ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

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THE QUESTION OF THE NILE

IN

ETHIO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS:

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

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THE QUESTION OF THE NILE
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Abstract

The Nile issue has long shaped the relations between Ethiopia and Egypt. With Egypt dominating the hydropolitics of the Nile, Ethiopia has been unable to strike a deal on establishing user right on the river. Egypt has made its preoccupation to obstruct any development efforts on the Nile by Ethiopia. Egypt’s diplomatic and political superiority has also proved effective in blocking any international funding for Ethiopia’s effort in using the resources of the Nile.

Egypt has also tried to exploit the instabilities and internal crises in some countries in the basin, particularly Ethiopia, in support of one or the other parties involved in the crisis with the object of diverting development efforts on the Nile.

This study emphasizes on the need to change the hitherto uncompromising hydropolitical situation in the basin particularly, the need to forge cooperation on using the resources of the river for the common good of the riparian countries. In this regard the recognition of equitable entitlement of the resources of the river to all the Nile basin countries is viewed as a positive step towards rapprochement in the basin countries in general and between Egypt and Ethiopia in particular.

The present cooperative endeavors and recognition of equitable entitlement of the riparians is to my understanding a welcome sign for future cooperation on utilizing the resources of the river. But there also seem to be some problems on the road to cooperation. The stumbling block in this regard appears to be the prevarication displayed by the downstream co-riparian staples of Egypt, and the Sudan.

The study also highlights the need of the Ethiopian side to show commitment and action to implement its development projects even if foreign assistance couldn’t be available. Ethiopia is also expected to display a more proactive diplomatic role in attracting foreign assistance.
The study also touches on the lessons that are learned from the various political and diplomatic initiatives on forging agreement on the Nile. It also urges on the need to register progress in the ongoing attempts to come up with legal and institutional framework for establishing rights on the Nile resource. But the study also advises on the benefit of participating on the ongoing Nile Basin Initiative and specifically on the project-by-project based agreement of the ENSAP. It attempts to prove that Ethiopia’s participation in the short-term on such initiatives as ENSAP could not jeopardize her right to equitable share on the Nile. But a stress is made on the need to guard against the prevarication of Egypt and Sudan who seem not to desist from their unilateral and uncompromising stance. In this instance, Ethiopia’s choice is advised to be to mobilize its own human and financial resource and to build the necessary infrastructure on the ground for her ultimate utilization of the Nile.
Introduction

Relations between Egypt and Ethiopia may be traced to a very distant past. What necessitated this early contact is an open question that may be a subject of a different research. This is so simply because various authors have given various accounts on the causes for these contacts. It is observed that “Egypt is a country with which Ethiopia has had the longest foreign contact in its history” (Bahiru, 1991:25). Some other historians have also documented that “in the Middle Ages and in the period of the Discoveries (fifteenth and sixteenth centuries), the Nile was known to have two great tributaries south of Egypt, at least one of which had its sources in a country which would be identified as Ethiopia or ‘Abassia’” (Hecht, 1986:3).

There is one assertion which reads as “direct Egyptian interest in the Red Sea area and in the Eastern trade opened a new chapter in the history of the Ethiopian region” (Tadesse, 1972:15). The writer of this study is neither in a position to prove these assertions, nor wish as to delve into historical accounts that played their own role in establishing contacts between Egypt and Ethiopia. There was, however, one period of history that had kept the two countries closer to one another. This was necessitated by the fact that “…it was from Alexandria – the patriarchate of the Coptic Church – that an abuna, the head of the Ethiopian Church, had to be sent” (Hecht, 1986:3).

The above historical accounts are however not adequate enough to explain the longstanding relations of the two countries, because both trade and/or the consecration of Bishops or abuna were practices that had limited duration. So, what has been the main area of concern in the relation between these two countries? In the many readings and observation which this writer had come across, Egyptian interest has always revolved on the control of the Nile, the main source of which is Ethiopia.

Egypt is endowed with geopolitical and strategic positions to dictate policies on the Nile. This is believed to have persuaded or put Egypt to make a choice of either assuming a dominant position or take the risk of becoming the victim of outside powers (Metz, 1993:279). Egypt’s position has attracted outside powers who vied for its control. But whatever power had occupied Egypt, it had the control of the Nile as its primary objective. These powers had long recognized that Egypt would not
survive without the Nile and that its security is strongly linked to the Nile. These powers were also interested in bringing the Nile under their control not only for Egypt’s sake but for their own benefit, i.e.-to secure their dominance in the region. This is what had been adapted by post-colonial Egyptian leadership. There are also some other factors that have made the relation between the two countries to remain non-constructive and filled with animosity.

We may observe in this study how Egyptian foreign policy has aimed at protecting its interest on the Nile. We can also observe beginning from distant history the way the Egyptians have focused their policy on the Nile with the object of thwarting any moves by upstream Ethiopia to divert or arrest the flow of the Nile. This policy has become more focused and specialized after the emergence of politically economically, and militarily more stronger and dominant Egypt.

The question here is how about Ethiopian foreign policy, has it ever been focused and specialized with the object of thwarting any Egyptian moves in this regard? Did any previous Ethiopian ruler have a clear foreign policy towards Egypt, understanding of Egypt’s intent and how to thwart it diplomatically or through any other means? The writer tries to find out whether Ethiopia’s foreign policy was clear enough in this respect. Attempts will also be made to prove how the Egyptians have vied to secure their interest and by what means. Whether or not the Egyptian policy of control of the Nile has evolved into a cooperative attitude, and whether the allegation of destabilization and threat of war are factors that could characterize Egyptian foreign policy on the Nile will also be discussed in this study.

The study also touches on the possibilities, which could make the Nile a factor that would reshape the relations between the two countries in view of the emerging scenario of cooperative use and the international political and economic perspective.

In conducting this study, I have employed a wide range of secondary data, i.e.. books, journals, articles, conference papers, internet dispatches and news papers. But I have also included data on current thinking as a primary data through the considerable
interviews I have undertaken not only with authorities on the water sector but also with people closely associated with the politics of water, researchers and diplomats.
Part I

Background to the Problem

The issue of the Nile reverberates through all aspects of relations between Egypt and Ethiopia. It is noted that the Nile enabled ancient civilization to flourish in Egypt (Swain, 1997: 676). Egypt’s prosperity is also attributed to the Nile, which waters its vast arid deserts. The relation of the two countries “has always been influenced by the Nile and resonated at all forums and in all areas whenever there are Ethiopian and Egyptian contacts” (Sosina, 1994:4).

As some historians have written ‘Egypt is the gift of the Nile’ “and the dependence of the rapidly growing nation on the river has not diminished” (Swain, 1997:676). But the vise versa may also hold true as the Nile could also be considered as a gift to all countries of the basin as some analysts have reasoned (Kinfe, 1999:) Egypt wanted to control the source of the Nile, and it might have done so had the Ethiopians have not successfully defended their territory as it was done by Yohannes IV at Gundet in 1875 and at Gura in 1876 (Swain, 1997:676). Thus, the kind of feeling which the two countries display towards each other emanates from these complex relations. It needs however to be studied whether their relations were rooted in the Nile issue and if so at what historical juncture the issue figured as the main cause for contact between the two countries throughout the history of the two nations. So, the purpose of this part of this study is to identify the factors and variables of national attributes, which have shaped the relations of the two countries.

1.1 Theoretical Framework

Before attempting to discuss the theory, which shaped the relations of the two countries, it is necessary to describe the leading theories that may govern foreign policies of many countries.

It may be helpful to start with a definition of the concept of foreign policy which, as some have put it, "is a set of decisions made by national leaders which are intended to serve as broad guidelines for choosing among various courses of actions in international affairs" (Pearson and Rochester, 1988:103). Thus, it is a set of
guidelines for choices being made about people, places and things beyond the boundaries of the state. Foreign policy, whether we are talking of the process of creating decisions, making decisions or implementing decisions is relational. That is, the intention of foreign policy is to affect the behavior of another actor. Because nothing is distributed equally in the global system, every state requires resources of economic goods, military capabilities, political and strategic support and cooperation of all sorts from other actors. Foreign policy, thus, "concerns behavior towards some other actor for some reason" (Russet and Starr, 1986:191).

Other scholars emphasize on the need to try to explain foreign policy by examining the factors that influence officials to make a particular decision instead of attempting to deduce a country’s foreign policy on the basis of its national interest. Accordingly, they argue that the foreign policy of any country is an interaction between internal and external factors. Foreign policy "as both process and output is a link between what goes inside a state and the world environment outside that state" (Ibid.).

In terms of its objective “the foreign policy of every country deals first with the preservation of its independence and security, and second with the pursuit and protection of its economic interests" (Deutsch, 1978:100). Foreign policy also consists of two elements: national objective to be achieved and the means for achieving them. The interaction between national goals and the resources for achieving them is the subject of statecraft. In this connection some scholars allege that in the pursuit of protecting their interests, the foreign policy of all nations, great and small, is the same (Couloumbis, 1986:125). Others are, however, of the opinion that:

deeply involved with these interests – in the case of the major powers, at least – are a concern with resisting any penetration and manipulation by foreign countries and ideologies, and unblushing effort to accomplish some active penetration and manipulation of their own (Deutsch,1978:100).

Hence, when one talks about states foreign policy and behaviors, one means both the goals that national governments pursue in international arena as well as the instruments – the political, economic, diplomatic and military tools that they employ to achieve these goals (Pearson and Rochester, 1988:103). The explanation that may
follow from this is that “a nation’s feeling of insecurity expands directly in relation
to its power: the larger and more powerful a nation is, the more its leaders, elite and
often its population increase their level of aspirations in international affairs”
(Deutsch, 1978:101). But, not all countries act in the same manner in the
international arena. Thus national power and national interest are correlative: one concerns capability, the other right. “They are the obverse and reverse of the coin”(Ibid.).

As the one time British Prime minister Disraeli has put it “when we talk of “British interests” we mean material British interests – interests of that character which are
sources of the wealth or securities for the strength of the country” (Wight, 1991:111).
Not all countries act (behave) in the same manner "many people, realists in particular
would argue that all foreign policy behavior of any importance can be traced to
simply what Winston Churchill referred to as "national interests"(Ibid.). According
to this view, national leaders basically seek to maximize their country’s advantages
vis-à-vis other states, either in cooperation with or at the expense of such states

A distinction need to be made here between the realist and the idealist conception of international relations. According to Vasquez (1982:2):

The notion that power and action are the key to international politics and that morality and reason can be utopian and impotent are the hallmarks of the approach to international relations known as realism or realpolitik.

On the other hand, idealists underestimate the role of power in enforcing a new order and preventing war. They are also observed as exaggerating the influence of reason by assuming a fundamental harmony of interests, when in fact, according to the realists, there are often profound conflicts of interest that can only be resolved by a struggle for power (Ibid.).

As I have indicated earlier there are scholars who disagree with the realist concept of national interest. In this regard writers such as Allison and Halperin (1972) criticize the realist idea that "the nation is a unitary rational actor that produces foreign policy
in the national interest” (Vasquez, 1990:126). They seem to view foreign policy “as a product of the pulling and hauling of bureaucratic actors each with its interests” (Ibid.).

Although it is true that all foreign policy behavior can be traced to national interests, there are also a variety of other factors determining foreign policy behavior which may be found inside or outside the national boundary. In this connection “it has been frequently argued against the realist conception of foreign policy that its key concept, the national interest, does not provide an acceptable standard for political action” (Ibid., 131). The variety of factors that are identified as determining foreign policy behavior are generally classified as (1) systemic (2) national attributes, and (3) idiosyncratic (Pearson and Rochester, 1988:103). Viewed from the context of the above mentioned factors, the content of a foreign policy seems to be determined by the political traditions and the total cultural context within which a nation formulates its foreign policy. The concept of the national interest then contains two elements, “one that is logically required and in that sense necessary and one that is variable and determined by circumstances” (Vasquez, 1990:131-132).

Systemic factors are those conditions in a country’s external environment that can affect its foreign policy. These include geography, international interactions and links, and the international system structure. Systemic factors also include the politics and actions of other states, which can stimulate policy responses. In this respect it can be said that foreign policy is a set of responses to the external challenges and opportunities (Couloumbis, 1986:134). Accordingly, systemic variable affects a state’s foreign policy formulation both objectively and subjectively. The objective condition is that systemic variables provide constraints and opportunities that outline the general direction of foreign policies. In other words, there are objective limits to the actions of states. “any foreign policy which operates under the standard of the national interest must obviously have some reference to the physical, and cultural entity which we call a nation” (Vasquez, 1990:132).

It is also provided that “in a world where a number of sovereign nations compete with and oppose each other for power, the foreign policies of all nations must necessarily refer to their survival as their minimum requirements” (Ibid.). Therefore,
national leaders define their country’s interests in terms of problems and opportunities in the world around them. Leaders do not have as much control over their external environment as they do over their domestic environment, and hence foreign policy makers often find themselves reacting rather than shaping unforeseen events or intractable conditions (Couloumbis, 1986:134.).

It also seems true that larger and stronger nations may think themselves as destined or obliged to put the world’s affairs in order, or at least to keep them in some sort of order that seems sound to them. In contrast to this, members of small nations usually have no such idea. With regard to small nations, it seems natural for them to concentrate their attention and efforts on preserving their own nation in a world whose economics and/or ideologies they do not expect to control in any case (Deutsch, 1978:101). The assertion that foreign policy makers usually react rather than shape events or conditions may not be equally applicable to all nations because – largest and strongest nations can develop “some at-least-plausible image of a world which they, by their own national efforts, might mould, change, or preserve wholly or in large part according to their own desires”. (Ibid.). It is with these conceptual framework that we may pass to consider the second factor influencing foreign policy decision making, which we have noted as national attributes.

The presence or absence of various national attributes – demographic, economic, military, and governmental factors can strongly affect a country’s foreign policy behavior particularly in terms of scope and modus operandi. For example, the more economic assets a country has the greater its ability to pursue global interests, to use economic tools of influence and to participate in international organizations. A country’s military preparedness, rate of economic growth, and access to resources can affect its foreign policy assertiveness (Pearson and Rochester, 1988:181).

Although objective conditions such as national attributes, systemic factors impose limits on a state’s capacity to act no matter who is at the helm, differences in leadership personality, temperament and other characteristics (idiosyncratic factors, in general) can have important impacts on foreign policy. For example, one can not fully account for Chinese and French foreign policy after World War II without noting the special imprint of strong leaders like Mao Tse Tung and De Gaulle (Ibid.). It is not
disputed that “individuals make foreign policy, or accept or reject it in the light of what they think they like” (Deutsch, 1978:99).

From the foregoing discussion on the theoretical basis, on foreign policy decision-making we may observe that, systemic factors seem especially important in affecting alignment behavior, national attribute factors especially affect the scope of foreign policy and idiosyncratic factors affect the *modus operandi* (the mode of operation). However, frequently all three sets of factors operate simultaneously, intermingling as foreign policymakers consider how their state should relate to other states (Pearson and Rochester, 1988:181).

It is observed that the traditional tensions and conflicts are becoming increasingly intertwined with new global challenges: widespread underdevelopment and poverty and large-scale environmental problems that threaten human health, economic equality and international security. The disparity in resource allocation between countries has also become an important political factor. Rich and powerful countries have attempted to cloak their actions in the mantle of poor developing nations. This has proved to be an effective new gambit in the game of international politics and conflict (Gleick, 1991:4). In this connection it is argued that:

The political and ideological questions that now dominate international discourse will not become less important in the future; rather they will become more tightly woven with such variables as poor resource allocation. It is in particular expected that rapidly growing population, greater irrigation demands, and future climatic changes may increase international tensions over shared water resources. In this regard the goal of a nation-state *visa-avis* other states is expected to be to enhance its power and the principal tools for this are military power and political alliances which would result in one's gains over other's loss as the only recourse used to pursue state objectives (*Ibid.*).

An understanding of the modes of generally conducting international relations but also an understanding of the behavior of nations towards a crisis or conflict situation is essential. According to Snyder and Diesing (1997:4):
What most urgently needs theoretical description and explanation is how the perpetual shadow of war affects the behavior of states, and how they manipulate that shadow to advance and protect their interests.

International political theories including the ones discussed in this part of the study do not seem to be adequate to explain the modes and intricacies of present crises and conflicts. That seems why it is argued that:

The many models developed to explain international behavior have not considered access to resources and the degradation of global environmental services a central problem of international polities and security. Political scientist Stephen Krasner summarized the conventional meaning of security as "the defense of territorial and political integrity, which was understood as the fundamental and immutable, objective of states in the international system". International relations before the last part of the twentieth century was, indeed, primarily concerned with security in this narrow sense and millions died in the first half of the twentieth century in pursuit of this goal. Economic questions were secondary. Environmental issues barely appeared on the international agenda (Gleick,1991:4).

The move to widen the scope of international relations to include environmental and resource issues is necessitated because these issues are producing conditions that render international conflict more likely. To substantiate this contention it is argued that "the recent threats to withhold freshwater from Iraq by cutting off the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers is yet another demonstration of the links between environment and security" (Ibid.).

In the Ethio – Egyptian relations throughout history it may be argued that systemic factors have shaped the relations of the two countries. It would seem that Ethiopia has been subject to pressures from the proximate world around it particularly – Egypt, which was considered as hostile with a political orientation and design of disrupting her national cohesion and stability. This perception seemed to persist until the early nineties where the Dergue regime is noted to have "banked so much on force to subdue its opponents and to caw and intimidate citizens, thus had its foreign policy counterpart which zeroed in on projecting a macho image abroad, most particularly
with respect to Ethiopia's relations with its neighbors" (Sosina, 1994:4). But was this not a result of the hostile policies of Ethiopia's neighbors? It may be seen that Ethiopia had no claim on the territories of the countries, which abound her, but its neighbors seemed to have a strategic interest of obtaining acquiescence of this country to their demands.

1.2 The Nile and Ethio – Egyptian Relations

Egypt and Ethiopia have been in contact for centuries. As has been stated before the early contacts between Ethiopia and Egypt seem to have been based on the Red Sea trade. But some have noted that the knowledge that the Nile had a major tributary in Ethiopia was known in both countries, Egypt and Ethiopia at quite an early date.

It is also recorded that Ethiopia had control over SouthWest Arabia although only for a short time. However, after the Persians established themselves in Yemen, if effectively ended any pretense of Aksumite control. It was at this juncture in history that the Persians attacked Byzantine Egypt, the attack that resulted in disrupting Aksumite trade networks in the Red Sea area (Ofcansky and Berry, 1993:10).

According to the statement of the above stated authors, one of the most important contributions the Aksumite state made to Ethiopian tradition was the establishment of the Christian Church.

The Aksumite State and its forbears had certainly been in contact with Judaism since the first millennium B.C. and with Christianity beginning in the first century A.D. The introduction of Christianity into Ethiopia is believed to have strengthened the relations between these two countries, viz. Egypt and Ethiopia. In this regard, the Alexandrian church had lasting effects on historical developments of Ethiopia, Later, however, the establishment of Islam in Egypt and the Levant greatly reduced Aksum’s relations with the major Christian power, the Byzantine Empire. Consequently although contact with individual Christian churches in Egypt and other lands continued, the Muslim conquests hastened the isolation of the Church in Aksum (Ibid.).
Limited communications continued, however, the most significant being the consecration of Bishops for the Ethiopian Church by the Coptic Church of Alexandria until Emperor Haile Sellassie took the initiative in 1950 to get an Ethiopian Bishop (Lipsksy, 1992:106).

The Ethio – Egyptian communications was not, however, limited to the relations of the two churches. The relationship of the two nations is older than the relations between the churches. To substantiate this contention there are historians who indicate that the early Ethio-Egyptian contact dates back to 2800 B.C, when Egyptians tried to locate the source of Blue Nile and its tributaries. Historical relics found in the tombs of pharaohs and inscriptions found on the tomb of Titaitmus the Third, mentions places like Adulis, and Tigre, thereby indicating early contacts Ethiopia had with Egypt (Ofcansky and Berry, 1993:11).

