Institutional Arrangement of the FDRE Ministry of National Defense in the Realization of Modern Education and Training: the Case of Training Main Department

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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgements</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Acronyms</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter One

1. Background of the study
   1.1. Statement of the Problem
   1.1.2. Research Questions
   1.1.3. Assumption

2. Objectives
   2.1. General Objective
   2.2. Specific Objectives

3. Delimitation of the Study
   3. Limitations of the Study

4. Working Definitions

5. Significance of the Study

6. Organization of the Study

## Chapter Two

2.1. The theoretical basis of institutional arrangement
   2.1.1. What is Institution?
   2.1.2. Essence of Institutional Arrangement

2.2. The Nature of Defence forces
   2.2.1. The Definition of Defence forces
   2.2.2. Elements of the defence forces capability
   2.2.3. The role of Defence forces

2.3. Historical overview of the Ethiopian armed forces
   2.3.1. The Ethiopian military tradition
   2.3.2. Modernizing the Ethiopian Army: Early initiatives

2.4. The introduction of modern education and the birth of military academy
2.4.1. The introduction of modern education ................................................. 23
2.4.1 The establishment of Genet Military Training School (1934) .................... 23
2.5. Academy and military training during the Dergue regime (1974-1991) ........ 28
2.5.1. Conditions of the Ministry of Defence during the Dergue Regime .......... 28
2.5.2. Education and Training ................................................................. 29
   2.5.2.1. Regular Forces ........................................................................ 29
   2.5.2.2. Foreign Military Assistance .................................................. 31
2.6. Comparison on Recruitment and Training during the Imperial and the Military Regime. ........................................................................................................ 32
2.7. Post-1991 Ethiopia’s Defence Forces ......................................................... 36
   2.7.1. Evolution from Liberation Armies to National Army ......................... 37
   2.7.2. Military Leadership and Organizational Structure .............................. 38
Chapter-Three: Methodology of the Study ....................................................... 42
   3.1. Introduction ....................................................................................... 42
   3.2. Research Framework Design ............................................................. 42
   3.3. Study Area Description ...................................................................... 43
   3.4. Data Sources ..................................................................................... 43
   3.5. Data Collection Instruments ................................................................ 44
   3.6. Research Procedures ......................................................................... 44
   3.7. Data Analysis and Interpretation ......................................................... 44
   3.8. Ethical Considerations ........................................................................ 45
Chapter-Four: Data presentation, Discussion, Results and Analysis .................. 46
   4.1. Introduction ....................................................................................... 46
   4.2. Objective, Goal, Mission, Vision and Mandate of the TMD .................. 48
      4.2.1. The Mission of the TMD ............................................................. 49
      4.2.2. Vision of the TMD .................................................................... 50
      4.2.3. Mandate of the TMD ................................................................ 50
   4.3. Main Training Department Structure .................................................... 50
      4.3.1. Organizational Structure of the TMD ......................................... 50
      4.3.2. Decentralization Structure of the TMD ...................................... 52
      4.3.3. The Relationships of the Training Centers and Colleges with the TMD 53
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Acronyms

ACA - Army Combined Academy
BEEE - British Military Mission to Ethiopia
EAF - Ethiopia Air Force
EDCSC - Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff College
ENDF - Ethiopian National Defense Forces
EPRDF - Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front
FDERE - Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
IBG - Imperial Body Guard
IISS - International Institute for Strategic Study
JMSC - Joint Military Staff college
MOD - Ministry of Defense
MOND - Ministry of National Defense
MONDAS - Ministry of National Defense Archival Source
MOI - Ministry of Information
MGHAMA - Major General Hayelom Araya Military Academy
MAAG - Military Assistance and Advisory Group
NCOs - Non Commissioned Officers
NIE - New Institutional Economics
TGE - Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TMD - Training Main Department
UNDP - United Nation Development Program
WB - World Bank
SIPRI - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract

This thesis examines the institutional arrangement of the FDRE’s Ministry of National Defense, in its application of modern education and training. It takes the case of training of the Main Department. The thesis has mainly focused on revealing gaps in its subdepartments, sections structurally arranged within the main office of TMD, and the military training centers and colleges vis-à-vis the mission stated as per in the FDRE constitution the ministry of national defense. It largely deals with the TMD mission in its modernizing and qualifying members of the Ethiopian defense forces. The review of related literature, key informant interview as well as documentary sources pertaining to the institutional arrangement of the TMD. These are the major sources of data used in this thesis qualitative analysis employed, and the analysis final shows the multifaceted, nature of the subject. The thesis has come up with both strong and weak points of the TMD. Whereas the TMD’s contributes, devotions and dedications to its mission stands out as the high point of its strength; the thesis has also not failed to identify the TMD’s weak points in order to findings of thesis contribute towards its future trajectory like of success in its mission the TMD has played key role in the training and educating members of the defense forces in its various training centers and colleges: There is no doubt this is a success story. However the fact on the ground remained that the institutional arrangement of the TMD still awaits further improvement above all to compete with capacity improvement and cope up with the changes in technology through the March of time. This thesis has tried its level best by analyzing concluding and recommending to about what should be done from now and on.
Chapter-One
1.1 Background of the study

Education is a basic pre-requisite for social, economic and political development of any society. Education is furthermore, a cornerstone for development (World Bank, 1998; p.1).

The purpose of construction schools, colleges and Academic institutions for the army is to provide them to achieve basic knowledge and skills which could enable them to be flexible, creative, and adaptable to fast environmental changes and technological development; help them to the maximum use of arms and better communicate with other concerned bodies. Furthermore, it enables them to carry out their day to day activities efficiently and effectively (MoND, 2002; p.6).

In much the same vein, to cope up with changes in the area of military science; and, to be part of the defense force of the global village in safeguarding humanity and nature, the issue of education for all has been an area of global concern in the modern education system. The 21st century defense force of any country is also becoming modern and is still modernized in its capacity to deal with the existing modern technology.

Like wise, the Ethiopian National Defense Force has to be in part with the change or development and working on regulating its forces and updating its capacity to the standard. This is possible only through educating its personnel. Thus, in order to achieve its objective the Ministry of Defense has established different defense universities, colleges and academic institutions for the army.

Designing objectives are fundamental in every organization. In the case of the Officers Academy, the vision, mission, and values of National Defence are fundamental as that sources for the mission and objectives of the national defence Academy Colleges and Institutions.

The Officers Academy is a military, educational and training institution. As such, it is an organization for producing an increasing number of Officers that graduate as leadership after attending three years of College Military Education and training. The objectives of the Officers
Academy are thus, very basic and fundamental. These objectives represent the overall intended learning and training outcomes.

The objectives of the education and training programmes of the Military Academies are, among other things, the bases in many ways. They serve to evaluate and determine the viability of the organizational structure proposed; and the efficiency as well as effectiveness management functions, processes and operations embodied. Therefore, the research will focus on the institutional arrangement of Training Main Department (TMD) in the process of realizing of Modern Education for the army.

1.1.1. Statement of the Problem

Problem Description

The Training Main Department of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Ministry of Defense has the mandate, among other things, to inculcate modern education by and through having full-fledged institutional set up. Ironically, its institutional arrangement have some pitfalls to translate the modern education into action.

The indicative pitfalls in the institutional arrangement of the Ministry of National Defense of Ethiopia in its endeavor of the realization of modern education are the following:

- There are gaps in the functional linkage to have updated information which enables it to take proactive and/or reactive measures in the realization of modern education;
- That Military science calls for interdisciplinary composition, practically the Ministry has currently limitations with respect to the composition of its human resources.

1.1.2. Research Questions

- Has the Training Main Department of Ministry of National Defense full-fledged institutional set up in the realization of modern education?
- Does the Training Main Department have educational training policy and strategy?
- How is the Training Main Department organized? And what looks like its institutional arrangement?
Have the Training Main Department clear objectives, goals Mission and Mandate in realizing of modern education for the army?

1.1.3. Assumption

The assumption of the researcher is, if there is strong and well institutional arrangement in TMD there may enhance modern education and training for the army and this will indicate that the TMD will realize the vision of MOND (i.e. it will realize the responsibility and protection of the sovereignty of the country).

1.2. Objectives

1.2.1. General Objective

➢ To exponnor the institutional arrangement of the Training Main Department of Ministry of National Defense in the realization of Modern Education.

1.2.2. Specific Objectives

• To assess the functional linkage of the Training Main Department of Ministry of National Defense;
• To examine the viability of the institutional arrangement of the Training Main Department of Ministry of National Defense;
• To indicate all gaps and impacts of the problem and provide recommendations to the decision making;
• To contribute in support of the Training Main Department by providing possible solutions.

1.3. Delimitation of the Study

The Ministry of National Defense of Ethiopia has a wide range of institutional arrangements with different missions to be achieved. The scope of the research, however, due to time and budget constraints, is limited to the post 1991 institutional arrangement of the Main Office of the Ministry of National Defense of Ethiopia in the realization of modern education.

1.4. Limitations of the Study

Sources of materials were critical issue for my study, because of no full- fledged research has so far been done in this area. Moreover, primary data were collected using a key informant
interview schedule. Though the respondents were selected through careful screening of their institutional responsibilities and access to reasonable and banded information, the inherent weakness of the instrument may rarely give room for the reflection of personal bids of key informations.

1.5. Working Definitions

- **Organization of the National Defence Forces**

- **Recruitment to the MoND**
  ✔ The Ministry recruits persons who are fit and willing for Military services. The Recruitment involves a fair representation of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples.

- **Military Training**
  ✔ It refers to the training offered by the Ministry of Defence for the new recruited persons as well as the members. That is, every member of the Defence forces shall receive basic military training before going into service: members of the Defence Forces on active duty shall be trained in diverse skills, as necessary considering their individual disposition and competence. Moreover, anyone from among the ranks of the Defence Forces fulfilling the criteria to be issued by the Ministry shall receive training that qualifies him for Officer Service.

- **Vision**
  ✔ Helps to see what the Training Main Department working towards

- **Mission**
  ✔ The given basic purpose for the Ministry of National Defence and Training Main Department

- **Mandate**
  ✔ A mandate is clear activities that give for each department under Training Main Department it emanates from the Ministry of Defence proclamation, Regulations, and Rules.
• **Objectives**
  ✓ Objective is a very specific statement of what is to be done to accomplish the mission and vision.

• **Institutional Arrangement**
  ✓ An appropriate institutional structure both horizontal and vertical coordination among different layers in the Training Main Department.

• **Higher Military Institutions:**
  ✓ A center of education which are responsible to train soldiers in several military profession into higher skill levels.

• **Platoon:**
  ✓ Tactical and administrative infantry grouping of three or more sections or squads (i.e. about 30 men)
  ✓ (b) Tactical and administrative armored grouping of three or more thanks or armored reconnaissance vehicles

• **Modern Army:**
  ✓ Building a capable and modern national defense forces which is absolutely loyal to the constitution and constitutional order of the FDRE. 7

• **Strategic leadership:**
  ✓ Military leader who has the mandate in providing the vision and direction of the institution for the growth and success of the organization. In other words, such leaderships set the vision and goals for an entire organization.

• **Operational leadership:**
  ✓ At such leadership level, the leaders have the responsibility for Man slating tragic objectives which set by strategic leadership into a series of operational objectives within a specific operation entity, combination of entities, or across a geographic region.
- Higher-Tactical leadership:
  ✓ These levels of leadership are focused almost exclusively on achieving specific tangible objectives.
- Staff:
  ✓ It refers to body of officials without commissional authority appointed to assist a commanding officer, the parts of any at my concerned with administrative matters, planning etc

1.6. Significance of the Study
The Ministry of National Defense envisions guaranteed peace and protected and democratic constitutional political order for the prosperity and well-being of Ethiopians by building armed forces that have the deterrent capabilities and the ability to assure speed and effective victory in the event of actual wars through rigorous education and advanced training in its schools, academics and colleges. For this very reason, it is a pressing need for the Training Main Department of Ministry of National Defense to deep entrench an institutional arrangement that is capable of inculcating modern education and training which in turn realizes its vision.

Under the FDRE’s Constitution the National Defence has the mandate, *inter Alias*, to protect the sovereignty of the country and carry out any responsibilities as may be assigned to them under any state of emergency declared in accordance with the constitution. To realize this mandate, it is overt that modern education plays instrumental role. This, being the case, the research on the institutional arrangement of the Training Main Department of Ministry of National Defence in the realization of modern education in turn indicates the success or the failure of the policy direction in the FDER Constitution. Moreover, to the best knowledge of the researcher, no full-fledged research has so far been done in this area. Thus, I hope it will provide some ground for future researchers in the area.
1.7. Organization of the Study

The thesis is organized into five chapters. The first chapter deals with the background, statement of the problem, objective of the study, significance, scope & limitation of the study, and these research methodology used in the course of the thesis preparation. The second chapter deals with revision of conceptual as well as empirical literature pertinent to the objectives of the study. Chapter three exclusively deals with the research methodology pursued. Chapter four presents major analysis of findings and discussions. Finally, the summary, conclusion and recommendations are presented in chapter five.
CHAPTER TWO

2.1. The theoretical basis of institutional arrangement

2.1.1. What is Institution?

Institutions are defined and conceptualized by different scholars in different ways. According to (North, 1995: 23), institutions are defined as ‘humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’. They are the ‘rules of the game’ in a society, the rules that facilitate human interaction and societal life. Consequently, institutional development may be seen as the processes by which institutions evolve and perish, i.e. ongoing endigenous and autonomous processes in society. Ever since this planet has been populated by humans, they have made arrangements for governing their lives. These arrangements are often referred to as ‘institutions’. They may be formal arrangements, such as legal systems and property rights, or informal arrangements, like moral standards. In some cases, they take the form of implicit world views or mental maps, i.e. cognitive frameworks for looking at the world around you. These arrangements or institutions operate at different levels, ranging from an international level (such as trade arrangements) to community and individual levels (for instance, the values that determine the way in which people interact with each other). (Gant, 1993: 18) defines institutions as follows:

“*Institutions are the forms in which people organize their affairs in relations with each other. An institution is a system of action, system of action comprehends the structures and mechanisms which provide the capacity and support for action in the form of agencies or organizations. Bureaus or departments are institutions of this kind, as schools, prisons, hospitals and banks. Systems of action also comprehend processes and delivery instruments by which specified tasks are executed or by which categories of functions are supported or controlled.*”

As it is can be observed from the above quotation, institutions include organizations, delivery system, accepted social norms and behaviors. Further more, (Gant, 1993:19) asserts that an institution as a system of action should possess certain indispensable qualities:
First of all the system of the institution, must have the capability to produce or deliver the product or perform the functions for which it was created; the institution must be effective in accomplishing its purpose;

Secondly, the institution whether as agency or process or convention, must be accepted by the society and environment of its location. The institution must represent the way in which people, as individuals and in groups wish to be served and work with or relate to one another. The institution must therefore have value and meaning for those people if it is to serve in a fully effective and productive way;

Thirdly, the institution must be able to survive because it is adequately supported with the necessary, financial, personal, and political capability to adopt itself and its program to changing and evolving conditions and situations, including the ability to learn from its own experience and correct its mistakes.

If an institution is lacking any of the three aforementioned qualities, definitely the institution fails. Thus, institutionalization, the process by which system of action acquire public acceptance, adequate financial and qualified manpower, becomes indispensable to effectively achieve the desired development goals and objective (Rondinelli, 1997; Sharp, 1998; Gant, 1993).

Institutions are created and grow in different ways. For instance, the traditional institutions are born out of customs and habits of the society and gradually become conventional rules to society. Authorities or governments can establish institution by entrusting them with legal and administrative powers based on their political system (North, 1995; Rondinelli 1993; Sharp; Gant, 1993).

Institutions are defined as the "rules" in any kind of social structure, i.e. the laws, regulations and their enforcement, agreements and procedures (Uphoff, 1986; Israel, 1987; de Capitani and North, 1994). In other words, the word “institution” has been used to mean different things, different people but today it is a full-fledged discipline in economics (called neo institutional economics) and also organizational psychology and administration (Institutional management).

It is a discipline that combines politics; law, psychology, public administration etc, explain
why certain decisions are made and impact of the same in the organization. Under neo institutional economics, this body of knowledge, this essentially complements neo classical theories of the firm, originates from the work of (Commons, 1931: p.48) who defined institutions as a “collective action in control, liberation and expansion of individual action “ collective action covers areas like customs, law and procedures.

