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**Declaration!**
I enclose declare that this Thesis: The Impacts of Ethnic-based Federalism in the Construction of National Identity: Experience of Post-1991 Ethiopia is my original work and never been presented in any other institution or university. I also proclaim that any information used in the study properly acknowledged and stated in the completed references.

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<tr>
<td>ANDM</td>
<td>Amhara National Democratic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUD</td>
<td>Coalition for Unity and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLF</td>
<td>Eritrean People's Liberation Front</td>
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<td>EPP</td>
<td>Ethiopian Prosperity Party</td>
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<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
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<td>ESM</td>
<td>Ethiopian Students Movement</td>
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<td>FDRE</td>
<td>Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia</td>
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<td>MLLTT</td>
<td>Marxist Leninist League Tigray</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAMA</td>
<td>National Movement of Amhara</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OLF</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front</td>
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<td>Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization</td>
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<td>TPLF</td>
<td>Tigray People's Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>UEDF</td>
<td>United Ethiopian Democratic Forces</td>
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Abstract
The aim of this article is to investigate the impacts of ethnic-based federalism in the construction of national identity: experience of post-1991 Ethiopia. To achieve the main objective of this study, a qualitative research approach was employed; and the data were collected both from primary and secondary sources. A semi-structured interview was employed as a data collection instrument. Essentially primary data were collected from key informant, observation and document reviews, and the secondary data were collected from various written documents. The finding of the study showed that, over the past five decades, ethnicity and ethnic identity have played a significant role in the country's overall activities, ethnocentrism and ethnic identity issues have had a significant contribution to the weakening of national identities. The proliferation of ethnic-based political parties in Ethiopia is intensified clash of interests, the aggravation of ethnic political elites’ rivalry, escalation of ethnic suspicion, weakening of national sentiment. Ethiopia’s peculiar nature of federalism has been a viable option for the integrity of the Ethiopian state and society on the other hand exacerbates and ignites identity politics, thus, it leads to further disintegration. Accordingly, the major conclusion of this study revealed the ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia has become an instrument of political mobilization, which further perpetuates violence, dissension, and a sense of separatism.

Key terms: Federalism, ethnicity, identity, nationalism, national identity, ethnic based federalism
Chapter One

1. Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

State formation is a relatively recent phenomenon in Africa and where both the colonial and the postcolonial states (Kidane, 2001: 22). Ethiopia has a long history that dates back thousands of years (Mulugeta & Feseha, 2021: 3). As far as the limited documentary evidence allows us to understand, so did historic Ethiopia (Levine, 2011: 314). A prime text for this claim, the Kebra Negast stands for nothing if not the image of the Ethiopian nation as belonging to a world of distinct nations among which it stands out by virtue of possessing a special mission (Levine, 2011: 314). However, the modern Ethiopian empire took shape during the second half of the 19th century (Mulugeta & Feseha, 2021: 3). Ethiopia is unique in the manner of its creation. As is well known, the founder of the present state is the Christian highland kingdom of Abyssinia, whose origins can be traced into antiquity (Markakis, 1989: 118). Because of its long history, and the stubborn defense of its national independence during colonial times, Ethiopia has always been an idealistic icon of a pure image of Africa (Finneran, 2003: 27). When the process of the creation of a modern multi-ethnic empire-state was started by Kassa of Begemidir around the 1850s (Bahru, 1991, Teshale, 1995 and Merera, 2003). Menelik's southward imperial expansion was met by resistance, which in the later years of Emperor Haile Selassie I (1930-1974) translated into demands for national self-determination among the oppressed groups (Mulugeta & Feseha, 2021: 3).

Towards the end of the 19th century, the Amhara political elite of Shewa, central Ethiopia, took the helm of power in the country (Alemseged, 2010: 270). Menelik's conquests in the last quarter of the nineteenth century doubled the territory and population of his domain, henceforth officially called the Ethiopian Empire (Markakis, 1989: 118). A great variety of ethnic groups inhabited the conquered territories and, unlike Abyssinia, Ethiopia was a highly heterogeneous state (Markakis, 1989: 118). However, Ethiopia's ruling elite, the Amhara, effectively utilized the glimmers of modernity to build an Ethiopian state in their image (Alemseged, 2010: 270). Mulugeta & Feseha identified national identity questions have been at the center of Ethiopian politics since the formation of the modern state during the reign of Emperor Menelik II (Mulugeta & Feseha, 2021: 3).
The creation of an identity for Ethiopia with reference to its past has been shaped on many levels (Finneran, 2003: 31). Self-confidence, nationwide pride in the very localized glories of an Aksumite past, a strong ecclesiastical fabric, historiographical, ethnic, and linguistic elements, and a small, though ultimately traumatic, brush with the colonial experience have conspired to shape a very unique view of Ethiopian heritage (Finneran, 2003: 31). State nationalism, a vital aspect of Ethiopia’s nation- and state-building process, was the epicenter of the ethno-regional nationalism that has mushroomed in the region during the last five decades (Alemseged, 2010: 269). These symbols were spread throughout Ethiopian society by virtue of an extraordinary system of national communication, that provided by the Ethiopian national church (Levine, 2004: 4). Churches and monasteries throughout the country embodied a nationwide system of communication. Liturgically, the classical Ethiopian language, Ge’ez, unified it much as Latin unified medieval Europeans speaking different languages (Levine, 2004: 4).

During the imperial and the socialist period, political elites tried to “flock” all Ethiopians together through the construction of a sense of “Ethiopianness” designed to transcend ethnic differences, to mobilize the population against external aggressors, and to encourage it to sacrifice economic priorities for national unity and identity (Gebrewold, 2009: 80). The notion of Ethiopia as a Christian, Amharigna-speaking nation-that is an extension of Abyssinia-was cultivated (Markakis, 1989: 119). Amharanization, which became an article of faith of the state- and-nation-building process in Ethiopia, was discredited in Eritrea (Alemseged, 2010: 286). Haile Selassie’s reign was pivotal in Ethiopian history for consolidating the territorial and political gains of earlier military campaigns, particularly those of Menilek (Smith, 2013: 58). Smith noted out Emperor Haile Selassie embarked on a project of national integration, using distinct methods for accomplishing this, which make this historical period crucial in the history of citizen creation and citizenship expansion in Ethiopia (Smith, 2013: 58-59).

The collapse of the imperial regime revealed the fault lines in the foundations of the Ethiopian state and called forth visions of other geopolitical arrangements among those who had no reason to be committed to its preservation (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003: 83). For better or worse, the revolution of 1974 was arguably the most pivotal event in contemporary Ethiopian history (Gebru, 2009: 34). What turned out to be Africa’s most disruptive social upheaval to date began peacefully and rather innocently, without any conscious or deliberate planning by any group or
organization (Ibid: 35). Recognizing the importance of the ethnic and regional component of its political support, the Derg introduced the most radical land reform in the southern regions to address the land expropriations that had occurred under Menilek’s and Haile Selassie’s reigns (Smith, 2013: 71). Ethnicity in Ethiopia reached political maturity during the reign of the military regime, and all political forces that emerged during that troubled period were obliged to take account of this phenomenon (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003: 83). Throughout the 1980s that the sense of ethnic solidarity had been gradually cultivated as many members of various struggling movements were imprisoned or simply disappeared (Zahorik, 2011). Derg’s solution to this rise in ethnic nationalism early on was the adoption of the principle of equality of all ethnic groups, including the right to self-determination, but within the context of Ethiopian unity (Smith, 2013: 73). Under the policy of Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia First), which included a version of Ethiopian socialism called hebetesebawinnet, the Derg expressed its intention to pursue “equality; self-reliance; the dignity of labor; the supremacy of the common good; and the indivisibility of Ethiopian unity.” (Smith, 2013: 71).

After the downfall of the Derg regime, in a significant departure from the tradition of African states, Ethiopia has ventured on a bold experiment of marrying federalism with ethnicity (Yonatan, 2010: 187). Ethnic-based federalism makes the country relatively unique in Africa, where ethnic relations may be an obvious factor in national politics but not in any recognized form (Abbink, 2011: 597). Though the Ethiopian federal system was adopted in the post-Cold War political context when the former socialist federations had dissolved the stamp of socialism, federations and the Marxist ideology are the symbols in the design and operation of the Ethiopian ethnic federal system (Gashu, 2014: 123-124). Markakis noted out, the introduction of a decentralized federal system based on ethnic constituencies is difficult for Ethiopian nationalists to come to terms with, for it appears to reverse the process of integration and threaten the existence of the state itself (Markakis, 2011: 229).

Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) leadership thus remained devoted to their interpretation of Ethiopian people and their opposition against preceding regimes’ Ethiopianness considered the root cause of Ethiopia’s troubles (Bach, 2014: 109). Bach argues that it would be excessive to conclude from these first observations that Ethiopianness purely and simply disappeared as from 1991 in EPRDF’s discourses (Bach, 2014: 111). EPRDF politicized and radicalized tribal
identities at the expense of collective ones (Mehretu, 2012: 131). Therefore, this study tried to evaluate the State structure and Construction of National Identity in Ethiopia: Pre and Post-1991.

1.2 Statement of the Problems

Ethiopian history in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the whole of the twentieth century clearly indicates a lack of political will as well as the existence of little sense of history among the country’s dominant elite of the day (Merera, 2003: 159). Merera identified that determination to Ethiopian history is play a zero-sum game of politics to the endgame (Merera, 2003: 159). Just as the historic realities of long established, nations like Ethiopia pose a challenge to conventional ideas about nationhood, so the contemporary Ethiopian experience prods us to rethink conventional notions of national boundaries (Levine, 2004: 11). Ethiopian history lack of the art of compromise, blurred vision of the future regarding larger societal goals, propensity for hegemony, vanity of grandeur, and above all failure to learn from past mistakes and history are all hallmarks of the succeeding generations of Ethiopian elites (Merera, 2003: 159). Too often, blame has been hurled against the nationalism that has been nurtured by centrifugal forces. However, this does not present a complete picture of the region’s problems because it does not include state nationalism as conceived by the country’s ruling elite, the Amhara (Alemseged, 2010: 269).

Nationalists in Ethiopia have drawn their ideology from various political, religious, and cultural experiences of Ethiopia, internally as well as externally (Gebrewold, 2009: 94). For Ethiopian nationalists, memories of past glory, independence, and victory over a former colonial power have served as the core of national ideology (Gebrewold, 2009: 94). On the other hand, Smith identifies that Menilek consolidated the geographic boundaries of the modern state, but his campaigns surely did not resolve the contentious matter of the terms of inclusion for newly incorporated peoples, nor for those groups such as the Oromo or Anywaa (Smith, 2013: 46). She argues that those who, although already physically part of the Ethiopian state, were by no means included in political, social, or economic life on equal terms (Smith, 2013: 46). However, this commonness is not self-evident since there is ethnic nationalism in Ethiopia. There is mistrust between various ethnic groups in Ethiopia such as Oromo, Tigray, Amhara, etc. Mengistu tried to overcome this by suppressing it, whereas EPRDF tries to overcome it through ethnic federalism (Gebrewold, 2009: 94). Even the non-Amhara or non-Tigrayan educated urban elites consider the fact that Ethiopia was never colonized as the core of Ethiopia’s national identity
(Gebrewold, 2009: 82). Actually, some elites of some ethnic groups like the Oromo argue that the Amhara or the Tigrayans are the colonizers of the rest of Ethiopia (Asafa Jalata, 2007).

According to Gebrewold (2009: 96) argument, various nationalists in Ethiopia have been trying to mobilize all Ethiopians to overcome ethnic nationalism and unseat the current regime through democratic mobilization, reinvigoration of permanent popular nationalism, and by harnessing a universal emergency nationalism in the face of external aggression (Gebrewold, 2009: 96). He identified that, the leadership of Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front accused by Ethiopian nationalists of have facilitated ethnic nationalism rather Ethiopian identity (Ibid: 96).

Mehretu also noted out the EPRDF, government has done from the beginning by using its divisive architecture of hegemonic governance and became hostile to the Ethiopian collective identity (Mehretu, 2012: 126). In general, with an obstinate hold on its ethnic agenda, the EPRDF minimized macro-national collective identities and failed to facilitate a neoliberal and functional agenda for the economic and political integration of the country as a whole.

Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, there is no literature concerning the State structure and Construction of National Identity in Ethiopia: Pre and Post-1991. Rather, only a few authors discussed the Ethiopian nation, its challenges by ethnic nationalism, and the source of Ethiopian nationalism. The study contributed to the endeavors to fill the gaps in the literature and assessed the State structure and Construction of National Identity in Ethiopia: Pre and Post-1991.

1.3 Central Arguments
The central argument of this research was although Ethiopia is a country with a history of three thousand years; it has not been able to build an inclusive and holistic national identity over the past thousand years.

1.4 Research Objectives
The overall objective of this study was a critical examination of the state structure and construction of national identity in Ethiopia: pre and post-1991.

Accordingly, the study tried to address the following four specific objectives.

- To evaluate the nexus between ethnicity, nationalism, and national identity in Ethiopia.
- To assess the failure of national identity construction and nation building in Ethiopia pre-1991 Ethiopian state.
To investigate the impact of adopting ethnic-based federalism on the construction of national identity in Ethiopia.

To identify the challenges and prospects of adopting ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia.

1.5 Research Questions
The overall research question of this study was what is the State structure and Construction of National Identity in Ethiopia: Pre and Post-1991?

The need to conduct this research was to answer the following four specific questions.

1. What is the nexus between ethnicity, nationalism, and national identity in Ethiopia?
2. What are the challenges of national identity construction in Ethiopia pre-1991 Ethiopian state?
3. What are the impacts of adopting ethnic-based federalism on the construction of national identity in Ethiopia?
4. What are the challenges and prospects of adopting ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia?

1.6 Methodology and Methods of Data Collection
The study employed a qualitative research methodology. The qualitative research methodology, as Dawson (2007: 14) describes it is an exploration methodology for ‘attitudes, behavior, and experiences through such methods as interviews or focus group discussions. He argued qualitative research attempts to get an in-depth opinion from participants (Dawson, 2007: 14-15). This means that qualitative research tries to interpret situations subjectively that according to the meanings people attach to them. In other words, qualitative research is, basically, interpretive in that it involves analyzing data and finally making interpretations or drawing conclusions about the implication of the information analyzed (Creswell, 2014). This is because quantitative methodology often lacks intense and prolonged contact with participants in their natural setting to investigate a problem at hand. Therefore, by using pertinent methodology and instruments and consulting relevant sources, the study collected and used qualitative data necessary to address the research objectives set and answered the research questions forwarded. In line with this, a case study that considers multiple data sources and instruments of data collection was the strategy of this study.
1.6.1 Source of data
The researcher used both primary and secondary data sources as an input of data to investigate the case in detail. Berg & Lune noted out qualitative research tends to assess the quality of things using words, images, and descriptions and most quantitative research rely chiefly on computers, many people erroneously regard quantitative strategies as more scientific than those employed in qualitative research (Berg & Lune, 2017: 12). In this study, the researcher also used various documents, such as the 1995 FDRE constitution, government policy, proclamation, ethnic and citizen-based political parties program, TV interview that conducted with party leaders, articles, and books.

Among primary data sources, the researcher employed face-to-face interviews with officials from the House of Federation, ethnic and multi-ethnic political party leaders, scholars of political science, and federalism. The interview questions conducted in a semi-structured interview. The researcher posed similar questions for key informant to collect the relevant data and to make the comparison between pre and post 1991 state structure and national identity construction. However, in some instances, the researcher asked different questions for ethnic and multi-ethnic party leaders due to the difference in their nature and practice.

1.6.2 Sampling procedure
The researcher used purposive, non-probable sampling for this research. It helps the researcher to meet targeted respondents easily. According to Babbie (2008: 204), purposive sampling is in which the units to be observed are selected on the basis of the researcher’s judgment about which ones will be the most useful or representative. The goal of purposive sampling is to sample cases/participants in a strategic way so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are being posed (Bryman, 2012:418). For the purpose of this study, the researcher purposely selected respondents from federalism scholars, multi-ethnic and ethnic political party leaders, officials from Federal Democratic Republic Ethiopia, House of Federation, and ministry of peace.

1.6.3 Instrument of Data Collection
Data collection for this study is mainly through interviews with the selected interviewees. The researcher employed face-to-face interviews with officials from the House of Federation, ethnic and multi-ethnic political party leaders, scholars of political science, and federalism. The
interview questions conducted in a semi-structured interview. The researcher posed similar questions for key informants to collect the relevant data. However, in some instances, the researcher asked different questions for ethnic and multi-ethnic party leaders due to the difference in their nature and practice. These questions are typically asked each key informants in a systematic and consistent order, but the interviewers are allowed the freedom to degrees. As (Berg & Lune, 2017: 69) semi-structured interviewers are permitted to probe far beyond the answers to their prepared standardized questions. Interview guide questions were prepared in the Amharic language since almost all of the interviewees are able to communicate with Amharic. Accordingly, from different sources of interviews, 5 key informants were interviewed for the purpose of this study.

1.6.4 Data Analysis
The researcher used thematic analyses. According to (Dawson, 2002:116) a thematic analysis method, used data from different people are comparing and contrast and the process continues until the researcher is satisfied that no new issues are arising. However, Berg & Lune (2017: 191-192) argues that the count of terms, words, and themes provides one avenue for the social scientist to better understand and meanings. Therefore, after the necessary data has been collected through various instruments like Semi-structured interviews, the researcher coherently described basic outcomes through thematic analyses.

1.7 Scope of the Study
This study delimited to assess the State structure and Construction of National Identity in Ethiopia: Pre and Post-1991. It deeply investigated the nexus between ethnicity, nationalism, and national identity in Ethiopia. Research also focused on identify the failure of national identity construction and nation building in Ethiopia pre-1991 Ethiopian state. The thesis is mainly to navigate the impact of adopting ethnic-based federalism on the construction of national identity in Ethiopia and the challenges and prospects of adopting ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia.

1.8 Significance of the Study
This research has done to consider the following benefits. First, to clarify the State structure and Construction of National Identity in Ethiopia: Pre and Post-1991, especially, it would be a good elaboration for a nexus between ethnicity, nationalism, and national identity in Ethiopia. Second, giving information related to the failure of national identity construction and nation building in
Ethiopia pre-1991 Ethiopian state. Thirdly, to inform impact of adopting ethnic-based federalism on the construction of national identity in Ethiopia. Lastly, a thesis increase the awareness of the public about the challenge and prospects of ethnic-based federalism their related consequence on the state political system.

1.8 Limitation of the Study
It is important to address some major challenges that the researcher encountered during the study to know under what situations the study conducted. The major limiting factors include the lack of works of literature concerning the study area as far as it is the recent political reform and political development of a country. On the other hand, in conducting the in-depth interview, the researcher faced the challenge of reaching Amhara National Movement key informants to balance the views concerning the issue under the study. The unwillingness of some concerned bodies to provide information was also another challenge during the study.

1.9 Research Ethics
During the conduct of the study, ethical considerations considered. Accordingly, respondents informed that the data taken from them were used for academic purposes, and I explained about me, and where I came from, to give a general understanding with whom the respondents are conducting the interviews. As well, the interviewees informed that they had full authority freely respond to question raised and informed or to stop responding whenever they did not want to answer. The other ethical consideration taken was participant and data confidentiality. For the sake of data confidentiality, the respondents asked for their consent to recording their voices.

1.10 Organization of the study
This study organized into seven chapters. The first chapter consisted of a background of the study, a statement of the problem, the general and specific objective of the study, basic research questions, significance of the study, the scope of the study, and methodologies. The second chapter deals with the literature relevant to the study and conceptual framework has adapted from previous studies directly related to ethnicity, ethnic-federalism, identity, nation, and national identity. Chapter three deals with the nexus between ethnicity, nationalism, and national identity in Ethiopia state. The fourth chapter assess the failure of national identity construction and nation building in Ethiopia pre-1991 Ethiopian state. The fifth chapter of the thesis investigated the impact of adopting ethnic-based federalism on the construction of national identity.
identity in Ethiopia. The sixth chapter of the thesis identified the challenges and prospects of ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopian state structure. The last chapter is the concluding session of a paper.
Chapter Two

Literature Review

2 Conceptual and Theoretical Perspectives

2.1 Conceptual perspective

2.1.1 State

The concept of the state is concerned with the construction of an ideal type of the modern state can be shown from a passage in the essay on “Objectivity” (Anter, 2014: 13). Gellner also discussed the concept of the state may initiate with Max Weber's celebrated definition of it, as that agency within society, which possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence (Gellner, 1983: 3). Kspruyt suggested that the formation of the modern state inevitably involved the creation of new legitimizations of authority and power (Kspruyt, 2007: 212). According to Kspruyt, argument, monopolization of violence can only occur if governments are deemed at least partially legitimate (: Ibid: 212). The monopolization of force by a central instance is the outcome of a complex process in which those who dispose of power locally are successively expropriated (Anter, 2014: 27). Kspruyt identified that the successful monopolization of violence itself will correlate with the ability of central governments to establish some modicum of efficient administration as well as the ability to raise revenue (Kspruyt, 2007: 212). According to Anter (2014: 27) since the different stages of this process are difficult to distinguish and occur at different rates from region to region, it is difficult to identify the point at which the monopoly of force is born a point at which the state is born, if we adhere to Weber’s definition of the state. As Gellner, the idea behind this is simple and seductive in well-ordered societies, such as most of us live in or aspire to live in, private or sectional violence is illegitimate (Gellner, 1983: 3). He also argues the conflict as such is not illegitimate, but it cannot rightfully be resolved by private or sectional violence (Ibid: 3). Gellner noted out violence may be applied only by the central political authority, and those to whom it delegates this right (Gellner, 1983: 3).

Any attempt to clarify the conceptual nature of the state was simply dismissed: this had of course often been attempted, but every such attempt met with failure on account of the complexity of the phenomenon (Anter, 2014: 10). The state constitutes one highly distinctive and important
elaboration of the social division of labor (Gellner, 1983: 4). He identified that, where there is, no division of labor, one cannot even begin to speak of the state. However, not any or every specialism makes a state: the state is the specialization and concentration of order maintenance (Gellner, 1983: 4). The fact that the state is in a permanent state of transition has consequences for the construction of an ideal-typical concept of the state, which abstracts from mutable aspects (Anter, 2014: 25). As Gellner (1983: 4), the 'state' is that institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order. The state exists where specialized order-enforcing agencies, such as police forces and courts, have separated out from the rest of social life (Ibid: 4).

The Weberian definition also draws attention to related but distinct dimensions of state formation: the formation of a rationalized-legal administration; the rise of extractive capacity by a central government; and the legitimacy of such authority (Ksruyt, 2007: 211-12). However, construction of such a concept is a matter of no small difficulty, a difficulty inherent in the nature of the state itself (Anter, 2014: 9). In fact, nations, like states, are a contingency, and not a universal necessity. Neither nations nor states exist at all times and in all circumstances. Moreover, nations and states are not the same contingency (Gellner, 1983: 6). Nationalism holds that they were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy (Gellner, 1983: 6).

Every attempt to define the State runs up against the question of whether such a constantly changing, abstract and complex structure can be reduced to one clear concept (Anter, 2014: 9). The idea enshrined in this definition corresponds fairly well with the moral intuitions of many, probably most, members of modern societies (Gellner, 1983: 3). He stressed on there are 'states' or, at any rate, institutions, which we would normally be inclined to call by that name which do not monopolize legitimate violence within the territory, which they more or less effectively control (Gellner, 1983: 3). The circumstances in which nationalism has generally arisen have not normally been those in which the state itself, as such, was lacking, or when its reality was in any serious doubt (Gellner, 1983: 4). He argues the state was only too conspicuously present. It was its boundaries adore the distribution of power, and possibly, of other advantages, within it, which were, resented (Gellner, 1983: 4).
2.1.2 Nation

The idea of a nation is to be found as far back as the ancient world, although it is not clear that there was then what we understand as a nation today (Kellas, 1998: 29). As Gellner (1983: 5), the definition of the nation presents difficulties graver than that attendant on the definition of the state. Heywood noted out the difficulty of defining the term because ‘nation’ springs from the fact that all nations comprise a mixture of objective and subjective features, a blend of cultural and political characteristics (Heywood, 2013: 109). In objective terms, nations are cultural entities: groups of people, who speak the same language, have the same religion, bound by a shared past and so on (Ibid: 109).