But the question here is has the Nile figure out as one of the main factors, which shaped the relations between the two countries? If yes, when and at what historical juncture did it figure out as the main factor? The writer of this study tries to prove that the issue of the Nile and Egypt's attempt to control it figured out as one of the essential factors for the relations between the two countries. Attempt would also be made to prove whether Ethiopia's rulers acted with knowledge of thwarting this Egyptian design in defending the country from their repeated incursions.

It can be observed that Egypt occupies a strategic position as a land bridge between two continents and a link between two principal waterways, the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. This geopolitical position of Egypt is believed to have influenced her policies and worked to become strong enough to dominate its environment or risk becoming the victim of outside powers (Metz, 1993:279). Egyptian rulers also thought that with the control of the Nile, they can safeguard their water security.

Often in their history Egyptian leaders have sought to unify the Nile Valley under their rule by conquering the Sudan. But the Egyptian intention to conquer the areas of the source of the Nile was not limited to the Sudan. It is noted that “ the Egyptian Foreign office has always believed that Churchill’s idea of the whole of the Nile Basin
as one hydrological political unit to be ruled from Cairo should remain the cornerstone of their policy,” (Bulloch and Darwish, 1993:100). This Egyptian design of bringing the Nile Basin nations under their influence does not seem to have changed through the ages. This is particularly true with respect to Ethiopia where it has been historically proved that beginning with the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Egyptian kings undertook their colonial program of creating a “Greater Egypt”. In this respect, the Egyptian king, Khedive Ismael, wanted to make the Nile an Egyptian River and to annex to his country all the geographical area of its basin including Ethiopia (Wondimneh, 1979:15-16).

The Ethiopians for their part were thought to have the intention of causing famine and economic hardship to Egypt and thus to put pressure on it. The Egyptians feared that the waters of the Nile might possibly be blocked or diverted by Ethiopia. Hence, they tried to control Ethiopia as witnessed by their military engagement with the Ethiopians “at Gura – some eighty miles from Massawa in Northern Tigre, the northernmost kingdom of the ancient Ethiopian Empire, part of which later became Eritrea” (Jesman, 1959:75).

The Egyptians kept no secret about their expansionist aims. This was disclosed in the letters their kings sent to Emperor Yohannes IV of Ethiopia in which they informed the Ethiopian Emperor that they aimed "to restore tranquility on the turbulent border between Ethiopia and Egypt around Keren and to fix the boundary line between the two states". In fact, it is recorded that the Egyptian king of the period, Khedive Ismail was “less modest”; he freely admitted, "in these enlightened days, the world is acquiescing in the extension of progressive powers" (Ibid.).

Egyptian colonial scheme was prompted by various factors in addition to the control of the Nile. During the beginning of the nineteenth century, Egypt was undergoing a significant process of change, which was to have an enduring effect both on its internal shape and foreign policy. The Ethiopian historian, Bahiru Zawdie (1991:25), notes that the Napoleonic occupation brought an end to the rule of Mamluks in Egypt, and that in turn had two consequences; the beginning of British interest in Egypt and the Red Sea, and the emergence of Muhammad Ali, the Albanian adventurer in the Ottoman army, who established the dynasty that was to rule Egypt for a century and a half. After
establishing a secure economic and military base for his own power, Muhammad Ali turned his attention southward. It was his southward expansion which was to have a lasting impact and which posed threat to Ethiopia (*Ibid.*).

When Ismail, the grandson of Muhammad Ali, became the Viceroy of Egypt in 1863, Egyptian ambition of conquest became distinctly more imperialistic. Ismail pursued a policy of vigorous penetration of the African interior, more particularly the Nile Valley. He found it essential "to occupy the Sudan – invading Darfur in 1874 to impress his European creditors" (Jesman, 1959:76). Together with Ismael’s ambition to control the Nile Valley, British interest also had its role to play in the Egyptian expansion into the heart of Africa. After sustaining a heavy defeat in the hands of the Ethiopians at the Battle of Gura, Ismael disclaimed publicly any hostile intentions against Ethiopia (*Ibid.*). In this connection, when asked what he intended to do about "the absorption or annexation of the whole or part of this country he used to say that as Nature was already sending him down the best part of Ethiopia with each flood of the Nile, he had no desire for the residue" (*Ibid.*). These non-violent utterances seemed, however, a camouflage for the true intentions of the Khedive. He was making preparations for the occupation of the country with a view to future military operations and permanent administration.

British Colonialism in northeast Africa also sought to secure its interest in the Nile in order to ensure the production and export of long staple cotton for its industry at home (Girma, 1997:3). In this regard in 1853, the British John Petherick established trading posts under the Egyptian flag on the upper Nile. Furthermore, an Egyptian military garrison was set up at Fashoda in 1865 and it is recorded that on the 20th of May, 1870 already under Ismael, Sir Samuel Butler announced the annexation of Equatoria to Egypt (Jesman, 1959:77). In addition, General Gordon slowly extended the Khedivial dominion towards the lakes and in 1874 reached the confines of Uganda (*Ibid.*). The British also achieved control over the Nile with other colonizers and by establishing Anglo-Egyptian condominium over the Sudan in 1899 to ensure that no projects could be built in the basin without Egyptian and British consent.

The colonial treaties and the condominium over Sudan were designed mainly to protect Egypt’s interests in the basin, since for many strategic and economic reasons
Egypt had become the most important Nile basin riparian state for the British colonizers. The strategic importance of Egypt arose mainly because of the value of its Red Sea ports for Britain’s colonial trade and of the Suez Canal for controlling the shortest route from Europe to India. Consequently, political stability in Egypt acquired paramount importance for its British administrators (Elhance, 1999:68). To a very large extent, this stability became contingent upon satisfying Egypt’s growing water needs, without much regard for the interest of the other Nile riparians. This colonial era mentality subsequently inherited by the rulers of independent Egypt, and the resentment it has generated has continued to circumscribe the hydropolitics in the Nile Basin (*Ibid*).

Thus, the Egyptian incursion into Ethiopia was prompted by internal Egyptian development (national interest) and external influence (British economic and strategic interest in the Nile basin). This Egyptian national interest led them to expand towards the heart of Africa. Just like the Egyptian extremists of today, its leaders were inflamed with the idea of the unity of the Nile Valley from the Great Lakes to the delta under the Egyptian flag (Bulloch and Darwish, 1993:26). Sooner or later, this would have meant the conquest of Ethiopia, the hereditary Christian menace to every modern ruler of Egypt. As we have seen earlier, Mohammed Ali had designs on Ethiopia. He was stopped only by a formal declaration from the British. But unlike Mohammed Ali, his nephew Khedive Ismael, achieved considerable achievements in the field of empire building (Elhance, 1999:68). In this regard, it is noted that in three years, from 1874 to 1876, he founded his great African Empire which was to extend the limits of Egypt as far as the equatorial lakes, the shores of the Indian Ocean, the frontiers of the black kingdoms of Chad (Wondimneh, 1979:15).

With the objective of controlling the Nile Basin, Egypt made several military expeditions. By 1872, Khedive Ismael attempted to connect Massawa with Sudan and even claimed Berbera and Harrar as part of the Ottoman Empire administered by Egypt. To make sure he is in firm control of his hypothetical territory, Ismael further encroached deep into Ethiopian territory and fought with Ethiopian forces at Gundet in 1875 and at Gura in 1876 where his forces were annihilated by Ras Alula’s army (Alula, 2001:1). The battles were fought on the plains of Gura between the 7th and 10th of March, 1876 and both were the consequence of an earlier battle between the
Egyptians and the Ethiopians in November 1875 at Gundet, a nearby locality on the River Merb (Jesman, 1975:75).

From the foregoing, we can note that throughout history the dynamic force of Ethio-Egyptian relations has been the Nile factor. Therefore, we shall deal with the Nile factor as a dynamic of Ethio-Egyptian relations in greater detail hereunder.

1.3 Problems Faced in the Relations between Ethiopia and Egypt

There are particular geographical and political aspects of the Nile Basin, which might give rise to conflict over its waters. Chief among these are the great contrast between the riparian states who use almost all the waters of the Nile and those who are unable to derive any benefit from it. The author Nurit Kliot (1994:15) argues that "sharing the waters of the Nile has become urgent for rapid population growth, and the needs of the farming economies of the riparian states has turned the Nile waters into a greatly demanded but scarce commodity ". It seems true that the Nile for Egypt is almost everything from water supply to irrigation and power. It is argued that Egypt has ground water resource estimated to meet between 3-5% of its requirements (Mekuria, 2002). While the other riparians are said to have abundant rain, Egypt is considered to be totally dependent on the Nile. The upper riparian demand for use of the water is also not considered as crucial as it is for Egypt. The questions that would follow from these assertions are (1) is it true that Egypt is totally dependent on the Nile? (2) Is it true that the upper riparian countries, especially Ethiopia, which has remained an onlooker on the use of the Nile, disposed the need for using the Nile as comparable as those of the lower riparian states of Sudan and Egypt? Opinion seems to be divided with regard to these questions.

In responding to the first question, Mekuria Tafesse (2002), an engineer from the Metaferia Consulting Engineers starts by describing that the Nile means everything for Egypt-from water supply to power, irrigation, etc. But he prefers to treat Egypt's dependence on the Nile from two perspectives: dependence as such on the overall economy and the dependence on the river for its agricultural use as rainfall in Egypt is nominal. From the agricultural perspective he argues that Egypt is totally dependent on
the Nile. In other respects, he argues that Egypt is not totally dependent on the Nile, because Egypt's economy is relatively developed and diversified. The relative strength and diversification of Egypt's economy is also accepted by other authorities who argue that other economic sectors such as tourism and industry strongly support the economy (Kidane, 2002). In particular, its industrial production is known to be serving as a major military supplier of weapons, equipment and other military hardware to many Middle Eastern countries. Egypt is also in a better position to employ modern technology not only to diversify its economy but to economize and build its own strength in utilizing the resources of the river, even in times of drought, when the flow of the Nile decreases. So, concludes Mekuria, “Egypt is not totally dependent on the Nile, it has other options” (Mekuria, 2002).

Other authors do not seem to accept technological capability as sufficient to mitigate Egypt's dependence on the river. In this connection authors such as Shapland (1997:63) seem to imply Egypt's precarious position in spite of its technological capability to construct hydraulic works. The writer of this study also shares this opinion because Egypt could not attain water security or availability in the face of the burgeoning population increase and the demand for the use of the river by the other riparian countries such as Ethiopia and Sudan.

Other authorities strongly believe that Egypt is totally dependent on the Nile. Among then, Tesfaye Tafesse (2002) of the Addis Ababa University asserts that "had there been no Nile, the country would have been part and parcel of the Sahara". But Egypt's dependence on the Nile could be mitigated if it can use more efficient technology to conserve water. It may also have to switch to some other methods of decreasing its dependence such as employing the so-called 'virtual water' practice. Egypt is also believed to be a net importer of cereals as its agriculture is not self-sufficient. One writer even asserts that "Egypt is no longer as dependent on the Nile because it has relieved its dependence with large imports of cereals" (McEwan, 2002). The capability of Egypt to use better technology to utilize other resources such as desalinating sea water or to convert water intensive crops with less water intensive ones may be used as one possibility of easing its dependence on the river as Tesfaye has put it (2002).
Others are more emphatic. In this connection Yacob Arsano (2002) from the Addis Ababa University argues that "as far as the water resources are concerned, Egypt is totally dependent on the Nile". I think the argument that Egypt is totally dependent on the Nile is true as long as Egypt's water resources come in the main from the Nile flow the origin of which is from countries outside Egypt. It is the Nile, which supports Egypt's agriculture, tourism and other industrial sectors. The questions that should be asked here are: For what in particular does Egypt depend on the Nile? Is it for its economy? How much is water, the source of its economic development? The fact that Egypt is capable of efficiently utilizing the waters of the Nile through its technological prowess and its diversified economic sector-could not change its dependence on the Nile. Further, Tesfaye Tafesse (2002) says that even if the Egyptians using technologically advanced methods could "add/ save some more water, which they are actually thinking about, they intend to use it for their Toshka and EL Salam canals and not to strike a deal with Ethiopia". This Egyptian exercise, if true, could have serious implications with the cooperative endeavors under the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) which we would be discussed in part III of this study.

The fact that Egypt is dependent on the Nile has also been observed to have made the "safety and the continued flow of the great river the central concern of its policy" (Bulloch and Darwish, 1993:26). But what does water security mean for Egypt and what factual conditions necessitated the Egyptians to undertake such a policy? This question needs to be analyzed in order to understand the reasons for the Egyptian motivation of pursuing the water security policy. According to Waterbury (1979:63).

The sense of vulnerability and the attendant fears of the downstream states-above all, Egypt's-are at the center of all decisions affecting the choice of projects and technology to master the river.

What the above quotation may imply is that Egypt, as a downstream state has been made to be over possessive of the Nile and suspicious of actions by upstream states of tampering with the flow of the Nile on whose continued flow the Egyptian life hinges. The Egyptian response to counter this perceived fear was to achieve a dominant role in the water use, which they did by building the necessary infrastructure to maximize their utilization of the water resources. This technological and technical capability has
assured Egypt to play a leading role in regional security. So, in international relations parlance the Egyptian move to assume a prominent position has set the hydro-political structure in the Nile River Basin.

In the words of Waterbury, (1979:63) "to hedge against the potential threat of their volatile neighbors, Egypt and Sudan have pursued various strategies for regional security". This Egyptian move may induce us to retrace theories, which derive the Egyptian policy in the Nile Basin. Among the relevant theories could be the so-called domino theory which indicates that "some power sets the pieces upright in the first place" (Ibid., 64). We may also observe that Egypt's foreign policy and the goals which it aimed to protect were based on “its feeling of insecurity towards the actions of other actors”, to use Deutsch's, (1978:101) words. This seems the theoretical basis, which drives Egyptian policy of safeguarding the control of the Nile River resources. Although many factors make up the power capability of a country to influence the actions of other actors, the propitious condition which motivated Egypt to assume its present status as a power to be reckoned with, in my opinion, is connected among others, to its geopolitical position. This opinion seems to be shared by such authors as Haggai Erlich (1994:128) who states that:

The Egyptian political establishment was still motivated by the ideas of Egyptian nationalism as formed in the early 1920s. These included the slogan of Unity of the Nile Valley and the dream of building a Greater Egypt, including the Sudan.

It should be seen that geopolitical factor may not be the only element that would empower states. Other elements such as population size, economic and political factors could also play a critical factor in determining the power of a country. In this regard, Egypt conducted its policy of water security and unhampered user right on the resources of the Nile because it is a country with relatively large economy and has the industry and technology and the military power which follows from its economic ascendancy (Henderson, 1998:106). When viewed from this perspective, the rest of the riparian countries of which the Nile River bounds were considered at times as "congeries of nominally independent, poorly integrated politically unstable states whose policies, moods, objectives and big power alignments cannot be satisfactorily
forecasted from one year to the next" (Waterbury, 1979:63). This portrayal of the other riparian countries seems however, uncharacteristic or not exactly a correct representation of the objective conditions in which these countries are presently conducting their foreign policies.

The big power alignment to which countries of the basin are related seems to have ended with the end of the Cold War at the turn of the 1990's forcing these countries to pay allegiance to the single super-power- the United States. But it remains to be seen whether Egypt could continue to win the favors of big powers, which can in one way or another have influence on the future appropriation of the resources of the Nile. In the past, any attempt of development of the resources of the Nile by such countries as Ethiopia, as the major contributor of the Nile, would require a clearance of no objection from Egypt and Sudan whom the powers seemed not to disappoint and would ultimately release the financial and technological assistance needed to implement the development projects once they obtained their consent. For example,

When Ethiopia tried to obtain funds to install an irrigation network for sugar plantations with water drawn from the Finchaa Dam, its application to the African Development Bank was opposed by the Egyptians and Sudan's, on the ground that they had not been consulted about the Dam's construction (Shapland, 1997:78).

This is a clear case of the Egyptian capability to influence development efforts in the Nile River. Except for Egypt and the Sudan the other riparian countries, specifically Ethiopia, have not been in a position to utilize the waters of the Nile. In addition to their diplomatic prowess, the Egyptian policy on the Nile also exhibits military capability with which to support their policy.

The question here is how would Egypt respond to the upper riparian countries attempt to use the resources of the Nile? Would Egypt use force to prevent this attempt? The Egyptian leaders have repeatedly stated that they would go to war if Ethiopia develops the Nile tributaries in its territory for purposes of irrigation and power. In a familiar blatant threat in this connection, the late Egyptian leader, Anwar Sadat is quoted as saying "if Ethiopia takes any action to block our right to the Nile Waters, there will be no alternative for us but to use force" (Wondimneh, 1979:10).
But I doubt whether the Egyptians would gamble to such an extent. The fear that they could make incursions into Ethiopia seem to me to be more exaggerated. It is true that this Egyptian rhetoric was advanced against the background of hostility, which these two countries experienced during the Cold War period in the late 1970s when both were aligned to the two opposing superpowers, namely, the Soviet Union and the United States. This allegiance to two opposing superpowers as we have seen has been replaced by a single superpower—the United States which is believed to influence the policies of the two countries, to submit to its political expectations among which could include negotiation for equitable use of the Nile.

In this regard it is argued that "since then Ethiopian and Egyptian statements on the division of the Nile have been less bellicose" (Shapland, 1997:79). In a response to a question of whether Egypt would use force, Tesfaye Tafesse, (2002), an authority on the Nile responded by saying that responded by saying that:

The question is even if they have the gut to do so, which I doubt given the circumstances (Ethiopia's terrain, the distance of the target points from Egypt, external pressure, etc) can they win it? I don't think they can on their own and it could have a boomerang effect. The Egyptian incursion could also militate the Ethiopians to focus more on the Nile and there could also be some external pressure (assuming they are rational) to end the war by renegotiating the 1959 or other treaties.

A discussion of the relation of power and international society may be relevant in this context. According to Henderson (1998:121) "The nature of power was becoming more persuasive and less coercive, and the ends sought were increasingly the shared needs and wants of multiple actors rather than just the security of states".

This seems to be a clear indication that Egypt couldn't achieve its dominance by power alone. It could benefit more by recognizing the fact that it could make life better for its population by cooperation and not by opting for confrontation. In the international political interaction a number of models, have been developed to describe and explain different paradigms of concordant and accommodative relations. In this context I would prefer to discuss the version of "realism" and the neoliberal theories which seem to be related to the type of power politics the Egyptians have
been advocating as just and reasonable in pursuance of their position as a state and in pursuance of their national interest specifically the so-called “water security policy”. In this connection, in a question posed by the present writer on whether it is not right for the Egyptians to implement their water security policy, Tesfaye Tafesse (2002) says:

.... From the point of view of the Egyptians or if one is an Egyptian, and a nationalist at best, he/she fights to safeguard or maintain the water security policy. That is what they are actually doing at the moment. But, a farsighted cooperative endeavor would benefit all the basin states, including and probably more importantly Egypt (ellipses mine).

The writer of this study, however, thinks Egyptian policy of water security to be in concurrence with the classical realist concept of self-interest, according to which the state behavior is considered to be rational under the assumption that "states are guided by the logic of" national interest "usually defined in terms of survival, security, power, and relative capabilities" (Holsti, 1995:131). Whether this characterization fits the present Egyptian thinking is an open question. It does not also mean, however, that this Egyptian disposition is beneficial to the peaceful interactions of the parties whose ultimate survival is connected with the common resource i.e. the Nile. It is neither rational from the perspective of the rights of the other riparians countries to use the resources of the River. It would indeed do good for the Egyptians to be “far-sighted and cooperative” as Tesfaye (2002) stated. A change of attitude in this regard also seems be logical as suggested by such prominent realist thinkers as Morganthau, according to whom it is believed that "rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits" (Holsti, 1995:131, quotation original).

