THE ROLE OF IGAD’S HEGEMONS IN THE SOUTH SUDAN PEACE TALKS

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<td>AU</td>
<td>Africa Union</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>Compromise Deal</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Compromise Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
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<td>EPLF</td>
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<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Front</td>
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<td>GRSS</td>
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<td>HoA</td>
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ABSTRACT

South Sudan is the world’s youngest state that held hope for peace, prosperity and development as its independence was announced in July 2011. Yet, two years on the country descended into chaos. The failure of the South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to transform itself into a popular movement on the dawn of independence brought with it reasons for disagreement between its members. The culmination point was the outbreak of a war in December 2013 between forces loyal to Vice President Dr. Riek Machar Teny and President of South Sudan Salva Kiir. The dispute was soon framed under ethnic fault lines plunging the world’s youngest state into a bloody civil war. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was soon mandated as the mediating body to resolve the differences between the two contending personalities as well as manage the unfolding South Sudan crisis. Yet, it failed to do so being itself entrapped in a war of interest vis-a-vis the new state between its dominant member states. While Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan appointed each a Special Envoy for the IGAD Led South Sudan Peace Talks; Uganda deployed its troops in Juba to reassert itself as the big player in the neighbourhood. As such, the South Sudan Mediation Process became a platform of struggle between the four countries to surge out as a hegemon in both the mediation and by extension the Horn of Africa (HoA) region. This struggle stalled the Peace Talks for nearly two years with a standoff between Ethiopia and Uganda on the best way forward for the new South Sudan. Yet, an apparent surge of regionalism as a result of international pressure and revitalization of the mediation process under the IGAD Plus propelled a Compromise Deal (CD) on August 17 2015. This study, through the analysis of reports, articles and books as well as a series of unstructured interviews with key informants and respondents who worked in the peace process, analyses the interests of each of those four hegemons vis-à-vis South Sudan. It then looks at the different roles that are derived from these interests before concluding on the ways forward of IGAD and its viability as a mediating platform in the region.

Key words: IGAD, South Sudan, Hegemony, South Sudan Peace Talks
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The past two decades have witnessed the “balkanization” of the Horn of Africa (HoA). The failure of the state of Somalia, the coming about of an autonomous Puntland and a defacto Somaliland, a hostile Eritrea and last but not least a South Sudan, the world’s youngest state, that is being torn apart by a civil war are a few that can be cited. 2011 was a year that held hope for peace and development for South Sudan. However, it was not long before such hopes were overshadowed by accusations of corruption, mismanagement of resources and “authoritarian tendencies” of the Government of South Sudan (GRSS) as well as the failure of the liberation movement, the Southern People Liberation Movement (SPLM) to transform itself into a popular movement (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2014). The culmination point of these factors was the outbreak of a civil war between President General Salva Kiir Mayardit and his Vice President Dr. Riek Machar, veteran fighters of the Southern People Liberation Movement (SPLM). This was triggered by the dissolution of the Parliament by the President in July 2013 followed by a failed coup attempt by his Vice President in December 2013. The divide between the two personalities was soon framed under ethnic fault lines of Nuer against Dinka plunging the world’s youngest state into a bloody civil war.

In light of its objective of “promoting peace and stability in the region and create mechanisms within the region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter-State and intra-State conflicts through dialogue” (Inter-Governmental Authority on Developement (IGAD), 1996, p. 7), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was the first actor to intervene for the resolution of the South Sudan crisis. Inspired by the principle of subsidiarity enshrined in Chapter VII of the United Nations’ Charter, the 1992 Agenda for Peace Report by Boutros Boutros Ghali highlighted the importance of outsourcing the UN’s peace role to

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1 Four days after the crisis erupted on December 2013, the IGAD Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, H.E. Tedros Adhanom went on an emergency three day visit to Juba to convince conflicting parties to cease hostilities and consider a dialogue for peace (Inter-Governmental Authority on Developement (IGAD), 2013).
regional and sub-regional organizations. It underlined the role that Regional Economic Mechanisms (RECs) can play on the achievement of peace and security in their respective areas of influence (United Nations, 1992). In light of this, and with the new African paradigm of African solutions to African Problems, African RECs are best suited for the resolution of conflicts and the bringing about of sustainable solution in their particular neighbourhoods. This is further supported by the principle of subsidiarity of the African Union (AU) that calls upon regional clusters to have the first say in what occurs in their neighbourhood (African Union(AU), 2008). IGAD’s selection as the platform for the resolution of the South Sudan conflict is inspired by this paradigm, its acknowledgment of its peculiar knowledge of its volatile neighbourhood but most importantly its endorsement by the AU Peace and Security Council².

In fact, IGAD has a record of mediating conflicts in the volatile Horn region of which its member states are part of. These are in particular the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia, but also the settlement of the decades long Sudan-South Sudan civil war and eventually the cessation of the Republic of South Sudan through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Terlinden, 2004). IGAD was the right platform to tackle the outstanding issues between Kirr and Machar. The South Sudan Peace Talks/the IGAD led mediation for the Resolution of the South Sudan Conflict were thus initiated on January 4th 2015 under the leadership of Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin from Ethiopia, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo from Kenya and General Mohammed Ahmed Moustafa El Dabi from the Republic of the Sudan. (Inter-Governmental Authority on Developement(IGAD), 2014). After 22 months of tedious consultations and negotiations, several breached cease fires and pressure from both IGAD member states and the international community, a Compromise Deal (CA) was finally reached on August 2015.

Amongst the reasons for the failure to reach an agreement sooner in the South Sudan Peace Talks is the unfolding of a complex regional war of interests between

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² The Communiqué of the 411th Peace and Security Council of Heads of States and Governments states the support and encouragement to be given by the AU to the ongoing IGAD Led South Sudan Peace Talks led by the Special Envoys for South Sudan through the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) (African Union(AU), 2013).
the member states of IGAD (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2015). This is not a new phenomenon as many regional frameworks in the continent are at their infant stages of development paving way for competition between their members’ states interests. As Asnake (2015) argues, this is indeed well illustrated within the IGAD region (Kefale, 2015).

With the independence of South Sudan, its neighbouring states not only felt a sense of entitlement to the resources of the country but also a concern to the unfolding of events in this new state vis-à-vis their interests at stake. As such, two years since the South Sudan Peace talks have started; IGAD not only negotiated a peace deal between President Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar but also the interests of its hegemons: Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. The South Sudan Peace Talks have been the platform of a bitter rivalry between Sudan and Uganda, and a competition for diplomatic influence between Kenya and Ethiopia.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

This thesis will investigate the problem of the interplay between hegemony and regionalism into the mediation process of the South Sudan crisis, in understanding of the national interests of the specific hegemons cited above in the IGAD Region. This is in consideration of the fact that the region, especially the HoA operates as a regional security complex. As defined by Buzan, it is “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that, their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan, 1991, p. 190). However, this intricate intimacy when it comes to security in the region does not incentivize cooperation among the member states of the Horn or the four hegemons dealt with in this thesis. On the contrary, shared and dependant security concerns amongst Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda have created a bitter rivalry to emanate not only as a hegemon in the HoA but also in the IGAD Led South Sudan Peak Talks. This attests Sheehan’s argument that such complexes are

“held together not by the positive influences of shared interest, but by shared rivalries. The dynamics of security contained within these levels operate across a broad spectrum of sectors – military, political, economic, societal and environmental (Sheehan, 2005).”
It is further reiterated by Getachew Zeru (2015) who argues that the South Sudan Peace Talks and the IGAD platform for that matter of fact are at a cross roads because of the growing incompatibility of interests of the four hegemons in the South Sudan crisis. As put forth by Alexander Rondhos Special Representative of the European Union (EU) to the HoA, neighbouring states have the right and interest to have a say, and become front line states in any regional crisis that affects them. As such, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda do eventually have the right to protect their interest at stake as a result of the South Sudan crisis. Yet, the question remains as to whether they are playing a constructive role in the resolution of the conflict in parallel (Rondos, 2016).

According to Chinedu Thomas Ekwealor (2015), the achievement of peace and security in Africa is very much dependent on genuine cooperation of regional hegemons. The signing of the Comprehensive Agreement (CA), in August 2015, between Dr.Riek Machar and President Salva Kiir is reflective of this statement. In fact, many scholars (Mesfin (2015), Zeru (2015), de Waal (2016)) would argue that it was the moment where the national interests of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda aligned themselves.

1.3 Research Objectives

This thesis will mainly study the role and influence of regional hegemons on peace processes with emphasis on the South Sudan Peace Talks and examine whether a constructive role has been played by the mentioned IGAD member states in the Peace Talks. More particularly, it will

1) Discuss the respective national interests at stake for Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda vis-a vis the South Sudan crisis, and with it, the manner of their engagement in the South Sudan Peace Talks
2) Assess the influences of the four hegemons on the South Sudan mediation process in light of their particular interests
3) Anticipate the sustainability of the reached Compromise Deal
4) Make recommendations on IGAD’s model as a regional platform for future conflict resolutions in the Horn Region

1.4 Research Questions

With this in mind, this research deals with the following research questions in line with the research objectives stated above:

1) What are the national interests of the four “hegemons” with regards to the South Sudan crisis?

2) How do/did the national interests of each respective hegemon shape its role and influence in IGAD-Led Mediation Process for the Resolution of the South Sudan Conflict?

3) In light of this, what are the prospects for the sustainability of the reached Compromise Deal as well as the resort of IGAD as a mediation platform for conflicts in the HoA?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The IGAD Led South Sudan Peace Talks have been and still remain a subject of discussion in the global policy and academic circles to date. This research is aimed at providing an analysis of the peace talks from the point of the struggle for influence among Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. This is undertaken under the premise that there is no solution for South Sudan without the participation region. The HoA is a cross cultural, ethnic and religious platform where neighbouring states are intertwined politically, economically and socially. As such, it is no surprise that some IGAD member states seized the momentum of the events that happened on December 2013 to engage with each other on finding a sustainable solution to the newly independent state while protecting their respective interests (Rondos, 2016). This research presents and then analyses the national interests of the four dominant countries of IGAD in the IGAD-Led mediation for the South Sudan crisis to understand the roles that were played by each of them.
1.6 Delimitations of the study

This research is limited to the study of the role of IGAD’s hegemons in the South Sudan Peace Talks. The IGAD hegemons in this study are Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. This is following the premise that the four countries are the main IGAD member states engaged in the South Peace Talks. While Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan have appointed a Special Envoy for the IGAD-Led Mediation for the South Sudan crisis, Uganda is and was a party to the conflict with the deployment of its troops in Juba. Furthermore, the study of the respective roles of each of those member states will be undertaken under the life span of the mediation from January 2013 until the signing of the Comprehensive Deal (CD) between President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Dr. Riek Machar in August 2015. Events that occurred after this two year time period will be used to complement facts and findings of the study but will not be the main subject of this research.

1.7 Limitation of the Study

While undertaking this study, the researcher was faced with the following limitations. The first and foremost was the unavailability of many of the respondents from the IGAD Office of the Special Envoys for South Sudan (IGAD-OSESS) that were selected for interviews. As the mandate for the office ended with the signing of the CD, many of the selected respondents were unavailable. Additionally, although some of the respondents were found through snowball sampling, because of busy schedule and in many cases due to reasons of confidentiality and sensitivity of the matter, many were unwilling to take part in the interview prepared by the researcher. Out of those who agreed to be interviewed, many did not wish to be recorded and gave their answers on an “off record” basis. Finally, appointments over a long period of time and sometimes their cancellations were also an obstacle in the undertaking of this study.

