THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERATION ON “OTHERNESS”
AND “RATIONALITY”: A TRANS-MODERN PERSPECTIVE
TOWARDS GLOBALITY

BY
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INTRODUCTION

In his views of the Enlightenment, Kant was concerned to emphasize that human beings are capable for emancipating themselves from the state of epistemic-moral imprisonment using the power of reason. He conceived reason as the only essential instrument in which rational agents struggle for liberation from the veil of ignorance and domination. In Kant’s emancipative analysis of the Enlightenment, one can see a self-reflective understanding of humanity which flourishes from the will to end immaturity which is a conscious comprehension of the self that concerns every rational being. It is here his idea of a universal reason shows the necessity of a new emergence of humanity. Kant’s Enlightenment theory of emancipation, in later years was modified and reconstructed in relation to a socio-historical context by W.F Hegel’s conceptualization of “Spirit”, and Karl Marx’s critical practical philosophy. Critical social theory tries to work in a particular context of emancipation providing a deep philosophical inquiry into the social catastrophes of the modern world.

Controversies appear in understanding human problems of the contemporary world. Among other things, we have a debate on the proper identification of the social challenges of modern world which can be analyzed systematically in a “plurivesal” and contextual sense. Many proponents of critical social theory attempt to point out some historically obvious social turmoil of modernity like the Holocaust, totalitarianism, economic exploitation, and racism, giving a narrow ethnocentric (i.e. Eurocentric and later Western epistemic) point of departure. This can be easily and clearly seen in both modern and postmodern critical social discourses. Because of this narrow epistemic outlook most human problems of the non-Western society were hidden in the critical understandings of the modern world. In other words, the philosophical discourses of modernity and postmodernity failed to see modern human global problems which include colonialism, imperialism, economic dependency, various genocides, and other inhumane acts of oppression and exclusion, which mostly exist in the Third-world. Thus it is quite important to have a truly global mind-set to identify the crises and contradictions in the project of modernity.
Additionally, there is a failure in both modern and postmodern critical social theories to provide broad socio-historical solution(s) to the global challenges of modernity. Postmodernists are chiefly concerned with explaining modernity in relation to the irrational aspects of destruction and domination. Despite the postmodernists’ performative contradiction, thinkers of modern critical discourse insist that it is through reason that the unfinished business of human emancipation can only be achieved. That is why Jurgen Habermas claims that modernity is a project which evolves, a system retaining its continuity in a rational communicative action of the present generation. When Habermas says modernity is unfinished project, politically he would like to propose an ongoing democratic reflexivity of liberated subjects. He writes in *The Postnational Constellation*, present modernity should be developed by liberated citizens using intersubjective discursive talk. This claim of modernity is crucial to maintain the ground of human liberation in epistemic and practical frameworks.

The increasing realizations that there are modern problems for which modernity and postmodernity fail to see points towards the need to move beyond the paradigm of a narrow Eurocentric conception. In other words, it now seems important to think about the Enlightenment of the underside of modernity, that is, the hidden philosophical traditions of the colonized society by introducing a point of departure which originates from the lived and felt experiences of their people. To deal with the Enlightenment of the underside of modernity is one progressive stage to liberate the “Other” from existential domination and marginalization. This “Other” includes all human beings who are exposed to the sacrificial irrational myth of modernity, which is the colonized in colonialism and imperialism, and excluded from contemporary capitalist communicative rationality and action. It is in this new philosophical current that the metaphysical and political liberation of the underside of modernity transcends the occidental cosmopolitan understanding of contemporary global human problems and their solutions. This is a liberation theory and practice that underscores the necessity to negate the modern system of marginalization and subjugation by developing a solidaristic-critical study into the underlying socio-historical realities of the present world through a new approach, i.e. what Enrique Dussel calls “trans-modernity.”
The central focus of this thesis is the critical views of the Philosophy of Liberation which deals within a trans-modern perspective as a way of questioning the historical horizon of global coloniality and calling for the emancipation of the marginalized and the suppressed. According to the Philosophy of Liberation, colonialism empirically began in the last decade of fifteenth century with the European “discovery,” expansion, domination and exploitation into the “New” World, Africa and Asia. This refers to the first phase of colonialism that imposes economic, military, and ideological order. This is followed by the second phase of global epistemic and cultural coloniality. The second stage of coloniality operated through the so-called rational-scientific-technological discourses and social institutions that are the inventions of capitalism and its liberal ideology. In the Philosophy of Liberation, therefore, we need to ask some ontological-ethical-political questions, such as how the majority global population (82% according to the UN 1992 report) becomes poor, oppressed and excluded. Is poverty natural for more than three-fourth of global humanity? To what extent is the indigenous knowledge of non-Western societies primitive and illogical?

Dussel’s Liberation Philosophy attempts to develop the possibility of disclosing and communicatively enriching the philosophical traditions of the underside of modernity. As he argues, this possibility is seen in the phenomenological and hermeneutic understanding of the “Other” and its hidden critical cultures. One might ponder that using the two methods will open a new consciousness of the world, i.e. trying to show the unconcealment [alaethea] and truth [alaetheia] of the “Other,” in the Heideggerian way of expression-- “Other others,” and reinterpreting the historical horizons of discourses. Thus his Liberation Philosophy can be taken as a revolutionary theory that promotes a rational communication of pluriversal philosophies of the world. Dussel develops, in relation to Habermas’ reconstructive project of modernity, a trans-modern perspective.

The thesis contains four major chapters and a conclusion. Chapter one is a fundamental analysis of the general theory of liberation, covering both theological and philosophical aspects. It provides a preparatory view of the overlapping views of religious and secular claims of liberation theory. In this section elucidations of conceptual frameworks are given to philosophical terms such as poverty, emancipation, solidarity, justice, and sin
from both Western scholastic and Latin American liberation thoughts. Furthermore, there is a sub section which deals with the hermeneutic reading of the Holy Scripture and Marx’s philosophy. Finally this chapter gives an overview about Dussel’s Philosophy of Liberation. Chapter two is devoted to an account of the politics of liberation. It historically and philosophically reflects on the logic of “otherness” in the colonial and postcolonial liberation discourses. Here we can see how both rational white man and the prelogical of indigenous people were “invented” in the context of ontology and politics. It also discusses the postcolonial refutations of the epistemological and psychological colonial inventions and the political understanding of otherness in Liberation Philosophy from the point of views of relational ethics and face-to-face justice. In the third chapter the question of differentiating the rational and irrational aspects of modernity leading to the new Dusselian orientation of trans-modern reason is developed. And the final chapter deals with the existential global modernity which is addressed in terms of its temporality, which is the past and present of effective consciousness in the projection of a better future.
CHAPTER ONE
A PREPARATORY ANALYSIS ON LIBERATION THEORY

Based on historical accounts the second half of the twentieth century marked as a point of departure for a substantial movement on the topic of liberation across widely; liberation that is contained within a contentious critical popular voice of change on the prevailing and broad political structure of the world. In this period, in many parts of the dominated regions, for instance Africa, Asia, and South America, people were in protest and war to gain their century lived anguish of ‘being free’ from the colonial culture of subjugation and exclusion. Even though some of the revolutionary movements of this period tended to have an economic, some socio-cultural, or some other initial causes, the ultimate goal of all these movements were rooted in an ontological and practical presupposition of liberation; that is the disclosedness of the identity of the “Other”, the negation of an enforced hegemony, and the reformulation of a just as well as rational global history of humanity. Those people posed the forefront quest for liberation due to brutal existential situations in which they were forced to live for centuries. Although certain misrepresentation and misconceptions were made on the frontal concern of popular movements of pre and post twentieth century in the various social discourses (e.g. critical, hermeneutical, and postcolonial), the very target particularly in the dominated regions of the world was, and still is liberation.

Theorizing the fundamental existential concern of South American people, liberation thought since the 1960s has been deploying a “positive discourse” that can critically negate all negativities of modernity adopting a new tool that Enrique Dussel calls “trans-modernity”.¹ The new perspective as a philosophical trend oriented towards the future, attempts to reexamine the historical and dialectical factors of the development of conceptions like global modernity and its emancipatory delineation, universal human development, rationality and others. Within this historic venture liberation theory came into being with both theological and secular themes which underlined modernity in the world is originating due to Europe’s disclosure to an expansive interest through exploration and military conquest. For liberation thinkers, modernity in its global sense began empirically to appear in 1492 when the invention and naming of the new world
was announced by the Europeans within a context of ‘might is right’ motto. In his article, “Philosophy in Latin America in the Twentieth Century: Problems and Currents,” Dussel quotes from H.A. Murena’s book entitled *El Pecado Original de America* or the “*Original Sin*”. According to Murena the term ‘America’ is coined by European expelled people to designate the novelty of the land, uncultivated material and savage spirit magnified through a narrow self-projection of the “Other” and all its markers. The invention goes beyond the essence of discovery in the conscious negation of the indigenous ontology, epistemic and axiological values.

Thus, a new construction of modernity is taken by Dussel and other liberationists to imply both the historical and philosophical conditions in which Europe controlled and invented the world from the end decade of fifteenth century. This reformulation of modernity is opposed to most Eurocentric epistemic assertions, which assert that modernity originated in the eighteenth century with the Enlightenment, core advocating human liberation, the socio-political revolutionary ideas of the people of France, and a road map of material production dominated by the European industrial revolutions of France and Britain. In fact, in the reconstructive understanding of modernity those above listed revolutionary cases seen as modern even though there is more on the supplement of a new starting point by revisiting and deconstructing the Eurocentric demonstrations of world history. One of the Eurocentric analyses of modernity is an attempt to ponder colonialism as an exterior thing which has no link with the modern projection of the world. The reason for this seems to be the absolutism and rationalism of modernity; its absolutism appears to conceal the historical, and with thus to assure the mask of neutrality, the rationalism and to dismantle the irrational and mythic components of modernity. Here the reconstructive position of modernity in Dussel and some other liberation scholars seems to me to deconstruct the hidden irrational aspects and some other reformulations. Thus, this reconstructive approach seeks to show the fundamental difference of liberation theory from postmodern philosophical discourses.

If we follow the argument of liberation theorists which says modernity as a planetary historical notion seen since 1492, then we need to ponder the rational and irrational aspects side by side. This is quite important to see where the liberationists’ understanding
of modernity differs from the Eurocentric one. For instance, while the Eurocentric conception of modernity rests on the positivism of the emancipatory indulgence of humanity, Dussel as we have seen before states that the invention of America is indeed the disclosure of modernity but not only with its claims of emancipation, but equally domination, not only rationalization, but also mystification, and so on. In a similar vein, V.Y. Mudimbe, Franz Fanon and very differently Messay Kebede talk about the invention of the self of Africa and ‘human nature’ in philosophical discourses. Of course I will briefly discuss their notion of invention in relation to otherness and rationality.

As a methodology, liberation thinkers opt for existential-ontological and historicico-hermeneutical tasks while severely challenging the analytic philosophical trends of Anglo-Saxon American thoughts. For the analytic tradition, since the meaningfulness of any proposition is determined either in its analytic or synthetic validations, ethical, social, political and other value spheres are simply thought to be speculative. Analytic philosophers give priority to the methodological. The pillars of physics and mathematics to the revolutionary progress of science and technology in their point of view are methodologically successful, and by that they are insisting on the ‘scientification’ of the human world and society. According to Alejandro Korn, who is among the distinguished liberationist scholars in the 1920s, the naïve determination of positivism in scientific-social discourses has to be accused by the divergence of discourses with existential human questions. Korn suggested the point that is; human liberation is an existential struggle to attain not an economic developmental embarrassment, rather a human utility which is all-constitive. Korn’s idea implies that the Philosophy of Liberation is critical of human liberation providing the capitalist fallacious program of developmentalism of the South.

So the phenomenological and hermeneutical methodologies are fundamental mechanisms that Latin American liberationists like Carlos Astrada, Dussel and others worked on by using the texts of profound Western philosophers. Astrada utilizes the phenomenological ideas of Edumund Husserl and Martin Heidegger within the context of Latin American existential history. Most empathically, to Astrada the influence of Heidegger’s thought of Being in general, and in particular Dasien’s ontic and ontological existence in the world
is seen as critical to the liberation struggle of his time and society. Similarly to the phenomenological method, the historical-hermeneutic method is employed by liberationists to interpret texts within the lived and felt conditions of people’s life world. For example, the Bible, in an ecclesiastical community is not expected to be studied in the traditional way, instead interpreting it from the perspective of the horizon of the poor. The poor is privileged for their philosophic questioning of the system of the modern world in solidarity and justice. Christopher Rowland notes that, “the oppressed call into question assumptions about the character of human relationship, both local and international, in a suffering and unjust world.” Likewise, Dussel reads Marx’s Capital as an ethical interpretation and critique of capitalism. However, we need to clarify that both the phenomenological and hermeneutic tools are used by most of the liberationists not only to criticize the tradition of analytic philosophy, but also radical relative ethnologies.

In this preparatory section the emphasis of my study is taken on two aspects of liberation theory; theological and secular. Indeed, we can find Dussel in both the theological or religious and secular or philosophical trends. The major concern of theological liberation is what is or ought to be Christians in this phenomenal world by criticizing the Platonic versions of traditional Christianity and some of Thomistic, Kierkegaardian, and Nietzschean claims of a religious community. One could admire the appropriation of Marx’s idea of revolution to the Christian thought of liberation theology. There are many convergences between Marxism and Christianity according to the liberationists. The other thing that we need to look at in this theological theory is the precursor of religion to the totality of the human life in which an ethical core is built. This may open a new juncture for religious and secular thinkers to deal collaboratively with the human core questions of our current age. In the philosophical or secular aspect of liberation theory I will focus largely on the first part of Dussel’s Underside of Modernity with reference to the nature, horizon and objective of Liberation Philosophy.
1.1. Liberation Theology

In Latin America the thought of human liberation began to be associated with religious praxis in the twentieth century to dismount the structural order which makes the majority of people there, to be dominated culturally, economically, and politically. Being in the theological prism a majority of Latin American Christians argued for a cultural transformation in the interpretation of the Gospel. By broadening the horizon of the “Cultural” radicalization of the question of liberation into economic and political matters, they raised three radical points under the general idea of their liberation theology. These are “(1) an interpretation of Christian faith out of the suffering, struggle, and hope of the poor; (2) a critique of society and ideologies sustaining it; and (3) a critique of the activity of the church and Christians from the angle of the poor”. Accordingly, liberation theology privileges the poor in interpreting the Bible from their own ontological existence. The poor has the right to use his religion as a means of transformation and to interrogate on the dehumanizing imprisonment of the socio-cultural order and the resulting material and spiritual poverty. For liberation theologians, therefore, religion is not as Marx considered “an opium of the people” but rather the best weapon with which the poor socio-historical dehumanization and slavery can be rejected. And these liberation theologians suggest that: “religion has a primary role to play in human liberation, and that in the search for liberation, transmitting the Gospel’s message of salvation cannot be separated from the creation of a better life, “here” and “now”.

The “here” and “now” claims of Theology of Liberation objected to the Platonic traditional understanding of God and a historical view of Christianity. Contrary to the analysis of an out-there and unhistorical Christianity, one of the Peruvian liberationist theologians Gustavo Gutierrez sees the functional role of theology. As far as Gutierrez is concerned, “theology is in flux; it is dynamic and ongoing exercise involving contemporary insights into knowledge, humanity, and history.” This point seems quite significant for the hermeneutic understanding of Christian religion based upon the horizon of the existential life of the poor and other dominated subjects. As real children of Christian God, liberationists affirm that, we need to let our religion in its openness that evolves in accordance with the dynamism of this worldly human life. Here it would be
sound to provide the full idea of Ron Rhodes on the divergence between traditional Platonic Christians’ and liberation theologians’ conceptions of God:

*Liberationists argue that the traditional Christian doctrine of God manipulates the divine being such that He appears to favor the capitalistic social structure. They claim the orthodox view of God is rooted in the ancient Greeks who saw God as a static being distant and remote from human history. This distorted view of a transcendent deity has, they say, yielded a theology that understands God as “Out there,” far removed from the affairs of humankind. As a result, many Latin Americans have adopted a passive stance in the face of their oppression and exploitation… Liberation theologians have thus tried to communicate to their compatriots that God is not impassive. Rather, He is dynamically involved in behalf of the poor and downtrodden. And because God stands against oppression and exploitation, those who follow him must do likewise. Indeed, Gutierrez says that “to know God is to do justice.”*12

There are strong challenges often presented from this-worldly concerned religions and atheism regarding the Christian Biblical orientations of the church’s functional role to guide the living dynamism of this-worldly life of human beings. The out-there or in Kantian sense the noumena superiority over the here and now, in traditional Platonic Christianity made a negation of every dynamism. This is to say that the dogmatic understanding of Christianity contradicts with the earthly existential concerns of the human life and leads into manipulation and fantasy with the enigmas of human’s temporality.

Concerning Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical-political theory we have to begin with the positive inference of religious assertions into the common good humanity as a social animal. His political thought (before the development of social contract and communicative theories), underlined that human beings can establish a political order of their own that fosters the common interest and good. In his *Summa Theological;* Aquinas tried to justify the Aristotelian scholastic idea of Man as a political animal (i.e. *zoon politikon)* using the Christian God as the only being who created man with a nature of social interaction. Moreover, Aquinas in parallel with the core principle of liberation theory suggested that, the position of the poor should be recognized, and if not, there is every right for the poor to secure his human need. Let us see this idea from Aquinas’s “Need and charity” (Question 66, *Article 8 of the Summa)*:
there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all to be secured by means or the same thing, each one entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succour his own need by means of another’s property, by taking it either openly or secretly; nor is this properly speaking theft or robbery.\textsuperscript{13}

As a matter of fact, the core concern of liberation theology is on the poor who is in imminent danger because of the historical structure of world politics in modernity. So long as a theory of liberation examined the rational and irrational aspects of modernity, the oppressed-poor of the world make their critique towards the global political structure of the world, which includes an economic and cultural domination within the system of capitalism.

Despite his concern for the poor, in the metaphysical-political theory of Thomistic liberation philosophy every interest of earthly human life has to consider the ultimate end of man, i.e. the supernatural end. According to him the supernatural end is the only and superior end in which man permanently should incline for. Although some writers argue that in Aquinas the temporal and permanent ends of man reconciled in the supernatural one, still we can see in the higher degree the influence of traditional Christianity’s speculative value of the kingdom of God. Aquinas declares that the end of society is the good life. For him the good life is fulfilled when human beings virtuously seek to attain to the enjoyment of God. His conception of \textit{summum bonum} states that man’s moral act is concerned with the achievement of the highest good which consists in a transcendental metaphysics. “In the case of the human subject the highest good/end, corresponding to its most profound and deepest longings, does not merely consist in a philosophical contemplation of reality but in the beatific vision of God.”\textsuperscript{14} With this respect, the earlier liberationists’ acquisition of traditional Christianity’s view of a distant God is also seen in Aquinas’s final end of man. Gutierrez and Rhodes may argue that, Aquinas’s claim on the supernatural end could be problematized under the traditional Platonic speculative dichotomization of the world of being versus the world of becoming, the kingdom of God versus the earth, the supreme Good versus the human good, and so on. For these

[11]
liberation theologians, God is immanent in the temporality of humans’ existential conditions. And that is why they need a new Christian turn to read the Bible from the point of departure of their existentiality by developing the phenomenological and hermeneutic methods.

Quite beyond the Thomistic and Platonic Christian metaphysics, Soren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche may also be accused by liberation theologians for their failure to understand and transform the social power of a Christian community. This does not mean that, to the liberationists the critiques of Christianity by these two great Western thinkers are totally insignificant. Instead one can identify not only critical rejections of their ideas, but also common thoughts among liberationists and the two Western scholars mentioned here. Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are crucial to imply the static and mythic feature of traditional Christian religion on the existential nature of man.

To see them separately, Kierkegaard with an existential analysis reexamined the true engagement of Christian life. His view of philosophical existential subjectivism provided that the life of Abraham which is stated in the Bible to show that how man’s particular existence sometimes goes beyond the rational metaphysics of the universal. Abraham in Christian scripture considered as a heartily friend of God for his faith. Kierkegaard believed that, Abraham’s relation with God especially at the moment of the big order of God to sacrifice his only son, Isaac at Mount Moriah clearly shows man in his existence is singular. It is only through faith for Kierkegaard that one can explain Abraham’s existential condition to his worldly life and unconditional loyalty to the Creator (i.e. the Absolute). So Abraham in the moment of sacrifice of his only child had a faith:

*He had faith. This is the paradox by which he remains at the apex, for the paradox is that he as the single individual places himself in an absolute relation to the absolute. Is he justified? Again, his justification is paradoxical, for if he is, then he is justified not by virtue of being something universal by virtue of being the single individual.*

So Abraham’s existence is a subjective one. Of course this idea of Kierkegaard is given as a refutation for Hegel’s understanding of the universal ethical. Abraham’s life shows that how man’s life is sometimes going beyond a linguistic expression for the fact of anxiety, and other related moods. From this we can infer that Kierkegaard’s essential effort opens a new metaphysics of man that describes the subjective existence which can
be maintained within certain psychological moods. And these psychological moods we have pondered in the case of Abraham may have a linguistic content and expression. Nevertheless, the lack of linguistification procedure in the psychological moods such as anxiety as far as I am concerned, not imply the irrationally of existential life, rather that life’s trans-lingual position.