In contrast to the earlier theoretical explanation, the nature of power seems to be undergoing a process of considerable change. In this regard, it is observed that:

Today states are about as likely to base their power on a prosperous, industrialized economy and highlevel technology as much on a military capability. In fact, the latter would be hard to achieve
without the former two. By turning from hard power and thinking collectively, countries have not turned altruistic: they simply have different needs (Henderson, 1998:121)

The same author further argued that:

Countries now want open markets, control of pandemics, reduction of pollution, improvement in the respect of human rights... and other goals generally requiring non-military means (Ibid., ellipses mine).

Whether an order of cooperation is coming to prevail over an order of conflict in the Nile Basin is an open question. But what has been seen up to now is that "The downstream stance towards upstream riparians has been overprotective of their water security and oftentimes aggressive" (Yacob, 2000:3).

It has also been observed that: -

The Egyptians have always been obsessed by the Nile Water and their position concerning the development and utilization of the Nile Water has all along been governed by the principle of absolute territorial integrity which is in contradistinction to the Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Tesfaye, 2000:5).

The discussion so far presented stressed on Egyptian policy towards the Nile, vis-a-vis Ethiopia. But what was and is Ethiopia's policy towards the Nile vis-a-vis Egypt?.

It is stated earlier that "this issue of obtaining an abun from Alexandria made it imperative for the Ethiopian emperors to communicate with Egypt’s rulers” (Haggai, 1994:23). This 6th century contact shows how ancient are the communication between the two countries. What is most significant of all, however, is even at such an early period when Ethiopia’s level of development could not have allowed the diversion of the flow of the Nile, “Egypt’s rulers were, ... most concerned about the Nile, the lifeline of their country” (Ibid.). According to Haggai (Ibid. ellipses mine):

The first written record of such a concern dates from the days of the Fatimid dynasty (909-1171). Around
1090, with the Nile Waters a low ebb, the Fatimid ruler al-Mustansir bil- Allah sent an appeasement mission headed by the Coptic patriarch to the Zagwe court. Ethiopian tradition has it that the greatest Zagwe King, Lalibela (1133-1173) had discussed the idea of diverting the Nile but refrained from so doing because other Muslims, in Ethiopia’s east, would benefit from it, and also because the Egyptians had agreed to pay an annual tribute.

It is argued that. "The Nile has been at the heart of the regional foreign policy that has been pursued by Egypt, which continues to proclaim its historic right (going back 5500 years) to utilize the water that it needs from the river" (Swain, 1997:685 ellipses mine).

This recorded account from Haggai’s book may help to understand at what juncture in history the Nile has figured as one of the basic issues which started to shape the relations between the two countries. But the Ethiopians had neither the capacity nor the need to divert the Nile at this period. The Egyptians nevertheless remained sensitive and suspicious of Ethiopia’s intentions. They never stopped to strive to secure the unhindered flow of the Nile. The reasons for their repeated incursions into Northern Ethiopia were, as explained earlier, to control the sources of the Nile. The question that would be raised here is whether Ethiopian foreign policy of the period was directed to thwart this Egyptian design of controlling the Nile. The present writer believes that apart from defending herself from Egyptian incursions, Ethiopia did not seem to have a clear foreign policy towards Egypt. Others however argue that the country had a clear understanding of Egypt’s intents except that it didn't have a clear vision on how to thwart it diplomatically or through any other means. In support of this view Yacob Arsano (Interview, 2002), who responded to a question from this writer says, “there is a clear understanding of Egypt’s intents”. He adds however “as in all other cases there is no specialization”. This would take us to an investigation of on what theoretical background Ethiopian foreign policy operated.

As we have indicated earlier the fact that Ethiopian foreign policy was not active or with a direction on how to counter foreign pressures seemed to have made it reactive. But the rulers of the nineteenth and early twentieth century Ethiopia seemed to have had a foreign policy objective of protecting the dominance of the Orthodox Church
and its design of spreading it across the country. The political orientation of the rulers of the period revolved around the belief that the 'Muslim enemy' surrounded Ethiopia. This major preoccupation of ancient Ethiopian kings to counter Islamic influence came with the emergence of “a powerful Ethiopia under the Solomonic Dynasty” (Haggai, 1994:24):

Between the Mamluks (Egyptian kings, emphasis mine) and Ethiopia’s emperors there developed a hostile series of exchanges: The Mamluks delayed sending abuns to Ethiopia, mistreated their own Egyptian Copts, and punished the Ethiopian community in Jerusalem, and the Ethiopians threatened to block the Nile (Ibid.).

Although it is said that Ethiopia’s foreign policy seemed to lack a focus on the Nile issue as such, its efforts to obtain concession from the Egyptian Mamluks shows that its policy was not reactive and reductive of outside pressures alone. The attempts by ancient Ethiopian rulers to invade Egypt and their efforts at soliciting the assistance of European rulers in their quest for protecting their country from the “Muslim enemy” may indicate that Ethiopia’s foreign policy orientation in the distant past has remained relatively active in maintaining the country’s Christian tradition.

But no comparable change of stance seemed to have occurred in the modern times as argued by some analysts.

Throughout the 1980s and into the early years of the present decade, Ethiopia remained aloof from regional discussions touching on the Nile Waters. Ethiopian representatives attended meetings of Hydromet and the Undugu Group, but only as representatives (Shapland, 1997:80).

Ethiopia, however, continued to distance itself from participating in such meetings. As a continuation of this policy, Ethiopia refused to join the Undugu. Contrary to the account by Shapland Ethiopian representatives did not attend the Undugu meetings. This Ethiopian policy has however, been a center of criticism by some authorities who argue that “Ethiopia is also partially to be blamed for the hitherto existing no-win situation or for stalling agreements on the utilization of the Nile Waters” (Tesfaye, 2001:102). The question here is what does Ethiopian avoidance of the various Nile
basin initiatives reflect? And how did her participation in an observer status in such initiatives affect her?

The avoidance of the various Nile initiatives on the part of the Ethiopian government seemed to have aimed at thwarting Egyptian design of promoting their water security policy, which was directed at preventing utilization of the river by upstream states, particularly Ethiopia. Ethiopia insisted the inclusion of water allocation issue in the various initiatives, which the Egyptians were not prepared to accept.

The Egyptian strategy of maintaining its dominance on the Nile seems to be multidimensional. That is, it worked not only at spearheading the various Nile basin cooperation endeavors such as the TECCONILE and the Hydromet, it had also seemed to work on the political front. In this connection it is observed that:

The territory of the Nile basin is shared by nine states, all of which could to varying degrees, influence the flow and the quality of the water of the river. Egypt has always been actually sensitive to the dangers of this broader regional context for, as the epitome of the downstream states its economic life at the mercy of upstream development…. This concern has implicitly and on occasion explicitly led Egypt to reserve for itself the right to intervene in the affairs of other states to protect its vital water interests (Waterbury, 1979:5, ellipses mine).

I would argue that Ethiopia had no focus on the Nile except reacting to the initiatives and interventions of Egypt through indirect means. This feature of the Ethiopian policy had allowed the Egyptians to prevail in the regional politics. The other important question is how far the allegation of Egypt's interference in the affairs other states to protect its vital water interests is true?

We have seen how the Egyptians have tried to bring the source of the Nile under their control through their repeated incursions in Northern Ethiopia. This Egyptian interference is believed to have continued unabated to this date. This interference is not a direct one as in the past but indirectly by sponsoring certain political group. It is aimed to create political instability with a target of bringing a shift from focus on
water resources development particularly in Ethiopia (Yacob, 2002). Another authority on the Nile issue agrees with this conclusion by arguing that Egypt pursued such a policy in the Sudan by direct means, while their interference in Ethiopia manifested itself in an indirect means (Kidane, 2002). Egyptian pressure is also manifested in other forums where Ethiopia’s interest in the Nile is involved as we have seen before.

However, these assertions need not necessarily imply that the political problems and crises which prevailed and which prevented any development efforts in the sub-region are of Egypt’s own making. The problems of civil war and famine, which have arrested the development endeavors of these countries in my opinion, are in the main internal to the countries of this region. Outside pressures and interference may have aggravated it. But the civil war in the Sudan for example started by the policies of assimilation and subjugation of the North on the south. The civil war in Eritrea erupted following the abolition of the federation by Hailesllassie’s Ethiopia. Even the interstate conflicts in the region are attributed mainly to the policies of the respective countries involved in the conflict.

In this connection an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whom this writer asked to respond to the question argues that the causes for the region’s troubles are mainly internal. Analyzing the various conflicts, the official, Fisseha Shawl (2002) cites the Ethio-Eritrean conflict the causes of which he attributes to the arrogant and belligerent regime of “Shabia,” the EPLF, which he says wanted to impose its own policies on Ethiopia. The conflict between the Sudan and Ethiopia according to him was caused by the incompatibility of the policies of the two countries. The NIF wanted to export a version of Islamic Fundamentalism in the region, including in Ethiopia. The Ethio-Somali conflict is also attributed to the policies of Somali irredentism according to him. The above named official however, accepts that in all this inter-state conflicts, the issue of the Nile has been brought into the picture because Egypt would be interested in siding one of the conflicting parties against Ethiopia with the objective of diverting her attention from the utilizing the Nile.

This shows that the assertion of Egyptian interference, although not direct is widely believed to have played an influential role in complicating the stability of the region in general and Ethiopia in particular.
1.4 The Rights of the Principal Nile Riparian Countries to the Nile

The Nile as a transboundary river does not only traverse natural boundaries but it gives upstream countries a distinct advantage over downstream neighbors. The countries of the basin would in the future depend on the resources of the river. It seems for this reason that the one time Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt spoke frankly of “the critical importance of water to his country, which falls last in the receiving line for the precious stuff of the Nile” (Postel, 1995:402).

The reasons for the Egyptian move to secure the unimpeded flow of the Nile has been the state of the river in the hands of other countries whose right to use the water has not up to now been clearly recognized. It is true that nature has endowed Egypt with available water that it needs for its agriculture, industries, human consumption, etc.

But this resource is also precious for the other co-basin states that are pressurized to resort to this resource in order to feed their burgeoning population and to avert the looming danger of famine. The Egyptians may be right in thinking that their “national security is in the hands of the other African countries in the Nile basin” (Ibid.). But they seemed not to be cognizant of the need to work for mutual gains and cooperation on water issues. True, the other nine countries of the basin are not in a position to pressure Egypt to look for equitable arrangements in using the resources of the river. But as is the case with other similar shared water basins tension between the countries of the basin were already surfacing. It seems with the object of averting the danger of open conflicts that a need is urged for cooperation on the Nile with an objective of bringing a shift from the previous perceptions that shaped the relationship in the Nile co-riparians in dealing with issues of the Nile waters (Elzain, 1997:1). What makes the Nile different from other similar shared river basins seems that it is downstream countries that are displaying more influence and power in raising the stakes, while the upstream basin countries have remained weak and uninfluential in demanding water use rights. This state of affairs may not last long and as Postel (1995:403) has put it "over the next decade, water issues in the region, as may in other regions, will lead to either unprecedented degree of cooperation or a combustible level of conflict".
To avert this danger, the states of the basin in the words of Scheumann and Kalphake (2002,3) need to move away from focusing “on their discretion and sovereignty rather than on the process towards attaining sustainable water management”. The above statement stresses the need for a sustainable water management procedure by all the members of the river basin. The question here is how would this be achieved?

The basis for their exclusive use of the Nile advocated by the downstream Nile riparian countries is the so-called prior or historic rights. These downstream riparian countries, seem not to have been concerned with the need of reaching a consensus on how best to equitably allocate the resources of this river with the rest of the riparians, particularly those countries from whose soil the river originates and who have not been able to tap from it for their economic and social development. But what does consensus in the context of using the Nile mean? What does equitable allocation entail? These are the core questions, which need to be addressed in assessing the rights of the riparian countries in the basin in general and the principal riparian countries in particular, in exploiting the resources of the river.

What does a right of a riparian state to a shared river basin resource entail? There is no defined basis of an entitlement of a share to a river basin resource as the member states of the basin proclaim their own entitlement rights from the perspectives they consider as reasonable, equitable or prior or historic right. The present writer considers these conflicting principles of entitlement as a basis for any riparian state to claim a share from a common river. This reduction of the theoretical background of claim to the above indicated basis would rule out the claim based on the so-called “sovereignty or territorial integrity” for as is put by one author “gone are the days of absolute sovereignty” (Ahmed, 1994:351).

In line with this understanding some agreements in shared river basin resource have tried to create a legal regime for utilizing the shared water resource. A look into the Mekong River Agreement on cooperation shows that the principle of sovereign equality and territorial equality has been instituted. In this regard Article 5 of this agreement says:
To utilize the waters of the Mekong River system in a reasonable and equitable manner in their respective territories, pursuant to relevant factors and circumstances, the Rules for water utilization and inter basin diversion provided for under Article 26 (http://www.the water page.com/mekong.htm/).

What we may derive from this, as a matter of commonsense, is that the parties to the Agreement have recognized the rights of the riparian states to utilize the resources of the River in an equitable and reasonable manner. I would consider the words "reasonable and equitable" to be key words because they imply that within the context of reasonable and equitable utilization, the parties have a right to reap benefit from the river and that the resources of the river are accessible to such member states. Under this arrangement, I would think that no member party state would be denied or prevented from accessing the resources of the river. This arrangement is to my belief a good pace setter and its experience could be exemplary to the Nile River basin, a basin where to date no basin wide water utilization arrangement has been made.

The above River basin utilization Agreement is not comparable to the 1959 Nile basin utilization agreement. In fact, the very idea of sharing the Nile River resource has been a cause of discord and hostility between the riparian countries, especially between Ethiopia and Egypt. Some writers argue that the sharing of the resources of the river between the riparians would not be easy to achieve and it “is always likely to be difficult for the riparian countries concerned, especially in the Nile Basin, where over 80% of the population are engaged in agricultural production, and where the catchment areas suffer from periodic drought” (Swain, 1997:691).

As Whittington and Waterbury have put it “establishing or changing the allocation of property rights for a major international river such as the Nile is always a political task of monumental proportions” (Ethioscope, 1994). It is true that there would be difficulties of enormous significance on the road towards attaining a consensus on utilizing the resource of the Nile River between the riparian countries. But in my opinion the exigencies of population increase, repeated occurrence of drought or prevalence of famine and negative environmental impacts should rather hasten the attainment of such a consensus and not vice versa.
A question that should be raised here is what are the impediments for such cooperative utilization of the river. What are the attitudinal problems that are confronted with? In analyzing these problems, the present writer raised a question to some authorities on the issue, a question as to whether it is true or not that Egypt’s intransigence in maintaining the inequitable agreements (status quo) is becoming an obstacle to cooperation? But before going into the responses of the different authorities to the question presented to them I would prefer to state in a few words about the 1959 Agreement for the Full utilization of the Nile River.

Although a number of agreements on the Nile were concluded during or after the colonial period, the most significant of these is the 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Water between Egypt and Sudan. According to Elhance (1999:77); this Agreement:

> Was based on the assumption that the mean annual flow at Aswan would be 84 billion cubic meters that would be allocated to the two countries in a fixed proportion. Egypt, which was then drawing 48 billion cubic meters of water from the Nile and on whose territory the dam was to be built, would receive an additional 7.5 billion cubic meters while Sudan’s share would also increase by an equivalent amount from 11 to 18.5 billion cubic meters. The remaining 10 billion cubic meters of water was expected to be lost from evaporation and seepage from the reservoir.

This is a type of agreement which is devoid of any consideration for utilization right of the other riparian countries from whose territory the water drains. But the Egyptians may not secure the water by such an arrangement. It should be made clear that the upper riparian states are increasingly viewing the river as a "principal feature of their economies" as put by Messele Fisseha (2002) head of the Basin Studies in the Ministry of Water Resources, who describes the need for the water by the upper riparians as:

> The occurrence of recurrent drought and famine in the Sub-Saharan Africa and the vagaries of rainfall in the upper catchment of the Nile Basin have fueled
the demand for increased use of the waters of the Nile for irrigation and other purposes by the concerned upstream countries.

The present arrangement of water utilization in the basin, is also a factor that seemed to have imputed to the intransigence on the path of cooperative use. In responding to the question raised by the writer, Tesfaye Taffesse (2002), an authority on the Nile issue says:

… the Egyptians remained and are remaining adamant and intransigent to change the status quo. Cooperation of any form on any issue for that matter could be forged if and only if the beneficiaries think that they can gain or accrue profit out of it (ellipses mine).

In another paper on the subject Tesfaye (2000:3) thinks that all the basins riparian states are entitled to utilize the waters of the Nile equally. It seems that Egypt is trying to complicate the issue of equal access to the use of the Nile. This may be implied from the preoccupation of Egypt to construct the mega projects designed to divert Nile out of its natural basin. In this connection Tesfaye says:

The utilization of the Nile Waters by Egypt be it for flow regulation or power production or irrigation which until recently has been confined within the Nile Basin, has since the mid 1990s made a digression involving out-of-basin moves (Ibid.).

Another authority Yacob Arsano (2002) confronted with the above question agrees with the intransigence of Egypt but he argues that other riparian states except Sudan would reject that. The writer agrees with the reasons that have implicated Egypt in becoming obstacle to cooperative utilization of the resources of the river. Asked whether it is rational from the Egyptian perspective to implement its water security policy, Yacob (2002) thinks that, it is not rational, as it excludes other nations interests and, believes that a new fresh negotiated arrangement would be rational.

I think this observation on the rationality of Egyptian policy of water security may have to be looked from a perspective of the interests of the countries of the basin in general and not only from the perspective of the narrow interests of a specified
riparian country. Some writers seem to consider the Egyptian move to secure the continued and unimpeded flow of the Nile and in particular the construction of the Aswan High Dam, which makes the bulwark the Egyptian policy of water security, as rational. In this connection Waterbury (1979:3) argues that:

Too much has been made of the bungling of the High Aswan Dam as well as other Third World ventures into sophisticated hydraulics. Too little has been made of how comparatively well this and other projects have been implemented or of what the consequences would have been had they never been undertaken.

Such views on building the Dam seem to be intended to boost the Egyptian move in this regard. The writer thinks that this view is not rational and the construction of the High Aswan Dam by Egypt has rather increased the competition for the use of the Nile River resources. The Dam has been described as “the most recent (and surely not the last) manifestation of Egypt’s struggle to dominate rather than coexist with the Nile Valley” (Elhance, 1999:75). Egypt could have played a more cooperative role in the utilization of the Nile: the Dam may increase the availability of water, even at times of drought, but it would not insure water security for Egypt as alleged.

As witnessed in its various activities on the Nile, Egypt continues to proclaim its historic right to utilize the water it needs from the river. The question that would be posed here is whether Egypt can go on using such large quantities of water for its increasingly expanding agriculture when the needs of other countries upstream are growing. This trend is not possible to continue unchallenged. The upstream countries of the river basin have to begin to harness the waters of the river with resources that could be available even from the limited internal sources as the present Ethiopian Government is currently doing. The Tekezze River Basin Hydroelectric Feasibility Study is cited a case in point in this endeavor (Tesfaye, 2000:10).

It seems also true that "common to all the basin states, the rising populations and expectations of improvements in the standards of living are compelling each of them to consider increasing abstractions of water for various purposes, so water is
becoming an increasingly scarce commodity” (Messele, 2002). But the question that may be raised here is how can these countries realize these needs?