1.8 Organization of the Study

The thesis is organized into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the research undertaken by presenting its objectives and questions in mind along with
the delimitations and limitations encountered. It then outlines the conceptual framework of the thesis by discussing the concepts of mediation, hegemony, and regionalism. This will be followed by the discussion of the research methodology where the selected research approach and method will be justified. The fourth chapter will then present the findings of the research and their analysis. It will present the different national interests of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda with regards to the South Sudan crisis. It will then discuss the roles that were played by each respective state as well the influences on the peace talks that came as a result. Finally, the last chapter summarizes the whole research by answering the research questions posed at the beginning, and ends by concluding remarks as to the prospects of the reached CA and the IGAD platform as a reliable peace and security platform in the HoA.
CHAPTER 2: MEDIATION, HEGEMONY AND REGIONALISM

The South Sudan crisis is often referred to as a regional crisis. It is not merely a crisis that descended upon the newly established state and its people as a result of the “feud” that occurred between the two personalities of the country. It is also and remains to be the arena where the IGAD member states play various roles to protect their particular interests. In essence, it is a playing field where each wishes to come out more powerful and influential than the other (Mesfin, 2015). Through the analysis of the different theories on mediation, hegemony and regionalism, the following chapter ill establish the theoretical framework of the study on the Role of IGAD’s Hegemons on the South Sudan Peace Talks.

2.1 Mediation

Conflict has been an inevitable aspect of international relations now more than ever. The Syria crisis, or the widespread violence and instability in the Central African Republic (CAR) and as is the case of this thesis the South Sudan civil war are just but a few examples. Nevertheless, conflict can also be prevented, managed and resolved. Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter states that “all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered” (United Nations(UN), 1945, p. 3). Furthermore, Article 33(1) provides the different diplomatic mechanisms to be employed by concerned parties upon the resolution of conflict among which mediation.

Additionally, the African Union (AU) following its normative shift from non-interference to non-indifference has advocated the “peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states of the Union” such as mediation as indicated by Article 4(e) (African Union (AU), 2000). In doing so, as it will be discussed later on, the continental organization has taken important measures to not only institutionalize mediation but also having Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as key partners in this endeavour. Under the principle of subsidiarity, as defined and elaborated under Article 16 of the AU’s Peace and Security (AU PSC), Protocol, RECs are to be
part and parcel of the AU’s effort to prevent as well as resolve conflict (African Union(AU), 2002). Thus what does mediation entail?

2.1.1 Definition and features

Derived from the Latin word *mediare* that means to be in the middle, mediation has been resorted to as a mechanism for conflict resolution as early as the Mesopotamian era. As Hoffman puts it, mediation is “a process in which parties to a conflict attempt to reach a mutually agreeable solution under the auspices of a third party” (Jeong, 2000, p. 181). In other words, it is a course of conflict resolution that is undertaken under the sponsorship of a third party where the final settlement is agreed upon by the concerned parties. The Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) elaborates further:

A flexible process conducted confidentially in which a neutral person actively assists parties in working towards a negotiated agreement of a dispute or difference, with the parties in ultimate control of the decision to settle and the terms of the resolution (Daly, Higgins, & Bolger, 2010, p. 2).

This definition offers a prescription as regards to the character and role of the third party of the conflict. Not only is it expected to reflect neutrality—that is to not in any manner endorse the ideology or politics of the disputing factions— but it must be bound to a strict principle of confidentiality in its assistance of the conflicting parties as well. (Kleiboer, 1996) Furthermore, this definition underlines the role of the third party as limited to a consultative function whereby the disputing parties exclusively hold the decision making power (Bercovitch, 2004).

On the other hand, the International Mediator Institute, an independent non-profit organization defines mediation as:

A process where two or more parties appoint a third-party neutral (“Mediator”) to help them in a non-binding dialog to resolve a dispute and/or to conclude the terms of an agreement (Daly, Higgins, & Bolger, 2010, p. 2).
In addition to the above mentioned features, this definition highlights the fact that the third party, that is the mediator as a neutral body must be accepted by the disagreeing factions. It also emphasizes the mediator’s role of enabling and facilitating dialogue between the conflicting parties. The mediator works to establish communication between the concerned parties thus avoiding the outburst of conflict between them. Finally, it identifies the mediation process as non-binding, which is that breach of the final reached settlement does not lead to sanctions: if parties fail to implement it, another round of mediation will be conducted instead (Bercovitch, 2004).

From the above cited definition, it is possible to identify mediation as encompassing three essential elements: a dispute or source of disagreement, conflicting parties and a mediator. As a diplomatic tool of conflict resolution, mediation thus revolves around the idea of the intervention of an accepted third party to obtain a mutually accepted settlement between the concerned parties upon a dispute. As such it is possible to highlight its defining features as follows (Lazaro, 2014).

The first feature is in relation with the assumption that mediation is assigned to any conflict resolution process where the third party in question intervenes at the request and consent of contending parties. Therefore, it is a voluntary process where the mediator with a neutral stand, only holds a consultative function with the aim of resolving and minimizing the conflict through enabling communication between the disputants. Finally, mediation is a non-binding process and operates under the ad hoc principle: when the conflict ceases so do the activities of the mediator (Jeong, 2000). A more comprehensive definition embodying these principles is suggested by Bercovitch and Houston who understand mediation as

a reactive process of conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization to change their behavior, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law (Lazaro, 2014, p. 322).
2.1.2 Mediation process

If mediation is understood as a peaceful mechanism in which a neutral mediator undertakes the role of facilitating a mutual settlement between the concerned parties, the question now comes as to what steps must be undertaken to arrive as such a result. There is no exact formula as to what must be precisely done but scholars identify the following as the main components of a mediation process.

The first step is related to the disputing parties’ willingness to accept peace; they must reflect readiness to resolve their differences through peaceful mechanisms. Only then can there be the intervention of a third party accepted by both that will act as a mediator. The next step involves the mediator laying the ground rules under which the peace process is to be carried out. Of course, the acceptance of the rules of the game rest within the disputing parties, as mediation is a non-binding course of action. Once the rules are accepted, the mediator starts its actual work: that is to be in the middle of the disputing parties. This neutral body organizes a series of round talks both formal and informal to understand the views, interests and positions of the concerned parties. In most disputes or conflicts however, the mediator starts with informal mediation, negotiating with each sides separately. In fact, when the parties are hostile to each other, the mediator has no choice but to conduct shuttle diplomacy until their relations smoothen up. As such, not only does the mediator facilitates their dialogues but also presents their clear and concrete proposals to each other as a reliable source, thus avoiding and/or clearing up any misperceived stands or opinions. Finally, it proceeds to the undertaking of face to face mediation where both sides present themselves into a discussing round table until a mutual agreement is reached and sees to its implementation by each (Jeong, 2000).

These processes constitute the main steps of a mediation process. They are not undertaken within a limited time period but can take weeks, months, even years depending on the willingness of the parties, the extent to which they are willing to compromise and most essentially the nature of the dispute as well as the skills and expertise of the mediator.
2.1.3 Theoritical models and mediation strategies

Mediation as a diplomatic mechanism for the resolution of conflict and encompassing the above mentioned steps fits one of the three following models to which a particular strategy is associated. These models and their respective strategies are categorized on the goal of the mediation and the extent of the mediator’s involvement in the process.

The original model of mediation is the facilitative mediation model. It concerns itself with the opening of a dialogue between the disputing parties. In fact, in order to have a settlement at the end it is quite important to get the conflicting parties into negotiating terms and this is the main priority of this model. Therefore, fostering communication is at its heart. This is undertaken with the assumption that if the disputing parties are on discussion terms then it will be quite easy to work towards the development of a mutual agreement. Hence, this model captures the essence of mediation as the role of the mediator in it fits to the definition of mediation itself. Many scholars label this particular role as a “communicator”. The intervening third party is responsible of promoting cooperation and thus a settlement between the disputing parties through enhancing communication between them. As such in this particular model, the mediator assumes a communication facilitation strategy (Daly, Higgins, & Bolger, 2010).

The other is the evaluative model that assumes a greater role for the mediator. In this model the mediator goes beyond the enhancing of communication between the conflicting parties. Here, the aim is not only to get the parties onto discussion terms but pressure them to reach a settlement. As such, the mediator assumes two responsibilities. First, it carries out the task of understanding each party’s needs and interests as well as revealing their respective positions to one another. Then, based on their evaluation, the mediator suggests a settlement. In fact, not only does it propose a mutual agreement to be reached, the mediator sets the timing, the agenda issues and terms of agreement of the mediation. It possesses the power to carve out the mediation process as its sees fit for the development of a common agreement especially in contexts where the disputing parties have little to no experience in
negotiations. It adopts a procedural strategy as scholars put it and assumes the role of “formulator” of the mediation (Daly, Higgins, & Bolger, 2010).

The final one is the transformative mediation model, which prepares a greater role for the mediator than anticipated by the two previous models. It is undertaken with the aim of ensuring that disputing parties have a feeling of confidence, autonomy and security to themselves at the end. It intends to have disputing parties not only understand but also empower and recognize each other as well. The underlying agenda in transformative mediation is to generate a mutual settlement that will transform the concerns of the parties. To achieve this result, the mediator applies more pressure than in the evaluative model resorting to persuasion or coercion techniques to manoeuvre parties into a mutual agreement. Mediators resort to such techniques such as the proposition of incentives, diplomatic sanctions, and even carrot and sticks methods to have opposing parties break their cycle of distrust, or violence and work towards the reconstruction of solid and sound diplomatic relations. (Bercovitch, 2004) This sum of techniques fall within the third form of strategies employed in a mediation process: the directive strategies. And as the name indicates, in the transformative model, the mediator directs the process to the extent of manipulation to settle peace. This has earned it the label of “manipulator” by scholars who warn that this particular strategy might be counterproductive especially when mediation involves big powers (Daly, Higgins, & Bolger, 2010).

In sum, mediation is one of the diplomatic mechanisms of conflict resolution underlined by Article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter. With the intervention of a neutral and consented upon mediator it involves the resolution of a dispute between conflicting parties. This mediation is undertaken under several processes from the opening of the communication corridors between the opposing parties to the concluding of a non-binding consensual settlement. This in turn involves the resort of one of the three noted mediation models and their respective strategies. If mediation is understood as such, it is important not to forget about the main driving component of the mediation process: the mediator. The next part will deal
specifically with this actor and understand both its identity and expected code of conduct.

2.2 The Mediator: identity and codes of conduct

In mediation, the mediator is the neutral third party charged with the task of facilitating, proposing or directing the unfolding of a consensual agreement between the disputing parties. The question is who can it be and what are its expected codes of conduct.

2.2.1 Identity of the mediator

Several different actors can act as mediators in a conflict resolution. Scholars identify them into three as individuals, states and institutions. They are in turn categorized under Track I and Track II mediators (Daly, Higgins, & Bolger, 2010).

Track I mediators encompass the traditional actors of the international arena: states and institutions whether regional or global. States as Track I mediators propel themselves in a mediation mainly in circumstances where they believe that their national integrity is at stake. Conflicts have the tendency to spill over territories and pose serious refugee crisis and states will take any necessary measures to mitigate these unwanted consequences. In fact, not only states possess both the resources and the mandate to use them to limit these consequences but go as far as intervening as mediators in contexts where regional and international stability are at stake as well. Since states are abstract entities they usually conduct the mediation through the appointment of government officials or representatives (Bercovitch, 2004).

