THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF SOUTH SUDAN’S SECESSION FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA

BY

IBRAHIM KEDIR

ADDIS ABABA

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THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF SOUTH SUDAN’S SECESSION FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA

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BY: IBRAHIM KEDIR

ADVISOR: YASIN MOHAMMED (PhD)

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
CENTER FOR AFRICAN AND ORIENTAL STUDIES

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CENTER FOR AFRICAN AND ORIENTAL STUDIES

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Approved by the Board of Examiners:

________________________  ______________  _____________
Advisor                  Signature                  Date

________________________
External Examiner

________________________  ______________  _____________
Internal Examiner        Signature                  Date
Table of Contents

Acknowledgment ......................................................................................................................... i

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ ii

Acronyms .......................................................................................................................................... iii

Chapter One ...................................................................................................................................... 1

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1

   1.1 Background ............................................................................................................................... 1

   1.2. Statement of the Problem .......................................................................................................... 4

   1.3. Objectives of the study .............................................................................................................. 5

      1.3.1 General Objective ................................................................................................................ 5

      1.3.2 Specific Objectives .............................................................................................................. 6

   1.4 Research Questions .................................................................................................................. 6

   1.5 Research Method ...................................................................................................................... 6

      1.5.1 Qualitative Design .............................................................................................................. 6

      1.5.2 Data Collection .................................................................................................................... 7

      1.5.3 Data Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 7

   1.6. Ethical Considerations ............................................................................................................ 8

   1.7. Limitation and Delimitation of the Study .............................................................................. 8

   1.8. Significance of the Study ....................................................................................................... 9

   1.9. Organization of the Study ...................................................................................................... 9

Chapter Two ..................................................................................................................................... 10

2. Conceptual Framework ............................................................................................................. 10

   2.1 Security .................................................................................................................................... 10

   2.2 Securitization ............................................................................................................................ 13
2.3. A New Framework for Analysis of Security ................................................................. 15
   2.3.1 Military Sector ......................................................................................................... 16
   2.3.2 Environmental Sector ............................................................................................ 17
   2.3.3 Economic Sector ..................................................................................................... 18
   2.3.4 Societal Sector ....................................................................................................... 19
   2.3.5 Political Sector ....................................................................................................... 20
2.4 Understanding Regional Security Complex .................................................................. 21
2.5 Viewing the Horn of Africa as a Regional Security Complex ...................................... 23
Chapter Three .................................................................................................................. 25
3. The Sudanese Civil Wars ............................................................................................... 25
   3.1. Background .............................................................................................................. 25
   3.2. The First Civil War (1955-1972) ........................................................................... 27
   3.3 The Addis Ababa Agreement ..................................................................................... 30
   3.4 The Second Civil War (1983-2005) ....................................................................... 31
   3.5. Towards a New Agreement ...................................................................................... 34
   3.6. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ......................................................... 36
       3.6.1 Power and Wealth Sharing Protocols ............................................................... 37
   3.7. The Secession .......................................................................................................... 38
Chapter Four .................................................................................................................... 39
4. Understanding the Security Implications of the South Sudan Secession for the Sub-
   Region ................................................................................................................................ 39
   4.1. South Sudan-Sudan Relations: Outstanding CPA Issues ......................................... 39
       4.1.1. Management of the Oil Sector ........................................................................... 39
       4.1.2. Conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Niles .................................................... 42
4.1.2.1. Merging Conflict of the Two Sudan’s Along the South Kordofan-Unity Border .................................................................................................................. 44

4.1.3. Status of Abyei ................................................................................................................. 45

4.2. From Civil War to Independent State: Understanding South Sudan Relations with the Neighbors in Security Perspectives .......................................................................................................................... 48

4.2.1. South Sudanese-Ugandan Perspectives .............................................................................. 48

4.2.1.1. UPDF Intervention in the Current South Sudan Conflict ..................................................... 50

4.2.2. Ethio-South Sudan Security Dilemma .................................................................................. 51

4.2.2.1. The Current Conflict in South Sudan: Spillover effect to Gambella .................................. 54

4.2.3 Kenyan-South Sudanese Relations ..................................................................................... 55

4.2.3.1. After the South Sudan Independence: Role for Kenya ....................................................... 57

4.2.4. South Sudan-Eritrea Perspective ....................................................................................... 58

4.3. The Current South Sudan Conflict: A New Arena for Regional Competition .................... 60

4.3.1. Sudan Vs Uganda ............................................................................................................... 61

4.3.2. Ethiopia VS Eritrea ............................................................................................................ 63


4.4.1. Phase One: September 1993–May 2002 ............................................................................ 67

4.4.2. Phase two: May 2002–January 2005 ............................................................................... 68

Chapter Five ............................................................................................................................... 71

5. Conclusion and Recommendations ............................................................................................ 71

5.1 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 71

5.2 Recommendations .................................................................................................................. 74

Reference
Appendices

Appendix A: Interview Questionnaire

Appendix B: Map: Horn of Africa

Appendix C: Map: Sudan

Appendix D: Map: South Sudan

Appendix E: Map: Sudan and South Sudan Border Disputes and Conflicts
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Abstract

South Sudan, after more than two decades of civil war, got its independence in July 2011. Even though South Sudan seceded from its mother state, its relation with the north is yet to be resolved. Today, relations between Khartoum and Juba are heavily influenced by the outstanding issues in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which have created obstacles to progress in both the Sudan and South Sudan. Important unresolved CPA issues include fair and equitable oil revenue-sharing between Sudan and South Sudan, conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Niles, and the status of Abyei. Hence, in order to maintain peace and security in the region, normalizations of relations between the two Sudan is of fundamental importance. The contention of this thesis is that the South Sudan secession has several security implications for the countries of the Horn of African region. Source of inspiration for other would be states (those in demand of secession), an influx of refugees, spillover nature of conflicts and renewed bilateral relations are among the implications. Through data analysis of primary and secondary sources the paper will provide the rationale of the thesis.
Acronyms

AU—African Union
AUHIP—African Union High Level Implementation Panel
CPA—Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DoP—Declaration of Principles
DUP—Democratic Unionist Party
GNU—Government of National Unity
GoSS—Government of South Sudan
GRS—Government Republic of Sudan
IGADD—Inter-Governmental Authority for Drought and Desertification
IGAD—Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
JEM—Justice and Equality Movement
LAPSSET—Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Corridor
LRA—Lord’s Resistance Army
NCP—National Congress Party
NIF—National Islamic Front
OAU—Organization of African Unity
RSC—Regional Security Complex
RCCNS—Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation
SAF—Sudanese Armed Force
SANU—Sudan African Nationalist Union
SDBZ—Safe Demilitarized Border Zone
SPLA-IO—Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition
SPLA--Sudanese People Liberation’s Army
SPLM-N—Sudanese People Liberation’s Movement-North
SPLM—Sudanese people Liberation’s Movement
SRF—Sudanese Revolutionary Front
SSLM—Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
UNF—United National Front
UNISFA—United Nation Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMIS—United Nation Mission in Sudan
UPDF—Ugandan People’s Defense Force
Chapter One

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

The Horn of Africa\(^1\) is one of the most politically unstable and most deprived regions in Africa, if not in the world. Nearly all states in the region, at one time or another experienced some form of domestic insurgencies and intra-state violence and most states in the region show signs of fragility, political suppression and authoritarian political system (Mandrup, 2012: 6; Healy, 2012: 6; Berouk 2011: 2).

The region has long faced and continuous to face enormous political instability and economic challenges. In a continent that has had a disproportionately high share of global conflicts and political instability, it stands out as the most conflict ridden often infamously known for indignities its people have went and continue to go through (Assefaw, 2012: 43). Often the region functions as regional security complex, a community of states in which the security of any one country is intimately connected to the security of all others (Healy, 2011: 39). The Eritrea war of independence, border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the longest civil war in north-south Sudan could all be a case in point.

Within a geo-political perspective, the Horn of Africa is one of the most strategic locations for Africa as well as world economies. Thus, the region has always been allotted a relatively important and expeditious rout of international trade (Berouk 2011).

Since independence, the Horn of Africa has witnessed an influx of secessionist movements resulted from a multitude of factors. This painful and violent question of state formation and disintegration is evident in the dynamics of Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan and the South, Somalia and Somaliland (Healy, 2008: 39). Self-determination is a highly charged in all the countries of the region. This has undermined the territorial integrity of the Horn of African states (Makinda, 1982).

\(^1\) For the purpose of this research, only six countries are selected. These are; Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda.
The Horn of Africa is also famed with long and protracted conflicts. It has occurred at every level within states, between states, among proxies, between armies, at the center and periphery. The magnitude of violent conflict in this region, taken over time, is greater than in any other African region (Healy, 2012). It has been both prevalent and persistence, with multiple examples of both civil war and inter-state war (Healy, 2008: 9). In fact, the African continents longest civil running intra-state conflicts, the Eritrean and South Sudanese conflict, with an untold number of deaths and causalities, took place in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011: 3). As a result, the region is well Known for the deaths and maiming of hundreds of thousands, the internal displacement of millions and the flight of refugees across borders in the millions (Assefaw, 2012: 44).

The civil war in Sudan (the longest in Africa) started at independence from British colonial rule in 1956. Failure of the British government to provide an equitable power sharing for both sides of North and South contributed for the eruption of the war. The political and economic marginalization of the Southern Sudanese, Arabization and Islamization carried out in the South by successive Khartoum governments from 1949 onwards also played a critical part in stirring up the civil war (Seri-Hersche, 2013: 6).

After 17 years of bloody fighting, the first civil war came to a halt with the signing of the Addis Ababa accord in 1972. The accord stipulated that Southern Sudan was to benefit from arrangements of power-sharing and most notably from the right to enjoy regional autonomy (Kassahun 2014: 53). Accordingly, the South was made a self governing unit (Ibid). However, the agreement only lasted for around 10 years. Violations of certain points of the accord led to the eruption of the second civil war (Varma, 2011: 4). This time, the conflict was between the government and the opposition movement named the Sudanese People Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), which was formed in 1983 in Ethiopia.

The second civil war was directly related to the first civil war (Wama, 1997). Nevertheless, while the goal of the first civil war was to achieve autonomy, the second war, championed by the SPLA/M, was to restructure the country into a new Sudan that would be free from any discrimination due to race, ethnicity, religion, culture, or gender (Deng cited in Seri-Hersche, 2013).
Although, reconciliation efforts such as the *Machacos* protocol, a peace agreement signed in 2002, settled the 19 years of civil war, sporadic human rights violation continued (ISS, 2012). The 2002 peace agreement prompted South Sudan’s right to self-determination and was followed by the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

The CPA is the composite of six agreements namely; the *Machakos* protocol, the protocol on security arrangements, and the protocol on resolution of conflicts in the three areas of Nuba Mountains, and the Blue Nile signed in Kenya between 2002 and 2004 by the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A (Kassahun, 2014: 54). The agreement anticipated a permanent ceasefire and consensus on wealth and power sharing. With some justification and despite its alleged shortcomings, the CPA is viewed as an important milestone in shaping the stage for the transformation towards a better future anchored in equality, democracy and justice (Ibid.).

As stipulated in the CPA, an interim period of six years was agreed upon to implement affirmative action in order to persuade the South to unite with, rather than to secede from the North. Nevertheless, Southern citizens participated in a referendum of a January 2011 where by more than 99 percent indicated their preference to secede (BBC, 2011). The outcome of the successive civil wars enabled South Sudan to conduct a referendum and eventually gain independence on July 2011.

The incident of 2011 referendum that witnessed the emergence of a new nation on the Horn of Africa sent a plethora of fear and concerns both among scholars and several African leaders. Among the concerns were that South Sudan would be a source of inspiration for other would-be states in Africa, such as, Ogaden (in Ethiopia), and Darfur (in Sudan) (Kassahun 2014: 65; Angelo & McGuinnes, 2012: 20). There were frequent incidents were the civil war in South Sudan spilled over to the neighboring countries. For instance, the Gambella region in Ethiopia has been and still is the destination for the influx of refugees, which threatened the security of the region.

The South Sudan independence has also created in a new relationship with the neighboring states, which this paper attempt to understand.
1.2. Statement of the Problem

On July 9, 2011, South Sudan achieved independence from the northern state of Sudan to become the youngest nation in the world. South Sudan is the second case of a successful secession in post-colonial Africa after Eritrea independence in 1993. The founding of a sovereign Southern Sudan state would have multidimensional implications, not only domestic implication, but would also affect regions power configuration and reshape its security and political environment (Hemmer, 2010).

Alarming statements made by several African leaders and researchers unveiled that this topic is critical to be studied. In one occasion, the then Libyan leader col. Muammar Gaddafi warned that Sudan could become a contagious disease that affect the whole of Africa (Temin, 2010). On another times he predicted that “the beginning of the cracks in Africa’s map”. Algerian foreign minister added “the partitioning will have fatal repercussions on the African continent”. Chadian president also cautioned “we all have North and South. If we accept the breakup of Sudan, the domino effect will be inevitable and it would be a disaster for the continent” (Ibid).

Indeed, the separation of South Sudan sent a wave of fear among African states and especially in countries that neighbor Sudan. Hemmer (2010: 2) contends that Southern Sudan has always been deeply enmeshed in the geo-politics of the Horn and Central Africa. Nevertheless, the partition of Sudan and the establishment of South would drastically alter the regions political playing field.

The Horn of Africa where South Sudan belongs is noted for the taking shape and escalation of violent conflicts marked by rebel activities, military coups ethnic and ideology-based insurgencies inter-state rivalry and state collapse (Kassahun, 2014: 53). Considering this facts, what is dangerous is that secession of South Sudan leads to a dramatic change in the geo-strategic nature of the region of the Horn of Africa (Widdatallah, 2012). Angelo & Mc Guinness (2012) views South Sudanese independence as additional layers of instability and complexity to the already volatile region. It further adds an additional layer of fragility to an area that can be characterized as highly insecure, a vast area of violence that moreover easily spills over into other countries.
From a geo-political perspective, the splitting of Sudan into two states may be regarded with apprehension by political leaders in whose countries share similar ethnic, cultural, economic and political divides. For such observers, the primary point is that the fracture of Sudan could serve as model for similar conflicts elsewhere in the region (Angelo & Mc Guinness, 2012: 14). The contention is that if the Southern population could separate from Sudan and become independent, why other peoples can’t do the same, in context that can be considered as comparable to the Sudanese. One can consider the cases of Somaliland (in Somalia), the Ogaden (in Ethiopia), and Darfur (in Sudan) whose political entrepreneurs aspire for secession and could as a result gain impetus, thereby leading to turbulence of a wider scale in the region (Kassahun 2014: 65).

Previous researches regarding South Sudanese secession focused on for example the secession and causes for external recognition (Newbery, 2012). The paper analyzed the forces behind how secession states come to be recognized and gain international sovereignty taking South Sudan and Somaliland as a case. Other research addressed the social dimensions of the South Sudanese secession (Yousif, 2013). Of particular importance to researchers were also the prospect and implications of South Sudan secession on Nile Basin hydro politics (Lino, 2013).

However, research with regards to the South Sudan secession and its security implication for the Horn of African states is minimal and leave a Knowledge gap on the available literatures. Thus, this research analyzes the security implications of the South Sudan secession for the Horn of Africa. It attempts to contribute to fill the gap in the existing literatures.

1.3. Objectives of the study

1.3.1. General Objective

The purpose of this research study is to understand the security implications of the South Sudan secession for the Horn of Africa.
1.3.2. Specific Objectives

1. Examining the historical and current relations of the two Sudan.
2. Analyzing the effects of South Sudan secession on the remaining parts of Sudan.
3. Examining the relations of Sudan and South Sudan with the neighboring countries (Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya & Eritrea) from civil war to independence.
4. Exploring the impact of the South Sudan secession on the sub-regional states.
5. Examining regional institutional response to the security challenges of the region.

1.4. Research Questions

Central research question: - What are the security implications of South Sudan’s Secession for the Horn of Africa?

Sub research questions pertinent to the general question are:

1. What do the historical and current relations of Sudan and South Sudan look like?
2. What are the effects of South Sudan secession on the remaining parts of Sudan?
3. What does the South Sudan independence mean for neighboring countries (Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and Eritrea) in terms of alliance, alignment, destabilizing actions and conflict of interests?
4. What are the impacts of the South Sudan secession for countries of the sub-region?
5. How regional institutions (like IGAD) do respond to the security challenges of the region?

1.5. Research Method

1.5.1. Qualitative Design

Qualitative research is “social or behavioral science without the numbers” (Newman, 2011). It is concerned with subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behavior (Kothari, 2004; Creswell, 2012). Qualitative approach enables to develop an in depth
exploration of a central phenomenon (Creswell, 2012). It, moreover, enables to understand a certain phenomenon. The study follows descriptive research approach.