It is argued that, development efforts should not in the main rely on outside financial or technical assistance but on the resources mobilized from internal sources (Fisseha, 2002). This however doesn’t mean that Ethiopia needs no foreign assistance to develop its water resources. The point is that Ethiopia may not have to postpone its water development projects for want of external assistance. It needs to exercise its right to utilize the resource of the river on its own resource. This alternative is open to Ethiopia if a basin wide agreement for water sharing is not achievable and the Egyptians would continue in their stubborn and uncompromising stand and the World Bank remains reluctant to “support projects that are not based on an international agreement over shared water resources” (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 2001:32).

1.5 Colonial and Post – Colonial Agreements on the Nile.

To date, no comprehensive agreement on the Nile is available. This does not mean however, that no agreement was made on the use of the Nile. The point is that the numerous agreements reached with regard to the Nile waters did not include most of the riparian countries and in the words of Yacob (2000:4) “they lavishly favored Egypt, the most downstream country”. This is endorsed by Okidi (19994:321) who says, “A review of the treaties on the consumptive utilization of the Nile and Lake Victoria will show how Egypt has strenuously sought to ensure security of the water flowing down the Nile”. It has also been observed that the agreements of major importance are those “entered between some of the watercourse states mainly with the aim of securing the interests of one riparian state (Egypt) or to some extent the Sudan to the total exclusion of other riparian states” (Girma, 1997:1).

Tracing the background to the initial agreements on the Nile, it is recorded that after the British found themselves in Egypt, they started using the Nile waters as a
political weapon in order to strengthen their hold over Egypt and extend their influence in the Nile Valley to perpetuate their control over the gate to India and the rest of their Empire in the Orient (Zewdie, 2000:6). The British tried to promote their objective by building a dam over the Nile to grow cotton in the Gezira. British primary motive in this regard is noted to have been to provide at low cost long staple cotton to the Lancashire Cotton Mills, not necessarily to promote the interest either of the Sudan or of Egypt (Ibid.).

One of the earliest agreements regarding the Blue Nile waters is the Treaty between Great Britain and Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia at Addis Ababa on 15 May 1902. This is not, however, the first of its kind. According to Okide (1994:323):

There are about ten agreements dealing with consumptive use of the waters of the Nile and Lake Victoria. The United kingdom, then the administering colonial power over the Sudan, signed an agreement with Italy (1891), Ethiopia (1902), the Independent state of Congo (1906), and with Italy and France (1906).

But, a question that would be raised here is what was the validity of these agreements? As we have seen earlier, the British tried to safeguard the continued flow of the Nile for their own economic interest. They tried to maintain the continuity of flow of the Nile by entering into agreements with their rivals i.e. other colonial powers like the French and the Italians. But they also seemed to be concerned with the motives of other non-European powers, most importantly Menelik II of Ethiopia, who was competing for territorial gains with the British in the region.

The British dwelled on Menelik and they eventually convinced him to enter into an agreement in 1902. This Agreement was basically made to demarcate the frontiers between Ethiopia and Sudan. But it also contained what some writers called a "peculiar Article" III on the use of the Nile Waters which as quoted by Girma (1997:2) reads
His Majesty the Emperor Menelik II engages himself toward the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct or allow to be constructed, any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile, except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of the Sudan (Article 111, 1902 Agreement).

The questions which may be asked here with regard to above quoted Article is what did this article purport to achieve? Would this article prevent Ethiopia from using the Nile? Was the Amharic version of this Article different from the English version?

According to Shapland (1997:70):

In 1902, Ethiopia and Britain (acting for Egypt and Sudan) signed the Addis Ababa Agreement. Ethiopia undertook to seek the prior consent of Britain before initiating any works that might affect the flow of the Blue Nile or Sobat.

With regard to the question of what purpose the Agreement intended to achieve the intention is believed to have been British desire of obtaining assurance against “a probable unilateral and complete stoppage” “of the Nile Waters before an agreement was reached on mutually satisfactory basis” (Girma, 1997:3).

Others argue that the purport of the article was broader than prevention of complete stoppage. It is alleged that this particular article obliges us not to do anything with the waters of the Nile (Tesfaye, 2002). They seem to reason that it is understood that “we have neither the intention nor the capacity nor the need to arrest them ...” (Ibid. ellipses mine). I opt to differ from the above interpretation of the article and would rather think that the article intended to prevent a total stoppage and not the use or diversion of the waters by Ethiopia under normal circumstances. In this connection, the interpretation given by Girma (1997:3), who bases his reasoning on the Amharic version of the Article appears to be reasonable to interpret the intention of the provision as long as Menelik did not “stop” the flow of the waters, Article III of the 1902 Agreement did not restrict him from diverting water (Ibid.).
The author Nurit Kliot (1994:82) in her list of agreements treats the 1902 Addis Ababa Agreement as an agreement made for the benefit of Egypt but describes its validity as questioned by Ethiopia because of the fact that “it was not ratified and its own rights were not mentioned”. It is also argued that the proviso, “except in agreement with the Government of Sudan” shows that it, “is made in favor of Sudan and according to the principle of treaties, Egypt cannot claim any rights from the agreement”.

This writer agrees with the reasons for the invalidity of the agreement given by Kliot above. But I would contend the validity of the agreement not because it was a colonial agreement but because Ethiopia was not a colonial subject at the time.

I would also contend that the agreement as not binding on Ethiopia because it was not ratified. Moreover, the agreement being made for the benefit of Sudan, which was a British colony at the time, Ethiopia’s rights were not specified under the agreement. But, perhaps a more convincing argument could be the fact that the agreement was not made between equal parties. Britain being a colonial power tried to impose its terms by duress and infringement on the sovereignty of Ethiopia. It could also be said that the agreement intended to subordinate Ethiopia’s interest on the Blue Nile to British consent.

The other argument in support of the invalidity of the agreement is that:

..The British could not obtain any right from the treaty as they had subsequently denied the sovereignty of Ethiopia by their act of accepting Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia (Girma, 1997:4 ellipses mine).

A further argument presented on the validity of the treaty starts as a basis on the so-called 'Nyerere doctrine,' based on the principle of “Tabula rasa” or “pact terris nec nocent nec prosant”. These principles argue that “states that were formerly colonies should not be assumed to be bound automatically by treaties signed by colonial powers, as the new states had no role in the negotiation of those treaties” (Shapland, 1997:72). This line of argument may be applicable to Ethiopia although it was not
subject to colonial rule. The point is that the colonial treaties were not treaties made between equal parties and that the new states had no obligation to endorse treaties which tilted towards safeguarding the interests of the colonial masters.

The 1902 agreement between Ethiopia and Britain, which is also named as the 1906 Tripartite Treaty made between Britain, France and Italy recognized the British political influence over the Ethiopian territory of the Nile basin. Article II of the agreement in particular is believed to have posed a threat on the sovereignty of Ethiopia (Girma, 1997:4). This agreement was concluded after Britain and Italy signed a protocol in April 1891 for the demarcation of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Africa. The agreement between France, Italy, and Britain in December 1906, and that between Italy and Britain in December 1925, also protected the flow of the Nile from any upstream diversions (Swain, 1997:676-677).

The 1906 Agreement, which was signed between Britain, France and Italy also, seemed to have a colonial objective. It was made without consulting Ethiopia and the three colonial powers had collaborated to act together to safeguard their interests over Ethiopia. In excluding Ethiopia and in designing their sphere of influence, they have in effect violated the sovereignty of Ethiopia. That seems why the Agreement was rejected by Emperor Menelik as a sinister ploy against the sovereignty of Ethiopia (Girma, 1997:4).

But I think the British seemed not interested in controlling Ethiopia as the Khedives of Egypt did. They seemed more interested in securing the flow of the Nile, which was watering their cotton fields in Egypt and the Sudan, than controlling the country. The 1902 Agreement, the basis of which is the demarcation of the frontiers of Ethiopia and the Sudan is accepted as valid (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FDRE 1998:1). The intention of the Article relating to the use of the Nile Water under this Agreement is believed to be directed at the prevention of arrest on the Ethiopian side of the Nile and not the use of it, according to the Amharic version of the same Agreement (Ibid.). This interpretation of the intention of that particular article seems tenable.

Nevertheless, Britain continued to pursue vigorously its interests in controlling the head waters of the Blue Nile. Accordingly, the Anglo-Italian agreement of 1925 which
recognized the prior hydraulic rights of Egypt and the Sudan was made \( (Ibid.)\). These treaties were made to further the political and other interests of the “metropolitan states” (Getachew, 2000:4). They were not concluded for the benefit of the present upper riparian states. On the contrary, it is observed that “due to the changing political influence of colonial powers in the region, as well as Britain’s ‘dualflag’ policy of creating the Anglo-Egyptian condominium for the Sudan, the legal character of these agreements became uncertain and complicated” (Swain, 1997:677). It is also assumed that these agreements ceased with the end of the colonial era; their only significance being indications of how far back the interests of the Sudan and Egypt in the Nile Basin waters have been protected \( (Ibid.)\).

The question here is did Britain in protecting the Nile, aimed at safeguarding the interests of the Sudan and Egypt? The answer to this question seems to be simple. It was their interest in their colonies – the Sudan and Egypt that the British were protecting and not vice versa. But the most interesting aspect of the British policy on the Nile is that their policy changed with the change of their sphere of influence. Once they were in control of Egypt and the Sudan, the British regarded the Nile so precious to them that they threatened to use force against any upstream attempts of diverting the Nile. And when they pulled out of Egypt and the Sudan and established themselves in the Equatorial region, they changed gear and stood in defense of the interests of the White Nile Basin States. They even indicated their interest of renegotiating those Agreements they once firmly upheld and enforced by power of arms and influence. As observed by Getachew Aberra (2000:4) "it is possible to argue that the treaties were made to further the political and other interests of the metropolitan states". Thus, their fight for the rights of upstream countries was not for their lasting benefit from the Nile. As observed by Kliot (1994:36, quoting Howell, et.al, 1988): "It is not surprising that attention in the early days concentrated upon Egypt’s need for ‘timely water’ with only some regard for the emergent Sudan, which became a separately managed entity in 1925."

The other agreement of major importance is the 1925 Agreement. According to Okide (1994:325), “in an exchange of notes is Rome in December 1925, the imperialist powers were to agree on how they, as well as the Sudan and Egypt would use their influence to benefit from the Ethiopian highlands”. It is also observed that “this
agreement, among other things, recognized the prior rights of Egypt and the Sudan (Swain, 1997:). The 1925 agreement is also a clear proof of the imperialist imposition on Ethiopia. It is assumed that the agreement could not have been intended to be binding on Ethiopia and as things turned out later, it aroused angry reaction from Ethiopia, which protested to the League of Nations against the designs of the two Governments on its sovereignty. The British and Italians later backed away from their position and declared publicly that they did not have any ambition on the sovereignty of Ethiopia. The colonialist ploy was thus, effectively challenged and the agreement never materialized (Ibid.).

The other agreement on the Nile which was not of major importance as regards the interest of Ethiopia is the 1929 Agreement between Sudan and Egypt. Although the Nile waters Agreement reached in 1929 was criticized by other riparian countries, particularly the Sudan as having been motivated by Great Britain to maintain good relations with Egypt at the expense of the Sudan, which formally repudiated the agreement in 1958, it provided for the regulation of the river until the Nile waters Agreement of 1959 (Swain, 1997:677).

Some authorities claim that the 1929 Agreement had nothing to do with Ethiopia (Imiru, 2002). But all other agreements including the 1959 agreement have nothing to do with Ethiopia. As put by Collins (1990:151) the agreements “appeared to work solely for the benefit of Egypt whose established and historic rights were recognized”. The 1959 agreement was made between Egypt and the Sudan to the exclusion of other Nile riparian states. The agreement was for the full utilization of the Nile. It allocated 55.5 bcm to Egypt and 18.5 to the Sudan. The great shortcoming of this agreement was that only two of the states in the Nile Basin signed it. According to Shapland (1997:74) "while it removed a potential Sudanese threat to Egypt over the Nile, it has found no favor with the upstream states”.

The 1959 Agreement, made between Sudan and Egypt, was not binding on Ethiopia or on any member states of the basin. But it was only binding on the two downstream states – Egypt and Sudan pursuant to the legal maxim pact teris nec nocent proscsnt – (contracts create obligations and confer rights only in contracting parties). It is also not made in Ethiopia’s name unlike the Agreement of 1906 which was made between
colonial powers for the benefit of their colonial territories. The 1959 Agreement was made between independent states. What makes this agreement different from its predecessor, the 1929 Agreement is it makes a reference to the right of claim of the other states of the basin in the future. Interestingly, the parties to the Agreement wanted to take into their own hands the future share of the other states in the basin. In this attempt they ruled that “once other upstream riparian states claim a share of Nile Waters, both countries (Egypt and the Sudan) will study together these claims and adopt a unified view thereon” (Tesfaye, 2001:77).

This ruling, authoritative as it is, indicates that the two parties were thinking in the minds of their ex-colonial masters, who wanted and did indeed dictate terms on the use of the Nile. They have assumed an unchangeable right of using the Nile. What little concession they, according to the agreement, have to the other states in the basin would be allowed on condition that “if studies result in the allocation of a specified volume of Nile Water to one or the other of the upper riparian states, then the amount shall be deducted in equal shares from the share of the two countries” (Ibid., 77). This also shows how selfish the agreement of the two parties is, considering the fact that it is made for the full utilization of the Nile as if they control the source. It also shows how the two countries, particularly Egypt marginalizes the interests of the upper riparian countries, particularly Ethiopia, from where most of the Nile originates. This Egyptian marginal consideration appears to emanate from their excuse of abundant rain in the other states in the basin. This seems to be the thinking behind the Egyptian insistence on the validity of the 1959 Agreement. This is also the agreement, which has prevented cooperation on the use of the Nile.

After decades of confrontation and mistrust on the use of the Nile, Ethiopia and Egypt seemed to have broken the silence and talked of the Nile in the so-called “Framework Agreement” also called “Framework for General Cooperation” signed in Cairo in 1993. This agreement is considered the first of its kind in the two countries history. This Agreement according to Shapland (1997:81) “left the details of the use of the Nile waters to be worked out by experts from both countries; on the basis of the rules and principles of international law”. The most controversial part of the agreement is, however, the provision which specifies that neither country would do anything with the Nile that would cause ‘appreciable harm’ to the other.
Some authorities argue that this agreement gives prominence to the principle of the avoidance of appreciable harm on which the Egyptians claim their right of use. The agreement has sometimes been raised by Egyptians in some forums as the recognition by Ethiopia that the no harm principle is the operational rule in the Nile (Imiru, 2002). But there are also others who consider this agreement as bringing no change in the status quo (Yacob, 2002). It is also believed that it did not establish any legitimate right for Ethiopia (Ibid.). My own view, however, is that the agreement was historic in the sense that it allowed an unprecedented talk on the use of the Nile which the Egyptians had always avoided. I believe that Ethiopia’s right to equitable share could not be affected by such agreement, because the rights of the countries on the use of the Nile are referred to future negotiation and study.

Part II
The Hydropolitical Position of the Principal Nile Riparian States
The River Nile, a cradle of civilization as it was, has also been a source of conflict and rivalry between powers who vied for its control. At the center of the rivalry was the geopolitical importance of Egypt. In particular, Egypt’s strategic position had attracted powers both from the East and the West, who found it a gateway to commerce and international trade.

But, for all its strategic importance and even survival as a nation, Egypt is at the mercy of the upstream countries. It is the Nile, which supply and sustain their survival. But they remained reluctant to talk on the cooperative use of the Nile with their downstream neighbors, particularly Ethiopia. “Knowing the fact that the tap and faucet lies somewhere else” (Tesfaye, 2002).

The Egyptians instead evaded the question of cooperative use of the Nile, on the pretext that the situation in the basin, which according to them is mired in civil wars, political troubles and other (Bulloch and Darwish, 1993:95). The question which should be raised here is, hasn’t the Egyptians been behind these troubles in some countries in the basin? Another diplomatic evasiveness displayed in the Egyptians is the argument that “many riparian countries can rely on rainwater for irrigation, while Egypt is totally dependent on the Nile.” (Ibid.). But is this the true picture of the upstream countries?

The Egyptians also argue that they have a prior or historic right, as the Nile is their only source of survival. Egypt tries to defend its historic rights by arguing on the basis of the principle of the so-called “obligation not to cause significant harm”. These and similar issues are at the center of discussion in the next sub-topic, the validites of which will be discussed against the perspective of common interest and cooperation.

With regard to the position of Ethiopia, from whose territory the greater part of the Nile arises, I think that it was not assertive, as it should have been. As we have seen earlier Ethiopia was confronted and at times its sovereignty threatened by the powers who controlled Egypt and the Sudan. The colonial agreements to which it was made to comply attempted to infringe on her sovereignty in general and on her right to use the Nile in particular-the 1906 and the 1925 agreements are cases in point in this regard.
But Ethiopia has repeatedly and consistently protested against the agreements – colonial or post – colonial. It has reserved its right to use the waters of the Nile based on its “projected water needs and natural rights to Nile Waters originating in its territories” (Waterbury, 1979:75). This Ethiopian position, which appears to be based on the principle of “Absolute sovereignty” seems to have outlived its applicability. This is because its relevance to such international or transboundary resources as water is bound to infringe on the rights of the other riparians. Ethiopia, accepts the principle of “Equitable and Reasonable utilization”, but with some reservations. Regarding the argument of Ethiopia’s reliance on rainwater for irrigation, it denies any restriction on the exercise of its rights to use and exploit the Nile within its territory in a reasonable and equitable manner.

According to the Ethiopian Government “The big and main water resources problem in Ethiopia is the uneven spatial and temporal occurrence and distribution” (Ministry of Water Resources, FDRE, 1999). These and similar arguments shape the Ethiopian position on the Nile, the validities of which will also be discussed against the perspective of common interest and equitable use.

2.1. Egypt's policy on the Nile Since 1956

The Egyptians seem to think that by securing water for generations to come or by establishing century storage facilities like the world’s largest man-made Lake Nasser, they can control the Nile in Egypt. This Egyptian thinking seems to be derived from their concern that:

The sources of the river in hostile or even in indifferent hands must always be a grave cause of danger ... The Aswan High Dam was to free Egypt from being the historic hostage of upstream riparian states ... water security has a dual purpose: providing freedom from foreign control over Egyptian waters but also providing security from water shortages. The Aswan High Dam's first and most important purpose was to provide long-term storage of water within the boundaries of Egypt. Overyear storage would protect Egypt from the fluctuation of the Nile floods (Kliot, 1994:20 ellipses mine).
For Egypt, the construction of the High Dam was more "strategic rather than technical: the 'century storage' which it would provide would be under wholly Egyptian control" (Shapland, 1997:62). This huge project was designed to serve as a fundamental leverage for the regime's agricultural and industrial plans, resources and technological capability to undertake the project. That was why Egypt applied for Western aid in 1954-1955. Although at the beginning the Western powers promised to extend financial aid to the project, this promise was later reversed and the Dam was completed in 1970 with the massive aid from the Soviet Union (Meital, 2000:200).

As a background to this agreement, after the Egyptian revolution in 1952, the Sudan started demanding that the 1929 arrangements be renegotiated. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953 had also afforded the Sudanese an opportunity to decide about their own future. They, thus overwhelmingly, rejected to be united with Egypt and chose independence, after which the republic of Sudan was established in 1956 (Swain, 1997:679).