Nevertheless, when states seem incapable of handling the conflict institutions intervene. Highly growing in number since the last twenty years, global and regional institutions such as the UN or the AU are increasing their role as mediators in the international arena. They usually get involved when the conflict intensifies and states no longer have the necessary requirements to settle peace. Institutions thus take charge as intergovernmental grouping concerned with regional stability (such as the
IGAD or either specialized non-governmental groups committed to conflict resolution (such as Amnesty International) or religious or civic and humanitarian organizations (such as the Red Cross). With no stakes in the dispute except the bringing about of peace, these establishments not only gain access to conflicting parties but earn their intimacy and trust. Consequently, they are able to play a major role in the development of a lasting and consensual agreement between them (Bercovitch, 2004).

As track I mediators, states and institutions have the ability to pressure groups into concluding a settlement. They both possess the resources and the mandate to utilize them to have conflicting parties make concessions. Of course, those compromises come through the proposition of positive conditionality such as investment incentives or negative conditionality such as the proclamation of diplomatic sanctions by the mediator. As a result, states and institutions possess leverages over the disputing parties which is quite useful to have a more immediate cease of a particular conflict. They would thus negotiate a settlement within the evaluative and transformative models of mediation along with the procedural and directive strategies (Daly, Higgins, & Bolger, 2010).

On the opposite end, there are Track II mediators. They have been quite influential since the dawn of the twenty-first century. These are individuals with prestige and wide international acclaim. They operate privately and although holding official positions they do not represent or act on behalf of their sending state. They intervene in conflicts that are intractable or where parties are quite hostile to one another to the extent of distrusting any source of information that emanates from each. Hence, individuals assume the role of mediator and gain the intimacy and trust of the conflicting parties. In fact, since they do not hold any other interest in the conflict besides resolving it, they are able to operate informally and gain the confidence of the disputing parties (Bercovitch, 2004).

Individuals as mediators usually take this opportunity to smooth up the relations of the concerned parties and open the corridors for face to face discussion. In other words, individuals as mediators operate within the facilitative mediation model with the communication facilitation strategy. This is a position that cannot be
assumed by Track I mediators as they usually resort to forceful conclusion of any agreement neglecting the interests or positions of any group that they have outlined as hostile. However individuals facilitate mediation by enhancing the existing communication between the conflicting parties they, unlike track I mediators do not possess any form of leverage. And without the resources or power held by states or institutions they sometimes are unable to develop any form of consensual agreement or work towards its implementation. Hence, their role is just limited to facilitating mediation (Daly, Higgins, & Bolger, 2010).

Therefore, both Track I and Track II mediators have their specific contexts in which they will yield maximum result. However, an effective mediation will ask for a combination of both. Multi-track mediation as scholars label it where states and/or institutions work with individuals will ensure not only a lasting settlement but also a transformed relation between the concerned parties. To arrive as such a result, mediators must embrace a certain code of conduct (Daly, Higgins, & Bolger, 2010).

2.2.2 Codes of conduct

There is no precise rule book concerning the code of conduct of a mediator whether it is a state, an institution or an individual. However, as a result of long years of practice, scholars underline the following as the expected behaviours of any type of mediator in a dispute. First, any party that wishes to engage itself as a neutral third party that is to assist conflicting parties to reach a mutual settlement must be knowledgeable about the situation and the context at hand. Second, a mediator is expected to hold a comprehensive understanding of the source of dispute as well as the interests and positions of each of the disputing parties. This is quite important not only for the mediator to at the least facilitate communication but to also be able to propose and draft a settlement that can satisfy the concerned parties (Elgström, Bercovitch, & Skau, 2003).

Third, a mediator is expected to be neutral and impartial. Neutrality is in relation to the fact that the mediator must in no way endorse the political aspirations of any of the parties of the dispute be it a state or any political group thus referring to the behavior that the mediator must adopt in regards to the parties. On the other
hand, impartiality refers to the fact that a mediator should not conduct mediation on the foundation of discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion or any identity marker (Kleiboer, 1996). Of course, scholars agree that mediators cannot absolutely be neither neutral nor impartial. In fact, many agree with the assumption made by Jercovitch that mediators are not and cannot, be neutral as they hold some kind of political aspirations. Yet, what must be understood by neutrality is that mediators must in no way let these aspirations cloud their judgments. They should not, for instance, refuse to bargain with some specific parties on the basis that they do not support or align themselves with the general political norm. Impartiality is more probable, in comparison. Mediation should be a comprehensive process that takes into considerations the interests of every concerned party and based on their assessment present a compromisable solution that can answer to all (Elgström, Bercovitch, & Skau, 2003).

Finally, mediators must understand that they are here as facilitators of a peace process and not as its imposers. Mediation is a non-binding peace process which means that there is no institutional mechanism responsible of the implementation of the reached agreement. As such, however, in possession of leverages, mediators must be careful as to not force a settlement. Mediators must only intervene to assist the parties in understanding each other’s positions and interests on the basis of which they will formulate an agreement to be negotiated on. Forcing a settlement is likely to result in retaliation of one of the conflicting parties that will accuse mediators of impartiality or worse in the intensification of the conflict itself. As such, parallel to the conflicting parties accepting the ground rules of the peace process, so must the mediators as well (Jeong, 2000).

Therefore, a mediator must be endorsed with the knowledge about the context of the conflict, impartiality and neutrality in regards to each party and the peace process itself, be aware that its main role is to precipitate the cease of the dispute and understand that it must undertake it through persuasion rather than force. The carrying out of these tasks of mediation is executed by a state, an institution or an individual. Nevertheless, these sets of conducts or identity of the mediator do not guarantee the success of mediation. Yet, what must underlined here is that during a
mediation process, the role played by the mediator is a determinant factor for the sustainability of the deal that will be reached. In other words, not only should the mediator shape the process to facilitate the disputing parties to reach a settlement, but should refrain from over cramming the process by advancing its own particular interests. As precised earlier, a mediator should not impose the “peace” but also itself as well in the process.

In *In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation* (2008), Lakdar Brahimi and Ahmed Salman summarize the codes of conduct of a mediator and mediation under seven points they identify as the seven sins (Brahimi & Salman, 2008). They are as follows.

1. **Ignorance**

Mediators should always be aware of the context they are operating in as well as have a holistic account of the conflict they are trying to resolve. According to the authors, they need to be able to have as much detailed information as possible to the following questions:

Who are the national actors with the power to stop or re-start the war and from where are they acquiring external support (e.g. arms, financing, and recognition)? Do they believe they can still prevail militarily, or have they accepted the need or desire to reach a negotiated solution? Which key constituencies can they legitimately claim to represent? Which key constituencies are unrepresented in the current political process? Which actors have opted or been left out of the process, why and what capacity do they have to disrupt or derail it? To what extent are the relevant members of the international community—neighbors, key regional players, big powers—united or working at cross-purposes with one another? Do they consider their strategic national interests to be at stake? Which of the domestic and international players welcome, are undecided about or actively oppose the mediator’s role? (Brahimi & Salman, 2008, p. 5)

2. **Arrogance**

Mediators have to acknowledge that if they are not aware of some aspects of the conflict, they have to ask around. Yet, while asking, it is important they go beyond the answers that they want to hear. As put by Brahimi and Salman (2008)

One challenge is to know which individuals to approach and what to ask them. An easy trap to fall into is to depend heavily on ‘the 50 people in the country who are most fluent in English’ who readily say exactly what the mediator wants to hear. It is both naïve and arrogant, and often a recipe for
failure, to rely almost exclusively on the views of those who flatter us and appear to most resemble ourselves (Brahimi & Salman, 2008, p. 8).

Additionally, a mediator has to understand that each conflict and its context are peculiar. As such, he/she has to refrain from making the mistake of assuming that a certain conflict is similar to one that was already dealt with in the past.

3. Partiality

It is very essential that a mediator does not take sides. This does not mean simply remaining neutral, rather being bold enough to tell parties and stakeholders in the conflict that they are wrong when they are. Mediators have to appreciate positions that are supported by evidence, and disregard any claims that lack it.

4. Impotence

Alongside partiality, it is important that mediators understand that they will remain impotent in mediation as long as they do not have the support of the international community as well as the neighboring states involved as stakeholders in the peace process. The concessions and proposals made by mediators should match the message conveyed with regards to the process by the stakeholders concerned. In this scenario, it will be harder for conflicting parties to ignore peace as the way forward and relapse into conflict. It is essential in parallel, to consider neighboring states interests so as to add further pressure on the conflicting parties.

5. Haste

A mediator should also understand that peace should not be rushed. It is a lifetime process; the best that can be done is lay its foundation. Any peace deal that is proposed by mediators should be the result of a series of consultations with all the actors involved. These consultations maybe repetitive at times but they are the best way so as to reach a peace deal that has the confidence of all the stakeholders involved. This guarantees a sustainable peace.
6. Inflexibility

In line with the above point, mediators should also consider that as conflict is dynamic, they need to be ready to re-work the peace deal proposed. Positions by parties to the conflict and stakeholders involved may change. In such circumstances, mediators, however they feel proud of their proposal have to be ready to be flexible.

7. False promises

Mediators have to refrain finally from making false promises to the international community as well as to the parties to the conflict. As put by Brahimi and Salman (2008) mediators should regularly reinforce the following points:

- progress will be slow; mistakes will be made; setbacks will occur; periodic review and course correction will be required; technical problems can be resolved through technical solutions but political problems need political solutions; painful compromises and concessions will be expected of everyone;
- there is no short-cut to sustainable peace in the aftermath of war; it will take several years if not decades to re-build a war-torn State and achieve reconciliation; and this is just the beginning of the process (Brahimi & Salman, 2008, p. 12).

2.2 Regionalism

The South Sudan Peace Talks under the umbrella of the IGAD regional framework propel the necessity to discuss the importance of regional frameworks and regionalism. This is in light of the assumption that the taking over of the South Sudan crisis by IGAD was logically given.

2.2.1 Defining regionalism

There are several theories around the theme of regionalism and regional integration that have somehow become a fashion in the 21st century. Our situation in the neo-liberal framework with globalization has accelerated and created new ways of integration. This is with the overall goal of making the world one global village. Expansion of trade infrastructures, institutionalized porous borders, new waves of technology to facilitate communication from all corners of the world have intractably connected the world. This is in a manner where any event occurring in some part of the world has implications everywhere for everyone. Classic examples would be
terrorism and radicalization of religion, the European migration crisis as well as the effects of climate change.

This is the outcome of a regionalism that has gradually extended its boundaries globally. But most importantly, it is the result of the success of the integration of the European Union (EU) in the aftermath of the Cold War as well as recognition of the importance of regional dynamics in the global quest for peace and security (ElAffendi, 2009). This was further reiterated by the 1992 Agenda for Peace that gave primacy to the role of regional organizations in achieving this objective (United Nations, 1992).

Referring to several literature, one can define regionalism in general terms as the

Efforts by a group of nations to enhance their economic, political, social, or cultural interaction. Such efforts can take on different forms, including regional cooperation, market integration, development integration, and regional integration (Lee, 2002, p. 1).

Regionalism is thus the set of activities and policies by a group of states to deepen their levels of interaction at different levels. This can be brought forth through four ways.