According to Smith nation is a human population sharing an historic territory, common myths, and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members (Smith, 1991: 14). Smith also argue the concept of the nation range from those that stress ‘objective’ factors, such as language, religion and customs, territory and institutions, to those that emphasize purely ‘subjective’ factors, such as attitudes, perceptions and sentiments (Ibid: 11). On the other hand Greenfeld, identify concept of nation as a people, an inclusive, sovereign community with membership unaffected by divisions of class and status, thus equal, and a natural object of the members’ loyalty and commitment(Greenfeld, 2016: 11). Greenfeld put forward that, nation emerged sometime in the late fifteenth to early sixteenth century in England, when ‘natio’ in its conciliar sense became the synonym of the word “people (Greenfeld, 2016: 11)

Barrington (1997: 713) noted out what makes nations unique is that they are collectives united by shared cultural features (myths, values, etc.) and the belief in the right to territorial self-determination. Benedict Anderson (2006: 211) suggested nations are merely imagined communities as members of these communities will rarely know each other, thus they will draw upon the concept of nationality from their own imagined population to which they belong to (Anderson 2006: 211). According to (Gellner, 1983: 5-6) argument although modern man tends to take the centralized state (and, more specifically, the centralized national state) for granted, nevertheless he is capable with relatively little effort, of seeing its contingency, and of imagining a social situation in which the state is absent.
2.1.2.1 **Nation-building**

Nation building is a much more limited exercise in political reconstruction or re-legitimation, or else a matter of promoting economic development (Fukuyama, 2005: 4). Hoefte & Veenendaal argue nation building can take many forms, including education policies or major infrastructure development to trigger economic growth and political stability (Hoefte & Veenendaal, 2019: 175). In their pursuit of nation building, political elites can explore a variety of strategies. Obvious short-term (and often rather superficial) tactics could be the creation of national flags, anthems, holidays, or sports teams (Ibid: 175). The term of nation-building is contending between European and American definition, Fukuyama noted out, Europeans often criticize Americans for the use of the term nation-building, reflecting as it does the specifically American experience of constructing a new political order in a land of new settlement without deeply rooted peoples, cultures, and traditions (Fukuyama, 2005: 3). He identified that Americans refer to as nation building is rather state building that is, constructing political institutions, or else promoting economic development (Fukuyama, 2005: 3). According to OECD defines:

> Nation-building is Actions are undertaken, usually by national actors, to forge a sense of common nationhood, usually in order to overcome ethnic, sectarian, or communal differences; usually to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty, and usually to mobilize a population behind a parallel state-building project May or may not contribute to peacebuilding (OECD, 2008: 13).

These nation-building efforts recall the policies of the Cold War when the United States was invested in the development of new states for strategic purposes in the context of a larger global struggle (Ekbladh, 2005: 19). Nation-building policies of that kind commonly focus on education as the key mechanism, to make sure that a new generation speaks the same language, has a similar conception of the national history, and has a shared reverence for national heroes and cultural icons (Hoefte & Veenendaal, 2019: 175-76). To the extent Norman argues that nation-building exercises aim at incorporating national minorities into the larger state or nation, are these groups given equal opportunities to shape and reinforce their own identities through state institutions (Norman 2006: 56). Here the political elite largely succeeded in their push to transform ethnically, linguistically, and religiously divided populations into a more or less unified nation (Hoefte & Veenendaal, 2019: 176). These objects of identification can certainly
strengthen feelings of national identity and unity but are by themselves meaningless if they are devoid of any underlying sense of shared nationhood (Ibid: 175).

Nation building clearly is a more daunting challenge in post-colonial states, especially in territories that were primarily used by the colonial power to extract resources or obtain other economic benefits (Hoefte & Veenendaal, 2019: 176). In Caribbean colonies, where European colonizers virtually exterminated the indigenous inhabitants and most of the later population consisted of enslaved Africans, the (near) absence of an original population with strong cultural traditions complicated any foundation for the development of national identities (Hoefte & Veenendaal, 2019: 176). Nation building in the years after World War II was understood by a spectrum of U.S. policymakers and international actors to be a collective activity (Ekbladh, 2005: 19). The nation-building energy expended during the Cold War was not solely that of state agencies. Nongovernmental, international, and, particularly, private business organizations were involved in the complex task of reconstructing and developing nations (Ibid: 19).

As in many multi-ethnic societies in Africa and Asia, colonial rulers here often stimulated animosity and rivalry between different groups through divide-and-rule policies (Hoefte & Veenendaal, 2019: 176). Because of their extractive colonial heritage, lack of a substantial indigenous population, and multi-ethnic and culturally heterogeneous populations, these Caribbean countries are probably among the weakest candidates for successful nation-building policies (Hoefte & Veenendaal, 2019: 176). According to Norman (2006: 74)

In a federal or quasi-federal state, the constitution will decide whether it is the central government (typically controlled by the majority group in the state) or the provincial governments (which may be controlled by national minorities) that will have control over particular powers with significant nation-building potentials. Such as education, health, and social services, communications, the military, powers to appoint constitutional court judges, and powers of taxation. Second, the constitution can embody provisions of great symbolic importance to nationalists, be these forms of national recognition or sources of national grievance.
2.1.3 Nationalism

Nationalism is both an ideology and a form of behaviour (Kellas, 1998: 27). The ideology of nationalism has been defined in many ways, but most of the definitions overlap and expose common themes. According to (Smith, 2010: 9), nationalism is an ideology that places the nation at the centre of its concerns and seeks to promote its well-being (Ibid: 9). Norman (2006: 6) define ‘nationalism’ is a process, a kind of sentiment or identity, a form of political rhetoric, an ideology, a principle or set of principles, and a kind of social-political movement.

According to Gellner nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement can best be defined / in terms of this principle, nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment (Gellner, 1983: 1). Gellner claims, define nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that political and the national unit should be congruent (Ibid: 1). Heywood also suggested that, nationalism is a difficult political phenomenon, partly because various nationalist traditions view the concept of a nation in different ways (Heywood, 2013: 110). Nationalism is therefore a political movement, not a question of culture or identity (Smith, 1996: 448). Nevertheless, Heywood argues regardless of the origins of nations, certain forms of nationalism have a distinctively cultural, rather than political, character (Heywood, 2013: 111).

However, Grigsby identify some nations exist without ever demanding the formation of their own states. For such nations, nationalism becomes a means of affirming a group’s identity and a basis for demanding respect for a group’s interest (Grigsby, 2008: 68). The understanding of nationalism today remains as blurred as it was in 1983, when, after a four-decade-long hiatus, nationalism again emerged as a subject of academic discourse (Greenfeld & Wu, 2020: 762). Such identification of the time and place of birth, in addition, makes possible the development of the initial definition of nationalism, which, in comparison with later cases, helps to separate its essential features from those of its particular expressions and to trace the evolution of historical types (Ibid: 765-66).

Nationalism is to miss one of its two sides. Either it thought of only as the attempt to get territory or it has thought of only as the emphasis on a unified national identity (Barrington, 1997: 714). He also identified that the two common features of all nationalisms share: such as at least roughly the territorial boundaries that the nation has a right to control and the membership
boundaries of the population that makes up the nation—the group that deserves this territorial control. In addition, that is entitled to the supreme loyalty of other members of the collective (Barrington 1997: 714).

2.1.3.1 The Emergence of Nationalism
Nationalism to emerge as a major force in politics, the conditions had to be right. These conditions may conveniently be divided into 'necessary' and 'sufficient' conditions (Kellas, 1998: 43). Most studies of nationalism trace the origins of the nationalist doctrine generally back to German Romantic thought roughly to the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries (Özkirimli, 2010: 11). The collapse of the communist order in Eastern Europe a few years after the publication of the three classic discourses forced an entire sub-discipline of various social sciences “Sovietology” to morph into studies of nationalism (Greenfeld & Wu, 2020: 774).

By the mid-1990s, the study of concrete nationalism in political science and sociology came into fashion, then turned into a mighty industry (Ibid: 774). The political, economic, and cultural aspects, and their interactions, which make up an explanation for the emergence and importance of ethnic and social nationalism, in the same way as was done for nationalism generally (Kellas, 1998: 68). Norman singles out two closely related (and interrelated) ways of articulating the basic desires and projects of nationalists that is in terms of self-determination of the nation in question and in terms of nation-building or literally the attempt to determine the ‘self’ of the nation (Norman, 2006: 23). Nationalism results from changes in the character of politics, the economy, and culture. However, these changes lead to ambiguous results, and it is very difficult to predict that ethnic or social nationalism, rather than some other outcome, will follow these changes. Kelly argued that it is clear that nationalisms in different parts of the world relate to widely differing political, economic, and cultural contexts (Kellas, 1998: 68)

2.1.3.2 Dichotomy of Nationalism
At various times, nationalism has been progressive and reactionary, democratic and authoritarian, liberating and oppressive, and leftwing and right wing (Heywood, 2013: 115). The effort to distinguish between different definitions of the nation has been a major preoccupation for scholars of nationalism (Lecours, 2000: 153). Hans Kohn’s dichotomy of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ nationalisms, still the most celebrated and influential of the typologies of nationalism
Tamir also argues the origins of the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism are to be found in the works of Hans Kohn, one of the first modern writers on nationalism (Tamir, 2019: 425). Writing at the end of World War II, Kohn (1944) distinguished between civic nationalism, a rational and liberal way of thinking founded on respect for human rights and personal freedoms (Ibid: 425). On the other hand, ethnic nationalism is a mystical, religious, and ethnocentric mindset predicated on tribal feelings (Tamir, 2019: 425).

Western forms of nationalism were based on the idea that the nation was a rational association of citizens bound by common laws and a shared territory, whereas Eastern varieties were based on a belief in common culture and ethnic origins (cited Smith, 2010: 43). He identifies as such tended to regard the nation as an organic, seamless whole, transcending the individual members, and stamping them from birth with an indelible national character (cited Smith, 2010: 43). However, Kellas suggested the idea of nationalism and the ideal of the 'nation-state' would not necessarily based on ethnicity. Rather they stressed the voluntary coming together of people in a state with a shared culture (Ibid: 65). Yet in modern times, especially in the twentieth century, ethnicity has come to be more important in politics, and ethnic nationalism has been the distinguishing characteristic of one form of nationalism (Kellas, 1998: 65). Since nationalisms differ in their myths, symbols, memories, values, rhetoric, rituals, traditions, and politics. Schrock-Jacobson argues to disaggregate the general nationalism variable into separate variables representing civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counter-revolutionary nationalism (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012: 838). For the purpose of this thesis, I tried to disclose the most known forms of nationalism such as ethnic and civic nationalism.

### 2.1.3.2.1 Ethnic-Nationalism

Ethnic-nationalism and cultural nations are related to an objective definition of the nation that uses linguistic, religious, or ethnic criteria to determine membership (Lecours, 2000: 153). It is the nationalism of ethnic groups such as the Kurds, Latvians, and Tamils, who define their nation in exclusive terms, mainly based on common descent. In this type of nationalism, no one can 'become' a Kurd, Latvian or Tamil through adopting Kurdish, Latvian, or Tamil ways (Kellas, 1998: 66). Ethnic nationalism is usually associated with the social and economic structures of Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, or with those of the pre-industrial West (Lecours, 2000: 153).
Ethnic nationalism is motivated by deep attachments that are inherited, not chosen, because “it is the national community that defines the individual (Tamir, 2019: 425-26). According to Schrock-Jacobson's argument, all forms of nationalism are not created equal (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012: 826). Ethnic-nationalism significantly and substantially increases the probability of war, while civic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary nationalism does not (Ibid: 826). Ethnic nationalism and cultural nations are related to an objective definition of the nation that uses linguistic, religious, or ethnic criteria to determine membership (Lecours, 2000: 153). The objective and subjective conceptions of the nation are said to be related to specific socio-economic and intellectual conditions that correspond to particular historical and spatial dimensions (Ibid: 153). Schrock-Jacobson (2012: 838), claims ethnic nationalism stresses the importance of common culture, language, religion, historical memory, and/or kinship in constructing and maintaining the nation. Ethnic nationalism was harnessed to the chariots of democracy, while the West kept silent, watching with satisfaction the decay of the Russian Bear (Tamir, 2019: 426)

2.1.3.2.2 Civic Nationalism
A more open form of nationalism is what is here called is civic or civil nationalism (Kellas, 1998: 65). This is based on a shared national culture, but not on common descent (Ibid: 65). According to Lecours (2000: 153) Civic nationalism and political nations are associated with a subjective definition that ignores these criteria and insists on the free will of individuals. Smith argues genuine multiculturalism can only exist in the framework of a ‘plural’ nation, which celebrates diversity and includes its different component cultures within the overarching political institutions and symbols of the national state (Smith, 2010:45). As Stilz suggests although the concept of a “civic,” is distinct from a “cultural,” nationalism goes very far back in the literature, those employing the distinction today tend to be philosophers who wish to defend a liberal ideal of citizenship (Stilz, 2009: 257). Stilz also claims that the most developed accounts of civic nationalism currently on offer do not adequately disentangle the state from the promotion of the majority national culture in practice (Stilz, 2009: 257).

According to Smith, (2010:45) civic nationalism’s failure to endorse minority group rights may be consonant with liberal individualism and individual human rights, but only by conveniently overlooking, the group rights accorded to the majority (host) nation. Schrock-Jacobson argue that
Civic nationalism often occurs in democracies and might be a proxy for democracy (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012: 838).

### 2.1.4 Identity

Identity has a wide number of meanings today, in some cases referring simply to social categories or roles, in others to basic information about oneself (Fukuyama, 2018: 6). Brubaker & Cooper, (2000: 2) define the term ‘Identity; it is a key term in the vernacular idiom of contemporary politics, and social analysis. As Stuart Hall, ‘identity is the meeting point the-point of suture; between on the one hand the discourses and practices which attempt to ‘interpellate’ (Hall, 1996: 5-6). Another hand, identity is the process that produces subjectivities, which constructs us as subjects that can be ‘spoken’ (Ibid: 5-6). The concept of identity is introduced both, the notion of continuity and that of change without making them contradictory; on the contrary, continuity, in so far as it concerns the ‘self’ in its relation with the ‘other’, is meaningless without transformation (İnaç & Ünal, 2013: 224). Maleševic also argues identity is not something tangible or visible; you cannot touch, smell, taste, or see it. Yet many claims that its presence is so prevalent today that nearly everything has become a matter of identity (Maleševic, 2006: 13). Brubaker and Cooper have tried to bring some order to this conceptual cacophony by identifying five dominant ways in which the concept of identity is currently used in social science and the humanities:

First, identities as non-instrumental forms of social action; second, identities as a collective phenomenon of group sameness; third, identities as deep and foundational forms of selfhood; fourth, identities as interactive, procession, contingent products of social action; and lastly, identities as fluctuating, unstable and fragmented modes of the ‘self’ (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000: 6–8). Many aspects of our identity are often too deep and complex to be accessible to self-consciousness, and hence our self-understanding falls considerably short of full self-knowledge and remains partial and limited (Parekh, 1995: 257). Fukuyama claims in the first place, an identity so understood grows out of a distinction between one’s true inner self and an outer world of social rules and norms that do not adequately recognize that inner self’s worth or dignity (Fukuyama, 2018: 6). Individuals throughout human history have found themselves at odds with their societies (Ibid: 6).
Our identity is shaped by a number of factors such as our upbringing, childhood experiences, the unconsciously absorbed influences of our surroundings, the half-digested and often poorly comprehended experiences of our adult life, and deep cultural memories, dreams, and myths (Parekh, 1995: 257). According to İnaç & Ünal (2013: 224), ‘identity is constructed in accordance with the special condition of the time process and dependent on time and space’. İnaç & Ünal also identify the two ways to construct identity: First, the authenticities are not natural and given by birth, but constructed within the social and historical framework. Second; the historical sense of identity means not only the positioning of identity units within the historical process but also changing the comprehensive and holistic character of any given common identity unit within the historical perspective (Ibid: 224).

2.1.4.1 Ethnic-Identity
Identity is any social category in which an individual is eligible to be a member (Chandra, 2006: 400). Ethnic identity and concepts related to ethnic identities such as ethnic diversity, ethnic riots, ethnic parties, ethnic violence, and ethnic conflict (Chandra, 2006: 399). He argues ethnic identity either does not matter or has not been shown to matter as an independent variable by most previous theoretical work on ethnic identity (Ibid: 399). Etymologically, the concept traces its origin from the word ethnic that relates to a community of physical and mental traits possessed by the members of the group as a product of their common hereditary and cultural tradition (Regmi, 2003: 3-4).

For the formation of ethnic identity, combination of factors-common descent, socially relevant cultural or physical characteristics, and a set of attitudes and behaviors is necessary (Regmi, 2003: 2-3). Regmi argued that, in this process, common descent might be real or putative (supposed); it is not necessary that there actually be a common racial origin (Ibid: 2-3). Chandra argues that Ethnic identity categories are a subset of identity categories in which eligibility for membership is determined by descent-based attributes (Chandra, 2006: 400). By attributes that “determine” eligibility for membership, either those that qualify an individual for membership in a category or those that signal such membership (Ibid: 400).

In the process of narrating experiences, people can explore the meanings events hold about the kind of person they are and about the nature of their group, and can find features of the group about which to be proud (Pasupathi, Wainryb, & Twali, 2012: 54). Cultural attributes like
distinctive beliefs; institutions, practices, religion, and language often form the bases of identity. In some instances, physical attributes pigmentation of the skin or body shape-provide the foundation of ethnic identity (Regmi, 2003: 3). To consolidate such an identity the members of an ethnic group must also share ideas, behavior patterns, feelings, and meaning (Regmi, 2003: 3). They should distinguish themselves (we) from others (they) (Ibid: 3). According to Chandra, Ethnic identity categories are a subset of this larger set, defined by the following restrictions:

**First, they are impersonal that is, they are an “imagined community” in which members are not part of an immediate family or kin group. Second, they constitute a section of a country’s population rather than the whole. Third, if one sibling were eligible for membership in a category at any given place, then all other siblings would also be eligible in that place. Fourth, the qualifying attributes for membership are restricted to one’s own genetically transmitted features or to the language, religion, place of origin, tribe, region, caste, clan, nationality, or race of one’s parents and ancestors (Chandra, 2006: 400).**

The primordialist approach to ethnic identities and ethnicity considers common descent as the more important factor, for primordial loyalties can be activated more easily than rational principles and organizations founded upon them (Regmi, 2003: 3). The other approach is variously known as situational/subjective/instrumental(Ibid: 3). Primordialist approach main emphasis is on the members' perception of being different from others and the implications of this for the groups' present status and predicament and to the understanding of contemporary reality, but they do not offer any final answers (Regmi, 2003: 3). They are often no more than grand exercises in the reconstruction of the past (even by manipulation or outright manufacture); the definition and redefinition of situations to explain the present; and strategies for achieving the desired future (Regmi, 2003: 3). According to Regmi Ethnicity as such does not appear to have fulfilled all conditions of becoming a standardized concept yet, since the meaning it conveys even now is more or less society specific and to a major extent depends upon the overall social and political orientation of the concerned society (Ibid: 4).

### 2.1.4.2 National identity

There is hardly a country in the world today in which national identity is not a subject of agonized public debate, their citizens frequently complain that they 'lack' or have 'lost their sense
of national identity (Parekh, 1995: 255). And also national identity has become 'diluted', 'eroded', 'corrupted' or 'confused', and wonder how they can 'acquire', 'retain', 'preserve' or 'strengthen' it (Ibid: 255). The emergence of National Identity is closely related to concrete historical phenomena; therefore, it would be misleading to imply that their characteristics exist in isolation from one another (Armstrong, 1982: 290). Although the tabular arrangement begins with broad underlying factors and proceeds to specific ethnic identity types, it should not be regarded as suggesting unidirectional influences (Ibid: 290).

National identity is a very complicated and multi-dimensional matter. A common language, religion, ethnicity, race, and/or culture are often the foundations of national identity (Grigsby, 2008: 67). According to Grigsby, a common language, religion, ethnicity, race, and/or culture are often the foundations of national identity (Grigsby, 2008: 67). On the other hand, Parekh argues, the term 'national identity, and replace it with the term 'collective identity of a polity' or other such expressions (Parekh, 1995: 255). The traditional term for the deliberate forging of identities, ‘nation-building’, is potentially misleading: it implies that this political activity is essentially about either creating a nation out of some other form of community or making an existing national identity stronger (Norman, 2006: 33). There is also the issue about where the sense of national identity ranks for different individuals among other identities defined in terms of ethnicity, religion, profession, sex, sexual orientation, family status, sports aficionado, etc. (Norman, 2006: 50)

Like Armstrong, the role of a common religion in the formation of national identity has been significant, albeit considerably less than that of language and territorial contiguity (Gat, 2013: 25). Ethnic ties and national sentiments are created by a variety of factors-ecological, social, and especially cultural and symbolic, such as religion, language, and the arts (Smith, 1996: 448). As Armstrong, religions, especially the great universal religions, have been the major forces producing broad value differentiation. Nevertheless, even very strong religious affiliations are sometimes surrendered as the price for retaining ethnic or national identity (Armstrong, 1982: 291). On the other hand, Norman argued, Nationalists shape national identities through subtle and not-so-subtle attempts to instill, eliminate, modify, strengthen, or weaken the beliefs, sentiments, and values that makeup individuals’ sense of national identity (Norman, 2006: 34).
More generally, it seems too simple to endow the state, whether ancient or modern, with the primary role in creating ethnic communities or nations (Smith, 1996: 448). According to (Grigsby, 2008: 67) nations may or may not possess their own states. National identity, or nationalism, may precede the emergence of a nation’s state. Moreover, national identity may exist even though a nation lives within the territory of a separate state rather than within the borders of a state conforming to the nation (Ibid: 67). According to Fukuyama (2018: 9), national identities can be built around liberal and democratic political values, and around the shared experiences that provide the connective tissue allowing diverse communities to thrive. Francis Fukuyama (2018: 9-11) also singled out the six reasons an inclusive sense of national identity remains critical to maintaining a successful modern political order:

- **First**, the primary function is for physical security. Secondly, national identity is important for the quality of government. Good government, which entails effective public services and low levels of corruption, depends on state officials placing the public interest above their own narrow interests. Third function of national identity: facilitating economic development. Fourth function of national identity is to promote a wide radius of trust, which acts as a lubricant facilitating both economic exchange and political participation. Fifth one is National identity encourages countries to maintain strong social safety nets that mitigate economic inequality in societies divided into self-regarding social groups whose respective members feel they have little in common; citizens are more likely to regard one another as competitors in a zero-sum contest for resources. The last function of national identity is to make possible liberal democracy itself.

However, Norman, argues the simplest solution to the problem of rival nation-building projects in multinational states would parallel the one some democratic states have adapted to the ‘problem’ of rival proselytizing religions (Norman, 2006: 69-70). Let the state be neutral about the value of these rival projects while protecting the rights (and developing the capacities) of individuals to make their own free choices (Ibid: 69-70)

### 2.2 Theories of Nationalism

The academic study of nationalism may have taken off in the twentieth century (Özkirimli, 2010: 9). He argues nationalism itself, as an ideology and a social and political movement. It has been
very much in evidence since at least the end of the eighteenth century (Ibid: 9). Özkirimli, (2010: 9) identified that most studies of nationalism trace the origins of the nationalist doctrine generally back to German Romantic thought roughly to the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries (Ibid: 11). The basic theories of nations that have been studied from the 19th century to the present day are primordialism, perennialism, ethnosymbolism, and modernism.

2.2.1.1 Primordialism
Primordialism is an umbrella term used to describe the belief that nationality is a ‘natural part of human being’ (Özkirimli, 2010: 49). It as natural as speech, sight or smell, and nations has existed from time immemorial (Özkirimli, 2010: 49). According to Weinreich, Bacova, & Rougier, primordialism is defined as a sentiment, or affect-laden set of beliefs and discourses, about a perceived essential continuity from group ancestry to progeny (perceived kith and kin), located symbolically in a specific territory or place (Weinreich, Bacova, & Rougier, 2003:119). As John Hutchinson, ‘nations are modern political entities, created by nationalists who employ historical revivals to overthrow ethnic traditionalists’ (Hutchinson, 2008: 18). More recently, Smith discusses the rise of two other kinds of primordialism; the first is a sociobiological version, which holds that nations, ethnic groups, and races can be traced to the underlying genetic reproductive drives of individuals and their use of strategies of ‘nepotism’ and ‘inclusive fitness’ to maximize their gene pools (Smith, 2010: 55-56). And, the second more influential, version of primordialism holds that ethnic groups and nations are formed based on attachments to the ‘cultural givens’ of social existence (Smith, 2010: 55-56). Smith argues today, ‘primordialism’ has acquired pejorative connotations of fixity, essentialism, and naturalism (Ibid: 56-57). However, Özkirimli noted that if ethnic and national attachments are ‘given’, they are also ‘underived’, before all social interaction, and ‘ineffable’, that is ‘incapable of being expressed in words’ thus unanalyzable (Özkirimli 2010: 62).

2.2.1.2 Perennialism
Before the Second World War, many scholars subscribed to the view that, even if nationalist ideology was recent, nations had always existed in every period of history, and that many nations existed from time immemorial a perspective that can be called perennialism (Smith, 2010: 53). Smith argue Perennialism was also encouraged by the idea of social evolution, with its emphasis upon gradualism, stages of progress and social and cultural cumulation (Ibid 53). The prominent
perennialists as if Anthon D. Smith argues all that is necessary for perennialism is a belief, founded on some empirical observation, those nations or at least some nations have existed for a long period, for whatever reason (Smith, 2010: 54). They do not have to regard nations as natural, organic, or primordial; indeed, they may, and often do, reject such ahistorical accounts (Smith, 2010: 54).