This study paper is entirely dependent on qualitative inquiry. Thus, the researcher will be able to have an in depth look of the problem.

1.5.2. Data Collection

As defined by Newman (2011: 9) data collection is “the forms of empirical evidence or information carefully collected according to the rules and procedures of science”. Both primary and secondary method of data collection is used to conduct the research.

**Primary Data:** - primary data are those which are collected afresh and for the first time, and thus happens to be original in character (Kothari, 2004). Methods of collecting primary involves; observation, interview, questioners, content analysis and etc (Ibid). This research employed documents relevant to the topic. In addition, interview with key informants is also held in order to meet the research objectives.

Documents: consists of public and private records that qualitative researcher obtains about a site or participant in a study, and they can include newspapers minutes of meetings, personal journals and letters. Essential documents like the Addis Ababa agreement of the 1972 and the CPA is scrutinized.

**Secondary Data:** - refers to the data which have already been collected and analyzed by someone else (Kothari, 2004). For the purposes of this study, books, published journals and newspaper articles are extensively used.

1.5.3. Data Analysis

Data analysis is defined as involving a number of closely related operations which are performed with the purpose of summarizing the collected data and organizing them in such a manner that they answer the research questions” (Kothari, 2004: 122). Hence, data collected through different instruments are analyzed to answer the central question “what are the security implications of the South Sudan secession for the Horn of Africa” and the sub-research questions thereof.
1.6. Ethical Considerations

In order to maintain the integrity of the research and the dignity of the interviewee, the researcher adopted ethical consideration approaches to avoid risks and build on trust between the researcher and the participant. In addition, the researcher is responsible to maintain that trust, just as participants expect, maintain and analyze the data they provide and not unveil their names due to anonymity. Therefore, the researcher maintained anonymity of one of the key informant as requested by. The participants are informed about the purposes of the study and the duration of time it take. Moreover, the information they provided is appropriately used without distortion and misinterpretation.

All material sources employed for this research purpose are all cited and acknowledged in the appropriate manner.

1.7. Limitation and Delimitation of the Study

Several factors challenged the research both during collection of data and analyzing and writing of the report. Firstly, there were many academicians, international institutions and experts in the list of key informants, but only two informants were interviewed. The attempt to incorporate the ideas of regional organizations, IGAD & EAC, didn’t succeed because of time. The researcher also approached the Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan; unfortunately the officials in charge were not available during the time of data collection. Hence, the researcher is forced to significantly rely on the existing literatures.

On the other hand, the complex and dynamic nature of the research area is another limitation. Moreover, the South Sudan case is still ongoing and much complicated, which was a stumbling block in understanding the problem.

The South Sudan secession has a multitude of implications for the region under study. However, this research paper is restricted to analyzing the security sector. Even though the South Sudan secession could have an implication felt well beyond the Horn of Africa, the paper is restricted to the sub-region. Thus, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and Eritrea are selected because of political, historical and cultural reasons.
The research design is limited to only using qualitative approach in order to better understand the central phenomenon. Therefore, quantitative approach is not used.

1.8. Significance of the Study

This research paper fundamentally helps to fill the gap in the available literatures. It is, furthermore, a good input for academics, researchers, governmental and non-governmental organizations to understand the security implications of the South Sudan secession for the sub-region.

This research could also be used as a preliminary input for researchers engaged in understanding the relations between Sudan and South Sudan (especially in the aftermath of the secession) as well as the politics of the Horn of African region.

1.9. Organization of the Study

This paper dealt with the security implications of the South Sudan secession for the Horn of Africa. Thus, the second chapter is about conceptualizing terms related with security. The third chapter attempts to understand the Sudan-South Sudan relations from colonial era to the secession. The next chapter, which is the main part of the research, analyzes the security implications of the South Sudan secession for the sub-region. Finally it provides concluding notes and recommendations.
Chapter Two

2. Conceptual Framework

2.1. Security

The term security, has demonstrated controversies in relation to its conceptualization; but its simplest explanation should be initially characterized as the freedom from threats, anxiety, danger or political coercion (Anne & V.Spike, 1999). However, the political thinkers have described the term as one of those common sense, pre-defined terms in the international relations orthodoxy that appears to be simple until examined with a critical eye (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). Although this definition may fall under critical debate, it is worth noting that in the years preceding the end of the Cold War, security was mainly focused on military power and the relations between/among sovereign states those predominantly spearheaded by the two Superpowers of the time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (USA).

It is also important to emphasize the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end up of the Cold War. Therefore, the end of the Cold War neither eliminated the international security threats nor regional vulnerabilities. Thus, the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States was another insecurity catastrophe which deeply exposed the traditional differences among the mainstream theories of the international relations those mainly focuses on security and peace (Booth, 2007). For example, the differences between the camps of traditional realism and critical theories have demonstrated an extreme debates and disagreement over the concept.

The realism mainly advocated the strengthening of conventional security instruments and the borders of states, or building and establishing strong institutions responsible for governance in order to strengthen domestic control to prevent either people or governments not felt further intensified fears and threats (Chris & Kirsten, 2005). According to this argument, to ensure security at the national level, governments should be recommended to trust their ability to deter attacks or to defend against them.
(Christopher, 2005). In this regard, such capacity has centered on the uses of military power among nation-states.

Furthermore, it deserves mention that Governments have traditionally been solely responsible for providing their own security which commonly referred as strategic security. But, in the contemporary world politics the re-conceptualization of security has been institutionalized under the cover of collective security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009).

This re-formulation rests upon an understanding that security threats are not necessarily political in nature, although the repercussions of such threats eventually may call for political solutions. But there are non-political threats against security, for instance, environmental problems have not usually been incorporated in definitions of security, yet the political repercussions from environmental degradation are increasingly being realized plus poverty, diseases, among others.

On the other hand, while the critical theory is a new and heterodox approach which emerged in the 1990s; it mainly rejects the realist or neo-realist arguments over the security (Andrew, 2007). According to the critical theorists, although those who carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks have destructed the icons of the world’s most greatest and powerful nation; America’s response has created unnecessary human suffering which remains a central fact of international life. Therefore, critical theory argues that although it is hard to ignore the changes brought by September 11, this change does neither justify to any form of domination nor collective punishment (Burchill et al. 2005). But, domination or collective punishment should be terminated or removed; peace, freedom, justice and equality for all should be promoted and encouraged. Nevertheless, the unfinished war on ‘terrorism’ spearheaded by Washington and London has so far done little to satisfy the critical theorist’s concerns.

In light of the latter argument, societies and individuals have become the primary concern of the issue of security in post-Cold War era. In mid-1990s, ‘human security’ emerged as a hallmark of the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’. This concept has not eliminated the role, responsibility and sovereignty of the state, but has certainly altered the power of the state (J. Maclean et al. 2006). In this sense, connecting the state security with the
human security is the most important thing that is hard to ignore and deserves explanation. To put it in another way, it is important to put emphasis on the protection of an individual welfare which is more important than the state.

Regardless of these contending ideas over the term, security should be regarded as a matter of ensuring national pride and survival with preserving the human dignity and integrity of the citizens; while it is widely believed that human and state can neither survive nor live unless there is peace, security, justice and stability (Burke, 2007).

On the other hand, it deserves mentioning the link between survival and security. However, survival is equated with existence or enduring as a physical being, while security is described as a survival-plus, thus, plus here is the choice that comes from (relative) freedom from existential threats and it is this freedom that gives security its instrumental value (Booth, 2007). Therefore, this evolution is linked to the increasing tendency of threats in societies that arise from internal or external factors. Nevertheless, survival, neither guarantees security, nor eliminate threats.

In this conceptual framework, security didn’t stand regime security, it refers both to human and state in the dawn of the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, the responsibility of formulating and implementing security strategy and policy by responsible government aims to address and eliminate the causes and fears of dissatisfaction of the citizens such as economic, political or social instability. This, however, could be regarded as one of the most effective ways that brings a long-term solution for the existing problems and preserves the security of the individuals for one hand, and the protection of the state apparatuses in the long-term for the other, since the nation-state is no longer the sole unit to be protected.

Essentially, “security means survival in the face of an existential threat” (Buzan et al. 1998: 27). This However needs to be seen in respect to securitization processes and how various actors securitize each other.
2.2. Securitization

If ‘Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics as above politics. Then, ‘Securitization’ can be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. According to Buzan and Wæver & de Wilde (1998) Securitization is defined as a “process where an actor securitizes a threat by proclaiming it as a threat”. This process is important to follow when conducting security analysis, because it will allow to understand the power-relation between actors and the nature of the threat. A threat is seen as a continuum ranging from ‘non-politicized’, ‘politicized’ to ‘securitized’ any issue can be placed in this Continuum, where the status of securitized is acquired when a security move is successful (Ibid). A successful securitization consists of three steps. These are: (1) identification of existential threats; (2) emergency action; and (3) effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules (Buzan et al. 1998: 6).

A security move is a speech act where an actor tries to securitize a threat, by speaking about it as a threat. To establish that a speech act is not only speech but an action in itself, which is “dependent on social position of the enunciator and thus in a wider sense is inscribed in a social field” (Buzan et al, 1998: 46). The securitization is thus becoming inter-subjective and thereby reliant on the acceptance of the audience to become legitimate, or in other words; if a certain threat is not accepted as such by the audience it will not gain the status of securitized. By stating this, Buzan and Wæver & de Wilde (1998) also state that studying and understanding securitization is to study discourses. The underlying aspect of this refers to an actor’s understanding of threat as something real, it does not however matter if the threat is real or not, but to what extent it is constructed as a real threat. The threat becomes real if it is fully securitized e.g. the relevant actors accept it as a real threat. By being fully securitized it becomes legitimate to break the common rules and procedures in order to deal with the discursive established

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2 ‘Non-politicized’ meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way an issue of public debate and decision. Through ‘politicized’ meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocation. To ‘securitize’ is the issue is presented as an existential treat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure (Buzan et al, 1998: 23-24).
existential threat (Buzan et al, 1998: 25). E.g. one could raise the Iraq war as a case in point. The war was initiated on the premise that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, which was an existential threat to the US. The US securitized it by speaking about it as a threat in order to gain support for the war.

Threats will at times arise and the securitization will happen on another particular end, however if the threat is persistent the securitization can become institutionalized. This is seen mostly with threats regarding the military sector, where the armed forces of other nations or non-state actors have posse threats for centuries. A defense system will in such situations have been built as an answer to the threat. This institutionalization is often based on an ad hoc measurement taken in by the actor and as the ad hoc threat becomes persistent, the security aspect becomes institutionalized (Buzan et al, 1998: 27). Buzan et al (1998) contends that the speech act’s approach to security analysis includes three types of actors. Referent objects, Securitizing actors and Functional actors. Referent objects are the objects, which are referred to in the act of securitizing. “The referent object is that to which one can point!” (Buzan et al, 1998: 36). In other terms, it is an object (or ideal) that is being threatened and needs to be protected.

On the other hand securitizing actors/agents are an entity that makes the securitizing statement. By performing the speech act they refer to the referent object. These actors are often political leaders, pressure groups, international agencies or governments. The distinction between the referent actor and the securitizing actor lies in that a securitizing actor cannot usually securitize itself e.g. a governmental regime will usually not securitize itself but the state or the nation. It is however not impossible for the referent object and the securitizing actor to be the same. Rarely will we see an individual being the securitizing actor because he/she will be the representative of a collective and therefore be bound to a certain role (Buzan et al, 1998: 42). Functional actors are usually influential in the field of security but are not the referent objects or the securitizing actors.

The influence has a say in whether the securitization of the securitizing actors is legitimate or not, it furthermore affects the general dynamics and decisions of the field of security (Buzan et al, 1998: 36). “The key question in security analysis is, who can “do” security in the name of what?” (Buzan et al, 1998: 45)
2.3. A New Framework for Analysis of Security

Buzan et al (1998) have questioned the primacy of the military element and the state in the conceptualization of security. This query has led to the emergence of a debate on “wide” versus “narrow” security studies. Those who propound the widening of the security agenda have convincingly argued that there are other non-military sources of threats to humanity. These include environmental, economic, societal and political aspects of security. In fact, after September 11 attack on the US, the debate contains a new flavor where religious fundamentalism is seen as one of the major sources of terrorism in the world (Buzan&Waever, 2003).

In his article “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century”, Buzan analyses how five sectors of security (Political, Military, Economic, Societal, and Environmental) might affect the “periphery” based on changes in the “center”. “The five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other. Each defines a focal point within the security problematic, and a way of ordering priorities, but all are woven together in a strong web of linkage” (Buzan et al, 1998: 8). The obvious threats that would seem to present the most pressing concerns are military, which are capable of posing threats to the state on several levels.

These five sectors serve to disaggregate a whole for purposes of analysis by selecting some of its distinctive patterns of interaction. But items identified by sectors lack the quality of independent existence. Relations of coercion do not exist apart from relations of exchange, authority, identity, or environment. Sectors might identify distinctive patterns, but they remain inseparable parts of complex wholes. “The purpose of selecting them is simply to reduce complexity to facilitate analysis” (Ibid).

However, in the case of Africa, the five sectors are not equally important. Buzan &Waever (2003) in their analysis of the African security found that the continents problem attributes to postcolonial state failure. They claimed that the military-political sector should be privileged as way of telling what an almost impossibly complicated story is otherwise (p-220). It does not say that securitizations in other sectors are absent or unimportant, but it does argue that state failure underlies most of them. There are of
course major stories to be told about economic, societal, and environmental security in Africa, but they will take a back seat (Buzan & Waever, 2003: 223).

In lights of the above argument, this research paper will give priority to the military-political sectors in order to analyze the security implications of the South Sudan secession for the neighboring states.

2.3.1. Military Sector

The historical contemporary condition shows that the military sector is most likely to be highly institutionalized, even though it is not necessarily so. Furthermore, in contrast to a traditionalist position the military sector does not have to be about security because for some states, the increase of military capacity does not necessarily have anything to do with internal security but is instead used for political and economic relations in foreign countries cementing the state’s role in international relations. Many European countries serve as an example of this. Since they do not have to fear external threats, the military activities are less about internal security and more about the political sphere. In the military sector the state and the ruling elite is the most important actors, but not the only ones (Buzan et al, 1998: 49).

The modern state is defined by the idea of sovereignty – the claim of exclusive right to self-Government over a specified territory and its population (Ibid).

This quote underlines that the fundamental nature of the state and how it is acquired is by force. Use of force is also a way of upholding and asserting sovereignty (Ibid.). This is why the agenda of the military security is mainly focused around the state. The exception to the quote is when a state disintegrates and or cannot find root, this will lead to anarchy such as it is seen in several African countries. The military security agenda is mostly about governments’ effort to maintain and protect themselves from internal and external threats, not only military ones but also non-military threats – for instance ideologies and migrants. This is also how the military and political sector is linked together.

The normal domestic functions of the government are administration and law, which upholds the peace and thereby civil order. Beyond that it can uphold the territorial
integrity, but this is not always securitized as a threat since governments, in theory, are free to negotiate reorganization of their borders. However, if it is perceived as an international threat the territorial integrity is of big importance (Buzan et al, 1998: 50).

There are several groups of people who challenge the nation state both from within. These groups can be: secessionists, unionists, revolutionaries etc. The international society often securitizes these would-be states because they are seen as a threat to the sovereignty. In such a case, the existing state might be motivated “... to use military force to secure its monopoly over legitimate violence” (Buzan et al, 1998: 53).

Different societies will see and respond differently to the same objective threat. Therefore, securitization is an inter-subjective process which is socially constructed (Buzan et al, 1998: 57). As an example, the threats and vulnerabilities between two states in the international system, is both defined through their respective military capabilities but also their ‘amity’ and ‘enmity’ interplay which is historical and socially constructed (Buzan et al, 1998: 58-59).

2.3.2. Environmental Sector

Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend (Buzan, 1991: 433).

The most demanding fact about the securitization of environmental problems is the time factor. They should be securitized even before they actually take place (Buzan et al, 1998: 109). Sometimes because the securitization came just with the threat consequences, the environmental problems are overlaying within the regions, the environmental securities of the states are interdependent and the states must address them to sustain their own existence (Ibid).

Into analysis of environmental sector as many as possible of the contributing factors must be taken because of the width of the relevant topics in the environmental sector. Among them is the disruption of ecosystems, energetic problems often connected to management

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3 ‘Amity’ is defined as relationships involving genuine friendship as well as expectation of protection. ‘Enmity’ is based on relationships set by suspicion and fear arising from like ‘border disputes’ (Buzan &Waever, 2003). These two terms are briefly discussed in section 2.4 of the chapter.
of disasters, population problems, food insecurities, economic problems and civil disputes (Buzan et al, 1998: 91). All the topics connected with any of the factor can be securitized, but that does not mean that they are to be securitized all at the same time. Some of them can achieve strong political attention, whereas some do not need to be perceived as imminent threat at all, since the securitization is process based on subjective preferences (Ibid).