The first is through regional cooperation which is a collaborative venture between two or more partners, with common interests in a given issue (Lee, 2002). This collaboration can be undertaken in the joint fight against terrorism for instance as undertaken by the Multinational Joint Task Force in the fight against Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It can also be the joint task of developing infrastructure as it is being done by Ethiopia, South Sudan and Kenya with the LAPSSET Corridor (Inter-Governmental Authority on Developement (IGAD), 2016).

The second way of achieving regionalism is through market integration, which is one that is mainly modelled on the EU’s success story. It is the gradual
progression of regionalism through different degrees of integration. It starts with a free trade area, followed by the instalment of a customs union, progressing to the establishment of a common market followed by the creation of an economic union that grows into economic integration (Lee, 2002).

Another way is through development integration where states and nations make the efforts of integrating one another with the common objective of developing their region as a whole. States and nations pledge to undertake a series of economic and social reforms that will not only help themselves individually but also help their neighbours develop as well. This is an aspiration pursued by the IGAD regional framework although its results are still not visible.

A final way of achieving regionalism is through regional integration. This is a process by which a group of nation states voluntarily and in various degrees have access to each other’s markets and establish mechanisms and techniques that minimize conflicts and maximize internal and external economic, political, social and cultural benefits of their interaction (Lee, 2002, p. 4).

This is regionalism at its best where members of the region become indispensable to the survival of the other and thus operate as a system. The degree of integration in this case has reached the level where conflict in the said region will devastate not only the member states involved but the region as a whole. The EU during the financial crisis and the bailout of the Greek economy is a good example. The decision of the Greeks to withdraw from the EU was a tough decision as it not only held the viability of the Greek economy but also the sustainability of the EU system as a whole.

2.2.2 Regionalism in Africa

Regionalism in Africa was to be fulfilled through economic integration which is to be achieved to its fullest by 2025, ten years from now according to the 1991 Abuja treaty signed by AU members states. Additionally, member states of the continental organization in partnership with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) have planned to gradually get there with the
respective regional integrations to be undertaken in the North, South, East, West and central parts of the continent (ElAffendi, 2009).

The importance of these geographical regional organizations in which members states share peculiar similarities are to be the pillars for the aspired African continental unity by 2063. Their importance had been highlighted in the 1900’s and further reiterated in 2002 with the transformation of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) into the AU. This stressed out the importance of RECs not only in the achievement of economic integration but also in bringing about peace and security in the continent. Thus, RECs were also an important partner of the AU as a vital peace and security platform in their respective neighbourhoods as explained in Article 16 of the AU’s Constitutive Act. This is in turn an extension of the principle of subsidiarity enshrined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 1992 UN Agenda for peace that calls for the engagement and importance of regional clusters in the fulfilment of peace and security globally (United Nations, 1992).

Although regionalism is the slogan in the 21rst century, its levels in the African continent are at records low (Kefale, 2015). Half a century since its independence, Africa still has not achieved its desired levels of integration amongst its 54 member states. Several reasons have been cited by different scholars. As cited by El Affendi, some scholars attribute the low levels of integration to the failure of policy makers to efficiently understand the context in which the model of the EU integration has been implemented in the continent. The EU’s integration was propelled by the context of highly industrialised economies that found ways of making each other indispensable. However, industrialization in the African continent is at all times low, with more than half of the economies primarily dependant on the exchange and export of primary products and high imports of finished industrial goods. Furthermore, the interlockedness of regional interests, multiple memberships to several RECs as well as the lack of complementarity of African economies are also some of the main reasons for the continent’s lagging behind in regionalism and regional integration (ElAffendi, 2009). Lee best summarizes these reasons below:

(1) Lack of comparative advantage and economies of scale; (2) huge economic
disparity between member states; (3) the unequal distribution of benefits, resulting in the regional giant(s) [being] the main beneficiary of integration efforts; (4) the implementation of that have been counterproductive to the regional agenda; (5) overlapping membership in regional economic organizations resulting in contradictions in policy objectives and goals; (6) lack of political commitment to regionalism; (7) dependence on external donors to fund the regional agenda, thus giving them the autonomy to determine policy; and (8) the failure to address the realities of the African environment (Lee, 2002, p. 9).

Despite those shortcomings, in line with the principles that aspired for regionalism in Africa, it came as no surprise that the South Sudan crisis was to be mediated in the IGAD platform. Although the conflict had escalated with the propagation of a severe humanitarian situation, peace bargained for by the neighbourhood, under the principle of subsidiarity, had to be given a chance before the AU or even the UN took over. Yet, as it will be discussed in this study, the dynamics of regional interests played out in the reaching of the CD in August 2015. In fact, concerned IGAD member states struggled against one another to come out as the hegemon in both the peace talks and the HoA.

2.3 Hegemony

Hegemony is derived from the Greek word *hegemonia* which means the dominant and oppressive nature of one element over the others in one particular system. It is a state of power that propels only one and one only as the prevailing force over any other forces that exist. In International Relations, it is a concept that has been built upon by the Realist School of thought (Yilmaz, 2010).

2.3.1 Hegemony in Realism

Realist scholars assume that the global arena is home to a wide range of power struggle between different states to preserve their survival. Hegemony was thus understood in its classical sense through one’s military might. As a result, international relations are quite dynamic: a sense of unease and lack of trust between global state actors determines the overriding principle that alliances, as well as
friends and foes are always ever changing; your friend today is likely to be your enemy tomorrow.

The father of the concept of hegemony is Italian Marxist scholar Antonio Gramsci. According to him hegemony is might brought forth through force as well as consent. For Gramsci, hegemony is not only the mere prevalence of a state through its military force but also the conscious acceptance of others of it. Drawing on his analogy with the bourgeoisie and working class, he asserts that the few or the one that dominates in the world is so as a result of the dominated accepting its status. According to him, the working class are oppressed and exploited by the bourgeoisie who drains all the profit from their labour in the capitalist system. This is so not only because the bourgeoisie controls the means of productions in the system but also because the working class consciously accepts their dominance. This is what he coins as “hegemony through consent” (Yilmaz, 2010).

It was building upon his ideas that Emmanuel Wallerstein further expanded this conception of hegemony to the world order. He argues that hegemony is also in line with the acceptance of a reality of a world of dominance as the only possible reality. He expands this understanding of hegemony in the capitalist system in his explanation of the world order that states fall in. For Wallerstein the dominant states are the core states. They are the states that control and exploit resources and transform them into finished goods to be sold to the rest of the world out of which they take all the profit to transform and further their development. Then there are the periphery states. They are the lowest of the orders and are states endowed with natural resources that are exported to the core countries in their raw form at very low prices. They are the underdeveloped section of the world order at the mercy of the core from where they import their finished and manufactured goods. Then, in between, somehow better than the periphery but not as developed as the core stands the semi-periphery. This is the part of the world composed of states that have somehow achieved development to the extent of transforming some of the world’s primary goods in manufactured goods that can be sold and exported to the core (Wallerstein, 2002).
This suggest all and all that a hegemon is somehow an influential power within the global arena that sets the standards of relations in international relations and is the heart of the global economy and extends as Sandra Destradi argues to

[...]a form of power exercised through strategies which are more subtle than those employed by states behaving as imperial powers. The means through which power is exercised – and here the distinction between hegemony and empire becomes evident – can vary from the exertion of pressure to the provision of material incentives, up to the discursive propagation of the hegemon's norms and values (Destradi, 2008).

2.3.2 Hegemony in the 21rst Century

Within this realm of hegemony defined by Wallerstein and Gramsci as well as Destradi, it is hard to identify one hegemon in the global arena in the 21rst century. The end of the Cold War had propelled the United States of America (USA) as the only global power in the world. In terms of its military might with the effective and massive deployment of its armies to keep peace in the different corners of the world, the setting of the American dollar as the strongest and the only currency that determines our global finances and finally its cultural dominance with the Americanization of cultures through the uncontested influence of its food and money industry, the USA was the hegemon of our world at the dawn of the 21rst century. Yet, as globalization expanded, the European Union (EU) strengthened itself as a strong Regional Economic Community that spoke under one voice, and the advancing of certain Asian economies, it is hard to say who the hegemon in our current global Affairs is. What we rather have is a multipolar world with different states/regions having the upper hand in particular areas. China and the EU are in control of the world’s economy. The USA still has the strongest military in the world; Africa is rising as the hub for entrepreneurship and an economic power not to reckon with.

2.3.3. Hegemony in Africa

When we come to Africa, according to Jeffrey Herbst there are only four countries that one can see or define as potential hegemons in their respective regions.
They are Ethiopia in the HoA, Nigeria in West Africa, South Africa in the Southern Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo in Central Africa. This is based on the assumption that the parameters for hegemony are the size of the population and the army (Herbst, 2000). In fact, these four states are some of most populated countries in the continent with large armies. Yet, one should question as to whether their potentiality of hegemony in their respective regions is similar to the influence that the USA exerts on the world.

The influence and power of each state is important in their respective region but not to the extent of leading the region to regional integration, or coming out as strong unified bloc. The matter of fact is that hegemony in the African continent is different than the traditional sense of hegemony explained earlier; where one state has the ability to surge out more powerful imposing its norms and values upon its neighbours and the world without any of them able to counter balance its influence (Dehez, 2008).

Hegemony in the African sense is different. In fact, African style hegemony is defined by a specific set of features. Primarily, African hegemony lacks the main features that made the traditional hegemons such the United Kingdom(UK) or the USA; which is a strong state with a strong sense of nationalism and an industrialized economy that enable it to project its influence and power onto the world. African style hegemony lacks in all of the above. Many potential hegemons still have to deal with complex internal political dynamics and just started their economic development; they are still weak states in the full sense of the term (Dehez, 2008). What we rather have as defining their prospect for hegemony is their active role in their respective regional platform where as it is the case with IGAD members states, try to legitimize their respective foreign policy and national governments (Healy, 2009). Furthermore, what we have is African hegemonies counterbalanced in their respective neighbourhoods. Neighbouring states either find ways to, as Dehez puts it “immunize” themselves from the influence of the said hegemon or directly challenge it (Dehez, 2008).

In light of this, in this thesis it should be understood that hegemony should be understood in the sense of holding regional influence or predominance. Each of the
four countries does hold a certain level of leverage from which its influence is
derived in the HoA neighbourhood. This can measured as diplomatic leverage for
Ethiopia, economic might for Kenya, economic power for Sudan as well although it is
fading away with the on-going austerity measures, and military leverage for
Uganda(as witnessed by its timely troop deployment). Each of the four countries
retains certain predominance in these areas in the IGAD region. With the South
Sudan Peace Talks, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan as well as Uganda have struggled to
magnify each of their respective influences so as to shape the mediation process in
their interest.

2.4 The South Sudan Peace Talks, Regionalism and Hegemony

In light of the above conceptual discussion, here is how one can position this
research study. Although a mediation process whether under the auspices of a state,
an institution or even an individual is expected to be neutral so as to yield the best
possible deal between contending parties, the South Sudan Peace talks offer a
different scenario. This is one where the mediation is impacted by interests from
member states especially Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. While the first three
have appointed a special envoy to mediate between Kirr and Machar, Uganda has
become a full-fledged partisan to the crisis. President Yoweri Museveni has deployed
its troops in Juba in support of President Kiir. What are the interests that drove such
an intervention for these states? How were their roles and interests manifested in the
Peace Talks as a result? In the 22 months duration of the mediation, the four states
have struggled against one another to dictate the direction and outcome of the
mediation and emerge as a hegemon. Did any emerge as one? While doing so, the
prospects for regionalism and regional integration in the region have been tested.
Many of the interviewees have indeed noted that the region has failed to come
together when it came to bringing about peace in South Sudan. What are the
prospects of the peace talks in this regard and the credibility of IGAD as a regional
platform for peace? These questions will be addressed in the chapters to come.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Site

This study was conducted in Addis Abeba where the offices responsible and working on the South Sudan Peace Talks are based. They are the IGAD-OSESS, the IGAD Conflict and Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), the office of the EU Delegation to the AU, the UNECA, the USA Embassy in Addis as well as the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). While the IGAD OSESS is the main office responsible of the peace talks, the rest are offices that were involved in one way or another as advisors and donors to the former. As the peace talks ended in August 2015, the IGAD-OSESS office mandate ended with a closing ceremony in early April 2016 with the submission of the Special Envoys Exit Report to MoFA (Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). The researcher conducted her interviews in these offices with respondents as well as key informants and collected the needed data to undertake this research.