According to Smith perennialism comes in two main forms: The first and more common variety, he calls ‘continuous perennialism, all that is asserted here is that particular nations have a long, continuous history, and can trace their origins back to the middle ages or, more rarely, antiquity. Smith argues here, the emphasis falls on continuity (Smith, 2010: 54). While ruptures and discontinuities not ignored, they have relativized by an emphasis on the slow rhythms of collective cultural identity; and the other main form is ‘recurrent perennialism (Smith, 2010: 54). He argues this makes a much bolder, general statement about the antiquity of nations (Ibid: 54). Particular nations, it says, are historical; they change with time (Smith, 2010: 54). Smith concludes that particular nations may come and go, the idea of nationhood itself is a universal, disembodied phenomenon, and as such could apply to many cultural or political communities in every age and clime (Smith, 2010: 55)

**2.2.1.3 Ethno-Symbolism**

Ethno-symbolism emerges from the theoretical critique of modernism (Özkirimli, 2010: 143) ‘Ethno-symbolism’ does not pretend to be a scientific theory. Rather, it should be seen as a particular perspective on, and research programme for, the study of nations and nationalism (Ibid: 143). Anthony D. Smith argued that nations, like races, were given in nature and therefore perennial and primordial (Smith, 2009: 3). While individual nations might come and go, ‘the nation’ as a category and historical community was eternal, a historical datum whose origins and lineaments could ultimately be traced to human biology, but which manifested itself as a specific type of socio-cultural community (Smith, 2009: 3). Smith identified that historical ethno-symbolism, in contrast to the others, focuses on the subjective elements in the formation of nations, the character and impact of nationalism, and the persistence of ethnies; and thereby seek to enter into and comprehend the ‘inner worlds’ of ethnicity and nationalism (Smith, 2010: 61).

As perennialists nations can be seen, from one angle, as specialized forms of ethnic groups, and, from another angle, as coexisting or competing with ethnic communities (Smith, 2010: 62). Accordingly, Smith noted out unlike modernists or perennialists, Ethno-symbolism attempts to
offer historical and sociological explanations for the continuing strong emotional attachments of so many people to ‘their’ ethnic communities and nations, as well as for their capacity for fanaticism and self-sacrifice on their behalf (Ibid: 62). Ethno symbolists claim to reject the stark ‘continuism’ of the perennialists and to accord due weight to the transformations wrought by modernity. Smith (1986: 13) single out Ethno-symbolism reject the claims of the modernists by arguing that a greater measure of continuity exists between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’, or ‘agrarian’ and ‘industrial’ eras hence the need for a wider theory of ethnic formation that will bring out the differences and similarities between contemporary national units and pre-modern ethnic communities.

2.2.1.4 Modernism

Modernism emerged as a reaction to the self-evident, primordialism of the older generations who saw nationalism as a natural and universal or at least perennial feature of human societies (Özkirimli, 2010: 72). Nationalism, in short, is a product of modernity, nothing less. He noted out it is this last assertion that marks out true modernism (Smith, 2010: 50). According to Modernists, nation and nationalism are modern phenomena. Modernists also argued that nation building was essentially a modern process, which found no real parallel before 1789. According to Anderson, the origin of nation formation in “imagined communities” is formed by the annihilation of religious states, the start of the new communicational methods, and “print capitalism” all over the world (Anderson, 2006: 17-26). Anderson argued nation and nationalism are imagined. Because: “The members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communication” (Benedict Anderson, 2006: 6)

But, it is not only nationalism that is modern (Ibid: 51). As modernist nations, national states, national identities, and the whole ‘international community (Ibid: 50-51). For modernist nations and nationalism appeared in the last two centuries and they are the products of specifically modern processes like capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, secularism, and the emergence of the modern bureaucratic state(Özkirimli, 2010: 72). They differ widely, however, over which factors of the transition to modernity have produced or make necessary the emergence of the nation (Ibid: 72). Ernest Gellner, perhaps the most prominent modernist theorist of nationalism, stresses modern economies' need for mutually substitutable, atomized individuals (Gellner, 1983:
57). However, what all these theorists share, and what is of significance for our purposes, is the view of nationalism because of modernity (Spyer, 2005: 50). In addition, it emerging in order to respond to particular social and political needs pertaining to modernity (Spyer, 2005: 50). As Spyer (2005: 50) while modernist theorists do not necessarily dismiss the existence of links between national identities and pre-modern ethnicity (Ibid: 50). They tend to discount or downplay the idea that such links may play a notable or central role in the functions and role of nationalism in modern polities (Ibid: 50).

According to (Smith, 2010: 51-52) argument the conjunction and interlinking of these novel phenomena are mirrored the new world order of modernity and modernist paradigm as follow:

**Socioeconomic:** Nationalism and nations are derived, in this version, from such novel economic and social factors as industrial capitalism, regional inequality, and class conflict.

**Sociocultural:** Nations are expressions of a literate, school-transmitted ‘high culture’ supported by specialists and by a mass, standardized, compulsory, public education system.

**Political:** here, nations and nationalism are forged in and through the modern professionalized state, either directly or in opposition to specific (imperial/colonial) states.

**Ideological:** Smith noted out the focus here is on the European origins and the modernity of nationalist ideology, its quasi-religious power, and its role in breaking up empires and creating nations where none had existed.

**Constructionist:** this is a rather different form of modernism in that, though it assumes that nations and nationalism are wholly modern, it emphasizes their socially constructed character (Smith, 2010: 51-52)

However, that was not the whole story. Of course, it was possible to end the story here and deduce from all this a theory of anti-imperialism whereby nationalism could be seen in a positive moral light, that is as the motor force of peripheric struggles against the imperialist forces of the West (Özkirimli, 2010: 76).
Chapter Three

3 Nexus between Ethnicity, Nationalism and National Identity in Ethiopia

3.1 Evolution of Nationalism in Ethiopia

Ethiopia has a long history that dates back thousands of years. Conventional theories trace nationalism to modern Western Europe, usually following the French Revolution (Levine, 2011: 311). However, markers of nationalism used by most scholars are attested by evidence of Ethiopia’s nationhood as early as the sixth century C.E. (Ibid: 311). Mulugeta & Feseha argue the modern Ethiopian empire took shape during the second half of the 19th century (Mulugeta & Feseha, 2020: 3). This requires revisions in both conventional notions of nationhood and views of those who find Ethiopianness a recent invention (Levine, 2011: 311). On the other hand, Merera suggested that the creation of "one Ethiopian nation," was the continuation of the expansion process under what was then termed “makinat’ (Merera, 2003: 145).

Adwa victory and patriotic resistance have left their mark on the articulation of the key concepts and symbols of the Ethiopian nation (Tewodros, 2013: 83). The very first stage of the rise of nationalism in Ethiopia was that of the 1896 victory at Adowa over the Italian forces (Zahorik, 2014: 153). Tewodros argued that, from the perspective of Ethiopian nationalism, the first quarter of the twentieth century marks the passing of an era and the beginning of another (Tewodros, 2013: 83). It was a period of transition from the historic to the modern nation, bearing elements of future social, ideological, and political trends (Ibid: 83).

Modern Ethiopian nationalism drew a part of its ideology from the period between Adwa and the patriotic resistance by being defined vis-a-vis Italian colonialism as the ‘significant other’ (Tewodros, 2013: 114). Levine noted out in the wake of Ethiopia’s victory against Italy in the battle of Adwa in 1896, her nationhood was fortified by a series of changes:

a national system of secular schools; a national bank and postal system; a national network of roads; a standing national army; an effective and prestigious national airline; and a number of cultural forms that gave expression to a modern Ethiopian national culture in such areas as athletics, literature, music, and the visual arts (Levine, 2011: 315).
Belachew (2009: 80) nationalism in Ethiopia has grown out of different historical experiences: The first cause is external threats from regional as well as global powers such as Egypt, Turkey, or western powers during the colonial scramble for Africa and internal challenges to making a strong nation like recurring famine and subsequent dependence on foreign humanitarian aid, and interethnic distrust. According to Alemseged Abbay, more than half a century, the political landscape of Ethiopia has been checkered with a tension between centripetal forces of uniformity, which launched state nationalism, and centrifugal forces of micro identities, which came up with their own nationalisms (Alemseged, 2013: 234). Before and during the state formation in Ethiopia, in every region, one could see plenty of local clashes between various clans or powerful individuals who were able to command strong private armies (Zahorik, 2014: 159).

Ethiopia, however, is unique in the manner of its creation. As is well known, the founder of the present state is the Christian highland kingdom of Abyssinia, whose origins can be traced into antiquity (Markakis, 1989: 118). The modern history of Ethiopia has been in official historiography presented through the eyes of the ruling circles mostly ignoring the fact that outside what was called Abyssinia there were a number of political units with their own political, religious, and social systems that contributed to the diversity of Ethiopia in many ways (Zahorik, 2014: 158). After centuries of medieval decline and obscurity, Abyssinia emerged as a regional power in the second half of the nineteenth century (Markakis, 1989: 118). Ethiopia has long been governed through a hierarchical political structure based ultimately on the control of territory (Clapham, 1990: 35). Clapham suggested, for many centuries this hierarchy was headed by an emperor whose membership of a specific 'Solomonic' dynasty was regarded as of critical importance (Ibid: 35). In terms of external historiography, Finneran identifies that Ethiopia has always seemed to be situated somehow ‘outside’ of Africa; it has historically always looked outwards, and even with a short period under Italian colonial occupation, it has maintained a remarkable socio-cultural identity (Finneran, 2003: 28).

3.2 The Beginning Ethiopianism (Ethiopian Nationalism)
Modern Ethiopia’s political history so far has been dominated by two towering nationalist discourses; the first one is Ethiopianism (Ethiopian nationalism) favoring a centralized and on occasion a homogenized one state on linguistic, cultural, and other parameters (Jemal, 2020: 1).
The other is the currently dominant one, which he called ‘Ethnopianism’ (the Ethiopian version of ethnic nationalism), revolves around the politicization of ethnic identity which has its roots in the Ethiopian Students Movement (ESM) and got momentum after the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 that borrowed Marxism-Leninism as its veil (Ibid: 1). During the imperial and the socialist period, political elites tried to “flock” all Ethiopians together through the construction of a sense of “Ethiopianness” designed to transcend ethnic differences (Belachew, 2009: 80). This Ethiopian nationalism has likewise and equally understandably, in keeping with their own interests and mission becomes deeply entrenched in central government institutions, and notably the armed forces (Clapham, 1990: 41). Haile Selassie's efforts systematically to co-opt disgruntled ethnic leaders was doomed to fail as soon as it became apparent that under his gradual 'Amharisation' strategy their groups would not be integrated as equals or allowed to share power in any meaningful way (Keller, 1995: 628).

The revolutionary leadership sought from the start, under the slogan ‘Etyopya tikdem’ or Ethiopia First, to mobilize this composite nationalism as a source of popular unity (Clapham, 1990: 41-2). ‘Ethiopia-Tikdem’ was also a plan to avoid conflict and discord, to bond with unity and love, to cultivate national feeling among the people; to avoid discrimination based on birth, religion, race, wealth, power, etc, and to establish trust, equality, unity, and harmony of the highest order among Ethiopians (Tewodros, 2013: 207). The uncertain commitment of the military to the ideology they professed, as opposed to the resilience of their nationalist allegiance, has led some authors to conclude that socialism was a cover-up for a nationalist policy (Messay, 2011: 7). Tewodros noted out, the call for ‘Ethiopia Tikdem’ was in part an attempt to inculcate a sense of a national and common Ethiopian identity beyond that of particular regions or nationalities (Tewodros, 2013: 208). Messay suggested that more than the commitment to social equality, the military were nationalists, both by profession and personal principle and basically the primary declaration of the Derg expressed a resounding nationalist commitment and deliberately avoided any reference to socialism (Messay, 2011: 7).

3.3 Histories of Ethnic-Nationalism in Ethiopia
Ethnicity was not an important issue during the early days of the twentieth century (Zahorik, 2014: 61). The early 1960s marked the apogee of the imperial state and its version of Ethiopianism (Tewodros, 2013: 244). This period also witnessed the origin of its ethnic and
regional antagonists. Somali, Oromo, Eritrean, and Tigrean Ethno-nationalists emerged to demand the dismantling of the Ethiopian state (Ibid: 244). Since the 1960s the multi-ethnic empire state of Ethiopia has been experiencing a crisis of major proportions that have provoked two major upheavals in 1974 and 1991 (Merera, 2004: 28).

The failure of the state to resolve the resentments simmering throughout the country tended, in the end, to encourage people to seek a solution in their own localities, producing a series of ethno nationalist mobilizations (Aregawi, 2004: 573). The conceptualization of ethnic issues as the major problem of Ethiopia it also influenced by colonial heritages (Girma, 2019: 3). The view of Ethiopia as an Amhara colony, before being constructed by Eritreans and some Oromo intellectuals, was an idea that Italians had originated to challenge the Ethiopian resistance (Ibid: 3). After the overthrow of Haile Selassie, the military junta, known as the Derg, was immediately confronted with the claims of several constituent ethnic groups for self-determination (Keller, 1995: 622). The intensification of ethno-regional movements in the country and their growing influence on the ESM itself again compelled the adoption of ‘regionalism’ as a compromise between ‘tribalism’ and ‘nationalism (Tewodros, 2013: 176). Tewodros identify, ‘tribalism' was condescendingly reserved for primordial ethnic, linguistic, and religious sentiments, whereas ‘nationalism’ seemed a more respectable equivalent to ‘Ethiopianism’(Ibid: 176). On the other hand, Jemal singles out one of the first assaults on Ethiopianism came not from within but from without before and during the Italian occupation (Jemal, 2020: 4).

The relevance of ethnicity and nationalism in the Ethiopian context has associated with the historical condition of state formation, the subsequent political struggle for power, resources, domination and marginalization, and succession-mostly by elites but not limited to them (Girma, 2019: 3). However, Blachew argues, Ethnic nationalism emerged right after the EPRDF took power in 1991(Belachew, 2009: 88). He also provides evidence that violent inter-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia have been taking place between the Surma and the Dizi, the Shaka and the Bench-Maji, Borana and Guji, Anuak and Nuer, between Somali on the one hand, and the Afar and Oromo on the other (Belachew, 2009: 88). On the other hand, Zahorik, suggested anywhere else has been the historical discourse so much politicized and ethnicized as in Ethiopia which has a long history of nationalisms, conflicts, civil wars and political tensions, and turmoil where ethnicity and religion usually play a remarkable role of mobilizing factors (Zahorik, 2014: 149).
To capture the basic political issues ranging from the nation-building project to ethnic nationalism and the struggle for power; ethnicity and nationalism in Ethiopia are seen as an ideology and instrument of political mobilization (Girma, 2019: 3-4). Italians promoted the notion of “Greater Tigre” as well as that of “Greater Somalia,” and during the five years of occupation divided Ethiopia along ethnic lines to activate (Ibid: 3). Later, the ethnicization of the Eritrean questions during the struggle periods promotes ethnic nationalism. Asnake asserted that in the past three decades not much work has done on the creation of common (Ethiopian) identity, on the other hand much has done on ethnic identity.

3.4 The Era of Ethnic Nationalism and the Fate of Ethiopian Identity

The modern Ethiopian history has always seen through a perspective of ethnicity since the rule of the government has centered around the Amhara ethnic group while the Oromo formed the largest opposition (Záhořík, 2011: 94). So far has dominated by two towering nationalist discourses; the first one is Ethiopianism (Ethiopian nationalism) favoring a centralized and on occasions a homogenised one state on linguistic, cultural and other parameters (Bekri, 2020: 1). As well as presently dominant one which Bekri call it ‘Ethnopianism’ the Ethiopian version of ethnic nationalism revolves around the politicization of ethnic identity (Ibid 2020: 1).

To capture the basic political issues ranging from the nation-building project to ethnic nationalism and the struggle for power; ethnicity and nationalism in Ethiopia are seen as an ideology and instrument of political mobilization (Girma, 2019: 3-4). Asebe argues, any attempt to understand politicized ethnicity in Ethiopia would be incomplete if it is seen separately from the historical trajectories that shaped the modern Ethiopian empire and the subsequent political domination (Asebe, 2012: 521). Tsegabirhan Tadesse argued that, Since the Ethiopian student movement, the national question has been important. In addition, ethnicity and nationalism became an organized political system in Ethiopia.

Ethnic nationalism has its roots in the Ethiopian Students Movement (ESM) and got momentum after the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 that borrowed Marxism- Leninism as its veil (Bekri, 2020:

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1 Interview with Assistant Professor Asnake Kefale, Researcher on Federalism and issues of identity; Addis Ababa university, on March 23/2021, 9:20 AM /Office

2 Interview with Tsegabirhan Tadesse, Directorate Director of the Federalism and Government Relations at the Ministry of Peace, on April 1/2021, 3: 50PM /Office.
1). Marxism and nationalism were the dominant ideologies among students and Maoism was also very influential, but their form and interrelationship had not solidified by the time the TPLF launched its insurrection as is evident in the ideological disputes that afflicted the movement in its first years (Young, 1997: 84). Girma suggested, ethnicity and nationalism in the Ethiopia contexts has associated with the historical condition of state formation, the subsequent political struggle for power, resources, domination and marginalisation, and succession-mostly by elites but not limited to them (Girma, 2019: 3). Ethnicity in contemporary Ethiopia creates an impression, as it is something given, something with which a man is born and we can see these perceptions on both sides of the battlefield (Záhořík, 2011: 97).

The cause of ethno-nationalist sentiment in the young educated class was strengthened by several factors (Aregawi, 2004: 580). Those are the monopoly of power by the dominant Showan-Amhara feudal class, that fostered its ethnic hegemony and kept Ethiopia in the dark, was the prime cause for ethnic resistance (Ibid: 580). With the objective of redressing ethnic-based domination and oppression, ethnic nationalism entered the political philosophy among the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) in the 1960s (Asebe, 2012: 521). Bekri also argues that, the beginning the Ethiopian Students Movement struggled to smoke out ethnicism or tribalism from its ideological drive (Bekri, 2020: 4). Typically, ethnic nationalism places great emphasis on the revival of rural traditions, folklore, dances and ethnic cuisine (Sorenson, 1996: 450). These traditions are considered to be imbued with the essence of the group and they provide nationalists with the symbols that can be used to differentiate the group from others (Ibid: 450).

3.4.1 Tigrayan Nationalism
Parallel to the growth of nationalism among the petit bourgeoisie in the towns of Tigray was its development among the Tigrayan political activists at Haile Selassie I University (Young, 1997: 80). It is also undeniable that in the 1960s a section of the incipient petite bourgeoisie mainly teachers, students, and civil servants put considerable effort into reviving the Tigrinya written language and culture (Gebru, 2009: 80). According to Aregawi, all factors that nurtured Tigrayan ethnonationalism were cultural domination reflected in the linguistic disparities within the empire, 1972-74 (Aregawi, 2004: 573). In addition to that, Aregawi argues the worst famine on record left more than half the population of Tigray destitute, the failure of the state to resolve the resentments simmering throughout the country tended, in the end, to encourage people to seek a

According to Gebru Tareke, there was no nationalism before the growth of an educated urban intelligentsia, and no direct connection between the revolts of 1943 and 1975 motivationally, ideologically or organizationally (Gebru, 2009: 81). He also argues Tigrayans’ long history in a relatively compact territory with linguistic and cultural uniformity and their inheritance of a “glorious past,” (Gebru, 2009: 80). Indeed, there was an anti-Shewan sentiment on the part of the defeated provincial gentry, who tried to impart an ethnic element to the peasant revolt of 1943 known as Weyane (Ibid: 80).

The Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) officially established on 18 February 1975 at Dedebit, an isolated lowland and shifta-infested area (Young, 1997, Aregawi, 2004). Originally, an ethno nationalism movement aimed to secure the self-determination of Tigray within the Ethiopian polity (Young, 1997: 81-82). At the foundation of the TPLF, 'self-determination' understood to mean autonomy or self-rule for Tigray in a democratic, poly-ethnic Ethiopia (Aregawi, 2004: 591).

Aregawi noted out in the early days of the struggle, self-determination has interpreted by an ultra-nationalist group within the emerging TPLF to mean secession from the Ethiopian nationstate (Ibid: 591). According to Aregawi, the aim of establishing an independent republic of Tigray, as declared in the TPLF manifesto of 1976 (Ibid: 591). Gebru argues separation was an option to be exercised only if the struggle to democratize Ethiopia failed (Gebru, 2009: 79). However, in 1978, the secession option had proclaimed to dropped, after pressure from an internal opposition and from other Ethiopians who saw no future in secession (Aregawi, 2004: 591). Ironically, external pressure, particularly from the EPLF, also played a significant role in the fight against the secessionists (Ibid: 591). The creation of an independent Tigrai may be feasible but from the perspective of the Tigrean peasants, in particular, and the Ethiopian masses, in general, it is not a desirable alternative (Gebru, 1984: 226).

Another wedge that was to emerge within the TPLF in the early 1980s was that caused by the development of an ultra-left ideological brand of Marxism-Leninism (Aregawi, 2004: 591). Which concluded in the formation of a group called the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray
(MLLT) in 1986 (Ibid: 591). Aregawi argues although the MLLT seems nowadays to be out of sight, the ideology it extolled was the source of divisions and defections that largely have been racking the organization from within to this day (Aregawi, 2004: 591-92). It succeeded in mobilizing the people of Tigray to such extraordinary effect that, in 1991, it won state power in Ethiopia in the name of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (Aregawi, 2004: 569).

3.4.2 Oromo Nationalism
Oromo nationalism developed as a peaceful self-help organization to uplift the Oromo spirit, improving their economic condition, and spreading literacy, building roads, clinics and schools, churches, and mosques (Mohammed, 2009: 30). Although Ethiopia is home to myriad ethnicities, the situation of the Oromo has emerged as a pressing component of a state newly reconfigured by the toppling of the dictatorship which had ruled the country since 1974 (Sorenson, 1996: 442). According to Asafa Jaleta, the development of the Oromo national movement is considered as an aspect of the worldwide struggle for cultural/national identity, multiculturalism, economic freedom, social justice, and inalienable political and cultural rights (Asafa, 2020: 7). He argues the Oromo national movement developed to challenge the Ethiopian colonial state and change the subordinate position of the Oromo nation (Asafa, 2020: 1).

The Macha-Tulama “movement marked the beginning of a new political experience that was crucial to the growth of Oromo nationalism in the 1970s, an experience that taught the Oromo elites that they needed a liberation movement that would marshal the resources of their people (Asafa, 2020: 6). In frustration, Tadesse Birru founded the «Mecha-Tulama Association», and with it started the growth of Oromo nationalism among those members of the amharised elites who remembered their Oromoness and became proud of being Oromo (Pausewang, 2005: 279). The leadership comprised educated Oromo who had been 'Amharised' but subsequently rediscovered their culture, deciding to fight for a fair share of the spoils of modernization for their nation (Keller, 1995: 627). The migration of a few Oromos to urban areas laid the initial foundation for the emergence of Oromo nationalism (Asafa, 1995: 168).

Before the 1960s, the Oromo lacked an intellectual class that aspired to create cultural and political space for itself (Mohammed, 2009: 31). In sum, the absence of modern education, the tight control of the Ethiopian administration, the absence of an intellectual class, and the
Amharization policy of Haile Selassie’s government, all delayed the development of Oromo nationalism before the 1960s (Ibid: 31). The point to note is that by the mid-1960s, Oromo intellectuals were demanding first-class citizenship rather than an independent state (Keller, 1995: 627). Alemseged argues Oromo nationalism has even gone further by replacing the Geez script (Abyssinian, Amhara, and Tigrayan) with the Latin alphabet to distance itself from the Abyssinians (Alemseged, 2013: 236). As such, Oromo nationalism has made Oromiffa a protector of Oromo collective identity (Ibid: 236). Dawud Ibsa noted out, the Oromo person has been waging a continuous struggle to achieve the above objective for the last three decades (Dawud, 2009: 59). He noted out, the struggle went through many ups and downs overcoming many obstacles. When this struggle started, the consciousness of the Oromo people was in its infancy, it took immense sacrifices to cultivate Oromummaa (Oromo nationalism) and rally Oromos for this just struggle of national liberation. Today Oromummaa has been widely and firmly established and Oromo consciousness has reached an irreversible stage (Daawud, 2009: 59).

Although an Oromo national identity was initially formed through culture, contact, wars of conquest, and trade, the nation was never coterminous with a single state (Keller, 1995: 623-24). Beginning the significance of the reconstruction of Oromo culture and history for the survival of the Oromo national identity and the development of Oromo nationalism (Asafa, 2020: 6). Keller argues, a profound effect of this experience on the Oromo was the sharpening of their sense of ethnic identity (Keller, 1995: 623-24).