With the failure of Egyptian design of uniting their country with the Sudan they gradually developed their own separate water project. In 1956, while Egypt sought to build the Aswan dam, Ethiopia formally declared that it "reserved its right to utilize the water resources of the Nile for the benefit of its people" (Shapland, 1997:77). Thus, the hydropolitics of this particular period of history seemed to have been characterized by the fact that while Egypt had obtained Soviet support for the Aswan Dam, Ethiopia sought the assistance of the United States in demonstrating that its right to the Nile was more than theoretical (Ibid.). Thus, with the assistance of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation in 1957, the Ethiopian Government undertook a survey to harness the Blue Nile for power and irrigation. The U.S Bureau of Reclamation conducted the water Resources survey. The question is did these surveys materialize into anything concrete. According to Wondimneh, they didn’t and in his words “these surveys within Ethiopia, it would now seem, were very merely calculated to add to Egyptian nervousness” (1979:29). But I think the above quoted author’s disregard for the success of the surveys doesn’t seem to be reasonable and seem to deny the efforts made by the Ethiopian Government to achieve such a result. The success in completing the study as a first step could help Ethiopia to request further fund or technical assistance for the realization of the projects designed by the survey. The disappointment of the author
quoted above could, however, be understandable considering the minimal U.S assistance in the face of the needs projected under the survey or study. But in conducting these surveys, the U.S had seemed to show its solidarity with Ethiopia and the surveys were also proved beneficial for the two downstream states.

What the minimal US assistance and their reluctance to extend fund to the implementation of the projects might show is that Ethiopia didn’t figure as vital country drawing U.S interest. Had Ethiopia figured as vital U.S interest, it could have influenced the decision by the African Development Bank’s loan to Ethiopia which as recorded by Shapland (1997:78) was refused because of Sudanese and Egyptian opposition.

The policy that the Egyptians pursue to prevent the upstream country attempt of using the Nile, particularly Ethiopia is to threaten the use of force against them. Egyptian interest of fomenting troubles and political crisis is also argued as a possibility. In the book by Bulloch and Darwish (1993:95), an Egyptian senior planner is quoted as saying:

> Although Egyptian officials always talk of cooperation, and appear to favor cooperation among the nine states on the use of the Nile Water, they always add a foot note in the way of ‘yes’ but as soon as civil wars, political troubles and the conflicts and, or when the African countries are politically stable ... etc. It would be naive to think that the Egyptians don’t have plans to exploit the politically unsuitable situation in some African countries- those, which have unfriendly governments or are considering plans that would affect the flow of the Nile. Egypt always wants those plans postponed indefinitely.

The above quotation from an Egyptian official is evidence and an indication of the Egyptian intractability. It also shows how myopic the Egyptian attitude towards the troubles in some upstream countries is. It is myopic, because the troubles in these countries could change and is changing in the positive direction. These countries could not be endlessly entangled with troubles that could or could not be of their own making. As alleged, the Egyptians themselves have even sponsored some troubles.

But Egypt has the backing of Western powers in upholding its inequitable policy on
using the resources of the Nile in spite of its non-cooperative and oftentimes belligerent policy.

The question here is why did Egypt attract the attention (solicitation). Of such superpowers as the Soviet Union? Why did the Soviets decide to extend help to construct the High Aswan Dam? In trying to give answers to these questions, one of the reasons could be because Egypt is strategically placed between the Middle East and Africa- suitable for the creation of Soviet hegemony in the Middle East. The entrenchment of the Soviet military establishment and advisors in Egypt for this objective was no secret before their expulsion in 1976, following the abrogation of the Special Friendship Treaty between the two counties (Elhance, 1999:74). It is also argued that what interested the Soviet Union to step in and offer help in the construction of the dam is “to show its superior technology in this show case project” (Kliot, 1994). For the Soviet Union “success meant gaining more geopolitical clout in the Middle East at large” (Ibid.). But, the point that should be of focus here is not the exchange of places of one superpower by the other, but the importance of Egypt as a nation to draw the attention of powers. The powers that came or left stood behind the Egyptian position which according to Elhance (Ibid., 76, ellipses):

... Included establishing a secure source of water within Egyptian territory, achieving national food security, and creating a strong bargaining position in future hydropolitics with its neighbors.

Leaving aside the question of what the geopolitical maneuverings and manipulations has earned the super powers, Egypt has succeeded in convincing some powers and international financial institutions to fund the Aswan Dam project.

The Aswan Dam project proved highly controversial and was opposed by upstream countries, notably Ethiopia. It showed Egyptian disregard for others’ woes. The Egyptians, by constructing the dam realized their water security policy. They in fact, thought that “The Aswan High Dam was to free Egypt from being the historic hostage of upstream riparian states” (Kliot, 1994:40). But is this true? Can Egypt’s vulnerability be eased by the construction of the Dam? I think Egypt would remain
dependent and at the mercy of upstream neighbors once these countries start to exploit the Nile for their ever-increasing needs of development.

The Egyptians pursuing their policy of water security completed the construction of the Aswan Dam. In this case, the Egyptians succeeded in what the Ethiopians failed in obtaining outside support and assistance. This augmented their strength. They also solicited Sudanese consent in realizing their dream of building the world's largest Dam at Aswan. The reason for the Egyptian need of Sudanese consent is that both Sudan and Egypt needed to change 1929 agreement and conclude a new agreement in order to proceed with their own independent plans on the Nile. Egypt needed the Sudanese agreement because the vast reservoir on the Aswan Dam would flood Sudanese territory. The Sudan on its part needed international finance for its dam at Roseires. Under this agreement Sudan received more allocation of water than the 1929 agreement.

The Agreement of November 1959 between Egypt and Sudan is referred to as "full utilization" and "full control of the river" when it involved only two states. It gave Egypt 75 per cent of the water of the river (i.e. 55.5 billion m$^3$) and 25% to the Sudan (18.5 billion m$^3$) (Daniel, 1999:8). It is also observed that the 1959 Agreement was a success in permitting both Egypt and Sudan to carry out projects that they regarded as vital to their development, and in removing the tension that had soured relations between them for most of 1950s (Shapland, 1997:74).

Ethiopia in particular rejected the validity of the 1959 agreement both during and at the conclusion of the agreement. In this connection, in a communiqué issued on 6 February 1956, the Ethiopian Government announced its plans for the utilization of the country’s vast irrigation and hydrological potential. In the same vein, in a 1957 Aide Memoir, it is recorded that the Government:

Reasserted and reserved now and for the future the right to take such measures in respect of its water resources and in particular, as regards that portion of the same which is of the greatest importance to its welfare, namely, those waters providing so nearly the entirety of the volume of the Nile whatever may be the measure of
utilization of such waters sought by recipient states situated along the course of the river (Girma, 1997:7).

It seems understandable that Ethiopia's provocative reaction to the 1959 agreement could have been precipitated by the recognition that the two parties to the agreement were both simply recipients and users, dependent on water from the Equatorial region and Ethiopia. They needed the cooperation of those upper basin states if their goal was to be assured (Okidi, 1994: 334). But the two countries, particularly, Egypt failed to involve Ethiopia as a party to the Agreement "in order to assure themselves of the volume of water from Ethiopia" (Ibid.)

The two parties decided to allocate the flow of the Nile water between themselves on the conviction that they have 'acquired rights' stemming from the Nile waters Agreement of 1929. But it is found out that "there is no historical or legal basis for the proportion set aside for Egypt and the Sudan in this agreement" (Ibid.). These agreements helped Egypt to dominate the hydropolitics of the Nile basin. The binding force of the agreement remains, however, null and void with respect to other riparians in the Nile basin, as they are not party to the agreement.

The predicament with the agreements so far made regarding the use of the Nile is succinctly put as follows:

The crux of the Nile problem can be explained thus, first and foremost, by Egypt's intractability to accept the principle and procedures of equitable benefit to all riparian countries. Both the colonial authored agreements as well as the 1959 Sudanese - Egyptian treaty favored Egypt. Hence, Egypt has always wanted to keep these agreements unrepealed. To the contrary, successive Egyptian leaders wanted the agreements to be recognized and accepted by upstream countries. The upstream countries, in particular Ethiopia, are not, understandably, willing to recognize or accept both the letter and the spirit of those agreements to which they are not a party. The reason for doing so is simple. They cannot accept a compromise over their national resources without reciprocity or commensurate benefits accruable from such agreements (Gima, 1997:7).
This writer thinks that Egypt’s refusal to concede to the request of equitable use of the Nile or the involvement of Ethiopia in the allocation of it is linked to the effects of such use on Egypt. This argument is supportable by the outcome of the study by U.S Bureau of Reclamation, which as observed “concluded that if all the projects which it proposed were implemented, irrigation withdrawals and losses from evaporation from reservoirs would reduce total annual flow of the Blue Nile into Sudan by 8.5%” (Shapland, 1997:78).

It would however not seem a lack of recognition of the benefit of cooperation, which revolves the Egyptian intractability on changing the issue of using the Nile. It is rather argued that:

The anxiety over the use of the water of the Nile is not simply a consequence of its impact as a key element in the support system of Egypt's physical survival, but it is also intimately linked with the role of the Nile as a symbol of national security and national cohesion (Kinfe, 1997:8).

This Egyptian attitude on the use of the Nile seems to be growing more complicated. In this connection, the utilization of the Nile waters by Egypt which until recently remained within the Nile Basin has since the mid 1990s made a digression involving out-of-basin moves. The Egyptians are striving to derive maximum benefits from the Nile waters, while their upstream neighbors and sustainers are remaining mere onlookers. In their new moves, the Egyptians are taking the Nile to the south under the so-called New Valley Development, which embrace the Toshka and El - Salam (peace) canals. In a paper presented at Nile 2002 conference held at Addis Ababa from February 24 - 28, 1997, it is recorded that:

Recently Egypt has once again undertaken a gigantic construction work to open up for irrigation over 200,000 hectares of land by digging an 800 km long canal, named Zayed canal, linking the Nile to the New valley of Kharga and Dkhla Oasis. Parallel to this new venture, the 22 km Toshka canal which links Lake Nasser to a diversion reservoir of 6000 square kms impounding 120 billion cubic meters of water in an artificial lake has been put into operation ... The completion of the project would
enable Egypt to increase its cultivated land by about 7 percent. (Hailu, 1997:691 ellipses mine).

Egypt has neither advised nor sought the agreement of the upper riparian states before it undertook the construction of these projects. The Egyptians are, hence, all along attempting to create facts on the ground to complicate the issue of sharing the resources of the river. According to Elhance (1999:8), "If this Egyptian move is not reversed, there is a possibility of very volatile hydropolitics in the future".

As if its moves of aggressive use is not enough, Egypt continues to drum threat of war to prevent upstream countries from taking any actions that might adversely affect the lives of all Egyptians (Swain, 1997:685). The question that is increasingly being posed is, however, whether Egypt can go on aggressively using the Nile when the needs of other countries upstream are growing.

The Israeli factor has also played a great role in influencing Ethio-Egyptian policies on the Nile. According to Bulloch and Darwish (1993:89)," there is now a faction in the Egyptian decision making establishment, which takes potential Israeli action into account when considering water projects". What Arab nationalists in Egypt and other Arab countries see, as a threat is Israeli intention and desire to have a share of the Nile Water. Some Egyptian scholars argue that Egypt's repeated refusal of Israel requests to use the Nile waters would lead Israel to exert an indirect pressure on Egypt by getting involved in Ethiopia's plans to build dams on the Blue Nile (Ibid.).

The fact that Egypt has become a strategic link between the regional security complex in the Middle East and northeast Africa by virtue of its involvement in the larger Arab-Israeli conflict means that hydropolitics in the Nile basin has not been and can not be immune to developments in the larger geopolitical situation in the two regions.

Given the fact that Ethiopia lacks the capacity to utilize its water resources it may not be far fetched to argue that Egypt views Ethio-Israeli contact as a menace to its interest in the Nile. Egypt seems to be interested in ensuring that Ethiopia remain weak, unstable, underdeveloped, and thus incapable of constructing large projects upstream from Egypt or mounting a serious challenge to Egypt's disproportionate share of the basin's water (Elhance 1999:65).
In brief, Egypt’s position on the Nile, as has been seen in our discussions here may be summarized as water security, threat of war and destabilizing the countries of the basin in order to distract them from developing the capacity on using the resources of the River Nile.

2.2 Ethiopia's Position on the Use of the Nile

Ethiopia's foreign policy remained defensive and reserved at some issues, which determined the use of the Nile. Perhaps, its position on the Nile remained throughout the later half of the twentieth century until the Egyptians committed themselves to implement their water security policy in the early 1950s. But this was not because it had no clear understanding of Egypt’s intents and designs on the use of the Nile. It seems rather because, unlike Egypt, Ethiopia had no specialized focus on the Nile. Such authorities as Yacob Arsano (2002), a political scientist and an authority on the Nile share this view. Leaving distant historical position aside, Ethiopia is reported, to have indicated its concern on the use of the Nile once again after World War II when talks on the Nile are recorded to have taken place between the three riparian countries, i.e. Ethiopia, Egypt and the Sudan. According to John Waterbury (1979:75). “Despite inconclusive talks with Egypt and the Sudan over the utilization of Lake Tanna as an overyear storage facility, no new agreements were reached among the three riparians”. This might have been the first occasion where Ethiopia as a source of the Blue Nile, the major and majority contributor of the Nile system has been involved in the talks of utilizing the Nile among the principal Nile riparian neighbors. But these historic talks were not conclusive and the need for the involvement of Ethiopia in the subsequent treaties on the use of the Nile concluded between Egypt and the Sudan was disregarded.

In spite of this, however, Ethiopia had insisted on forging a workable arrangement on the use of the Nile, with the object of paving the road to making new arrangements and assisted its right to the waters of the Nile. In connection with the 1956 declaration by the Ethiopia Government Bulloch and Darwish (1993:104) have put the following as Ethiopian position.
Ethiopia had the right to exploit Nile Water running within its borders. That declaration was followed by Ethiopian statement stressing its right to carry out any plans or projects that were considered essential for the Ethiopian economy and to meet the agricultural, water and energy needs of its 55 million people. To emphasize the seriousness of its attitude, Ethiopia chose to set out these objectives in a letter to all diplomatic missions in Cairo.

These statements could be considered as a departure from early Ethiopian position in the early twentieth century in particular, the 1902 Agreement, where Ethiopia was made to remain reserved in the use of the river and to solicit the prior approval of Britain for any works that it could make on the River Nile.

When Ethiopia pronounced her legitimate right to put to use her water resources the, Egyptians were preparing to implement their overyear storage system through the construction of Aswan Dam. Ethiopian statements were in protest of the construction of the Dam without Ethiopia’s consultation. The Egyptians however served no heed to the Ethiopian protest. The Ethiopian position at this time is reported to have been inconsiderate of the water needs of the riparian states.

In the words of shapland (1997:77):

The declaration was forceful in that it made no reference to the desirability of achieving an apportionment of the waters of the Nile through negotiations, let alone to the cooperative development of the basin as a whole.

This Ethiopia position which to my understanding seems to have been based on the principle of “absolute sovereignty” would perhaps have had a negative implication on the right of use of the other riparian countries. But the Egyptians also seemed to have been operating in pursuance of this principle and could perhaps not have made any difference as long as the situation developed into a non-cooperative trend which according to Okidi (1994:321) created a situation where, “... basin states do not consult one another and develop a framework for cooperative utilization of the waters of an international river” (ellipses, mine).
The trend of non-cooperation continued unchanged throughout the Dergue regime and in a 1978 response it is recorded that:

The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a series of terse and non-conciliatory responses directed largely to Egypt and in part, to the Sudan. Their position was that ‘Ethiopia has all the rights to exploit her natural resources. Purportedly the statements also remind Egypt that, even though it receives 85% of its Nile Water from Ethiopia, it has never shown friendship nor sought cooperation from Ethiopia. The Ethiopian statement points out that Egypt went a head and built the Aswan Dam, which has to depend on the Blue Nile Waters without even consulting Ethiopia.

These and other Ethiopian statements however were not supported by facts on the ground. They seemed more rhetoric than real. No projects of a significant benefit to Ethiopia were implemented. Ethiopia couldn’t prove its stakes in the Nile by building dams or implementing irrigation projects. While the Egyptians continued to expand and maximize their hydraulic works and irrigation projects, the Ethiopians seemed to take their time. Verbal assertions of their rights to the waters of the Nile proved nothing but Ethiopia’s inability to bring change in the status quo. These assertions seemed to have shaped the Ethiopian position of 1956 where Ethiopia based its rights in the principle of “absolute sovereignty. The change in the Ethiopian position is alleged to have been reflected in the 1977 UN conference on water where Ethiopia said that “the absence of such agreements did not in any way diminish the right of one basin state to go along, unilaterally, and develop the waters of the international rivers within its territorial jurisdiction”, (Shapland 1997:79). But this writer thinks that the significant change of position from previous Ethiopian position seems to the declaration that Ethiopia has rights to develop the Nile Water within its territory unilaterally if an agreement on equitable utilization could not be reached between Egypt and Sudan. This assertion may not involve the application of “absolute territorial sovereignty” principle because Ethiopia insists the need of forging agreement for equitable use in the first place.

But it may also be argued that Ethiopian position has not displayed a change of attitude considering the fact that the statement at the conference refers to Ethiopia’s
right to develop the river within its territory, the applicable principle of which is not specified. What was interesting in the 1977 statement seems to be Ethiopia’s announcement of its intention “to irrigate 90,000 hectares of land in the Blue Nile basin”, What perhaps makes the Ethiopian position unchanged is as argued by Bulloch and Darwish (1993:103) is that the Ethiopians said “They would welcome an accord on the utilization of the Nile with their downstream neighbors, but in the obscene of such an accord they reserve the right to carry out their plans on their own”.

Ethiopia’s projected irrigable hectares announced at the conference may have been aired against a background of hostility of late 1970s between Ethiopia and Egypt. Egypt was involved in the conflict in the Horn of Africa, particularly supporting Somalia against Ethiopia. In this connection Daniel Kendie (1999:20) says "in May 1978 Egyptian planes carrying weapons for the Somali army warring against Ethiopia were forcefully landed at Nairobi International airport by the Kenyan air force”. This could indicate the background of hostility between Ethiopia and Egypt during the late 1970s. This writer is not however arguing that the Ethiopian position of the late 1970 as disclosed at the Mar Del Platin 1977 was made only in retaliation for the Egyptian policy of destabilizing Ethiopia. On the contrary, Ethiopia consistently reserved its right to use the Nile long before Egypt started constructing the Aswan Dam.

The question that should be answered here is why has Ethiopia not utilized the Nile for its development? The answer to this question is attempted from different perspectives. Some authorities asked about the reasons among whom is Mekuria Tafesse a (2002), says lack of awareness and policies which were not conducive were part of the reasons. Mekuria says that although the Emperor had shown some interest to implement the projects designed by the U.S Bureau of Reclamation he was not successful in soliciting the necessary fund. Regarding the era of the Dergue, he argues that the Dergue was interested in running state owned projects and the private sector was discouraged. He also criticizes the current government’s policy as not conducive, although in theory the involvement of the private sector in the sector is allowed. In particular, he criticizes the land holding system as inefficient and unavailable. The projects slated for development are also inaccessible as peasant
lands are excluded from irrigation (Ibid.). Security in the country is another impediment according to him (Ibid.).

The arguments by the above official however need to be analyzed in view of the policies of the past Ethiopian Governments and the extent of attention focused on the water sector. It is true that the past governments, particularly the Emperor had visioned on utilizing the resources of the Nile for agricultural and power potential. But these attempts were not backed by sufficient funds. The need of skilled manpower which the utilization of the water potential demands was not also realized. This deficiency on the part of the Ethiopian Government is witnessed in the poor standard and capacity of the personnel involved in the water sector infrastructure. Ethiopia could have developed its water on its own had it possessed skilled manpower. Outside assistance couldn’t replace Ethiopia’s skilled manpower-it could only have complemented it.

Another official, Messele Fisseha (2002), details some constraints in the implementation of irrigation projects in Ethiopia. According to him, these are economic viability, capacity, resource availability, and social and environmental problems.