Environmental threats that can be securitized are categorized in the following manner:

- Threats coming from the natural environment not ignited by humans. This category addresses natural disasters that cannot be easily prevented, so they are not securitized usually, whereas the struggle with their impacts can become the topic of securitization.
- Threats ignited by humans threatening the environmental systems and planet structures and in the result the humankind such as the emissions of greenhouse gases, on the local scale it can be the overburdening of soil.
- Threats ignited by human activities but are not threatening the human civilization as such. It usually refers to the exhaustion of some natural resources, that can’t be replaced by some substitution (the lack of oil, for instance) and because it does not threaten directly the civilization, it has a marginal securitization attention (Buzan et al, 1998: 97).

2.3.3. Economic Sector

Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power (Buzan, 1991: 433). Economic security points to the persistent structural disadvantages of late development and a position in the lower ranks of wealth and industrialization. The consequences of such weakness range from inability to sustain the basic human needs of the population (as in Sudan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Liberia), through the disruption of fluctuating and uncertain earnings from exports of primary products (as in Zambia, Peru, Nigeria), to inability to resist the policy pressures of outside institutions in return for needed supplies of capital (as in Brazil, Argentina, Tanzania) (Buzan, 1991: 446).
2.3.4. Societal Sector

This sector is concerned with the societal security of a given societal unit. The organizing concept of this sector is identity. In brief societal security concerns the sustainability within acceptable conditions for evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture, and religious and national identity. (Buzan, 1991: 447; Buzan et al, 1998: 119).

Societal insecurity appears when societal units of whatever kind define a potential threat to their society. Societal units are structured around identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community. A state may consist of several societal units (Ibid). It is a personal choice taken by the individual that defines whether one wishes to identify with a certain community and thereby belong to that societal sector. Factors such as language, culture, history and location may have a large role in the idea of identity (Buzan et al, 1998: 120). Societal security is about the threats and vulnerabilities that affect patterns of communal identity and culture.

The most common threats to societal security are highlighted in the concepts as migration, Horizontal competition and Vertical competition.

1) Migration is a threat to societal security as the increase of foreign population may interfere with the existing identity in a given community.

2) Horizontal competition is when a neighboring culture is influencing the existing identity in a societal sector. Too great a foreign influx will threaten the ability of the existing society to reproduce itself in the old way, which can easily create a political constituency for immigration control. Uncontrolled immigration eventually swamps the existing culture (Buzan, 1991: 447).

3) Vertical competition is when the existing identity is being challenged by an integrating project or secessionist regionalist project that pulls them toward either narrower or wider identities. Examples are the European Union, Catalonia and former Yugoslavia.

A possible fourth issue, which may threat the societal security, could be depopulation, famine, war, plague and natural catastrophes may lead to a decrease in population and
thereby threaten the existing identity of a given community. Equal for all security threats is that they pose a threat to the ‘we of a society’. Buzan et al (1998: 121) contends that in order to cause insecurity for the societal sector, we must be threatened by a factor challenging the collective identity of a given society.

2.3.5. Political Sector

The political sector is primarily about non-military threats to sovereignty. Political security is therefore concerned with the organizational stability of social order(s). The political sector is the most widespread sector there is, often overlapping the other sectors for example, political-societal, military-political etc. one can argue that all military is political (Buzan et al, 1998: 141).

The political threats will vary in degree and have different goals. Since the main objective for a state is organizing ideology and thereby form a national identity, the political threats can be feared on the same level as military threats because the aim is to destabilize the organizational stability of the state. The political threat arises from its aim at overthrowing the government and to pressure a particular policy to weaken the state as a power (Buzan et al, 1998: 142).

The political threats could emanate from both internal and external actors;

    Political threats are thus made to (1) the internal legitimacy of the political unit, which relates primarily to ideologies and other constitutional ideas and issues defining the state; and (2) the external recognition of the state, its external legitimacy (Buzan et al. 1998: 144).

As stated in the quote, typically the threats will relate to, the external – recognition, and internal – legitimacy (Buzan et al, 1998: 145).

The main referent object of the political sector is the state, where other unit-level objects too can serve as referent objects for a political organization such as emerging super state structures, self-organized, stateless societal groups and transnational movements (Ibid.). The government of the state will often be the securitizing actor, and as mentioned in the military sector section, it can be hard to tell if securitization is done to protect the government itself or the state, also in regards to internal and external threats (Buzan et al,
1998: 56-57). The internal threats will occur more in weak states, because there will be distrust from the population towards the government using the state as a securitizing factor, to protect themselves (Buzan, 1998: 146).

2.4. Understanding Regional Security Complex

When studying this aspect of security Buzan (1981) states:

Security is a relational phenomenon. Because security is relational, one cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded (P-187).

For example the security of France is not in itself a meaningful level of analysis.

In his analysis of regional security and how it affects the concept of security as a whole, Buzan offers several interesting and important concepts. The first is that of “amity and enmity among states” (p-189), in other words relationships between states that can represent a spectrum from friendship or alliances to those marked by fear. According to Buzan, the concepts of amity and enmity cannot be attributed solely to the balance of power. The issues that can affect these feelings range from things such as ideology, territory, ethnic lines, and historical precedent. This is important to understand as the concept of amity/enmity leads to the idea of what Buzan refers to as “security complex” which is “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Ibid). The definition of Regional Security Complexes (RSC) was reformulated to shed the state-centric and military-political focus and to rephrase the same basic conception for the possibility of different actors and several sectors of security.

Accordingly Buzan and Waever (2003) defined RSC as “a set of units whose major process of securitization and de-securitization are both so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (P.44). They claim that there are two components with different dynamics which define security complexes, namely the distribution of power between states in a specific geographic area and historical patterns of amity and enmity between these states.
Under RSC, geographic proximity is paramount as “most political and military threats travel most easily over short distances than over long ones” (Buzan & Waever, 2003: 45). RSC, therefore, is mandated by the interaction between geographic proximity and the forces at play in an anarchic system. The specific pattern of who fears or likes whom is generally not imported from the system level, but generated internally in the region by a mixture of history, politics, and material conditions. (Buzan & Waever, 2003: 43-47).

Buzan’s conceptual framework provides meaningful insights both into how different types of conflict suddenly erupt and quickly spread in space and time, and also into the interplay between these different types. Security complexes are exposed to four major types of threats and their interaction: balance of power contests among great powers; lingering conflicts that emerge between neighboring states; intra-state conflicts, which are usually spillovers of internal politics; and conflicts that arise from transnational threats caused, for instance, by the rise of religious fundamentalism and informal networks, state fragility, demographic explosion, environmental degradation and resource scarcity (Buzan, 1991: 3).

The ideas of regional security and security complexes are important as every state can put its security in relation to at least one complex. Many examples of this can be easily identified; perhaps the most extreme can be considered that of Israel and its Arab neighbors. If we use Israel and the Middle East security issues as an example, we can clearly see how Israel’s security is tied up with its regional complex of the Middle East and vice versa, and how it undoubtedly takes this into consideration when considering its national security. In the case of Africa, Buzan and Waever (2003) contends that mainlines of security interaction takes place within states or across state borders by non-state actors. They identified the root of the African problem for international relation and regional security complex, as being the post-colonial state failure. The post-colonial state was never able or enabled to reach the state level of this mirror. Post independent states do and did miss the central features of political, social and economic functionality, deficiency affluent through the state apparatus (Buzan & Waever, 2003: 229).
2.5. Viewing the Horn of Africa as a Regional Security Complex

According to Buzan and Wæver (2003), the Horn of Africa displays many of the features of a Regional Security Complex. They claimed the region could be treated as pre-Regional Security Complexes. The countries involved display high levels of security interdependence. Historically the region had a dynamic (of conflict) that was quite distinct from the patterns found among its sub-Saharan and North African neighbors. In more recent times, these characteristic patterns of conflict appear to be radiating outwards, bringing countries such as Uganda and Chad at least partially into the conflict system of the Horn (Healy, 2008: 41). Historical patterns of amity and enmity are deeply etched in the region.

For most of the period up to the early 1990s, there were two main stories of security interaction in the Horn: the linked civil wars in Sudan and Ethiopia, and an interstate conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia over possession of the Ogaden region. Interwoven with these was a much older tradition of conflict between sedentary highland Christian agriculturalists and nomadic lowland Muslim pastoralists (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 241).

Another dynamics of the Horn of Africa is, the host of usually mutual cross border interventions in which the government in each state supports insurgencies in the other: Somalia and Ethiopia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda, Sudan and Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopia. As elsewhere in Africa, these were the main instruments of most governments against each other (Ibid). This has destabilized one another and act as spoilers to derail peace processes (Healy, 2008: 42).

Substantial outside partisan interventions, were another dynamics of the Horn. This was manifested in Soviet and Cuban support for Ethiopia in 1977, which turned the war against Somalia in Ethiopia’s favor, and US support during the 1990s for insurgents against the radical government in Khartoum, and for backers of those insurgents in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda. Some international interventions: A failed humanitarian one in Somalia in the early 1990s and a peacekeeping one on the Eritrean–Ethiopian border starting in 2000 (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 242).
Understanding how security threats are perceived and articulated in the Horn of Africa could provide better insights into how the region actually works. The states of the Horn securitize events in relation to past events and present perceptions that might seem idiosyncratic if taken out of their context. But the context is vital for an understanding of how and why conflict occurs. How could Eritrea construe a shooting incident at Badme in May 1998 as an event that justified a full-blown military attack? Is it plausible that lack of access to the sea could be construed as a security threat for Ethiopia? Would a united Somalia or an Islamist Somalia threaten Ethiopia’s security? How long will the détente between Ethiopia and Sudan last? The ways in which ‘amity and enmity’ are constructed among the players has a rich history (Healy, 2008: 42). Without grasping this, external players are liable to be baffled by the conflicts that repeatedly erupt and fuel one another in the Horn. Consequently, their interventions will be liable to miss the mark (Ibid).
Chapter Three

3. The Sudanese Civil Wars

3.1. Background

Sudan, located in northeast Africa, used to be the largest country in Africa and the Arab world. It was also the tenth largest in the world with an area of 967,495 square miles (2,505,813 square km) (A World of Information: Sudan, UN Data). Nine African states bordered the country these were: Egypt to the north; Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east; Kenya and Uganda to the southeast; the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic to the southwest; and Chad and Libya to the west and northwest respectively.

Sudanese population is divided between the Afro-Arab belts. This is because the Arab-Islamic North Africa has had significant influence on the Sudanese population. In fact, Sudan and Egypt were under one governing structure between 1899 and 1956. According to one account, Sudan housed about 19 main nationalities, 56 ethnic groups, and about 597 sub ethnic groups who speak more than 115 languages (Deng cited in Daoud, 2012: 21).

For most of Sudan’s post-independence period Arabic and English had been recognized as the two official languages of the country with Arabic widely used in the North and English in the South. However, indigenous languages were used more widely in the South than English. In particular, more than 50 percent of the populations spoke the Arabic language, about 18 percent spoke Nilotic languages, and Nilo-Hamitic was spoken by about 12 percent of the population. Religious diversity is also a feature of the Sudanese society (Ibid).

Prior to colonization by British, different ethnic groups, including the Arabs and non-Arabs, intermingled, intermarried, and integrated mediated by a host of historical, socio-economic and political forces and factors (Kassahun 2014: 51-52). The colonial divide and rule strategy alienated some of the ethnic groups from one another by law preventing understanding and cooperation. Cotranas quoted in Daoud (2012: 24) wrote in 1955 that
“the imperial agenda prevented the Sudanese from knowing each other, feeling with each other, working with each other and learning from each other.” Hence, it was the colonial period that gave rise to modern ethnic politicization (El-Battahani, 2010: 35).

To a great extent, Sudan has failed to develop crosscutting values or build a shared sense of identity among the Sudanese people. This failure contributed to the alienation of regional groups in Sudan, particularly the Southern Sudanese. Nevertheless, many scholars argue that the Sudanese government was unable to develop a Sudanese identity because it was unable to undo decades of separation policies initiated by the colonizers. One cannot ignore the enormous impact of colonial rule (1898-1956) on impairing Sudan’s national culture. Ethnic manipulation was a central component of the British agenda as the colonial power sought to control fractious groups (Dauod, 2012: 22).

After more than half a century of divide and rule, the British anticipated the end of colonial rule in 1947. Subsequently, the South was reunited with the North forming modern Sudan (Rogier, 2005: 7-8). This unification was the outcome of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement. The agreement entailed that the British would maintain their control over the Suez Canal and in exchange Egypt would annex all of united Sudan as opposed to only the North. However, the Arab North refused to join Egypt later on.

In August 1955 Southern soldiers, who were now under Arab officers, mutinied as they feared they would be disarmed and moved to the North. These soldiers would flee to the bushes and to neighboring Uganda and form the core of the Anyanya, the first Southern guerrilla movement, named after a type of Southern poison. The British were anxious to withdraw and thus refused to send troops to control the mutiny. On January 1st 1956, Britain granted Sudan independence (Rogier, 2005: 12). Khartoum was left to control the mutiny on its own and to address pressing constitutional matters. Since in 1955, the domination of Islamic north over the non-Islamic south and other factors resulted to the commencement of the first civil war (Kumelachew 2014: 838).
Thus, this chapter will seek to understand the Sudanese civil wars that led to the signing of the prominent peace agreements, which eventually enabled South Sudan to reach independence.

3.2. The First Civil War (1955⁴-1972)

The Sudanese civil war was a direct result of the discontent with Khartoum’s domestic (social, economic, and political) policies. Between Sudan’s independence in 1956 and 1958, Khartoum was led by a weak coalition government that among many things had failed to contain the South’s rebellion. In 1958, General Abboud led a military coup and overthrew this newly born and fragile civilian government. The military regime (1958-64) laid down the foundations for a centralized economic development plan.

The regime also endorsed an independent foreign policy, where the government cooperated with both Eastern and Western blocs (Rogier, 2003: 60). Abboud did not only lead a centralized economic plan, but also a centralized form of governance. As he was an authoritarian leader he severely limited political participation, and enforced rigid social and economic policies. Arabization and Islamization focused on education formed the core of his regime’s social policies (Johnson, 2003: 29). According to Mamdani quoted in Kumelachew (2014: 841), Abboud declared that "there must be a single language and a single religion for a single country". His policies were repressive to churches and political organizations and resulted in increasing the opposition in the North, as the northern secularists and leftists condemned them, and inflamed the Southern war (Ibid).

One of the reasons that led to the intensification of the war was the soaring strength of the Anyanya; the movement that started the rebellion in 1955. The movement was receiving support from the Ugandan and Israeli governments (Rogiers, 2003: 60). While the Ugandan government provided the movement with room for operation and training, the Israeli government provided military training, equipment and other forms of assistance. Additionally, the movement gained popular support and increased its followers.

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⁴ Even though money scholars agree that the civil war started in 1955, some literatures claim that the war commenced only in 1960’s.
In the 1960s, students and political leaders joined the rebels in Uganda to form the Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU), with Anyanya as the militant element. SANU’s core objective was the self-determination of the South. By doing so SANU ran directly counter to the newly formed OAU pledge to maintain the old colonial borders of the emerging states (Johnson, 2003: 31).

In trying to suppress the Anyanya, Abboud wasted significant portions of Sudan’s revenues. Therefore, frustrations with the General’s government were growing among trade unions, urban classes and political and religious groups (El-Battahani, 2010: 34). Communists and radical leftists created the United National Front (UNF). With aid from trade unions and students, the UNF led a successful protest that was supported by lower ranks of the army and ultimately toppled the military regime on October 24, 1964 (Ibid).

Other elements of society were unsatisfied with the ascendency of communists and radical forces. The conservative political faction initiated a new movement where they mobilized rural-based religious groups. The movement inundated and defeated the leftists. By 1964, Elections were held, as a result the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) won creating a democratic coalition government.

The new democratic government allowed a political opening as part of its new political policies and the Southerners were welcomed to join Sudan’s political process. Hence, all exiled Southerners were invited to participate in round table discussion on solving the problem in the South. However, to the dismay of the Southerners, they found themselves divided. The division came between two camps, SANU inside (those in Sudan) and SANU outside (those out of Sudan). The Southerners belonging to SANU inside abandoned self-determination and thought a federal solution would suffice while those involved with SANU outside insisted on secession. This led to serious internal unrest as Anyanya fragmented, SANU’s military arm.

Soon after, Anyanya’s fractions started to fight each other. Attempts for reconciliations followed and in a conference held in 1965 both sides decided to hold a referendum as means to let the people of the South decide. However, many of the Northern
representatives rejected any kind of self-determination since elections were around the corner. Election time came with a growing discourse around an Arab-Islamic agenda for votes (Rogier, 2003: 11). This discourse angered the southerners and the war recommenced. The war intensified and internationalized with the joining of Israel, Ethiopia and Uganda to support Anyanya. Simultaneously, the Arab countries supported Khartoum (Ibid).