The EPRDF had come to power in a situation of competing for nationalist movements, most of them ethnically based, and the nationalities question emerged as the central one in Ethiopian politics (Sorenson, 1996: 442). The Tigrayan-led Ethiopian government accepted state violence against the Oromo and others as a legitimate means of establishing political stability and order (Asafa, 2020: 7). However, Daawud Ibsaa elaborates, TPLF has chosen to resort to all means of suppression to stay in power instead of working for long-term peace and prosperity (Daawud, 2009: 61). It has declared rich and educated Oromos to be enemies of its Revolutionary Democracy (Daawud, 2009: 61).

In April 2018, the Oromo peaceful movement led by Qerroo/Qarree (Oromo youth) forced the Tigrayan-dominated government called the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF) to reorganize itself under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed who has promised to transit Ethiopia to democracy (Asafa, 2020: 7). Asafa argued that Oromo nationalism helped bring Abiy Ahmed to power, but it could also be his ruination.

3.4.3 Amara Nationalism

Many scholars argue Amara and Tigre rulers shaped the modern Ethiopian state through internal and external struggle. They played critical roles in designing and redesigning the state apparatus. On the other hand, they brutalized each other and other people of Ethiopia in the struggle for the throne and supremacy. For the past millennium, the Abyssinian/Ethiopian state has identified with the Amhara ruling class and this has led to Amhara defining itself through Ethiopian nationalism (Mackonen, 2008: 396). The narrow chauvinist policies of the Shoan Amhara old regime stimulated dissident nationalism in the periphery and by overthrowing the regime and carrying out a social revolution; they would ensure the unity of Ethiopia (Young, 1997: 83). Even ideologically, the majority of Amharic speakers have historically affiliated with Ethiopianism, instead of Amhara nationalism. Whether or not an Amhara identity exists separate from Ethiopiawinet (Ethiopiannes) has long debated by Ethiopian academics and politicians in general, and Amhara elites in particular (Semir, 2019: 12).

The term ‘Amhara’ is ambiguous in referring to class, ethnic, cultural, or geographical boundaries (Mackonen, 2008: 395). Some participants maintained that the Amhara did not exist as an ethnic group, while others insisted that the Amhara, as any other ethnic group, had to identify themselves as a nationality (Pausewang, 2005: 274). Mackonen argues Amhara exists as an identity; it represents multiple ethnicities with a varied national consciousness (Mackonen, 2008: 395). The language, Amharic, serves as the center for this melting process even though it is difficult to conceive of the existence of a language without the existence of a corresponding distinct ethnic group speaking it as a mother tongue (Pausewang, 2005: 276). However, some discard a concept Amhara exists as a distinctive ethnic group with a specifically located boundary (Mackonen, 2008: 395). Like the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Andreas Eshete have argued that as long as the Amharic language exists, Amhara exists as an ethnic group (Ibid: 395).

According to Pausewang, (2005) after 1975 especially post-1991, the Amara developed a strong tendency towards identifying themselves as Ethiopians, in opposition to centrifugal tendencies in
the political sphere and an increasing ethnic consciousness (Pausewang, 2005: 280). However, scholars from Oromo and the Southern Nations, contest these definitions or descriptions of Amhara and suggest that Amhara exists as a distinct ethnic group and is a dominating and oppressive class (Mackonen, 2008: 395)

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government encourages Ethiopian nationals to organize according to their ethnic affiliation (Mackonen, 2008: 396). From among Amhara prisoners of war, ANDM became the official party representing the Amhara as one group (Pausewang, 2005: 276). One of the paradoxes of the legacy of the EPRDF’s multi-nationalist project is the creation and development of a peculiar brand of Amhara nationalism (Semir, 2019: 11). Semir argues, Ethnic Amhara nationalism strengthened in those locations long assumed strongholds of Ethiopian nationalism and competed with it (Semir, 2019: 11). The upsurge of Amhara nationalism has also coincided with the strengthening of other contending nationalisms for example that of the Oromo (Semir, 2019: 13).

Many scholars argue, Amhara nationalism as a mass movement is a relatively contemporary development. According to Zola Moges article written in the African report argues that, in Ethiopia’s ever-changing political landscape, one recent phenomenon has been the emergence of Amhara nationalism. Compared to other substate nationalisms, namely, Oromo, Tigrayan, Somali and Sidama, it is a latecomer. He suggested that, this was not because Amhara people suffered from social, political, and economic subjugation less than others but Amhara identity as we know it is today was only constructed in response to a target of repression, with the rise of Derg (Zola, 2020). Semir noted out, the Amhara ethnic identity, as most literature on the subject illustrates, was for long subsumed under the wider Ethiopian nationalism and it was difficult to distinguish between the two (Semir, 2019: 12). Moreover, he argues that anti-regime Amhara nationalism is one of the most glaring unintended consequences of the TPLF’s state project (Semir, 2019: 11-12). When it comes to Amara ‘ethnogenesis’ some observers give credit to the forces of external ascription claiming that the current Ethiopian young generation grew up only knowing and breathing tribalism, constantly being told, “You are Amhara”, and also the younger generation has adopted its ‘Amharaness’.

According to (Zola, 2020) argue that the sustained policy of oppression against the Amara ethnic group gradually sowed the seeds of victimhood, alienation, discrimination, and resentment,
which finally inspired Amhara nationalism. Dessalegn Chanie the former head of National Movements of Amara (NaMA)\(^3\) also suggested:

*The narrative that wrongly portrayed the Amhara as an oppressor ruling class has done through a systematic and designed manner, over the past 27+ years. Desalegn also told the chief architect of this dubious allegation is the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). This narrative was later institutionalized with the ratification of the constitution of the FDRE. In his interview with Addis Standard, he assured the constitution in the preamble and in some of its articles reaffirms this same narrative, and made the accusation constitutional. We plan to address this through our struggles such as counteracting the widely circulated propaganda through all media outlets, party briefs, awareness creation, and indoctrination (Addis Standard, June 19/2018)*

. Although different organizations were created on that basis during and after the 1991 transition, signs of Amhara nationalism as a mass movement to be reckoned with began to appear during the protests that contributed to the advent of the current political liberalization (Semir, 2019: 12). Mysteriously, TPLF and Oromo ethnonationalism forces welcomed Amara nationalism, with many proclaiming success in longstanding efforts to force ‘Amharas’ to embrace their ‘Amharanness’. However, the others, concerned by the dangers of ethnic nationalism, expressed their fear that this would intensify an already polarized political climate and lead to disintegration.

3.6 Symbol of Ethiopia Nation and National Identity

Alongside the Great Tradition, other political interpretations of Ethiopia’s present and past took shape in the years following the 1896 Adwa victory (Marzagora, 2017: 443). The image of Ethiopia as an historical exception on the African continent it also strengthened by the country’s early adoption of Christianity, imperial rule, written language and plough agriculture (Aalen, 2006: 256). An all-Ethiopian identity must reflect the diversity of the Ethiopian population in addition to focusing on Ethiopia as an historical exception on the African continent (Aalen,

\(^3\) Ethiopians of ethnic Amhara origin launched a two days founding conference and heralded the coming into being of a new opposition political party, National Movement of Amhara (NAMA). The motto of National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) reads: “one Amhara for all Amharas; all Amharas for one Amhara” and the movement elected Dr. Desalegne Chane as chairperson of the party. Belete Molla is elected as vice chairperson.
However, a fundamental problem with the historically entrenched Ethiopian identity is nevertheless that it constructed from the Amhara dominated elite’s point of view (Aalen, 2006: 256). Indeed, the change of regime in 1991 did not necessarily mean the rejection of a Pan- Ethiopian nationalism its symbols, images and heroes. But rather a more complex articulation between different scales of nationalisms, a process of selective utilization of them to reinvent the Ethiopian nationhood out of a complex combination of imperial inheritances and the “national oppression thesis” rooted in the Ethiopian Student Movement and the armed struggle (Bach, 2013: 96-97).

The introduction of a decentralised federal system of government promised to end the centre’s historical monopoly of ruling power, while the reformulation of Ethiopia’s national identity based on cultural pluralism lifted the burden of cultural inferiority from the periphery and the threat of forced assimilation (Markakis, 2011: 279). Despite these efforts, symbols and myths of the Kings of Kings of the empire and from ancient Ethiopian history clearly reappeared when the war against the young Eritrea broke out in 1998. During that period, the TPLF/EPRDF’s leaders called “Ethiopians” to fight against forces they denounced as the heirs of European colonizers, i.e. Issayas Afeworki’s Eritrea. The symbolism of the battle of Adwa (1 March 1896), 15 embodying Ethiopia’s resistance against external enemies, was soon reactivated to mobilize Ethiopian troops and spirits, the “Rights of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” remaining, nevertheless, a very strong base of Ethiopian renewed identity (Bach, 2013: 96). In state-sponsored discourse, shiny skyscrapers, multilevel highways and the colossal Millennium Dam became the new rock-hewn churches and the new Fäsilädäs castles. Images of the Millennium Dam now appear on government diplomatic and touristic publications side by side with the long-established symbols of Ethiopianist nationalism, such as Aksum’s steles or Lalibäla’s churches(: 442) (Marzagora, 2017). The Festival of the Ethiopian Millennium not only confirmed the compatibility and interdependence of these different conceptions of the Ethiopian nation, but above all, it illustrated how historiographies, symbols, and images can be reinvented within a permanent and broader “set of mythologies” to serve the government’s quest for legitimacy (Bach, 2013: 97).

3.6.1 History as a Means of Contradiction
The narrating of Ethiopian history always begins with the origin of the state in the ancient Axumite Kingdom founded at Axum and the port of Adulis around 200 BC (Toggia, 2008: 321). Most obviously the history of a state, and the story that it tells recounts the ups and down of what is assumed to be a broadly continuous political organization, over the space of some two thousand years (Clapham, 2002: 38). The historical narratives implicitly and explicitly organized around recurring themes of the continuity, unity, and identity of the state from its primordial existence to the present (Toggia, 2008: 324).

History and virtually all national histories take this form becomes a tool of state creation, and readily co-opted by the requirements of 'nation-building'(Clapham, 2002: 41). Ethiopia's historiography, for instance, was silent about his contribution to the battle of Adua, where Ethiopia became the only African country triumphantly to check the colonial onslaught (Alemseged, 2004: 597). Moreover, it challenges the traditional Ethiopian history as being Amhara-centred and exclusionary towards other ethnic groups (Toggia, 2008: 323). Such a counter-hegemonic project towards traditional Ethiopian history critically viewed by Unitarian forces as tantamount to disintegrating the unitary state (Toggia, 2008: 323).

Recently, and indeed rightly, the great tradition approach to Ethiopian history has come under increasing attack; not least as the expression of a 'manifest destiny' that encompasses the right of Christian highlanders to govern anyone over whom they could exercise control (Clapham, 2002: 42). According to Clapham, the most thoroughgoing attempt of which is to write a counter-history of Ethiopia, from the later nineteenth century onwards (Clapham, 2002: 43). On the Oromo, there is a similar lack of clarity, but in the process of writing the Oromo into Ethiopian history, a common history of the Oromo was a necessity (Yates, 2017: 125). The process of making such a history makes use of the traditional Oromo organizing system, the gada system, the traditional Oromo religion, waaqeffannaa, or the traditional Oromo culture, orumumma (Ibid: 125). According to Mohammed how the subjection of the Oromos by the Ethiopian state since the 1880s led to the suppression of their history in the officially written state history. Mohammed suggested the conquest and annexation of their territory not only deprived the Oromo of their sovereignty but also of their history (Mohammed, 1990: 1). He argued for, the creation of the empire consolidated the myths and untruths long held and circulated in the Christian kingdom about the Oromo, who were generally portrayed as people without a history (Mohammed, 1990: 1).
1). This is because, in Ethiopia, identities are fluid, conflict transcends ethnicity, and Ethiopia possesses a syncretic culture (Yates, 2017: 125).

### 3.6.2 Culture Paradox

The contested nature and boundaries of the Ethiopian self-point to broader questions about essential elements and boundaries of cultures and about authority to speak for cultural groups (Sorenson, 1992: 228). The assimilationist path helped the absolutist state to build an Amhara cultural supremacy in Ethiopia (Alemseged, 2004: 597). Furthermore, the state continued to reinforce the centripetal forces and weaken the centrifugal tendencies of non-Amhara elites, by securing control of most of the country's political and economic institutions (Alemseged, 2004: 597).

Greater Ethiopian discourse relegates the Oromo to inferior status (Sorenson, 1992: 231). As result of that, Oromummaa emerges from Oromo cultural and historical foundations, it goes beyond culture and history in providing a liberative narrative for the future of the Oromo nation as well as the future of other oppressed peoples, particularly those who suffer under the Ethiopian Empire (Asafa, 2007: 2). According to Assefa Jaleta the paltry, uneven development of Oromummaa is a reflection of the low level of political consciousness and the lack of political cohesiveness in contemporary Oromo society (Asafa, 2007: 1). On the other hand ethnocultural diversity in the South does not a priori mean that they are a collection of loosely integrated or alienated peoples in the context of Ethiopia far from it (Abbink, 1998: 68). Although many anthropological and ethnohistorical studies have been carried out here especially in the last two decades, the complexities of Southern political history and of the underlying cultural models and socio-organizational patterns is still not fully clear (Abbink, 1998: 64).

The Socialist government, until its demise in 1991, was conscious of how Orthodox Christianity was influential in Ethiopian culture and politics (Belachew, 2009: 84). Hence, it avoided confrontations with the Ethiopian Orthodoxy, the dominant religion in Ethiopia since the 4th century (Belachew, 2009: 84). Markakis singled out the two important initiatives credited to the new regime that is power sharing in a federal system and the multicultural definition of Ethiopia’s national identity the latter was the boldest (Markakis, 2011: 279).

### 3.6.3 Discourse of Language in Ethiopian State
Amharic, the language of the dominant elite, became the national/official medium of the country and non-Amhara Ethiopians were obliged to study it (Alemseged, 2004: 595). Since a particular language often becomes symbolic of the ethno-culture in which it embedded and which it indexes, language often becomes a rallying symbol for the whole culture (Mekuria, 1997: 327). In some cases, linguistic suppression imposed with the pretext of nation building has become a cause for armed conflict and the disintegration of the state (Mekuria, 1997: 327).

The state's policy on the past, along with its policy on language, merely ended up nourishing centrifugal inclinations on the part of ethno regional political entrepreneur (Alemseged, 2004: 597). Since it embodies a different culture and symbolizes a separate identity, the Oromo language was (and still is) considered by Abyssinian elites, particularly by the Amhara, as an obstacle to the expansion of 'Ethiopian identity' and the growth of Ethiopian 'nationalism' (Mekuria, 1997: 326). Although the goal was to build an 'Ethiopian nation', Ethiopian identity is not considered as an amalgam of the identities of the various groups that inhabit the country (Mekuria, 1997: 326). Its imposition as the official language has been a major source of grievance among those who did not speak it, because, in addition to the practical inconvenience of having to learn an alien language, it symbolized the ascendancy of an ethnic group to the helm of power (Alemseged, 2004: 612). According to Ephraim Madebo⁴ argument, nowadays, students in universities do not communicate with each other, it is a deliberate act of the TPLF/EPRDF government. I think language has a big problem in contemporary Ethiopian politics.

In spite of its significance as a language of wider communication, Afaan Oromoo (with the exception for oral communication) has been until very recently one of the prohibited languages in Ethiopia (Mekuria, 1997: 326). Restrictions on its use have minimized since the fall of the military regime in 1991 and afaan Oromoo has become a medium of instruction, administration and mass communication. In a matter of only a few years, it has established itself as a fast-growing working language (Mekuria, 1997: 326). Today, Oromo publications are proliferating and we are witnessing a very rapid growth of Oromo literature (Mekuria, 1997: 326). Afaan Oromo thus became an academic and administrative language (Alemseged, 2004: 604). The

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⁴ Interview with Ephrem Madebo, Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (Ezema), Strategic Advisor on Election Issues: on March 18/2021, 2:00: PM /Office.
Oromo elite have elected to drop the Geez script in favour of the Latin alphabet, and they can now freely enjoy their distinct identity (Alemseged, 2004: 604). This genuine cultural accommodation deprives the Oromo political landscape of a resource crucial to ethnic mobilization (Alemseged, 2004: 604).

However, choosing one of the local languages and privileging it as the official national language symbolizes the dominant status of its speakers (Alemseged, 2004: 612). As such, the fact that Article five, item two, of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, privileges Amharic as 'the working language' of Ethiopia could be a recipe for disaster, because it still symbolizes the dominant status of its speakers (Alemseged, 2004: 612). Among the Oromo political entrepreneurs, in particular the OLF, as well, Amharic has been rejected (Alemseged, 2004: 613). Oromo political organizations of all shades, including the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), one of the constituent ethnic pillars of the EPRDF, have dropped the Geez script the script that used in Amharic - and adopted the Latin script (Alemseged, 2004: 613).

### 3.6.4 Flag Politics and National Identity

A national flag symbolizes a distinctive, unified story of a nation’s history, culture, and social construct to the world. Flag exists as a long-lasting symbol of a nation. For centuries, the Ethiopian flag has been a symbol of Ethiopians national strength and unity. During imperial times, the Ethiopian royal flag featured an emblem containing the Lion of Judah, a syncretic symbol combining Judaic and Christian elements (Goshu & Castro, 2016: 11). The Ethiopian flag is the flag of all Ethiopians. All Ethiopians from all regions, religions, and ethnicity died for this flag and for the honor of it. The Battle of Adwa, Machew, Ogaden and many other battles that kept Ethiopia independent, sovereign and proud fought under this flag. All the heroes and heroines we have as a people and as a country died for this flag. Despising this flag is despising them all. That is very unacceptable and morally reprehensible.

The Derg initially modified the emblem in this state flag, eliminating imperial and religious elements from the Lion (Ibid: 11). However, EPRDF control Addis Ababa, the new leaders considered the flag a simple “piece of cloth” in 1991, the relative enterprise of state and nation “deconstruction” and “reconstruction” necessitated this strong symbol to be reinterpreted (Bach,
Furthermore, the Ethiopian flag is not Ethiopia’s flag only. It is an African flag. The Red, the Yellow and the Green colors are now African colors. Most African countries adopted these colors as the flag of their liberation struggle inspired by Ethiopia’s victory at the Battle of Adwa. All Ethiopians should be proud of this magnificent history (Birhanemeskel, 2018).

It is interesting to note how this initial rejection and later inclusion reveal the articulation between different levels of Ethiopian “nationalisms” as well as its past and future and how these articulations must be perceived in terms of complementarity rather than exclusiveness (Bach, 2013: 100). EPRDF regime first returned to the plain tricolor flag before introducing its own national emblem, a yellow pentagram surrounded by a light blue circle, in 1996 (Goshu & Castro, 2016: 11). The constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, adopted in 1995, stated that the flag represented the equality and unity of the country’s nations, nationalities, peoples and religious communities. (Goshu & Castro, 2016: 11). Like a compromise between imperial history and the necessity to distance oneself from it, the imperial green-yellow-red colors were retained, but a yellow star on a blue disc was added to represent the different nations, nationalities, and peoples(Bach, 2013: 101-102). The colors of Ethiopinaness have thus remained, and NNPs’ star now appears as a complement to Ethiopia’s imperial history and identity (Bach, 2013: 101). The organization of the first

People imbue flags with considerable emotional and cultural meaning. The discourse about Ethiopia’s flag politics especially characterized by expressive, even shrill, references to flags “made sacred by the blood of patriots,” or flags denigrated by callous politics and public acts of disrespect. Yet there has been a low-key dimension to flag politics as well, as illustrated when the flag is flown at sporting or other public events as an act of defiance or protest, albeit a quiet one (Goshu & Castro, 2016: 14).

National Flag Day in July 2008 within the Millennium celebration framework clearly marked a new step in the way the national symbol has used since (Bach, 2013: 101-102). In 2009, the government issued a new Flag Proclamation, which prohibited, under penalty of fines and imprisonment, the flying of national flags without the emblem (Goshu & Castro, 2016: 11). Under the direction of the ruling coalition there could be no public display that challenged, even symbolically a federal Ethiopia not even a display based on the peaceful self-determination of its peoples (Goshu & Castro, 2016: 11). Each Ethiopian regime from Emperor Menelik to Emperor
Haile Selassie and from the Derg Regime to the TPLF regime adopted their own insignia and emblems and inscribed it on the Ethiopian flag. Those insignias and emblems were changing as the regimes change (Birhanemeskel, 2018).

The lowering of the national flag has also taken place within Ethiopia recently, with protestors replacing the national flag with the tricolor flag in Amhara or with the Oromo Liberation Front flag in Oromia (Goshu & Castro, 2016: 11). There is no surprise to see the Ethiopian people reject and demand the removal of the emblem of the hated and most repressive and criminal group in Ethiopian history, the TPLF from the Ethiopian flag. In fact, for most Ethiopians, waving the red, yellow and green Ethiopian flag without the TPLF insignia and emblem is part of the resistance movement and part of the regime change demand for the last 27 years. It seems near certain that, the TPLF regime emblem removed from the flag in a very short time once the transformation process is completed (Birhanemeskel, 2018). On several occasions, we have heard of attempts to enter the stadiums, squares, embassies and consulates and lower the Ethiopian flag, degrading its glory, and hoisting the goals of the old and Oromo Liberation Front. The new thing is that the enforcement of the laws is a public nuisance.
Chapter four

4 State structure and construction of national identity imperial and Derg period

4.1 Ethiopian state

The Ethiopian state traces its roots to the Axumite civilization in the first millennium BC, whose center was in what is now the province of Tigray (Young, 1996: 532). The founder of the present state is the Christian highland kingdom of Abyssinia, whose origins can be traced into antiquity (Markakis, 1989: 118). The bulk of the epic contrasts the nation of Israel with that of Ethiopia, mentioning Egypt along the way and it concludes by naming several others Rome, Armenia, and Nagran and asserting the primacy of Ethiopia, as God is favored among the nations (Levine, 2011: 314). According to Markakis, after centuries of medieval decline and obscurity, Abyssinia emerged as a regional power in the second half of the nineteenth century (Markakis, 1989: 118). Just in time to fend off an Egyptian incursion in the north and, subsequently, to contain an Italian invasion in the same region (Ibid: 118). In the last years of the nineteenth century and the first decade of this century, the Shoan Emperor Menelik II incorporated the lands and peoples of the south, east, and west into an empire, which became the modern state of Ethiopia (Young, 1996: 532). From the perspective of the Great Tradition, the ‘expansion,’ as it is invariably described, was the finale in the struggle for the ‘reunification’ of Ethiopia (Markakis, 2011: 93). According to Markakis (2011, 93) a process began by Tewodros and completed by Menelik, that is, the recovery of lands that allegedly belonged to the Christian kingdom in the past and lost in the aftermath of Gragn’s invasion (Markakis, 2011: 93). Much of the conquered land was given to court and church officials, soldiers, and settlers from the north who were encouraged to migrate to the region (Young, 1996: 532). Unlike the north, southern lands were fertile, suitable for valuable export crops as if those that coffee and the indigenous population could be dispossessed (Young, 1996: 532).

Ethiopia is virtually unique in Africa in possessing a tradition of the state, which long predates the colonial era (Clapham, 1990: 35). While most African societies were governed through political systems based on a mythology of descent from a common ancestor (Clapham, 1990: 35).
However, Ethiopia has long been governed through a hierarchical political structure based ultimately on the control of territory (Clapham, 1990: 35). Early twentieth-century Ethiopia had seen leaders with visions of a more modern state: in particular, Lij Iyasu recognized the need to build a broader multi-ethnic nation, and Haile Sellassie with his endeavored to modernize the state's infrastructure (McClellan, 1996: 57). This ethnic non-exclusiveness has been essential to the survival of the Ethiopian state, particularly as it has expanded to incorporate new peoples since the later nineteenth century (Clapham, 1990: 35). The unity of the nation was assumed and largely unquestioned; many at the center understood Ethiopia as a multi-ethnic state, but one bound firmly together by ancient traditions of monarchy, church, and culture (McClellan, 1996: 59). The objective of Ethiopia's rulers, even before Menelik, was the centralisation of the feudal state, and this involved a measure of modernization and the import of military, bureaucratic, and educational technologies that could only be paid for with agricultural export (Young, 1996: 532).

However, the modernizing emperors who ruled Ethiopia from 1855 to 1974, nonetheless, could not fully achieve their state-creating goals, any more than French kings or Russian czars could achieve theirs (Clapham, 1990: 36). According to Clapham's argument, the reason for failure is the inherent limitations placed on them by the nature of the political structures through which they had to rule (Ibid: 36).

### 4.1.1 State structure during Haile Selassie’s regime

Haile Selassie’s reign was pivotal in Ethiopian history for consolidating the territorial and political gains of earlier military campaigns, particularly those of Menilek (Smith, 2013: 58). Nevertheless, Haile Selassie's reign in the period from his appointment as Crown Prince in 1916 to the Italian Occupation in 1935 was essentially concerned with consolidating his position (Wells, 2009: 150). According to McClellan (1996: 59), the Emperor and ruling elite seemed much more intent on gaining the means to preserve their hold on power and defend their territory than in promoting programs that would meld Ethiopia's peoples into a single nation. On the other hand, Smith argues that Emperor Haile Selassie embarked on a project of national integration, using distinct methods for accomplishing this, which make this historical period crucial in the history of citizen creation and citizenship expansion in Ethiopia (Smith, 2013: 58-59). In building a nation, the Ethiopian state had tremendous obstacles to overcome in terms of available resources and vast territories (McClellan, 1996: 59). While the process had been underway for
only a relatively short time, the state's efforts at nation-building were arguably deficient and unsuccessful then (Ibid: 59).