It is also argued that water sector development requires extensive expenditure and its funding couldn’t be fulfilled with own resource considering Ethiopia’s economic condition. But, extensive funding need may not be peculiar to the water sector. There are also other sectors, which demand external funding on a massive scale. The problem, according to one official, is that the past Governments have not realized the need of mobilizing internal resources to implement projects that would have the impact of improving the livelihood of the people in general and the water sector in particular (Fisseha, 2002). According to this official the problem of internal security or the absence of stability could not be responsible for the failure to implement the projects (Ibid.). The official also rejects absence of conducive policy on the sector as responsible for the lack of progress in the sector (Ibid.).
But this writer finds it difficult to relegate the impact of security in undertaking development activities on the water sector. The point that should be taken home is that stability could affect long term economic activity. The hydraulic works that would be needed to implement large-scale projects require long-term planning and allocation of sufficient funding. But the planned or designed works can be carried out if security in the areas where these works or constructions is being carried out is safeguarded. For example the Jongeli Canal, a joint Egyptian and Sudanese project in Southern Sudan, the completion of which the Egyptians strongly sought was terminated for security reasons (Swain, 1997:682). The Takeze Rever power, the construction of which was inaugurated last July 2002 was delayed because of the Ethio-Eritrean war. But it seems not only the security aspect that has precluded development. According to Tesfaye (2001,96) “Due to financial handicaps and the country’s internal instability most of the planned projects, save the minor control works on the Blue Nile (Abbay), failed to be realized to this date”.

The failure for the implementation of the earmarked projects or the projects, which remained in the stage of plan, may also be attributed to the lack of good system-political as well as infrastructure. But how about the present Government? Are there problems of policy or political determination? These are the types of questions, which this part of this study tries to address.

This writer finds the argument forwarded by Messele (2002) to be more plausible as an impediment to the implementation of the irrigation projects. Accordingly, one of the factors affecting the economic viability of the projects is considered to be "the high cost of irrigation project". In this regard the official says "the major contributory factor is the location of irrigation projects in remote areas with low population density and absence of skilled labor".


The cause for the poor achievement and the dilemma for the future of the country’s water resources to significantly contribute to the overall socio-economic development of the Ethiopian people lies mainly in the absence of a well defined coherent policy and the lack of the required huge investment.
But this seems to be not enough. The past Ethiopian governments also had targeted policies but they achieved nothing except enmity and hostility with their neighbors. The policies of the Dergue which once boasted of realizing a green revolution by diverting the Abbay (Blue Nile) river for irrigation, seemed however, to lack the necessary fund.

So what makes the present Governments policy different from the ones of its predecessors seems the fact that it has clearly formulated its policy goals, objectives and principles, and also has made it “essential to immediately adopt development strategies, policy implementation methodologies and pertinent action plans to translate the policy into practice” (Ibid.)

I think this is a great stride forward in tackling the issue of development in this country. It is only rational to give justice to the development efforts undertaken by the new Government.

But formulating an ideal policy would not be sufficient unless their implementation could be realized. In this regard the major impediment is believed to be lack of foreign assistance. According to Messele (2002) "If it is large irrigation scheme, it requires considerable foreign exchange for consulting services and purchase of equipment”. He also adds that "most of the Ethiopian rivers are transboundary rivers, from the total resource available only 3% remains in the country and most of the international financial institutions and banks are unwilling to lend money for the development or irrigation projects, since there is no agreement with the other countries sharing the transboundary rivers”.

The development plans formulated by Ethiopia, which are necessitated by the need to cope with population growth and the unreliability of rain-fed agriculture continue to face challenges from Egypt which as put by Collins “reflects Egypt’s historical paranoia and its fears for its water security” (quoted in Kliot, 1994:68).

But can Ethiopia have any other alternative in the face of recurring drought presently occurring almost every two or three year cycle? I think Ethiopia is left with no
alternative other than developing its irrigation potential. Ethiopia now seems to be set on this course and its present position, which could be considered as an extension of the policy which it has been advancing for almost half a century seems to be shared by other riparians which as quoted by Tesfaye (2000: 96) have demanded at the seventh ordinary session of the council of Ministers of Water Affairs (Nile-Com) in Addis Ababa on May 12, 1999.

… Equitable utilization of the resources of the Nile for effective and sustainable development of all concerned towards a shared vision amongst the nine basin countries “(BBC News online, 12 May. There should be a joint discourse with a common pursuit of the sustainable development and management of the Nile Waters (Walta Information Center, 16 September, 1999 ellipses mine).

Developing the Abbay (Blue Nile Basin) is also becoming a necessity because the basin is highly populated and forms vast and drought prone area with a potential for irrigation. This according to Musa Mohammed (2002), a lawyer from the Ministry of Water Resources is in recognition of this potential and its role in improving the socio-economic situation in the country. He contends that the present Government has performed unprecedented development oriented activities in the past 10 years. In this endeavor an integrated Master Plan, and implementation studies have been carried out by the Government by allocating appropriate budget from its own resources. It is observed that the Ethiopian Government believes that the Nile Basin initiative (NBI) is consistent with its 20 years strategic water sector development program currently undertaken by the Ministry of water Resources (Mekonen, 2002).

The plenary plans projected for hydropower potential, land and watershed management has enabled the Government to construct such projects as the Koga dam, a medium size dam. This dam according to Musa (2002) is the first small-scale dam constructed with funds obtained from foreign assistance. This instance may indicate the prospect for foreign involvement in the utilization of the resources of the Nile, which have been handicapped in the past in the opinion of this writer. Although Egypt and Sudan have not yet desisted from their wholesale opposition to the Ethiopian
efforts of developing the Nile, this small-scale undertaking could be considered as a pacesetter.

The sustainable development anticipated from using the water resources is articulated in the master plan where as Messele (2002) has stated is expected to play:

a unique role in proposing a water allocation and utilization plan under alternative development scenarios and to generate data, information and knowledge that will contribute to the future water allocation negotiations with the downstream countries. Allocation of water to different uses, based on their contribution to the development of the basin and the nation as a whole. The technical feasibility of water resources development projects is augmented by considerations of their contribution to local employment, regional industrialization, national economic growth, as well as more conventional analyses of economic rates of return and contributions to increased food production. The river basin provides natural geographic boundaries within which natural resources growth, exploitation and regeneration may be modeled on a rational and systematic basis. Agro-ecological and agroclimatic zonation, essential to the understanding of land use and land cover possibilities, may be overlaid on river basin boundaries and used to further subdivide areas within then on a scientific basis. The master plan will guide the development of the resources of the basin particularly, with respect to the occurrence, distribution, quality and quantity of the water resources for the coming 30 to 50 years.

It is also explained by Musa (Ibid.) that Ethiopia attaches great importance to the development of irrigation projects and he thinks that the focus on the hydropower potential is given a second priority by the current policy of the Ethiopian Government. This explanation seems worth noting because in the past the Ethiopian development potential was in the main predicated on developing its hydropower potential. In this connection Arun Elhance (1999:67) says:

… Even if Ethiopia could develop a substantial portion of its estimated 8,380 megawatts of hydroelectric potential, the electricity generated would not be fully consumed within the country
because domestic demand for it will continue to be suppressed from lack of economic development as well as the concentration of whatever demand there is in some distant urban areas.

True, Ethiopia’s potential output of electric power may not be consumable in the foreseeable future. But the country could be able to improve its electricity distribution and could as well augment power demand for its emerging industrial use. It may also be able to export a considerable power to neighboring countries if efforts at forging cooperative use of the Nile could be realized under the Nile Basin Initiative. Recent developments seem to indicate a promising start in this sector. Accordingly, it is reported that the Ethiopian electric Power Corporation has signed agreements with Sudan and Djibouti to export electric power. The agreement is noted to include installation of transmission lines and power distribution centers. The report also indicates that the Corporation plans to install 691 km transmission line at a cost of 75 million USD over five years starting in 2002 (The Ethiopian Herald, 20 April, 2002). But Ethiopia’s potential use is not limited to hydropower. Its projected irrigation potential could be realizable even with the help of the limited internal budget resource which are being undertaken presently in some domestic run projects. The integrated river basin master plan, which has earmarked some projects for implementation, is a case in point.

The Ethiopian government has always been consistent with its opposition to the Egyptian policy of reclamation and inequitable water usage. In the view of the Ethiopian Government, the Egyptians are increasingly attempting to secure more water in disregard of the needs of other riparian states. It is aware of the fact that Egypt is doing this in violation of the obligations to keep the Nile within its natural basin and is trying to create facts on the ground in which it becomes the sole beneficiary of the Nile (Daniel, 1999:19).

In general, however, this writer thinks that the issue of the Nile Water management need not necessarily be a zero-sum game. Indeed, Ethiopia has a strong interest in renegotiating the allocation of the waters of the Nile. But, it is in Ethiopia's interest to forge agreements in the near to medium term so that international help can be secured (Whittington and McClelland, 1998:154).
Part III
The Framework for the Utilization and Management of the Resources of the Nile

The Nile, although it originates from two different geographical locations— the central highlands plateau of Ethiopia and the Great Lake Region of Central Africa, it traverses different sovereign states from its source to its confluence and until its destination—the Mediterranean sea. The hydrological and geographical feature of the Nile would thus be summarized in the words of Elhance (1999:6)

Tie all the riparian states sharing it into a highly complex web of economic, political, environmental and security interdependence, leaving them no choice but to interact with one another indefinitely.

This may imply the nature of such rivers, which should in return require their shared use. The transboundary nature of such rivers as the Nile may also initiate a question as to who should control or utilize its resources, because states are inclined to use this resource unilaterally.

But, it is also possible that a thought as to their shared use may transpire as a possible answer to the above question. This, however, should not be considered as a utopia or wishful thinking, because these resources are not the sole property of one nation, even if these are nations from whose territory these waters originate. It seems under this conviction that Tesfaye Tafesse (2001:66) argues that:

The Nile River is a common property and wealth, which belongs to all the co-basin countries on an equal basis. The proper utilization and management of the basin’s resources requires coordination, integration and mutual agreement for the benefit of all the peoples living in and around the basin.

There are however difficulties which the member states of the basin encounter in attempting to exploit the resources of the river rationally and on equal basis. These
difficulties could be of political and economic nature. The major objective of this part of the study is not however to discuss these difficulties, but to find out the mutually beneficial framework on which the countries of the basin particularly the principal ones-Ethiopia and Egypt could utilize the resources of the Nile. Before discussing whatever commonly applicable cooperative framework there are for the basin states to work in a cooperative arrangement, however, I wish to start with a discussion of previous attempts at forging a common framework for exploiting the resources.

Although the Egyptians have attempted in the past to draw the other riparian states into accepting the 1959 Agreement—thereby constraining their right to claim share in the Nile, these attempts have not so far been successful. But the Egyptians have not pinned their hopes and have attempted to win the hearts of the Equatorial region states in their design of creating consensus on the status quo.

In this regard, the Egyptians launched a series of Nile Basin Initiatives. One of these was the Hydrometeorological survey of the Equatorial States (Hydromet). According to Shapland (19997:74). “While the area covered does not extend into their territory, Egypt and Sudan have been members of Hydromet since its foundation”. But what was the objective of this initiative? The objective of this initiative as observed was “to evaluate the levels of water in the Lake Victoria catchment areas in order to assist in their control and regulation, as well as the ensuing flows down the Nile” (Swain, 1997:690). The issue here is did this initiative aim to bring about a framework of common utilization of the resources of the river by the riparian states? The answer is no, because this organization was not established with this adjective. On the contrary, the initiative appeared to be an attempt by the Egyptians to impose their dominance in the basin.

According to Ahmed (1994:357):

The objective of the above project was to collect and analyze hydrometeorological data of those catchments in order to study the water balance of the upper Nile. This should assist the riparian states in the planning of water conservation and development and in providing the groundwork for future inter-
governmental cooperation in the regulation and utilization of Nile Water (Ibid.).

To implement this project a preliminary work had begun by setting up data collecting stations in order to complete adequate network from which basic data can be collected from the Equatorial Lake region. Although the Egyptians had attempted to realize their objective, “the other riparians had no incentive to agree” (Shapland, 76). The failure of the Hydromet thus is imputed to the riparian states suspicion of the Egyptian motives. It is also argued that its failure was due to the fact that the riparian states believed that “establishment of the Nile based organization such as the Hydromet and the envisaged Nile Basin Commission would be dominated by Egypt and the Sudan by virtue of their historic and technical experience and their economic and political power” (Tesfaye, 2001:105 quoting Collins). The other initiative, the Undugu was established to forge cooperation on matters, which were unrelated to the issue of the Nile, such as transport, telecommunications, culture and trade.

The TECCONILE (Technical Cooperation Committee for Promotion of the Development and Environment Protection of the Nile Basin) was formed with Egypt’s initiation in 1992 (Yacob, 2001:8). This initiative in my opinion seemed to have advanced a step further in addressing some of the concerns of the riparian states. This view is based on the fact that although the initiative initially focused on environment and water quality control, it had later included an issue of an equitable entitlement of the Nile Waters to the basin states. In this connection it is stated that:

In the short term TECCONILE aimed to assist member states in developing national master plans and their integration into a Nile development action plan: and develop the infrastructure and build capacity and techniques required for the basin’s water resources (Ministry of Water Resources, FDRE, 1999:4).

But what made the TECCONILE better from all other initiatives does not seem to be the above stated short-term objectives, but its loftier aim of declaring equitable entitlement. This long-term objective was given credence in this initiative as put by Tesfaye (2001:106):
One of the projects that is designated as D3 is, dealing with forging a cooperative framework that would in the last resort solve the problems of water allocation amongst the Nile riparian states. (ellipses mine).

This initiative unlike its predecessors thus seemed not to have been a lost effort. This is because the so-called D3 project included in it has remained a cause for consultation between the riparian states. It doesn’t however mean that this project was directly addressing riparian rights. Its attempt may however be considered as Elhance (1999:80 ellipses mine) puts it as one of the “... attempts of multilateralism on issues of mutual concern ...” Aside from this, the TECCO NILE was not successful because its planned projects couldn’t come into fruition for lack of funding promised by donors and the insufficiency of the funds raised (Tesfaye, 2001:107). According to Tesfaye, “it was under these circumstances that the unfinished jobs of the TECCO NILE, particularly the pending projects had been ceded to the successor organization, i.e. the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)” (Ibid.).

This writer views the series of attempts at forging cooperation on the Nile as an Egyptian design of keeping the Nile riparian countries in good terms with them by glossing over the real issue of allocation of the waters of the Nile. The only exception in this regard could perhaps be the consolation with respect to the so-called D3 project, which included some mutually beneficial projects.

3.1 Rules Applicable to Utilization and Management

In the past the world has witnessed numerous conflicts between states over borders, perhaps for a patch of desert, a sandbank or a rock. These conflicts were created between countries who hoped to gain some riches, probably oil or gold (http://www.mideastnews.com/waterwars.htm.,1994). But future conflicts are predicted to be not on borders because most borders are set or mapped so that conflicts in this context are unlikely to be recurring. According to Adel Darwish “Water is taking over from oil as the likeliest cause of conflict in the Middle East” (Ibid.).
It is this looming danger of conflict that would necessitate the need for forging agreement on utilizing transboundary rivers. But what is a transboundary river? What are the factors that would necessitate agreement? What should the framework agreement entail? What could be the problems that would preclude watercourse agreements? These are some of the questions, which this part of the study tries to address.

Transboundary river is defined as “a river which crosses boundaries”. (Ministry of Water Resources, 1999:1). According to the 1997 convention on the Law of Non-navigational uses of International Watercourses adopted by the UN “International Watercourse means a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different states”. (http://www.thewaterpage.com/un-convention-97-htm/).

The above mentioned Convention is meant to serve as a multilateral framework for establishing agreement on the use of transboundary rivers. But this is not the only type of agreement that could govern the utilization of transboundary rivers. There are also bilateral agreements, which govern the utilization of Transboundary River between two states on their shared water resource. Therefore, the focus of this part of the study will be on the feasibility of forging such agreements between the states using shared water resource in view of the 1997 Convention on International Watercourse and the validity of existing bilateral agreements more specifically the 1959 Agreement between Sudan and Egypt. It is observed that:

The Nile is shared by nine African co-riparians of which only two, Egypt and the Sudan, not only take full advantage of its waters but also are bound by an agreement to divide the Nile’s Waters between themselves, thus excluding the other co-riparians from the benefits of the river (Kliot, 1994:266).

This agreement as we have seen before would not bind Ethiopia or any of the other riparian states because they were not made parties to this agreement. Whatever reference is made to the other riparian states in this Agreement would be of no effect because no other riparian state consented to the agreement.
If may also be true that if Ethiopia exercises its right to utilize the resources of the Nile for its development activities, these activities could result in a substantial reduction on the present flow of the Nile and on the allotted amount of water used currently by the two downstream states-signatories of the 1959 Agreement. But any Ethiopian endeavor to utilize the Nile Water resource is bound to be opposed by Egypt and Sudan under the pretext that they were not consulted before. This has often been observed not only in the implementation of some projects which required a marginal utilization of the river, but also at many forums and deliberations in which Ethiopian plans and projects were announced. The Ethiopian Governments stand in this regard is that Egyptian opposition to the Ethiopian plan to utilize the Nile would not help settle the conflict created between these countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997:8). The Ministry has also made it clear that Egypt and the Sudan need not find it necessary to obtain Ethiopian consent in all these decades of their use of the Nile (Ibid.).

These are the types of problems, which have precluded cooperation on the use of the Nile. These are also the difficulties which would require the creation of a workable framework under which the states of the basin particularly Ethiopia and Egypt, as a focus of this study, should utilize the river for mutual benefit. So, the question here is what type of arrangement could be available for such mutual benefit?

### 3.2 Equitable and Reasonable Utilization

The issues raised above are issues closely connected with the administration and uses of waters of international rivers. As an international river, the Nile needs to be governed by the rules governing the utilization of such rivers. Interestingly, the rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia appears to be based on the interpretation of the international principles governing the use of an international shared river which according to Nebiyu, et.al, 1999:227) are portrayed as:

> a quintessential example of disputes between upstream and downstream states, whereas Egypt stresses its ‘historic right’ to the Nile Water, Ethiopia demands a more equitable sharing of it.
It should be noted here that the rules governing the utilization of international rivers trace their origin to traditional practices and agreements before attaining their present shape. The traditional and agreement based utilization principles however had to give way to the widely accepted principles which recognize rights over international rivers for all riparian states (Ahmed, 1994:351). For this reason it is observed that previous principles which fail to recognize equitable and reasonable principle have been discarded (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FDRE, 1997:8).

These are the two principles on which Egypt and Ethiopian differences are portrayed. These are also the principles, which form the cornerstone of the 1997 Convention. According to the writers Scheumann and Kalphake (2001:6), these articles reflected “the tension between utilization and protection”. The lower riparian state in protecting its right of using the river seems to invoke a right of preventing the upper riparian state from using the resources of the river by enunciating the ‘no-harm’ principle. It is this principle which has become a subject of controversy in that as argued by Getachew Aberra (2000,6)

The upper riparian state is prohibited from making use of water within its territory if such use is beyond its equitable and reasonable share, and, even if such use is within its equitable and reasonable share, if it results in significant harm to lower riparian state.

The principle of ‘obligation not to cause significant harm’ appears to be directed at the sovereignty of the upper riparian state. It would also seem to me to overrule the principle of ‘equitable and reasonable utilization’ because the lower riparian state would always wish to strengthen its acquired rights at the expense of the upper riparian state’s right to utilize resources of the watercourse. Obviously, the upper riparian country’s attempt to utilize its resources would result in the reduction of the flow of the river reaching the lower riparian state.