Although the leaders in Khartoum promised political opening they were not willing to negotiate any forms of power sharing with the South. They were also inclined to instill the Arabization policy towards the Southern people. Discontent with the government was on the rise for wasting public resources and continuing to refuse all proposals to solve the Southern problem. Rampant corruption and claims of resource abuse further exacerbated public frustrations (El-Batthani, 2010: 34). As a consequence, Jaffar Numeiri and his military colleagues came to power in Sudanese politics in a bloodless coup in 1969 (El-Battahai, 2010: 37; Kumelachew 2014: 842).

Jaafar Numeiri’s communist and socialist ideologies required of him to introduce an entirely different domestic agenda. Unlike his predecessors, the social policies excluded previous Islamization and Arabization policies because as a communist he was opposed Islamic rule. Although he led a dictatorial regime, Numeiri frequently spoke of an autonomous South. Therefore, his dialogue with the Anynaya was promising. However, Numeiri alliance with the communist party ended following the communist abortive coup of 1972 (Kumlachew 2014: 842). Numeiri’s discontinuation of alliance with the communists in the Sudan distanced him from the Soviet Union, costing him a principal source of support. He found himself destitute of all support from the right and left and was forced to look for allies elsewhere. He turned to the South hoping that peace with the South would increase his legitimacy (Rogier, 2005: 11).

Additionally, various international factors brought both Anyanya and Numeri to the negotiating table. Numeri began to alleviate regional tensions by attempting to improve relations with neighboring countries. In 1971, he signed an agreement with Ethiopia and Uganda that entailed the discontinuation of rebel support in the region. Uganda responded by expelling the Israelis and this had a devastating impact on Anyanya as it
could not sustain itself. The movement was then forced to the negotiation table (Ibid).
Therefore, it was both of Numeri’s national policies and the international (regional and
Soviet) stance that led to the negotiations known as ‘The Addis Ababa Agreement’. This
in effect ensured the end of the first civil war of the Sudan that began four months before

3.3. The Addis Ababa Agreement

The Addis Ababa Accord was negotiated between Nemeiri of Sudan and Joseph Lagu of
the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). The accord not only brought peace to
the Sudan, but, hailed a unique resolution to civil war never before achieved in post-
colonial Africa (Johnson, 2003: 39). Hence, the peoples of Sudan and its leaders received
a great international acclaim. The Agreement established a new set of political, social,
and economic policies, and the South responded to this agreement by incorporating
Anyanya, its militant wing, into the Sudanese national army.

Politically, the Addis Ababa Agreement allowed for extensive power sharing. It made
Southerners to enjoy regional autonomy. Accordingly, the South was made to have its
own legislative, executive and judiciary institutions using English rather than Arabic as
the working language of the region (Wama, 1997: 9). It also ensured that the three
provinces of Equatoria, Bahr Al Ghazal and Upper Nile to be constituted as self-
governing Regions within Sudan. All the provinces had one regional president (Daoud,
2012: 34). The Agreement further stipulates that a High Executive Council or Cabinet,
appointed by the Regional President, would be responsible for all governing aspects in
the South with the exception of defense, foreign affairs, currency, finance, economic and
social planning and interregional concerns. Authority over these sectors would belong to
the national government (The Addis Ababa Agreement, 1972). Freedom of religion,
personal liberty and equality of citizens were also guaranteed.

Several Northern Islamist parties felt that the Agreement had compromised Sudan’s
Islamic nature and claimed that it fostered separatism in the South. These parties did not
ratify The Addis Ababa Agreement and some campaigned against it. Soon, Numeri found
himself threatened by sectarian political parties and Islamists. He granted some of the
religious leaders prominent positions in the government and appointed some as advisors. The new regime members started to influence Numeri’s domestic policies.

Hassan Al-Turabi, a key figure in the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, had a significant influence on Numeri. Turabi, an attorney general at the time, proposed a bill that redrew the boundaries of the Southern region to strategically place the newly discovered oilfields in the North. Key resources in the South, such as oil and minerals, were discovered in the late 1970s. Numeri initially rejected the proposition and reaffirmed the borders agreed upon in The Addis Ababa Agreement. However, soon after (in 1980), he proposed a plan similar to Turabi’s to the Southern Regional Assembly.

In 1981, the Assembly rejected his proposal and Numeri responded by dissolving the body. In 1983 he created a new state in the South called “Unity” and divided the Southern region into three smaller ones with much less authority and power over economic matters (Rogier, 2005: 27).

The Addis Ababa Agreement stated that no changes were to be made to the South’s governing structure except with a Southern referendum. Therefore, Numeri’s unilateral action contravened the Agreement and ended its political, social, and economic policies. This was exacerbated by the regimes declarations of Sharia law to be applied in the country in 1983. Moreover, “the discovery of oil near Benitu in Southern Sudan prompted the government to resort to scheming aimed at subsuming Benitu within north Sudan” (Kassahun 2014: 53). This and the hitherto mentioned factors outraged the South who decided to go back to war and created another rebel group in the same year, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (Daoud, 2012: 36). In effect, Sudan, once again entered into a bloody civil war.

3.4. The Second Civil War (1983-2005)

There are few differences between the first and second civil wars. Firstly, while the first civil war was fought exclusively over autonomy, the discovery of oil\(^5\) in the late 1970s in the South added a resource factor to the second. In turn, the conflict intensified as neither

\(^5\) In fact, oil was not found during the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Hence, there was no way to include it in the agreement.
side wanted to lose the resource to the other. Moreover, the Sudanese leaders have shown increasing interest to return back to the pre-Addis Ababa Agreement of domination (Kumelachew 2014: 844). Additionally, while the conflict in the first war was limited to the north and South, in the second, conflicts multiplied beyond as rebel movements were growing in the east, west and north (Daoud, 2012: 36). The other point is that, as opposed to the first civil war the Southerners, which fought for the South’s autonomy, in the second the South’s leaders claimed an ideological affiliation to free the entire Sudan, as indicated in their name ‘Sudan People’s Liberation Army’ (Ibid).

The SPLA presented itself as a socialist movement that did not only intend to ‘liberate’ the Southerners but also all of Sudan. Dinka officer Dr. John Garang introduced the ideological facet to the SPLA. Garang, once an officer in the National Army, left Khartoum to join the rebellion. Considered a visionary, he founded the mission of the SPLA and created its political wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) (Peter cited in Daoud, 2012: 37). Garang also presented a detailed account for a new Sudan in his manifesto.

Garang proposed that the ‘New Sudan’ must first be built on secularism and second on African citizenship. The ‘New Sudan’ would reflect the diverse populations and ensure economic, social and political equality between the citizens. The predominant understanding in the movement was that Sudan’s problem is not ‘the South’ but the highly unrepresentative center. Emeric Rogier (2005) suggested that, “unity, secularism and socialism were seen as inseparable objectives, since secularism would guarantee respect for differences and socialism would ensure reduction of inequalities in a common framework” (p-29). Hence, as opposed to the pre-1993 guerrilla fighters, the SPLM/A did not follow the objectives of separating the South Sudan (Kumelachew 2014: 844).

However, in the south, Anyanya II, formed by veterans of the first Anyanya, opposed the SPLM/A vision. They continued to follow a separatist agenda where nothing less than independence would be acceptable. Whereas both movements initially had Dinka and Nuer, soon the SPLM/A became Dinka dominated and Anyanya Nuer dominated. This division introduced an ethnic dimension to the rivalry that only ended when Ethiopia
began supporting Garang’s non-separatist faction. Anyanya II would dissolve with most of its troops joining the SPLM/A by 1988.

Numeri was overthrown by the army take over in April 1985 following intense protest in Khartoum. General elections were held in 1986 from which Umma, the Democratic Unionist Party and the National Islamic Front (NIF) formed a coalition government. The overthrow of the Numeri regime however, did nothing to stop the civil war that began in 1983.

The newly elected Prime Minister, Saddiq Al-Mahdi, and the SPLM/A leader John Garang had conflicting views when it came to the social domestic policies. Contacts between the two parties bore fruit in the KoKa dam meeting in 1986, which was brokered by Mengestu (Johnson, 2003: 71). However, they failed to reach agreement on Islamic Law. Garang demanded that the government repeal the Islamic decrees of 1983. Although Al-Mahdi said that he would abrogate the decrees, he maintained that new Islamic laws would be decreed in Muslim-dominated regions where the rights of non-Muslims would be taken into consideration. Garang refused and contended that any religion-based structure was unacceptable since it would allow religious discrimination and inequality.

As witnessed in previous governments, the failure to reach an agreement on social national policies led to the militant escalation of the war with benefits mainly for the SPLM/A. “The rebellion was severe and was gaining tremendous strength” (Daoud, 2012: 39). The incorporation of Anyanya II along with support provided by external elements (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Cuba) enabled the movement to gain control over two thirds of the Southern Sudan (Ibid.).

Under pressure from the army and the public, Al-Mahdi started to move towards a peace settlement. On 30 June 1989, three days before negotiations that was to start in Addis Ababa, a joint military coup led by Omar Al-Bashir and Hassan-al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front (NIF) took power (Kassahun 2014: 54; Rogier, 2005: 21).
3.5. Towards a New Agreement

The new Islamist government led drastic political and social changes and this intensified the conflict with the South to an unprecedented level. First, the new government declared its commitment to new Islamist principle such as ‘Jihad’ (Holy war). Second, it established new jihadist institutions such as training and educational camps. After ratifying a ‘constitutional decree’ that dismissed Al-Mahdi’s civilian coalition and other state bodies, Al-Bashir appointed himself as the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCCNS), a 15-member body with all executive and legislative powers (Daoud, 2012: 40). Al-Bashir also issued other decrees that suspended political parties and trade unions. He imposed a state of emergency that prohibited demonstrations, opposition newspapers, and allowed the regime to imprison journalists and political activists.

Al-Bashir stated that the RCCNS would lead the country in the transitional period, and in 1993 he dissolved the body and announced a return to civilian rule. Simultaneously, he declared himself the president of the country holding all executive and legislative powers. By this time, Sudan had effectively become an Islamist totalitarian state (Ibid.). In March 1991 Al-Turabi, who masterminded many of the government policies, convinced Al-Bashir to establish the Criminal Act law. The Act introduced Shariah in all provinces, except in the South. Al-Turabi also pressured Al-Bashir into political opening and elections.

In 1996, non-party elections were held and Al-Bashir was the only presidential candidate. Al Bashir won with 75.7 percent of the votes. In 1999 political parties were allowed back into the political arena. It was then that Al-Bashir and Dr. Turabi created the National Congress Party (NCP). Al-Bashir also declared that it was a religious duty to fight and protect the Islamic nature of the country. The new jihadists and the army inflicted significant losses on the SPLA. This weakened the rebellion. Al-Bashir also manipulated and exploited the South-South conflict (Daoud, 2012: 41). During the early 1990’s, following the regime change in Ethiopia which was a second home and place of birth as well source of every aspect of support for SPLA/M, the movement entered into deep
rooted division (Kumlachew 2014: 845). The split in SPLA/M was attributed to ideological and personal differences rather than ethnic rivalry (Johnson, 2003: 71).

In 1996 the Sudanese government ratified a peace agreement with rebel ethnic-based factions that had dissolved away from the SPLA/M. John Garang, the leader of the SPLA/M, rejected the agreement. Undaunted, President Al-Bashir appointed one of the leaders of the ethnic-based factions as the head of an interim government in the South (Jeffry in Daoud, 2012: 42). At this point, the strength of both Khartoum and SPLA was equivalent.

However, by the late 1990s, the SPLM/A was gaining more strength particularly as it was receiving support and cooperating with other regional rebel movements. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the civil war, once confined to the South, stretched to the northeast near the Eritrean border. Various regional rebels, such as the Eastern Front and the Justice and Equality Movement, cooperated to place pressure on Khartoum. The government forces found themselves facing the SPLA/M along with six other opposition armies all united under a single commander (Ibid.). As a result of the organized rebellion, neighboring countries feared the development of grave instability in the region and pushed for conflict resolution measures (Ibid).

Regional peace efforts were accompanied by international actors led by the United States. In November 2002, an American peace envoy, John Dan forth, visited Sudan for the first time to resolve the conflict between the Sudanese government and the rebels. He introduced confidence-building measures and mediated a ceasefire (Kumelachew 2014). Despite the ceasefire the SPLA/M declared responsibility for killing government soldiers in an oil-rich area claiming that the Khartoum government had initially unleashed a massive assault against some of their bases in defiance of the ceasefire. As usual, the parties were swinging between peace and war.

In January 2004, after 15 months of extensive negotiations, Sudan’s government and SPLA/M ratified an agreement to share the mounting prosperity of oil exports (Daoud, 2012: 43). This time the long initiated and negotiated process by the regional body of Intergovernmental Authority for Development to mediate the government in Khartoum


### 3.6. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

The CPA enacted an entirely different set of political, social and economic policies. Although the Addis Ababa Agreement had similar provisions, three main differences between The Addis Ababa and The Comprehensive Peace Agreements exist. All the differences are related to the amount of autonomy granted to the South by the CPA, which was unprecedented. Firstly, the Addis Ababa Agreement did not recognize any of the South’s rights in their resources, while the CPA included a wealth sharing agreement such as land ownership and natural resources and oil and non-oil revenues (Kassahun, 2014: 55).

Secondly, the Addis Ababa Agreement included minimal Southern representation in Khartoum, while the CPA gave the South proportionate representation. And finally, the CPA allowed the South to maintain its armed forces while The Addis Ababa Agreement forced the South to dissolve its army. According to Daoud’s (2012) interview with state officials, “the Southern representatives had learned from their previous mistakes and were more aware of their rights” (p-45).

The CPA comprises six agreements which were signed in Kenya between 2002 and 2004. These are; the Machakos protocol, Power-Sharing Agreement, Wealth-Sharing Protocols, The Resolution of the Abyei conflict, The Resolution of the Conflict in the Two States of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, and finally the Security Arrangements (Kassahun 2014: 54; Daoud, 2012: 45). The first chapter of the CPA agreement established a six-year interim period, starting from July 9th 2005, where Southern Sudanese would govern their own regional affairs and participate equally in the national government.
The South’s administration adopted the title ‘Government of Southern Sudan’ (GoSS) rather than being designated as a regional body merely. The GoSS would have full autonomy with an independent executive, legislature and judiciary including its own flag and army (Healy, 2008). The Agreement also made provisions that by the end of the interim period, on January 9th 2011, the people of the South would vote on a referendum either to consolidate Sudan’s unity or to secede. Although this opened the door to the potential separation of the South, the agreement explicitly stated that implementation was to be conducted in ways that make the unity of Sudan attractive (Healy, 2008: 29).

3.6.1. Power and Wealth Sharing Protocols

The power sharing protocol was concluded in 2004 and it is perhaps the most salient component of the CPA. The CPA outlined that all parties involved are “convinced that decentralization and empowerment of all levels of government are cardinal principles of effective and fair administration of the country” (Taha and Garang quoted in Daoud, 2012: 50). There were three-tiers of power-sharing, one distinct to the national level manifested in the Government of National Unity (GNU), one to the Government of Southern Sudan, and another for the 25 States in Northern and Southern Sudan.

The power sharing protocol established the institutions of the GNU (Ibid.). The Agreement stated that the NCP would hold 52 percent while the SPLM would hold 28 percent and the remaining parties would hold 20 percent of the judiciary, executive, and legislative institutions in the GNU (Healy, 2008: 31). Accordingly, President Omar Al-Bashir would remain in office, with Dr John Garang, Chairman of the SPLM, serving as First Vice President, pending elections in 2009 (Ibid).

The wealth-sharing protocol was another important aspect of the CPA, particularly when it comes to oil. Although, 80 percent of Sudan’s oil is generated from the South, all the pipelines responsible for its transport to the Red Sea pass through the North from Khartoum to Bour Sudan on the Red Sea. The protocol stipulated that net revenue from oil reserves in southern Sudan be distributed equally between GNU and northern states, and the GOSS. With sizable oil reserves in the vicinity of the North–South border, this arrangement has significantly raised the stakes over demarcation of territory between
North and South. To make things difficult, the GoSS depended almost exclusively on oil revenues. According to (UNDP SUDAN in Healy, 2008), the GOSS budget of US$1.622bn for 2007 was based on anticipated oil revenues of US$1.3bn.

Apart from power and wealth sharing protocols, the CPA in its cultural aspect stressed that the government of Sudan should recognize that Sudan is a multicultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-lingual country. The CPA also established freedom of faith and forbade discrimination on the basis of religion. While Islamic Sharia was recognized as the only source of legislation in Northern Sudan, the CPA protected the religious rights of non-Muslims in the area.