The philosophical subjectivism and theological reflections of Kierkegaard could be severely questioned by the thinkers of theology of liberation in its lack of concern for human solidarity as real believers of what the Redeemer thought and practiced. There is, of course, a common argument between Kierkegaard and the liberationists suggest that Jesus as the son of God and the son of Man is regarded to be “the father of liberation” in human history. Jesus’ life and thought construed human values including love, justice, equality and above all freedom. But, according to the liberationists Jesus is the symbol of unity within which humanity appeals to justice, love, and liberation. Here the liberationists provided their argument for solidarity of the poor and the role of the church in insuring freedom. The poor can only achieve their goal human emancipation when there is a strong structural unity and commitment among themselves which stands against domination. As a result of this, in the theology of liberation the substantial solidarity of the poor is presented to show a democratic power holding and consensus. In other words, in the Christian community, liberationists would argue that there is sharing with, communicating reflectively, and accompanying the “non-person” for the preservation of the human life. Gutierrez in his words states that, “the theology of liberation tries – in ecclesial communion – to be a language about God. It is an attempt to make present in this world of oppression, injustice and death, the Word of life”.17

Still one of the crucial differences between Kierkegaard and liberationists occur on which could be the rightful interpretation for Jesus’ death on the cross. For Kierkegaard Jesus is died on the cross basically to show His love for humanity by the act of liberation from sin. On the contrary, for the majority of the liberationists, Jesus’ leftist stand on religion as well as politics of His own time is frontal. Accordingly liberation theologians explain the death of the Redeemer not as of vicarious one. Rather they say “Jesus died because He upset the religious/ political situation of His time”18
Theologians of liberation made use of Nietzsche’s *Uebermensch* and his objections of a transcendental and a historical religious ethics of Judo-Christianity and major European philosophical thoughts until his time. The *Uebermensch* is the ground for transvaluating the ethical principles based on Nietzschean concept of the will to power. For Nietzsche the will to power occurs in the human world by prescribing all values of goodness on their essential conservation and maximization of power. He said this will

*... happens in the organic world is part of a process of overpowering, mastering, and that, in turn, all (over powering) and mastering is a reinterpretation, a manipulation, in the course of which the previous ‘meaning’ and ‘aim’ must necessarily be obscured or completely effaced.*

By this Nietzsche tried to argue that the organic world which includes man’s life as a major component is governed by the will of power, and over powering. This idea of his could be explained in relation to Thomas Hobbes’s claim about the natural link between power and human beings. For Hobbes there is a restless desire of power in man which is used as a means for creating a better future. Nietzsche’s will to power appears to be Hobbesian in a sense that the only means and guide of man’s existentiality as an organic being is power.²⁰ The meaning of life is power, and thus the language of goodness is determined only with an appropriate understanding of the natural will. The *Uebermensch* is for him the “stronger species of man” that always associates his life to those fundamental values of the will to power.²¹ Accordingly the *Uebermensch* knows that life exists if and only if his will to power lively is employed to invent all of the goodness by virtue of strength, victory, domination, etc.

Most liberation theologians agree with Nietzsche concerning the will to power and the *Uebermensch*. They agree that for the liberationist trend power is important to crash all obstacles that make human a slave of another human. To them revolution and violence is important to deconstruct the traditional capitalistic assertions of ethical goodness and badness. So there is a need for a revaluation of ethical values from the perspective of the poor that quest for revolution. Moreover, there are certain basic points that liberationists extract from Nietzsche’s work, *Beyond Good and Evil*, which is given for his Uebermensch to destroy the Christian or herd doctrine of morality. As far as Nietzsche is concerned, Christian morality which gave the crown shape to Western philosophical and
religious ethical values failed to illuminate the possibility of the will to power, and thus, the organic existence of man has to be affirmed with the transvaluated realities of the goodness of the natural will.\(^{22}\)

For liberation theologians, Nietzsche’s ethical transvaluation seems both affirmative and negative. On the one hand, they admit that since the existential ontology of human always rests on change, then transvaluation is a necessary means to understand the horizon and historicity of being. To put it differently, in this organic world, man as a living organism finds himself within an ongoing process of “be-ing”\(^ {23}\), and for that reason our values and their meanings ought to be updated. However, liberation theologians admit that it is the existential ontology within a Christian Biblical framework that leads into ethical transvaluation. On the other hand, liberationists disagree with Nietzsche’s total rejection of Christian ethics. The reason for this is that, to the liberationists in both Old and New Testaments, one can find so many words of God which can falsify Nietzsche’s reduction of Christian morality into ‘herd ethics’. Using their hermeneutic re-reading of the Bible, they for instance ponder “Moses a liberator of an oppressed people” in the Old Testament and Jesus Christ and Paul as political radical in the New Testament.\(^ {24}\)

### 1.2. Liberation Theology and Marxism

Why is it that theological liberationists’ core questions are considered so leftist, so Marxist? How is Marx’s philosophy relevant to religious and socio-economic matters in Latin America and other so-called ‘Third-World’ countries? These two questions may initiate a way of understanding Marx’s critical theory from the perspective of general philosophy in Latin America. Dussel’s critical remark on the significance of Marxism asserts:

*He will be a Marx whose critical thought will be in the hands of Humanity-critical capitalism and, in a positive way (opening its democratic and creative era)…It is a question of a complete rereading of Marx, with new eyes: as a Latin American, from the growing poverty of the peripheral world, the underdeveloped and exploited of capitalism at the end of the 20\(^\text{th}\) century. Marx is, in the periphery, today, more pertinent than in the England of the mid-19\(^\text{th}\) century.*\(^ {25}\)
Certainly there are many people who could be disgusted with liberation theologians application of Marx’s philosophy within their religious movement given that Marx himself took an atheistic position. This atheistic position of Marx perhaps associated with his strong criticism of capitalism which necessitates religion. The system of capitalism undergoes with fantasy that causes human estrangement. Marx is then conceiving religion as a theoretical weapon invented by man himself and operates in an abstract and mythical fashion, negating the true reality of the human life in this world. This is Marx’s argument,

*Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is indeed the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet own through to himself or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man, state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are in an inverted world. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality.*

With this atheistic critical insight Marx strived to deconstruct the abstract and false consciousness by which humanity is a victim of alienation. To solve man’s estrangement Marx believed that the struggle should be with religion and what it produces, because religion is as he generally understood a mechanism in which human beings suffer and dominate in capitalism. That is why he came up with an idea that sees religion as an instrument of human domination and illusory life into the world: “*Religious suffering is at one and the same time the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.*”

We may think at this point, for Marx, since most of the social values including religious belief, morality, politics and law constructed by religion itself, most importantly in the context of nineteenth and twentieth centuries Europe, the way in which human problems can be solved directly moves us into irreligious criticism of religion.
Given the above ideas of Marx, what would liberationists say about their Marxist drive of religious criticism? Here it appears to me there are two possible responses for liberationists’ application of Marxism in the theological project; the first one is, they could use only those ideas of Marx which are only relevant to their project, and the second is, they may argue that his notion of religion as an “opium” tended to show how traditional Christianity is impotent to emancipate humanity. The first point perhaps seems more acceptable than the second because for most of liberation theorists, including the theological ones, Marx is largely used in relation to the critical role of philosophy, and an ethical economic critique of capitalism.

Three major tasks of philosophy are described by Marx especially in his Theses on Feuerbach. Basically his Theses attempted to point out where the focus of philosophy should be in the contemporary age which is based in a totally different perspective than the traditional focus. Ludwig Feuerbach played a prominent role in causing Marx to reject the Hegelian tradition and open a new door for philosophy. Feuerbach’s questioning of Hegelian speculative metaphysics, though sketchily demonstrated, was especially decisive to Marx. The Theses on Feuerbach contained XI points, and as I have said three major roles of philosophy were constituted there. The three tasks are: being practical, critical and revolutionary. The eleventh point could summarize what role critical thinkers have in the world: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it”. For Marx the task of changing of this world based in a reconsideration of the material conditions in which our being is developing, and by which our essence is determined.

Latin American liberation theologians take the critical-practical-revolutionary tasks of philosophy as a way of understanding the existential conditions of a society further into novel interpretation of the Christian faith as a call for the total transformation of humanity and the world:

Christian faith becomes a critical and dynamic leavening in revolution. Faith intensifies the requirement that the class struggle proceed with determination towards the emancipation of all humanity -in particular those who suffer the harshest forms of oppression. It stresses our aspiration to a total transformation of society rather than a simple transformation of its economic structures. Thus faith brings to the Christians involved in the struggle, and through them, its own contribution to a society qualitatively different from the present one, and to the appearance of the New Man.
Hence, for both Marx and liberation theologians it is through critical practical-revolutionary thinking that a transformation could only be attained in the world. Of course there are differences between the two; Marx’s emphasis is on practical philosophy or critical revolutionary activity whereas liberation theologians’ focus is on Christian praxis. Indeed secular liberationists are more Marxists than the religious one. Despite this, there is also a strong Marxist tradition among the liberationists on the notion of practical solidarity.

Talking of the Marxists’ idea of practical solidarity in particular, Andrew Levine tends to note that social revolutionary emancipation necessitates the ending of domination. Marx’s practical solidarity sees the social power of the wretched of the earth to destroy class antagonism and social death. This is a solidaristic politics and ethics which promote the practical transformation of the status quo providing primacy to the oppositional genuine rationality and action of the marginalized.30

If the issue is about total transformation, then there could be no means of achieving this as individual or even isolated group. This argument sounds like a socialist critique of liberalism. It is noteworthy here to deal with the Basic Christian Communities or Base Ecclesiastical Communities’ (CEBs) crucial tasks in bringing solidarity and social consciousness about how to struggle for equality and justice. As the central religious claims of Hebrews and Christians on justice and love respectively, liberationist Christians of Latin America make their central focus solidarity. The CEBs in this respect try to unify people under a collective sentiment to read and get the meaning of the Bible from the perspective of the poor or the dominated. The very nature of the CEBs is to protest the traditional fidelity that the church had to rich and elite groups. Because of the CEBs, Berryman says that “today the Bible is read in small villages or barrio level groups by people sitting on benches, often in the dim light of a kerosene lamp.”31

From this we can understand how the social consciousness and transformation evoked by the CEBs gives a special attention to the poor and farmers in the countryside. This attempt of the CEBs is aimed at fostering solidarity of the poor or the dominated in order to gain his humanity, equality and justice. In other words, the rationale of solidarity is to
abolish all conditions of dehumanization and repression. *CEBs* also have the task of enabling people to meet their basic needs and enhance their moral support.\(^{32}\) In short the *CEBs* manifested their social transformative mission by incorporating Marx’s philosophical notion of communication with their existential and self-conscious study of the Bible.

To see the convergence of Marxism and liberation theologians on ethical-economic criticism of capitalism we need to begin with what Marx referred to as estrangement:

> The worker becomes poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and extent. The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he produces. The devaluation of the human world grows in direct proportion to the increase in value of the world of things. Labour not only produces commodities; it also produces itself... the object that labor produces, its products, stands opposed to it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer... In the sphere of political economy this realization of labor appears as a loss of reality for the worker objectification as loss of and bondage to the object, and appropriation as estrangement, as alienation.\(^{33}\)

Marx develops this idea of alienation in line with how capitalism is mainly concerned with profit maximization at the expense of workers life. He underlines that capitalism reveals itself as a system of dehumanization of the worker. The principle of comodification entails the fact that the worker becomes a slave of his object of production. In fact the estrangement of the worker appears at four levels; estrangements from the product, the production process, species-being and others.\(^{34}\) The first two alienations clarify more the objectification principle in which the worker loses his value at the cost of the production and its entire activity. The last two explain the fantastic solitary existence of the worker that has separated him from his fellow workers as well as his own essence.

For both liberation theologians and philosophers who accept Marx’s critique of capitalism, his political economy and *Capital* should be interpreted as making a great contribution to our understanding of ethics and economics in the contemporary world. Liberation theologians consider capitalism as a cause of chaos in the present global society, and thus, contemporary sin. Michael Lowe believes that, “the injustice produced by this society is the fruit of capitalist relations to production which necessarily create a
class society characterized by discrimination and injustice”.

The traditional understanding of sin for the liberationists now focuses on a global system, and for that reason solidarity of the poor is the only solution to avoid human suffering, human hunger, inequality, injustice of the world.

Recently Eduardo Mendieta published a conversation with Jurgen Habermas on the liberationists’ focus on solidarity and material conditions as an essential procedure for making communicative action possible today. But in that conversation, Habermas tended to view the attempt of liberation theologies as old-fashioned and ineffective in challenging the status quo. Concerning liberation theology he writes:

> I understand it as the active outrage against the inertia and the insensitivity of a status quo that no longer appears to move in the current of a self-accelerating modernization.... The supererogatory elements of this personal intervention also appears as a reflex of powerlessness, though always an admirable one, in the face of the anonymous, systematic forces of politically untamed capitalism, which understand only the language of cost, not of morality.

Habermas’ idea could be seen as a way that liberationists’ opposition to capitalism never accommodates itself to the ethical project of Christianity as well as a postconventional communicative society. Though Habermas believes that his critical project develops within a postmetaphysical ground, some contemporary hermeneutics thinkers like Robert P. Badillo argue that Habermas’ communicative theory is largely influenced by Thomistic metaphysical horizon. According to Badillo, Habermas attempts to modify the emancipative and communicative metaphysical thoughts of Aquinas’ Absolute transcendental establishing artificial consensus for the relative transcendental communication. Beyond this, Habermas also tries to understand the current system in its progress, and situate his communicative project within it. As a matter of fact, what we may see in Habermas’ view is his discomfort with ethical critique of capitalism.

What makes the effort of the theologians fruitful, as we have seen, is their critical and transformative approach to the existential reality of global humanity and the centrality of the poor that is the dominated and excluded human beings, or in Dussel the “Other”-[we will see this more in chapter two]. The theological attack of capitalistic sins such as massive poverty, dehumanization, death, etc... illuminates an ethical core established by
philosophers in order to fight against the status quo. For this reason, therefore, these conceptions of ‘praxis’, ‘solidarity’, ‘power’ and ‘revolution’ need a philosophical justification. However, it is significant to rethink the counter-arguments made on the claims and practices of liberation theologians.

1.3. Dussel’s Philosophy of Liberation: Nature, Praxis, Method and Objective

Dussel asserts that his Philosophy of Liberation starts with an identification of the original link between the present turmoil of human “globality” and the irrational aspects of modernity. As we saw, modernity for Latin American liberationists first emerged in 1492. And, for Dussel the origin of modernity is not only tied with national conceptions of the modern self and her or his values of liberty, equality and the like, as described by many Western thinkers, but also compounded by irrational sacrificial myths. He says that the myth of modernity is irrational, since aggression, domination and exclusion are its manifestations: “… 1492 is the moment of the “birth” of modernity as a concept, the moment of origin of a very particular myth of sacrificial violence, it also marks the origin of a process of concealment or misrecognition of the non-European.”^{38} Modernity then serves to explain that its project constitutes a foundation for emancipation as well as repression. Dussel wants to eliminate a Eurocentric interpretation of modernity as essentially a European phenomenon. Rather he wants to situate it in a dialectical relation with what he calls in economic term the “center” or Europe and the “periphery” or the “Other”. The dialectical relation is a historical thesis and antithesis of Europe, and later on the West with the non-Europeans or those who are known to be today as Third-World nations.

Thus, his Liberation Philosophy attempts to reconstruct the concept of modernity in its historical dialectical context. Seen from this constructive understanding of modernity, Dussel’s explanation of the myth of modernity seems obvious and reasonable: an analysis of history as well as philosophy which is inevitably done in the phenomenological and hermeneutic points of departure. It is from these points of departure, for Dussel, which one can know the existential condition of twenty-first century’s global periphery, and the relevance of Liberation Philosophy for human development:
The reality out of which such a philosophy emerged is today more pressing than ever before in its continuous and maddening spiral of underdevelopment: the misery, the poverty, the exploitation of the oppressed of the global periphery (in Latin America, Africa, or Asia), of the dominated classes, of the marginalized, of the “poor” in the “center,” and the African-Americans, Hispanics, Turks, and others, to whom we would have to add women as sexual objects, the “useless” aged gathered in misery or in asylums, the exploited and drugged up youth, the silenced popular and national cultures and all the “wretched of the earth,” as Franz Fanon put it, who wait and struggle for their liberation.

Dussel thus notes how the majority of human in the world is subjugated and excluded. To give a general description of those who are the dialectical products of modernity giving in conditions of domination and exclusion in the contemporary world, he takes the language of Emmanuel Levinas, concerning the “Other”. This term of Levinas permits Dussel to develop his Liberation Philosophy in relation to the practical crises of contemporary global world caused largely by the political and economic structural adjustment of capitalism. So it is important to develop a practical philosophical approach in order to address the present predicaments of global humanity. In addition to Levinas, Dussel employs Heidegger’s ontological concern, Marx in a newly constructed form to expand capital from its normal interpretation, and hermeneutics. These all are incorporated critically to show the methodological prism of Liberation Philosophy. Dussel in his Liberation Philosophy reexamined Habermas’ theory of communication to provide a practical ground for communicative rationality and action.

Hence by reconstructively incorporating these methodologies and concerns, Dussel’s Liberation Philosophy announces itself as a trans-modern critical social theory. This makes his approach different from both modern and postmodern discourses. Eduardo Mendieta in his editorial introduction puts the idea of trans-modernity as follows:

The term trans-modernity underscores that Liberation Philosophy is not about either negating modernity or blithely accepting it, but about transcending it anadialectically; that is, to think the couplet modernity and post modernity not just from within, but also, and especially from the perspective of its reverse, its underside, its occluded other.

There are some people who simply regard Dussel’s approach as a postmodern one. In fact his Liberation Philosophy implies the disastrous and mythic appearance of modernity. This seems postmodern. Nevertheless Dussel equally discusses about the rational
development of modernity. And he also accuses postmodernists that they are more modern than proponents of modernity. In simple terms what we may argue here is that his Philosophy of Liberation is different from both modern and postmodern perspectives since it starts with the other side of modernity. Accordingly, the novelty of his approach lies in critically reflecting on both the positive and negative sides of modernity from the philosophical and historical position of the “Other”.

In relation to ‘horizon’, Dussel affirms that his Philosophy of Liberation works with four major practical realms, “Politics”, “erotics”, “pedagogy” and the “negation of fetishized totality”. The first horizon attempts to identify who is exterior and who is interior to a given system of modernity and to raise questions on the core political aspects including democracy, equality and justice. Historically he wants to understand what caused it, and how to transcend such exteriority. The second practical horizon, “erotics” becomes crucial to see the phallocratic order and ethical dilemma of homosexuality from the perspective of the liberation of the “Other” which includes the critical standpoint of the feminist liberatory philosophy. Thirdly we have a practical horizon of cultural liberation that gives serious attention to global epistemic coloniality. And the forth practical horizon seeks for the negation of the fetishist philosophical tradition of totality.41

The objective of Dussel in all of these attempts is to understand the cause for current global suffering of humanity and nature, and then to employ his emancipative theory as a means through which the historical exteriority of the “Other” could be problematized and solved in a trans-modernizing modernity. As it has been mentioned earlier the concern of trans-modernity is not to destroy the values of modernity, but rather to critically engage creative values from the very insight of what Fanon called the “wretched of the earth”. In precise terms the goal of Dussel’s Liberation Philosophy is to liberate those people who are forced to be exterior by the hegemonic totality of modernity, and to show the relevance of mutual difference which describes the dynamism of human existence in the current world.
A human being is her own liberation! Humanity as a living entity raises the question of liberation to express an immanent inseparability of her existential throwness from the will to life. It is true that the “be-ing” of the human life manifested in history, generation, and some other matters of dynamism, but still liberation is here and there permanently presenting itself within a paradigm of the will to survive, or in the Nietzschean sense of the will to power. So there is no possible way of understanding humanity independent of her liberation, which is her survival. How could one affirm that she is human without having, no any means of identifying as well as making who she is really? In the reductionists’ view, particularly in contemporary dominant political thoughts, there is an attempt to comprehend human liberation under the realm of liberalism’s doxa of liberation. The impugn to this reduction claim of liberalism seems to me that liberation is not white or black, rich or poor, God or beast, American or Ethiopian, but only human. Underscoring this whole analysis of human liberation, in this chapter the general discussion is going to be held on Dussel’s arguments of liberating the “Other” and reconstructing Habermas’ communicative theory within a trans-modern framework which insists the point of liberation is human and practical. This Dusellian Liberation Philosophy will give us a critical insight to abandon the destructive forces of modernity establishing the primacy of the “Other”.

The concern of human liberation as her own can be shown in the necessity of self-identification as both a particular and universal being by means of methodic politicization. The politicization enlarges the philosophical scope to deeply reflect on power, identity, justice, equality and recognition that the self possesses vis-à-vis others. In our case, since Dussel’s assiduous fixation of the “Other” in a privilege position is maintained, we need to concentrate more on the politics of otherness in the Philosophy of Liberation. For that sake the discussion in this chapter will be on the identity and power of political subjects in modernity and its colonial interests. And thus we can use a
diagnosis of modern philosophical colonial and postcolonial thoughts in their epistemic treatments of otherness and liberation. Based on this we are supposed to have a preliminary search on modern, colonial, and counter-colonial reflections of otherness from the perspective of Liberation Philosophy. From the diagnosis of the colonial and counter colonial thoughts of the conception of otherness then we will proceed to Dussel’s justifications for the reconstruction of the theory of communication on the basis of dual emancipation in one; that is the liberation of the “Other” as primary, and the liberation of human in general which is its end.

One of the central arguments of Dussel’s Philosophy of Liberation is that modernity as a world phenomena appeared in 1492. He believes that this time is the point of which Europe constituted its physical power and “centrality” by dominating other parts of the world. As a matter of fact this centrality of Europe is established in the dialectic relation with the “Other” or the periphery. In this respect world modernity expressed itself through a dialectical power relation of Europe with the “Other”. This power relation can be viewed simply as the colonization of the world; Europe as the colonizer and the “Other” as colonized. The first physical domination by Europe over the periphery later manifested itself in the epistemic and cultural imposition of Eurocentrism to construe the powerlessness of the “Other” on racial, sexual, and class grounds. So Dussel says that, this “Other” is the dominated being of the world on the basis of Europe’s centrality to the world in terms of race, man’s centrality in terms of sex, and the bourgeoisie’s centrality in terms of class. Politically speaking, the “Other” could be seen as the one who is governed by a Eurocentric-phallocratic-oligarchic order. For Dussel, the “Other” is a historically manipulated under European man-centered slavery of the world and cluster brutality. In other words, for him the “Other” is objectified to the European domination of the world, i.e. “the genocidally murdered Indian, of the African salve reduced to merchandise, of women as sexual objects, of the child pedagogically dominated.”