It would seem reasonable to argue that while Article 5 of the convention pronounces equitable and reasonable utilization, the upper riparian states right in this regard is restricted by virtue of Article 7. The other aspect of article5 is that it provides for an obligation on the part of the riparian countries to utilize the resources of the shared river for their common good. But, how could countries implement this principle? In
this regard the convention under Art.6 has tried to set factors that are meant to
determine the practicability of the equitable and reasonable utilization principle.
Among the basic factors indicated under these articles are:

I) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological and other factors of a
natural character,
II) The social and economic needs of the watercourse states concerned;
III) The population dependent on the water course in each watercourse
state;
IV) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one
watercourse state on other watercourse states.
V) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse.
VI) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the
water resources of the watercourse and the cost of measures taken
to that effect.
VII) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a
particular planned or existing use. (Framework Convention on

These factors as can be seen are set against the practicability of the principle of
equitable and reasonable utilization. But the generality and the ambiguity with which
these factors are stipulated could cause problems. In this regard the list of non-
exhaustive factors included under Article 6(1), are observed to be insufficient (Ibid.).

The acceptability of some of the factors is also questioned (Scheumanne & Klaphake,
200:6) as evidenced by the fact that “while some states wanted reference to the
contribution to the watercourse by each state, others favored mentioning the availability
of alternative water resources and the needs of future generations”(Ibid.). If we try to analyze the
factors of contribution to watercourse and the availability of alternative resources
from the perspective of upstream and downstream positions it may not be difficult to
find out the reasons for their preference to one or the other factors.

In the case of Ethiopia, the country seems to prefer interpreting the factors so as give
weight to its contribution to the Nile. While the Egyptians may press for giving
weight to the availability of alternatives of comparable value. The Convention seemed
not to have clearly indicated the contribution to the watercourse as a factor. The
availability of alternatives on its part could be regarded as giving leverage to those
downstream countries that are totally dependent on the flow of water from upstream.
It seems, therefore, unclear as to whether these factors could help determine the equitable and reasonable utilization of the watercourse.

This does not mean however the factors that are listed under Art.6 (a) are all meant to entrench the position of the lower riparian states. On the contrary Art 6 (d) of the Convention calls for the consideration of “existing and potential uses of the international watercourse” (Convention on the non-Navigable use of Intentional Watercourse, 1997: 6). According to Kliot (1999:268), this could be interpreted as pointing to the rights of upper riparians such as Ethiopia- “to an equitable water allotment of the Nile”. The provision of equitable and reasonable utilization also seem to harbor conflict when it tries to epitomize the existing use of some riparians for considerations of social and economic needs. In this regard, it may be difficult to conceive equity when it seems obvious that presently upstream countries particularly Ethiopia hardly use the waters of the Nile. The problems that could result in endorsing the existing use of the lower riparian countries for consideration of social and economic needs as explained by Kliot (Ibid.) are that:

Applying these principles to the basin raises several major problems. First, it was found that all the co-riparians are poor and underdeveloped. It is extremely difficult to decide whose needs are greater. Secondly, the ILC Rules (Convention) are inherently based on the premise that there is a direct connection between the Nile’s waters and the prosperity of the riparians of the basin. This may be true only for Egypt (and perhaps the Sudan) which really can show a direct correlation between their economic and social affluence and the Nile; but this connection does not exist (or is not easily discovered) in the economic and social features of Ethiopia and the other co-riparians, since these countries do not show direct dependence on the Nile’s sources (Ibid., ellipses mine).

Such negative implications seem to have rendered the status of equitable and reasonable utilization controversial. But this is not the only principle that has to stand the test of plausibility in the face of the above stated problems. The principle of obligation not to cause appreciable harm has also been singled out as a principle fraught with problems, which could preclude the conclusion of agreements on bilateral or multilateral basis.
A question may be asked here on whether the convention has been approved or not. Issues regarding the Ethiopian and Egyptian positions on the use of the watercourse has already been included in this study.

With regard to the status of the convention it is provided that by a vote of 42 states for, 3 against (China, France and Turkey) and 18 abstaining, the committee known as Working Group of the whole adopted the text of the framework Convention (Wouters, 1997:14). Ethiopia and Egypt are named among the states, which abstained. Their positions are reflected in their contention on the principles of equitable use and the no appreciable harm.

It has also been found out that the final text of the Framework convention, which is known as the law of the Non-Navigational uses of International Watercourses, has been presented to the UN General Assembly and approved at its 51st session on 21 May 1997.

3.3 `Obligation Not to Cause Significant Harm.

The present realities in the Nile Basin point to the fact that the upstream states have been unable to mount any significant development schemes using the resources of the Nile. One of the most disadvantaged states of the region, which has been incapable of mitigating its food insecurity problems by utilizing the resources of this great river, has been Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian Government seems now cognizant of the fact that “such water resource development is the country’s main option, providing food security and socio-economic development in the region through the use of irrigation and hydroelectric power” (Sherk, et.al, 2001: 12). The government’s policy direction in significantly improving its capacity of utilizing its water resource has clearly been indicated in its Water Resources Management Policy (Ministry of Water Resource, FDRE, 1999:26)

The area of irrigated agriculture cultivated so far is insignificant compared to the irrigable potential. Sufficient food has to be produced to meet the
requirements of the fast growing population and ensure food security for eventualities at household level. Furthermore, small, medium and large scale irrigation schemes will have to be developed in order to enhance reliable agricultural development in Ethiopia to cater for externally marketable surplus that would earn the country foreign exchange and at the same time provide raw material inputs for industries.

These Ethiopian potential development effort is however, is bound to draw Egyptian resistance. As we have seen before, it has long been an Egyptian preoccupation to frustrate any upstream development of the Nile particularly when the development projects pertained to Ethiopia. This confirms the Egyptian policy of water security. It is alleged that “if the Egyptians think that the other co-basin countries have a real or perceived plans to utilize the waters of the Nile they would indulge themselves in subversive activities as they have frequently done against Ethiopia” (Tesfaye, 2001:128-129).

The question here is why does Egypt stand to block the implementation of development efforts in the upper riparian countries? The reason is believed to be because Egypt wants “to preserve its share (rather monopoly) of the waters of the Nile” (Sherk et.al, 2001:13). But these could not be the only reason for Egypt’s aggressive stance in relation to upstream development. This is because Egypt is now diverting the water of the Nile out of the natural basin. It is also using the resources of the Nile beyond its equitable and reasonable share by pumping the water to the most arid regions of its territory for uses which are not considered economically rational (Imiru, 2002).

From the above discussion the observation that may be drawn is how should the principle of equitable share be operational if every move by the upper riparian is to be construed as harmful? What should be the substantive content and interrelationship between Articles 5 and 7? It is my belief that if the two principles are to have a meaningful relevance in the issue of watercourse utilization they have to be consistent with the purpose of equitable utilization. The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization enunciated under Article 5 has to be the guiding principle in water utilization and Article 7 should not derogate but complement the application of the
governing rule of reasonable utilization. This interpretation seems to be shared by other writers who consider that particular article as subsidiary to the substantive rule contained in Art 5 (Sherk, et.al, 2001:13.).

The principle of ‘obligation not to cause significant harm’ is invoked when the upper riparian state exercises its right to equitable and reasonable utilization of the river. The exercise of equitable and reasonable utilization couldn’t however necessarily result in causing significant harm. True, this exercise of right by the upper riparian state may result in the reduction of the flow in the watercourse but this exercise of right would remain not causing any harm as long as the utilization made is within the limit of equitable and reasonable share. Aside from this, this provision would seem to prohibit the upper riparian state from ‘making use of water within its territory. Therefore, the right of the riparian state to use the water should be respected as long as this use is within its equitable and reasonable share, even if such use results in significant harm to the lower riparian state” (Getachew, 2000:6).

The equitable use and no-harm principles may also overlap as indicated in the following:

A case in point would be Ethiopia’s situation on the Blue Nile where Egypt could effectively preclude the development of new uses by Ethiopia on the grounds that these would cause significant harm to Egypt’s existing uses. The principle of equitable use would require that all relevant factors be considered in the assessment of a reasonable and equitable use in each particular case. Thus, Ethiopia could be entitled to cause even significant harm to Egypt’s existing uses, should that result in the most equitable use of the waters of the Nile (Sherk, et.al, 2001:1).

In the context of the above-cited quotation, each state may stick to the principle, which it thinks would promote its own interests. The result is however, not compromise but conflict. The question here is how do legal rules help to reconcile these mutually exclusive principles?
It is stated that the adoption of the 1997 UN convention on Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses was a positive step but it has also been argued that it has not succeeded in addressing some challenges in the operative use of these resources and thus considered a weak legal instrument for resolving conflicts. (Scheumann, and Klapahake, 2001:4). It would seem that its weakness is in particular evident in the fact that it tends to protect the statu squo. In this regard "Egypt could effectively preclude the development of new uses by Ethiopia on the ground that these would cause significant harm to Egypt's existing uses" (Sherk et al, 2001:22). The no significant harm rule also seems to act as a veto on future development endeavors.

3.4 Exchange of Data and Notification Procedure

The 1997 convention requires cooperation between contracting basin states in the regular exchange of data and information. The procedure involved here relates to hydrological, meteorological, and ecological exchange of data and notification with respect to water quality and related forecasts (Article 9 of the Convention and Schumann, 2001:8). It is only in cases “where such exchange of information is regarded as vital to national defense or security” (Article 31) that they may be refused.

The exchange of data collection and the level of accuracy of those data do not seem however, to be readily acceptable by the entire basin states (Kliot, 1994:267). Accordingly “if equitable water allocation relies on geographic and hydrological features of the basin state, then we need to be in possession of very accurate information about those features” (Ibid.). As can be inferred from above, the only beneficiaries of such an exchange of data and information could be the present users of the river i.e. Sudan and Egypt owing to their powerful and organized hydraulic system. The many projects which were constructed within the drainage including the Aswan Dam were designed for the benefit of Egypt (Collins, 1990: 74).

Under these circumstances, Ethiopia appeared to be well advised to record its reservations on the application of the provision on exchange of data and notification in the 1997 Convention (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FDREI 1997:8). Another possible negative effect of the notification procedure is observed to refer to
‘situations where states intend to implement new measures (Article 12) if they have reasonable grounds to believe that another watercourse state is planning measures that may have significant adverse effect upon it’’ (Article 18(1) and Scheumann and Klaphake 2001:8). This procedure, I believe could be used as a ploy to prevent upstream states from implementing any projects that could increase their level of utilizing the resources of the shared watercourse.

But there are other predicaments with regard to the acceptability of this procedure. One of this relates to fact that:

… a state that intends to implement measures has no obligation to notify all water course states but all potentially affected ones; that there are no legal consequences mentioned in case watercourse states do not comply with the general provision on the exchange of information, or the case a state does not respond to a request for notification; the lack of substantive definition as to what type of information is to be submitted; the absence of indicative list of types of measures that would require consultation (Ibid.).

Although the above-stated shortcomings may have the effect of reducing the probable acceptability of this procedural provision, they may not be substantive enough to change the situation. This is because the provision is unlikely to be acceptable in view of the differences in the level of development within the basic countries.
Part IV
Towards a Shared Vision on the use of the Nile

The inequitable state of water utilization in the Nile has always been a cause of concern for the successive Ethiopian Governments. This state of affairs hasn’t passed unchallenged although the protests and challenges to the exclusive and inequitable use of these waters by Egypt and Sudan continued unhindered. These were also the reasons why Ethiopia chose to shun joining the series of initiative and groupings on the Nile.

Ethiopia considers that past initiatives such as the Hydromet and TECCONILE were not cooperative forums for they avoided the crucial issue of water allocation as an issue of grave concern between the riparian states. Ethiopia also stressed the need for a new water sharing agreement to determine the requirement of each co-riparian country. Egypt and Sudan were not however willing to enter into fresh water sharing agreement. They were in fact interested in maintaining their acquired share under existing agreements, particularly the 1959 Agreement. Egypt has always insisted on the legal validity of acquired rights. It resisted any attempt by the upper riparians to harmonize policies for the purpose of establishing agreed regimes.

The failure of water sharing agreement is noted to have aggravated the competition for water between the two countries, “with Ethiopia seeking international funding for water projects and Egypt trying to obstruct Ethiopia’s efforts on the grounds that its proposals would deprive Egypt of its acquired rights and cause it appreciable harm” (Shapland, 1997:99).

Egyptian attitude of cooperation on the Nile seemed to be predicated on the fact that existing water sharing arrangements should be maintained for perpetuity and that if any cooperation is to be forged it should be based on additional waters that could be salvaged from water saving schemes. In this context, it seemed that they were interested in involving the riparian countries to work together towards augmenting the flow of the Nile by undertaking activities of exchange of information on hydrometeorological data and environmental protection. Ethiopia has all along rebuffed this Egyptian position. It was also conceived as major impediment towards effective cooperation and even a ploy
by the lower riparians to appropriate the entire flow of the river to the detriment of other rightful states of the Nile (Girma, 2000:3). So, the prospects for a change of this attitude on the part of the existing users depend on the creation of a new basis of cooperation. It is in this perspective that the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has to be analyzed.

4.1 The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)

The countries of the Nile basin have recognized the need of taking steps towards utilizing the resources of the river for their development potential. Although the absence of a meaningful agreement on the legal framework persists, they seem to be convinced that there are grounds for cooperation pending the agreement on the legal and institutional framework. It is in this context that the Nile Basin Initiative was established in 1999. Accordingly “The initiative is guided by a shared vision to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of and benefit from, the common Nile basin water resources and a set of policy guidelines which provide a basin-wide framework for cooperative action” (Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin States (Nile-Com), 2002:2).

The above statement seems to consider the resources of the Nile as an international watercourse and in particular as a resource, which all the basin states should benefit from. The key concept in the above quoted statement seems to my understanding the concept of ‘equitable utilization’. We have seen what equitable utilization could mean under international law (Non-navigational watercourse Convention, 1997). We have also seen how ambiguous the principle or concept of equitable and reasonable utilization could be when it is tied up with the seemingly counter principle of obligation not to cause significant harm. The significance of the inclusion of the concept of equitable utilization in the new Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), however, is that it is the first time that such a novel idea has been introduced in the new initiatives in the basin. It seems also possible to argue that the concept would render the decades old concept of ‘historic or prior use right’ as inconsistent with the present realities in the basin and to the success of the attainment of sustainable development and the common good for all the people of the basin. But this conclusion could be hasty or unsubstantiated because
the implementation of the concept of equitable utilization has become very difficult unless a consensus is reached on how to translate it into concrete terms. The rights of the riparian states in the equitable utilization of the resource have to be defined. The rules under Article 6(1) of the 1997 Convention on Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses may be applicable in formulating concrete terms and conditions of equitable utilization, but they may not be concrete and objective to the realities of the basin. This is one of the crucial points that the riparian states have to come to terms with. It seems in recognition of this that the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has pledged to support such projects as the so-called D3 project which is connected with the issue of equitable utilization, the objectives of which as quoted by Tesfaye (200:110) are specified as:

“...Enabling of the Nile River basin countries to determine equitable entitlements for each riparian country for the consumptive and non-consumptive use of the Nile Waters (and) for optimum socioeconomic benefits of the inhabitants of the basin (Nile COM, 1999).

The above stated objective of some of the projects included in the Nile River Basin Initiative may not however be unattainable if the riparian countries motto of shared vision on the use of the resources of the Nile can be maintained. There could also be possibilities of translating this vision into reality within the context of the 1997 Convention on Non-navigational use of International Watercourse. In this connection, Article 7 (1) of the Convention seems to have conferred an exercise of right by a riparian state, to utilize the resources of the shared river with due diligence. This, to my understanding, may help mitigate the difficulty of harmonizing the two opposing poles of right to equitable use and the obligation not to cause significant harm. To this end, the particular article provides that “watercourse states shall, in utilizing an International watercourse in their territories take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse states” (Art.7 (1)).

For the moment, however, a shift in the thinking of exclusive use towards a cooperative use of the River Nile and recognition of equitable use by all the riparian countries in general and Egypt in particular seems to me to be a change of strategy rather than of attitude. This may also be noticed on the Ethiopian side, in the fact that
Ethiopia used to shun any cooperation short of addressing the issue of equitable allocation. The Ethiopian side long pursued a policy imperative that required the need for forging agreement on the applicable legal framework in the Nile basin which would recognize her right to equitable utilization. In switching to such a change of a strategy however, Ethiopia could not have suspended or abandoned the issue of water allocation as an ultimate condition for cooperation. What these change of strategy could imply, in my opinion, is the recognition on the part of the Ethiopian side that the agreement on the legal framework for the allocation of the Nile could take long time and Ethiopia would not be prepared to sacrifice its short-term cooperation benefits for want of such a long-term objective. Ethiopia is perhaps cognizant of the fact that “Given Egypt’s significant international role and its privileged access in Western capitals, its opposition to Ethiopian application for funds would probably be successful, at least initially” (Shapland, 1997:99). And on the reverse side what could be the reasons for the unprecedented Egyptian reorientation of endorsing the stated objectives of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) among which are included the recognition of equitable use of the Nile?

To address the above-mentioned issues a close reference into the strategic context of the Nile Basin Initiative may be relevant here. Accordingly it is stated that:

“… The Nile holds significant opportunities for win-win development that could enhance energy availability, food production, transportation, industrial development, environmental conservation, and other related development activities in the region, cooperative water resources. Management might also serve as a catalyst for greater regional integration, both economic and political, with benefits far exceeding those derived from the river itself (Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin States (NILE-Com, 2002:2).

International donors and powerful western states in which Egypt has a great stake back these strategic imperatives. The Egyptians may have found it difficult to sacrifice or to jeopardize their relations with these countries and organizations by refusing to open dialogue with the other riparian countries that are pressing for the need of forging basin wide cooperation on the Nile. The Nile Basin Initiative also seems to have a prospect of
gaining international aid and investment from which the Egyptians could benefit. As some anonymous writer has indicated, by enlisting membership in the initiative “Egypt can employ its considerable experience to participate in dam development and water resource management as well as other projects in Ethiopia and the Sudan, thereby continuing Egyptian rule over one of the world’s most famous rivers” (cited at http://www.Stratfor.com, 2000). I also share the opinion that changed Egyptian attitude may not point to the fact that they have abandoned their monopolistic policy on the Nile river. It seems that by participating in the initiative they think they can advance their own economic benefit.

This writer would also think that the seemingly open change of heart on the part of the Egyptians may not contradict their policy of domination of the Nile. This may be implied from their positions on the ongoing discussion on the implementation of the “Nile Basin Cooperative Framework” (Project D3). In this connection Tesfaye Tafesse (2001:111) says:

The POE (panel of Experts) did, ... discuss each and every provision of the draft document and produced Revised Version that was marred with reservations made by one party or the other. This indicates among others, the ascendancy of conflicts of interest and locked-in positions that had been reigning in relations among Nile basin states.

The need to reach agreement is considered as crucial for Ethiopia’s sustained development, particularly, agreement on allocation of the waters of the Nile. But Ethiopia also can not afford to remain aloof from the current cooperative initiative which seem short of addressing the real issue of water allocation, but nevertheless it could give a leeway to its development endeavors. Indifference to the series of Nile Basin initiatives should have passed a lesson to Ethiopia. The Egyptians or the Sudanese to a lesser degree were actively pursuing Nile Basin initiatives for their own good. In the Hydromet, they have benefited by closely working with the other riparian countries on issues of data collection and gathering information that could help strengthen their existing use. Ethiopian reserved stance hasn’t significantly changed the Egyptian position. In fact, the Egyptians seemed to feel comfortable in participating in their self-sponsored initiatives with Ethiopia’s absence (Shapland, 1997:69). According
to Kidane Aseffa (2002), current head of the ENTRO office for the Easter Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP), the NBI has made a breakthrough with the traditional thinking which closed all venues that could lead to discussion and cooperation on issues on mutual concern on the Nile.

He also thinks that progress on the discussion of some issues and present consensus on the initiative could result in attitudinal change on the part of the Egyptians with respect to the 1959 Agreement (*Ibid*.). Some of the reason why Ethiopia avoided full membership or remained an observer in the past Nile Basin initiatives to my mind seemed to be the fact that these initiatives were irrelevant to her interest (Hydromet) or they basically reflected the interests of Egypt and the Sudan (*TECCONILE*) which projected water allocation agreement as a long-term objective.