3.7. The Secession

As stipulated in the CPA, South Sudanese were set to decide between union with Sudan or secession. The implementation was made making unity attractive. On February 14th 2011, the first official referendum results were declared. Despite the efforts made the South, as anticipated, overwhelmingly (about 98 percent) voted for separation. On July 9th, the South celebrated its official independence from Sudan forming The Republic of South Sudan to become Africa’s newest state. Khartoum immediately responded by being the first country to officially recognize the independence of South Sudan in an official ceremony in Juba. The recognition was hours before the formal split between the two took place. At the same time, Khartoum promised to work together for the newly born state (Aljazeera, July 2011).
Chapter Four

4. Understanding the Security Implications of the South Sudan Secession for the Sub-Region

4.1. South Sudan-Sudan Relations: Outstanding CPA Issues

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2005 between Khartoum and SPLA/M. The CPA which ended the protracted conflict led first to a semi-autonomous South Sudan under the cooperative arrangement of ‘one country two systems’ and later in 9 July 2011, led to an independent state of South Sudan. However, the agreement is comprehensive in name only owing to its failure to provide answers to outstanding issues, which led the two states to frequently engage in destructive conflicts (Jumbert & Rolandsen, 2013: 5). Cognizant of the fact, in 2010 the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), chaired by South African president Thabo Mbeki, emerged as the framework to negotiate post-referendum and post-CPA relations between the two Sudan. Originally having a broad mandate, the AUHIP has mainly focused on facilitating relations between Sudan and South Sudan since 2011 (Sudan Tribune, 2010). Nonetheless, several outstanding issues remained unresolved including the management of oil sector; the status of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Therefore, this section examines the status of the outstanding issues.

4.1.1. Management of the Oil Sector

Following secession of the South in July 2011, 75% of oil production in Sudan passed to the South (Bloomberg Business, January 2012). The North, however, still controls the pipeline and refining infrastructure necessary to process the landlocked South’s oil, transport it to marine terminals, and (hence) make it available to global markets. The two countries are highly dependent on oil revenue: the loss of oil revenue in the North posed severe challenges to economic stability, requiring the government to urgently diversify its revenue base and find new sources of foreign exchange. For years, Khartoum had

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6 In fact, these are not the only issues. There are other pending areas, like citizenship and identity and the Nile water, but they relatively are less significant.
neglected other areas of its economy, which forced it to remove fuel subsidies, partially and then fully, and that led to people on the streets, protests, unrest, along with other consequences (Copnall, 2014: 3).

For its part, the South is almost totally reliant on oil revenues with 98% of government revenues coming from the oil, which make it the most oil-dependent nation on earth. More optimistic commentators noted that, properly managed, oil revenues could enable the South to catch up with, and even exceed, levels of development in the North (Lunn & Thompson, 2012: 3). The scene was thus set for fractious negotiations over oil revenue sharing and in particular the transit fee levied on oil piped from the South to the coast. South Sudan was not willing to pay a share for the oil money as a “ransom” or “fee” for independence. Yet Khartoum, partly supported by the international facilitators, argued that Sudan needed compensation for its loss of oil revenues (Angelo & McGuinness, 2012: 36).

Hence, oil became a major issue in negotiation between the two states. In November 2011, in a bid to resolve the dispute over oil revenue-sharing, the International Monetary Fund, the AU and South Sudan agreed on an amount of US $5.4 billion as appropriate compensation by the south to the north to make up for lost revenue, infrastructure expenditures and investments. However, Khartoum requested nearly three times that figure – US $15 billion over seven years, which was an excessive amount that can only produce a deadlock in the negotiations. This showed Sudan’s unwillingness to reach agreement, despite the dire economic consequences (Angelo & McGuinness, 2012: 37).

The disappointed South Sudan took the decision to shut down all its oil production throughout the country in January 2012 (Sudan Tribune, January 2012). Some considered it as an ‘economic suicide’ because of its extensive dependence on oil. At the root of the decision has been the result of an unresolved dispute over a mutually acceptable transit fee for oil flowing from South Sudan to the marine terminal at Port Sudan, in the North. According to IRIN News (2012) the decision was initiated after the North began confiscating oil in lieu of payment in November 2011. The South accused the government in the North that it had stolen 6m barrels ($815m-worth) of oil and demanded to be paid back or otherwise will not resume production of oil. The North, in
it's part, admitted siphoning-off oil and impounding it, but says it is ‘payment in kind’ for $1bn of unpaid transit and refining fees, calculated at 23% of the total value of transported oil (Lunn & Thompson, 2012: 4-5).

In any ways, the decision resulted in dire economic consequences, especially for South Sudan. Among the consequences are; greater potential for food insecurity, inflation and an escalation of tensions with the Government Republic of Sudan (GRS) (Enough Project, 2012: 2-4).

After a yearlong of oil shut down South Sudan was pressured into signing an oil agreement with Sudan in September 2012 (Aljazeera, 2012). The outcome of these negotiations was largely in Sudan’s favor, since South Sudan has to pay transportation fee above a normal rate, and the oil issue, instead of contributing to solving the other outstanding issues, has become linked to the question of ending the rebellions in South Kordofan and Blue Nile (Jumbert & Rolandsen, 2013: 5).

Relations between the two Sudan’s regarding oil seemed to be settled until Sudanese president order of government to block oil flowing from South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, June 2013). The president vowed that his country will never allow the flow of oil ever again. According to Bashir the decision was made in retaliation of Juba’s continued support to the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) rebels fighting Khartoum on multiple fronts. For his part, Salva Kiir, president of South Sudan acknowledged the decision and also showed his willingness to engage in peaceful dialogue to promote better relations.

The decision, though, had been delayed and was never implemented. And later in June of the same year, Sudan announced that South Sudan oil will continue to flow through the countries pipelines (Douche Whelle, September 2013).

The current crisis in South Sudan that unfolded in mid-December 2013 led to the closer of oil production in unity states to become another headache for the two Sudan. Looking to the past, it’s prompting to say that the future of South Sudan oil is uncertain. Existing oil fields in production have a limited life span, while exploration for new sources has not gained momentum. There has been considerable interest around the possibility of building a new pipeline through Kenya or Ethiopia, but its realization seems improbable
But until the oil ends or a new pipeline is built, each country will continue to have strategic control over its neighbor’s oil revenues. On the other, a continued stalemate in negotiations on this crucial issue might serve to provoke an all-out military confrontation between the two countries, which jeopardizes regional security.

4.1.2. Conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Niles

South Kordofan and Blue Nile known as the ‘Two states’ had been, since 1980’s, theatres in the civil war between the central government in Khartoum and the SPLA that ended in the 2005 CPA agreement. Both states were addressed in a protocol signed in 2004, later incorporated into the CPA. But the compendium peace agreement failed to address the core issues of the conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The two states were instead assigned vaguely worded ‘popular consultations.’

Beyond the shortcomings of the CPA, the six-year interim period in South Kordofan was marked by the failure of all parties—the NCP, the SPLM, and the international community—to genuinely address the root causes of the war or implement CPA-mandated disarmament, land commissions, and popular consultations (Gramizzi & Tubiana, 2013: 14). As a result of this and other factors war broke out in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan in June 2011 just before the official independence of South Sudan to take place. The eruption of violence signaled the resumption of the 20-year civil war between the government in Khartoum and northern elements of the (SPLM/A) (Gramizzi & Tubiana, 2013: 11).

In the immediate aftermath of the South Sudan secession war also resumed in Blue Nile. Security along the border and the rebellions in the two Sudanese states became a major point of contention between the two Sudan’s, and the issue has certainly changed character as a consequence of South Sudan becoming an independent state (Jumbert & Rolandsen, 2013: 6). As the time of the eruption of violence in the two states Sudan has been fighting in Darfur for nearly a decade.

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1 It was aimed for inhabitants to say if the arrangements made for them in the CPA are satisfactory or not, and whether the implementation was good enough. However, the popular consultation is yet to take place.
On November 2011 it was announced that Darfuri factions and Sudanese People Liberation Movement-North signed an alliance to form the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) with the objective of working together to remove Bashir government and install a democratic system in Sudan (Aljazeera, November 2011). The collation is composed of SPLM-N, the main Darfurian armed movements—Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW), and Sudanese Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM). Even though the possibility of toppling Bashir seems remote, the creation of SRF provided an opening for a holistic, national approach to the different conflicts in Sudan and also marked a significant milestone in the long history of rebellion in Sudan (Gramizzi & Tubiana, 2013: 32; McCutchen, 2014: 24).

Later in late February 2012 the SRF announced its first ever victories, in Jaw (on the disputed Sudan–South Sudan border) and Troji, found on the road from Unity state in South Sudan to the main SPLM-North-controlled areas of in the Nuba Mountains. The two areas are of vital strategic importance, because controlling them allows the SRF to bring in supplies from South (McCutchen, 2014: 19).

On 4 October of the same year, the political leadership—under the presidency of SPLM-N Chairman Malik Agar—officially presented its political agenda in a document entitled ‘Re-structuring of the Sudanese State’ (SRF document cited in McCutchen, 2014). The document stipulated that a transitional period of six years will be needed for Sudan to enter a new constitutional era. During this period, the SRF demanded the country to be ruled by a government of national unity, drawn from the SRF, other political parties, and civil society organizations. While the situation in the two states continued, the war in Darfur became out of control. The situation in that area was considered the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis, and even in 2013 there were more than two million displaced persons (IDPs) in the region (UN OCHA, 2014).

Peace talks sponsored by AUHIP failed and in 2013, Sudan’s wars in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan converged in the latter state, which also borders on South Sudan. As a result South Kordofan became epicenter of Sudan’s national conflict. Major attacks began the day after peace talks between the government and the SPLM-N were suspended in April and shocked Khartoum (International Crisis Group, 2015: 2).
Both states accused one another of supporting rebel groups in each other land. Khartoum demanded that Juba stops the rebellions in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. According to Small Arms Survey (SAS) (2015: 4), however, there was no substantial evidence of the SPLA supplying weapons and ammunition to the SRF. Officials in South Sudan also denied the allegation. Yet, most observers believe that they are providing some assistance. Given historic and political ties, it is very likely that any support that Juba is funneling to the SRF will continue until the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile ceases (Enough Project 2012: 2). This provides Juba a perceived mechanism through which it believes it can destabilize the regime in Khartoum by providing support to the SPLM-N, and, by extension, the SRF (Ibid).

4.1.2.1. Merging Conflict of the two Sudan along the South Kordofan-Unity Border

Conflict broke out in Juba in December 2013; Dinka troops systematically killed many Nuer residents of the capital. This triggered Dinka-Nuer animosity across the country; fighting erupted in Unity state between Nuer and Dinka oil workers and then spread throughout the state (ICG 2015: 10). Within days of the outbreak of fighting in, the wars began to merge geographically in its Unity state. As rebels from Sudan (notably JEM) joined the fight on Juba’s side, it rapidly became a main theatre, characterized by protracted conflict over major towns and oil installations, mass atrocities and the confluence of multiple armed groups operating with their own agendas (Ibid).

On the other side, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO)—the principal rebel movement in South Sudan-has used militia members recruited from northern pastoralist groups and has received support from the Sudanese government. As a result the border zone has become the site where two civil wars intersect. The fight between SRF and SPLA-IO has caught many by surprise as they expected them to ally against both governments. According to Craze (2014: 6) the conflict in South Kordofan is a mere proxy war between the two neighbors. If they are not going to resolve the situation, the two countries might end up in all-out war.
In a bid to calm the situation, AUHIP-sponsored talks between the rebels and GOS begun on November 2014 in Addis Ababa. But the ‘one process, two tracks’ (Darfur, Two Areas) negotiations ended on 8 December without major progress. While negotiations were officially ongoing, on 1 December fighting erupted in South Kordofan, followed by heavy aerial bombardments (SAS 2015: 1). What makes the situation more difficult is that there are far more and better armed non-state groups along the border zone, and the political situation in each country is far more fragile, making government control over militias even more challenging than before (SAS 2015: 4).

4.1.3. Status of Abyei

Abyei which is Located between Northern Bahr al Ghazal, Warrap and Unity states to the South and Southern Kordofan to the North, is geographically, ethnically and politically caught between North and South. It is home to the Ngok-Dinka, while Misseriya nomads migrate seasonally through the territory (Debay 2012: 11). Abyei was the only one of the three areas that was promised a referendum in the CPA. Supposed to run concurrently with the Southern Sudanese referendum on secession, the referendum in Abyei was to allow the people of the area the right to choose whether to remain in what was once called Kordofan-and into which Abyei had been moved in 1905-or join what would be (if South Sudan voted to secede, as indeed it did) Africa’s newest nation (Craze, 2014: 40).

The CPA’s formulation of the referendum in the Abyei Protocol was an echo of an earlier commitment made in the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement that entitled the Ngok-Dinka Abyei’s principal residents—to a referendum on whether they wanted to join an autonomous southern region (Ibid). Therefore, in the run up to the referendum, the discussion on Abyei focused on over what exactly constituted Abyei and its population, and who would be allowed to vote. It was furthermore assumed that the main source of contention over Abyei was ownership of oil and oil revenues from the area.

In between 2007-2008 the two states dragged into conflict because of the area’s rich oil (Jumbert & Rolandsen, 2013: 6). Hence, the 2009 ruling of the International Arbitrary Court in The Hague would resolve the issue. Oil proved to be less significant than was
assumed as most of the oil fields relocated outside of Abyei border. It dose still produce oil, but the real issue here is more ethnic than economic issue (BBC, May 2011).

In June 2011 the UN Security Council Resolution 1990 established the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), an Ethiopian peacekeeping contingent mandated to monitor the demilitarization of Abyei. The Government of Sudan found UNISFA a more palatable option than United Nation Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which it perceived as being biased towards South Sudan (Craze, 2014: 18).

Peace talks from 2011 to 2012 stagnated as Sudanese Armed Force (SAF) occupied Abyei, and negotiations over an administration in the area remained at an impasse due to disagreements about the composition of the Abyei Area Council. In September 2012 the AUHIP attempted to resurrect the idea of a referendum in Abyei and put forward a proposal for a referendum on the area’s political future to be held in October 2013 (Ibid). Unlike the CPA’s Abyei Protocol, which also claimed that ‘other Sudanese residing’ in Abyei should be allowed to vote, but left open the criteria by which residency should be established, the AUHIP proposal defined residency in terms of ‘having a permanent abode within the Abyei Area’. The proposal was supported by GoSS and the United States, but the GoS rejected it outright, complaining that the way the proposal formulated residency was ‘singling out the Missiriya nomads whose lifestyle is inimical to the concept of permanent abode’ (Craze, 2014: 42).

On March 8th 2013 the parties signed an agreement on the establishment of a Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) and the deployment of Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) in order to strengthen border security and provide the framework to resolve the outstanding border issues (UN News Centre, 2013). However, despite both sides repeatedly committing to the establishment of a demilitarized zone, the border remains militarized (Small Arms Survey, 2015a). In subsequent months of 2013 the situation in Abyei remained at an impasse: there was no progress in implementing the SDBZ and no progress occurred in negotiations on the political future of the territory.

Between October 27 and 29, 2013, 64,775 Ngok-Dinka participated in an informal referendum on the Abyei area’s final status. The referendum resulted in 99.98 percent of
voters choosing to rejoin South Sudan (Aljazeera, October 2013). Neither the referendum nor its results were recognized by the international community. Both the GOS and GoSS rejected\(^8\) the result. The African Union and the U.N. warned that such actions would only increase tensions. The nomadic Misseriya groups argued that any political endeavor that did not include them would not be respected (Enough Projects, 2014: 4). The USA also denied of supporting the Abyei unilateral referendum (Sudan Tribune, October 2013).

The decision by Ngok-Dinka to hold a unilateral referendum resulted from different factors. First, the community felt abandoned by the international community, which continued to insist on bilateral negotiations between the GoSS and GoS. It also felt increasingly abandoned by South Sudan, following the latter’s secession. South Sudanese support for Abyei was increasingly called into question in 2013, after President Salva Kiir removed a number of top officials hailing from Abyei as part of his attempts to consolidate power at the top levels of the SPLM (Craze, 2014: 44). The Ngok-Dinka frequently urged the international community to recognize the referendum but to no avail. Nonetheless, they are still in de facto control of much of Abyei.

The two ethnic groups, Ngok-Dinka and Misseriya have been in frequent clash over the years. Every year, Misseriya nomads move southward during the dry season to access water sources and pasture their herds in Abyei and other parts of South Sudan, despite the Ngok-Dinka claimed to be permanent settlers of the area. To make matters worse, Ngok-Dinka paramount chief, Kuol Deng Kuol, was allegedly shot dead by Misseriya herder. This assassination largely destroyed the already fragile ties that existed between the Ngok-Dinka and the Misseriya.