The main objective of collective action is that of less or greater control of the acts of individuals which result in either economic loss or gain in the process of economic exchange. Control is about prohibitions of certain acts in such a way that control of one person leads to liberty of the other gains. For example when the state bodies make law and enforce the result is control in which case some gain and others loose in economic sense. According to common these institutions establish relation of rights, duties, no rights, and no duties which influence economic behaviors of individuals. (Later, Coarse, 1937: p.15) introduced the concept of transaction costs. That is any rational economic man will only make a decision to invest after weighing both internal and external transaction costs.

During the 1960s and 1970s the call for a rigorous application and analysis of institutions in economic decision making resulted into New Institutional Economics (NIE) with two main strands. That is institutional environment and arrangement (Davis and North, 1971), which covers rule structure, regulatory mechanism and enforcement. Since then various researchers and scholars have explored the institutional phenomena including the costs of enforcing contracts (Williams, 1985: p.118) and how courts of law provide negatives incentives to producers (Galanter, 1981: p.93). Others are on the influence of norms, customs, and laws on production (Hart and Moore, 1990, Ellickson, 1991).

The most recent influence on New Institutional Economics is that from the work of (North 1995: p.34) who defined institutions “as the rules of the game” in a society or more formally are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. .. The constraints determine the transaction and transformation (production) costs that make up total costs in economic activity. The major role of institutions in society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction “. (Klein, 1998: p.5) elaborates
further that institutions could be formal explicit rules, contracts, laws, and rights (institutional arrangements) or informal in the sense of social conventions that are not designed by anybody. According to (Formichev, 2000: p.2), institutions are constraints that human beings impose on human interaction. They provide incentives as well as constraint to own and use assets, income etc. Incentives include rights while constraints include both what individuals are prohibited from doing and under what conditions. They define and limit the set of choices available for individuals in economics production and exchange. Therefore, institutions are costs minimizing arrangement and the basic function is to maximize gains where different actors interact.

2.1.2. Essence of Institutional Arrangement

Institutional arrangements bring and bind organizations together for a certain common goal. Government and non government organizations have to work together for social goal. By taking on board the market modification argument, developed by (Weisbrod, 1986: p.24) a three sector delivery model scenario (private, public, and voluntary) as an alternative for purely service provision. This model is seen as important step towards addressing the problems of both public and private failures to provide public goods and services (Weisbrod, 1986: p.69).

It is important, on the other hand, to realize that any development goal can not be achieved by the public sector alone because development has a wider dimension and concerns and different sectors too. In this regard, the private sector and community based organizations do have significant contributions to development. Consequently, efficacy of institutional arrangement and integrated efforts of all actors involved in development process call for trust, loyalty, secure legal system, efficient and competent bureaucracy staffed with well motivated and trained personnel. In addition to easing burdens in resources and skill requirements, institutional relation will reduce the risks involved in development process (Tegegn, 1999; North, 1995; Manuel, 1997).

According to (Rondinelli, 1993: p.13), Institution building or arrangement is concerned not only with strengthening the administrative capacity of individual organization but also with
seeking cooperative relationships among them. Thus institutional approach to development becomes imperative.

(Gant, 1993: p.9) has asserted the need for capacity for development as a fundamental condition for executing any development activity. He puts “Capacity, in the private and the public sectors, and, consists of the methods and systems and activities by which development policies, projects, and programs are carried out to accomplish the specific goals of development, goals which are articulated for a particular period of time and place.” The capacity for development involves the organizations and agencies, the institutions both private and public, to sustain and support the several process of development. The capacity for development includes the will of the people, and their preparedness as individuals. Development then and the promise therefore can be measured in terms of the comparative excellence of the relevant process that exists in the social, economic, and political institutions. Process and capacity which are effective and responsive should take people of a country are the centre of the development interest (Gant, 1993: p.9).

In the above argument, it is noted the need for the development of capacity that should exist in the social, political, and economics including both private and public sectors. Thus the capacity for development becomes a prerequisite for the commencement and achievement of effective development goals and programs (UNDP, 2000; Rondinelli, 1993; Meheret, 1998; World Bank, 1999).

More important, one has to recognize that a competent agency must have qualified staff and adequately trained personnel. The assurance of such a staff entails the quality of personnel administration, including supporting educational and training institutions, adequate remuneration system, public esteem and status. The staff must have specialized qualifications to perform the tasks with understanding and motivation. After all, motivation and capability of the staff lay foundation for the success of development objectives. As such, the availability and full utilization of highly trained and motivated staff are the crucial factors of success and the first point of concern in any institution building process (World Bank, 1997; Gant, 1005; UNDP, 2000).
Among other things, institution building process requires the development of well educated and trained people with out which an attempt for development becomes futile. It has to be noted that institutional and administrative capacity building is a key to development whose major component is the human resource that should get the great emphasis.

In general, institutional arrangements bind organizations together towards a certain common goal. In the context of this study, the training main department and its institutional setup have to work together for realization of modern education to the armed forces. Therefore, throughout the study, the term “institution” will only be used to refer to the mandate, policies, laws, procedures, and guidelines used in setting and managing the organizational setups of the Training main department.

Institutional arrangements are sets of mandate, polices, laws, procedures, regulations, and guidelines that establish partnership or setups of different department, military training centers and colleges under training main department in the realization of modern education for the armed forces.

2.2. The Nature of Defence forces

The rather widely accepted principle of realist approach on national security advances the fact that military power lies at the national security of states. It plays undoubtedly vital roles in the pursuit of national security, and protecting the state from outside threats. This section will discuss what military power is, and what elements are included in the military capability.

2.2.1. The Definition of Defence forces

National power is viewed as the general capability of a state to influence the policy and behavior of its potential as well as actual adversary states (Jordan, 1993: p.26). National power, therefore “determines the outcome of international politics, and therefore states seek to maximize the power available to them” (Sheehan, 2006: p.12). It encompasses many attributes such as economic, diplomatic, cultural and ideological as well as military. But, military power, as the “capacity to use violence for the protection, enforcement or extension of authority,
remains an instrument with which no state has yet found it possible completely to dispense” (Howard, 1970: p.46).

According to Realism military power and national securities of states are inseparable being the first is considered as means while the latter is an end. Military power, with the capacity to use force for the protection and enforcement of authority of states, is the basic and principal instrument to meet the national security of states through either deterrence or defence vis-à-vis external threats. Here what should be bare in mind is that military power results from defence forces. Defence forces (different units like ground force and air force units) are “instruments for generating military power” (Knorr, 1970: p.50).

Military power (national defence forces) is therefore ultimately the power to “destroy and kill, or occupy and control, and hence to coerce. In the international system, military power.... is a relation among states that permits one government to induce another to behave in a way which the latter would not have chosen freely” (Knorr, 1970: p.50).

2.2.2. Elements of the defence forces capability

The following nine elements which “all add up to military capability or the product of building capable defence forces” (Arlinghaus, 1984: p.6):

1. **Size and structure of the defence forces**: This involves the questions of how a standing national defence forces and trained reserve forces are; how the national defence forces is structured (army, air force) and equipped. These are the basic elements to be considered in assessing the level of defence forces capability (Jordan, 1993: p.27). The size of states national defence forces “plays a decisive role in military engagement ... [and] dose offer an advantage” (Barrows, 1985: p.114).

2. **Firepower**: This involves what the quality and quantity of arms are at the disposal of the defence forces. It also involves what the potential of these arms are in terms of range, accuracy, lethality, survivability and reliability. In fact, firepower provides destructive force because it is essential in defeating the enemy’s ability and will to fight. (Jordan, 1993: p.28).
3. **Logistics supply and maintenance**: Given the fact that defence forces carry “so much equipment with them and must be re-supplied ....to remain in action for more than a few days” (Jordan, 1993: p.27), efficient system of supply area mandatory. Defence forces can not sustain without well developed logistics system of supplying, repairing, calibrating, and replacing their equipment. It is more than any other criterion “distinguishes greater from lesser capabilities” (Barrows, 1985: p.11).

4. **Mobility**: It involves the locations of units and weapons systems, the ability to quickly move troops, equipment and supplies to strategically and tactical important locations (Jordan, 1993). Mobility “in combat is....considerably more demanding than simply delivering troops to a new location” (Barrows, 1985: p.113).

5. **Manpower quality**: Man power quality includes the skills, training, military leadership and doctrine and the moral aspect of the defence force. The training and skills aspect assess the level of training of both forces in being and reserve units, the proficiency of soldiers in employing their weapons under varying conditions, and the skills of forces in combined operations. The military leadership and doctrine aspects on the other hand evaluate the effectiveness of commanders in chain of command through which orders are issued and carried out, and the nature and quality of the doctrines of force and military engagement respectively. The moral aspect, which involves the level of units moral, fighting spirit, and popular support for the employment of force in various contexts of the army, is absolutely vital to success in combat (Jordan, 1993: p.27).

6. **Technology in terms of Command, Control and Communication**: This addresses the issue of “technological capability of existing weapons systems and command, control and communications” (Jordan, 1993: p.27).

7. **Intelligence effectiveness**: Effective “intelligence has an unambiguous role understanding the enemy” (Herman, 1996: p.145). Indeed” there is probably no single capability more valuable to a state to a given course of action” (Chuter, 2000: p.73). So, intelligence is more fundamental to develop the defense forces of a state by providing accurate information and assessments, particularly about the views and likely actions of external threats.
8. National willingness to employ force: This includes the value of national leadership of state and the preparedness of the population to “sustain the domestic deprivation (conscription, rationing of various types, etc) that would result from sustained, large scale wartime activities” (Jordan, 1993: p.28).

9. Foreign military alliance and assistance: This involves the “status of alliances that can change opposing force ratios significant... [And] the quality of alliance commitments under various conditions” (Jordan, 1993: p.27), in terms of military units, armaments, and trainings likely to made available for armed forces of the state.

2.2.3. The role of Defence forces

States basically rely on their military capability against their external threats which are basically military and political in nature. Defence forces, with their capability, play their pivotal roles of ensuring the national security objectives of states.

In the assessment of national security threat, it has been stated that “the military element of the overall security of a state is usually the most important criterion” (SIPRI, 1977: p.61). It has also been argued that the national security of “each state can only be guaranteed by the state itself and that this means the acquisition and maintenance of military power” (Orwa, 1984: p.208). Indeed, the military plays four vital roles in the pursuit of national security. First, it is a “mark of national sovereignty” Arlinghaus (1984, p.5). Second, it is “charged with external security, protecting the nation from outside threats to its territory and interests” Arlinghaus (1984, p.5). Third, it “maintain internal security...Finally, it engages in ‘nation-building’...activities” (Arlinghaus, 1984: p.5).

Accordingly, the first major function of military capability vis-à-vis external threats is deterrence. The most general definition of deterrence is “the use of threats to induce an opponent to act in desirable act” Krause (1999, p.121). Essentially, the objective of deterrence is “discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for [enemy] a prospect of cost and risk outweighing [its] prospective gain” (Snyder, 1975: p.3). (Jordan, 1993:29) made clear the deterrence role of military capability as it prevent “others from initiating an action
that threatens a particular interest”. In other words, deterrence is a “preventive strategy designed to avoid…war or aggression” (Krause, 1999: p.121). Thus deterrence reduces the probability of enemy military attacks, by posing for the enemy a sufficiently likely prospect that it will suffer a net loss as a result of the attack.

Secondly, the capability of defence forces has the role of defence that means “reducing…prospective costs and risks in the event that deterrence fails” (Snyder, 1975: p.3). Capable defence forces “enables a state to reduce the potential damage that would be caused by an attack, and prevents the enemy from making those aims on which [it] reckoned in waging the war” (Jordan, 1993: p.29).

Third, the defence forces of a state can be employed to compel an adversary to give up courses of actions already undertaken against the national security of the state. Compliance is a “strategy for forcing others to bend one’s will” (Krause, 1999: p.121). The means of compulsion is the direct application of defence forces, and its objective is to “hurt the adversary to the degree that it determines that the further pursuit of its course of action would incur increasing costs incommensurate with any possible gain” (Krause, 1999: p.30).

Forth, military power has the intervention role vis-à-vis a hostile or adversary state. Military power can be made intervene in the internal affairs of potential or actual adversary state when a change in its government or policy is “deemed threatening to important national interests [and] to stabilize a preferred regime against rebels or insurgents to overcome a hostile regime” (Krause, 1999: p.30).

So, in the anarchical, uncertain and dangerous world system, states should rely upon “their own strength, particularly military strength, to maintain international peace and their own security....

Defence forces of a state can accomplish their pivotal roles of securing and protecting the national security of the state from external military and political threats if and only if it is capable. In the previous sections it has been argued that in the anarchic environment all states maintain “military capabilities. In war times there is a clear military advantage gained from
having larger armed forces and superior weapons systems or military doctrine” (Sheehan, 2006: p.8). Accordingly, to achieve the state’s military capability through making all elements of military capability possible and real, there are determinant factors with challenges or opportunities for the Defence forces to assume the level of capability. (Knorr, 1970: p.22) identified three factors as challenges and opportunities for the Defence forces of the state to have the capability level. These factors are: the first determinant factor is the military power potentials, which involves “all resources of being mobilized for the establishment of military force” (Knorr, 1970: p.51). Military power potential includes manpower, fighting equipments and principles and doctrine of the Defence forces.

The second determinant factor which challenges the Defence forces to have the level of capability is the political “value placed on military power by [the state], and hence the proportion of potential actually transformed into military strength” (Knorr, 1970: p.51).

The third challenge to military power of assuming level of capability is the skill with which resources are cast into ready military strength and with which the use of the resulting military power is directed politically as well as militarily (Knorr, 1970: p.51).

Thus, the real determinant factors of military power in assuming the level of capability are the availability of resources (human and material), political willingness to build strong military power, and skills utilize the available resources and political willingness to capable Defence forces for the national security purposes.

2.3. Historical overview of the Ethiopian armed forces

2.3.1. The Ethiopian military tradition

Ethiopian history is mostly a history of wars and conflicts. Ethiopia is an ancient country and her military culture is inherited from the ancient past. Ethiopians of the Axumite Empire were sailors and owners of the red sea port of Adulis. Their trade and culture was not limited to the Mediterranean alone but extended to India and, the Far East. Axumites utilized their fleets on the Red sea both for trade and war purpose (Article on the remembering of the Harar Military Academy, 2009: p.6).
The most commonly used individual weapon then was the spear, the sword, shield, bow and arrow were also used for combat purposes Pankhurst (1955, p.225). Rifles and gunpowder employing artillery were for the first time seen in Ethiopian battlefield during the period of 1527-1543. This was a period of civil and religious wars, and these weapons have played a decisive role of achieving victory. It can be said that an understanding was for the first time reached during these civil wars regarding the combat effectiveness of organized and trained troops. The heroic leader of Adan, Ahmed Ibin Iberahim Al-Ghazi, popularly known at home as Mohammed Giragne, was able to conquer the army of Emperor Liben Dingel an army equipped with spears, bows, and arrows. This was made possible not through his bravery and wise leadership alone, but also through the engagement of trained troops from Turkey, Egypt, Persia and Arabia (Article on the remembering of the Harar Military Academy, 2009., p.6).

It was during the 16th century that the Oromo started to expand and settle especially in the northern highland areas of Ethiopia. This migration which changed the nation’s geo-politics and made people intermingle was made possible through the leadership of the warlord who had the title Abadula and an army organized under the Oromo (Gada system) Portuguese troops who were fighting on the side of Emperor Gelawdewos have appreciatively described the Abdula’s army as “…..an army properly trained in military drill Special English Edition (2009, p.6). This implies to us in modern military academy drill’s given as one course for trainees (either for basic trainees or for cadet trainees).

As is well Known, during this historical era, the crown was only a symbol; real power was in the hands of Kings, Rases and Dejazmatches who had organized their own armies in their respective administrative regions and formed their petty governments. This was a period of regional conflict know as in history “Zemene Masafent” one king would rise to impose his rule over the other and expand his regional holding. Each king used to equip his own army with arms purchased from or donated by foreign governments and Individual Article on the remembering of the Harar Military Academy, 2009.; p.11).

Until the end of the “Era of the princes“ apart from a special interest in modern weapons, modern military organization was. Man power employed for combat was people’s army with no military service through mobilization (Article on the remembering of the Harar Military
Although the commanders had no military training, they had become self-made leaders through their great achievements in the field of battle (Article on the remembering of the Harar Military Academy, 2009: p.12).