Prior to the Italian occupation of Ethiopia (1936–1941), the most significant reform enacted by the emperor was the 1931 Constitution (Smith, 2013: 59). Which set up the juridical framework of Haile Selassie’s absolutism and attempted to create a compromise between the forces of centralism and regionalism (Ibid: 59). In addition to the important symbolic and administrative implications of the emperor’s promulgation of the 1931 Constitution, the emperor was at the same time quite busy consolidating the territorial and political authority of the imperial state in more direct ways (Smith, 2013: 60). After the Italians lost their African territories with their defeat in World War II, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia but allowed powers of self-governance in certain affairs (Smith, 2013: 63). In addition, the western nations officially began to use the name "Ethiopia" and abandon the older "Abyssinia" an effort promoted by the Emperor (McClellan, 1996: 67).

During the imperial period Moreover, positions of the highest political power have been open to individuals of any group who have been prepared to associate themselves with the central government (Clapham, 1990: 35). Others saw the monarchy as dispensable, preferring instead a representative, constitutional government with democratically elected leaders, a state that would promote unity through cooperation and inclusion (McClellan, 1996: 58). In what became an absolute monarchy in fact as well as theory, political power was monopolized by the Emperor and was exercised at the center through a coterie of handpicked retainers (Markakis, 1989: 119). Merara also argues that Haile Selassie was very conscious of the fact that his goal of institutionalizing absolute power against the resistance of the traditional elite could not be realized without the creation of a loyal modern bureaucracy and the army whose raison d’être should be loyal to him alone (Merera, 2003: 146)

**4.1.2 National Identity Pre-1974 Revolution**

The creation of one Ethiopian nation was the continuation of the expansion process under what was then termed ‘makinat’ (Merera, 2003: 145). Some saw the perpetuation of the monarchy as essential, a symbol of nationhood going back thousands of years that would provide strength and unity to a multi-ethnic state (McClellan, 1996: 58). For nationalists, it represents a substantive challenge to historic notions of Ethiopian national identity that are grounded in specific historical
and cultural themes including unity of Ethiopia, territorial integrity, and a specific national identity (Smith, 2013: 82-83). According to Merera's argument, the process of ‘makinat’ involved the evangelization of the local population, the institutionalization of a new system of political control, and the imposition of a new political class, culture, and language on the indigenous population (Merera, 2003: 145). However, both before and during the state formation in Ethiopia, in every region, one could see plenty of local clashes between various clans or powerful individuals who were able to command strong private armies (Zahorik, 2014: 158).

The Solomonic dynasty and line of descent were said to remain the sole source of political power in Ethiopia from the early Axumite state up to the deposition of the last Emperor in 1974, with the only interruption by the Zagwe Dynasty (Siraw, 2016: 106). Zahorik suggested that Ethiopia, despite being ruled by the Solomonic dynasty for many centuries based on the three “powers” the Emperor, the Orthodox Church, and the Amharic language (Zahorik, 2014: 151). He also argues the modern history of Ethiopia has been in official historiography presented through the eyes of the ruling circles mostly ignoring the fact that outside what was called Abyssinia(Ibid: 158). The fact remains that most Ethiopian peasants in the newly incorporated areas increasingly came to identify with fellow ethnics (Smith, 2013: 67). Whether they initially located their oppression in economic and class-based origins or based on cultural and religious domination (Smith, 2013: 67).

During the Imperial period, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was the symbol of authority and identity. As Keller (2009: 61) argues, the basic argument of the Kebre Nagast (the Glory of Kings) the first written document justifying the mythical origins of the royal family was that the Ethiopian people are the chosen people. He stresses that only Ethiopian monarchs of the Solomonic line of descent have the right to rule not only the Ethiopian people but also the entire world (Keller 2009: 61). However, Levine noted out, a prime text for this claim the ‘Kebra Negast’ stands for nothing if not the image of the Ethiopian nation as belonging to a world of distinct nations among which it stands out by virtue of possessing a special mission (Levine, 2011: 314). Smith also argues that Haile Selassie did little to develop the sense of Ethiopia as a “community of interests,” and this failure has had tremendous implications for the development of a social consensus over citizenship (Smith, 2013: 59). According to Smith (2013: 59), the Ethiopian family has historically been quite hierarchical and patriarchal, the implications for
social relations among Ethiopia’s disparate and highly unequal ethnolinguistic and religious communities is compounded when one considers the gendered nature of a family-based analogy.

Another feature of the Imperial period was that Amharic was used as a national language and other language families had no State recognition (Siraw, 2016: 107). This is explicitly stated in the 1931 and 1955 Constitutions and in the 1930 Nationality Law of the country, which states that any foreign national would be granted Ethiopian citizenship if and only if he/she fluently speaks and writes in Amharic (Siraw, 2016: 107). Smith (2013: 67) noted out assimilation and domination were outmoded political ideals, even as far back as the 1930s and 1940s. Haile Selassie never successfully created a consensus about the proposed national symbols of Ethiopia (Smith, 2013: 67). Markakis argues, during Haile Selassie’s reign, the notion of Ethiopia as a Christian, Amharigna-speaking nation—that is, an extension of Abyssinia-was cultivated (Markakis, 1989: 119). He suggested that all Ethiopian languages other than ‘Amharigna’ were banned from printing and broadcasting (Ibid: 119). Amharization was also a political attempt to transform distinct ethnic symbols into national symbols – making symbols of northern highland culture the symbols of the modern state of Ethiopia (Smith, 2013: 65-66).

The key role of Amhara culture in the Ethiopian political system, including the use of Amharic as the language of government and the special status (until the revolution) of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, has led many observers to view Ethiopia as a state-created (Clapham, 1990: 35). Also, Clapham argues that maintained by the simple imposition of 'Amhara domination' over subordinate peoples (Clapham, 1990: 35). The espoused or encouraged policies of assimilation, including the imposition of the Amharic language, the formal political establishment of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and its distinct theology as the national religious identity of the state (Smith, 2013: 65). Such a noncontroversial language emerged to the stature of a lingua franca; ethnic minorities would have readily learned it because it would have given them a badge of sophistication and new socioeconomic opportunities (Alemseged, 2013: 235). Alemseged argues, language emerged to the stature of a lingua franca may have been perceived as ethnic neutral, readily serving as a banner of collective identity (Ibid: 235). Moreover, the dominance of Amhara cultural and political symbols in political life (Smith, 2013: 65). The dominance of the Amharic language and Orthodox Christian Religion led, among other things, to the emergence of armed group struggles for recognition and some even for complete
secession from the Ethiopian state machinery (Siraw, 2016: 107). Merera argues that one of the biggest mistakes of the pre-EPRDF Ethiopian governments is that they have worked hard on one language and one culture to create a single Ethiopian identity. However, this effort has created problems in many areas instead of bearing fruit. Unlike previous Ethiopian governments, the EPRDF has sought to destroy Ethiopian identity, build ethnic identity, and use ethnic identity as a stepping-stone to stay in power.

Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) and led in turn to the demise of the imperial and the socialist regimes, lay directly in the attempted imposition of cultural and political identities that did not resonate with the newly conquered peoples (Smith, 2013: 67). National oppression was nowhere better manifested than in the restriction of languages and the systematic repression of local cultures in the empire-state of Ethiopia (Gebru, 1984: 215). Ethiopian student Movement attacked the core tenets of Amharization by identifying the nationalist project as assimilationist and undemocratic (Smith, 2013: 66). Along the same lines, Smith citing Keller argued that Haile Selassie “almost completely ignored the need to build a sense of genuine Ethiopian national identity” among the non-Amhara and non-Tigrayan ethnic groups (Smith, 2013: 68-9). However, the imperial government’s effort at defining Ethiopian national identity gained ground with foreigners in particular (Smith, 2013: 66). One finds numerous references in early scholarship in which elements of Amhara culture and practice are presented as national, when in fact they are not (Smith, 2013: 66).

The vigorously enforced initiatives of centralization and cultural assimilation pursued by Haile Selassie surely encouraged ethnic identification, without the attendant attention to building a sense of Ethiopian-ness (Smith, 2013: 67). The imperial regime failed because it could establish neither the political nor the economic and military/administrative conditions required for state transformation (Clapham, 1990: 36). These combined failures provide the classic conditions for revolution, especially in decaying agrarian monarchies faced by the challenge of modern state formation; and Ethiopia found itself in this respect, as in many others, in the mainstream of revolutionary political change (Clapham, 1990: 36). Formerly, the iconological significance of the Emperor, with the force of tradition behind him, would have represented the totem for Ethiopian nationhood and provided a focal point for disparate ethnic groups (Finneran, 2003: 28). According to Smith (2013: 66), it is not at all clear, however, that other ethnic groups in
Ethiopia ever truly assimilated even the symbols of national identity as their own (Smith, 2013: 66). Cities and towns were renamed under Haile Selassie, but local people continued to use the older (often-ethnic) name (Ibid: 66). The collapse of the imperial regime revealed the fault lines in the foundations of the Ethiopian state and called forth visions of other geopolitical arrangements among those who had no reason to be committed to its preservation (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003: 83). But, with the end of the civil war in 1991, and the advent of a provisional government dominated by the northern Tigrayans, concepts of nationhood are more often being referred to in terms of a linguistic group rather than ‘being Ethiopian’ (Finneran, 2003: 28)

4.2 The Leninist Model of state

For better or worse, the revolution of 1974 was arguably the most pivotal event in contemporary Ethiopian history (Gebru, 2009: 34). He argued that the revolution was a paroxysm that shook the country as no other event had done in a hundred years—that is, since the formation of the empire-state (Gebru, 2009: 34). Ethiopia’s centuries-old monarchy came to a crashing collapse in the 1974 popular revolution, followed by the ascendance to power of Mengistu Hailemariam’s military government – the Derg (Khisa, 2019: 1). Ethiopia has since 1974 and especially since the creation of the WPE in 1984 made the most sustained attempt by any African state to create a Marxist-Leninist structure of government along broadly Soviet lines (Clapham, 1990: 37). He argues it may be more helpful to regard socialism (in its Leninist form) as a doctrine especially apposite to state consolidation in the Third World (Ibid: 37). Under pressure from popular expectations for radical change aroused by the students, the Derg adopted a radical ideology and undertook a fundamental transformation of Ethiopian society (Young, 1996: 534).

Nonetheless, the Ethiopian Revolution was unplanned and just as sudden and unforeseen a great surprise to everyone, even the radical activists who had propelled it but widely popular and initially bloodless (Gebru, 2009: 34). And a means to implement a conception of centralized state power which could be viewed through the prism of Marxism-Leninism as rational, progressive and above all scientific (Clapham, 1990: 37). One of the attractions of socialism to the Ethiopian left starting from the 1960’s was their conviction that once it was adopted as the official ideology, it would put an end to local nationalism and give birth to a new and united Ethiopia (Andargachew, 2014: 11). Soviet style marxism-leninism provided the ideological framework the Derg utilised to destroy the old social structure, to force the pace of development, to further
centralize state power and the militarize its apparatus (Young, 1996: 534). Gebru Tareke argues that the revolution was, of course, all too clear that by the early 1970s society was in the throes of a gigantic social upheaval (Gebru, 2009: 34). According to Markakis, the Ethiopian regime's claim to the mantle of revolutionary socialism was force fully contested by a militant Marxist group, which had catalyzed the fusion of diverse social forces that comprised the popular movement (Markakis, 1979: 3). The extraordinary determination with which the Ethiopian military regime and its Marxist civilian allies sought to create an institutional structure based on broadly Soviet models was thus derived, not merely from an immediate need for Soviet military aid (Clapham, 1990: 37). The leaders of this revolution would quickly proclaim allegiance to a different model of socialism, later to Marxist-Leninism (Cowcher, 2019: 3). One far less concerned with the recovery of lost communalism, and much more occupied with exposing indigenous ‘feudalism’ (Cowcher, 2019: 3).

The 1974 Revolution was primarily a class-based revolution, with its slogan being “Land to the Tiller” (Smith, 2013: 71). The land reform gave the peasantry in the south a vested material interest in the Ethiopian state, as well as a political interest in the incumbent regime (Markakis, 1989: 122). The most crucial element in this process was the 1975 nationalisation of land, which destroyed the material basis of the old regime (Young, 1996: 543). In this time, the radicals then dogged its every step, demanding fundamental socioeconomic reform that would preclude a restoration of the old order (Markakis, 1989: 122). The Derg also proclaimed an end to ethnic oppression, it decreed the equality of all cultures, promoted the use of other languages and cultures, and entertained the idea of some type of federal structure for Ethiopia (Young, 1996: 543). The renovation of the state had reached an advanced stage by the 1960s, when it faced the first challenges from dissident ethnic and regional groups (Markakis, 1989: 119). The revolution, which may be expected to appeal to elites whose primary goal, is the creation of a centralised and disciplined structure of political control (Clapham, 1990: 37). This is of course a goal, which the military, as the most hierarchically organised section of the state bureaucracy, may be expected to share (Ibid: 37).

As militant Marxists, the radicals were obliged to confront the national issue, after some agonising, opted for the Leninist principle of national self-determination, and declared their support for the Eritrean rebels (Markakis, 1989: 121). Since it subsequently espoused Marxism
as its ideology, the new regime could not formally reject the principle of national self-determination (Markakis, 1989: 122). Ethnicity in Ethiopia reached political maturity during the reign of the military regime, and all political forces that emerged during that troubled period were obliged to take account of this phenomenon (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003: 83). They argue that, the main reason was the growth and politicisation of the intelligentsia among subordinate ethnic groups (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003: 83). From 1974 to 1977, the Derg attempted to resolve the contradictions between local autonomy and centralisation by appointing local administrators to run their home areas (Wells, 2009: 153). However, Markakis noted out no such political acumen was evident in the Dergue's handling of the national issue, where its policies proved to be the same as those of the imperial regime, although more energetically pursued (Markakis, 1989: 122).

Apart from the revolutionary economic and social implications of the land reform, it had an immediate and highly significant political impact (Markakis, 1989: 122). The Ethiopian military had no intention to weaken the power of the centre, nor to allow meaningful mass participation in the government (Young, 1996: 534). Subsequently, the rise of militant regional and ethnic opposition movements gave the issue a political urgency that could not be ignored, and compelled the regime to seek constitutional solutions (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003: 83). The Dergue’s promotion of ethnic cultural emancipation, its denunciation of Abyssinian chauvinism, the reiterated proclamations concerning the equality of all groups and the right of nationalities to self-government (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003: 83).

The Derg thus fought to maintain not only the integrity of the Ethiopian state against strong challenges by Eritrean, Somali, Oromo, Afar and other dissident ethnic group(Young, 1996: 534). The Derg also proclaimed an end to ethnic oppression, it decreed the equality of all cultures, promoted the use of other languages and cultures, and entertained the idea of some type of federal structure for Ethiopia (Young, 1996: 534). With this in mind, it established the Institute of Nationalities in the mid-1980s, to study the ethnic composition of Ethiopia and to draft a constitutional design for local self-government (Young, 1996: 534). Initially, it chose to confront ethnicity as a cultural issue, and set about redressing the wrongs of the past (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003: 83). It also strove to forge a totally centralized state and, therefore, it refused to share power with either the politically conscious middle classes or the emerging regional and
ethnic elites, and ensured that the state retained its predominately Amhara character (Young, 1996: 534). Consequently, the new regime was almost immediately challenged from many quarters.

4.2.1 Institutional Transformation of Derg

Ethiopian bureaucracy did not grow, as the society become richer and more complex needing formalization and rationalization of all institutions (Tsegaye, 2010: 2). The revolutionary regime could, as already noted, draw on the powerful tradition of statehood, which had enabled the central Ethiopian highlands to sustain a recognizable political structure over a period of some two thousand years (Clapham, 1990: 38). The Provisional Military Administrative Council was established in the summer of 1974, and by December, it had declared the country a one-party state (Smith, 2013: 71). However, a Leninist party structure undermines the institutional autonomy of the military itself, which must be subordinated to the control of the party apparatus in a way, which undercuts the military command (Clapham, 1990: 37). The institutional transformation of the Derg consisted in three interlocking elements, through which the new regime sought to create the intermediary institutions between central political power and the social and economic base, which had been so evidently inadequate under its predecessor:

Firstly, the establishment of a new structure of institutional control; secondly, the drastic reorganization of the economic basis of state power; and thirdly, a selective widening of political representation (Clapham, 1990: 38).

Substantial social changes occurred under Haile Selassie, which crucially affected the feudal formation (Markakis, 1979: 4). New social groups emerged while the position of established classes shifted significantly (Markakis, 1979: 4). The process of centralization cum modernization gave birth to the so-called bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the upper levels of the newly established administrative and military apparatus of the imperial state (Markakis, 1979: 4). This new social group largely supplanted the feudal aristocracy in the management of the centralized state (Markakis, 1979: 4). The 1987 reorganization of the administrative structure ostensibly returned Ethiopia to civilian rule, with the founding of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) (Wells, 2009: 153). The revolution resulted in the transformation of a previously largely personal set of relationships, within a characteristically feudal structure of deference and subordination, into institutional relationships of much greater complexity and
effectiveness (Clapham, 1990: 38). Revolution and decentralization, though they constitute a sweeping, fundamental change in the political organization and economic property control, they have not yet precipitated a synchronous transformation of the socio-economic system (Tsegaye, 2010: 2).

The key base-level institutions of revolutionary Ethiopia are the peasants' associations and the urban dwellers' associations (or kebeles), which were both established as agencies of local self-administration, replacing mechanisms for rural and urban control which had been destroyed by the great revolutionary reforms of 1975 (Clapham, 1990: 38). The most significant of these measures was a sweeping land reform, which nationalized land, limited holdings to a maximum of ten hectares, forbade the selling and renting of land and the use of hired labor, and redistributed land equally among those who tilled it (Markakis, 1989: 122). The rural land reform, which abolished all private land ownership and the private hire of agricultural labor, could only be implemented through an organization that allocated land within a given area (notionally of 800 hectares but in practice very variable) among the peasant families which farmed it (Clapham, 1990: 38). The urban land reform, which abolished privately rented housing, likewise required an organization to allocate housing and collect rents on a communal basis (Clapham, 1990: 38). However, tsegaye argues that During the time of Derg, the power elite suffer from top-down ism characterized by vertical political structure, centralized and monopolized policymaking, the absence of institutionalized checks and balances, and a unidirectional flow of power and influence that discourages bottom-up policy feedback (Tsegaye, 2010: 2).

Futile though it turned out to be, Dergue’s constitutional exercise raised the nationality issue to the constitutional level and linked it intrinsically with the principle of decentralization of state power (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003: 83). However, although emphatically a party of the state apparatus, it is not simply a party of the military (Clapham, 1990: 39). The Political Bureau includes several influential survivors of the group of civilian Marxist intellectuals who were prominent in the early years of the revolution, and as one moves down the party hierarchy, the proportion of military appointees steadily diminishes (Clapham, 1990: 39). According to Wells, (2009: 153), the reorganization divided the country into 24 administrative regions and 5 autonomous regions. Eritrea was given the status of an autonomous region with three
administrative regions. Each region had its own assembly and the power to elect its own executive body (Wells, 2009: 153). Indeed, in the case of the larger groups, such as Tigreans, Somalis, Oromos, and Amharas, this seems to have been deliberately avoided (Wells, 2009: 153).

### 4.2.2 The Structure of Representation

Ethiopia's efforts to build a new socialist society are primarily of interest because it seems to be moving toward state socialism despite the architects of this transformation viewing (Keller, 1985: 1). Keller argues that this process more as a means to an end than as an end in itself (Ibid: 1). The major impetus for revolutionary transformation comes from a massive expansion of popular participation in political life is people become involved in politics to an extent, and in ways, that were previously inconceivable (Clapham, 1990: 41). According to Clapham, this has certainly occurred in Ethiopia, even though this participation is not free or democratic in any Western liberal sense of the words (Ibid: 41). It envisaged ‘a people’s democratic republic’ under the leadership of the proletariat acting in close alliance with the peasantry and supported by the petty bourgeoisie, and foresaw the formation of a workers’ political party (Markakis, 2011: 175). According to Clapham (1990: 41), the central political problem for any revolutionary regime is to combine this increased level of participation with the requirements of state consolidation.

Having hoisted the standard of ‘scientific Marxism’ to the mast of the Revolution, the Dergue came under pressure from its radical allies and its Soviet patron to produce a ‘workers’ party’ (Markakis, 2011: 175). The party has as its primary mission the leadership of the revolutionary working class and the provision of an authoritative interpretation of the laws of historical development (Keller, 1985: 1). The elections to institutions such as the National Shengo established in 1987 under the constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) are very little more than a rubber-stamping of central nominations (Clapham, 1990: 41). Even if the dominant role being played by members of the armed forces in the WPE and in the government is accepted, one cannot help but be struck by the lack of serious attention given by the Derg as well as the party to the "national question" (Keller, 1985: 14)

Nevertheless, by far the most critical area is the representation of ethnic or regional interests, commonly described as 'nationalities (Clapham, 1990: 41)'. The sole political gesture made by the first head of state-appointed by the Dergue, General Aman Andom, was intended to outflank
the liberation fronts by appealing directly to the people of Eritrea to support the regime in Addis Ababa, which had overthrown their oppressors (Markakis, 1989: 122). For the past century (precisely, since the emperor Menilek's accession in 1889), the political and geographical center of Ethiopia has been in Shoa, a region of mixed Oromo, Amhara, and other peoples, most of whose population is of Oromo origin, even though much of it is assimilated to Amhara language and culture (Clapham, 1990: 41). As Keller, A glaring obstacle to this is the fact that the Politbureau consists exclusively of Amharas and Tigres; two-thirds of the Central Committee come from these groups and higher military and administrative posts are also dominated by these groups (Keller, 1985: 14). Many Shoans are ethnically unidentifiable. Given its ethnic heterogeneity, its geographical centrality, its dominance of the state, and its key position in the modern externally oriented economy, this Shoan core has had an evident interest in articulating a composite Ethiopian nationalism (Clapham, 1990: 41). According to Clapham (1990: 42) Noted out This leadership was itself drawn from a wide variety of ethnic origins:

The first chairperson of the Provisional Military Administrative Council, Aman Andom, was Eritrean. the second, Teferi Benti, was a Shoan Oromo; Mengistu Haile-Maryam is generally regarded as of Wollamo origin, from Sidamo in the south; the former second-ranking member of the Derg and Vice-President, Fisseha Desta, is from Tigray; the third-ranking member and Prime Minister, FikreSelassie Wogderes, is a Shoan of indeterminate ethnicity from a largely Oromo area (Clapham, 1990: 42)

Keller also noted out although the Oromo are the most numerous ethnic group in Ethiopia, not one of their number is included in the Politbureau and few are on the WPE Central Committee (Keller, 1985: 14). Given this range of origins, as well as the regime's willingness to overthrow the previous structure of domination indicated by land reform, there is no reason to regard its commitment to an undifferentiated Ethiopian nationalism as merely the cover for 'Amhara domination' which it is frequently portrayed as by its opponents (Clapham, 1990: 42). It is here worth emphasizing the striking discrepancy between the charges of ethnic domination often brought against the Ethiopian central government, and the actual distribution of effective regional opposition to the regime (Clapham, 1990: 42). Regional representatives of the Derg, reacting repressively to what they saw as 'narrow nationalism', regional chauvinism, peasant backwardness, or outright counter-revolutionary activity, succeeded only in driving large areas

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of the country into the arms of the opposition (Clapham, 1990: 42). According to Keller (1985: 14), there are no mass organizations in the WPE, which represent ethnic nationalities. He identified on March 25, 1983, the Derg did authorize the establishment of an "Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities" (Ibid: 14).

**4.2.3 The quest of National identity During the Military Regime**

After the Dergue seized power in September 1974, the radicals then dogged its every step, demanding fundamental socioeconomic reform that would preclude restoration of the old order (Markakis, 1989: 121). According to Siraw the Military Government, identification with one’s ethnic identity and other identity sets was considered to have divided loyalty to the nation (Ethiopia) and the working-class community (Siraw, 2016: 108). The only identity set demanded by Dergue’s scientific socialism was working-class solidarity and identity (Keller, 2009).