Following the assassination, negotiations between the GoS and the GRSS stagnated. Mindful of the fact, the UN security council in its 2205(2015) resolution extended the UNISFA role until 15 July 2015, voicing concern over delays in border mechanism operation (UNSC Resolution, February 2015).

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\(^8\) The rejection of South Sudan was partly designed for international consumption: given that the UN and AU criticism of the referendum, openly supporting the process would be politically dangerous. Moreover, even if it were to accept the result of the referendum, without the agreement of GoS and Missiriya Abyei would not be able to join South Sudan without military conflict between SAF and the SPLA.
Given the ongoing conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan, and the reduced diplomatic and international focus on Abyei mean there is unlikely to be a change in the area’s political status in the foreseeable future. The Enough Project (2015) warned that “longer the final status remains unresolved, the grater the potential for further violence in the area and between the two Sudan.”

4.2. From Civil War to Independent State: Understanding South Sudan Relations with the Neighbors in Security Perspectives

A history of regional meddling, proxy wars, cross-border entanglements, border disputes, resource competition and competing ideologies, as well as a host of common ethnic groups, illustrate the interconnectedness of this region and the central position the two Sudan’s occupies in it. Many of Sudan’s nine bordering states were directly involved in, or affected by, its civil wars. Likewise, many played important roles in securing the CPA and the principles enshrined therein. The secession has also resulted in new relations between South Sudan and their neighboring countries. Therefore, this section will seek to understand the historical and current relations of South Sudan with the sub-regional states.

4.2.1. South Sudanese-Ugandan Perspectives

The relationships between South Sudan and Uganda have been friendly for several decades. During the lengthy North-South civil war, Uganda served as a vital rear base for the SPLM/A. Uganda’s history of cooperation and alliance with the South can be attributed to various reasons, including the existence of ethnic groups that straddle the border as well as a long, positive relationship between the late Dr. John Garang and President Yoweri Museveni (Ismail & LaRocco, 2012: 4).

Another factor is that, following 1986 coup that brought Uganda’s serving President Yoweri Museveni to power, several armed groups emerged to challenge his leadership. Aware of Museveni’s close personalities with SPLA commander-in-chief John Garang, Khartoum began supporting the attempts of these groups to topple him. In a striking display of tit-for-tat politics, the newly established government in Kampala responded by
providing military assistance to the SPLA, before becoming its most important sponsor when the level of Ethiopian support dropped after the fall of the Mengistu regime (Hemmer, 2010: 3).

This relationship and cooperation has extended to President Salva Kiir after Garang’s death, though not as friendly as it used to be. This is compounded by an antagonism between Museveni and Bashir. During the Second Civil War, President Museveni consistently aligned Ugandan policy with the South and viewed Khartoum’s vision of an Islamic state as anathema to the demographic realities of the country. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is the most significant remnant of the Sudan-Uganda proxy war that prevailed during the 1990s. Northern Uganda initially suffered the greatest burden of LRA activity, but Joseph Kony’s small yet resilient guerrilla army gradually turned into a regional menace (Ibid).

However in early 2002, probably as a consequence of US pressure, Khartoum claimed an end to its support of the LRA and allowed the Ugandan army to fight Kony and his supporters on Sudanese soil. Although the icy relations between Bashir and Museveni thawed somewhat in the period 2000-2002, Museveni’s continued support for the SPLM/A and the general distrust between the two leaders hindered real reconciliation.

The government of Uganda was an important and active supporter of the peace talks that resulted in the 2005 CPA Agreement, and during the post-conflict period it has actively buttressed the SPLM and the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) (Høigilt et al, 2010: 13).

According to Hemmer (2010) the Ugandan government’s involvement in the Southern Sudanese referendum process and its aftermath has two main motives: first, security concerns over the continuing existence of the LRA, and the implications of renewed internal conflict in the Southern Sudan; and second, socio-political and economic interests in re-orienting the Southern Sudan towards eastern Africa and expanding Ugandan trade opportunities there. Ugandan businessmen have greatly benefited from the relative calm in Southern Sudan since the establishment of the CPA and the withdrawal of the LRA from the Southern Sudan-Uganda border area. In recent years, there has been
a massive increase in exports from and through Uganda to Southern Sudan. Currently, Ugandans are assumed to constitute the largest population there (Hemmer, 2010: 3). Added to these interests is President Museveni’s personal ambition to remain in power and take a lead in regional integration. Therefore, Uganda has security and economic related interest in South Sudan.

4.2.1.1. UPDF Intervention in the Current South Sudan Conflict

South Sudan, in just three years of its independence entered into destructive internal conflict. During the night of 15 December 2013, fighting broke out between factions of the SPLA in Juba. The fighting started after President Salva Kiir accused former Vice President Riek Machar of attempted coup. Five days later, the Ugandan People Defense Force (UPDF) deployed in South Sudan, although it’s active participation in the conflict alongside the SPLA was only publicly acknowledged in mid-January 2014 in a speech by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni (Sudan Tribune, January 2014). The justification forwarded by Ugandan government includes, it had been invited by the legitimate government of South Sudan to ensure order; it needed to evacuate Ugandan citizens caught up in the fighting; it had been asked by the United Nations Secretary-General to intervene; and that the regional organization, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development had sanctioned the intervention (Apuuli, 2014).

According to Apuuli (2014: 11), however, the underlying reason for the intervention is clearly economic. Despite frequent argument by Ugandan officials that it was done in accordance with the International Law, he found all the justification illegal except that it was invited by the legitimate GoSS. Berouk (2014) also agrees with the idea that economy is the driving force behind the intervention. Uganda sought to protect its lucrative bilateral relationship with South Sudan since it had become a major trading partner. It also aimed to protect the thousands of Ugandans working and operating business there. He further added that the scenario most feared by Uganda is an outright victory by the opposition forces, which are heavily linked to the Nuer ethnic group and led by former Vice President Riek Machar also from the Nuer group. This would lead to Kiir’s removal from power, which would be a strategic set back to Uganda and erode its capacity to influence developments in South Sudan (Ibid).
From the security perspective, Uganda has been the primary destinations for wave of South Sudan refugees an unwelcome burden and a potential source of insecurity. According to UNHCR 2015 report, more than 147,000 thousand refugees are seeking shelter in Uganda, as of the December 2013 fighting.

On the other dimension, there are others who see the intervention as right and appropriate. Uganda has the moral responsibility, security, and economic interests in South Sudan, so it had to ensure peace and stability for the good of its citizens. The SPLA forces that remained loyal to the government were admittedly overwhelmed and it was through the intervention of Ugandan troops that Juba was spared from the carnage and destruction, the like of what was witnessed in Bentiu, Bor and Malakal (Awolich, 2014: 12). Others also claimed that Uganda helped avert a potential Rwanda style genocide, as both sides accused of massacring civilians on the basis of their ethnicity (IRIN, May 2014).

On several occasions opposition groups accused the Ugandan intervention as one-sided. Uganda’s role in the conflict has been not as referees but as fighters on the side of Kirr forces, which makes them part of the problem rather than part of the solution. This will in the end hinder any peace talks between the warring parties (IRIN, June 2014). Moreover, there is a potential fear among many concerned parties that it will potentially trigger for regional war. Even though, the immediate neighbors have not been fighting against each other, the conflict is already taking a regional dynamic (Ibid). There is been a push by different actors over Ugandan troops to live the South Sudan soil. However, Uganda is hesitant to withdraw its troops unless the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) deploys its Protection and Deterrent Force (PDF).

4.2.2. Ethio-South Sudan Security Dilemma

Ethiopia’s association with the situation in South Sudan can be traced back to the August 1955 Torit mutiny that heralded the beginning of armed rebellion in the Sudan. The cordial relations between Ethiopia and the Umma Party and military governments from mid-1956 to early 1964 led to their collaboration against southern Sudan rebels. The
imperial regime supported the GoS in many terms and even pursued a policy of unconditional support for the successive regimes till late 1964 (Belete 2013: 36).

However, the bilateral relations between the two countries begun to deteriorate following the October 1964 popular uprising in Sudan, which made Ethiopia to revise its position on Sudan in general and the South in particular. Moreover, with the termination of the federal arrangement in Eritrea (1962), Ethiopia’s internal politics witnessed the emergence of armed resistance. Soon afterwards, the shift in the Ethio-Sudan political equation led to the commencement of the latter entertaining secessionist elements particularly from Eritrea (Belete 2013: 37). In retaliation Ethiopia begun to support rebel groups in South Sudan (Hemmer, 2010).

Hence, Ethiopia’s association with South Sudan began in earnest afterward. In subsequent years the contact with South Sudan factions became more frequent. Nonetheless, the two countries managed to improve their relationship following the signing of the historic Addis Ababa Accord, which was brokered by Emperor Hayla-Selassie (Belete 2013: 38).

Ethiopia’s support to the South Sudan rebels was also extended in times of Derg. Following the Bor mutiny in 1983, the SPLA set up operations in Ethiopia and was fully accommodated by the then leader, Mengistu HaileMariam, which helped the formations of the group. Mengistu played a formative role in the movement; including helping elevate a fellow Marxist, John Garang. Angered also by Khartoum’s backing for Eritrean and Tigrayan rebels, Ethiopian support to the SPLA was extensive, including bases, training, political direction, weapons and other supplies (Doop, 2013: 128). It also provided the rebels a frequency and the means to create and transmit “Radio SPLA” across the region, and it hosted tens of thousands of Southern refugees. Consequently, Khartoum largely saw the SPLA as a proxy of Mengistu and Museveni (ICG, 2010: 12).

When Mengistu fell in 1991, the SPLA was expelled, and Ethiopia’s support ceased. Because the SPLA had been close to Mengistu and employed in his strategy against the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which was now in power, relations were severed. However, they soon improved, and the new regime in Ethiopia
resumed considerable military support to the South in 1993 (Ibid). Having supported both the Tigrayan and Eritrean rebels to topple Mengistu, Khartoum was dismayed that the new governments had turned against them including by endorsing the principle of self-determination in the CPA talks. While Kenya fronted the mediation, Ethiopia was equally important in the IGAD process, using a combination of diplomatic and military maneuvers in support of the SPLA to move the talks forward.

This policy reorientation was largely a response to the danger posed by the National Islamic Front (NIF) – an increasingly expansionist Islamic regime with an international agenda – that had consolidated its grip in Khartoum and was pursuing destabilizing activities in the region, thus threatening Ethiopian security. In part aimed to counter encroachment, Ethiopia’s renewed military support for the SPLA included fighting decisive battles against government forces inside Sudan in the mid-1990s (Doop, 2013: 129). In fact–with endorsements and financial backing from the U.S. – Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda each took up the cause, intervening directly in support of opposition forces in order to stem extremist ambitions and associated risks of terrorism.

However, this regional dynamic changed profoundly following the outbreak of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border war in 1998, which prompted both states to seek rapprochement with their enemy Khartoum. Since then, Ethiopia has managed to establish fairly good political and trade relations with Sudan, and currently imports a vast share of its total oil demand from its western neighbor (Hemmer, 2010: 3). However, it remains extremely wary of the Islamist agenda that ruling elites in Sudan might have, and thinks of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) as a more ‘natural’ and reliable partner.9

Regional security is the primary concern in Addis. Any internal instability in Sudan and South Sudan certainly cause damaging spill over in Ethiopia.10 Ethiopia is aware that renewed conflict or destabilization in Sudan would likely draw in much of the region, including creating opportunities for Eritrea. Ethiopia has its own share of separatist worries, particularly involving its Oromo and Ogaden communities. It is feared that the

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9 Interview with key informant 2, associate professor of political science and international relations at the Addis Ababa University.
10 Ibid.
secessions of South Sudan could inspire such groups to strengthen their goal of separation\textsuperscript{11}. On top of that Ethiopia has enshrined a self-determination principle in its own constitution. The greater concern for the EPRDF in this regard would be Khartoum’s ability to again lend support to opposition groups and other Islamic elements (ICG, 2010: 13). For now Ethiopia seems to have positive relations with the two Sudan’s owing to the role played by the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (and still played by Hailemariam Dessalegn) in negotiating the two uneasy neighbors including sending Ethiopian troops to join the UNISFA in Abyei, and an agreement to monitor the border.

4.2.2.1. The Current Conflict in South Sudan: Spillover effect to Gambella

Gambella is one of the most conflict-ridden regions in Ethiopia. One of the most contentious issues is the politics of numbers that has locked two of the region’s major ethnic groups, the Anuak and the Nuer, into conflict. Ethiopia shares a more than 1,000 km border with South Sudan that is straddled by the two ethnic groups (ICG, 2010: 13). Both have a cross-border settlement in South Sudan as well. Until the mid-1980s the Anuak constituted the majority of Gambella’s population. However, the massive influx of refugees since the outbreak of the second Sudanese civil war in 1983 has dramatically changed the region’s demography (Dereje 2014).

The ongoing civil war in South Sudan, which begun in December 2013 has already produced hundreds of thousands of refugees, mostly hosted in refugee camps in Gambella. By May 2015, the number of South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia rose to more than 201,000, predominantly ethnic Nuer (UNHCR, 2015). The Ethiopian government is hosting the refugees with assistance from international organizations. However, the new refugee phenomenon in Gambella is viewed only from a humanitarian point of view, whilst it may have longer-term political ramifications for the area (Dereje 2014).

\textsuperscript{11}Interview with Dr. Kassahun Berhanu, associate professor of political science and international relations at the Addis Ababa University. He was an IGAD nominee as a member of the Panel of Experts in the Abyei Boundary Commission from April to July 2005 and resident Vice President of the Organization of Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa from December 2005 to January 2007.
For decades the Anuak have felt marginalized by the influx of Nuer refugees into the Gambella region, a demographic anxiety compounded by massive migration of highlanders from the east. The current Nuer movement may renew tensions if Anuak believe they are here to stay, further altering the area’s demographics in their rival’s favor. The Anuak claims to be the main indigenous group but the continued influx of Nuer refugees affects the power balance. Anecdotal evidence shows that some Nuer political elites are using the refugees to gain political advantage, by issuing Ethiopian ID cards to Nuer refugees, causing tension between the regional political leadership and the federal institution of the Administration for Refugee Affairs (Ibid).

Cross-border political and military mobilization has been a hallmark of regional politics that binds Gambella closely to South Sudan. Like the 1991 split of the SPLA, the ongoing violent conflict has also been increasingly framed in ethnic terms, with Kiir and Machar claiming to represent or identified with the two major ethnic groups of South Sudan, the Dinka and the Nuer, respectively. The conflict quickly spread and became deeply polarized as civilians were targeted based on their ethnicities. People in Gambella are furious with President Salva Kiir for the killings of Nuer in Juba, while many have relatives now sheltering in the UN’s compounds in South Sudan. The SPLM in opposition led by Riek Machar has extensive support among the Nuer populace in Gambella, raising the possibility that some Ethiopians might wish to provide support or shelter to South Sudanese rebels, or even join their fight. The Ethiopian government, on the other hand, has followed an official policy of neutrality and assumed a mediating role, a position that is reinforced by its current IGAD leadership (IRIN, May 2014). However, there is strong conviction that Ethiopia supports SPLA-IO.12

4.2.3. Kenyan-South Sudanese Relations

During Sudan’s last civil war, Kenya managed to avoid becoming a party to the conflict. Nonetheless, it had supported the SPLA, and while more discreet than some of its neighbors, its diplomatic, logistical and humanitarian aid and the open border it maintained were essential in sustaining the rebel movement. After the SPLA was forced

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12 Interview with Dr. Kassahun Berhanu
to leave Ethiopia in 1991, following regime change, it was welcomed to set up its political headquarters in Nairobi and was accommodated by Moi’s government. The SPLA leadership was treated very well during not infrequent visits to Nairobi. The impact of the death of Dr John Garang in 2005 was considerable in Kenya, where many mourned the loss (ICG, 2010: 1-2).

During the civil war, Kenya hosted nearly 100,000 Sudanese refugees that resulted in dire economic and humanitarian consequences (Ibid). Many of these refugees, most of whom settled in Kakuma and Lokichokio in Kenya’s remote north-western Turkana district, have yet to return to their country of origin, much to the distress of the local population (Hemmer, 2010: 3).

Kenya is an important ally of South Sudan, given the significant role it played during negotiation of the CPA agreement, particularly in 2003 and 2004, though many in Khartoum viewed Kenya’s mediation as partial to the SPLA. It is likewise a key economic player in the region and an important trading partner to South Sudan. Not only has Kenya made some visible economic investments in South Sudan, along with Uganda it also supported South Sudan’s membership in the East African Community (while rejecting Sudanese membership bid on technical grounds) (Angelo & McGuinnesss, 2012: 54). Since the signing of the agreement, Kenyan businesses have significantly expanded their activities in Southern Sudan, particularly in its capital city Juba.

Apart from this, Kenya’s informal connections with Southerners are evident. Many SPLA officers kept their homes and families in Nairobi during the struggle, and many retain those homes and educate their children in Nairobi today.