The Ethiopian war tradition is a by-product of experiences amassed from the Wars fought among the regional lords for political hegemony on the one hand, and those fought against foreign expansionist and invaders on the other. The prominent place warfare occupies in the Abyssinian value system is correctly described by (Donald Levine, 1968: p.39) as follows:

*Military virtues have ranked among the highest in the Abyssinian value system; military titles have been among the most prestigious in their social hierarchy. Military symbolism has provided a medium for important national traditions and focus for a good deal of national sentiment; military status and procedure have influenced patterns of social organization in many ways.*

Ironically enough, however, the Ethiopian army had remained traditional for a long time. In the absence of a regular army force, the traditional army was constituted from the palace bodyguards who lived at the expense of the chiefs, soldiers who rendered two or three months' military service in return to a land grant, and a mass levy called during the time of emergency (Article on the remembering of the Harar Military Academy, 2009: p.12).

2.3.2. Modernizing the Ethiopian Army: Early initiatives

The military has generally been the first concern of any modernization ruler of the country, because of its pivotal role in the maintenance of national security (Bahru, 2002: p.63). The whole idea of establishing (building) a standing or modern national army in Ethiopia goes back to the time of Emperor Tewodros. In his effort to modernize the army, he “set out to remodel the military structure of Ethiopia in three important respects: organization, discipline, and armament”. With regard to the organizational sphere, Tewodros attempted to replace the regional armies with a standing national army. It was Tewodros who first thought of “reorganizing the army along modern lines and putting them under a centralized feeding and command and control system” (MoND, 2004: p.37). He was therefore determined to create a modern type of army that would live on rations, or pay, provided by the state (Pankhurst, 2001: p.54).
What Tewodros attempted to do in the organization sphere was to replace the regional armies of the “Zemene Masafent” with a national army which cut across local loyalties. Thus, steps were taken to build up a united military, for instance “soldiers were recruited from all corners of the country and organized under one regiment” (Pankhurst, 2001/ p.54). Similarly, a “new hierarchy of command, with military titles which are still in the Ethiopian army for example, ‘Yasr Alaqa’, ‘Yamsa Alaqa’, ‘Ya’shi Alaqa’, respectively commander of ten, commander of fifty, commander of a thousand was introduced” (Bahru, 2002: p.33).

Discipline remained a next concern of Tewodros; one of the lessons that he had drawn from the Battle of Dabarq in 1848 was of its value, but he proceeded apply a harsh version (Bahru, 2002: p.33).

The third aspects Tewodros’s military reforms were his unrelenting drive to acquire modern arms. The upshot of this strategy appeared at Gafat, an area near Daber Tabor which, more than any other place, symbolized Tewodros modernizing derives. Tewodros wanted from the European their science, not the region. At Gafat, a school was established where Ethiopian youths acquired literacy and some technical skill by trial and error, under the emperor’s ceaseless prodding the missionaries managed to manufacture some weapons Bahru (2002, p.33). Finally his struggle to equip with modern arms succeeded when “the first well-documented arsenal in Ethiopian history was established, with 15 canon, 7 mortars and different types of rifles and ammunitions (Bahru, 2002: p.33).

Tewodros’s successes of accomplishing of modernizing the army where however prevented by domestic and external factors. Internally, “...his attempt to unify the state pitted him against regional warlords.....Externally, his mission of acquiring firearms to build a stronger army pitted him against the British” (Merera, 2003: p.59). Eventually, he left his efforts of modernizing the army unfinished. However, the ideas of modernizing the army had influenced his successors. Both Emperor Yohannes and Emperor Menelik gave high priority for modernizing their army through trainings, acquiring and importing large quantities of firearms, and ammunitions.
In this regard, Tewodros, although short-lived, had attempted to introduce a sort of quasi-modern military structure which, as described by Sven Rubenson, includes “marshalling of soldiers into a number of regiments, appointing officers of different grades, fixing and their pay and the number of their private servants and also mixing up “soldiers coming from the different provinces.

Tewodros’ military reforms did not succeed. Nor did his successors, Yohannes IV and Menelik II make significant reforms in the military sector. Both of them were rather known more for their possession of a large number of weapons than for the institution of military reforms (Tekest, 1994: p. 1).

It is reported that in October 1897 the first regular Russian Diplomatic and Military Mission came to Ethiopia. About seven Russian officers are known to have been assigned to train the army until 1903. But even these officers did not seem to have introduced substantial changes into the traditional army (Tekest, 1994: p.1-2).

Menilek, as on the case of Tewodros, also embarked also on the reorganization of the army in his move to dissolve the powers of the local hereditary chiefs. The decentralization of power into the hands of the regional lords which had been an impediment to maintain balance between the central authority and local autonomy was done away with through the establishment of war ministry 1907 with a view to control and coordinate military services to the whole empire. Besides, Menilek, in addition to his bodyguards, had set up the “Mehal Sefari” which a kind of regular army under his direct control, and quartered separately in all strategic places of Addis Ababa (Eyayu, 1994: p.661).

In spite of the assiduous efforts exerted by the emperors, the establishment and maintenance of a standing army in Ethiopia did not come true before the twentieth century was subjected. The army that was dispersed into the four main regions of the country was still far from being modern. Like all traditional armies elsewhere, the Ethiopian army was characterized by predominance of personal leadership, lack of definite recruiting system, absence of organized training, lack of discipline, division of labor and regular pay (Eyayu, 1994: p.661).
2.4. The introduction of modern education and the birth of military academy

2.4.1. The introduction of modern education

Interest in modern education in Ethiopia could be traced to the nineteenth century. As in many parts of Africa, its introduction coincided with the arrival of missionaries, who saw the provision of educational facilities as the most effective way of winning over new converts. They thus set up schools and sent the more promising ones for studies in metropolitan institutions aboard. As result, a number of Ethiopian youth made their way the European and occasionally Indian schools, some later returned to assume important position as interpreters, adviser and envoys. This missionary involvement in education continued, with some ups and downs, into the present century and is still part of the national educational life (Bahur, 2002: p.35).

It took a while after the introduction of missionary schools for the Ethiopian state to assume responsibility for the provision of modern education for its young citizens. Emperor Tewodros was highly impressed by European technological power and more particularly the military manifestation of that power had started a school at Gafat to train young Ethiopians in technique of arms manufacture. Menilek I once he had confirmed at the battle Adwa his internal paramount and his international sovereign status could turn his attention to introducing some of the amenities of modern civilization. In the post Adwa period, the more intensive relations with Europe created ampler opportunities for the spread of modern education. The expansion of the state apparatus (through the ministerial system and customs administration for instance) made the training of cadre of officials imperative (Bahur, 2002: p.35).

2.4.1 The establishment of Genet Military Training School (1934)

Accordingly, modernization of the army in terms of capability (organization, size, discipline, training, and armaments) is generally attributed to Emperor Haile Sellassie I, (the former Ras Teferi mekonnen,) in early 1917. Thus the first force to be “organized and trained” along the modern art of warfare was the Imperial Body Guard (IBG) of Ethiopia. Between 1917 and 1934 by foreign officers such as Russians, Belgians and Swedish were employed to train the IBG. Besides, about a dozen of young Ethiopians educated in foreign languages were sent to the French St. Cyr military Academy for training. As these students completed their training
abroad and came back to Ethiopia they were assigned to train IBG and other government forces in the country (Tekeste nd., p.16).

Ras Teferi’s famous European Tour of 1924 brought home a number of new things. The IBG was supplied with better modern weapons, uniforms, berets etc. Following his coronation in 1930 Emperor Haile Selassie made attempts to consolidate his power through the creation of a centrally controlled administration and standing army. Furthermore, after 1924, Haile Selassie purchased several aircraft, including potez 25 bombers and other light aircraft (Tekeste nd., p.16).

A few years later the Haile Selassie, acting on the advice of a Swedish military adviser, General Eric Virgin, decided to set up a military school. This decision was taken in 1934, only a few months prior to the “Wal Wal Incident” of December 1934, which fascist Italy was soon to use a pretext for Ethiopia’s invasion. The Swedish government was asked to supply the training staff, and responded by selecting five instructors. In view of the urgency of opening the school with the utmost speed it was decided that an existing building should be utilizes. An old palace of Emperor Menelik situated in Holleta, also known as Genet, an hour’s drive west of Addis Ababa, was accordingly selected in 1934 (Bahru, 2002: p.36).

Though alteration work on the building was still in precious, the cadets began their studies at the end of January 1935, only five months after the decisions to establish the school. Emperor Haile selassie carried out his first inspection of the building in April, at which time he presented the institution with colors. Commenting on the establishment of the school, he later proudly observed:

*In former times everyone who becomes a soldier did so through experience alone. But now, I founded a military academy. I arranged for instruction in all military subjects, including drill, musketry and the like.* (Virgin, 1963: P.23).

The necessity for the modernization of the Ethiopian’s military system, which was, it can be argued with certitude, the result of three main concerns. The initial focus was on internal security, first as a power base for the returning monarch. A concurrent aim was to guard against rebellion by ethnic minorities, disgruntled lords or political rivals of the monarch at the same time ensuring the national stability required to avoid foreign interference. The third
concern was the need to fend off possible external military threats to the state’s independence together with ensuring the security of Ethiopian borders against foreign encroachment (Bahru, 1991, p.207-208).

However, this process of consolidation and modernizing of the army was short lived because of the Italian aggression in 1935/36. On the eve of the Italian aggression of 1935/36 Ethiopia’s armed forces largely remained to be traditional forces in many respects. As compared to other armed forces the IBG was in a better position. But even this force as whole was still far from being a fully-fledged modern force (Tekeste nd., p.28).

The brief period of fascist occupation brought home, more than ever, the urgency of modernization at national level in general and of military modernization in particular. As a matter of fact Ethiopia’s military set-up was considerably transformed in the past 1941 period the post war modernization consisted of the following noteworthy measures (Berouk, 2002: p.41):

1. The Imperial Body guard was revived and received training “under the command of Ethiopian officers who had attended the Holeta Academy before the war and matured during the campaign of liberation “(Levine, 1968: p.12). The Holeta military school was also re-opened after 1941 with a staff of British instructors (until 1951). In addition, the Haile Selassie I Military Academy was opened in 1957 in Harar (525 kilometers east of Addis Ababa), and was managed and staffed by Indian army officers until 1971. This higher learning institution provided a three year course for cadets aged 18-21 in military science as well as academic subjects. Military instructions include field craft, tactics, engineering, intelligence, security and administration (Mamo, 1990: p.3640). The entry requirements of both the holeta and Harar academy were high, the former accepting applicants who completed 12th grade and the latter giving preference to applicants who have completed one or two years at university. The training programs had three educational goals: “the development of a loyalty to the nation that transcends loyalty to particular ethnic groups; the substitution of an ethnic of professional competence for the old fashioned military ethic of naive material enthusiasm and wanton bravery; and the substitution of an ethic of professional duty for the age old ethic of political ambition through military service” (Levine, 1968: p.15).
2. The Territorial Army was created in 1959. It was meant to provide auxiliary forces in time of war, and to assist in the maintenance of internal security in the time of peace. It was “trained in twelve training centers of which six were in the region encircling the capital” (Tekest nd., p.17).

3. The traditional method of raising armies by regional levies was abandoned. The traditional military hierarchy and ranks were abrogated. Responsibility for all military affairs was fully concentrated in a ministry of war (reorganized and renamed Ministry of Defence in 1955). And, the Ethiopian government expanded a large amount of its annual budget for military affairs. “In 1944-1945 for instance, out of a total of some $Eth.38 million ... about $Eth.8 million was allocated for war. In 1967, the fighters were over $Eth.80 million....out of a total of about $Eth.400 million” (Bahru, 1991: p.208).

4. The Ethiopian government signed a military assistance agreement with the U.S which initially undertook “to train and equip three six thousand man division at a total cost of about five million dollars, a generosity then and subsequently considered a form of rent” Marcus (1995, p.89-90) for the American use of the Kagnew communications base in Eritrea, which claimed at the time “the largest high frequency radio relay station and listening post in the world” (Smith, 1974: p.1590). The U.S was Ethiopia’s primary supplier of military hardware and training, and provided a model for Ethiopian army’s doctrine and structure. Ethiopia ranked first as a U.S military aid recipient, getting at least 60% of all U.S military funds for Africa. It had received between the early 1950s and 1970s around U.S S147 million (Markakis, 1974: p.257). Also, in the same period, around 2800 Ethiopian officers were sent to the U.S for various courses.

5. The imperial Ethiopian Air Force was organized with the assistance of Swedish personnel, forming its first combat units in 1948. The Air Force Training school was established at Debre Zeit (60 kilometers south of Addis Ababa) in 1945. After 1963-64, the U.S began providing training and equipment, the Air force becoming “the most prestigious show piece of American military aid” (Bahru, 1991: p.186).

6. After the federation of Eritrea into Ethiopia in 1952 (and the ensuing 500 nautical miles coastline on the Red Sea to guard and defend), the Imperial Ethiopian Navy was formed with the assistance of Norwegian naval college at Massawa in 1955 (EAF, 1963: p.36).
The college consisted of three branches, the “executive Branch where cadets are trained to become deck officers responsible for the navigation and seamanship: the administrative branch where the cadets are taught the arts of supply and procurements; and lastly, the Engineering branch which entails the training of engineering officers in the manipulation of engineering and electrical equipment” (EAF, 1963: p.36).

Immediately after the Italian occupation, one of the three major reforms he launched was the abolition of provincial armies in favor of a national wide standing army. He seemed quite aware that success in establishing a modern army would, as described by (Levine, 1968: p.15), “enable him to preside over a material power together with political and ecclesiastic authority”.

Following independence, the Ethiopian army was re-organized in accordance with the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942. Major- General Butler, head of the British Military Mission to Ethiopia (BMME) was assigned together with his colleagues to organize and train the new army. The army officer corps includes the pre-war cadets of Holata military school and surviving veteran officers of the traditional army. It was, however, the IBG which emerged as a kind of elite force in the 1950 owing to its being more privileged than other armed forces. It was better trained, organized and equipped. The bulk of its officer corps came from the Qaobana IBG cadet school which was opened in March 1946 and produced about 350 officers in three successive batches. Its commander-in-chief was Brigadier General Mulugeta Buli, one of the notable cadets of pre-war Holata School (Tekest nd., p.94).

In 1951 the relatively better trained and equipped IBG was selected to go to Korea following Ethiopia’s commitment to send troops under the UN Security council. Three battalions named Kagnew, were consecutively sent to Korea. In the Korea war Ethiopian forces proved to be among the best fighters and some of the offices distinguished themselves as efficient commands (Tekest nd., p.94).

As the British Military Mission to Ethiopia terminated in 1951, the U.S. took-over Britain’s position in Ethiopia. In 1953 An Agreement was signed between the U.S. and Ethiopia. As pre-the 1953 agreement the American Military Assistance and Advisory group (MAAG) was in-
charge of the supply of military facilities, training and advising Ethiopia’s armed forces. According to Hess:

...In the first ten years of the agreement the U.S. provided Ethiopia. With almost $74 million in military assistance; this represented virtually half the United State’s military involvement in Africa. Several thousand men have been exposed to American influenced through training in Ethiopia.

Consequently, by 1970 Ethiopia had managed to build the largest military establishment including the most modern air force between (Sahara and Zambezi. Eyayu, 1994: p.662). Although important measures were taken to institutionalize the military structure along western lines, the Ethiopian army had still been far from being a constitutional army, ruled and administered by law alone. However, the army like many other social groups joined the popular upheaval with its own demands forwarded reflected the dissatisfaction with low salary scale, inhospitable working and living conditions, unfair transfer policy, corruption etc. then finally the Ethiopian revolution erupted in 1974. In light of the absence of strong political organizations and the low degree of the political consciousness of the people, the army, by virtue of its better organizational capacity and military power, gradually came into the political centre.

On 28 June 1974 the military intervened and took over political power after having formed an ad hoc committee, known as coordinating committee for the armed forces and police forces, since then widely know as the Dergue.

2.5. Academy and military training during the Dergue regime (1974-1991)

2.5.1. Conditions of the Ministry of Defence during the Dergue Regime

As soon as the military regime (also called the Dereg) assumed power by overthrowing the Feudal ruling class in 1974, the first measure that had been taken by the former was that changing the upper strata of the ruling class completely. Accordingly, the Ministry of Defence was restructured in that it primarily stood to protect and defend the ruling class in general and the monarch in particular. In this regarding the chief-of-staff and the three forces (air force,
ground force and navy) were answerable directly to the minister himself while the mandate and responsibility of coordinating military mission and battles were left or given to the provisional military administrative council (Halefom, 2008: p.61).

