-Sellassė, 16 Mäskäräm 1928 E.C.]

APPENDIX: XVI

[Translation]

[Däjjac Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa to Emperor Haylä-Sellassé, 16 Mäskäräm 1928 E.C.]

King of Kings Haylä-Sellassé I of Ethiopia, Lion of Judah, elect of God.

I received the military uniform, which your Emperorship sent to me. I, therefore, bow and kiss the ground [thanks] ten times. I wear it as soon as it arrived. Hoping that the military cap (uniform) would come I am also ready to obey the orders of your emperorship for the future. 16 Mäskäräm 1928 E.C.

Your servant Däjjazemač Haylä-Sellassé Gugsa.