Restoring control over a periphery agitated by the political turmoil at the centre was a priority in re-building the state (Markakis, 2011: 171). Markakis argues that the very first elucidation of Etiopia Tikdem in July 1974 included a pledge ‘to modernize the existing provincial administration’ (Ibid: 171). In this time the nationalistic motto of ‘Ethiopia-Tikdem’ /Ethiopia First/ demonstrates the Military Government’s homogenizing policy of group identities (Siraw, 2016: 108). In addition to that Siraw noted out identity ‘Etyopia Tikdem’ was a national call to dedicate oneself to the purity of history, to the development of the civilization and the common good of the country and the people (Ibid: 207). The chosen motto 'Ethiopia First', the soldiers' primary goal was the preservation of the Ethiopian state, and they could not countenance secession (Markakis, 1989: 123). Under the policy of Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia First), which included a version of Ethiopian socialism called hebretebawinnet, the Derg expressed its intention to pursue “equality; self-reliance; the dignity of labor; the supremacy of the common good; and the indivisibility of Ethiopian unity” (Smith, 2013: 71). The revolutionary leadership sought from the start, under the slogan Ityopya tikdem or Ethiopia First, to mobilise this composite nationalism as a source of popular unity, and to extend its appeal by removing elements of traditional political identity, such as adherence to Orthodox Christianity, which prevented it from serving as a fully national symbol (Clapham, 1990: 41-42).

In a list of definitions of the term Ethiopia Tikdem was said to mean that the many now took precedence over the few, ethnic pluralism replaced ethnic hierarchy, land and property were to
be for common usage and, importantly, that ‘developing awareness of the values of our cultural heritage (Cowcher, 2019: 6). The introduction of local languages in the literacy campaign, the accounting of linguistic and religious diversity in the population census, and the constitutional provision for autonomous regions, all tended to sharpen the political profile of ethnicity ( Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003: 83). Nonetheless, the “meserete timhirt” and the development of written literacy materials in languages other than Amharic had powerful symbolic and practical effect (Smith, 2013: 77). In the list of fifteen languages, one can see direct correspondence to the important languages of the contemporary language policy (Smith, 2013: 77). While radical Marxism was its avowed ideology, Ethiopian nationalism and a commitment to the nation-state project was the revolution’s driving force (Markakis, 2011: 161). This Ethiopian nationalism has likewise and equally understandably, in keeping with their own interests and mission become deeply entrenched in central government institutions, and notably the armed forces (Clapham, 1990: 41). Students and soldiers alike were fervent nationalists committed to the preservation and consolidation of the state inherited from the Abyssinian empire builders and, like them, regarded centre hegemony as the cornerstone of the project (Markakis, 2011: 161). This proved to be the first generation of educated youth in the periphery who had imbibed the radical ethic (Markakis, 2011: 175). The regime’s apparent divergence from the Abyssinian model of the nation-state, its pronouncements on ethnic equality, cultural emancipation and, above all, its land reform, were powerful incentives for those who had come of age in the midst of the Revolution (Markakis, 2011: 175). They accepted the radical thesis that national contradictions could be resolved through the class struggle, and put their faith in the soldiers to see this through (Markakis, 2011: 175).

The issue of Ethiopian identity is about who belongs to the political nation and its conceptualization should be as inclusive as possible so that it will give space for all ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic, gender, etc. (Siraw, 2016: 108). Whereas nationalist rhetoric promoted the idea of national unity and concord, students seemed to promote discord and balkanization. And in asking for the “renarrativizing” of the country’s history and the complete secularization of the state by detaching it from the Church, they advanced an idea that was as subversive of the polity’s ideology and the status quo as it was divisive and injurious to their movement (Gebru, 2009: 32). However, as the Dergue strictly followed the melting-pot perspective where all diversities had assimilated into a single national culture and language a
very large array of the population remained alienated from national self-definition (Siraw, 2016: 108-09).

Nevertheless, Markakis identify that the Dergue on the cultural plane adopted a more meaningful approach, where it departed from the policy of the ancient regime (Markakis, 1989: 123). From the beginning, it had promised cryptically to abolish ‘certain traditional customs which may hamper the unity and progress of Ethiopia'(Ibid: 123). Tewodros argues, once the revolutionary fervor was over the issue of nationalities, especially concerning the status of languages emerged as the most sensitive concern among the educated elite of the time (Tewodros, 2013: 220). The proliferation of many armed groups in the country's history who fought for national self-definition and even some for complete secession from the country could be a case in point (Siraw, 2016: 111). The debates about national and local languages escalated following the promises of Etyopia Tikdem and even more after the announcement of the Development through Cooperation Campaign in 1974 (Tewodros, 2013: 220).

The process of nation building attempted by the Imperial Regime and the Military Government appear to converge at forging a strong Ethiopian nation-state with superficially linguistic and cultural homogeneity (Siraw, 2016: 109). Nevertheless, they were aware that some policies of the imperial regime were proving counter-productive, and raised them to the top of the political agenda, obliging the successor regime to modify their aims (Markakis, 2011: 161). Consequently, the rupture caused by the 1974 Revolution marks an important turning point in the nation-state building project and the opening of a second phase under a new political order and fresh perspectives (Markakis, 2011: 161). Important and truly revolutionary steps were taken under the Derg, however, which facilitated the political organization of ethnic groups within the country (Smith, 2013: 75). There was a public recognition that ethnicity was a central political identity for many Ethiopians and that inequality based on ethnicity was a primary force behind the revolution (Smith, 2013: 75).

Beyond the affirmation of equality, respect for all cultures and the condemnation ‘Yehebereseb chiqona’ (‘nationality inequality’), the soldiers-turned-politicians made no effort to define the elements of an inclusive national culture shared by all Ethiopians (Markakis, 2011: 185). They did not expressly condemn nor defend the ‘Amharisation’ policy of the imperial regime, and Colonel Mengistu himself cast doubt on the meaning of the term when he once said: ‘In
Ethiopia, the correct meaning of Amhara is highland dweller (Markakis, 2011: 185). Intrinsically, the various dimensions of group identities individual Ethiopian citizens identify and live with were grasped as symbolized by a single dominant religious, linguistic and cultural identity. Ephrem Madebo argued that, One of the possible reasons for the problems that have arisen in the past 50 years is related to national identity in Ethiopia is we have not created a country all agreed\textsuperscript{5}.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{5} Interview with Ephrem Madebo, Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (Ezema), Strategic Advisor on Election Issues: on March 18/2021, 2:00: PM /Office.}
Chapter five

5 Federal state and National Identity Post-1991 Ethiopia

5.1 Reconstruction of Ethiopian State: Federal Model

Ethiopian state historiography has developed its own unique dominant plot (Toggia, 2008: 321). It underlies the permanence, continuity, and unity of the Ethiopian state from ancient times to the present (Toggia, 2008: 321). In the mid-nineteenth century, under emperors Tewodros, Yohannes and Menelik, Abyssinian force was reasserted and the foundations of the modern Ethiopian state were established (Sorenson, 1992: 229). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Amhara king of Shewa, Menelik, was able to gather sufficient firearms not only to make him the strongest man in Ethiopia by 1889 (Alemseged, 2004: 594). In addition to Menilek’s military successes both with foreign powers and in incorporating new lands in the southern and western regions of present day Ethiopia (Smith, 2013: 51). His also expand southwards and annex the huge Oromo landmass, hitherto outside the Ethiopian state (Alemseged, 2004: 594).

The model of Ethiopian ‘nation-building’ that had been implicit in the country’s approach to governance, from Menilek to Mengistu (Clapham, 2017: 68). Clapham argues through the imposition of a top-down hierarchy by whatever level of coercion was required, had been tested to destruction under the Derg (Ibid: 68). Despite the stark differences of its origins from those of most African states, Ethiopia shares a number of state-building problems with the rest of African states (Kidane, 1997: 120). One major obstacle to state building is the failure to develop integrating economic systems supported by homogenizing administrative and educational mechanisms (Ibid: 120). Other groups who live within Ethiopia's borders but reject Ethiopian affiliation and adopt other identities, such as Eritreans and Oromos offer different versions of regional history (Sorenson, 1992: 227-28). They reject a unified national identity and challenge the vision of a continuously-existing Ethiopian state which has endured since antiquity (Sorenson, 1992: 228).

Since the 1970s, the nationality question, that is, addressing the claims by ethno national groups to self-rule, fair representation in public institutions, and ensuring equality, has remained a crucial point in the agenda of Ethiopia’s political parties (Assefa, 2019: 155). The forces of the
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) overthrew the military government and disposed its violent centralized authoritarian system (Kidane, 1997: 122). Following the fall of the derg regime and the coming of the TPLF/EPRDF to power, one can observe that the nation-building strategy as elaborated by this front stressed the “primordial” belonging to “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” as the basis of Ethiopians’ identity (Bach, 2014: 108).

Under the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1991-95), a new ethnic-based map of Ethiopia and its regional states was introduced already in 1991 (Abbink, 1998: 62). In Ethiopia has adopted a unique model of resolving the challenges to the state that culminated in the creation of federal arrangement through which ethnic groups would be empowered and the existing framework of state reconstructed (Abraham, 2006: 89). According to Abbink the major reason of EPRDF adopt federal system is to solve “the national question” as the main cause of Ethiopia’s problem, above all others; and to come to a shared political agenda to address perceived or real “ethnic grievances” (Abbink, 2011: 597). This implied the reconstruction of the polity based on unity-in diversity whereby all national groups would enjoy political autonomy and self-government through constitutional guarantees of devolution of sovereignty in a federal framework (Abraham, 2006: 90). Evolution of the Ethiopian nation-building process and TPLF/EPRDF’s conception of the Ethiopian nation can also be explained by the TPLF’s perception of the Ethiopian state and their pragmatic strategies during the struggle (Bach, 2014: 113). Bach suggested, that actually reveals the complexity of TPLF’s nationalism itself (Ibid: 113). By its very nature, such a system relies on dividing citizens along ethnic lines and institutionalizes their division (Alemante, 2003: 85). Markakis noted out Ethiopia was to be divided into ethnic units, a task many would have considered impossible given the country’s history of population shifts and intermingling, inter-marriage and assimilation (Markakis, 2011: 234).

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Ethiopia has undertaken far-reaching political changes. Most importantly, the country was restructured based on what is often called 'ethnic federalism' (Asnake, 2014: 589). Aalen argues the concept of ethnic federalism was introduced in Ethiopia in 1991 when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power (Aalen, 2006: 246). Back in 1991, the TPLF-EPRDF ideology of ethnic federalism could have been seen as ‘the best possible model’ (Abbink, 2011: 599). It seems, however, that Ethiopia has
gone further than any of these countries in promoting ethnic diversity through a federal system that is explicitly based on ethnicity (Ibid: 243). The introduction of ethnic federalism was supposed to be the panacea to solving Ethiopia’s perennial “nationalities question” generated by the flawed nation-building process of the 19th and 20th centuries. And, the TPLF/EPRDF government announced its objective to establish an ethnically egalitarian nation-state with the redressing of past injustices.

An ethnically based federal system must therefore be able to change its administrative structures and mobilize ethnic identities (Aalen, 2006: 248). On the one hand, the ethnic federal system created ethnic units with their structures of administration, including their executive, judiciary, and legislative branches, and governed by their constitutions (Semir, 2019: 6). Nearly all nationalities felt the need to form their political organization (Markakis, 2011: 234). One of the underlying aims of a federation is to further stability, via the recognition of autonomy and self-determination claims, the application of rule-of-law principles in political practice, and the mediation of conflicts (Abbink, 2011: 608).

The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia also states that the federal structure will base itself on an ethno linguistic divide. Therefore, ethnic federalism in Ethiopia inseparably links identity and territory. Aalen argues some achievements regarding the rights of minorities have been made since the introduction of ethnic federalism (Aalen, 2006: 256). Assefa Fiseha suggested that the post-1991 federal system has brought ethnocultural justice to historically marginalized groups in the country (Assefa, 2019: 160). Particularly in the area of language, culture, local self-government, and the promotion of their own histories (Ibid: 160). However, different scholars argue that, Ethiopia’s peculiar nature of federalism has been praised and destined. A viable option for the integrity of the Ethiopian state and society on the other hand suggests that it exacerbates and ignites identity politics, therefore, would lead to further disintegration comparing with the failed federal states in the fall of the 1990s.

5.1.1 The Role of Ethnicity in Ethiopian federal system
In the Post-1991 Ethiopian politics, ethnicity emerged as a driving force of organization and mobilization of the rural elite. Yonatan suggested that ethnicity constitutes one of the major features of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 1/1995 and the basis for the internal organization of the federal state (Yonatan, 2010: 187).
Under the FDRE constitution Article 39 stated that, ethnic groups 'equitable representation in state and Federal governments. The Ethiopian Constitution’s definition of ethnic groups as clearly distinguishable cultural groups, Aalen identify it is akin to primordial ideas of ethnicity (Aalen, 2006: 247).

In a significant departure from the tradition of African states, Ethiopia has offered on a bold experiment of marrying of federalism with ethnicity (Yonatan, 2010: 187). Primordial definition of ethnicity and its classification of all Ethiopians as ethnic citizens, may strain the flexibility of the system and in the end make the containment of ethnic demands a very difficult task (Aalen, 2006: 248). Asnake suggested many of the concepts used to discuss problems of ethnic relations in Ethiopia were copied from Russian revolutionaries (Asnake, 2009: 63 and Crisis-Group, 2009: 23). The multiplication of ethnic based liberation movements is indicative that ethnic relations had reached an impasse (Kidane, 1997: 126). It must emphasized that the inclusion of the ethnic factor in the design of the state is consistent with the constitutionally declared commitment to celebrate ethnic diversity and build a multi-nation state (Yonatan, 2010: 203). In post-1991 Ethiopia ethnic identities, mainly in the form of linguistic cultural background and based on Stalin’s conception of “nationalities” were recognized politically and made the basis of regional and local administrations, to be filled by local people (Abbink, 2009: 13).

The military junta made gestures to address the emerging demands from ethno national groups when it came to power and toward the end of its era (Assefa, 2019: 154). To solve national question, in 1983, the Derg established the Institute of the Ethiopian Nationalities (ISEN) in order to provide the government with more knowledge about the national groups and projecting the process of constitutional drafting (Aalen, 2006: 246). However, it was accompanied by a tortuous and to many people painful rhetoric of ethnicization that declared Ethiopians primarily a member of “their ethnic group” and only second as Ethiopian citizens (Abbink, 2011: 599). As Kidane argument, Ethnic relations in the country were already poisoned by the previous two regimes and the country was clearly on the verge of disintegration along ethnic lines (Kidane, 1997: 126). International Crisis-Group (2009: 1) stated that, ethnically defined politics that decentralize rather than mitigate inter-ethnic relations.

A peculiar feature of the subsequent development was the new regime’s official encouragement of ethnic politics of in post-1991 Ethiopia based on the discourse of self-determination of
nationalities including secession (Abraham, 2006: 80). Self-determination and the option for secession are the EPRDF’s attempt to accommodate the nationalities (Crisis-Group, 2009: 23). EPRDF regime gave and invested political sovereignty to ethnic groups or “nationalities” rather than individuals. Ethnic group identity has been declared the basis for the entire political process: For party formation, for the delineation of regions and electoral districts, for registration of voters, for eligibility of a candidate to one of the two post-1995 chambers of parliament, and for staffing the administration of local and regional governments (Abbink, 1998: 62). Mulye Welela⁶, noted out due to the emphasis on ethnic identity, the common Ethiopian identity has severely weakened. They are so fortunate in their tribe and ethnicity that they do not even remember the great Ethiopian identity. Yonatan also identified, that ethnicity has become a major source of power, and the development of ethnic entrepreneurship across linguistic lines has become a common phenomenon (Yonatan, 2010: 207). It would seem that they have been dominating politics since 1991 by redefining and deploying ethnicity as a weapon to assert their power (Yeshtila, Kjosavik, & Shanmugaratnam, 2016: 7). This is evident in the fact that the rural elite have been able to control the state machinery in the last three decades under the TPLF/EPRDF-led government.

Ethiopian federation seen as composed of nations, nationalities and peoples as defined above, it means that every citizen must belong to an ethnic group and define themselves along ethnic lines (Aalen, 2006: 247). In such a system, every dispute turns into an ethnic dispute. As Yonatan, ethnicity becomes the sole lexicon of political discourse and, more dangerously for national unity, a readily accessible tool for ethnic entrepreneurs (Yonatan, 2010: 207). At present, Ethiopian citizenship for all practical purposes (voting rights, marriage, k'ebelle registration, etc.) is defined through ethnic identity. According to Abbink obligatory for children of mixed family to "choose" to belong to the ethnic group of one of the parents, even if this in itself can already be difficult to determine (Abbink, 1998: 63). This ethnic definition of citizens thus seems to have been extended into domains where it is completely irrelevant (Abbink, 1998: 63).

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⁶ Interview with Muley Welela, Team leader and late directorate director of constitutional interpretation and identity affairs at FDRE House of Federation: March 26/2021, 10:10: AM at Office.
5.2 Ethnic Based-Federalism and Its Discontents in Ethiopia

Federalism, as the system that devolves the decision-making process, is antidotal to the unitary and assimilationist policies that were at the root of Ethiopia's political sickness (Alemseged, 2004: 208). Federalism provided an institutional base for the new class of subordinate elite, who assigned greater responsibilities and corresponding power than was the case under previous regimes (Markakis, 2011: 281). Federalism introduced in Ethiopia as the solution to widespread, prolonged and violent political conflict that had brought the state to the brink of collapse (Ibid: 304). After the transition period led by the EPRDF-dominated Transitional Government, Ethiopia became a federal democratic republic composed of nine regional states (Abbink, 1998: 62).

Post-1991 Ethiopian restructured the political map along ethnic federal lines was expected to mitigate the zero-sum character of politics (Alemseged, 2004: 208). Ethnically based federal system must therefore be able to change its administrative structures along with the mobilisation of ethnic identities if it is going to fulfill its promises of ethnic self-determination (Aalen, 2006: 248). Ethnic federal system bears the name of their majority ethnic group, except Gambela and the Southern Regions (Aalen, 2006: 248). Smaller ethnic groups are granted the right to self-administration in their respective locality; they have the right to establish their own regional state (Medhane & Alagaw, 2014: 20). However, EPRDF created federalism as a system of government, but the regime did not create the conditions for us to continue as a nation-state (Alemseged, 2004: 208). Merera suggested the adoption of ethnic federalism as a system of government has further exacerbated the problem of national identity building. He suggested Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) made a good start but eventually got sick. Merera argues, the regime used it’s a federal system a tool of divide and conquer the state.

Both the Marxist Derg and the ethno-national EPRDF misread the signals, intentionally or unintentionally, and led the country into ideological and ethnic fundamentalisms that systematically marginalized every Ethiopian (Assefa M., 2012: 125). As this identification solidifies, citizens will gradually withdraw their identification with and support of the central

7 Interview with Prof. Merera Gudina, Chairman of Oromo Federalist Congress, on March 20/2021, 3: 00: PM /Office.
government (Alemante, 2003: 87). Ethnic-based federalism is the most controversial EPRDF policy (International Crisis-Group, 2009: 22). It celebrated by some as the panacea for holding multi-ethnic Ethiopia together, others decry it as a dangerous concept that will eventually dismember the country (Ibid: 22). The marriage of federalism with ethnicity, however, invokes too many difficulties to be viable or workable (Alemante, 2003: 85). According to Assefa Mihretu argument, the killil system of ethnic-federalism is the second and perhaps most powerful weapon of EPRDF’s divisive architecture of hegemonic governance (Assefa M., 2012: 118). In addition to that, the ethno-linguistic orientation of the geographical configuration of the federal state has provoked harsh criticisms (Yonatan, 2010: 202). The crux of most of these criticisms is that it is a perilous experiment that is more likely to exacerbate ethnic tensions and militate against national unit (Ibid: 202).

Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia was supposed to be buttressed by what appears to be consociationalism, namely, the principle of power-sharing among ethnic leaders at a federal level, balanced recruitment, and proportional resource allocation (Alemseged, 2004: 609). However, the EPRDF’s ethnic federalism has decisively transformed politics, although not always with the hoped-for consequences (International Crisis-Group, 2009: 22). It has not resolved the “national question” (Ibid: 22). After Ethiopia implement federalism as a system of government, ethnic conflicts have not disappeared, Nevertheless have been either transferred from the national to the regional, district and kebelle levels or been contained by the security forces (International Crisis-Group, 2009: 22). Muleye Welela, suggested that the reason behind the current conflict that erupted throughout the country is giving a priority to ethnic identity than national identity.

EPRDF under the leadership of TPLF sought to deconstruct the notion of statehood based on pan-Ethiopianism by so-called Shewan nobles (Yeshtila, Kjosavik, & Shanmugaratnam, 2016: 8). Indeed, as Ethiopia's experience indicates, when the state deliberately uses ethnicity as a source of political identity, citizens who might not have been aware of their ethnicity will regroup under its banners purporting to be a distinct people (Alemante, 2003: 86). In the hands of ambitious ethnic leaders, the existence of independent ethnic governments will serve as a means

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8 Interview with Muleye Welela, Team leader and late directorate director of constitutional interpretation and identity affairs at FDRE House of Federation: March 26/2021, 10:10: AM at Office.
for "collating," articulating and disseminating ethnic demands and grievances against the central government (Ibid: 87). As much as the decision to provide territorial autonomy responds to the demands of many ethnic groups, the Ethiopian approach to provide a mother state to each single especially large ethnic group, admittedly poses a potential danger to the territorial integrity of the state (Yonatan, 2010: 204). The 2005 general elections finally revealed how, despite the government’s efforts to leave it behind, the Great Tradition was all too alive (Marzagora, 2017: 441). Some of the opposition parties whose rapid rise in popularity threatened the EPRDF had positions very close to the old imperial Pan-Ethiopianism (Marzagora, 2017: 441). The EPRDF managed to maintain its political supremacy, but in the aftermath of the elections it started referring more conspicuously to the Great Tradition in its public rhetoric in order to prevent future challenges (Marzagora, 2017: 441).

As the experience of multi-ethnic federations reveal, large ethnic groups carved under a single constituent unit pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the state (Yonatan, 2010: 204). The propensity to engage in conflicts is high when each constituent unit identified with a single ethnic group (Yonatan, 2010: 204). The existence of an ethnically based governmental structure is thus of great assistance in the struggle to create a new and independent state (Alemante, 2003: 87). These arguments suggest that ethnic-based federalism seriously flawed as a mode of governance (Alemante, 2003: 87).

EPRDF’s divisive architecture of hegemonic governance has worked well as a mechanism of control from above for an ethnic group with a small population and meagre resources, and with a locus of state power outside its demographic centre in a hostile territory inhabited by much larger tribes (Assefa M., 2012: 125). National groups have the unconditional right for self-determination that included a full measure of self-administration, cultural protection, historical preservation, and the ultimate right for secession (Medhane & Alagaw, 2014: 20). However, Aalen noted out due to EPRDF’s grip in every corner of the country and its suppression of opposition, it can be argued that the Ethiopian federation, like the Soviet and Yugoslav federations, is maintained by force (Aalen, 2006: 255).

5.3 Ethnic-Based Federalism Vs Pan-Ethiopian Identity
The concept of ethnic federalism introduced in Ethiopia in 1991 when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power (Aalen, 2006: 245). However, the
new regime showed it-self to be thoroughly aware of this need, and rapidly developed constitutional and governmental structures designed to tackle the former regimes problem (Clapham, 2017: 76). For nationalists, ethnic based federalism is a deliberate plan to undermine national identity, pride and self-esteem flowing from the exceptional history and continuity of the Abyssinian Empire and Ethiopian state. Merera suggested, in the new scheme of things, 'the right to self-determination and secession' and the ethnic-based federal arrangement have been carefully designed in a manner they could serve the dominance of the new Tigrayan elite in power (Merera, 2004: 33).

The point of view of state discourses; in the years after 1991, the EPRDF discouraged the use of imperial symbols of nationhood in public life (Marzagora, 2017: 440). Former emperors, in line with the national oppression thesis, were disparaged for their human rights abuses and crimes against the Ethiopian people (Marzagora, 2017: 440). The new government consciously turned to history to forge a new identity for the Ethiopian nation (Ibid: 440). Many scholars describe ethnic federalism as a malicious TPLF tactic to plant divisions among ethnic groups to facilitate rule by the Tigrayan minority (International Crisis-Group, 2009: 22-23). Most opposition supporters allege that the TPLF manipulates ethnic identities and conflicts to stay in power (Ibid: 22-23).

The TPLF proposed instead a new regionalist version of highland nationalism based on Tigrayan historical achievements (Marzagora, 2017: 441). By recognizing specific regions of a country as the "homeland" of particular ethnic groups, it serves to encourage loyalty to one's ethnic group (at the expense of loyalty to the nation) and to whet the appetite for ethnic nationalism (Alemante, 2003: 99). In fact, from the 1970s, TPLF’s nationalism was built on the tension between historical Ethiopianness and the ideological “national oppression thesis” (Bach, 2014: 114). This may in the long run prevent a redefinition of the Ethiopian identity to become inclusive instead of exclusive and hinder the development of a sustainable pan-Ethiopian identity, which can act as a bulwark against claims of secession and disintegration (Aalen, 2006: 256). It remains to be seen whether a regime change in Ethiopia will lead to disintegration, as it happened in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Ibid: 255).