In fact, “the new organizational structure of the ministry of defence became effective as of 11 September 1977. One of the major change introduced was the merging together of what used to be known as the headquarters of Ministry of defence and the Headquarters of the Armed forces and the Justification was to shorten the chain of command and reduce bureaucratic problems” (Tekest n.d., p.20). While the military regime was recognizing and restructuring the army in modern lines the purpose of the army would be maintaining the sovereignty of the nation and safeguarding of the revaluation from both internal and external opposition forces

Upon its coming to power, the Dergue government bestowed the mandate of coordinating the affaires of the training and operation, communication, ground force, air force and navy force to the chief-of–staff (Tekest nd., p.94).

2.5.2. Education and Training

It would be quite necessary to note that the complexity and diversity of Ethiopia’s post 1977 army lay in the fact that it referred not only to regular forces but also included various from of Para-military forces. In light of method of conscription, training, military education, organization and operations one could clearly see some similarities between army regular forces and Para-military forces such as the police military and the peoples’ militia of the country between 1977 and 1991 (Tekest nd., p.26). It is therefore worth having a look at how the regular forces.

2.5.2.1. Regular Forces

The Genet Military Academy, under which the Harar Military Academy and the Holeta Military School operated after 1977, trained cadets for commissioning as regular officers with the rank of second lieutenant (Berouk, 2002:p.97)
Varieties of methods were employed in the recruitment of Cadets between 1977 and 1991. The first method was on voluntary basis. Young Ethiopian’s who completed their 12th grade education in the Ethiopian secondary schools and who were believed to be physically fit and loyal to the “revolution” was allowed to be conscripted as cadets for the armed forces. This, however, was particularly true for the earlier period of the military regime (1976-1982) with the exception of the 1977/78 “mother Land Call”. But as regards other volunteers who joined the cadet schools later, there were elements who were volunteers for the sake of getting employment and despite their failures to meet standard requirements they were allowed to join the training schools. In some cases, particularly during the reign of terror in 1977/78, individuals made themselves volunteers with the mere desire to save their lives from the Red Terror (Tekest nd., p.27).

The second and the main method of conscription involved force in different ways. This started mainly when the military government became more and more corrupt and thereby giving rise to growing civilian and military discontent on the one hand, and the escalating war in Eritrea, Tigray and elsewhere on the other. The quota system became the main method of conscription until the final demise of the military government. Students were rounded up in the urban centers and sent to cadet schools. In some cases students from among those who completed 12th grade in the Ethiopian secondary schools were systematically recruited on the ground that they would be offered scholarship opportunities abroad. In this coercive method of recruitment political organizations, labor unions and mass organizations such as the peasant Associations and urban Dwellers Associations played instrumental role (Tekest nd., p.27).

The third, case the government obtained conscripts from among the serving NCOs in which cases these elements appeared to be volunteers for it was a promotion in their military career (Tekest nd., p.27).

However, almost 50% of those who joined the cadets’ schools were not to be officers in terms of physical fitness and health conditions. Many of them were also known to have their own social problems at the time of conscription (Tekest nd., p.27).
Until the mid 1970s the two main cadet schools producing officers to the army were the Harar Military Academy and Holota Military Training school. In the curse of the Ethio-Somolia war of 1977/78 Harar Military Academy the best cadet school in the country was closed and instead new cadet schools were opened later at Hoursso and at Arba in the eastern of the country YMHG (1973, p.19). The length of training programme for officers varied from time to time depending on the conditions of warfare in the country. In 1977, during the Somali aggression officers were trained for three to six months only, quite a short period as compared to the previous four-year training programme offered at Harrar Military Academy. All these were expected to be leading officers. Along with the military training cadets are known to have been indoctrinated along the Marxist-Leninist ideology. It is said that the training programme focused on teaching cadets how to shoot and be loyal to the existing system. It therefore failed to orient them to have respect for fundamental human rights, one of the main weaknesses revealed in regions where battles were fought against anti-government forces.

With respect to the quality of the training officers it is respected that there were some who were well-qualified and experienced, satisfactory, and poorly qualified and inexperienced trainers. But, it was widely reported that the number of the first two groups of training officers was so small that it failed to meet the requirements of the huge military machine. In addition to Ethiopians, there were foreign training officers such as the Russians, Cubans, Koreans, Yemenis, Israelites, with the first two being mainly assigned as ‘military advisers’ at various levels.

Generally speaking the quality of officers training went on deteriorating with the intensification of the war in the north, when training programme were shortened in an aim to promptly fill vacancies created in the military command as a result of government losses in leading officers.

2.5.2.2. Foreign Military Assistance

After the 1977/78 Ogaden war, the Soviet Union becomes Ethiopia’s principal supplier of weapons and training (of military units). Ethiopia also received military assistance from other Socialist, including Cuba, East Germany, and by late 1980s, North Korea.
In 1978, Ethiopia concluded a twenty-year Treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. Based on this treaty, the Soviet Union intensified its training assistance efforts in Ethiopia. To this end, there were 1,900 military advisors in 1981, 2,600 in 1984, 1,400 in 1988 and 1,700 in 1989 (DoD). The Soviet Union trainers had emphasized training the military personnel of Ethiopia’s three services in the operation and maintenance of weapon systems as well as in military tactics and doctrine. In addition, by 1984, more than 1,600 Ethiopian military personnel, have been trained in Soviet Union (trained at the Moscow’s Frunze Academy or the Leningrad Naval Academy (Berouk, 2002: p.93).

From 1977 to 1978, out of a genuine streak of “Proletarian internationalism” Cuba deployed in Ethiopia 17,000 troops, many of whom were brought in from Angola. Organized in three brigades, these troops went for beyond their training and advisory mission, and actually participated directly in combat against Somalia forces hastening the Ethiopian military personnel were also sent to Cuba for training in political indoctrination, intelligence as well as training management and logistics (Berouk, 2002: p.93).

East Germany’s military assistance to Ethiopia started in 1977 immediately after the outbreak of the Ogaden war, initiated at the urge of the Soviet Union (Bittman, 1981: p.217). It provided logistical and command advice, and gave hundreds of Ethiopian officers’ ideological training.

### 2.6. Comparison on Recruitment and Training during the Imperial and the Military Regime.

Recruitment and Training are the two important factors which have a very significant bearing on strength and fighting capacity of any army. Even though these practices are interrelated the writer treats them in their logical sequence.

It has become both common and imperative for countries to have clear military doctrines of their own which state the overall policy regarding the military as an establishment. Countries with good military tradition always make assessment and try to know both the targets and strength of enemy countries before they decide on the type and size of an army they should
have every promising recruitment procedure of the army needs clarity on such doctrinal issue (Eyayu, 1994: p.664).

Partly because of the long period of peace and stability and partly the efficiency of the Ethiopian Officers trained both in Ethiopia and abroad, the recruitment procedures of the army during the reign of Haile Sellassie were more planed and organized than that of its successor. The good statesmanship of the Emperor together with the admirable diplomatic skill of his appointees have also enabled Ethiopia to safeguard its territory and maintain its unity with an army of comparatively smaller size. Ethiopia had an army of no more than 40,000 by 1974 after nearly three decades since its establishment (Eyayu, 1994: p.664).

Under the imperial rule, the army recruitment was made on voluntary basis. A new recruit was supposed to singe, with good health records and fall within the age range of 18-25 before he is accepted for any kind of military training; officer or private. The difference lies in their academic background. Those who joined officer training were mostly among the best students in the senior high schools who either passed in the E.S.L.C.E. or rank 1to5 from their classes. Private recruits were expected to have basic knowledge enough to acquaint themselves with different armaments and other instruments relevant for the training. The same recruitment style is said to have resumed for the first few years after the revaluation. The deterioration of the internal political climate as the result of the internal power struggle, the war in the northern part of the country, and the unprecedented Somali invasion of 1976 had totally changed the size and recruitment pattern of the Ethiopian army (Eyayu, 1994: p.665).

The shift to the Soviet-block and the adoption of the socialist ideology had also necessitated the restructuring of the military after the East European model. Commitment to socialist dictums became additional rules of the Army.

Massive recruitment started during the Ethio-somali war of 1976. The news about Somali’s seizure of the Eastern and South-Eastern Ethiopia aroused mass indignation. After a national call by the government, nearly 300,000 volunteers are said to have been enlisted Eyayu (1994, p.665).
After the victory over the Somalis, the Derg moved to North. However, it was difficult to get a second victory as was initially intended. The peculiarities of the war, the difficult terrain and the unhealthy political climate in the country have contributed to the protection of the war. The endlessness of the war coupled with absence of resulted in weariness and feelings of desperation among the soldiers. The modus operandi in the war front not only eroded the moral and the fighting capacity of the army, but also hampered all possibilities of voluntary recruitment.

Determined to resolve the conflict in the north military, the Derg launched forced recruitment all over the country. A significant number of the militia and the National service components of the army said have been victims of this obligatory recruitment. Some members of the regular army and the veterans are also recruited under duress.

The officers of the Military Commissariat, public Security, party, Regional Administration together with the Kibeles and peasant association were using their executive powers for the realization of the recruitment process. Quite often fixed quotas were assigned to all administrative regions by the office in charge of military campaigns. The administrative regions in turn redistributed their quotas to their respective awarajas, and this process went down to the level of Kebeles and peasant associations (Eyayu, 1994: p.665-668).

It was under these situations that the remaining recruits would start the training. With such a state of mind, there were very few who could follow up the training seriously. The rest either calculated for their escape or capture (Eyayu, 1994: p.665-68).

The other serious bottle-neck to conduct an efficacious military training incompatibility with the available logistics and resources during the insatiable ambition of the military regime was building a huge army. The training centers also suffered from acute shortage of experienced trainers. The huge number of recruits admitted in the training centers was greater than the number of trainers available.

Most of the officer corps of post-1974 was also results of the same enmasse training. Even though the most frequented intake was 1,000, it is said that about 6000 officers were trained once at the old Harar Military Academy for six months. One dose not has to be a military
scientist to understand the superficiality of the training. It became even more absurd when it is contrasted to the size of officer trainees in the same Academy before 1974. (Eyayu, 1994: p. 666-69)

Inadequacy of time allotted for training was also another weakness that deserves serious attention. Private recruits, mostly with elementary and junior secondary educational background, had to finish their military training in three months time. The time allotted for officer training varied from three to six months.

Under the imperial rule, however, private recruits were subject to a six-month military training out of which the first three months were devoted to integrated training and inclination assessment. It was after these three months and based on their performance in the integrated training that trainees were assigned to the different areas of specialization such as artillery, infantry, communication, armored units, engineering etc. Officers also had to pass through an elaborate and rigorous four-year training (Eyayu, 1994: p.666-669).

The comparison given above clearly shows the insufficiency of the training time of the army in the Derg era. What made the situation even worse was the desperate move the government sometimes used, in which trainees were dispatched move fronts before they finished their training. Many training centers did not have a special squad for demonstration. Much of the training was therefore conducted through lectures. If there were at all demonstrations, they were done by individual instructors together with the lectures. In addition to this, trainees were often sent for rehearsal without being accompanied by supervisors. Consequently, important lessons such as camouflage were often left for the students to rehearse under each others supervision (Eyayu, 1994: p.666-69).

The absence of a common medium of instruction was another achilles heel to the training program. In view of the fact that there were a considerable number of private recruits coming from all corners of the country, it was not possible to use Amharic as a common medium of instruction. Hence, instructions were mostly given through translators. It is accounted that as many as ten translators were used at a time. The languages used for translation were mainly Oromigna, Tigrigna, Kembatigina, Hadiyagna, Guragegna, and Wolaytagna. It is difficult to
imagine the kind of training offered under this situation. Distortions of technical terms and concepts were common. Trainees who could not understand Amharic were seen as disinterested because of the lack of clarity in the translated lessons (Eyayu, 1994: p.669-673).

Excessive politicization of the curriculum was also an obstacle both in terms of relevance and time optimization. General Nega Tegegne pointed out that about 75% of the training went for political education. It was compulsory for all trainees to attend classes on Marxism-Leninism and the Ethiopian Revaluation.

Under the imperial rule, military promotions were in most cases transparent, and given on the basis of merit. Experience backed by a satisfactory performance report together with the request training for a given military rank were the most important requirements that had to be met before any kind of promotion is given. The standard trend regarding the promotion of officer corps was as follows. A second lieutenant had to serve for two years before he was promoted to lieutenant. A lieutenant is required to give five years service and attend higher training before he is promoted to the rank of Capitan. A Capitan must render service for five years and pass through the necessary course to get promoted to major. This pattern consistently continued for all promotions up to the rank of colonial. Promotions leading to the rank of General were mostly political appointments, although the candidates had to attend Staff College. It should also be noted that promotions within NCO ranks were no less strict. However, these promotion procedures and criteria were abandoned during the Derg regime (Eyayu, 1994: p.673).

2.7. Post-1991 Ethiopia’s Defence Forces

After the defeat of Mengistu’s regime in 1991, the former national defence forces were disbanded and the EPRDF forces were entrusted to the task of maintaining the national security of the country for the transitional period. Later on, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) proposed to transform its national liberation armies to establish a nation-wide standing and professional national defence forces. The section therefore, examines how the post-1991 Ethiopian national defence forces (ENDF) has evolved from national liberation armies and its
frequent reforms, transformations and reorganization of leadership and organizational structure towards capability.

2.7.1. Evolution from Liberation Armies to National Army

In May 1991, Mengistu’s regime was outside and his huge armed forces were defeated and dismantled by the combined forces of EPRDF, Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, and others. Following the collapse of the Derg’s armed forces therefore the responsibility of safeguarding the country’s national security from both internal and external threats had fallen in the hands of the victorious groups of EPRDF forces under the TGE (Library of Congress, 2005). Accordingly, throughout the Transitional period, there was no a unified national defence forces for Ethiopia. In fact, under the TGE, there were defence forces which were composed of the armies of the EPRDF member organizations to function as national defence forces vis-à-vis external threats (Vestal, 1999: p.67).

However, the need for the establishment of a unified national defence forces was unquestionable for the TGE. Thereby the process started with the aim to build the national defence forces that “reflects the diversity and unity of Ethiopia” Tsadkan (1993, p.6). Thus in 1993 the TGE announced its plans to create a professional national defence force with multi-ethnic background. They should have “political awareness, within the army, of the constitution and of its role in defending and promoting the constitution” (Tsadkan, 1993, p.6). This process entailed the creation of a new professional and officer class standing national defence forces and the demobilisation of many of the EPRDF fighters (Library of Congress, 2005: p.5).

In the transition of Ethiopian defence forces from national liberation armies to defence forces therefore, extensive demobilization of former members of EPRDF forces took place “while efforts to introduce a national balance [were] being made involving recruitment from other ethnic groups” (IISS, 1999: p.205). Accordingly, the Ministry of National Defence claimed to have recruited thousands of youngsters from different ethnic groups throughout the country. Thereby it trained them in basic military science and politics before they joined the newly established national defence forces of Ethiopia. Eventually, the different national liberation
armies of EPRDF were disbanded and reconfigured with the newly recruited armies to form a professional standing national defence forces.

Furthermore, with the establishment of the FDRE in 1995, the constitution stipulated the establishment of ENDF. FDRE’s constitution clearly identified the principles for Ethiopia’s external relations with regard to its national security as protecting the vital national interest and respecting the country’s sovereignty (FDRE, 1995). The constitution further stated that the “armed forces shall protect the sovereignty of the country “(FDRE, 1995) from external aggression and invasions.

The constitution also stipulated that the national defence forces should be organized and regulated in a manner of reflecting the representation of different nations, nationalities and peoples of the country. It stated that the “composition of the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia”(ibid). Eventually on the basis of the constitution it was “found necessary to organized, and to regulate the administration of the defence forces of the [FDRE] which safeguard the country’s sovereignty, embody a fair representation of nations, nationalities and peoples “…(FDRE,1996). In this context, the national defence forces made transformation from liberation armies into a national defence forces. Accordingly, in February 1996 the commanders of EPRDF forces took military ranks for the first time as the sign of establishing professional national defence forces.