For the question how does the European man or the White man maintain the power of domination and universal model of humanity we can find two basic historical responses of Dussel. The first is the military domination of Europe’s “ego conquer”, and the second is the intellectual rationalism and scientism of Europe’s “ego cogito”. For most
Western thinkers the principle of the *ego cogito* precedes the *ego conquer*. But for Dussel *ego cogito* develops one century after the cruel application of the “I conquer” over the Indians, Africans and Asians. His argument says:

*The “I”, which begins with the “I conquer” of Hernan Cortes or Pizarro, which in fact precedes the Cartesian ego cogito by about a century, produces Indian genocide, African slavery, and Asian colonial wars.*

Rene Descartes or the Cartesian fundamental idea of *ego cogito* explains a solitary assurance of self-knowing about clear and distinct thoughts. And this ego cogito has a political meaning in its philosophical subjectivism, which is the priority of the self or the “I” over the “Other”. There is a claim that modern Western philosophical thoughts planted their foundation on this philosophy of the subject or paradigm of rational consciousness. But as Dussel insists the background of this rational consciousness is the “I conquer” that urged the hierarchical relation of Europe as the center and the dominated parts of the world as periphery. Put differently, Europe since 1492 settled its power of domination over the rest of the world by the logical bifurcation of the “I” and the “Other”.

The bifurcation and hierarchy of the “I” and the “Other” in modern Western philosophical thought presented a rational justification for one’s domination over the other. Thus how could the justification of the hierarchical bifurcation of the “I” and the “Other” be examined in emancipatory analysis of Dussel’s philosophy? There are also counter reflections on such dichotomizations of the “I” and the “Other” providing the colonial condition of dominated regions with all the unbreable sufferings of colonialism. On this line we could refer to the radical appropriations of poststructuralism, decolonization and deconstruction into the philosophical discourses of the South, particularly African philosophical arguments. Again we need to evaluate the counter discourses in the context of Dussel’s liberation of the “Other” as a priori condition for universal emancipation. In the following two sub-parts of this chapter we can see modern colonial theoretical assertions of otherness in Western philosophical traditions, and African counter colonial discoursing.
2.1. The Hegemonic Politics of the “I”

When we look into the dominant Eurocentric philosophical view mostly drafted in paradigm of consciousness, there is no doubt that modernity and the identity of the modern self is essentially constituted by the Cartesian epistemological description of the “I” as a liberated and enlightened self. Such understanding of a modern self primarily is explained in the context of radical progress and rationalization; though in German idealism an ontological justification of self-conscious and self-autonomous being is also given. In a sort of general claim, we shall begin our concern with how the “I” is politicized in rationalization and ontology of the so-called modern identity of global humanity. In doing so the universality logic of humanness opens its dilemma in the discourses of modernity by which the universal sameness and uniqueness of the “I” is defined. The truth is, in both rationalization and ontological Eurocentric analysis; the “I” sought to have a dialectical relation with respect to something else. In other words, the “I” is the “I” in a sense of its uniqueness in relation to “non-I”, and thus, which makes him different in virtue of the “I”的 oppositional character. In Aristotelian logic this could be explained with respect to the laws of identity and non-contradiction, i.e. the “I” is the “I” and not “non-I”. To make it simple, therefore, these laws of Aristotle state that the “I” by no means is the “Other”. But as Hannah Arendt clearly shows there is a failure in philosophical tradition of the West concerning the question of the identity of being whether that of the “I” or the “Other”. For Arendt identity is about “who”, not “what”, and that is why she says the Western philosophical tradition does not properly address the issue of identity as it ought to be.

The really crucial point that we need to take from Arendt is the way to ask an appropriate question concerning the identity of the modern self. As I have tried to argue the “I” constituted its “I-ness” in a relational dialectic, and thus we need to ask based on Arendt’s formula, who is the “I” and who is the “Other”. The focus on “who” is indeed different from “what” is. But given the decisiveness of Dussel’s Philosophy of Liberation, it is equally important to question the historical factors shaping the identity of the “I” as “I”, and the identity of the “Other” as “Other”. So who is this modern self of

[27]
the “I”, and what is its dialectical link with the “Other”. These and other related questions will move us into the political positioning of the “I” and the “Other” in terms of power recognition, equality and justice.

Perhaps there are many markers of distinctiveness of the “I” and the “Other” in which the Eurocentric understanding of modern identity is prescribed. From these markers one can put forward, for example, the “I” is a subject of cognition while the “Other” is a subject of affection; the “I” is the modern mentality of man that employs a patriarchal anthropocentric science and order by dominating other things including Nature and Woman. The “I” is modern and thus the measure and the colonizer whereas the “Other” is necessarily primitive and dominated in terms of the development of Christian colonialism.

To begin with Descartes’ “ego cogito” of the modern self there is an epistemic foundation that issues from an enlightened authentic ego determining the knowledge of things from one’s mental clarity and distinctiveness. Arguably, the metaphysical, that is the ontological existence of the ego, arises out of the cognition of certainty in which the thinking substance assures the evidence for what is true and not. This is the major reason for Descartes to concentrate more on the method of science. The method of science rests on unshakable ground as long as the possibility of a fallible rationality is dismantled with the emergence of an emancipated cogito of the ego. The cognition of the ego for Descartes is the power and freedom of judging. It is an impulse of verification, and consequently, it is an emancipating weapon from any false opinion, thought, and mode of existence.

The scientific ground of philosophy is manifested in Desecrates attempt to develop his theory on the basis of methodic doubt. As he believes in human experiences there are many occasions in which opinions, beliefs and claims are simply taken to be knowledge without being articulated in a system of scientifcicty or certainty. But now his method, i.e. the tool of doubt, requires each and every thought to be certified with the cognition of the ego. The cognition distances itself from sense perception, imagination, and even reason based in the possibility of an evil demonic intervention (i.e. pure fallible reason). His three arguments, namely: wax, dream and demon assure that a true episteme of man can
only be produced in the thinking substance or the mind. In these three arguments he goes on to infer that the knowledge of senses, imagination and pure fallible reason can never be true since methodologically the foundation of certainty is not asserted. Thus, true knowledge is only produced through and from an intellect of the self or the mind which assures both the knowledge of certainty and ontological existence of the self. Descartes’ ego cogito argument implies that “… I think hence, I am, there is nothing at all which gives me assurance of their truth beyond this that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist.”

Now taking this scientific treatment of the identity of the “I”, Descartes affirms that the modern self reaches the knowledge of things and then ontology. In other words, the “I” thinks and by that knows what is true. But not only this, the “I” also presupposes his existence in such evidential thinking. The “I” does exist if and only if he thinks, and this logic determines the identity of the “I” to be permanently conceived only within the thinking substance. Despite the emphasis of his scientific methodic doubt, still Descartes presupposes the central view of traditional contemplative definition of human beings as rational creatures which means the self is rational in so far he thinks. The uniqueness of this “I” arises in a dialectical relation with the “Other”, that is, in Descartes’ term, things of extension including the body of the “I”. For him all external objects to the “I” are extended things in which their true knowledge is gained through the process of thinking: “bodies themselves are not properly perceived by the senses nor by the faculty of imagination, but only by the intellect alone.”

From this what we may conclude is that, for Descartes, the political identity and superiority of the self is defined by the intellect. The thinking substance is identical with the self or the true humanity of modernity, and absolutely different and hierarchically superior over things of extension. In simple term, the intellect is the “I” when an extended thing is the “Other”, and this indicates that clear and distinct knowledge of the body and other external objects should be subordinated to the hegemonic power of the “I”. The maturity of the human intellect in Descartes’ rational paradigm of thinking thus materializes the bifurcation of the “I” and the “Other” in a dialectical relation of powerful and powerless, respectively.
Descartes attempts to provide a theological justification for the scientific dichotomization of the “I” and the “Other”. As a matter of fact, this religious argumentation of such dichotomization again preserved in the traditional scriptural outlooks about human beings being made in the image and likeness of the Devine being, i.e. God. ‘Traditional Christianity conceives God as a distant being endowed with virtues of Omnipotence, Omniscience and Omnipresence. Such image of God as we saw in the theology of liberation obscured the religious critical attempts of Christians to understand the phenomenological hermeneutic of this-worldly human existentiality. Very far from a theology of liberation, Descartes tends to show the interaction of the ego cogito and the omniscient being on the ground of the notion of perfection. His argument asserts that a more perfect being, an “infinite substance” exists for the “I”, that is “[Sovereign], eternal, infinite [immutable], all-knowing, all-powerful, and the creator of all things that are out of himself.”

This sounds like, it is the divine rational order of God that creates the scientific distinctiveness and power relation between the “I” and the “Other”. Accordingly, Descartes is arguing that, for the rational consciousness of the ego, things other than the thinking substance are extended objects that constitute a general identity of being the “Other”.

The crucial point, then, is the “who” of the “I” and the “Other” in Descartes’ hierarchical dichotomization. Gabrielle Hiltmann, in her article “Accounting for the Other: Towards an Ethics of Thinking”, goes on to accuse the paradigm of consciousness in Descartes from the logical view of what she calls “relational ethics”. Based on her relational ethics, then, Descartes’ bifurcation of res cogitans and res extensa can be problematic in four political categories; namely authoritarianism of the “I” and domination, destruction and exclusion of the “Other”. Here is her point about Descartes’ ego cogito argumentations:

1) the tendency to hypostasize the I as an absolute, autocratic and self-sufficient legislator of reason, 2) the hierarchical subordination of the other to the I, 3) the negation of the otherness of the other, 4) the exclusion of the manifold by focusing on the one

In a relational ethics the “I” always makes his identity in relational link with the “Other”. Hiltmann says the identity of the “I” equally coexists with the logical identity of the “non-I”, that is the “Other”. The “I” of Descartes though presupposes an absolute
sovereign power holding, it actually affirms a dialectical relation to the “Other” in the negative sense. In other words, Descartes’ “I” must have a necessary relation with its “non-I” in order to exercise the hegemonic power of domination and exclusion.

Hiltmann wants to employ Arendt’s an intersubjective understanding of personal identity, and phenomenological treatment of the “who” of the “I” and the “who” of the “Other”. Here she states that Arendt’s philosophy of interpersonal identity will consider the equality of the “I” and the “Other”. But as she underscores it is really significant to use the phenomenological conceptions of Maurice Merleau-Ponty about the primacy of intercorporality in an intersubjectivity to reject the Cartesian principle of authoritarian ego over that “Other”. Let’s look this argument of Hiltmann about Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation into her relational ethical theory:

Merleau-Ponty’s inter-relational understanding of the human person necessitates a new conception of the body-soul-consciousness relation. The separation of the body, soul and consciousness is the reason why idealistic philosophies cannot account for an other which is not constituted by the I. Instead, M. Merleau-Ponty does not start with thinking, but rather with the perceptual experience of the other in ‘being in and towards the world (etre au monde). In this relational ontology, the person is always already and necessarily open towards the other. Due to this constitutive openness, the self is always already in a (potentially ethical) relation to the other and to itself.\textsuperscript{11}

The problem of the philosophy of subjectivism as far as Hiltmann’s relational ethics is concerned, is the thinking of the self always places itself in a closed system that is not only separated from the “Other” but also from itself. To put oneself in a closed system means to remain in absolute isolation and a non-changeable identity of the self. Nevertheless as Hiltmann claims the identity of humanity is always in flux, and hence, there has to be a potential disclosedness of the self to the other and to itself to constitute an ethical wholeness. “It is not the body, nor the soul, nor consciousness, which would ground the identity of a person, but rather the unlimited process of intertwinement which is constantly opened towards the “Other”\textsuperscript{12}. The openness of the self to the “Other” and to itself, in the views of relational ethics is mediated through the principle of love. For Hiltmann the meaning of self-preservation, self-development’ and self-consciousness can only be secured with loves relation and attunement of the self to the “Other” since she argues that, “without the love of others, no self even emerges.”\textsuperscript{13}
Taking up the critical attitude of relational ethics the problem of the philosophy of subjectivism is the denial of a friendship, a love relation of the “I” and the “Other” in building a closed distant cage of an ‘enlightened self’. It is not only Descartes who tried to develop a philosophical thought that contradicts with relational ethics, but also Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, German idealists and others operated with a similar trend of defining the self in a closed system.

The Baconian and Hobbesian thought of calculative rationality as presented by Emmanuel C. Eze understands the modern self as entirely linked with the scientific technological advancement in which the artistic disciplines lost their positive role to explain the identity of one’s personality. Bacon suggests that modern philosophical discourses and methods should be conducted in an experimental manner in which the success of science and technology in the world significantly shaped the validity of the knowledge of a civilized people and society. The New Organon of Bacon is given as a negation of the old speculative Organon of Aristotelian world view. As Eze observes the New Organon of Bacon deals with rationality of quantification, materialization and governmentalization. His quantification principle describes an important trend that experimental sciences introduced to humanity. According to Bacon it is an empirical verification that ultimately brings an advancement of the human world.14

The materialization aspect of his new science of philosophy is glorification and maximization of scientific and technological disciplines in academic centers so that the material utility of man would be satisfied. If this is true then the role of arts is insignificant to accomplish human’s material utility:

... arts are manifestations of irrationality and must be not only culturally degraded but also, when possible, banned... academic study of art is unnecessary because whatever legitimate objectives such courses of study might have could be better accomplished and realized in the methods of the New Organon15

During colonialism one of the descriptions of the colonized people was the lack of rationality as a means for sustaining the material unity. For the colonizers indigenous people in the colonized world were irrational, emotional, and so on. In the mind of the European colonizers the ordinary life of the colonized people cannot be accommodated
with the goal of material development in experimental sciences. To put this differently, according to European colonizers people of the colonized regions are culturally unscientific yet artistic, and thus, irrational and undeveloped.

The *New Organon*’s governmentalization concern is the consequence of calculability and material utility that the science of man brings into the world. As long as the difference between pre-modern and modern worlds is based in the science of man, the new governmental assertion should be that man has an absolute control over nature and other things. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno explain the governmentalization doctrine of Bacon’s experimental philosophy as follows:

*The concordance between the mind of man and the nature of things that he had in mind is patriarchal: that human mind, which overcomes superstition, is to hold sway over nature. Knowledge, which is power, knows no obstacles: neither in the enslavement of men nor in compliance with the world’s rulers.*

Hence in Bacon’s patriarchal development of modern mind of the “I” we can find two sorts of governmentalization principles; the first is the domination of modern philosophical mind of Man over nature which might be understood as an anthropocentric order, and the second is, an absolute and natural rule of modern philosophical thinking of Man over Woman which comes to be known an order of phallocracy. From this we can infer that, within the Baconian patriarchal understanding of modern self, the position of the “I” is confined to the modern philosophical mind of Man whereas the status of otherness is leveled with things that are exterior to Man’s thinking substance including one’s body, nature and women.

German idealists provided that, the relation of the “I” and the “Other”, generally pondered as the supreme authority of the subject over the object. In this line, as many contemporary intellectuals think, Immanuel Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* had given the significance of human reason to realize the possible distinction between the power of thinking and the power of knowing in the philosophy of the subject. On this assumption Kant is standing against the Cartesian equation that says thinking equals with knowing. In Descartes, we have seen that, the “I” knows its existence from the possibility of its subjective thinking, and furthermore, the “I” assures that a more perfect being exists
again from the power of thinking. To refute this idea of Descartes, Kant demarcates between the worlds of *phenomena* and *noumena*, or in his own terms the phenomenal world and noumenal world.\(^{17}\) Kant borrows these two terms from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz who represent the world of appearance and the world of things-in-themselves. Based on Leibniz’s rationalist metaphysics the noumenal world is knowable using the monadology by one’s intellectual intuition. Disgusted with such dogmatic rationalism of Leibniz, Kant argues that knowledge of the phenomenal world arises in which pure concepts are necessarily made in order to arrange in space and time the mere facts of the human intuition of sensible objects. Here is his argument:

> First human intuition is sensible, only through the sensibility are objects given to us. Second, human understanding is discursive and not intuitive; our intellect has no independent access to existing things. And third, pure concepts of understanding acquire cognitive significance only when schematized in spatiotemporal terms. Hence any use of them beyond spatiotemporal objects is illegitimate.\(^{18}\)

Accordingly, human reason is only capable of knowing things which ruled by spatiotemporality and then appearance as objects. Concerning noumenal objects, Kant says, it is possible to think but we cannot know them reasonably. Unlike Descartes, for Kant the knowledge of things external to the self is equally certain to the cognition of the ego. At this point he introduces us with his transcendental idealism which says that there is no degree of differentiation in the “knowledge of the external world” and the “knowledge of one’s mental states” in so far as both of them are merely objects of appearance: “The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.”\(^{19}\) From this, what we can see is that, even though Kant challenged dogmatic rationalists’ talk of knowing the transcendent world that has an independent being from experience, he still remained in the idealist transition claiming that human knowledge is possible through the transcendental apperception of unity of the “I”. This transcendental unity of apperception goes beyond the level of subjective unity of consciousness since its main objective is to know of objects with certainly. And knowing requires understanding. Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* writes:
Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty of cognitions. These consist in the determinate relation of given representations to an object. An object however, is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. Now, however, all unification of representations requires unity of consciousness is that which alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, thus their objective validity, and consequently is that which makes them into cognitions and on which even the possibility of the understanding rests.

As far as Kant is concerned, there is a necessary relationship between reason and morality. He argues that man should be treated intrinsically as an end because every human being is capable of reason and freedom. His argument states that, although there is a sentient nature of human beings to respond to pleasure and pain, their will is governed by reason as rational and autonomous beings which make them different from brutes. “Our capacity for reason is bound up with our capacity for freedom. Taken together, these capacities make us distinctive, and set us apart from mere animal existence. They make us more than mere creatures of appetite.” Here we can say Kant’s pure practical reason underlines the point that human beings have the capacity for free choice based on reason and thus they are not determined by the law of appetite. Kant believes that the free choice of humanity has to be respected.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte conceives that the identity and the freedom of humans always arise from the existential “self-positing” of the “I” over the “Other”. In his Wissenschaftslehre, he employs the logic of identity to show that freedom is a matter of self-positioning: “the I simply posits itself. This principle expresses what Fichte believes the supreme act of the mind, an act in which the I is simultaneously subject and object.” Fichte’s argument seems to me that, the identity and freedom of the self are created with the power of positing oneself to be totally hierarchically superior. Self-positing as far as I am concerned, needs the power of self proclaiming of what the “I” is despite the social innovation of that being’s freedom. So long as the “I” posits itself, Fichte thinks that, the meaning of everything affirms the logical ground of what is. In other words, when the self posits itself, according to him the Parmenidian analysis of being becomes valid. In this attempt of self-positing of the “I”, Nature and the “Other” are thought to be traits of freedom. This sense of obstacle and tension between a self positing I and [nature and the Other] that brings a transformation of absolute freedom into freedom of human that is limited in space and time Fichte’s point is this:
Freedom is possible and actual only within the context of natural necessity, where it is never “absolute,” but always limited and finite. Though it must posit its freedom “absolutely” that is to say, “purely and simply” (schlechthin) or “for no reason” a genuinely free agent can actually exist only as a finite individual striving to overcome its own limitations and transform the natural world in accordance with its own goal concepts. To be an “I” is thus to be involved in an endless process of self-overcoming, a process which necessarily takes place in reciprocal interaction with other self-overcoming agents and in the context of a spatio-temporal material world.

To look Fichte’s idea from the perspective of relational ethics, it is not love or friendship between the “I” and the “Other” that constitute human freedom, but rather the power, tension, and obstacle that coexist in the relationship of the self-positing I and [nature and the other].

G.W.F. Hegel attempts to describe the notion of freedom within a context of “concrete right” which can only be realized in the dialectical relation of human’s ethical life. For him every right of humankind can only be concretized when there is an encounter of the self with the “Other”, and if not, things will remain abstract. In what follow, the conceptions of freedom and equality in the natural states of whether we talk of theories of Hobbes or John Locke, Hegel affirms that no free and equal beings practically exist unless an encountering as well as reciprocal interaction of selves with one another is made.

Prior to such encounter(s), therefore, the self is not yet in the process of self formation, let alone the fully formed and recognizable product of that process. The self is abstract so far. Thus, it is not a fully formed individual, but a case of bare self-relatedness, a purely formal narcissism of an abstraction.