3.2 Research Method

This study will mainly refer to the use of the qualitative research method. The aim is to capture and discuss the views, perceptions and expressions of government officials, politicians and scholars on the influence of the IGAD Hegemons on the South Sudan Peace Talks in order to draw pertinent recommendations and conclusions. The qualitative research method is the most relevant approach as it conveys and enables the collection of those views, perceptions and expressions.

3.2.1 Data Collection Strategies

With this in mind, the thesis resorted to the following qualitative research method data collection techniques that enabled the collection of both primary and secondary data. The aim of the thesis is to collect perspectives and views on the role played by Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda and Sudan in the South Sudan Peace Talks from those that were involved, followed and analysed the peace talks. This will
enable the researcher to draw conclusions on the roles played by each of those states as a result of their respective interests at stake.

Primary data was collected through the use of 7 semi structured and in depth interviews in addition to the use of IGAD communiqués, press releases, online youtube videos and documentaries of debates on South Sudan; and institutional reports. This provided the views of those that were directly involved in the peace talks as well as those that followed them. Secondary data was collected through the reading and analysis of reports, articles, journals, books and book chapters as well as newspapers. These provided the views of the scholars that analysed the peace talks as well the regional dynamics that emerged in the IGAD region and the peace talks. The combination of both strategies helped the researcher collect enough data to paint a holistic image of the peace talks with regards to the scope that was discussed in the previous chapters and draw sound conclusions.

Initially, the study aimed at undertaking semi structured interviews to collect the views of the different representative of Kenya, Sudan and Uganda based in Ethiopia as well as officials and representatives working on the South Sudan Peace Talks from MoFA. Understanding the particular diplomatic relations between the four countries as well as the sensitivity of the issue discussed the use of structured interviews with open ended questions allows to capture the different views of the four countries on the role themselves and their neighbours play on the South Sudan Peace Talks. However, due to busy schedule and the sensitivity associated with the issues, only the IGAD Desk at MoFA accepted the request for interview. As such, the researcher changed the data collection strategy to conducting in-depth interview with those that were involved in the peace talks directly as well as donor states and institutions. Views that were expected from the remaining IGAD countries were complemented by the use of secondary data such as articles and journals on the matter as well as online debates organized by research institutions.

3.2.2 Sampling Method

In the selection of her respondents, the researcher made use of purposive sampling in this research. As indicated by the title, the researcher selected
individuals that were directly involved in the peace talks in order to collect the desired data. Snowball sampling was also used in some instances where the researcher asked some of its key informants to suggest individuals that may help assist her in the research study. The sample population was the collection of people that were involved in the peace talks.

3.2.3 Data Analysis

The primary data collected was analysed on the basis of thematic analysis. The data was sorted out under the themes of hegemons/hegemony, national interests, challenges, positive/negative influence, cooperation and competition. Furthermore, the collected views from the interviews with politicians and academicians were triangulated. Triangulation is the process by which “data methods or collected data are mixed so that diverse viewpoints or standpoints cast light upon a topic” (Olsen, 2004, p. 1). This is with the intention of providing a rich understanding of the complex mediation process at hand and pertinently capturing the views thereby expressed. This in return will enable a systematic and organized manner of undertaking the classification of views and opinions as stated above.

3.3 Ethical Considerations

Ethical consideration need to be respected as they relate directly to the integrity of a research and of the disciplines that are involved. The issue under investigation is a politically sensitive and dynamic issue. As such, the researcher asked for the consent of the selected research participants before undertaking the interview. The researcher prepared a consent form explaining the purpose of the research that is to be signed by the participant thus expressing his/her consent to be part of the research. The researcher also complements a consent form with a letter of cooperation from the Institute explaining the purpose of the research (See Annexe 2). The researcher respected the choice of some participants wishing to remain anonymous as well as protect the confidentiality of their responses solely to the purpose of the study that is being undertaken. The researcher also respected the wish of its respondents to not record them rather to take notes because of the sensitivity of the subject of study. Finally, the research resorted to the appropriate citation of the
responses as well as give due credit to the work of others. In fact, as instructed by the Institutes guidelines, the researcher made use of the 6th APA style of referencing.
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

In this chapter, the collected data and its analysis will be presented in three sections. The first part will discuss how the South Sudan Peace Talks as a mediation platform that is guided by the respective national interests of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. This part also explains what is at stake for these countries vis a vis the South Sudan crisis as well as the contexts within which they were born. The second section will look at the different roles taken up by each of those countries as a result of it. The third and final section will assess the influences that were exerted by each of those countries in the duration Peace Talks thereof.

4.1 A mediation driven by national interests

There is an interlockedness of regional interests in the IGAD platform during the South Sudan Peace Talks. In fact, as highlighted by Alexander Rhondos during a lecture at the Nordic Peace Institute (NPI), the region has the right for interest in its neighbourhood (The Nordic Peace Institute, 2016). When it comes to the IGAD region, it is undeniable even more so inescapable (Healy, 2009). This was the case during the negotiations for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and still remained so in the South Sudan Peace Talks.

In fact, as emphasised by one of my informants, it is an extension of the regional interplay and relations that were formed during the negotiations for the self determination of South Sudan (Key Informant III, 2016). The Peace Talks were actually an arena where Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan built upon the dynamics of their relations between the two Sudans before they extended that dynamic to South Sudan and as a result the whole region. The rivalries and enmities that were present during the mediation of the CPA in 2005 are still present during the South Sudan Peace Talks. The bitter competition for influence on Juba between Khartoum and Kampala, as well as the struggle to emerge as the peacemaker between Addis and Nairobi are still visible in the IGAD Peace Process for South Sudan. Furthermore, these sets of relationships also extend to the interaction of the four states in the HoA. Khartoum and Kampala still have not called for friendly
relations amongst themselves; Kenya and Ethiopia still compete for international prestige in the region: while one dominates the diplomatic platform, the other is one of the few economic giant in the region.

4.1.1 Understating the context of regional interest in South Sudan.

Regional interests in the Horn Region are quite intricate. As the social make up of each states in term of its ethnic composition are cross cutting through the boundaries, so are the national interests in the region. In fact, as Alex de Wall (2016) argues, when it comes to this region, relations are aligned under the different set of relationships existing among the different liberation movements of the region. Many of the governments in the Horn are formed by liberation movements that have transformed, in some manner, into state governing popular movements as is the case with Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and now currently with a somewhat failed transformation South Sudan. During different periods, these liberation movements have served as proxies against one another in this turbulent region thereby determining the relation that each has with its neighbour while ascending to power (de Waal, 2016).

A. Ethiopia

For many scholars and respondents of the study, the engagement of Ethiopia in the South Sudan Peace Talks came as no surprise. In fact, according to Simone Barenghi, Political advisor at the EU-AU delegation, the push for the mediation under the auspices of IGAD was enforced by Ethiopia, who since 2008 has been the Chair of the regional framework (Barenghi, 2016).

However, there are additional reasons that go beyond this fact. Ethiopia is at a delicate and somewhat opportune position in the HoA neighbourhood. It is the only country that shares boundaries with all of the Horn states except Uganda. Sharing these boundaries also implies sharing ethnic groups around those boundaries which in turn indicates that any occurrence of conflict in any form, violent or peaceful, in any of its neighbouring states is likely to have a spill over effect on Ethiopian soil.
This the driving premise behind Ethiopia’s relations with its neighbouring states. In fact, as stated in the 2002 Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy the prime objectives of development and democracy of the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) are to be achieved if and only if both domestic and external sources of instability are neutralized (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 2002). The government is confident that Ethiopia is at least stable internally has been highly engaged in resolving conflicts in the HoA. A statement by Sebehat Nega, veteran of Tigrean People Liberation Front (TPLF) confirms this position whereby he affirmed in an interview in 2010 that “Our internal peace gives us chances [...] we can play a regional role because we’ve solved most of our internal contradictions” (Verhoeven, 2011, p. 6). As a landlocked state, Ethiopia reaches out to its neighbours to gain access to incremental resources among which access to ports as it does with Djibouti, resources as it does with oil with Sudan and last but not least an economy of import and export with neighbouring Kenya. Therefore, neighbours play a vital role in the development of Ethiopia; a stable neighbourhood is thus the counterbalancing effect for the landlocked status of this country. This has propelled Ethiopia as the most active actor in its neighbourhood in terms of security. It is indeed manifested by its leading role in the IGAD institution as its chair and thus having the front seat in the different undertaken peace processes in the region from Somalia to recently South Sudan (Doop, 2013).

In particular, the country’s engagement in South Sudan can be justified in precisely two manners. One relates, as many respondents have underlined especially, an official from the UNOAU, to the historical ties that exist between Juba and Addis (UNOAU Official, 2016). It should not be forgotten that the SPLM has been trained, and operated in the Gambella Region of Ethiopia during the Derg Regime. In fact, this was the result of tenuous relations between Ethiopia and Sudan which had a troubled relation which extends to harbouring each other’s opposition groups. While the Ethiopian government equipped the SPLM movement in its fight for autonomy of South Sudan, the Khartoum Government offered shelter and supply of needed armaments to the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) and Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF) to topple down the government in Addis. Yet, in
1991, the victory of the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) led to the closure of the operating bases of the SPLM in Gambella, to return back the favour to the helping hand of Khartoum. Nevertheless, it was not long before the EPRDF, in its turn, started supporting the same movement it banished from its soil. The failed assassination attempt by the Khartoum government on President Hosni Mubarek of Egypt during an OAU summit in Addis in June 1995 stained the newly acquired friendship between the two cities. Ethiopia closed its embassy in Khartoum and shifted its support to the SPLM with ardent military support since.

This set of historic ties between the two countries, that is Ethiopia and South Sudan is further consolidated by the sharing of boundaries that dictate the concern of Ethiopia over matters in South Sudan. Sharing boundaries with both, Ethiopia was a trusted mediator amongst Sudan and South Sudan during the negotiations for the CPA.

This then brings about the second precise factor relating to the engagement of Ethiopia in South Sudan: the dilemma of the Gambella Region. Ethiopia has been forced to balance and at some instance chose between resolving ethnic tensions in the Gambella region while offering protection to the second largest ethnic population in South Sudan fleeing to its boundary since the outbreak of the South Sudan crisis. The Gambella region now hosts several refugee camps set up by the international community in consent with the Ethiopia government to the conflict fleeing South Sudanese. There are nearly 200 000 South Sudanese in Gambella most of which are Nuer by ethnic identity supporting the Nuer faction of former Vice President Dr. Riek Machar. The humanitarian support extended by Ethiopia to host the refugee population of its neighbour is commendable. Yet, the presence of this particular population has upset the dynamic of ethnic relations in the South Western Region of the country (Feyissa, 2014).