2.7.2. Military Leadership and Organizational Structure

When Ethiopia faces external military threat to which the defence forces must be exercised, the council of Ministers of FDRE “shall submit draft laws to the House of people’s Representatives on …. A declaration of war” (FDRE, 1995). Accordingly, the House on the basis of the draft law submitted to it by the Council “shall proclaim a state of war” (FDRE, 1995). In line with this, the Prime minister is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, and he has the power to deploy the armed forces for any combat purpose (ibid) to defend the national security of the state. The house, the council and the prime Minister therefore hold the responsibility of the national strategic leadership over ENDF.
Below the strategic leadership over ENDF, the leadership within the ENDF is organized into strategic, operational and tactical leadership (Armed Forces General Headquarters, 2007: p.13). The strategic leadership preserves the objectives of the national security force or the threat of force. The operational leadership applies the available defence forces to attain specific goals or counter specific threats, while the tactical leadership uses specific techniques to carry out the directives generated at high levels.

Thus, the strategic leadership within ENDF comprises the Minster of National Defence and the General-Chief-of-staff (FDRE, 1996). The Minster has the following major powers: to ascertain that the defence forces are loyal to, and stand firm in upholding, the constitution: to initiate laws and. Rules governing the defence Forces and ensure their implementation subsequent to approval. On the other hand, among the major powers given to the General-chief-of-staff the following are worthy of mentioning. These are: holding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation inviolable: organizing the National Defence forces in line with decisions by the government, and ensuring that the Armed Forces are, at all times, combat-ready and directives and decisions of the commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (FDRE, 1996).

Generally, matters of defence policy and administrative control over ENDF are performed by the Minister while defending the state through the use of the defence forces is the responsibility of the Genera-chief-of-staff (FDRE, 1996). Accordingly, based on its power and responsibilities, the strategic leadership mission includes:

- Conducting national and regional security threat analysis and assessment
- Initiating and planning defence politics, rules, doctrine and strategies
- Building the general capacity of the defence forces and keeping it continue
- Setting the direction of building and training of the defence forces
- Building the capability of defence forces in terms of deterring and/or defeating enemy forces Armed Forces General Headquarters (2007, p.13).

Moreover, commanders of each Commands and Ethiopian Air Forces are responsible for operational leadership (Armed Forces General Headquarters, 2007: p.13). Each operational leadership mission includes:
• Ensuring its unit fighting capacity and state of combat readiness
• Gathering up-to-date intelligence on its area of operation
• Ensuring reliable peace (security) within its area of operation, and controlling and destroying those who try to destabilize the peace within its area of operations
• Making its unit capable to deter and defeat enemy forces when war occurs (ibid).

Division and Air Force Base commanders and their sub-unit commanders have the responsibility of tactical leadership (Armed Forces General Headquarters, 2007: p.13). The missions of tactical leadership therefore include:

• Giving direct leadership to its unit/s and accomplishing mission success
• Making opportunity to make continue the built up capability
• Ensuring reliable peace with in its area of operation

Organizationally, ENDF is organized into the Ground Force and the (Air Force FDRE: 1996). And there are also different main departments and centers under the General Chief-of staff and Ministry Defence to give support for ENDF in the areas of intelligence, training, operation, logistics, administration and others. The size and organizational structure of the national defence forces however have been in the process of frequent reorganization depending upon the national security threat analysis setting, and the process of implementing reform programs and transformation towards building capable national defence forces (Mesfine, 2008: p.50-60).

Training Main Department is one of the main departments in Ministry of Defence of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The focus of training policy and strategy is on creating combat capability. It has three interconnected and integrated strategies, such as Institutional training, Unit training and self development, it applies in long and short period of time. According the training policy, obligations to pass all army members and officers through sequential and integrated training are the most important issue in the arms career development and culture (Training policy, 2005: p.9-16). Moreover the role of Training Main department includes:

• Plan, organize, coordinated and control institutional training,
- Develop curriculum's, training systems, and guiding documents with respective institutions,
- Develop training and education policy,
- Develop and up-grade training aid materials and facilities to support the training process.

With this policy, strategy and role the Training Main Department arranged different offices or institution to realize modern education and training for the Ethiopian defence forces. These will be discussed in chapter four in detail.
Chapter-Three: Methodology of the Study

3.1. Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to depict the type, nature, and rational of the methodology of the research. To achieve this objective the chapter covers the framework design of the research, research procedures, study area description, ethical consideration, data source and data collection, data collection instrument, data analysis and interpretation.

3.2. Research Framework Design

As indicated in the above diagram, the study has tried to carry out a deep investigation into the institutional arrangement of the F.D.R.E Ministry of Defense in the realization of Modern Education: the case of TMD. The study is concerned with issues pertaining to a give the institutional arrangement of TMD and aspects of analysis are also focused on specific objectives of the research. Thus, qualitative method of research with semi-structured open ended interview that elicit the views and opinions from participants is employed.

Case by case in-depth exploration and analysis of facts were made in order to identify the institutional arrangement of the Ministry of Defense of F.D.R.E in realization of Modern Education: the case of training main department. In further interest to refine the findings, triangulation of responses from informants, observations, and written documents were also made.
3.3. Study Area Description

The training main department of ministry of defense is one of the departments within the main branch of the ministry of defense of FDRE.

3.4. Data Sources

Primary Data were collected through face-to-face in person interview with the key informants who were strategically and purposefully selected from focal institutions.

To have balanced information, the primary data were collected from key informants within the institutional arrangement that expected to deep entrench modern education and training in the Ethiopian Defense Forces.

Training Main Department (MTD) has different departments. These are: Head of Main Training Department, Head of curriculum and planning section, Head for Training Operation, Head of Human Resource Development Project, and Head of foreign training follow up section.

The first category of key informants was composed of top officials who are responsible to spearhead the mission training main department.

The other category of key informants is composed of different stakeholders that have direct interest on the institutional arrangement of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) of FDRE in the realization of modern education for the defense forces Ethiopia. And these are different training centers and colleges:

1. Ethiopian Command and Staff College:- has a direct accountable to ENDF main training department. For this very reason the academic dean of Ethiopian command staff college is selected to be key informants and interviewed;

2. Maj. General Hayelom Araya Military Academy: - has a direct accountable for the issue of academy, administration and finance to ENDF main Training Department. For this very reason the academic dean of Maj. General Hayelom Araya Military Academy is selected to be key informants and interviewed;
Secondary data were collected from various documents. These were circular and letters to/from of the training main department, books, proclamations, regulation and polices of Training and education, senior essays and thesis.

3.5. Data Collection Instruments

The study has employed two major data collection instruments. These were semi-structured interview and checklist. The semi-structured interview contained a number of questions that were responded by the groups of the key informants. The checklist was developed by the researcher to be able to take notes of any discrepancies regarding institutional arrangement in realization of modern education for the Ethiopian Defense forces while review of documents as secondary data sources.

3.6. Research Procedures

In order to realize its intended purpose, this research undertaking has employed several methods in gathering pertinent data. First, key informants were contacted in order to obtain their agreement to take part in the study. Secondly, secondary data sources have been identified and sorted out on the basis of their relevance for the study. Thirdly, series of interviews were conducted with the key informants in accordance with the scheduled time and place arranged with the respondents. Fourthly, responses from different respondents have been tallied to check their consistency with each other. Finally, data obtained from primary sources have been substantiated with facts from secondary sources.

3.7. Data Analysis and Interpretation

Qualitative analysis was employed. The analysis was multifaceted, iterative, and simultaneous. The process of data analysis involved making sense out of data. It involved preparing the data for analysis, conducting analysis, moving deeper and deeper in to understanding the data, representing the data, and making and interpretation of the larger meaning of the data.

Interpretation of data was made on the basis of identification of prevailing practices and the working documents governing that particular practice in view to come up with the institutional
arrangement of the Ministry Of Defense of FDRE in the realization of Modern Education: the case of Training Main Department.

3.8.Ethical Considerations

In the process of data collection due care was taken in order to make this pace of work ethically sound. Respondents have been informed that their contribution was sought for exclusive academic purpose. Their consent was also obtained on the basis of consensus to fully respect their rights, needs, values, and desires as far as the issue of this research is concerned.
Chapter-Four: Data presentation, Discussion, Results and Analysis

4.1. Introduction

The Training Main Department (TMD) is one of the main departments in the FDRE Ministry of Defence. The TMD main responsibility is to train and educate members of the Defence Forces beginning from basic military training for new recruited up to military science and warfare training for those in the service. Furthermore, the TMD has made a paramount contribution to military training centers and colleges by assisting training and education strategy, policy and by offering training and educational aid materials.

In order to realize modern education and training for the Ethiopian Defence Forces the Training Main Department has been organized/structured different departments and sections within its main head quarter. In addition to this the TMD has been established and opened several military training centers and academy colleges in different parts of the country.

The research is taking as a trigger to investigate the realization of modern training and education for the Ethiopian Defence forces, as a result, the researcher gathered data from various concerned bodies of TMD through the following data gathering instruments such as interview, document review, and personal observations of the researcher. Then, the researcher presents the major themes of the result and discussion below.

Before looking into the details to what extent the institutional arrangement of the TMD is helpful, in the realization of modern education and training for the Ministry of Defence, it would be of paramount importance to briefly look at some basic and important theories and principles on institutional arrangement that would further consolidate the different aspects of this research topic.

While hearing in mind an institution, it is clear that three interwoven essentials are under consideration: objectives, the productive way and support (Gant, 1993:, p.14). The first principle of institution, in the words of Gant: “institution as a system must have the capability of produce or deliver the product or perform the functions for which it was created; the institution must be effective in accomplishing its purpose.”
The second principle concern, according to Gant, lays the institution whether as agency or process or convention, must be accepted in the society and environment of its location. The institution must represent the way in which people, as individuals and in groups wish to be served and work with or related to one another. The institution must therefore have value and meaning for those people if it is to serve in a fully effective and productive way.

The third, the institution must be able to survive because it is adequately supported with necessary, financial, personal, and political capability to adopt itself and its program to changing and evolving conditions and situations, including the ability to learn from its own experiences and correct its mistakes (Gant, 1993: p. 13-14).

If an institution is lacking any of the three aforementioned qualities, it fails. Thus, institutionalization, the process by which system of action acquire public acceptance, adequate financial and qualified manpower, becomes indispensable to effectively achieve the desired development goals and objective (Rondinelli, 1997; Sharp, 1998; Gant, 1993).

It is important, on the other hand, to realize that any development goal can not be achieved by the public sector alone because development has a wider dimension and concerns and involves different sectors. In this regard, the private sector and community based organizations do have significant contributions to development. Consequently, efficacy of institutional arrangement and integrated efforts of all actors involved in development process call for trust, loyalty, secure legal system, efficient and competent bureaucracy staffed with well motivated and trained personnel. In addition to easing burdens in resources and skill requirements, institutional relation will reduce the risks involved in development process (Tegegn, 1999; Manuel, 1997).

According to (Rondinelli, 1993: p.38), Institution building or arrangement is concerned not only with strengthening the administrative capacity of individual organization but also with seeking cooperative relationships among them. Thus institutional approach to development becomes imperative. Institutional arrangements bring and bind organizations together for a certain common goal.
There is no standard format for a qualities of institutional arrangements, but quality of institutional arrangement is composed of training objectives, policies, mission, goal, mandate, command and control of education and training guidance, resource (Man power, budget, and Material), and they must all be addressed. It is therefore against such accepted theories and principles that this chapter attempts to analyze the data that have been collected from the aforementioned informants and test the assumption.

4.2. Objective, Goal, Mission, Vision and Mandate of the TMD

Both oral informants and written sources confirmed that the objectives of the TMD are to:

- Build an army that can effectively launch operation under any type of landscape and at any type of weather condition;
- Develop at all levels leaderships in discipline and military leadership;
- Develop individual capacity and skill in order to minimize the cost in time, life, and finance;
- Upgrade and develop the fighting capacity of combined/joint war (infantry, mechanized and air force);
- Develop the system and capacity to won the war within a short period of time and command;
- Develop and enhance effective system of training and education.
- Develop the required military techniques and skills of the infantry and mechanized to cross or bypass the obstacles of enemy defence lines and to successfully accomplish its future combat mission;
- Develop the required skill and knowledge to use military weapons effectively;
- Build the technical capacity and skill of all support units (logistics, intelligence, combat engineering and communication);
- Build the right culture, experiences and ethics in the individual army (MoNDAS-A, B; informants No 1, 4, and 5).

Based on the above stated facts, thus, the goal of the training is among other things, preparing an army, which can effectively discharge its duty given to it under any time, and condition and
preparing an army that has the indispensable physical strength and which can effectively withstand difficulties. Furthermore, the goals of the TMD are:

- To create an army that has democratic attitude and always stand to defend the constitution and the constitutional system and sovereignty of the country from external invaders, terrorists and internal anti-peace elements;
- To participate, safeguard and protect the Ethiopian peoples, properties as well as governmental/public institutions from manmade and natural disasters;
- To participate in international, continental and regional peacekeeping mission;
- To create and enhance an armed forces who will be competent with the globalize technology-age by participating in military science, research and technology;
- To prepare an armed forces who are physically and mentally fit for any desired institutional duty/goal;
- Develop and maintain defence forces that can deter and fight to won when deployed in conventional war;
- Develop and maintain motivated, disciplined and strong defence forces; and
- Develop and maintain technically and tactically proficient armed forces that can accomplish their mission with success. (MONDAS-B)

4.2.1. The Mission of the TMD

The mission of the TMD can briefly be summed up as follows:

- To build the capacity, skill and knowledge of military profession at each level who are responsible to defend the constitution and sovereignty of the country from external invaders, terrorists and internal anti-peace elements. Furthermore, to safeguard and protect Ethiopia from man-made and natural disaster. To participate in regional, continental and international peacekeeping mission;
- To establish and strengthen military training centers, academy and colleges to train the army and to cope-up with new technology and military science;
- To create a culture of training for each military personnel
- To enhance the military training and to introduce with new military weapons. (MONDAS-B)
4.2.2. Vision of the TMD

- To see any army with a wisdom and capable leadership, to see and create an
excellences of training centers and colleges, to enhance and expand well and update
training and education system. To prepare and create an army that has the ability to
accomplish missions (operations successfully, defend the constitution of the country
and discharge the responsibilities vested to MOND (MONDAS- A and B).

4.2.3. Mandate of the TMD

Some of the major mandate of TMD are:

- Plan, organize, coordinate and control institutional training, unit training and self-
development training;
- Consulting instructors;
- Develop curriculum, training systems, directives and guiding documents, and manuals
  with respective institutions;
- Develop and upgrade the infrastructure and facilities of training centers and military
  colleges;
- Support and facilitate aid materials to military training centers and colleges;
- Develop training and education policy, strategy and direction; and
- Coordinate and work with abroad and domestic civil academy institutions. (MONDAS-
  A, and B; Informants No. 1 interview).

4.2. Main Training Department Structure

4.2.1. Organizational Structure of the TMD

With regard of the organizational structure of the TMD both the oral sources and document
sources confirmed that in the TMD have two types of structure, these are:

Both oral and document sources confirmed that there are two types of structure, these are:

1. within the TMD, there are different departments and sections and arranges in TMD.

   There are:

   1.1. Service Provider Departments. These are:

       - Secretary Office,
       - General Service Department, (see Appendix ___).
1.2. Training follow-up departments. These are:
- Operation for Training Department,
- Human Resources Development Department/project
- Curriculum and planning Department,
- Foreign Training follow-up section. (See Appendix)

2. Different military training centers and colleges (see Appendix).
These includes different military training centers and colleges which are responsible to give training and education from basic military training up to different military profession (Informant No. 1,3,4,5 interview).

In fact, the organizing of each departments/section within TMD and the Military training centers, and colleges was done in 2007/2008. Moreover, to be stronger and well structured the TMD had been done the following efforts:

- preparing curriculums;
- building infrastructures, and services for training centers and colleges and institutions
- organizing and qualifying man-power for each training centers and colleges

(Informants No. 1 &4-interview)

Different training documents (like training policy and strategy) were prepared for implementation of the specific mission. Several training manuals through which the arms, starting from that of the private soldiers up to the highest leadership were also written and compiled by the TMD and were disseminated to each military training centers and colleges. According to the informants, written documents and the manuals have two parts (informants No. 1, 4,5,-interview).

Firstly, training manuals of theoretical and conceptual content of military science have been designed and prepared on the basis of the situation and concrete reality of the Ethiopian army. These mammals can provide answers o the basis of military science and wisdom. These
manuals not only indicate concepts and theories, but also give reply to on how they could be implemented from the standpoint of the country’s concrete reality.

In addition to this, training manual that can be referred to as technical and with which all members of the defence forces (starting from private soldiers up to Higher Officers) could be trained in their profession were being prepared.

The preparation of manuals inter-alias were about:

- Command and control;
- Fire and Control;
- Operation Art;
- Mountain and Desert Warfare; and
- Staff Work (Informants No. 1, 3, &4-interview).