Hegel’s construal of the concreteness of human freedom is also strongly at odds with relational ethics taken by contemporary phenomenologist and intercultural ethicists. This is because, Hegel tries to develop the concept of freedom in his ethical system based on the dialectical link of master and slave. In the Hegelian approach, it is in the supreme stage of an ethical life, i.e. the state, that the synthesis of thesis and antithesis takes place: “the state is the explicit unity or harmony of the universal and the particular, of the objective and subjective, of duty and right, of necessity and freedom.”
On the contrary, the phenomenologist admit that the relational ontology of the “I” and the “Other” manifests through a perpetual openness by being-in-the world as being-with. In addition to what we have seen in Merleau-Ponty, one of the great philosophers of the twentieth country Martin Heidegger in his famous work, *Sein Und Zeit (Being and Time)* states that being-in-the world as Dasien-with-others:

*By ‘Others’ we do not mean everyone else but me - those over against whom the “I” stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself - those among whom one is too. This being-there-too [Auch-da-sein] with them does not have the ontological character of a Being -present-at-hand-along-‘with’ them within a world. The ‘with’ is something of the character of Dasien; the ‘too’ means a sameness of Being as circumspectively concernful Being-in-the-world. ‘With’ and ‘too’ are to be understood existentially; not categorical. By reason of this with-like [mithaften] Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one the I share with others. The world of Dasien is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is being-with-Others.*

In such a phenomenological understanding Heidegger is arguing that, the “I” and the “Other” equally thrown into the world and they existentially identify their being or identity within a with-world. This concept of solicitude indicates the existential concern of the “I” with the “Other” to achieve the possibility of authenticity and knowledge of selves in the world of Dasien-with. Based on this we may say that Heidegger’s view of solicitude shows that there is a relational concern in the existential condition of the “I” and the “other”. In fact, Heidegger tries to situate his Dasien into “dasMan” or the “they” to address the publicness of distantability, averageness and leveling down. As his theory of publicness asserts the identity of the “I” is something which is given by the “they: “everyone is the other, and no one is himself.” To see the politics of one’s publicness then, there is always a sense of assimilation to the power of socialization which arises from the distantiability or non-familiarity to the “they”. But in the next stage of averageness and leveling down the self attempts to gain his authenticity in the being of everydayness, that is the development of a different being or identity into the socialization of the “they”. Relational ethics largely shares the socialization of the “I” by the power of the “they” which is not the “I” in an original existence since the “I” is not of him or her in terms of his or her thrownness into-the world.
2.2. The Historical Invention of Otherness and Colonialism

Most postcolonial discourses of the South are centrally concerned with the problem of the philosophical justification for the otherness of historically colonized people. The problem for these discourses is how the measure of otherness can be rationally justified without at the same time considering the historical imposition of the European self by the invention of its own identity as universal in relation to the identity of the “Other”. By another of saying this, historically in colonialism the European self posits itself to be an objective measure of each and every identity. Dussel sees that the colonial empire of Europe since the mid fifteenth century began to expose the general being of the colonized world as the “Other”. According to Dussel as we saw in our first chapter, the people and culture of the colonized regions not “discovered”; but rather invented by Europe. However how do postcolonial discourses of the South, most emphatically African thought, analyze the invention of otherness of their historical colonized being?

Drawing upon the spirit of post-structuralism, V.Y. Mudimbe constructs the relationship between discourses of power and knowledge of otherness in the European invention to colonize the non-European people and their culture. He tells us about the structural order of colonialism that reveals the core of difference of the logic of invention from the logic of discovery by its conscious arrangement of organizational architecture and imposition. This is Mudimbe’s concept of the invention of the “Other”, of the colonized people of non-European areas, of Africans in particular, in which Europe made a systematic construction of its power/discourse. This view is analogous to what Dussel said concerning the invention of America in the first chapter. Both Mudimbe and Dussel argue that, in colonialism Europe, as the one that possessed the historical political power of the world, designed and determined the identity of the “Other”. In other words, colonialism describes how Europe invented the modern world.

Mudimbe claims that the notion of otherness structurally established with the anthropological discourses of Western epistemic locations by a method of dichotomization between invented markers of non-Europeans and Europeans: “traditional versus modern; oral versus written and printed; agrarian and customary communities versus urban and industrialized civilization; subsistence economies versus highly
productive economies”.

We can also add closed versus open socio-cultural structures. Of course these all oppositional combinations what C. Levi-Strauss calls “bircologe”, mean that odd combinations. These odd combinations are constructed in the anthropological and later on philosophical discourses to show that Europe is superior over the non-Europeans. This can be understood in the Hobbesian hypothesis of the state of nature. Accordingly, the “Other” is primitive, poor, ahistoric, uncultured, and so on.

For such a picture of the Other, Mudimbe argues that, the epistemological organization, structure and power have created the means of alienation and objectification of colonized people. In connection to this D A. Masolo accepts the thesis of Mudimbe on the fact that how African social discourses were articulated by Western epistemic and political power, the main theme of which is the invention of Africans as the “Other”.

For Mudimbe, the non-Europeans become the “Other” through constructs which can be found in the culture of the white man in the Biblical discourse of sameness. In the Bible all differences of humans in terms of sex, color, age and the like are explained in terms of being one among the sheep who are lost from Israel. The ironic message of deserving the identity of one of the sheep of Israel is to assure that a given self is the child of a Christian God. That is why Jesus Christ is seen as a universal human who symbolizes sameness. According to Mudimbe the logic of sameness in the Bible and what the anthropological sciences of European discourses imitated, justify the idea that non-Europeans are the “Other” of the white man. Such glorification of the white race and culture is the foundation, according to him, for the “invention” of the African as an object of a scientific discipline. As a good example, Mudimbe talks about the development of processes of “ethnologization” and “aestheticization” which arise from the discourse arrangement of the so called the arts of “Other”, or primitive arts.

_The operation of ethnologization consists of isolating a datum from its real context (and references to its background are generally used only to specify the datum as an entity, not as an element of cultural whole) analyzing it (in fact, differentiating it from everything else), classifying its attributes and its model, and assigning it a label, locating it as such or such from that given latitude, longitude, tribe, etc… another operation might take place, an aestheticization. In ethnographic studies, a product is granted or denied the status of art on the basis of external criteria; in effect, in order to belong to the realm of artistic achievement, a work needs to produce visibly characteristics and constraints that can, technically, be localized on a chronological scale determined by Western experience._

[39]
Hence, the processes of ethnologization and aestheticization might explain the Western mercantile interest of alienating the art of the other from its cultural empire, and with that denying the historical particularity as well as exteriority. The art of the “Other” considered being primitive since the European or white art seeks to impose its ethnocentric supremacy as of universal. In this regard Mudimbe believes that the anthropological sciences as power/knowledge allow a political system to justify a “savageness” of the “Other” from the ethnocentric perspective of Europeans. To look at his argument: “the discourse on “Savages” is… a discourse in which and explicit political power presumes the authority of a scientific knowledge and vice-versa. Colonialism becomes its project and can be thought of as duplication and a fulfillment of the power of Western discourses on human varities.”

It is thus clear that, through colonialism the role of Western discourses on and about non-European colonized identity was an invention and naming. So in colonialism the major goal of anthropological sciences is creating the inferiority of the “Other” by employing the power of naming which is a political tool of identifying one as not the same. For such innovation and naming tasks Mudimbe believes that Western discourses are ethnocentric, i.e. a Eurocentric rather than universal understanding of the ontological and cultural identity of the “Other”. This ethnocentric content of colonial discourses attempted to reduce the existential plurality of humanity into an enforced one, which results in the military, economic, cultural and political expansion and hegemony of the white race. In a similar vein, Dussel considers the global development of Eurocentric world system which is claimed to be universal, but which in fact was based on the political and military power of Europe to dominate the world.

Another philosopher of the South, Messay Kebede deals with the invention process of the “Other” during colonialism as necessarily and entirely linked with the systematic invention of what he calls the “myth of the white man”. In this respect Messay’s claim is that the invention is dual; both of the “white man” and the “Other”. In his analysis the “Other” is invented with markers of primitiveness and prelogicality based upon another mythic invention of the identity of the white man as rational, scientific, and civilized in
the religious and secular texts of the West. Like Mudimbe and Dussel, Messay argues that, the political superiority of the West makes non-Western peoples the “Other” that could not cope with rationality and scientific as well as technological advancement.36

Yet Messay believes that, such understandings of the “Other” historically invented in the anthropological sciences are grounded in the oppositional identity of the white race which is given in the myth of the “white man”.

… the justification for subjugating non-Western peoples instead of engaging in free economic exchanges emanates from the perceived otherness of these people, which otherness justifies the hegemonic position of the West. The myth of the “white man” calls for the attribution of otherness to non-Western peoples, and subjugation constitutes its validation following the scientific criterion of successful practice as a confirmation of truth. While anthropology establishes the otherness of non-Western peoples, conquest confirms materially the superiority of the “white man”37

Based on this we may infer that, for Messay the myth of the “white man” gave the light for the anthropological sciences to draft the otherness picture of non-Western peoples. Such hypothetical figuration of the “Other” was historically imposed as to be natural and factual during the European colonial conquest of the world. Indeed on this point a difference appears to me between Messay and Dussel on mythic procedure of the invention of the “Other”. For Dussel the “ego cogito” is a product of the “ego conquer” while pondering the historical and philosophical invention of the “New World” in fifteenth century. Unlike him, Messay would say that the “ego conquer” of Europe developed itself from the mythic ground of the invention of the white man that constitutes the Aristotelian real identity of a human essence, i.e. rationality as marker of civilization, universalization and domination.

Frantz Fanon focuses more on the colonial psychological hegemony of the white man over the black in his two famous works: Black Skin White Masks and the Wretched of the Earth. Fanon, in his first book, talks about the invention of blackness not by the black man himself, instead by the white man as Messay insisted: “white civilization and European culture have forced an existential deviation on the Negro. I shall demonstrate elsewhere that what is often called the black soul is a white man’s artifact.”38 The Negro or the black human because of the psychological disaster of colonialism, according to

[41]
Fanon, thinks that the white humanity is the real human who is absolutely free. In the second and third chapters of *Black Skin White Masks* he deals with the strong desires of the black woman and the black man to attain their own psychological freedom by bonding themselves through marriage with the “super race” of white man and white woman, respectively. The black woman thinks that to marry a white man is to receive whiteness and humanness. Likewise the black man explains his bond with the white women as being a champion of freedom. Let us ponder these two views of the black woman and the black man. The black woman states that:

> Every one of us has a white potential, but some try to ignore it and others simply reverse it. As far as I am concerned, I wouldn’t marry a Negro for anything in the world… All these Frantie women of color in quest of white men are waiting. And one of these days, surely, they will be surprised to find that they do not want to go back, they will dream of “a wonderful night, a wonderful lover, a white man”… what they must have is whiteness at any price. 39

Whereas the black man expresses his feeling of getting married with the white woman as follows:

> I marry white culture, white beauty, and white whiteness. When my restless hands caress those white breasts they grasp white civilization and dignity and make them mine 40a… Talking recently with several Antilleans, I found that the dominant concern among those arriving in France was to go to bed with a white woman 40b

From this we can simply understand that colonialism causes a self-rejection. Albert Memmi notes that the notion of negritude conceived by many Africans and the Diaspora in its negative connotation; that is the major reason for the denial of the cultural heritage of black humanity is still preserved to their mind on the present neocolonial conditions. When we say there is a self-rejection it is to mean that the ontological positioning of one’s otherness is destructed seeing the past socio-cultural values as wretch. 41

Fanon reminds us that the tension between blackness and whiteness, otherness and sameness rests on a dialectical relationship. For this he refers to the Hegelian dialectic of the “Master-Slave” relationship. He interprets that dialectic in the context of historical colonialism. According to his understanding of colonialism the dialectic works quite differently from what Hegel asserted in dialectical idealism. In historical colonialism the slave is supposed to be unfree regardless of his or her articulation to their position as an
antithesis to the colonial domination. The colonized people of the Third-World still remain under a neo-colonial order in which Western capitalism constitutes a world system of military and economic domination which claims to be a just and democratic system. “The West saw itself as a spiritual adventure. It is in the name of the spirit, in the name of the spirit of Europe that Europe has made her encroachments, that she has justified her crimes and legitimized the slavery in which she holds four-fifths of humanity.” In parallel with this, Dussel states that the majority, that is three-fourth of the world humanity, are treated as the other of Europe economically and politically because of the system of capitalism. The capitalist system is therefore the major means for the domination and exclusion of the majority of the human population of the world.

2.3. Political Privileging of the “Other” in Trans-modernity

Dussel accepts most of the claims of otherness discussed so far by the thinkers South in the context of the ontological, cultural, political, economic and psychological hegemony of Europe. For him, since modernity of the world is constructed primarily by the European expansive political establishment it is reasonable to look at the historicity of the power of asymmetry between Europe as the center and the “Other” as periphery of the center. The asymmetry of power produces injustice in addition to the power differences between Europe and the non-Europeans. In fact Dussel underlines that, Europe enlarges itself as a “Western” power which consists of the Untied States of America and North Atlantic Trade Organization. Thus the center of modernity in the contemporary age is the Western world while the rest of the world is reduced to be its periphery.

To transcend modernity from its ethnocentric tendency, Dussel places the “Other” in a political position that holds the responsibility of achieving human emancipation. This seems odd for most of us for the reason that for centuries the “Other” has been subjugated, and asserted to be non-human, irrational, primitive, etc…So how could one say this “Other” is now responsible to attain human liberation while she herself is not free? Or, in what logical sense can the tasks of human liberation be secured by the colonized being of capitalistic colonialism? The Dusselian trans-modern project asserts that the revolutionary activities of the “Other” are largely based in the praxis of the theory of communication.
The core objective of the theory of communicative rationality and action as Habermas develops it is to maintain that modernity is a thing still in progress or “an unfinished project.”

When Habermas ponders modernity as an unfinished project his theme is to criticize the postmodernists’ radical abandoning of the rational development of the enlightenment. According to the postmodernists including the orthodox ones, like Nietzsche, Heidegger, J. Derrida and Michael Foucault, and leading proponents of first generation Frankfurt School Critical Social Theory, namely Horkheimer and Adorno, the speculative concern of traditional way of doing philosophy and the paradigm of consciousness concealed the realistic and historical nature of human power and at the same time destructive forces of the Enlightenment. Although Habermas rejects the postmodernists’ absolute negation of modernity, he acknowledges their critiques of the metaphysical concern of traditional philosophy including the philosophy of consciousness. Most emphatically, he is interested with the postmodernists’ attempt of a linguistic turn and the socio-historical focus of their thoughts.

Dussel affirms that his Philosophy of Liberation approves most of Habermas’ communicative project for human emancipation even though procedural primacy is given for liberation of the “Other”. In this sub-section we need to see first the primacy of liberation of the oppressed, and second a trans-modern reconstruction of communicative theory into praxis by considering the new concerns of humanity.

i) Liberation of the “Other”

The condition of the “Other” for the last five hundred years has been analyzed as slavery. Because of an “irrational sacrificial myth” of Europe, Dussel states that the “Other” is considered to be unenlightened. That myth asserts that: “the victims of modernity in the periphery (the extermination of the Indians, the enslavement of the Africans, the colonization of the Asians) and in the center (the genocide of Jews, the third holocaust) are the “responsible” ones for their own victimization.”

From this we can draw a point that the irrational myth of modernity develops to undermine the majority of humanity of the world in the name of barbarity. The principle of a “just war” began to be used for the mechanism of an aggressive abandonment of the savageness of the Amerindian, African, Asian and the Jews. Using this word “just” war is waged on the so-called barbarous
people. Many of them lost their lives in the name of a European interest in teaching civilization based in rational arguments. Accordingly, the irrational myth of modernity constructs a system of domination and exclusion of non-European subjects. Since this myth discriminates against different races of the world in favor of the white race we can say that it is an exploitation of one’s identity based in color.

Liberation of the other seeks to differentiate the rational and progressive aspect of modernity from that of irrational sacrificial myth contained in its modern project. Western domination through colonialism is still perpetuated in another form within the system of globalization, capitalism, liberalism, and “world democratization”. To end the system of domination, not the mere idea of freedom echoed politically since the second half eighteenth century, but the praxis of liberation is important. Since colonialism continues in the Western philosophies of homogenization, democratization, development and the like we need to be very critical of liberation practices that could be employed in the world.

One of the key tools for liberation of the “Other” is revolution. Fanon talks about the role of violence, which is a revolutionary development of the colonized people which strives for the creation of a new human history:

It is a question of the Third World starting a new history of man, a history which will have regard to the sometimes prodigious theses which Europe has put forward, but which will also not forget Europe’s crimes … racial hatreds, slavery, exploitation and above all the bloodless genocide which consisted in the setting aside of fifteen thousand millions of men. So, comrades, let us not pay tribute to Europe by creating states, institutions and societies which draw their inspiration from her. Humanity is waiting for something other from us than such an imitation. If we want humanity to advance a step farther, if we want to bring it up to a different level than that which Europe has shown it, then we must invent and we must make discoveries.

This Fanon’s analysis of a new history of humanity recognizes the political and ethical responsibilities of the Third-World people to struggle for human liberation of the world. In this sense the political violence of the “Other” can never be seen as ethically wrong, since it aims at the destruction of dehumanization.
Anthony Bogues tries to conceive the revolution of the “Other” as a quest for a “new beginning.” Like Hannah Arendt, revolution is a new beginning because the question it brings is fundamentally determined by the problem of novelty in relation to the status quo, or in Khunian terms the “normal” functions of science but in relation to the existing political system. As far as Bogues is concerned, the name “revolution” is given if and only if a thought or an action bears with new beginning(s) or problem(s). It appears to me that, the conception of revolution in Bogues as a new beginning resembles Thomas Kuhn’s scientific revolution, as a revolutionary transformation process of normal science to radical science. Like Bogues, Kuhn asserts that revolution is a result of problems or what he calls anomaly. The anomaly is the instance of violation of the “paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science.” From this we can say that, the revolution of the oppressed asserts its own anomalous existence in relation to the status quo. Dussel’s liberation struggle is similar to the concept of revolution as a new beginning which arises from the political anomaly or anomalous “Other”.

Bogues would like to enlarge his idea of revolution to the invention of existence in the human world. In this enlargement his main target, like Fanon, is the invention and discovery of a new humanity by those parties who are capable of defending universal humanization. According to Bogues most of the revolutions of Western nations in relation to abolitionism were not universally human, but rather interested with the freedom and justice of the white race, and thus, of course they were race-centered.

*British and American abolitionism was very much about white liberty and white justice. But this was not the only strain of abolitionism. There was a black abolitionism that carried within itself a logic of liberation as the ground of freedom. The most important expression of this current of abolitionism occurred in the dual Haitian Revolution.*

The point here is that, in fact the question of freedom politically developed in French Revolution and expanded into Britain and America. But still that question of freedom was not based in the liberation of humanity. As Bogues underlines, freedom has to be rooted in liberation as the abolition of dehumanization and injustice. In a similar manner, Dussel articulates his Philosophy of Liberation not as a utopian map, but a praxis which works
for not one or some selected races, but for humanity. In so far as the humanity of the world is dominated and excluded in reality. Liberation ought to be grounded in praxis and not utopian.

When the Praxis of liberation of the oppressed opens a new structure of the world it is through the “Other” that human oppression, exploitation and exclusion will be overcome by the sense of critical abolitionism. In the Philosophy of Liberation therefore, the “Other” is a political and ethical subject whose core interest is philosophically analyzed to be the negation of negation as the new order. But this negative dialectic of the Philosophy of Liberation is not held to be a total negation of the “normal” system of modernity, rather a way in which the “Other” takes a position of emancipating humanity from the irrational, sacrificial political status quo of domination and exclusion. This is to say, the “Other” is a responsible political agent to end the negative orderings of the project of modernity.

At the heart of liberation of the oppressed there is an environmental concern that insists the “dignity of the Earth”. This view of the Philosophy of Liberation attempts to criticize the capitalist and technological modern destruction of the eco-system. Today we are confronted with environmental crises largely caused by Western industrial wastes. It is clear that capitalism is dependent on industrial firms and productions. But if we look consciously, the present world and humanity is suffering with drought, flood, and high temperature that are the direct effects of our industries. So it is now quite important to develop the idea of liberation of the earth, which is the health and dignity of the environment.

Dussel’s argument about the exteriority of the “Other” is related to the identification of one’s identity. His basic insight here is to give an answer for the question who the “Other” is in the phenomenological sense. He raises the question as follows: humanistic-
ally and existentially who are we? This is purely the question of identity, or the “who” of a person as Arendt would perceive. Concerning the issue of identity, Arendt argues that etymologically and existentially have different meanings. The etymology is derived from two Latin terms “idem” and “ens” which mean that “the same” and “being”, respectively. Etymologically therefore, identity is meant by the permanent, never changing being of a thing or a person. However existentially, Arendt says that the identity of the person under goes in flux that is the identity of a living personality who is thrown into life where there is a course of natural social changes. Dussel seems to be developing the existential notion of identity to respond to who the “Other” is culturally. His answer would be the “Other” is the other in terms of its existentially not of absolutely the same of the universal beyond its humanity.

In current globalization or homogenization colonialism largely revolves around Western cultural domination. Westerners use education as an instrument to expose the idea that non-Western cultures are premodern, unenlightened. This Western understanding is claiming the lack of scientific and technological thinking in the indigenous thoughts of the colonized people. From this we may affirm that, there is an epistemic coloniality in the Western imposition of a technical occidental rationality. In order to systematically deconstruct the epistemic coloniality of cultural domination of the West, Dussel wants to incorporate Paulo Friere’s psychological thought. In the Pedagogy of the Oppressed Friere develops the point that the Western epistemic colonialism evolves in a dehumanizing system. As a result of this, the liberation theory Friere is concerned with is a communion revolutionary act of the oppressed and oppressors to abolish any system domination. That is why in his work he mentions the revolution of the oppressed as fundamental tool to fulfill human emancipation:

[Sooner or later being less human leads the oppressed to struggle against those who made them so. In order for this struggle to have meaning, the oppressed must not, in seeking to regain their humanity (which is a way to create it) become in turn oppressors of the oppressors, but rather of the humanity of both]

Dussel thinks that his Philosophy of Liberation struggles against the hegemony of Western epistemic, political, economic and other traditions insisting that humanity exists in a diverse or what we call a pluriversal condition. His attempt is not to construct a new
hegemony of the “Other” as in a Foucaultian point of view, rather creating a political condition in which different or plural identities of the world “polylogically” take place in the abolition of domination and exclusion. Put differently, the goal of the Philosophy of Liberation is not to replace the hegemony of the West by the oppressed-mainly Third-World, but to struggle against all internal and external factors of dehumanization.

ii) The “Other” and Communicative Theory: A Trans-modern Reconstruction

Habermas’ communicative theory tries to develop a postmetaphysical philosophy in which language becomes its central concern to insist that the intersubjectivity of humanity makes rationality and action possible. There are at least two essential grounds of communicative theory that shows its difference from the old metaphysical paradigm of consciousness and which mark a new beginning. The fist one is, its positive identification of language in what Habermas calls a “Postconventional identity”\(^{56}\) which puts every question into an open discussion. Of course one may think that, this postconventional self has an intimacy with the modern self of the enlightenment who fought with for instance doubt, ignorance and lack of courage in Descartes and Kant. But Habermas’ postconventional self appears not in the philosophy of the subject, rather in an intersubjectively developed society:

\[\text{The self is intersubjectively constituted through and through; the relation to a community is what makes the practical relation-to-self-possible. If the individual is to realize her true identity, she cannot do so by withdrawing from this community}\] \(^{57}\)

The postconventional identity of Habermas’ communicative theory asserts that the metaphysical argumentations of a self-certain, self-known, transcendental and authentic I are all methodologically questionable in so far they denied the intersubjective nature of the meaning and validity of truth/knowledge. Thus postconventional self in Habermas’ epistemology explains that meaning and validity is a social production, given that language is the only means to reach the truth. But this does not mean that the meaning of validity claims is absolutely relative. This point will lead us into the second ground of communicative theory, which is the universality of validity claims.
Concerning validity claims, Habermas says, once a linguistic meaning is granted then its validity is universal due to the criteria of being *true, right* and *sincere*. Whenever and wherever a given speaker defends a claim the universal validity claims are evoking conscious reflections and consent of the hearer. It is through this intersubjective communicative action that the speaker and the hearer can develop a rational agreement. This is the basic feature of a linguistic communicative action.