According to Dereje (2014), the Nuer is invading the political space of the Agnuak, a once prominent group in Gambella. An important component of the social make up of Gambella, the Agnuak feel overshadowed by the growing number of Nuer in their region and the favours they feel are granted to them, starting with the
Presidency of the region, which was their “reserve” until 2012. The group feels that it is being pushed away from its land and constituency by the sudden pouring Nuer refugees in Ethiopia. The tension has been made worse with an important amount of those refugees have changing their status of refugees with the issuance of Ethiopian National Ids enabling to live in the region. This has frustrated the Agnuak population who has gone as far as accusing the Ethiopian government of ethnic cleansing in the region for its own political purposes.

Yet, despite these occurrences, the Ethiopian government seems to be at crossroads when it comes to the Nuer population in its territory. While their shelter and protection helps control and manage the refugee flow from the crisis, it is having serious repercussions in its domestic politics. It cannot afford to undermine them as they are one of the strongest constituencies in support of Machar but cannot also continue to ignore the effects of their dynamic in Gambella region. Endorsing them, is likely to fuel conflict in Gambella and make Ethiopia a partisan to Dr. Machar changing the course of the mediation and questioning the impartiality of the country. Yet, the government cannot also deny their importance as their numbers are growing in Gambella and keep silent with the unfolding of the tense ethnic climate in the region (Feyissa, 2014).

Therefore, South Sudan is important for Ethiopia in many aspects. On a more general term, it is an exercise platform of its leading role in the region for its own development and peaceful relation with its neighbours. As one of the key informants argued, Ethiopia wishes to appear as a broker of peace and security in the IGAD neighbourhood (Key Informant I, 2016). However, the outstanding rationales for its engagement remain to be the continuation of its peaceful and historical relation with Juba and the acquisition of border security in the Gambella region.

B. Kenya

As a neighbouring state to South Sudan, Kenya was and remains another key IGAD actor in the South Sudan Peace Talks. In fact, before discussing the national

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3 They constitute to date more than 40% of the population shifting the population dynamics in favour the Nuer.
interests at stake in the South Sudan crisis, it is important to highlight the importance of the Nairobi-Juba relation.

The relationship between Juba and Nairobi was initiated when the SPLM was kicked out of Ethiopia in 1991 with the coming to power of the EPRDF. This was the momentum ceased by Kenya to shelter the South Sudanese Liberation Movement who at the time was in dire need of a sponsor. This late endorsement and support to the movement still continues today and has actually deep repercussions in the diplomatic relations between Kenya and South Sudan.

At a social level, many South Sudanese consider Kenya as their second home away from home (Mesfin, 2015). At a political level, Kenya has always supported the self-determination of the South asserted by the active engagement of General Lazarro Sumbeyo in the negotiations of the CPA in Navaisha, Tanzania. For Kenya, an independent South Sudan is an investment in the expansion of its economy in the region that was hoped to bring in major returns. In fact, Kenya rushed to set out its financial sector kingdom in South Sudan with the installation of banks and insurance services as soon as the CPA was signed. Nairobi further extended its financial gains by investing in additional sectors like aviation, construction, hospitality, and information and communication technologies (ICT), transportation, and wholesale and retail trade. On this last note, Kenya is one of the biggest trading partners of South Sudan. In fact, Kenyan exports to South Sudan accounted for 10.2% of total exports to Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) making South Sudan the fourth-largest export destination for Kenya out of the 18 other members of COMESA (Odhiambo & Muluvi, 2014). Kenya is thus in control of the macro-economy of South Sudan especially the financial institutions as explained by one key informant (Key Informant I, 2016).

The returns of trade with South Sudan were so significant that Kenya ardently advocated for its new neighbour to join the East African Community (EAC). As the market in Juba is an important client to Kenyan goods, the membership of South Sudan in the EAC reduces import-export tariffs in the trade between the two countries. This implies the gaining of enormous economic benefits on both sides and
the consolidation thereof of economic relations between Juba and Nairobi (Odhiambo & Muluvi, 2014).

Kenya’s thirst for economic advantage from South Sudan extended to the planning and execution of integration projects in the region amongst which the Lamu Port-South-Sudan-Ethiopia (LAPSSET) corridor and standard gauge railway. This project integrates the economies of Kenya, South Sudan and Ethiopia through a platform of exchange of power and oil services as well hospitality and aviation services (Odhiambo & Muluvi, 2014). Yet, as the crisis erupted, the projects was paused until it was recently launched with the signing of a memorandum of understanding in May 2016 with IGAD and Kenya taking the lead in the management for its operationalization (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development(IGAD), 2016). Economy is thus an important feature of the Nairobi and Juba relations amongst all the existing relations between the two.

Therefore, the primary reason behind the engagements of Kenya in the South Sudan Peace Talks is about the protection of Kenyan economic assets in South Sudan. Yet, at this stage it is about the protection of those that remain. Since the outbreak of the crisis, Kenya has suffered huge losses in its South Sudanese investments with the robbing of its established banks and the delaying of the LAPSSET Corridor execution. Many Kenyan citizens have returned back to their country empty handed.

In addition to its economic interests, Kenya’s involvement in the South Sudan Peace Talks is also tied with the on-going refugee crisis in the region. As a second home for many South Sudanese, Kenya is also a preferred destination for South Sudanese refugees. By May 2014 alone, near to 20 000 refugees had made their way to Kenya. This adds strain on the Kenyan government who is still trying to manage the sustained problem of Somali refugees in the country (Odhiambo & Muluvi, 2014).

4 The conflict in South Sudan has had adverse economic effects on its neighbouring countries and the International community. If the war worsens, countries such as Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania will suffer substantial GDP losses of 9%, 4.5%, and 4.7% respectively. Additionally, Kenya’s exports to South Sudan in 2012 were at $210 million, but this has decreased sharply since the outbreak of the South Sudan crisis. Furthermore, the Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), the largest operating bank in South Sudan has closed some of its 19 branches in South Sudan as a result of the on-going conflict in the country (Zeru, 2015).
In addition to the issue of refugee influx, Kenya’s concern for its security has also driven its involvement in the Peace Talks. Kenya is member of several regional groupings such as IGAD, EAC and COMESA. As a member of the last two, Kenya cannot guarantee its security as both are more specialized on an economic platform for economic integration solely as the way to achieve regional integration (Byiers, 2016). There are no safer and credible platforms than IGAD for the Kenyans to discuss, debate and pass policies as to the outstanding issues of peace and security in the region and no opportune moment than to articulate them during the peace talks.

As such for Kenya, its engagement in the South Sudan Peace Talks is mainly driven by the protection of its economic interest in the newly independent state along the line of ensuring its security and managing the constant refugee influx.

C. Sudan

Sudan is another key player in the South Sudan Peace Talks, if not the most important country in this aspect for South Sudan according to the UN-OAU Official. After all, Sudan is the mother land from which South Sudan seceded with which by coincidence or making, it shares the longest border in comparison to its neighbouring IGAD states. As such, it is the country with which it has the most extensive bilateral relation at the core of which lies the oil. Oil constituted 98% of the South Sudanese economy and its lifeline was dependant on its motherland where the processing plants are situated (UNOAU Official, 2016).

Historic and Economic ties situate South Sudan as the zone of influence for Khartoum politics. Despite its secession, Khartoum views this new state in the neighbourhood as part and parcel of its territory. Despite the operationalization of the principle of self-determination as stipulated in the CPA, the independence of South Sudan has been a “sour pill” to take on for Khartoum says one key informant (Key Informant III, 2016). The mother state believes that it still has and if not needs to acquire, the leverages necessary to reel in South Sudan to its former place. The 2011 independence has not yet “sunked” in amongst the Khartoum leadership circle as explained by another official from the UN-OAU (UNOAU Official, 2016).
As such, the engagement of Khartoum in the South Sudan Peace Talks is an extension of this wish to still have South Sudan as a zone of influence. This is mainly linked to the issue of oil, upon which the government in Khartoum is also dependant on. But most importantly, Sudan is engaged in the South Sudan Peace Talks as there are still a set of remaining issues that need to be resolved with Juba. The self-determination of South Sudan was not the only outcome of the CPA. There are several contentious issues that need to be addressed such as Abyei, normalization of relations between Juba and Khartoum, security arrangement as well as the sharing of oil revenues amongst the few. A protracted conflict in the newly established South Sudan is likely to back shelf those issues, unable to full fledgedly address the independence of South Sudan. In line with keeping South Sudan as a zone of influence for Khartoum, one should also note the enmity existing between Sudan and Uganda. This is also reflected in the peace talks as it will be discussed further below, but the important point to note here is that with South Sudan as its zone of influence, Khartoum wishes to alienate Kampala, a policy also practiced by the latter as well.

D. Uganda

As a landlocked state, Uganda highly depends on its trade partnership with Kenya, as it is the only way through which goods come into the country, and its cross border trade with South Sudan which amounts to millions of dollars in trade exchange (Mesfin, 2015). Kampala wishes to keep these two states and especially Juba as its zone of influence in the region. This could be achieved with the coming about of a new state of South Sudan rather than trying to control an already established state like Kenya. It is with this premise that one can understand the engagements of Uganda in South Sudan. For Uganda, engagement in the South Sudan crisis is a result of a combination of two security threats. One relates to having South Sudan as a buffer zone against Khartoum and its influence. The second one relates to keeping the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) out of the region, in fear that an unstable South Sudan may not only reel in but also harbour the rebel group.

The deep mistrust and tense diplomatic relations between Khartoum and Kampala are a result of a series of destabilizing proxy wars against one another.
While Uganda ardently supported the SPLM movement since its inception against Sudan, Sudan on its end funded and gave Jospeh Kony, leader of the LRA the needed armament and equipment in its fight against the Ugandan troops. These proxy wars have embittered the relationship between the two countries who often position themselves against one another in regional developments in the continent. With the South Sudan crisis, while Kampala went to support Kiir in the capital with the deployment of its troops, Khartoum extended its help to Riek Machar as Uganda completely mistrusts Machar considering him as Khartoum’s puppet. It is for this reason that it has made itself available to President Kirr during the outbreak of the crisis in December so as to minimize Khartoum’s influence in South Sudan and eventually cut it off from the country as whole (Key Informant III, 2016).

On the same line of argument, with the wish to exert its influence on Kampala, President Museveni also wishes the newly independent state to be a buffer zone against the LRA. Although the movement has been dismantled all and all with the on-going trial of Joseph Kony, President Museveni is distrustful of Dr. Riek Machar who consulted with Joseph Kony back in 2006. Riek Machar was the Chief Mediator of the Juba Peace Talks for the LRA. His consultations were undertaken for the sake of negotiating peace in Northern Uganda. Yet, many on the Ugandan side, especially Museveni and his entourage believe that is was a façade in which Machar negotiated for the escape of several LRA members through a corridor that passes through South Sudan. The entry point of this corridor was Uganda (Paterno, 2015). These suspicions had upset Uganda, who not only considered the former Vice President as an ally of Khartoum but also of the LRA, thus the country’s insistence to not have him as a Vice President (Key Informant III, 2016).