4.3.2. Decentralization Structure of the TMD

Following the year 2008, the role of the TMD began to turn down or minimize as a result of the previously power, responsibility and authority of the TMD decentralized and delegated to those military training centers and colleges. The rationale behind is to minimize the long way of bureaucracy (informants No.1, 2, 5-interview). This means, the structural way of communication between the TMD and each military training centers and colleges is decentralization structure.

Meanwhile, each military training centers and colleges have a jurisdiction to communicate directly with defence main departments such as Finance, Logistic, Human Resource and Development etc. This means, if one military training center or college has an issue with regard to logistics request it communicate directly with defence logistics main department. The same is true for other issues like budget and finance, human resources and etc (informants No. 1, 3,4-interview).

In the meantime, due to these decentralization, the relationship between the TMD and all military training centers and colleges is continued on directing, evaluating and controlling the
training and education matters only (informant No. 1-interview). Moreover, each Military training centers and colleges in their organizational structure have different departments like:

- Department of curriculum, and planning
- Department of Operation for training,
- Department of human resource development,

4.3.3. The Relationships of the Training Centers and Colleges with the TMD

According to some key informants the relationship between the TMD and the training Centers and colleges are on:

- Directing and leading the training;
- Evaluating the ongoing training;
- Giving consultancy service about training;
- Arranging and facilitating workshops on training issues;
- Planning detail how the training and education implement;
- Prepare and evaluate the curriculum; and
- Assisting training aid materials and qualified manpower.

In addition, the TMD has a mandate on evaluating and controlling the training and education at strategic level (Informants No. 1-interview).

With regard to curriculum at the TMD head office, there is a curriculum and planning department. This department is responsible to follow-up and gives assurance for the quality, relevance and standard of the curriculum that is prepared and designed by those training centers and colleges. According to the informant “quality” means “does the curriculum have include at least the expected quality”; “relevance” means “does the curriculum includes and cover the basic interests and objectives of the MoND”; “Standard” means “does the curriculum designed and included in different type military profession” (informants No. 1&5-interview). In addition to this, the department is responsible to evaluate, revise, study or to make an impact assessment in the implementation of the curriculum in each Military Training Centers and Colleges.
According to the informants, the Curriculum and Planning department is also responsible on the following matters:

**Giving Assistance**
- To give advise and prepare a workshop for military training centers and colleges on how to design curriculum;
- To facilitate by finding experts on curriculum preparation (Informant No.3-Interview).

Here, all informants confirms that each military training centers and colleges have a responsibility and authority to prepare and design the curriculum due to this, at each training centers and colleges there is a department section of curriculum (informants No.1,2,3,4,5,6,8 and 9 interview).

### 4.4. Policy Implications in Realization of Modern Education and Training for the Army

#### 4.4.1. Education and Training Policy

The Defence has worked focusing on the arms capacity building, for example, the defence’s strategic plan main focus is human development which includes, improving the arms academic status using different means, establishing of basic capacity building institutions, educating of professional army members within and outside the country in order to use them as instructors and in different important work places (MNDAS-F,G; Informants No. 1,2,4 and 5-interview).

In relation to these, both the informants and available written documents alike agreed that, the focus of training policy and strategy is on creating combat capability. It has three interconnected strategies, such as institutional training, unit training, and self-development.

- **Institutional Training:**
  - To train Military personnel in military schools, training centers, academies and colleges.

- **Unit Training:**
  - Used to prepare soldiers and leaders for unit mission
  - All units concentrate on improving and sustaining unit task proficiency
  - Unit training is the responsibility of the unit leaders and commanders.
- **Self-development**
  - Self-development is the individuals responsibility
  - Commands at all levels create an environment that encourages subordinates to establish personal and professional development (MoNDAS-A and B).

It applies in long and short period of time and by the individual activities respectively to promote the soldiers capability in mission accomplishment. Based on the human development manual, all army members must participate/get training for their award and promotion, no member of the army can get these promotions and responsibilities without getting those level trainings, but it doesn’t mean that after the accomplishment of the training they are promoted and wear the sign, rather they are prepared for promotion and responsibility. In case if someone has got the rank and responsibility before training, he must enforced to take back the training. But some one can get the professional responsibility before taking leaders training (MoNDAS-A, B and D; Informants No.3-interview).
According to the above training policy, obligations to pass all army members and officers to pass through sequential training is the most important issue in the arms career development and culture, every member of the army, from the binging of his/her service up to the end he/she should informed and aware of to pass through
As depicted in the above organizational structure of institutional training starting from the basic military training, lower to the higher up to General War College trainings are included as a shape of escalation. In addition to this horizontally different staff’s professional trainings are included as part of Institutional training by using the stationary institutional infrastructures to share on the creation of strong infantry’s building (MONDAS-A and B).

However, when the researcher try to see the Ethiopian army’s tradition, this culture is not well adapted throughout the institution, specially most Officers are promoted to the higher rank and responsibility without getting any additional training to their new responsibility and assignment, instead of the Officers go to the next rank and responsibility by improving their skills, knowledge, and competency, then this makes them inactive and not competency in their assigned new responsibility. In which this is the worst in the arms culture and needs to change revise throughout the institution in the near future (Informants No.4, 2, 3, 8&9-Interview).

4.4.3. The Role of the Military Training Centers and Colleges in Modernizing of the Army

According to both the informants and available written documents there are different military training centers and colleges that give modern military training and education for the army. These Military Training Centers and Colleges are found in different parts of the country. These training institutions are:

- Ethiopian Defence Command and Staff College (Addis Ababa)
- Awash combined Army Academy (Awash Sebat)
- Major General Hayelom Araya Military Academy (Holeta Genet)
- Joint Military Staff College (Mekelle)
- Special Forces Training Center (Bilate)
- Tolay NCOs Training Center (Tolay)
- Hurso Basic Military Training Center (Hurso)
- Birsheleko Basic Military Training Center (Birsheleko)

It was stated in chapter two, the idea of establishing (building) a standing or modern national army in Ethiopia goes back to the time of emperor Tewodros II. As we have seen in the historical development of the Ethiopian armed forces, the previous as well as today’s regime in
Ethiopia had their own officers training centers, organization, purpose, consistency, integration, and task etc.

After the downfall of the Dergue regime in 1991, the former National Defence Forces were disbanded and the EPRDF forces were entrusted to the task of maintaining the national security of the country for the transitional period. Later on, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) proposed to transform its national liberation armies to establish a national wide standing and professional national defence forces.

In fact it was not continued immediately as the ministry of national defence, there was a gap from 1991-1995. Despite to this, the Ministry of national defence had begun to offer different Officers courses at Bella (in Addis Ababa) since 1994 (Informants No.7 interview).

The cadet course was began in 2001, at Awash Arba and two batches were Graduated there. Then after, in 2002 the “Ethiopian Military Academy” was re-opened at a place called Hurso which graduated consecutively three batches short term attended Officer Cadets. In addition, in 2005 the MoND which has an intention to modernize its armed forces decided to re-establish Cadet School with formal standard of international cadet academy and it was officially opened by the name of “Major General Hayelom Araya Military Academy” (MGHAMA) again at Holeta Genet (Informants No.9-Interview).

Both oral informants and the curriculum of the MGHAMA stipulated that, the Academy has the mission to provide the highest standards of focused training on the professional, intellectual, physical, and leadership and to build a well-disciplined Officer Cadet both Morally as well as ethically. To train Cadets who integrate themselves with new technologies, corporate and modern practice with view to providing the armed forces competent potential junior leaders with high standard of integrity and loyalty (Informant No. 9-interview).

Moreover, the mission of the Academy is to produce competent Second Lieutenants (Line Officers) who are deeply committed to their profession and simultaneously respect and stand loyal to the FDRE constitutions. The Academy shoulder a responsibility to produce young Officers, with appropriate Military skills and knowledge required for leading small sub-units both during war and peace time (Curriculum of the MGHAMA, 2008: p.8).
Higher Officer’s training: from 1994-1997 several short courses training were offered to Ethiopian Higher Officers at Bella, Addis Ababa, but because of the Ethio-Eritrean war the training was interrupted (informants No.8-interview). In January 2006 the Ethiopian Defence Command and Staff College (EDCSC) has officially established at a place called “Jan Meda”, Addis Ababa with a mandate to train Higher Military Officers. Since then the College receives higher officers both from ground forces and air force who completed grade 12 or college graduates in Diploma or BA degree. The college also received students of neighboring or friend nations such as from South Sudan, Somaliland and soon from Rwanda. It is also responsible to provide short-term program training for Higher Officers, which lasted for about six months (Curriculum of the EDCSC; informants No.8-interview).

The mission of the EDCSC is to prepare selected military leaders for the responsibilities of operational leadership and to educate current and future leaders on the development and employment of forces in multinational, joint and interagency environment. The EDCSC will develop critically thinking leaders of character who have trust and confidence for the constitution as well as by themselves, are operationally and strategically minded, proficiency in joint matters, and skilled joint war fighters. The EDCSC is also responsible for research and development, and support doctrinal, national security and military issues (curriculum the EDCSC; informants No.1, 4, & 8-interview).

Combined Army Academy (CAA) It has established in 2008 at Awash Sebat and receives Higher Officers from all ground forces, which have a diploma or completed grade 12 to be graduates by BA degree program. The mission of the CAA is to play a key role in strengthen the capacity of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces by producing competent and constitutionally committed tactical level combined arms commanders, who can efficiently accomplish their national, regional, and international mission. Moreover, the mission of CAA is to conduct research and providing military consultancy services for the combined arms unit of the ENDF (CAA curriculum 2008: p.8).

Joint Military Staff College (JMSC): This College has established in July 2008 at Mekelle by combining four faculties, these are:

- Logistic Faculty
• Military Communication Faculty
• Military Intelligence Faculty; and
• Combat Engineering Faculty.

Before they held the current name—‘Joint Military Staff College’; they were named differently, some of them called as College and others called as Academy (Informants No.1, &3-interview).

Mission of the Joint Military Staff College is providing quality training in the area of intelligence, communication, combat engineering, and logistic management fields. To conduct a relevant research in art and science of intelligence, communication, combat engineering, and logistics. Furthermore, the college shouldered to provide consultancy service and capacity building service to various army units and the community the (Curriculum of JMSC, 2004: p.6).

4.4.4. The Role of Foreign Military Assistance in Qualifying of the Army

As the researcher depicts in chapter two of the research one elements of the Defence Forces capability is foreign military alliance and assistance. This involves the “status of alliances that can change opposing force ratios significantly … [and] the quality of alliance commitments under various conditions”, in terms of military units, armaments, and trainings likely to made available for the armed forces of the state” (Jordan, 1993: p.28).

In this case, all informants confirms that the MoND have problems with educated and trained manpower. Thus, to tackle such problems the MoND has been opened various military colleges and Academies to qualify and modernize its armed forces. In addition to this, the Ministry has been brought different foreign military instructors and advisors in Defence Colleges to teach for some military courses which are not covered by the Ethiopian instructors. Concurrently the MoND in every year has been sent some members of the army to train in abroad military colleges and training centers (MONDAS-E; Informants No.1, 3, &6-interview).

As my informants stated that the main rationale in sending members of the army to train in the abroad is to enhance the capacity of the institution as well as to train them as efficient
commanders, staff members, and instructors. The duration for training is either for short time or long time. Short term training lasted from one month up to one year; and mostly this type of training is free charge training (without any fee) and the medium of instruction is English. The long term training lasted more than a year or from one to seven years and the medium of instruction are French, English, and Russian, and this type of training offered by foreign countries through full-payment, half-payment and without fee (free payment training) (MONDAS-E; Informants No. 1,3,&6-interview).

Different types of training are given by different foreign countries to MoND. These are as follows:

- Middle and Higher Command Training;
- General Command and Staff Training;
- Combined Army War Command and Staff Training;
- Mechanized Command and Staff Training;
- Combat Engineering and Staff Training;
- Communication and Staff Training;
- Logistic and Transport Staff Training;
- Intelligence Training for Middle and Higher Officers;
- Military Topography Training;
- Radio Electronics War Training;
- Air Born Training;
- Air Defence Command and Staff Training; and
- Air Command and Staff Training;
- Different Medical Specialties Training. (MONDAS-E; Informants No.3,6-interview).

According to the key informants the role of foreign military assistance and alliance is not only on offering of training and education but also in advising assisting and establishing of different military colleges. Some of these countries are:

- The U.S.A. Defence Forces: The US DoD has been assist to the FDRE MoND on establishment of the EDCSC by sending different military instructors, by helping on curriculum development, books, and training manuals. Furthermore, the US department
of Defence assists different equipments and materials on peacekeeping, combat engineering, air force and medical equipment. The US also actively working with the ENDF on combating terrorism (Informants No.1, 3, 6-interview).

- **Israel**: The Israeli Military instructors were taught in Mekelle Joint Military Staff College on Faculty of Military Communication and intelligence. The MoND the Human Resource requirement and selection system was also brought from Israeli (Informant No.2, - Interview).

- **Republic of Ukraine**: at Awash Arba Technical Combat School simulators were brought from the republic of Ukraine (Informants No.1-interview).

- **India**: There are nine military instructors at MGHAMA who teach Officer Cadets at the academy and the MoND request different military instructors for Mekelle and Awash Colleges too. In addition to this the Indian Government on the program of the ITEC different Military training and education offered for the ENDF without fee.

- **China**: the China People’s Armed forces is the second free offering training for the ENDF (Informants No.1-interview).

- **Russia**: The Russian Federation Armed Forces is the biggest offering training in military and academy profession for the ENDF. Around 60-70 members of the ENDF are now in training in Russia. The Russian Federation offering of the training has three ways/types (these are: free pay training, half-payment training, and full-pay training) (Informants No.1, 3, 6-interview).

The same informant confirms that the sending members of the ENDF for training and education in the abroad will be diminishing in the coming three years (Informant No.1-interview).

4.4.5. Recruitment, Selection and Placement

To build-up capable national defence forces of any state manpower is a central component. The availability of manpower for the common defence of the country’s national security therefore is determined by the size of its usable manpower-quantity and quality of the manpower. The quantity and quality of the citizenry of the state will determine how large the military can be maintained, and how well it well fights. The quality of the manpower includes the age, health
condition, education and other standards set by the Ministry of defence to recruit manpower (Mesfin, 2008: p.76).

4.4.5.1. Recruit Quality

The Military’s ultimate purpose is to deter war, and if that fails, to prevail in the ensuring conflict. “The object of crating an army is not to be fair; it is not to be economical, it is to fight a war; it is to meet the enemy in combat and to smash him” (Bandow, 1990: p.111). Thus the most important standard for a prospective soldier is whether he can fight well.

However, the only true measure of combat ability is battle itself, in which new recruits obviously have not been engaged. Unfortunately, no paper and pencil quit can adequately gauge an examinee’s ability to perform consistently, under stress, as part of a team. As a result, the military is forced to rely on a variety of such standards to measure enlistee quality (Bandow, 1990: p.111-112).

According the informant, the MoND now carefully screens recruits for intelligence and skills for new recruit soldiers, NCOs and Cadet for the purpose of assigning (placing) them to a job. The MoND use for selection the following system:

1. psychometric Test
2. Evaluation Activities.

Psychometric Test: a test using computer on the asking of question like aptitude to assess the potential knowledge of the recruited. This aptitude test seek to discover the natural talent of an aspirant in a specific area of learning or practice associated with the job. Different jobs require different aptitudes and selection must be done as requirements. Aptitudes may be word fluency, reasoning, spatial, numerical or memory aptitude etc (Informant No. 2- interview).

Evaluation Activities: this is to evaluate the recruited trainees’ activities when she/he was in the training center. This evaluation is done by the instructors (Informant No.2-interview). Then, using these two methods of selection the result will send to computer data base. Based on the result the new recruited army will be assigning or placing at the right work place.
the MoND will consider the new recruited trainees background that he/she has a certificate, diploma, or B.A./Bsc. Degree (Informant No.2-interview).

According to the informants, this selection process/method also used by the MoND for the NCOs and Officers classifications. This means those who are in the army service for promotion purpose (Informant No.2-interview).