.... with her utterance a speaker makes a truth claim relating to the objective world of states of affairs, a rightness claim relating to the social world of normatively regulated interpersonal relations, and a truthfulness or sincerity claim relating to the subjective world of experiences.

By this, Habermas’ communicative theory attempts to place the speaker and hearer in a position which could be thought as symmetrical. In other words, his theory of communication can take place among people who present themselves in intersubjectively constituted postconventional communities. In his *Communicative Action*, he tries to describe the current global system and its life-worlds in the context of a postconventional understanding of the modern self and of the world. He insists that the emancipatory interest of global humanity can only be attained today by using the theory of communication that promotes the discourse of consensus.

Nevertheless, using Dussel’s Philosophy of Liberation we could ask Habermas the following questions; to what extent the theory of communication is or can be strong enough to address the existential problem of the world realistically given that the USA and her oriented ideology absolutely dominated the world? How can we assume the ideal of symmetry in the current world in relation to the economic and political power of G-8 Nations on the one hand, and daily reports of hunger, war and death of millions of people of the Third-World on the other? Is there any possibility to restructure the so-called “universal organizations” as human which work for actual liberation, justice, and peace?

In the theory of communication, as Dussel says, linguistic intersubjective communication of individuals and philosophical traditions in the world is important. But Habermas’ theory fails to take a serious account on the racial and class differences with the world. As far as Dussel is concerned, the capitalist system made some races and classes superior
over the others. For instance he states that the “racism of Apartheid in south Africa”, and wealthy individuals and nations developed at the expense of the poor. With these essential differences of race and class we can see inequality among humanity and nations. Thus, Liberation Philosophy provides a critical position in relation to the existential political, social and economic inequalities of the world.

Dussel disagrees with the Habermasian distinction of lifeworld and system especially from the point of view of “North-South” political and economic relationships. In his understanding, the lifeworld of the “North” (i.e. a European-North American life-world) is functioning as a system of domination and exclusion for the “South”. In other words, the lifeworld of the “North” is “the hegemonic, dominating one that, with respect to the other worlds, exercises a function very similar to that of the colonizing systems.”

All of this clearly implies that, in the Philosophy of Liberation the primary task is the abolishment of the political arrangement and system of colonialism. But the end objective is like the theory of communicative rationality insuring the liberation of the world of humanity which could only be attained through an intersubjective recognition and communicative consensus. That is why in the opening section of this chapter I have tried to articulate the point that, the Philosophy of Liberation emphasizes a general objective of accomplishing two emancipations in one that is liberation of the “Other” and liberation of humanity as a whole. It is within this core theme of Dussel that we can talk of a trans-modern reconstruction of Habermas’ communicative theory.
CHAPTER THREE

REASON, INTERPELLATION OF THE “OTHER”, AND INSTALLATION OF THE PRAXIS OF A COMMUNICATIVE RATIONALITY

Throughout the development of philosophical discourses the subject matter of reason is grounded on the nucleus, as the first and last of all fundamental labors of philosophy in which other topics follow either to affirm or deny for its root. The Christian scripture understood reason [logos] as a cosmic order in which everything else is structurally created. It is from that reason that the metaphysical concern of cosmological and ontological orders is developed. Parallel to this metaphysical assertion of reason, many philosophers around the world have been dealt with the nature, scope and limit of earthly knowledge within a prism of Aristotle’s famous basic attribute of humanity which says “Man is a rational animal”. This is to mean that, the human curiosity to know about the world and themselves arises from the very fact that their mind has cultivated with the character of rationalization. The merging of interest in philosophical and scientific thoughts notoriously raised the point that humanity differs from brutes through the power of reason that aimed at the “disenchantment of the world”. This disenchantment of the world seeks to maintain liberation installing a human power.1 Hence, the modern project of philosophy, i.e. Enlightenment’s program of the disenchantment of the world, pondered the necessity of human liberation from the general condition of irrationality.

The disenchantment of the world, insisted in the Enlightenment thinkers, shows that human beings have the power and courage of rationality, which is their essential peculiarity in the animal kingdom based on species-genus difference. However, a deep critical understanding of the project of modernity necessarily raises the question of how our interpretation of man as a rational animal transcends the logical level of species-genus difference, and looks more intensively at what conceptions of Man ontologically and rational imply concerning the historical situations of humanity in the world. Based on historical grounds, Magobe B. Ramose points out that Aristotle’s idea of Man as a rational animal tended to marginalize and exclude certain groups of humanity such as women, African, Amerindians and Australasian from the crown of rational-conscious

[52]
Accordingly, these groups of humanity could never be seen as proper Human Beings in their ontology, and hence it is reasonable to say that Aristotle’s claim from the historical point of view recognized the above listed people as “Others” who are not rational and at the same time Man. Given this critical interpretation then we can raise these two crucial questions: 1) what is to be a human being? , and 2) what sort of reason is rational?

Looking towards human liberation, the Enlightenment project tries to promote the use of reason and knowledge for the betterment of the world. With this respect, discourses of rationality and ethics are combined to promote the power of reason in reconstructing the human world enhancing its goodness and creating better form of life with Man the master of the earth. In the eyes of the Enlightenment proponents and their supporters reason is about process, success, and emancipation. On the other hand, the critique of the Enlightenment is developed by presenting the historical facts in which modernity and its Enlightenment program are not rational so long as violence and myths are told and seen in the modern world. The main point of this critique is that the “rationality” of modernity seems to lead to destruction, violence, and the hegemony of a mystic power. For instance, Horkheimer and Adorno explain the Enlightenment project in their words as based in the power of totalitarian myth and Men’s dictatorship over nature based upon principles of utility and alienation.\(^3\) This is to say that, the disenchantment of the world is prescribed in relation to a scienticism of its myth, under the teleological understanding of nature, instead of the rational and emancipatory construction of human sovereignty. Thus, the fear and the myth still persevered although they were transported into the totalized project of the Enlightenment.

Habermas maintains that the emancipatory interest is still the critical task of the unfinished project of modernity. For him, Enlightenment discourses essentially shaped his critical social theory except for that their reduced concern of reason and human communication. Robert P. Badillo notes this:

\textit{For Habermas the will to reason is understood in an enlightened sense as signifying the will to reason free from dogmatic and ideological influences. The actual employment of critical reflection may be required only to remedy systematically distorted communication, though it resides as a telos in the structure of human communication.}\(^4\)
It is only through reason for Habermas that humanity can achieve their emancipation, and thus the role of communicative critical social theory lies in the abandonment of irrational constraints towards the goal of the Enlightenment.

Indeed, Dussel accepts the general positive understanding of reason of Habermas. But Dussel attempts to show that in the historical development of modernity, the reason of humanity was not treated in its plurality since the reason of the “Other” was subordinated to the hegemonic **occidental rationalism** of Europe. He states:

*Modernity is born when Europe (the peripheral Europe of the Muslim and Ottoman world), begins its expansion beyond its historical limits. Europe arrives in Africa; in India and Japan, thanks to Portugal; in Latin America, and from there to the Philippines, thanks to the Spanish conquest. That is to say, Europe has become itself “center”. The other races and cultures now appear as “immature”, barbarous, underdeveloped … modernity is inaugurated, no longer as an emancipatory rational nucleus but as an irrational sacrificial myth.*

Dussel’s point is that modernity has contained both rationality and irrationality in its project of the Enlightenment. Of course his critique is not only given to the physical conquering of Europe on the other parts of the world, but also to the hegemonic suppression of the cultures that may contain their own diverse rationalities, to provide a priority for occidental rationalism. In this section reflections will be given on modern rational and ethical discourses about the emancipatory potential of humanity, shortcomings of ethnocentrism and especially Eurocentrism from the perspective of the reason and interpellation of the “Other”, and finally rationality as well as significance of a trans-modern logos.

### 3.1. Modernity, Occidental Rationalism and Cosmopolitanism

The Philosophy of Liberation focuses on the empirical construction of the modernity in which Europe invented itself as the center of the world in domination and Eurocentered inclusion of the peripheral traditions. And one of the problems of the centrality of Europe in modernity is the judgment of human maturity and civilization in relation to the European paradigm only. This is an attempt to universalize the culture and rationality of Europe through European expansionism. Within the context of this expansionism, philosophical and anthropological discourses of the Enlightenment and also Christian theological writings justified the subordination of the “barbarians” by the “civilized-
matured” European’s powers. Perhaps in most great civilizations of the world including the pre-modern ones, the people and society who promote their great achievement often take the position of the center while waiting for the admiration of other people. The core objective of constituting the center is to expand the culture of civilization to other parts so that the development utility of a civilized culture transcends its particularity in terms of the inclusion of the “Other” in an ethnocentered approach. But for Dussel there is a crucial difference between pre-modern cultural civilizations of the world and modern European culture in terms of the means and end for possessing the center of the global system. He states,

All the great Neolithic cultures were “centers” of civilizing sub-systems with their own periphery, but without any historically significant connection with other ecumenes. Only modern European culture, from 1492 onwards, was a center of a world system, a universal history that confronts (with diverse types of consumption and exteriority) as all other cultures of the earth cultures that will be militarily dominated as its periphery.⁷

In this respect, modern European culture made world-wide expansion not only to show its civilization but also to dominate other cultures of the world using its military achievement. Hassan Hanafi distinguishes two cultures which are developed due to the European global expansion; one is, “Culture” as it is capitalized which represents the European culture that aspires for central position and power of supremacy, and the other is, culture in small “c” that refers to the dominated cultures of the world.⁷

Modern European cultural expansionism according Dussel has developed itself in confusing its particularity, which is pure Eurocentrism, with universality. That culture displaces other civilizations, philosophical traditions, and identity of the non-Europeans by claiming that Eurocentrism is the only and universal culture of humanity. However, the success of modern European culture for Dussel can only be gained in its historical relation with non-European cultures. And this relation is a perpetual dialectic of cause-effect or impact-counter-impact:

Modern European culture, civilization, philosophy, and subjectivity came to be taken as such abstractly human-universal. A great part of the achievement of modernity were not exclusively European but gorse from a continuous dialectic of impact and counter-impact, effect and counter-effect, between modern Europe and its periphery even in that which we could call the constitution of modern subjectivity.⁸
Thus, the philosophical and anthropological discourses of modernity were largely construed based on the dialectical relation of Eurocentrism (European cultural expansion) and non-European cultures that are victims of domination and violation. To see the philosophical and anthropological points of Eurocentrism we need to start from Kant’s views of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment, he says, is the overcoming of one’s self-imposed ignorance, the transformation of man into knowledge and civilization: “Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. The immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another.”

Kant insists that the Enlightenment is the emergence of a self-conscious being to end his enslavement to a self-imposed immaturity. This can only be done through developing the courage to use one’s own will to reason.

Reason is taken to be the only way in which man attains his liberty from the possible causes of ignorance that arises in the order of the other. It is clear that in the mind of Kant the Enlightenment makes a distinction between the two states of Man; the first is, the man in the state of tutelage that is ignorant, “unfree” and uncivilized. And the second is, the man who emerges from his self-imposed immaturity and entering the state of conscious, liberty and civilization. The goal of the Enlightenment then is the development of man to the stage of rationality and sovereignty, and by that to install his mastery of great achievements onto the world. This is the philosophical insight of Kant’s notion of the Enlightenment.

The philosophical concern of Kant’s Enlightenment is developed in his two Critiques in which he argues that reason is the only means for pure and practical knowledge: “the metaphysics of each type of knowledge consists in a priori or pure rules originating in reason alone.” While his Critique of Pure Reason asserts that phenomenal objects are known through human reason unlike things-in-themselves (nominal objects). In the Critique of Practical Reason he talks about the nature of moral imperative in which absolute rules of deontological ethics are established. The Kantian categorical imperative states that the moral life can only be explained by the intuitive act of ought to do the right
and ought not to do the wrong deeds. In other words, the moral life of humanity is universally guided or directed by the pure law of reason. Thus for Kant reason is about universality concerning the epistemic understanding of phenomenal objects and the ethical realization of categorical imperatives. It is from this claim of universality that we may get his position towards a formal ethical project. This project assumes that moral rules are universal and objective so long as reason is the governing principle.

However, Eze tells us that such universality claims of Kant’s philosophical thought served as a road map for crystallizing and justifying the rationality of European expansion and colonization of the non-European territories. As evidence Eze provides the anthropological and physical geography lectures of Kant in which a racial categorization is given. In the context of his reflections on the “Color of Reason,” Eze elucidates the racial thoughts of Kant based in several lectures on the “twin sciences” (anthropology and physical geography) in which he explains the natural relation of man’s inner and moral aspect with the external or physical color of the body. These twin sciences of Kant intended to justify the diverse race of man in the world in terms of hierarchical differences of the inner quality, that is the rational and moral variations among races of white, yellow, black and red. By presenting the white (European Man) at the top of the empirical racial ladder, Eze explains that, Kant established the supremacy and universality of the one race over others. Here is Eze’s argument:

Kant’s theoretical anthropological edifice, then, in addition to its various conscious and unconscious ideological functions and utilities, had uncritically assumed that the particularity of European existence is the empirical as well as ideal model of humanity, of universal humanity, so that others are more or less human or civilized (“educable” or “educated”) as they approximate this European ideal.

With this anthropological differentiation of human races, Kant affirmed that the Enlightenment project of releasing human beings from their self-imposed immaturity is given for the “enlightened”, “liberated” and “civilized” European man.

This can be viewed as a struggle to transcend Eurocentrism into universalism. The logic is simple in that Kant’s anthropological explanations justify the civilizing mission of the European self to liberate other peoples from the condition of tutelage. Accordingly, man can only attain liberation and civilization once he is incorporated into the European ideal
of universal humanity. The white (European) man is the model of humanity in so far he is a rational and a moral being. The universal rules of reason in the world are revealed through him based on the analysis of Kant. From where does such Eurocentric view of Kant arise?

Many scholars believe that Kant’s Eurocentrism originated from missionary and anthropological sources which observed that peoples in the dominated areas are in the state of backwardness both physically and spiritually. The argument of these scholars is that Kant never had any contact with non-European peoples. He was even not aware of other people of Deutschland beyond his small town. Nevertheless, Tsenay Serequeberhan thinks that the Eurocentrism of Kant ought to be clearly understood as an attempt to establish the universality of European culture and history through the logic of transcendental necessity or\textit{transcendental obligation}. Tsenay argues as follow:

\begin{quote}
Kant’s explicit endorsement of European expansion and conquest (as the beneficial effect of the providential and secret design of nature) is not due to his lack of sympathy for non-European peoples; nor is it an accidental or extrinsic aspect of his historical thinking- an easily excusable “blemish”. It is rather, as I have argued in this paper, the effect of his universalistic and universalizing discourse grounded on the Idea that European history is the “transcendentally obligatory” meeting point of all particular histories.
\end{quote}

Therefore, in Tsenay’s understanding Kant is insisting on the universality of European rationality to construct human civilization. Kant believes that the epistemic, technological and industrial revolutions of Europe have the capacity to change the history of humanity and the world at large.

Hegel emphasizes the necessity of \textit{reason} in his philosophy of history. But the question is what sort of “reason” he is posing. The similarity of him and Kant is evident insofar as Europe constituted the center of the world in modernity. According to Hegel the history of the world moves from east to west. The center and perfect end of human civilization will be the heart of Europe and Asia is the starting point. This assertion of Hegel displaces Africa and Latin America from the history of the world. In relation to Africa he develops a claim that the continent which has a physical feature of “\textit{enclosedness}” and is culturally backward. He classified the continent into three parts on the basis of spiritual and cultural character. The first part is \textit{North Africa} or Arab African region. According
to his consideration, this region of Africa is largely influenced by the Spaniards, the Phoenicians, the Romans, the Vandals, the Arabs, and the Turks. This is to say that North Africa is spiritually non-Africa since a significant influence is made by peoples of Europe and Asia. The second part, “Egypt” or Nile Valley is rich and a symbol of great civilization which might be looked from the perspective of its territorial and spiritual attachment with the Mediterranean Europe. Again like North Africa the Nile valley for Hegel represents a non-African spirit that should be belong to the Mediterranean civilization. He regards the third region, “Africa proper” or today’s sub-Saharan Africa as real Africa whose sprit is barbarism and savagery. For Hegel, Africa proper describes the true essence of Africa, that is enclosed in itself, isolated from the centers of human civilization, and the world. This is a spiritless land in a sense that no European types of civilization, government, politics, or religion were established before Europe expanded and conquered to the region.

Hegel talks about the legal character of Slavery that Europe should follow in its relation with the Africa or the continent of the Negro.

Since human beings are valued so cheaply, it is easily explained why slavery is the basic legal relationship in Africa. The only significant relationship between the negroes and the Europeans has been-and still is – that of slavery. The negroes see nothing improper about it, and the English, although they have done most to abolish slavery and the slave trade, are treated as enemies by the negroes themselves. The negroes are enslaved by the Europeans and sold to America. Nevertheless, their lot in their own country, where slavery is equally absolute, is almost worse than this, for the basic principle of all slavery is that man is not yet conscious of his freedom, and sinks to the level of a mere object or worthless article. In all the African kingdoms known to the Europeans, this slavery is endemic and accepted as natural.

Thus, the language of liberation or freedom in the Negroes can never be raised if they ponder slavery as a natural manifestation of their life. This is to mean that the Negro is not ready to dialectically negate the natural will, and remains in a state of natural enslavement and subordination to rational creatures like the Europeans. Hegel is saying that, the Negroes live their life not as intrinsically valuable, rather as an object that always serves as a means. In other words, man in the kingdoms of the Negro is intrinsically valueless. So for Hegel it is rational to colonize Africans and exploit their extrinsic value.
In terms of morality, Hegel says, the *Oriental World (Asia)* has shown the supreme value of humanity radically different from the Negro world. In Asia he admits that there is power of rationalization that works on the ethical supremacy of man’s life which is the rock stone of a political consciousness: “We find here a power which exists in and for itself, and man only exists in and for himself in so far he is related to this universal substance. It is this relationship to the substantial power which unites the individuals with one another. Thus, it is Asia that the ethical world of political consciousness first arose.”

From this one may argue that, Hegel develops an optimistic outlook towards the Asians. But still we can see his pessimism when he views Europe as the heart and perfect end of World history. Following his logic contemporary economic and political philosophy scholars of the global state attempt to explain the basic link of the Christian colonizing project and the system of capitalism, which is why they most often say, capitalism is the end of history. For Hegel and his followers, occidental rationalism of Europe will take humanity to the peak of world civilization. But in the move towards the end of history occidental rationalism has to be the hegemonic type of reason by its virtue of not only intrinsic moral and political consciousness of humanity, but also to the technological and scientific progress of the world. On this level of analysis it seems logical for us to take Hegel’s idea that says, “What is rational is actual; what is actual is rational” as a ground for occidental rationalism and capitalism.

Dussel insists that both the Kantian program of the Enlightenment and Hegelian project of the philosophy of world history contain strong ethnocentric justifications about how Europe and its culture are superior over others. But as he tries to show this problem of Eurocentrism is not only associated to Western metaphysical philosophical tradition. Even in contemporary age in the thoughts of crucial thinkers of communicative rationality (Habermas), discourse ethics (both Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel), pragmatic liberalism (Richard Rorty), Charles Taylor’s historical project of the Modern self and others, there is a Eurocentric epistemic consideration. So in the following few paragraphs we will see the Eurocentric tendency of Habermas’, Apel’s and Taylor’s contemporary reflections.

[60]
The communicative theory of Habermas has the objective of reconstructing modernity by showing that the unfinished business of the Enlightenment can only be realized through the power of rational consciousness. Postmodernism was strongly criticized by Habermas for “disempowering ideas of reason altogether”20 thus discrediting the emancipative emphasis of modernity. For postmodernists’ rationalization in the modern age operated under the law of violence and domination. Habermas responds to the postmodernist underlining the importance of those rational and emancipatory ideals of the Enlightenment.

Habermas is concerned with upholding the Enlightenment values of freedom, democracy, individuality, autonomy, criticism, and rationality; with analyzing their interconnections; with understanding how they have been threatened by development within modernity; and with demonstrating how these values can be anchored in actual social institutions through advancing existing forms of “communicative action”. The rationality that informs such action is based on raising and evaluating validity claims within an intersubjective context oriented toward achieving rational consensus over social values and policies.21

Here we can see not only Habermas’ serious support of the Enlightenment principles of reason and liberation. In his critique of postmodernism he opposes social and critical discourses that work beyond the scheme of linguistification and intersubjective communication. Put differently, Habermas’ communicative theory functions as the critique of both modernism in relation to its metaphysical assumptions and postmodernism for its abandonment of the power of reason in accomplishing the goal of human emancipation.