4.2 Roles and influences defined by national interests

As stated earlier, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda are the main IGAD member states that were involved in the South Sudan Peace Talks. The set of interests particular to each of the above IGAD states with regards to the South Sudan peace talks have shaped the role that each of those states have played in the South Sudan
Peace Talks. Each of their roles can be discussed individually by states. A duo of patterns of engagements was observed from the data collected from respondents and key informants. One relates to a diplomatic role that was undertaken under the umbrella of the IGAD institution or personal diplomacy while the other relates to a partisan role that are undertaken upfront and in covert ways. As discussed below, each manner of engagement comes with its own set of influences on the peace talks.

4.2.1 Diplomatic roles and their subsequent influences

The different interviews undertaken with officials from the USA Special Envoy to South Sudan, the IGAD OSSES, Ethiopian MoFA, and key informants suggest that Ethiopia and Kenya resorted to diplomatic tools in their approach to the South Sudan Peace Talks. Both countries have engaged the warring parties within the framework of the IGAD and respective government institution. This has been insisted on by an official from the USA State department. He commends Ethiopia and Kenya for their “constructive institutional role” (USA State Department Official, The Role of IGAD’s Hegemons in the South Sudan Peace Talks, 2016). In fact, looking through the progress of the peace talks in the past 22 months, one can observe how both states had made use of their respective governments to initiate consultations and discussions prior to the outburst of conflict in December 2013. It was then that the mediation under the framework of IGAD was endorsed during the 23rd Extraordinary Heads of State and Governments Assembly on December 27 2013.

The diplomatic engagement of Ethiopia and Kenya was marked by personal diplomacy targeting the leaders of each faction and each exerting its particular leverages.

A. Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s role in the HoA and by extension South Sudan has been to play the “regional peace maker” (Deresso, 2014). In fact, in the South Sudan Peace Talks, Ethiopia’s influence has been exerted as its role of being the Chair of the regional framework with the opportunity to have the last say in the operations of the regional mechanism. In this regard, the influence of Ethiopia is most importantly felt through the selection of its Special Envoy. Amb. Seyoum Mesfin is a veteran diplomat that
had served as Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister on several occasions and is well versed on the issues of Sudan and South Sudan. The Ethiopian MoFA was careful in the selection of this personality as after all, the diplomatic skills of this country that rallies together in the region need not to be tested (Key Informant III, 2016).

The highlight of Ethiopia’s influence is felt as the posts of Chief Mediator; the force commander and the IGAD Protection and deterrent force in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) were all Ethiopians (de Waal, 2015). This propels Ethiopia as the premier face and decision maker of the Peace Talks and the UNMISS both regionally and internationally. Particular to the South Sudan Peace Talks, Amb. Seyoum and by extension Ethiopia, as, one key informant puts it is “the man of the show”5 (Key Informant I, 2016). An addition to this would be that the summits, mini-summits and consultations will all be undertaken in the capital city of Addis with the IGAD-OSESS office being based there.

In other words, Ethiopia was able to exert its diplomatic influence in the Peace Talks with all the necessary leverages through the different diplomatic platforms it acquired. With its reputation as a regional peace maker and its respect from both Salva Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar, Ethiopia had the ability to leverage both parties as an “impartial” mediator and push for the peaceful settlement of the conflict.

B. Kenya

Alongside Ethiopia, Kenya did also play an important diplomatic role although quite limited. The appointment of General Lazarro Sumbewyo as one of Special Envoys of the Peace Talks was of added value. The General was a veteran on the South Sudan issue as he was the Chief Mediator behind the brokering of the CPA in 2005. However, the dynamics have now changed with his counterpart, Amb. Seyoum leading the mediation and him solely reduced to his assistant (Key Informant III, 2016).

5 According to one of the Key Informants, Amb. Seyoum had the last say on the points that were discussed in the Peace Talks. He designed the mediation strategy, decided on the reports and communications that were to be sent to IGAD partners, Heads of States and Media Houses. Additionally, he was the dominating figure in all the media briefings on the South Sudan Peace Talks.
Despite this fact, Kenya’s choice of Sumbeyo as its Special Envoy for South Sudan was apparent. It was noted in the previous section that Kenya is keen on protecting its investments in South Sudan. It happens so that the Special Envoy also has a number of important economic assets in the country that he wishes to guarantee (Mesfin, 2015). This by extension implies that, General Sumbeyo is in fact the best that Kenya could offer to both look out for its economic interest during the peace talks but also see through the resolution of the crisis through peaceful means.

The duo of Amb. Mesfin and General Sumbeyo represents the best two mediators that have solid expertise on Sudan and South Sudan, as well as the embodiment of the two most important tools in the region necessary for future integration: diplomacy and economic leverage. Together they drive the South Sudan Peace Talks; yet, it should be underlined that Ethiopia runs the show and Kenya follows.

4.2.2 Partisan Roles and their subsequent influences

While the diplomatic engagement of both Ethiopia and Kenya are clear, the roles played by Sudan and Uganda are different. While Uganda is partisan to the conflict with the presence of its troops, Sudan’s role is quite unclear as it does not take an active role in both the Peace talks despite the appointment of a Special Envoy and in the Crisis as well as a spoiler.

A. Uganda.

Uganda is a clear partisan to the conflict as it did not hesitate to deploy 5000 of its Ugandan People Defence Forces (UPDF) into Juba five days after the feud between Vice President Riek Machar and President Salva Kiir erupted in December 2013. President Museveni justifies the intervention of his army under the pretext that President Kiir had requested for the intervention. Uganda also justified its military intervention as securing the evacuation of its population living in Juba, thus protecting its civilians.6 Yet, the real rationale for Uganda’s intervention in Juba not

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6 It is true, according to Uganda sources, as far as 30 000 Ugandas have been rescued from Juba following the crisis that erupted in December 2013 (Apuuli, 2014). In somehow one manner, under the line of argument that it was indeed a coup that took place in Juba, what Uganda did is actually in the legality of Article 4(h) of the AU’s Constitutive Act, which outlaws coups against legitimate
only went beyond the protection of civilians but supported one faction of South Sudan against the other.

The intervention of Uganda at first was hailed by the international community present in Juba, who feared for itself as the officials from the USA State Department and UN-OAU put it. The taking over of the international Airport in Juba by Uganda and the securing of key roads in the country by the UPDF, helped secure the transportation and evacuation of many civilians, international and nationals alike. IGAD further supported the action of the UPDF for “securing critical infrastructure and installations in South Sudan” (Apuuli, 2014). IGAD could not have condemned the intervention of Uganda in South Sudan while the life of civilian was at stake. Furthermore, IGAD states feared that condemnation might upset the dynamics present in South Sudan and actually push Uganda to make the decision to abandon IGAD as a whole (UNOAU Official, 2016). Additionally, the intervention took place with the understanding that Ugandan troops would soon leave Juba. Yet the scenario that unfolded was different. Ugandan troops became engulfed in the conflict aligning with President Kiir and fighting against Vice President Riek Machar and his supporters.

Despite warnings by IGAD member states, the UPDF went as far as Bor in fighting to secure Kiir’s grip in South Sudan (Barenghi, 2016). However, the surprising factor is that this is in line with the premise that Uganda sees Machar as an extension of Sudan’s sphere of influence in the newly acquired in Juba as well as deep hatred and enmity to his personality (Byiers, 2016). It is these rationales that will have Uganda have its foot down until the very end to not have Machar back in Juba as a Vice President. A scenario of South Sudan with Machar in political office was neither wished nor desired by Kampala until regional and international pressure got the better of President Museveni at the end (Key Informant III, 2016).

Therefore, it could be said that for Uganda, its partisan role in South Sudan is informed by its deep hatred for Khartoum and its allies. Its leverage on the South

governments. If Kiir’s government was considered as legitimate, the help extended by Museveni in the capital in his support enshrines the value of the Constitutive Act.
Sudan Peace Talks is thus directed towards engaging with and supporting Kiir and fighting and not talking to Machar until the signing of the CD. In fact, the role that Uganda played in the peace talks has been labelled as disruptive by key informants. They have cited reasons such as coming late to the IGAD Heads of State and Governments Meeting and requesting to have a draft ready to sign for President Museveni before the meetings end (Key Informant I, 2016). President Museveni in particular shows in many of the consultations a stance of saying “my way or the gun way” (Key Informant I, 2016) convinced that after the death of Former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, he is the “big man”7 in the region (Key Informant III, 2016).

B. Sudan

As precised earlier, Khartoum has still not faced the reality that South Sudan is no longer part of the country, and is no longer in its sphere of influence. Yet, the government cannot abandon it seceding part to the influence of Uganda. Its enmity towards Kampala as well as its dire need for oil for its economy has pushed Khartoum to carefully calculate its role in the Peace Talks. This has made the role of Sudan a somehow difficult one to define.

On the one hand, it pushed according to one key informant, for having a Special Envoy appointed to South Sudan, while it was not initially thought of (Key Informant I, 2016). The appointment of General Mohamed El-Dabi as a Special Envoy still underlines the outstanding security issues in South Sudan that are of importance to Khartoum. It should not be forgotten that the Special Envoy is actually a military man.

On the other hand, it plays a partisan role in supporting Dr. Riek Machar to offset the duo created by Kiir and Uganda. Yet, its support to Machar and his troops, Khartoum was not able to leverage what Uganda has offered Kiir as Khartoum did

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7 This is informed by the fact that Museveni is the last of the beacons of hope in the HoA. During the Clinton administration, the USA propelled certain African states and their leaders as the new generation of African leaders amongst which, in the HoA, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, President Issayas Afewerki of Eritrea and President Museveni of Uganda. As the late Prime Minister has passed away, and President Issayas being isolated from the region (in the aftermath of the Ethio-Eritrea War) and the international arena due to his repressive regime, Museveni is the only one left (Meredith, 2005). The South Sudan Peace Talks offered the momentum to better articulate this slogan to his advantage.
not put troops on the ground in South Sudan. The upfront style of military intervention that Uganda undertook in Juba could not be reciprocated with that of Khartoum to Machar; this would have been tantamount to waging war\(^8\) against Uganda (UNOAU Official, 2016).

Therefore, unlike Uganda, Khartoum’s role can be said to be of double standards. While being part of the Peace Talks and the mediation team, it is breaching its impartiality to the factions by secretly supporting Dr. Riek Machar and his troops.

### 4.3 Implications on the South Sudan Peace Talks

The respective national interests of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda have shaped the engagement, the role and the influences of each with regards to the South Peace Talks. The discussion above suggest that the roles are polarized into two camps: a diplomatic role lead by Ethiopia and Kenya and a partisan role lead by Uganda and Sudan. In fact, we can single out Ethiopia and Uganda as exerting strong influence on the peace talks in the region. While Ethiopia pushes for the diplomatic resolution of the crisis by the constructive engagement of IGAD as a whole, Uganda demonstrates its capacity to go to war in South Sudan unless their version of peace is accepted by the region. The latter emanates as many informants and respondents argue from the desire of Museveni to be the “big man” in the region.

These contrasting strategies between Ethiopia and Uganda have stalled the mediation for a long period of time. In fact, what one can observe is that Uganda was unwilling to consider a peace that keeps Vice President Riek Machar into the picture, a view also shared by President Kiir. However, for Ethiopia and its supporting IGAD member states, a solution that does not include the leaders of the contending parties was considered no solution at all. The alternative is a victor’s peace that guarantees

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\(^8\) Sudan is carefully watching its steps in South Sudan. Due to austerity measures and deep international scrutiny (as Sudan is coming out of its decade long isolation for its “terrorist tendencies), Khartoum cannot afford a war in South Sudan and will not go into one until pushed to do so. At a time where its economy is slowly decaying and Khartoum is slowly getting in the good favours of big states like the USA, Khartoum is cautious towards its actions in South Sudan and the Peace Talks.
the propagation of the crisis into a larger scale conflict within the region either forcing its member to take sides or worse watch the unfolding of a full blown civil war under ethnic fault lines.