In September 2008, Somali pirates hijacked a Ukrainian-owned ship heading for Kenya. It contained military cargo including main battle tanks, multiple launch rocket systems, anti-aircraft guns and grenade launchers. The end-user for this consignment was the SPLA. The incident seemed to confirm already existing suspicions that Kenya serves as a transit port for weapons deliveries to Southern Sudan, and damaged the country’s reputation as an ‘impartial’ actor in Sudan’s political marketplace (Hemmer, 2010: 3).
This led to strained relations between Kenya and Sudan. Yet, the Kenyan government denied any wrong doing arguing that Southern Sudan has a right to arm itself, and cannot sit idly by while Khartoum increases its arsenal with the help of Chinese, Russian and Iranian suppliers. One confirmed that this was neither the first nor the last such shipment and that Kenyan actors had also played a role in facilitating relationships between buyer and seller (ICG, 2010: 4). Its engagement in the risky business of arms acquisitions – particularly outside the reporting procedures stipulated by the CPA – is a telling indication of Kenyan support, although the financial benefits associated with the trade could also be a strong incentive. Such activity is not without cost, though, and may have weakened Nairobi’s credibility as a neutral actor in the eyes of Khartoum. However, Khartoum can ill afford to harm relations, lest it push Kenya further into the South’s camp (Ibid).

4.2.3.1. After the South Sudan Independence: Role for Kenya

Upon the independence of South Sudan, Kenya’s trade relations with its neighbors increasingly become important. Here, it is necessary to mention the agreement reached over the construction of oil pipeline. If realized, it will enable landlocked South Sudan with access to the red sea (Howes, 2012). The Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Corridor (LAPSSET)\(^{13}\) involves airports, railways, roads and importantly, an oil pipeline between Lamu (where a new refinery will be built) and South Sudan. Transport links will connect cities in Kenya, Ethiopia and South Sudan. The existing rift valley transport corridor connects Mombasa and Uganda, leaving Sudan a notable absentee from Kenya’s infrastructural investment aimed at promoting regional trade. The pipeline in particular could lead to a changing dynamic in the East African extractives industry; emerging oil players Uganda (with its large confirmed reserves in the Lake Albert basin bordering DRC) and Kenya could feasibly export through the same pipeline, leaving Sudan, with all of its oil processing infrastructure, out in the cold (Ibid).

\(^{13}\)However, the pipeline is highly unlikely to materialize, especially given US opposition to this proposal on the grounds that remaining oil reserves in South Sudan are too limited to warrant such a large-scale investment. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that a new pipeline would have significant regional repercussions. It would be likely to cause irreparable damage to relations between Sudan and South Sudan, as well as dealing a fatal blow to the Sudanese economy – certainly unwise in the long term.
With regards to regional security, Kenya’s role is not that significant. Because, first and foremost, today’s political leadership in Nairobi is preoccupied with its own domestic dynamics after the violence in connection with the presidential elections in 2007–2008. Those events created deep wounds, challenging national identity and further fracturing Kenyan society. Second, the Kenyan security forces have been deeply engaged in the southern regions of Somalia, in fight against al-Shabaab militias. Combined, these two factors – domestic politics and military engagement in Somalia – along with the declining state of the national economy, certainly curtail Kenya’s role in making a contribution to strengthening state authority in South Sudan (Angelo & McGuinness, 2012: 54).

With the current crisis in South Sudan, Kenya shares Ugandan concern that prolonged instability in the country will damage its own lucrative trade with Juba. Additionally, Kenya is worried about the influx of refugees fleeing its borders (IRIN, March 2014). As of the December 2013 conflict in South Sudan, more than 46,000 refugees have crossed the Kenyan border (UNHCR, 2015).

4.2.4. South Sudan-Eritrea Perspective

Since the 1960s, former Sudanese President Jafaar Nimeiri played a critical role in arming and supporting Eritrean and Tigrayan fighters against Emperor Haile Selassie’s Ethiopian government and subsequent Sudanese regimes continued that support to the rebellion against Mengistu through the 1980s. However, those ties quickly faded, as Khartoum’s support for Islamic groups, including Eritrean jihadists, increased in the 1990s. Asmara soon broke diplomatic ties, and President Isaias declared in 1994 that “President Omer al-Bashir will be overthrown within a year” (De Waal quoted in ICG, 2010: 16). Subsequently, irritated with Khartoum and backing John Garang’s vision of the democratic transformation of the whole of Sudan, Isaias began supporting multiple opposition elements in an effort to achieve forceful regime change in Khartoum.

The Eritrean army was instrumental in the SPLA’s third front, when Garang attempted to expand the war in the North and stretch Khartoum’s army. Asmara provided bases, training, military intelligence It also hosted the National Democratic Alliance, a group of primarily Northern opposition parties plus the and skilled strategists and deployed its own
troops deep in eastern Sudan in the mid-1990s, contributing to a crucial SPLA victory in Blue Nile state in 1997 (ICG, 2010: 16).

Eritrea is also important because of the Beja rebels. The Beja form the largest ethnic group in eastern Sudan, with a small number also living on the Eritrean side of the border. It is feared that such groups could be inspired to strengthen their agenda of secession following the South Sudan precedent, which led to its independence. In October 2006, Eritrea facilitated the signing of a peace accord between the Sudanese government and the Eastern Front, an alliance of the Beja Congress and a small armed rebel movement called the Rashaida Free Lions. However, peace has not resulted in either power sharing or development in this remote region of Sudan. Instability and discontent have been growing. On 15 November 2011, for example, a dissident faction of the Beja Congress decided to join the SRF (Angelo & McGuinness, 2012: 54).

Their bilateral tension and the extent to which Khartoum becomes a crucial third party has long been the primary concern of both Eritrea and Ethiopia. The three nations have historically been engaged in a complicated regional politics. Eritrea’s Sudan policy may in fact be more defined by the hostile relationship with Ethiopia than by anything in Sudan. While Ethiopia and Eritrea each has serious concerns about the regime in Khartoum, both have at times had to engage constructively with it to serve their own interests (ICG, 2010: 16). One can remind the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2000, which forced both countries to reconsider their ties with Khartoum. However, Khartoum frequently accused the Asmara government of supporting rebels in Sudan, though Eritrea vehemently denies.

The Eritrean government faces a dilemma. On the one hand, Eritrea needs Khartoum for a variety of reasons. After years of hostile posturing, it began a discreet rapprochement with Khartoum in 2005-2006, sending delegations to seek economic assistance and discuss trade, border issues and the flight to Sudan of Eritrean youth hoping to escape a repressive atmosphere and mandatory military conscription. At the same time, Asmara attempted to play a more constructive role with rebels in both Darfur and the East. In this

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14 Interview with Dr. Kassahun Berhanu
15 Interview with key informant two
regard, Isaias participated in the February 2010 signing ceremony of the First Framework Agreement in Doha between the Sudanese government and the JEM rebels. Increasingly isolated both regionally and further afield, he may see Khartoum as one of the few allies available. If it is alienated, Asmara would be in an even more untenable position, a fact that gives the NCP considerable leverage in the relationship.

On the other hand, it played an important role in supporting the SPLA and Sudan’s opposition groups more broadly. It also was critical in enshrining the principles of secular governance and self-determination during the early days of the IGAD peace talks.

Eritrean private business has expanded noticeably since 2005, which was also extended after the independence of South Sudan. Asmara can’t afford to lose its relation with Juba given the hitherto factor. Therefore, one can conclude that Eritrea is not committed towards the two Sudan’s, at least for now.

Eritrea is also in dispute with many of its neighbors, especially with IGAD member states. Moreover, given its rejection in the international arena, it’s less likely to influence the region in general and South Sudan in particular\(^\text{16}\). Nonetheless, Eritrea remains important, at least as a potential spoiler, a role at which it has frequently exhibited both willingness and considerable skill. The current South Sudan conflict could be a case in point.

**4.3. The Current South Sudan Conflict: A New Arena for Regional Competition**

As of mid-December 2013, the government and opposition forces in South Sudan have been locked in a destructive political and military crisis. The fighting has resulted in an estimated tens of thousands of deaths, 1.4 million internally displaced persons, and thousands of refugees dispersed to neighboring countries. About four million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. A UN recent report unveiled gross human rights violations. Diplomatic efforts have so far failed to secure a lasting ceasefire—let

\(^{16}\)Interview with key informant 2
alone lay the groundwork for a negotiated political settlement. As a result, the volatile security situation in the Horn of Africa has only worsened.

The South Sudan crisis has added a new dimension to existing tensions in the region – between Uganda and Sudan on one hand, and Ethiopia and Eritrea on the other (Berouk 2014). Historically, such countries have often been locked in a vicious circle of mutual interventions. The motto and practice of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’, which underpins intervention by proxy, has been used by Ethiopia, the Sudan, Somalia and of late independent Eritrea (Kassahun 2013: 87).

Every day the crisis continues, additional pressure is placed on these states that have, for some time now, been locked in a distrustful and suspicious relationship to support one side or the other. As one official involved in the ongoing diplomatic efforts pointed out, ‘the longer the conflict drags on, the more the possibility of fixing South Sudan fades, and the higher the risk of greater regional competition’ (Berouk 2014).

4.3.1. Sudan Vs Uganda

There are obvious tensions between Sudan and Uganda – which no longer share a land border after the creation of South Sudan, and are respectively South Sudan’s oldest enemy and closest ally. Uganda has security-related, political and economic interests, which prompted it to intervene militarily in South Sudan in support of the government. As indicated in the preceding section, Uganda has historical attachment with the SPLM during its struggle against Sudan, which reciprocated by giving support to the LRA. In the current conflict, Kampala has expressed its concern that the LRA, which has more recently operated in neighboring CAR & DRC, could regroup in a lawless South Sudan (IRIN, March 2014). Moreover, Uganda sought to protect its multi-dimensional interest in South Sudan, which prompted it to intervene in the country. Under some estimate the Kampala’s force is numbered in between 1,500 to 4,500. According to Sudan Tribune (2015) Uganda has deployed an additional 7,000 troops in South Sudan.

The proximity of Ugandan forces to the oil fields in the Unity and Upper Nile states caused great anxiety in Sudan regarding Uganda’s intentions. Sudan was deeply concerned by the possibility that the SRF might receive a significant number of weapons
from Uganda. Following the Ugandan and SRF interventions, Khartoum began to provide limited support to the SPLM-IO. Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir’s visit to South Sudan in early January 2014 was supposed to symbolize his support for Kiir’s government against Machar – who for so many years had been Sudan’s key ally (Berouk 2014). Yet, there are real concerns that Sudan might already have reverted to its longstanding tactic of supporting the opposition forces, which are on the lookout for foreign sponsors and conduits for military support in the region. The South Sudanese government repeatedly claimed that opposition forces were allowed full use of Sudanese territory to carry out military operations and attacks (Ibid).

According ICG (2015) report, Khartoum support to the SPLM-IO balances Kampala’s and the SRF’s help for Juba and pressures Kiir not to aid the Sudanese rebels. A Sudanese official interview with ICG called Uganda “the main reason why Sudan could be involved alongside SPLM-IO”. Sudanese officials and others suggest Kampala forced the SRF to fight for Juba. SRF leaders deny this, but a Ugandan official said, “in times of need, all are called upon to act”. Khartoum insists Juba continues to support the SRF and allows Uganda to arm it via the Yida airstrip. Juba disputes this, says Ugandan troops are only positioned to defend Juba and Bor and denies or downplays the SRF role (p-21).

The South Sudanese crisis has enabled Sudan to present itself to the international community as a force for stability. Yet, it is unlikely that Sudan can withstand the temptation of settling old scores with the greatly weakened South Sudan. A protracted civil war in South Sudan would be beneficial to Sudan’s interests in the short to medium term, as it would prevent the emergence of a stronger and oil-rich state allied to Uganda—thereby allowing Sudan to re-establish its influence over South Sudanese politics (Berouk 2014). Moreover, Sudan sees the crisis as a relief from its continued hostilities with South Sudan.17 Sudanese involvement in South Sudan’s internal conflict could mean that Khartoum and Kampala would play out their differences through the war in South Sudan.

17 Interview with Dr. kassahun Berhanu
4.3.2. Ethiopia VS Eritrea

The tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea are far more obvious. They were friends during the armed struggle against the military regime of Mengistu. However, since 1998, these states have been involved in a bitter and undisguised ‘long game’ of undermining each other’s security, building opportunistic alliances and fighting cross-border proxy wars. Eritrea, for example, supports Ethiopian opposition forces like the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), while Ethiopia sponsors several activities of the Eritrean opposition (Kassahun 2013: 79). The Eritrean government is also accused of providing strong support to the Somali Islamists who are still locked in a bitter war with the African Union contingents drawn from Uganda and Burundi, including Ethiopia, Kenya and the highly beleaguered Somali Transitional Federal Government (Ibid).

Ethiopia has consistently avoided direct involvement in the South Sudanese crisis because of wider geopolitical, diplomatic and security considerations. The state believes that unilateral and partisan military intervention is counter-productive, and would only exacerbate the existing fault-lines in South Sudan. It has thus strongly asked Uganda to pull out its troops, even if they had entered South Sudan at that government’s request. Ethiopia believes that Uganda’s military intervention has created harmful regional dynamics, endangering the mediation efforts of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), of which Uganda is a member (Berouk 2014). Nonetheless, there are strong speculations that Ethiopia is supporting the rebel groups in South Sudan. If confirmed, it would have a serious implication for the bilateral relation between Kampala and Addis Ababa as the former is supporting the government forces.\(^{18}\)

In the face of the negotiating table, Ethiopia sought instead to play a balanced but highly visible role. The crisis may have presented a political opportunity for Ethiopia to play such a role and to prove itself as a reliable partner of the international community. Yet, the state has a very high stake in this crisis.

\(^{18}\) Interview with Dr. Kassahun Berhanu
Firstly, the crisis has provoked an influx of large numbers of refugees in to Gambella, Ethiopia, much of them from ethnic Nuer. Secondly, Ethiopia feels that the crisis must be stopped before it becomes an ethnic conflict beyond repair, which would complicate and even sharpen the political divide between the Nuer and Anuak ethnic groups that live in Ethiopia’s Gambella region (Ibid). Following, the appointment of a Nuer president in April 2013, this border region has experienced persistent struggles for power between the two dominant ethnic groups (Dereje 2014). Thirdly, deteriorating security on Ethiopia’s long, porous and politically explosive border with both Sudan and South Sudan poses a direct threat to Ethiopia.

More than any other state in the region, Ethiopia seeks to prevent at all costs the total collapse of the South Sudanese government and a prolonged civil war. This could in turn lead to the marginal areas of South Sudan being used by Eritrea to infiltrate Ethiopian rebel groups and conduct destabilizing activities inside Ethiopia. Ethiopia is also very concerned that a South Sudan-style crisis could materialize in Sudan and ultimately lead to a full-fledged war between the two states (Birouk 2014).

Since February 2014, some reports suggest that Eritrean operatives are covertly providing support to South Sudanese opposition forces. Later in March the Ethiopian government accused Eritrea of involving in South Sudan crisis. It said Eritrea’s involvement in regional conflicts and crises has been the case for long and is not a new phenomenon (The Reporter, March 2014). However, the Eritrean government dismissed all accusations and instead blamed Ethiopia (Sudan Tribune, March 2014). This would be deeply unsettling to Ethiopia, which sees Eritrea as the principal source of instability in the Horn of Africa for as long as President Isaias Afwerki remains in power. Such support will probably never be fully corroborated, since it is as secretive as it is sensitive. The disclosure of its true extent would not only threaten its effectiveness, but risk major embarrassment to Eritrea. Yet, considerably isolated from Horn of Africa politics and diplomacy, Eritrea is visibly not enthusiastic about the mediation undertaken by IGAD. \(^\text{19}\)

\[^{19}\text{Interview with key informant 2}\]
Eritrea views IGAD as a tool of Ethiopia’s ever-increasing military and economic predominance in the region. Eritrea may thus have risked reaching out to the South Sudanese opposition forces in support of Sudan’s interests—and in the hope that fragmentation or a government change could later on cause a spill-over of the violence into Ethiopia. The Gamgella case best illustrates the assumption. This would be the simplest and cheapest way to keep Ethiopia entrapped in South Sudan’s unrest for many years, as armed factions seek passage through Ethiopia to conduct military operations. As a result, Ethiopia would eventually lose the political capital that it so carefully expended in the hopelessly uncertain course of mediating the crisis (Berouk 2014).