Another factor that contributes to the undermining of the idea of an overall Ethiopian citizenship is that under the regime of the EPRDF, the key to get access to the resources of the central
government is to acquire a separate ethnic identity and an ethnically defined administrative structure (Aalen, 2006: 256). Through its governing practices, the EPRDF, and particularly the TPLF, has not done enough to make the Ethiopian state appear ethnically neutral (Aalen, 2006: 256). It cannot take sides as the EPRDF government has done from the beginning by using its divisive architecture of hegemonic governance and became hostile to the Ethiopian collective identity (Assefa M., 2012: 126).

In the ‘unity of opposites’ framework, ‘communal’ forces will operate freely within the national legal system and pursue their legitimate role for the full recovery of their communal life (Assefa M., 2012: 126). The constitutional clause that gives nationalities the right to secede it touted as proof of the EPRDF’s anti-Ethiopian stance (Crisis-Group, 2009: 23). Therefore, it can also argued that the Ethiopians, unlike the peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, have a stronger common identity, an idea of an overarching citizenship that transcends ethnic identities, which can be called upon to prevent disintegration (Aalen, 2006: 255).

5.4 Controversy between Ethnic and National Identity post 1991-Ethiopia state
Post 1991 showed, as the Ethiopian “nationalities” became the core of a renewed conception of the Ethiopian nation derived from the “national oppression thesis” defended by the TPLF rebellion during the struggle (Bach, 2014: 109). The Tigrayan youth who formed the TPLF developed their ideology in the Ethiopian student movement of the 1960s and 1970s, which fought the old regime and the military dictatorship on a pan-Ethiopian basis (Young, 1997: 32). However, whether this ideology of dismantling the idea of pan-Ethiopian identity found wide acceptance is less sure (Abbink, 1998: 70). Marxism was ‘officially’ discarded and replaced by 'liberal democracy after the capture of state power by the group in 1991 while Tigrayan nationalism has continued to serve as a moving spirit in the post-1991 remaking of the Ethiopian state (Merera, 2004: 33). After the EPRDF control Addis Ababa, ethnic nationalism broke out in large numbers everywhere in the country, even at a district level. It was not intended to be a common economic and political community.

The EPRDF has been proposing a new vision of Ethiopian identity, where primordial identities can coexist with an imperial inherited Ethiopianness without being mutually exclusive (Bach, 9).

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9 Interview with Tsegabirhan Tadesse, Directorate Director of the Federalism and Government Relations at the Ministry of Peace, on April 1/2021, 3: 50PM /Office.
For those urban residents who related to a Pan-Ethiopian identity, it forced upon them an externally imposed identification with an ethnic group (Dias, 2014: 145). The late prime minister Meles Zenawi suggested building a new Ethiopian identity “from below”, which would emerge from first and real identities of Ethiopian peoples, i.e. their “ethnic” belonging (Bach, 2014: 110). Abbink put forward that: people were forced to make an often-impossible choice as to their ethnic identity and mother tongue in the educational system (Abbink, 1998: 65). Unlike previous Ethiopian governments, the EPRDF has sought to destroy Ethiopian identity, build ethnic identity, and use ethnic identity as a stepping-stone to stay in power.\(^\text{10}\)

At the level of the criteria for Ethiopian nationality, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) continued the earlier practice of not recognizing claimants to dual ‘international’ nationality (Dias, 2014: 145). The TPLF/EPRDF regime enshrined ethnicity as the governing principle of national life, redefined and restructured the territory, memory, and ideology of the Ethiopian nation (Tewodros, 2013: 270). For the past 27 years, spreading ‘Ethiopianism’ has no longer been among the official tasks of the government; and so some social forces took it as their foremost responsibility (Semir, 2019: 7). Ethiopian nationality was mutually exclusive of other ‘international’ nationalities (Dias, 2014: 145). At the level of the domestic criteria for Ethiopian citizenship, the state defined citizenship according to the ethnic identity (Dias, 2014: 145).

Dias suggested that this conception of mutually exclusive of other ‘international’ nationalities in practice, created a dual identity, whose are an international Ethiopian national identity and a domestic Ethiopian ‘national’ identity (Dias, 2014: 145). He argues the domestic Ethiopian ‘national’ identity was defined through the ethnic identity, which was also mutually exclusive (Dias, 2014: 145). Smith, single out the most radical part of Article 39 is an articulation of meaningful citizenship, at least for ethnic group members (Smith, 2013: 83). Bach argues, the TPLF leadership thus remained devoted to their interpretation of Ethiopian people and to their opposition against preceding regimes’ Ethiopianness considered the root cause of Ethiopia’s troubles (Bach, 2014: 109).

\(^{10}\) Interview with Prof. Merera Gudina, Chairman of Oromo Federalist Congress on March 20/2021, 3:00: PM at Office.
The peculiar ‘Ethiopianising’ project anchored in the promotion of common culture and language was not, however, seen as a favorably by certain groups of people, especially outside the Amharic-speaking north (Semir, 2019: 5). Though several internal and external events, as well as long-term causes, explain the fast putting in perspective of the ethnic discourse and the slight rehabilitation of ‘Ethiopianness’ as from the middle of the 1990s (Bach, 2014: 112).

5.5 Political Parties and National identity under a federal system

According to Anderson, ethnic political institutions privilege certain groups at the expense of others, and that this then freezes in place a system that reifies ethnicity and empowers ethnic entrepreneurs, is difficult to dispute (Anderson, 2013: 70). Ethnically defined politics that decentralize rather than mitigate inter-ethnic relations; government-propagated democratization inhibited by the ruling party’s unwillingness to share power (International Crisis-Group, 2009: 1). And it rapid economic growth and increasing urbanization accompanied by growing inequality and social tensions (International Crisis-Group, 2009: 1)

The post 1991 setup led to the proliferation of different, mainly ethnic based, political parties. This was relatively an unprecedented move in comparison to the Derg regime, where only a single party was allowed to operate in the political landscape (Beza, 2018: 4). To most of the Ethiopians, their ethnic belonging is much more important than their Ethiopian identity (Ismagilova, 2004: 182). As a matter of political practice, since the reorganization of the country into ethnic federation, EPRDF has largely sought to perpetuate ethnic representation, both at the federal and regional legislative bodies (Beza, 2018: 9). Ethnic parties, however, can always and anywhere affect the quality of democracy. The proliferation of ethnic parties is likely to increase the number of parties achieving legislative representation (Elischer, 2013: 4). By promoting ethnicity to the centre of state policy-making and using it as instrument of divide and rule, it has further deepened and widened the old lines of political polarization while adding the new ones (Merera, 2007: 11).

The absence of consensus regarding ethnic federalism results from contradictions that date back to the formation of the modern state in the nineteenth century and have become virulent since 1991(Crisis-Group, 2009: 1). In an interview with Ephrem, he said that the proliferation of ethnic parties undermines national identity. It was the Amhara who made it difficult for the EPRDF to
negotiate when it came to Ethiopia. Later, organizing in Amhara was called self-preservation. The creation of Amhara nationalism has weakened the movement at the national level\textsuperscript{11}.

On the other hand, the article published by Crisis-Group identified, fundamentally opposing visions of Ethiopia’s history, problems and the way forward as conceived by different ethno political constituencies and a diaspora dominated by Amhara and Amharised urbanites (Crisis-Group, 2009: 1). Presently the issue of ethnicity is critical, the political elites continue to use ethnicity as a resource for political exploitation and free enterprise (Getnet, 2020: 60). People will want to have their ethnic relationship; to be able to get employments and share resources etc. (Ibid 60).

And current Ethiopian situation ethnic based political parties created mistrust among the federal government and the local ethnic groups (Getnet, 2020: 60). The legal and political recognition of ethnic groups authorised by the EPRDF has created a political context in which ethnic parties, though now legally sanctioned, have been unwilling and unable to work together (Joirerian, 1997: 398).

The heart of identity politics is when voters vote for or against someone because of the candidate’s characteristics is the basic matter in Ethiopian politics (Getnet, 2020: 61). Therefore, this is becoming a serious challenge to the national unity of Ethiopian as a country (Getnet, 2020: 61). Asnake also argues the proliferation of ethnic-based political parties undermines the construction of national identity. I don’t think ethnic-based parties play a constructive role in Ethiopian identity building. Those ethnic-based parties give priority to their ethnic group and identity\textsuperscript{12}. In the current condition, it is difficult to bring national unity in Ethiopia, because ethnicity is the most sensitive issue (Getnet, 2020: 61). Getnet noted out ethnic politics originates from selfish political elite and has no or little meaning to ordinary people. The value of one sense of nationalism will be lost (Getnet, 2020: 61).

When the time of interview Asnake also said that, we are currently seeing the impacts of ethnic nationalists in Ethiopia, so I think it is naked breaking to build a national identity with the proliferation of ethnic-based political parties in Ethiopia. He asserted that, one ethnic group see the other ethnically deferent neighbor as an enemy. When we look at what the Amhara elite have

\textsuperscript{11} Interview with Ephrem Madebo, Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (Ezema), Strategic Advisor on Election Issues: on March 18/2021, 2:00: PM /Office.

\textsuperscript{12} Interview with Assistant Professor Asnake Kefale, Researcher on Federalism and issues of identity: Addis Ababa university, on March 23/2021, 9:20 AM /Office
said about the Oromo; in the last, three or four years and what the Tigrayans said about the Amhara, give a situation about the horrific nature of ethnic-based politics Ethiopia alone\textsuperscript{13}.

5.5.1 Polarize Political Parties and challenge of Ethiopian state
The positive development in Ethiopian students movement which bring the history of party formation in Ethiopia and dismantlement of old feudal regime soon began to be overshadowed by political polarization and fragmentation that precipitated an endless polarization in the Ethiopian state (Shimelis, 2017: 61). Conspicuously, albeit at different levels sectarianism, conspiracy and political intrigues have become the hallmark of the Ethiopian political parties and their leaders with the resultant effect of frustration, disillusionment and demobilization of the common folks across the country (Merera, 2007: 1).

These polarized debates are not of historical importance only; they constitute, as reflected in the 2005 election, the most contested in Ethiopian political history, a central place in the contemporary Ethiopian political and constitutional debate (Yonatan, 2010: 183). Contradictory interpretations of the Ethiopian history underlie the country’s alignment of political forces (Yonatan, 2010: 183). On the one hand, are political forces that regard the Menelik expansion of the nineteenth century as the process of nation building for them, this is an unavoidable route that any great power has to go through (Yonatan, 2010: 183). EPRDF political intolerance is evident in its unwillingness to engage with alternative political points of view (Markakis, 2011: 250). Despite the fact that it has had to discard most of its ideological and programmatic baggage on the road to power, the ruling party remains firmly convinced of own infallibility (Markakis, 2011: 250)

The EPRDF developed its human and ethnic minority rights rhetoric as part of the solution to realpolitik challenges that had to be dealt with after its military victory over Mengistu and his dictatorial regime (Barata, 2012: 67). However, in Ethiopia one party see the others as natural enemy and danger to Ethiopia considering itself as the only panacea for Ethiopian political problems (Shimelis, 2017: 61). According to Shimelis, political party related problem in Ethiopian democratization process is political polarization among Ethiopian elites in general and political parties in particular (Shimelis, 2017: 61). Merera noted out, the rise of multi-ethnic political parties and national liberation movements side by side has also contributed to the

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid
political fragmentation and the political polarization (Merera, 2007: 15). Tsegabirehan suggested that, it has deteriorated the image of the great Ethiopian because ethno-political parties see everything as a matter of their own ethnicity\textsuperscript{14}.

The contending views that emerged boiled down to two conflicting understandings of the essence of "Ethiopianness": ethnic or civic (Tsfaye, 2006: 58). There is lack of consensus among political parties on national issues like constitution, national flag, national army and police and national election board (Shimelis, 2017: 61). The widespread mistrust to both the ruling elite and the state is undermining the people’s image of the state as a guarantor of the rights of all citizens, independent of ethnic identity (Aalen, 2006: 256).

The consequences of the political polarization, which blocked the aggregation of the broader national interest across political divides by the Ethiopian political parties, are immense to say the least (Merera, 2007: 8). Beyond making multi-party politics a mockery, the more than a quarter of a century of EPRDF rule contributed to fear, fragmentation and disunity widely felt within the Ethiopian body politic in the post 1991 period (Solomon, 2018: 99).

Since April 2018, some of the elements of the political rhetoric of the EPRDF led by the administration of Abiy Ahmed have changed (Solomon, 2018: 114). The political language has become one of promoting unity than harping on EPRDF’s divisive rhetoric’s anti-peace, anti-development, anti-democracy which have been replaced by the language of Medemer or unity (Ibid: 114). The country is bracing itself to organize elections in 2021, which is predicted to be one of the most contested in its history. In the time being, several forces, including the parties that have recently returned from exile, are preparing themselves to work to fulfill the procedural requirements for registration and forging alliances with other like-minded parties.

With the creation of the Prosperity Party, the three former ethnic parties of the EPRDF and other ethnic-based parties that voted to join it, such as the Ethiopian Somali People’s Democratic Party will cease to exist as distinct political entities, and their memberships will merge. At first glance, the demise of the TPLF/EPRDF and the creation of the Prosperity parties as a pan-Ethiopian party seem like a positive step towards uniting a long-divided country. On the other hand, Awol

\textsuperscript{14} Interview with Tsegabirhan Tadesse, Directorate Director of the Federalism and Government Relations at the Ministry of Peace, on April 1/2021, 3: 50PM /Office.
suggested that it becomes clear that the architects of the move failed to take into account a range of constitutional, ideological, and representational issues that could bring the political legitimacy and representative capacity of the newly formed party into question (Awol, 2019). He argued that the formation of the Prosperity Party comes at a time when these ethnic cleavages are pronounced and the central demands of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups for political autonomy and cultural justice remain unresolved (Awol, 2019).

Merera said that currently the two members of the prosperity party ‘Oromo prosperity’ and the ‘Amara prosperity’ do not seem to be working together as one party. Their activities clearly show the differences between the two prosperous parties in many places. There is nothing wrong with ethnocentric parties, as long as they work within the legal framework Merera, he said that, currently the two members of prosperity party ‘Oromo prosperity’ and the ‘Amara prosperity’ they do not seem to be working together as a one party. Their activities clearly show the differences between the two prosperous parties in many places.\textsuperscript{15} There is nothing wrong with ethnocentric parties, as long as they work within the legal framework\textsuperscript{16}

5.6 Balancing Ethiopianness and Nation Nationalities and peoples

5.6.1 Ethio-Eritrean War and the Re-Emergence Pan-Ethiopian Nationalism

At the end of the 1990s, pan-Ethiopian nationalism had then re-appropriated and used by these post-1991 Ethiopian rulers in order to fight against Eritrean. First on the EPRDF agenda when they assumed power in 1991 was to redress the ethnic question in Ethiopia (Tronvoll, 2009: 467). He argues that EPRDF dismantled the unitary Ethiopian state, and emphasized ethnic equality and autonomy within a ‘new’ Ethiopian federal state (Ibid: 467).

The 1998-2000 war and in its aftermath the emphasis on diversity and decentralization was increasingly substituted by the focus on unity (Dias, 2014: 208). As Eritrea was amicably released to form its own state, the nationalists accused the TPLF of conspiring with the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front to violate the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and subject it to being landlocked (Semir, 2019: 7). The Eritrean–Ethiopian war radically changed EPRDF policies on

\textsuperscript{15} Interview with Prof. Merera Gudina, Chairman of Oromo Federalist Congress, on March 20/2021, 3: 00: PM /Office.

\textsuperscript{16} Interview with Ephrem Madebo, Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (Ezema), Strategic Advisor on Election Issues: on March 18/2021, 2:00: PM /Office.
this issue and had a dramatic impact on how both informal and formally sanctioned discourses on identity were expressed (Tronvoll, 2009: 467). Suddenly, ‘Ethiopia’ rose like a phoenix from the ‘revolutionary ashes’, positioning herself at the center of political discourse on identity (Ibid: 467). Bach argues the war against Eritrea meant resorting to broader federating symbols and pivotal events stressing the unity and solidarity of Ethiopian peoples (Bach, 2014: 117). In addition to that, the outbreak of the war allowed the citizens to voice resentment towards the ruling party’s own conception of statehood (Dias, 2014: 208).

The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea implied the increasing use of another dimension of nationalism at the state level, inherited from the imperial period which, once again, had not disappeared since 1991 (Bach, 2014: 117). Dias noted out EPRDF was forced to abandon its emphasis on diversity and revive the motto of ‘One Ethiopia’ to mobilize support for the defense of the territorial integrity of the state against external aggression (Dias, 2014: 208). Bach (2014: 117) argues that it symbolized the union of Ethiopian peoples in their resistance against external enemies. The outbreak of the 1998-2000 war definitely rehabilitated the symbol. Bach argue the most illustrative fact of the re-appropriation of Adwa by the TPLF/EPRDF is undoubtedly the 1st of March 1999, the date on which one of the most important Ethiopian offensives against Eritrean troops in the disputed area of Badme was launched ‘Operation Sunset’ (Bach, 2014: 117).

Bach noted out, Adwa, Ginbot 20, Operation Sunset and Badme enter the core of a reinvented Ethiopian mythology, showing once again how imperial Ethiopianness and the new nationalism based on the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples have to be considered as interdependent instead of opposed (Bach, 2014: 119). Eritrean-Ethiopian war, however, prompted a revival of pan-Ethiopian politics, and the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) filled this lacuna in the political landscape of the country (Tronvoll, 2009: 468). Generally, the war against Eritrea somehow reconciled the Ethiopian empire with Ethiopian identity with the post-1991 revolutionary state.

5.6.2 2005 General Elections and Ethiopianness
According to Tronvoll, in 1991, the relative change of national identity and the subsequent revision of Ethiopia’s history at the beginning of the 1990s appeared more controversial than the implementation of the federal system itself (Tronvoll, 2009: 58). However, the resurgence of
Ethiopian nationalism due to the war contributed to the rapid growth of the new pan-Ethiopian political coalition, CUD, established in its aftermath (Ibid: 467). In fact, multinational federalism was strongly condemned by observers for being the rejection of “ethiopianess” supposedly born in Adwa, putting at risk national unity (Worku, 1993; Aberra, 1995; Bach, 2014). The ethno nationalist groups in reaction insisted one should demonstrate absolute loyalty to substrate identity (Assefa, 2019: 156)

This resurgence of a Pan-Ethiopian nationalist discourse clearly emerged at the occasion of the 2005 regional and federal elections and got a new dimension (Bach, 2014: 120). Although two forerunners and component parts of the new CUD had previously campaigned on a pan-Ethiopian ticket, the political context in the country was too constrained for them to be effective in the 2000 election (Tronvoll, 2009: 467). Bach identify, opponents defending a unitary Ethiopia found in the war the occasion to legitimize their thesis and prove they were right at the beginning of the 1990s when they warned of imminent new conflicts, for which multinational federalism was accused of being responsible (Bach, 2014: 120). While most would agree that the 2005 election in Ethiopia was generally peaceful, the post-election period has transformed the Ethiopian social and political landscape into one of great uncertainty and increasing political violence (Tesfaye, 2006: 55).

Ethiopia’s multiethnic federalism encourages political parties to organize along ethnic lines, and it champions an ethnicized federal state (Alem, 2005: 315). Centrist political elites under the slogan “Ethiopia first” insisted that one should demonstrate absolute loyalty to the overarching state and aimed to entrench unity and territorial integrity of the country (Assefa, 2019: 156). Those Parties defending the Ethiopian state’s and nation’s unity, and criticizing multinational federalism have not disappeared (Bach, 2014: 120). Tronvoll argued that the Coalition of Unity and Democratic (CUD) grew out of the sentiments created by the war; frustrations over a perceived failed EPRDF policy of ethnic federalism and the restoration of a proud Ethiopianness (Tronvoll, 2009: 467). The case of the All Amhara People Organization (AAPO), or the Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party (EDUP), whose political programs were based on the unity of a “Greater Ethiopia” and the defense of a strong Ethiopianness (Bach, 2014: 119).

According to Sara smith, the election is the idea that ethnic politics in Ethiopia is Amhara or Tigray versus the rest, with the CUD being sometimes portrayed as a pro-Amhara party and the
EPRDF as a pro-Tigrean party (Smith, 2007: 60). First, the Amhara themselves are divided between rural peasants and urban constituencies and it is not entirely clear that all Amharas voted for the CUD, though clearly, they favored the CUD more than other regions of the country (Smith, 2007: 60). These pan-Ethiopianists admitted that the country was unified around an Amhara cultural base, but they asserted that neither the ancient class system nor the superstructure of the modern Ethiopian state was exclusively the domain of the Amharas (Tесfaye, 2006: 59).

5.6.3 Post-2018 Reform and Ethiopian re-emergence national identity

Since April 2018, Ethiopia has seen a political liberalisation acclaimed worldwide for its pace and breadth (Semir, 2019: 1). Abiy has freed thousands of political prisoners, made peace with Ethiopia’s old enemy Eritrea, overhauled the cabinet and other top posts, and committed to economic liberalization and democratic elections (Temin & Badwaza, 2019: 139).

Abiy and his reforms have awakened enthusiasm (Temin & Badwaza, 2019: 140). On his inauguration date 2/April 2018, Abiy Ahmed said that:

"What we have is one Ethiopia. Above any political thought, national unity is supreme. We need however underline that national unity does not mean oneness. Our unity needs to embrace our diversity and highlights our multinational identity," he also noted out Ethiopian (national) identity.

At the time of inauguration, Abiy Ahmed also said, "You will find the precious bodies of every Ethiopian from every corner of the country become soil in another part of the country. We Ethiopians, while alive, we are Ethiopians; when we die, we become Ethiopia".

The unitary state of the imperial and the Dergue periods promoted nation building across the country using the arms of the state (Semir, 2019: 5). Gerth-Niculescu noted out, by safeguarding ethnic representation while creating a more inclusive party, the Prosperity Party hopes to find a middle ground between Ethiopia's strong ethnic identities and national unity (Gerth-Niculescu, Deutsche Welle, 2020). Nevertheless, the current government taking a measure that builds

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17 Ethiopian Prime minister Dr Abiy Ahmed inauguration speech: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4yn_bxVJlw
national integration and a seed for national (Ethiopian) identity construction one of them is the establishment of prosperity party.

With more than a hundred political parties active today, Ethiopia has a party scene replete with groups that will need time to establish themselves and define their platforms (Temin & Badwaza, 2019: 150). The transformation of the EPRDF from a coalition to a single party is bringing political tensions over the balance between a pan-Ethiopian identity and the various national identities empowered by the ethnolinguistic structures created under Ethiopia’s federal institutions to a head (Mosley, 2020: 4)

However, Embedded within these foundational issues are concerns relating to regional borders; the status and chains of command for federal police and regional special forces; and the rights of people who reside outside their ethnic homelands in a climate where protecting minorities or settlers is becoming harder (Temin & Badwaza, 2019: 150-51). As both Amhara and Oromo nationalisms rose, Tigrayan nationalism both gained and lost moving into the transition period. The TPLF, the most influential actor in Ethiopian politics for 27 years, was now effectively sidelined with the change of government (Semir, 2019: 14). Amhara and Oromo activists and politicians had cooperated in order to sideline the TPLF, but soon failed to maintain the warmth of their relationship (Ibid: 14-15)
Chapter six

6 Challenge and Prospect of Ethnic Based Federalism in Ethiopian

6.1 Prospects of Ethnic based Federalism
The EPRDF’s state-building strategy is built is the recognition and institutionalization of ethnic identity with special emphasis given to the historically oppressed nations, nationalities, and peoples. Previously neglected or oppressed minorities have gained confidence in their own language and culture and have obtained their own administration (Aalen, 2006: 256, Erk, 2016: 7). Mulugeta & Feseha argues that, over the following decades, Ethiopia was transformed, achieving unprecedented economic development and constructing an innovative model of a multinational state that respects the rights of cultural identities (Mulugeta & Feseha, 2020: 2). Erik also argues the last decade in Ethiopia has been marked by unprecedented levels of economic growth, a lot of it the consequence of a state-driven development strategy and foreign direct investment (Erk, 2016: 3). The nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia exercise sovereignty by organizing their own state and local level councils to administer themselves and share federal power through their representatives organized under two federal chambers (Mulugeta & Feseha, 2020: 6). Relative to the past administration, the system was able to score success in the political, economic and socio-cultural area (Takele, 2019: 7). The economic growth achieved by the government is particularly remarkable even by international standards (Takele, 2019: 7).

6.1.1 Regional Autonomy and Self Determination
In principle, federalism is the system of decentralizing powers so that the federal and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent (Takele, 2019: 11). Based on the principle of self-administration, the FDRE constitution established a federal republic comprising nine regional states created based on a predominant ethnic group (Alem, 2003: 19). EPRDF introduced an ethnically based decentralized federal arrangement and officially allowed different political parties to compete and participate at both central and regional government levels (Takele, 2019: 11, Aalen, 2006: 246 ). This project was not only driven by faithfulness to its original doctrine of self-determination (Mulugeta & Feseha, 2020: 6). But also because of
political necessity as there was no way of bringing together all those nationalist movements who were fighting for self-determination for building a democratic Ethiopia (Ibid, 2020: 6).