As the peace process advanced into a year, a deal was still not able to be sealed. Worse, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoH) signed by both parties kept on being breached. Furthermore, the humanitarian disaster was reaching an alarming scale with close to 2 million people being displaced as a result of the conflict exacerbated by the risk of a famine outbreak (Mercy Corps International, 2016). The international community, especially the IGAD Partners Forum, were fed up and losing hope in the IGAD Process as well as the IGAD region as a whole. Even then, while IGAD member states were pushing for a post-crisis scenario that includes the Vice President, Uganda and Kiir refused the deal.

Yet, the revitalization of the process with the coming of the IGAD-Plus was a turning point in the peace process. The inclusion of the AU, the Troika countries as well as China and the USA put pressure on President Museveni and by extension President Kiir to consider the alternative of peace. The threat of UN Security Council Resolution 2206 (2015) that called for travel ban and assets freeze of those involved in the South Sudan conflict if a deal was not met by the August 17 2015 deadline added further impact for the signing of the peace deal.

Within this complex interplay of regional interests, the above four countries realized the importance of their relationships towards one another especially during the last months of the negotiation for a peace deal. Uganda realized the importance of a peaceful region. As a landlocked state, a full blown crisis will push it to close its borders thereby shutting down the vital cross border trade amongst its people and South Sudanese. At the same, it cannot afford losing Kenya as an ally. The Port of Mombassa is the only outlet to the sea that the country has and upon which it depends for its import of various Kenyan goods (Mesfin, 2015). Additionally, Ethiopia cannot afford to antagonize Sudan despite their differences on the Peace Talks. Khartoum recently endorsed the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). This signals Khartoum’s endorsement of the principle advanced by Ethiopia for all
 riparian states to have the right to make use of Nile Resources. Furthermore, this also means that Ethiopia made one more friend against Egypt in the Nile River Basin (UNOAU Official, 2016). Sudan and Uganda even improved their relations with one another as each country’s President’s embarked on visiting journeys to Kampala and Khartoum (Agence France Press(AFP), 2016).

Summary

Ethiopia, Kenya Sudan, and Uganda had each a set of different interests at stake in the South Sudan crisis. They range from upholding a diplomatic image of peace broker in the international platform for Ethiopia, protecting economic investments for Kenya, maintaining South Sudan as a zone for influence for Sudan and creating a buffer zone against Khartoum and the LRA for Uganda. These interests informed the engagements of the four countries under two lines: diplomacy and the search for an inclusive peace deal or partisanship for the establishment of a victor’s peace. After a stalemate for nearly 20 months as a result of the incompatibility of interests of the four countries, the coming about an IGAD Plus process with the leverage of international scrutiny and pressure of UN sanctions forced both President Kiir and his former Vice President Riek Machar to consider peace as the only way out of the crisis. This was complemented on its end by an apparent surge of regionalism that pushed Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda to realize that they benefit more from cooperation with another than they do from bitter rivalries. These four states came out stronger as neighbours and made IGAD surge out stronger as a regional institution, but most importantly led to the signing of the CD by its deadline.
CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY & CONCLUDING REMARKS

5.1 Major Findings Summary

This research study aimed at looking at the role of IGAD’s hegemons in the South Sudan Peace Talks. It assessed the different national interests at stake for Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda and explained the roles and influences that came as a result. The findings can be summarized into four important points.

**Roles played by the IGAD hegemons.**

While undertaking this study, the researcher found that the roles that were taken in the South Sudan Peace Talks are informed by a set of different national interest at stake for each country. In fact, the form of interest informed the choice of the Special Envoy for South Sudan for Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. For Uganda, the concern of its security being of outmost importance (the protection of its citizens, the fear of a coming back of the LRA, cutting off of Khartoum’s influence) has propelled the country to put its troops on the ground in Juba. These national interests then inform the respective roles of each key regional actor. The roles undertaken according to the findings of the study are of twofold. While the diplomatic route has been pursued by Kenya and Ethiopia with the latter taking the lead, a more partisan role with military intervention or proxy support have been observed on the respective parts of Uganda and Sudan. In fact, Sudan had an ambivalent role as it was both part of the mediation while at the same time supporting Machar.

**Hegemony or Predominance in the South Sudan Peace Talks and the region**

There is no hegemon when it comes to the South Sudan peace talks in the traditional sense of the term. No one country dictated the outcome of the peace talks. If there were to be a hegemon, that country would have sanctioned the contending parties and brought forth persuasive incentives for cooperation between them. What is observed in the peace talks is a standoff between the diplomatic camp lead by Ethiopia and the partisan one lead by Uganda. Hegemony in the African sense may be a more suitable coining of the importance of each player in the peace talks. Thus,
it would be more efficient to use the word “predominence” as suggested by Simone Barenghi. What we have in the South Sudan Peace Talks, is each of the four states having enough leverage to sway the peace talks in one direction or another. This implies that they all have equal leverage. Yet, there still remains to be one that slightly has more leverage than the other. Ethiopia has more leverage than Kenya, the same with Uganda and Sudan. As such, what we can say is that Uganda and Ethiopia played a predominant role in the South Peace Talks in comparison to the other countries.

This analogy also extends to the HoA Region. As suggested by many of the respondents and key informants, there is no hegemon in the region as Nigeria is to ECOWAS. Rather what we have is where one lacks the other has. While Ethiopia has the diplomatic leverage in the Horn, Kenya has the economic one. In fact, the two are the predominant states in the region.

**Regionalism in the HoA**

Another point worth mentioning is that the South Sudan Peace Talks are the result of a surge of a last minute regionalism. While both the member states and the international community were fed up with the lagging of the process, the lack of commitment of the contending parties and the failure of members states to find a way out from their regional interests, IGAD member states made a turn point. In fact, they each realized the importance of one to the other; one cannot exist without the other. The intricate social make up that crosses boundaries in terms of identity has made it so. In fact, sworn enemies like Sudan and Uganda have even made the courtesy of visiting one another in the last three months.

**IGAD as a mediating platform**

IGAD has proved its importance for mediating the peace deal between President Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar following the principle of subsidiarity enshrined in both the AU Constitutive Act and the UN Charter. Yet, if it is to continue with the realization of its vision of “Peace, Prosperity and Integration”, many suggested the following two as lessons learnt from the Peace Talks for IGAD.
They are genuine inclusiveness of all those affected by the conflict as well as able to contribute to building peace in South Sudan and the use of sanctions/incentives by the region or the international community. The Peace Talks were highly focused on the two contending personalities and failed to go through with the multi-stakeholder model that encompasses Faith Leaders, Women’s Group, Civil Societies and Political Parties as well as other parties to the conflict. Although an attempt was made, the polarization of the peace talks between Machar and Kiir also spilled over to those groups, defeating the purpose of the process (UNOAU Official, 2016). Additionally, as noted by an official from the USA State Department, IGAD must also learn to make use of sanction tools at its disposal, from the UN for instance, to incentivise cooperation and compliance to agreements (USA State Department Official, 2016).

5.2 Concluding Remarks

The South Sudan Peace Talks have tested the integrity and unity of the region and its institutions. Although one can observe the resurgence of some as leading contenders in the peace process, it should be noted that each country in the region has its own importance and leverage to pull. Yet, as discussed above, there would always be one that has a more predominant role than the other. Nevertheless, the South Sudan Peace process has proved that there cannot be a solution not only without the contending parties but the region as well. Regionalism was thus an important mobilizing factor in the reaching of a CD between President Salvaal Kiir Dr. Riek Machar (USA State Department Official, 2016). To the contrary of regionalism however, hegemony hinders mediation in the region, especially in the case of South Sudan. The absence of one, and with it the struggle for one of the four countries to emerge as the hegemon in the region has stalled the mediation process in South Sudan.
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## Annex 1

### Interviewees List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position and Affiliation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador Hiruy Amanuel</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to the Office of the Special Envoys for South Sudan, UNOAU (Year, 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. William Echols</td>
<td>Desk Officer, Office of the US Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, (Year, 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Simone Barenghi</td>
<td>Political Advisor, Horn of Africa, Delegation of the EU to the AU, (Year, 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Alex de Waal</td>
<td>Executive Director, World Peace Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Informant I</td>
<td>IGAD (Year, 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Informant II</td>
<td>MoFA (Year, 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Informant III</td>
<td>IGAD OSSES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2

MA THESIS RESEARCH DECLARATION

I Elshaddai Mesfin agree and swear to keep the confidentiality of the information disclosed by the respondents of my interview for the completion of my MA Thesis on **the Role of IGAD’s Hegemons on the South Sudan Peace Talks**.

I agree to give due credit of reference to my interview respondents.

I also agree to keep the anonymity of my respondents in case they wish to respond off record.

I also assure my respondents that the discussions undertaken are solely for the purpose of my MA thesis Research.

Elshaddai Mesfin Haileyesus
Annex 3

Interview Questions

Research Objectives

- Assess the national interests of the four IGAD Hegemons: Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Kenya
- See how these national interests have influenced the Peace Talks
- Make recommendations on the prospects of the Peace Talks and the viability of IGAD as a peace platform in the Horn Region

A. Causes of the South Sudan Peace Talks
1) What would say is or are the Causes of the South Sudan crisis?
2) Would you label the conflict Ethnic?

B. Hegemons in the IGAD Region
1) Scholars are divided on the issue of the existence of a hegemon in the IGAD region. While some assert that there is one (Ethiopia) others are of the opinion that IGAD member states complement one another. Where do you position yourself? Please explain.
2) How would you define the role that Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya took in the South Peace Talks as a member of the IGAD Partner Forum?
3) Who do you believe has been playing a dominant role in the South Sudan Peace Talks? How?

C. The South Sudan Peace Talks and the IGAD hegemons/regional actors
1) Would you attribute the two years that the Peace Talks took to reach the agreement to the lack of commitment of the IGAD member states or the disputing parties?
2) Would you label any of the IGAD countries as “spoilers” or difficult partners in the Peace Talks? Why? Who are the spoilers.....in the peace process?
3) Do you think that a peace agreement would have been reached sooner? Why?
4) Who is a more neutral mediator: Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya or Sudan or IGAD? Why?

5) Do you think that IGAD member’s states should have condemned the military intervention of Uganda? Why do you think they failed to do so?

6) How would define President Kiir’s and Riek Machar’s personalities having worked with them in the mediation process?

D. Prospects for the South Sudan Peace Agreement and IGAD

1) Do you think that the Peace Agreement will sustain itself in the coming years, understanding that it was 1. Under the threat of UNSC sanctions that the parties agreed to sign it and 2. The JMEC is behind schedule in the implementation of the agreement?

2) If there were any lessons to be taken from the South Sudan Peace Talks for IGAD member states and IGAD itself what do you think they are for you as a member of the IGAD’s partner’s Forum? (What is the way forward?)

3) How do you think the Peace Talks Positioned IGAD as a platform for peace and mediation in the region? Would you think it viable? Should it be improved?

E. International Responses

1) What it is at stake for the USA/UN/EU/IGAD in the South Sudan crisis?
Declaration

I the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree at any other University, and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

__________________________
Elshaddai Mesfin Haileyesus

July 2016

This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the candidate

__________________________
Sunday Angoma Okello(Phd)

July, 2016