According to the training policy, the recruitment and selection criteria for new army (for basic military training) are:

- Should be volunteer to serve in the army
- High school graduate (minimum of 10th grade, in new education policy)
- Pass physical and medical test
- No criminal records
- Committed to serve in the armed forces (contract 7 years)
- Age 18-25 years old
- Duration for training is 6 months

NCOs Training Schools: there are different NCOs training schools for different levels of NCOs:

- One senior NCO training school (for intermediate and senior NCOs)
- Four Junior NCOs training schools (for squad or team leaders and platoon sergeants)
- Duration of the training 2-4 months for each

Selection criteria for Squad leaders Training:

- It is a primary NCO leadership training
- To be a squad/team leader at the rank of Corporal, it is mandatory to pass through the squad leader training; and
- Private soldiers and Lance Corporals with 2-3 years service can join the squad leader training.

Selection criteria for platoon sergeant training:

- It is a short tactical and leadership training for promotion of Corporals to Platoon sergeants.
Selection Criteria for Company sergeant and quarter Master training:

- Senior sergeant training for promotion to the rank of Company quarter master and company sergeant;
- 2-3 years service at the rank of platoon sergeant.

Selection criteria for regiment quarter master and sergeant major training:

- Senior NCOs training for promotion to the rank of regiment quarter master and sergeant major;
- 2-3 years service at the rank of company sergeant.

Selection criteria for Cadet training:

- A training of Officer candidates to be an Officer
- Recruited from the unit (armed forces) with minimum of 2 years service
- High school graduates
- Well disciplined
- Pass aptitude test and field screening
- Training programs:
  - Short course (6-9 months) for senior sergeants with maximum 35 years old
  - Long-term training (5 years) with maximum of 28 years old for degree program.

Selection criteria for Officers specialty training:

- This type of training covers for basic professional training which includes infantry, tank, artillery, anti-air craft artillery, combat engineering, military communication, intelligence, and logistic.
- It is a mid-level Officers training for a regiment, division command and staff duties
- Required 4-5 years service in the armed forces at rank of captain.
- Age: maximum 35 years.
- Training institutions:
  - Combined Army Academy
  - Military Joint Staff College
Selection criteria for Ethiopian Defence Command and Staff College:

- It is a senior Officers training for operational and strategic positions;
- Admission Requirement:
  - Rank: Lt.Colonel-Colonel
  - Minimum High School Graduate
  - Age: Maximum 40 years old
- Focus areas for training is leadership, strategy and Operation (Curriculum of EDCSC, 2008).

With regard to sending abroad for training the selection criteria were both oral sources and written documents confirms that, it depends on type and duration for the training. This means, for those who will go for longtime training, at least their academic background should be 12 grades complete in the old curriculum and 10 grades complete in the new education policy and their age should be not more than 35 years old. This type of training includes medicine, military topography, radio electronics war (MONDAS-E; Informant No.3,6-interview). And those who will go for short time training, their academic background is the same with long-term training and their age should be below 42 years old. This type of training is mostly below a year like Command and Staff Training. In addition to this, there are criteria, that are the person should be active member of the armed forces, mentally and physically should be fit (MONDAS-E; Informant No.3-interview).

According to the manual on foreign training and the regulation policy, those who were selected based on the above criteria the selection process was approved by the selection and recruitment board. This board had a committee from the TMD (Chair person), Operation Main Department, Intelligence Main Department, and Administration and Education Departemnt (MonD, 2006: p.28). To facilitate the foreign training the mandate was given for the section of foreign training follow-up under the TMD. However, at this time this whole process of the criteria for the selection was given to the Defence Human Resources Management Main Department (Informant No.3-interview). In addition, the issue of placement for those who graduated from abroad and here in different military training College has remained as the responsibility of the Defence Human Resource Management Main Department. The TMD just only has a responsibility to provide proposal (Informants No.3&6-interview).
4.4.6. The Five Year Strategic Plan and Policy in Capacity Building of the Army

In chapter two of the thesis, it was stated that the fundamental feature of the international system is anarchy, the absence of any central control. In that the primary objective of states is to ensure survival. Consequentially, states are forced by the “realities of the system to acquire security through their own efforts” (Sheehan, 2006: p.17). They can do this either by “building up their own military strength or by developing clever strategies that will give them advantage over the other states in the system (Sheehan, 2006: p.17).

Thus the process of building a capable national defence forces is based on its objective and security threat analysis setting vis-à-vis external threats. The objectives of building capable defence forces “includes definitions of... [Vital] national...interests, together with a specification of those that are vital, important, or secondary” (Arllinghaus, 1984: p.5). In line with this therefore, Ethiopia’s objective of building defence forces is to protect the country’s national security and its constitutional order from internal and external threats (MoND, 2006: p.18).

Based on the objective of building capable defence forces, the ENDF has embarked on a five years strategic plan by assessing the internal capacity limitations within the defence forces. In that strategic plan has been set in the way to answer the questions of what is the current situation in the defence force, what should be its posture in the near future, and what should be done to assume its posture vis-à-vis Ethiopia’s external threats (Wugagen Gazette, 2006: p17).

The strategic plan identified that there were capacity limitations within the national defence forces. These capacity limitations were largely reflected in terms of not understanding the country’s constitution and the role of the national defence forces in protecting the country’s constitutional order. There were also lack of clear rules and principles to guide the roles and functions of defence forces. Accordingly in the process of building capable defence forces, by resolving internal limitation, the strategic plan set the vision and mission of the ENDF and the means by which they are made successful. It set the vision as follows:

Building a capable and modern national defence forces which is absolutely loyal to the Constitution and constitutional order, ready to protect and safeguard the country and the people
from any threat effectively; and plays significant role in continental and international peacekeeping activities (MoND, 2006: p.15).

The army regularization and modernization had begun as early as 1997 when the 1995 FDRE Constitution was ratified. The defence forces organization, command and control, recruitment roles as well as responsibilities were defined based on the constitutional framework and guiding principles (Halefom, 2008:, p.66). It was in such a way that the reform program was launched.

In the first phase of the reform and transformation program which was of course interrupted as a result of the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean war, had many projects under it. The essential projects under the first phase of the reform and transformation program were:

- Demobilization of the disabled from all army units, who have been fighting in the armed struggle to overthrow the Derge regime. The demobilization of the disabled personnel was followed by the demobilization of a huge number of the Tigrean fighters, this was to balance the Tigrean nationalities with other Ethiopian nations and nationalities in the new armed forces;
- New recruitment from other nations and nationalities;
- Organize the regular head quarters, units and command and control systems;
- To launch an intensive training programs this was actually the core. The training was aimed at integrating and standardizing of all members and units, at all levels and to create common ground/integration upon which the new regular military working framework can be setup;
- The doctrine, which was proved to be successful during the armed struggle was radically revised in an attempt to accommodate, with the ongoing political transformation and the building of regular national armed forces with new roles and responsibilities;
- In accordance with the revised doctrine the military science and art, with its strategies, were equally revised; and
• New army organizations and standards were also endorsed with an objective to regularize the armed forces and establish also formal working systems (Halefom, 2008: p.67-68).

Thus the first integrated military reform and transformation efforts which were aimed at creating a relevant and affordable regular National Defence Forces was suddenly, however, interrupted due to the Ethio-Eritrean war (Halefom, 2008: p.69).

In post Ethio-Eritrean war the MoND launches the second phase of reform and transformation program. In this phase aims at:

- Articulation of the institutions vision, mission, and values;
- Articulate and state organizational mission statement;
- Define the roles and responsibilities of different bodies;
- Resolve the internal capability limitations; and
- Build small size but capable national defence forces and who believe in the country’s constitution and committed to protect it from any threat (Halefom, 2008; and Mesfin, 2008).

Thus, MoND has been in the process of implementing reform and transformation programs to build reliable and capable defence forces which can either deter potential security threats or face and defeat them if the situation demands.

Here the issue of manpower should be underlined that quantity is not the only element of manpower as a factor challenging the MoND efforts to building capable defence forces. The quality of the manpower also is a determinant element. Physical fitness, reliable fighting readiness, educational background to use modern and sophisticated weapons and fighting principles and doctrines are identified as the basic determinant elements of manpower quality (Wugagen, 2006: p.5). As weapons, military principles and doctrines become more complex, the defence forces need to recruit smart people capable of using and handling of weapons and using them.

In this regard Ethiopia’s manpower quality in terms of educational background was at low level because of the country’s low economic capacity to expand educational centers through
out the country. Currently, however, Ethiopia’s nation-wide educational and capacity building programs are being implemented. Primary education is reaching large segments of the population, while secondary education is “growing substantially. A national army drawn from an enlightened population, and provided with training in military theory, military science and techniques would definitely become successful in carrying out its duties” (MOI, 2003: p.47). But, the limitation or challenge is to what extent those educated people can be diverted for armed forces.

4.5. Data Analysis

The main purpose of the thesis is to investigate the institutional arrangement of the FDRE TMD in the realization of modern training and education and its role in modernizing the Ethiopian Defence forces.

In this regard the researcher made interviews with eight Higher Military Officers, three of whom are General Officers who are responsible in designing, directing, controlling and evaluating the training and education policy of the MoND, four of whom are Colonels who are department heads in the TMD and Defence Main department, two of whom are academic deans for military colleges. In this regard, 36 open-ended questions were prepared on the basis of the major research question and assumptions. The data gathered from the interviewees are therefore analyzed as follows.

Before delivering into the data, a point that needs worth mentioning is that in the course of field work to collect data, a unique characteristic of the TMD among/between departments and their relationships with military training centers and colleges was observed. Responses to questions relating to the institutional arrangement of the TMD and the activities of military training centers and colleges from different informants were merged with different documents. Hence I will try to condense and summarize the various answers given by the informants into one in accordance to the following research questions:

- Has the Training Main Department (MTD) of the Ministry of National Defence Force full-fledged institutional set-up in the realization of modern training and education?
- Has the Training Main Department training and education policy and strategy?
• How is the Training Main Department organized? And what looks like its institutional arrangement?
• Have the Training Main Department a clear, objectives, goals, Mission, and mandate in realizing modern training and education for the army?

4.5.1. Analysis

Most of the informants emphasized on the newly introduced style of structure that is "decentralization". Giving mandate, power and responsibility to the training centers and colleges, that is to be self administration can make them capable by themselves. Here, the main objective of decentralization is to minimize the bureaucracy chains, means each military training centers and colleges have an access to communicate directly with defence main department in matters of finance and budget, human power, logistics or in all matters of administration. However, on the issues of training and education are expected to get advice from the TMD.

In the words of informant No. 1, “...this new structure of decentralization is not well studied by the concerned body and there is a clear overlap of mandate....” (Interview). According to the informants, to realize its objective, goals, mission, and mandate, the TMD should have to study, revise or see the new structural system.

Each college’s has clear mission and stated in their respective documents, having these mission is considered as preconditions for each college, it provides them inspiration and challenge to all members of the college towards an ideal of what the college can become. Purposefully, it can serve them as a critical driven force and as a bridge in the present and future efforts and change. However, the mission is not fully implemented as it is stated, because the desire of the mission is wide and overlaps with the mission of the MTD and all colleges mission is not interdependently and systematically arranged, known and applied as institution to bring institutional competency and change rather than stand independently. Moreover, most of the colleges are weak institutions in terms of qualified, capable, knowledge and certified their academic staffs. Here, most informants confirm that, “Almost in all colleges there is a challenge with regard to instructors especially in military science and art”.
In the issue of curriculum, in all colleges it is a copy-paste from Western Military Institutions not reflected the practical reality of Ethiopia. Furthermore, the curriculum of most Colleges had been revised more than two/three times. This shows that the revision of the curriculum is without seeing its results. This is true in EDCSC, “within three years the curriculum revised four times”. And the other problem with designing the curriculum is, almost most college are not uses the experts in their curriculum.

Accordingly, to all informants and written documents, the MoND has clear training policy and strategy, because there is visible hierarchical training development, but, it is not properly functional. This training policy is purposefully, articulated by the authoritative body for relatively long period of time to guide the general direction of the armed force training career development from the bottom to the higher level. This training policy known throughout the army members from the higher to the lower level or individual members of the army to prepare them to pass through the process in each level of training. However, the training policy and strategy is simply put in the paper. Moreover, once the MoND after prepared and opened this training policy until now the MoND not yet make any impact assessment and not evaluated its result.

As a result this may affect the defence members of the army in building of modern capable and regular way of thinking, to promote according to his/her merit from the lower up to higher level through regular training and competition.

Military Doctrine is the fundamental principles by which defence forces guide their military actions and operations in support of their objective of safeguarding national security. In addition, it is a “system of a multitude of factors which shapes a military establishment and furnishes a guide for the employment of its forces” (FDRE Air Force, 2004: , p.56).

Accordingly, the current Ethiopian defence doctrine has been strictly designed based up on defensive doctrine. This doctrine has served to determine the size, military strategy, organization and trainings of the defence forces to ensure the integration of potentials for military capability and direct their military actions against enemy forces (MoND, 2005: p.35).
The colleges are also incapable to carry out the teaching and learning process in terms of instructors, they are still covered by foreign instructors, and the other big issues is that all colleges do not have the same training doctrine, because some of them use American instructors and their doctrine, others use the Russian instructors and their doctrine.

Selection in the military starts from the very beginning, private soldiers who fulfill the set criteria are selected from the society and then they enter to the basic military training centers. In this center they got basic military courses for 6-months and they graduate by acquired basic military skills which are in their profile. After some year’s service, those soldiers serve as a big source to select for the next different military professions. For the Cadet course candidates may selected only from active members of the armed forces.

At the current situation for the Officer’s who select to train in Cadet Academy, combined army academy, joint military staff college, and command and Staff College are received trainees not in appropriate way or listed criteria. The reasons to happen this problem are may be two things. These are:

I. The historical and academicals background of the army. This is because of the armed forces struggle from 1974-1991 most Officers had not got regular training throughout their career development come to higher level of leadership through their experience.

II. The late establishment of the present training colleges because most of the military colleges were opened after Ethio-Eritrean war.

Most of the Officers are selected to each college from different selected units based on the college’s specific criteria’s. However, the selected units are not prioritized the interest of the institution or the criteria rather than they give priority to their own interest. These selection problems are expressed by sending of trainees who are over age Officers, low academic status, weak job performance, and Officers who are idle.

There are also problems recipient colleges concerning. Instead of correcting rejecting the unqualified Officers by sending them back to their units, they receive and train the officers who are not fit to the set criteria. This implies that the aim of all colleges may fail to achieve the expected results at the end of the course.
The purpose of establishing training colleges are to strengthen the arms capability by training competent officers in the completely fulfilled the selection criterias’. The ministry has an objective to bring a radical change in the army’s capacity building activities, but practically it is not observed that rather than contradicting with the aims of the MoND.

4.5.1.1. Manpower

To start with the manpower, as the other elements are attributes of qualified manpower, it is taken as the center of gravity to the effort of building defence forces. The availability of manpower for the common defence of the country’s national security, therefore, is determined by the size of its usable manpower-quantity and quality of the manpower. The quality of the manpower includes the age, health, education and other standards set by the needs of the defence forces to recruit manpower.

Thus, Ethiopia’s population ultimately is its strength providing manpower necessary to defend the state from external threats. However, the country’s economy determines it. It is true that the level of economic development and the conditions of manpower fit for military services of the country have direct relationships. The country with better economic development level will have healthy and educated population to recruit manpower ready for the military services. Accordingly, Ethiopia’s low level of economic development is resulted as a challenge and makes difficulties to build and establish modern national defence forces.

Here, it should be underlined that the quantity is not the only element of manpower as a factor challenging of the ENDF’s efforts to building capable defence forces. The quality of the manpower also is a determinant element. Physical fitness, reliable fighting readiness, educational background to use modern and sophisticated weapons and fighting principles and doctrine are identified as the basic determinant elements of manpower quality. So in this regard, the MoND need to recruit smart people form civil people.

4.5.1.2. Defense infrastructure, facilities, and services

The task of army building requires many resources and inputs to achieve its goals. The critical requirements in such a complicated process are infrastructures and facilities such as quality
maintenance centers, health service centers and research and developments centers, library, laboratory, computer centers etc are critical for army building in general.

With this regard, innovative and comprehensive trainings have paramount importance as weapons become more advanced and the nature of war continues to change dramatically. Moreover, as the military services are various (infantry, artillery, air force, mechanized, and Special Forces), the individual services must train their personnel to full fill their specific tasks. Indeed, history is repeat with examples of small, well-trained forces have successfully defeated larger armies.

MoND therefore has expanded its different military training centers and colleges as part of its efforts to build-up capable defence forces. These training centers and colleges have been playing their decisive roles to make the members of the defense forces familiar with modern fighting material and principles of war and doctrine and to make them loyal to, and stand firm in upholding, the country’s constitution.