A federal arrangement has the potential to mitigate conflict by granting ethnic groups cultural autonomy and a certain degree of control over their local governance (Kidane, 2001: 22). Kidane argues a genuine decentralization, the power to control their local affairs, which the Constitution grants regional governments, would enable minority ethnic groups to reduce the power the majority has over them (Kidane, 2001: 22). Some voices are critical to ethnic decentralization as an instrument of conflict management (Asnake, 2014: 591). As long as there is competition for control of the state’s resources, a constitutional clause giving every ethnic group the right to self-determination is likely to spur groups to come up with claims of their own administrative structure to have a greater share of the state’s resources (Ibid: 248). On ethiopian federation one of the issues relevant to economic self-determination, that is ownership of land and natural resources is excluded from the provision that deals with the right of self-determination and are included under a provision on the right to property in general, Art 40 of FDRE constitution. Tsegabirhan strongly argues, in post-1991 Ethiopian state EPRDF has created confidence that different nations and nationalities will be able to govern themselves and self-administration. However Merera, disagree with Tsegabirhans argument, he said that, EPRDF did not give an appropriate answer to the question of self administration those who raise the question.

However, some attribute the lack of genuine decentralization in the country to the government’s concern that allowing the regions to become too autonomous would encourage some regions to secede (Takele, 2019: 12). There are also economic, infrastructural, and personnel limitations in translating the principles of ethnic federalism into practice. Some of the smaller and peripheral regional-states simply lack the administrative capacity to manage their newly found competencies (Erk, 2016: 7).

18 Interview with Tsegabirhan Tadesse, Directorate Director of the Federalism and Government Relations at the Ministry of Peace, on April 1/2021, 3: 50PM /Office.

19 Interview with Prof. Merera Gudina, Chairman of Oromo Federalist Congress, on March 20/2021, 3: 00: PM /Office.
6.1.2 Language Pluralism

In Ethiopia, no single ethnic community in Ethiopia constitutes more than 50% of the country’s population. In other words, there are more than 80 languages in Ethiopia (Alem, 2003: 17). Hence, the crucial task of the new government was to design an institution that better recognizes and accommodates the country’s ethno linguistic and cultural diversity (Takele, 2019: 7). The administration system prior to 1991 had not given due recognition to the existential problem of the country, the multi-ethnic and linguistic nature of the nation (Ibid: 6). Nonetheless, cultural assimilation with Amharic as the language of instruction was the policy during the imperial, and to a lesser extent, the military periods (Alem, 2003: 17). Nevertheless, post-1991 Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism is characterized by cultural pluralism, including language pluralism (Alem, 2003: 17). Ephrem also argues EPRDF recognize language pluralism, he assure since the fall of the Derg regime, EPRDF unbolted the way for citizens to learn in their mother tongue. In my opinion, educating people in their mother tongue is one of the good things the TPLF / EPRDF government has done. In addition to that, the adoption of the federal system in Ethiopia as the country's political system has created awareness among the people that they can govern themselves

According to Aalen, the majority of the Ethiopian people have the chance to speak their own language in education and administration and are, at least in theory, able to take part in governmental affairs in their ethnic community like never before (Aalen, 2006: 256). Aalen identified that major attainment for people in their everyday life is that when they take a case to court they are able to follow the procedures in their own language (Ibid: 256). However, Assefa identified the federal education policy required states to promote the federal working language in schools, in some parts of the Oromia regional state this was largely seen as a continuation of the old regime and they resisted it (Assefa, 2019: 161).

6.2 Challenges of implementing real federalism in Ethiopia

Since its inception, Ethiopia's ethnic-federalism has been the subject of much debate among various political organizations in the country (Kidane, 2001: 22). The federal system has also shaped and transformed the nature of intergroup relations and tensions over the years (Assefa, 2019: 161). The fact that the disputed areas coincided with the administrative boundaries

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20 Interview with Ephrem Madebo, Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (Ezema), Strategic Advisor on Election Issues: on March 18/2021, 2:00: PM /Office.
between regional governments seem to have transformed the conflict between local communities to conflicts between regional states (Assefa, 2019: 161). Erik identified that, the challenges in translating the principles of ethnic federalism into practice do not only come from inter-ethnic politics (Erk, 2016: 7). Erik argues that, a geographic and demographic factors also preventing the full scale realization of the principles enshrined in the 1995 FDRE constitution (Ibid: 7). The recent (2017) Oromia- Ethio–Somali conflict is perhaps the worst example in which local political elites, the media, and police apparatus took sides in the conflict causing death and displacement (Assefa, 2019: 161). . to hundreds of thousands from both sides and threatening the peace and stability of the country (Assefa, 2019: 161). Ethiopia's adoption of ethnic federalism has exacerbated the problem of national identity due to the EPRDF’s mismanagement of national identity and the Tigray People's Liberation Front's (TPLF) greed for power21. Its supporters consider ethnic federalism as the solution for holding multi-ethnic Ethiopia together, but others also criticize it as a dangerous concept that will eventually disintegrate the country. In the time of interview with Merera Gudina, he said, since Ethiopia accepted ethnic-based federal systems as a system of government it has not effectively implemented them. The EPRDF has not even been able to implement the articles it has set out in the constitution to answer national questions. Even the TPLF regime did not answer questions about self-determination and identity22.

6.2.1 Inter-ethnic Ethnic-Conflict
Interethnic relations will always be among the most difficult issues in poly ethnic states (Ismagilova, 2004: 179). Since the mid-1990s, the EPRDF has somehow changed its rhetoric on the nationalities from the liberation of oppressed groups (Aalen, 2006: 259). The post-1991 regime in Ethiopia, despite its promise and claims to bring solutions, it has been less successful than expected in managing ethnic tensions in the country (Abbink, 2006: 390). Alemante argues that, as Ethiopia’s experience indicates, when the state deliberately uses ethnicity as a source of political identity, citizens who might not have been aware of their ethnicity will regroup under its banners purporting to be a distinct people (Alemante, 2003: 86). Such a paradoxically implemented federal system also contributed to the proliferation of nationalism of various sorts

21 Interview with Prof. Merera Gudina, Chairman of Oromo Federalist Congress, on March 20/2021, 3: 00: PM /Office.
22 Interview with Prof. Merera Gudina, Chairman of Oromo Federalist Congress, on March 20/2021, 3: 00: PM /Office.
(Semir, 2019: 4). Ethnic nationalist used the ethnically charged environment and federal structure to nurture ethnic sentiments (Semir, 2019: 4). Asnake noted out, Ethnic federalism/autonomy reifies and consolidates ethnic identity and provides incentives for ethnic entrepreneurs to engage in a politics of division (sectarianism) and magnification of grievances leading to recurrent violence (Asnake, 2014: 591). Additionally Merera said that, the TPLF has used its dominance of the federal system to divide and ethnic group. The regime also created a custodian government by setting up puppet governments for the so-called local governments\textsuperscript{23}.

The lack of genuine self-determination for the larger ethnic groups of the country due to the intervention of the ruling party in regional affairs may lead to ethnic conflicts (Aalen, 2006: 260). A report published by the Institute of Peace and Security Study, in Addis Ababa university elaborated that the federal system has intensified ethnic hostilities by eroding national unity, further augmenting lack of trust among ethnic groups and unleashing minority-majority tensions (Peace and Security Studies, 2020: 4). The Institute asserted that several inter and intra-ethnic conflicts have unfolded across and within regions since the adoption of the federal structure (Ibid: 4).

In Ethiopia, today, contending nationalisms exist in the face of institutional fragility and incoherence. The outcome is the proliferation of violent conflicts, with many examples across the country (Semir, 2019: 7). A closer look at the micro-level would reveal that many ethnic-based conflicts are driven by security dilemmas. Security dilemmas occur when one actor, fearing the potentially hostile behavior of another, initiates a power build-up to maintain its security (Semir, 2019: 9). On July 2021 Ethiopian election debate, Birhanu Nega said that, different regional states in Ethiopia have formed Special Forces to oppose each other, they have established media, they have created states and they are ready for war. In this regard, the current federal system in Ethiopia does not meet the expectations of this federalism\textsuperscript{24}.

Forces (Liyu Hayle) of the regional states whose constitutional status remains dubious are close to replacing the defense function (Assefa, 2019: 161). It should be noted that national defense is an exclusive mandate of the federal government (Assefa, 2019: 161). Ismagilova suggested that

\textsuperscript{23} Interview with Prof. Merera Gudina, Chairman of Oromo Federalist Congress, on March 20/2021, 3: 00: PM /Office.
\textsuperscript{24} Prof. Birhanu Nega, head of Ethiopian citizen for social justice party, election debate see, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SEoHEHqvY5w&t=559s
ethnic conflict is not the existence of primordial antagonisms among ethnic communities. However, Assefa argues that socioeconomic and political factors as competition for resources, inadequate state set-up, inappropriate governance, and deliberate mobilization of ethnicity to political ends to win a conflict (Ibid: 179). To the extreme, the EPRDF Government ought to show its political will to carry out a referendum on the ethnic federal system and its constitution if that is needed to end ethnic identity-driven conflict and political instability to realize the creation of an inclusive society (Takele, 2019: 11).

6.2.2 Dominant Party System and Revolutionary Democracy
Since the change of regime in 1991, Ethiopia has been undergoing a political transformation that is hoped to profoundly transform the Ethiopian state. The hope for Ethiopian democratic transition was publicly inaugurated with the accord of the London Conference of May 1991 (Merera, 2001: 8). Yet, during the whole period of the transition, the ruling party's main concern appears to be not the building of democratic institutions and their institutionalization (Ibid: 8).

According to Abbink, Ethiopia’s ethnic-federal, democracy is of course not a liberal parliamentary democracy as commonly accepted. It is rather centralist and vanguardist, under a ruling party (Abbink, 2011: 602). As a part of the legacy of the Marxist period of the liberation struggle, the Ethiopian people’s revolutionary democratic front (EPRDF) is working conferring to the principle of democratic centralism, where party officials at all levels are accountable to the hierarchy above (Aalen, 2006: 250). Asnake identify the oldest members of the EPRDF (TPLF and ANDM) were initially Marxist Leninist organizations and their chief instrument of the organization was democratic centralism (Asnake, 2014: 590). Ethnic politics often takes place, not within the formal institutions of the federal system, but within the country’s dominant political party, the EPRDF (Erk, 2016: 3).

EPRDF regime along with its ideology of “revolutionary democracy” and hegemonic control of power has also made multiparty democracy a farce (Assefa, 2019: 169). On the other hand, Merera identified, what has been undertaken in Ethiopia certainly amounts to political liberalization level, albeit serious contradictory moves, but falls short of democratization (Merera, 2001: 9). EPRDF uses the principle of democratic centralism and decisions made by the upper echelons of the organization are implemented with little local/regional variation (Asnake, 2014: 590). As a result, the party structure and its decision-making procedures
undermine the federal division of power and subordinate the state governments to the whims of the party (Assefa, 2019: 169). Moreover, the narrowing of the political space for democratic contestation and the control of all structures of the government from local to federal levels by the EPRDF and its affiliated parties (Asnake, 2014: 590).

Successful multi-ethnic federations often combine federalism with power sharing. However, twenty-five years’ experience in Ethiopia has resulted in a single dominant party that controls power at all levels and compromised the autonomy of the states while marginalizing the political opposition (Assefa, 2019: 168). On the other hand, Adem Farah, the current speaker of the house of federation assured that at election Debate on TPLF led government lead the country unconstitutionally. Adem stressed on “the federal system that the prosperity party intends to implement is very different from the unconstitutional guardianship federal system that has been in place for the past 27 years under the TPLF / EPRDF regime. One of my key informant prof. Merara also said that, TPLF created undemocratic federalism. The EPRDF was also a dictatorship. I have never argued that it was an honest federal system. According to Merera, EPRDF government has lost two important chances in the last three decades; either it did not bring about true democracy or create a political system that treats everyone equally.

Therefore, the long-lasting undemocratic government system in Ethiopia was not seen only as historical facts but also serves as a potential source of a force of inertia to challenge the upcoming realization of constitutionally promulgated democracy (Semir, 2019: 60). The first and prime challenge to Ethiopia’s on its path to democracy is the country’s authoritarian traditions.

6.2.3 The Representation Protection of Internal Minorities
From the foregoing, it is clear that the need to take into accounts the interests and rights of internal minorities is particularly important for a multi-ethnic federation (Yonatan & Beken, 2013: 34). Ethiopia is inhabited by dozens of peoples or ethnic groups, who use various languages, practice different religions, cherish and express diverse cultural traditions, and create a livelihood for themselves by undertaking a wide range of socio-economic activities (Takele, 2019: 11). Ethnic decentralization in Ethiopia was premised on the principle of matching of ethnic and administrative boundaries (Asnake, 2014: 592). According to Asnake, it led to the

See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LnwB3PbsCRM&t=228s
Interview with Prof. Merera Gudina, Chairman of Oromo Federalist Congress, on March 20/2021, 3: 00: PM /Office.
emergence of two categories of people in ethnically constituted self-administrative units such as ‘titular’ ethnic groups who are entitled to exercise self-administration in their home regions, and ‘non-titular’ groups dispersed settler/migrant minorities (Ibid: 592). In addition to titular and settler ethnic groups, the southern regions of the country also include small and isolated indigenous communities living deep in the rain forest (Erk, 2016: 7).

Internal minorities are scattered throughout the regional majorities, giving rise to a majority-minority tension (Yonatan & Beken, 2013: 35). According to Christophe Van der Beken, even though all regions have ethnically diverse populations, the constitutions of Oromia and Somali Regions do not mention specific ethnic groups other than the titular groups (ie the Oromo and Somali) (Beken, 2015: 158). The constitutions of the Afar, Tigray and Amhara Regions on the other hand do recognize, besides the dominant ethnic groups, other groups that have been empowered by the establishment of the region (Ibid: 159).

The major mechanism for the protection of indigenous internal minorities involves the creation of separate ethnic-based territorial administrations within which the indigenous internal minorities concerned can exercise self-government and other minority rights (Yonatan & Beken, 2013: 40). In this regard, the plurality electoral system used in all regions goes a long way in ensuring the representation of most indigenous internal minorities in the regional parliaments (Yonatan & Beken, 2013: 40). In case indigenous internal minorities are too small to control an electoral constituency, they are treated as minority nationalities and peoples (Yonatan & Beken, 2013: 40). Under the current federal system, the Amhara ethnic group living in Arsi is not represented in ‘Chaffee Oromia’ or the Ethiopian parliament. This is because the electoral system in Ethiopia does not comprise non-indigenous minorities living in other regions. He said that this is a deliberate act of TPLF/EPRDF.  

Present day Ethiopia is fronting polarize ethnic relation, as Erk enter-ethnic relations have become particularly polarised in some regional-states whose constitutions make ‘sons-of-the-soil’ and ‘homeland’ references (Erk, 2016: 7). This is complemented by a constitutional

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27 Interview with Ephrem Madebo, Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (Ezema), Strategic Advisor on Election Issues: on March 18/2021, 2:00: PM /Office.
instruction that each regional government must ensure the equitable representation of the different ethnic communities (Yonatan & Beken, 2013: 40)

6.2.4 Ethnic-Federalism and Risk of Disintegration
In 1995, the EPRDF government established a federal system with regional and local administrations drawn along ethno linguistic lines (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2020: 4). Through its governing practices, the EPRDF, and particularly the TPLF, has not done enough to make the Ethiopian state appear ethnically neutral (Aalen, 2006: 256). Those, encouraged ethnonational groups and their elites may, by focusing on the politics of difference, in the end, have independent nationhood as their objective (Assefa, 2019: 160). Erk noted out, the political system divides rather than unites people by creating mutual suspicion and instituted ethnic dynamics that could easily spiral out of control (Erk, 2016: 4). According to Tsegaberhan, one of my key informant said, the challenges to nation building since the implementation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has been the deficiency of putting into practice. He argues the major failure of Ethiopian federalism is lacks of interest of the regime in appropriately implement the constitutional rights of nation and nationalities question of self-administration28.

On the other hand, some understand ethnic federalism to be a malicious Tigrayan People Liberation Front (TPLF) tactic to plant divisions among ethnic groups, to the resultant effect of facilitating rule by the Tigrayan minority (Erk, 2016: 4). However, two dominant forces contest this governing structure: Ethno nationalist/centrifugal forces (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2020: 4). There are different competing claims for and against ethnic- based federalism in Ethiopia. Proponents of ethnic regionalization acclaim the recognition of group rights, seeing the creation of ethnic-based administrative entities as the only meaningful approach for defusing ethnic discontents (Desta & Ephrem, 2020: 44).

Ethno nationalists strongly support the (ethnic) federal structure and call for its effective implementation including genuine self-rule and fair representation at the federal level. Besides, those centripetal forces criticize the federal system for undermining the country’s unity (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2020: 4). The Ethiopian federal system by empowering ethnonational groups to self-rule and by providing resources and the media at their disposal may

28 Interview with Tsegaborhan Tadesse, Directorate Director of the Federalism and Government Relations at the Ministry of Peace, on April 1/2021, 3: 50PM /Office.
weaken common ties (Assefa, 2019: 160). Ethiopian federal system thus a high-risk strategy that may eventually bring about the country’s disintegration (Assefa, 2019: 160).

There are competing claims, for and against ethnic federalism. Proponents of ethnic regionalization acclaim the recognition of group rights, seeing the creation of ethnic-based administrative entities as the only meaningful approach for defusing ethnic discontents. In addition to that, Aalen argues factor that contributes to the undermining of the idea of overall Ethiopian citizenship is that under the regime of the EPRDF, the key to getting access to the resources of the central government is to acquire a separate ethnic identity and an ethnically defined administrative structure (Aalen, 2006: 256). According to Professor Birhanu Nega, head of Ethiopian citizen for social justice party said the following challenges of federalism Ethiopian facing now. In July 2021-election debate he said that:

*The reality in Ethiopia related to the implementation of a federal system is a paradox. The system creates a regional state but, the system did not create pillars of federalism like self-administration, regional self-administration has been controlling by a command from the center. He said Ethiopian federalism never tolerated diversity. Now day conflict is here and their federalism has resulted in the loss of many lives and property in different parts of the country. The Ethiopian federal system does not been able to create wealth equity. No region other than Addis Ababa has been able to meet its own budget needs* 29

Not only would this help tackle the big question of secession-proneness of ethnic federalism, but also it would bring in a richer understanding of how ethnic federalism works in a diverse country like Ethiopia (Erk, 2016: 4). Such an important question on whether ethnic federations are secession-prone cannot be resolved in light of a handful of formal institutional variables plucked from the Ethiopian constitution (Ibid: 4). Article 39 of the FDRE constitution of Ethiopia gives self-determination including up to secession. Desta & Ephrem strongly argues that secession would have not been devised as a means of solving conflicts rather it should be just to daunt such secessionist resentment in the first place(Desta & Ephrem, 2020: 44). Ethiopia’s ethnic regions generate continuing debate regarding their long-term effects on the country’s integrity.

29 Prof. Birhanu Nega, head of Ethiopian citizen for social justice party, election debate see, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SEoHEHqvY5w&t=559s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SEoHEHqvY5w&t=559s)
**Conclusion**

The post-1991 processes of state reconstruction and undertaking of institutional reforms in Ethiopia constitute a radical and multipurpose attempt of transforming political, economic, and social organizations in challenging settings of Ethiopia's multi-ethnic social system, severely underdeveloped economy, and the backdrop of undemocratic political traditions. According to international crisis group 2009 report Ethnic federalism celebrated by some as the panacea for holding multi-ethnic Ethiopia together, it is decried by others as a dangerous concept that will eventually dismember the country behind the controversy are contested definitions of citizenship and of what it means to be Ethiopian (International Crisis Group, 2009: 22).

As collected data of various sources has shown, in the modern Ethiopian state ethnicity becomes the sole lexicon of political discourse and, more dangerously for national unity, a readily accessible tool for ethnic entrepreneurs. During the derg period, Ethiopian politics indicated as the Ethiopian nationalities became the core of a renewed conception of the Ethiopian nation derived from the “national oppression thesis” defended by the TPLF rebellion during the struggle. After the downfall of derg The Ethiopian, people's revolutionary democratic front has proposed a new vision of Ethiopian identity where primordial identities can coexist with an imperial inherited Ethiopianness without being mutually exclusive. EPRDF has sought to destroy Ethiopian identity, build ethnic identity, and use ethnicity as a stepping-stone to stay in power. The current Ethiopian federation seen as composed of nations, nationalities, and peoples as defined above, which means that every citizen must belong to an ethnic group and define themselves along ethnic lines. Subsequently, the ethnic-based federalism of Ethiopia has not significant roles in the societal and construction national identity of the present Ethiopian state since implemented a federal system in Ethiopia the system has not been democratic ever.

Because of that, currently, Ethiopian federalism faces a different challenge such as the federal system has also shaped and transformed the nature of intergroup relations. As well as tensions over the years, the disputed areas coincided with the administrative boundaries between regional governments seem to have transformed the conflict between local communities into conflicts
between regional states. In the past three decades, the right of self-administration has not practically implemented except the incumbent government prosperity party gives recognition for sideman regional state. The 1995 FDRE is unique in granting sovereignty to the country’s nations and nationalities. Its position is also radical because it allows an absolute right for self-determination, up to secession, to Ethiopia’s more than 80 ethnic groups. This has raised the stakes in federal-regional disparities, and potentially increased the risk of conflict by allowing secession to be a negotiating chip in political disputes.

The incumbent government has a responsibility to balance Ethiopian and ethnic identity. It is necessary to develop national identity through consolidating democracy and giving the tangible right to self-administration. Accept and respect that the confusion of the past few years and the present problems has the limits of Ethiopia’s testing in ethnic federalism. To deliver an appropriate reaction for ethnic federalism has raised as many questions as it has answered, and that it has made Ethiopia a more fragmented, polarized, and conflict-plagued country.

The findings of this study also have some policy implications that require attention to the positive impacts of ethnic-based federalism on the construction of national identity: These include failure to exercise the constitutional right to self-determination of nations and nationalities; Proliferation of ethnic-based Political parties; the basis of party formation along ethnic lines; The federal structure centered on ethnic and language; lack of proper representation of minority whose live in outside their regional state, as well as the priority of group rights over individual rights.
Reference

Books


**Journals article**


Website document


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**PhD dissertation**


**Conference Papers, Working papers and Term papers**


**Report**

Legal Documents


Appendices

Appendix-A

List of key informant

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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of interviewee</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Academic rank</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Merera Gudina</td>
<td>Party Chairman</td>
<td>Oromo Federalist Congress</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>March 20/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ephrem Madebo</td>
<td>Electoral affairs strategic advisor</td>
<td>Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (Ezema)</td>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>March 18/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Asnake Kefale</td>
<td>Academician</td>
<td>Addis Ababa university</td>
<td>Associate professor</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>March 23/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Muleye Wolelaw</td>
<td>Team leader and late director of constitutional interpretation and identity affairs.</td>
<td>House of Federation</td>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>March 26/2021</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tsegabirhan Tadesse</td>
<td>Director of the Federalism and Government</td>
<td>FDRE Ministry of peace</td>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>April 1/2021</td>
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Appendix –B
Guiding questions for Semi-structured Interview

I Tewodros Hailu Masters's student at Addis Ababa University, kindly request you to prepare or inscribe your answer for the following interview questions. The purpose of this interview guide is to gather information to conduct research for the partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in political science (comparative).

These interview questions are prepared for the purpose of gathering information for my Master's thesis entitled “state structure and the construction of national identity pre-and post-1991 Ethiopia. Information that you will provide is intended to serve for the identification of the impacts of ethnic-based federalism on the construction of national identity after Ethiopia has implemented ethnic-based federalism, for academic purposes only. I confirm that all data given by you will be treated confidentially.

Open-ended questions

1. Can we identify one holistic identity in a multi-national country?
2. How do you explain the role of ethnicity for national identity construction in post-1991 Ethiopia?
3. Do you think the rise of ethnic nationalism influencing the construction of Ethiopian identity?
4. What are the impacts of ethnic-based federalism on the construction of national identity in the Ethiopian Federation?
5. What are the current challenges to create some strong feelings of Ethiopianism (Ethiopian nationalism)?
6. Do you think national identity and ethnic identity compatible with each other in Ethiopia? How?
7. Do you believe that ethnic-based federalism avoids inter-ethnic conflict in Ethiopia? If yes, how?
Do you think the implementation of ethnic-based federalism is a hindrance to nation-building in Ethiopia?

What are the challenges of the proliferation of ethnic-based political parties for the construction of Ethiopian identity?

What are the prospects of the proliferation of ethnic-based political parties for the construction of Ethiopian identity?

Which political system (ethnic or civic based) is suitable for the construction of national identity? How?

What are the challenges of ethnic-based federalism since Ethiopia adopted a federal system of government?

What are the major prospects of ethnic-based federalism since Ethiopia adopted a federal system of government?

References