In the Knowledge and Human Interest, Habermas argues that emancipation arises from self-understanding and self-reflection.22 This is analogous with the motto of the Enlightenment which insists that man is free in so far he acquires the knowledge of himself using the tool of reason. It is reason that gives man consciousness and liberation. But different from the Kantian principles of the Enlightenment, Habermas underscores the social and historical context of reason, which is rational innovation in interpersonal communication. The cognitive interest of human knowledge for Habermas appears in three distinct but interrelated fields, namely; technical, practical, and emancipatory interests.

[61]
As Steven Best will show, Habermas articulates three forms of human cognitive interest in terms of their specific objectives:

... a technical interest in controlling objective process, a communicative interest in forming an intersubjective world through linguistic symbols, and an emancipatory interest in becoming self-reflective, self-determining, and nature (Mundigkeit).

The cognitive interest of hard science or “empirical-analytic” sciences is a technical one for its concern to produce objects and governing nature. The cognitive interest of “historical-hermeneutic” sciences is the result of interpretive activities of inter-subjectively communicating individuals to reach consensus within a frame of “linguistic tradition.” And the emancipative interest of “critical sciences” is to achieve human liberation. In all knowledge, Habermas says, there is interest. In this respect, the empirical-analytic sciences are interested with making of things for survival sake, the practical sciences are concerned to develop value analysis, judgments and interpretations of social embodiments, and critical social theories are devoted to achieve the emancipative interest.

Although these three interests are interlinked with one another, Habermas is chiefly concerned with emancipatory cognitive interest in the theory of communication. Hence his theory of communication is one of the critical sciences that stresses on liberating humanity from domination. The communicative theory of Habermas states that human emancipation takes place if and only if there is a rational consensus of participants based in universal validity claims among the participants of a shared linguistic tradition. These validity claims are formed in the speech act of an utterance to give meaning of something in the manner of pragmatic relations that a speaker has with either the objective world, or social world, or subjective world. The pragmatic relations of the speech act of an utterance of the speaker in the three worlds explain the universal validity claims of truth, rightness and sincerity. This is the main reason for Habermas to develop his communicative rationality and action based on a postmetaphysical tradition in which language is central.
A postmetaphysical approach is used by Habermas to show the hard core of a social mutual interaction in enlightening critical understanding and argumentative consensus. In the theory of *Communicative Action Vol.2* Habermas puts;

*Coming to an understanding* [Verständigung] *means that participants in communication reach an agreement* [Einigung] *concerning the validity of an utterance; agreement* [Einverständnis] *is the intersubjective recognition of the validity claim the speaker raise for it.*

The universality of validity claims is essentially governed by the mode and structure of language; whenever a speaker speaks the meaning is wholly determined in relation to the three worlds. Habermas says, the speaker and the hearer come together under the rule of their utterance(s) to be related with the world that contains objective, social, or subjective life forms. In this case the life world serves as a shared background for rational communication within which the participants freely talk, and form convincing ideas on the natural, socio-cultural and personal realities. In short, the free talk and consensus among participants will lead into mutual enrichment of discussion and understanding. Thus, the emphasis of Habermas’ communicative theory is on the dialogical universal human communication which is governed by universal validity claims and free participatory logical discussion of participants.

Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality and action supplies important insights to us in order to widen and get the exact value of reason in developing critical sciences of contemporary world. It does it by considering the question of emancipating human beings from domination in relation to the other two cognitive interests. Moreover, his understanding of reason as the only tool to bring about communication in a shared linguistic tradition implies the necessity of intersubjective dialogue among participants. Form the perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation, there is no doubt that Habermas’ arguments about the positive essence of reason display an important role on the present and future goals of critical social theories.

But there are suspicions as to how far that the communicate theory and other thoughts of Habermas have been distanced from the occidental rationalism and tradition. For instance, his view of a postconventional society could be seen as a mirror of Western
liberal society, in which participants ideally, have an equal power to engage in discussion and mutual understanding. Here the concern would be what is and what will be the communicative process among the rich-industrialized people and the poor-Third World people, men and women, the epistemic cultures of the West and other parts of the world. From this we may argue that Habermas’ view of the universality of communication is entirely contained occidental rationalism, and thus Eurocentric. The Weberian influence is still prominent in Habermas insofar he seems to be limited to the concept of occidental rationalism and the values of cosmopolitan rationalism such as freedom, democracy, reason, criticism and some other values of the Enlightenment.

The current of occidental rationalism is also maintained in the “discourse ethics” of both Habermas and Apel. Discourse ethics is not far from the Kantian “formal” or “procedural” understanding of the universality of moral rules except that a change is made from metaphysical universal law to the universality of validity claims. According to David Couzens Hoy and Thomas McCarthy the dependency and leap of discourse ethics from Kant’s categorical imperative is explained like this:

> The discourse model represents a procedural reformulation of Kant’s categorical imperative. Rather than ascribing to others as valid any maxim that I can will to be universal law, I must submit my maxim to others for purposes of discursively testing its claim to validity. The emphasis shifts from what each can will without contradiction to be a general law to what all can agree to as a general norm. Accordingly, “rational will-formation” is not something that can be identified and certified privately; it is inextricably bound to communication processes in which agreements are both discovered and shaped.\(^9\)

Both Kant’s ethics and discourse ethics look for the universality of moral rules. Indeed Kant’s categorical imperative explains the universality in claiming that \textit{a priori} or pure laws of reason intuitively appear to the mind of the doer (s) of an action. Differently, in discourse ethics the direction comes from the general norm which is communicatively produced using universal validity claims. Despite their difference, in both cases there is a formal understanding of ethics. Formal ethics generally could be criticized in terms of its abstraction or idealization. The abstraction in the case of Kant’s and discourse ethics occurs when an attempt is made to universalize occidental rationality and historicity.
Dussel faces a similar problem in Taylor’s work *The Source of the self: The Making of the Modern Identity*. Dussel presents three arguments on the limitations of Taylor’s project. The first one is, a “methodological limitation” due to their vast dependence on only the works of early and Modern European philosophers, and their misrecognition of historical events of the modern world such as domination and violence. The second is, Taylor’s “hellenocentrism” in understanding of the “source of the modern self” in the sense of Greek’s cultural foundation of philosophy. And the third is, Taylor’s “Eurocentrism” to take the “Euro-North American” trend of modernity as exclusively a European phenomenon.  

From this we can understand that our present critical sciences needed to differentiate the human concern of emancipation from the point of view of not only Europeans, but also non-Europeans. This is to say that in our time a critical-emancipative approach has to be employed on the Western thoughts of universality and globalization in relation to the responsibility of understanding and answering to corporeal and mental sufferings of the oppressed. Their pain is reason by itself to struggle for emancipation!

3.2. Reason beyond Eurocentrism and Ethnocentrism

The Philosophy of Liberation, parallel with Habermas’ communicative theory, admits that reason is the key for human emancipation. Dussel suggests that the Levinsean notion of the “Other” [*Autrui*] incorporates ethical and political human relations as well as responsibility in the “Face-to-Face” engagement, or communicative rationality and action. In this respect today’s revolution of the oppressed and excluded has to be understood as a rational call of the world demanding justice. The question of justice in the Philosophy of Liberation is seen from an exterior-interpellation, or in simple term, justice is Other-oriented. When we say the interpellation of the “Other” it is to imply from an “external” and “prior” condition that the justice of discourses and actions is maintained. Dussel tries to show where the difference lies between the interpellation of the “Other” and interpellations “from inside” using Marx. For Marx, he says:
Bourgeois “morals,” or “right,” justifies “from inside” that which applies to its own principles. Slavery is unjust for the bourgeois or socialist order; it is just for the slavery order. Salaried labor is unjust for Marx or in the socialist regimes, insofar as it is an institutionalism which steals from the worker part of product of his labor (Surplus value). In this case, the ethical criterion is “external” and “prior” to capital as such; it is the living labor, the dignity of the person of the worker ante festum.  

This sounds like the way we look at something from inside always tries to justify the entire principle of its own given system. If a communicative process starts within the current socio-cultural political and economic order, i.e. approaching “from-inside”, then “x” is right in so far it is stated to be right in the world system. Instead of such communicative practice, Dussel argues that the “external” and “prior” ethical interpellation of the exploited and marginalized is necessary to enlarge the sphere of the communicative process. This is his new construction of Habermas’ communicative theory from the point of view of the oppressed and excluded:

Participants in a peripheral communication community, where the experience of exclusion is an everyday starting point that is to say, an a priori, and not an a posteriori, we must find “philosophical room” from our experience of misery, poverty, difficulty to discuss (due to lack of resources), uncommunicativeness, or merely not “being part” of the hegemonic communication community.

As far as Dussel is concerned, the historical condition of the Africans, Latin Americans, Asians, poor Workers of the Capitalist world, women, the youth and aged of the periphery, and some others who commonly share a value of otherness, are in an exterior position in relation to Europe’s centrality to the modern world and its systems. With this respect, the communicative theory of Habermas states the possibility of the inclusion of the “Other” reinforcing into the hegemonic communication community of the world by denying the asymmetry of power in globalization. It is because of this asymmetric power relation that the voice, reason and sovereignty of the oppressed have been disregarded. Thus, communicative action should be reconstructed considering the power and rationality of the “Other”, i.e. the reason and interpellation of the dominated, exterior to the system of industrial capitalism of the West.
3.2.1. The Reason of the Other

Since 1492 Europe has been establishing its economic political, military and cultural empire to dominate the world. Europe and North America (Western hegemonic power) are controlling and managing almost all activities of the world. In the name of rationality the West colonized other parts of the world to fulfill its political and economic interests. As a result of this, today we can think about a real communicative theory if our emancipatory interest enlarges deeply into the socio-political and economic problems of the status quo. The emancipatory interest must be aware of the relationship between the economic technical interest and the ethical practical interest.

Yet, Dussel says that the “Other” in a communicative process should not be subordinated, rather directed to the intelligibility of meaning in rationality and action. “The Other, not as “other” than reason but as the “reason” of the Other is the other reason which “interprellates” and from where one may show norms to be invalid or statements to be false”. Habermas keeps everything internal to the communicative system whereas Dussel is now pondering the necessity of freeing the reason of the Other which is alterior to the totality, or the system, and ethically strong enough to provide critical reasons and justifications of righteousness and wrongness, truth and falsity. In a mere abstraction Habermas idealizes the equality of participants is his life world. But for Dussel we need to differentiate the authority of reason and the authority of control.

Different from Habermas, Dussel’s liberation theory recognizes the ethical consideration of the corporal suffering of global humanity due to the economic system of capitalism. This move of Dussel is abhorrent to Habermas’ communicative theory that sees language as the foundation of integration and social evolution. Unlike Habermas, Dussel conceives labor not primarily in its “economic” meaning, but in ethical sense. That is why he would like to interpret Marx’s *Capital* as an ethical critique of the capitalist mode of production. Based on this, Dussel’s hermeneutic reading of Marx’s *Capital* from the perspective of an ethical challenge to capitalism underlines the relation of labor and language, and the logical position of the “Other” in creating a new just order of humanity from an exterior rationality and interpellation.
The interpellation is an originary speech act, with which the pauper erupts into the real community of communication and producers (in the name of the ideal), and makes them accountable, demands a universal right, as a human being-part of the community; and, in addition, expects to transform it by means of a liberation praxis (which is also frequently a struggle), into a future, possible more just society. It is the excluded one who appears from a certain nothing to create new moment in the history of the community. He/she erupts, then, not only as excluded from the argumentation, affected without being-part, but as excluded from life, from production and consumption, in misery, poverty, hunger, and imminent death. All this would seem to point to the inevitable interpellation and reason of the “Other” as necessary to liberate human beings, both dominator and dominated, from the system of domination and exclusion. Habermasian communicative theory derecognizes to see the suffering, poverty and death of the “Other” (Africans, Latin Americans, Asians and so on) in relation to its task fulfilling of the unfinished interest of modernity. One might say, his critical social fails to see the injustice of capitalism. On the contrary, the Philosophy of Liberation affirms that more than three-fourth of the world population is in economic danger. Thus, a new order should be established through the logical position of the “Other” to create a new moment of human history based in global justice.

3.2.2. Reason as One and Many

In our previous discussion of occidental rationalism we have seen how Eurocentric reason tried to universalize itself employing its hegemonic order to other cultures and their human rational values. We have also understood the objections of Dussel to those proponents of various discourses on the ground of Eurocentric epistemic rationality. Mainstream philosophy is not beyond the proliferation of occidental rationalism. This philosophical current provides a wide range of claims that reason is European. For example, Hegel clearly stated that the center of conscious rationality and technological as well as spiritual development is Europe. For him Africa and Latin America lacks the spirit of reason. Although that spirit has an objective and universal appearance to him, in so far as it encompasses European governrmentalization of the modern world, there is no space given to the Africans and other “slaves” of the world. Mainstream thinking as a whole asserts that philosophy, development, liberty, democracy and etc exclusively belong to the culture of occidental rationalism. Thus, occidental reason is taken as the only universal reason of the world.
In the colonial liberation struggle some thinkers of the colonized world asserted a claim that there is a natural link between the European self and reason, limiting “other” people to emotion. The first president of independent Senegal, Leopold Senghor said that “cognition is white as affection is black.” This means that it is only in the “white” world that the spirit of analytic and discursive reason exists; passion is predominant in the black world. In fact, for Senghor affection is a superior virtue of human beings.\(^{35}\)

Unlike mainstream and Senghor’s convictions, the Philosophy of Liberation points out that reason is human. Dussel attempts to put the rationality of human beings on a scientific ground asserting that “their level of cerebral development allowed for consciousness, self consciousness, and linguistic, ethical and social development.”\(^{36}\) So, all human beings despite their difference in race, geography, and class are naturally endowed with a reflective and reflexive consciousness about the objective, subjective and social worlds. The cerebral function of the human mind indicates how human beings lead their life through confronting universal questions of life. Thus, all of humanity is in the ontological state of the Heideggerian “Dasien.” We are an interrogating species. The sense of interrogation, Dussel continues to argue, develops in the struggle of human life to respond to universal ontological problems.

Yet, these universal ontological problems appear in different horizons of geography, history, culture and other variables. So the responses of human beings in different life-worlds might vary due to the intensity of core problems and historic cultural means of responding to such problems. However for Dussel human beings respond to their core problems developing a linguistic expression that holds either a symbolic or philosophical rationality. In such a linguistic expression there is an intersubjective reflection of reason and thus slightly his approach assumes a theory of communication to solve the core ontological problems. In the background of the rational responses to the core problems, Dussel says, there is a foundation of myth:

Through all of its stages of development humanity has always and inevitably given linguistic expression to rational responses (understood here to mean those that are proffered with some-kind of underlying foundation regardless of its specific character, at least until it is refuted) to the core problems. This has occurred as a result of a process involving the “production of myths” (Mythopoiesis).\(^{37}\)
Dussel points out that in any linguistic expression there is meaning or rationality at least until a refutation is made. And in different cultures of the world we can find a number of rationalities given that several myths are incorporated in those cultures. Humans cannot escape from myth(s) to give a rational understanding of the world; “the production of myths was the first rational forms of interpretation or explanation of reality (of the world, subjectively, the ethical practical horizon, and the ultimate reference of reality that is described symbolically”). Therefore, in different horizons we have varieties of reason. But these varieties of reason will become one when “symbolic rationality” of myths developed into the “rationality of philosophical conceptual categorization”. Philosophical rationality works on the condition of shaping conceptual frameworks through communicative reflections. But one thing is clear here, that is each reason originates from myths which are rational to the extent of their linguistic structure and expansion. The Philosophy of Liberation strongly opposes any sort ethnocentrism of reason, and asserts the need for transcending particular and symbolic rationality into the rationality of philosophical conceptual categorization, particularly in the course of communicative practice.

Recognizing this view of the Philosophy of Liberation, one can talk about the diverse nature of reasons of the world, and their possible unification into philosophical conceptual framework. In this sense reason is not exclusively given to Europeans, rather to all human beings of the world. In a similar development, Eze talks about the importance of understanding a diversity of reason: “Diversity of conceptions of reason is thus something to be welcomed, not abolished”. The point is, an ethnocentric understanding of reason should be criticized to escape from an ideology of reason in an intersubjective philosophical perspective focusing on commensurable critical communication including all cultures and rationalities of the world. This focus on the reason of the “Other” is the critical task of the Philosophy of Liberation.

3.3. A Trans-modern Polylogue

The reason of the “Other” is the starting point of a new history within which we can move into a trans-modern world. From the Philosophy of Liberation view of reason, both modernism and postmodernism limited their concerns to the historical success and failure
of occidental rationalism. Thus in these discourses “reason” is restricted to the project of the Enlightenment. For the liberationists reason is a human phenomenon in which different philosophical traditions of the world tried to solve the core problems. There are two central points about a trans-modern conception of reason. The first point is as we saw in the reason of the “Other” it is through the employment of systematic self-reflection that humanity can liberate them from domination. This is to say, reason is the only path to emancipation. Let us look at the positive link between liberation and reason recognizing the core objective of the reason of the “Other”:

> This is the subject of the Philosophy of Liberation, a liberation from exclusion, from misery, from Oppression. This is the foundation, reason (Grund), “reason (Vernunft) of the Other”, a philosophy which has the right to give its reasons. There is no liberation without rationality; but there is no critical rationality without accepting the interpellation of the excluded, or this would inadvertently be only the rationality of domination.

So we can say that, reason in trans-modernity seen as something positive to abolish the domination of human beings unlike postmodernism. But different from both modernism and postmodernism in transmodernity the critical task is given for the reason which is “external” and “prior”, that is, the reason of the oppressed and excluded.

The second point is that, in trans-modernity reason is one and many. It is many because beyond modern European reason (the so-called occidental rationality) we have varieties of reason in different philosophical traditions of the world, including Islamic, Asian, African, Latin American, and so on. Of course in his thought Dussel argues that, all philosophical traditions since 1492 were conditioned by Eurocentric modernity and now the point should be trans-modernizing modernity by developing in a new “global mindset” and this is through pluriversal commucaition. In a pluriversal communication we can have logical discussions that could lead us into consensus. This kind of dialogical communication in an intercultural field is known as “polylogue”. Polylogue takes place among various participants from different philosophical traditions.

There is a basic difference between Habermas’ theory and the Philosophy of Liberation in pondering the power relations of the present globality. The hegemonic status of Europe and North-America in the present realities of the world is obvious. To show one the
shortcomings of Habermas’ communicative rationality Dussel quotes Bedounis’ ethical idea:

The wealthy speaks and many approve and consider eloquent the senseless speech... the pauper speaks with sense and the words are not regarded. The wealthy speaks and is heard in silence and the talent highly praised; the pauper speaks and they say, “who is he?” and if he falls over he is shoved. By appealing to Bedounis’ idea it seems important to reflect on contemporary communication. Today the global communication is largely mediated by the power of money and military instead of rational discussions. For this we can think organically the present meetings in the Untied Nations and other world wide conferences. In reality, the reasons of peoples of the globe are not equally recognized. The hegemonic system of the world seeks to fulfill more the interest of the wealthy-industrial nations and classes, and elites of the status quo. There is a strong political intervention of the US in international economic organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The voice of the G-8 Nations and North Atlantic Trade Organization is highly visible in governing the world by the combined force of money and nuclear power. Based on this like Bedounis, we can argue that in contemporary global communication the logic focuses on the possibility of extending the hegemonic political and economic power of the West, and thus there is no equal place for nations of the world. It is on this ground that a critical question of democracy has to be demonstrated to develop mutually recognized international organizations that carry human responsibilities of creating a better world. In short, a philosophical revolution of liberation should bring a new humanist approach to redirect contemporary global communication.

According to the Philosophy of Liberation the history of the world can never be enclosed with the modern capitalist system of occidental rationalism. Human history is now searching for a trans-modern future. The new progress is possible because of the critical power of the reason of the “Other” to reveal the hidden philosophical traditions of the world and their struggle to achieve liberty at the expense of domination. To use Fanon’s idea:

I said in my introduction that man is a Yes. I will never stop reiterating that. Yes to life. Yes to love. Yes to generosity. But man is also a No. No to scorn of man. No to degradation. No to exploitation of man. No to the butchery of what is most human in man: freedom.
The reason of the “Other” assumes a new history of humanity, which is of course the end of exploitation and exclusion, but also a new beginning to the life of liberation and humanization.

It is reasonable to come with this idea; the creator of history is not history itself, but human beings. In the reason of the oppressed and excluded that aims at creating a new global system that contains the pluriversal human traditions and their logical communication to respond for the core ontological problems. Fanon believes that human beings are engaged in a creative activity to make themselves responsible agents of positive history. Fanon’s idea sounds Heideggerian in the sense that the history of the world puts into its authenticity by the ontological character of human beings. He argues,

There are in every part of the world men who search. I am not a prisoner of history. I should not seek there for the meaning of my destiny. I should constantly remind myself that the real leap consists in introducing invention into existence.

In the world through which I travel, I am endlessly creating myself.