The MoND divides its training centers and colleges into different categories. These training centers can be categorized broadly as basic military service training centers, officer’s acquisition training centers or colleges and specialized skill training centers/Colleges.

In basic military training centers, all recruits, whether joining the active defense force or reserve force, receive initial training that provide them with the basic skills (basic military training and political indoctrination) that are required by all members of the military service involved before going into services. Currently, the situation of the basic training centers are under main TMD for the purpose of training. There training centers are:
- Hurso Basic Military Training Center; and
- Birsheleko Basic Military Training

These training centers have a problem with infrastructure and facilities. This is expressed that they accept new recruits more than their capacity and this have an impact on dormitory, dining and other services. With regard to the officers training centers/Colleges give trainings that qualify these recruited among the ranks of the defense forces for officers services. These training centers/colleges are:
The specialized skills training centers/colleges train members of the defiance forces on active duty in diverse skills, as necessary, considering their individual disposition and competence. These training centers/colleges are:

- Joint Military Staff College;
- Combined Army Academy;
- NCOs training center; and
- Commando, Air Born, Special Forces School.

While we observe the above stated training centers/Colleges organization, teaching aid materials, libraries, laboratories, internet services and their building facilities and services have not enough in provide the required services for the trainees. Moreover, all colleges are not strongly established relationships with each other as well as with TMD through networks to facilitate their learning and teaching process.

Meanwhile, the availability of standardized capacity building for those training centers and colleges is very urgent and critical. If not the ongoing military transformation program can not succeed with out such capacities. The lack of standard infrastructures and facilities is aggravated because of the serious lack of long-time institutionalized military infrastructures in Ethiopia. Despite the fact that Ethiopian military have a long-aged history, the new Ethiopian military is very young, it has no any inherited significant military infrastructure and facilities including organized training centers and military professionals from the previous regimes. Thus, in order to achieve the aimed goals the TMD gave highest priority for the enrichment of the capacity building of those several training centers and colleges.

4.5.1.3. Organizational linkage of TMD

Operational capabilities of a modern army greatly depend on the nature of the way it is organized. Organization in modern military institutions refers to the general and specific proper arrangement of various conditions such as command and control system, fighting forces, Logistics, training, military intelligence, communication and various auxiliary units.
Unnecessary bureaucratic networks in the army structure not only reduce its efficiency but may cause serious damages into the force at times of war. Ill-organized training systems are likely to produce unqualified or not well-trained army, leading to questionable state security.

With this regard, the institutional arrangement of TMD and its departments within is almost at the current situation non-functional. This is because the TMD is announced that the new way of structure and that is a “decentralization”. Here as clearly discussed in the discussion part, defense training centers and colleges have a mandate to communicate with defense main departments in matters of administration and finance. Just the only that consulates with TMD is about training and education.

The departments in TMD like curriculum and planning section, operation training department, department of human resources development project, foreign training sections, and general service departments are not able to discharge (accomplish) their duties and activities as their systems are paralyzed.
Chapter five: Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1. Conclusions

The government of FDR of Ethiopia has envisioned of the need for building and employing capable national defence forces to deter potential security threats before they launch attacks on Ethiopian, or to defeat them within a short time if they went to war. With this regard, the MoND has faced with critical challenges in its effort of building capable, qualified and modern defence forces.

This is true that in realization of the given mandate, the institutional arrangement of departments/sections under TMD are facing big challenges. Each departments/sections is not well organized with their staffs/manpower. Furthermore, the TMD launch the new approach of structure “Decentralization” that gives a mandate each military training centers and colleges to communicate directly with Defence Main Departments and this implies that over lapping of Mandate or activities with departments/sections under TMD.

As the researcher tried to examinee the mission of all Military Training centers and colleges is considered as a positive thing by itself, but they don’t able to achieve their mission correctly as it is stated on the paper. This can be expressed that, the mission of each military training center and colleges their missions by itself have lacks of institutional sense, it seems simply put independently.

Regarding defense training policy and strategy, there is a written policy, but it is not know by all training centers and colleges, regional army command, division command and by all army members in general it is not well applied. Since it is not well known throughout the army and not properly applied, the researcher can say that it is difficult for the MoND to apply training policy and strategy. Moreover, sources of selection for all training colleges are still from the army officers who do not pass through the sequential level trainings and not accumulated knowledge and skills through trainings. So currently, all training colleges have no additive nature of training.
Even though all colleges have their own academic criteria, there is a serious problem in this issue. Selections are not applied correctly according to the criteria’s and the interests of the institution. Most of the time, the selection lacks responsibility and those who are selected to train are low in academic status and above age etc. Due to these problems, most colleges enforced to give a preparatory course about two years for cadets and six moths for officers, and this implies all colleges to spare in unnecessary time and cost. In addition to this, some of the officers who were selected from grade 10 were suffered during the learning process as they did not fulfill the criteria. At the end, they were not qualified with required skill and knowledge, which lead the institution and the individuals disadvantaged.

5.2. Recommendations

On the basis of the data analysis and conclusion, this study recommends the following points, which could be implemented by the TMD in particular and by the MoND in general. Implementation of these recommendations may enhance the prospects of the ENDF to build and sustain capable defence forces with the posture of deterring or defeating enemy forces, and to preserve the country’s national security.

- The defence officer’s training policy and strategy needs to be revised and arranged. General direction of the training, organization of training centers/colleges from the lower up to the top level should be revised. The sequential flow and linkage of all colleges, source of selection for the next higher training, the basic knowledge and skills which is desired to create in each college or training center, the obligations of each officer to train and acquire the required skills throughout his life and this policy should also be known and well adapted by all army members and applicable by all responsible bodies.

- Organization of the training centers/colleges should be arranged. Currently the existed officers training centers/colleges are not logically and sequentially linked, there are breaks at the middle and at the top to keep the track and escalation of the officer’s career. Therefore, line officers training center and War College should be established. Because if there is no line officer training center, there is a nine years gap until the cadet graduated officers join to the combine army academy or other military colleges,
during the course of nine years they may lose their skills and knowledge. Also if there is no war college at the top, the officers career development is not full, high ranking officers and general officers who are graduated from command and staff college and other higher institutions should trained in this college to acquired the knowledge and skill of strategic military leadership.

- Mission of all training centers/colleges need to be revised. First of all the vision and the mission of all training centers/colleges should be carefully recognized/identified and then their mission can establish in three separate terms, such as what the college wants to accomplish in the short, middle and long period of time by considering the actual ground of the army officers availability for each period of time, otherwise if the mission is simply put to achieve the maximum range of the college, it may lack logical reasoning and practically may not achieve in the ground. All training centers/colleges mission should have institutional sense then simply put independently; it should have institutional sense than simply put independently; it should be consider what activates are done at the lower level training and at the next higher level training in order to make the linkage and sequential flow between them.

- Entry criteria’s should be deliberately created and centralized. Criteria’s can be relatively constant or variables, they can also be academic, non-academic ad other special considerations, but they must created carefully related with the actual availability of the source and demand of the training centers as well as the institution, if necessary it can be criticized by appropriate bodies before disseminating. After once approved, it should be clear, transparent and known by all members of the army and responsible bodies. Since it is criteria, it should be centralized and have an obligation to apply in every level of command to select trainees according toe admitting criteria’s. Even if there is a need to amend the criteria’s it should be centralized, otherwise the selection system may lack uniformity and failed in bringing the desired result.

- Duration of officers in all colleges need to be reduced. Currently deferent preparatory classes are given in each college for those long term trainee officers independently from six month to two years which is wastage for those officers in particular and for the Ministry of Defence in general. For example, cadet academy received candidates who completed grade ten (10), then educate them grade 11 & 12 for two years, finally they
trained cadet course for three years, after five years they graduated by BA degree, if a candidate join to the academy at the age of 24/25 years he/she graduated at the age of 29/30, therefore in addition to the time wastage no individual cadet graduated officer can reach at the rank of general officers through the proper way of promotion. My recommendation here is, cadet academy can receive candidates who completed grade 10, 12, and diploma and then they should directly start their regular cadet course program, but their graduation must be diploma and first degree respectively according to their entrance and the time duration for both courses can be arranged from two-three years.

- Students for EDCSC, CAA & JMSC are currently selected from grade ten (10) and then they are given a preparatory class for six months. After that they try to cover grade 11 & 12 classes parallel to their two years regular course of training in order to fulfilled the criteria’s to be graduated in BA degree program. So those high ranking officers pass about three years excess time in the training centers. This it is also a burden for them to cover all programs. Therefore, the researcher recommends that, officers who are selected for those colleges should complete grade 12 or diploma and above, and the preparatory classes which is currently given in Awash-sebat is not that much necessary and effective, because they can cover it in their unit in the form of on-job training since its focus is English language and basic computer knowledge, then directly they start their two years regular course.

- Curriculum of all training centers/colleges should be prepared, developed and revised by experts. In addition to this, the TMD should be prepare a workshop on preparation and development of curriculum for heads and concerned bodies of Military training centers and colleges.

- The TMD should revise the new-approach of administration structure, that is, “Decentralization”. The departments/sections at the TMD head Office have a problem with manpower, and over lapping activities. Thus, the researcher recommends fulfilling the necessary manpower who should be given a clear activities and mandates.

- Exploit all the positive potentials for military power. As potentials for military power and political values build capable defence forces, the MoND should exploit all the advantages to implement them in building capable defence forces. This is to say that
TMD should make efforts to develop the skills of all members of the defence forces and transform the opportunities at hand into real defence capability. This includes resolving internal capacity limitations of the defence forces through implementing reform and transformation programs.
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   C. የሆስMarks ዋላል ከፋ ይነስ መዝገቡ ከፋ ዋላል ከፋ (1995) እሆኔ እሳት የሆስMarks ከፋ መዝገቡ ከፋ ወን ይቹ
   
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   G. የሆስMarks ዋላል ከፋ ከፋ ከፋ ከፋ ከፋ ከፋ (1998) እሆኔ እሳት
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Appendix I

School of Graduate Studies
Institute of Educational Research
Interview Guide... General Framework

The purpose of this interview is to collect first hand information about institutional arrangement of ministry of defense of FDRE in realization of modern education and Training for the army: the case of Training Main Department. This study is believed to result in generating new ideas and approaches in realization of modern education and training for the Army. your honest responses will play a significant role in making this study a success. Therefore, you are kindly requested to make remarks on the following questions as freely and frankly as possible.

Thank you in advance for kind cooperation.

Semi structured interview guide for interviews

1. Questions for Head of ENDF Main Training Department

1.1. What is the mandate of main training department?

1.2. Has the main Training department full- flagged institutional set up in the realization of modern education and training? If yes, what are these institutional framework and how is the linkage of each departments with the main training department?

1.3. Has the main training department education, training policy and strategy? If yes, is it implemented on practical and what is the impact on the army and in the institution as a whole?

1.4. Does the main Training Department have guidance, regulations, and procedures for realization of modern Education for the Army? And what to be done more for realization of modern education and training for the Army?
1.5. How is the main training Department organized? And what looks like its institutional arrangement?

1.6. Institutional arrangements bring and bind organizations together for a certain common goal. So in line with this view, what mechanisms use the main training department to integrated each departments to achieve common goals?

1.7. What is the implication of the success or failure in realization of modern education and training for the Army?

1.8. What are the possible limitations in institutional arrangements of the main training department and what are the possible solutions to strengthen institutional set-up of main training departments in realizations of modern education?

2. Questions for main Training Head of Curriculum and Planning Department

2.1. What is the mandate of this department?

2.2. Who is responsible to evaluate the curriculum? And what are the criteria’s used for evaluation?

2.3. Does exist any actual/ potential conflict on preparing or revising the curriculum between this Department and military training centers/ colleges?

2.4. Does this Department have full of manpower (experts) in curriculum? And how is it organized?

2.5. What is the institutional linkage of this department with military training centers/ collages and with head of main training department?

2.6. In order to realize modern education for the army, as the head of curriculum and planning department what do you recommend for realization modern education for the Ethiopia defense forces.
3. Questions for Main Training Department Head of Foreign Training follow up Section

3.1. What is the mandate of this section?
3.2. What criteria use to select the trainees/ student to send abroad?
3.3. Do you think that the Ministry of Defense beneficiary from foreign training and academy institutions? If yes, what are the impact on the army and on the Ministry of Defense?
3.4. What is the linkage of this section with Training Main department and with Defense foreign relations and military cooperations?

4. Questions for academic Dean of Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff College

4.1. What is the mandate given to the Ethiopian defense command and staff college (EDCSE)?
4.2. The EDCSC is directly accountable to defense main training department so, how is the linkage of this college with main training department? And what is the role of main training department for this college?
4.3. Does any potential/ actual power conflict exist between this college and main training department?
4.4. The academic staff of this college is Ethiopian or foreigners? If they are Ethiopian how many of them qualified in military science or other academy specialization?
4.5. What are the limitations of this college in realization of modern education for the army?

5. Questions for Academic Dean of Maj. Gen Haylom Araya Military Academy

5.1. What is the mandate given to this military academy?
5.2. What is the linkage between this military academy and defense training main department?
5.3. This military academy does have any linkage with other authorized or legal institution if yes, who are these and what is their support/role for this military academy?

5.4. What are the limitations of this military academy in realization of modern education and training? And what are the possible solutions?

6. Questions for dupty Head of TMD and Head of Operation for Training and Education Department

6.1. What is the mandate of this department?

6.2. What are the linkages of this department with the head of Training Main Department and with Military training centers/colleges?

6.3. Does this department full of manpower?

6.4. As a dupty for head of Training Main Department how is the main training department organized? And what looks like its institutional set up in realization of model education and training for the Army?

6.5. What are the limitations in institutional arrangements of the training main department and what are the possible solutions to strengthen the institutional set up for training main department in realization of modern education and training for the army?

7. Questions for dupty Head of Defense Foreign Relations and Military Cooperation Department

7.1. What is the responsibility of this department?

7.2. What is the relationship of this department with defines training main department?

7.3. How the ministry of Defense gets different military training and education from foreign countries? And what are the types of the training and education?

7.4. Do you think that the Ministry of Defense beneficiary from foreign training and education? And what are impact on the army?
8. Questions for Dupty Head of Defense Research and Transformation Center

8.1. How do you see the development of army education and training that delivered by TMD?

8.2. What is the role of Defense Research and Transformation center in supporting for TMD?
# Appendix II

## List of Informants

Codes given to the respondents with the intention of keeping the names of the respondents confidential

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Position of the respondent</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Code</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Head of training main Department</td>
<td>11 Jan, 2011</td>
<td>Head H-1</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Head for human resource development project</td>
<td>16 Feb, 2011</td>
<td>Head H-2</td>
</tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Chief of secretary office in TMD and farmer head of foreign training follow-up section</td>
<td>23 Feb, 2011</td>
<td>Head H-3</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Deputy Head of TMD and Head of operation for training</td>
<td>23 Jan, 2011</td>
<td>DHH D-1</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Deputy Head of TMD and Head of curriculum and planning department</td>
<td>05 Feb, 2011</td>
<td>DHH D-2</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Deputy Head for Defense foreign relations and military cooperation's transformation center</td>
<td>03 March, 2011</td>
<td>DHH D-3</td>
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<td>Deputy head for defense research and transformation center</td>
<td>21 Dec, 2010</td>
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<td>19 March, 2011</td>
<td>Dean R-2</td>
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Appendix III

Organizational Structure of TMD

Service Provider departments

Head of TMD

Secretary office

General service provider department

Inspection department

Indoctrination Department
Appendix IV

Organizational Structure of TMD

2. Training follow up department and sections

- Head of TMD
- Secretary office of TMD
- Curriculum planning department
  - standard relevance and quality assurance
  - Curriculum development and revision
- Operation for training department
  - Planning and program for training and education
- Human resource development project department
  - Testing center
  - Selection and requirement
- Foreign training follow up section
Appendix V

3. Organizational Structure

Military Training Centers and Colleges

- Ethiopian Defense command and staff college
- Joint military staff college
- Combined army academy
- Major general Haylom Araya military academy

- Non commissioned officers school
- Special forces training school
- Harso basic Military training center
- Birsheleka military training center
DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and it has not been presented for a degree in any other universities. Hence, all sources and material used for this thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Name: Mamo Mekonnen Kesessa

Signature: ________________________________

Date: ________________________________

Place and date of submission: Addis Ababa University, June 15, 2010.

This Thesis has been submitted for the examination with my approval as a university advisor.

Name: Getachew Adugna

Signature: ________________________________

Date: 18/6/2010