Eritrea’s priority would be to strategically use resulting dynamics to help its shakier regional position, and improve its own political vulnerability and economic difficulties. It is also of great importance for Eritrea to solidify its renewed strategic relationship with Sudan. Both Eritrea and Sudan had officially proclaimed their political support for the South Sudanese government during Al-Bashir’s official three-day visit to Eritrea in late January 2014 (Sudan Tribune, January 2014). However, this visit did nothing to allay the apprehension of their strongest rivals – Uganda and Ethiopia. On the contrary, it essentially confirmed their mutual interest of curbing the greater role that Uganda and Ethiopia play in South Sudan (Berouk 2014).

All this seems unlikely to Western analysts and diplomats, who hastily argue that the fear of a Sudan-Eritrea ‘axis of evil’ is misplaced; that there is no compelling evidence to date of Eritrean misdemeanors; and that Eritrea is currently weakened to the extent that it can no longer compete in any way with Ethiopia in South Sudan. Nonetheless, one can claim the possibility of South Sudan as a new arena for the wider proxy war between Addis Ababa and Asmara within which Gambella plays a strategic role (Dereje 2014).

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was established in 1986 by six member states\(^{20}\) to coordinate the efforts of member states to combat the problems of drought and desertification in the region. The name of the organization betrayed no political ambition for greater regional integration and its mandate was confined to functional coordination on environmental protection, food security strategies and natural resource management. The rationale for establishing IGADD was not overtly political. The state of Eritrea\(^{21}\) was admitted as the seventh member of IGADD at the fourth Summit of Heads of State and Government at Addis Ababa in September 1993.

Subsequently, it soon became apparent that IGADD could provide a regular forum in which leaders of the region could tackle other political and socio-economic issues in the regional context. Realizing this, the heads of state and government at an extraordinary summit on 18 April 1995 resolved to expand the mandate of IGADD and issued a declaration to revitalize the authority and expand areas of cooperation among member states. The revitalized IGADD was renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1995 (Apuuli, 2011: 352). Hence, its mandate was subsequently expanded to cover issues of peace and security.

IGADD launched its peace initiative for Sudan at its Addis Ababa summit in the early 1990’s. Therefore this section is concerned with the IGAD-led Sudan Peace Conference from 1993 to 2005. This peace conference was divided into two phases, namely phase one (September 1993–May 2002) and phase two (May 2002–January 2005).

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\(^{20}\) These states are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda

\(^{21}\) Eritrea suspended its participation in IGAD in 2007, following Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia and what it saw as “the moral failure of IGAD to condemn the acts of aggression against a fellow Member State”.
4.4.1. Phase One: September 1993–May 2002

At the IGADD summit in September 1993, President Omar al-Bashir asked his neighbors to help end the Sudan conflict. IGADD established a standing committee on peace made up of the heads of state and government of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda, with President Daniel arap Moi as the chairman. The mediation process was handled by a standing committee made up of the foreign ministers from the same countries and chaired by Kenya. In addition, the Friends of IGADD was formed by leading Western countries (now called the IGAD Partners Forum [IPF]) and it promised support for IGADD’s peace keeping role (Young, 2007: 9). The IGAD sub-committee was entrusted with the responsibility of bringing the Sudanese conflict to an end through a negotiated settlement.

The ingredients for a well-balanced mediation thus appeared to be present. However, the deadly rivalry within the Horn was soon to resume, tilting the balance firmly towards the SPLA. In January 1994 Eritrea broke off relations with Sudan, accusing Khartoum of sponsoring an Islamist rebel group inside Eritrea. Uganda took up the hostile stance towards Sudan, with the active backing of the United States. Ethiopia followed suit in 1995 after blame fell on Sudan for an attempt on President Mubarak’s life at the Addis Ababa OAU summit. The IGADD committee continued its negotiations despite the collapse of the regional alliances that had prompted Bashir’s request for its involvement. Kenya alone maintained its neutrality and organized proximity talks between representatives of the Sudanese government and the SPLA (Healy, 2011: 111).

In March 1994, the meeting of the IGADD sub-committee was convened in Nairobi, at which it proposed a Declaration of Principles (DoP) to form the framework of the negotiations. The DoP acknowledged the right of the south to self-determination, but made this contingent upon the failure of the GoS to introduce democracy and secularism. It was also stipulated that Sudan must respond to its diverse population’s need for social and political equality (Apuuli, 2011:353). Bashir refused to accept the DoP but it remained on the IGADD table and later became the foundation upon which the CPA was negotiated (Healy, 2011: 111).
For the next two years the focus of regional involvement shifted from the negotiating table to the battlefield (Ibid.). Hence, the negotiations stalled for the next 33 months. The Clinton administration supported the cause of the Southern Sudanese and provided $20 million of US military assistance to its friends in the region, ostensibly to help them withstand the Islamist threat from Sudan (Young, 2007: 10).

In October 1997, the GoS returned to the negotiating table and thereafter in May 1998, accepted the DoP as the basis for negotiations. However, the outbreak of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War in May 1998 reduced the government’s enthusiasm for the IGAD peace initiative. As IGAD peace process lost considerable momentum, but it was not abandoned. As Cairo and Tripoli sought to take advantage of IGAD inactivity, western support for the IGAD process was stepped up (Healy, 2011: 111). Although these initiatives attracted the support of the parties to the Sudan conflict, they did not achieve much. Even though, it was faltering, the IGAD process was seen by all as the best forum to deal with the Sudan issue. Notwithstanding, the IGAD process suffered from major flaws: inter alia, the failure to involve other political forces (Apuuli, 2011: 353)

On the positive side, this phase of the IGAD process accomplished some achievements, including the production of a well-thought-out DoP; workable relations with the conflicting parties; the development of a system of ambassador envoys; the attraction of political and financial support from the IPF; and international legitimacy. Furthermore, the process made good progress on a wealth-sharing agreement and on the resolution of the problem of the marginalized territories (Ibid).

4.4.2. Phase two: May 2002–January 2005

From the experience of the first phase of the IGAD peace process, it became clear that if the sub-regional organization was to succeed with the Sudanese problem, the process had to be revived. The second phase of IGAD mediation kicked off in June 2001 with the convening of an extraordinary IGAD summit in Nairobi. The summit recognized the outstanding issues that constituted a stumbling block to the negotiations, and recommended serious dialogue between the parties (Kwaje, 2004: 98). Subsequently, in November 2001, Lieutenant General Lazaro Sumbeiywo was appointed special envoy to
the IGAD peace process in Sudan (Kwaje, 2004: 99). In May 2002, Sumbeiywo drew up a programme of work for the negotiations, known as the Machakos I Protocol.

By July 2002 General Sumbeiywo had successfully negotiated the Machakos II Protocol. The detailed agreement was titled ‘Agreed Text on the Preamble, Principles, and the Transition Process between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (Apuuli, 2011: 354). This secured the crucial ‘one country, two systems’ compromise in which the two sides agreed that Shari’a law would be the basis of the legal system in the North, while the South would have its own secular administration. It also established the timing of the referendum on self-determination, to be held six years after the signing of the peace agreement (Healy, 2011: 111).

The agreement, however, suffered a setback in September 2002 when the GoS decided to recall its delegation from Machakos. The GoS argued that it could not continue with the negotiations based on the SPLM/A position regarding power sharing, the status of the national capital and the issue of Nuba Mountains, Funj and Abyei. The SPLM/A had proposed a structure of power-sharing at three levels of government: the national government, South Sudan government and state government (Kwaje: 2004: 101). It had also proposed a sharia-free capital for the central government.

On the question of the three areas of Nuba Mountains, Abyei and Funj, the SPLM/A had accepted the proposal of the mediators that the status of these areas be dealt with under IGAD mediation as part of an overall solution to the Sudanese conflict. However, the GoS had demanded that IGAD limit the peace process to southern Sudan in accordance with the borders of 1 January 1956.

The negotiations recommenced in October 2002 when the parties signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on cessation of hostilities in order to ‘create and maintain a conducive atmosphere throughout the negotiations until all the outstanding issues were resolved’ (Apuuli, 2011: 354). From Machakos in 2002, the negotiations were shifted to Nakuru in July 2003, then Nanyuki in August 2003 and finally to Naivasha in September 2003. The Naivasha negotiations finally led to the concluding and signing of the CPA on 9 January 2005. Specifically, at the Naivasha round of negotiations, the parties reached
agreement on the issues of security arrangements, wealth sharing, oil and the decentralization of power (Ibid).

A number of things can be noted from the IGAD mediation. Firstly, the process was not all inclusive, as it narrowly focused on the GoS and SPLM/A, while excluding the participation of civil society and other political parties. In fact, according to Young (2007) ‘the negotiations were narrowed to the participation of two elites [Garang and Taha] whose support base was questionable’ (P-22). The lack of inclusion was later to manifest itself when the issue of Darfur emerged. Darfur was not part of the agenda of the IGAD led process. As a result, this failure to widen the peace process has contributed to the many of problems that have emerged in the post-CPA period. Secondly, although IGAD was given authority to conduct the mediation, its continued role after the conclusion of the negotiations was not made very clear. Therefore, IGAD had no mechanism by which it could follow directly the day-to-day implementation of the CPA.

In a nut shell, openings for conflict resolution in Sudan occurred more as a result of shifting regional alliances than because of new approaches to regional security. Volatile regional relations often threatened to derail the IGAD peace process. External pressure also played a key part. Nonetheless, IGAD’s institutional role proved crucial, first in framing the problem as a North–South issue and second in maintaining a semblance of continuity for the Sudan peace process as a whole. This long-term engagement enabled those involved to capitalize on opportunities to come to a settlement. Without IGAD’s sustained involvement these would most likely have been lost (Healy, 2011: 111).
Chapter Five

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusion

The South Sudanese people suffered from political and economic exclusion from the early days of independence in mid-1950. Successive governments in Khartoum forcefully imposed a policy of Arabization on southerners. In response to the policy of the north, a civil war broke out. The civil war lasted until the signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa Accord, which provided the south relative autonomous. Relative peace prevailed for a decade and the north-south relation seemed amicable.

However, the abrogation of the agreement by Nemer in 1983, led to the resumption of the civil war and the formations of the SPLA. The SPLA/M was more of an ideological movement than a secessionist one. Moreover, it displayed powerful military skills. Instead of liberating the South, the SPLA/M sought to liberate all of Sudan and turn it into an African-secular nation.

In late 1990’s, Khartoum faced multiple rebel armies who worked together under one commander backed by neighboring Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Chad. Beyond the regional picture, the United States was providing support for Sudan’s neighbors as part of its containment of the Islamist ideology. The mounting pressure led Khartoum to reconsider some of its domestic and international policies. Eventually the NCP was pressured into negotiating the CPA with the SPLA/M. The CPA provided the south opportunity to decide its fate whether to remain with or seceded through making unity attractive. However, the north failed to make unity attractive, which eventually led to the secession of South Sudan in July 2011.

The January 2011 referendum in South Sudan was a watershed event with wide-ranging and multi-dimensional political, economic and social consequences – for the north and the south, as well as for relations between the two states. Moreover, the broader region, including the regional balance of power, has been impacted by the formation of this new state. Today, tense relations between Sudan and South Sudan dominate the regional
landscape, threatening to cause even greater instability in this already unstable part of the world.

The CPA agreement is comprehensive in name only because of its failure to provide solution to the outstanding issues. Some of the top priority CPA issues are; management of oil revenue, conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile and the status of Abyei. The oil sector has been a source of dispute ever since the secession of the south from the north. As a result of the 2011 referendum Khartoum lost much of its oil to Juba, yet it remains in possession of all the infrastructures, which make both countries dependent on each other. The dispute therefore is on the equitable divisions of oil revenue that at sometimes prompted both states to take drastic measure. For now, the relation between the two neighbors, related to oil seems amicable. Nonetheless, failure to reach a sustainable agreement, will possibly drug the two countries in to an all-out war thereby destabilizing the sub-region. Therefore, it is noted that the top priority in terms of peace and security in the region is the normalization of relations between these two hostile neighbors.

The South Sudan secession also impacted the state of South Kordofan and Blue Niles. These two states were not participated in the South Sudan referendum as they were promised ‘popular consultations’. Consequently, war broke out in the ‘two states’ in just before and after the independence in July. Even though these states are located in Sudan, most of the people fought alongside the SPLA during the second civil war and moreover feel as southerners. In the meantime, Sudan has been fighting in Darfur for nearly a decade. This has led to the formations of rebel collation, SRF and the conflicts in the three states converged into South Kordofan. Later in 2013, when war broke out in South Sudan, these wars merged along the Sudan and South Sudan border of Unity and South Kordofan states. As a result the conflict become proxy war between the two neighbors and both states frequently accused of brinkmanship. The two Sudan should refrain from such act in order to maintain the peace and security of the area as well as the sub region.

Abyei is also at the center of the disputes between the two Sudan’s. Abyei is one of the three states that were promised to have its own referendum, though that didn’t take place. The two states entered into war because of the resourcefulness of the area. But, after the relocation of the area its significance declined. The promised referendum is yet to take
place, however the two states are still claiming the area. Moreover, the two ethnic groups (Ngok-Dinka & Misseriya) seasonally clash as the later cross border in search of pasture and grazing. The UNISFA role has been extended to the end of June, but the future prospects of Abyei seems bleak as the two states are highly consumed in their internal affairs.

The South Sudan secession also resulted in new relations with Sudan as well as with the neighboring countries. These countries (Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya & Eritrea) have supported SPLA during the second civil war against the government in Khartoum. Moreover, they have been directly or indirectly involved in the CPA. Over the years their security has been threatened because of the influx of refugees and the spillover nature of the conflict.

Ethiopia has managed to maintain relatively good relations with both countries and has been the main actor in negotiating the two Sudan and recently the South Sudanese warring parties. But, Ethiopia is wary of the South Sudanese internal conflict that might spillover through its pores border. Uganda in contrast openly sided with South Sudan in a bid to undermine its oldest enemy Sudan. It also intervened in the current South Sudan conflict in support of the government. Kenya like Uganda has openly showed its support for the government of South Sudan. Yet, its role in negotiating the CPA should not be forgotten. For now, Eritrea remains uncommitted, though some reports say that it is supporting the government in Sudan.

The current intrastate conflict in South Sudan has been regarded by many as a new battlefield for regional war. Indeed, the South Sudan crisis has already added a new dimension to existing tensions in the region—between Uganda and Sudan on one hand, and Ethiopia and Eritrea on the other. This will certainly jeopardize the peace and security of the Horn of Africa region. In this regard, the study contends that unless a comprehensive settlement is between the two Sudan as well as within the opposition groups is reached the situation of the region might get even worse.
5.2 Recommendations

As indicated in the thesis, the outstanding CPA issues have been and are still sources of instability in the two Sudan as well as in the broader region. Therefore, it is imperative to find a solution to the top priority CPA issues. Failure to provide thereof may drag the two countries into an all-out war there by endangering the already volatile regions of the Horn of Africa.

The neighboring countries, especially Uganda should play a constructive role in the relations between the two Sudan’s and hence promote regional stability as well as economic integration. They should moreover, refrain from entering in to the internal affairs of each other’s state as it hinders regional peace and security.

IGAD has been the main reason behind the signing of the historic CPA agreement, which ended Africa’s longest civil war. Yet, its role was minimized in the subsequent years of the signing of the agreement and also in the following years of South Sudan referendum. In order to bring a sustainable peace and security in the region, IGAD’s role and its capacity should be strengthened, especially with related to the two Sudan. Its role, moreover, should be free from the influence of member states and some of the international actors.

The South Sudan case has proven one thing that secession is not a panacea for peace and democracy, at least for now. Hence, armed groups with a cause of self-determination through secession should realize that couldn’t be a solution. Governments should also learn to address the problems of their peripheries lest it become beyond control.
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Key Informants

1. Kassahun Berhanu (PhD)
   Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa University. He was an IGAD nominee as a member of the Panel of Experts in the Abyei Boundary Commission from April to July 2005 and resident Vice President of the Organization of Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa from December 2005 to January 2007.

2. Anonymous
   Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa University.
Appendix A: Interview Questionnaire

1) What are the security implications of the South Sudan secession for the Horn of Africa\textsuperscript{22}?

2) How do you describe the historical and current relations between Sudan and South Sudan?

3) Describe holistic effects of South Sudan secession on the remaining parts of Sudan?

4) What are the impacts of the South Sudan secession on the sub-region?

5) What does the South Sudan independence mean for neighboring countries (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Kenya) in terms of alliances, alignment, destabilizing actions and conflict of interests?

6) How do regional institutions (like IGAD) responded to the security challenges of the region?

7) What prospects are there towards achieving a sustainable regional security?

\textsuperscript{22} For the purposes of this research, only six countries are selected. These are; Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda.
Appendix B: Map: Horn of Africa

Source: http://www.cartedumonde.net
Appendix C: Map: Sudan
Appendix D: Map: South Sudan
Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that the thesis is my original work, has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all the sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Declared by:  

Name ____________________________  
Signature ________________________  
Date ____________________________

Confirmed by:  

Name ____________________________  
Signature ________________________  
Date ____________________________