In Dussel’s word, the project of human emancipation in his trans-modern approach will be achieved through intellectuals developing a real philosophical critique of the status quo from the perspective of the oppressed and discarded. Thus intellectuals of a trans-modern communicative community should have organic spirit and function in understanding as well as changing the social world. Antonio Gramsci’s notion of “Organic intellectuals” gives the light for liberation theory to concentrate most importantly on the practical solidarity and functional role of intellectuals to address the various problems of the contemporary world. For Gramsci intellectuals are organic insofar they engage in critical social actions and questions of the status quo. Because of this he asserts, “All men are intellectuals…but all men do not have the function of intellectuals in society.” Needless to state, the open door of intellectuals’ consciousness by itself provides an ethical responsibility of creating a historical just world. In other words, knowledge becomes power to overcome any kind of oppressive system. Hence, intellectuals especially in the global South have to struggle for promoting indigenous knowledge of their communities so that what Freire calls a banking concept of epistemology will be addressed. According to Freire, the banking idea of knowledge is against the liberation project since one’s critical consciousness is passive to change him and the world. In this regard, he takes the consciousness of organic intellectuals as an authentic thinking of reality in a communicative action.
CHAPTER FOUR
LIBERATION PHILOSOPHY’S EXISTENTIAL INTERROGATIONS OF GLOBALITY

It is a generally held view that we are now in the age of globalization; information flows from one corner of the world to the other within a microsecond interval about issues of politics, economics, culture and the like. The telecom, electronic, and other communication Media, the increasing transportation sectors and other communication centers are narrowing the gap of the world into a village invoking a spirit of globalization. It seems amazing to us when we critically observe the causal link of interests, talks and decisions of the present world, which may imply the point that the language of isolationism is almost out lowed in the twenty-first century. This issue is not only concerned to the politics of the state, but also the politics of culture, religion, economy, ecology and other matters of the human life. There is of course an argument that says the contemporary world of globalization has been directly caused by modernity providing the technical and emancipatory interests of the modern project that developed itself through rationalization and universalism frameworks. This is to mean that we are now in the age of homogenization due to the rational and universal forces of modernity. On the contrary, there is a point which discusses about an enforced globalization which has masked its irrational and ethnocentric power of world domination under the rational project of modernity.

Modernity contained both rational and irrational aspects in the course of its historical development. The rational contents are still important to maintain the emancipatory interest given that still all human beings in the age of globalization are in an existential space of modernity. Two questions may arise in this existential understanding of modernity in the philosophy of liberation. The first question is about to what extent justification is given where we are now in relation to the project of modernity. To put this in question from then does today’s globalization settle within the modern system of the world? Postmodernists would argue that today the world is no more in the period of modernity presenting as a justification the various conflicts, violence, destructi
disasters of the global system. As counter argument for this claim of postmodernity, others believe that the rational and emancipative principles of modernity are ongoing and we need to achieve that project through discourses and communication. This counter argument asserts that the present should seek for the future. It is at this point that we can raise the second question. Can we escape from modernity and contemporary globalization? And again this question can be reformulated in time framework as follows; where do we go from now to the future?

From the perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation it seems that the present globalization historically appeared five centuries ago when Europe developed its power as the center of the world system of modernity. This power is all-embracing including military, economic, political, cultural, and philosophical. So, present globalization is historically established with the expansion of European power into other parts of the world to insure that the center, Europe, rules the periphery. This system is modern in the planetary sense. It was the original force that united the world within a single system. Dussel states that global modernity “constitutes and reconstitutes itself simultaneously by a dialectical articulation of Europe (as center) with the peripheral world (as a dominated sub-system) within the first and only “world system.” The historical justification of the global system is closely connected knowing the historical cause of it. In addition to the previous two essential interrogations, then we could have the third. What is the source of the current homogenization forces of the world?

So, to speak about globalization existentially means to question its temporality. Hence we have the times of “past”, “present” and “future” globality. Globality in the course of the Philosophy of Liberation may be seen to me in the Heideggerian view of temporality. Heidegger explains the temporality of Dasein’s being in relation to the periodic division of “will”, “was” and “is”. He states that, for Dasein the future is all about the possibility of choice, the past is throwness, and the present is the non-concealment of entities in the world of being with. The Philosophy of Liberation tries to understand the world system in the context of temporality in which it asserts that dialectically the global periphery and the global center were thrown into the planetary structure of modernity which originated in Europe. If this is so, then we can argue that no one escapes from the existential past of
modernity. In other words, it is impossible to ignore that globalization is what it was since 1492 as a modern project of the earth. To say that Europe constituted the center the system while dominating Africa, Asia and Latin America is to affirm that these parts of the world were forced to be thrown into the global system.

The present globality requires an openness of culture and reason in the world. In the past globality, the world system is built through Europe’s domination over other areas, and thus Liberation Philosophy accepts the fact that other cultures and rationalities were forcibly marginalized. It is within this past-present temporality that one can see the rational and irrational aspects of modernity. From the perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation, present global scholars should work to disclose the irrationally excluded cultures of the past, and differentiate the rational or positive aspects of modernity from the irrational ones so that a transformation could be made into the new future, that is a trans-modern globality.

The transformation from present globalization into a future one is maintained in the Philosophy of Liberation to establish a new global human project in a trans-modern perspective. Trans-modernity is a new and future oriented project that critically observes the emancipatory-rational and irrational-dominating as well as excluding themes of modernity from its underside:

As rational critique from the Exteriority of modernity, the “other face” of modernity, trans-modernity (Amerindians, Africans, Asians, etc.) criticizes the irrational myth of violence against the colonies, peripheral capitalism, against the South. To take into account this question is the condition of all possible philosophical dialogue between the North and the South, because we are situated in an asymmetrical situation.

The basic point here bears that, the underside of modernity is skeptical about the politics of inclusion of the “Other”. Most thinkers from the North describe the rational power of discourses in communicating the global population to discuss with the human emancipative interest. For them today a rational communication can be held globally because there is a symmetrical power relation in the world concerning the fulfillment of emancipation. Basically their argument concedes the political imposition of a Eurocentric occidental rationalism of human liberation. Currently they are claiming for the inclusion of the “Other” just to explain human equality and dignity from their own cultural point of
view. Despite this, liberationists argue, there is inequality in the present modern world, and the political will is therefore not the inclusion of the marginalized in the dominant culture of the North, but the dialogical production of human universal values that arise from real philosophical critique and consensus. To start from the underside of modernity means not a passive and abstract inclusion of coloniality in modernity. Instead, it is to employ critical reflections from the epistemic force of the “other-face” of modernity. In this regard the reason and solidarity of the oppressed should put in a privileged epistemological and political position to confront the one-sided interpretation of modernity.

4.1. What is the Source of Global Crises?

Dussel’s Philosophy of Liberation allows us to respond to the question of what caused the crises of modern global modernity. Its cause is the one-sided Eurocentric hegemonic power. The argument of Dussel suggests the problematic development of modern globality in the crude sense of claiming that European values are not only superior to non-European ones, but are also universal. The philosophical crux of the problem claims that European particular values are universal and human in the context of the “rationality” of modernity. In this respect, he argues that the problem is a philosophical one in which the crises of global modernity originated because of Europe’s confusion of its particularity with globality. This confusion of Europe can be explained as follows. He says, Europe,

… never defined itself as a hegemonic center where information is controlled, where the learning of humanity is processed, and where political institutions (political, economic, ideological, etc.) which permit greater global accumulation of wealth in the center (economic, cultural, and all other types of wealth), thus “systematically” exploiting the periphery, are created.\

The Philosophy Liberation notes that the global crises of the world are created out of modernity’s interest of coloniality. In chapter two we pondered how the “ego conquer” historically preceded the “ego cogito”. Now it seems possible to argue that historically there is no modernity without coloniality. Thus, the political, economic, and cultural domination by Europe, for Dussel, becomes philosophical when the project of rationalization and emancipation is opened. To the Philosophy of Liberation, both
coloniality and modernity in the global context must be approached philosophically in a way that contemporary social crises of the world fundamentally solved by developing a North-South realistic conversations.

There are thinkers who believe that the global problems of the world would have different historical origins, and thus, are incommensurable. Among others here we can mention the views of Apel and Paul Ricoeur. Both of these philosophers made their own critiques of the Dusselian project of the Philosophy of Liberation, especially on the diverse crises of the modern world and possibility of their relation to the political and economic system of globalization. As one major current of intercultural and comparative orientation, liberation theory is working on the global problems of the world by developing a North-South conversation. It is in this dialogue that Apel and Riceour provided their critiques to liberation philosophy. Although later on, Dussel made a response and clarified his position. Let us see first the objection of Apel and Riceour to the philosophical project of Dussel.

Apel criticizes Dussel’s liberation theory in relation to developing a discourse ethics which promises to be a cosmopolitan solution to the problem of the modern world. The basic concern of discourse ethics is to deal with different problems of the world within a system of communicative rationality. Apel admits that the North economically, politically, culturally, and philosophically has dominated the world, and thus, the South is in a subordinate position. As a result of this, he says that liberation of the South is a rational question even in the philosophical quest of communicative discourses.\(^6\) He also accepts that the fundamental causes for the present socio-economic and political problems in the North-South relationship are largely associated with the system of capitalism. Problems such as the economic dependency of the “South”, the debt crisis, the ecological crisis and so on are based in the capitalist global economy.\(^7\)

In talking of the crises of the system of capitalism, Apel says, Dussel made a mistake in taking a Marxist approach. For Apel the Marxist approach of Dussel may take the reason and interpellation of the other into a cynical rationality which considers liberation external to communicative communication. Apel appeals to Habermasian point of view to
show the shortcomings of Marx’s political economy. He says that, it is true alienation is the central question of Marx in the class system of capitalism, yet still Marx’s political economy was constructed through the paradigm of philosophy of the subject. Apel put it this way:

*Marx refers such an alienation to work, that is, the production of goods in accordance with modern subject-object philosophy and, in particular, with the tradition of the labor theory of value of the classics of economy.*

Thus, the thought of Marx as far as Apel is concerned, ignored the communicative paradigm of thinking which is essential to the emancipative project. Moreover, Apel shares the Popperian objection to Marxism of claiming to be a scientific discourse predicting the future from the historical-dialectical materialistic standpoint. According to Apel the problem is not only about the absence of falsification in Marxist predictions of the future, but rather its contradiction with the necessary procedures of communicative theory, that is a communicative engagement in argumentative discourses including ethics:

*On the basis of the dialectical-historical perspective, one could adopt a standpoint from which it seemed to be possible to localize any scientific-philosophical claim in a dialectical-historical fashion, and to explain it, consequently, objectively. This has led to the elimination in practice of the possibility of participating in (virtually unlimited) argumentative discourses, inasmuch as this last one is the meta-institution responsible for the justification or critique of all theories and any type of institutionalized science.*

Apel obviously thinks the Philosophy of Liberation has to go beyond the Marxist tradition of the paradigm of consciousness and places the interpellation of the oppressed in discourse ethics. According to him, Dussel’s thought of the interpellation of the “Other” is one of the interpellations typically raised from the Third-World and expects its procedural development within an intersubjective communicative argumentation(s). Hence, he would like to include the task of Liberation Philosophy in his discourse ethics.

Analogous to Apel, Ricoeur suggests that the Philosophy of Liberation must not see to the cynical interest of establishing the political and economic hegemony of the South as a response and revenge to the historical domination of the North. Ricoeur more closely talks about three objections of liberation theory. The first one is the incommunicability of diverse histories of liberation in the age of modern globality. Here his main intention is to
explain that there are varieties of points of departure that today we can mutually learn from each and all the causes of liberation movements in this epoch of globalization. He writes:

\[
\text{It is therefore necessary to consider different thematic and different original situations. We can talk with the intention, of a plurality of histories of liberation. The question now resides in knowing what it is that each can teach the other, and what one can learn from the other.}\]

This is to say that the points of departure for the question of liberation in the global South and the global North are different, and thus non-communicable. In the mind of Ricoeur there could be a similar experience about the question of liberation in the North struggle against the regimes of totalitarianism and the South confrontations of colonialism. The important point is now to explore the different sources for that question of liberation is to share different life experiences in a South-North dialogue not in oversimplification of the various points of departure to global crises.

The second objection of Ricoeur develops in relation to the name entirely and goal of the Philosophy of Liberation. He says, since every philosophy is oriented towards ‘liberation’ the Philosophy of Liberation seems to exclude other philosophies and philosophy itself. The third and last of the critiques asserts that the “Other” could not be reduced to a single object of identity. If we say that the poor in the North, women, Africans, Latin Americans, Asians and others are all the “Other” without maintaining their different histories of otherness then we simply neglect the plurality of their identity. Ricoeur says there is no single subject of the wretch of the earth, rather we can find the “diverse figures of others, others qua face-to-face encounter; others such as the “each one” of the relations of justice.” In simple term we may argue that, for Ricoeur it is crucial to rethink the multiple sources of global crises and the identity of others in addition to the ultimate end concern of a philosophical discourse.

Dussel responds by arguing first that the sources or the points of departure of global crises of modernity are hermeneutically communicable as well as commensurable in relation to the rational foundation of liberation theory. He says that, it is “exactly the origin of Liberation Philosophy, since it is necessary to co-relate “worlds” apparently
incommunicable in order to obtain a world vision, universal, in relationship to humanity.”

Here what we dealt with in chapter two seems significant. The end concern of the philosophy of liberation is the emancipation of humanity in general from the system of domination and exclusion. The problem of the system of both domination and exclusion that liberation discourse emphatically sees is that coloniality is constitutive of modernity. This makes the Philosophy of Liberation concerned with humanity as a whole although the starting point is the emancipation of the oppressed, the poor, or the Third-World. There is a stage of liberation in which the Dusselian liberation theory’s ultimate is the emancipation of humanity as a whole. It entails,

... a “de-centering” of Liberation Philosophy’s reflection from the world periphery (from the oppressed woman, the repressed son or daughter, the discriminated races) in order to place itself now in a world “perspective” (a “point of view,” a lens, like a microscope or telescope). The “liberation” of which Liberation Philosophy will speak is no longer solely Latin American because of its pretension, but worldly, global; and as philosophy, it is now philosophy as such, without anything else, albeit always from the oppressed, the excluded, the discriminated; that is the dis-tincion (which others have called difference), the “exteriority,” the “alterity” of the Other.

We might assert, then, the Philosophy of Liberation is essentially concerned to refute dehumanization. The problem of domination is not restricted to the global South only, instead in modernity humanity as a whole is exposed to suffer, and thus the emancipative theme of the theory of liberation aims at global emancipation. But, since the goal is to negate domination and marginalization it is necessary to start the emancipatory task pertaining ethical questions on the behalf of exteriority. This is for a practical development of human liberation.

It is on this point that Dussel provides his second response for the importance of Marx’s ethical critique of capitalism in the Philosophy of Liberation. Apel, Ricoeur, Habermas and most other Western contemporary thinkers associated Marx and his philosophical works with standard Marxism and orthodox socialism. Dussel finds the views of orthodox and scientific Marxism problematic because of the previously raised shortcomings. To put it in other terms, the Philosophy of Liberation rejects standard Marxism and the dialectical-historical materialism that sought to describe itself as purely a scientific enterprise.
Despite this, Dussel emphatically argues in his liberation theory of Marx’s thought is a re-reading different from standard Marxism, scientific Marxism, or even the dominant Western understanding of Marxism. He says, in his project of Liberation, Marx’s technical or economic reflections of capitalism should be hermeneutically understood as a moral-practical refutation of the capitalist system. Two justifications appear to this hermeneutic analysis of Marx’s philosophy in Dussel’s thought. First, Marx shows that, all of his views are oriented towards a revolutionary change of the world adopting a new *practical-critical-activity* in its discourse. Second, Dussel claims that the most important economic ideas of Marx in his famous works are not about pure economics but rather are a philosophical [“practical-critical”] concern, which demonstrate a strong ethical and political criticism of capitalism. The ethical critique of capitalism that Marx developed according to Dussel is an emancipative or “liberational” practice in relation to the actual problems of the global capitalist system from the logical points of view of an ideal community. For Liberation Philosophy, then, the philosophical economics of Marx articulated through an ethical project which critically observes the real estranged individuals in the capitalists’ community of producers.

*For Liberation Philosophy, Marx is a classic of “economic philosophy” (in addition to being an economist for the economist), a philosophy which was developed as a critique of a capitalist life world whose fundamental structure (and not only as a system) are obstacles to the reproduction of human life. Therefore, Marx departs in his critique from an ideal community of producers, out of which a real alienated society of producers (capital) is deconstructed. For Marx the essential is not subject of labor/object-nature, but the relation subject/subject as a practical, ethical relationship. His economics is the critique from the perspective of an “ideal community” of a capitalist “real society.”* 17

In addition to what we have discussed in relation to Apel, proponents of communicative theory and discourse ethics would be disgusted with liberation theories’ appropriation of Marx in an ethical space of the human interest in emancipation. For instance Habermas frankly states that, Marx’s thought even though it contained a communicative rationality in terms of its critical activity, situated the practical emancipative interest under the technical one. 18 However, Dussel insists that in both the production community and the ideal communication of speech there is intersubjective communication among subjects. And in both communities using the insights of liberation theory he says that there are
individuals or groups (it could be class) subjected to alienation. Thus, the emancipatory interest emerges from the economic structure of capitalism based in estrangement and dehumanization. Likewise, in a communicative rationality and action we engage in a critical activity to declare the emancipatory interest of all human beings of the world. That is why Dussel asserts the commensurable nature of the production community of capitalism and the ideal communicative community: “production by an isolated individual outside society... is as much as of an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other.”

Accordingly, the source of global crises from the perspective of Liberation Philosophy is the hegemonic power and system which originated when Europe enlarged its domination over the world, and misconceives itself not only to be the center and the universal, but also global and human. Based on this, most of the crises of global modernity are communicable and commensurable since all of them are caused by the same global system of domination and exclusion. To address this system of domination and exclusion therefore it is reasonable to develop the Philosophy of Liberation which aims at the emancipation of the oppressed and the oppressor.

4.2. Where Are We Today in Globality?

The past globality has its own effect on the present globalization. We have observed earlier that culturally, politically, economically and philosophically modernity made its appearance and growth through coloniality. The globality of the world is established when Europe established its hegemonic rule of the world. Today this hegemony is referred to as the global North’s domination of the global periphery. This North’s domination of the world assumes the unity of the world based on a single tradition of culture, development, politics, religion and philosophy of European decent. As a result of this, current globalization only promotes the life world of the center or the North. Hence this is a central problem for multicultural development and the liberation of the “Other”. With respect to intercultural difficulties, Ram Adhar Mall argues that hegemonic globalization is destroying the varieties of horizons within which human beings exist in the world today. According to Mall this is a result of the colonial domination of other traditions and values. Mall states,
Backed by powerful extra philosophical factors, the West succeeded in neglecting and appropriating other cultures, religions, and philosophies. The life-worlds of others were not taken into consideration at all. Unity as uniformity reigned supreme, and the difference was something to be overcome.20

Mall’s point underscores that the present homogenization is not a product of multicultural communication between different life-worlds and human traditions, but rather an enforced declaration of North cultural values to be globally accepted facts.

In a similar vein, Jennifer L.Eagan talks about the present globalization as an enforced one. Eagan presents the “either-or” doctrine of the American foreign policy during the regime of the former president, George W. Bush. Bush’s government after the 11 September 2001 attacks attempted to explain this world of globalization in a logic that says “either you are with us (USA and NATO) or our enemy like the cold war period. She would like to describe the either-or principle of Bush’s globalization in the following manner:

In the United States since 11 September 2001, we have experienced the homogenization of all people into two abstract and overly simple categories of the “good” versus the “bad”... Each of the two categories serves to fix individuals with essential and unchangeable characteristics without nuance or difference.21

These two categories of “good” and “bad” are used to show the unity of individuals in America and the world at large. But the question is what if a person or a state decided to follow a new third way that could transcend the fundamentalists’ false dichotomy, i.e. neither “good” nor “bad”. That is why Eagan suggests that the doctrine of the Bush foreign policy truly implies an enforced homogeneity. This either-or logic may give a choice but only in a false dichotomy. In addition to this, it also lacks communicative rationality.

One may contend at this point that the two ethical categories of goodness and badness in relation to the politics of contemporary world apparently explained through a modern diplomatic ways of rationalizing and discussing about universal human problems. Habermas’ postmetaphysical and discourse ethics underline that the emancipative and communicative ideal of modernity can only be rationalized in a postconventional society where there is non-metaphysical foundations. But, Shadia B. Drury explains that the politics and its practical problems of the twenty-first century are thoroughly biblical. Like
Eagan, he says the world is classified into two ethical camps based on the either-or logic. It is in the context of this logic and rationality George W. Bush expresses the US international policy of categorizing states and people of the world politically as “us” and “them”. Drury in *Terror and Civilization* writes this:

> In the politics of the twenty-first century, we are confronted by two civilizations, each claiming to be privy to the one true revelation; each claiming to be the representative of the one true God; each is convinced that it is on the side of truth and justice, while its enemy is allied with Satan, wickedness, and barbarism…. The language of George W. Bush clearly reflects this dualistic biblical sensibility—and so does the language of Osama bin Laden. The result is that the world loses all complexity; it is polarized into two camps: good and evil, God and Satan, civilization and barbarism, us and them.  

Now we can ask these questions: who are the terrorists? Who are the fundamentalists? Who are the thieves? Who are the exploiters and unjust? These interrogations are fundamentally conceptual questions and thus need to be critically addressed and looked at from different dimensions. In the present age of globalization most of the time the correct answers for the questions are expected from the side of the North. The so-called international organizations such as the UN, World Bank, World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund usually operate in relation to the interest and decisions of the super power of the world, i.e. the United States, and the military as well as economic power of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO). However both Mall and Eagan argue that the present crises of globality can only be solved through intersubjective communications.