But, it is argued that Ethiopia could have pursued a more a proactive policy to underscore her concerns and interests. In connection with the impacts this skeptic Ethiopian stand had on the Nile issue, Tesfaye (200:102) says that:

Not withstanding its own situation as a victim of the *status quo*, Ethiopia is also partially to be blamed for the hitherto existing no-win situation or for stalling agreements on the utilization of the Nile Water. They should have at least been clever enough to use all the possible venues (e.g. Participation in the various Nile based organizations that they had previously avoided and/or preferred to remain merely as an observer) to hammer out the possible conclusion of the future use of the Nile Waters. Instead, and of course regrettably, they spent most of their times waving a red flag to the downstream users oftentimes claiming that they can do whatever they wish on the portion of the Nile Water that flows in their own territory with or without the consent of Egypt and Sudan.

Ethiopian pronouncements and declarations on her sovereign right to use the resources of the Nile served nothing more than rhetoric. It should also be mentioned here that past Ethiopian position on the Nile reflected the so-called 'riparian principle' in opposition to the Egyptian 'prior or historic' use. But these principles seemed to have outlived their relevance and couldn't advance cooperative use except the perpetuation of the stalemate.
According to Kidane (2002), it is better to move a bit on the cooperative road than remain in a standstill. He says that NBI could not pre-empt allocation, it is a first step towards equitable use. It seems in the hope of achieving breakthrough to the hitherto unflinching position of the upstream (Ethiopia) and downstream (Egypt and Sudan) that the NBI has become a top preoccupation with present Ethiopian authorities.

The NBI has enabled all the Nile Riparian to adapt the Nile River Basin Strategic Action Program (NILESAC) which is responsible for setting guidelines for cooperation in the Nile. The Strategic Action Program comprises of two complementary sub-programs, the first of, which as I have tried to portray above, is the shared vision which has a Basin-wide application, and the second being the subsidiary Action program (SAP) is meant to realize the vision on the ground (Girma, 2000:13).

We have seen earlier that all the Nile countries have agreed on shared vision for the Nile whose objective is "To achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of and benefit from the common Nile Basin Water resources" (NILE-Com, 2001:). It is worth noting here that the NBI holds promising prospects for cooperation on the Basin. The broadly set themes of the initiative are:

1. Cooperative Framework (Project D3 ongoing)
2. Confidence building and stakeholder involvement
3. Socio-economic, environmental and sectoral analysis
4. Development and investment planning
5. Applied training (Girma, 2000:10)

Kidane (2002) considers the Cooperative Framework, which is the most important of the five themes, as a process because it is a framework agreement and not an allocation agreement. Agreement on this theme is crucial for Ethiopia's development endeavors but the road ahead seems to be very difficult considering the lack of any significant progress so far. Without a breakthrough, the present cooperation could not bring the much-needed development. Allocation is thus basic and undying principle (Ibid.). Investors and donors would also require it as a condition for their involvement.
But is this the only option, which Ethiopia has on the utilization on the Nile? How else can the countries of the Basin, specifically, Ethiopia and Egypt cooperate pending the resolution of their differences on the allocation issue. This is the issue, which we will discuss, in the next sub-topic.

4.2. The Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP)

EN SAP is expected to realize development projects, which are jointly designed and agreed between the countries of the sub-basin comprising of Ethiopia, Egypt, and the Sudan. This program is also expected to allow the move from planning to action. There is also another sub-basin division of the southern Nile comprising of the countries of the lake region viz., Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, DRC, Sudan and Egypt known as the Nile Equatorial Lakes Region (NEL-SAP) as dichotomized under the strategic Action Program of the NBI. These divisions have been made with the objective of implementing the technical assistance and capacity building types of projects basin wide (Nile-Com, 20001:2)

The focus of this sub-topic however will be on the EN-SAP, which would involve cooperation between the countries of this sub-basin, comprising of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. Ethiopia was induced to enlist full membership into the NBI after the inclusion of the issue of establishing legal and institutional regime for the Nile waters utilization and management. There was also a keen interest on the Ethiopian side to benefit from the new initiative in order to facilitate its strategy of poverty alleviation and achieve sustainable development as envisaged in its new Water Resources Management Policy (Ministry of Water Resources, FDRE, 1999:13). The Ethiopian Water Resources Management Policy explicitly articulates the country's long-term objective for accelerated socio-economic growth as connected with the need to foster meaningful and mutually fair regional cooperation and agreement on the joint and efficient use of Trans-boundary waters with Riparian countries based on "equitable and reasonable" use principles" (Ibid., 13).

In a response to questions posed on the Internet, Tesfaye Tafesse (2002,Tesfayeidr@yahoo.com) says that:
The three ENSAP member states have already forwarded a total of fifty-six hydraulic projects, including hydropower, irrigation, water and soil conservation that await funding of these projects, forty-six of them (80 percent) are proposed by Ethiopia [thirteen for HEP, eight for irrigation and 5 for watershed management] and the remaining ten percent by Egypt and Sudan (emphasis original).

The present writer thinks that the number of projects proposed by Ethiopia could show the dire need of the country to utilize the resources of the Nile for its much-needed economic growth. It may, on the contrary, show the lesser need of the other riparians viz. Egypt and the Sudan for such small-scale projects. According to Kidane (2002) the imbalance in water use between the upstream and downstream countries of the basin is reflected in the level of infrastructure development and hydraulic works. Ethiopia had derived no benefit from the Nile. The country had remained backward in the water sector development. This does not however, mean that the two downstream states have no stake in the cooperative endeavors under the ENSAP. It is believed that in order to minimize sediment retention on their dams and to prevent flooding, the Sudanese for instance expend about 700-800m USD annually. This could be a good reason for cooperation on the construction of dams in upstream Ethiopia on the basis of cost and benefit sharing (Ibid.) The Egyptians are also believed to have a great stake in the sub-basin cooperative effort in order to mitigate flood-drenching and siltation on their dams which is costing them dearly (Ibid.)

One of the impending problems, which could be confronted with the proposed cooperation, is the reliability of acquiring the expected external funding. In this connection Tesfaye Tafesse (2002) argues that "there is a big string that is attached to the funding, namely several NG-Os that participated in the ICCCON meeting warned against building a string of dams on the Nile, arguing that the cumulative effect could be catastrophic for the ecosystems in the region". It could also be possible to argue that the expected fund wouldn't be available for all projects and whatever assistance is obtained could only supplement and not replace internal resource. It seems in recognition of this that the Ethiopian Government is allocating own funds for implementing some projects in addition to those which would require matching funds. Moreover, the NBI is believed to be an interim arrangement (Musa 2002). Ethiopia needs to pursue its goal of reaching understanding on the establishment of legal and
institutional framework for water allocation. In the absence of this arrangement, the alternative is believed to be to go on our own and whatever we sign should not effect our long term right to use (Mekuria, 2002) It is also noted that the present Water Management Policy considers irrigation and not hydroelectric power as a top priority (Musa, 2002)

With regard to Tesfaye's comments on the skepticism of bringing World Bank investments into Egypt, my own viewpoint is that the Egyptians have a greater stake in the initiative than implementing their mega projects by subscribing to ENSAP But they seem not to think of rescinding (halting) their mega projects such the Toshka or the Southern Valley Projects. They seem in fact gaining ground as some Gulf states and Saudi Businessmen have shown interest in funding some components of the 80 billion worth project (Fisseha, 2002). The Egyptians also seem to advance a two-tier (a two channel) Policy on the Nile, i.e. they are trying to expand their utilization capacity by creating new facts on the ground. They are also actively involved in the current Nile Basin Initiative.

This Egyptian stance may indicate the difficult path of the cooperative endeavors. But it is believed that her participation in ENSAP could give her good return in such projects as the dam development, production and transmission of hydroelectric power (http://www.stratfor.com, 2000). Participation in such project-by-project approach may help Ethiopia to build capacity in the sectors, which the country seemed backward as compared with its downstream neighbors. But it can attain sustainable development when the actual issue of equitable entitlement of the Nile Waters is addressed and her share of the waters determined. This issue would seem to drag for sometime, but Ethiopia's refusal to take advantage of the current initiative could only worsen her bargaining position. I am of the opinion that her participation couldn't eclipse the real issue of allocation agreement, because negotiation on the framework for establishing such agreement is still proceeding.

4.3 Caveats on the Cooperative Endeavors

It is believed that the current attempt at forging cooperation on the use of the Nile between the Eastern Nile Basin States is encouraging. It remains however, to be seen
whether this cooperative endeavor is firmly established and the states involved are committed to the implementation of the joint projects they have agreed upon. Ethiopia, the most disadvantaged and the poorest of the countries of this part of the basin had thrown her lot of developing its Nile resources to the consent and cooperation of its downstream neighbors.

Ethiopia’s commitment to the *NBI* in general, and to the *ENSAP* in particular, is believed to be firm. In this regard, top Ethiopian officials such as the Minister of Water Resources has reiterated his country’s conviction that participation in the NBI is consistent with the country’s water resources strategic programs (Mekonen, 2002). This Ethiopian commitment has also been expressed in a recently presented seminar manual on “Rural Development Policies, Strategies and Approaches” prepared by the Ministry of Information for a nationwide seminar for public servants, higher education level teachers, and professors (Ministry of Information, FDRE, 2001:105).

Ethiopia’s commitment of promoting cooperation on the Nile with a firm conviction of benefiting from such cooperation has also been clearly articulated in the document “Ethiopia’s Water Resources Management Policy” (Ministry of Water Resources, FDRE, 1999:13) as follows:

1. Promote the establishment of an integrated framework for joint utilization and equitable cooperation and agreements on transboundary waters;
2. Ascertainty and promote Ethiopia’s entitlement and use of transboundary waters based on those accepted international norms and conventions endorsed by Ethiopia;
3. Foster meaningful and mutually fair Regional cooperation and agreements on the joint and efficient use of transboundary waters with riparian countries based on “equitable and reasonable” use principles.

These, to my understanding, are enough to prove Ethiopia’s strong belief and hope on the cooperative endeavors in the sub-basin. In pursuance of such belief, Ethiopia has submitted 26 projects for joint implementation out of which 13 are for hydroelectric power, 8 for irrigation and 5 for water shade management (Tesfaye idr@ Yahoo.com, 2002). Of the total fifty-six hydraulic projects presented for funding forty-six of them (80%) are proposed by Ethiopia and ten percent jointly by Egypt and Sudan (*Ibid*.).
The Sudanese and Egyptians however don not seem to be as committed as Ethiopia to the success of the initiative. In this connection some inconsistency is observed with the implementation of these joint projects. One of the project areas where cooperation is sought and on which the parties have expressed their consent is the hydropower trade. In this regard Ethiopia has earmarked projects where the Sudanese are assumed to participate by making use of hydropower potential and production from Ethiopia. But in spite of their acceptance of such an arrangement they are said to be busy at the moment with the implementation of their own hydropower production on the Merewe River basin. This seems to be an attempt to frustrate the power export potential of Ethiopia (Kidane, 2002). This is also believed to be a Sudanese attempt of not to import Ethiopian power. This could also be inconsistent with the joint projects approved and agreed between the parties.

It is also argued that the Egyptian commitment to the initiative is not dependable. They can use and influence the Sudan against Ethiopian moves of using the Nile. It is assumed that the skepticism of these downstream riparians is being reflected through Sudan. To prove this assertion Kidane Aseffa, (200) the current ENSAP ENTRO office head says that Sudan has a rain-fed agricultural land which is more than what Ethiopia has. They also possess large power potential. Presently they are trying to meet their power demand and attain self-sufficiency. This attempt could shadow skepticism to the cooperation initiative. What is particularly worrying is that the Sudan’s objection to Ethiopia’s attempt of developing the tributaries of the Nile. They seem to pre-empt Ethiopia’s endeavors (Ibid.).

In addition to the Merewi, the Sudanese are busy now developing the tributaries of the Nile. They are in particular constructing hydroelectric power on the Rhad, Dinder, Merewi and others. They seem not to appreciate the benefits they have acquired through the construction of small dams on the Blue Nile, Tana (Ibid.). They are also busy expanding the capacity of the Roseires dam. These unilateral activities could in my opinion create problems on the cooperative endeavors and prevent the creation of enabling environment for cooperation.
The authorities in the Ministry of Water Resources believe that the NBI has enabled the riparian countries to draft a common vision catered for mutual benefit. They also seem to be confident that this would enable them achieve a sustainable development. It could also accommodate the interest of the Nile riparians comprehensively (Musa, 2002).

But this writer likes to stress that this noble and ideal objectives enunciated in the initiative need to be accepted as the points of departure for every development endeavor undertaken by each riparian. In this regard, the countries of the Eastern Nile Basin have yet to show their firm commitment to the objectives. Current cooperative endeavors although encouraging need to be strengthened and digression from the basic principles agreed and enunciated in the Shared Vision in general, and the sub basin grouping of ENSAP in particular, need to be rectified.
Conclusion

This study is made in an attempt to portray the political and economic interests at the root of Ethio-Egyptian relations. The Nile as a major factor, which has tied the relations between the two countries, has remained a cause for conflict and political differences between the two countries. The Nile is a factor the utilization of which has created intense rivalry and served as a factor, which bestowed prosperity on one at the expense of the other.

The Nile also figured out as a top security concern in Egypt’s relations with Ethiopia. When their strategy of the Unity of the Nile Valley failed, the Egyptians tried to secure their interest and use of the Nile by creating every diplomatic and political machination to prevent or divert upstream countries from claiming and utilizing their share from the resources of the Nile. Their policy in particular targeted Ethiopia, the country of the major source of the Nile. The Ethiopians for their part never abandoned their declaration of their sovereign right to use the waters within their own territory. But this Ethiopian declaration remained more rhetoric than real.

As decades passed without a workable arrangement for utilizing this great resource, factors that necessitated the recognition of equitable entitlement seem to have won their day as the countries of the basin were warned of the risk of impending danger of conflict and instability that could ensue from the absence of a workable cooperation. This cooperative endeavor however has yet to pass the test of compromise between the upstream countries and present users of the Nile, particularly Egypt, which in spite of her subscription to the objectives of the Nile Basin Initiative seems not to have halted its policy of water security. While Egypt presents herself as committed to the objectives of the ongoing Nile Basin Initiative and specifically to the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP), she is also actively engaged in constructing mega projects which would require billions of cubic meters of water to develop the Sinai and the Southern Valley desert of Egypt. This is the kind of intransigence that had characterized Egyptian foreign policy of the Nile. This selfish and unbalanced Egyptian stance has obstructed the need for defining the equitable needs of the countries of the basin.
The present cooperative endeavors were meant to change this imbalance in the use of this shared water resource. The new initiatives aim to bring cooperative environment through a protracted negotiations and dialogues. The countries have to wage repeated and sustained negotiations on the core issue of establishing the framework agreement for equitable use. The negotiation on this issue is currently undergoing. This is also the issue, which divides the interests of upstream and downstream states of the Nile. It is on this issue that a major breakthrough is expected so that the countries of the basin, particularly Ethiopia, could realize sustainable economic growth. This is also the issue, which would create investor confidence and draw large-scale foreign assistance for sustainable economic development.

The NBI is predicted to bring the countries of the basin together in designing and implementing joint projects catered for mutual economic benefit. It is also expected to enhance the capacity of the basin countries in implementing water sector project. It would also crate confidence building between the riparian countries as one of the projects of the initiative.

The project-by-project agreement between the countries would not however replace the framework agreement. The two should go parallel and one should not affect the other. The NBI is thought to be an interim arrangement for cooperation. The chance for a long-term cooperation is thought to be tied to the compromise that should be brokered (achieved) on the going legal and institutional framework negotiation.

Ethiopia has shown great interest in participating in the present initiatives by designing projects that could be of mutual benefit. These projects however, although they could be of some economic significance and benefit would not be adequate to address the socio-economic problems that the country faces. Consensus on a workable legal and institutional arrangement is more urgent now more than anytime before. Gone are the days when Ethiopia could readily depend on the occurrence of rains. The agricultural problems are in worsening situation. Ethiopia has no alternative but to use the resources of the Nile in its territory.
Ethiopia’s predicament would not however be lessened unless Egypt renegotiates for equitable share the Nile. But this would seem to require more than negotiation. An agreement may have to be reached at the highest political level with the concerned countries of the basin (Kidane, 2002,). Egypt in particular needs to take positive steps to achieve an equitable use of Nile. It needs to reconsider its position of monopolizing the utilization of the waters of the Nile.

Cooperation is beneficial not only to lessen Ethiopia’s predicament of poverty and other socio-economic problems, but also to decrease the effect of environmental degradation and situation, which have negatively affected the agricultural and power sector of the downstream countries. In general, the findings and conclusion reached in this study suggest that Ethiopia’s economic growth would be strongly linked to its ability to utilize the resources of the Nile for the benefit of its people. This however demands a strong commitment on the Ethiopia side to acquire the necessary capacity towards this end. It would also require a persistent political and diplomatic campaign by Ethiopia to win the hearts and minds of the often euphemistically called ‘development partners’ whose policies have always tilted towards Egypt which presented more political and economic stake than Ethiopia.

Ethiopia’s prospect of developing the waters of the Nile to improve the living standard of its people and to transform its present backward socio-economic infrastructure will require a strong commitment on the part of the government to mobilize its own human and financial resource to implement those large scale projects designed to lift the country from the quagmire of poverty in which it has submerged itself.

This does not however mean that Ethiopia’s chances of winning the Support of external aid are slim. The World Bank that is actively supporting NBI may indicate the possibility of gaining external assistance for joint projects agreed between the riparian countries. If these projects are approved and the necessary fund is obtained from the World Bank and other donor agencies, Ethiopia could derive significant benefits from the implementation of these projects. This could also shade some light on the possibility of change of attitude on the part of the Egyptians who were successful in frustrating any development efforts on the Nile by Ethiopia. They
consistently vetoed any international funding for development projects as affecting their exclusive utilization of the Nile. There seems to be some sign of change in this regard. But it remains to be seen whether there is a true commitment on the part of the Egyptians to negotiate on sharing the use of the River Nile with other riparian countries particularly with Ethiopia.

The study also suggests that in view of the new developments in thinking with regard to poverty alleviation and environmental improvement, international political landscape seems to be changing. Theories, which propagate the primacy of national interest and the dominance of power over common understanding and cooperation, are being revisited as being not sensible. These theories have not been adequate enough to explain and address social and economic problems. Common understanding and cooperation is essential for sustainable economic growth. The new theories are based on the so-called neo-classical economics and game theory.

The Economist in its August 24th -30th 2002 issue quotes a world Bank Development Report, 2002 which contains the following.

Environmental problems are at the root social problems. The distribution of assets and the costs and benefits of different policies as well as the rule of trust are all critical to the abilities of societies to develop competent rules and institutions to address environmental, social and economic problems. The poor and dis-empowered must have much greater access to assets if growth is to be sustainable and the world is to avoid social unrest. (The Economist, 2002:56).

From the above quotation we may observe that the control of resources by powerful states may not be maintained endlessly. These resources especially those, which relate to shared resources the need for their shared use and utilization is critical for sustained growth. Their shared use and development is also critical for the sustainability of the resources themselves. If their shared use is not regulated based on appropriate and commonly accepted rules they are bound to be despoiled affecting not only the interest of those less empowered and less utilizing states but also those interests of the more powerful and more utilizing states. This is what we may observe in the case of the Nile.
Therefore it is in the interest of both upstream and downstream states of the Nile to enter into cooperative agreements defining the rights of all riparian states to equitably and reasonably use the resources of the Nile and to protect the environment in the basin from further degradation and depletion. To this end a fresh start at the cooperative endeavor and establishment of a framework for cooperation particularly agreement on legal and institutional framework is critical.
Declaration

The thesis is my original work, has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.
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Appendix

List of Questionnaire passed to authorities for interviews.