For the Philosophy of Liberation the solution of Mall, Eagan and Drury has to be oriented towards the disclosure of the different cultural identities of the world and their integration into communication processes. It is by mutual understanding that a new trans-modern globality is possible. Today we need in our philosophical practice to open up the hidden identities of the “Other” and its reason so that communicative rationality and action take place based in mutual enlightenment of human traditions. The present global questions of development which require democracy, good governance, and above all citizens’ willing to change the state of the world especially in the case of the oppressed must seek first the assurance of liberation. Dussel argues:
... it is necessary to be able to undertake one’s own path of development, different from the European (because up to the present we have been the other face of the same system, but the exploited, dominated, dependent face); and therefore, structural and in-depth changes cannot be ruled out a priori.23

In fact, the imperialists seek to preserve a never-ending hegemonic rule of the world. This is the obvious interest of capitalist society and state. As Hannah Arendt writes in the Origins of Totalitarianism, the imperialist power politics essentially considers strong or mature capital accumulation. Thus, the political assertion of “might is right” serves for the imperialists to establish a new system of domination and exploitation of the non-capitalist areas, evoking mob racial ideologies. The racial doctrines are employed to grant solidarity among imperialist politicians and their people to focus more on the international horizon of making a state great by process of power accumulation. Arendt conceives the imperial accumulation of power as a process of modern dehumanization24. It is a destructive force which occurs in dominating, marginalizing, and killing human beings. She draws an argument that considers the political and economic power of imperialism as a negation of the essence of humanity. So today states and peoples of the global South might take a self-developmental political and economic strategy to challenge the capitalists’ dependency theory.

Nevertheless, it would be hard to the global South to undertake a self-developmental projection from the present standpoint. However in order to establish real development policies and projects there is no any choice to follow a revolutionary economic as well as political program that ignores the dependency logic of capitalism. In this respect, there should be a mutual economic and political dependency between North and South instead of imperial exploitive dependency. We are encountering the profit of a self-developmental project in global peripheries like China, India, and Brazil.
4.3. Where to Go From Here?

Today in the world we are encountering several questions and revolutions of liberation. These questions and revolutions develop on both micro and macro levels. When we look at the question of liberation in the context of the world system especially the economic and political one, Dussel insists that the coloniality of modernity has made the largest portion of the world population poor and dependent. For example he quotes the 1992 statistical report of the UN that states that “80 percent of global humanity” only gets “18 percent of the income.”

This clearly implies that, more than three-fourth of the people of the world is economically dependent on one-fourth of the population. The same is true politically. The Africans, South Americans, Asians and others are still politically dominated in terms of “democratic” election and structures of development and government both locally and internationally. In this regard, the question of liberation is about justice, equality, democracy, and so on.

Now, Dussel would argue that the past and present political, cultural, social, economic, and philosophical drawbacks of global modernity can only be addressed by going into a trans-modern globality.

Trans-modernity (as a project of political, economic, ecological, erotic, pedagogical, and religious liberation) is the co-realization of that which it is impossible for modernity to accomplish by itself: that is, of an incorporative solidarity, which I have called analectic, between center periphery, man woman, different races, different ethnic groups, different classes, civilization/nature, Western culture/Third World cultures, et cetera

This notion of trans-modernity in Dussel expresses that in the global modernity of capitalism there has been a force of exclusion and domination over the “Other”, and consequently, another world seems impossible. Habermas and his followers state the point that rational communicative discourses will lead into the development of democratic dialogue among individuals in a postconventional lifeworld. But the problem of these discourses is that their universalistic claim is fictitious because their critical global project is rooted in capitalist occidental rationalism. Thus, trans-modernity insists on the need for trans-capitalist philosophical traditions of the world. Accordingly, the future globality is all about the possibility of a just democratic world through a trans-
modern polylogue between the diverse philosophies of the planet: “a trans-modern pluriverse (other than universal and not post-modern) appears on the horizon. Now “other philosophies” are possible, because “another world is possible.”

As a point departure therefore, the reason and interpellation of the “Other” opens the way for a trans-modern pluriversal world philosophy. And this philosophy will reconstruct the history of global philosophy. However, in order to achieve this future globality, the Philosophy of Liberation insists, as we pointed out in chapter three, the intellectuals of the world must participate in global critical communicative and emancipative conversations. Most importantly, they must do a revolutionary organic struggle against all forms of dehumanization and social death from the oppressed space and be critical of the status quo. From this it seems possible to argue that, the role of Liberation Philosophy is to change contemporary globalization into a trans-modern globality of the future which strives for a better world. The logic of a pluriversal global philosophy works not in a narrow category of “either-or”, or X is “good” and Y is “bad”, but rather by broadening the horizon of difference so that philosophical communication could reach towards mutual understanding and the development of a truly humane values.
CONCLUSION

As we have seen throughout this thesis, the Philosophy of Liberation is concerned with identifying contemporary global social crises that can only be analyzed through a philosophical mind based in life-experience of the oppressed and the socially dead. The language of praxis used, emphasizes the practicality of revolutionary liberation, and hence to begin with the large suppressed and marginalized populations of the world is inevitable. If our philosophy seeks the emancipation of global humanity, we need to see the real causes of the social sufferings, sicknesses and immature death of peoples in the Third-World. We must confront the unemployment, massive poverty, homelessness, cultural coloniality, dangerous and destructive proliferation of nuclear power in the globe as a way of looking at the world from the perspective of the victims of all these. We think these revolutionary thoughts and feelings provide a promising ground for a just world.

Indeed there are some who argue that the emancipatory project is for humanity as a whole, and thus they reject the privileged position of the “Other” in Liberation Philosophy. Their objection asserts that a non-privileging emancipatory project like Habermas’ communicative theory has to take place. This criticism seems important to avoid any kind of hegemonic race and class order in the world.

However, Dussel’s Liberation Philosophy calls for the emancipation of all humanity: the dominator and the dominated, the exploiter and the exploited. His privileging of the “Other” is not directed toward the hegemonic politics of the poor or the oppressed, but rather the establishment of a just order which goes beyond domination and exclusion. When the oppressed struggles for his humanity against the system of oppression he is also calling his oppressor to be a just man, thus putting himself in a face-to-face ethical relation. Put differently, as we saw in chapter two, Liberation Philosophy is the emancipation of humanity, in that the poor of the world assert their solidaristic moral function of changing the world. Dussel’s response for the above criticism is that his liberation thought essentially works within Habermas’ theory of communication, but not in utopic and abstract sense of Habermas’ modern project of human emancipation.
Based on his empirical analysis of the world Dussela attempts to indicate the limitations of Habermas’ theory of communication. His trans-modern approach is developed as a critique of the limited Eurocentric views of modernity. Against this trans-modern outlook one can argue in favor of the cosmopolitan occidental rationalism of modernity to indicate the point that human liberation is a universal question which requires intersubjective rationality and action within the lifeworld. This is a claim that tries to see occidental rationalism as a universal force in which discussions and consensus take place in our present globalized world. Of course we have two positive ideas here: one is a universal understanding of reason’s attributes for transcending particularities and ideological ethnocentrism, and the second is within this framework we can think of communicative rational solutions to contemporary social challenges.

Trans-modernity is similar to modernity in relation to the power of reason to emancipate humanity. That is why the new orientation of Dussel differs from postmodernism. But the rationality that trans-modernism provides is not a Eurocentric or intra-European way of considering modernity. Instead of this monological understanding, the Philosophy Liberation takes reason as a world perspective in which varieties of rational thoughts and experiences of the philosophical traditions of the world are developed into pluriversal communication and consensus. We call it a trans-modern reason since there is an opening to the hidden philosophical cultures that go beyond occidental rationalism: “modern reason is transcended not as denial of reason as such, but rather as denial of the violent, Eurocentric developmentalist, hegemonic reason.”¹ The new opening into the philosophical traditions of the world does not assert a new ethnocentrism, but rather a mutual enrichment of critical conversation (i.e. polylogue) and solution to the global problems.

Opening to the philosophical traditions of the world according to Dussel, will bring a change in the mode of production. In other words, his trans-modernity tries to solve the socio-economic problems of capitalism, transcending exploitation, alienation, and the injustice imposed on the working class. In his hermeneutic reading of Marx’s *Capital* we concluded that an ethical criticism of capitalism is important to show how the economic system is a core aspect of critical social theory. The Philosophy of Liberation in this
sense criticizes the Habermasian distinction between the lifeworld and system. For Dussel both the lifeworld and system go together, and thus it is important to see the alienation of the worker from the mode of production as similar to the estrangement of the poor and the powerless from the present communicative community. In addition to the economic concern, today’s critical social discourses must look at political, educational, cultural and religious thoughts and systems. Most of the present global problems are products of the world system which started in the fifteenth century by Western Europe. To have a just global system therefore we need a creative, ethical, and critical reflection on the status quo.

It is true that the modern project is not yet fulfilled. In this regard Dussel and Habermas have similar views. But their difference lies in the attempt to fulfill the unfinished concern of modernity. While Habermas devotedly works towards the reconstruction of modernity in the context of an occidental and rational theory of communication, he clearly starts from a Eurocentric position Dussel’s trans-modernity asserts a conception of modernity from the perspective of a politically enriched alterity. In other words, Dussel claims that the underside of modernity should be seen hermeneutically to address the myth of modernity that includes coloniality. He writes,

> The fulfillment of modernity has nothing to do with a shift from the potentialities of modernity to the actuality of European modernity. Indeed, the fulfillment of modernity would be a transcendental shift where modernity and its denied alterity, its victims, would mutually fulfill each other in a creative process. The transmodern project is the mutual fulfillment of the “analectic” solidarity of center/periphery, woman/man, mankind/earth, Western culture/peripheral postcolonial cultures, different races, different ethnicities, different classes. It should be noted here that this mutual fulfillment of solidarity does not take place by pure denial but rather by submption from alterity.

One of the most striking features of liberation theory is a revolutionary method for changing the world. Most people conceive “revolution” has a negative connotation which tends to lead to devastating conflicts, economic strikes by workers, and terror as fundamentalists, are promoting. As far as these peoples’ claim is concerned, how can Liberation Philosophy articulate a project of emancipation around the notion of “revolution”? 

[91]
We argued in chapter two that revolution is seen as a new beginning which affirm political power of alterity. Revolutionary reconstruction must preserve the socioeconomic and political problems of the world (poverty, oppression, exclusion, the imperial developmental fallacy, and so forth), to make a change from the perspective of the exterior. In short, most of the social sufferings of global humanity have to be rearticulated in ways that will bring an end to dehumanization and injustice.

Reconstruction is maintained in the context of revolution in order to have a clear empirical and philosophical idea of modernity in relation to the irrational and sacrificial myths of coloniality. Empirically we can see a global strategy which reinforces the colonial condition and sufferings of majority of the world population to secure the interest of the few. The logic of profit maximization, as we can see today, is highly dependent on the cultural expansion and military power of the industrial world which is led by the United States of America. So, to fight the imperial power and interests it is very important to develop the epistemic force of the “Other,” that is the “interpellation” of justice through a political praxis of the poor.

The reason and interpellation of the “Other” is revolutionary if and only if a critical path of an economic and political philosophy is taken as a major part of contemporary critical social discourses. This is a new path of developmental democracy that arises from the socially manipulated, oppressed and dependent aspects of the modern system. Based on this, “revolutionary democracy” in the Philosophy of Liberation asserts the beginning of a new path of development and social justice by considering the socioeconomic and political sufferings of modernity: “to speak of democracy or politics is not enough. What is necessary is a social or material-economic democracy, and political philosophy articulated adequately through an economic philosophy.”

Nevertheless, to achieve the revolutionary program of liberation theory it seems crucial to emphasize the solidarity of the exploited and excluded. The exploited have the moral right interpellative and articulate the will to labor in relation to justice. Their speech in a communicative rationality and action asserts a social recognition of being human without
alienation. There is no just world that excludes humanity and its culture. As a result of this, human solidarity is essential to end domination, dehumanization, and exclusion. The solidarity of the poor has to be seen as a mechanism in which the system of domination and exclusion can overcome the dominators becoming part of the new just social system. As human liberation starts with the oppressed, the solidarity also develops among them. But in both cases the end is creating social justice in the world.

Putting oneself within the currently enforced homogeneity of the world, one would argue that a trans-modern pluriversal globalization is impossible. Dussel’s response to this objection is that, although the future of his project seems difficult to achieve, he believes that there is a practical necessity to reflect on the diversity of philosophical traditions in the world. If this is so, then a pluriversal communication is necessary to enrich philosophical discussions and solutions for the present social crises as noted in the last two chapters. Wimmer states that it is impossible to hold a polylogue without abstractions and valuations. In the case of Liberation Philosophy a trans-modern globality is expressed not hypothetically, but rather in the practical essentials of transcending modernity using the epistemic power of pluriversal indigenous philosophical thoughts of the world. Instead of assuming the intra-European rationality as universal, the new path must involve broadened historical origins of reason and develop the varieties of world reason in such a way that a universal philosophical mode of communication becomes possible. The argument here is that real universality always arises from the pluriversal rational communication.

Active intellectual practice is revolutionary since there is an organic link of intellectuals and their society. Thus Liberation Philosophy stresses that solidarity and justice are basic ideas to develop organic critique of the ongoing asymmetric power relations in the political and economic, cultural and racial spheres of local and international societies. Organic intellectuals’ role in this case is not a total negation of the status quo, but rather a critical understanding of the local and global problems from the perspective of an existential responsibility to secure human dignity and authenticity. It is based on this existential responsibility that one’s self-forgetfulness and cultural dissemble might be
solved. If local, regional, and global contemporary social crises directly related with the modern world system, we need to explore the different horizons of the world and questioning its structures.

The praxis of a revolutionary liberation is fulfilled only to the extent that critical thinkers fight intellectually dehumanization and depersonalization. Since it is necessary to create a just human world, the revolution of organic intellectuals develops within effective dialogical communication to preserve the goal of human liberation from ideological and economic manipulations, class contradictions, and cultural impositions. In the present global situation, the imperialists see domination as a necessary condition to preserve the status quo. The US-led globalization, as we have said in the forth chapter, follows an enforced strategy of homogenization that employs an either-or logic. So the communication of a trans-modern world should invite pluriversal discussion and action. Dussel asserts that the future trans-modern global orientation is directed towards the realization of humanity in a revolutionary communication. This is to say, without communicative action there would be no true humanization. If this is so, then there has to be a functional criticism to the ongoing system of the world and its catastrophes. The solution to our global problems can only be developed through a united action of the people of the world in solidarity and love. Hence, the Dusselian trans-modern critical social theory tries to reconstruct the human world in an ethical ground.

As previously stated in relation to the Fanonian liberation theory there is a possibility of creating a better world. The struggle of organic intellectuals aims at changing the world. To change the present world therefore we need to have an ethical openness to the social problems including massive poverty, diseases, wars, and immature deaths. This could be taken as a crucial phase of communicative action between critical intellectuals and people. As Freire argues, a revolutionary praxis of world transformation and its goal of humanization essentially rest in the development of an organic relation between leaders or intellectuals and their people. For him “the road to revolution involves openness to the people, not imperviousness to them; it involves communion with the people, not mistrust.” It is very important to rethink Fanon’s idea of creating a better world and a new history in the context of the human affirmation of liberation.
To conclude this thesis, then, let me raise the following points. On the one hand, Liberation Philosophy has a lot to do in communicating and enriching the philosophical traditions of the world, most importantly the marginalized critical traditions. To achieve this, present intellectuals and revolutionary leaders must understand the resources and needs of their people through research and dialogue. This can be possible in two ways: first by transcending the banking idea of knowledge into an authentic existential understanding of society, and second, through communication among human traditions in response to fundamental ontological problems. It seems crucial to take the concept of “revolution” of the Philosophy of Liberation as a new beginning in the ethical sense by identifying modern social crises and developing a trans-modern pluriverse and just global system. This requires the promotion of a face-to-face communication. As Marx said, the essential ethical critique of the existing economic system of the world would be a worthwhile understanding to achieve a genuine liberation of human beings by overcoming alienation. On the other hand, at this last stage I would argue that the Dusselian project should be critical in transcending the prejudices of so called “consensus” in communicative action in such a way that human beings of the world would be able to make autonomous rational choices of their own in relation to fulfilling their emancipatory ends. In a pluriversal trans-modern globality human beings are organic agents for the recreation of new socio-economic and political histories.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. This idea of “pluriversal” is discussed in chapter three and four.


3. Enrique Dussel offers a trans-modern perspective to solve the problem of modernity by going beyond the hegemonic politics of domination and marginalization. This is a new perspective that recognizes plurality of social realities and critical exploration towards the wretched of the earth.

CHAPTER ONE: A PREPARATORY ANALYSIS ON LIBERATION THEORY


3. ibid. p.13-19

4. ibid. p.15

5. ibid. p. 16

6. See H. Mark Roelofs “Liberation theology: The recovery of Biblical Radicalism,” “The American political science Review,” Vol. 82, No.2 (Jun. 1988), p. 557. In this page Roelofs explicitly explains that liberation theology emerges on the basis of challenging the traditional option of the church for the “have” class: “The emergent church, looking to Jesus as its founder, declares “an option for the poor.” In contradiction, the “established” or “traditional” or “bourgeois” church is depicted as having sustained throughout the modern era “an option for the Middle class.” In addition to Roelofs, Ron Rhodes in his article “Christian Revolution in Latin America: the Changing Face of Liberation Theology,” “Part One in a Three-Part Series on Liberation Theology”, (http://www.ronrhodes.org/Liberation.html, January, 2011, p.10 talks about the hermeneutic reading of the Bible by the poor: “in liberation theology, the basic authority in interpretation ceases to be scripture; it is rather the mind of the interpreter as he “reads” the current historical situation...”


9. Karl Marx, *Early Writings of Marx* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1975), p. 244, and this is the part in which Marx’s critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of right that shows how the oppressed is enslaved in reality because of the fantasy of his illusory existence in religion, which is necessitated by the Capitalist Mode of Production.


15. The “non-person” is the term that Gutierrez uses to refer the poor, oppressed, or those who are inhuman misery or social death.


22. This notion of “be-ing” is discussed by Professor M.B Ramose to insist the point that every philosophical reflection evolves in a continuous search of the everydayness experiences. For him A. Shute’s definition of philosophy as “a rigorous, self-critical intellectual discipline” could have its own significance in extracting and introducing the rich philosophical contents from the non-philosophical human culture. See Ramose’s article, “I Doubt, therefore African Philosophy Exists”, in *South African Journal Philosophy*, (Pretoria: PSSA and the Faculty of Humanities, 2002), p.121


26. ibid.

27. ibid. p.423


31. ibid. p. 249


33. ibid. pp.327-330


39. ibid. p.3

40. ibid. p. xxii

41. ibid. pp. 7-1

CHAPTER TWO: THE NEGATION OF MODERN COLONIALITY: THE POLITICS OF “OTHERNESS” IN DUESSEL’S LIBERATION PHILOSOPHY


2. ibid. p. 21

3. ibid. p.20


6. ibid. see part II the Meditations

7. ibid. Meditations, Part II

8. ibid.

9. ibid. Meditations, part IV

11. ibid. p.10

12. ibid.

13. ibid. p.11


15. ibid. p.30


17. Jill Vance Buroker, *Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: An Introduction* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), See pp.201-204 ---the two terms, phenomena and noumena first coined in philosophy by Goltfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s *Discourse on Metaphysics*, to signify objects of “Sensory representations” and “things-in-themselves”, respectively. For Leibniz we can know thing-in-itself through intellectual intuition that takes the light from the “intelligible substances” or “monads”.

18. ibid. p.202

19. ibid. p.109


23. ibid. p. 160


27. ibid. pp. 158-163
28. ibid. p. 165
29. See V. Y Mudimbe’s analysis of the relationship between power and otherness most importantly focusing on the primitivism, functionalism, evolutionism, Marxism and other anthropological Eurocentric and ethnocentric discourses. But concerning the invention of Africa in the colonial discourse/power it is more important to ponder the first page of his *Invention of Africa Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indian. University Press, 1988)
30. ibid. p. 4
37. ibid. p. 10
39. ibid. pp. 48-49
40. a. ibid p. 63, and b. ibid. p.72
43. Jurgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Frederick Lawrence (trans.), (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987), see the very line of the preface page.
44. ibid. In the introduction section Thomas McCarthy presents where Habermas acknowledges postmodern thinkers for their significant implication to shift from metaphysics into language, for instance, “Nietzsche’s heroic proclamation of the end of philosophy, Wittgenstein’s therapeutic Farwell, and Heidegger’s dramatic overcoming”. This shift enables Habermas to see language as a center of his communicative theory. Beyond that he also appreciates Foucault’s emphasis on social and historical natures of social discourses and power that laid their own significant contribution to the validity claim of communicative theory, and also Derrida’s analysis of discourses in their “rhetorical literary means”.


46. ibid.


52. ibid.


54. ibid.


57. ibid.
58. ibid. p. ix
59. See Enrique Dussel’s *the Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, Eduardo Mendieta (ed.), (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), especially his idea of social class contradictions within a state and racial North south conflicts on pages 30-31
60. ibid. p. 30

CHAPTER THREE: REASON, INTERPELLATION OF THE “OTHER” AND INSTALLATION OF THE PRAXIS OF A COMMUNICATIVE RATIONALITY

6. ibid. p.132


13. ibid. p. 117


16. ibid. pp.172-173

17. ibid. p. 183

18. ibid. p. 190


24. ibid. p.152


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28. ibid. p.126


31. ibid. p. 21

32. ibid. p.24

33. ibid.

34. ibid. p.36


37. ibid. p. 2

38. ibid.

39. ibid. p. 4


42. Enrique Dussel “A New Age in the History of Philosophy: The World Dialogue between Philosophical Traditions” (Seoul, Korea, August 2, 2008), p. 11-14


CHAPTER FOUR: LIBERATION PHILOSOPHY’S EXISTENTIAL INTERROGATIONS OF GLOBALITY

5. ibid.p.217
6. ibid.p.181
7. ibid. pp. 181-182
8. ibid. p. 192
9. ibid. p.194
10. ibid. p.196
11. ibid. p.205
12. ibid
13. ibid. p.212
14. ibid. p.217
15. ibid. p. 218
16. ibid. p.220
17. ibid


27. ibid.

CONCLUSION


2. ibid. pp. 473-474


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___________ “Philosophy in Latin America in the Twentieth Century: Problems and Currents,” (www.afyl.org/dussel1.pdf, 18 December, 2010 18/10/11 10:45 am)


